Category: Pandemic

MIL-OSI Global: ‘There has never been a more dangerous time to take drugs’: the rising global threat of nitazenes and synthetic opioids

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Philip A. Berry, Visiting Research Fellow, King’s College London

US Drug Enforcement Administration images accompanying a warning about the emergence of nitazenes in Washington DC, June 2022 USDEA

In the early hours of September 14 2021, three men parked in a quiet car park in the southern English market town of Abingdon-on-Thames. The men, returning from a night out, had pulled over to smoke heroin.

Unknown to them, the drug had been fortified with a nitazene compound called isotonitazene, a highly potent new synthetic opioid. Two of the men, Peter Haslam and Adrian Davies, overdosed and went into cardiac arrest. The third, Michael Parsons, tried to save them and himself by injecting naloxone, an opioid overdose antidote. Despite paramedics also trying to resuscitate Haslam and Davies, both died at the scene.

Their deaths were among at least 27 fatalities linked to nitazenes that year in the UK. Since then, nitazenes – otherwise known as 2-benzylbenzimidazole opioids – have become more prevalent in the UK’s illegal drug supply, leading some experts to warn that they are a major new threat because of their extreme potency.

In June 2023, the UK’s most recent outbreak of deaths linked to synthetic opioids emerged in the West Midlands when drug dealers used nitazenes to fortify low-purity heroin. By August, there were 21 nitazene-related fatalities in Birmingham alone. In some cases, dealers also added xylazine (colloquially known as “tranq”), a non-opioid sedative used by vets.

The increasing availability of these and other synthetic drugs led the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA) to warn in August 2024 that “there has never been a more dangerous time to take drugs”. Like Haslam and Davies, many heroin users are unaware they might also be consuming nitazenes, which significantly increase the risk of overdose.

Given their potency, only a small amount of nitazene is required to produce a fatal dose. While some studies have concluded that nitazenes are even more potent than the synthetic opioid fentanyl, which causes many thousands of deaths in the US, the NCA judges it a “realistic possibility” that the potency of both substances are “broadly equivalent” – making them roughly 50 times more potent than heroin.

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Officially, more than 400 deaths plus many non-fatal overdoses were linked to nitazenes in the UK between June 2023 and January 2025. But this is likely to be an underestimate because of gaps within forensic and toxicology reporting. These figures come amid record levels of drug-related deaths in England and Wales. In 2023, there were 5,448 deaths related to drug poisoning, an 11% increase on the previous year and the highest total since records began in 1993.

This is of particular concern given that the UK has the largest heroin market in Europe, comprising around 300,000 users in England alone. While nitazene-related deaths are still relatively low (although by no means insignificant) compared with those from heroin and other opioids, these new synthetic opioids are cheap and easy to buy, and offer dealers multiple advantages over traditional plant-based drugs.

Unlike opium, nitazenes and other synthetic opioids can be produced anywhere in the world using precursor chemicals that are often uncontrolled and widely available. Producer countries including China and India have not yet banned all nitazene compounds, meaning they are sold legally – mostly online. Chemical manufacturing companies in these countries can synthesise nitazenes at scale using a comparatively easy three or four-step process.

Opioid use death rates around the world:

Estimated deaths from opioid use disorders per 100,000 people in 2021.
Our World In Data, CC BY

For the past 15 years, I have researched and advised on the international narcotics industry, especially the Afghan drug trade, as an academic, UK Home Office official and consultant. I’ve observed many shifts within global drug markets, and I believe the increasing availability of synthetic drugs in the UK and Europe may represent a new chapter in illicit drug use here – with the emergence of nitazenes only adding to these concerns.

A brief history of synthetic opioids

New synthetic opioids (NSOs) are one of the fastest-growing groups of new psychoactive substances around the world. The EU Drugs Agency (EUDA) currently monitors 81 NSOs – the fourth-largest group of drugs under observation.

NSOs largely fall into two broad groups: fentanyl and its analogues, and non-fentanyl-structured compounds – these include nitazenes, among many other substances.

Many of these “new” synthetic opioids have, in fact, existed for decades. Nitazenes were first synthesised in the 1950s by the Swiss pharmaceutical company, Ciba Aktiengesellschaft, as pain-relieving analgesics, although they were never approved for medical use.

Prior to 2019, there had only been limited reports of nitazenes in the illegal drug supply – including a “brownish looking powder” found in Italy in 1966; the discovery of a lab in Germany in 1987; several nitazene-related deaths in Moscow in 1998; and a US chemist illegally producing the drug for personal use in 2003. But since nitazenes re-emerged at the end of the last decade, over 20 variants have been discovered.

Paul Janssen, the Belgian chemist who first made fentanyl.
Johnson & Johnson

The most common NSO in the illegal drug market, fentanyl, was first synthesised by Belgian chemist Paul Janssen in 1960. Fentanyl, which is roughly 100 times more potent than morphine, was approved in the US in 1968 for pharmaceutical use as an analgesic.

Over the next four decades, however, illegally produced fentanyl resulted in three relatively small outbreaks of deaths in the US. A fourth, larger fentanyl outbreak in Chicago, Detroit and Philadelphia resulted in about 1,000 deaths between 2005 and 2007.

The current US fentanyl crisis started in 2013, expanding to affect much of the country. Between 2014 and 2019, Chinese companies were the main manufacturers of finished fentanyl substances in the US – to combat this, both the Obama and Trump administrations lobbied Beijing to curtail the fentanyl industry.

The Chinese government responded by controlling specific fentanyl analogues. However, every time an analogue was banned, chemists there would slightly adjust the formula to produce a new compound that mirrored the banned substance.

China finally banned all fentanyl-related substances in May 2019, prompting two significant changes in the drug’s supply: a slowdown in the development of new fentanyl analogues, and a reduction in their direct sale to the US from China. Instead, Chinese companies increasingly sent fentanyl precursors to Mexican drug cartels who would synthesise fentanyl (or counterfeit medication) in clandestine labs, before smuggling it across the US border. Consequently, Mexico is now the primary source of fentanyl in the US.

But these supply changes led to another shift in the global drugs arena, as China’s chemical and pharmaceutical businesses – keen to develop new markets – adjusted their focus to producing uncontrolled synthetic substances, including nitazenes. At the same time, they expanded their geographical focus from North America to include Europe and the UK.

The nitazene supply chain

Producing nitazenes is a relatively low-cost exercise. They are largely manufactured in laboratories – both legal and illegal – in China, before being smuggled to the UK and Europe via fast parcel and post networks.

Nitazenes’ high potency means only small quantities are required, making them easier to transport and harder for border officials to detect. Some Chinese vendors have reportedly been offering to hide nitazenes in legitimate goods such as dog food and catering supplies, to circumvent custom controls. All of this decreases the risk to sellers, and lessens the price of doing business.

In March 2024, two China-based sellers operating on the dark web were selling a kilo of nitazene for between €10,000 and €17,000 (£12,000-£20,000). During roughly the same period, a kilo of heroin at the wholesale level in the UK was selling for between £23,000 and £26,000. Once bought, nitazenes are largely used to fortify low-purity heroin, although the drug can also be made into pills.

Video by The Guardian.

Nitazenes are not limited to the dark web. They are widely and openly advertised on the internet, social media and music streaming platforms. In February 2024, one China-based e-commerce site displayed 85 advertisements for nitazenes. Such sites also sell a range of other synthetic drugs, including fentanyl analogues and precursors, xylazines, cannabinoids and methamphetamine.

This means drug dealers in the UK and across the world no longer need to have established connections to underworld figures to source illegal drugs. With a click of a mouse, they can have them delivered to their home address. In this sense, the internet has democratised the drug trade by widening access beyond “traditional” criminals.

In the UK, while the supply of nitazenes is currently assessed as “low”, a number of smaller-scale organised crime groups are importing them to fortify low-purity heroin, before largely dealing it at the “county lines” level. This involves organised crime groups moving drugs – primarily heroin and crack cocaine – across towns, cities and county borders within the UK, using mobile phones or another form of “deal line” to sell to customers.

In November 2023, Leon Brown from West Bromwich was imprisoned for seven years for dealing drugs containing nitazenes – a verdict described as “a great result in our ongoing efforts to tackle county lines drug dealing” by detective sergeant Luke Papps of the South Worcestershire county lines team.

A few larger UK criminal networks have also been involved in nitazene distribution. In October 2023, the police and Border Force conducted raids across north London, arresting 11 people. They dismantled a drug processing site and seized 150,000 tablets containing nitazene – the UK’s largest ever seizure of synthetic opioids – as well as a pill-pressing machine, a firearm, more than £60,000 in cash and £8,000 in cryptocurrency. The police suspected the group had been selling the tablets on the dark web.

Anecdotal reports suggest there have been mixed reactions to the introduction of nitazenes into the illegal drug supply. Richard, a recovering heroin user from Bristol, told Vice magazine that, given their potency, some “people are scared of [nitazenes]” while others are “actively seeking” them.

As has been the case with fentanyl in the US, users build up tolerance and therefore seek stronger doses. Manny, a heroin user from Bristol, told Vice: “I smoked [heroin cut with nitazenes] and it felt like the first time I’d ever taken drugs.”

Video by Vice.

UK-based criminals also use the dark web to export nitazenes abroad. In October 2023, the Australian Border Force identified 22 nitazene discoveries in packages shipped to the country via mail cargo from the UK. British criminals have also trafficked counterfeit medicines containing nitazenes to Ireland and Norway.

Use of nitazenes is now being detected all over the world. Within Europe, Ireland experienced several nitazene outbreaks in 2023-24 while in Estonia, nitazenes now account for a large share of overdose deaths – a trend also seen (to a lesser extent) in Latvia. Preliminary data suggests at least 150 deaths were linked to nitazenes in Europe in 2023.

Nitazenes have also been discovered in fake pain medication such as benzodiazepines, oxycodone and diazepam, which widens the number of people at risk to include those with no opioid tolerance. The death in July 2023 of Alex Harpum, a 23-year-old British student who was preparing for a career as an opera singer, was a stark reminder of the danger of buying fake medicine online that may have been contaminated with nitazenes.

The nitazene ‘boom’ and the global heroin trade

For decades, Afghanistan was the world’s largest opium producer and the source of most of Europe’s heroin. Then in April 2022, the ruling Taliban announced a comprehensive prohibition on the use, trade, transport, production, import and export of all drugs. As a result, poppy cultivation has fallen to historically low levels for a second consecutive year.

While this has not, as yet, translated into a shortage of heroin on European streets, including in the UK and Germany, some indicators suggest a slowdown in heroin supplies to the UK. In the year March 2023-24, the quantity of heroin seized in the UK fell by 54%, from 950kg to 441kg. This is the lowest quantity of heroin seized since 1989, when about 350kg was intercepted.

The NCA assesses that the Taliban ban has created market “uncertainty”. The wholesale price of heroin has increased from roughly £16,000 per kilo prior to the COVID-19 pandemic to about £26,000, while anecdotal reports suggest average heroin purity for users dropped to under 30% (often to 10-20%) in 2024, compared with around 35% in 2023 and 45% in 2022.

Video by UN Story.

Even without the Taliban’s ban, heroin is not easy to produce and supply. Cultivating opium poppy is labour-intensive, taking five or six months. The static nature of opium fields means they are visible and susceptible to eradication; poppy crops can also be negatively affected by blight or drought.

Converting opium into heroin base is also a labour-intensive process that can involve (depending on the production method) at least 17 steps. Acetic anhydride, the main chemical used to convert morphine into heroin, is relatively expensive compared with synthetic precursors. Moreover, heroin is a bulky product, which means it is harder to move in large volumes.

While the relationship between events in opiate-producer countries and the introduction of synthetic opioids to consumer markets should not be overstated, this new type of drug offers economic advantages to criminals whose “sole motivation is greed”.

For decades, Turkish, Kurdish and Pakistani criminal networks have been responsible for importing heroin into the UK. Once in the UK, both Turkish and British groups largely control its wholesale supply, with some participation of Albanian gangs.

To date, there is little evidence to suggest these groups have transitioned to supplying NSOs, including nitazenes. The shifting dynamics in the global drug supply chain, however, could upend traditional markets and the gangs who profit from them.

America’s synthetic drug crisis

The synthetic opioid fentanyl has devastated the US, having been linked to about 75,000 deaths in 2023 alone. It is the primary cause of death for Americans aged 18-49. Canada, too, has experienced a wave of deaths: between January 2016 and June 2024, there were 49,105 apparent opioid deaths there, with fentanyl implicated in a large proportion.

While the North American nitazene market is still small in comparison, the US, followed by Canada, has reported the highest number of unique nitazenes to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Early Warning Advisory on New Psychoactive Substances.

More than 4,300 reports of nitazenes have reached the US National Forensic Laboratory Information System since 2019. They are typically used to fortify fentanyl and other opioids, which can produce a fatal concoction.

Efforts to stem the flow of NSOs, including nitazenes, from China to the US and elsewhere will prove challenging. And even if China does implement stricter controls, other countries could step in to fill the void. According to the Commission on Combating Synthetic Opioid Trafficking:

The overall sizes of these industries, limited oversight efforts and political incentives contribute to an atmosphere of impunity among firms and individuals associated with those industries.

While US and Chinese counter-narcotics cooperation ended in 2022 amid increasing geopolitical tensions, the following November’s summit in Woodside, California, between presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping saw them agree to recommence collaboration.

As a result, China recently closed several chemical companies that were shipping fentanyl precursors and nitazenes to the US. These vendors used encrypted platforms and cryptocurrency to conduct the deals, and mislabelled the consignments to try to ensure the substances evaded border controls. China has also outlawed more chemicals and substances, including several nitazene variants.

But President Trump’s imposition of tariffs on imports from China – which sit alongside proposed taxes on imports from Canada and Mexico, in part for supposedly not doing enough to curb the trafficking of fentanyl and its precursors to the US – threatens this counter-narcotics cooperation.

While nitazenes are not yet widely available in the US, their presence within some fentanyl batches is complicating the US opioid crisis – and according to some experts, has the potential to further increase the already shocking number of synthetic opioid-related deaths.

The UK response to nitazenes

Successive UK governments have made tackling NSOs a high priority. Shortly after the most recent nitazene-related deaths were discovered in the UK in summer 2023, the NCA launched Project Housebuilder to lead and coordinate the law enforcement and public health response.

This was soon followed by the establishment of a government-wide Synthetic Opioids Taskforce “to improve…understanding, preparedness and mitigation against this evolving threat”. Chris Philp, then the UK’s combatting drugs minister, stated that “synthetic opioids are at the top of [this government’s] list because of the harm they cause”.

The taskforce has taken a range of measures, such as controlling more NSOs as class A drugs, conducting more intelligence operations at UK borders, widening access to naloxone, and enhancing the UK’s real-time, multi-source drug surveillance system. The government also worked with the US and Canada to learn from their experiences.

Recently, the current UK government banned a further six synthetic opioids and introduced a generic definition of nitazenes as class A drugs. And the UK’s current government, unlike its Conservative predecessor, has also indicated its willingness to consider evidence from the UK’s first drug consumption facility, which recently opened in Glasgow.

Other policy measures worthy of consideration include expanding drug checking services whereby drug users submit drugs to a lab to test what is in them, then are provided with information about the sample. These services offer vital information to the public and authorities about current drug trends.

While there is high uncertainty about what is going to happen next in the UK regarding illicit drug trends, the evolution of the US drug landscape over generations provides some important lessons.

Lessons from the US

The US fentanyl crisis shows drug markets can change quickly with long-lasting consequences. Most heroin on US streets contains – or has been replaced by – fentanyl. According to DEA seizure data, US heroin seizures declined by nearly 70% between 2019 and 2023, whereas fentanyl seizures have increased by 451%.

However, illegal drug markets evolve in different ways and at different paces. In May 1989, Douglas Hogg, a UK Home Office minister, travelled to the US and the Bahamas on a fact-finding mission about crack cocaine, a drug that was predicted to spread from the US to the UK. Upon his return, Hogg noted:

The ethnic, social and economic characters of many of our big cities are very similar to those in the US. If they have a crack problem, why should not we? … The use of crack in Great Britain is likely to develop very substantially over the next few years.

But this “crack invasion”, as some called it, did not materialise in the UK to the extent it had in the US – and the same was true about a predicted wave of methamphetamine use in the UK, which remains low compared with the US.

It is also unlikely the UK and Europe will experience a synthetic opioid crisis on the same scale as the US. The first wave of the US crisis was driven by extensive overprescription of opioids for pain relief. This increased the number of people addicted to opioids, some of whom later turned to heroin, before transitioning to fentanyl. In contrast, large-scale opioid prescriptions have not been a major issue in the UK or Europe, although there is some diversion of legal fentanyl into the illegal drug market in Europe.

Video by The Brookings Institution.

According to Alex Stevens, professor of criminology at the University of Sheffield, another factor differentiating the US and Europe is the provision of drug treatment and harm reduction programmes. Opioid users in Europe, and to a lesser extent in the UK, are much more likely to be in medication-assisted treatment than their US counterparts, thus reducing the number of people at risk. These interventions are reinforced by different socioeconomic factors in much of Europe, such as lower economic inequality, stronger social protections, and better healthcare systems.

None of this, though, means the nitazene threat in the UK and Europe should be underestimated, nor that use and supply of these drugs (and other NSOs) will not increase from its current relatively low base. As the NCA recently warned:

While a zero-tolerance approach from law enforcement, plus advice to users on the heightened dangers, may contain or slow the current uptake, we must prepare for these substances to become widely available, both unadvertised in fortified mixes and in response to user demand as a more potent high.

The future of new synthetic opioids

Predicting the future of NSO use and trafficking is a challenging task. Projections for Europe range from existing opiate stockpiles ensuring that heroin consumer markets remain serviced (assuming the Taliban ban is short-lived), to a heroin shortage which results in more drug dealers turning to NSOs to plug the shortfall, which in turn could lead to lasting changes in European drug markets (as happened in a few countries following the Taliban’s first opium ban in 2000-01).

In such a scenario, it is possible that Turkish criminal networks may exploit their links with Mexico’s Sinaloa cartel to source NSOs. Mexican criminal gangs also operate in Europe, which may increase the likelihood of them trying to open a new NSO market on the continent.

There is also evidence that some Italian criminal organisations have entered the NSO marketplace. In November 2023, Italian authorities announced the seizure of 100,000 doses of synthetic drugs, including fentanyl, as part of operation Painkiller, a joint Italian-American initiative.

Given the many advantages for criminal groups of NSOs, it seems likely they are here to stay. A key question is whether nitazenes (or other NSOs) will supplant traditional heroin as the opioid of choice, as they have done in the US, or remain at relatively low levels in Europe, co-existing with or mixed into the heroin supply.

In December 2023, Paul Griffiths, the EUDA’s scientific director, told Vice: “We’re not seeing much new initiation of heroin use in Europe. So in five to ten years … as heroin users get older and more vulnerable, we’re not going to have much of an opiate problem left.”

But he warned that if heroin use does dry up: “You might then see opioids appearing in other forms and preparations, such as pills, that could potentially become popular among younger age groups who currently do not appear attracted to injecting heroin.”

While previous NSO outbreaks in the UK were relatively short-lived and limited in scale, the most recent nitazene outbreak, which started in summer of 2023, has been more sustained, covered more parts of the UK, and involved more fatalities. The broader trend in Europe also suggests the prevalence and variations of NSOs are increasing at a faster pace than in previous years.

Notwithstanding, nitazene use and supply in the UK currently remains relatively low. In fact, the rate of nitazene-linked deaths – at least those officially reported – decreased between spring 2024 and the end of the year.

In the short term, then, it seems unlikely there will be a nitazene “explosion”. Rather, criminal groups will probably try to increasingly embed nitazenes into the UK drug market at a similar pace to the last 18 months.

However, this situation could change rapidly in future, especially if larger criminal networks involved in heroin importation switch to smuggling NSOs, and there is a genuine shortage of Afghan heroin. This problem would be compounded if drug users start seeking nitazenes, thus creating demand for them.

Either way, the UK government, along with its European partners, should continue to reinforce the whole drug system, to prepare for the worst-case scenario.

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Philip A. Berry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘There has never been a more dangerous time to take drugs’: the rising global threat of nitazenes and synthetic opioids – https://theconversation.com/there-has-never-been-a-more-dangerous-time-to-take-drugs-the-rising-global-threat-of-nitazenes-and-synthetic-opioids-247268

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

MIL-OSI Global: 3 ways the Trump administration could reinvest in rural America’s future

Source: The Conversation – USA – By Randolph Hubach, Professor of Public Health, Purdue University

Rural America can be idyllic, but many communities still need support. Mint Images via Getty Images

Rural America faces many challenges that Congress and the federal government could help alleviate under the new Trump administration.

Rural hospitals and their obstetrics wards have been closing at a rapid pace, leaving rural residents traveling farther for health care. Affordable housing is increasingly hard to find in rural communities, where pay is often lower and poverty higher than average. Land ownership is changing, leaving more communities with outsiders wielding influence over their local resources.

As experts in rural health and policy at the Center for Rural and Migrant Health at Purdue University, we work with people across the United States to build resilient rural communities.

Here are some ways we believe the Trump administration could work with Congress to boost these communities’ health and economies.

1. Rural health care access

One of the greatest challenges to rural health care is its vulnerability to shifts in policy and funding cuts because of rural areas’ high rates of Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.

About 25% of rural residents rely on Medicaid, a federal program that provides health insurance for low-income residents. A disproportionate share of Medicare beneficiaries – people over 65 who receive federal health coverage – also live in rural areas. At the same time, the average health of rural residents lags the nation as a whole.

Rural clinics and hospitals

Funding from those federal programs affects rural hospitals, and rural hospitals are struggling.

Nearly half of rural hospitals operate in the red today, and over 170 rural hospitals have closed since 2010. The low population density of rural areas can make it difficult for hospitals to cover operating costs when their patient volume is low. These hospital closures have left rural residents traveling an extra 20 miles (32 km) on average to receive inpatient health care services and an extra 40 miles (64 km) for specialty care services.

The government has created programs to try to help keep hospitals operating, but they all require funding that is at risk. For example:

The Low-volume Hospital Adjustment Act, first implemented in 2005, has helped numerous rural hospitals by boosting their Medicare payments per patient, but it faces regular threats of funding cuts. It and several other programs to support Medicare-dependent hospitals are set to expire on March 31, 2025, when the next federal budget is due.
The rural emergency hospital model, created in 2020, helps qualifying rural facilities to maintain access to essential emergency and outpatient hospital services, also by providing higher Medicare payments. Thus far, only 30 rural hospitals have transitioned to this model, in part because they would have to eliminate inpatient care services, which also limits outpatient surgery and other medical services that could require overnight care in the event of an emergency.

Rural emergency hospitals can get extra funding, but there’s a catch: They have no inpatient beds, so people in need of longer care must go farther.
AP Photo/Rogelio V. Solis

Services for pregnant women have also gotten harder to find in rural areas.

Between 2011 and 2021, 267 rural hospitals discontinued obstetric services, representing 25% of the United States’ rural obstetrics units. In response, the federal government has implemented various initiatives to enhance access to care, such as the Rural Hospital Stabilization Pilot Program and the Rural Maternal and Obstetric Management Strategies Program. However, these programs also require funding.

Expanding telehealth

Before the COVID-19 pandemic, telehealth – the ability to meet with your doctor over video – wasn’t widely used. It could be difficult for doctors to ensure reimbursement, and the logistics of meeting federal requirements and privacy rules could be challenging.

The pandemic changed that. Improving technology allowed telehealth to quickly expand, reducing people’s contact with sick patients, and the government issued waivers for Medicare and Medicaid to pay for telehealth treatment. That opened up new opportunities for rural patients to get health care and opportunities for providers to reach more patients.

However, the Medicare and Medicaid waivers for most telehealth services were only temporary. Only payments for mental and behavioral health teleheath services continued, and those are set to expire with the federal budget in March 2025, unless they are renewed.

One way to expand rural health care would be to make those waivers permanent.

Increasing access to telehealth could also support people struggling with opioid addiction and other substance use disorders, which have been on the rise in rural areas.

2. Affordable housing is a rural problem too

Like their urban peers, rural communities face a shortage of affordable housing.

Unemployment in rural areas today exceeds levels before the COVID-19 pandemic. Job growth and median incomes lag behind urban areas, and rural poverty rates are higher.

Rural housing prices have been exacerbated by continued population growth over the past four years, lower incomes compared with their urban peers, limited employment opportunities and few high-quality homes available for rent or sale. Rural communities often have aging homes built upon outdated or inadequate infrastructure, such as deteriorating sewer and water lines.

Rental homes in older towns can become run down. Community maintenance of pipes and other services also requires funding.
LawrenceSawyer/E+ via Getty Images

One proposal to help people looking for affordable rural housing is the bipartisan Neighborhood Homes Investment Act, which calls for creating a new federal tax credit to spur the development and renovation of family housing in distressed urban, suburban and rural neighborhoods.

Similarly, the Section 502 Direct Loan Program through the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which subsidizes mortgages for low-income applicants to obtain safe housing, could be expanded with additional funding to enable more people to receive subsidized mortgages.

3. Locally owned land benefits communities

Seniors age 65 and older own 40% of the agricultural land in the U.S., according to the American Farmland Trust. That means that more than 360 million acres of farmland could be transferred to new owners in the next few decades. If their heirs aren’t interested in farming, that land could be sold to large operations or real estate developers.

That affects rural communities because locally owned rural businesses tend to invest in their communities, and they are more likely to make decisions that benefit the community’s well-being.

A farmer carries organic squash during harvest. Young farmers often struggle to find land to expand their operations.
Thomas Barwick/Stone via Getty Images

Congress can take some steps to help communities keep more farmland locally owned.

The proposed Farm Transitions Act, for example, would establish a commission on farm transitions to study issues that affect locally owned farms and provide recommendations to help transition agricultural operations to the next generation of farmers and ranchers.

About 30% of farmers have been in business for less than 10 years, and many of them rent the land they farm. Programs such as USDA’s farm loan programs and the Beginning Farmer and Rancher Development Program help support local land purchases and could be improved to identify and eliminate barriers that communities face.

We believe that by addressing these issues, Congress and the new administration can help some of the country’s most vulnerable citizens. Efforts to build resilient and strong rural communities will benefit everyone.

Randolph Hubach receives funding from the National Institutes of Health and the Health Resources and Services Administration.

Cody Mullen receives funding from the Health Resources and Services Administration. He is affiliated with the National Rural Health Association.

– ref. 3 ways the Trump administration could reinvest in rural America’s future – https://theconversation.com/3-ways-the-trump-administration-could-reinvest-in-rural-americas-future-245451

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

MIL-OSI: Arq Provides Update on Transformational GAC Project

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Construction of Arq’s GAC production facility remains on schedule, with initial production expected in Q1 2025

Customer negotiations for GAC contracts progressing well

GAC production ramp-up set to begin in H1 2025, with full run-rate of 25 million pounds targeted for H2 2025

GREENWOOD VILLAGE, Colo., Feb. 07, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Arq, Inc. (NASDAQ: ARQ) (the “Company” or “Arq”), a producer of activated carbon and other environmentally efficient carbon products for use in purification and sustainable materials, today provided an update on the continued execution of its Granular Activated Carbon (“GAC”) project.

GAC Production and Ramp-Up Timeline

Arq confirmed that initial production of its proprietary GAC at the Red River facility (“Red River”) remains on track to commence in Q1 2025, in line with most recent guidance. Following first production, the Company expects a ramp-up period to reach full production capacity of 25 million pounds annual run-rate of GAC in H2 2025. Once full run-rate capacity is achieved, the Company will have greater visibility on potential additional capacity enhancements.

GAC Customer Engagement & Contract Update

Arq continues to make meaningful progress in commercial discussions for GAC and continues to engage with a range of customers and testing opportunities. As noted on its Q3 2024 earnings call, in addition to PFAS-related customers, discussions with biogas and other industrial customers are advancing positively, with early pricing indications indicating a strong commercial opportunity. Given the need for in-situ pilot testing as a condition to securing long-term contracts from these customers, Arq has elected to strategically hold back additional contract commitments to diversify end-use markets and focus on profitability over volumes. The Company is planning to match its contracting and sales with the production ramp-up timeline in H2 2025.

Capital Expenditures & Cost Management

Arq reported capital expenditures related to its GAC expansion at Red River in Q4 2024 were slightly above expectations, bringing full-year 2024 capex for this project to approximately $80 million. The Company attributes this recent increase to several factors, including the need for additional external professional services, increased small-bore piping needs, and a commitment to maintaining previously communicated timelines. Given knowledge and experience gained from the first phase of construction, the Company does not anticipate similar cost overruns for a second phase of GAC development at the site. Arq continues to evaluate opportunities for additional cost optimization and efficiency gains as the Company scales production.

Commencement of Legal Proceedings

The Company announced today that it had commenced legal proceedings against its design firm for the GAC expansion project at Red River. The Company believes that the design firm was negligent and breached its contract with the Company and as a direct result of this negligence and breach of contract, the Company suffered a material increase in costs and time delays associated with the project versus original forecasts. The Company is seeking damages related to the increased costs and delays it believes resulted from such negligence and contractual breaches. Because of prior actions by the Company to bring certain professional services in-house and to other parties, including those previously disclosed, the Company believes there will be no impact on product performance and as noted above, GAC production is expected to commence in Q1 2025.

Q4 & FY 2024 Earnings Conference Call

Arq will release its Q4 and full-year 2024 financial results on March 5, 2025. The Company will provide separately additional details related to its earnings conference call, as well as its participation in upcoming investor conferences in the near term.

Forward Looking Statements

This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which provides a “safe harbor” for such statements in certain circumstances. When used in this press release, the words “can,” “will,” “may,” “intends,” “expects,” “continuing,” “believes,” similar expressions and any other statements that are not historical facts are intended to identify those assertions as forward-looking statements. All statements that address activities, events or developments that the Company intends, expects or believes may occur in the future are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements or expectations regarding: the estimated costs and timing associated with capital improvements at our facilities and the related anticipated production capacities, the expected timing for commercial production of the Company’s GAC products, potential future capacity enhancements at the Company’s facilities, anticipated commercial opportunities in various GAC markets, cost optimization and efficiency efforts associated with future phases of the Company’s GAC project and the Company’s GAC product performance. . These forward-looking statements involve risks and uncertainties. Actual events or results could differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements as a result of various factors including, but not limited to, the Company’s ability to maintain relationships with customers, suppliers and others with whom it does business and meet supply requirements, or its results of operations and business generally; risks related to diverting management’s attention from the Company’s ongoing business operations; changes in construction costs or availability of construction materials; our inability to effectively manage construction and startup of the Red River facility or Corbin facility; our inability to ramp up our operations to effectively address recent and expected growth in our business; the timing and cost of capital expenditures and the resultant impact to our liquidity and cash flows; our inability to obtain required financing or obtain financing on terms that are favorable to us; opportunities for additional sales of our activated carbon products and end-market diversification; the Company’s ability to meet customer supply requirements; the rate of coal-fired power generation in the United States; timing and scope of new and pending regulations and any legal challenges to or extensions of compliance dates of them; impact of competition; availability, cost of and demand for alternative energy sources and other technologies; technical, start up and operational difficulties; competition within the industries in which the Company operates; loss of key personnel; ongoing effects of the inflation and macroeconomic uncertainty, including from the lingering effects of the pandemic and armed conflicts around the world, and such uncertainty’s effect on market demand and input costs, as well as other factors relating to our business, as described in our filings with the SEC, with particular emphasis on the risk factor disclosures contained in those filings. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on the forward-looking statements and to consult filings we have made and will make with the SEC for additional discussion concerning risks and uncertainties that may apply to our business and the ownership of our securities. In addition to causing our actual results to differ, the factors listed above may cause our intentions to change from those statements of intention set forth in this press release. Such changes in our intentions may also cause our results to differ. We may change our intentions, at any time and without notice, based upon changes in such factors, our assumptions, or otherwise. The forward-looking statements speak only as to the date of this press release and the Company disclaims any duty to update such statements unless required by law.

About Arq

Arq (NASDAQ: ARQ) is a diversified, environmental technology Company with products that enable a cleaner and safer planet while actively reducing our environmental impact. As the only vertically integrated producer of activated carbon products in North America, we deliver a reliable domestic supply of innovative, hard-to-source, high-demand products. We apply our extensive expertise to develop groundbreaking solutions to remove harmful chemicals and pollutants from water, land and air. Learn more at: www.arq.com.

Source: Arq, Inc.

Investor Contact:
Anthony Nathan, Arq
Marc Silverberg, ICR
investors@arq.com

The MIL Network –

MIL-OSI USA: Sowing the Seeds of Change in Danbury Schools

Source: US State of Connecticut

Gardens welcome students, employees, and visitors at all of Danbury’s schools, thanks to Anne Mead, the director of family, school, and community partnerships for Danbury Public Schools, and the many people and organizations she works with on the school garden initiatives. Her role includes working with partners and developing strategies for families to engage with the schools.

Mead ’06 (BGS) has a master’s and doctoral degree in educational and organizational systems and the Danbury Schools recruited her to lead the partnerships initiatives in 2008.

Mead is a UConn Extension Master Gardener volunteer and collaborates with this program and UConn Extension’s Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program (EFNEP) in her work with Danbury Schools.

“I came into the district with a farm and garden approach to schools, and we have gardens at many schools now. We have a Farm to School Institute team and are implementing the 3C’s classroom, curriculum, and cafeteria,” she says.

Students have opportunities for experiential learning through the gardens, including planting, watering, and caring for the plants. This fosters their education, and nutrition awareness as they harvest produce from the garden and help prepare healthy meals.

Mead’s Extension involvement began as a child, growing up in Redding. Her mother was an avid gardener and healthy cook; a 4-H leader, as well as a cookbook committee member. Mead always loved gardening because of this early introduction. She and her husband live in Danbury and have extensive gardens on their property as well.

During the pandemic, Mead enrolled in UConn Extension’s Master Gardener Program and earned her certification.

“The Master Gardeners brought my horticultural understanding to a different level intellectually because of the amount of knowledge you walk away with; you understand the whys, permaculture, and wind patterns.” She also recently became an Advanced Master Gardener.

In addition to the skills and knowledge she has gained, Mead also appreciates the community connections Extension programming provides. She helps families who visit the Master Gardeners at the farmers market, providing resources and recommendations on types of vegetables to grow and scaling up their garden each year. She continues volunteering with the program and helping people with gardening and food choices, in addition to her role with the schools.

“I encourage everyone to visit an Extension location; there is one in every county,” Mead says. “Talk to the program coordinator and graduates, spend some time volunteering with the Master Gardeners or sit in on a class. Look at the projects in your community. Becoming a Master Gardener is one way to become informed and spend time in your community.”

Mead’s building in the Danbury School System is connected to the elementary school building, and this year, she received a grant from the Connecticut Master Gardener Association to add a pollinator garden for butterflies and insects on their playscape. She also serves on the district’s health and wellness committee, and they are developing healthier snacks, cutting down on highly processed, sugar-laden foods, and adding more fresh fruits and vegetables to the menus. The 3- to 5-year-olds participate in making the meals and then filling their plates.

“Anne Mead is a dynamic partner. She brings in-depth knowledge about greater Danbury and coupled with her knowledge of public education, especially understanding the needs of area students and their families, exemplifies how Extension increases its reach even further as we support and help grow these important initiatives,” Bonnie Burr, the assistant director of UConn Extension says.

One of her next projects will be helping bring a Green Academy to Danbury High School’s Wall to Wall Academy. This will include gardening aspects and career pathways, and she’s excited to incorporate her horticultural knowledge and Master Gardener experiences in this new initiative.

The gardening and nutrition projects are one aspect of Mead’s work with Danbury Public Schools, but the impact is far-reaching.

“We hope to see much better nutrition,” Mead shares. “Gardening with the students is a time without a lot of competition and very little technology, they can be themselves in the garden. The parents are participating too, and it’s building a sense of community with the youth and families.”

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MIL-OSI Europe: Forssmed: We must not forget the lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic

Source: Government of Sweden

“Our capacity to manage a pandemic is better today than it was in 2020. However, a crisis requires more than preparedness in the form of regulatory frameworks,” writes Minister for Social Affairs and Public Health Jakob Forssmed (Christian Democrats).

This week marks five years since the first COVID-19 case was reported in Sweden. In this short time, society has undergone a comprehensive crisis and long since returned to normality. But for the people and families in our country, COVID-19 has left lasting scars in the form of grief and loss. Many lost their lives and many still experience long-term health issues as a result of COVID-19. Long-term isolation and loneliness have also left deep scars.

Sweden could face a new crisis

Other crises and difficulties have arisen in place of the pandemic, and seemingly part of human nature – in our country at least – is the wish to leave the preceding crisis behind us. But we must not forget the lessons of the COVID-19 pandemic, because unfortunately, we cannot rule out that Sweden will be faced with another pandemic – it is actually very likely that we will. That is why I am grateful for all the efforts that we are currently undertaking and that have been undertaken within the Government Offices to ensure that Sweden is better equipped to deal with any future pandemics.

A few examples:

Inquiry Chair Professor Jan Albert has been tasked with reviewing the regulation of communicable diseases to better adapt it to situations of extensive spread of infectious diseases. He will also submit information for a strategy for future pandemic management, including analyses of issues of allocation of responsibilities in the event of another pandemic.
The Public Health Agency of Sweden has been tasked with ensuring continued access to vaccines for the population in the event of an influenza pandemic. Currently, the avian influenza H5N1 has caused extensive outbreaks globally among both tame and wild animals in a short period of time. There are cases of the infection passing from animals to humans as well.
The Public Health Agency of Sweden has also been tasked with ensuring continued access to antiviral medicines in the event of a pandemic.
The National Board of Health and Welfare has been tasked with establishing a national collaboration structure for health and welfare’s supply preparedness of medical care products and any other equipment required to ensure the provision of proper care, together with the Medical Products Agency, the Swedish eHealth Agency, the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions.
The Public Health Agency of Sweden’s mandate in relation to communication and information for the public has been clarified. The Agency plays a natural role in the dissemination of information and communication to the public.

Critical flaws in pandemic management

Important measures have been taken within the Public Health Agency of Sweden as well, including building a stronger system for surveillance of communicable diseases. This system includes increased epidemiological and microbiological surveillance with a higher degree of automation than previously.

The Agency is also working to integrate its different surveillance systems and automate the collection of data on infectious diseases within the health policy platform. This will enable real-time data sharing between national and regional actors, gathered within a shared user interface with different authorisation levels and tools to analyse cases of illness and outbreaks.

The Agency was tasked with strengthening its capacity to discover and analyse viruses spread via wastewater. All the above will ensure that we are better equipped to manage a pandemic today than in 2020. There were critical flaws at that time, which the COVID-19 Commission has highlighted.

But the COVID-19 Commission also points out that crisis management requires more than preparedness in the form of regulatory frameworks. It also requires a capacity to act in an entirely new set of circumstances where one does not have all the answers. One needs to be able to be act proactively and with force in peacetime crisis situations as well as in wartime and when there is a risk of war. In relation to this, the Government has made changes to the instructions to the Public Health Agency of Sweden to include a clear expectation for the Agency to act.

Sweden is better equipped

A clear conclusion from the pandemic is the requirement for clear political responsibility. The Government governs the state in times of crisis as well and that responsibility cannot be handed over to public authorities. Finally, it is important to remember what was perhaps the COVID-19 Commission’s main conclusion – everything centres around our society, values and people.

Sweden made it through the COVID-19 pandemic, despite the errors in management and initial passivity. This was achieved by virtue of a strong sense of duty, particularly among health and social care staff, caring for others and a fundamental trust in society. These assets, together with all the initiatives taken by the Government and public authorities, mean that Sweden is now much better equipped should another pandemic befall our country.

MIL OSI Europe News –

MIL-OSI: Plains All American Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2024 Results; Provides Update on Efficient Growth Initiatives and Announces 2025 Guidance

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

HOUSTON, Feb. 07, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Plains All American Pipeline, L.P. (Nasdaq: PAA) and Plains GP Holdings (Nasdaq: PAGP) today reported fourth-quarter and full-year 2024 results, announced 2025 guidance and provided the following highlights:

2024 Results

Fourth-quarter and full-year 2024 Net income attributable to PAA of $36 million and $772 million, respectively, and 2024 Net cash provided by operating activities of $726 million and $2.49 billion, respectively
Delivered strong fourth-quarter and full-year 2024 Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA above the top-end of guidance with $729 million and $2.78 billion, respectively
Generated full-year 2024 Adjusted Free Cash Flow (excluding changes in Assets & Liabilities; including impact from legal settlements) of $1.17 billion and exited the year with leverage at 3.0x
Net income for the quarter includes the impact of a $225 million charge resulting from the write-off of a receivable for Line 901 insurance proceeds and $140 million of non-cash charges related to the write-down of two U.S. NGL terminals

Efficient Growth Initiatives

Closed all three previously announced bolt-on acquisitions for approximately $670 million net to PAA, including the acquisition of Ironwood Midstream Energy
Closed on previously announced purchase of approximately 12.7 million units, or 18%, of its Series A Preferred Units for a purchase price of approximately $330 million
Continue pursuing a long runway of synergistic and strong return bolt-on opportunities across the asset footprint

2025 Outlook

Expect full-year 2025 Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA of $2.80 – $2.95 billion
Announced distribution increase of $0.25 per unit payable February 14, 2025, representing a 20% aggregate increase in the annualized distribution versus 2024 levels (new annual distribution of $1.52 per unit)
In January, successfully raised $1 billion in aggregate senior unsecured notes at 5.95% due 2035
Anticipate leverage ratio to be at or below the low-end of leverage target range of 3.25x to 3.75x, continuing to provide significant balance sheet optionality and flexibility
Expect to generate approximately $1.15 billion of Adjusted Free Cash Flow (excluding changes in Assets & Liabilities), which is reduced by approximately $580 million for previously announced bolt-on transactions closed in the first quarter
Remain focused on disciplined capital investments, anticipating full-year 2025 Growth Capital of +/- $400 million and Maintenance Capital of +/- $240 million net to PAA

“We continue delivering strong financial and operating results and increasing return of capital to unitholders. As evidenced by our recently announced acquisitions, we have the ability to leverage our integrated asset base and financial strength to drive accretive transactions and deliver value to our customers and unitholders,” said Plains Chairman and CEO Willie Chiang. “We remain confident entering 2025, with strong operational momentum and focus on executing our efficient growth strategy. Our strong performance and positive outlook combined with the contribution from recent bolt-on acquisitions continues driving meaningful cash flow and underpins increasing returns to unitholders all while maintaining capital discipline and financial flexibility.”

Plains All American Pipeline

Summary Financial Information (unaudited)
(in millions, except per unit data)

	Three Months Ended December 31,					%			Twelve Months Ended December 31,				%
*GAAP Results*	2024			2023		Change			2024		2023		Change
Net income attributable to PAA	$	36		$	312		(88	)%	$	772	$	1,230		(37	)%
Diluted net income/(loss) per common unit	$	(0.04	)	$	0.35		(111	)%	$	0.73	$	1.40		(48	)%
Diluted weighted average common units outstanding		704			701		—	%		702		699		—	%
Net cash provided by operating activities	$	726		$	1,011		(28	)%	$	2,490	$	2,727		(9	)%
Distribution per common unit declared for the period	$	0.3800		$	0.3175		20	%	$	1.3325	$	1.1200		19	%

	Three Months Ended December 31,					%			Twelve Months Ended December 31,				%
*Non-GAAP Results* ⁽¹⁾	2024			2023		Change			2024		2023		Change
Adjusted net income attributable to PAA	$	357		$	355		1	%	$	1,318	$	1,250		5	%
Diluted adjusted net income per common unit	$	0.42		$	0.42		—	%	$	1.51	$	1.42		6	%
Adjusted EBITDA	$	867		$	875		(1	)%	$	3,326	$	3,167		5	%
Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA ⁽²⁾	$	729		$	737		(1	)%	$	2,779	$	2,711		3	%
Implied DCF per common unit and common unit equivalent	$	0.64		$	0.68		(6	)%	$	2.49	$	2.46		1	%
Adjusted Free Cash Flow	$	365		$	710	**			$	1,247	$	1,798		(31	)%
Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions	$	79		$	458	**			$	102	$	809		(87	)%
Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) ⁽³⁾	$	134		$	402		**		$	1,173	$	1,604		(27	)%
Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) ⁽³⁾	$	(152	)	$	150	**			$	28	$	615		(95	)%


**	Indicates that variance as a percentage is not meaningful.
⁽¹⁾	See the section of this release entitled “Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Selected Items Impacting Comparability” and the tables attached hereto for information regarding our Non-GAAP financial measures, including their reconciliation to the most directly comparable measures as reported in accordance with GAAP, and certain selected items that PAA believes impact comparability of financial results between reporting periods.
⁽²⁾	Excludes amounts attributable to noncontrolling interests in the Plains Oryx Permian Basin LLC joint venture, Cactus II Pipeline LLC and Red River Pipeline LLC.
⁽³⁾	Fourth-quarter and full-year 2024 Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) includes the negative impact of a $225 million charge resulting from the write-off of a receivable for Line 901 insurance proceeds.

Summary of Selected Financial Data by Segment (unaudited)
(in millions)

	Segment Adjusted EBITDA
	Crude Oil			NGL
Three Months Ended December 31, 2024	$	569		$	154
Three Months Ended December 31, 2023	$	563		$	169
*Percentage change in Segment Adjusted EBITDA versus 2023 period*	1		%	(9		)%

	Segment Adjusted EBITDA
	Crude Oil			NGL
Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2024	$	2,276		$	480
Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2023	$	2,163		$	522
*Percentage change in Segment Adjusted EBITDA versus 2023 period*	5		%	(8		)%

Fourth-quarter 2024 Crude Oil Segment Adjusted EBITDA increased 1% versus comparable 2023 results primarily due to higher tariff volumes on our pipelines, tariff escalations and contributions from acquisitions. These items were partially offset by fewer market-based opportunities, as well as an increase in estimated costs for long-term environmental remediation obligations.

Fourth-quarter 2024 NGL Segment Adjusted EBITDA decreased 9% versus comparable 2023 results primarily due to lower weighted average frac spreads in the fourth quarter of 2024.

Plains GP Holdings

PAGP owns an indirect non-economic controlling interest in PAA’s general partner and an indirect limited partner interest in PAA. As the control entity of PAA, PAGP consolidates PAA’s results into its financial statements, which is reflected in the condensed consolidating balance sheet and income statement tables attached hereto.

Conference Call and Webcast Instructions

PAA and PAGP will hold a joint conference call at 9:00 a.m. CT on Friday, February 7, 2025 to discuss fourth-quarter performance and related items.

To access the internet webcast, please go to https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/xp2zqt6q/.

Alternatively, the webcast can be accessed on our website at https://ir.plains.com/news-events/events-presentations. Following the live webcast, an audio replay will be available on our website and will be accessible for a period of 365 days. Slides will be posted prior to the call at the above referenced website.

Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Selected Items Impacting Comparability

To supplement our financial information presented in accordance with GAAP, management uses additional measures known as “non-GAAP financial measures” in its evaluation of past performance and prospects for the future and to assess the amount of cash that is available for distributions, debt repayments, common equity repurchases and other general partnership purposes. The primary additional measures used by management are Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA, Implied Distributable Cash Flow (“DCF”), Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions.

Our definition and calculation of certain non-GAAP financial measures may not be comparable to similarly-titled measures of other companies. Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA, Implied DCF and certain other non-GAAP financial performance measures are reconciled to Net Income, and Adjusted Free Cash Flow, Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions and certain other non-GAAP financial liquidity measures are reconciled to Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities (the most directly comparable measures as reported in accordance with GAAP) for the historical periods presented in the tables attached to this release, and should be viewed in addition to, and not in lieu of, our Consolidated Financial Statements and accompanying notes. In addition, we encourage you to visit our website at www.plains.com (in particular the section under “Financial Information” entitled “Non-GAAP Reconciliations” within the Investor Relations tab), which presents a reconciliation of our commonly used non-GAAP and supplemental financial measures. We do not reconcile non-GAAP financial measures on a forward-looking basis as it is impractical to do so without unreasonable effort.

Non-GAAP Financial Performance Measures

Adjusted EBITDA is defined as earnings before (i) interest expense, (ii) income tax (expense)/benefit, (iii) depreciation and amortization (including our proportionate share of depreciation and amortization, including write-downs related to cancelled projects and impairments, of unconsolidated entities), (iv) gains and losses on asset sales, asset impairments and other, net, (v) gains and losses on investments in unconsolidated entities and (vi) interest income on promissory notes by and among PAA and certain Plains entities, and (vii) adjusted for certain selected items impacting comparability. Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA excludes the portion of Adjusted EBITDA that is attributable to noncontrolling interests.

Management believes that the presentation of Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA and Implied DCF provides useful information to investors regarding our performance and results of operations because these measures, when used to supplement related GAAP financial measures, (i) provide additional information about our core operating performance and ability to fund distributions to our unitholders through cash generated by our operations and (ii) provide investors with the same financial analytical framework upon which management bases financial, operational, compensation and planning/budgeting decisions. We also present these and additional non-GAAP financial measures, including adjusted net income attributable to PAA and basic and diluted adjusted net income per common unit, as they are measures that investors, rating agencies and debt holders have indicated are useful in assessing us and our results of operations. These non-GAAP financial performance measures may exclude, for example, (i) charges for obligations that are expected to be settled with the issuance of equity instruments, (ii) gains and losses on derivative instruments that are related to underlying activities in another period (or the reversal of such adjustments from a prior period), gains and losses on derivatives that are either related to investing activities (such as the purchase of linefill) or purchases of long-term inventory, and inventory valuation adjustments, as applicable, (iii) long-term inventory costing adjustments, (iv) items that are not indicative of our core operating results and/or (v) other items that we believe should be excluded in understanding our core operating performance. These measures may be further adjusted to include amounts related to deficiencies associated with minimum volume commitments whereby we have billed the counterparties for their deficiency obligation and such amounts are recognized as deferred revenue in “Other current liabilities” in our Consolidated Financial Statements. We also adjust for amounts billed by our equity method investees related to deficiencies under minimum volume commitments. Such amounts are presented net of applicable amounts subsequently recognized into revenue. Furthermore, the calculation of these measures contemplates tax effects as a separate reconciling item, where applicable. We have defined all such items as “selected items impacting comparability.” Due to the nature of the selected items, certain selected items impacting comparability may impact certain non-GAAP financial measures, referred to as adjusted results, but not impact other non-GAAP financial measures. We do not necessarily consider all of our selected items impacting comparability to be non-recurring, infrequent or unusual, but we believe that an understanding of these selected items impacting comparability is material to the evaluation of our operating results and prospects.

Although we present selected items impacting comparability that management considers in evaluating our performance, you should also be aware that the items presented do not represent all items that affect comparability between the periods presented. Variations in our operating results are also caused by changes in volumes, prices, exchange rates, mechanical interruptions, acquisitions, divestitures, investment capital projects and numerous other factors. These types of variations may not be separately identified in this release, but will be discussed, as applicable, in management’s discussion and analysis of operating results in our Annual Report on Form 10-K.

Non-GAAP Financial Liquidity Measures

Management uses the non-GAAP financial liquidity measures Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions to assess the amount of cash that is available for distributions, debt repayments, common equity repurchases and other general partnership purposes. Adjusted Free Cash Flow is defined as Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities, less Net Cash Provided by/(Used in) Investing Activities, which primarily includes acquisition, investment and maintenance capital expenditures, investments in unconsolidated entities and the impact from the purchase and sale of linefill, net of proceeds from the sales of assets and further impacted by distributions to and contributions from noncontrolling interests and proceeds from the issuance of related party notes. Adjusted Free Cash Flow is further reduced by cash distributions paid to our preferred and common unitholders to arrive at Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions.

We also present these measures and additional non-GAAP financial liquidity measures as they are measures that investors have indicated are useful. We present the Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) for use in assessing our underlying business liquidity and cash flow generating capacity excluding fluctuations caused by timing of when amounts earned or incurred were collected, received or paid from period to period. Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) is defined as Adjusted Free Cash Flow excluding the impact of “Changes in assets and liabilities, net of acquisitions” on our Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows. Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) is further reduced by cash distributions paid to our preferred and common unitholders to arrive at Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities).


PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS (in millions, except per unit data)

	Three Months Ended December 31,						Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
REVENUES	$	12,402		$	12,698		$	50,073		$	48,712

COSTS AND EXPENSES
Purchases and related costs		11,227			11,558			45,560			44,531
Field operating costs ⁽¹⁾		578			363			1,768			1,425
General and administrative expenses		93			87			381			350
Depreciation and amortization		258			273			1,026			1,048
(Gains)/losses on asset sales, asset impairments and other, net		159			(9	)		160			(152	)
Total costs and expenses		12,315			12,272			48,895			47,202

OPERATING INCOME		87			426			1,178			1,510

OTHER INCOME/(EXPENSE)
Equity earnings in unconsolidated entities		154			92			452			369
Gain on investments in unconsolidated entities, net		15			—			15			28
Interest expense, net ⁽²⁾		(112	)		(97	)		(430	)		(386	)
Other income, net ⁽²⁾		20			17			65			102

INCOME BEFORE TAX		164			438			1,280			1,623
Current income tax expense ⁽³⁾		(52	)		(41	)		(195	)		(145	)
Deferred income tax benefit		7			2			28			24

NET INCOME		119			399			1,113			1,502
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		(83	)		(87	)		(341	)		(272	)
NET INCOME ATTRIBUTABLE TO PAA	$	36		$	312		$	772		$	1,230

NET INCOME/(LOSS) PER COMMON UNIT:
Net income/(loss) allocated to common unitholders — Basic and Diluted	$	(27	)	$	248		$	514		$	976
Basic and diluted weighted average common units outstanding		704			701			702			699
Basic and diluted net income/(loss) per common unit	$	(0.04	)	$	0.35		$	0.73		$	1.40


⁽¹⁾	Field operating costs include $225 million and $345 million for the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2024, respectively, resulting from adjustments related to the Line 901 incident that occurred in May 2015, including the write-off of a receivable for Line 901 insurance proceeds in the fourth quarter of 2024 and settlements in the third quarter of 2024.
⁽²⁾	PAA and certain Plains entities have issued promissory notes by and among such entities to facilitate financing. “Interest expense, net” and “Other income, net” each include $17 million and $48 million for the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2024, respectively, related to interest on such notes. These amounts offset and do not impact Net Income or Non-GAAP metrics such as Adjusted EBITDA, Implied DCF and Adjusted Free Cash Flow.
⁽³⁾	The increase in current income tax expense for the 2024 periods was largely associated with Canadian withholding tax on dividends from our Canadian entities to other Plains entities driven by timing of dividend payments.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET DATA (in millions)

	December 31, 2024		December 31, 2023
ASSETS
Current assets (including Cash and cash equivalents of $348 and $450, respectively)	$	4,802	$	4,913
Property and equipment, net		15,424		15,782
Investments in unconsolidated entities		2,811		2,820
Intangible assets, net		1,677		1,875
Linefill		968		976
Long-term operating lease right-of-use assets, net		332		313
Long-term inventory		280		265
Other long-term assets, net		268		411
Total assets	$	26,562	$	27,355

LIABILITIES AND PARTNERS’ CAPITAL
Current liabilities	$	4,950	$	5,003
Senior notes, net		7,141		7,242
Other long-term debt, net		72		63
Long-term operating lease liabilities		313		274
Other long-term liabilities and deferred credits		990		1,041
Total liabilities		13,466		13,623

Partners’ capital excluding noncontrolling interests		9,813		10,422
Noncontrolling interests		3,283		3,310
Total partners’ capital		13,096		13,732
Total liabilities and partners’ capital	$	26,562	$	27,355

DEBT CAPITALIZATION RATIOS
(in millions)

	December 31, 2024			December 31, 2023
Short-term debt	$	408		$	446
Long-term debt		7,213			7,305
Total debt	$	7,621		$	7,751

Long-term debt	$	7,213		$	7,305
Partners’ capital excluding noncontrolling interests		9,813			10,422
Total book capitalization excluding noncontrolling interests (“Total book capitalization”)	$	17,026		$	17,727
Total book capitalization, including short-term debt	$	17,434		$	18,173

Long-term debt-to-total book capitalization		42	%		41	%
Total debt-to-total book capitalization, including short-term debt		44	%		43	%

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
COMPUTATION OF BASIC AND DILUTED NET INCOME/(LOSS) PER COMMON UNIT ⁽¹⁾ (in millions, except per unit data)

	Three Months Ended December 31,						Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
Basic and Diluted Net Income/(Loss) per Common Unit
Net income attributable to PAA	$	36		$	312		$	772		$	1,230
Distributions to Series A preferred unitholders		(44	)		(44	)		(175	)		(173	)
Distributions to Series B preferred unitholders		(19	)		(20	)		(78	)		(76	)
Amounts allocated to participating securities		(1	)		(1	)		(10	)		(10	)
Other		1			1			5			5
Net income/(loss) allocated to common unitholders	$	(27	)	$	248		$	514		$	976

Basic and diluted weighted average common units outstanding ^{(2) (3)}		704			701			702			699

Basic and diluted net income/(loss) per common unit	$	(0.04	)	$	0.35		$	0.73		$	1.40


⁽¹⁾	We calculate net income/(loss) allocated to common unitholders based on the distributions pertaining to the current period’s net income. After adjusting for the appropriate period’s distributions, the remaining undistributed earnings or excess distributions over earnings, if any, are allocated to common unitholders and participating securities in accordance with the contractual terms of our partnership agreement in effect for the period and as further prescribed under the two-class method.
⁽²⁾	The possible conversion of our Series A preferred units was excluded from the calculation of diluted net income/(loss) per common unit for each of the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 as the effect was antidilutive.
⁽³⁾	Our equity-indexed compensation plan awards that contemplate the issuance of common units are considered potentially dilutive unless (i) they become vested only upon the satisfaction of a performance condition and (ii) that performance condition has yet to be satisfied. Equity-indexed compensation plan awards that are deemed to be dilutive are reduced by a hypothetical common unit repurchase based on the remaining unamortized fair value, as prescribed by the treasury stock method in guidance issued by the FASB.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED CASH FLOW DATA (in millions)

	Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2024
	2024			2023
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Net income	$	1,113		$	1,502
Reconciliation of net income to net cash provided by operating activities:
Depreciation and amortization		1,026			1,048
(Gains)/losses on asset sales, asset impairments and other, net		160			(152	)
Deferred income tax benefit		(28	)		(24	)
Change in fair value of Preferred Distribution Rate Reset Option		—			(58	)
Equity earnings in unconsolidated entities		(452	)		(369	)
Distributions on earnings from unconsolidated entities		505			458
Gain on investments in unconsolidated entities, net		(15	)		(28	)
Other		107			156
Changes in assets and liabilities, net of acquisitions		74			194
Net cash provided by operating activities		2,490			2,727

CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
Net cash used in investing activities ⁽¹⁾		(1,504	)		(702	)

CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
Net cash used in financing activities ⁽¹⁾		(1,077	)		(1,976	)

Effect of translation adjustment		(11	)		—

Net increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash		(102	)		49

Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash, beginning of period		450			401
Cash and cash equivalents and restricted cash, end of period	$	348		$	450


⁽¹⁾	PAA and certain Plains entities have issued promissory notes by and among such entities to facilitate financing. For the twelve months ended December 31, 2024, “Net cash used in investing activities” includes a cash outflow of $629 million associated with our investment in related party notes. An equal and offsetting cash inflow associated with our issuance of related party notes is included in “Net cash used in financing activities.”

CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
(in millions)

	Net to PAA ⁽¹⁾								Consolidated
	Three Months Ended December 31,				Twelve Months Ended December 31,				Three Months Ended December 31,				Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024		2023		2024		2023		2024		2023		2024		2023
Investment capital expenditures:
Crude Oil	$	55	$	75	$	214	$	245	$	80	$	100	$	300	$	334
NGL		41		14		115		65		41		14		115		65
Total Investment capital expenditures		96		89		329		310		121		114		415		399
Maintenance capital expenditures		68		58		242		214		73		63		261		231
	$	164	$	147	$	571	$	524	$	194	$	177	$	676	$	630


⁽¹⁾	Excludes expenditures attributable to noncontrolling interests.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
NON-GAAP RECONCILIATIONS (in millions, except per unit and ratio data)

Computation of Basic and Diluted Adjusted Net Income Per Common Unit ⁽¹⁾:

	Three Months Ended December 31,						Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
Basic and Diluted Adjusted Net Income per Common Unit
Net income attributable to PAA	$	36		$	312		$	772		$	1,230
Selected items impacting comparability – Adjusted net income attributable to PAA ⁽²⁾		321			43			546			20
Adjusted net income attributable to PAA	$	357		$	355		$	1,318		$	1,250
Distributions to Series A preferred unitholders		(44	)		(44	)		(175	)		(173	)
Distributions to Series B preferred unitholders		(19	)		(20	)		(78	)		(76	)
Amounts allocated to participating securities		(1	)		(1	)		(11	)		(10	)
Other		1			1			5			5
Adjusted net income allocated to common unitholders	$	294		$	291		$	1,059		$	996

Basic and diluted weighted average common units outstanding ^{(3) (4)}		704			701			702			699

Basic and diluted adjusted net income per common unit	$	0.42		$	0.42		$	1.51		$	1.42


⁽¹⁾	We calculate adjusted net income allocated to common unitholders based on the distributions pertaining to the current period’s net income. After adjusting for the appropriate period’s distributions, the remaining undistributed earnings or excess distributions over earnings, if any, are allocated to the common unitholders and participating securities in accordance with the contractual terms of our partnership agreement in effect for the period and as further prescribed under the two-class method.
⁽²⁾	See the “Selected Items Impacting Comparability” table for additional information.
⁽³⁾	The possible conversion of our Series A preferred units was excluded from the calculation of diluted adjusted net income per common unit for each of the three and twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 as the effect was antidilutive.
⁽⁴⁾	Our equity-indexed compensation plan awards that contemplate the issuance of common units are considered potentially dilutive unless (i) they become vested only upon the satisfaction of a performance condition and (ii) that performance condition has yet to be satisfied. Equity-indexed compensation plan awards that are deemed to be dilutive are reduced by a hypothetical common unit repurchase based on the remaining unamortized fair value, as prescribed by the treasury stock method in guidance issued by the FASB.

Net Income/(Loss) Per Common Unit to Adjusted Net Income Per Common Unit Reconciliation:

	Three Months Ended December 31,					Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023		2024		2023
Basic and diluted net income/(loss) per common unit	$	(0.04	)	$	0.35	$	0.73	$	1.40
Selected items impacting comparability per common unit ⁽¹⁾		0.46			0.07		0.78		0.02
Basic and diluted adjusted net income per common unit	$	0.42		$	0.42	$	1.51	$	1.42


⁽¹⁾	See the “Selected Items Impacting Comparability” and the “Computation of Basic and Diluted Adjusted Net Income/(Loss) Per Common Unit” tables for additional information.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
Net Income to Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA and Implied DCF Reconciliation:

	Three Months Ended December 31,						Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
Net Income	$	119		$	399		$	1,113		$	1,502
Interest expense, net of certain items ⁽¹⁾		95			97			382			386
Income tax expense		45			39			167			121
Depreciation and amortization		258			273			1,026			1,048
(Gains)/losses on asset sales, asset impairments and other, net		159			(9	)		160			(152	)
Gain on investments in unconsolidated entities, net		(15	)		—			(15	)		(28	)
Depreciation and amortization of unconsolidated entities ⁽²⁾		26			20			84			87
Selected items impacting comparability – Adjusted EBITDA ⁽³⁾		180			56			409			203
Adjusted EBITDA	$	867		$	875		$	3,326		$	3,167
Adjusted EBITDA attributable to noncontrolling interests		(138	)		(138	)		(547	)		(456	)
Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA	$	729		$	737		$	2,779		$	2,711

Adjusted EBITDA	$	867		$	875		$	3,326		$	3,167
Interest expense, net of certain non-cash items ⁽⁴⁾		(92	)		(92	)		(365	)		(367	)
Maintenance capital		(73	)		(63	)		(261	)		(231	)
Investment capital of noncontrolling interests ⁽⁵⁾		(24	)		(24	)		(86	)		(87	)
Current income tax expense		(52	)		(41	)		(195	)		(145	)
Distributions from unconsolidated entities in excess of/(less than) adjusted equity earnings ⁽⁶⁾		—			(15	)		11			(37	)
Distributions to noncontrolling interests ⁽⁷⁾		(114	)		(97	)		(425	)		(333	)
Implied DCF	$	512		$	543		$	2,005		$	1,967
Preferred unit cash distributions paid ⁽⁷⁾		(63	)		(64	)		(254	)		(241	)
Implied DCF Available to Common Unitholders	$	449		$	479		$	1,751		$	1,726

Weighted Average Common Units Outstanding		704			701			702			699
Weighted Average Common Units and Common Unit Equivalents		775			772			773			770

Implied DCF per Common Unit ⁽⁸⁾	$	0.64		$	0.68		$	2.49		$	2.47
Implied DCF per Common Unit and Common Unit Equivalent ⁽⁹⁾	$	0.64		$	0.68		$	2.49		$	2.46

Cash Distribution Paid per Common Unit	$	0.3175		$	0.2675		$	1.2700		$	1.0700
Common Unit Cash Distributions ⁽⁷⁾	$	223		$	188		$	891		$	748
Common Unit Distribution Coverage Ratio	2.01x			2.55x			1.97x			2.31x

Implied DCF Excess	$	226		$	291		$	860		$	978


⁽¹⁾	Represents “Interest expense, net” as reported on our Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations, net of interest income associated with promissory notes by and among PAA and certain Plains entities.
⁽²⁾	Adjustment to exclude our proportionate share of depreciation and amortization expense (including write-downs related to cancelled projects and impairments) of unconsolidated entities.
⁽³⁾	See the “Selected Items Impacting Comparability” table for additional information.
⁽⁴⁾	Amount excludes certain non-cash items impacting interest expense such as amortization of debt issuance costs and terminated interest rate swaps.
⁽⁵⁾	Investment capital expenditures attributable to noncontrolling interests that reduce Implied DCF available to PAA common unitholders.
⁽⁶⁾	Comprised of cash distributions received from unconsolidated entities less equity earnings in unconsolidated entities (adjusted for our proportionate share of depreciation and amortization, including write-downs related to cancelled projects and impairments, and selected items impacting comparability of unconsolidated entities).
⁽⁷⁾	Cash distributions paid during the period presented.
⁽⁸⁾	Implied DCF Available to Common Unitholders for the period divided by the weighted average common units outstanding for the period.
⁽⁹⁾	Implied DCF Available to Common Unitholders for the period, adjusted for Series A preferred unit cash distributions paid, divided by the weighted average common units and common unit equivalents outstanding for the period. Our Series A preferred units are convertible into common units, generally on a one-for-one basis and subject to customary anti-dilution adjustments, in whole or in part, subject to certain minimum conversion amounts.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
Net Income Per Common Unit to Implied DCF Per Common Unit and Common Unit Equivalent Reconciliation:

	Three Months Ended December 31,					Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023		2024		2023
Basic net income/(loss) per common unit	$	(0.04	)	$	0.35	$	0.73	$	1.40
Reconciling items per common unit ^{(1) (2)}		0.68			0.33		1.76		1.07
Implied DCF per common unit	$	0.64		$	0.68	$	2.49	$	2.47

Basic net income/(loss) per common unit	$	(0.04	)	$	0.35	$	0.73	$	1.40
Reconciling items per common unit and common unit equivalent ^{(1) (3)}		0.68			0.33		1.76		1.06
Implied DCF per common unit and common unit equivalent	$	0.64		$	0.68	$	2.49	$	2.46


⁽¹⁾	Represents adjustments to Net Income to calculate Implied DCF Available to Common Unitholders. See the “Net Income to Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA and Implied DCF Reconciliation” table for additional information.
⁽²⁾	Based on weighted average common units outstanding for the period of 704 million, 701 million, 702 million and 699 million, respectively.
⁽³⁾	Based on weighted average common units outstanding for the period, as well as weighted average Series A preferred units outstanding of 71 million for each of the periods presented.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
Net Cash Provided by Operating Activities to Non-GAAP Financial Liquidity Measures Reconciliation:

	Three Months Ended December 31,						Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
Net cash provided by operating activities	$	726		$	1,011		$	2,490		$	2,727
Adjustments to reconcile Net cash provided by operating activities to Adjusted Free Cash Flow:
Net cash used in investing activities ⁽¹⁾		(264	)		(257	)		(1,504	)		(702	)
Cash contributions from noncontrolling interests		17			53			57			106
Cash distributions paid to noncontrolling interests ⁽²⁾		(114	)		(97	)		(425	)		(333	)
Proceeds from the issuance of related party notes ⁽¹⁾		—			—			629			—
Adjusted Free Cash Flow ⁽³⁾	$	365		$	710		$	1,247		$	1,798
Cash distributions ⁽⁴⁾		(286	)		(252	)		(1,145	)		(989	)
Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions ⁽³⁾⁽⁵⁾	$	79		$	458		$	102		$	809

	Three Months Ended December 31,						Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
Adjusted Free Cash Flow ⁽³⁾	$	365		$	710		$	1,247		$	1,798
Changes in assets and liabilities, net of acquisitions ⁽⁶⁾		(231	)		(308	)		(74	)		(194	)
Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) ⁽⁷⁾⁽⁸⁾	$	134		$	402		$	1,173		$	1,604
Cash distributions ⁽⁴⁾		(286	)		(252	)		(1,145	)		(989	)
Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) ⁽⁷⁾⁽⁸⁾	$	(152	)	$	150		$	28		$	615


⁽¹⁾	PAA and certain Plains entities have issued promissory notes by and among such entities to facilitate financing. “Proceeds from the issuance of related party notes” has an equal and offsetting cash outflow associated with our investment in related party notes, which is included as a component of “Net cash used in investing activities.”
⁽²⁾	Cash distributions paid during the period presented.
⁽³⁾	Management uses the non-GAAP financial liquidity measures Adjusted Free Cash Flow and Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions to assess the amount of cash that is available for distributions, debt repayments, common equity repurchases and other general partnership purposes. Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions shortages, if any, may be funded from previously established reserves, cash on hand or from borrowings under our credit facilities or commercial paper program.
⁽⁴⁾	Cash distributions paid to preferred and common unitholders during the period.
⁽⁵⁾	Excess Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions is retained to establish reserves for future distributions, capital expenditures, debt reduction and other partnership purposes. Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions shortages may be funded from previously established reserves, cash on hand or from borrowings under our credit facilities or commercial paper program.
⁽⁶⁾	See the “Condensed Consolidated Cash Flow Data” table.
⁽⁷⁾	Management uses the non-GAAP financial liquidity measures Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) and Adjusted Free Cash Flow after Distributions (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) to assess the underlying business liquidity and cash flow generating capacity excluding fluctuations caused by timing of when amounts earned or incurred were collected, received or paid from period to period.
⁽⁸⁾	Fourth-quarter and full-year 2024 Adjusted Free Cash Flow (Excluding Changes in Assets & Liabilities) includes the negative impact of a $225 million charge resulting from the write-off of a receivable for Line 901 insurance proceeds.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
SELECTED ITEMS IMPACTING COMPARABILITY (in millions)

	Three Months Ended December 31,						Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023			2024			2023
Selected Items Impacting Comparability: ⁽¹⁾
Derivative activities and inventory valuation adjustments ⁽²⁾	$	(6	)	$	43		$	(85	)	$	(101	)
Long-term inventory costing adjustments ⁽³⁾		17			(62	)		9			(35	)
Deficiencies under minimum volume commitments, net ⁽⁴⁾		41			(8	)		31			(12	)
Equity-indexed compensation expense ⁽⁵⁾		(8	)		(8	)		(36	)		(36	)
Foreign currency revaluation ⁽⁶⁾		1			(11	)		17			(8	)
Line 901 incident ⁽⁷⁾		(225	)		(10	)		(345	)		(10	)
Transaction-related expenses ⁽⁸⁾		—			—			—			(1	)
Selected items impacting comparability – Adjusted EBITDA	$	(180	)	$	(56	)	$	(409	)	$	(203	)
Gain on investments in unconsolidated entities, net		15			—			15			28
Gains/(losses) on asset sales, asset impairments and other, net ⁽⁹⁾		(159	)		9			(160	)		152
Tax effect on selected items impacting comparability		3			4			13			13
Aggregate selected items impacting noncontrolling interests		—			—			(5	)		(10	)
Selected items impacting comparability – Adjusted net income attributable to PAA	$	(321	)	$	(43	)	$	(546	)	$	(20	)


⁽¹⁾	Certain of our non-GAAP financial measures may not be impacted by each of the selected items impacting comparability. See the “Net Income to Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA and Implied DCF Reconciliation” and “Computation of Basic and Diluted Adjusted Net Income Per Common Unit” table for additional details on how these selected items impacting comparability affect such measures.
⁽²⁾	We use derivative instruments for risk management purposes and our related processes include specific identification of hedging instruments to an underlying hedged transaction. Although we identify an underlying transaction for each derivative instrument we enter into, there may not be an accounting hedge relationship between the instrument and the underlying transaction. In the course of evaluating our results, we identify differences in the timing of earnings from the derivative instruments and the underlying transactions and exclude the related gains and losses in determining adjusted results such that the earnings from the derivative instruments and the underlying transactions impact adjusted results in the same period. In addition, we exclude gains and losses on derivatives that are related to (i) investing activities, such as the purchase of linefill, and (ii) purchases of long-term inventory. We also exclude the impact of corresponding inventory valuation adjustments, as applicable. For applicable periods, we excluded gains and losses from the mark-to-market of the embedded derivative associated with the Preferred Distribution Rate Reset Option of our Series A preferred units.
⁽³⁾	We carry crude oil and NGL inventory that is comprised of minimum working inventory requirements in third-party assets and other working inventory that is needed for our commercial operations. We consider this inventory necessary to conduct our operations and we intend to carry this inventory for the foreseeable future. Therefore, we classify this inventory as long-term on our balance sheet and do not hedge the inventory with derivative instruments (similar to linefill in our own assets). We treat the impact of changes in the average cost of the long-term inventory (that result from fluctuations in market prices) and write-downs of such inventory that result from price declines as a selected item impacting comparability.
⁽⁴⁾	We, and certain of our equity method investees, have certain agreements that require counterparties to deliver, transport or throughput a minimum volume over an agreed upon period. Substantially all of such agreements were entered into with counterparties to economically support the return on capital expenditure necessary to construct the related asset. Some of these agreements include make-up rights if the minimum volume is not met. We record a receivable from the counterparty in the period that services are provided or when the transaction occurs, including amounts for deficiency obligations from counterparties associated with minimum volume commitments. If a counterparty has a make-up right associated with a deficiency, we defer the revenue attributable to the counterparty’s make-up right and subsequently recognize the revenue at the earlier of when the deficiency volume is delivered or shipped, when the make-up right expires or when it is determined that the counterparty’s ability to utilize the make-up right is remote. We include the impact of amounts billed to counterparties for their deficiency obligation, net of applicable amounts subsequently recognized into revenue or equity earnings, as a selected item impacting comparability. We believe the inclusion of the contractually committed revenues associated with that period is meaningful to investors as the related asset has been constructed, is standing ready to provide the committed service and the fixed operating costs are included in the current period results.
⁽⁵⁾	Our total equity-indexed compensation expense includes expense associated with awards that will be settled in units and awards that will be settled in cash. The awards that will be settled in units are included in our diluted net income per unit calculation when the applicable performance criteria have been met. We consider the compensation expense associated with these awards as a selected item impacting comparability as the dilutive impact of the outstanding awards is included in our diluted net income per unit calculation, as applicable. The portion of compensation expense associated with awards that will be settled in cash is not considered a selected item impacting comparability.
⁽⁶⁾	During the periods presented, there were fluctuations in the value of the Canadian dollar to the U.S. dollar, resulting in the realization of foreign exchange gains and losses on the settlement of foreign currency transactions as well as the revaluation of monetary assets and liabilities denominated in a foreign currency. The associated gains and losses are not integral to our results and were thus classified as a selected item impacting comparability.
⁽⁷⁾	Includes costs recognized during the period related to the Line 901 incident that occurred in May 2015. For the 2024 periods, includes the write-off of a receivable for Line 901 insurance proceeds in the fourth quarter of 2024 and the impact of settlements in the third quarter of 2024.
⁽⁸⁾	Includes expenses associated with the Rattler Permian Transaction.
⁽⁹⁾	For the 2024 periods, primarily includes non-cash charges related to the write-down of two U.S. NGL terminals. For the twelve months ended December 31, 2023 primarily includes gains related to the sale of our Keyera Fort Saskatchewan facility.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA BY SEGMENT (in millions)

	Three Months Ended December 31, 2024						Three Months Ended December 31, 2023
	Crude Oil			NGL			Crude Oil			NGL
Revenues ⁽¹⁾	$	11,959		$	535		$	12,187		$	623
Purchases and related costs ⁽¹⁾		(11,019	)		(300	)		(11,306	)		(364	)
Field operating costs ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾		(503	)		(75	)		(274	)		(89	)
Segment general and administrative expenses ^{(2) (}⁴⁾		(74	)		(19	)		(68	)		(19	)
Equity earnings in unconsolidated entities		154			—			92			—

Other segment items: ⁽⁵⁾
Depreciation and amortization of unconsolidated entities		26			—			20			—
Derivative activities and inventory valuation adjustments		(16	)		22			(52	)		9
Long-term inventory costing adjustments		(9	)		(8	)		58			4
Deficiencies under minimum volume commitments, net		(41	)		—			8			—
Equity-indexed compensation expense		8			—			8			—
Foreign currency revaluation		(4	)		(1	)		18			5
Line 901 incident		225			—			10			—
Segment amounts attributable to noncontrolling interests ⁽⁶⁾		(137	)		—			(138	)		—
Segment Adjusted EBITDA	$	569		$	154		$	563		$	169

Maintenance capital expenditures	$	48		$	25		$	39		$	24


⁽¹⁾	Includes intersegment amounts.
⁽²⁾	Field operating costs and Segment general and administrative expenses include equity-indexed compensation expense.
⁽³⁾	Field operating costs for the three months ended December 31, 2024 include higher expenses related to (i) $225 million resulting from the write-off of a receivable for Line 901 insurance proceeds and (ii) an increase in estimated costs for long-term environmental remediation obligations.
⁽⁴⁾	Segment general and administrative expenses reflect direct costs attributable to each segment and an allocation of other expenses to the segments. The proportional allocations by segment require judgment by management and are based on the business activities that exist during each period.
⁽⁵⁾	Represents adjustments utilized by our CODM in the evaluation of segment results. Many of these adjustments are also considered selected items impacting comparability when calculating consolidated non-GAAP financial measures such as Adjusted EBITDA. See the “Selected Items Impacting Comparability” table for additional discussion.
⁽⁶⁾	Reflects amounts attributable to noncontrolling interests in the Permian JV, Cactus II Pipeline LLC and Red River Pipeline LLC.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
SELECTED FINANCIAL DATA BY SEGMENT (in millions)

	Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2024						Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2023
	Crude Oil			NGL			Crude Oil			NGL
Revenues ⁽¹⁾	$	48,720		$	1,724		$	47,174		$	1,935
Purchases and related costs ⁽¹⁾		(45,033	)		(898	)		(43,805	)		(1,123	)
Field operating costs ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾		(1,440	)		(328	)		(1,053	)		(372	)
Segment general and administrative expenses ^{(2) (}⁴⁾		(298	)		(83	)		(271	)		(79	)
Equity earnings in unconsolidated entities		452			—			369			—

Other segment items: ⁽⁵⁾
Depreciation and amortization of unconsolidated entities		84			—			87			—
Derivative activities and inventory valuation adjustments		5			80			17			142
Long-term inventory costing adjustments		1			(10	)		22			13
Deficiencies under minimum volume commitments, net		(31	)		—			12			—
Equity-indexed compensation expense		36			—			35			1
Foreign currency revaluation		(22	)		(5	)		19			5
Line 901 incident		345			—			10			—
Transaction-related expenses		—			—			1			—
Segment amounts attributable to noncontrolling interests ⁽⁶⁾		(543	)		—			(454	)		—
Segment Adjusted EBITDA	$	2,276		$	480		$	2,163		$	522

Maintenance capital expenditures	$	183		$	78		$	145		$	86


⁽¹⁾	Includes intersegment amounts.
⁽²⁾	Field operating costs and Segment general and administrative expenses include equity-indexed compensation expense.
⁽³⁾	Field operating costs for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 include higher expenses related to (i) $225 million resulting from the write-off of a receivable for Line 901 insurance proceeds, (ii) $120 million associated with settlements related to the Line 901 incident that occurred in May 2015 and (iii) an increase in estimated costs for long-term environmental remediation obligations.
⁽⁴⁾	Segment general and administrative expenses reflect direct costs attributable to each segment and an allocation of other expenses to the segments. The proportional allocations by segment require judgment by management and are based on the business activities that exist during each period.
⁽⁵⁾	Represents adjustments utilized by our CODM in the evaluation of segment results. Many of these adjustments are also considered selected items impacting comparability when calculating consolidated non-GAAP financial measures such as Adjusted EBITDA. See the “Selected Items Impacting Comparability” table for additional discussion.
⁽⁶⁾	Reflects amounts attributable to noncontrolling interests in the Permian JV, Cactus II Pipeline LLC and Red River Pipeline LLC.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
OPERATING DATA BY SEGMENT

	Three Months Ended December 31,				Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024		2023		2024		2023
Crude Oil Segment Volumes
Crude oil pipeline tariff (by region) ⁽¹⁾
Permian Basin ⁽²⁾		6,846		6,710		6,731		6,356
South Texas / Eagle Ford ⁽²⁾		421		411		403		410
Mid-Continent ⁽²⁾		478		503		506		507
Gulf Coast ⁽²⁾		214		250		218		260
Rocky Mountain ⁽²⁾		461		452		474		372
Western		259		237		256		214
Canada		349		340		346		341
Total crude oil pipeline tariff ^{(1) (2)}		9,028		8,903		8,934		8,460

Commercial crude oil storage capacity ^{(2) (3)}		72		72		72		72

Crude oil lease gathering purchases ⁽¹⁾		1,661		1,518		1,586		1,452

NGL Segment Volumes ⁽¹⁾
NGL fractionation		138		127		132		115
NGL pipeline tariff		224		188		213		180
Propane and butane sales		127		125		92		86


⁽¹⁾	Average volumes in thousands of barrels per day calculated as the total volumes (attributable to our interest for assets owned by unconsolidated entities or through undivided joint interests) for the period divided by the number of days in the period. Volumes associated with assets acquired during the period represent total volumes for the number of days we actually owned the assets divided by the number of days in the period.
⁽²⁾	Includes volumes (attributable to our interest) from assets owned by unconsolidated entities.
⁽³⁾	Average monthly capacity in millions of barrels calculated as total volumes for the period divided by the number of months in the period.

PLAINS ALL AMERICAN PIPELINE, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
NON-GAAP SEGMENT RECONCILIATIONS (in millions)

Supplemental Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA Reconciliation:

	Three Months Ended December 31,				Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024		2023		2024		2023
Crude Oil Segment Adjusted EBITDA	$	569	$	563	$	2,276	$	2,163
NGL Segment Adjusted EBITDA		154		169		480		522
Adjusted other income, net ⁽¹⁾		6		5		23		26
Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA ⁽²⁾	$	729	$	737	$	2,779	$	2,711


⁽¹⁾	Represents “Other income, net” as reported on our Condensed Consolidated Statements of Operations, excluding interest income on promissory notes by and among PAA and certain Plains entities, as well as other income, net attributable to noncontrolling interests, adjusted for selected items impacting comparability. See the “Selected Items Impacting Comparability” table for additional information.
⁽²⁾	See the “Net Income to Adjusted EBITDA attributable to PAA and Implied DCF Reconciliation” table for reconciliation to Net Income.

PLAINS GP HOLDINGS AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATING STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS (in millions, except per share data)

	Three Months Ended December 31, 2024									Three Months Ended December 31, 2023
				Consolidating									Consolidating
	PAA			Adjustments ⁽¹⁾			PAGP			PAA			Adjustments ⁽¹⁾			PAGP
REVENUES	$	12,402		$	—		$	12,402		$	12,698		$	—		$	12,698

COSTS AND EXPENSES
Purchases and related costs		11,227			—			11,227			11,558			—			11,558
Field operating costs		578			—			578			363			—			363
General and administrative expenses		93			1			94			87			1			88
Depreciation and amortization		258			—			258			273			—			273
(Gains)/losses on asset sales, asset impairments and other, net		159			—			159			(9	)		—			(9	)
Total costs and expenses		12,315			1			12,316			12,272			1			12,273

OPERATING INCOME		87			(1	)		86			426			(1	)		425

OTHER INCOME/(EXPENSE)
Equity earnings in unconsolidated entities		154			—			154			92			—			92
Gain on investments in unconsolidated entities, net		15			—			15			—			—			—
Interest expense, net		(112	)		17			(95	)		(97	)		—			(97	)
Other income, net		20			(17	)		3			17			—			17

INCOME BEFORE TAX		164			(1	)		163			438			(1	)		437
Current income tax expense		(52	)		—			(52	)		(41	)		—			(41	)
Deferred income tax (expense)/benefit		7			(2	)		5			2			(16	)		(14	)

NET INCOME		119			(3	)		116			399			(17	)		382
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		(83	)		(44	)		(127	)		(87	)		(243	)		(330	)
NET INCOME/(LOSS) ATTRIBUTABLE TO PAGP	$	36		$	(47	)	$	(11	)	$	312		$	(260	)	$	52

Basic and diluted weighted average Class A shares outstanding								197									196

Basic and diluted net income/(loss) per Class A share							$	(0.05	)							$	0.27


⁽¹⁾	Represents the aggregate consolidating adjustments necessary to produce consolidated financial statements for PAGP.

PLAINS GP HOLDINGS AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATING STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS (in millions, except per share data)

	Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2024									Twelve Months Ended December 31, 2023
				Consolidating									Consolidating
	PAA			Adjustments ⁽¹⁾			PAGP			PAA			Adjustments ⁽¹⁾			PAGP
REVENUES	$	50,073		$	—		$	50,073		$	48,712		$	—		$	48,712

COSTS AND EXPENSES
Purchases and related costs		45,560			—			45,560			44,531			—			44,531
Field operating costs		1,768			—			1,768			1,425			—			1,425
General and administrative expenses		381			6			387			350			6			356
Depreciation and amortization		1,026			—			1,026			1,048			3			1,051
(Gains)/losses on asset sales, asset impairments and other, net		160			—			160			(152	)		—			(152	)
Total costs and expenses		48,895			6			48,901			47,202			9			47,211

OPERATING INCOME		1,178			(6	)		1,172			1,510			(9	)		1,501

OTHER INCOME/(EXPENSE)
Equity earnings in unconsolidated entities		452			—			452			369			—			369
Gain on investments in unconsolidated entities, net		15			—			15			28			—			28
Interest expense, net		(430	)		48			(382	)		(386	)		—			(386	)
Other income, net		65			(48	)		17			102			—			102

INCOME BEFORE TAX		1,280			(6	)		1,274			1,623			(9	)		1,614
Current income tax expense		(195	)		—			(195	)		(145	)		—			(145	)
Deferred income tax (expense)/benefit		28			(37	)		(9	)		24			(68	)		(44	)

NET INCOME		1,113			(43	)		1,070			1,502			(77	)		1,425
Net income attributable to noncontrolling interests		(341	)		(626	)		(967	)		(272	)		(955	)		(1,227	)
NET INCOME ATTRIBUTABLE TO PAGP	$	772		$	(669	)	$	103		$	1,230		$	(1,032	)	$	198

Basic and diluted weighted average Class A shares outstanding								197									195

Basic and diluted net income per Class A share							$	0.52								$	1.01


⁽¹⁾	Represents the aggregate consolidating adjustments necessary to produce consolidated financial statements for PAGP.

PLAINS GP HOLDINGS AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATING BALANCE SHEET DATA (in millions)

	December 31, 2024							December 31, 2023
			Consolidating							Consolidating
	PAA		Adjustments ⁽¹⁾			PAGP		PAA		Adjustments ⁽¹⁾			PAGP
ASSETS
Current assets	$	4,802	$	(26	)	$	4,776	$	4,913	$	3		$	4,916
Property and equipment, net		15,424		—			15,424		15,782		—			15,782
Investments in unconsolidated entities		2,811		—			2,811		2,820		—			2,820
Intangible assets, net		1,677		—			1,677		1,875		—			1,875
Deferred tax asset		—		1,220			1,220		—		1,239			1,239
Linefill		968		—			968		976		—			976
Long-term operating lease right-of-use assets, net		332		—			332		313		—			313
Long-term inventory		280		—			280		265		—			265
Other long-term assets, net		268		—			268		411		—			411
Total assets	$	26,562	$	1,194		$	27,756	$	27,355	$	1,242		$	28,597

LIABILITIES AND PARTNERS’ CAPITAL
Current liabilities	$	4,950	$	(26	)	$	4,924	$	5,003	$	2		$	5,005
Senior notes, net		7,141		—			7,141		7,242		—			7,242
Other long-term debt, net		72		—			72		63		—			63
Long-term operating lease liabilities		313		—			313		274		—			274
Other long-term liabilities and deferred credits		990		—			990		1,041		—			1,041
Total liabilities		13,466		(26	)		13,440		13,623		2			13,625

Partners’ capital excluding noncontrolling interests		9,813		(8,462	)		1,351		10,422		(8,874	)		1,548
Noncontrolling interests		3,283		9,682			12,965		3,310		10,114			13,424
Total partners’ capital		13,096		1,220			14,316		13,732		1,240			14,972
Total liabilities and partners’ capital	$	26,562	$	1,194		$	27,756	$	27,355	$	1,242		$	28,597


⁽¹⁾	Represents the aggregate consolidating adjustments necessary to produce consolidated financial statements for PAGP.

PLAINS GP HOLDINGS AND SUBSIDIARIES FINANCIAL SUMMARY (unaudited)
COMPUTATION OF BASIC AND DILUTED NET INCOME/(LOSS) PER CLASS A SHARE (in millions, except per share data)

	Three Months Ended December 31,					Twelve Months Ended December 31,
	2024			2023		2024		2023
Basic and Diluted Net Income/(Loss) per Class A Share
Net income/(loss) attributable to PAGP	$	(11	)	$	52	$	103	$	198
Basic and diluted weighted average Class A shares outstanding		197			196		197		195

Basic and diluted net income/(loss) per Class A share	$	(0.05	)	$	0.27	$	0.52	$	1.01

Forward-Looking Statements

Except for the historical information contained herein, the matters discussed in this release consist of forward-looking statements that involve certain risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results or outcomes to differ materially from results or outcomes anticipated in the forward-looking statements. These risks and uncertainties include, among other things, the following:

general economic, market or business conditions in the United States and elsewhere (including the potential for a recession or significant slowdown in economic activity levels, the risk of persistently high inflation and supply chain issues, the impact of global public health events, such as pandemics, on demand and growth, and the timing, pace and extent of economic recovery) that impact (i) demand for crude oil, drilling and production activities and therefore the demand for the midstream services we provide and (ii) commercial opportunities available to us;
declines in global crude oil demand and/or crude oil prices or other factors that correspondingly lead to a significant reduction of North American crude oil and NGL production (whether due to reduced producer cash flow to fund drilling activities or the inability of producers to access capital, or both, the unavailability of pipeline and/or storage capacity, the shutting-in of production by producers, government-mandated pro-ration orders, or other factors), which in turn could result in significant declines in the actual or expected volume of crude oil and NGL shipped, processed, purchased, stored, fractionated and/or gathered at or through the use of our assets and/or the reduction of the margins we can earn or the commercial opportunities that might otherwise be available to us;
fluctuations in refinery capacity and other factors affecting demand for various grades of crude oil and NGL and resulting changes in pricing conditions or transportation throughput requirements;
unanticipated changes in crude oil and NGL market structure, grade differentials and volatility (or lack thereof);
the effects of competition and capacity overbuild in areas where we operate, including downward pressure on rates, volumes and margins, contract renewal risk and the risk of loss of business to other midstream operators who are willing or under pressure to aggressively reduce transportation rates in order to capture or preserve customers;
the successful operation of joint ventures and joint operating arrangements we enter into from time to time, whether relating to assets operated by us or by third parties, and the successful integration and future performance of acquired assets or businesses;
the availability of, and our ability to consummate, acquisitions, divestitures, joint ventures or other strategic opportunities and realize benefits therefrom;
environmental liabilities, litigation or other events that are not covered by an indemnity, insurance or existing reserves;
negative societal sentiment regarding the hydrocarbon energy industry and the continued development and consumption of hydrocarbons, which could influence consumer preferences and governmental or regulatory actions that adversely impact our business;
the occurrence of a natural disaster, catastrophe, terrorist attack (including eco-terrorist attacks) or other event that materially impacts our operations, including cyber or other attacks on our or our service providers’ electronic and computer systems;
weather interference with business operations or project construction, including the impact of extreme weather events or conditions (including wildfires and drought);
the impact of current and future laws, rulings, legislation, governmental regulations, executive orders, trade policies, tariffs, accounting standards and statements, and related interpretations that (i) prohibit, restrict or regulate the development of oil and gas resources and the related infrastructure on lands dedicated to or served by our pipelines, (ii) negatively impact our ability to develop, operate or repair midstream assets, or (iii) otherwise negatively impact our business or increase our exposure to risk;
negative impacts on production levels in the Permian Basin or elsewhere due to issues associated with (or laws, rules or regulations relating to) hydraulic fracturing and related activities (including wastewater injection or disposal), including earthquakes, subsidence, expansion or other issues;
the pace of development of natural gas or other infrastructure and its impact on expected crude oil production growth in the Permian Basin;
the refusal or inability of our customers or counterparties to perform their obligations under their contracts with us (including commercial contracts, asset sale agreements and other agreements), whether justified or not and whether due to financial constraints (such as reduced creditworthiness, liquidity issues or insolvency), market constraints, legal constraints (including governmental orders or guidance), the exercise of contractual or common law rights that allegedly excuse their performance (such as force majeure or similar claims) or other factors;
loss of key personnel and inability to attract and retain new talent;
disruptions to futures markets for crude oil, NGL and other petroleum products, which may impair our ability to execute our commercial or hedging strategies;
the effectiveness of our risk management activities;
shortages or cost increases of supplies, materials or labor;
maintenance of our credit ratings and ability to receive open credit from our suppliers and trade counterparties;
our inability to perform our obligations under our contracts, whether due to non-performance by third parties, including our customers or counterparties, market constraints, third-party constraints, supply chain issues, legal constraints (including governmental orders or guidance), or other factors or events;
the incurrence of costs and expenses related to unexpected or unplanned capital or maintenance expenditures, third-party claims or other factors;
failure to implement or capitalize, or delays in implementing or capitalizing, on investment capital projects, whether due to permitting delays, permitting withdrawals or other factors;
tightened capital markets or other factors that increase our cost of capital or limit our ability to obtain debt or equity financing on satisfactory terms to fund additional acquisitions, investment capital projects, working capital requirements and the repayment or refinancing of indebtedness;
the amplification of other risks caused by volatile or closed financial markets, capital constraints, liquidity concerns and inflation;
the use or availability of third-party assets upon which our operations depend and over which we have little or no control;
the currency exchange rate of the Canadian dollar to the United States dollar;
inability to recognize current revenue attributable to deficiency payments received from customers who fail to ship or move more than minimum contracted volumes until the related credits expire or are used;
significant under-utilization of our assets and facilities;
increased costs, or lack of availability, of insurance;
fluctuations in the debt and equity markets, including the price of our units at the time of vesting under our long-term incentive plans;
risks related to the development and operation of our assets; and
other factors and uncertainties inherent in the transportation, storage, terminalling and marketing of crude oil, as well as in the processing, transportation, fractionation, storage and marketing of NGL as discussed in the Partnerships’ filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

About Plains:

PAA is a publicly traded master limited partnership that owns and operates midstream energy infrastructure and provides logistics services for crude oil and natural gas liquids (“NGL”). PAA owns an extensive network of pipeline gathering and transportation systems, in addition to terminalling, storage, processing, fractionation and other infrastructure assets serving key producing basins, transportation corridors and major market hubs and export outlets in the United States and Canada. On average, PAA handles over 8 million barrels per day of crude oil and NGL.

PAGP is a publicly traded entity that owns an indirect, non-economic controlling general partner interest in PAA and an indirect limited partner interest in PAA, one of the largest energy infrastructure and logistics companies in North America.

PAA and PAGP are headquartered in Houston, Texas. For more information, please visit www.plains.com.

Contacts:

Blake Fernandez
Vice President, Investor Relations
(866) 809-1291

Michael Gladstein
Director, Investor Relations
(866) 809-1291

The MIL Network –

MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Lack of transparency in how the COVID-19 pandemic was managed – E-000421/2025

Source: European Parliament

Question for written answer E-000421/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Jorge Martín Frías (PfE)

The US House of Representatives recently published an investigation offering an in-depth assessment of the United States’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic, its causes and the vaccination campaigns.

The investigation concludes that the measures adopted, such as quarantining and requiring masks to be worn, were arbitrary and not based on any scientific evidence, and, what is more, that they were ineffective and detrimental.

Regarding the vaccines, the investigation indicates that they did not prevent the spread of the virus as hoped for and that the decisions taken in respect of the vaccines were partly politically motivated.

In light of these conclusions:

1.Does the Commission intend to launch an investigation – one that includes the full declassification of documents between pharmaceutical companies and Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen – into what took place in the European Union?
2.Will there be an assessment of the way in which the COVID-19 passport was used to restrict the freedoms of European citizens in some Member States, despite this being contrary to the intent of the legislator?
3.Does any data exist on the cost of these measures, both economically and to mental health, in the EU?

Submitted: 30.1.2025

Last updated: 7 February 2025

MIL OSI Europe News –

MIL-OSI: Defiance Launches ORCX, The First 2X Leveraged Single-Stock ETF on Oracle Corporation.

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

MIAMI, Feb. 07, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Defiance ETFs is proud to unveil ORCX, the first 2X long ETF for Oracle Corporation. ORCX seeks to provide 200% long daily targeted exposure to Oracle Corporation (NYSE: ORCL) (the “Underlying Security” or “ORCL”). Defiance’s single-stock ETFs provide leveraged exposure to disruptive companies without the need for a margin account.

“Defiance is excited to launch ORCX, which seeks to provide amplified exposure to Oracle. Oracle’s Stargate initiative is a game-changer, enhancing multi-cloud connectivity and driving seamless data integration across platforms. This innovation enhances Oracle’s position in enterprise AI and cloud infrastructure, presenting a potential growth avenue for investors interested in the evolving tech landscape,” said Sylvia Jablonski, CEO of Defiance ETFs.

The Fund is not intended to be used by, and is not appropriate for, investors who do not intend to actively monitor and manage their portfolios. The Fund pursues a daily leveraged investment objective, which means that the Fund is riskier than alternatives that do not use leverage because the Fund magnifies the performance of its Underlying Security. The Fund is not suitable for all investors. The Fund is designed to be utilized only by knowledgeable investors who understand the potential consequences of seeking daily leveraged (2X) investment results, understand the risks associated with the use of leverage, and are willing to monitor their portfolios frequently. The Fund is not intended to be used by, and is not appropriate for, investors who do not intend to actively monitor and manage their portfolios. For periods longer than a single day, the Fund will lose money if the Underlying Security’s performance is flat, and it is possible that the Fund will lose money even if the Underlying Security’s performance increases over a period longer than a single day. An investor could lose the full principal value of his/her investment within a single day.

An investment in the ETF is not an investment in Oracle Corporation.

About Defiance ETFs

Founded in 2018, Defiance is at the forefront of ETF innovation. Defiance is a leading ETF issuer specializing in thematic, income, and leveraged ETFs.

Our first-mover leveraged single-stock ETFs empower investors to take amplified positions in high-growth companies, providing precise leverage exposure without the need to open a margin account.

Important Disclosures

The fund attempts to provide daily investment results that correspond to two times (200%) the share price performance of an underlying exchange-traded fund (an “Underlying Security”). The Fund is not intended to be used by, and are not appropriate for, investors who do not intend to actively monitor and manage their portfolios. The Fund is very different from most mutual funds and exchange-traded funds. The Fund may not achieve investment results, before fees and expenses, that correspond to two times (2x) the daily performance of the Underlying Security, and may return substantially less during such periods. During such periods, the Fund’s actual leverage levels may differ substantially from its intended target, both intraday and at the close of trading, potentially resulting in significantly lower returns.

The Fund’s investment adviser will not attempt to position a Fund’s portfolio to ensure that the Fund does not gain or lose more than a maximum percentage of its net asset value on a given trading day. As a consequence, if an Underlying Security’s share price referenced by a Fund decreases by more than 50% on a given trading day, the corresponding Fund’s investors could lose all of their money.

Defiance ETFs LLC is the ETF sponsor. The Fund’s investment adviser is Tidal Investments, LLC (“Tidal” or the “Adviser”).

The Funds’ investment objectives, risks, charges, and expenses must be considered carefully before investing. The prospectus contains this and other important information about the investment company. Please read carefully before investing. A hard copy of the prospectuses can be requested by calling 833.333.9383.

Investing involves risk. Principal loss is possible. As an ETF, the funds may trade at a premium or discount to NAV. Shares of any ETF are bought and sold at market price (not NAV) and are not individually redeemed from the Fund. A portfolio concentrated in a single industry or country, may be subject to a higher degree of risk.

Underlying Security Risk. The Fund invests in swap contracts and options that are based on the share price of ORCL. This subjects the Fund to certain of the same risks as if it owned shares of ORCL, even though it does not.

Indirect Investment in ORCL Risk. ORCL is not affiliated with the Trust, the Fund, or the Adviser, or their respective affiliates and is not involved with this offering in any way and has no obligation to consider your Shares in taking any corporate actions that might affect the value of Shares.

ORCL Trading Risk. The trading price of ORCL may be subject to volatility and could experience wide fluctuations due to various factors. Short sellers may also play a significant role in trading ORCL, potentially affecting the supply and demand dynamics and contributing to market price volatility. Public perception and external factors beyond the company’s control may influence ORCL’s stock price disproportionately.

ORCL Performance Risk. ORCL may fail to meet its publicly announced guidelines or other expectations about its business, which could cause the price of ORCL to decline. ORCL provides guidance regarding its expected financial and business performance, such as projections regarding sales and production, as well as anticipated future revenues, gross margins, profitability and cash flows. Correctly identifying key factors affecting business conditions and predicting future events is inherently an uncertain process, and the guidance ORCL provides may not ultimately be accurate.

Software Industry Risk. The software industry can be significantly affected by intense competition, aggressive pricing, technological innovations, and product obsolescence. Companies in the software industry are subject to significant competitive pressures, such as aggressive pricing, new market entrants, competition for market share, short product cycles due to an accelerated rate of technological developments and the potential for limited earnings and/or falling profit margins.

Operations and Business Risks. ORCL may be unsuccessful in developing and selling new products and services, integrating acquired products and services and enhancing its existing products and services.

Data Security Risks. If ORCL’s security measures for its products and services are compromised and as a result, its data, its customers’ data or its IT systems are accessed improperly, made unavailable, or improperly modified, ORCL’s products and services may be perceived as vulnerable, its brand and reputation could be damaged, the IT services ORCL provides to its customers could be disrupted, and customers may stop using ORCL’s products and services, any of which could reduce ORCL’s revenue and earnings, increase its expenses and expose it to legal claims and regulatory actions.

Intellectual Property Risks. ORCL relies on copyright, trademark, patent and trade secret laws, confidentiality procedures, controls and contractual commitments to protect its intellectual property. Despite ORCL’s efforts, these protections may be limited.

Leverage Risk. The Fund obtains investment exposure in excess of its net assets by utilizing leverage and may lose more money in market conditions that are adverse to its investment objective than a fund that does not utilize leverage. An investment in the Fund is exposed to the risk that a decline in the daily performance of the Underlying Security will be magnified.

High Portfolio Turnover Risk. Daily rebalancing of the Fund’s holdings pursuant to its daily investment objective causes a much greater number of portfolio transactions when compared to most ETFs.

Liquidity Risk. Some securities held by the Fund may be difficult to sell or be illiquid, particularly during times of market turmoil. Markets for securities or financial instruments could be disrupted by a number of events, including, but not limited to, an economic crisis, natural disasters, epidemics/pandemics, new legislation or regulatory changes inside or outside the United States.

Derivatives Risk. The Fund’s investments in derivatives may pose risks in addition to, and greater than, those associated with directly investing in securities or other ordinary investments, including risk related to the market, leverage, imperfect daily correlations with underlying investments or the Fund’s other portfolio holdings, higher price volatility, lack of availability, counterparty risk, liquidity, valuation and legal restrictions.

Compounding and Market Volatility Risk. The Fund has a daily leveraged investment objective and the Fund’s performance for periods greater than a trading day will be the result of each day’s returns compounded over the period, which is very likely to differ from two times (200%) the Underlying Security’s performance, before the Fund’s management fee and other expenses.

Fixed Income Securities Risk. When the Fund invests in fixed income securities, the value of your investment in the Fund will fluctuate with changes in interest rates. Typically, a rise in interest rates causes a decline in the value of fixed income securities owned by the Fund.

Single Issuer Risk. Issuer-specific attributes may cause an investment in the Fund to be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment which diversifies risk or the market generally. The value of the Fund, which focuses on an individual security, may be more volatile than a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole and may perform differently from the value of a traditional pooled investment or the market as a whole.

New Fund Risk. The Fund is a recently organized management investment company with no operating history. As a result, prospective investors do not have a track record or history on which to base their investment decisions.

Diversification does not ensure a profit nor protect against loss in a declining market.

Brokerage Commissions may be charged on trades.

Distributed by Foreside Fund Services, LLC

Contact Information:

David Hanono

833.333.9383
info@defianceetfs.com

A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/9a2f6854-1043-4edc-8250-60065d17e319

The MIL Network –

MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Phenomenal figures released for York’s Park & Ride

Source: City of York

Figures released today show that 2024 was the busiest year for York’s Park & Ride since 2017, with the total number of journeys exceeding 4.5 million, almost one million higher than in 2023.

December saw the most trips for a decade, recording nearly 500,000 journeys, a 3.5% increase on the previous highest monthly total set in December 2016.

City of York Council estimates that people boarding at the Park & Ride sites in December resulted in over 61,700 cars not travelling into central York – equivalent to a line of traffic that would be long enough to reach central London.

In December, First Bus sold 148,310 tickets at the Park & Ride sites alone (the remaining journeys being people who joined the bus along the route or were returning from the city centre). Industry standard definition of occupancy per car for a leisure trip is 2.4 people. This gives us a total of 61,700 cars that didn’t come into the city centre over Christmas. Google Maps shows that the road route from York Minster to Westminster Abbey is 210 miles. If we say a car takes up 6 metres of space on the road, 61,700 times 6 metres is 230 miles. Therefore, 61,700 cars would stretch all the way to central London.

York’s Enhanced Bus Partnership, which oversees £17.2 million of government funding for the Bus Service Improvement Plan, ran a marketing campaign to promote the Park & Ride as well as direct bus services for six weeks before Christmas. Working with Make It York and all bus operators, the social media posts and adverts reached over 2.2 million people in a campaign targeting towns and cities where previous research has shown Christmas Market visitors come from.

Councillor Kate Ravilious, Executive Member for Economy and Transport at City of York Council, said:

Just shy of half a million journeys in one month is an incredible milestone to reach, so thank you to all the residents and visitors for using the Park & Ride, and thank you to First Bus for increasing the number of buses available during this incredibly busy period.

First Bus invested in more services on the network in November and December, increasing frequency on several routes to support the York local and visitor economy in anticipation of customer demand. First Bus replicates this investment during other busy periods to keep York visitors and commuters moving sustainably throughout the year.

Cllr Ravilious continued:

The numbers are phenomenal but we do also need to recognise that York still experienced congested streets in the run up to Christmas, so while we are delighted, we continue our work throughout the year to support and promote the city’s bus services as well as other sustainable forms of transport.

“Our young people’s ticketing and marketing campaigns, which and are funded by central government, have over the last 12 months helped make bus use more attractive and given more people more options, and we will soon be consulting on improvements to the Park & Ride sites.”

Kayleigh Ingham, Commercial Director of First Bus North & West Yorkshire, said:

The superb performance throughout 2024 is a tribute to the commitment and high standards of service delivered by the First Bus team.

“We’ve demonstrated that bus is an easy and sustainable way to travel into York. We’re attracting more customers due to good value fares, zero-emission buses, and our service, which is delivered with a smile. The benefits this brings, with cleaner air and quieter city centre roads, contributes to York’s environmental targets.”

Sarah Loftus, Managing Director of Make It York, said:

It is wonderful to see the great results for bus travel for the year and 500,000 journeys during the Christmas period is fantastic.

“We are very fortunate to have a bus service within the city that supports both demand and sustainability. Collaboration between all parties on communicating key messages was key and we look forward to working with and supporting the transport sector throughout 2025.”

These Park & Ride figures follow the Department for Transport’s own statistics released late in 2024 which show that York’s bus services as a whole (including all local services and the Park & Ride) are once again in the top ten of all local authorities for the number of bus trips per resident. An average of 70.6 journeys per head of population in 2023 and 2024 ranks York the best in Yorkshire and nationally sits 9th out of 90 English local authority areas.

The data also showed that York’s bus trips are up 35% from 2021 and 2022, almost quadrupled from 2020 and 2021 and now back within 3% of the level they were in 2019 and 2020 (the year before COVID-19). This is one of the best post-pandemic recovery rates in the country.

In addition to December’s figures, November 2024 was the busiest November ever recorded, with 10% more passengers than the previous record set in 2016.

MIL OSI United Kingdom –

MIL-OSI Economics: Robust corporate governance a strategic imperative for business resilience and growth, says GlobalData

Source: GlobalData

Robust corporate governance a strategic imperative for business resilience and growth, says GlobalData

Posted in Strategic Intelligence

Effective corporate governance is essential for sustainable business growth. As regulatory scrutiny intensifies, companies must strengthen governance frameworks, including risk management and anti-corruption measures, to ensure compliance and long-term resilience. Weak governance can undermine trust, while a well-structured approach enhances competitiveness, drives value creation, and positions businesses for sustained success, according to GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

GlobalData’s latest Strategic Intelligence report, “ESG – Governance Factors,” reveals that poor governance practices are at the root of many corporate scandals. In 2024, the US regulators criticized Boeing’s board for failing to hold management accountable for a deterioration of controls around safety standards. The company’s challenges predate the COVID-19 pandemic and labor strikes, with the 737 MAX crashes exposing serious lapses in production quality, oversight, and regulatory compliance.

Pinky Hiranandani, Senior Strategic Intelligence Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “Governance failures have led to the demise of several companies. In 2024, Sam Bankman-Fried, founder and CEO of cryptocurrency exchange FTX, was sentenced to 25 years in prison for defrauding investors. The collapse of FTX underscores the critical importance of robust corporate governance and highlights the need for investors to prioritize governance risks in their due diligence processes.”

Indian edtech startup Byju’s saw its valuation collapse from $22 billion in 2022 to just $1 billion in 2024. Aggressive acquisitions, coinciding with a post-pandemic slowdown in edtech demand, exacerbated its challenges. Governance concerns, including a lack of transparency in management, further eroded investor confidence, underscoring the critical role of sound governance in sustaining business stability.

Hiranandani concludes: “Companies with poor corporate structure and risk management, weak internal controls, and unethical practices can quickly become the target of consumer and shareholder ire, which can jeopardize their future viability. As regulatory expectations rise, businesses must view governance not as a compliance burden but as a strategic advantage that fosters innovation, enhances reputation, and drives sustainable growth.”

MIL OSI Economics –

MIL-OSI New Zealand: Seventy-three graduate in first police wing for 2025

Source: New Zealand Police (National News)

Commissioner Richard Chambers, the Minister of Police, Hon Mark Mitchell, Associate Minister of Police Casey Costello and Wing Patron, Glenn Dunbier ONZM congratulated the 73 graduating constables from wing 381 today.
Families and friends joined the newly attested constables at Te Rauparaha Arena, Porirua this morning to watch them parade out from their initial police training course.

Constable Brent Edwards, Ngāti Awa, recipient of the Minister’s Award for top recruit of the wing, who was previously a police officer is pleased to be back on the front line; “I missed the job and the sense of satisfaction you get from helping people and holding offenders to account. There is no other job like it. But the main reason I’ve returned is the people, the organisation is full of good people, who are doing things for the right reasons. It is great to be part of it again.”

The Commissioner’s Award for Leadership and the Patron’s award was awarded to Constable Aleksandar Banjac. “This recognition is not a reflection of my individual efforts, but a testament to the hard work and commitment of the entire wing. This award is a shared achievement, and I accept it with deep respect and gratitude to my peers for the nominations. I would like to thank everyone involved with their continued support in this journey.”

All Awards:
Minister’s Award recognising top student: Constable Brent Edwards, Ngāti Awa, posted to Tasman District.
Commissioner’s Award for Leadership and the Patron’s Award for second in wing, recognising second top student: Constable Aleksandar Banjac , posted to Auckland City District.
Driver Training and Road Policing Practice Award: Constable Lucas Lowe posted to Bay of Plenty District.
Physical Training and Defensive Tactics Award: Constable Eli Marsters, Ngāti Whanaunga, posted to Bay of Plenty District.
Firearms Award: Constable Michael Tooley, posted to Wellington District.

Deployment:
The new constables will start their first day of duty in their Police districts on Monday 17 February 2025 and will continue their training on the job as probationary constables.
Northland 6, Tāmaki Makaurau a total of 23 and broken down as follows: Auckland – 5, Waitematā – 5, Counties Manukau – 13, Waikato – 4, Bay of Plenty – 8, Eastern – 9, Central – 3, Wellington – 9, Tasman – 2, Canterbury – 4, Southern – 5.

Demographics:
23.3 percent are female, 76.7 percent are male. New Zealand European make up 58.9 percent of the wing, with Māori 16.4 percent, Pasifika 8.2 percent, Asian 11.0 percent, LAAM 1.4 percent and Other is 4.1 percent.

381 Wing Patron
Former Deputy Commissioner Dunbier joined Police in 1985. He has worked across frontline, investigative, covert policing, and numerous leadership roles. He was appointed Area Commander for Eastern Waikato in 2006, District Commander for Bay of Plenty in 2010, then promoted to Deputy Commissioner in 2014. He served as lead police liaison officer in Turkey, coordinating the tri-lateral Australia – New Zealand – Turkey commemorations for the Anzac centenary of Gallipoli in 2015.
Following a three-year secondment to the Australian Department of Defence in 2017, he became deputy commissioner of operations in early 2020, with responsibility for more than 10,000 New Zealand Police staff. Dunbier led the police response to the Covid-19 pandemic, which included the policing of lockdown restrictions, staffing and managing the managed isolation and quarantine facilities across the country and operating the alert level boundary checkpoints. In 2022, he was made an Officer of the New Zealand Order of Merit (ONZM) for services to New Zealand Police and the community. Glenn retired from New Zealand Police in 2023. He now volunteers with two organisations – one dedicated to combatting food poverty/food waste and the other caring for the aged, as well as participating on boards and committees.

Watch out for our Ten One story coming soon with more images and stories.

ENDS

Issued by Police Media Centre

MIL OSI New Zealand News –

MIL-OSI USA: Senator Coons leads Democratic colleagues in resolution reaffirming USAID’s role in safeguarding U.S. national security

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Delaware Christopher Coons

WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.) introduced a resolution reaffirming that the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is essential for advancing the national security interests of the United States in the wake of President Trump’s efforts to halt U.S. foreign assistance operations and dismantle USAID. The resolution is cosponsored by Senators Brian Schatz (D-Hawaii), Mark Warner (D-Va.), and 40 other members of the Senate Democratic Caucus.

Senator Coons went to the Senate floor Monday evening to introduce and ask for unanimous consent on the resolution; U.S. Senator Jim Risch (R-Idaho) objected. You can watch his full remarks here.

“President Donald Trump’s unprecedented attacks on USAID and our entire foreign aid apparatus weaken our standing in the world, create power vacuums for our adversaries to fill, and put American lives in danger,” said Senator Coons. “For less than one percent of the federal budget, USAID and foreign aid stop pandemics before they reach America, prevent terrorism, human trafficking and organized crime from finding footholds, and prevent Chinese and Russian disinformation from spreading. Congress created USAID as an independent agency and only Congress can reverse that. I’m glad to see so many of my colleagues standing with me to defend the separation of powers and our foreign aid programs.”

“There will be suffering all over the world because of Trump and Musk’s illegal steps to dismantle USAID,” said Senator Schatz, Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations. “Right now, families are waiting for medicine and food that’s already been paid for, including food produced by American farmers, and Musk just cut them off. The law is on our side, but in the meantime, the Trump administration is illegally fueling chaos that will lead to death across the world and make America less safe.”

“For a small fraction of the overall U.S. budget, USAID promotes global health and stability, fights terrorism, and strengthens U.S. relationships abroad. As Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, I want to be clear: The latest attempt by the Trump administration to freeze U.S.-funded foreign aid assistance and punish the men and women who are working at the agency is a gift to our adversaries that will make us less safe. No one is more delighted that the United States is retreating from its global leadership role than the Communist Party of China,” said Senator Warner.

The resolution is a direct response to the efforts by President Donald Trump and Elon Musk to eliminate USAID and pause the vast majority of U.S. foreign assistance programs, including reports that President Trump would sign an executive order folding the agency into the State Department— moves that are illegal without congressional approval. Senator Coons and his Senate Democratic colleagues are demanding clarity amid purges of USAID’s top personnel, aid freezes, and chaos.

Accounting for less than one percent of the federal budget, our foreign assistance programs, many of which are led by USAID, play an indispensable role in promoting global stability and protecting our nation. Examples include the agency’s vital humanitarian assistance work during global conflicts, efforts to combat infectious diseases before they spread to the United States, to counter terrorism recruitment worldwide and to reduce the number of children pulled into gangs supporting organized crime and human trafficking.

In addition to Senators Coons, Schatz, and Warner, this resolution is cosponsored by Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.) Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) Lisa Blunt Rochester, (D-Del.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Maggie Hassan (D-N.H.), Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Ruben Gallego (D-Ariz.), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), Andy Kim (D-N.J.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Angus King (I-Maine), Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Patty Murray, (D-Wash.), Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Gary Peters (D-Mich.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Raphael Warnock (D-Ga.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), and Jon Ossoff (D-Ga.).

The full text of the resolution is available here.

MIL-OSI Australia: Recent decisions cast doubt on state-based trade mark removal actions

Source: Allens Insights

A low bar for ‘intention to use’ 6 min read

The Australian Trade Marks Office recently decided two related actions for removal for non-use against registered marks owned by Mae Watson: the first, ‘Whiplash’, and the second ‘WHIPLASHED’, both for beauty salon and beauty-related services including lash extensions.

The decisions shed light on whether an applicant can limit a removal action under section 92 of the Trade Marks Act 1995 (Cth) (TMA) to particular states in Australia and the threshold question of the ‘intention to use’ under s92(4)(a).

In this Insight, we outline the details of each decision and what trade mark owners can do to avoid the risk of removal actions being brought.

Key takeaways

If, after filing a s92 TMA removal action (which requires an applicant to be satisfied, on its enquiries into use, that the owner has not used the relevant mark in Australia), it becomes clear throughout the evidentiary process or at hearing that there is some use, but only in a specific geographical location, the applicant may, in certain circumstances seek that the Registrar invoke the s102 TMA discretion, and request that the mark remain on the register but be subject to a geographical limitation.
‘Intention to use’ in a s92(4)(a) TMA removal action is a low bar. The act of filing the trade mark application combined with a positive statement by the owner confirming an intention can be enough to shift the onus to the removal applicant to show a lack of intention.

Delegate declines two related non-use removal actions

Beauty salon, Whiplash’d Pty Ltd (the Removal Applicant), brought two related removal actions against Mae Watson (the Owner)’s registered marks ‘Whiplash’ and ‘WHIPLASHED’:

an application for complete removal (excluding WA) of ‘Whiplash’, brought on the basis of non-use for a period of three years in all states except WA (s92(4)(b)); and
an application for complete removal of WHIPLASHED brought on the basis of a lack of intention to use in good faith and non-use in the relevant period (s92(4)(a)).

Action for removal of ‘Whiplash’

The Owner argued that she had used Whiplash in all states in Australia, predominately in WA, in connection with lash extension services throughout the relevant three-year period, and further that the COVID pandemic was an impediment to broader use of the mark in Australia.

The Removal Applicant sought to qualify the removal action to removal except for the state of WA. The Delegate, however, considered that there is no provision in s92 for a removal application to be qualified in that manner. Section 92(4) requires that a removal applicant seek removal for all or any of the goods and/or services in respect of which the trade mark is registered in Australia (and not a part of Australia).

Section 102 provides the Registrar with a discretion to impose a territorial restriction on the registration of a trade mark where there has been no use of the mark in a particular place in Australia for a three-year period, where certain conditions are met. These include that the applicant for such an action is either the registered owner of a trade mark that is:

substantially identical with or deceptively similar to the challenged mark,
registered in respect of the same goods and/or services specified in the application, and
subject to the condition that the use of the trade mark be restricted to a specific place in Australia;

or the Registrar is of the opinion that the trade mark may be registered by the applicant with that condition or limitation.

The quirk of s102 is that it can only be invoked if an applicant has a removal action (s92(4)(b)) on foot for all of Australia. In this case, as the Removal Applicant had not invoked s102, the Delegate considered the removal action as if it applied to all of Australia. The Owner exhibited evidence of use of the mark in respect of beauty salon services in the relevant period in (at least) WA. Given that the Delegate was satisfied there was use in WA, it was unnecessary to consider whether the mark had been used outside of WA. Further, even if that Applicant had invoked s102, it had not made any arguments that it would satisfy the criteria outlined above. Ultimately, the Delegate found the ‘Whiplash’ trade mark had been used in the three-year period in Australia, and so, could remain on the register unamended.

Action for removal of ‘WHIPLASHED’

To succeed in opposing the action against WHIPLASHED, the Owner had to rebut the allegation that, at the time of filing, she had no intention in good faith to use the mark, or show that the trade mark was used in good faith in the relevant period.

The Delegate noted that the burden on the Owner of establishing the requisite intention is not high and that the filing of a trade mark is prima facie evidence of an intention to use the mark in respect of all the services claimed. The act of filing, combined with a positive statement by the Owner (such as ‘when I registered WHIPLASHED I was committed to using it’ or ‘I had an intention to provide services under the WHIPLASHED brand throughout Australia’) was sufficient to shift the onus to the Removal Applicant to prove a lack of intention. The Removal Applicant did not cast any doubt on the genuineness or reliability of the Owner’s evidence of intention to use, so the Delegate was satisfied that the intention was made out.

In terms of demonstrating actual use, the Owner provided evidence of use in the relevant period in relation to beauty services and the Removal Applicant failed to cast doubt on this evidence. The Owner also provided evidence of use of ‘Whiplash’ in relation to beauty salon services, and the Delegate accepted that use of ‘Whiplash’ constituted use of WHIPLASHED under s100(2)(a), as it was use with ‘alterations not substantially affecting the identity’ of the mark.

In the result, the Owner had established both an intention to use as at the filing date, and use of the mark during the relevant period, and the mark remained on the register.

Actions you can take now

Companies seeking to limit a competitor’s registered trade mark to exclude the state in which they operate should consider if they meet the criteria to invoke s102 (for instance, whether they own a similar mark on the register that is itself subject to a geographical limitation). Removal applicants face somewhat of a conundrum, in that, the initial non-use removal application would have to be framed to claim that there is no use in Australia, and the subsequent invoking of s102 could then seek to limit the registration to a particular geographical location.
Once a company settles on branding, it should register any relevant marks it intends to use as soon as possible to avoid competing marks being entered onto the register and gaining priority.
If a competing mark has priority on the register, a company can nevertheless consider investigating whether the competing mark is being used in all the geographical locations, and in respect to all the goods and/or services for which it is registered, to inform whether to bring a non-use action.
Companies intending to operate Australia-wide should ensure that all relevant registered marks are being used as trade marks in all relevant jurisdictions—particularly where there are competing marks on the register subject to geographical limitations—to avoid the risk of a removal action being brought that invokes s102.

MIL OSI News –

MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Press Briefing Transcript – Julie Kozack

Source: International Monetary Fund

February 6, 2025

INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND PRESS BRIEFING

Washington, D.C. Thursday, February 6, 2025

P R O C E E D I N G S

KOZACK: Good morning, everyone. It’s great to see you all, here in person and online. Welcome to the first IMF press briefing for 2025. I’m Julie Kozak, Director of the Communication Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. U.S. Eastern Time. I’ll start with a few announcements and then I’ll move to take your questions in person, on WebEx, and via the Press Center.

First, Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva will travel to Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The Managing Director will visit Ethiopia on February 8th and 9th to meet Prime Minister Abiy and his team, and this visit will take stock of the economic reforms and progress that is being made by the country. She will also meet with stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector.

The Managing Director will also travel to the United Arab Emirates to participate in the Arab Fiscal Forum on February 10th and the World Government Summit on February 11th where she will deliver keynote remarks. On February 16th and 17th, the Managing Director will participate in a two-day conference in Saudi Arabia on building resilience of emerging market economies. The conference is co-organized by the IMF and the Saudi Finance Ministry.

The First Deputy Managing Director Gita Gopinath will travel to Japan to join the Article IV mission. She will participate in meetings with the authorities and hold a press conference on February 7th at 10:30 a.m. Tokyo time.

Finally, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan to participate in a jointly organized IMF-JICA conference on Economic and Fiscal Policy Challenges and Prospects for Asia. And this is scheduled for February 12 and 13.

And with that I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please do turn on both your camera and the microphone when speaking. Let’s get started.

QUESTIONER: Hi,I was just wondering, you mentioned Ethiopia. How concerned are you about sort of countries with large IMF programs which also receive a substantial amount of support from USAID, considering the recent executive order, countries like Ethiopia and Ukraine, for example. Thanks.

KOZACK: Thanks very much. So with respect to your question, you know we are closely following the announcements and developments regarding USAID. At this stage it’s too early to gauge the precise impact on the countries that it supports. We’ll wait for clarity on the next steps, including any changes to the scope of the work of USAID.

QUESTIONER: So, the IMF mission is going to start working in Ukraine this month. Could you specify please what main issues will the Fund plan to focus on during the Seventh Review of the EFF program. And the second question is about the pension reform in Ukraine. Ukrainian government committed to starting this reform this year. Could you elaborate on what key changes the IMF expects from Ukraine on this area? Thank you.

KOZACK: Are there any other questions on Ukraine?

QUESTIONER: So, according to latest information, the review of the EFF is scheduled to begin this month. When the decision on the disbursement is going to be made and what amount of funds are going to be provided with this fund? And the follow-up, how much money is left in the EFF according to the current situation? Are there any plans to expand this program? Thank you.

QUESTIONER: Just to follow up on the question about Ethiopia. Obviously, the USAID cuts also affect Ukraine pretty significantly. And I wonder, you know, both in those cases and in all cases involving USAID funding, whether you are working with the US ED here and sort of sending a message about the impact. So, whether you’ve kind of figured it out across the enterprise and across all the countries that the IMF works with as well. Thanks.

KOZACK: Anything else on Ukraine online? Okay. So, on Ukraine, just to remind everyone of the context. So, on December 20th, the IMF’s Executive Board approved the Sixth Review of the EFF program. That enabled the disbursement of $1.1 billion and that brought total disbursements under the program to $9.8 billion. And the total size of the program, I believe, was $15.6 billion. So, the difference between those two is what would be remaining. At that time, the Board assessed that program performance remained strong. The authorities had met all of the benchmarks and prior actions for the review.

With respect to the next mission, the technical work for the upcoming review is underway. The mission dates are in the process of being finalized, and once we have them, we’ll be sure to communicate that. During this upcoming mission, the IMF staff will engage with the authorities on fiscal policy, including progress on revenue mobilization, monetary policies for 2025, and also progress in ensuring that debt sustainability and fiscal sustainability are restored. Staff will also be reviewing governance reforms, which remain a key pillar for the program. Based on the approved calendar of disbursements, subject to completion of the next review and, of course, subject to Board approval, Ukraine would have access to about $900 million for that next review.

With respect to pension reform, the government has committed to launch pension reforms this year in 2025, and they would be spearheaded by the Ministry of Social Policy. And those reforms are supported by external partners, notably the World Bank. What I can also add is that the authorities are in the process of developing a comprehensive set of proposals for pension reforms, but it’s too early to tell exactly what will be included in those proposals and what the changes may be.

And on the second question, I don’t really have much to add to what I already said, other than obviously we’re paying close attention and we’re awaiting further details.

QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Just on Syria, can you give us an update if the IMF has made any contact with the new government and if there are any plans to provide a loan package to the country? Thank you.

KOZACK: We’re closely monitoring, obviously, the situation in Syria, and we stand ready to support the international community’s efforts to assist Syria’s reconstruction as needed and when conditions allow. With respect to our engagement, we have not had a meaningful engagement with Syria since 2009, which was the time of the last Article IV Consultation, and this has been due to the difficult security situation in the country.

QUESTIONER: I have two questions, and they’re Caribbean-related questions. Can you provide a breakdown of the growth projections for the Caribbean region, more specifically, focusing on St. Kitts and Nevis, and what factors are driving the projected growth or decline outlook for the region, more specifically, the Caribbean region?

KOZACK: Okay. All right, let me step back and give a little bit of an overview of where we stand, what our view is on the Caribbean. So, following the rapid recovery after the Pandemic, real GDP growth in the region has normalized in recent years. Average GDP growth for the region, and this is excluding Guyana and Haiti, is estimated at 2.2 percent for 2023, 2.4 percent for 2024. And growth, our projection is for growth to remain relatively stable at 2.4 percent in 2025.

Broadly speaking, there are sort of two groups of countries in the Caribbean. So, we look at tourism-dependent economies, and there we see that growth in tourism economies has slowed as tourism arrivals have returned to pre-Pandemic levels. And then for commodity-exporting countries, they have faced challenges in the energy sector but have overall benefited from robust performance in their non-energy sector, and that has been driven by supportive and economic policies.

I can also add that inflation in most Caribbean countries has moderated significantly over the past few years, and the decline was due to lower global commodity prices and easing of supply chain disruptions. And we expect inflation to remain moderate in the years to come.

QUESTIONER: My question is on the comment by Managing Director Georgieva in Davos. MD mentioned in Davos clearly that more cooperation in the regional levels might be needed in the future in such a fragmented world and IMF would support such a movement. And could you give me some more detailed plans?

KOZACK: Thanks very much for the question. What the Managing Director noted in Davos is that we are seeing shifting patterns in global cooperation, in trade, and in other areas, including financial and capital flows. And of course, as a global institution, what will be important for us is as we engage with our membership, right, to take all of this into account to ensure that we can give our members the best policy advice within our mandate of economic and financial stability.

QUESTIONER: Thanks so much, Julie. I wanted to ask you very broadly about the changes that are happening in the United States and the tariffs that President Trump has announced. Now the implementation of the tariffs on Canada and Mexico has been delayed to March 1st. And, you know, it’s not clear what will happen there exactly. But one of the, you know, the tariffs on China have stayed in place. China has now announced tariffs that will kick in on February 10th. The IMF has warned repeatedly against rising protectionism and also kind of cataloged the thousands of trade restrictions that have been put in place and growing over time since COVID. Can you just walk us through what your perception is right now? The markets have been really all over the place, you know, sort of up and down depending on the day’s mood. Do you see this period of trade uncertainty that you warned about in the WEO, kind of really affecting and dampening global growth prospects? Thanks.

KOZACK: Thanks very much. Let me see if anyone else has questions on this broad topic.

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Yeah, I was just wondering, just to follow on the previous question, how you sort of think about the unpredictability of of these tariffs or the discussions around the tariffs, the uncertainty that that kind of brings up, and potentially how that could affect monetary policy. We’ve seen a lot of analysts talking about how they no longer expect the Fed to cut, or they expect the Fed to cut maybe only once this year. I’m just sort of wondering how you’re kind of in real time or as close to real time as you can, sort of taking on board that unpredictability when you think about the U.S. economy and the impacts for global growth. Thanks.

KOZACK: Great. And you also had a question.

QUESTIONER: Yes. Just following up with my colleagues. What sort of study, if any, has the IMF undertaken to better understand the global ramifications of these tariffs? We know they’re on pause for another 30 days or so or less. And what sort of impact would small states that are heavily dependent on the United States feel going forward?

KOZACK: And let me go online to see if anyone online has a question along these lines.

QUESTIONER: It is very similar. Just wondering the fact that it’s not just tariffs that have imposed on China, but the threat of tariffs on countries across the EU, Canada, and Mexico, and what effect that has on the global outlook. Thank you.

KOZACK: Okay. Thank you. Anyone else online want to come in on this topic? Okay. So, what I can say on this issue is we’re following the announcements by the U.S. with respect to tariffs on Chinese goods and potentially Canadian and Mexican goods. We’re following these announcements. We believe that it’s in the interest of all to find a constructive way forward to resolve this issue.

With respect to the assessment, assessing the full impact of these measures of tariffs, it’s actually going to depend on several factors, and let me lay those out. One of those factors is going to be the responses of the countries concerned. Another factor will be how firms and consumers react. And finally, how the measures evolve over time will also have an impact.

So, at this stage, that’s what I can share with you. We will, of course, have more information over time and in due course as the situation evolves.

QUESTIONER: Julie, I’m sorry, I think the question is, like, can you say something about what uncertainty does to the global economy? I mean, you’ve talked about this in WEO’s before, but do you see this as a period of heightened uncertainty now that Trump has taken office? And, you know, what is the impact of that uncertainty on things like investment and all this, you know, the sort of categories of economic indicators that we look at?

KOZACK: So, I think what I can say is, of course, I would refer you to the WEO for some of those analysis. And again, assessing the full impact of this will include all of the factors that I just laid out. And we would take into account issues related to uncertainty, market reactions, et cetera, in an assessment that we will ultimately undertake as the situation evolves and once we have more information.

Let me now go online. I see a couple of hands up. So, if you’re online, please go ahead and jump in.

QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning. Thank you for taking my question. Well, has the letter of intent between the IMF and Argentina been prepared? Or let me ask in a different way. Are the negotiations between Argentina and the IMF already in the final stage?

KOZACK: Thanks. Other questions on Argentina?

QUESTIONER: Could you give me any updates on the negotiations of the new agreement and what are the most challenging issues they are facing right now? And also yesterday, Minister Luis Caputo said a new agreement will not imply a devaluation of the peso or the exit of the exchange restrictions the next day. Does the IMF agree with this statement?

KOZACK: Thanks. Others on Argentina?

QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie. I was wondering also if you could give some input regarding the meetings that the mission in Buenos Aires had, if they have only been talking to government officials or if they are also contacting unions and other opposition representatives. And also, the new crawling peg of 1 percent has started this February. I was wondering if that was a matter of discussion between the staff and the government.

KOZACK: Thanks, other questions?

QUESTIONER: Yes, thank you, Julie. So, my question is also on the crawling peg. So, is the IMF concerned about the greater exchange rate delay generated by this reduction of the crawling peg from 2 percent to 1 percent started the 1st of February?

KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I hear two more. Please go ahead.

QUESTIONER: Hi, Julie, I wanted to know if Argentina has already paid a debt due on February 1st or when is it expected to do so? And if there is a meeting plan between Argentina authorities and the IMF network staff in Washington.

KOZACK: Thank you. Next.

QUESTIONER: Good morning. The question is if Argentina and the IMF comes to a new agreement, should it be like we are talking here in Argentina about $5 million? It will be for anything special, for example, to leave what we call cepo, or it depends on the Argentine authorities.

KOZACK: Any other questions on Argentina? Okay, I do not see anyone coming in.

So, on Argentina, what I can share is first that, as the Managing Director highlighted after her meeting with President Milei last month, we recognize Argentina’s tremendous progress in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, returning to growth, and with poverty finally starting to decline. We continue to engage constructively with the Argentine authorities. And a staff mission did recently visit Buenos Aires to advance discussions on a new program. The new program will aim to build on the gains that have been achieved so far, while also addressing the remaining challenges that the country faces. Constructive and frequent discussions continue, and we will provide further details on next steps when we have them.

I can also just add that to sustain early gains, there is a shared recognition between the Fund staff and the Argentine authorities about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary, and foreign exchange policies while furthering growth-enhancing reforms. I also know that you have a lot of interest, and there were a lot of detailed questions here, but given that the discussions are continuing and there has been good progress so far, we do want to ensure that there is space for staff and the authorities to continue these constructive discussions. And of course, we will communicate more when we have further details.

Okay, let us go online because I see a few hands up.

QUESTIONER: My question is, when do we expect Board of Directors to discuss Egypt Fourth Review?

KOZACK: Do we have other questions on Egypt?

QUESTIONER: Hi, I’d like to ask, in addition to that, when the board does discuss Egypt’s Fourth Review, will it also be discussing an additional RSF for Egypt? There have been some reports that Egypt is in line to receive as much as $1 billion.

KOZACK: Other questions?

QUESTIONER: I just wanted to ask, in terms of the assessment of Egypt, but also other countries in the region, to what extent you are calculating additional costs and spending needs that have to do with Gaza and with the potential absorption of Palestinian refugees that has been proposed.

KOZACK: Okay, any other questions on Egypt? I see I have two questions that have come through the press center, which I will read aloud. So, the first is when will the IMF’s Executive Board complete the Fourth Review of the Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility for Egypt?

The second question is regarding the Executive Board’s approval of the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program, could it be this month? Does the IMF have updates on your projections for Egypt’s economy in light of regional updates?

Let me share with you where we are on Egypt. On December 24, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Fourth Review of the EFF. This review is subject to approval of our Executive Board and subject to that approval, Egypt would have access to about $1.2 billion. Preparations for Board consideration are underway, and the Board meeting is expected to take place in the coming weeks.

In light of the difficult external conditions and challenging domestic environment, the IMF staff and the Egyptian authorities agreed to recalibrate the fiscal consolidation path, and this was agreed in December, I would highlight, to create fiscal space for critical social programs benefiting vulnerable groups and the middle class while ensuring debt sustainability.

Looking forward, reform priorities comprise lowering inflation, sustaining exchange rate flexibility, and liberalized access to foreign exchange. In addition, the program aims to boost domestic revenues. It aims to improve the business environment. It aims to accelerate disinvestment or divestment rather and leveling [of] the playing field between state-owned enterprises and the private sector. And of course, it also aims to enhance governance and transparency.

With respect to the question on the RSF, a policy package of reforms will be considered by the Fund’s Executive Board along with the Fourth Review of Egypt’s program.

And lastly, there is no connection at the moment between some of the announcements in Gaza and the and the Egypt program.

QUESTIONER: Hi, I wonder if I can just clarify. On the RSF, you say a policy package of reforms that also presumably comes with some additional funding. Can you confirm whether the amount of up to $1 billion is accurate?

KOZACK: I can’t confirm now the precise amount of the RSF, but of course as we have more information, we will provide that.

QUESTIONER: Thank you so much.

KOZACK: Let us go online. I see another hand online and then we will come back. Just one follow up, a follow up. Go ahead.

QUESTIONER: You cannot confirm the amount of the RSF. So just so we are clear, are you confirming that there are discussions around an RSF? Thanks.

KOZACK: Yes, there’s discussions on an RSF and the intention is to present the RSF with its package of reforms to our Executive Board at the same time as we present the Fourth Review of the EFF.

QUESTIONER: Question about Rwanda and Eastern Congo. I wanted to know, I know that the IMF has programs with both Rwanda and the DRC. And I wanted to know, you know, given the M23 incursion, the fall of Goma, how the programs can react to it, if there is anything you can say about that. And also, obviously, in El Salvador, they changed their cryptocurrency law, but it is also reported that they recently bought 50 bitcoins. So, some people are for the kind of national treasury. Some people are confused in terms of what the contours of the limitations put on. And I wonder if you could comment on that. Thanks a lot.

KOZACK: Okay, thank you. Any other questions on these countries? DRC, Rwanda, El Salvador?

Okay, let me start with DRC and I want to start by saying that, you know, we are deeply saddened by the loss of lives and the humanitarian crisis in the Eastern part of DRC. We are closely monitoring the situation, including its potential impact on neighboring countries and the region. And of course, we are also closely monitoring with respect to potential impact on our program.

With respect to Rwanda, what I can say on Rwanda is simply that the country continues to demonstrate a robust commitment to advancing policy reforms. And In December of 2024, our Executive Board concluded the Fourth Review of Rwanda’s programs.

With respect to El Salvador, just to step back and remind, IMF staff and the Salvadorian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on December 18th for a new arrangement, a new EFF arrangement. The arrangement would be for about $1.4 billion to support the government’s reform agenda, and this agreement is subject to approval by the IMF’s Executive Board.

I can also add that as explained in the press release that we issued following the staff-level agreement, the new Fund supported program aims to reduce the potential risks of the bitcoin project. Once in place, purchases of bitcoin will be confined under the program as agreed.

QUESTIONER: Thank you, Julie. Good morning, everyone. A few things. In Zimbabwe, when you expect a deal for the Staff Monitored Program? And on Lebanon, have you had any contact with the new government? Are there any signs that you are going to be able to work with them? Also on Senegal, can you give us any update on the resolution of the suspension of the financing program there? And lastly, are there any concerns of a drop in the commitment of funding from the U.S.? The 2025 project calls for the U.S. to stop putting money into the World Bank and the IMF. So, are you guys concerned about that?

KOZACK: Okay, thanks. Starting with Zimbabwe, I do not have an update for you for today on Zimbabwe, but we will come back to you bilaterally.

On Lebanon, what I can share is that, you know, we welcome the election of General Aoun as president of Lebanon, and we look forward to working with him and his new government to address the challenges facing the Lebanese economy. And just to remind, Lebanon continues to face profound economic challenges, and the conflict had exacerbated an already fragile macroeconomic and social situation. The election of the president, the formation of a new government, as well as the ceasefire, are critical to support policy actions and reforms that would allow the gradual return to the normalization of economic activity in Lebanon.

And what I can share on Senegal is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities on addressing the misreporting case. Senegal’s Court of Auditors is expected to issue its final report this month. In parallel, IMF staff are working closely with the authorities to identify their capacity development needs and to implement corrective measures needed to address the root causes of the misreporting. These efforts are aimed at enhancing transparency, strengthening accountability, and preventing a recurrence of similar misreporting in the future.

And I think, on your final question, all I can say here is that the United States is the IMF’s largest shareholder, and it plays an extremely valuable role in helping ensure global financial stability. We have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so.

QUESTIONER: Thanks, Julie. Thank you for taking my question. When do you think we can expect the Executive Board’s approval on the next tranche for the Island Nation? And if there is any delay, what sort of reason is there? Is there more for the government to do? And secondly, the budget for the country is expected in a few weeks. Has the IMF given any input on preparing this budget, given the fact that the country is still in the EFF program?

KOZACK: Thanks. So, your question was on Sri Lanka? And yes, I see you nodding. So, if anyone else has questions on Sri Lanka, I can take them now. Okay. If not, let me go ahead with Sri Lanka.

So, on Sri Lanka on November 23rd, IMF staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Third Review of Sri Lanka’s EFF program. Once approved by the IMF’s Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $333 million in financing. And we expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.

Here, I would also just like to take the opportunity to emphasize that Sri Lanka’s ambitious reform agenda is delivering commendable outcomes. The economy expanded by 5.5 percent in the fourth — third quarter of 2024. Average headline and core inflation remain contained well below the target during the fourth quarter of 2024. And international reserves increased to $6.1 billion at the end of 2024.

With respect to the specific question on the budget, what I can share is that the staff-level agreement that I mentioned, which was reached in November, will be presented to the Executive Board or is subject to Executive Board approval, but it’s also contingent upon, among other things, implementation by the authorities of prior actions, including submission of the 2025 budget that is consistent with parameters identified under the program.

QUESTIONER: Most of the questions we had have been touched upon, and I would just reinforce as well what colleagues had said earlier about trying to get a sense of what all this uncertainty around tariffs will mean. I know there is a tendency to talk about the policies once they are implemented and the impact. But given the fact that policies get announced and withdrawn and swung around, it seems like the uncertainty has more of the impact than the actual policy. But all that seems to be covered. I will get to — actually, the only outstanding question we have now is if you could update us on the status of the Mozambique program and if there is a risk to that program’s existence right now, given what is going on. That is for our Africa colleagues. Everything else was covered. Thank you so much. I appreciate it.

KOZACK: Thank you very much. So, on Mozambique, what I can share is that the Article IV Consultation and the Fourth Review of the Extended Credit Facility, or ECF, were completed back in July of 2024. An IMF team will visit Maputo in the coming weeks to engage with the new government. We do remain engaged to support the country’s efforts toward remaining macroeconomic stability, accelerating growth and making growth more inclusive, in line with the arrangements. But given that there is a mission in the coming weeks, we will have more to report toward the end of that engagement.

QUESTIONER: Julie, regarding Russia, are there any developments concerning the postponed mission to Russia to evaluate progress in economy that was stopped in September due to necessity to gather additional information and make additional analysis. Anything we should expect this year, probably? Thank you.

KOZACK: Unfortunately, I don’t yet have an update for you or a timeline for the Article IV.

QUESTIONER: One final question. Thank you. Sorry, Julie, I’m going to try again with a sort of a similar question. But, you know, we are seeing a fundamental shift in the global and potentially in the support that is available for developing countries. The United States has ended foreign assistance. It has frozen funding for the World Food Program. It is pulling out of and talking about pulling out of the World Health Organization. These are institutions that are part, writ large, of the Bretton Woods system in which the IMF is such a key player.

So, I do not think it’s unfair of us to be asking for some guidance from you about how you at an institution like the IMF are approaching this period of time that is marked by uncertainty, not just for the markets or for global trade, but also for the institutions themselves. And, you know, we have seen some initial reports that Elon Musk’s DOGE employees or people who work with DOGE are starting to look at the World Bank and other institutions.

And I, you know, so I guess we want to hear something from you that is a little bit broader about the time that we’re in and what it means, because it obviously has implications for other countries, too, if they’re going to fill the gap in the developing thing. And, you know, you have been warning for years that the developing economies face a kind of perfect storm of different difficult circumstances. This seems like it adds to, to it. Thanks.

KOZACK: Thanks very much. Look, what I can say now is really what I’ve been saying. I really do not have much to add other than that we are a global institution. We have a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally and just ultimately support growth and employment in the world economy. We are continuing as an institution to remain laser-focused, of course, on that mandate. And we, as a global institution, take our responsibility to serve our membership very, very seriously. And we will continue to do everything that we need to do to serve our membership in the best possible way. You know, we do, as I said, have a long history of working with successive U.S. administrations, and we look forward to continuing to do so as an institution for which the U.S. is our largest shareholder.

And with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to an end. Thank you all for your participation today. As a reminder, this briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time today. A transcript will be made available later on IMF.org, and as usual, in case of clarifications, additional queries, or anything else, please reach out to my colleagues at media@mf.org.

This does conclude our first press briefing of the year. I wish everyone a wonderful day and I do look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you all so much for joining, and please be safe given the weather outside here in D.C. Thank you, everyone.

* * * * *

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MIL OSI Economics –

MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth Holds Senate Floor to Protest Project 2025 Architect Russell Vought’s Cabinet Nomination and Trump’s Illegal Power Grabs That Are Harming the Middle Class and Our National Security

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth

February 06, 2025

[WASHINGTON, D.C.] – Today, U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) joined Senate Democrats’ 30-hour protest opposing Project 2025 architect Russell Vought’s nomination to serve as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under President Donald Trump. Holding the floor, Duckworth delivered an impassioned speech slamming Trump and unelected billionaire Elon Musk’s ongoing illegal power grabs—including his unlawful federal grant freeze and his shuttering of USAID—that are inflicting pain on middle-class Americans and endangering our national security. Video of Duckworth’s opening remarks can be found on the Senator’s YouTube and her full speech can be found on the Senator’s Twitter/X and Facebook.

Key quotes:

“Decades before I ever considered a career in politics, when I was just starting out in the Army, I raised my right hand and took an oath. I swore to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. I vowed to protect our nation against all enemies—foreign and domestic. And in this moment, at this precipice for our country, I need to make good on that promise. Because in the just 18 days since Donald Trump was inaugurated, we have witnessed an all-out assault on the system of checks and balances that our government was founded upon. We have seen the President both overreach and underdeliver: proving through executive orders and Twitter marching orders that he cares more about the billionaires who belong to Mar-a-Lago than the middle-class folks he pretended to care for on the campaign trail.”

“Last week, news broke that Trump had declared a blanket freeze on all federal grants. Ignoring the fact that Congress had already appropriated those funds. Ignoring that he point-blank did not have the authority to do so. Ignoring that his action would—and already has—hurt countless folks who rely on these grants for their most basic needs… He manufactured a crisis that has left that single mom working a double shift in a Southside nursing home unsure whether her Medicaid will be stripped away in the dark of the night. He’s created a crisis that has left Veterans wondering if they’ll be able to access the benefits they earned with the blood they were brave enough to shed for our country. He’s fabricated a nightmarish reality where homeless shelters might have to close their doors and turn back onto the streets the at-risk teenagers who rely on their care.”

“Elon Musk is unelected, unvetted and unqualified—he does not have the legal authority to dismantle entire agencies. Yet in Trump’s America, the size of his bank account and how far he is willing to bend the knee is enough for our President to bestow on him unchecked power. Musk is willing to bow down to Trump’s throne made of fool’s gold and false promises. So in return, Elon gets to run wild, run rampant. He for some reason gets to have full access to Americans’ social security numbers and Veterans’ personal information—for what reason, no one knows and all of us should fear. He gets to hijack our systems to enrich himself rather than the middle class. He gets to stomp on those in need, then fire anyone who dares stand up for what’s right—or what’s legal…They aren’t making America great. They’re making it authoritarian.”

Duckworth’s opening remarks as prepared below:

I take the verbal baton from Senator King after hours and hours of arguments from my Democratic colleagues, not because I woke up this morning with a strong desire to hear my own voice for as long as I could on the Senate floor, but because decades before I ever considered a career in politics—when I was just starting out in the Army—I raised my right hand and took an oath. I swore to support and defend the Constitution of the United States. I vowed to protect our nation against all enemies—foreign and domestic.

And in this moment, at this precipice for our country, I need to make good on that promise.

Because in the just 18 days since Donald Trump was inaugurated, we have witnessed an all-out assault on the system of checks and balances that our government was founded upon.

We have seen the President both overreach and underdeliver—proving through executive orders and Twitter marching orders that he cares more about the billionaires who belong to Mar-a-Lago than the middle-class folks he pretended to care for on the campaign trail.

Look, 250 years ago this April, a few brave patriots grabbed their muskets and risked their lives at Lexington and Concord, sacrificing for a country that was still more of an idea, more of an ideal, than reality.

They did so because they could no longer stand living under a tyrannical leader.

They did so because they had dreamt up the notion of a government of, by and for the people—and they knew that a system based on checks and balances was the best way to keep this new nation’s leaders from turning into the kind of tyrant they’d fled England to escape. A system of checks and balances.

Well, two weeks into Trump’s America, the only checks I see are the ones going into the pockets of Trump’s rich friends. The only balance I see is Trump’s balancing act between ripping off the middle class and endangering our national security.

Our system of government is being eroded before our eyes. It is being perverted to work for the few—the billionaires—rather than the many, the people.

And it is sickening to see so many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle put their hands over their eyes and pretend they don’t see what’s happening, refusing to speak up as our President turns into more of a despot every day, as his power-grabs get more extreme, more insidious, more cruel.

Even if we took the full 30 hours of debate on this nomination, I don’t think we could get through all the ways that Trump’s absolute disregard for the rule of law over the past two weeks has already harmed America—and Americans. But let me use my time to try.

Last week, news broke that Trump had declared a blanket freeze on all federal grants. Ignoring the fact that Congress had already appropriated those funds. Ignoring that he point-blank did not have the authority to do so. Ignoring that his action would—and already has—hurt countless folks who rely on these grants for their most basic needs.

President Trump may think that he “owned the Libs” by causing havoc in our federal government. But what he’s really done is create a reality where his own voters who depend on groups like Meals on Wheels aren’t sure how they’re going to put food on the table next week.

He may think he “destroyed woke culture” with this freeze. But no. No, he didn’t. Instead, he manufactured a crisis that has left that single mom working a double shift in a Southside nursing home unsure whether her Medicaid will be stripped away in the dark of the night.

He’s created a crisis that has left Veterans wondering if they’ll be able to access the benefits they earned with the blood they were brave enough to shed for our country.

He’s fabricated a nightmarish reality where homeless shelters might have to close their doors and turn back onto the streets the at-risk teenagers who rely on their care.

Listen, when I was in high school, my family struggled. We had no money and some days had no food. I still remember going to the grocery store and counting out our last five one-dollar food stamps to buy as much bread and bologna as possible—then praying we’d have enough to last the week. I still remember the hours my dad spent walking from payphone to payphone, hoping to find just 50 cents so my brother and I could buy lunch at school the next afternoon. A lot of times, that hot lunch at school was the only meal I could count on.

So as a former hungry kid, and now as a mom of two little girls, I cannot imagine the pain of parents who rely on school meals to feed their own kids and who are now terrified that Trump’s vanity project of a federal freeze will force their five-year-old to go hungry as the grants that fund cafeteria meal programs may now get gutted.

Shame on Donald Trump. And shame on the Republicans who can’t seem to find the ounce of courage necessary to stand up and say what all of us in this Chamber so obviously know: That this is wrong. That this is outrageous. And that this is a wild, unlawful abuse of power.

But Trump didn’t stop with the grant freeze. Last weekend, he gave Elon Musk—the world’s richest person—the power to cut off aid from the world’s most vulnerable people. He gave him the authority to dismantle an entire agency in one illegal, fell swoop. Together, they are now actively gutting USAID, completely undermining the United States’ national security and global standing—knowingly, intentionally—jeopardizing the safety of countless innocent people worldwide who rely on the organization for humanitarian assistance.

Now, bad actors in the PRC and Russia will be able to step in to fill the leadership vacuum that Trump created—forcing folks in need across the world to turn to our adversaries, not us, for help.

Let me be clear: USAID is an organization dedicated to doing good around the globe—but the good that it does also has a direct, tangible impact on the safety and economic security of families here at home.

It is an organization that helps allies detect fentanyl—in part so we can stop it before it comes across our own borders.

It’s an organization that help feeds starving families worldwide—but it does so using 2 billion dollars of food purchased from American farmers, with the paychecks going into their red, white and blue pockets so they can keep their family farms for another generation.

It is an organization that helps stop global pandemics. And it’s an organization that works to make sure the poorest children in the poorest countries don’t die from drinking dirty water—a mission that also happens to be critical to our national strength, as when countries experience water insecurity, they’re more likely to undergo political instability as well, increasing the odds that their governments fail and power falls into the wrong hands—a sequence of events that often leads to the kind of immigration crisis we’re already facing at our border.

I know there is waste, fraud and abuse in our government—and I am all for rooting that out. In fact, I’ve written and passed legislation to do just that. But eliminating an entire agency with such a vital mission is not the way to go about this.

USAID makes up just 1% of our federal budget. And these short-sighted cuts will end up costing the American taxpayer even more in the long term, as there will be more global instability, more migrations crises, more pandemics to contend with as a result of this frankly idiotic decision.

It’s ironic. The guy charged with making our government more efficient is making it more costly and more chaotic. Case in point: He’s threatening to use American troops to bring home USAID workers if they don’t leave their overseas posts in the next 30 days—a move that in itself would cost Americans an estimated 100 million dollars.

Elon Musk is unelected, unvetted and unqualified—he does not have the legal authority to dismantle entire agencies. Yet in Trump’s America, the size of his bank account and how far he is willing to bend the knee is enough for our President to bestow on him unchecked power.

Musk is willing to bow down to Trump’s throne made of fool’s gold and false promises. So in return, Elon gets to run wild, run rampant.

He for some reason gets to have full access to Americans’ social security numbers and Veterans’ personal information—for what reason, no one knows and all of us should fear.

He gets to hijack our systems to enrich himself rather than the middle class.

He gets to stomp on those in need, then fire anyone who dares stand up for what’s right—or what’s legal.

Trump and Musk are not bringing back the good ole days of Ronald Reagan. Reagan believed in international aid. He is the one whose name is on the front of USAID’s building.

They aren’t making America great. They’re making it authoritarian. And we should all be asking ourselves—if we let them gut USAID, then what’s next?

The answer is the Department of Education. And then your Social Security. Your Medicaid. The things you and your families need to get by are right behind.

Look, Trump ran his campaign on the idea of lowering costs for the middle class. He said he’d reverse inflation on day one. Well, day one has come and gone. So has day two, three, four.

Here we are, weeks in, and all he’s done is take actions that have hurt everyday Americans to help his rich buddies afford another private jet. Under his wise stewardship, egg prices have skyrocketed. Inflation remains sky-high. A needless trade war seems to be getting closer every day, which could raise the price of gas and groceries even further. And all of us are in greater danger from bad actors the world-over.

Enough is enough. Enough was enough a very long time ago. Donald Trump is unchecked. The scales of our government have become unbalanced. Every day those scales tip more and more away from serving the needs of the working class and toward feeding the greed of the billionaires who pal around with the President on the golf course.

It was Ronald Reagan who once said, quote: “[T]he genius of our constitutional system is its recognition that no one branch of government alone could be relied on to preserve our freedoms… The great safeguard of our liberty is the totality of the constitutional system, with no one part getting the upper hand.”

Reagan also described the Constitution as a “covenant” — a covenant that, quote: “[W]e have made not only with ourselves, but with all of mankind.”

Today, I am asking my Republican colleagues to honor the covenant so cherished by their own conservative hero, Ronald Reagan. I am asking them to heed his words. To heed his warning. To heed his plea to us all.

Under Donald Trump, our government is not of, by or for the people. It is of, by and for the people with the deepest pockets. “E pluribus unum,” “out of many one,” is supposed to signify the strength of our union—the solidarity of our nation.

Do not let Donald Trump pervert it to mean that out of the many people, he is the only one who matters.

To my colleagues on the other side of the aisle: All I am asking of you today is to do the jobs you were elected to do.

All I am begging for is that you make good on the oath you took when you were first sworn into this chamber: To support and defend our Constitution.

Trump is acting as if he believes that the Constitution is just an old, yellowing piece of paper that he can crumble up at his will. My colleagues, you know better. And you know your constituents deserve better.

Please, find the courage to stand up and say so. It’s the least each of us can do for the country that we are lucky enough to have been elected to protect.

You can do that, today, by voting no on Trump’s latest unqualified, unfit cabinet nominee, Russell Vought:

A man who doesn’t even care to hide that he will happily rubber-stamp Trump’s worst instincts.

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MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Tells Trade Nominee to Focus on Opening More Export Markets, Not a Tariff-First Approach

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

02.06.25

Cantwell Tells Trade Nominee to Focus on Opening More Export Markets, Not a Tariff-First Approach

“The biggest task at hand is to […] get U.S. products into more places,” Cantwell tells Trump’s pick for U.S. Trade Representative; In fallout of Trump’s tariff threats, Cantwell paints a clear path forward: Instead of imposing tariffs, we need to open new markets;

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee and the ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, emphasized the importance of open markets for farmers and exporters in the State of Washington and across the country during a Finance Committee hearing to consider the nomination of Jamieson Greer for U.S. Trade Representative.

“When you look at apples — and about [50%] of our market export is to Canada and Mexico,” said Sen. Cantwell, “and the U.S. Free Trade Agreement increased that capacity … why are we arguing with our closest neighbors, our biggest export markets for apples? And in the meantime, not going out and opening up more apple markets?

“The tariffs that were put on cost us an unbelievable retaliatory tariff in India,” Sen. Cantwell added. “It basically decimated the market. It went from 120 million in India down to 1 million. …. I fought hard and did get the Biden administration to work with India and reverse that tariff on apples. And I have to say we are now back to recapturing that market. But I don’t understand why you think a tariff-first approach is the way to capitalize on the biggest task at hand.”

As a front page article in today’s Yakima Herald-Republic warns: Potential trade war could hit Yakima Valley agriculture.

Yesterday, Sen. Cantwell voted against advancing the nomination of Howard Lutnick, President Trump’s choice to be Secretary of the Department of Commerce, citing concerns with Lutnick’s support for Trump’s proposed tariffs.

Tuesday, Sen. Cantwell delivered a major speech on the Senate floor, arguing that the President’s arbitrary tariffs threaten domestic job creation and economic growth in an Information Age. She outlined a strategy focused on building coalitions, growing exports, and establishing principles to support innovation in the Information Age.

Sen. Cantwell has remained a steadfast supporter of free trade to grow the economy in the State of Washington and nationwide. Sen. Cantwell was the leading voice in negotiations to end India’s 20 percent retaliatory tariff on American apples, which devastated Washington state’s apple exports. India had once been the second-largest export market for American apples, but after then-President Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum in his first term, India imposed retaliatory tariffs in response and U.S. apple exports plummeted. The impact on Washington apple growers was severe: apple exports from the state dropped from $120 million in 2017 to less than $1 million by 2023. In September 2023, following several years of Sen. Cantwell’s advocacy, India ended its retaliatory tariffs on apples and pulse crops which was welcome news to the state’s more than 1,400 apple growers and the 68,000-plus workers they support.

In May 2023, Sen. Cantwell sent a letter urging the Biden Administration to help U.S. potato growers finally get approval to sell fresh potatoes in Japan. In June 2023, Sen. Cantwell hosted U.S. Sen. Debbie Stabenow (D-MI), then-chair of the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, in Washington state for a forum with 30 local agricultural leaders in Wenatchee to discuss the Farm Bill.

In 2022, Sen. Cantwell spearheaded passage of the Ocean Shipping Reform Act, a law to crack down on skyrocketing international ocean shipping costs and ease supply chain backlogs that raise prices for consumers and make it harder for U.S. farmers and exporters to get their goods to the global market.

In August 2020, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Sen. Cantwell sent a letter to then-Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue requesting aid funds be distributed to wheat growers. In December 2018, Sen. Cantwell celebrated the passage of the Farm Bill, which included $500 million of assistance for farmers, including those who grow wheat.

In 2019, Sen. Cantwell helped secure a provision in the $16 billion USDA relief package, ensuring sweet cherry growers could access emergency funding to offset the impacts of tariffs and other market disruptions.

In Washington state: Two out of every five jobs are tied to trade and related industries. In 2023, the state imported $19.9 billion of goods from Canada – primarily oil, gas, lumber, and electrical power — making our northern neighbors Washington state’s largest trade partner. Also in 2023, the state imported $1.7 billion in goods from Mexico, including motor vehicles, vehicle parts, and household appliances. More information about how President Trump’s proposed tariffs will impact businesses and consumers in the State of Washington is HERE.

Video of Sen. Cantwell’s remarks during today’s hearing is available HERE, audio is available HERE, and a transcript is available HERE.