Category: Pandemic

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Philip R. Lane: The euro area bond market

    Source: European Central Bank

    Keynote speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Government Borrowers Forum 2025

    Dublin, 11 June 2025

    I am grateful for the invitation to contribute to the Government Borrowers Forum. I will use my time to cover three topics.[1] First, I will briefly discuss last week’s monetary policy decision.[2] Second, I will describe some current features of the euro area bond market.[3] Third, I will outline some innovations that might expand the scope for euro-denominated bonds to serve as safe assets in global portfolios.

    Monetary policy

    At last week’s meeting, the Governing Council decided to lower the deposit facility rate (DFR) to two per cent. The baseline of the latest Eurosystem staff projections foresees inflation at 2.0 per cent in 2025, 1.6 per cent in 2026 and 2.0 per cent in 2027; output growth is foreseen at 0.9 per cent for 2025, 1.2 per cent in 2026 and 1.3 per cent in 2027. The lower inflation path in the June projections compared to the March projections reflects the significant movements in energy prices and the exchange rate in recent months. These relative price movements both have a direct impact on inflation but also an indirect impact via the impact of lower input costs and a lower cost of living on the dynamics of core inflation and wage inflation.

    The June projections were conditioned on a rate path that included a quarter-point reduction of the DFR in June: model-based optimal policy simulations and an array of monetary policy feedback rules indicated a cut was appropriate under the baseline and also constituted a robust decision, remaining appropriate across a range of alternative future paths for inflation and the economy. By supporting the pricing pressure needed to generate target-consistent inflation in the medium-term, this cut helps ensure that the projected negative inflation deviation over the next eighteen months remains temporary and does not convert into a longer-term deviation of inflation from the target. This cut also guards against any uncertainty about our reaction function by demonstrating that we are determined to make sure that inflation returns to target in the medium term. This helps to underpin inflation expectations and avoid an unwarranted tightening in financial conditions.

    The robustness of the decision is also indicated by a set of model-based optimal policy simulations conducted on various combinations of the scenarios discussed in the Eurosystem staff projections report, even when also factoring in upside scenarios for fiscal expenditure. A cut is also indicated by a broad range of monetary policy feedback rules. By contrast, leaving the DFR on hold at 2.25 per cent could have triggered an adverse repricing of the forward curve and a revision in inflation expectations that would risk generating a more pronounced and longer-lasting undershoot of the inflation target. In turn, if this risk materialised, a stronger monetary reaction would ultimately be required.

    Especially under current conditions of high uncertainty, it is essential to remain data dependent and take a meeting-by-meeting approach in making monetary policy decisions. Accordingly, the Governing Council does not pre-commit to any particular future rate path.

    The euro area bond market

    Chart 1

    Ten-year nominal OIS rate and GDP-weighted sovereign yield for the euro area

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    Let me now turn to a longer-run perspective by inspecting developments in the bond market. In the first two decades of the euro, nominal long-term interest rates in the euro area were, by and large, on a declining trend from the start of the currency bloc until the outbreak of the pandemic (Chart 1). The ten-year overnight index swap (OIS) rate, considered as the ten-year risk-free rate in the euro area, declined from 6 percent in early 2000 to -50 basis points in 2020, a trend matched by the 10-year GDP-weighted sovereign bond yield.[4] The economic recovery from the pandemic and the soaring energy prices in response to the Russian invasion in Ukraine caused surges in inflation which led to an increase of interest rates. The recent stability of these long-term rates suggests that markets have seen the euro area economy gradually moving towards a new long-term equilibrium following the peak of annual headline inflation in October 2022, as past shocks have faded.

    Chart 2

    Decomposition of the ten-year spot euro area OIS rate into term premium and expected rates

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The decomposition of the OIS rate into expected rates and term premia is based on two affine term structure models, with and without survey information on rate expectations[5], and a lower bound term structure model[6] incorporating survey information on rate expectations. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    A term structure model makes it possible to decompose OIS rates into a term premium component and an expectations component. For the ten-year OIS rate, the expectations component reflects the expected average ECB policy rate over the next ten years and is affected by ECB’s policy decisions on interest rates and communication about the future policy path (e.g., in the form of explicit or implicit forward guidance). The term premium is a measure of the estimated compensation investors demand for being exposed to interest rate risk: the risk that the realised policy rate can be different from the expected rate.

    Chart 3

    Ten-year euro area OIS rate expectations and term premium component

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The decomposition of the OIS rate into expected rates and term premia is based on two affine term structure models, with and without survey information on rate expectations4, and a lower bound term structure model5 incorporating survey information on rate expectations. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    The decline of long-term rates in the first two decades of the euro and the rapid increase in 2022 were driven by both the expectations component and the term premium (Charts 2 and 3). The premium was estimated to be largely positive in the early 2000s, understood as a sign that the euro area economy was mostly confronted with supply-side shocks. Starting with the European sovereign debt crisis, the euro area was more and more characterised as a demand-shock dominated economy, in which nominal bonds act as a hedge against future crises and thus investors started requiring a lower or even negative term premium as compensation to hold these assets.[7] The large-scale asset purchases of the ECB under the APP reinforced the downward pressure on the term premium. By buying sovereign bonds (and other assets), the ECB reduced the overall amount of duration risk that had to be borne by private investors, reducing the compensation for risk.[8] With demand and supply shocks becoming more balanced again and central banks around the world normalising their balance sheet holdings of sovereign bonds in recent years, the term premium estimate turned positive again in early 2022 and continued to inch up through the first half of 2023. As it became clear in the second half of 2023 that upside risk scenarios for inflation were less likely, the term premium fell back to some extent and has been fairly stable since.

    Different to the ten-year maturity, very long-term sovereign spreads did not experience the same pronounced negative trend. From the inception of the euro until 2014, the thirty-year euro area GDP-weighted sovereign yield fluctuated around 3 percent. The decline to levels below 2 percent after 2014 and around 0.5 percent in 2020 reflect declining nominal risk-free rates more generally but also coincide with the announcements of large-scale asset purchases (PSPP and PEPP). Likewise, the upward shift back to above 3 percent during 2022 occurred on the back of rising policy rates and normalising central bank balance sheets.

    Chart 4

    Ten-year sovereign bond spreads vs Germany

    (percentages per annum)

    Sources: LSEG and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The spread is the difference between individual countries’ 10-year sovereign yields and the 10-year yield on German Bunds. The latest observations are for 10 June 2025.

    In the run-up to the global financial crisis, sovereign yields in the euro area were very much aligned between countries and also with risk-free rates (Chart 4). With the onset of the global financial crisis and later the European sovereign debt crisis, sovereign spreads for more vulnerable countries soared as investors started to discriminate between euro area countries according to their perceived creditworthiness.

    On top of the efforts of European sovereigns to consolidate their public finances, President Draghi’s 2012 “whatever it takes” speech and the subsequent announcement of Outright Monetary Transaction (OMTs) marked a turning point in the euro area sovereign debt crisis. Sovereign spreads came down from their peaks but have kept some variation across countries ever since.

    The large-scale asset purchases under the APP and PEPP further compressed sovereign spreads. During the pandemic and the subsequent monetary policy tightening, the flexibility in PEPP and the creation of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) supported avoiding fragmentation risks in sovereign bond markets. The extraordinary demand for sovereign bonds as collateral at the beginning of the hiking cycle, at a time when central bank holdings of these bonds were still high, resulted in the yields of German bonds, which are the most-preferred assets when it comes to collateral, declining far below the risk-free OIS rate in the course of 2022. These tensions eased as collateral scarcity reversed.[9]

    This year, bond yields and bond spreads in the euro area have been relatively stable, despite significant movements in some other bond markets. This can be interpreted as reflecting a balancing between two opposing forces: in essence, the typical positive spillover across bond markets has been offset by an international portfolio preference shift towards the euro and euro-denominated securities. This international portfolio preference shift is likely not uniform and is some mix of a pull back by European investors towards the domestic market and some rebalancing by global investors away from the dollar and towards the euro. More deeply, the stability of the euro bond market reflects a high conviction that euro area inflation is strongly anchored at the two per cent target and that the euro area business cycle should be relatively stable, such that the likely scale of cyclical interest rate movements is contained. It also reflects growing confidence that the scope for the materialisation of national or area-wide fiscal risks is quite contained, in view of the shared commitment to fiscal stability among the member countries and the demonstrated capacity to react jointly to fiscal tail events.[10]

    Chart 5

    Holdings of “Big-4” euro area government debt

    (percentage of total amounts outstanding)

    Sources: ECB Securities Holding Statistics and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The chart is based on all general government plus public agency debt in nominal terms. The breakdown is shown for euro area holding sectors, while all non-euro area holders are aggregated in the orange category in lack of more detailed information. ICPF stands for insurance corporations and pension funds. The “Big-4” countries include DE, FR, IT, ES. 2014 Q4 reflects the holdings before the onset of quantitative easing. 2022 Q4 reflects the peak of Eurosystem holdings at the end of net asset purchases.

    Latest observation: Q1 2025

    In understanding the dynamics of the bond market, it is also useful to examine the distribution of bond holdings across sectors. The largest euro-area holder sectors are banks, insurance corporations and pension funds (ICPF) and investment funds, while non-euro area foreign investors also are significant holders (Chart 5). The relative importance of the sectors differs between countries. Domestic banks and insurance corporations play a relatively larger role in countries like Italy and Spain, while non-euro area international investors hold relatively larger shares of debt issued by France or Germany.

    Since the start of the APP in early 2015, the Eurosystem increased its market share in euro area sovereign bonds from about 5 per cent of total outstanding debt to a peak of 33 per cent in late 2022. Net asset purchases by the Eurosystem were stopped in July 2022, while the full reinvestment of redemptions ceased at the end of that year: by Q1 2025, the Eurosystem share had declined to 25 per cent. The increase in Eurosystem holdings during the QE period was mirrored by falling holdings of banks and non-euro area foreign investors. The holding share of banks declined from 22 per cent in 2014 to 14 per cent at the end of 2022, while the share held by foreign investors fell from 35 per cent to 25 per cent over the same period.

    ICPFs have consistently held a significant share of the outstanding debt, especially at the long-end of the yield curve. Since 2022, following the end of full reinvestments under the APP, more price-sensitive sectors, such as banks, investment funds and private foreign investors, have regained some market share. Holdings by households have also shown some noticeable growth in sovereign bond holdings, driven primarily by Italian households.[11] In summary, the holdings statistics show that the bond market has smoothly adjusted to the end of quantitative easing. In particular, the rise in bond yields in 2022 was sufficient to attract a wide range of domestic and global investors to expand their holdings of euro-denominated bonds.[12]

    To gain further insight into the recent dynamics of the euro area bond market, it is helpful to look at recent portfolio flow data and bond issuance data. Market data on portfolio flows[13] highlights a repatriation of investment funds in bonds by domestic investors during March, April, and May, contrasting sharply with 2024 trends, while foreign fund inflows into euro area bonds during the same period surpassed the 2024 average (Chart 6). Simultaneously, EUR-denominated bond issuance by non-euro area corporations has surged in 2025, reaching nearly EUR 100 billion year-to-date compared to an average of EUR 32 billion over the same period in the past five years (Chart 7).

    Expanding the pool of safe assets

    These developments (stable bond yields, increased foreign holdings of euro-denominated bonds) have naturally led to renewed interest in the international role of the euro.[14]

    The euro ranks as the second largest reserve currency after the dollar. However, the current design of the euro area financial architecture results in an under-supply of the safe assets that play a special role in investor portfolios.[15] In particular, a safe asset should rise in relative value during stress episodes, thereby providing essential hedging services.

    Since the bund is the highest-rated large-country national bond in the euro area, it serves as the main de facto safe asset but the stock of bunds is too small relative to the size of the euro area or the global financial system to satiate the demand for euro-denominated safe assets. Especially in the context of much smaller and less volatile spreads (as shown in Chart 4), other national bonds also directionally contribute to the stock of safe assets. However, the remaining scope for relative price movements across these bonds means that the overall stock of national bonds does not sufficiently provide safe asset services.

    In principle, common bonds backed by the combined fiscal capacity of the EU member states are capable of providing safe-asset services. However, the current stock of such bonds is simply too small to foster the necessary liquidity and risk management services (derivative markets; repo markets) that are part and parcel of serving as a safe asset.[16]

    There are several ways to expand the stock of common bonds. Just as the Next Generation EU (NGEU) programme was financed by the issuance of common bonds jointly backed by the member states, the member countries could decide to finance investment European-wide public goods through more common debt.[17] From a public finance perspective, it is natural to match European-wide public goods with common debt, in order to align the financing with the area-wide benefits of such public goods. If a multi-year investment programme were announced, the global investor community would recognise that the stock of euro common bonds would climb incrementally over time.

    In addition, in order to meet more quickly and more decisively the rising global demand for euro-denominated safe assets, there are a number of options in generating a larger stock of safe assets from the current stock of national bonds. Recently, Olivier Blanchard and Ángel Ubide have proposed that the “blue bond/red bond” reform be re-examined.[18] Under this approach, each member country would ring fence a dedicated revenue stream (say a certain amount of indirect tax revenues) that could be used to service commonly-issued bonds. In turn, the proceeds of issuing blue bonds would be deployed to purchase a given amount of the national bonds of each participating member state. This mechanism would result in a larger stock of common bonds (blue bonds) and a lower stock of national bonds (red bonds).

    While this type of financial reform was originally proposed during the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the conditions today are far more favourable, especially if the scale of blue bond issuance were to be calibrated in a prudent manner in order to mitigate some of the identified concerns. In particular, the euro area financial architecture is now far more resilient, thanks to the significant institutional reforms that were introduced in the wake of the euro area crisis and the demonstrated track record of financial stability that has characterised Europe over the last decade. The list of reforms include: an increase in the capitalisation of the European banking system; the joint supervision of the banking system through the Single Supervisory Mechanism; the adoption of a comprehensive set of macroprudential measures at national and European levels; the implementation of the Single Resolution Mechanism; the narrowing of fiscal, financial and external imbalances; the fiscal backstops provided by the European Stability Mechanism; the common solidarity shown during the pandemic through the innovative NGEU programme; the demonstrated track record of the ECB in supplying liquidity in the event of market stress; and the expansion of the ECB policy toolkit (TPI, OMT) to address a range of liquidity tail risks. [19] In the context of the sovereign bond market, these reforms have contributed to less volatile and less dispersed bond returns.

    As emphasised in the Blanchard-Ubide proposal, there is an inherent trade off in the issuance of blue bonds. In one direction, a larger stock of blue bonds boosts liquidity and, if a critical mass is attained, also would trigger the fixed-cost investments need to build out ancillary financial products such as derivatives and repos. In the other direction, too-large a stock of blue bonds would require the ringfencing of national tax revenues at a scale that would be excessive in the context of the current European political configuration in which fiscal resources and political decision-making primarily remains at the national level. As emphasised in the Blanchard-Ubide proposal, this trade-off is best navigated by calibrating the stock of blue bonds at an appropriate level.

    In particular, the Blanchard-Ubide proposal gives the example of a stock of blue bonds corresponding to 25 per cent of GDP. Just to illustrate the scale of the required fiscal resources to back this level of issuance: if bond yields were on average in the range of two to four per cent, the servicing of blue bond debt would require ringfenced tax revenues in the range of a half per cent to one per cent of GDP. While this would constitute a significant shift in the current allocation of tax revenues between national and EU levels, this would still leave tax revenues predominantly at the national level (the ratio of tax revenues to GDP in the euro area ranges from around 20 to 40 per cent). The shared payoff would be the reduction in debt servicing costs generated by the safe asset services provided by an expanded stock of common debt.

    An alternative, possibly complementary, approach that could also deliver a larger stock of safe assets from the pool of national bonds is provided by the sovereign bond backed securities (SBBS) proposal.[20] The SBBS proposal envisages that financial intermediaries (whether public or private) could bundle a portfolio of national bonds and issue tranched securities, with the senior slice constituting a highly-safe asset. The SBBS proposal has been extensively studied (I chaired a 2017 ESRB report) and draft enabling legislation has been prepared by the European Commission.[21] Just as with the blue/red bond proposal, sufficient issuance scale would be needed in order to foster the market liquidity needed for the senior bonds to act as highly liquid safe assets.

    In summary, such structural changes in the design of the euro area bond market would foster stronger global demand for euro-denominated safe assets. A comprehensive strategy to expand the international role of the euro and underpin a European savings and investment union should include making progress on this front.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Philippines and Angola Explore Tourism Cooperation in First Bilateral Business Forum


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    The Philippine Embassy in Lisbon, together with the PH-Angola  Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIAF), and in coordination with the Philippine  Department of Tourism (DOT), Asian Institute of Management (AIM), Philippine  Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI), Angola’s Ministry of Tourism, and AIPEX,  successfully held the First Philippines-Angola Business Forum on Sustainable Tourism on 30 May 2025 via virtual platform. 

    The Forum was held at the Philippine Honorary Consulate General’s Office in  Dipanda, Angola, under the leadership of Honorary Consul General Etienne Brechet,  with Honorary Consul Megan Brechet-Amamou as Forum host. 

    With the theme “Sustainable Tourism: A Pathway to Economic and Cultural  Development,” the Forum brought together government officials, private sector  representatives, and tourism stakeholders from both countries to explore opportunities  for bilateral cooperation, tourism development, and sustainable investment, with  particular focus on promoting Namibe Province as an emerging tourism destination. 

    The Philippine side shared its experiences in tourism policy development, post pandemic recovery efforts, sustainable tourism strategies, and private sector engagement. Presentations covered the Philippines’ legal and institutional  frameworks, ecotourism strategies, tourism infrastructure investments, and  approaches to ensuring that tourism development preserves cultural heritage and  ecological integrity. 

    Angola’s delegation, led by Angola’s Ministry of Tourism and CCIAF, presented the tourism potential of Namibe province, identifying opportunities in eco- and adventure  tourism, resort development, and cultural tourism, and expressed keen interest in  building business partnerships with Philippine stakeholders. 

    The Angolan side also conveyed their utmost appreciation for the comprehensive  presentations provided by the Philippine speakers and expressed a strong desire to  learn from the Philippines’ expertise in sustainable tourism development. 

    The Forum concluded with mutual interest in pursuing reciprocal business missions, tourism training exchanges, and joint promotional efforts to advance sustainable  tourism cooperation between the Philippines and Angola.

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of the Philippines.

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Treatment of intensive care patients with disinfectants increases risk of infection A routine disinfection procedure commonly used when admitting patients to intensive care units (ICU) can increase ‘superbug’ infections according to new research from the University of Aberdeen.

    Source: University of Aberdeen

    A routine disinfection procedure commonly used when admitting patients to intensive care units (ICU) can increase ‘superbug’ infections according to new research from the University of Aberdeen.
    The study compared bloodstream infections in ICU patients who experienced different types of disinfection when admitted.
    The results showed that the ‘universal disinfection’ of all patients admitted to ICU was linked to the rise of superbug – ‘methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus epidermidis’ (MRSE) bloodstream infections in vulnerable patients.
    The results are published today, June 11, 2025, in Lancet Microbe
    Universal decolonisation refers to the disinfection of all patients admitted to ICUs and was introduced during the MRSA epidemic in the 1990’s to attempt to control healthcare-associated infections. However, hospital infections and how they respond to antibiotics are known to change over time. This is why the team, led by Professor Karolin Hijazi, sought to re-evaluate the benefits and unintended harms of these infection control practices, particularly for those disinfectants implicated in rise of antimicrobial resistance.
    During universal decolonisation, when patients are admitted to ICU their whole body is disinfected with an antimicrobial called chlorhexidine – a disinfectant also widely used to disinfect medical devices and hospital surfaces. Patients also receive nasal treatment with another disinfectant called mupirocin.
    Currently, there is inconsistency in disinfection practices across hospitals in the UK with some hospitals adopting the universal decolonisation of all patients, whilst others employ a more targeted and risk-based approach of decolonisation of only those patients who have tested positive for MRSA. This means that much larger volumes of the disinfectants chlorhexidine and mupirocin are used in hospitals that practice universal decolonisation.
    The team compared the bloodstream infection type and resistance rates of patients over 13 years across two intensive care units in Scotland practicing the different decolonisation approaches and found that universal decolonisation practices were related to increased MRSE infections compared to a targeted approach.
    Professor Hijazi Chair in Oral & Maxillofacial Medicine at the University of Aberdeen, who led the study explains their findings: “We found that the drastic reduction of disinfectant when using targeted decolonisation of only MRSA-positive patients reduced bloodstream infections related to MRSE. Whilst MRSE is generally not life-threatening, this data is a concern as MRSE increases the burden of circulating antimicrobial resistance.
    “However, reducing disinfectant did not increase all bloodstream infections from serious pathogens. This means that universal decolonisation is not superior to more sparing and targeted approaches in controlling serious bloodstream infections.
    “This research essentially demonstrates that the excess use of disinfectants in universal decolonisation offered no advantage in terms of control of serious blood infections in a low MRSA ICU setting but instead caused the unintended rise of MRSE bloodstream infections.
    “Universal decolonisation is associated with greater risks of antimicrobial resistance and costs at no increased benefit. “According to the findings of our study, in low MRSA settings universal decolonisation is likely an unnecessary and harmful practice.”
    The authors suggest that hospitals should consider the unintended harms of universal decolonisation, particularly in the context of global rise of antimicrobial resistance.
    Professor Hijazi adds: “As the landscape of hospital infections changes over time, it is imperative to re-evaluate the benefits and unintended harms of all antimicrobial treatments including disinfection practices. This is particularly important for disinfectants implicated in antimicrobial resistance.
    “Our research aligns with the top 10 research priorities of the ‘five-year action plan for antimicrobial resistance’ set out by the UK government, agencies and administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland UK, which called to strengthen the evidence of the role of biocides in driving antimicrobial resistance.
    “Our study fits squarely with this commitment and should inform standardised national guidelines for effective and safe patient decolonisation in low MRSA settings.
    “Skin decolonisation must effectively control hospital infections whilst minimising emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance which is ‘the silent pandemic’ of our times.
    “Skin decolonisation of hospital patients is also very costly as it must be prescribed by specialist medical staff and administered by trained nurses. So we anticipate significant cost savings associated with efforts to reduce and avoid this practice where not necessary.”
    Professor Marco Oggioni from the University of Bologna who contributed to the research added: “Antimicrobial stewardship and other measures for infection prevention are our most powerful tools to contrast the global emergency of antimicrobial drug resistance, but this should never hinder our critical re-evaluation of the instruments we utilise to achieve our goals.”
    Professor Ian Gould, Honorary Professor at the University of Aberdeen concluded: “This timely study is the culmination of 25 years’ work in Aberdeen Royal Infirmary.
    “The original study was borne out of an initial response to control a nationwide epidemic of MRSA, the original superbug, by using universal decolonization.
    “We have subsequently learned to use antibiotics cautiously but this important study provides the firmest evidence yet that antiseptics and disinfectants, which are also commonly misused, should be subject to the same restrictions.”
    This study was funded by NHS Grampian Charity, and was a collaboration with Dundee University, Ninewells Hospital, Leicester University and the University of Bologna.
    ENDS

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    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Australia: First of five new trade missions jets off

    Source: Australian Attorney General’s Agencies

    Every day Aussie businesses exports some of the world’s best agricultural, industrial and technological products to every corner of the globe. With one in three Australian jobs supported by trade, the Albanese Labor Government has been working to strengthen our existing trading relationships and develop new ones internationally.

    In uncertain times in global trade, diversification of our trading relationships has never been more important. That’s why in April, Labor committed to five business and investment missions to priority markets, as well as $50 million to create additional opportunities for local businesses.

    This week, the first of these trade missions will travel to the United Kingdom to help Australian businesses discover new opportunities and accelerate our ongoing trade diversification efforts.

    The first mission brings together representatives from 20 of Australia’s leading healthcare and MedTech companies. They will visit the United Kingdom to take part in London Tech Week 2025 and NHS ConfedExpo 2025 in Manchester.

    It comes as Australia and the United Kingdom mark the two-year anniversary of the implementation of the Australia-UK Free Trade Agreement, which is delivering outstanding results for Australian business.

    For example, Australian beef and veal exports to the UK were worth A$97.8 million in 2024, which is more than double that of the previous year (2023), and around eight times what they were worth in 2022.

    The UK has so much more to offer Australian exporters, and this business mission focused on health and medical technology will help unlock more jobs, more growth, and more certainty for our business.

    Australia ranks 5th globally for healthcare innovation and we’re home to around 700 biotech and MedTech companies. Our world class healthcare and MedTech companies are already making a difference in the UK, including across flu vaccines, pandemic preparedness, and cancer care.

    Australian and UK companies are also increasingly collaborating in critical technology sectors including quantum, cyber and AI.

    To assist export ready Australian tech businesses expand into the UK market, Australia, through Austrade, will be launching a new London Landing Pad program later this month.

    I wish the Australian businesses all the best and look forward to successful outcomes.

    MIL OSI News

  • US, China reach deal to ease export curbs, keep tariff truce alive

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. and Chinese officials said on Tuesday they had agreed on a framework to put their trade truce back on track and remove China’s export restrictions on rare earths while offering little sign of a durable resolution to longstanding trade differences.
     
    At the end of two days of intense negotiations in London, U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick told reporters the framework deal puts “meat on the bones” of an agreement reached last month in Geneva to ease bilateral retaliatory tariffs that had reached crushing triple-digit levels.
     
    But the Geneva deal had faltered over China’s continued curbs on critical minerals exports, prompting the Trump administration to respond with export controls of its own preventing shipments of semiconductor design software, aircraft and other goods to China.
     
    Lutnick said the agreement reached in London would remove some of the recent U.S. export restrictions, but did not provide details after the talks concluded around midnight London time (2300 GMT).
     
    “We have reached a framework to implement the Geneva consensus and the call between the two presidents,” Lutnick said. “The idea is we’re going to go back and speak to President Trump and make sure he approves it. They’re going to go back and speak to President Xi and make sure he approves it, and if that is approved, we will then implement the framework.”
     
    In a separate briefing, China’s Vice Commerce Minister Li Chenggang also said a trade framework had been reached in principle that would be taken back to U.S. and Chinese leaders.
     
    The dispute may keep the Geneva agreement from unravelling over duelling export controls, but does little to resolve deep differences over Trump’s unilateral tariffs and longstanding U.S. complaints about China’s state-led, export-driven economic model.
     
    The two sides left Geneva with fundamentally different views of the terms of that agreement and needed to be more specific on required actions, said Josh Lipsky, senior director of the Atlantic Council’s GeoEconomics Center in Washington.
     
    “They are back to square one but that’s much better than square zero,” Lipsky added.
     
    The two sides have until August 10 to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement to ease trade tensions, or tariff rates will snap back from about 30% to 145% on the U.S. side and from 10% to 125% on the Chinese side.
     
    Investors, who have been badly burned by trade turmoil before, offered a cautious response and MSCI’s broadest index of Asia-Pacific shares outside Japan rose 0.57%.
     
    “The devil will be in the details, but the lack of reaction suggests this outcome was fully expected,” said Chris Weston, head of research at Pepperstone in Melbourne.
     
    “The details matter, especially around the degree of rare earths bound for the U.S., and the subsequent freedom for U.S.-produced chips to head east, but for now as long as the headlines of talks between the two parties remain constructive, risk assets should remain supported.”
     
    RESOLVING RESTRICTIONS
     
    Lutnick said China’s restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals and magnets to the U.S. will be resolved as a “fundamental” part of the framework agreement.
     
    “Also, there were a number of measures the United States of America put on when those rare earths were not coming,” Lutnick said. “You should expect those to come off … in a balanced way.”
     
    U.S. President Donald Trump’s shifting tariff policies have roiled global markets, sparked congestion and confusion in major ports, and cost companies tens of billions of dollars in lost sales and higher costs. The World Bank on Tuesday slashed its global growth forecast for 2025 by four-tenths of a percentage point to 2.3%, saying higher tariffs and heightened uncertainty posed a “significant headwind” for nearly all economies.
     
    A resolution to the trade war may require policy adjustments from all countries to treat financial imbalances or otherwise greatly risk mutual economic damage, European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde said on a rare visit to Beijing on Wednesday.
     
    PHONE CALL HELPED
     
    The second round of U.S.-China talks was given a major boost by a rare phone call between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping last week, which Lutnick said provided directives that were merged with Geneva truce agreement.
     
    Customs data published on Monday showed that China’s exports to the U.S. plunged 34.5% in May, the sharpest drop since the outbreak of the COVID pandemic.
     
    While the impact on U.S. inflation and its jobs market has so far been muted, tariffs have hammered U.S. business and household confidence and the dollar remains under pressure.
     
    Lutnick was joined by U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent at the London talks. Bessent departed hours before their conclusion to return to Washington to testify before Congress on Wednesday.
     
    China holds a near-monopoly on rare earth magnets, a crucial component in electric vehicle motors, and its decision in April to suspend exports of a wide range of critical minerals and magnets upended global supply chains.
     
    In May, the U.S. responded by halting shipments of semiconductor design software and chemicals and aviation equipment, revoking export licences that had been previously issued.
     
    China, Mexico, the European Union, Japan, Canada and many airlines and aerospace companies worldwide urged the Trump administration not to impose new national security tariffs on imported commercial planes and parts, according to documents released Tuesday.
     
    Just after the framework deal was announced, a U.S. appeals court allowed Trump’s most sweeping tariffs to stay in effect while it reviews a lower court decision blocking them on grounds that they exceeded Trump’s legal authority by imposing them.
     
    The decision keeps alive a key pressure point on China, Trump’s currently suspended 34% “reciprocal” duties that had prompted swift tariff escalation.
     
    (Reuters)
  • MIL-OSI: Brown & Brown, Inc. announces pricing of $4 billion offering of common stock

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DAYTONA BEACH, Fla., June 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Brown & Brown, Inc. (NYSE: BRO) (“Brown & Brown” or the “Company”) today announced the pricing of its public offering of 39,215,686 shares of its common stock (the “common stock”), par value $0.10 per share, at a price to the public of $102.00 per share, for an aggregate offering amount of $4 billion. The offering is expected to close on June 12, 2025, subject to the satisfaction of customary closing conditions. In addition, the Company has granted the underwriters a 30-day option to purchase up to an additional $400 million in shares of common stock at the public offering price, less underwriting discounts.

    J.P. Morgan and BofA Securities are acting as lead book running managers of the offering. BMO Capital Markets and Truist Securities are acting as additional book running managers of the offering and Wells Fargo Securities, BTIG, PNC Capital Markets LLC, Fifth Third Securities, Morgan Stanley, Citizens Capital Markets, Barclays, Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC, Dowling & Partners and Raymond James are acting as co-managers of the offering.

    The Company expects that the net proceeds of the offering will be approximately $3.9 billion, after deducting underwriting discounts and expenses and assuming no exercise of the underwriters’ option to purchase additional shares. The Company intends to use the net proceeds of the offering to fund a portion of the consideration payable pursuant to that certain agreement and plan of merger by and among RSC Topco, Inc., a Delaware corporation (“RSC”), the Company, Encore Merger Sub, Inc., a Delaware corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary of the Company, and Kelso RSC (Investor), L.P., a Delaware limited partnership, solely in its capacity as the equityholder representative, pursuant to which the Company will acquire RSC, the holding company for Accession Risk Management Group, Inc. (the “Transaction”), and to pay fees and expenses associated with the foregoing. If the Transaction is not consummated, the Company intends to use the net proceeds of the offering for general corporate purposes.

    The Company has filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) an automatic shelf registration statement  (including a prospectus) on Form S-3 dated May 5, 2023 (File No. 333-271708) and a related preliminary prospectus supplement, dated June 10, 2025, to which this communication relates, and the Company will also file a final prospectus supplement relating to the shares of common stock. Investors should read the preliminary prospectus supplement and base prospectus in the registration statement, including the information incorporated by reference therein, and the other documents the Company has filed with the SEC for more complete information about the Company and the offering. You may obtain these documents for free by visiting EDGAR on the SEC’s website at http://www.sec.gov. Alternatively, a copy of the prospectus supplement relating to the offering may be obtained by contacting J.P. Morgan Securities LLC at J.P. Morgan Securities LLC, c/o Broadridge Financial Solutions, 1155 Long Island Avenue, Edgewood, NY 11717, by email at prospectus-eq_fi@jpmchase.com and postsalemanualrequests@broadridge.com or BofA Securities, Inc. at BofA Securities, NC1-022-02-25, 201 North Tryon Street, Charlotte, NC 28255-0001, Attn: Prospectus Department, Email: dg.prospectus_requests@bofa.com.

    This press release shall not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy the common stock of the Company, nor shall there be any sale of such securities in any state or other jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state or jurisdiction. The securities being offered have not been approved or disapproved by any regulatory authority, nor has any such authority passed upon the accuracy or adequacy of the prospectus supplement or the shelf registration statement or prospectus relating thereto.

    About Brown & Brown, Inc.

    Brown & Brown, Inc. (NYSE: BRO) is a leading insurance brokerage firm providing customer-centric risk management solutions since 1939. With a global presence spanning 500+ locations and a team of more than 17,000 professionals, we are dedicated to delivering scalable, innovative strategies for our customers at every step of their growth journey.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” within the “safe harbor” provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, as amended. You can identify these statements by forward-looking words such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “intend,” “estimate,” “plan” and “continue” or similar words. Brown & Brown has based these statements on its current expectations about potential future events. Although Brown & Brown believes the expectations expressed in the forward-looking statements included in this press release are based upon reasonable assumptions within the bounds of Brown & Brown’s knowledge of its business and the transaction, a number of factors could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed in any forward-looking statements, whether oral or written, made by Brown & Brown or on its behalf. Many of these factors have previously been identified in filings or statements made by Brown & Brown or on its behalf. Important factors which could cause Brown & Brown’s actual results to differ, possibly materially from the forward-looking statements in this press release include, but are not limited to, the following items: (a) risks with respect to the timing of the Transaction; (b) the possibility that the anticipated benefits of the Transaction are not realized when expected or at all; (c) risks related to the financing of the Transaction, including that financing the Transaction will result in an increase in Brown & Brown’s indebtedness and that Brown & Brown may not be able to secure the required financing in connection with the Transaction on acceptable terms, in a timely manner, or at all; (d) the unaudited pro forma condensed combined financial information reflecting the Transaction is based on assumptions and is subject to change based on various factors; (e) risks relating to the financial information related to RSC; (f) risks related to RSC’s business, including underwriting risk in connection with certain captive insurance companies; (g) the risk that certain assumptions Brown & Brown has made relating to the Transaction prove to be materially inaccurate; (h) the inability to hire, retain and develop qualified employees, as well as the loss of any of Brown & Brown’s executive officers or other key employees; (i) a cybersecurity attack or any other interruption in information technology and/or data security that may impact Brown & Brown’s operations or the operations of third parties that support it; (j) acquisition-related risks that could negatively affect the success of Brown & Brown’s growth strategy, including the possibility that Brown & Brown may not be able to successfully identify suitable acquisition candidates, complete acquisitions, successfully integrate acquired businesses into its operations and expand into new markets; (k) risks related to Brown & Brown’s international operations, which may result in additional risks or require more management time and expense than Brown & Brown’s domestic operations to achieve or maintain profitability; (l) the requirement for additional resources and time to adequately respond to dynamics resulting from rapid technological change; (m) the loss of or significant change to any of Brown & Brown’s insurance company or intermediary relationships, which could result in loss of capacity to write business, additional expense, loss of market share or material decrease in Brown & Brown’s commissions; (n) the effect of natural disasters on Brown & Brown’s profit-sharing contingent commissions, insurer capacity or claims expenses within Brown & Brown’s capitalized captive insurance facilities; (o) adverse economic conditions, political conditions, outbreaks of war, disasters, or regulatory changes in states or countries where Brown & Brown has a concentration of Brown & Brown’s business; (p) the inability to maintain Brown & Brown’s culture or a significant change in management, management philosophy or its business strategy; (q) fluctuations in Brown & Brown’s commission revenue as a result of factors outside of its control; (r) the effects of significant or sustained inflation or higher interest rates; (s) claims expense resulting from the limited underwriting risk associated with Brown & Brown’s participation in capitalized captive insurance facilities; (t) risks associated with Brown & Brown’s automobile and recreational vehicle finance and insurance dealer services businesses; (u) changes in, or the termination of, certain programs administered by the U.S. federal government from which Brown & Brown derives revenues; (v) the limitations of Brown & Brown’s system of disclosure and internal controls and procedures in preventing errors or fraud, or in informing management of all material information in a timely manner; (w) Brown & Brown’s reliance on vendors and other third parties to perform key functions of its business operations and provide services to its customers; (x) the significant control certain shareholders have; (y) changes in data privacy and protection laws and regulations or any failure to comply with such laws and regulations; (z) improper disclosure of confidential information; (aa) Brown & Brown’s ability to comply with non-U.S. laws, regulations and policies; (bb) the potential adverse effect of certain actual or potential claims, regulatory actions or proceedings on Brown & Brown’s businesses, results of operations, financial condition or liquidity; (cc) uncertainty in Brown & Brown’s business practices and compensation arrangements with insurance carriers due to potential changes in regulations; (dd) regulatory changes that could reduce Brown & Brown’s profitability or growth by increasing compliance costs, technology compliance, restricting the products or services Brown & Brown may sell, the markets it may enter, the methods by which it may sell Brown & Brown’s products and services, or the prices it may charge for its services and the form of compensation it may accept from its customers, carriers and third parties; (ee) increasing scrutiny and changing laws and expectations from regulators, investors and customers with respect to Brown & Brown’s environmental, social and governance practices and disclosure; (ff) a decrease in demand for liability insurance as a result of tort reform legislation; (gg) Brown & Brown’s failure to comply with any covenants contained in its debt agreements; (hh) the possibility that covenants in Brown & Brown’s debt agreements could prevent Brown & Brown from engaging in certain potentially beneficial activities; (ii) fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates; (jj) a downgrade to Brown & Brown’s corporate credit rating, the credit ratings of Brown & Brown’s outstanding debt or other market speculation; (kk) changes in the U.S.-based credit markets that might adversely affect Brown & Brown’s business, results of operations and financial condition; (ll) changes in current U.S. or global economic conditions, including an extended slowdown in the markets in which Brown & Brown operates; (mm) disintermediation within the insurance industry, including increased competition from insurance companies, technology companies and the financial services industry, as well as the shift away from traditional insurance markets; (nn) conditions that result in reduced insurer capacity; (oo) quarterly and annual variations in Brown & Brown’s commissions that result from the timing of policy renewals and the net effect of new and lost business production; (pp) intangible asset risk, including the possibility that Brown & Brown’s goodwill may become impaired in the future; (qq) changes in Brown & Brown’s accounting estimates and assumptions; (rr) future pandemics, epidemics or outbreaks of infectious diseases, and the resulting governmental and societal responses; (ss) other risks and uncertainties as may be detailed from time to time in Brown & Brown’s public announcements and SEC filings; and (tt) other factors that Brown & Brown may not have currently identified or quantified. Assumptions as to any of the foregoing, and all statements, are not based upon historical fact, but rather reflect Brown & Brown’s current expectations concerning future results and events. Forward-looking statements that Brown & Brown makes or that are made by others on Brown & Brown’s behalf are based upon a knowledge of Brown & Brown’s business and the environment in which it operates, but because of the factors listed above, among others, actual results may differ from those in the forward-looking statements. Consequently, these cautionary statements qualify all of the forward-looking statements Brown & Brown makes herein. Brown & Brown cannot assure you that the results or developments anticipated by Brown & Brown will be realized or, even if substantially realized, that those results or developments will result in the expected consequences for Brown & Brown or affect Brown & Brown, its business or our operations in the way it expects. Brown & Brown cautions readers not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. All forward-looking statements made herein are made only as of the date of this press release, and Brown & Brown does not undertake any obligation to publicly update or correct any forward-looking statements to reflect events or circumstances that subsequently occur or of which Brown & Brown hereafter becomes aware.

    For more information:

    Investors

    R. Andrew Watts
    Chief Financial Officer
    (386) 239-5770

    Media

    Jenny Goco
    Director of Communications
    (386) 333-6066

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Christine Lagarde: Drawing a common map: sustaining global cooperation in a fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the People’s Bank of China in Beijing

    Beijing, 11 June 2025

    It is a pleasure to be back here in Beijing.

    Some years ago, I spoke about how a changing world was creating a new global map of economic relations.[1]

    Maps have always reflected the society in which they are produced. But in rare instances, they can also capture historical moments when two societies meet at the crossroads.

    This was evident in the late 1500s during the Ming Dynasty, when Matteo Ricci, a European Jesuit, travelled to China. There Ricci went on to work with Chinese scholars to create a hybrid map that integrated European geographical knowledge with Chinese cartographic tradition.[2]

    The result of this cooperation – called the Kunyu Wanguo Quantu, or “Map of Ten Thousand Countries” – was historically unprecedented. And the encounter came to symbolise China’s openness to the world.

    In the modern era, we saw a similar moment when China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. The country’s accession to the WTO signified its integration into the international economy and its openness to global trade.

    China’s entry into the WTO went on to reshape the global map of economic relations at a time of rapid trade growth, bringing significant benefits to countries across the world – particularly here in China.

    Since that time, the global economy has changed dramatically. In recent years, trade tensions have emerged and a geopolitically charged landscape is making international cooperation increasingly difficult.

    Yet the emergence of tensions in the international economic system is a recurring pattern across modern economic history.

    Over the last century, frictions have surfaced under a range of international configurations – from the inter-war gold exchange standard, to the post-war Bretton Woods system, to the subsequent era of floating exchange rates and free capital flows.

    While each system was unique, two common lessons cut across this history.

    First, one-sided adjustments to resolve global frictions have often fallen short, regardless of whether deficit or surplus countries carry the burden. In fact, they can bring with them either unpredictable or costly consequences.

    Such adjustments can be especially problematic when trade policies are used as a substitute for macroeconomic policies in addressing the root causes.

    And second, in the event that tensions do emerge, durable strategic and economic alliances have proven critical in preventing tail risks from materialising.

    In contrast to eras when ties of cooperation were weak, alliances have ultimately helped to prevent a broader surge in protectionism or a systemic fragmentation of trade.

    These two lessons have implications for today. Frictions are increasingly emerging between regions whose geopolitical interests may not be fully aligned. At the same time, however, these regions are more deeply economically integrated than ever before.

    The upshot is that while the incentive to cooperate is reduced, the costs of not doing so are now amplified.

    So the stakes are high.

    If we are to avoid inferior outcomes, we all must work towards sustaining global cooperation in a fragmenting world.

    Tensions across history

    If we look at the history of the international economic system over the past century, we can broadly divide it into three periods.

    In the first period, the inter-war years, major economies were tied together by the gold exchange standard – a regime of fixed exchange rates, with currencies linked to gold either directly or indirectly.

    But unlike the pre-war era, when the United Kingdom played a dominant global role[3], there was no global hegemon. Nor were there impactful international organisations to enforce rules or coordinate policies.

    The system’s flaws quickly became apparent.[4] Exchange rate misalignments caused persistent tensions between surplus and deficit countries. Yet the burden of adjustment fell overwhelmingly on the deficit side.

    Facing outflows of gold, deficit countries were forced into harsh deflation. Meanwhile, surplus countries faced little pressure to reflate. By 1932, two surplus countries accounted for over 60% of the world share of gold reserves.[5]

    One-sided adjustments failed to resolve the underlying problems. And without strong alliances to contain tail risks, tensions escalated. Countries turned to trade measures in an attempt to reduce imbalances in the system – but protectionism offered no sustainable solution.

    In fact, if current account positions narrowed at all, it was only because of the fall-off in world trade and output. The volume of global trade fell by around one-quarter between 1929 and 1933[6], with one study attributing nearly half of this fall to higher trade barriers.[7] World output declined by almost 30% in this period.[8]

    During the Second World War, leaders took the lessons to heart. They laid the groundwork for what became the Bretton Woods system in the early post-war era: a framework of fixed exchange rates and capital controls.

    This marked the beginning of the second period.

    The new regime was anchored by the US dollar’s convertibility into gold, with the International Monetary Fund acting as a referee. Trade flourished during this era. Between 1950 and 1973[9], world trade expanded at an average rate of over 8% per year.[10]

    But again, frictions emerged.

    In particular, the United States had shifted from initially running balance of payments surpluses to persistent deficits. At the heart of this shift was the role of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency and source of liquidity for global trade.

    While US deficits provided the world with vital dollar liquidity, those very same deficits strained the dollar’s gold convertibility at USD 35 per ounce, threatening confidence in the system.

    By the late 1960s, foreign holdings of US dollars – amounting to almost USD 50 billion – were roughly five times the size of US gold reserves.[11]

    Ultimately, these tensions proved unsustainable as the United States was unwilling to sacrifice domestic policy goals – which generated fiscal deficits – for its external commitments.

    The Bretton Woods system ended abruptly in 1971, when President Nixon unilaterally suspended the US dollar’s convertibility into gold and imposed a 10% surcharge on imports.

    The goal behind the surcharge was to force US trading partners to revalue their currencies against the dollar, which was perceived as being overvalued.[12] As in earlier periods, this was a one-sided adjustment – though now aimed at shifting the burden onto surplus countries.

    Crucially, however, the downfall of Bretton Woods unfolded within the context of the Cold War. Countries operating under the system were not just trading partners – they were allies.

    And so, everyone had a strong geopolitical incentive to pick up the pieces and forge new cooperative agreements that could facilitate trade relationships, even in moments of pronounced volatility.

    We saw this several months after the “Nixon Shock”, when Western countries negotiated the Smithsonian Agreement.

    This agreement was a temporary fix to maintain an international system of fixed exchange rates. It devalued the US dollar by over 12% against the currencies of its major trading partners and removed President Nixon’s surcharge.[13]

    And we saw a strong geopolitical incentive at work again with the Plaza Accord in the 1980s – an era of floating exchange rates and free capital flows – when deficit and surplus countries in the Group of Five[14] sat down to try and resolve tensions.

    Of course, neither agreement ultimately succeeded in addressing the root causes of tensions. But critically, the risk of a broader turn toward protectionism – which was rising at several points[15] – never materialised.

    The contrast is telling.

    Both the inter-war and post-war eras revealed that one-sided adjustments cannot sustainably resolve economic frictions – whether on the deficit or surplus side.

    Yet the post-war system proved far more resilient, because the countries within it had deeper strategic reasons to cooperate.

    Frictions threatening global trade today

    In recent decades, we have been moving into a third period.

    Since the end of the Cold War, we have seen the rapid expansion of truly global trade.

    Trade in goods and services has risen roughly fivefold to over USD 30 trillion.[16] Trade as a share of global GDP has increased from around 38% to nearly 60%.[17] And countries have become much more integrated through global supply chains. At the end of the Cold War, these chains accounted for around two-fifths of global trade.[18] Today, they account for over two-thirds.[19]

    Yet this globalisation has unfolded in a world where – increasingly – not all nations are bound by the same security guarantees or strategic alliances. In 1985 just 90 countries were party to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Today, its successor – the WTO – counts 166 members, representing 98% of global trade.[20]

    There is no doubt that this new era has amplified the benefits of trade.

    Some originally lower-income countries have experienced remarkable gains – none more so than China.

    Since joining the WTO, China’s GDP per capita has increased roughly twelvefold.[21] The welfare impact has been equally profound: almost 800 million people in China have been lifted out of poverty, accounting for nearly three-quarters of global poverty reduction in recent decades.[22]

    Advanced economies, too, have benefited, albeit unevenly. While some industries and jobs have faced pressure from heightened import competition[23], consumers have enjoyed lower prices and greater choice. And for firms able to climb the value chain, the rewards have been substantial – especially in Europe.

    Today, EU exports to the rest of the world generate more than €2.5 trillion in value added – nearly one-fifth of the EU’s total – and support over 31 million jobs.[24]

    But the weakening alignment between trade relationships and security alliances has left the global system more exposed – a vulnerability now playing out in real time.

    According to the International Monetary Fund, trade restrictions across goods, services and investments have tripled since 2019 alone.[25] And in recent months, we have seen tariff levels imposed that would have been unimaginable just a few years ago.

    This fragmentation is being driven by two forces.

    The first is geopolitical realignment. As I have outlined in recent years, geopolitical tensions are playing an increasingly decisive role in reshaping the global economy.[26] Countries are reconfiguring trade relationships and supply chains to reflect national security priorities, rather than economic efficiency alone.

    The second force is the growing perception of unfair trade – often linked to widening current account positions.

    Current account surpluses and deficits are not inherently problematic, particularly when they reflect structural factors such as comparative advantage or demographic trends.

    But these imbalances become more contentious when they do not resolve over time and create the perception that they are being sustained by policy choices – whether through the blocking of macroeconomic adjustment mechanisms or a lack of respect for global rules.

    Indeed, while in recent decades the persistence of current account positions has remained fairly constant, the dispersion of those positions – that is, how widely surpluses and deficits are spread across countries – has shifted significantly.

    In the mid-1990s current account deficits and surpluses were similarly dispersed within their respective groups: both were relatively evenly distributed among several countries.[27]

    Today, that balance has changed. Deficits have become far more concentrated, with just a few countries accounting for the bulk of global deficits. In contrast, surpluses have become somewhat more dispersed, spread across a wider range of countries.

    These developments have recently led to coercive trade policies and risk fragmenting global supply chains.

    Making global trade sustainable

    Given national security considerations and the experience during the pandemic, a certain degree of de-risking is here to stay. Few countries are willing to remain dependent on others for strategic industries.

    But it does not follow that we must forfeit the broader benefits of trade – so long as we are willing to absorb the lessons of history. Let me draw two conclusions for the current situation.

    First, coercive trade policies are not a sustainable solution to today’s trade tensions.

    To the extent that protectionism addresses imbalances, it is not by resolving their root causes, but by eroding the foundations of global prosperity.

    And with countries now deeply integrated through global supply chains – yet no longer as geopolitically aligned as in the past – this risk is greater than ever. Coercive trade policies are far more likely to provoke retaliation and lead to outcomes that are mutually damaging.

    The shared risks we face are underscored by ECB analysis. Our staff find that if global trade were to fragment into competing blocs, world trade would contract significantly, with every major economy worse off.[28]

    This leads me to the second conclusion: if we are serious about preserving our prosperity, we must pursue cooperative solutions – even in the face of geopolitical differences. And that means both surplus and deficit countries must take responsibility and play their part.

    All countries should examine how their structural and fiscal policies can be adjusted to reduce their own role in fuelling trade tensions.

    Indeed, both supply-side and demand-side dynamics have contributed to dispersion of current accounts positions we see today.

    On the supply side, we have witnessed a sharp rise in the use of industrial policies aimed at boosting domestic capacity. Since 2014, subsidy-related interventions that distort global trade have more than tripled globally. [29]

    Notably, this trend is now being driven as much by emerging markets as by advanced economies. In 2021, domestic subsidies accounted for two-thirds of all trade-related policies in the average G20 emerging market, consistently outpacing the share seen in advanced G20 economies.[30]

    On the demand side, global demand generation has become more concentrated, especially in the United States. A decade ago, the United States accounted for less than 30% of demand generated by G20 countries. Today, that share has risen to nearly 35%.

    This increasing imbalance in demand reflects not only excess saving in some parts of the world, but also excess dissaving in others, especially by the public sector.

    Of course, none of us can determine the actions of others. But we can control our own contribution.

    Doing so would not only serve the collective interest – by helping to ease pressure on the global system – but also the domestic interest, by setting our own economies on a more sustainable path.

    We can also lead by example by continuing to respect global rules – or even improving on them. This helps build trust and creates the foundation for reciprocal actions.

    That means upholding the multilateral framework which has so greatly benefited our economies. And it means working with like-minded partners to forge bilateral and regional agreements rooted in mutual benefit and full WTO compatibility.[31]

    Central banks, in line with their respective mandates, can also play a role.

    We can stand firm as pillars of international cooperation in an era when such cooperation is hard to come by. And we can continue to deliver stability-oriented policies in a world marked by rising volatility and instability.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    In a fragmenting world, regions need to work together to sustain global trade – which has delivered prosperity in recent decades.

    Of course, given the geopolitical landscape, that will be a harder challenge today than it has been in the past. But as Confucius once observed, “Virtue is not left to stand alone. He who practices it will have neighbours”.

    Today, to make history, we must learn from history. We must absorb the lessons of the past – and act on them – to prevent a mutually damaging escalation of tensions.

    In doing so, we all can draw a new map for global cooperation.

    We have done it before. And we can do it again.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Why does the US still have a Level 1 travel advisory warning despite the chaos?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samuel Cornell, PhD Candidate in Public Health & Community Medicine, School of Population Health, UNSW Sydney

    No travel can be considered completely safe. There are inherent risks from transportation, criminal activity, communicable diseases, injury and natural disasters.

    Still, global travel is booming — for those who can afford it.

    To reduce the chances of things going wrong, governments issue official travel advisories: public warnings meant to help people make informed travel decisions.

    Sometimes these advisories seem puzzling – why, for example, does the US still have the “safest” rating despite the ongoing volatility in Los Angeles?

    How do governments assess where is safe for Australians to travel?

    A brief history of travel advisories

    The United States pioneered travel advisories in 1978, with other countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland following.

    Australia started providing travel advisories in 1996 and now runs its system under the Smart Traveller platform.

    To determine the risk level, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) draws on diplomatic reporting, assessments from Australian missions overseas about local security conditions, threat assessments from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and advice from Five Eyes intelligence sharing partners (Australia, the US, United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada).

    The goal is to create “smart, responsible informed travellers”, not to restrict tourism or damage foreign relationships.

    DFAT has stressed its system is not influenced by “commercial or political considerations”.

    Soft power and safety

    In theory, these advisories are meant to inform travellers, keep them safe and reduce the burden on consular services.

    However, they can also subtly reflect politics and alliances.

    While travel advisories are presented as neutral, fact-based risk assessments, they may not always be free from political bias.

    Research shows governments sometimes soften their warnings for countries they are close with and overstate risks in others.

    A detailed analysis of US State Department travel warnings from 2009 to 2016 found only a weak correlation between the number of American deaths in a country and the warnings issued.

    In some cases, destinations with no record of US fatalities received frequent warnings, while places with high death tolls had none.

    In early 2024, Australia issued a string of warnings about rising safety concerns in the US and extremely strict entry conditions even with an appropriate visa.

    Yet, the US kept its Level 1 rating – “exercise normal safety precautions” – the same advice given for places such as Japan or Denmark.

    Meanwhile, Australia’s warning for France was Level 2 — “exercise a high degree of caution” — due to the potential threat of terrorism.

    Experts have also criticised Australia’s travel warnings for being harsher toward developing countries.

    The UK, a country with lower crime rates than the US, also sits at Level 2 — putting it in the same risk level as Saudi Arabia, Nicaragua and South Africa.




    Read more:
    In Trump’s America, the shooting of a journalist is not a one-off. Press freedom itself is under attack


    Inconsistencies and grey areas

    The problem is, the advisory levels themselves are vague: a Level 2 warning can apply to countries with very different risk profiles.

    It’s used for places dealing with terrorism threats like France, or vastly different law and respect for human rights such as Saudi Arabia, or countries recovering from political unrest such as Sri Lanka.

    Until early June 2025, Sweden was also rated Level 2 due to localised gang violence, despite relatively low risks for tourists. Its rating has since been revised down to Level 1.

    Travel advisories often apply a blanket rating to an entire country, even when risks vary widely within its borders.

    For instance, Australia’s Level 1 rating for the US doesn’t distinguish between different regional threats.

    In June 2025, 15 people were injured in Boulder, Colorado after a man attacked a peaceful protest with Molotov cocktails.

    Earlier in 2025, a major measles outbreak in West Texas resulted in more than 700 cases reported in a single county.

    Despite this, Australia continues to classify the entire country as a low-risk destination.

    This can make it harder for travellers to make informed, location-specific decisions.

    Recent travel trends

    Recent data indicate a significant downturn in international travel to the US: in March 2025, overseas visits to the US fell by 11.6% compared to the previous year, with notable declines from Germany (28%), Spain (25%) and the UK (18%).

    Australian visitors to the US decreased by 7.8% compared to the same month in 2024, marking the steepest monthly drop since the COVID pandemic.

    This trend suggests travellers are reassessing risk on their own even when official advisories don’t reflect those concerns.

    The US case shows how politics can affect travel warnings: the country regularly experiences mass casualty incidents, violent protests and recently has been detaining and deporting people from many countries at the border including Australians, Germans and French nationals.

    Yet it remains at Level 1.

    What’s really going on has more to do with political alliances than safety: increasing the US travel risk level could create diplomatic friction.

    What travellers can do now

    If you’re a solo female traveller, identify as LGBTQIA+, are an academic, come from a visible minority or have spoken out online against the country you’re visiting, your experience might be very different from what the advice suggests.

    So, here are some tips to stay safe while travelling:

    • Check multiple sources: don’t rely solely on travel advisories – compare travel advice from other countries

    • Get on-the-ground updates: check local news for coverage of events. If possible, talk to people who’ve recently visited for their experiences

    • For broader safety trends, tools like the Global Peace Index offer data on crime, political stability and healthcare quality. If you’re concerned about how locals or police treat certain groups, consult Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, or country-specific reports from Freedom House

    • Consider identity-specific resources: there are travel guides and safety indexes for LGBTQIA+ travellers like Equaldex, women travellers (Solo Female Travelers Network) and others. These may highlight risks general advisories miss.

    Travel advisories often reflect whom your country trusts, not where you’re actually safe. If you’re relying on them, make sure you understand what they leave out.

    Samuel Cornell receives funding from an Australian Government Research Training Program
    Scholarship.

    Milad Haghani does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Why does the US still have a Level 1 travel advisory warning despite the chaos? – https://theconversation.com/why-does-the-us-still-have-a-level-1-travel-advisory-warning-despite-the-chaos-258182

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Caribbean Challenge: Fostering Growth and Resilience Amidst Global Uncertainty

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 10, 2025

    As prepared for delivery

    Introduction and Road Map

    Good evening, everyone.

    It is a great pleasure to join you here in Brasilia for the 55th Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB or the Bank).

    Thank you Valerie for your very kind introduction. I also take this opportunity to thank the Bank for giving me the honor of delivering this year’s lecture in memory of Dr. William Gilbert Demas.

    It is highly symbolic that this year’s meeting takes place in Brazil for the very first time. This symbolizes a new beginning and demonstrates the CDB’s broad and international coalition of shareholders all vested in CDB’s success.

    The CDB is an incredibly important institution that has a vital role to play in the Caribbean’s development. It must be cherished, and supported, even as it delivers value to its borrowing and non-borrowing membership in harmonious partnership with all its stakeholders.

    This is also the first CDB Annual General Meeting under the presidency of Mr. Daniel Best. It is therefore in order to, again, congratulate President Best and to wish him tremendous success.

    Dr. Demas’s contributions throughout his career—as a policymaker, as an academic, and as an economist—cannot be overstated. He left a legacy of far-sighted vision and Caribbean excellence. A legacy that the whole region can be proud of.

    We need to channel that vision and that excellence to meet two urgent priorities for the region. First, to lift growth prospects and living standards. And second, to build resilience against persistent economic shocks and natural disasters. These two objectives go hand in hand. We need the second to sustainably deliver on the first.

    At a moment of exceptional uncertainty in the global economy, these tasks become even harder—and our efforts become even more urgent.

    Today, I will address the growth and resilience challenge: both in the global context and in the context of the Caribbean region.

    I will then discuss how regional policymakers can respond—by implementing sound macroeconomic policies and by following through on necessary structural reforms.

    Finally, I will share how the IMF is supporting our members to boost growth prospects and build resilience in today’s uncertain global environment.

    The Global Growth Challenge

    Let me start with the global growth outlook.

    After a series of shocks over the past five years, the global economy seemed to have stabilized—at steady but underwhelming rates, as compared with recent experience.

    However, the landscape has now changed. Major policy shifts have signaled a resetting of the global trading system. In early April, the US effective tariff rate jumped to levels not seen in a century.

    And, while trade talks continue and there’s been a scaling back of some tariffs, trade policy uncertainty remains off the charts.

     

    As a result, we significantly downgraded our most recent global growth projections in the April World Economic Outlook—by 0.5 percentage point for this year, from 3.3 to 2.8 percent; and 0.3 percentage point in 2026, from 3.3 to 3.0 percent. This represents the lowest global growth in approximately two decades, outside of 2020, the year of the pandemic.

    A natural question is: if trade tensions and uncertainty persist, what could be the impact on global growth?

    To start, we know that uncertainty imposes huge costs. With complex modern supply chains and changing bilateral tariff rates, planning becomes very difficult. Businesses postpone shipping and investment decisions. We also know that the longer uncertainty persists, the larger the costs imposed.

    In addition, rising trade barriers hit growth upfront. Tariffs do raise fiscal revenues but come at the expense of reducing and shifting economic activity—and evidence from past episodes suggests higher tariff rates are not paid by trading partners alone. These costs are passed on to importers and, ultimately, to consumers who pay higher prices.

    Protectionism also erodes productivity over the long run, especially in smaller economies. Shielding industries from competition reduces incentives for efficient resource allocation. Past productivity and competitiveness gains from trade are given up, which hurts innovation.

    Tariffs will impact economic growth differently across countries, but no nation is immune. The IMF’s most significant downgrades to growth are concentrated in countries affected the most by recent trade measures. Low-income countries face the added challenge of falling aid flows, as donor countries reprioritize resources to deal with domestic concerns.

    And we have already seen an increase in global financial market volatility. Equity market valuations declined sharply in response to the April tariff announcements. Unusual movements in the US government bond and currency markets followed.

    Equity markets have since regained ground on the hopes of a swift resolution of trade tensions. But with continued uncertainty and tighter financial conditions, we assessed in our most recent Global Financial Stability Report that risks to global financial stability have increased significantly.

    These global realities result in three main vulnerabilities.

    First, valuations remain high in some key segments of global equity and corporate bond markets. If the economic outlook worsens, these assets are vulnerable to sharp adjustments. This could, in turn, affect emerging markets’ currencies, asset prices, and capital flows.

    Second, in more volatile markets, some financial institutions could come under strain, especially highly leveraged nonbank financial institutions, with implications for the interconnected financial system.

    Third, sovereign bond markets are vulnerable to further turbulence, especially where government debt levels are high. Emerging market economies—which already face the highest real financing costs in a decade—may now need to refinance their debt and finance fiscal spending at even higher costs.

     

    These vulnerabilities, and the potential for impact in emerging economies, should not be underestimated nor ignored.

    But let me step back from these most recent economic and financial developments. As I mentioned, global growth prospects were already underwhelming.

    And looking over the medium term, these global growth prospects, as I mentioned previously, remain at their lowest levels in decades.

    What is driving this? Our analysis shows that a significant and broad-based slowdown in productivity growth accounts for more than half of the decline in global growth.

    This is partly because global labor and capital have not been flowing to the most dynamic firms. Lower private investment after the Global Financial Crisis and slower working-age-population growth in major economies exacerbated the problem. Our studies show that, without a course correction, global growth rates by the end of this decade would be below the pre-pandemic average by about 1 percentage point.

    Simply put, new uncertainties on top of already weak economic prospects make for a very challenging global growth backdrop.

    The Caribbean Growth and Resilience Challenge

    It is not surprising, then, that most Caribbean countries also face a challenging outlook.

    In our latest World Economic Outlook, we already projected tepid growth in the Caribbean region overall—even before accounting for the US trade policy announcements. Stronger performance in some countries—such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago—was offset by slower growth in others.

    And in several countries, crime weighs on growth prospects. Particularly in Haiti, where the security situation hampers efforts to sustain economic activity, implement reforms, and attract aid and foreign direct investment.

    On top of that, we estimate that the April tariff announcement and its global spillovers would lower Caribbean regional growth by at least 0.2 percentage point on average.

    But the impact varies across countries.

    In tourism-dependent economies, where growth is closely tied to US economic activity, the impact will mainly depend on the size of the US tourist base (Figure).

    In oil-exporting countries, lower commodity prices and higher volatility are the main channels of transmission. Lower global growth means lower demand for these commodities which adversely impacts the economies of commodity exporting countries.

    Slower growth, while a relatively recent phenomena from a global perspective, is, unfortunately, not new to the Caribbean. Declining growth trends in the Caribbean region have loomed over the longer horizon as well. Recent IMF analysis finds that most Caribbean countries had significantly slower growth over the last decades: 2001–2023, as compared with the previous two decades: 1980–2000 (Figure).

    For tourism-dependent Caribbean economies, we estimate a decline in potential growth from 3.3 percent over the 1981 – 2000 period to 1.6 percent over the following two decades, 2001-2019.

    This presents the Caribbean with an aggravated challenge – to reverse the trend of slower growth at a time when global growth is also declining. That is, the challenge is to reverse the trend of slower growth when the wind in the proverbial sail is weaker and has changed direction.

    Let’s be clear about what is at stake.

    Slower growth in the Caribbean slows the improvement in living standards and stymies the aspirations of Caribbean people for better opportunities. Slowing growth, in the past, has also meant that convergence in income levels between the Caribbean and advanced economies has stalled. In other words, the gap between the economic fortunes of the Caribbean national and that of her counterpart in the advanced world is growing wider.

     

    Of course, there are exceptions to the regional trend. In particular, Guyana’s economy has grown rapidly over the past two decades, progressing from low-middle-income to high-income status. Growth accelerated to over 45 percent on average in the past three years, making Guyana the fastest growing economy in the world!

    But for the Caribbean more broadly, the questions on which we should focus is – what explains the pattern of declining growth? And, what is the appropriate menu of policy responses to this pattern?

    With respect to the first question, and as in the rest of the world, a key explanation for declining growth is weak productivity growth.

    The growth challenge is not a mystery. Growth potential can be decomposed into its constituent factors and we can compare how the Caribbean’s growth potential has declined over time. Such an analytical and data-driven approach reveals that the Caribbean’s growth potential is a half of what it was a few decades ago. Addressing the Caribbean growth challenge requires systematic and comprehensive policies to strategically improve the factors that contribute to growth potential. Zooming in on one of the important factors: the Caribbean’s productivity growth has declined to almost zero. This is at the root of the Caribbean’s growth challenge. In addition to productivity growth, physical and human capital development need to be accelerated. So, ladies and gentlemen, there is no magic solution to the Caribbean growth challenge. There is no quick fix either. In fact, great danger exists if we believe that the growth challenge can be addressed with quick fixes. Solving the growth question will require as much effort as the effort put into the macro stability reforms successfully undertaken in Jamaica, Barbados and Suriname.

    What Should Policymakers Do? – Maintain and Entrench Macro Stability

    The goal for policymakers is clear: to foster resilient and inclusive growth that sustainably raises living standards.

    How should this be achieved?

    1. Maintain and entrench macro-economic stability and
    2. Decisively and comprehensively address the factors that raise growth potential

    As a pre-requisite, countries should strive to pursue policies that restore, maintain and entrench macroeconomic stability – stable prices, sustainable fiscal trajectories, adequate foreign exchange reserves and financial sector stability.

    The collective Caribbean experience powerfully demonstrates the transformative potential of macroeconomic stability. Jamaica, for example, which was burdened with unemployment rates that averaged 20% between the early 1970’s and the end of the 1980’s and 15% between over the 1990’s to the mid 2000’s only achieved the previously unimaginable result of low single digit unemployment rates, in the region of 4% and lower, when stability became entrenched.

    Stability is also a friend to the poor as Jamaica’s experience also highlights.

    Jamaica achieved the lowest rate of poverty in its history in 2023, again on the back of entrenched macroeconomic stability in the context of an institutionalized social protection framework supplemented by temporary and targeted counter-cyclical measures at times of distress.

    Friends, our history and global economic history clearly demonstrate that economic stability is indispensable to national success, regardless of chosen social and political organization. Economic stability should therefore be guarded and protected as a national asset, allowing for focus on higher order challenges like structural reforms to unlock growth potential. Also, the requirements of stability should act as a constraint on policy. Any proposed policy action that has the prospect of jeopardizing any of the components of stability should not make it through the policy formation gauntlet. Securing economic stability into the future requires laws but laws are insufficient. Stability over the long term is best preserved by developing, empowering, and strengthening institutions.

    Build fiscal buffers, strengthen fiscal frameworks, and bolster resilience.

    The Caribbean region hosts different currency regimes. The key requirement is internal consistency within the chosen currency regime. Floating rate and fixed rate currency regimes impose their own constraints. These need to be observed for success.

    While there is always room for improvement in monetary frameworks, the areas within the macro stability complex, that require urgent attention in the Caribbean, are rebuilding fiscal buffers, strengthening fiscal frameworks and bolstering resilience.

    Let’s face it: on top of all the other challenges, government budgets in the region are strapped. Providing extraordinary support in response to extraordinary shocks has depleted buffers.

    Public debt ratios have come down since the pandemic—this is good news. However, in many countries—including Caribbean countries—debt and financing needs are still too high.

    In fact, for some Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) members, achieving their regional debt target of 60 percent of GDP by 2035, a full decade from now, will require sizeable efforts.

    With timely fiscal consolidation, countries can bring down debt ratios and by so doing, they can protect themselves against future shocks. And they can make space to invest in crucial human and physical capital—an investment in their own future.

    In addition, some Caribbean countries have pegged exchange rates, which have been a long-standing anchor of stability—for example, in the Eastern Caribbean. The ECCU is one of only four currency unions in the entire world[1] and stands as a testimony to the capacity of Caribbean people to collaborate, cooperate and innovate.

    However, to safeguard the stability provided by this currency union long into the future, fiscal policies must be sustainable, resilient, and consistent with the exchange rate regime. Inconsistency only serves to compromise the currency union with the potential for destabilizing consequences.

    Our advice to policymakers on how to rebuild buffers and strengthen frameworks is straightforward: mobilize tax revenue, spend wisely, and plan ahead.

    Let’s start with mobilizing tax revenue. The tax revenue yield in Eastern Caribbean countries is falling short of peers. Inefficient tax exemptions and weak tax administrations are leading to large revenue losses.

    Broadening the tax base and removing distortions will not only increase revenues but also support investment and growth. The Fund has provided technical assistance to our members in the Caribbean to support their ongoing efforts in this area.

    Let me turn to spending wisely. Not all spending is productive spending. With limited fiscal space focus must be on spending that has the potential to deliver quantifiable social and economic returns within reasonable timeframes. Policymakers should keep the quality and composition of spending under review, including by containing unproductive spending, enhancing efficiency, and digitalizing government services.

    Finally, plan ahead. With conviction. Credibility is critical to allow fiscal consolidation to proceed gradually with lower financing costs and better growth results.

    Strong medium-term fiscal frameworks, with well-designed fiscal rules and specific plans for fiscal policies and reforms, can help bring debt down and investment up.

    Frameworks that combine debt and operational targets—and are backed by adequate capacity and institutions—can be particularly powerful.

    This approach worked well in Jamaica, where fiscal responsibility was written into law under the Financial Administration and Audit Act. The Act established a public debt goal of 60 percent of GDP and a rule that determines the annual target fiscal balance consistent with that objective. An Independent Fiscal Commission is the arbiter of Jamaica’s fiscal rules and provides an opinion on fiscal policy sustainability, strengthening credibility and accountability.

    Planning ahead also means being ready for the certainty of economic shocks. A golden rule in policymaking in a country is to design policies that fit the country’s circumstances. Shocks are a permanent feature of Caribbean small state reality. Caribbean economic policy ought, therefore, to make provisions for the inevitability of economic shocks. In Jamaica’s Act, there are clear escape clauses for large shocks and an automatic adjustment mechanism to secure a return to the debt target.

    Well-designed and transparent sovereign wealth funds can also help stabilize public finances when shocks hit. For example, Trinidad and Tobago’s sovereign wealth fund insulates fiscal policy from oil price fluctuations. Guyana’s fund helps manage its natural resource revenues, finance investment, and save for the future. And St. Kitts and Nevis is considering a fund to smooth volatile revenues from the Citizenship-by-Investment program.

    Planning for shocks is ever more important in regions like the Caribbean that face recurrent threats from natural disasters.

    Our countries need to be prepared before disasters hit.

    Recurring natural disasters impair productive infrastructure and hinder human development, constraining productivity growth even further.

    Major natural disasters cost an average of 2 percent of GDP per year in Caribbean countries and close to 4 percent of GDP in the Eastern Caribbean countries.

    There is a physical dimension to disaster preparedness, which involves investing in resilient infrastructure.

    There is also a financial dimension, which involves developing resilient risk transfer, contingent claim and insurance mechanisms.

    Unfortunately, rising global private re-insurance premiums are making the task even harder. Domestic insurance premiums have also been rising. The result is lower insurance coverage in the private sector, and thus potentially more burden on governments when a natural disaster strikes.

    Caribbean countries can secure a comprehensive insurance framework with multiple layers: self-insurance through their own fiscal buffers, participation in pooled risk transfer arrangements, contingent financing and catastrophe bonds.

    With respect to the first layer, in Jamaica, there is a legislated requirement to save annually in a natural disaster fund. I recognize, however, that for some countries individual buffers have declined since the pandemic and need to be restored.

    On the second layer, the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) helps fill an important gap. Coverage has steadily improved since its inception, and the CCRIF has made prompt payouts after various natural disasters. This included US$85 million across five countries, Grenada, St Vincent & the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, the Cayman Islands and Jamaica, in a matter of days after Hurricane Beryl, underscoring the Facility’s regional importance. Further expanding coverage would pay off in the long term.

    On the third layer of contingent financing, the World Bank has approved catastrophe deferred drawdown options for Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, among other countries in the pipeline. Furthermore, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines have already drawn on these instruments following natural disasters.

    In addition, the IDB has credit contingent facilities with Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, St Vincent and the Grenadines among other countries.

    On the fourth layer, Jamaica has, with World Bank assistance, independently sponsored two catastrophe bonds.

    Now, to be clear, stability, resilience and risk transfer by themselves, do not automatically deliver the elevated growth needed. However, elevated levels of economic growth cannot be achieved without stability. Furthermore, stability and resilience set the stage for elongating the economic cycle by significantly lowering a country’s risk premium, lowering the cost of capital, expanding the frontier of project economic viability and providing the counter-cyclical capacity to respond to shocks, thereby limiting the duration and intensity of downturns, and providing for longer unbroken periods of consecutive economic growth. The Jamaican experience demonstrates these relationships.

    To achieve higher growth, in addition to stability, policymakers have to decisively address factors that elevate growth potential beginning with the productivity gap.

    Decisively address structural obstacles to lift firm level productivity

    Addressing the growth challenge requires reversing the decline in the Caribbean’s growth potential by 1) improving total factor productivity and 2) boosting investment in physical and human capital.

    Our analysis for the ECCU shows that the bulk of total factor productivity losses come from high costs of finance, cumbersome tax administration, inefficient business licensing and permits, and skills mismatches in the workforce. From my experience, this can also be applied to most of the Caribbean beyond the ECCU.

    Overcoming these obstacles could bring substantial productivity gains ranging from 34 to 65 percent— which would be an incredible result! This could close the gap in income per capita with the US by 9 to 27 percentage points.

    Simplify and Digitalize Regulation, Business Licensing, Permits and Tax Payment Procedures

    One practical step is to promote digitalization of Caribbean societies which can significantly boost productivity. This will require a multifaceted strategy including investment in digital infrastructure, digital transformation of government, reducing the cost and increasing the availability of data transmission, improving digital literacy, among other factors.

    Application of digital tools and digital technologies to improve access to government services, while reducing time, ought to be seen as a non-negotiable imperative. As an obvious example, further enhancing taxpayer access to digital government services—through e-payment, e-filing, and e-registration—would not only reduce the administrative burden but also encourage compliance, fostering a better environment for entrepreneurship.

    In much of the Caribbean, businesses have to navigate a complex labyrinth of licensing, permitting and regulatory regimes. This is a drag on productivity. While the largest enterprises have the scale to absorb the inefficiencies, smaller firms suffocate from overly burdensome processes. We know that the economic vitality of a country is linked to the level of hospitability of the business environment to its small and medium-sized firms.

    There is, therefore, tremendous scope in the region to greatly simplify regulatory processes and eliminate unnecessary steps. Furthermore, the digitalization of licensing, permitting and regulatory procedures promises to enhance the efficiency of firms, boosting productivity.

    Improving Access to Finance

    That leads me to another practical step: improving access to finance, which can encourage new businesses and support a transition into the more productive formal sector. Finance is the oxygen of business, and its affordable and widespread availability is essential for having a dynamic business environment.

    There could be an entire session on improving access to finance as it is so fundamental, yet so multifaceted and complex.

    Many factors hinder access to finance in the Caribbean. I will touch on a few.

    First, legacy weaknesses in banks’ balance sheets limit access to credit, investment, and growth across the region. So it is important to address vulnerabilities in the banking sector. This includes timely compliance with regulatory standards and easier ways to dispose of impaired assets. Progress is happening: banks are building buffers and reducing non-performing loan ratios. But more work is needed to ensure all banks meet regulatory minimums.

    Reducing the costs of non-performing loan resolutions, ultimately reduces the cost of loans. This can be achieved by modernizing insolvency regimes to encourage faster out-of-court debt workouts. Asset management companies—if they are properly funded—would facilitate asset disposals.

    Collateral infrastructure should also be strengthened through effective credit registries and partial credit guarantee schemes. For example, the recently created regional credit bureau in the Eastern Caribbean can help lower the cost and time of credit risk assessments and close information asymmetry gaps. This will help small and medium enterprises access credit while safeguarding credit quality.

    Stronger anti-money laundering and anti-terrorism financing frameworks can help protect the financial system from external threats and retain correspondent banking relationships, the absence of which impedes access to credit.

    The above financial sector measures are absolutely necessary but hardly revolutionary.

    Revolutionizing access to credit in the region could be achieved by enabling mobile real-time, instant, 24/7 payment system platforms as exist in India through their Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and right here in Brazil through Pix.

    In both India and Brazil, access to finance and to financial services have been transformed, and inclusiveness expanded, by these innovations. Transactions are free, or ultra-low cost, and these payment platforms are integrated into banking apps and into e-commerce platforms.

    Of course, these systems only exist within the context of national identification systems that provide the necessary identity verifications as required.

    Seize the Opportunities from the Renewable Energy Transition.

    The use of oil imports for electricity generation is costly and has led to very high electricity prices which undermines competitiveness—particularly for the tourism industry—at the expense of potential growth.

    As we explored last December in the Caribbean Forum in Barbados, a successful energy transition can foster inclusive, sustainable, and resilient growth.

    That transition will look different for energy-importing and energy-exporting countries.

    For energy importers, diversifying into renewable energy, with fast declining costs, can reduce reliance on expensive and volatile oil imports. It would also offer relief from some of the highest electricity costs in the world. Consider this key fact: electricity in many countries in the Caribbean costs, a minimum of, twice as much as in advanced economies. We have been discussing this in the region for a long time. Too long.

    The energy transition would enhance external sustainability for energy importers, while making them more competitive, more resilient to shocks, and more likely to grow faster and on a sustainable basis.

    But seizing these opportunities requires tackling key obstacles. For example, high upfront investment costs. Limited fiscal space. Regulatory hurdles for private investment. And small market sizes and isolated grids that hinder economies of scale.

    So, the transition to renewables will take time and investment. It will also take efforts coordinated on a regional scale.

    One immediate, cost-effective step is to implement energy efficiency measures. For example, both Barbados and Jamaica have retrofitted government buildings with energy-efficient equipment. This delivers quick savings, typically without large upfront costs.

    On the regional front, initiatives like the Resilient Renewable Energy Infrastructure Investment Facility—championed by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank and supported by the World Bank—offer a promising step forward.

    Regional mechanisms to promote pooled procurement and to harmonize regulatory frameworks will also be key.

    Energy exporters in the Caribbean face a different set of challenges. Most notably, they have the difficult task of managing changes in fossil fuel demand and fiscal revenues while maximizing the value of existing reserves.

    But the energy transition is also an opportunity to diversify into the green energy sectors of the future, such as green petrochemicals and green hydrogen.

    Energy exporters will also need to watch out for spillovers from other regions’ climate policies, such as border carbon adjustment mechanisms. For example, Trinidad and Tobago faces exposure to the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, which could, potentially, affect over 5 percent of the country’s total exports. And a further 5 percent is at risk if the EU expands its Mechanism.

    But energy exporting countries can also turn this type of spillover into an advantage. By introducing their own carbon pricing systems, they can retain revenue in their economies rather than have it collected by their trading partners.

    Invest in Human Capital, Bridge the Skills Gap and Invest in Physical Infrastructure

    The most important investment Caribbean countries can make is in boosting the human capital of the region. Human capital development is multifaceted, but today I will focus on the central elements of education and skills.

    Invest in Human Capital; Address the Skills Gap

    Given the small size of Caribbean economies, and the absence of economies of scale, economic success will be determined by the level and quality of human capital in the region.

    Elevated levels of economic growth will require substantial improvements in education and skills outcomes across the region, and in some countries more than others. This is deserving of the region’s energy and focus.

    A recent survey for the ECCU highlights a shortage of skilled labor as a key constraint for businesses. I know this skills gap is also a reality in Jamaica and can be generalized across much of the Caribbean.

    What can be done? The answer is twofold: enhance the skills of those employed and provide opportunities to those who have skills but are not in the labor market.

    Expanding vocational training and modernizing education systems, coupled with active labor market policies, can help mitigate the skills gap. And digital tools can connect employers with potential employees.

    Emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence—make closing the skills gap all the more important. The opportunity is that rapidly evolving technologies could bring high productivity gains, with the threat that failure to upgrade skills could expose industries important to the region such as business process outsourcing.

    Harnessing that potential in Caribbean countries includes, for instance, integrating AI and data science into all levels of education.

    The good news is that many countries in the region are facing the skills challenge head on.

    For example, my home country of Jamaica launched a national initiative—supported by the World Bank—for secondary school students in the areas of Science, Technology, Engineering, Arts, and Mathematics, also known as the STEAM initiative.

    In Barbados, the 2022 Economic Recovery and Transformation Plan aims to enhance the business environment by advancing digitalization and skills training.

    In St. Vincent and the Grenadines, an ongoing education reform is focused on modernizing and expanding post-secondary technical and vocational education to better align skills with labor market needs.

    And in Antigua and Barbuda, the planned expansion of the University of the West Indies Five Islands Campus will provide new opportunities for higher education and regional talent development.

    However more can be done, and should be done, in each of these countries. The goal of policy should be to have Caribbean schools rank in the upper quartile of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) benchmarks.

    On creating more opportunities, bringing more women into the labor market can contribute to economic growth.

    We estimate that eliminating the gender gap in the ECCU—which is over 11 percentage points, on average—could boost regional GDP by roughly 10 percent. That is a powerful economic case for inclusive labor policies, such as enhanced access to childcare and elderly care.

    It is also imperative to foster opportunities for youth. Caribbean countries have some of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world, ranging from 10 to 40 percent. Empowering future generations is at the core of addressing the growth and resilience challenge in the region.

    I want to acknowledge the important efforts led by the Caribbean Community, CARICOM, to work towards deeper social and economic integration.

    Earlier this year, we saw tangible progress. CARICOM members are working to enable free movement of CARICOM nationals for willing countries. Importantly, this initiative also includes access to primary and secondary education, emergency healthcare, and primary healthcare for migrating individuals.

    Boost Investment in Infrastructure

    Improved infrastructure enhances the productivity of capital as well as the productivity of labor. The Caribbean will need much higher levels of investment to restore and boost its growth potential.

    Workers depend on public transportation to get from home to work and back home again. If this, for example, routinely takes an hour and a half each way, on average, and costs a third of weekly wages, then labor productivity will suffer. Efficient, affordable, accessible mass transportation enhances productivity. While taxis complement bus transportation, they cannot be an effective substitute. This is more of a problem in larger Caribbean territories and I know that Jamaica is tackling this problem head-on.

    Similarly, road and highway connectivity that opens new investment opportunities and reduces the cost of transportation of people and goods enhances productivity of capital as well as the productivity of labor and enhances growth potential.

    Modern commerce relies on communication and, importantly, on data. I mentioned this earlier. There is scope for telecommunications and broadband infrastructure to be improved, for data costs to be lowered, and for data access to be expanded. This will require investment. Hopefully, private investment, but investment that will need to be facilitated by government policy.

    Water is the source of life. Without water, communities are less productive, and businesses cannot function. Across the region, significant investment in water treatment, storage, and distribution infrastructure will be required to support economic growth and improve standards of living over the medium term.

    All of these elements of infrastructure – transportation, broadband, roads, water, and energy, dealt with earlier, – need considerable investment to keep Caribbean societies competitive and to raise the growth potential.

    However, Caribbean governments will not have the required resources to finance these investments from tax revenues, and at the same time fund education, health, security and other essential services.

    As such, governments will need to consider attracting local, regional, and international private capital in well-structured transactions to finance the productivity enhancing infrastructure needs of the region.

    This can be accomplished through the variety of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) modalities that exist and with the advice of multilateral partners, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) who are very experienced in structuring these kinds of transactions, and who know what is required to generate investor interest.

    I can speak from experience – the IFC has been instrumental in assisting Jamaica to develop its pipeline of PPP’s.

    My advice however is to not develop PPP’s sequentially, one at a time, starting one as the other concludes. Given the preparation period required for each, sequential PPP development will take too long. Instead, pursue PPP’s using a programmatic approach. That is, develop a pipeline of infrastructure PPP’s in parallel so you can bring these to market in rapid succession. The time and resources required for investors to familiarize themselves with the macro-environment, the legislative framework, the regulatory architecture, the country risks etc., with uncertainty around bid success, needs to be amortized over a number of transactions – in order to attract deep pocketed and experienced investors prepared to provide competitive bids.

    Open, transparent and competitive PPP’s, that are well structured, can help bridge the infrastructure gap and boost productivity.

    The Role of the IMF

    These are not easy times, and these are not easy steps to take. They require clarity of vision, coordination, partnerships, technical expertise and lots of energy.

    But these steps can put Caribbean countries on a path toward greater growth and resilience.

    Rest assured that the IMF remains fully committed to supporting our members across the region.

    Our near-universal membership provides us with a unique global perspective and we are informed by a large range of cross-country experiences over the last 80 years.

    With 191 member countries the IMF, as compared to the United Nations with 192 member countries, is as global as it gets. We engage with each of our members on a country-by-country basis, as well as on a regional basis with currency unions, including the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union.

    Our member countries, including Caribbean states, are shareholders and owners of the IMF. We work for you. And we do so through three primary modalities – (i) surveillance, where we provide a review and analysis of our member countries’ economy on an annual or biennial basis. This review, called the Article IV Consultation report, named after the clause in our articles that mandates this exercise, is a principal obligation of IMF membership. This review, which contains country specific policy advice, is published, and freely available, online. I encourage media practitioners, economists, financial analysts, public policy advocates, and citizens interested in their country and region to access these Article IV reports for your country and make good use of the information and analysis contained therein.

    The second modality through which the IMF provides a service to its member countries is capacity development. Here we provide technical analysis and tailor-made policy advice on specific issues that countries may be grappling with. For example, designing of tax policy measures, improving efficiency in public spending, optimizing public debt management, bolstering the capacity of statistics agencies and the development of monetary policy tools to name a few. Under this modality we also provide training courses for public officials through regional institutions such as CARTAC and also in courses at the IMF’s headquarters in Washington, DC.

    Our third modality is the one that most are familiar with – the IMF provides financing designed to address balance of payments challenges. Our long-established lending toolkit helps countries restore macroeconomic stability. In this goal of restoring macroeconomic stability many countries have had successful engagements with the IMF. In the region, Jamaica, Barbados, and Suriname come immediately to mind.

    At the recent IMF Spring Meetings I moderated a panel where the Greek Finance Minister made the point that at this juncture of very challenging fiscal circumstances in the Eurozone, only six countries within the 27 member EU have fiscal surpluses, and it so happens that four of these had IMF programs during the Global Financial Crisis.

    And the IMF continues to evolve to meet the needs of our member countries. Our rapid facilities provide emergency financing when shocks hit. And our newer Resilience and Sustainability Facility provides affordable long-term financing to support resilience-building efforts.

    In the Caribbean, Barbados and Suriname have made great strides in positioning their economies for growth while reducing vulnerabilities under their economic programs supported by the Extended Fund Facility. These countries’ ownership of the reforms has been critical to their success.

    Jamaica had access to—but did not draw on—the Fund’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line, which provided an insurance buffer against external shocks. It supported efforts to keep the economy growing, reduce public debt, enhance financial frameworks, and upgrade macroeconomic data.

    The Fund also provided rapid financing to seven Caribbean member countries during the pandemic.

    And Barbados and Jamaica have benefitted from the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Reforms have helped integrate climate-related risks in macroeconomic frameworks, provide incentives for renewable energy to support growth, and catalyze financing for investment in resilience.

    We are also engaging closely with Haiti through a Staff-Monitored Program. This Program is designed to support the authorities’ economic policy objectives and build a track record of reform implementation, which could pave the way for financial assistance from the Fund.

    Of course, the effectiveness of our advice and financial support is enhanced by our continued efforts in capacity development. In particular, I would like to highlight the work of CARTAC, which has been operating since 2001.

    CARTAC offers capacity building and policy advice to our Caribbean members across several areas: from public finance management, to tax and customs administration, to financial sector supervision and financial stability, and beyond.

    We greatly appreciate the generous support received so far for CARTAC. But more is needed to close the financing gap. I hope we can count on your advocacy with development partners to sustain CARTAC’s essential work.

    In my time at the Fund thus far, I have seen how much advanced countries rely on, and use, the IMF’s intellectual output to the benefit of their countries and how this output features in, and informs, public discourse in many member countries. The IMF is an incredibly powerful resource that works for you and I strongly encourage Caribbean countries to strategically maximize their use of the IMF and what it has to offer.

    A Call to Action

    Let me conclude.

    Policymakers in the Caribbean are facing a complex set of old and new challenges.

    But challenging times can also be times of opportunity, action, and resolve.

    The Caribbean is a region of immense promise, with rich cultural heritage, natural beauty, and vibrant population.

    The world is undergoing profound change. This change introduces global vulnerabilities to which the Caribbean is not immune. The resilience of small open economies like those in the Caribbean is likely to be tested.

    It is imperative, therefore, that Caribbean countries work to put their macro-fiscal houses in order while engaging in deep and meaningful structural reforms to increase the growth potential of Caribbean economies.

    You hold the keys to the future of the region. You have the tools, the talent, and the tenacity to chart a new path for growth and resilience. Your actions can make a difference to the Caribbean’s prospects.

    We have seen many steps in the right direction to address bottlenecks and boost productivity. And we encourage you to keep going.

    Implement those reforms that are under your control.

    Continue to work together across the region.

    Capitalize on CARICOM to achieve a larger market for the movement of people, investment, and trade.

    Stay focused on the goal: delivering more economic resilience, higher growth prospects, and better living standards for people across the Caribbean.

    And, you can count on the Fund along the way.

    Thank you.


    [1] The other currency unions are: Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC); West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); and the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/10/dmd-clarke-cdb-speech-june-10

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: International travel: April 2025 ? Stats NZ information release

    International travel: April 2025 – information release

    11 June 2025

    International travel covers the number and characteristics of overseas visitors and New Zealand resident travellers (short-term movements) entering or leaving New Zealand.

    Key facts

    Monthly arrivals – overseas visitors

    Overseas visitor arrivals were 267,300 in April 2025, an increase of 42,200 from April 2024. The biggest changes were in arrivals from:

    • Australia (up 33,800)
    • United Kingdom (up 4,000)
    • United States (up 3,300)
    • Hong Kong (up 1,600)
    • Indonesia (down 1,100).

    The increase in the number of overseas visitors from Australia in April 2025 compared with April 2024 was partly related to the timing of school holidays. Easter and school holidays’ impact has more information.

    The total number of overseas visitor arrivals in April 2025 was 87 percent of the 307,400 in April 2019 (before the COVID-19 pandemic).

    Visit our website to read this information release:

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NIH Director Commits to Providing Detailed List of Total Staff Reductions at NIH By End of Day; Senator Murray Grills Director on Cuts to Clinical Trials, Grant Terminations

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray
    ICYMI: Murray, DeLauro, Baldwin Blast Director Bhattacharya for Terminating Thousands of Active NIH Grants, Upending Research, Threatening Patient Treatment
    ***WATCH: Senator Murray’s exchange with Bhattacharya***
    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, questioned National Institutes of Health (NIH) Director Dr. Jayanta Bhattacharya at a Senate Appropriations Labor, Health and Human Services, Education, and Related Agencies Subcommittee hearing on the president’s fiscal year 2026 budget request for NIH. Senator Murray secured a commitment from Dr. Bhattacharya to provide a detailed list of total staff reductions across NIH—by Institute, Center, and Job Function—under the Trump administration by the end of the day. Senator Murray also grilled Dr. Bhattacharya on the abrupt termination of at least 160 clinical trials and the delay and freezing of grant funding, which is disrupting lifesaving research across the country.
    In her opening comments, Vice Chair Murray said:
    “I am extremely proud of the work that I’ve done on a bipartisan basis to strengthen our investments in NIH, to support lifesaving research, and to really maintain American leadership in biomedical innovation. I’m not going to mince words today about how that progress is now being unraveled.
    “What the Trump administration is doing to NIH right now is, frankly, catastrophic. Over the past few months, this administration has fired and pushed out nearly 5,000 critical employees across NIH, prevented nearly $3 billion dollars in grant funding from being awarded, and terminated nearly 2,500 grants—totaling almost $5 billion dollars for lifesaving research that is ongoing—that includes clinical trials for HIV and Alzheimer’s disease.
    “Across the country, including in my home state of Washington, research institutions have been waiting for months to receive funding for grants they’ve already been awarded. Meanwhile, NIH is cutting down on grant awards—with thousands of fewer research grants this year, and almost 15,000 fewer next year if the administration has its way.
    “Because, to pile on to this destruction, you and the President are requesting that we now slash NIH’s budget by 40 percent, or $18 billion dollars. I cannot fathom to what end. The Trump administration is already systematically dismantling the American biomedical research enterprise that is the envy of the world—throwing away billions in economic activity in every one of our states, and jeopardizing the lifesaving work of researchers across the country.
    “This budget proposal would effectively forfeit our leadership in research innovation and competitiveness to China. It would mean we depend on China for the latest treatments for devastating diseases.
    “No one in America wants us to do less cancer research. No one is asking you to make it harder to research Alzheimer’s disease. And no one is asking you to cut lifesaving clinical trials.

    “We are hearing this from the experts themselves. You just received a letter signed by hundreds of your own staff who believe this administration’s actions risk breaking NIH and the lifesaving work it does. I really hope you heed their warning, and it should go without saying, but I expect none of them to face retaliation for raising those concerns.
    “Everyone on this dais wants NIH to succeed. And you’re going to need to see some major changes from what you are doing right now to get us back on the right path.”
    [STAFF PUSHED OUT ACROSS NIH]
    Senator Murray began her questioning by following up on points she raised on a phone call with Dr. Bhattacharya last week, and that her staff has been asking for answers to for months: “We spoke on the phone last week, I appreciate that, I want to follow up on those questions and what I’ve been trying to get answers from you for months. You told me 25 staff have been fired from the NIH Clinical Center out of the 1,445 who have been fired across the entire agency. But that does not include staff leaving after being offered buyouts or threatened with future layoffs. I want to know, what is the total number of employees who left the Clinical Center and the entire agency as a result of the Trump Administration’s personnel actions in total?”
    “The numbers I have in front of me are for the Reduction in Force, that’s the 25 I mentioned in our conversation. We’ll get those numbers for the retirements to you,” said Dr. Bhattacharya.
    “Well, I told you I was going to ask for this [information] over the phone, I requested this multiple times, how come you do not have that for us today?” said Senator Murray.
    “My misunderstanding, I thought you were asking for the Reduction in Force numbers,” said Dr. Bhattacharya.
    “No. I was being very clear,” said Senator Murray. “I want to know, by the end of the day, can I have a detailed list of reductions in staff by Institute, by Center, by job function—not just the RIFs, but total staff reductions. Can I have that by the end of the day?”
    “Yes,” Dr. Bhattacharya committed.
    “Okay. Those are really basic questions, and I want to see that by the end of today,” Senator Murray said.
    [GRANT CANCELLATIONS FOR CLINICAL TRIALS]
    Senator Murray continued her questioning by asking Dr. Bhattacharya about NIH cuts to, and termination of, hundreds of clinical trials over the past few months: “Now I am also particularly concerned, as I told you, about cuts to clinical trials—which are harming patients’ care nationwide, and the chance for better treatments and cures. NIH has now terminated at least 160 clinical trials. In addition to terminating grants, you are also delaying grant awards and freezing, or significantly delaying, institutions from being able to draw down their grant funding, which is disrupting clinical trials—to say nothing of other research that it is now threatening. How many clinical trials across the country have been impacted by the grants you have terminated, frozen, or delayed?”
    “Senator, I don’t have the number for the specific numbers of trials,” Dr. Bhattacharya replied. “We’ve worked to make sure that no patients enrolled in the clinical trials are, have any delay in their care as a result of the—in 2020, the NIH terminated a very large number of clinical trials.”
    “Well I’m asking you about today, under your direction,” SenatorMurray said.
    Dr. Bhattacharya responded, “I don’t have specific numbers, and a lot of that is subject to negotiations. I’ve set a process where people can appeal for, if there’s any decisions made regarding grant pauses and terminations and we’re actively working to make sure that that appeals process is going. The numbers are in flux, and I’m happy to get some of those numbers to you later.”
    Senator Murray said, “Well we do know that patient care is being impacted, at your own Clinical Center and in more than 100 clinical trials in the country.”
    “On May 30th, you terminated a 23-year research effort to develop an HIV vaccine, just as scientists, including at the Fred Hutch Center in Seattle, are on the cusp of a functional cure for HIV. Terminating those HIV vaccine trials now cuts off access to treatment for 6,000 patients in the network. You canceled a clinical trial evaluating new evidence-based interventions for Type 2 Diabetes in rural communities in Appalachia. You terminated a clinical trial studying immunotherapy in combination with monoclonal antibodies to treat women with recurrent ovarian cancer. That is what has already happened. So now you are coming to us today, proposing to cut NIH funding by 40 percent next year. Tell us how many fewer clinical trials would you fund in the next fiscal year with a budget cut of $18 billion dollars from NIH?” Senator Murray asked.
    “Senator, can I just address HIV, because I am absolutely committed—in 2019, President Trump issued a challenge for us to eliminate the threat to HIV in this country,” Dr. Bhattacharya said. “And we’ve had a 22 percent reduction in HIV transmission since then. We now have the technological tools to do that, and I’ve been working on developing a program to actually implement this vision, so we can use—”
    “But you did terminate the HIV research at Fred Hutch that, again, was on the cusp of a treatment for 6,000 patients nationwide. You did do that?” Senator Murray pushed back.
    “I don’t—I’d have to get back to you on that,” Dr. Bhattacharya replied.
    “You did do that,” SenatorMurray said.
    “Senator, I think we actually have now the chance, with the existing technologies, Lenacapavir and other treatments, to actually address—” Dr. Bhattacharya hedged.
    “I’m delighted to hear that, but I’m just telling you what clinical trials have been terminated and I’m asking you this because we have to write an appropriations bill,” SenatorMurray replied.“How many fewer clinical trials will you fund in the next fiscal year with an $18 billion dollar cut? That’s your budget request.”
    “Senator, the budget request is a work of negotiation between Congress and the administration. President Trump has issued a letter to Secretary Kratsios committing the United States to be the leading nation—” dodgedDr. Bhattacharya.
    “Well you’re not answering the question. We need to know how many fewer clinical trials, can you get that number back to me please? You’re asking for a budget, we’re trying to figure out what that will fund. That’s our job,” SenatorMurray said.
    “The number depends on what the requests we get for proposals from all across the country. The budget itself would be dependent on what you all do, as well as what the administration does,” Dr. Bhattacharya responded.
    Senator Murray pressed, “Well I know, but we are trying to write a budget with the knowledge that you have, with the request that you have, I’m asking a question, how many fewer clinical trials—we need an answer back to that.”
    Dr. Bhattacharya again said, “It’s hard to give an answer back to that because I don’t know what the proposals are going to be.” To which Senator Murray replied: “You came here today to ask for a budget that reduces NIH significantly. I would expect as Director, you would know the impacts of that. We need to know what the impacts are in order to fund that budget.”
    “Senator, I mean it’s hard to say what the researchers of the country are going to do in response, for a hypothetical budget—” repliedDr. Bhattacharya.
    “Would you say there’s going to be MORE clinical trials under that? Under an $18 billion dollar, 40 percent cut?” Senator Murray asked.
    “It seems unlikely,” Dr. Bhattacharya admitted. “But I will say this, that the budget itself is a negotiation between the administration and Congress. Congress allocates the funds. I am absolutely committed to making sure that, whatever the allocation goes, that we address the health—
    “You are asking us for a significant reduction. It will impact the health of the United States of America. This committee has an obligation to know how you are spending that money,” Senator Murray concluded.
    ___________________________________
    Senator Murray has been a leading voice in Congress raising the alarm over HHS’ unilateral reorganization plan and slamming the closure of the HHS Region 10 office in Seattle and the CDC’s National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Spokane Research Laboratory. Senator Murray has sent oversight letters and hosted numerous press conferences and events to lay out how the administration’s reckless gutting of HHS is risking Americans health and safety and will set our country back decades, and lifting up the voices of HHS employees who were fired for no reason and through no fault of their own.
    In particular, Senator Murray has been leading the charge against the Trump administration’s efforts to gut lifesaving research at NIH and push out nearly 5,000 NIH skilled scientists, grants administrators, and other employees at the agency. Senator Murray released a statement decrying the Trump administration’s all-out assault on the NIH upon meeting with Bhattacharya in February, and at his nomination hearing in March, she pressed Mr. Bhattacharya on the Trump administration’s efforts to cut billions from biomedical research through an illegal cap on indirect costs, and their unprecedented halt on NIH Advisory Council Meetings, among other issues.
    When the Trump administration attempted to illegally cap indirect cost rates at 15 percent, Senator Murray immediately and forcefully condemned the move, led the entire Senate Democratic caucus in a letter decrying the proposed change, and introduced amendments to Senate Republicans’ budget resolution to reverse it, which Republicans blocked. Murray has led Congressional efforts to boost biomedical research. Previously, over her years as Chair of the Labor-HHS Appropriations Subcommittee, Senator Murray secured billions of dollars in increases for biomedical research at NIH, and during her time as Chair of the HELP Committee she established the new ARPA-H research agency as part of her PREVENT Pandemics Act to advance some of the most cutting-edge research in the field. Senator Murray was also the lead Democratic negotiator of the bipartisan 21st Century Cures Act, which delivered a major federal investment to boost NIH research, among many other investments. 
    Senator Murray forcefully opposed the nomination of notorious anti-vaccine activist RFK Jr. to be Secretary of HHS, and she has long worked to combat vaccine skepticism and highlight the importance of scientific research and vaccines. Murray was also a leading voice against the nomination of Dr. Dave Weldon to lead CDC, repeatedly speaking up about her serious concerns with the nominee immediately after their meeting. In 2019, Senator Murray co-led a bipartisan hearing in the HELP Committee on vaccine hesitancy and spoke about the importance of addressing vaccine skepticism and getting people the facts they need to keep their families and communities safe and healthy. Ahead of the 2019 hearing, as multiple states were facing measles outbreaks in under-vaccinated areas, Murray sent a bipartisan letter with former HELP Committee Chair Lamar Alexander pressing Trump’s CDC Director and HHS Assistant Secretary for Health on their efforts to promote vaccination and vaccine confidence.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Resisting Dependency: U.S. Hegemony, China’s Rise, and the Geopolitical Stakes in the Caribbean

    Source: Council on Hemispheric Affairs –

    By Tamanisha J. John

    Toronto, Canada

    Introduction

    The Caribbean region is an important geostrategic location for the United States, not only due to regional proximity, but also due to the continued importance of securing sea routes for trade and military purposes. It is the geostrategic location of the Caribbean that has historically made the region a target for domineering empires and states. As both geopolitical site and geostrategic location, U.S. foreign policy articulations of Caribbean people and the region have been effectively contradictory, but the contradiction has allowed the U.S. to maintain its hegemonic position: Caribbean peoples in U.S. foreign policy are rendered backwards, unstable, and dangerous or targets of xenophobic harassment; while the physical region is rendered as a place where U.S. foreign policy must maintain one-sided power relations, lest these sites come under the influence of other states that the U.S. views as impinging upon its sphere of influence. One can most readily look to Haiti to see these contradictory dynamics at play. Haiti has not had democratic elections for two decades and instead has been under United Nations (UN) sanctioned “tutelage” or occupation via the CORE group, of which the U.S. is a part.[i] Over the past two decades, Haiti has been subject to a massive influx of U.S. manufactured weapons that fuel gun violence and murder in the country.[ii] Meanwhile those Haitians fleeing this violence to the U.S. have been met with whips at the U.S.-Mexico border, deportation flights from the U.S., and dehumanizing mythological hysteria accusing Hatians of  “eating pets.”[iii]

    Given the domineering impact of the U.S. and its allies in Canada and Europe in the Caribbean region, states in the region remain deeply dependent on foreign investment and tourism from these powers. ‘Foreignization’ of Caribbean economies makes it hard for the peoples of the region to make a living. Many Caribbean governments, neoliberal in orientation, willingly support this dependent development scheme by promoting migration for remittances, service industries for tourism, and temporary foreign worker schemes abroad due to lack of worthwhile opportunities at home. A large part of what maintains this dependent relationship—that many would find to be demeaning in most circumstances—is the securitization of the Caribbean region by the U.S. and its allies, as well as the invocation of “shared cultures,” rooted in colonial histories which continue to impose multiple hierarchies of domination on Caribbean peoples.

    Washington’s aim of permanent hegemony in the region is being challenged by an increasingly multipolar world, and this accounts for the US attempt to limit China’s influence in the Caribbean. For example, U.S. tariff assaults on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) stems from U.S. insecurities about China’s economic growth alongside its manufacturing and technological developments.[iv] China’s extension of infrastructural, technological, and other tangible material developments to states lower down on the global value chain, and at smaller costs to them is referred to by the U.S. and other western policy makers as “China’s growing influence.” This includes states in the Caribbean, which have not only become consumers of products from China but have also increased their exports to China since the 2010s. Unsurprisingly, the U.S. fears that China is gaining too much influence in the Caribbean given its developmental hand there. Although the U.S. is not directly competing with China on development initiatives, Washington’s reluctance to support meaningful progress in the Caribbean—where U.S. corporations continue to profit from structural underdevelopment—has led it to pursue strong-arm diplomacy as a symbolic stand against China instead.

    China’s alternative to dependent development challenges Western Hegemony in the Caribbean

    Western capitalist modernity, as an ideological, political, and socioeconomic project, is threatened by improvements to the global value chain. The issue at hand is that the U.S. and the Western-led capitalist system have long relegated states of the ‘Global South’ to lower positions on the global value chain. This has rendered development elusive for many states, to the sole benefit of Western corporations and their allies. Lack of development in places like the Caribbean, Africa, Asia, and Latin America actually benefits capitalist enterprises headquartered in the ‘Global North’ which extract surplus value by exploiting cheap natural resources, labor, and land in these regions. China’s accelerated advancement within the global value chain—alongside the rise of other partner states positioned lower on that chain—has not depended on economic or political subordination to the west. This trajectory is actively interpreted as eroding Western hegemonic dominance—even as the improved developments of states like China within the global value chain, have expanded global capitalism. Since 2018, the U.S. tariff assault on China, which has intensified under the second Trump administration, is a direct response to China’s economic growth propelled by China’s added value to the global value chain. In essence, the fear is China’s rise, while not reliant on the west, has made the West more reliant on importing cheap products and manufactured goods from China.

    After the global 2007/8 financial crisis, China’s expressed strategy was to diversify its exports and import markets through helping other states improve their own conditions in the global trade value system. This of course, was due to the negative impacts felt by China in its export markets from the 2008 global financial crisis. Since then, China has increased the internal demand within China for Chinese goods, which also saw the purchasing power of Chinese citizens rise. This helped the growth of a middle class in China, and also allowed the Communist Party of China (CPC) to think more broadly about its continued growth strategy. By the early 2010s China sought to develop a wider external market that was not dependent on the U.S. and the other Western states. As China began formulating a broader development strategy, the growing purchasing power of Chinese citizens made the U.S. and other Western countries increase demands on China to have unfettered access to China’s internal market. The 2010s thus became rife with false accusations by Western commentators of China manipulating its currency to amass reserve wealth, and maintain competitive exports[v] – which helped to spark Trump’s trade assault on China in 2018, and again during the second Trump administration in 2025.

    While conversations in the West hinged on conspiracy, the CPC acknowledged that neither internal consumption nor reliance on the U.S. and Western markets would promote long-term sustainable development and growth of China’s economy. Greater emphasis was placed on increasing and improving relations with other developing states. In essence, helping the development of states lower down on the global value chain would be necessary—in order to make them consumers (thus importers)—of products from China. This became part of China’s long-term strategy to diversify its import and export markets. Thus, after the 2008 global financial crisis and especially after 2010, China’s investment in places like the Caribbean had a marked and noticeable increase. A decade later, this strategy has proven beneficial to China’s growth and development – as well as to growth and development of other developing countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean with more states engaging in, and pursuing trade and other relations with, China.

    The impact of U.S. tariffs and fees on the Caribbean

    Despite growing U.S. security concerns over China’s engagement in the Caribbean, the region remains largely dependent on the United States, and Caribbean states consistently run trade deficits in favor of the U.S. These trade deficits usually come at the expense of local Caribbean growers, producers, and artisans. According to Sir Ronald Sanders, Antigua and Barbuda’s Ambassador to the United States: “In 2024, the United States ran a $5.8 billion trade surplus with CARICOM as a whole. For a tangible illustration, Antigua and Barbuda’s imports from the U.S. exceeded $570 million, while its exports in return were a mere fraction of that total.”[vi] Given Caribbean regional economic dependence on the U.S., Canada and Europe, many Caribbean people seeking employment and/or asylum opportunities typically see the U.S. as a destination of choice, contributing to the large Caribbean diasporic communities in North America and Europe. These Caribbean diasporic communities not only send remittances and goods back to their home countries to support family, friends, and communities – but also facilitate Caribbean state’s exports into the U.S. It is important to underscore these dynamics, as the longstanding U.S.-Caribbean relationship—rooted in dependency—remains firmly entrenched, despite growing investments in the region from China.

    The U.S. tariff assault on China extended into a wider tariff assault by the U.S. against multiple countries, including states in the Caribbean. By April 3, 2025 the U.S. had imposed tariffs on 24 Caribbean countries: a 10% tariff on 23 of them,[vii] and a 38% tariff on Guyana[viii]—a Caribbean nation with extensive relations with China[ix]—excluding its exports of oil (dominated by U.S. and other foreign corporations), gold, and bauxite. The U.S. tariffs on Caribbean states—levied amid fragile post-pandemic recovery and lingering hurricane damage—underscores a troubling, though not surprising indifference to the region’s economic vulnerability and ongoing efforts toward stabilization and renewal.[x] During this time, the U.S. introduced a series of tariff increases on China, peaking at a 145% tariff after April 10, 2025, before settling on a 10% rate through an agreement reached on May 13, 2025.[xi] In addition to the tariffs that Washington placed on China, the U.S. also announced that it would issue port fees on Chinese built ships entering U.S. ports. In all, these tariffs and fees being imposed by the U.S. meant that there would likely be negative impacts borne by Caribbean states that import U.S. goods, and Caribbean states that export goods to China. The overall impact of the tariffs and fees would be two-fold: First, U.S. consumers of goods imported from the Caribbean would have to pay more to access those goods. Second, increased costs accrued to Caribbean state’s importing U.S. goods due to port fees, would make it more cost effective for those Caribbean states to import more goods directly from China. However, in the immediate term, Sino-Caribbean trade, lacking established relationships on a wide range of import products, has the potential to lead to import shortages – particularly of food and other essential imports from the U.S.—in the Caribbean. Given global backlash from the shipping industry, the U.S. revised and changed its decision regarding port fees a week later,[xii] and three weeks later, on April 28, it reduced the tariff on Guyana to 10%.

    Political commentators recognize, contrary to the denials by the Guyanese government, that the initially high tariffs placed on Guyana were motivated by U.S. tensions with China. According to former Guyanese diplomat, Dr. Shamir Ally,[xiii] and Guyanese political commentator, Francis Bailey, Guyana “is caught in a geopolitical battle between the US and China. Or more specifically – Washington objects to Beijing’s “very strong foothold” in Guyana.”[xiv] This was made clear, when prior to the Trump administration’s announcement of the tariff’s on Guyana, Guyanese President, Irfaan Ali, pledged that the U.S. would “have some different and preferential treatment” from Guyana[xv]— given a shared stance between the two countries in relation to Venezuela.[xvi] This pledge by Guyana’s president took place within the context of the U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to the Caribbean, during which Rubio chastised the construction of infrastructure in Guyana that he deemed subpar, and alleged must have been built by China, even though it was not.[xvii] These kinds of geopolitical posturing by Washington stoke antagonisms, ignoring the negative impacts of Caribbean dependency, including that of Guyana. Caribbean economic dependency on the U.S. (Europe and Canada) will not be completely ameliorated by China, and neither will China be able to fill the role of the West for Caribbean exporters who, given histories of enslavement, indentureship, and colonialism, rely on diasporic taste and preferences for ‘niche’ exports (e.g., artisan goods, arts, entertainment). Given the high degree of U.S., Canadian, and European ownership in the Caribbean’s industrial and manufacturing sectors, the region’s capacity to produce “finished products” on an exportable scale remains limited. Despite the continued dependency relation of Caribbean states on U.S. markets, however, China can positively impact Caribbean economies by helping to diversify their trading partners, and by increasing local opportunities for people within Caribbean states, based on the kinds of new (or improved) infrastructure typically developed in partnerships with China.

    Though on the rise, the trade relationship between China and states in the Caribbean is still quite limited. Caribbean states that are a part of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) saw a notable increase in their exports to China, from less than 1% of their total exports in the 1990s and 2000s, to between 1% and 6 % of exports going to China after the 2010s.[xviii] The majority of exports from the Caribbean to China from the 2010s forward have been agricultural and mineral in nature. Alongside the growing export potential of CARICOM states to China since the 2010s, there has also been an increase in Caribbean states importing Chinese goods. States such as Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Guyana, Jamaica, and Suriname import about 10% of their goods from China. On the other hand, states like the Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago import less than 10% of their goods from China. The overall trend, then, is that CARICOM states have added some diversification to their trading partners since the 2010s but continue to remain firmly within the Western trading bloc. Given the structured dependency of Caribbean economies, they tend to import more from their trading partners than they export to them. However, as political analyst Daniel Morales Ruvalcaba points out, as a trading partner, China’s commitment to South-South partnerships has meant that trading disparities between itself and CARICOM states are “offset by investments flowing from China to the Caribbean […] broadly categorized into three key sectors: port infrastructure development, resource extraction, and the tourism industry.”[xix] This way of tending to the trade disparity has had beneficial impacts—that can also be seen very visibly by those who live and visit states in the Caribbean. Additionally, China’s investments have not been limited to CARICOM states, or to states that recognize China and not Taiwan. For instance, China invests in Belize, Haiti, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines—these are Caribbean states that recognize Taiwan.[xx]

    While China does not play a dominant import-export role in the Caribbean, given the system of dependency into which the Caribbean is already integrated, it also does not pose a security threat to the Caribbean region, despite Washington’s portrayal of China as a “bad actor.” The PRCs commitment to non-interference makes it extremely unlikely that China would use the Caribbean as a springboard for a security confrontation with Washington and its NATO allies. China does, however, have a strategic partnership with Venezuela, largely limited to a defensive posture given its relations with other states in the region, including the Caribbean. Further, with the large security presence of the U.S. and its allies in the Caribbean, China would have nothing to gain from an offensive military posture in the region. Though self-evident, this explains why the U.S has chosen to frame China’s presence in the Caribbean not in economic terms, but as a technological and geopolitical “threat”—going so far, on multiple occasions, as to allege that China is constructing covert surveillance facilities in Cuba to conduct espionage on the U.S.[xxi]

    The China-Caribbean “threat” from the U.S. Perspective

    In 2018, Washington signaled its intent to limit Chinese investments in infrastructure, energy, and technology abroad; by 2023, U.S. Southern Command identified the Caribbean as a key region where China’s growing economic footprint should be restrained. In its effort to push China out of the Caribbean tech sector, the U.S. has allowed U.S. and other Western companies to develop 5G networks in Jamaica at virtually no cost in the short term—effectively subsidizing the infrastructure to block Chinese involvement and investments in the sector. This campaign has gone so far as to include veiled threats of sanctions toward Jamaica and other regional nations should they pursue connectivity projects with China.[xxii] Since the 1940s, the U.S. has viewed government-controlled economies as threats to the Western capitalist order—a label that readily applies to China. In 2025, the trade offensive against China is markedly more severe, driven by Washington’s explicit goal of curbing the spread and stalling the advancement of China’s high-tech industries—an effort aimed at preserving U.S. dominance in the sector, which is increasingly seen as under threat. The trade war, which began openly during Trump’s first term, has only intensified in his second—driven in part by the growing influence of high-tech capitalists closely aligned with his administration. China’s advances in artificial intelligence, seen with the public release of DeepSeek AI, has only accelerated the U.S. assault.

    According to  U.S. and other pro-Western security analysts who view China as a “threat” in the Caribbean, this threat manifests in three primary ways. First, they point to China’s development of internet-based infrastructure in Caribbean nations which they claim enables Chinese espionage operations that target the U.S. from within the region. Second, they highlight the fact that most Caribbean states recognize the People’s Republic of China, rather than Taiwan, under the One-China policy—a position they attribute to questionable dealings with Beijing, rather than to the exercise of Caribbean political agency in matters of state recognition. And lastly, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is portrayed as a nefarious development scheme that allows China to assert its influence globally. Notably, these accusations that form the “threat” narrative amongst U.S. and other pro-Western security advocates don’t hold up against the slightest scrutiny.

    First, there is no evidence that there are “Chinese spy bases” in Cuba or in any other country in the Caribbean—despite these accusations being levied by both Trump White Houses, and various U.S. Republican politicians in Florida.[xxiii] Second, the PRC does invest in, and maintain diplomatic relations with, Caribbean states that recognize Taiwan.[xxiv]  This suggests that the PRC does not force a One-China policy on states in the Caribbean with which it has cooperative relations. Commenting on Sino-Caribbean relations, Caribbean leaders themselves often note that the recognition of China and not Taiwan is due to support for China safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, of which they include national reunification.[xxv] Ultimately, the alleged “nefarious” nature of the Belt and Road Initiative stems from its core premise: that developing countries receive meaningful support from China to pursue their own development goals. Such efforts inevitably draw scrutiny from the U.S. and the Westbroadly, as genuine development in the ‘Global South’ is often perceived as a challenge to Western capital and hegemony. The BRI also encourages signatory states to build greater regional relationships with their Caribbean neighbors. It reflects a highly agentic approach, in stark contrast to the traditional way U.S. and other Western initiatives are typically implemented.

    Ultimately, the BRI is seen as a threat by Western policymakers because they would prefer China not pursue its own global initiatives. Given that the BRI also supports states in developing technological infrastructure and other advancements—with backing from China—these efforts are viewed by the U.S. as a strategic threat, ensuring the initiative will remain a target of sustained opposition. In the Caribbean, the U.S. push to end their tech relations with China comes off as brash, given that U.S. technology investments in the region have declined since the mid-1990s, while China technology investments have increased.[xxvi] In fact, the U.S. (and its Western allies) seem to only understand China’s investments, including the BRI, as lost market share. In essence, Washington and its Western allies seek to control economic development in the region. Two years ago for COHA, John (2023) argued that the U.S. and its allies were increasing their “diplomatic” presence in the Caribbean to maintain geostrategic influence, given China’s growing economic investments there.[xxvii] John maintained that the dismal track record of capitalism—led first by the Western European powers and later by the United States—has entrenched Caribbean states in a position of structural dependency within the global capitalist system. Key features of this dependency include persistently high levels of unemployment, underemployment, poverty, and a heavy reliance on labor exportation. This dependence made the region very receptive to Chinese investment.

    John (2023) concluded that influence is gained only where it aligns with local interests—and that investments from the PRC stood in stark contrast to Western strategies, which for decades have indebted Caribbean states, privatized their economies in ways that deepened foreign control, and consistently disregarded regional calls for reparations. This track record, it was argued, would only lead to increased militarization in the Caribbean by the U.S. and its Western allies, who have no tangible goal of helping Caribbean states to develop—but want confrontation with China. Two years later and the concluding remarks still stand.

    Concluding Remarks: Dependent Development is the price of Western Capitalism in the Caribbean

    In the Caribbean, the U.S. and its Western allies have long profited from—and perpetuated—the notion that foreignization is the norm. This extends beyond economic structures to encompass both domestic and foreign policies that effectively surrender the state, and its people, to massive  exploitation by foreigners. Some governments and local elites have been brought on as “shareholders” to maintain this backwards dependent status. That is because imperialism, especially in the Caribbean, has always been intent on establishing what Cheddi Jagan called “a reactionary axis in the Caribbean.”[xxviii] U.S. ‘influence in the Caribbean region has historically centered around controlling the “backwardness” and “unstableness” of its people, in order to keep U.S. geostrategic and geopolitical interests intact. This is done in conjunction with Caribbean political elites, who subject their own Caribbean populations in perpetual servitude to Western capital. Caribbean neoliberal states have a disregard for the rights of their citizens (and diaspora), favoring almost exclusively (and predominantly) Western foreign corporations and wealthy individuals. Cuba, however, stands out as an exception to this trend, and this is why it has been under relentless attack by Washington for more than 62 years.  It is important to point this out, given that some in the Caribbean political elite classes also share the same regressive rhetoric from the Westabout the “threat of China” to produce reactionary mindsets and views amongst large swaths of Caribbean people— so that their hand in maintaining Caribbean dependency is not critiqued.

    Caribbean people struggling to improve their societies for the better are continuously warned by the U.S. and its Western and Caribbean allies that they must maintain themselves in a dependent position. The truth is: So long as the majority of individual Caribbean states are importing finished products and agricultural goods from the U.S., Canada, and Europe—and to a smaller extent now China—the Caribbean will never have trade surpluses with these states. Lack of local businesses and the foreignization of Caribbean economies compound this contradiction that is perpetuated by the entrenched Western-led economic system. Political elites in the Caribbean frequently disregard local protests and locally developed alternatives that could threaten Western foreign corporations and investment. There is a real need for enhanced regional integration for Caribbean people, not only states, to improve their lot within the prevailing system. People will continuously be let down by formations like CARICOM, so long as these associations are dominated by Western development frameworks and have individual member states who care more about aligning their security interests with the West instead of their own region. While neoliberalism in the Caribbean is often attributed to structural constraints and the limited capacity of states to regulate foreign capital, such explanations fail to account for the extent to which Caribbean governments have themselves normalized and actively advanced neoliberal policy frameworks. The promotion of neoliberal policies both prolongs, and makes systemic, foreign dependence and domination.

    U.S. fear mongering about China in the Caribbean is propaganda. It only serves to prevent people from questioning why Caribbean states are dependent and why there is rampant foreignization of Caribbean economies. Who owns these corporate entities that make life hard in the Caribbean? The “threats” from the U.S. perspective boil down to the fact that China, in the Caribbean, is taking advantage of Western policies that make the Caribbean exploitable. It is often noted—and indeed observable—that China imports its own labor for development projects in the Caribbean. However, this practice is neither new nor unique; countries such as the United States, Canada, and various European powers have long employed similar strategies. Understandably, this reliance on imported labor has generated frustration among Caribbean populations, particularly given the region’s high levels of unemployment and underemployment. Many local workers are both willing and able to acquire the necessary skills and trades to work on infrastructure and development projects that come to the region. Local Caribbean firms and entrepreneurs would also seize the opportunity to participate in these projects—including local sourcing of materials. But this beneficial type of development is not presently feasible given how Western capitalists have integrated Caribbean states into the global capitalist system.

    The efforts of the Trump administration to cast China as a security threat in the Caribbean and to portray doing business with China as a security risk, have largely been unsuccessful. In the Caribbean, China simply takes advantage of Western policies that have made the region highly favorable and open to foreign investment, foreign entrepreneurs, and government dealings—in the form of Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) and Letters of Agreement (LOA)—with other states and corporations. The acceptance of these MOUs and LOAs receive minimal, to no input from Caribbean citizens. Debt traps have been normalized in the Caribbean by the Western capitalist system, making the Caribbean one of the most highly indebted regions in the world. Today, propagandists tend to invoke the myth of the  “Chinese debt-trap” to attribute to China this false label of being engaged in “debt trap diplomacy”—a term popularized in 2018 during the first trade assault against China.[xxix] In response to this myth, progressive commentators tend to highlight that China forgives a lot of debt, and has even helped Caribbean states to restructure debts owed to various financial institutions.[xxx] However, the biggest elephant in the room is that even if China ceased to exist in the Caribbean region, the region would still be one of the most indebted within the Western capitalist system. The debt-trap narrative not only deflects attention from the significant role Western powers have played in producing Caribbean indebtedness, but also unjustly shifts the burden onto China to forgive obligations for which Western capital is responsible.[xxxi] Lack of transparency in investment agreements and investor tax benefits, including profit repatriation, in the Caribbean has been normalized by laws first written by various European empires and later by Western capitalists that crafted structural adjustment policies. Yet, such arrangements, historically established by U.S. and Canadian capital interests, are often rebranded as evidence of corruption within the China–Caribbean relationship. Those concerned with the persistence of Caribbean dependency should critically engage with its structural causes and actively challenge Western propaganda regardless of the source from which it emanates.

    Endnotes

    [i] Pierre, Jemima. 2020. “Haiti: An Archive of Occupation, 2004-.” Transforming Anthropology 28(1): 3–23. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/traa.12174.

    [ii] Kestler-D’Amours, Jillian. “‘A Criminal Economy’: How US Arms Fuel Deadly Gang Violence in Haiti.” Al Jazeera, March 25, 2024. web: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2024/3/25/a-criminal-economy-how-us-arms-fuel-deadly-gang-violence-in-haiti.

    [iii] Mack, Willie. Haitians at the Border: The Nativist State and Anti-Blackness. Carr-Ryan Commentary. Harvard Kennedy School, 2025. web: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/centers/carr-ryan/our-work/carr-ryan-commentary/haitians-border-nativist-state-and-anti-blackness.

    [iv] Ziye, Chen, and Bin Li. “Escaping Dependency and Trade War: China and the US.” China Economist 18, no. 1 (2023): 36–44.

    [v] Wiseman, Paul. “Fact Check: Does China Manipulate Its Currency?” PBS News, December 29, 2016. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/fact-check-china-manipulate-currency.

    [vi] Loop News. “More Caribbean Countries Respond to New US Tariffs,” April 4, 2025, sec. World News. https://www.loopnews.com/content/more-caribbean-countries-respond-to-new-us-tariffs/.

    [vii] TEMPO Networks. “Here Are All The Caribbean Countries Hit By Trump’s New Tariffs.” Tempo Networks, April 3, 2025, sec. News. https://www.temponetworks.com/2025/04/03/here-are-all-the-caribbean-countries-hit-by-trumps-new-tariffs/.

    [viii] Grannum, Milton. “Oil, Bauxite, Gold Exempt from US Tariff.” Stabroek News, April 4, 2025, sec. Guyana News. https://www.stabroeknews.com/2025/04/04/news/guyana/oil-bauxite-gold-exempt-from-us-tariff/.

    [ix] Handy, Gemma. “Was China the Reason Guyana Faced Higher Trump Tariff?” BBC, April 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjeww5zq88no.

    [x] John, Tamanisha J. 2024. “Hurricane Unpreparedness in the Caribbean, Disaster by Imperial Design.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). The Caribbean. https://coha.org/hurricane-unpreparedness-in-the-caribbean-disaster-by-imperial-design/.

    [xi] Grantham-Philips, Wyatte. “A Timeline of Trump’s Tariff Actions so Far.” PBS News, April 10, 2025, sec. Economy. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/economy/a-timeline-of-trumps-tariff-actions-so-far.

    [xii] Saul, Jonathan, Lisa Baertlein, David Lawder, and Andrea Shalal. “United States Eases Port Fees on China-Built Ships after Industry Backlash.” Reuters, April 17, 2025, sec. Markets. https://www.reuters.com/markets/global-shippers-await-word-us-plan-hit-china-linked-vessels-with-port-fees-2025-04-17/.

    [xiii] Credible Sources interview on February 26, 2025. Guyana in U.S.-China Crossfire? Ex-Diplomat Weighs In, 2025. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UtCNBiKdj-0

    [xiv] Handy, Gemma. “Was China the reason Guyana faced higher Trump tariff?” BBC, April 28, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjeww5zq88no.

    [xv] Chabrol, Denis. “Guyana Pledges ‘Preferential’ Treatment to US.” Demerara Waves, March 27, 2025, sec. Business, Defence, Diplomacy. https://demerarawaves.com/2025/03/27/guyana-pledges-preferential-treatment-to-us/.

    [xvi] John, Tamanisha J. “Guyana, Beware the Western Proxy-State Trap.” Stabroek News, December 25, 2023, sec. In The Diaspora. https://www.stabroeknews.com/2023/12/25/features/in-the-diaspora/guyana-beware-the-Western-proxy-state-trap/.

    [xvii] Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun’s Regular Press Conference on April 3, 2025. Beijing Says That Road in Guyana Criticised by Rubio Is Not Built by China, 2025. https://youtu.be/6gljwDyW1qk?si=2QXhDUythljBsIcJ.

    [xviii] Morales Ruvalcaba, Daniel. 2025. “National Power in Sino-Caribbean Relations: CARICOM in the Geopolitics of the Belt and Road Initiative.” Chinese Political Science Review 10: 28–48. doi: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s41111-024-00252-4.

    [xix] Ibid.

    [xx] Ibid. 

    [xxi] Qi, Wang. “Hyping Chinese ‘spy Bases’ in Cuba Slander; Shows US’ Hysteria: Expert.” Global Times, July 3, 2024. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202407/1315376.shtml.

    [xxii] Pate, Durrant. “US Warns Jamaica against Chinese 5g.” Jamaica Observer, October 25, 2020. https://www.jamaicaobserver.com/2020/10/25/us-warns-jamaica-against-chinese-5g/.

    [xxiii] Belly of the Beast. Investigative Report. May 30, 2025. Big Headlines, No Proof: Inside the Hype Over “Chinese Spy Bases”  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CF87JJp8WIo

    [xxiv] Bayona Velásquez, Etna. “Chinese Economic Presence in the Greater Caribbean, 2000-2020.” In Chinese Presence in the Greater Caribbean: Yesterday and Today, 599–661. Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic: Centro de Estudios Caribeños (PUCMM), 2022.

    [xxv] Loop news. “T&T, Caribbean countries pledge support for One China policy.” May 6, 2022. https://www.loopnews.com/content/tt-caribbean-countries-pledge-support-for-one-china-policy/

    [xxvi] Ricart Jorge, Raquel. “China’s Digital Silk Road in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Real Instituto Elcano, April 21, 2021, sec. Latin America. https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/commentaries/chinas-digital-silk-road-in-latin-america-and-the-caribbean/.

    [xxvii] John, Tamanisha J. 2023. “US Moves to Curtail China’s Economic Investment in the Caribbean.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). https://coha.org/us-moves-to-curtail-chinas-economic-investment-in-the-caribbean/.

    [xxviii] Jagan, Cheddi. “Alternative Models of Caribbean Economic Development and Industrialisation.” In Caribbean Economic Development and Industrialisation, 3 (1):1–23. Hungary: Development and Peace, 1980. https://jagan.org/CJ%20Articles/In%20Opposition/Images/3014.pdf.

    [xxix] Chandran, Rama. “The Chinese “Debt Trap” Is a Myth.” China Focus, August 26, 2022,  http://www.cnfocus.com/the-chinese-debt-trap-is-a-myth/

    [xxx] Hancock, Tom. “China renegotiated $50bn in loans to developing countries: Study challenges ‘debt-trap’ narrative surrounding Beijin’s lending.” Financial Times, April 29, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/0b207552-6977-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d

    [xxxi] Kaiwei, Zhang and Xian Jiangnan. “So-called “debt trap” a Western rhetorical trap.” China International Communications Group (CN) , September 14, 2024, https://en.people.cn/n3/2024/0914/c90000-20219659.html

    Featured image: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (centre) poses for a group photograph with representatives from the Caribbean countries that share diplomatic relations with China, May 12, 2025, at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, Beijing
    (Source: Chinese State Media)

    Tamanisha J. John is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics at York University and a member of the US/NATO out of Our Americas Network zoneofpeace.org/ 

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Reaching out for a clearer view of the economy

    Source: Bank of Canada

    We’re gathering more information

    Traditional data on inflation, jobs and housing are key to our decisions about whether to lower, raise or maintain our policy interest rate. But they often just give the big picture. And they show what has already happened, weeks later.

    Non-traditional data can help us see what’s happening under the surface—and in a timelier way. That’s especially helpful in uncertain and rapidly changing situations.

    • At the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, we used data on restaurant reservations, flight bookings and credit card transactions to see how consumer spending patterns were shifting in real time.
    • Today, to gauge the early impact of tariffs, we’re looking at changes in the number of trucks crossing the Canada-US border and the volume of ships entering and leaving ports.

    Similarly, our surveys give us a clearer sense of the evolution of the economy, and timelier insights from Canadians across regions and sectors. The quarterly Business Outlook Survey (BOS), the monthly Business Leaders’ Pulse (BLP) and the quarterly Canadian Survey of Consumer Expectations have been especially helpful in recent years.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Talking to Canadians: How real-world insights shape monetary policy

    Source: Bank of Canada

    Surveying Canadians

    Now on to another important tool: surveys.

    Like other central banks, the Bank conducts a number of surveys with the financial sector. The results provide us with information on important issues like lending conditions as well as the demand for and supply of credit. We also gain important insights on risks and resiliency in the financial system. And we talk to financial market professionals to hear their views on where the economy and inflation are headed.

    But today, in talking about surveys, I want to focus more on how our regional offices inform our monetary policy deliberations by reaching out to households and businesses.

    Since the late 1990s, the Bank has been expanding its reach into the diverse regions that make up this great country. This work has included opening regional offices, and surveying businesses and consumers about their economic views. Our regional staff are well positioned to strengthen our ties with key local stakeholders such as industry, government, educational institutions and community organizations.

    Currently, the Bank’s regional offices conduct three key macroeconomic surveys: the Business Outlook Survey, the Business Leaders’ Pulse and the Canadian Survey of Consumer Expectations., , 

    I’ll go over each one in greater detail in a moment. But overall, surveys like these accomplish three main goals.

    First, they help inform our outlooks for the economy and inflation. We hear from individuals and businesses about how they’re feeling—a measure of their current levels of confidence. We also ask what they expect to happen to prices and their own spending in the future.

    This gives the Bank forward-looking views on economic activity, demand, capacity pressures and inflation. That makes surveys particularly helpful in providing early indications of how the economy is reacting during times of great uncertainty, like the current trade conflict.

    Surveys also shine a light on trends that may be simmering beneath the surface. They help us understand behavioural changes that don’t always show up in aggregated data reports—at least not immediately.

    Finally, these surveys help us gather a wide range of views on how current economic conditions are playing out in communities across Canada.

    Our national economy is made up of diverse regional economies. Economic conditions may differ across regions, and regions may respond differently to broad-based upswings and downturns. Survey data give us a clearer view of the differences in how households and businesses are experiencing the economy.

    Let me now turn to each of the surveys.

    The Business Outlook Survey—or BOS for short—is a quarterly survey of businesses across the country. It has existed since 1997, which provides us a rich, long dataset for comparisons.

    Staff in our regional offices meet with local business leaders to discuss their views on the economy. We ask about their expectations for sales and demand, as well as their investment intentions. We probe their views about labour shortages, as well as hiring and wages. And we ask for their outlooks on costs and pricing, as well as economy-wide inflation. This gives us a broad range of perspectives about how businesses view the economy.

    For example, the results of the BOS for the fourth quarter of 2021 helped us better understand how the COVID-19 pandemic was affecting firms. For the first time since the start of the pandemic, we saw that businesses were planning to pass along cost increases stemming from supply chain pressures. They had concluded that customers understood these pressures and were willing to accept price increases.

    More recently, firms told us that uncertainty about tariffs has been affecting them in multiple ways. These impacts include weaker demand from their business customers that would be directly affected by tariffs.

    Now on to the Business Leaders’ Pulse, or BLP for short. This is our newest survey, created in 2021. It’s a short monthly online questionnaire to assess firms’ expectations for growth in sales and employment. It also asks about perceived risks to their business outlook, and poses other topical questions.

    The BLP provides a flexible and nimble pulse of evolving situations. It complements the BOS with timely feedback from firms about the effects of rapid changes in the economy.

    And the BLP has been very helpful in monitoring effects from the situation south of the border. For example, businesses were reporting an increase in both uncertainty and inflation expectations as early as November 2024. In December, we also began noting a decline in business sentiment—even before the new US administration was sworn in.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor Statement on the Passing of Councilwoman Gwendolyn Henderson

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Reprepsentative Kathy Castor (FL14)

    U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor Statement on the Passing of Councilwoman Gwendolyn Henderson

    WASHINGTON, D.C., June 10, 2025

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor (FL-14) released the following statement today on the passing of Tampa City Councilwoman Gwendolyn Henderson:

    “I am deeply saddened to learn of the sudden loss of Councilwoman Gwen Henderson. Gwen was a devoted public servant, a passionate advocate for Tampa’s neighborhoods and a fierce voice for Tampa families.

    “Her love for her hometown was evident in every action she took—from championing affordable housing and public safety to standing up for seniors and small businesses. Gwen fought for the hopes and dreams of her community, including advocating for the rebuilding and expansion of the Fair Oaks Recreation Center in East Tampa. As the owner of the Black English Bookstore in Tampa Heights, she preserved Black history for future generations. I have been proud to work closely with Gwen often—from securing federal support for important community initiatives to supporting students and parents with free laptops when the COVID-19 pandemic forced remote learning.

    “Tampa has lost a beloved neighbor and tireless advocate. My thoughts are with her daughter Ariel, her family, her friends and the neighbors she served so faithfully. May Gwen’s memory be a call to continue the work she so proudly led.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The risks to consider before going under the knife

    Source: Anglia Ruskin University

    By James D. Frame, Anglia Ruskin University

    A series of ads for Brazilian butt lifts (BBL) on social media platforms like Instagram and Facebook were recently banned by the UK’s Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). These ads were found to be misleading and irresponsible, often downplaying serious health risks and pressuring consumers with time-limited offers.

    This move highlights growing concerns over how cosmetic surgery is marketed online and the safety of BBL procedures. But BBLs are not the only cosmetic surgeries under scrutiny.

    Liposuction has a high rate of post-operative complications, and even non-surgical procedures like lip fillers and liquid BBLs have raised health concerns among experts.

    According to recent data from the British Association of Aesthetic Plastic Surgeons (BAAPS), there were 27,462 cosmetic procedures performed in 2024 – a 5% rise from 2023. More than nine out of ten (93.5%) of these procedures were performed on women.

    Body contouring – including liposuction, abdominoplasty and thigh lifts – are the most popular surgeries, while facial rejuvenation procedures, particularly face and neck lifts, brow lifts and eyelid surgery have all increased in popularity since 2023.

    Risk factors

    Many of these popular procedures are also among the riskiest. Body contouring surgeries like liposuction, tummy tucks and fat grafting, for example, are major operations that typically take hours and involve general anesthesia.

    And the aesthetic outcomes are not always as expected either. Fat removal can sometimes lead to uneven body contours, lumps, or skin irregularities, which may worsen as the body continues to age.

    All surgeries carry risks, but complications from cosmetic procedures are often downplayed or misunderstood. These risks can manifest immediately after surgery or even weeks later, ranging from minor issues like infection and scarring to life-threatening conditions such as blood clots or organ failure.

    One of the most dangerous risks is pulmonary embolism, which occurs when a blood clot travels to the lungs. In the US, around 18,000 cases of venous thromboembolism (VTE) occur annually among plastic surgery patients, with about 10% resulting in death within just one hour of symptoms appearing.

    This already serious threat has become even more pressing in the post-COVID era, as VTE cases are rising. COVID is known to increase the body’s tendency to form blood clots – even in those with mild or no symptoms.

    These lingering effects can persist for weeks or months and, when combined with the usual surgical risks like immobility, tissue trauma and inflammation, they significantly increase the likelihood of a life-threatening event like a pulmonary embolism. As a result, people undergoing plastic surgery today may face a higher baseline risk than before the pandemic.

    Fat embolism is another potentially deadly complication, often associated with procedures like liposuction or BBLs. This occurs when fat particles enter the bloodstream and travel to vital organs, leading to serious medical emergencies.

    After surgery, some patients may wake up disoriented, confused, or with lingering neurological symptoms – signs of a serious medical emergency. Fat embolism can have immediate, life-threatening effects and, in severe cases, can cause permanent brain damage, organ failure, or sudden death.

    Procedures like rhinoplasty (nose reshaping) or breast augmentation can come with relatively high rates of dissatisfaction. Implants, in particular, can cause issues like rupture, deflation, capsular contracture (hardening around the implant), or asymmetry. There is also some concern about a rare form of cancer – breast implant-associated anaplastic large cell lymphoma (BIA-ALCL) – linked to certain types of implants.

    Even if surgery doesn’t result in major complications, many patients still walk away unhappy. A common issue is that procedures don’t account for how the body continues to age. A facelift or tummy tuck might look great initially, but the natural ageing process can quickly undo or distort those results.

    The problem is that many cosmetic procedures fail to account for the inevitable changes our bodies undergo with age. Our bodies change over time – skin loses elasticity, fat distribution shifts and trends evolve. What feels like a good decision in your 20s might look very different in your 40s.

    Non-surgical treatments

    One of the most troubling issues in the cosmetic industry is the lack of consistent regulation. This is particularly true for non-surgical treatments, where injectable products can be administered by anyone, from trained doctors to self-taught beauty influencers. Cosmetic tourism adds another layer of complexity. Many people travel abroad for cheaper procedures, only to face complications once they return home – with limited recourse or support.

    Non-surgical treatments like dermal fillers and Botox have become increasingly popular due to their quick results and minimal downtime. However, they are not without risk.

    Modern fillers like hyaluronic acid are generally safer than older materials such as silicone. They’re less likely to cause issues like granulomas – as long as they don’t become infected – and they can even be reversed if needed. However, when injected incorrectly, especially into a blood vessel, fillers can cause serious complications like tissue death, permanent scarring, or even blindness.

    Botox injections also carry risks, including muscle paralysis, nerve damage, and uneven facial results – particularly when performed by unqualified practitioners.

    Before undergoing any cosmetic procedure – whether surgical or non-surgical – it’s essential to research a qualified practitioner, understand the risks and set realistic expectations.

    Cosmetic surgery can be empowering for many people, helping them feel more confident in their own skin. But the decision to alter your appearance permanently should never be taken lightly. Behind the glamour and glossy Instagram stories lies a more serious picture – one where the risks are real and the consequences, sometimes irreversible.

    James D. Frame, Professor of Aesthetic Plastic Surgery, Anglia Ruskin University

    This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

    The opinions expressed in VIEWPOINT articles are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of ARU.

    If you wish to republish this article, please follow these guidelines: https://theconversation.com/uk/republishing-guidelines

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Security: Morrison Man Sentenced to 46 Months in Federal Prison for PPP Loan Fraud

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    DENVER – The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Colorado announces that Richard Nieto, age 39, of Morrison, Colorado, was sentenced to 46 months in federal prison and ordered to pay $962,438.85 in restitution for engaging in wire fraud and money laundering in connection with obtaining two Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) loans during the COVID-19 pandemic. 

    According to the plea agreement, the defendant submitted three fraudulent PPP loan applications to a lender seeking $1,117,903.56 and was successful in obtaining two PPP loans totaling $913,551.88.

    In the first successful application for $175,384.83, the defendant inflated the number of employees and average monthly payroll for his business, Denver Pro Painting & Contracting, that had operated before the pandemic and fabricated Forms 941 that did not match the tax returns filed with the IRS. He then submitted a second successful PPP application for $738,167.05 to the same lender for another business, DenPro, that had no payroll or employees and was not operating at all. In this second application, the defendant made up $1,771,601.04 in annual payroll while fabricating fourth quarter tax returns to support the lies on the application.

    Before making a single payment on either loan, the defendant submitted fraudulent applications for loan forgiveness. In support of the forgiveness applications, the defendant created a total of 87 fake payroll checks and paystubs that falsely indicated that each check related to a specific pay period and employee and that the defendant’s companies had withheld taxes so that they would qualify for loan forgiveness. One of the defendant’s PPP loans was fully forgiven.

    Despite telling the lender that he would use the PPP loan money on business expenses, the defendant transferred PPP loan money through multiple intermediate accounts before using it on personal expenditures and investments. Among other transactions, the defendant used loan money to pay a home mortgage, purchase bitcoin, contribute to an investment account, buy gold and silver coins, and invest in a friend’s startup business. 

    “This is another case of someone using for personal gain a program meant to help people suffering during the COVID-19 pandemic,” said Acting United States Attorney J. Bishop Grewell. “I want the public to know that we are aggressively prosecuting people who stole from this relief program.”

    “Mr. Nieto went to great lengths to abuse a program meant for hardworking small business owners, seeking only to enrich himself.” said Amanda Prestegard, Special Agent in Charge, IRS-CI Denver Field Office. “We are proud to partner with the U.S Attorney’s Office to aggressively pursue those who defrauded this and other CARES Act programs and hold criminals like Mr. Nieto accountable.”

    United States District Judge William J. Martinez presided over the sentencing.

    The Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation conducted the investigation.  Assistant United States Attorneys Craig Fansler and Martha Paluch handled the prosecution of the case.

    Case Number: 22-cr-00262-WJM

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Mission to Turkmenistan

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 10, 2025

    End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    • Growth slowed in 2024 due to weak hydrocarbon exports. The main economic challenge is to translate hydrocarbon wealth into more diversified, sustainable, and inclusive growth.
    • A more market-based strategy, reforms to the monetary and exchange rate frameworks, increased public spending efficiency, and enhanced governance and transparency would support the transition to a more diversified and robust economy.
    • Further improvements in the availability, quality, and reliability of economic statistics would help inform policy makers and increase transparency and credibility.

    Washington, DC: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Ms. Anna Bordon visited Ashgabat during May 21-June 3, 2025. The purpose of the visit was to review the country’s economic landscape, including its financial developments, economic outlook, risks, and policies aimed at promoting diverse, inclusive, and sustainable growth. The mission met with senior government officials, representatives of the private and financial sectors, and the diplomatic community. At the end of the visit, Ms. Bordon issued the following statement: 

    “Economic activity moderated in 2024, and inflation softened in recent months. IMF staff estimate that growth slowed to 3.0 percent in 2024 from 4.5 percent in 2023, owing to weak hydrocarbon exports. Inflation decelerated from 3.8 percent at end 2024 to 1.1 percent in March 2025 owing to a sharp slowdown in food inflation combined with deflation in non-food items and low inflation in services. Credit growth and monetary conditions have been tighter since the second half of 2023, while the parallel market exchange rate has remained broadly stable. The current account surplus narrowed from 5.9 percent of GDP in 2023 to 4.4 percent in 2024.

    “Looking ahead the economy is expected to expand at around 2.3 percent in 2025 and over the medium term. Hydrocarbon exports growth is expected to be negative in 2025, but to gradually pick up to around 2 percent over the medium term while non-hydrocarbon growth is expected to remain subdued, given the challenging business environment, investment inefficiencies, significant real exchange rate overvaluation, and protectionism. Inflation is projected to pick up gradually over the medium term due to looser monetary conditions, returning to its recent historical average of 8 percent, which is primarily fueled by the long-standing policy of increasing public sector wages and pensions by 10 percent annually. The external position is projected to gradually deteriorate, shifting from a surplus to a deficit, driven by lower hydrocarbon prices, declining oil exports, and an overvalued currency. Rising wages are also expected to fuel import demand, further weakening the trade balance. Risks to the outlook remain tilted to the downside.

    “The nonhydrocarbon primary balance improved in 2024, with higher revenues more than offsetting an increase in capital spending. Looking ahead, the deficit is anticipated to narrow further over the medium term, with capital spending expected to moderate. To leverage this positive trajectory, it is crucial for Turkmenistan to focus its spending on enhancing physical and human capital. This will require improving spending efficiency and public investment management, transitioning towards performance-based public wage increases, and reforming state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

    “Strengthening fiscal reporting and public financial management (PFM) should be a top priority. Turkmenistan should expedite the implementation of medium-term budgeting, establishment of a single treasury account, and the expansion of fiscal reporting coverage. Reforming SOEs is also pivotal in managing fiscal risks, enhancing fiscal transparency, and fostering private sector development by reducing the state footprint.

    “The Central Bank of Turkmenistan (CBT) should focus on price and financial stability. Until recently, the CBT had typically kept monetary policy loose to support the government’s long-term development objectives. Since the second half of 2023, however, CBT net lending to banks has slowed considerably, owing to SOE repayments. Going forward, commercial bank lending for development purposes, if needed, should be supported by the state budget, and not by the CBT. The CBT should also modernize its central bank operations and accelerate its efforts to strengthen financial regulation, supervision, and crisis management.

    “Unifying the exchange rates would support Turkmenistan’s diversification objectives and reduce economic distortions and governance vulnerabilities. Turkmenistan should consider a significant upfront adjustment of the official exchange rate combined with sufficiently tight macroeconomic policies, a clear communication strategy, and enhanced social benefits to protect the most vulnerable. Post-adjustment, the devalued official exchange rate can remain the monetary anchor, with the CBT ready to provide FX to meet demand. Exchange restrictions on current international transactions should also be eliminated, to create a level-playing field, improve efficiency, and alleviate FX shortages. The adjustment measures and supporting reforms need to be sequenced carefully, while recognizing inherent uncertainties.

    “Turkmenistan is adequately prioritizing economic diversification. A pre-requisite for diversification is macroeconomic stability, including as a core element the unification of the exchange rates and elimination of exchange restrictions. Moving away from a centrally planned economy will require continued efforts to liberalize prices and reduce the state footprint to allocate resources more efficiently. A more market-oriented economy will also require improving governance, skills, infrastructure, digitalization, and logistics while accelerating the efforts toward WTO accession.

    “Further improvements in the availability, quality, and reliability of economic statistics would help inform policy makers and increase transparency and credibility.   

    “The IMF team is grateful to the authorities and other stakeholders for their warm hospitality and insightful and candid discussions.”

    Turkmenistan: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022–26

     
       

     

     

     

     

     

     

       
     

    Est.

    Est.

    Est.

    Proj.

    Proj.

       

     

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

       
       

     

    Output and prices

    (Annual percentage change)

       

    Real GDP 1/

    3.0

    4.5

    3.0

    2.3

    2.3

       

    Real hydrocarbon GDP

    -6.4

    -0.6

    -10.6

    -2.6

    1.8

       

    Real nonhydrocarbon GDP

    5.2

    5.6

    5.7

    3.0

    2.3

       

    Consumer prices (end of period)

    3.0

    1.4

    3.8

    4.0

    6.0

       

    Consumer prices (period average)

    11.2

    -1.6

    4.6

    3.9

    5.0

       
     

    Investment and savings

    (In percent of GDP)

       

    Gross investment

    18.2

    17.0

    16.0

    13.0

    12.9

       

             Of which: State budget

    0.5

    0.9

    1.6

    0.7

    0.7

       

    Gross savings

    27.9

    22.9

    20.4

    15.1

    13.3

       
     

    Fiscal sector

    (In percent of GDP)

       

    Overall fiscal balance 2/

    3.4

    0.1

    -0.1

    0.3

    -0.3

       

          Revenue

    16.4

    13.8

    14.4

    14.1

    13.7

       

          Expenditure

    13.0

    13.7

    14.5

    13.8

    14.1

       

    Total public debt 3/

    7.9

    5.8

    3.6

    3.3

    3.1

       
     

    Monetary sector

    (12-month percent change, unless otherwise indicated)

       

    Credit to the economy 4/

    8.2

    0.3

    2.2

    5.4

    5.9

       

    Credit to GDP ratio

    58.6

    53.1

    49.6

    49.9

    49.6

       

        Broad money, incl. foreign currency deposits at CBT

    -2.6

    -2.5

    10.1

    5.3

    6.7

       
     

    External sector

    (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

       

    Exports of goods (In millions of US$)

    14,727

    12,963

    12,168

    11,218

    11,068

       

    Imports of goods (In millions of US$)

    7,188

    7,401

    7,665

    8,407

    9,085

       

    Current account balance

    9.7

    5.9

    4.4

    2.1

    0.4

       

    Foreign direct investment

    2.0

    0.9

    0.4

    0.0

    0.0

       

    Total public sector external debt

    7.9

    5.8

    3.6

    3.3

    3.1

       
             

    Memorandum items:

             

    Nominal GDP (in millions of manat)

    198,371

    219,848

    240,363

    251,884

    268,110

       

    Nominal GDP (in millions of US$)

    56,677

    62,814

    68,675

    71,967

    76,603

       
       
       

    Sources: Turkmen authorities; and Fund staff estimates and projections.

           

    1/ Staff uses its own GDP estimates given that the narrative underlying the official GDP growth estimates is hard to reconcile with other available data. In particular, official GDP growth is extremely stable, despite shocks, including the pandemic.

                       

    2/ Excluding receipts from government bond issuance and privatization proceeds.

                     

    3/ Includes domestic state government debt and external public and publicly guaranteed debt.

                   

    4/ Including credit to SOEs.

     

     

     

                         
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Mayada Ghazala

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/10/pr-25190-turkmenistan-imf-completes-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Spending review: Rachel Reeves is about to make a £600 billion gamble on growth

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steve Schifferes, Honorary Research Fellow, City Political Economy Research Centre, City St George’s, University of London

    UK chancellor Rachel Reeves faces her biggest test with the government’s departmental spending plans for the three years from next April until the general election. With nearly £600 billion a year to spend, her decisions will impact on every aspect of public life and shape the political weather for years to come.

    She believes the key to reviving Labour’s fortunes as its poll ratings tumble lies in boosting economic growth.

    So the government has promised that its policies will increase the UK’s anaemic growth rate and enhance productivity. Reeves is looking to capital spending on big projects that will boost the economy, such as the £14.2 billion government investment in a new nuclear power plant at Sizewell in Suffolk.

    Last year she revised the government’s fiscal rules to give herself the space to borrow an extra £113 billion over three years to transform Britain’s ageing infrastructure. She has already made it clear that she wants to boost transport investment outside of London, as well as invest in research and development, including green energy.

    But there are challenges ahead. In the first place, the effect of infrastructure investment takes a long time to feed through. This is partly because of the lag between planning the projects and when they come on-stream.

    It will take time before the full effect will be felt on productivity, which has been growing more slowly than expected. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) suggested in March that the latest government plans for planning reform might increase productivity by just 0.2% in the longer term.

    There are also some real trade-offs as to where the increased capital investment will go – and which sectors will benefit most. The chancellor has emphasised her commitment to putting more money into projects outside London and south-east England that have had less public investment in the past.

    But London and the south-east is where productivity is highest and where further investment might have a bigger effect on economic growth.

    It appears that there may be less funding for social housing, which may threaten the government’s ambitious target of building 1.5 million homes over the parliament. There may also be less available to repair schools and hospitals.

    And the plans to boost defence spending on expensive military equipment – such as frigates and fighter planes – will also count as capital spending. As such, it could further reduce the amount available for infrastructure investment.

    The departmental trade-offs

    Despite the relative abundance of cash for infrastructure, the tighter fiscal rules on day-to-day spending mean that many departments are facing a squeeze on their budgets. The government plans to allow total day-to-day departmental spending on average to rise by just 1.2% per year in real terms during the next three years. This probably spells a real-terms cut for some “unprotected” departments.

    This is because the money will not be distributed equally. The Department of Health and Social Care gets 40% of all departmental spending and is likely to be the big winner.

    It has already received a big increase in the last spending round, with an 11% increase in capital spending is likely to get even more to realise an ambitious ten-year plan for improving services in the NHS in England.

    If health spending were to go up by 2.5% (well under its historic average), this could mean very little increase for many other government departments. And if it is increased by 3.5% this will imply real-terms cuts for other areas.

    The situation is made more difficult by the government’s decision to prioritise two other areas: defence and schools. For defence, it is committed to raising spending to 2.5% by 2027 and to 3% in the next parliament.

    And for education, Reeves has pledged an extra £4.5 billion per year for more teachers, childcare places and free school meals. The decisions have a strong political dimension, as health and education tend to be the most popular spending priorities among the public.

    Boosting the education spend tends to play well with the UK public.
    Monkey Business Images/Shutterstock

    The spending review, however, only covers half of total government spending. The more unpredictable part is annually managed expenditure, mainly on benefits and interest payments on government debt.

    The Treasury sets an overall target (known as the spending envelope) on how much will be spent in these areas. But it now faces a crunch point over the unpopular decisions to cut disability benefits and keep the two-child benefit cap.

    Reeves’ partial U-turn on the winter fuel payment, which will now be paid to 9 million pensioners, will cost an additional £1.25 billion a year but may have been a political necessity.

    But a full U-turn on the two other issues will be much more expensive. Taken together, such a change might breach the fiscal rules, which give only £10 billion of “headroom” in a total government budget of more than £1.2 trillion. So while there will be some rowing back, the finances suggest any more major U-turns are unlikely.

    To make matters worse, these spending plans are based on an economic forecast made by the OBR in March. This did not include the effect of US president Donald Trump’s tariff plans. Since then, both the IMF and the OECD downgraded their UK growth forecasts for both 2025 and 2026, and despite a recent small upgrade by the IMF, growth is still significantly lower than previously expected.

    Even though Britain seems to have secured a deal with the US, the effect of tariffs on global growth will still damage the UK’s prospects as a trading nation.

    This will make it harder for the government to meet its fiscal targets in the autumn budget while sticking to the departmental spending plans. The chancellor will then have three options. She can look for more cuts in benefits spending.

    She could try to find other sources of tax revenue, for example by tweaking the rules on taxing pensions or extending the freeze on upgrading tax bands. Or, more radically, she could modify the fiscal rules to give herself more flexibility – for example by having only one economic forecast a year, as the IMF has suggested.

    Ultimately Labour’s electoral prospects will depend on whether it has succeeded in boosting living standards. While the productivity drive could work, the UK economy remains at the mercy of wider global economic forces.

    Steve Schifferes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Spending review: Rachel Reeves is about to make a £600 billion gamble on growth – https://theconversation.com/spending-review-rachel-reeves-is-about-to-make-a-600-billion-gamble-on-growth-258526

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: The world needs bold, equitable climate action at the 2025 G7 summit

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Sharon E. Straus, Professor, Department of Medicine, University of Toronto

    As climate change and disrupted weather patterns impact countries around the world, leaders must act to mitigate the negative effects on public health.

    Leaders from six western countries and Japan will soon gather in Kananaskis, Alta., for the Group of Seven (G7) meeting from June 15 to 17, 2025. In the lead-up to this meeting, the Royal Society of Canada hosted the Science 7 (S7). This is an engagement meeting of the leading academies of the G7 member countries.

    Following discussion and deliberation, three statements aimed at advancing science for society were published, entitled Advanced Technologies and Data Security, Sustainable Migration and Climate Action and Health Resilience.

    One of us (Sharon Straus) oversaw the S7 statement on Climate Action and Health Resilience. This statement draws attention to the health impacts of climate change and recommends several mitigation strategies.

    Wide-ranging health impacts

    Experts on health and climate change have outlined the growing impact of delayed climate action. The data are clear. Extreme weather events such as heat, floods, droughts and wildfires are having wide-ranging health impacts.

    In the 10 years between 2014-2023, there was a 167 per cent increase in heat-related deaths in those aged 65 years and older compared with the 10 years between 1990-99. Extreme weather events also directly impact food and water security, as well as infectious diseases and chronic diseases.

    The health consequences of climate change are not only the result of environmental factors. Of equal importance are recent decisions eliminating funding for programs that mitigate the risks of climate change.

    Consider for example, the multiple threats to recent progress in eliminating malaria. The World Malaria Report published in December 2024 by the World Health Organization estimated that 2.2 billion malaria cases and 12.7 million malaria deaths were averted between 2000 and 2023.

    Now, many countries anticipate a malaria resurgence. Antimalarial drug resistance, mosquito resistance to insecticides, changes in temperature and humidity affecting mosquito survival and the emergence of new mosquito species linked to climate change — combined with the recent abrupt funding freeze from the United States — are leading to a perfect storm.

    Economic impact of climate change

    The economic burden of climate change, which includes more health-care use, lost productivity, adaptation and mitigation expenses — to say nothing of the costs of rebuilding — is massive.

    Much of that burden is borne by those who live in low- and middle-income countries (80 per cent of the world’s population) and who are the lowest contributors to carbon dioxide emissions.

    To put this in perspective, in 2021, the United Nations Environment Program estimated the costs of annual adaptation for vulnerable countries at US$70 billion and predicted this would increase to US$140-300 billion by 2030.

    In addition to the costs of adaptation aimed at reducing vulnerability to climate change, there are the costs associated with losses resulting from climate change. The 2024 Lancet Countdown estimated that the average annual economic losses due to extreme weather-related events reached US$227 billion between 2019-2023. This value exceeds the gross domestic product of approximately 60 per cent of the world’s economies.

    What about Canada?

    In Canada, warming is happening at twice the global rate with resulting heat, wildfires and floods. There is also evidence of significant impacts on mental health and chronic diseases, leading to an increased need for health care.

    Indigenous communities, older adults and those who have experienced homelessness are disproportionately impacted by climate change. Indigenous Peoples, especially those living in remote and northern areas, are particularly vulnerable.

    Currently there are 37 long-term and 40 short-term drinking water advisories in First Nations communities across Canada. The lack of safe, clean drinking water can exacerbate climate-related food and water insecurity and lead to infectious disease transmission.

    The number of people experiencing homelessness is growing and many of these individuals are over 50 years old. These older adults are physiologically 15-20 years older than their housed counterparts and are at higher risk of chronic diseases, including those exacerbated by climate change.

    Similarly, frail older adults are at higher risk of health effects of climate change. It is worth remembering the impact of poor air quality and lack of air conditioning during the COVID-19 pandemic on those living in long-term care homes.

    Climate change costs health-care systems more each year. The Canadian Institute for Climate Choices recently estimated that health-related hospitalizations will increase by 21 per cent by mid-century. Our health systems are not prepared for this.

    In addition, the costs of death and reduced quality of life from heat-related climate change is estimated to rise between $3 billion and $3.9 billion by the middle of this century. Factoring in other impacts such as those from air pollution, flooding and wildfires, the total estimated costs are in the tens to hundreds of billions.

    S7’s recommendations

    The S7 statement on Climate Action and Health Resilience includes seven recommendations. Addressing the disproportionate impact of climate change on populations who are particularly vulnerable and investing in innovative solutions are among them. Particularly critical are societal and political innovations that involve affected communities, including Indigenous communities.

    The S7’s climate and health resilience recommendations include:

    • Developing and optimizing climate change mitigation strategies to transform health and social services (such as early warning infectious disease systems and biomonitoring).

    • Developing new regulations nationally and internationally to transform health, public health and social services, increasing their readiness and safeguarding health from climate change impact.

    • Providing economic and regulatory incentives to foster adaptation and resiliency of health systems.

    • Investing in innovative solutions (including vaccine development for emerging diseases, wastewater surveillance) to mitigate climate change and its health risks.

    The G7 summit is an opportunity to centre climate change discussions and act on the S7 recommendations. Bold investment in innovations that address the health challenges resulting from climate change will benefit us all and drive new economic activity and resilience.

    Climate change is a health issue, a social justice issue and an economic issue, and the time to act is now. Scientists, policymakers, clinicians and the public must work together.

    Sharon E. Straus receives research funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research and the Public Health Agency of Canada. She is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

    Françoise Baylis is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada.

    ref. The world needs bold, equitable climate action at the 2025 G7 summit – https://theconversation.com/the-world-needs-bold-equitable-climate-action-at-the-2025-g7-summit-256876

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: DAUPHIN COUNTY – Lt. Governor Austin Davis and Governor’s Advisory Commissions Open Art Exhibit for Gun Violence Awareness Month

    Source: US State of Pennsylvania

    June 10, 2025Harrisburg, PA

    ADVISORY – DAUPHIN COUNTY – Lt. Governor Austin Davis and Governor’s Advisory Commissions Open Art Exhibit for Gun Violence Awareness Month

    Lt. Governor Austin Davis and the six Governor’s Advisory Commissions will be joined by surviving family members, artists, and policy makers to open the Souls Shot Portrait Project exhibit in Harrisburg to help commemorate Gun Violence Awareness Month.

    After peaking during the COVID-19 pandemic, gun violence and crime rates are beginning to decline in many states across the country, and they fell significantly in Pennsylvania last year. The Shapiro-Davis Administration has focused on driving down gun violence rates by providing resources to help recruit and train nearly 1,500 state and local law enforcement officers, as well as increasing investments in community-based programs proven to reduce violence and standing up and staffing a state Office of Gun Violence Preventione.

    WHO:
    Lt. Governor Austin Davis
    Ashley Walkowiak, Governor’s Advisory Commission on Women
    Aubrey Fink, Souls Shot Portrait Project

    WHEN:
    Tuesday, June 10, 2025, at 4:00 PM

    WHERE:
    The State Library, 607 South Drive, Harrisburg PA 17120

    RSVP:
    Press who are interested in attending must RSVP to ra-gvgovpress@pa.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Statement by the Minister of National Defence in response to the Auditor General of Canada’s report on Delivering Canada’s Future Fighter Jet Capability 

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 10, 2025 – Ottawa, Ontario – National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces

    Following the tabling of the Auditor General of Canada’s (AG) report on Canada’s fighter force, the Minister of National Defence, The Honourable David McGuinty, issued the following statement:

    “I welcome the AG’s report on the administration of the fighter project. It lays out the tireless efforts by the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and the Government of Canada to implement the fighter capability on time.

    “As articulated in Canada’s 2017 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged, and reaffirmed in our 2024 defence policy update, Our North, Strong and Free, the Government of Canada is investing in a modern fleet of fighter jets to support RCAF operations now and into the future.

    “The aim is to provide the RCAF with a fighter fleet that will be capable, lethal, survivable, upgradeable, resilient, and interoperable with our allies’ and partners’ fleets. This will enable Canada to continue to meet its North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commitments, and execute any other missions assigned to Canada.

    “The Government of Canada takes these findings seriously, and is taking several steps to address the AG’s recommendations:

    • We have put in place an approved and updated risk management plan to formally and regularly identify all known Future Fighter Capability Project (FFCP) risks ensuring there are appropriate mitigation strategies in place.
    • We will update and refine a master implementation plan to manage project activities in accordance with the Integrated Master Schedule. As with all major projects, the plans for the FFCP are evergreen, and will continue to be monitored and updated when required.                                           
    • We will review the FFCP cost estimates on an annual basis, or more frequently should significant issues be identified.
    • Additionally, we will communicate on milestones achieved on discrete projects in order to be transparent in public reporting.

    “The Future Fighter Capability Project value— which includes the costs for 88 fighter aircraft, associated equipment, sustainment set-up and services, training and information services, as well as construction of Fighter Squadron Facilities—has increased since initial estimates.

    “The increased cost to the FFCP is the result of external economic conditions driven by the COVID-19 pandemic, including global supply chain disruptions, workforce shortages, and increased inflation and foreign exchange rates. In combination with increased global tensions and related impacts on the availability and demand for materials, we would not have been able to deliver the full scope of this project under our previous budget. This increase included additional contingency funding to enable our ability to better mitigate potential economic risks and uncertainty in the future.

    “We will continue to work closely with our partners to actively manage costs throughout the duration of this project to ensure that the best value is being provided to Canadians. The FFCP represents the greatest investment in the RCAF since the Second World War. This project will provide Canada with an invaluable air defence capability that will continue to support the RCAF well into the future.

    “It is critical to note that Canada needs fighter aircraft to protect the sovereignty of Canadian airspace and ensure the safety and security of Canadians. Through the NORAD alliance, the RCAF makes substantial contributions to continental defence, generating the vital capabilities required to detect, deter, and defeat threats to Canada and, by extension, North America. Abroad, fighter aircraft are a critical contribution to NATO operations or other Coalition operations, where they operate to deter aggression or conducting air campaigns.

    “Additionally, I would like to highlight that the Government of Canada is currently reviewing the defence procurement system, including examining internal processes used by the Department of National Defence to define requirements and approve projects, and looking at the broader set of rules, regulations, and policies that govern military procurement. This effort will clarify mechanisms to facilitate the timely delivery of military equipment and look at how best to leverage existing programs to strategically invest in the domestic capacity building.

    “I will ensure that the AG’s recommendations are fully integrated and that the best value continues to be provided to Canadians.”

    Associated Link

    2025 Spring Reports of the Auditor General of Canada

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Silver, Assistant Professor, York University, Canada

    Coverage of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns on girls in Malawi emphasised the risks they faced as a result of not attending school. In particular, concerns about pregnancy garnered significant media attention.

    The United Nations Children’s Fund, for example, published an article in March 2021 entitled “Schoolgirl shakes off COVID-19 regret: Lucy’s return to school”. Under a glossy photograph of a smiling girl, readers learn about 16-year-old Lucy, one of 13,000 Malawian students who became pregnant during COVID-19 school closures. The story went on to detail the dire consequences of sexual activity to Lucy’s well-being, and the redemptive power of an eventual return to school.

    The Unicef piece echoed thousands of similar publications circulated after March 2020 that analysed COVID-19’s unique risk for girls in the global south and lamented lost returns to girls’ education.

    In response to COVID-19 surges, Malawian schools closed for over seven months, during which the percentage of pregnancies to young women aged 10-19 did increase from 29% to 35% of total pregnancies.

    Yet, our research has demonstrated that international development organisations and media outlets focused mostly on narrow, sexualised framings of risk to African girls and women rather than on the many intersecting and ongoing barriers to their well-being and school retention. These challenges both predate and extend beyond COVID-19.

    As scholars of international development education who have conducted research in Malawi for over a decade, we decided to join Malawian educational activist and collaborator Stella Makhuva to research how girls themselves narrated their experiences of the COVID-19 years. What did they consider a risk to their schooling?

    Together, we designed a longitudinal study from 2020 to 2023 that included multiple rounds of interviews and participatory journalling methods with 22 upper primary and secondary school girls in southern Malawi.

    We found that for girls in our study, COVID-19 was less a rupture – an unusual event that threatened their education in unprecedented ways – than an added variable in the already complex calculations girls and their families made about whether and how to remain in school.

    We argue that it was not pregnancy itself, but escalating resource constraints, that kept girls from school. And that interventions must do something about the real problem: inequitable systems.

    The stories told by the girls illustrate this. (All the names are pseudonyms.)

    Their stories

    When Faith joined our study in 2020, she was attending a peri-urban primary school near her home. She lived in a mud and grass-thatched house with her parents, both subsistence farmers who supported Faith’s and her siblings’ education. During school closures, she studied with friends to keep up with academic content when she was not helping with her parents’ farm.

    Yet school costs threatened Faith’s return to school upon reopening. Despite primary school being officially “free” by government mandate, students at her school were required to contribute 800 Malawi kwacha (close to US$1 at the time) per term to a school fund for infrastructure projects and upkeep. Not paying into the fund resulted in exclusion from classes.


    Read more: Does free schooling give girls a better chance in life? Burundi study shows the poorest benefited most


    When Faith eventually passed the Primary School Leaving Certificate Exam and enrolled in secondary school, the costs to schooling rose from 5,000 kwacha (about US$6.50 in early 2021) to 20,000 kwacha (about US$19 in late 2022). Faith worried about whether her parents, whose maize and tomato yields suffered from poor rains, would be able to pay.

    On top of this, Faith paid other costs, from exam fees and bicycle rental fees to supplemental lessons in which she learned material never covered during school hours. She said she and her family often sacrificed eating sufficiently to save money.

    Still, Faith was repeatedly pushed out of school until her fee balance was met. Before, during, and after COVID-19 school closures, girls like her were pushed out of school for a lack of regular fee payments.

    Faith’s school-going was also threatened by warming temperatures and new rain patterns that left her family with diminished food and income. Added to this were volatility in government agricultural subsidies to small farmers, inflated school fees, and the increasing privatisation of public education in Malawi.


    Read more: Malawi faces a food crisis: why plans to avert hunger aren’t realistic and what can be done


    Like Faith, all of the girls in our study worked to supplement their schooling with part time lessons, holiday classes, or by repeating grades given educational quality concerns. Based in under-resourced schools with low exam pass rates, girls knew that they were provided an incomplete education.

    According to Brightness,

    We do not learn fully what we are supposed to cover, and some teachers tend to be absent during their lessons. This makes us lag behind … As a result during exams they ask some questions which some of us … did not learn.

    Empirical evidence has shown how teacher engagement has long been influenced by the region’s high disease burden, especially due to HIV/Aids. This has left teachers both ill and caring for ill relatives.

    While teacher disengagement, therefore, reflected factors such as competing care responsibilities, professional dissatisfaction and stress, girls were deeply frustrated by what felt like abandonment.

    Rethinking pregnancy and parenting

    Mainstream discourses that missed key barriers to girls’ school retention and performance, such as privatisation and food insecurity, misrepresented student pregnancy as an emergent “crisis”.

    Prior to the pandemic, sexuality and school-going already overlapped for many girls in Malawi, where adolescent pregnancy rates were threefold the global average. Still, girls in our study countered the idea that schooling and sex were incompatible. They also challenged the idea that school was inherently safe and that it was pregnancy that kept them from school.


    Read more: Education and gender equality: focus on girls isn’t fair and isn’t enough — global study


    Many of the girls’ stories emphasised continuity with what came before the pandemic.

    We have found this in past research. Schooling and sexuality are not necessarily opposed; but parents and teachers try to protect girls from sexuality; and parenting and non-parenting girls alike face significant resource-related barriers to schooling.

    Conclusion

    If girls’ choices, particularly around sexuality, do not represent the greatest or only source of risk for girls’ schooling, interventions must respond to this reality. They should support well-being and address the broader conditions in which girls live and learn. The problem is inequity, not pregnant girls.

    – What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy
    – https://theconversation.com/what-keeps-girls-from-school-in-malawi-we-asked-them-and-its-not-just-pregnancy-258401

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Rachel Silver, Assistant Professor, York University, Canada

    Coverage of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic shutdowns on girls in Malawi emphasised the risks they faced as a result of not attending school. In particular, concerns about pregnancy garnered significant media attention.

    The United Nations Children’s Fund, for example, published an article in March 2021 entitled “Schoolgirl shakes off COVID-19 regret: Lucy’s return to school”. Under a glossy photograph of a smiling girl, readers learn about 16-year-old Lucy, one of 13,000 Malawian students who became pregnant during COVID-19 school closures. The story went on to detail the dire consequences of sexual activity to Lucy’s well-being, and the redemptive power of an eventual return to school.

    The Unicef piece echoed thousands of similar publications circulated after March 2020 that analysed COVID-19’s unique risk for girls in the global south and lamented lost returns to girls’ education.

    In response to COVID-19 surges, Malawian schools closed for over seven months, during which the percentage of pregnancies to young women aged 10-19 did increase from 29% to 35% of total pregnancies.

    Yet, our research has demonstrated that international development organisations and media outlets focused mostly on narrow, sexualised framings of risk to African girls and women rather than on the many intersecting and ongoing barriers to their well-being and school retention. These challenges both predate and extend beyond COVID-19.

    As scholars of international development education who have conducted research in Malawi for over a decade, we decided to join Malawian educational activist and collaborator Stella Makhuva to research how girls themselves narrated their experiences of the COVID-19 years. What did they consider a risk to their schooling?

    Together, we designed a longitudinal study from 2020 to 2023 that included multiple rounds of interviews and participatory journalling methods with 22 upper primary and secondary school girls in southern Malawi.

    We found that for girls in our study, COVID-19 was less a rupture – an unusual event that threatened their education in unprecedented ways – than an added variable in the already complex calculations girls and their families made about whether and how to remain in school.

    We argue that it was not pregnancy itself, but escalating resource constraints, that kept girls from school. And that interventions must do something about the real problem: inequitable systems.

    The stories told by the girls illustrate this. (All the names are pseudonyms.)

    Their stories

    When Faith joined our study in 2020, she was attending a peri-urban
    primary school near her home. She lived in a mud and grass-thatched house with her parents, both subsistence farmers who supported Faith’s and her siblings’ education. During school closures, she studied with friends to keep up with academic content when she was not helping with her parents’ farm.

    Yet school costs threatened Faith’s return to school upon reopening. Despite primary school being officially “free” by government mandate, students at her school were required to contribute 800 Malawi kwacha (close to US$1 at the time) per term to a school fund for infrastructure projects and upkeep. Not paying into the fund resulted in exclusion from classes.




    Read more:
    Does free schooling give girls a better chance in life? Burundi study shows the poorest benefited most


    When Faith eventually passed the Primary School Leaving Certificate Exam and enrolled in secondary school, the costs to schooling rose from 5,000 kwacha (about US$6.50 in early 2021) to 20,000 kwacha (about US$19 in late 2022). Faith worried about whether her parents, whose maize and tomato yields suffered from poor rains, would be able to pay.

    On top of this, Faith paid other costs, from exam fees and bicycle rental fees to supplemental lessons in which she learned material never covered during school hours. She said she and her family often sacrificed eating sufficiently to save money.

    Still, Faith was repeatedly pushed out of school until her fee balance was met. Before, during, and after COVID-19 school closures, girls like her were pushed out of school for a lack of regular fee payments.

    Faith’s school-going was also threatened by warming temperatures and new rain patterns that left her family with diminished food and income. Added to this were volatility in government agricultural subsidies to small farmers, inflated school fees, and the increasing privatisation of public education in Malawi.




    Read more:
    Malawi faces a food crisis: why plans to avert hunger aren’t realistic and what can be done


    Like Faith, all of the girls in our study worked to supplement their schooling with part time lessons, holiday classes, or by repeating grades given educational quality concerns. Based in under-resourced schools with low exam pass rates, girls knew that they were provided an incomplete education.

    According to Brightness,

    We do not learn fully what we are supposed to cover, and some teachers tend to be absent during their lessons. This makes us lag behind … As a result during exams they ask some questions which some of us … did not learn.

    Empirical evidence has shown how teacher engagement has long been influenced by the region’s high disease burden, especially due to HIV/Aids. This has left teachers both ill and caring for ill relatives.

    While teacher disengagement, therefore, reflected factors such as competing care responsibilities, professional dissatisfaction and stress, girls were deeply frustrated by what felt like abandonment.

    Rethinking pregnancy and parenting

    Mainstream discourses that missed key barriers to girls’ school retention and performance, such as privatisation and food insecurity, misrepresented student pregnancy as an emergent “crisis”.

    Prior to the pandemic, sexuality and school-going already overlapped for many girls in Malawi, where adolescent pregnancy rates were threefold the global average. Still, girls in our study countered the idea that schooling and sex were incompatible. They also challenged the idea that school was inherently safe and that it was pregnancy that kept them from school.




    Read more:
    Education and gender equality: focus on girls isn’t fair and isn’t enough — global study


    Many of the girls’ stories emphasised continuity with what came before the pandemic.

    We have found this in past research. Schooling and sexuality are not necessarily opposed; but parents and teachers try to protect girls from sexuality; and parenting and non-parenting girls alike face significant resource-related barriers to schooling.

    Conclusion

    If girls’ choices, particularly around sexuality, do not represent the greatest or only source of risk for girls’ schooling, interventions must respond to this reality. They should support well-being and address the broader conditions in which girls live and learn. The problem is inequity, not pregnant girls.

    Rachel Silver has received funding from the National Academy of Education/Spencer Foundation and the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    Alyssa Morley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What keeps girls from school in Malawi? We asked them and it’s not just pregnancy – https://theconversation.com/what-keeps-girls-from-school-in-malawi-we-asked-them-and-its-not-just-pregnancy-258401

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Motsoaledi hails historic Pandemic Pact at G20 Health Summit

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Health Minister, Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, has praised the adoption of the Pandemic Agreement during the 4th Health Working Group meeting of the Group of 20 (G20) held in Johannesburg. 

    This significant international treaty, supported by 124 member states on 20 May 2025, is only the second international health treaty approved by the World Health Organisation (WHO) since its establishment in 1948.

    The agreement’s adoption follows three years of intensive negotiation launched due to gaps and inequities identified in the national and global COVID-19 response.

    It aims to boost global collaboration to ensure a stronger, more equitable response to future pandemics.

    Delivering the welcome address on Tuesday morning, Motsoaledi celebrated the momentous achievement and emphasised the importance of collective action in ensuring global health security. 

    “Your presence here today is a testament to our collective commitment to global health security,” he said.

    Motsoaledi stated that the agreement results from the diligent efforts of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body (INB), which was established to develop a legally binding framework for pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response.

    “The stark lessons of the COVID-19 crisis fuelled our collective resolve to forge a more robust and equitable framework, one that ensures international cooperation and protects all nations from the devastating impact of future pandemics,” the Minister told the attendees. 

    South Africa, playing a pivotal leadership role as a co-chair of the INB, worked alongside partners from France and the Netherlands, while acknowledging contributions from vice-chairs representing Brazil, Thailand, Egypt, and New Zealand.

    The Minister stated that the four key pillars of the agreement are designed to fundamentally transform the global response to health emergencies. 

    The agreement emphasises the importance of equitable access to pandemic-related health products, the establishment of a global supply chain and logistics network, and the creation of a coordinating financial mechanism to strengthen pandemic response capabilities.

    In addition, the agreement highlights a holistic “One Health” approach, which stresses the connections between human, animal, and environmental health, which is now a central focus of global pandemic strategies.

    The Minister said the agreement incorporates a Pathogen Access and Benefit-Sharing (PABS) system, requiring pharmaceutical companies to contribute 20% of production during pandemics in exchange for access to critical pathogen data. 

    This mechanism aims to ensure that all nations benefit from scientific advancements, especially in times of crisis.

    “As an active participant and representative member for the African region, I can say with certainty that we see this agreement as a crucial step towards rectifying the deep-seated imbalances in access to life-saving pandemic products that were so painfully exposed during the recent crisis.”

    Although Motsoaledi has acknowledged the agreement’s adoption as a significant success, there is still much work ahead.

    “While we celebrate the adoption of the Pandemic Agreement, our work is far from over. We are now entering a critical new phase.”

    He urged immediate engagement in further discussions regarding the PABS system, to convene the Intergovernmental Working Group before 15 July 2025. 

    “Finalising a robust and equitable PABS annex is the ultimate litmus test of our collective commitment. It is the essential next step to transform the Pandemic Agreement from a document of principles into a functional, life-saving tool for justice and our shared global health security.”

    He has since called for continued collaboration and commitment to safeguarding global health for everyone. 

    This important week-long meeting began this morning and will conclude on Friday, 13 June 2025. 

    The event brings together health leaders, experts, and policymakers from the world’s largest economies, invited nations, and international organisations. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: SA closely monitoring new COVID variant spreading across Asia

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    South Africa is closely monitoring the emergence of a new COVID-19 variant, known as Nimbus or NB.1.8.1, associated with a rise in cases in certain regions of Asia. 

    This is according to Health Minister Dr Aaron Motsoaledi, who addressed the 4th Health Working Group meeting of the Group of 20 (G20), which is underway in Johannesburg.

    Motsoaledi said the World Health Organisation (WHO) has designated this “a variant under monitoring” due to its growing presence.

    India is the latest country to experience a surge in new COVID-19 cases due to the emergence of the new variant, NB.1.8.1. 

    According to the Independent, infections have been confirmed in several Asian countries, including Thailand, Indonesia and China. 

    In addition, the United Kingdom Health Security Agency reported the first 13 cases of this variant in England last week.

    “I wish to reassure this esteemed gathering that South Africa has robust surveillance systems in place. 

    “Our National Institute for Communicable Diseases (NICD) manages a comprehensive sentinel surveillance programme that systematically tests for key respiratory viruses, including SARS-CoV-2, influenza, and RSV. Currently, our data show very low SARS-CoV-2 activity,” Motsoaledi explained.

    South Africa is currently experiencing a seasonal rise in influenza, but the country is well-prepared to manage the situation, he said.

    “Crucially, the new variant remains a descendant of the Omicron lineage. This means that current recommendations for updated SARS-CoV-2 vaccines are still effective. Therefore, at this stage, no specific new public health actions are required from the public.” 

    Motsoaledi said government continues to promote good hygiene practices, including handwashing, covering coughs, and staying home when feeling unwell.

    “These simple measures are effective in reducing the spread of all respiratory illnesses. We will continue to monitor the situation closely through our established networks and will report any significant changes.” 

    Meanwhile, he called on the attendees of the meeting to work together with “renewed urgency and unwavering resolve”.

    “Let us build a future where solidarity, equity, and cooperation are the cornerstones of our global health architecture.”

    The week-long Health Working Group meeting began on Tuesday and will conclude on Friday.

    It brings together health leaders, experts, and policymakers from the world’s largest economies, invited nations, and international organisations.

    The plenary sessions will build on lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic and address ongoing barriers to accessing countermeasures, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. 

    There will be a focus on prioritising the expansion of local and regional manufacturing capacity, especially in regions like Africa.

    Delegates will also explore opportunities for technology transfer, sustainable financing, and regulatory alignment to ensure timely and equitable access to life-saving tools during health emergencies. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Europe is perfectly placed to lead a world abandoned by the US – but will it meet the moment?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesco Grillo, Academic Fellow, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Bocconi University

    Shutterstock/Coffeemil

    I believe we Europeans feel far too safe. Europe’s political and economic leadership in the world, which was still unchallenged at the beginning of the century, has long since ceased to exist. Will the dominant cultural influence of Europe be maintained? I think not, unless we defend it and adjust ourselves to new conditions; history has shown that civilisations are all too perishable.

    It is astonishing how much these words used in 1956 by Konrad Adenauer, one of the founding fathers of the European Union, still sound valid today. They perfectly define the current state of the union. Europeans are still struggling to adjust to new conditions – and the conditions to which they need to adjust also continue to change dramatically.

    The battle for technological leadership is the current version of this struggle. Success in this domain could transform Europe, yet the continent remains complacent about its decline into backwardness. The European commission itself calculates that of the 19 digital platforms that have more than 45 million EU users, only one (Zalando) is from the EU.

    Information is (economic and political) power and losing control means to gradually lose both market share and the ability to protect European democracies. Brussels has produced a mass of regulation on digital services, yet American digital platforms are getting away with what European leaders themselves call the manipulation of democratic elections, with very little repercussions. Elon Musk’s X, was banned in Brazil for less – refusing to ban accounts accused of spreading misinformation.

    This decline, however, has been slow enough to lull European leaders into complacency about the future.

    Meanwhile, Donald Trump has a point when he laments that the European Union has been slow to engage in the negotiations he imposed on trade. Indeed, even on trade – one of the very few areas in which the European Union has a mandate from the member states to deal directly with third parties – progress is generally stuttering. The commissioner in charge has to constantly find a common denominator with the agendas of 27 member states, each of which has a different industrial agenda.

    Europe’s decision-making processes are sub-optimal. Indeed, they were built for a different age. There is no shared voice on foreign policy – the EU has been able to say far less on Gaza than individual countries like Spain or the UK, for example. This may have the practical consequence of eroding the “moral leadership” that should still be Europe’s soft advantage.

    Crisis of confidence

    Europe’s failure to respond to real-world changes is due to sub-optimal institutional settings. However the current paralysis in the face of clear need for action may be due to an even more fundamental question of trust in its own capabilities.

    On one hand, there still seems room for complacency. As Stanley Pignal, the Charlemagne columnist for The Economist, recently put it, Europe can take a moderate amount of satisfaction from its continued status as a place where people are free to pursue “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. Yet, it is evident that the institutions needed to concretely achieve those objectives are crumbling: healthcare systems and welfare; robust and independent media; energy and military autonomy in a world without order.

    On the other hand, Europe is increasingly resigned. A global poll taken by Gallup International shows that when responding to the question “do you think that your children will live better than you?” seven of the most pessimistic countries of the world are from the EU. Only 16% of Italians and 24% of French respondents answered “yes” to this question.

    According to Ipsos, less than half of young Europeans feel prepared to enter the job market. And they blame the education system for that. The picture may well be even worse now – this survey was taken in 2019, before the pandemic, war in Europe and, more importantly, AI made the picture even more uncertain.

    Europe has no alternative, as even far-right and far-left parties seem to acknowledge. Note that France’s Rassemblement National and Italy’s Lega no longer talk about exiting the EU but about changing it from the inside. Individual nation states simply do not have the minimum scale to even try to take leadership in a world looking for a new order.

    In a world abandoned by the US, Europe stands a real chance. However, it urgently needs to be creative enough to imagine new mechanisms through which EU institutions take decisions and EU citizens have their say. This in turn requires an entire society to somehow recover the reasonable hope that decline is not inevitable (although we also must be aware that it may even nastily accelerate).

    Finally, young people are absolutely crucial in the process. The rhetoric of “listening to them” must now be replaced by a call for them to govern. They are today what Karl Marx would have probably defined as a class – with very specific demographic, cultural, economic and linguistic characteristics. These must be turned into a political agenda and a new vision of what Europe of the future could look like.


    The challenges ahead for the European Union will be the subject of the forthcoming conference on the Europe of the future in Siena, Italy. This will feed into a seven-point paper that will be discussed with EU institutions.

    Francesco Grillo is associated to VISION think tank.

    ref. Europe is perfectly placed to lead a world abandoned by the US – but will it meet the moment? – https://theconversation.com/europe-is-perfectly-placed-to-lead-a-world-abandoned-by-the-us-but-will-it-meet-the-moment-258030

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Executive Order “Unleashing American Drone Dominance” -– Draganfly Selected by Southern Border Cochise County Sheriff’s Department for Drone Pilot Program.

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Tampa, FL, June 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO) (CSE: DPRO) (FSE: 3U8) (“Draganfly” or the “Company”), an award-winning, industry-leading drone solutions and systems developer, is pleased to announce its selection by the Cochise County Sheriff’s Department to support a new drone pilot program aimed at enhancing surveillance and operations along the southern border. This initiative aligns with President Donald J. Trump’s executive order, “Unleashing American Drone Dominance,” which seeks to reassert America’s leadership in unmanned aerial systems for security and defense.

    The Cochise County Sheriff’s Department, recognized nationally for its innovative use of technology in law enforcement, has previously implemented high-resolution camera networks, sensor-integrated mobile units, and ground surveillance radar systems. These efforts have garnered commendations and visits from President Trump and Vice President JD Vance, highlighting the department’s leadership in border enforcement and technological integration.

    “The southern border is one of America’s most critical national security frontiers,” said Captain Tim Williams of Cochise County Sheriff’s Department. “Our department has always been committed to leveraging the best tools available. With Draganfly as our drone partner, we’re entering the next phase of smart border enforcement. Their systems will enhance our ability to protect communities, manage humanitarian concerns, and respond rapidly to evolving threats.”

    Under this new pilot program, the department will deploy the Draganfly family of drones for extended border surveillance, quick-response missions and nighttime operations. Draganfly’s drones are known for their adaptability and multi-mission capabilities, providing law enforcement and public safety operators the ability to execute a variety of operating tactics and capabilities from a single vehicle, with a variety of configurations available to support various payload and range demands. Draganfly products are capable of integrating with a variety of incumbent hardware and software solutions, including TAK(Team Awareness Kit) network compatibility, enabling a seamless integration with existing capabilities.

    “We are honored to be working with the Cochise County Sheriff’s Department on this historic program,” said Cameron Chell, CEO of Draganfly. “Their team represents some of the best of American law enforcement—innovation-focused, community-minded, and mission-ready. This project embodies the spirit of President Trump’s executive order and sets a gold standard for how drone technology should be used to secure national borders.”

    This initiative not only reinforces the department’s legacy of operational excellence but also positions Cochise County as a national model for technology-enabled border enforcement.

    About Draganfly

    Draganfly Inc. (NASDAQ: DPRO; CSE: DPRO; FSE: 3U8) is the creator of quality, cutting-edge drone solutions, software, and AI systems that revolutionize how organizations can do business and serve their stakeholders. Recognized as being at the forefront of technology for over 25 years, Draganfly is an award-winning industry leader serving the public safety, agriculture, industrial inspections, security, mapping, and surveying markets. Draganfly is a company driven by passion, ingenuity, and the need to provide efficient solutions and first-class services to its customers around the world with the goal of saving time, money, and lives.

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    Media Contact:
    Erika Racicot
    Email: media@draganfly.com

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    Email: info@draganfly.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains certain “forward looking statements” and certain “forward-looking ‎‎‎‎information” as ‎‎‎‎defined under applicable securities laws. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎and information can ‎‎‎‎generally be identified by the use of forward-looking terminology such as ‎‎‎‎‎“may”, “will”, “expect”, “intend”, ‎‎‎‎‎“estimate”, “anticipate”, “believe”, “continue”, “plans” or similar ‎‎‎‎terminology. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎and information are based on forecasts of future ‎‎‎‎results, estimates of amounts not yet determinable and ‎‎‎‎assumptions that, while believed by ‎‎‎‎management to be reasonable, are inherently subject to significant ‎‎‎‎business, economic and ‎‎‎‎competitive uncertainties and contingencies. Forward-looking statements ‎‎‎‎include, but are not ‎‎‎‎limited to, statements with respect to Draganfly’s drones being known for their adaptability and multi-mission capabilities, providing law enforcement and public safety operators the ability to execute a variety of operating tactics and capabilities from a single vehicle, with a variety of configurations available to support various payload and range demands, as well as their capable of integrating with a variety of incumbent hardware and software solutions, including TAK network compatibility, enabling a seamless integration with existing capabilities. Forward-‎‎‎‎looking statements and information are subject to various ‎known ‎‎and unknown risks and ‎‎‎‎‎uncertainties, many of which are beyond the ability of the Company to ‎control or ‎‎predict, that ‎‎‎‎may cause ‎the Company’s actual results, performance or achievements to be ‎materially ‎‎different ‎‎‎‎from those ‎expressed or implied thereby, and are developed based on assumptions ‎about ‎‎such ‎‎‎‎risks, uncertainties ‎and other factors set out here in, including but not limited to: the potential ‎‎‎‎‎‎‎impact of epidemics, ‎pandemics or other public health crises, including the ‎COVID-19 pandemic, on the Company’s business, operations and financial ‎‎‎‎condition; the ‎‎‎successful integration of ‎technology; the inherent risks involved in the general ‎‎‎‎securities markets; ‎‎‎uncertainties relating to the ‎availability and costs of financing needed in the ‎‎‎‎future; the inherent ‎‎‎uncertainty of cost estimates; the ‎potential for unexpected costs and ‎‎‎‎expenses, currency ‎‎‎fluctuations; regulatory restrictions; and liability, ‎competition, loss of key ‎‎‎‎employees and other related risks ‎‎‎and uncertainties disclosed under the ‎heading “Risk Factors“ ‎‎‎‎in the Company’s most recent filings filed ‎‎‎with securities regulators in Canada on ‎the SEDAR ‎‎‎‎website at www.sedar.com and with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on EDGAR through the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. The Company undertakes ‎‎‎no obligation to update forward-‎looking ‎‎‎‎information except as required by applicable law. Such forward-‎‎‎looking information represents ‎‎‎‎‎managements’ best judgment based on information currently available. ‎‎‎No forward-looking ‎‎‎‎statement ‎can be guaranteed, and actual future results may vary materially. ‎‎‎Accordingly, readers ‎‎‎‎are advised not to ‎place undue reliance on forward-looking statements or ‎‎‎information.‎

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Orezone Intercepts Further High-Grade Mineralization at Bomboré Including 11.33 g/t Gold Over 11.00m and 10.28 g/t Gold Over 5.00m

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    VANCOUVER, British Columbia, June 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Orezone Gold Corporation (TSX: ORE, OTCQX: ORZCF) (the “Company” or “Orezone”) is pleased to provide additional drill results from its ongoing multi-year exploration campaign at its flagship Bomboré Gold Mine. These latest results are from multiple targets identified along the broader 14km long reserve defined Bomboré gold system, which remains open for further expansion.

    Selected Drill Highlights1:

    • 11.33g/t Au over 11.00m (BBC6960)
    • 10.28g/t Au over 5.00m (BBC7132)
    • 6.79g/t Au over 8.00m and 2.22g/t Au over 14.00m (BBC7141)
    • 7.40g/t Au over 6.70m (BBD1124)
    • 6.61g/t Au over 4.15m (BBD1341)
    • 2.96g/t Au over 10.00m (BBC7158)
    • 1.84g/t Au over 15.70m (BBD1346)
    • 1.53g/t Au over 17.00m (BBC7148)
    • 1.45g/t Au over 14.10m (BBD1344)
    • 1.23g/t Au over 9.65m (BBD1329)

    Patrick Downey, President and CEO stated, “These latest drill results further underscore the significant exploration upside at Bomboré and clearly illustrate that the broader system remains open to depth, along strike and outside of the currently delineated mineralized trends. At P17, drilling was successful in tracing higher-grade sub-zone mineralization a further 300m down plunge, while wide spaced step-out drilling at P16 and Siga have extended mineralization a respective 600m and 550m along strike. As we ramp up our exploration efforts at Bomboré, we continue to re-evaluate and update the project’s existing exploration framework. The latest results also provide clear evidence that the hanging wall and footwall of the broader 14km long reserve defined system are prospective for additional near-surface discoveries, which was not previously recognized.

    While Bomboré currently hosts a stated 5 million ounce global resource, which is the basis for the ongoing production expansion to 220,000 to 250,000 ounces per annum, the results of the current exploration program continue to provide support for the Company’s long-term targeted resource base of 7 to 10 million ounces.”

    P17 Trend: Higher-Grade Sub-Zones

    Drilling at P17 was successful in further illustrating the down plunge continuity of the higher-grade sub-zones, the highlight of which was an intercept of 7.40g/t Au over 6.70m (BBD1124), which marks a 300m down plunge extension from the previously reported 11.52g/t Au over 10.60m (BBD1081, Figure 3). Other notable sub-zone intercepts from this recent round of drilling include 5.22g/t Au over 4.00m (BBD1346), 20.14g/t Au over 2.00m (BBD1341) and 15.61g/t Au over 1.00m (BBD1335).

    While the Company continues to define the structural setting of the P17 Trend, and further develop a predictive model for future sub-zone targeting, a key takeaway from the recent drilling was a better understanding of the controls of the higher-grade mineralization which comprise these sub-zones. It is now recognized that the higher-grades are associated with a later-stage quartz veining event, within which multiple occurrences of visible gold were observed for the first time (Figure 1). This marks an important development in the Company’s understanding of the Bomboré system, which to date has been focused on a low grade, bulk tonnage open pit model. While still early-stage, the Company continues to evaluate the sub-zones along the P17 Trend, and other localized higher-grade areas along the broader 14km system, as future potential sources of higher-grade underground feed, beneath the open pits.

    Figure 1: P17 Drill Core Photos – highlighting visible gold within higher-grade sub-zone

    P17 Trend: selected high-grade sub-zone intercepts (previously reported):

    • 14.67g/t Au over 6.0m (BBD1066)
    • 16.58g/t Au over 4.6m (BBD0991)
    • 11.52g/t Au over 10.6m (BBD1081)
    • 9.44g/t Au over 10.0m (TYD0041)
    • 8.47g/t Au over 6.0m (BBD1132)
    • 7.08g/t Au over 7.0m (TYC0123)
    • 7.62g/t Au over 5.5m (TYD0035)

    Near Surface Strike Extensions

    In addition to extending the Bomboré mineral system to depth, and defining higher-grade sub-zones within, further delineating near-surface strike extensions to multiple resource areas continues to be another important area of investigation. A highlight of such recent targeting was at P16, where a series of step-out holes successfully identified mineralization an additional 600m to the north (Figure 2), as supported by intercepts of 0.92g/t Au over 14.35m (BBD1348), 0.71g/t Au over 9.00m (BBD1349), 0.68g/t Au over 17.00m (BBD1338) and 1.27g/t Au over 5.00m (BBC7180). These initial step-out results support the interpretation that P16 is a sub-parallel trend to the P17 Trend, which significantly expands the exploration model and potential within this area of the project.

    Future targeting of the P16 strike extension will be centered on backfill drilling, with the goal of delineating open pittable near-surface mineralization, as well as to further investigate the potential for higher-grade sub-zones, as is observed within the P16 resource area.

    P16 Trend: selected high-grade sub-zone intercepts (previously reported):

    • 10.63g/t Au over 14.0m (BBD0448)
    • 16.50g/t Au over 5.0m (BBD0448)
    • 9.03g/t Au over 12.0m (BBC3241)
    • 6.69g/t Au over 15.5m (BBD0443)
    • 5.91g/t Au over 15.0m (BBD0447)
    • 7.82g/t Au over 9.0m (BBD0213)
    • 58.91g/t Au over 3.0m (BBD0768)

    At Siga, initial testing of the southern strike extension yielded encouraging results, with mineralization intercepted approximately 550m to the south of the current mineral resource. This area of the project has not been previously explored with results of the initial scout drilling returning 5.93g/t Au over 0.85m and 6.35g/t Au over 1.00m (BBD1340). Follow-up drilling will comprise a series of wide spaced backfill fences to further delineate this broad southern extension.

    Additionally, significant potential remains to extend resources to the north of the existing open pit designs in the North Zone. Localized 50-100m step-outs along the broader North Zone strike extension have demonstrated promising continuity, with initial results of 2.22g/t Au over 14.00m and 6.79g/t Au over 8.00m (BBC7141) and 2.21g/t Au over 7.00m (BBC7201). Further drilling along this northern strike extension, which has seen limited testing to date, is planned for upcoming campaigns.

    Expanding Exploration Model

    In addition to testing the extent of known mineralization, the Company continues to challenge the broader exploration model at Bomboré. The previously established exploration framework was centered on gold mineralization being confined to the Bomboré Shear Zone, with limited prospects within the hanging wall and footwall of the broader system. However, more recent targeted drilling, and local surface excavations outside of the mining lease, provide evidence to the contrary. Initial testing within the immediate hanging wall to the Siga Zone has led to the discovery of the HK Zone (Figure 2), which is marked by intercepts of 11.33g/t Au over 11.00m (BBC6960), 10.28g/t Au over 5.00m (BBC7132), 1.35g/t Au over 9.00m (BBC6976), and 1.46g/t Au over 6.00m (BBC7120).

    With the prospects of identifying additional high-grade centers of mineralization outside of the Bomboré Shear Zone, the Company has recently commenced a near-mine and regional air core drill program, comprising a series of wide spaced drill fences within the mining lease and surrounding exploration tenements.

    Figure 2 – Bomboré Plan Map Highlighting Selected Intercepts

    Figure 3 – P17 Composite Long Section Highlighting Selected Intercepts (Looking West)

    Table 1 – Highlight Drill Intercepts

    Hole Zone Easting Northing Elv. Dip Azi. EOH
    (m)
    From
    (m)
    To
    (m)
    Length*
    (m)
    Grade
    (g/t Au)
    Type
    BBD0206 P17 730599 1344300 267 -50 270 155 125.00 128.00 3.00 1.79 HR
    BBD1069 P17 S 730270 1343125 261 -51 270 277 225.00 226.00 1.00 9.53 HR
    and               251.75 260.60 8.85 1.39 HR
    incl.               257.60 259.60 2.00 3.58 HR
    BBD1084 P17 S 730355 1343175 261 -52 270 437 314.00 317.95 3.95 2.36 HR
    BBD1104 P17 S 730365 1343250 261 -52 269 401 355.00 358.00 3.00 2.09 HR
    incl.               357.00 358.00 1.00 5.17 HR
    BBD1124 P17 S 730425 1343375 261 -49 272 495 459.00 465.70 6.70 7.40 HR
    and               480.00 485.00 5.00 2.09 HR
    BBD1131 North Zone 730395 1343325 261 -51 270 452 395.00 398.00 3.00 1.66 HR
    and               416.00 419.00 3.00 1.01 HR
    and               425.00 428.30 3.30 1.82 HR
    BBD1329 North Zone 729034 1353901 283 -55 312 396 341.35 351.00 9.65 1.23 HR
    and               356.50 362.50 6.00 1.53 HR
    BBD1331 North Zone 728993 1353501 276 -52 312 330 42.00 43.00 1.00 8.06 OX
    BBD1334 P17 S 730483 1343350 261 -53 271 519 278.10 283.10 5.00 1.72 HR
    and               488.50 498.50 10.00 1.12 HR
    incl.               494.50 497.50 3.00 2.51 HR
    BBD1335 P17 S 730257 1343350 261 -50 270 396 47.00 48.00 1.00 15.61 HR
    BBD1338 P16 729508 1344364 259 -45 263 291 193.00 210.00 17.00 0.68 HR
    incl.               202.00 206.00 4.00 1.20 HR
    and               257.00 262.00 5.00 2.43 HR
    and               268.00 271.20 3.20 1.10 HR
    BBD1339 P16 729597 1344551 260 -50 270 336 334.00 336.00 2.00 2.95 HR
    BBD1340 P16 729000 1343900 260 -50 270 201 89.15 90.00 0.85 5.93 HR
    and               191.00 192.00 1.00 6.35 HR
    BBD1341 P17 S 730336 1342750 261 -50 270 156 123.75 127.90 4.15 6.61 HR
    incl.               125.90 127.90 2.00 20.14 HR
    BBD1343 P17 S 730392 1343125 261 -55 270 360 309.00 313.00 4.00 1.03 HR
    BBD1344 P17 S 730371 1343501 261 -50 270 528 323.00 337.10 14.10 1.45 HR
    incl.               323.00 332.70 9.70 1.87 HR
    and               428.00 431.00 3.00 1.79 HR
    BBD1345 P17 S 730340 1342800 261 -50 270 165 136.20 139.80 3.60 1.68 HR
    and               146.00 148.55 2.55 5.02 HR
    BBD1346 P17 S 730618 1344250 266 -50 270 225 137.25 141.00 3.75 1.17 HR
    and               178.00 193.70 15.70 1.84 HR
    incl.               186.70 190.70 4.00 5.22 HR
    BBD1348 P16 729566 1344413 259 -50 270 303 168.00 173.15 5.15 1.54 HR
    and               214.00 228.35 14.35 0.92 HR
    incl.               222.00 228.35 6.35 1.03 HR
    and               260.00 266.00 6.00 0.81 HR
    BBD1349 P16 729517 1344443 259 -50 270 312 241.00 250.00 9.00 0.71 HR
    and               255.00 270.00 15.00 0.57 HR
    BBC6946 HK 728515 1348358 277 -50 270 60 13.00 17.00 4.00 2.53 OX
    BBC6958 HK 728560 1348357 276 -50 270 75 70.00 75.00 5.00 1.19 OX
    BBC6960 HK 728536 1348408 274 -50 280 114 48.00 59.00 11.00 11.33 OX
    incl.               48.00 51.00 3.00 40.12 OX
    BBC6962 HK 728829 1348272 278 -50 250 129 56.00 62.00 6.00 0.68 OX
    BBC6963 HK 728844 1348280 277 -50 279 131 74.00 78.00 4.00 0.80 OX
    BBC6975 HK 728537 1348357 276 -50 270 96 84.00 93.00 9.00 0.65 HR
    BBC6976 HK 728564 1348402 275 -50 280 113 74.00 83.00 9.00 1.35 OX
    BBC7120 HK 728557 1348302 276 -50 270 100 69.00 75.00 6.00 1.46 HR
    BBC7122 HK 728563 1348386 275 -50 270 120 78.00 87.00 9.00 0.78 HR
    BBC7129 HK 728603 1348435 274 -50 270 120 110.00 117.00 7.00 0.79 HR
    BBC7132 HK 728524 1348333 278 -50 270 130 26.00 30.00 4.00 0.72 OX
    and               82.00 87.00 5.00 10.28 HR
    BBC7135 HK 728391 1348375 283 -50 270 60 32.00 36.00 4.00 1.31 OX
    BBC7136 HK 728493 1348224 286 -50 270 100 27.00 36.00 9.00 0.65 OX
    and               46.00 50.00 4.00 0.76 OX
    and               60.00 63.00 3.00 2.26 OX
    BBC7140 North Zone 729983 1354256 285 -50 312 126 8.00 11.00 3.00 0.67 OX
    and               16.00 25.00 9.00 0.53 OX
    incl.               21.00 24.00 3.00 1.09 OX
    BBC7141 North Zone 730390 1354301 278 -45 312 100 27.00 41.00 14.00 2.22 OX
    incl.               27.00 30.00 3.00 8.44 OX
    and               66.00 74.00 8.00 6.79 HR
    incl.               67.00 70.00 3.00 14.82 HR
    BBC7142 North Zone 730082 1354338 282 -50 312 152 109.00 114.00 5.00 1.51 HR
    BBC7147 P11 727951 1349499 291 -50 270 150 70.00 75.00 5.00 0.85 HR
    BBC7148 P11 727932 1349408 292 -50 270 120 32.00 49.00 17.00 1.53 OX
    incl.               39.00 41.00 2.00 7.62 OX
    and               77.00 83.00 6.00 3.15 HR
    incl.               77.00 80.00 3.00 5.32 HR
    BBC7149 P11 727950 1349449 291 -50 270 150 90.00 97.00 7.00 1.62 HR
    BBC7150 P11 727983 1349253 285 -50 270 125 87.00 93.00 6.00 0.92 HR
    BBC7152 P11 728107 1349249 281 -50 270 120 74.00 77.00 3.00 1.64 HR
    BBC7153 P11 728106 1349299 279 -50 270 118 49.00 53.00 4.00 1.01 OX
    BBC7154 P11 728013 1349400 282 -50 270 150 98.00 100.00 2.00 1.47 HR
    and               116.00 119.00 3.00 1.84 HR
    BBC7157 Siga W 727966 1347455 276 -50 250 140 11.00 16.00 5.00 0.77 OX
    and               90.00 101.00 11.00 0.96 HR
    BBC7158 Siga E 728340 1347910 283 -50 250 120 67.00 77.00 10.00 2.96 HR
    incl.               69.00 71.00 2.00 11.72 HR
    BBC7161 Siga E 728615 1347638 277 -50 250 120 62.00 63.00 1.00 5.99 HR
    BBC7162 Siga E 728669 1347497 274 -50 250 150 73.00 78.00 5.00 1.05 HR
    BBC7163 Siga E 728624 1347428 273 -50 250 80 18.00 26.00 8.00 1.00 OX
    and               30.00 33.00 3.00 1.35 OX
    BBC7164 Siga E 728681 1347449 271 -50 250 114 42.00 47.00 5.00 1.23 OX
    BBC7165 Siga E 728647 1347090 280 -50 250 126 96.00 99.00 3.00 5.26 HR
    incl.               96.00 97.00 1.00 14.67 HR
    BBC7166 Siga S 728213 1345896 266 -50 250 84 6.00 9.00 3.00 1.13 OX
    BBC7180 P16 729608 1345000 261 -50 270 72 47.00 49.00 2.00 6.52 HR
    and               54.00 59.00 5.00 1.27 HR
    BBC7185 P8P9 728636 1352003 267 -50 312 123 2.00 8.00 6.00 0.63 OX
    BBC7186 P8P9 728571 1351926 269 -50 312 138 2.00 9.00 7.00 0.86 OX
    and               64.00 71.00 7.00 0.82 OX
    incl.               64.00 68.00 4.00 1.12 OX
    BBC7187 P8P9 728527 1351968 268 -50 312 136 133.00 136.00 3.00 1.62 HR
    BBC7191 North Zone 729740 1354677 284 -49 310 69 5.00 15.00 10.00 1.12 OX
    incl.               9.00 14.00 5.00 1.74 OX
    and               30.00 35.00 5.00 0.59 OX
    BBC7193 North Zone 729758 1354661 282 -51 310 114 25.00 34.00 9.00 0.47 OX
    and               44.00 48.00 4.00 3.14 OX
    and               53.00 67.00 14.00 0.88 OX
    BBC7195 North Zone 729774 1354680 282 -51 310 113 47.00 49.00 2.00 2.58 OX
    BBC7200 North Zone 730379 1354345 286 -50 310 80 12.00 20.00 8.00 0.62 OX
    and               61.00 67.00 6.00 1.50 HR
    BBC7201 North Zone 730417 1354345 279 -49 310 83 0.00 7.00 7.00 2.21 OX
    and               12.00 20.00 8.00 0.62 OX
    and               61.00 67.00 6.00 1.50 HR

    * True widths for all zones are reported as a percentage of drilled lengths: North Zone 85%, P8/P9 70-85%, Siga 90%, P11 75-85%, P17S 70% and 90-100%, P17N 70% and HK 75-80%.

    About Orezone Gold Corporation

    Orezone Gold Corporation (TSX: ORE OTCQX: ORZCF) is a West African gold producer engaged in mining, developing, and exploring its 90%-owned flagship Bomboré Gold Mine in Burkina Faso. The Bomboré mine achieved commercial production on its oxide operations on December 1, 2022, and is now focused on its staged hard rock expansion that is expected to materially increase annual and life-of-mine gold production from the processing of hard rock mineral reserves. Orezone is led by an experienced team focused on social responsibility and sustainability with a proven track record in project construction and operations, financings, capital markets, and M&A.

    The technical report entitled Bomboré Phase II Expansion, Definitive Feasibility Study is available on SEDAR+ and the Company’s website.

    Contact Information

    Patrick Downey
    President and Chief Executive Officer

    Kevin MacKenzie
    Vice President, Corporate Development and Investor Relations

    Tel: 1 778 945 8977
    info@orezone.com / www.orezone.com

    For further information please contact Orezone at +1 (778) 945 8977 or visit the Company’s website at www.orezone.com.

    The Toronto Stock Exchange neither approves nor disapproves the information contained in this news release.

    Qualified person

    Alastair Gallaugher (CGeol), Exploration Manager for Orezone, is the Qualified Person under NI 43-101 and has reviewed and approved the scientific and technical information contained in this news release.  

    QA/QC

    The mineralized intervals are based on a lower cut-off grade of 0.28g/t in the Oxide+Upper Transition zone, and 0.45g/t Au in the Lower Transition+Hard Rock zone. The half-core drilling samples were cut using a diamond saw by Orezone employees. The samples were prepared by BIGS Global Burkina s.a.r.l. (“BIGS Global”) and then split by Orezone to 1 kg using Rotary Sample Dividers (“RSDs”). A 1kg aliquot was analyzed for leachable gold at BIGS Global in Ouagadougou, by bottle-roll cyanidation using a LeachWellTM catalyst. The leach residues from all samples with a leach grade greater than or equal to 0.25g/t Au were prepared by BIGS Global and then split by Orezone to 50g using RSDs. A 50g aliquot was analyzed by fire assay at BIGS Global.

    Orezone employs a rigorous Quality Control Program including a minimum of 10% standards, blanks and duplicates. The composite width and grade include the final leach residue assay results for most of the drill intercepts reported.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains certain information that constitutes “forward-looking information” within the meaning of applicable Canadian Securities laws and “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of applicable U.S. securities laws (together, “forward-looking statements”). Forward-looking statements are frequently characterized by words such as “plan”, “expect”, “project”, “intend”, “believe”, “anticipate”, “estimate”, “potential”, “possible” and other similar words, or statements that certain events or conditions “may”, “will”, “could”, or “should” occur.

    Forward-looking statements in this press release include, but are not limited to statements with respect to the exploration program and the significant exploration upside at Bomboré including that the broader system remains open to depth, along strike and outside of the currently delineated mineralized trends; the potential to materially expand the project’s resource base from the current global 5 million gold ounces, to a targeted 7 to 10 million gold ounces longer term and the ongoing production expansion to 220,000 to 250,000 ounces per annum; evidence that the hanging wall and footwall of the broader 14km long reserve defined system are prospective for additional near-surface discoveries; the initial step-out results support the interpretation that P16 is a sub-parallel trend to the P17 Trend, which significantly expands the exploration model and potential within this region of the project; and significant potential remains to extend resources to the north of the existing open pit designs in the North Zone.

    All forward-looking statements are subject to a variety of risks and uncertainties and other factors that could cause actual events or results to differ materially from those projected in the forward-looking statements including, but not limited to, terrorist or other violent attacks, the failure of parties to contracts to honour contractual commitments, unexpected changes in laws, rules or regulations, or their enforcement by applicable authorities; social or labour unrest; changes in commodity prices; unexpected failure or inadequacy of infrastructure, the possibility of project cost overruns or unanticipated costs and expenses, accidents and equipment breakdowns, political risk, unanticipated changes in key management personnel, the spread of diseases, epidemics and pandemics diseases, market or business conditions, the failure of exploration programs, including drilling programs, to deliver anticipated results and the failure of ongoing and uncertainties relating to the availability and costs of financing needed in the future, and other factors described in the Company’s most recent annual information form and management’s discussion and analysis filed on SEDAR+ on www.sedarplus.ca. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on forward-looking statements.

    Forward-looking statements are based on the applicable assumptions and factors management considers reasonable as of the date hereof, based on the information available to management at such time. These assumptions and factors include, but are not limited to, assumptions and factors related to the Company’s ability to carry on current and future operations, including: development and exploration activities; the timing, extent, duration and economic viability of such operations, including any mineral resources or reserves identified thereby; the accuracy and reliability of estimates, projections, forecasts, studies and assessments; the Company’s ability to meet or achieve estimates, projections and forecasts; the availability and cost of inputs; the price and market for outputs, including gold; foreign exchange rates; taxation levels; the timely receipt of necessary approvals or permits; the ability to meet current and future obligations; the ability to obtain timely financing on reasonable terms when required; the current and future social, economic and political conditions; and other assumptions and factors generally associated with the mining industry.

    Although the forward-looking statements contained in this press release are based upon what management of the Company believes are reasonable assumptions, the Company cannot assure investors that actual results will be consistent with these forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are made as of the date of this press release and are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement. Subject to applicable securities laws, the Company does not assume any obligation to update or revise the forward-looking statements contained herein to reflect events or circumstances occurring after the date of this press release.

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/a40af525-f516-45bc-adcf-ddfd80dde15d

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/8fcc476e-2850-49f1-9a32-804e43b198f7

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    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/399dba20-2f38-4610-844d-a799ab111e1a

    The MIL Network

  • Lutnick says US-China trade talks going well on second day

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick said on Tuesday trade talks with China were going well as the two sides met for a second day in London, seeking a breakthrough on export controls that have threatened a fresh rupture between the superpowers.

    U.S. and Chinese officials are trying to get back on track after Washington accused Beijing of blocking exports of rare earth minerals that are critical to its economy, straining ties after they struck a preliminary deal in Geneva last month to step back from a full-blown trade embargo.

    White House economic adviser Kevin Hassett said on Monday that the U.S. was ready to agree to lift export controls on some semiconductors in return for China speeding up the delivery of rare earths and magnets.

    “(Talks went on) all day yesterday, and I expect (them) all day today,” Lutnick told reporters. “They’re going well, and we’re spending lots of time together.”

    Trump’s shifting tariff policies have roiled global markets, sparked congestion and confusion in major ports, and cost companies tens of billions of dollars in lost sales and higher costs.

    But markets have made up much of the losses they endured after Trump unveiled his sweeping “Liberation Day” tariffs in April, aided by the reset in Geneva between the world’s two biggest economies.

    The second round of U.S.-China talks, which followed a rare phone call between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping last week, comes at a crucial time for both economies.

    Customs data published on Monday showed that China’s exports to the U.S. plunged 34.5% in May, the sharpest drop since the outbreak of the COVID pandemic.

    While the impact on U.S. inflation and its jobs market has so far been muted, tariffs have hammered U.S. business and household confidence and the dollar remains under pressure.

    DISCUSSING DISAGREEMENTS

    The talks have been led by U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, Lutnick and U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, with the Chinese contingent helmed by Vice Premier He Lifeng.

    The talks ran for almost seven hours on Monday and resumed just before 1000 GMT on Tuesday, with both sides expected to issue updates later in the day.

    The inclusion of Lutnick, whose agency oversees export controls for the U.S., is one indication of how central rare earths have become. He did not attend the Geneva talks, when the countries struck a 90-day deal to roll back some of the triple-digit tariffs they had placed on each other.

    China holds a near-monopoly on rare earth magnets, a crucial component in electric vehicle motors, and its decision in April to suspend exports of a wide range of critical minerals and magnets upended global supply chains and sparked alarm in boardrooms and factory floors around the world.

    Kelly Ann Shaw, a former White House trade adviser during Trump’s first term and now a trade partner at the Akin Gump law firm in Washington, said she expected China to reaffirm its commitment to lift retaliatory measures, including export restrictions, “plus some concessions on the U.S. side, with respect to export control measures over the past week or two”.

    But Shaw said she expected the U.S. to only agree to lift some new export curbs, not longstanding ones such as for advanced artificial intelligence chips.

    In May, the U.S. ordered a halt to shipments of semiconductor design software and chemicals and aviation equipment, revoking export licences that had been previously issued.

    (Reuters)