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Category: Pandemic

  • MIL-OSI USA: Attorney General James Delivers Over $13,500 Worth of Baby Formula to Rochester Families

    Source: US State of New York

    EW YORK – New York Attorney General Letitia James today announced that her office secured more than $13,500 worth of baby formula from baby formula supplier Paragon USA & Co., LLC (Paragon) for families in Rochester. The donation is the result of an investigation conducted by the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) into Paragon for price gouging during the national baby formula shortage in 2022. As part of a settlement with OAG, Paragon has paid a $10,000 penalty and must pay an additional $35,000 in donated baby formula or cash. Today’s donation will be distributed to families in need across Rochester by Foodlink, a community organization that serves the Greater Rochester and Finger Lakes regions.

    “During a nationwide baby formula shortage, Paragon took advantage of New York families, illegally raising the price on formula to squeeze extra profits,” said Attorney General James. “My office made sure Paragon was held responsible for their illegal action and guaranteed that hard-working families in New York received relief. I thank Foodlink and all its partner organizations for distributing this baby formula to help Rochester families in need.”

    “We are thankful to Attorney General James for once again providing Foodlink and our new Health & Wellness initiative with additional baby formula,” said Julia Tedesco, President & CEO of Foodlink. “Our partners have highlighted a growing need for baby products and other essential items, especially as grocery prices remain historically high. This generous contribution will greatly benefit our members and their clients who are in urgent need of formula.”

    In 2022, Abbott Laboratories closed one of its baby formula manufacturing plants and recalled formula produced there, creating significant hardship for families throughout New York and the nation as formula supplies dwindled and prices rose. Abbott produces over 40 percent of the infant formula sold in the United States, and the plant it closed was responsible for approximately one fifth of total U.S. production.

    New York’s price gouging laws prohibit vendors from unconscionably increasing prices on goods that are vital to consumers’ health, safety, or welfare during market disruptions such as the 2022 formula shortage. In May 2022, Attorney General James issued warnings to more than 30 retailers across the state to stop overcharging for baby formula after consumers reported unreasonably high prices.

    The OAG’s investigation found that Paragon, which supplies formula to retailers in New York, generated tens of thousands of dollars in additional revenue by raising prices more than 20 percent after Abbott announced its recall.

    As a result of a settlement with OAG, Paragon must pay penalties and make formula donations with a combined value of $45,000. This includes a $10,000 penalty to the state that Paragon has already paid and an additional $35,000 that can be paid in the form of donated formula or cash that must be delivered by June 10, 2025.

    Today’s donation is the third secured by Attorney General James as part of the settlement with Paragon. In February, Attorney General James secured the donation of $1,500 worth of baby formula to families in Westchester, and in March, $6,300 worth of baby formula to families in Brooklyn. To date, Attorney General James has donated more than $21,400 worth of baby formula as a result of the settlement with Paragon.

    “No parent should be forced to choose between paying their bills or feeding their child,” said Senator Jeremy Cooney. “When businesses illegally jack up prices for goods like baby formula, they must be held accountable. I applaud Attorney General James for once again protecting consumers and ensuring Rochester families get the relief they deserve.”

    “Families are struggling to make ends meet with inflation and an economy on the brink of a recession, so this donation goes such a long way for Rochester children, who are already amongst the neediest in the nation,” said Assemblymember Jen Lunsford. “I am grateful to Attorney General James for doggedly pursuing these bad corporate actors and holding them accountable for their opportunistic money grab.”

    Attorney General James is a leader in the fight to protect New York consumers and guard against price gouging. As part of a $675,000 settlement with formula suppliers Marine Park and Formula Depot, Attorney General James secured the donation of over $344,000 worth of baby formula to families in the Bronx in March 2025 and $140,000 worth of formula to families in Rochester in December 2024. In October 2024, Attorney General James led a multistate coalition urging Congressional leaders to support a national ban on price gouging. In March and April 2024, Attorney General James distributed over 9,500 cans of baby formula in Buffalo and New York City from a settlement with Walgreens for price gouging during the formula shortage. In May 2023, Attorney General James secured a $100,000 settlement with Quality King Distributors, Inc. due to unconscionable price increases for Lysol products during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic. In April 2021, Attorney General James delivered 1.2 million eggs to food pantries throughout the state which were secured as part of an agreement with the nation’s largest egg producers for price gouging in the early months of the pandemic.

    New Yorkers should report potential concerns about price gouging to the OAG by filing a complaint online or calling 800-771-7755.

    This matter was handled by Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Fishman, under the supervision of Bureau Chief Jane M. Azia and Deputy Bureau Chief Laura J. Levine, all of the Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau. Former Data Scientist Jasmine McAllister also assisted in this matter, under the supervision of Director of Research and Analytics Victoria Khan, Deputy Director Gautam Sisodia, and former Director Megan Thorsfeldt. The Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau is a part of the Division for Economic Justice, which is led by Chief Deputy Attorney General Chris D’Angelo and is overseen by First Deputy Attorney General Jennifer Levy.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Robert Garcia Releases Oversight Report on Lessons From Kenneth Fire False Alerts

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Robert Garcia California (42nd District)

    Washington, D.C. – Today, Congressman Robert Garcia (CA-42) released a report with key findings on the causes of false evacuation warnings during the Kenneth Fire on January 9, 2025, and policy recommendations to improve emergency warning alerts. The full report can be found here.

    “The Kenneth Fire false alert was a wake-up call,” said Congressman Robert Garcia. “It showed the consequences of software failures, vague message wording, and a lack of federal standards. We must modernize our emergency alert systems to ensure that warnings are accurate, timely, and targeted. The public’s trust is at stake.”

    On February 13, 2025, Congressman Garcia and thirteen Members of Congress representing Los Angeles County sent oversight letters seeking answers to why evacuation warnings were accidentally sent to nearly 10 million L.A. County residents during the Los Angeles fires, why individuals received delayed warnings, or why individuals received multiple warnings.

    Responses were received from Genasys, Inc., the software company used by the County for issuing wireless emergency alerts, Los Angeles County, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

    The Kenneth Fire serves as a critical reminder of the importance of robust emergency communication systems. Congress and federal agencies must act swiftly to close identified gaps and ensure the public receives accurate and life-saving information when disaster strikes.

    The report’s key findings noted:

    • The initial false alert was caused by a software failure in Genasys, Inc.’s system. The correct evacuation area polygon was not uploaded to the IPAWS wireless alert channel, which Genasys believes was due to a network disruption. Genasys’ system failed to warn the LA County Office of Emergency Management that the polygon was missing, and the alert was to be sent county-wide. Genasys has since added safeguards to its software to address this issue.
    • LA County responded quickly, canceling the alert within 2 minutes and 47 seconds, and issued a corrected message 20 minutes later. The County temporarily transitioned to CalOES’ Onsolve CodeRed alert system and resumed use of Genasys on January 30, 2025.
    • LA County could improve the wording of alert messages. The wording of the original alert was vague and lacked geographic specificity. Improved language and inclusion of timestamps would have helped avoid confusion, especially for individuals outside the evacuation zone.
    • Duplicate and delayed alerts were not caused by downed cell towers, as initially thought, but by technical issuessuch as network overload, lack of unique message identifiers, and long alert durations.

    Policy recommendations included:

    1. Increase funding for IPAWS systems – Federal support is needed for planning, equipment, training, exercises, and system maintenance.
    2. Finalize FEMA’s IPAWS requirements – Five years after Congress mandated improvements, FEMA has yet to fully implement certification programs for users and third-party software providers.
    3. The FCC should ensure mobile providers include location-aware maps by the December 2026 deadline – Last October, the FCC passed a requirement for wireless services providers to include links to maps that show the emergency incident and your location relative to the incident by December 2026.
    4. The FCC should establish performance standards – The FCC should develop measurable goals and monitoring for Wireless Emergency Alert (WEA) performance, including reliability, accuracy, and speed.

    By addressing these challenges, emergency alerting can become more accurate, reliable, and effective in future crises.

    Congressman Garcia is dedicated to ensuring that government operations are efficient, effective, and safe, especially during emergencies. After the devastating LA wildfires in January, he led a letter with LA colleagues to Genasys Inc., Los Angeles County, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) demanding answers regarding accidental emergency alerts. Individuals received delayed evacuation warnings, some received the same message multiple times, and millions received unnecessary warnings. As Mayor of Long Beach, Congressman Garcia helped establish the AlertLongBeach system to provide those who live or work in the city with text alerts containing important information before, during, and after a major emergency or disaster. Congressman Garcia’s leadership on the Oversight Committee ensures that government operations are effective and responsive to crises. Congressman Garcia led dozens of his colleagues in calling on FEMA to honor their commitment to reimbursing California cities and counties for providing shelter options for individuals experiencing homelessness during the pandemic. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 12 May 2025 News release WHO Results Report 2024 shows health progress across regions overcoming critical challenges

    Source: World Health Organisation

    The World Health Organization (WHO) Results Report 2024, shows progress on global health goals, even in times of growing financial uncertainties.

    The report, released ahead of the Seventy-eight World Health Assembly (19–27 May 2025), presents a mid-term assessment of WHO’s performance in implementing the Programme budget 2024–2025, providing a snapshot of progress towards the strategic priorities of the Thirteenth General Programme of Work, 2019–2025.

    The report highlights WHO’s work in over 150 countries, territories and provides an update on the implementation of the Thirteenth General Programme of Work, showcasing both the achievements so far and challenges ahead.

    “This report shows how, with WHO’s support, many countries are making progress on a huge range of health indicators, helping their populations to live healthier lives, giving them greater access to essential health services, and keeping them safer against health emergencies,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General. “In a world of multiple overlapping challenges and constrained resources for global health, these results demonstrate why the world needs a strong and sustainably-financed WHO, delivering the high-quality, trusted support on which countries and their people rely.”

    Progress on triple billion targets

    The report shows significant progress on coverage with essential health services, protection from health emergencies, and enjoyment of healthier lives. Still, the progress is insufficient to reach the health-related Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.

    On the first billion – 1 billion more people benefitting from universal health coverage – an estimated 431 million more people, close to half of the goal, are estimated to be covered with essential health services without catastrophic health spending. This progress is largely driven by improvements in the healthcare workforce, increased access to contraception and expanded HIV antiretroviral therapy. However, people continue to face financial hardships and challenges in immunization programmes persist.

    Regarding the second billion – 1 billion more people better protected from health emergencies – an estimated 637 million more people are better protected through stronger preparedness, surveillance, workforce capacity, and equitable access to tools and services, supported by reforms such as the amendments to the International Health Regulations. Yet financial constraints threaten pandemic response efforts. In the face of the H5N1 avian flu outbreak, there is a continued need for pandemic preparedness. After more than three years of negotiations, WHO member states have drafted a pandemic agreement that will be up for consideration at the upcoming World Health Assembly. The draft proposal includes measures for an increased research infrastructure, emergency global health workforces and other key mechanisms to prevent and respond to pandemic threats.

    For the third billion – 1 billion more people enjoying better health and well-being – the report shows that 1.4 billion more people are living with better health and well-being, surpassing the initial goal. This is due to reduced tobacco use, improved air quality, clean household fuels, and access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH). Key challenges lie in addressing increased obesity and alcohol consumption.

    However, reaching the goals faces growing challenges. Pause in foreign aid and reduction of health budgets further strain already fragile health systems, especially in communities with the greatest health needs. Financial constraints threaten pandemic response efforts. Reduced funding will also undermine hard-won progress.

    WHO has taken concrete steps to become more efficient and effective, including by improving operational efficiency and transparency through digital innovation, enhanced support services, and stronger risk and security systems. In 2024, WHO strengthened its support for generating, accessing and using data paving the way for more evidence-based programming and timelier on the ground impact.

    Highlighted accomplishments

    Seven countries eliminated a neglected tropical disease in 2024, reaching 54 countries that have eliminated at least one neglected tropical disease. Guinea worm disease is now closer than ever to eradication.

    WHO assigned 481 international nonproprietary names for medicines and 185 countries accessed the WHO database of medical devices nomenclature.

    Seventy million more people had access to mental health services by the end of 2024 and at least one million people living with a mental health condition received treatment.

    An emergency polio campaign in the Gaza Strip vaccinated more than half a million children.

    With support from the African Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, WHO distributed 259 000 mpox tests in 32 countries. Globally, 6 million mpox vaccine doses were pledged.

    WHO coordinated responses to 51 graded emergencies in 89 countries and territories. WHO’s emergency medical teams performed more than 37 000 surgeries and supported infection prevention and control, WASH, trauma care, and mental health support.

    WHO trained over 15 000 health providers and policy-makers across more than 160 Member States on addressing the health needs of refugees and migrants.

    WHO collaboration with UNICEF and other UN agencies has resulted in multiyear funding programmes in 15 high-burden countries, reaching 9.3 million children and saving an estimated 1 million lives.

    Increasing efficiency, the global digital health certification network supported by WHO has now enabled about 2 billion people to carry digital health records.

    WHO recognizes the sustained commitment of Member States and will work with new and existing donors and partners to secure additional funding. Securing predictable, sustainable and resilient financing is the key objective of the Investment Round, which has mobilized over US$ 1.7 billion in pledges from 71 contributors, covering 53% of WHO’s voluntary funding needs.

    The Results Report is crucial to WHO’s accountability to Member States. This report ensures that funding is used to deliver impact, results are regularly measured, and future needs are correctly identified, based upon lessons-learned.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Kugler, Economic Outlook

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Thank you, Reamonn. It is an honor and a privilege to be asked to speak in the beautiful country of Ireland and here at the Central Bank of Ireland. The histories of the U.S. and Ireland are intertwined. Our friendship is enduring, and our economies are closely tied. The Irish economy and the Bank stand as examples of the benefits of being open to international connections and the sharing of the best ideas and practices. I am delighted to have the opportunity to meet with my counterparts here and continue this great friendship. It is also wonderful to see many members of the National Association for Business Economics (NABE). NABE and its members have made many important contributions to the field of economics; as such, I always enjoy speaking to this esteemed group.1
    I am particularly delighted to contribute to this conference on trade, technology, and policy. As an academic, part of my research has investigated the link between trade and productivity. And in my current role, I have highlighted these themes in several of my recent speeches, including the role of recent advancements in technology, such as artificial intelligence, as well as the role of business formation in terms of boosting U.S. productivity over the past few years.2 Today, I would like to focus my attention on the current outlook for the U.S. economy and how I am thinking about the path of monetary policy. Of course, given current developments, I will focus on the role played by trade policy and how it may affect the economy and productivity going forward.
    While the latest data show a resilient economy, I expect growth this year to be slower than last. Labor market conditions have been mostly stable. Inflation remains above the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC) 2 percent target, and further progress on disinflation has been slow. Looking ahead, I am monitoring the effects of changing trade policies, as I see them as likely having a significant effect on the U.S. and global economies in the near future.
    Trade policies are evolving and are likely to continue shifting, even as recently as this morning. Still, they appear likely to generate significant economic effects even if tariffs stay close to the currently announced levels, and the uncertainty associated with these tariffs has already generated effects on the economy through front-loading, sentiment, and expectations. Let me start by describing how I see current economic conditions.
    Economic ActivityRegarding overall economic activity, it is currently hard to judge the underlying pace of growth of the U.S. economy, as the gross domestic product (GDP) release for the first quarter showed strong evidence of front-loading of imports ahead of tariffs. GDP contracted at a 0.3 percent annual rate in the first quarter after expanding 2.5 percent during 2024. However, the latest GDP figure likely overstates the deceleration in activity, as a 41.3 percent surge in imports apparently did not get fully picked up in the inventory data or other components of spending. The size of the swings in imports may make the measurement of activity more difficult.
    It is helpful to look at private domestic final purchases (PDFP), a measure of demand in the private sector: It rose at a rate of 3 percent in the first quarter—similar to the pace recorded last year. Still, the strength in PDFP also likely reflects some pull-forward of purchases by businesses and consumers to get ahead of tariffs.
    The Federal Reserve’s April Beige Book and conversations with contacts also point toward front-loading in auto sales or other high-end goods. However, the Beige Book and various indicators of consumer and business confidence also point to a downbeat tone about underlying economic activity down the road. For instance, the Beige Book notes that several Districts see a deterioration in demand for travel and other nonfinancial services and indicates that businesses may put investments on hold moving forward. Several other economic indicators that I track suggest some signs of declining economic activity in the future. For instance, the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing purchasing managers index for April shows that new orders have been declining since February.
    Labor MarketOn the employment side of our mandate, conditions seem to be mostly stable. The most recent employment report showed that employers created 177,000 new jobs in April, in line with the average of the previous six months. The unemployment rate was 4.2 percent—still within the narrow and historically low range of 4 to 4.2 percent—where it has remained since May of 2024. In addition, the pace of layoffs remains modest. New applications for unemployment benefits have remained relatively stable at historically low levels. However, I am carefully watching other sources of data for any signs that the labor market could be shifting, given the broader uncertainty. Some forward-looking measures of layoffs have increased, such as the number of mentions of the word “layoff” in the Beige Book.
    In terms of the demand for workers, the U.S. Labor Department’s Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) showed that the vacancy rate—the number of vacant jobs as a percentage of total employment and vacant jobs—declined to 4.3 percent in March, the lowest in six months. The government data showed that the ratio of vacancies to the number of unemployed Americans was 1.0 in March, below its 2019 average of 1.2—also indicating the continuing easing of U.S. labor markets. Overall, job growth remains positive, and unemployment is still low, but I am watching a broad range of incoming readings carefully.
    InflationOn the other side of our dual mandate is inflation. After two years of notable progress following U.S. inflation reaching its pandemic-era peak, progress on disinflation has slowed since last summer. Inflation remains somewhat above the FOMC’s 2 percent goal. At the Fed, the inflation reading we track most closely is the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index. The March report, released on April 30, showed that the 12-month change in the PCE price index was 2.3 percent; the core PCE price index—which excludes food and energy prices—rose 2.6 percent over the same period.
    To help me judge the path of future inflation, I pay careful attention to two subcategories of the index. One is core goods prices, which exclude volatile food and energy prices. The second is nonhousing market-based services, which are based on transactions such as car maintenance and haircuts, not imputed prices. Goods inflation was negative for most of 2024—as was the norm for several years before the pandemic—but it was positive early this year. In contrast, nonhousing market services inflation stayed elevated through March, coming in at 3.4 percent. That category often provides a good signal of inflationary pressures across all nonhousing services. Looking ahead, I find it critical to monitor not only the most up-to-date data but also the changing economic policies around the world.
    Economic Effects of Global Policy ChangesTo pause briefly, I would like to take a moment to discuss the Fed’s structure. The Fed operates independently from the elected government in Washington. We make our policies to best achieve the goals given to us by Congress of maximum employment and price stability. As such, it is not my role to comment on the policies offered by the U.S. government or any government around the world. Rather, I make assessments of the likely effects of these policies, observe the behavior of the U.S. and world economies, and develop views about the best U.S. monetary policy to achieve our dual-mandate goals.
    The U.S. is implementing policy changes in trade, immigration, fiscal policy, and regulation, and other economies are also changing their policies in the areas of trade and fiscal spending, particularly in defense, which could stimulate aggregate demand. But given that the most important changes have occurred so far in the area of trade policy, today I would like to discuss some important economic channels through which changes in tariffs may affect the U.S. economy.
    Although higher tariffs on U.S. imported goods may affect our macroeconomy through many channels, some of which I will describe next, I think they will primarily act as a negative supply shock, raising prices and decreasing economic activity. While uncertainty remains about the ultimate level of the average tariff rate, currently announced average tariffs in the U.S. are still much higher than they were in the past many decades. If tariffs remain significantly larger relative to earlier in the year, the same is likely to be true for the economic effects, which will include higher inflation and slower growth.
    How do I expect this to play out? In the near term, higher import costs will raise prices for both consumer goods and inputs to production. On their own, imported goods represent about 11 percent of U.S. GDP. However, given that several intermediate goods, such as aluminum and steel have been tariffed, and they affect costs in many sectors of the economy, prices of many goods and services are also likely to be affected. In addition, in conversations with business contacts, I have heard that firms are paying attention to the price sensitivity of consumers across the entire catalog of items sold and may spread price increases to less price-sensitive items to avoid reducing their profit margins. A Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas survey of Texas business executives found that 55 percent of respondents expect to pass through most or all of the costs from higher tariffs to customers.3 Of those expecting to pass on costs, 26 percent expect to pass through the higher tariff cost upon the announcement of tariffs, and 64 percent expect this pass-through to occur within the first three months after the tariffs take effect. That would suggest that price increases may be observed soon.
    Given these expected price increases, real incomes will fall, and operating costs will rise, which will lead consumers to demand fewer final goods and services and firms to demand fewer inputs. Ultimately, I see the U.S. as likely to experience lower growth and higher inflation. Over time, there could also be significant effects on productivity. As firms adjust to the higher input costs and lower demand, they may cut back on capital investment and shift to a less-efficient combination of inputs. Additionally, less-efficient domestic firms may increase their market share.4 All of this may result in a decrease in potential output growth, lowering the underlying pace of economic activity in the U.S.
    In addition to any direct effect from actual global policy changes, consumers, businesses, and market participants have reported high levels of uncertainty about which policies may be ultimately chosen and how long they will remain in place. In fact, in recent months, several measures of economic uncertainty have risen sharply.
    There are several types of measures that quantify economic uncertainty, with two types having gained prominence among economists closely monitoring the U.S. economic outlook.5 Some are based on financial market transactions, such as the Chicago Board Options Exchange’s Volatility Index, popularly called the VIX. Others are based on the occurrence of certain keywords associated with the concept of uncertainty in newspapers of wide circulation, such as the economic policy uncertainty and trade policy uncertainty readings.6 These measures of uncertainty have reached historical highs in recent months. Similarly, I also saw the word “uncertainty” being highly cited in the Beige Book I reviewed before the FOMC’s policy meeting last week.7
    In times of heightened uncertainty, businesses may delay investment decisions, and consumers may increase precautionary savings and postpone discretionary purchases. Moreover, the economic research literature has documented that these decisions from businesses and consumers reverberate through the economy, pushing down aggregate demand. Firms, anticipating lower demand for their services and products, may post fewer job openings and cut back on investments to expand capacity. While the labor market has remained broadly resilient, the JOLTS data for March showed that job openings fell. Workers, therefore, may have a more difficult time finding employment, decreasing economy-wide income and aggregate demand.8 This lower aggregate demand may then exert downward pressure on inflation, though probably not by enough to offset the effect from the adverse supply shock that I previously mentioned. For example, recent data show that prices for accommodations and airfares have fallen, consistent with an increasing number of anecdotal reports of weaker consumer demand for discretionary travel services.
    I am also monitoring the effect of policy changes on another important channel: inflation expectations. For instance, consumers and businesses have reported tariffs as an important reason for having increased their near-term inflation expectations. Several surveys, including those from the Conference Board and the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta and New York, have found that consumers and businesses expect higher inflation one year from now. Another closely watched survey from the University of Michigan showed that one-year-ahead inflation expectations in April were higher than in the pandemic period. This increase in short-run expectations may give businesses more leeway to raise prices.
    Most longer-run measures, including those from the Philadelphia Fed’s Survey of Professional Forecasters and the New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations, show either stability or much smaller increases in inflation expectations, which does provide some comfort to me. Additionally, inflation compensation, which is based on yields from Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities, has increased only for short-term maturities, such as one year ahead, and has shown stability in maturities over the five years starting five years from now. Still, I have taken note of the increase in longer-term inflation expectations from the Michigan survey, which reached the highest level since June 1991. Given these developments, I am keeping a close watch on inflation, because as I have indicated in the past, I believe it is critical to keep long-term inflation expectations very well anchored at 2 percent.
    Looking globally, international developments do not seem to be adding inflationary pressures to the U.S. Economic growth in most developed economies remains moderate, and domestic inflation in those countries has declined from elevated levels. In Europe, activity data point to modest growth as the region deals with headwinds stemming from past energy shocks and competitive pressures from elsewhere in the world. The New York Fed’s Global Supply Chain Pressure Index has been relatively stable since the beginning of the year. Oil prices have declined significantly since January.
    Monetary PolicyI have discussed a lot of data and developments with you today. To summarize, the U.S. economy has remained resilient up until now, with a still-stable labor market. Meanwhile, the disinflationary process has slowed. This comes against a backdrop of heightened uncertainty as households, businesses, and, indeed, monetary policymakers process the changes to economic policies that are happening around the world. Going forward, I will continue to closely monitor the direct effects of global economic policies on prices and employment, as well as the indirect economic effects from uncertainty, inflation expectations, and productivity.
    U.S. monetary policymakers on the FOMC met last week in Washington. At that meeting, the Committee voted to maintain its policy rate at 4-1/4 to 4-1/2 percent. Given the upside risks to inflation and given that I still view our policy stance as somewhat restrictive, I supported the decision to keep rates at that level. With inflation and employment potentially moving in opposite directions down the road, I will closely monitor developments as I consider the future path of policy.
    I view our current stance of monetary policy as well positioned for any changes in the macroeconomic environment. I remain committed to achieving both of our dual-mandate goals of maximum employment and stable prices.
    Thank you for your attention today—and thank you very much for inviting me to speak to you here in Dublin. It has been an honor and a privilege. I look forward to your questions.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. See Adriana D. Kugler (2025), “Entrepreneurship and Aggregate Productivity,” speech delivered at the 2025 Miami Economic Forum, Economic Club of Miami, Miami, Florida, February 7. Also, see Adriana D. Kugler (2024), “A Year in Review: A Tale of Two Supply Shocks,” speech delivered at the Detroit Economic Club, Detroit, Michigan, December 3. Return to text
    3. The special questions included in the survey of Texas business executives is available on the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas’ website at https://www.dallasfed.org/research/surveys/tbos/2025/2504q#tab-all. Return to text
    4. For the effects of tariffs on productivity, see Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger, Adriana Kugler, and Maurice Kugler (2013), “Trade and Market Selection: Evidence from Manufacturing Plants in Colombia,” Review of Economic Dynamics, vol. 16 (January), pp. 135–58; Marcela Eslava, John Haltiwanger, Adriana Kugler, and Maurice Kugler (2004), “The Effects of Structural Reforms on Productivity and Profitability Enhancing Reallocation: Evidence from Colombia,” Journal of Development Economics, vol. 75 (December), pp. 333–71; and Davide Furceri, Swarnali A. Hannan, Jonathan D. Ostry, and Andrew K. Rose (2022), “The Macroeconomy after Tariffs,” World Bank Economic Review, vol. 36 (May), pp. 361–81. Return to text
    5. For a literature review on quantifying uncertainty, see Danilo Cascaldi-Garcia, Cisil Sarisoy, Juan M. Londono, Bo Sun, Deepa D. Datta, Thiago Ferreira, Olesya Grishchenko, Mohammad R. Jahan-Parvar, Francesca Loria, Sai Ma, Marius Rodriguez, Ilknur Zer, and John Rogers (2023), “What Is Certain about Uncertainty?” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 61 (June), pp. 624–54. Return to text
    6. For more details on the economic policy uncertainty index, see Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016), “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131 (November), pp. 1593–1636. For more details on the trade policy uncertainty index, see Dario Caldara, Matteo Iacoviello, Patrick Molligo, Andrea Prestipino, and Andrea Raffo (2020), “The Economic Effects of Trade Policy Uncertainty,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 109 (January), pp. 38–59. Return to text
    7. The April 2025 Beige Book is available on the Federal Reserve Board’s website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/beigebook202504-summary.htm. Return to text
    8. For studies documenting how uncertainty shocks may act as adverse aggregate demand shocks, see Sylvain Leduc and Zheng Liu (2016), “Uncertainty Shocks Are Aggregate Demand Shocks,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 82 (September), pp. 20–35, as well as Susanto Basu and Brent Bundick (2017), “Uncertainty Shocks in a Model of Effective Demand,” Econometrica, vol. 85 (May), pp. 937–58. Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Crime affects everyone, not only certain groups: Lamola

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    International Relations and Cooperation Minister Ronald Lamola has firmly denied allegations of persecution against white South Africans, especially white farmers. 

    This is after a group of 49 Afrikaners left South Africa on Sunday after being granted refugee status by the Trump administration, following claims that they were “victims of unjust racial discrimination“.

    The group is expected to arrive at the Dulles International Airport in Virginia on Monday. 

    Addressing a media briefing in Pretoria on Monday on South Africa’s G20 Presidency, Lamola said the South African government refutes the claim that white South Africans are persecuted and qualify as refugees. 

    “We have stated… that, in line with the international definition, they do not qualify for that status, according to us, and there is no persecution of Afrikaners in South Africa.” 

    Lamola said that crime in South Africa affects all citizens regardless of race, and there is no systematic targeting of Afrikaners.

    “Crime in South Africa affects everyone, irrespective of race and gender. There is a more pronounced crime that we are dealing with, which the President has declared a pandemic, [and that] is… gender-based violence, which is a societal challenge that we have to respond to. 

    “But there’s no danger at all that backs that there is persecution of white South Africans or Afrikaners (sic).” 

    The Minister said police statistics do not support claims of racial persecution, and that crime is a national challenge affecting all South Africans. 

    “In fact, more farm dwellers are also affected by crime, and white farmers do get [more] affected by crime, just like any other South African who gets affected by crime. So this is not factual… and [it is] without basis.” 

    On the question of whether these “refugees” have been vetted, Lamola said there was a process they had to undergo involving the South African Police Service (SAPS), such as checking all their criminal records. 

    “As I’ve said earlier, they can’t provide any proof of prosecution because there’s none… And we’re glad that a number of organisations, even from Afrikaner structures, have denounced this so-called ‘persecution’.”

    Lamola stated that where there are challenges, there are platforms to resolve them within the South African context, making this a domestic issue.

    “Our legislation provides sufficient platforms for any issue to be ventilated in that regard, and white South Africans, including Afrikaners, have voiced their views in this regard, and we welcome that as the government of South Africa. We encourage more of such engagements and platforms to clarify on the world stage this disinformation.” 

    The Minister took the time to denounce the notion of persecution and highlighted domestic platforms for resolving issues. 

    Regarding the Group of 20 (G20) Leaders’ Summit set for later this year, he said all members are invited, and that the participation of the United States and Russia is left to their discretion. 

    Meanwhile, Lamola announced that South Africa has extended invitations to African countries and other global entities, with any further invitations requiring consensus among G20 members. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: CBAK Energy to Report First Quarter 2025 Unaudited Financial Results on Monday, May 19, 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    DALIAN, China, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — CBAK Energy Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: CBAT) (“CBAK Energy”, or the “Company”), a leading lithium-ion battery manufacturer and electric energy solution provider in China, today announced that it will report its unaudited financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025 on Monday, May 19, 2025, before the U.S. market opens. The earnings results will be available on the Company’s Investor Relations website, and will be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on a Form 8-K.

    CBAK Energy’s management will host an earnings conference call at 8:00 AM U.S. Eastern Time on Monday, May 19, 2025 (8:00 PM Beijing/Hong Kong Time on May 19, 2025).

    For participants who wish to join our call online, please visit: 

    https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/wfu5unoh

    Participants who plan to ask questions at the call will need to register at least 15 minutes prior to the scheduled call start time using the link provided below. Upon registration, participants will receive the conference call access information, including dial-in numbers, a unique pin and an email with detailed instructions.

    Participant Online Registration: 

    https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BIb49b754e574a43e68068965ba0234966

    Once completing the registration, please dial-in at least 10 minutes before the scheduled start time of the conference call and enter the personal pin as instructed to connect to the call.

    A replay of the conference call may be accessed within seven days after the conclusion of the live call at the following website: https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/wfu5unoh

    About CBAK Energy

    CBAK Energy Technology, Inc. (NASDAQ: CBAT) is a leading high-tech enterprise in China engaged in the development, manufacturing, and sales of new energy high power lithium and sodium batteries, as well as the production of raw materials for use in manufacturing high power lithium batteries. The applications of the Company’s products and solutions include electric vehicles, light electric vehicles, energy storage and other high-power applications. In January 2006, CBAK Energy became the first lithium battery manufacturer in China listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market. CBAK Energy has multiple operating subsidiaries in Dalian, Nanjing, Shaoxing and Shangqiu, as well as a large-scale R&D and production base in Dalian.

    For more information, please visit ir.cbak.com.cn.

    Safe Harbor Statement

    This press release contains “forward-looking statements” that involve substantial risks and uncertainties. All statements other than statements of historical facts contained in this press release, including statements regarding our future results of operations and financial position, strategy and plans, and our expectations for future operations, are forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. We have attempted to identify forward-looking statements by terminology including “anticipates,” “believes,” “can,” “continue,” “could,” “estimates,” “expects,” “intends,” “may,” “plans,” “potential,” “predicts,” “should,” or “will” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology. Our actual results may differ materially or perhaps significantly from those discussed herein, or implied by, these forward-looking statements.

    Any forward-looking statements contained in this press release are only estimates or predictions of future events based on information currently available to our management and management’s current beliefs about the potential outcome of future events. Whether these future events will occur as management anticipates, whether we will achieve our business objectives, and whether our revenues, operating results, or financial condition will improve in future periods are subject to numerous risks.  There are a significant number of factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from statements made in this press release, including: significant legal and operational risks associated with having substantially all of our business operations in China, that the Chinese government may exercise significant oversight and discretion over the conduct of our business and may intervene in or influence our operations at any time, which could result in a material change in our operations and/or the value of our securities or could significantly limit or completely hinder our ability to offer or continue to offer securities to investors and could cause the value of such securities to significantly decline or be worthless, the effects of the global Covid-19 pandemic or other health epidemics, changes in domestic and foreign laws, regulations and taxes, the volatility of the securities markets; and other risks including, but not limited to, the ability of the Company to meet its contractual obligations, the uncertain markets for the Company’s products and business, macroeconomic, technological, regulatory, or other factors affecting the profitability of our products and solutions that we discussed or referred to in the Company’s disclosure documents filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov, including the Company’s most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K as well as in our other reports filed or furnished from time to time with the SEC. You should read these factors and the other cautionary statements made in this press release. If one or more of these factors materialize, or if any underlying assumptions prove incorrect, our actual results, performance or achievements may vary materially from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made as of the date of this press release and the Company undertakes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, other than as required by applicable law.

    For further inquiries, please contact:

    In China:

    CBAK Energy Technology, Inc.
    Investor Relations Department
    Email: ir@cbak.com.cn

    The MIL Network –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Governments shouldn’t chase growth at all costs. The harms of over tourism show why

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ilaria Pappalepore, Reader in Tourism and Events, University of Westminster

    Amsterdam hit its self-imposed limit of 20 million overnight stays in 2023. 4kclips/Shutterstock

    In the controversial case of expansion at Heathrow airport, the UK government insists that the benefits of economic growth outweigh the environmental and wellbeing costs. But what if focusing on prosperity is a shortsighted approach? The debate about a third runway, placed in the context of exponential growth in travel and tourism, makes the impact on people and the environment clear to see.

    Tourism accounts for an estimated 8% of global CO2 emissions, and emissions related to tourism will continue to grow despite technological advances. The Heathrow expansion, for example, has been shown to be incompatible with net-zero requirements.

    Meanwhile, many tourism destinations are struggling to cope with growing numbers of visitors. Residents have protested at the impact of overtourism on their quality of life, with harms including overcrowding, loss of amenities for residents and a skewed property market.

    London’s airport development plans (expansion is also mooted at Gatwick and Luton) aim to inject investment into a range of sectors beyond tourism. However, our research suggests that aligning tourism with other sectors and better cooperation of decision-making at different levels of government could lead to increased wellbeing, a healthier environment and greater benefits to the local economy.

    This provides options to rethink what tourism could look like when the focus is not just economic growth.

    It should be possible to look at new models that take a holistic approach to tourism development. This means putting the wellbeing of the community and the environment first. Falling under the umbrella term of “post-growth”, there are various approaches that all rethink the role of economic growth. They advocate prioritising human wellbeing within planetary boundaries.

    “Degrowth” argues that limiting growth is essential for a sustainable future. On the other hand, “doughnut economics” and regenerative approaches are more agnostic about economic growth. They argue that human prosperity and wellbeing should be prioritised regardless of whether GDP is going up or down.

    In the context of tourism and travel, these approaches provide a different perspective on the role of the sector and what it can bring to a place, beyond economic growth.

    They also go further than most strategies being implemented in popular tourist cities to prioritise residents’ wellbeing, quality of life, and lower-carbon travel.

    Taking the heat off tourist hotspots

    As part of a net-zero emission pledge, and in an attempt to curb overtourism and the frustration of locals, some cities across Europe are enforcing restrictions on cruise ships. And Greece is applying a climate resilience tax on top of the tourism tax on all overnight stays.

    One of the cities that has done the most to curb tourism is Amsterdam. After the start of the COVID pandemic, it adopted a citizen initiative to cap tourism at 20 million overnight stays per year.

    This number was reached in 2023, and the city has put forward a wide range of measures since then. These include a tourist tax rate of 12.5%, strict rules on short-term rentals, limits on visitor numbers at large attractions and reducing the number of cruises. The city has also strengthened its environmental regulations.

    Copenhagen, on the other hand, chooses not to restrict tourism. Rather, it now rewards visitors who engage in climate-friendly actions, with the “CopenPay” pilot project. Visitors who choose to cycle, use public transport or participate in volunteering are eligible for discounts or free access to 24 attractions.

    Visitors to Greece pay a climate charge as well as a tourist tax.
    ecstk22/Shutterstock

    While these initiatives are laudable, there are two reasons why they don’t go far enough.

    The first is that the majority of the measures are based on financial disincentives, such as charging entrance fees to destinations and taxing the most polluting transport. They rest on the assumption that we do not need to address the underlying pursuit of growth that led to this unsustainability.

    Likewise, arguments in favour of green growth are based on technological advances, such as sustainable aviation fuel (SAF). This underpins claims that air travel can continue to grow. However, both within and beyond the travel sector, it has been argued that green growth is a myth.




    Read more:
    There isn’t enough ‘sustainable’ aviation fuel to make a dent in our emissions – and there won’t be for years


    In the long run, these measures do not cut the ever-growing number of travellers. Nor do they effectively address climate issues.

    Second, cities need support from higher levels of government if they want to encourage travel that is more environmentally friendly and contributes to the wellbeing of residents. In the case of Amsterdam, the ongoing expansion of Schiphol airport can be linked to overtourism, as well as noise and air pollution.

    City leaders want to cut the maximum number of flights. But they cannot do much as long as economic growth is the focus of the Dutch government’s plans.

    This highlights the deep complexities of controlling visitor numbers. And it also suggests that the economic benefits that come with the growth of London’s airports may come with societal and environmental costs. These will be felt by London and its residents, and cannot be solved with local policies.

    Rather than going further and faster with growth, when it comes to travel and tourism we may need to go “closer by and slower”.

    That might mean placing greater emphasis on promoting destinations to nearby markets, investment in low-carbon travel options and regenerative tourism activities. A post-growth approach should ensure that the economic benefits do not outweigh long-term ecological and societal growth. After all, these are the things we all need for a resilient society.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Governments shouldn’t chase growth at all costs. The harms of over tourism show why – https://theconversation.com/governments-shouldnt-chase-growth-at-all-costs-the-harms-of-over-tourism-show-why-255038

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 13, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Advantage Solutions Reports First Quarter 2025 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Supporting clients through a challenging operating environment

    Continuing to make progress on transformation initiatives that will streamline operations

    Management lowers guidance to reflect heightened market uncertainty

    ST. LOUIS, May 12, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Advantage Solutions Inc. (NASDAQ: ADV) (“Advantage,” “Advantage Solutions,” the “Company,” “we,” or “our”), a leading business solutions provider to consumer goods manufacturers and retailers, today reported financial results for the three months ended March 31, 2025.

    Unless otherwise noted, results presented in this release are from continuing operations, and comparisons are on a prior year basis. Revenues for the three months were $822 million compared with $861 million, and net loss was $56 million compared to a net loss of $50 million.

    Q1 2025 Financial Highlights
    ►   Revenues declined 5% to $822 million. Adjusted EBITDA declined 18% to $58 million.
    ►   The majority of the financial impact was due to intentional client exits and anticipated transformation spending. Labor shortages in some regional pockets and a decline in retail inventory, resulting in lower order volumes, were contributing factors.
    ►   The Company remains focused on disciplined capital allocation with voluntary debt repurchases and share buybacks of approximately $20 million and $1 million, respectively.


    “I am proud of the support we delivered to our clients in the first quarter as our teammates demonstrated a relentless focus during a highly uncertain time,” said Advantage CEO Dave Peacock. “Demand remains healthy in our business across Experiential and Retailer Services, and Branded Services continues to take steps towards greater stability. While we must acknowledge near-term risk from macro-uncertainty as reflected in our updated guidance, I am excited by developments in our new business pipeline and our transformation initiatives, which remain on track to drive efficiency while enhancing growth and cash flow in 2026 and beyond.”

    Consolidated Financial Summary from Continuing Operations
    (amounts in thousands) Three Months Ended March 31,   Change (Reported)
      2025     2024   $   %
    Total Revenues $ 821,792     $ 861,412   $ (39,620)     (4.6 %)
    Total Net Loss $ (56,130)     $ (50,133)   $ (5,997)     12.0 %
    Total Adjusted EBITDA $ 58,181     $ 70,639   $ (12,458)     (17.6 %)
    Adjusted EBITDA Margin   7.1%       8.2%          


    The complete earnings release can be found
    here.

    Media Contact: press@youradv.com
    Investor Contact: investorrelations@youradv.com

    Conference Call Details
    Date/Time  May 12, 2025, 8:30 am EDT
    Dial-in 
    (10 minutes before the call) 
    800-267-6316 within the United States or +1-203-518-9783 outside the United States
    Dial-in Code: ADVQ1
    Webcast  Available at: ADV 1Q 2025 Earnings Webcast
    Replay  844-512-2921 within the United States or +1-412-317-6671 outside the United States
    Replay ID: 11158789


    About Advantage Solutions

    Advantage Solutions is the leading omnichannel retail solutions agency in North America, uniquely positioned at the intersection of consumer-packaged goods (CPG) brands and retailers. With its data- and technology-powered services, Advantage leverages its unparalleled insights, expertise and scale to help brands and retailers of all sizes generate demand and get products into the hands of consumers, wherever they shop. Whether it’s creating meaningful moments and experiences in-store and online, optimizing assortment and merchandising, or accelerating e-commerce and digital capabilities, Advantage is the trusted partner that keeps commerce and life moving. Advantage has offices throughout North America and strategic investments and owned operations in select international markets. For more information, please visit YourADV.com.

    Included with this press release are the Company’s consolidated and condensed financial statements as of and for the three months ended March 31, 2025. These financial statements should be read in conjunction with the information contained in the Company’s Annual Report on Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on March 7, 2025.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Certain statements in this press release may be considered forward-looking statements within the meaning of the federal securities laws, including statements regarding the expected future performance of Advantage’s business and projected financial results. Forward-looking statements generally relate to future events or Advantage’s future financial or operating performance. These forward-looking statements generally are identified by the words “may”, “should”, “expect”, “intend”, “will”, “would”, “could”, “estimate”, “anticipate”, “believe”, “predict”, “confident”, “potential” or “continue”, or the negatives of these terms or variations of them or similar terminology. Such forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject to risks, uncertainties and other factors which could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward looking statements.

    These forward-looking statements are based upon estimates and assumptions that, while considered reasonable by Advantage and its management at the time of such statements, are inherently uncertain. Factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from current expectations include, but are not limited to, market-driven wage changes or changes to labor laws or wage or job classification regulations, including minimum wage; future potential pandemics or health epidemics; Advantage’s ability to continue to generate significant operating cash flow; client procurement strategies and consolidation of Advantage’s clients’ industries creating pressure on the nature and pricing of its services; consumer goods manufacturers and retailers reviewing and changing their sales, retail, marketing and technology programs and relationships; Advantage’s ability to successfully develop and maintain relevant omni-channel services for our clients in an evolving industry and to otherwise adapt to significant technological change; Advantage’s ability to maintain proper and effective internal control over financial reporting in the future; Advantage’s substantial indebtedness and our ability to refinance at favorable rates; and other risks and uncertainties set forth in the section titled “Risk Factors” in the Annual Report on Form 10-K filed by the Company with the SEC on March 7, 2025, and in its other filings made from time to time with the SEC. These filings identify and address other important risks and uncertainties that could cause actual events and results to differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made. Readers are cautioned not to put undue reliance on forward-looking statements, and Advantage assumes no obligation and does not intend to update or revise these forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by law.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures and Related Information

    This press release includes certain financial measures not presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), including Adjusted EBITDA from Continuing Operations, Adjusted EBITDA from Discontinued Operations, Adjusted EBITDA by Segment, Adjusted Unlevered Free Cash Flow and Net Debt. These are not measures of financial performance calculated in accordance with GAAP and may exclude items that are significant in understanding and assessing Advantage’s financial results. Therefore, the measures are in addition to, and not a substitute for or superior to, measures of financial performance prepared in accordance with GAAP, and should not be considered in isolation or as an alternative to net income, cash flows from operations or other measures of profitability, liquidity or performance under GAAP. You should be aware that Advantage’s presentation of these measures may not be comparable to similarly titled measures used by other companies. Reconciliations of historical non-GAAP measures to their most directly comparable GAAP counterparts are included below.

    Advantage believes these non-GAAP measures provide useful information to management and investors regarding certain financial and business trends relating to Advantage’s financial condition and results of operations. Advantage believes that the use of Adjusted EBITDA from Continuing Operations, Adjusted EBITDA from Discontinued Operations, Adjusted EBITDA by Segment, Adjusted Unlevered Free Cash Flow, and Net Debt provide an additional tool for investors to use in evaluating ongoing operating results and trends and in comparing Advantage’s financial measures with other similar companies, many of which present similar non-GAAP financial measures to investors. Non-GAAP financial measures are subject to inherent limitations as they reflect the exercise of judgments by management about which expense and income are excluded or included in determining these non-GAAP financial measures. Additionally, other companies may calculate non-GAAP measures differently, or may use other measures to calculate their financial performance, and therefore Advantage’s non-GAAP measures may not be directly comparable to similarly titled measures of other companies.

    Adjusted EBITDA from Continuing Operations, Adjusted EBITDA from Discontinued Operations and Adjusted EBITDA by Segment are supplemental non-GAAP financial measures of our operating performance. Adjusted EBITDA from Continuing Operations and Adjusted EBITDA from Discontinued Operations mean net (loss) income before (i) interest expense (net), (ii) provision for (benefit from) income taxes, (iii) depreciation, (iv) amortization of intangible assets, (v) impairment of goodwill, (vi) changes in fair value of warrant liability, (vii) stock based compensation expense, (viii) equity-based compensation of Karman Topco L.P., (ix) fair value adjustments of contingent consideration related to acquisitions, (x) acquisition and divestiture related expenses, (xi) (gain) loss on divestitures, (xii) restructuring expenses, (xiii) reorganization expenses, (xiv) litigation expenses (recovery), (xv) costs associated with the Take 5 Matter, (xvi) EBITDA for economic interests in investments and (xviii) other adjustments that management believes are helpful in evaluating our operating performance.

    Adjusted EBITDA by Segment means, with respect to each segment, operating income (loss) from continuing operations before (i) depreciation, (ii) amortization of intangible assets, (iii) impairment of goodwill, (iv) stock based compensation expense, (v) equity-based compensation of Karman Topco L.P., (vi) fair value adjustments of contingent consideration related to acquisitions, (vii) acquisition and divestiture related expenses, (viii) restructuring expenses, (ix) reorganization expenses, (x) litigation expenses (recovery), (xi) costs associated with the Take 5 Matter, (xii) EBITDA for economic interests in investments and (xiii) other adjustments that management believes are helpful in evaluating our operating performance, in each case, attributable to such segment.

    Adjusted EBITDA Margin means Adjusted EBITDA from Continuing Operations divided by total revenues. 

    Adjusted Unlevered Free Cash Flow represents net cash provided by (used in) operating activities from continuing and discontinued operations less purchase of property and equipment as disclosed in the Statements of Cash Flows further adjusted by (i) cash payments for interest, (ii) cash received from interest rate derivatives, (iii) cash paid for income taxes; (iv) cash paid for acquisition and divestiture related expenses, (v) cash paid for restructuring expenses, (vi) cash paid for reorganization expenses, (vii) cash paid for contingent earnout payments included in operating cash flow, (viii) cash paid for costs associated with the Take 5 Matter, (ix) net effect of foreign currency fluctuations on cash, and (x) other adjustments that management believes are helpful in evaluating our operating performance. Adjusted Unlevered Free Cash Flow as a percentage of Adjusted EBITDA means Adjusted Unlevered Free Cash Flow divided by Adjusted EBITDA from Continuing Operations and Adjusted EBITDA from Discontinued Operations.

    Net Debt represents the sum of current portion of long-term debt and long-term debt, less cash and cash equivalents and debt issuance costs. With respect to Net Debt, cash and cash equivalents are subtracted from the GAAP measure, total debt, because they could be used to reduce the debt obligations. We present Net Debt because we believe this non-GAAP measure provides useful information to management and investors regarding certain financial and business trends relating to the Company’s financial condition and to evaluate changes to the Company’s capital structure and credit quality assessment.

    Advantage Solutions Inc.
    Reconciliation of Net Income (Loss) to Adjusted EBITDA
    (Unaudited)
     
    Continuing Operations   Three Months Ended March 31,  
    (in thousands)   2025     2024  
    Net loss from continuing operations   $ (56,130 )   $ (50,133 )
    Add:            
    Interest expense, net     34,360       35,761  
    Provision for (benefit from) income taxes from continuing operations     7,139       (15,865 )
    Depreciation and amortization     50,361       49,748  
    Changes in fair value of warrant liability     10       287  
    Stock-based compensation expense (a)     6,485       8,554  
    Equity-based compensation of Karman Topco L.P. (b)     (1,524 )     390  
    Fair value adjustments related to contingent consideration related to acquisitions (c)     —       778  
    Acquisition and divestiture related expenses (d)     423       440  
    Restructuring expenses (e)     931       —  
    Reorganization expenses (f)     12,240       35,052  
    Litigation expenses (g)     523       284  
    Costs associated with the Take 5 Matter (h)     308       240  
    EBITDA for economic interests in investments (i)     3,055       5,103  
    Adjusted EBITDA from Continuing Operations   $ 58,181     $ 70,639  
                     
    (a)   Represents non-cash compensation expense related to performance stock units, restricted stock units, and stock options under the 2020 Advantage Solutions Incentive Award Plan and the Advantage Solutions 2020 Employee Stock Purchase Plan.
    (b)   Represents expenses related to equity-based compensation expense associated with grants of Common Series D Units of Karman Topco L.P. made to one of the sponsors of Advantage.
    (c)   Represents adjustments to the estimated fair value of our contingent consideration liabilities related to our acquisitions, for the applicable periods.
    (d)   Represents fees and costs associated with activities related to our acquisitions, divestitures, and related activities, including professional fees, due diligence, and integration activities.
    (e)   Restructuring charges including programs designed to integrate and reduce costs intended to further improve efficiencies in operational activities and align cost structures consistent with revenue levels associated with business changes. Restructuring expenses include costs associated with the Voluntary Early Retirement Program and employee termination benefits associated with a reduction-in-force and other optimization initiatives.
    (f)   Represents fees and costs associated with various internal reorganization activities, including professional fees, lease exit costs, severance, and nonrecurring compensation costs.
    (g)   Represents legal settlements, reserves, and expenses that are unusual or infrequent costs associated with our operating activities.
    (h)   Represents costs associated with collection and remediation activities related to the Take 5 Matter, primarily professional fees and other related costs.
    (i)   Represents additions to reflect our proportional share of Adjusted EBITDA related to our equity method investments and reductions to remove the Adjusted EBITDA related to the minority ownership percentage of the entities that we fully consolidate in our financial statements.

    The MIL Network –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Government announces confirmed Chair and Board appointments to the S4C Board

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Government announces confirmed Chair and Board appointments to the S4C Board

    Delyth Evans is confirmed as the new Chair of S4C. Denise Lewis Poulton is reappointed and five new appointments have been made to the Board.

    Delyth Evan

    Delyth Evans’ term as Chair commenced on 1 May 2025 and will last for 4 years. Delyth Evans appeared before the Welsh Affairs Committee on Wednesday 23rd April for pre- appointment scrutiny. The Committee published their report on Friday 25 April, endorsing the appointment. The Government’s response to the Committee’s report was published on 30 April 2025. 

    This process for appointing the Chair of S4C is set out in the Broadcasting Act 1990.    

    Ministers were assisted in their decision-making by an Advisory Assessment Panel which included a departmental official and a senior independent panel member approved by the Commissioner for Public Appointments. The Welsh Government and UK Government Wales office were also represented on the Panel. 

    Delyth has declared she worked as a speechwriter for John Smith MP, Leader of the Labour Party between 1992-94. She worked as a special adviser to Alun Michael, First Minister of the Welsh Assembly between 1999-2000. She became a Member of the Welsh Assembly, representing the Mid and West Wales constituency for the Labour Party, between 2000-2003. She stood as a Labour Parliamentary Candidate for the Carmarthen West and South Pembrokeshire Constituency at the 2015 General Election. She has not undertaken any political activity since 2015.

    Denise Lewis Poulton is reappointed to the Board

    Denise is an experienced non-executive director, trustee and senior advisor to private, public and third sector bodies. She specialises in strategic communications, brand and corporate affairs. She spent her corporate career primarily as a senior director at international telecommunications companies such as Bell Canada plc, Cable & Wireless Communications plc and Orange plc. She went on to set up a consultancy business advising a number of cultural, media and public sector organisations including the Welsh Government, The Senedd S4C and the Millennium Centre in Cardiff.

    Denise is a Trustee of the National Lottery Heritage Fund and National Heritage Memorial Fund and Chair of the Wales Committee. She has also chaired the NLHF’s Grant-in-Aid programme on behalf of Welsh Government. She has served as a Trustee and Non-Executive Director with several charitable and national cultural organisations including The Welsh National Opera, the Hay Literary Festival and The Wallace Collection in London. She is an Honorary Lifetime Fellow of BAFTA.

    Five new Board Members have been appointed to the Board of S4C

    William Dyfrig Davies

    William Dyfrig Davies is an experienced leader in the Welsh media industry with 30 years of experience in radio, television, and digital content creation. Starting as a researcher, he was trained as Director, Producer, Executive Producer, and ultimately Managing Director of Telesgop Independent Media Company before retiring earlier this year. Davies played a key role in TAC (Independent TV Production Association) for many years, serving as Chair for over three years. His extensive expertise in the Welsh production sector equips him to tackle the challenges faced by industry professionals. He is experienced in dealing with broadcasters, politicians and industry leaders. He chaired the Urdd, the youth movement of Wales, where he honed skills in guiding organizations through strategic changes during the covid pandemic. He remains a trustee and believes strongly in promoting opportunities for the youth of Wales. 

    A strong advocate for S4C’s independence, Dyfrig Davies  believes in its vital role in promoting Welsh language, culture, and the economy. His interests lie in Welsh culture and sports. Recently, he returned to his roots to support family businesses in west Wales.

    William Dyfrig Davies declared he has canvassed in the past on behalf of Plaid Cymru for county council/local authority, Senedd and Parliament elections, but not for at least 10 years.

    Dr Gwennllian Lansdown-Davies

    Dr Gwenllian Lansdown Davies is originally from Bangor but now lives with her husband and four children in Llanerfyl, Powys.  After being elected to represent Riverside on Cardiff County Council in 2004, she worked as Office Manager for Leanne Wood MS in the Rhondda before being appointed Plaid Cymru’s Chief Executive in 2007. After working for the Coleg Cymraeg Cenedlaethol at Aberystwyth University, she became Chief Executive of Mudiad Meithrin (a voluntary organisation and main provider and enabler of Welsh- medium early years childcare and education in the voluntary sector with over 1000 settings all over the country) in 2014.

    Gwenllian is on the Board of the Commission for Tertiary Education and Research and the National Lottery Fund in Wales and volunteers at her local Cylch Meithrin on the committee as the RI.

    Dr Gwenllian Lansdown Davies declared she obtained office as a Plaid Cymru Councillor (2004-2011), Stood as a candidate for Plaid Cymru where she stood for the last time in 2008 as Councillor and MEP and has spoken on behalf of the Plaid Cymru CEO until 2011.  She has acted as a political agent for the Plaid Cymru CEO until 2011 and was a branch official. She has also canvassed on behalf of the party until 2011.

    Catryn Ramasut

    Catryn Ramasut is a strategic leader and entrepreneurial media practitioner with over 25 years of experience in the creative industries and arts organisations. A Cardiff-born, Welsh-speaking woman of mixed heritage, she brings a unique perspective to Wales’s cultural landscape. Catryn co-founded and served as Managing Director of award-winning ie ie productions, producing acclaimed films like “American Interior” and “Rockfield: The Studio on the Farm,” alongside critically recognised television content. Recently, she co-produced “Brides,” which premiered at the 2025 Sundance Film Festival.

    She represents Wales on the DCMS Creative Industries Council, was the inaugural Chair of Creative Wales, Welsh Government and a board member of Chapter Arts Centre. Catryn has recently been appointed Director of Arts at Arts Council of Wales, where she provides strategic leadership across the sector. Committed to revitalising Wales’s creative industries, Catryn combines cultural sensitivity with strategic innovation to develop a forward-thinking vision that embraces diversity, nurtures talent, and showcases Welsh creativity on the international stage.

    Catryn has declared she has applied independently but has no other political activity.

    Wyn Innes

    Wyn is a Chartered Accountant, who trained with Grant Thornton and Price Waterhouse with over 30 years experience working in both the Public and Private Sectors. He is currently Chief Financial Officer and Board Director of Ogi, Wales’s largest independent full fibre broadband business.

    Previously Wyn worked in both London and Cardiff in executive, financial and commercial roles. He was Managing Director of S4C’s commercial companies for 7 years. This included being CEO of SDN, a Digital Television Multiplex Company which he oversaw the sale of to ITV. Wyn was born in Cardiff and attended Bryntaf Cardiff’s only Welsh language Primary school at the time, and Ysgol Gyfun Llanhari. He is passionate about extending the role of the Welsh language and sees S4C as having a pivotal role in this endeavour. Married with three grown up children, in his spare time he enjoys playing cricket, golf and running whenever he can.

    Wyn Innes declared he has undertaken no political activity.

    Betsan Powys

    Betsan Powys was, for nearly three decades, a BBC journalist, a news and current affairs reporter and for some years, a member of the ITV Wales Current Affairs team. She won BT and BAFTA Wales journalism awards and became part of the prestigious BBC Panorama reporting team, before returning to Cardiff to cover the impact of devolution as BBC Wales Political Editor. She was responsible for leading BBC Wales’ election and referendum broadcasting for many years, appearing regularly on both network television and radio. Betsan became Editor of Welsh language radio and online services and subsequently, a BBC Wales board member. For some years now she’s been working as a freelance and is proud to have been honoured with fellowships of Aberystwyth University and the Radio Academy.

    Betsan Powys has declared she has undertaken no political activity.

    Notes to Editors

    • S4C (Sianel Pedwar Cymru, meaning “Channel 4 Wales”) is a British Welsh-language free-to-air television channel. 
    • The Chair of S4C is remunerated at £40,000 per annum and the time commitment will be equivalent to an average of two days a week.  
    • The Board members of S4C are remunerated at £9,650 per annum and the time commitment is on average of one day a week.The Broadcasting Act sets out how the Chair will be appointed.  
    • These appointments have been made in accordance with the Governance Code on Public Appointments. The appointments process is regulated by the Commissioner for Public Appointments.
    • DCMS has around 400 regulated Public Appointment roles across 42 Public Bodies including Arts Council England, Theatres Trust, the National Gallery, UK Sport and the Gambling Commission. We encourage applications from talented individuals from all backgrounds and across the whole of the United Kingdom.  To find out more about Public Appointments or to apply visit the HM Government Public Appointments Website.

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    Updates to this page

    Published 12 May 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Senior nurse to bring vast experience to ARU role

    Source: Anglia Ruskin University

    Professor Dame Ruth May DBE

    England’s former Chief Nursing Officer Professor Dame Ruth May DBE has taken up a professorial role with Anglia Ruskin University (ARU), bringing a wealth of experience to ARU’s health provision.

    Professor May has joined ARU as Professor of Nursing and Health Systems Leadership, within the Faculty of Health, Medicine and Social Care.

    An operating theatre nurse by background, Professor May retired from her role as NHS England’s Chief Nursing Officer in July 2024 after five years in the role. This was a culmination of several decades working in the NHS, including a number of roles in the East of England.

    Among her many accomplishments as Chief Nursing Officer was her leadership through the Covid-19 pandemic, directly advising the Government on nursing policy during one of the greatest challenges facing the health service in modern times. She also led the Stop the Pressure campaign to raise awareness and reduce the incidence of pressure ulcers among hospital patients.

    In 2009, Professor May was given the award of Honorary Doctor of Science by ARU in recognition of her leadership skills within the health service.

    She was appointed Dame Commander of the Order of the British Empire (DBE) in the 2022 Birthday Honours for services to nursing, midwifery and the NHS.

    Professor May’s new role involves working closely with staff and students, partners, and wider stakeholders, supporting ARU’s ambitions in its delivery of high-quality education and meeting NHS workforce needs, as well as supporting ARU’s collaborative endeavours through innovation, knowledge exchange and research.

    Among the key areas that Professor May will focus on in her new role is ensuring an excellent experience for health and social care students, particularly in the context of practice learning and employability.

    “ARU has a special place in my heart and, as a local resident too, it will be a great privilege to continue to play a part in helping the next generation of nurses, midwives and other health professionals on their path to an incredibly rewarding career.”

    Professor Ruth May

    “I congratulate Professor Dame Ruth May DBE on her appointment as Professor of Nursing and Health Systems Leadership at ARU, we are delighted that Ruth has joined the team in the Faculty of Health, Medicine and Social Care.

    “We look forward to drawing from Ruth’s vast knowledge and expertise developed over an impactful career in the NHS including overseeing the health service during the Covid-19 pandemic, one of the most significant global societal events in recent history. Ruth will make a unique contribution, further enhancing our students’ experience, partnership collaboration and the impact of ARU across the region.

    “ARU is proud to be the largest provider of healthcare education in the East of England. Our graduates play an important role in this region’s workforce and beyond, positively contributing to health and care delivery and optimising population health outcomes.”

    Professor Jackie Kelly, Pro Vice Chancellor and Dean of the Faculty of Health, Medicine and Social Care at Anglia Ruskin University (ARU)

    For more information about studying Nursing at ARU, please visit aru.ac.uk/nursing

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: University to host major science communication conference Around 600 delegates from around the world will arrive in Aberdeen this month for the bi-annual Public Communication of Science Conference.

    Source: University of Aberdeen

    University of Aberdeen to host Public Communication of Science ConferenceAround 600 delegates from around the world will arrive in Aberdeen this month for the bi-annual Public Communication of Science Conference.
    The University of Aberdeen will host the conference which will take place from 26 – 29 May at Old Aberdeen and P&J Live.
    The conference will examine how science communication can be used to effect positive change exploring transitions, traditions and tensions in the context of our climate emergency, of global health imperative, such as food and water security and poverty alleviation.
    Ahead of the conference, there will be a number of pre-conference workshops as well as an opening ceremony and public lecture at the Music Hall – which is open to the public and can be attended even if not attending the conference. You can secure tickets online or at the box office on Union Street.

    We have some incredible keynote speakers lined up and I am sure those attending will find the event not only informative, but also highly engaging and thought provoking.” Nikki Pearce

    Nikki Pearce, CPD Manager at the University of Aberdeen said: “We are so excited to be welcoming conference goers to Aberdeen. We worked with the P&J Live and Aberdeen Convention Bureau teams who were integral to the initial identification of the conference, and who helped us to bid for this event in 2016. The conference was originally due to be held here in 2020 but due to the Covid pandemic, we had to host a virtual version, so to be given the opportunity to – finally – host the in-person event here is fantastic.
    “The conference will delve into the importance of science communication and the difference it can make to the world around us. We have some incredible keynote speakers lined up and I am sure those attending will find the event not only informative, but also highly engaging and thought provoking.
    “Among the many highlights of the three-day programme is a live podcast panel which will bring together Professor Niamh Nic Daeid, a forensic scientist, Professor Alex Johnstone, a nutrition expert, Professor Marcel Jaspars, a marine biotechnologist, and Professor Thomas Weber, a historian and expert in international affairs, to explore how science is tested, challenged, and reimagined. From televised crime scenes to the food you choose to prepare in your kitchen, the deep sea to history, they’ll explore the differences between how they conduct and communicate their science, bust myths, influence policy and tackle the tensions between scientific and public opinion.”
    For further information about the conference, and about the events which are open to all and available to book now, please visit https://www.abdn.ac.uk/events/conferences/pcst-2025/

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Economic and Social Committee – P10_TA(2025)0082 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section VI – European Economic and Social Committee,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0054/2025),

    A.  whereas in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and by implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources;

    B.  whereas the European Economic and Social Committee (the ‘Committee’) is an advisory body of the Union providing a forum for consultation, dialogue and consensus among representatives of the various economic, social and civil components of organised civil society from the Member States;

    C.  whereas the Committee contributes to the Union decision-making process and, by ensuring links between Union policies and economic, social and civic circumstances, it pursues its missions of better law making, participatory democracy from the bottom up and the promotion of European values;

    D.  whereas the consultation of the Committee by the Commission or the Council is mandatory in certain cases, and the Committee may also adopt opinions on its own initiative while enjoying a wide area for referral as defined by the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty, allowing it to be consulted by Parliament;

    E.  whereas the Committee’s commission for financial and budgetary affairs (CAF) is the Committee’s supervisory body for all budgetary procedures and, in particular, the establishment of the budget estimates, the budget implementation, the annual activity report, the discharge and the follow up to the annual report of the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’);

    F.  whereas in the last years the Committee has taken initiatives to attract and retain skilled staff, optimise its organisational structure and working methods and promote a respectful working environment, in the context of a limited budget;

    1.  Notes that the budget of the Committee falls under MFF heading 7 ‘European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that, in 2023, the budget of the Committee represented 1,29 % of MFF heading 7 appropriations;

    2.  Notes that the Court, in its Annual Report for the financial year 2023 (the ‘Court’s report’), examined a sample of 70 transactions under Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

    3.  Notes from the Court’s report that administrative expenditure includes expenditure on human resources including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the fact that the Court concluded, as it did in previous years, that, overall, administrative spending is low risk; notes that the Court did not identify any specific issue concerning the Committee in 2023;

    Budgetary and financial management

    4.  Notes that the final adopted budget for the Committee was EUR 158 767 970 in 2023, representing an overall increase of 4,1 % compared to 2022; notes from the Committee’s replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’) and the Committee’s annual activity report for 2023 (the ‘Annual report’) that the remuneration and allowances budget line (expenses with Committee’s staff and Members) increased by 8,4 % between 2022 and 2023 due to the inflation; notes from the Questionnaire that the budget for outside assistance for the operation, development and maintenance of software systems increased by 33,70 % from 2022 to 2023 due to the Committee having made the implementation of its digital strategy for 2024-2026 a priority in 2023; notes that, otherwise, the distribution of appropriations across other budget lines in the Committee’s 2023 budget remained comparable to previous years’ distribution;

    5.  Notes with satisfaction that the rate of the Committee’s budget implementation of current year commitment appropriations increased further from 96,12 % in 2022 to 98,70 % in 2023, leaving behind the lower budgetary implementation in previous years due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the related travel restrictions; notes further that the current year payment appropriations execution rate increased from 88,12 % in 2022 to 90,67 % in 2023; notes that the average payment time in 2023 was 20,14 days, higher than in 2022 (i.e. 18,34 days);

    6.  Notes that the carry-over of appropriations from 2023 to 2024 amounted to EUR 13 827 713 (i.e. approx. 8,70 % of the Committee’s budget for 2023), which represents a decrease from the previous year’s level of EUR 20 162 518 (i.e. approx. 13 % of the Committee’s budget for 2022); notes further with appreciation that the rate of implementation of the appropriations carried over from 2022 to 2023 was 86,76 % in 2023, compared to 76,91 % in 2022; encourages the Committee to continue the efficient use of the provided funds;

    7.  Notes that the Committee’s own services launched 12 negotiated procedures below EUR 60 000 in 2022, mainly for case studies, studies and logistical support; notes that the Committee also launched six procurement procedures with the joint services shared with the European Committee of the Regions (the ‘CoR’) mainly in the field of logistics and maintenance;

    8.  Notes that, in 2023, the Committee continued to improve the cost-effectiveness of its activities, including through hybrid work, increased teleworking, full dematerialisation of financial circuits and reduced energy consumption; notes from the Questionnaire that the Committee achieved financial savings of EUR 65 000 in 2023 due to a reduction in energy consumption; commends the Committee for having signed a new framework contract for medical checks that provides for lower prices, increased flexibility and better service overall than the previous contract; acknowledges the significant budgetary and administrative savings achieved by the Committee through interinstitutional cooperation, notably the joint services with the CoR and the outsourcing (Service level agreements) of specific services to the Commission in the handling of HR and the use of financial and HR management IT tools, as well as the participation in interinstitutional procurement procedures led by other institutions; notes from the Questionnaire that the total cost incurred by the Committee for the outsourcing of specific services to the Commission increased from EUR 743 600 in 2022 to EUR 793 000 in 2023;

    9.  Recalls that the Council decision of 25 May 2023 set the allowance for remote attendance of members of the Committee at non-statutory meetings at EUR 145 per remote meeting per day, which represents 50 % of the daily allowance for physical participation in 2023; considers that despite remote attendance being an important instrument for modern institutions given that, inter alia, it reduces the costs of meetings and allows broader participation, the allocation of an allowance for remote attendance of meetings, even if reduced and intended only for some types of events, is difficult to understand for the public, even more so when taking into consideration the difference paid to the members of the Committee and members of the CoR for remote attendance; notes with satisfaction from the Committee’s follow-up report to Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the Committee’s budget for 2022 (the ‘Follow-up report’) that the application of that decision has already produced budgetary savings of EUR 1 677 000 due to lower travel costs and allowances paid, as well as environmental savings of some 553,66 tons of CO2, due to less travel in 2023; notes from the Annual report that the number of reimbursed meetings days attended remotely was 2006 (6 259 in 2022), with an average duration of 3 hours per meeting for a total cost of EUR 294 930 in 2023 (EUR 922 925 in 2022); welcomes multiple checks carried out by the Committee to prove the remote attendance of members prior to the payment of the allowance;

    10.  Notes that the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to put pressure on the Committee’s budget in 2023, through rising inflation and salary adjustments, challenges in building projects due to delays and higher raw material prices, the indexation of rental contracts (+10,3 % in 2023 compared to 2022), as well as indexation of maintenance and security service contracts (+13,50 % in 2023 compared to 2021); notes in particular that the energy costs increased from EUR 726 000 to EUR 3 125 000 between 2021 and 2022, before decreasing to EUR 1 923 391 in 2023; acknowledges the 2 % cap for non-salary-related expenses; commends in this context the Committee for its initiative in addressing challenges at budgetary level by e.g. implementing energy-saving strategies through short-term, as well as medium- and long-term measures, thus not needing an amending budget in 2023;

    11.  Notes a decrease in the current year appropriations for budget line 1004 (expenditure for Member’s travel, including subsistence and meetings allowances) from EUR 19,790 million in 2022 (of which EU 15,895 million were paid) to EUR 19,761 million in 2023 (of which EU 18,344 million were paid); notes with satisfaction an improvement in the implementation rate of those appropriations from 80,31 % in 2022 to 92,83 % in 2023; notes that the Committee President participated in 35 missions totalling EUR 71 926 in 2023 against 26 missions totalling EUR 38 042 in 2022;

    12.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the Joint Directorate for Innovation and Information Technology of the Committee and the CoR allocates some 3 % of its IT budget to cybersecurity which is far from the 10 % target provided for in the relevant legislation; calls on the co-legislators and the Commission to take this into account in the framework of the annual budgetary procedure;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    13.  Notes from the Annual report that, as part of its annual work programme for 2023, the Committee had a total of 31 objectives designed for all entities of its administration and, as part of the general secretariat’s strategy for 2021-2025, the Committee has five core values and five key strategic objectives; notes from the Questionnaire that the number of opinions produced and participations in high-level meetings are key indicators for measures the Committee’s performance; takes note from the Questionnaire that the Committee has performance indicators in various areas, such as IT, HR, translation and communication; asks the Committee to include in its future reporting a list of all key performance indicators and objectives, per activity, as well as the target ( %) set for achieving them and the level ( %) of their achievement;

    14.  Notes that the Committee pursues its mission through opinions, which refer to legislative proposals made by the Commission (referrals), own-initiative opinions, which call on the Union institutions to take action, and exploratory opinions, which feed into the Commission’s work on its planned initiatives, and that the Committee’s positions can be highlighted in resolutions or included in evaluation and information reports; commends the Committee for its performance in assisting Parliament, the Council and the Commission in the legislative cycle in 2023; notes in that context that, in 2023, the Committee adopted 213 opinions and reports, an increase from 202 in 2022 and organised 146 hearings and 23 conferences, compared to 116 and 29 in 2022, respectively; notes that Committee’s members participated in 429 high-level meetings, summits and conferences in 2023 compared to 345 in 2022;

    15.  Appreciates that the Committee has taken action in 2023 to improve the visibility and impact of its work in connection with the format of its opinions, the methodology for follow-up opinions, cooperation with Parliament and the Commission and other projects of transversal nature, as well as innovative initiatives such as the EU Youth test, the enlargement candidate member initiative and the European Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, among other;

    16.   Commends the initiatives undertaken by the Committee aimed at fostering the active engagement of youth in the policy-making process;

    17.  Welcomes the pilot project implemented between September 2022 and April 2023 with the aim of strengthening the follow-up of selected opinions in respect of all institutions, whereas 19 opinions were selected for reinforced follow-up under that project; notes from the Questionnaire the overall positive results of that pilot project, such as improving the Committee’s capacity to undertake follow-up actions, improved prioritisation of Committee’s work and increased outreach and impact of the opinions selected;

    18.  Highlights that the efficient management of limited resources remained a key challenge throughout 2023 due to staffing constraints, compounded by increased activities under a continuous stable staffing policy; notes the Committee’s plan to introduce a new approach to strategic workforce planning and staff allocation, leveraging data collection on staff skills, active listening across the organisation, and reflections on strategic priorities by the Committee’s political bodies; invites the Committee to keep the Parliament informed of the outcome of this new plan, as this it could inspire other institutions who face similar, recurrent challenges resources wise;

    19.  Notes with regard to internal control standards (ICS), that the 2023 compliance exercise showed improvements compared to 2022; notes in that context that compliance, namely the extent to which the requirements of the 16 ICS are implemented, increased from 80,30 % in 2022 to 87,40 % in 2023, while effectiveness, namely the extent to which the implementation of those requirements works as intended, increased from 74 % in 2022 to 78,10 % in 2023; notes further that the 2023 annual risk assessment exercise showed that the application of internal controls decreased inherent risks (in category ‘critical’ and ‘very important’) by 53 %, from 40 to 19, in 2023;

    20.   Notes that a restructuration of the Internal Audit Service (IAS) took place in 2023, strengthening its compliance with international audit standards and streamlining and documenting all its process;

    21.  Notes that, in the area of financial transactions, the Committee’s internal audit service (IAS) adopted a new decision on the assessment of risks for the implementation of a simplified procedure in the beginning of 2023; notes further that the Committee’s Bureau adopted a new internal audit charter and an audit committee charter including procedural rules in 2023;

    22.  Notes from the Annual report and the Questionnaire that in 2023, the IAS launched four audits, namely on meeting authorisations, selecting the consultative commission on Industrial change, strategic cycle and duration and distance allowances for Committee’s members; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the outcome of those audits and implement all open recommendations resulted from previous audits (on institutional deadlines, interpreting, verification, ethics and integrity, statutory rights and payment times);

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    23.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, the Committee was employing 707 staff members, compared to 706 in 2022; notes further that 49 contract agents and 130 temporary agents (of which 52 recruited in 2023) were employed in 2023 (compared to 50 contract agents and 128 temporary agents in 2022); notes, in addition, that the Committee was employing 12 interim agents and 10 external staff working intra muros, excluding external services providers in the fields of logistics and IT; takes note that the occupation rate was 95,50 % in 2023 compared to 95,10 % in 2022 and the staff turnover rate was 7 % in 2023;

    24.  Welcomes the ongoing efforts of the Committee to improve its HR framework with a view to becoming an attractive employer and workplace, where every individual is valued and can fully develop their potential; notes that as part of implementing its HR strategy for 2023-2025, the Committee delivered on several key milestones in 2023, with new decisions being adopted on working conditions (hybrid working, overtime, special leave), diversity and inclusion strategy and action plan for 2023-2027, staff mobility and the methodology on sensitive posts, as well as on staff appraisal and promotions system, among other; notes with satisfaction the positive results of the staff satisfaction survey published in May 2023, whereby both staff and managers expressed high levels of satisfaction with various HR related, matters in particular on working arrangements, a topic on which it appears the Committee has found the perfect balance;

    25.  Notes that the Committee became a net importer of talent (from other institutions) for the second consecutive year as a result of implementing a targeted attractiveness and retention plan; acknowledges nevertheless persistent challenges due to reliance on temporary agents amid a shortfall of EPSO reserve lists, posing risks to expertise retention; underlines the importance of permanent staff in maintaining skills, continuity and productive working environment; recommends the Committee to implement initiatives to respond to those challenges by, for example, organising internal competitions;

    26.  Notes that with a view to better distributing its scarce resources, an external HR mapping audit, commissioned by the Committee, was finalised in 2023; notes with concern that the results of that audit confirmed the heavy workload in many different services across the Committee, thus putting at risk the fulfilment of the Committee’s mission and obligations; calls on the Committee to implement that audit’s recommendations, including revising the appraisal and performance system by 2025, adopting the new working conditions decision, and conducting regular staff engagement monitoring; stresses the importance of strategic workforce planning to optimize resource allocation, ensure alignment with the high-level priorities set by political authorities and continue its cost-efficiency efforts;

    27.  Notes that in 2023 the positive trends initiated in 2022 in relation to recruitment of staff continued; commends the Committee for the actions taken in this area such as the alignment of publication of vacancy posts with the publication of new EPSO reserve lists or the publication of job opportunities on the Committee’s website and Linkedin, among other; asks the Committee to keep Parliament informed of the outcome of its pilot project on employer branding activities; underlines that the on-boarding of newcomers constitutes an important factor of strategic alignment by ensuring that staff are informed of the rules and strategies in place in an institution; commends the Committee for having strengthened the on-boarding of new staff members in 2023 through an updated welcome booklet and on-boarding letter, a welcome pack with eco-friendly goodies, a feedback loop on the on-boarding experience, improved welcome session timing, a revamped Newcomers’ Corner, and on-boarding tips for managers;

    28.  Recalls that the Committee adopted Decision 282/23A, effective 1 January 2024, establishing a flexible, trust-based hybrid working policy while offering staff an improved work-life balance and enhancing adaptability and efficiency; asks the Committee to inform the discharge authority about the developments in this regard in timely manner;

    29.  Welcomes the appointment of a female Secretary-General in January 2024 as a positive development towards achieving gender balance; regrets however that the percentage of women in senior management remained low in 2023, with only two out of seven senior management positions currently being held by women; welcomes nevertheless that the Committee considers the gender balance of its staff and in particular in the senior management as an important factor and invites the Committee to swiftly improve the situation at the highest levels of the Committee, by ensuring a balanced representation in line with the Committee’s commitments to diversity and inclusion;

    30.  Regrets that the Committee was unable to provide data on cases of burnout in 2023 and rejects the Committee’s position expressed in its follow-up report whereby burnout as such is not a recognised medical diagnosis and the reasons for burnout may be manifold; recalls the importance of statistical data on burnout with the aim ofhelping to take decisions on staff well-being, which should be also based on lessons learned from past very unfortunate experiences, and on external evaluations of the current framework; acknowledges data protection constraints but stresses the value of anonymised statistical data to support informed managerial decisions; notes with concern the findings highlighting heavy workloads in several services due to limited human resources; welcomes the adoption of new working arrangements as a positive step, but encourages the Committee to take further steps to ensure the publication of anonymised data on burnout cases;

    31.  Notes that, in 2023, the Committee was employing staff members from all Member States, with some of them being overrepresented (e.g. Belgium, Italy.); notes that in 2023 24 % of managers employed by the Committee were from the 13 Member States that joined the Union after 2004, which represents a slight increase compared to 21 % in 2022 and 19 % in 2021; reiterates its encouragement to the Committee to continue to take action to reach a proper geographical distribution within its staff, with a particular focus on management level;

    32.  Welcomes the Committee’s efforts to create a healthy work environment for its staff members; commends particularly the emphasis placed by the Committee on mental and physical health of staff, and the efforts made with regard to awareness-raising about health-related issues; notes the Committee’s measures on the management of sick leave, such as medical part-time and extended remote working, to ensure that staff on long-term sickness related absence return to work in a timely fashion, as well as an increase in the percentage of staff with no absences from 27 % in 2022 to 30 % in 2023; observes with satisfaction that the Committee arranged a free of charge skin cancer screening campaign on the Committee’s premises where 104 staff members over four days were consulted by external dermatologists in 2023;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    33.  Welcomes the adoption of the new diversity and inclusion strategy, effective until 2027; commends the specific awareness-raising actions on disability undertaken in early 2024; notes with satisfaction that diversity and inclusion training remains mandatory for managers and recommended for staff; acknowledges the Committee’s strong commitment to fostering a fully inclusive workplace; encourages the Committee to take further steps to monitor the representation of employees with disabilities and ensure the publication of anonymised data in this regard;

    34.  Notes that the Committee continued its internal reform process with the adoption of a decision on the general implementing provisions on administrative investigations and implementing rules for disciplinary proceedings in 2023; commends the Committee for having taken this last step necessary to fully implement the measures for a reinforced ethical framework of the Committee; notes from the Follow-up report that the Committee and the internal auditor have agreed on an action plan relating to the audit of the Committee’s ethics and integrity, with eight recommendations implemented and closed and two recommendations still open to be implemented by March 2025; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in this matter;

    35.  Notes that the Committee continued to train staff and raise awareness about topics related to whistleblowing, conflicts of interest and other ethical issues in 2023: notes in this context with satisfaction the results of the staff engagement survey carried out in 2023 showing a high awareness rate among staff, with regard to the Committee’s ethical framework, in particular on the networks of confidential counsellors (93 %) and ethics counsellors (83 %); observes that the Committee organised 12 training sessions on those topics with a total participation of 79 staff members in 2023; commends the Committee for organising compulsory training on respect and dignity at work for all staff, including managers;

    36.  Notes that one harassment complaint was reported in 2023 and closed the same year, as a result of investigation and mediation by the Committee, without sanctions being imposed; recalls that the Committee is a civil party in the ongoing legal proceedings initiated by Belgian national authorities against a former member accused of misconduct that is currently before the Belgian courts; asks the Committee to inform Parliament about developments in that case; believes that fostering a culture of respect and dignity, supported by a zero-tolerance policy on harassment, is crucial to prevent future allegations and to ensure a safe and inclusive working environment within the Committee;

    37.  Reiterates that a zero-tolerance policy against harassment is needed to protect the wellbeing of staff and is a duty of any employer; reminds that in addressing harassment claims a lesson learned approach should be put in place in order to avoid any possible wrongdoing; still considers that an external and independent investigation into the case currently under legal proceeding would be beneficial to improve the Committee’s reaction to similar cases;

    38.  Appreciates the Committee’s readiness to cooperate with the Union’s investigative bodies, namely the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the Ombudsman; notes that two OLAF cases were opened in 2023, both of which were dismissed in the same year: one for lack of sufficient evidence and the other referred to the Committee for follow-up; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed of the progress made in the second case; notes further that the Ombudsman opened an enquiry in 2023 in relation to the management of a case involving allegations of harassment; asks the Committee to inform the discharge authority of the outcome of that enquiry;

    39.  Notes with satisfaction the Committee’s work towards more transparency in its activities in 2023; notes in that context the adoption of a decision broadening the range of documents available online via the Transparency Register, such as the Committee’s meeting minutes and attendance lists, as well as a decision requesting the Committee’s members to meet only registered stakeholders, publish their list of meetings and attach their “legislative footprint” to their opinions; appreciates that the Committee publishes online information on its annual budget, performance indicators, expenditure or public procurement; calls for the publication of all meetings held by EESC members with third parties;

    40.  Notes with satisfaction that the Committee has put solid rules and procedures in place to prevent conflicts of interests and avoid revolving doors with regard to staff who engage in outside activities or members who take on jobs after no longer being a Committee member; notes in this context that the Committee has introduced a new “Declaration of financial interests form” in 2023; notes that the form is to be declared by members, delegates, alternates and advisors for both their remunerated and non-remunerated posts or activities outside the Committee; commends further the Committee for its involvement in 2023 in the political negotiations to create the Inter-institutional Ethics Body tasked with setting ethical standards to strengthen transparency and integrity;

    41.  Notes that the Committee Bureau, on 21 March 2023, adopted several transparency measures in accordance with the principles laid down with respect to the EU Transparency Register, such as a recommendation for office-holding members to only meet with registered stakeholders, the obligation for office holding members to publish their lists of meetings and a voluntary ‘legislative footprint’ for rapporteurs; notes that several actions were taken to implement the Bureau decision, including the issuing of a service note laying down practical modalities for the implementation of the decision, an awareness training campaign, and the provisions of template messages to be included in correspondence between Committee members and external stakeholders encouraging to join the EU Transparency Register (if applicable);

    42.  Urges the EESC to implement real-time tracking of declared conflicts of interest, requiring all members and senior staff to publicly disclose financial interests, assets, and external affiliations annually, to prevent undue influence on decision-making;

    43.  Notes an absence of cases in areas of fraud, conflicts of interest and whistleblowing in 2023; notes that the effectiveness of the Committee’s anti-fraud measures was reviewed in order to develop an anti-fraud strategy which is still missing despite several requests from Parliament in its discharge resolutions to take action to improve the overall anti-fraud system; recalls the importance of a comprehensive anti-fraud strategy and calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed of the outcome of that exercise that should have culminated with the adoption of an anti-fraud strategy in 2024;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    44.  Notes that the combined IT budget of both the Committee and the CoR was EUR 12 700 000 in 2023, compared to EUR 11 712 000 in 2022, i.e. an increase of 8,4 %, whereas EUR 350 000 of that budget (or 3 % thereof) was paid for cybersecurity in 2023; notes further that 6,24 % of the Committee’s total budget for 2023 represented expenditure for actions implementing the new ‘Digital Strategy 2024-2026’ (DS2026) prepared by the Joint Directorate for Innovation and Information Technology (DIIT) in 2023;

    45.  Notes that DS2026 envisions a future where technology integrates with the Committee’s core mission, focusing on efficiency, speed, and continuous digital evolution, putting both administration and members at the centre of digital transformation and aiming to improve service delivery, empowerment, and adaptability; notes that DS2026 is structured around eight objectives, eight key principles and four major projects such as the adoption of Ares and EdiT which are expected to be rolled out in 2026 and 2025, respectively; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire the progress made by DIIT in implementing DS2026 in 2023, with actions taken such as the adoption of staff guidelines on artificial intelligence, integration of amendment flows with translation tools and establishment of a project management office, among many other;

    46.  Notes from the Annual report the Committee’s actions in the area of protection of personal data and its processing; notes that in 2023 the Committee created a new online version of its register of records and a new joint register of records with the CoR, whereas the former had 121 records and the latter had 25 records at the end of 2023; notes further that the Committee adopted a new procedure for handling data breaches, published a data protection guide and implemented several awareness-raising initiatives for its staff and members in 2023; notes lastly that the EDPS launched one enquiry in 2023 related to the management of an external audit, and continued an older enquiry on the use of cloud services under the Cloud II contracts by Union institutions, whereas for both enquiries the conclusions are still pending; asks the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the follow-up on these matters;

    47.  Notes that the Committee finalised in 2023 its project for the equipment of all its meetings rooms, whereas an additional 14 such rooms were equipped with technologies that make them fully operational in hybrid mode; appreciates that the Committee conducted all procurement procedures for high value contracts in a fully digitalised way, used the Qualified electronic signature for any type of contractual agreements and provided trainings to staff on the transition to the Public Procurement Management Tool system and the Funding and Tenders Portal in 2023;

    48.  Commends the Committee for its concrete actions to ensure its staff acquire the necessary digital skills in an increasingly digitalised workplace in 2023; notes in this context the activities, such as “mini-hackatons”, organised in the framework of a peer-to-peer network established with the CoR to foster better use and understanding of collaborative digital tools, as well as peer-to-peer coaching and experience exchanges; notes that the outcome of those activities was integrated into the Committee’s training offer;

    49.  Notes that in October 2023 guidelines for staff members on the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) were adopted, that an information session was provided for all staff members, highlighting opportunities and challenges, and that further communication to staff members was provided through knowledge-based articles on the Committee’s intranet to raise awareness;

    50.  Notes that the work continued adopting and applying the NIST Cybersecurity Framework within both the Committee and the CoR in 2023, whereas the actions taken that year focused on some of that framework’s principles, i.e. protect and detect principles; notes that mitigation strategies are implemented using the “Essential Eight” Cybersecurity Framework; notes further that the Committee did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023, but it did encounter brief Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against the Committee’s externally hosted corporate websites at the end of 2022 and the start of 2024;

    51.  Urges the EESC to increase its cybersecurity budget to at least 10 % of its total IT expenditures in line with EU cybersecurity directives, ensuring enhanced protection against cyber threats, especially for sensitive data related to policy and budgetary matters;

    Buildings

    52.  Acknowledges receipt of the Committee’s report of 3 June 2024 informing the discharge authority about the Committee’s building policy, in compliance with Article 266(1) of the Union’s Financial Regulation; notes with satisfaction from that report that the Committee, with the CoR, achieved one of the major priorities of their 2017 Building Strategy, i.e. “geographical concentration of the buildings”; notes further that this achievement already brought savings due to the lower cost of renting the entire VMA compared to the three buildings previously rented; understands that those savings are approx. EUR 1,8 million, which,- according to that report, is equivalent to the rent paid for the B100 building; notes that the Committee is currently working on the update of its 2017 long-term building strategy, and that this work should be finished by the end of 2025; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the outcome of this exercise;

    53.  Welcomes the finalisation of renovations (i.e. fitting-out works) of the newly acquired VMA building, which included the installation of smart energy saving technologies; supports the Committee’s plan to carry out technical and environmental audits of all its buildings, whereas the outcome of those audits should allow for the identification of all technical installations and building components that need to be fully or partially renovated or kept as they are, thereby aligning with the European Green Deal objectives; invites the Committee to update the discharge authority on the outcome of those audits and their follow-up;

    54.  Notes that the task force on “new ways of working”, established in 2022, issued a first prospective report in 2023, focusing on the available office spaces and possible optimisation options; notes the Committee’s plan to continue that exercise with a participatory process with staff members to co-design the future workspaces; invites the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made on this matter;

    55.  Welcomes the commitment of the Committee and the CoR to systematically apply the “design for all” principle to their infrastructure, ensuring accessibility of their building by design; notes that the two committees took a range of different measures to ensure accessibility of their buildings to people with various kinds of disabilities in 2023, including upon modernisation of its elevators in the JDE building;

    Environment and sustainability

    56.  Welcomes the Committee’s green practices and commends the further reduction of gas, electricity and water consumption and carbon emissions and an increase in the recycling rate in connection with the Committee’s activities in 2023 compared to 2019; notes a slight deterioration, compared to 2019 levels, of the rate of waste volume, from -66 % in 2022 to -56 % in 2023 due to higher office presence;

    57.  Notes that the energy efficiencies and emissions reductions have been achieved through investments in innovative energy-efficient building installations, including through smart energy saving technologies installed in the VMA building, the purchase of 100 % green electricity, the introduction of (customised) environmental criteria in all tender procedures with value of EUR 60 000 or more, the use of paperless workflows and other measures such as reducing the operating hours for lighting, reducing the winter reference temperature in all buildings to 19 degrees or closing buildings in periods of low staff presence, among many other measures; notes that the reduction in the Committee’s energy consumption corresponds to a 3,4 % rate and a financial gain of EUR 65 395;

    58.  Notes from the Follow-up report that the smart energy saving technologies installed in the recently renovated VMA building contributed to a reduction in the Committee’s energy consumption (gas and electricity) of 20 % to 30 % in 2023; reiterates however its call on the Committee to provide the Parliament with an update on the return on investments of those technological installations;

    59.  Welcomes that the Committee adopted an energy-saving strategy, with short-, medium- and long-term measures; notes in this context that the Committee started an environmental audit of all its buildings in order to identify, among other, the level of the energy performance of the current structures and pieces of equipment, as well as estimate the environmental return of the necessary investments compared to the overall costs (maintenance, consumption etc.) over a 30-year period; notes further that studies on energy efficiency measures are planned for 2024 and 2025; calls on the Committee to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made on those matters;

    60.  Recalls that in 2022, the electricity produced by Committee’s solar panels was 15,5 MWH or 0,25 % of the Committee’s yearly consumption, whereas in 2023 the same figure decreased to 5,75 MWh; notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that the Committee is leading by example with regard to measures and actions taken in favour of sustainable mobility;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    61.  Commends the close cooperation established by the Committee with the CoR at administrative level, through the new cooperation agreement signed in 2022, whereby the two committees share premises and joint services in the areas of translation, infrastructure, logistics, security, procurement, financial management and IT, while maintaining full institutional autonomy; welcomes the positive development in 2023 when the two committee further agreed on the development and funding of a shared communication area with joint-audio visual facilities in the JDE building; asks the Committee to identify and inform the Parliament on the budgetary savings made during the first year of implementing that agreement in the audio-visual area; reiterates its call on the Committee to pursue and expand that cooperation in other areas with a view to avoiding duplication and further rationalising the operating costs of services available in the premises shared by the Committee and the CoR; invites the Committee and the CoR to explore the possibility of setting up a single administration for their joint services, keeping separate directorates or units for the services dealing with matters related to their specific and independent mandates; encourages the Committee and the CoR to continue their efforts to develop further cooperation and synergies;

    62.  Observes that budgetary savings and efficiency gains continued to be realised through active cooperation between the Committee and other Union institutions in 2023, including by organising the Committee’s plenary sessions on Commission and Parliament premises, where the venues and associated services are provided either free of charge or at rates below external market prices;

    63.  Notes with satisfaction that the Committee and Parliament re-negotiated in 2023 and signed in 2024 their inter-institutional agreement, whereas the agreement aims to provide more relevant and timely contributions throughout the legislative cycle and to reinforce bilateral cooperation; welcomes that the new Protocol of Cooperation of the Committee with the Commission, signed in 2022, already brought improvements to the Committee’s impact for example at pre-legislation phase through exploratory opinions; encourages the further reinforcement of political, legislative, and communication synergies between the Committee and Parliament, particularly in the context of the European Citizens’ Initiative and the European Semester;

    64.  Reiterates its appreciation for the outsourcing (Service level agreements) of specific services to the Commission in the handling of HR and the use of financial and HR management IT tools, as well as for the Committee’s participation in inter-institutional procurement procedures led by other institutions, whereby the Committee continued to benefit from synergies in the area of IT, corporate travel, insurance, transportation, translation and audio-visual equipment in 2023;

    65.  Notes the Committee’s role in reinforcing the links with and between the national economic and social councils (NESCs) of the Member States; notes from the Questionnaire the measures that the Committee has taken to reinforce the network of and the online community with the NESCs, such as the establishment of joint working groups and exchange programmes, working on collaborative IT platform, and participation in common events, among others; calls for continued cooperation on topics of common interest and the exchange of good practices, emphasising the vital role of civil society in addressing the Union’s current challenges;

    Communication

    66.  Notes that the Committee’s overall budget for communication in 2023 was EUR 2,15 million, an increase compared to EUR 1,5 million in 2022; notes that this budget was primarily allocated to the four flagship events organised in 2023 (European Citizens’ initiative, Your Europe, Your Say! The organic food awards and the 14th Civil Society Prize), the improvement and/or revamping of the Committee’s social media, external website and audio-visual production, as well as for media and press publications; commends the Committee for its communication activities delivering on this communication priorities for 2023, such as the Blue Deal initiative, COP28, the resolution on democracy, and the Committee’s 65th anniversary, among others;

    67.  Commends the Committee for its efforts in connection with its strategic communication in 2023; notes that the Committee adopted a new communication strategy aimed at strengthening its image and outreach; notes that, as part of that strategy, the Committee web-streamed its main events, mostly in all Union languages, introduced new communication tools such as the ‘Reporting from the plenary’ video series focused its communication resources on the Committee’s flagship events for 2023 and deployed special efforts to increase its outreach on social media;

    68.  Calls on the EESC to strengthen its monitoring and reporting on labour rights, social inclusion, and human rights violations within EU-funded programs, ensuring greater accountability in its advisory functions and policy recommendations;

    69.  Notes that the number of the social media followers on the Committee’s corporate platforms increased substantially by 25,000 in 2023; notes that by the end of 2023, the Committee reached 61 416 followers on X, which is an increase of 5 % compared to 2022, 61 761 followers on LinkedIn, which is an increase of 30 % compared to 2022, 46 868 followers on Facebook, which is an increase of 5,3 % compared to 2022 and 17 428 followers on Instagram, which is an increase of 45 % compared to 2022;

    70.  Welcomes the Committee’s positive approach towards the use of open-source solutions for its online communication; notes that in July 2023, the Committee opened its first account on the EU Voice Mastodon platform, a decentralised, free and open-source social media network that connects users in a privacy-oriented and advertising-free environment; observes throughout the second half of 2023, that the Committee actively communicated on the Mastodon account, feeding it every working day with posts on its activities and priorities and raising awareness about the Union; takes note of the Committee’s decision to discontinue its presence on that platform as of 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – European Data Protection Supervisor – P10_TA(2025)0085 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section IX – European Data Protection Supervisor,

    –  having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0053/2025),

    A.  whereas, in the context of the discharge procedure, the discharge authority wishes to stress the particular importance of further strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the Union institutions by improving transparency and accountability, and implementing the concept of performance-based budgeting and good governance of human resources (HR);

    B.  whereas data protection is a fundamental right, protected by Union law and enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union;

    C.  whereas Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union provides that compliance with the rules relating to the protection of individuals, with regard to the processing of personal data concerning them, is to be subject to control by an independent authority;

    D.  whereas Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 provides for the establishment of an independent authority, the European Data Protection Supervisor (the ‘EDPS’), responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the right to data protection and privacy, and tasked with ensuring that the institutions and bodies, offices and agencies of the Union embrace a strong data protection culture;

    E.  whereas the EDPS carries out its functions in close cooperation with fellow Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) as part of the European Data Protection Board (EDPB), and it serves the public interest while being guided by principles of impartiality, integrity, transparency, pragmatism and respects Union legislation;

    1.  Notes that the budget of the EDPS falls under MFF Heading 7 ’European public administration’, which amounted to a total of EUR 12,3 billion, i.e. 6,4 % of Union budget spending, in 2023; notes that the budget of the EDPS represented 0,18 % of MFF Heading 7 appropriations;

    2.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’), in its Annual Report (the ‘Court’s report’) for the financial year 2023, examined a sample of 70 transactions under MFF Heading 7, of which 21 (30 %) contained errors; further notes that for five of those errors, which were quantified by the Court, the Court estimated a level of error below the materiality threshold;

    3.  Notes from the Court’s report its observation that administrative expenditure comprises expenditure on HR including pensions, which in 2023 accounted for about 70 % of the total administrative expenditure, and on buildings, equipment, energy, communications and information technology; welcomes the Court’s renewed opinion that, overall, administrative spending is low risk;

    4.  Notes from the Court’s report that in 2023 it audited a salary payment of an official who had last made a declaration concerning rights to family and child allowance in 2020; echoes the Court’s concern that delays in receiving and verifying such declarations increase the risk of ineligible payments;

    Budgetary and financial management

    5.  Notes that the final adopted budget for the EDPS was EUR 22 711 559 in 2023, which represents an increase of 12,06 % compared to 2022; notes that the budget of the EDPS also covers the work of the independent Secretariat of the EDPB; notes from the Annual report of the EDPS for 2023 (the ‘Annual Report’) that the adopted budget of the EDPB was EUR 7,67 million in 2023, including EUR 300 000 granted by means of an amending budget which was needed due to an increase in litigation activities in 2023;

    6.  Acknowledges that the budget monitoring and planning efforts of the EDPS in the financial year 2023 resulted in a budget implementation rate of current year commitment appropriations of 96 % in 2023 (slightly lower than in 2022 when that rate was 98 %); further notes from the report on the EDPS annual accounts for 2023 that the current year payment appropriations execution rate was 84 % (lower than 88 % in 2022); notes in addition, from EDPS replies to the questionnaire submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Control for the 2023 budgetary discharge (the ‘Questionnaire’), that the execution rate of payment appropriations overall was 91,33 % in 2023 (lower than 94,09 % in 2022);

    7.  Notes further that the amount of carry-overs (C8) from 2023 to 2024 was EUR 2 517 942,67 or 11,08 % of the total budget for 2023, compared to EUR 1 827 354,23 or 9,01 % of the total budget for 2022; notes that the execution rate of the C8 budget in 2023 was 76,65 % (higher than 73,77 % in 2022);

    8.  Welcomes an improvement in the average time to pay from 25 days in 2022 to 19 days in 2023, with 97,50 % of payments processed on time; notes that that improvement is also due to the EDPS having solved an old bug with the electronic payment system for invoices linked to mission costs; notes further a significant increase in the number of payments from 799 in 2022 to 1335 in 2023; observes in that context that the number of transactions is still lower than pre-pandemic levels due to changes in the way of working (such as hybrid meetings or virtual events for experts);

    9.  Notes that the effects of illegal Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continued to create budgetary pressure on the EDPS in 2023, including through rising inflation and the consequent increase in energy costs, with the most affected budget lines being staff salaries, building security and rental costs, mission costs and services provided by external staff; commends in that context the EDPS for having re-adjusted its priorities and having implemented internal reallocation within budget chapters; understands that budgetary optimisation was necessary in order to successfully manage the indexation of staff salaries and rental costs, as well as an increase in the costs of external lawyer support services due to an increased number of EDPS binding decisions which led to a bigger number of cases to be defended before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) with the help of external legal assistance; regrets in that context that the EDPS had to postpone some of its activities, such as a feasibility study on artificial intelligence; calls on the EDPS to abide to the competences of its mandate with a collaborative approach with the Union institutions and agencies and to avoid initiating any legal action, especially those which are manifestly inadmissible, in order to avoid negative repercussions on the management of resources, which do not allow the EDPS to carry out its activities as an Institution;

    10.  Expresses concern about the significant increase in EDPS staff mission costs, from EUR 28 789 in 2021 and EUR 176 903 in 2022, to EUR 284 580 in 2023; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively; notes that the EDPS ceased making public the number of missions funded by organisers, as well as information on which unit or sector participated in each mission, thus reducing transparency regarding mission expenses; calls on the EDPS to reinstate this practice; encourages the EDPS to promote the use of video-conferencing tools where suitable, as this could contribute to lowering the number of missions and reducing costs; calls on the EDPS to assess whether the resources spent on missions are being used appropriately and effectively;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    11.  Notes that the EPDS used nine key performance indicators (KPIs) to monitor its performance in 2023, in alignment with the main objectives of the EDPS Strategy 2020-2024 which is implemented through the Annual Management Plan; notes from the Annual Report that the EDPS over-delivered in almost all areas, as indicated by the results of KPIs for 2023, except for one KPI (the number of EDPS followers on some social media accounts); notes with concern that the EDPS encountered considerable challenges due to a growing workload and intricate data protection issues arising from the rapidly evolving digital landscape, as well as due to the extension of the EDPS mandate to supervisory activities (such as audits and investigations) and replies to consultations and prior consultations, all in the context of a limited budget; notes from the EDPS’ follow-up report to Parliament’s resolution on the implementation of the EDPS’ budget for 2022 (the ‘Follow-up Report’) that several legislative developments in the last two years have impacted the work and resources of the EDPS, due to the extension of Eurojust’s mandate, new information to be received by Europol under the Digital Services Act, the roll out of the new Union’s large-scale databases and interoperability framework in the justice and home affairs field and the entry into force of the Artificial Intelligence Act (the ‘AI Act’); calls on the Commission and on the budgetary authority to take those matters into consideration during the annual budgetary procedure;

    12.  Welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS strengthened its ability to assess and prepare for emerging technological trends and their potential impact on privacy and data protection; notes that this was achieved through a foresight-based approach, with a focus on monitoring developments in areas such as large language models, digital identity wallets, the internet of behaviours, extended reality, and deep fake detection; welcomes in that context the publication by the EDPS of its third TechSonar initiative on emerging technologies; congratulates moreover the EDPS for having been awarded the GPA Global Privacy and Data Protection Awards 2023 in the category of innovation;

    13.  Notes that 2023 was marked by several organisational changes or updates that were needed in order to respond and adapt to the evolving data protection challenges; welcomes in this context the appointment of a Secretary-General from 1 July 2023; notes in addition the transition of two sectors into units such as ‘Information and Communication’ and ‘Governance and Internal Control’ and the creation of three new specialised sectors under the ‘Technology and Privacy’ (T&P) unit: ‘Systems Oversight and Audit’, ‘Technology Monitoring and Foresight’ and ‘Digital Transformation’;

    14.  Emphasises the role of the EDPS in supervising the processing of personal data by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies; notes with concern the length of proceedings before the EDPS, as the EDPS did not close a single investigation in 2023, but in comparison to the previous year, in 2023, the number of notifications beyond the 72 hours significantly decreased;

    15.  Notes that the EDPS received 420 complaints, i.e. 53 more than in 2022, out of which 73 were admissible and 347 inadmissible in 2023; notes that the EDPS issued a final decision, opinion or reply in 31 out of 73 complaint cases received in 2023 within 44 days on average and responded to all 347 inadmissible complaints received; notes that, out of all admissible complaints (ongoing and received in 2023), 55 cases were finalised in 2023, which represents an increase of 17 % compared to 2022; acknowledges the efforts made by the EDPS to reduce the high number of complaints by developing a dynamic tool on the EPDS’ website, although the volume of complaints remained challenging due to limited resources in 2023; notes with satisfaction that the EDPS developed various procedural tools and policies to enhance its investigatory processes in 2023; commends in that context the EDPS for having amended its Rules of Procedure, whereby the “review procedure” is replaced by a “preliminary assessment” in order to safeguard the right to be heard of all the involved parties, thus contributing to a fair and timely handling of complaints and investigations;

    16.  Underlines the important role of consultation and advice of EDPS in the legislative process; notes that, pursuant to Article 42(1) of Regulation (EU) 2018/1725, the EDPS responded to 80 formal legislative consultations and its advice took the form of 54 opinions (27 in 2022), 26 formal comments (49 in 2022) and 34 informal comments (30 in 2022) to the Commission and to the co-legislators in response to legislative consultation requests in 2023; commends the EDPS for its input with regard to the AI Act, in particular EDPS’ own-initiative opinion on the AI Act and advice on the AI liability rules, as well as for EDPS’ input to the GPA resolution on generative AI systems; acknowledges a significant increase (+93 %) of consultation requests over the last five years;

    17.  Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS carried out eight investigations and five pre-investigations, marking a significant increase compared to previous years; notes that in 2023 the EDPS was actively involved in a total of 13 investigations and seven pre-investigations, either launched in 2023 or carried over from prior years; notes that the EPDS continued two complex and resource-intensive formal investigations from 2021 into the use by European Union Institutions, Bodies and Agencies (EUIBAs) of cloud services from non-EU/EEA entities, including a focus on the Commission’s use of Microsoft 365; urges the finalisation of those investigations on time because of their significant impact on the working of institutions; notes further that the EDPS also launched five investigations based on complaints about EUIBAs’ websites, focusing in a broad way on privacy and data protection issues, with preliminary assessments expected in 2024;

    18.  Urges the EDPS to prioritise and enhance procedures for handling the personal data of minors under 15, particularly in the context of Europol’s systems, where such individuals may be marked as suspects; recognises the heightened vulnerability of that group and the need for robust safeguards;

    19.  Notes that the EDPS investigated the Commission’s alleged use of micro-targeting on platform X and continued two pre-investigations: one case concerning EUIBAs’ use of Trello cloud service, which was closed in 2023 and another one on EUIBAs’ use of profiling, which was carried out in 2024; notes that a total of six investigations and four pre-investigations (one pre-investigation in 2022) were launched in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (FSJ), reflecting a significant increase from 2022; notes the EDPS’ concerns with regard to the challenges that may arise in the case of investigations where joint action between national authorities and EUIBA’s is needed; notes in addition that, as part of its audit plan for 2023, the EDPS audited the following bodies: the European Personnel Selection Office, the European Investment Bank, the European Central Bank, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the European Medicines Agency;

    20.  Recalls that in 2022 the EDPS brought an action for annulment of two provisions of the amended Europol Regulation before the General Court, which was later rejected; notes that meanwhile the EDPS decided to appeal the order of the General Court in case T-578/22(1), believing the issues raised should be addressed at the highest level; regrets that the EDPS did not realise the manifest inadmissibility of its appeal, even if the institution did not intend to challenge an act by Europol, but a retroactive change in the legal framework aimed at neutralising the effects of the EDPS’ enforcement actions; calls on the institution to cooperate with Union institutions and agencies, before initiating legal proceedings that prevent the fulfilment of its mandate and the use of its resources for purposes for which they were intended; notes further that the EDPS also followed up on the implementation of its Order of 3 January 2022, including checks on Europol’s reporting; regrets that the final report on that matter was communicated by the EDPS only on 22 July 2024;

    21.  Notes that, after the pilot implementation of the new risk management framework at the EDPS in late 2022, an anonymous satisfaction survey was conducted in May 2023 to assess its effectiveness and gather additional suggestions; notes further that the survey results were positive, leading to the formal adoption of the framework on 26 June 2023;

    22.  Notes that the internal audit service (IAS) carried out an audit on the methodology for the planning of EDPS audits in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the audit was concluded with two recommendations for which the EDPS submitted an action plan to the IAS; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed on a regular basis on the progress made in that matter;

    23.  Recalls the Treaty on the European Union that the EU and its institutions shall promote solidarity and equality between women and men;

    HR, equality and staff well-being

    24.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, the EDPS had 129 members of staff, compared to 127 in 2022; notes that the EDPS employed 50 contract staff (CA) under Article 3(b) of the Staff Regulations of Officials and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (52 CA in 2022), 7 temporary agents (TA) under Article 2(b) and 2(c) (6 TA in 2022) and used the services of 12 external services providers (EXT) working intra-muros in 2023 (8 EXT in 2022); encourages the EDPS to continue its efforts towards a more balanced geographical representation among all Member States specifically at managerial level; welcomes the increased diversity of nationalities represented, but notes with regret the continued underrepresentation of women in senior management positions; calls for the adoption of a gender parity roadmap, including proactive recruitment measures and leadership training programs for female staff members;

    25.  Notes that the EDPS had 23 nationalities (from the Member States) represented among its staff in 2023, which is an improvement in comparison with 22 nationalities in 2022; notes with dissatisfaction the over-representation of five nationalities and an underrepresentation of other nationalities; urges the EDPS to continue its efforts to achieve a balanced geographical distribution of nationals from all Member States within its staff, by improving communication, fostering visibility, and enhancing job conditions to attract underrepresented nationalities;

    26.  Observes that, in 2023, the EDPS maintained a workforce comprising 65 % women and 35 % men, consistent with trends from previous years; regrets the absence of women in senior management roles, despite achieving gender parity among the six middle management positions; urges the EDPS to intensify its efforts to ensure gender-balanced representation across all staff levels, and invites the EDPS to promote the application of women also with a view to the next election of the Supervisor by Parliament;

    27.  Notes a high occupancy rate of the establishment plan of 95,65 % but also a high turnover rate of 13 % in 2023; notes that most of the unfilled positions were a result of candidates being unsuitable, given the EDPS’ need for highly specialised profiles and the small pool of eligible candidates; welcomes the addressing of those challenges through republication with a wider or more targeted dissemination of the vacancy or by redrafting the requirements; welcomes the steps taken by the EDPS regarding the hiring process; calls on the EDPS to continue to address the challenges in finding suitable candidates and to keep the discharge authority informed about improvements on staff recruitment and turnover;

    28.  Notes that, in the second half of 2023, the EDPS’ HR team launched a pilot for a new on-boarding process for newcomers, with sessions that cover, inter alia, presentations of core units’ work, ethics, procurement procedures and information security, whereas three on-boarding sessions were offered in 2023; invites the EDPS to continue offering to newcomers “on-boarding” and to all members of staff mandatory sessions that remind the importance of principles such as ethics, conflicts of interest, transparency, internal control and anti-fraud, as they have become the standard in the Union institutions; notes moreover that 12 individual sessions were offered for EDPS and EDPB staff, six sessions of group coaching in which participants (manager level) learned from each other, as well as a one-year team coaching with a designer for leadership development at the European School of Administration in 2023;

    29.  Notes, from the Questionnaire, that the EDPS offers flexible and hybrid working arrangements, that are well-received by members of staff who can benefit, inter alia, from parental leave, time credits, part-time work or working from abroad for a limited number of days per year; notes that, in 2023, the majority of staff made use of those working conditions, whereas 86,30 % of staff made use of teleworking arrangements in 2023; considers that the building infrastructure should be optimised to reflect that high rate of teleworking, which could contribute to reducing operational costs and ensuring more efficient use of office space; welcomes the EDPS’ continued efforts to actively improve physical and mental well-being of its staff;

    30.  Commends the EDPS for carrying out several awareness-raising actions during the year 2023 with information sharing on elimination of racial discrimination, International Women’s Day, EU diversity month and learning about neurodiversity; notes that currently the EDPS does not employ staff with disabilities but has an equal opportunities clause included in all EDPS vacancy notices and actively encourages applications from candidates with disabilities;

    31.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS considers confidential any information on burnout cases, including the number thereof; disagrees with that opinion and calls the EDPS to provide the discharge authority with the number of burnout cases on a yearly basis; notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, there were no harassment cases reported at the EDPS; welcomes the fact that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to provide an anti-harassment presentation delivered by one of the EDPS’ confidential counsellors, as part of the induction training called the ‘EDPS Welcome Day’; commends the publication of the decision on anti-harassment and the role of the confidential counsellors on the EDPS’ intranet;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    32.  Notes that, in 2023, the EDPS focused its efforts on increasing staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework by organising mandatory dedicated training sessions for all staff and induction trainings for EDPS/EDPB newcomers, appointing a new ethics officer and participating in the ‘Comité Paritaire des Questions Statuaries’ working group on ethics; welcomes the establishment of a mailbox by the EPDS, where members of staff can submit their requests regarding any ethics related inquiries, as well as the use of Commission’s Ethics module in Sysper; encourages the EDPS to continue raising awareness and organising surveys to assess the level of staff awareness of the EDPS/EDPB ethical framework;

    33.  Welcomes the overall high level of transparency achieved by the EDPS concerning its activities, in particular as regards the publication of the agenda and the declaration of interests of the Supervisor and of the Head of EDPS Administration, in line with the Supervisor’s code of conduct of 2019; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS has adopted two codes of conduct, whereas one of them applies to the Supervisor and the other one applies to the EDPS staff; understands that in cases when the Secretary-General is called to replace the Supervisor, the latter’s code of conduct also applies to the Secretary-General;

    34.  Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS has never been involved in any investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) since its establishment;

    35.  Notes that, out of five inquiries opened by the Ombudsman in 2023 concerning the EDPS, four were closed without any further inquiry; notes that, for one enquiry, the decision was still pending and expected for Q4 2024; calls on the EDPS to keep the discharge authority informed as to the outcome of this enquiry;

    36.  Regrets that the EDPS has still not formally joined the Union’s Transparency Register (TR); nevertheless notes from the Follow-up Report that, with a view to formally joining the TR, the EDPS has launched an internal assessment on transparency measures, whereas, in 2023, exploratory meetings and exchanges of the EDPS with secretariat of the TR took place; calls on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of the outcome of that assessment exercise; reiterates its call on the EDPS to join and use the TR, including for the proactive disclosure of meetings with any third parties, to ensure transparency in EDPS’ regulatory and advisory functions;

    37.  Notes with satisfaction that, in 2023, the EPDS established internal rules applicable to the hearing of persons that could be affected by an EDPS final decision adopted in own-initiative investigations and inquiries in order to ensure the proper exercise of their fundamental right to be heard in such proceedings; commends the EPDS for publishing a new factsheet on EDPS Investigations and a new EDPS Investigation Policy as well as for ensuring that all financial reports, including annual budgets, accounting and audit reports, are made publicly accessible through a Union institution website and other official channels, as the EPDS takes a leading role in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions;

    38.  Notes with satisfaction from the Questionnaire that no cases of conflicts of interest, whistleblowing or fraud were reported in the EDPS in 2023; notes that the EDPS has set up a framework to prevent conflicts of interest at the level of senior management and staff through codes of conduct, awareness raising and declarations of absence of conflicts of interest and confidentiality; notes that, in addition to the mandatory introduction to the ethical framework of the EDPS for all new members of staff, new members of staff are also introduced to the EDPS’ anti-fraud strategy;

    39.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS has internal rules on whistleblowing, which define safe routes and channels through which staff may raise concerns about fraud, corruption or any other serious wrongdoing, without prejudice to the confidentiality of the identity of the whistleblower and of the information reported; notes that, so far, there has never been a whistleblowing case reported to the EDPS;

    40.  Urges the EDPS to publicly disclose any recusals due to conflicts of interest in its enforcement decisions, ensuring full transparency in regulatory oversight and decision-making;

    Digitalisation, cybersecurity and data protection

    41.  Notes from the Questionnaire that the 2023 budget for IT equipment and projects was 9,5 % lower compared to 2022; notes that that decrease was primarily because no new IT feasibility studies were being commissioned in 2023, as opposed to 2022 where such studies represented a substantial portion of the IT budget; notes further that other cost elements remain relatively stable between the two years, including general IT services and maintenance;

    42.  Notes from the Follow-up Report and the Questionnaire the conclusions of the IT feasibility study carried out in 2022, whereby there are gaps between what the IT tools and services provided by the Commission and Parliament can offer and the specific needs of the EDPS; notes that those gaps should be addressed by developing in-house capabilities and applications for which a minimum of five IT staff and partial outsourcing EDPS was deemed necessary; regrets that, due to budgetary constraints, implementation of the recommendations of the study remained on hold; calls on the EDPS to consider a step-by-step approach by starting with those recommendations and projects that would require fewer resources;

    43.  Commends the progress made in 2023 by the EDPS in digitalising its workflows and processes, with the introduction of ARES, the qualified digital signature (e-IDAS) and a collaborative platform (Nextcloud) for drafting documents and video-conferencing, as well as updates to the tool (Website Evidence Collector) that automates the collection of personal data processing on websites of data controllers and processors, the adoption of the acceptance environment of EU Send Web, a service/channel to exchange sensitive non-classified information with other EUIBAs and further progress made towards implementing services that cannot be outsourced, such as the form and the electronic workflow to manage data breach notifications; notes nevertheless issues with regard to the use and maintenance of the e-procurement system;

    44.  Welcomes the EDPS’s focus on ensuring that external contractors meet the necessary moral and ethical standards expected of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, particularly in light of the previous use of external companies by EDPS that, according to Yale University’s ranking, continue to operate in Russia;

    45.  Acknowledges that the EDPS successfully relies on many of the administrative systems used by the Commission, particularly in the field of HR and business administration processes, as well as on some of Parliament’s services, including the provision of laptops, network infrastructure and video-conferencing; commends the fact that the project to improve the quality and performance of the computers provided to EDPS staff, in collaboration with Parliament, with a view to the generalisation of hybrid work, has been completed;

    46.  Acknowledges the leading role of EDPS in enhancing the cybersecurity preparedness of the Union institutions, while working closely with bodies such as European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and cybersecurity hubs such as CERT-EU; urges it to develop a structured audit framework for cybersecurity risks within Union bodies; notes that, in 2023, the EDPS continued to improve its readiness to protect personal data and sensitive information against cyber-attacks in view of the rapidly changing cybersecurity threat landscape; commends in that context the EDPS for reviewing its security policies and methodologies in preparation for the impact of the Cybersecurity Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841(2)); notes from the Questionnaire that the EDPS introduced a request for two additional full-time equivalents to cover cybersecurity infrastructure in connection with EDPS’s obligations under that Regulation as well as the EDPS’ role as a member of the Interinstitutional Cybersecurity Board (IICB); notes further with appreciation that the EPDS upgraded its Information Security Policy and the EDPS Acceptable Use Policy to address specific cybersecurity threats in relation to teleworking, use of personal mobile devices and banning of dangerous applications (TikTok); notes that the EDPS did not encounter any cyber-attacks in 2023; calls for annual public reporting on detected threats, response measures, and institutional cyber resilience;

    47.  Commends the EDPS for updating cybersecurity training for all staff and revamping the security training model for newcomers; appreciates that the EPDS has been proactive in raising awareness about cyber security risks, for instance by preparing fact sheets, conducting surveys with EUIBAs and running awareness campaigns; encourages the EDPS to ensure that staff receives compulsory training on the safe and ethical use of AI tools to enhance their understanding and mitigate potential risks;

    Buildings

    48.  Notes that in 2023, as in 2022, the EDPS and EDPB were the sole tenants of Parliament’s building where they were located, following the move of the Ombudsman at the end of 2021 and that by renting their premises from the Parliament rather than the private market the EDPS intends to keep the rental and maintenance costs at a reasonable level; notes that the EDPS had to request an additional EUR 81 856,84 for paying rental costs to Parliament, given that the indexation rate was 8,82 % and thus higher than the 2 % ceiling for administrative expenditures;

    49.  Notes that, in terms of accessibility of its building, the EDPS relies on the decisions taken and implemented by Parliament, as part of their building policy; notes from the Follow-up Report that the EDPS employs staff with physical impairments due to serious illness; welcomes the commitment of the EDPS to explore the possibilities of hiring trainees with reduced mobility or disabilities;

    Environment and sustainability

    50.  Notes that the EDPS has not joined the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS) but has implemented several measures to reduce its environmental footprint, such as regulating the temperature automatically and centrally, turning lights off automatically when there is no movement in the room, purchasing eco-friendly products and services and automating the workflows with the introduction of ARES; notes from the Follow-up Report that according to the information received by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Infrastructure and Logistics, responsible for the management of the building rented by the EDPS, solar panels are installed on that building; asks the EDPS to inform the discharge authority to report on the share (%) of the solar-panel produced electricity in the EDPS’ total energy consumption needs per year; calls further on the EDPS to inform the discharge authority of any new developments regarding the EMAS certification process;

    51.  Notes that the EPDS has not assessed its carbon footprint in 2023; welcomes, however, that the EDPS continues to apply measures that reduce the carbon footprint by reducing the travel of journey to the office through teleworking possibilities, reimbursing 50 % of staff’s monthly/annual subscriptions for the use of public transport, encouraging the staff to favour videoconferencing and train travel for short distances, managing the cycle for invoices electronically and achieving an entirely paperless selection procedure and appraisal exercise as regards HR;

    52.  Urges the EDPS to adopt the EMAS to systematically monitor and improve its environmental footprint, particularly in terms of energy consumption, waste reduction, and sustainable office policies;

    53.  Notes that the EDPS addresses sustainability-related risks (such as environmental, social and governance risks) in a comprehensive way through an annual risk assessment exercise; welcomes in that context that the EDPS adopted its new risk management process in 2023, which should help the EDPS to target and better analyse those risks and consequently better calibrate mitigating actions;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    54.  Welcomes the budgetary and administrative savings achieved by the EDPS through inter-institutional cooperation, particularly the conclusion of service-level agreements with Parliament for the rental of its premises and the use of IT system applications, hardware supplies and maintenance and with the Commission for HR and business administration processes, as well as through participation in large interinstitutional framework contracts in areas such as IT consultancy, interim services and office supplies; commends in addition the EDPS for maintaining a structured cooperation with the Ombudsman, the Agency for Fundamental Rights and CERT-EU through memorandums of understanding;

    55.  Notes that the EDPS participates in meetings of various interinstitutional bodies; welcomes in this context the participation of the EPDS in meetings of the Heads of Administration and the Interinstitutional Online Communication Committee, led by Parliament’s Directorate-General for Communication; acknowledges that interinstitutional cooperation with EDPS, in his supervisory role, is of key importance for the other Union institutions to enhance their level of compliance with the data protection legal framework;

    56.  Calls for closer cooperation between the EDPS, the Court of Auditors, OLAF, and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) to develop common protocols for fraud detection in digital data and financial transactions within EU institutions; stresses the need for joint audits on AI-based fraud risks;

    57.  Welcomes the pivotal role played by the EDPS in 2023 in the coordination of the Data Protection Authorities of the Member States (DPAs) to promote consistent data protection across the Union; notes that the EDPS joined 26 DPAs in a coordinated enforcement action on the role and tasks of data protection officers (DPOs), assessing their compliance with Regulation (EU) 2018/1725; notes the continued active involvement of the EPDS in the Coordinated Supervision Committee (CSC) within the area of FSJ addressing issues such as handling complaints against Europol and enhancing cooperation processes; appreciates furthermore all the other steps taken to improve cooperation between the EDPS and the DPAs such as the conduction of a joint Europol inspection with national authorities (Poland and Lithuania) and the participation in the coordinated supervisory action on processing minors’ data in Europol systems, the participation in an operational visit to the European Delegated Prosecutor’s office in Lisbon under a Working Arrangement with Portugal’s DPA and the coordination of an onsite inspection in Lesvos with Greece’s DPA to verify data collection practices during Joint Operations by Frontex; acknowledges that those interinstitutional engagements help the EDPS align with best practices of Union institutions and benefit from the exchange of information with peer departments;

    Communication

    58.  Notes that the budget for public communication and promotional activities in 2023 amounted to EUR 468 000, which represented an increase of 54 % compared to 2022;

    59.  Notes with satisfaction that the EDPS organised several communication events online as well as in person in 2023, aimed at raising awareness of EDPS’ role and mission among a wider public and the importance of respecting Union data protection rules, such as Data Protection Day, the EDPS Trainees’ conference (twice a year), the EDPS Seminar on the essence of the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection, and other international events;

    60.  Notes that the EDPS communicates online via its website and its social media accounts on X (ex-twitter) (29 400 followers), LinkedIn (71 000 followers), YouTube (2 900 followers), EU-Voice (5 900 followers) and EU-Video (750 followers);

    61.  Notes that the pilot project of the platforms EU Voice and EU Video (free and open-source social media networks, privacy-oriented and based on Mastodon and PeerTube software) continued in 2023; welcomes in that context the EDPS’ contribution to the Union’s strategy on data and digital sovereignty in order to promote the Union’s independence in the digital world and compliance with the data protection legal framework.

    (1) Order of the General Court of 6 September 2023, EDPS v Parliament and Council, T-578/22, ECLI:EU:T:2023:522.
    (2) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: France tightens security for riots anniversary after aborted New Caledonia political talks

    Fresh, stringent security measures have been imposed in New Caledonia following aborted political talks last week and ahead of the first anniversary of the deadly riots that broke out on 13 May 2024, which resulted in 14 deaths and 2.2 billion euros (NZ$4.2 billion) in damages.

    On Sunday, the French High Commission in Nouméa announced that from Monday, May 12, to Friday, May 15, all public marches and demonstrations will be banned in the Greater Nouméa Area.

    Restrictions have also been imposed on the sale of firearms, ammunition, and takeaway alcoholic drinks.

    The measures aim to “ensure public security”.

    In the wake of the May 2024 civil unrest, a state of emergency and a curfew had been imposed and had since been gradually lifted.

    The decision also comes as “confrontations” between law enforcement agencies and violent groups took place mid-last week, especially in the township of Dumbéa — on the outskirts of Nouméa — where there were attempts to erect fresh roadblocks, High Commissioner Jacques Billant said.

    The clashes, including incidents of arson, stone-throwing and vehicles being set on fire, are reported to have involved a group of about 50 individuals and occurred near Médipôle, New Caledonia’s main hospital, and a shopping mall.

    Clashes also occurred in other parts of New Caledonia, including outside the capital Nouméa.

    It adds another reason for the measures is the “anniversary date of the beginning of the 2024 riots”.

    Wrecked and burnt-out cars gathered after the May 2024 riots and dumped at Koutio-Koueta on Ducos island in Nouméa. Image: NC 1ère TV

    Law and order stepped up
    French authorities have also announced that in view of the first anniversary of the start of the riots tomorrow, law and order reinforcements have been significantly increased in New Caledonia until further notice.

    This includes a total of 2600 officers from the Gendarmerie, police, as well as reinforcements from special elite SWAT squads and units equipped with 16 Centaur armoured vehicles.

    Drones are also included.

    The aim is to enforce a “zero tolerance” policy against “urban violence” through a permanent deployment “night and day”, with a priority to stop any attempt to blockade roads, especially in Greater Nouméa, to preserve freedom of movement.

    One particularly sensitive focus would be placed on the township of Saint-Louis in Mont-Dore often described as a pro-independence stronghold which was a hot spot and the scene of violent and deadly clashes at the height of the 2024 riots.

    “We’ll be present wherever and whenever required. We are much stronger than we were in 2024,” High Commissioner Billant told local media during a joint inspection with French gendarmes commander General Nicolas Matthéos and Nouméa Public Prosecutor Yves Dupas.

    Dupas said that over the past few months the bulk of criminal acts was regarded as “delinquency” — nothing that could be likened to a coordinated preparation for fresh public unrest similar to last year’s.

    Billant said that, depending on how the situation evolves in the next few days, he could also rely on additional “potential reinforcements” from mainland France if needed.

    French High Commissioner Jacques Billant, Public Prosecutor Yves Dupas and the Gendarmerie commander, General Nicolas Matthéos, confer last Wednesday . . . “We are much stronger than we were in 2024.”  Image: Haut-Commissariat de la République en Nouvelle-Calédonie

    New Zealand ANZAC war memorial set alight
    A New Zealand ANZAC war memorial in the small rural town of Boulouparis (west coast of the main island of Grande Terre) was found vandalised last Friday evening.

    The monument, inaugurated just one year ago at last year’s ANZAC Day to commemorate the sacrifice of New Zealand soldiers during world wars in the 20th century, was set alight by unidentified people, police said.

    Tyres were used to keep the fire burning.

    An investigation into the circumstances of the incident is underway, the Nouméa Public Prosecutor’s office said, invoking charges of wilful damage.

    Australia, New Zealand travel warnings
    In the neighbouring Pacific, two of New Caledonia’s main tourism source markets, Australia and New Zealand, are maintaining a high level or increased caution advisory.

    The main identified cause is an “ongoing risk of civil unrest”.

    In its latest travel advisory, the Australian brief says “demonstrations and protests may increase in the days leading up to and on days of national or commemorative significance, including the anniversary of the start of civil unrest on May 13.

    “Avoid demonstrations and public gatherings. Demonstrations and protests may turn violent at short notice.”

    Pro-France political leaders at a post-conclave media conference in Nouméa last Thursday . . . objected to the proposed “sovereignty with France”, a kind of independence in association with France. Image: RRB/RNZ Pacific

    Inconclusive talks
    Last Thursday, May 8, French Minister for Overseas Manuel Valls, who had managed to gather all political parties around the same table for negotiations on New Caledonia’s political future, finally left the French Pacific territory. He admitted no agreement could be found at this stage.

    In the final stage of the talks, the “conclave” on May 5-7, he had put on the table a project for New Caledonia’s accession to a “sovereignty with France”, a kind of independence in association with France.

    This option was not opposed by pro-independence groups, including the FLNKS (Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front).

    French Overseas Territories Minister Manuel Valls . . . returned to Paris last week without a deal on New Caledonia’s political future. Image: Caledonia TV screenshot APR

    But the pro-France movement, in support of New Caledonia remaining a part of France, said it could not approve this.

    The main pillar of their argument remained that after three self-determination referendums held between 2018 and 2021, a majority of voters had rejected independence (even though the last referendum, in December 2021, was massively boycotted by the pro-independence camp because of the covid-19 pandemic).

    The anti-independence block had repeatedly stated that they would not accept any suggestion that New Caledonia could endorse a status bringing it closer to independence.

    New Caledonia’s pro-France MP at the French National Assembly, Nicolas Metzdorf, told local media at this stage, his camp was de facto in opposition to Valls, “but not with the pro-independence camp”.

    Metzdorf said a number of issues could very well be settled by talking to the pro-independence camp.

    Electoral roll issue sensitive
    This included the very sensitive issue of New Caledonia’s electoral roll, and conditions of eligibility at the next provincial elections.

    🔴 Mesures administratives 🔴

    À l’approche de la date d’anniversaire du début des émeutes de 2024, le Haut-commissaire, en lien avec les élus et responsables du monde économique, annonce les mesures suivante du 12 au 15 mai 2025 :

    🚫 Interdiction de vente d’alcool à emporter… pic.twitter.com/LzoFuiqgRj

    — Haut-commissariat en Nouvelle-Calédonie 🇫🇷 (@HC98800) May 10, 2025

    Direct contacts with Macron
    Both Metzdorf and Backès also said during interviews with local media that in the midst of their “conclave” negotiations, they had had contacts as high as French President Emmanuel Macron, asking him whether he was aware of the “sovereignty with France” plan and if he endorsed it.

    Another pro-France leader, Virginie Ruffenach (Le Rassemblement-Les Républicains), also confirmed she had similar exchanges, through her party Les Républicains, with French Minister of Home Affairs Bruno Retailleau, from the same right-wing party.

    As Minister of Home Affairs, Retailleau would have to be involved later in the New Caledonian issue.

    Divided reactions
    Since minister Valls’s departure, reactions were still flowing at the weekend from across New Caledonia’s political chessboard.

    “We have to admit frankly that no agreement was struck”, Valls said last week during a media conference.

    “Maybe the minds were not mature yet.”

    But he said France would now appoint a “follow up committee” to keep working on the “positive points” already identified between all parties.

    During numerous press conferences and interviews, anti-independence leaders have consistently maintained that the draft compromise put to them by Minister Valls during the latest round of negotiations last week, was not acceptable.

    They said this was because it contained several elements of “independence-association”, including the transfer of key powers from Paris to Nouméa, a project of “dual citizenship” and possibly a seat at the United Nations.

    “In proposing this solution, minister [Valls] was biased and blocked the negotiations. So he has prevented the advent of an agreement”, pro-France Les Loyalistes and Southern Province President leader Sonia Backès told public broadcaster NC la 1ère on Sunday.

    “For us, an independence association was out of the question because the majority of [New] Caledonians voted three time against independence,” she said.

    More provincial power plan
    Instead, the Le Rassemblement-LR and Les Loyalistes bloc were advocating a project that would provide more powers to each of the three provinces, including in terms of tax revenue collection.

    The project, often described as a de facto partition, however, was not retained in the latest phases of the negotiations, because it contravened France’s constitutional principle of a united and indivisible nation.

    “But no agreement does not mean chaos”, Backès said.

    On the contrary, she believes that by not agreeing to the French minister’s deal plan, her camp had “averted disaster for New Caledonia”.

    “Tomorrow, there will be another minister . . . and another project”, she said, implicitly betting on Valls’s departure.

    On the pro-independence front, a moderate “UNI” (National Union For Independence) said a in a statement even though negotiations did not eventuate into a comprehensive agreement, the French State’s commitment and method had allowed to offer “clear and transparent terms of negotiations on New Caledonia’s institutional and political future”.

    The main FLNKS group, mainly consisting of pro-independence Union Calédonienne (UC) party, also said that even though no agreement could be found as a result of the latest round of talks, the whole project could be regarded as “advances” and “one more step . . . not a failure” in New Caledonia’s decolonisation, as specified in the 1998 Nouméa Accord, FLNKS chief negotiator and UC party president Emmanuel Tjibaou said.

    Deplored the empty outcome
    Other parties involved in the talks, including Eveil Océanien and Calédonie Ensemble, have deplored the empty outcome of talks last week.

    They called it a “collective failure” and stressed that above all, reaching a consensual solution was the only way forward, and that the forthcoming elections and the preceding campaign could bear the risk of further radicalisation and potential violence.

    In the economic and business sector, the conclave’s inconclusive outcome has brought more anxiety and uncertainty.

    “What businesses need, now, is political stability, confidence. But without a political agreement that many of us were hoping for, the confidence and visibility is not there, there’s no investment”, New Caledonia’s MEDEF-NC (Business Leaders Union) vice-president Bertrand Courte told NC La Première.

    As a result of the May 2024 riots, more than 600 businesses, mainly in Nouméa, were destroyed, causing the loss of more than 10,000 jobs.

    Over the past 12 months, New Caledonia GDP (gross domestic product) has shrunk by an estimated 10 to 15 percent, according to the latest figures produced by New Caledonia statistical institute ISEE.

    What next? Crucial provincial elections
    As no agreement was found, the next course of action for New Caledonia was to hold provincial elections no later than 30 November 2025, under the existing system, which still restricts the list of persons eligible to vote at those local elections.

    The makeup of the electoral roll for local polls was the very issue that triggered the May 2024 riots, as the French Parliament, at the time, had endorsed a Constitutional amendment to push through opening the list.

    At the time, the pro-independence camp argued the changes to eligibility conditions would eventually “dilute” their votes and make indigenous Kanaks a minority in their own country.

    The Constitutional bill was abandoned after the May 2024 rots.

    The sensitive issue remains part of the comprehensive pact that Valls had been working on for the past four months.

    The provincial elections are crucial in that they also determine the proportional makeup of New Caledonia’s Congress and its government and president.

    The provincial elections, initially scheduled to take place in May 2024, and later in December 2024, and finally no later than 30 November 2025, were already postponed twice.

    Even if the provincial elections are held later this year (under the current “frozen” rules), the anti-independence camp has already announced it would contest its result.

    According to the anti-independence camp, the current restrictions on New Caledonia’s electoral roll contradict democratic principles and have to be “unfrozen” and opened up to any citizen residing for more than 10 uninterrupted years.

    The present electoral roll is “frozen”, which means it only allows citizens who have have been livingin New Caledonia before November 1998 to cast their vote at local elections.

    The case could be brought to the French Constitutional Council, or even higher, to a European or international level, said pro-France politicians.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 12, 2025
  • Traders vow to keep goods flowing amid tensions with Pakistan

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT), representing over 90 million traders across the country, on Friday expressed unwavering support for the Indian government and armed forces amid the ongoing tensions with Pakistan.

    Praveen Khandelwal, CAIT Secretary General and Member of Parliament from Delhi’s Chandni Chowk, stated, “Just as our brave soldiers are guarding the borders, the traders of the nation are committed to acting as soldiers on the economic front, ensuring an uninterrupted supply chain under all circumstances.”

    He lauded the Indian armed forces for responding to Pakistan’s “nefarious actions” with “exemplary courage and strength,” calling it a matter of national pride. Describing the current scenario as akin to a state of war, Khandelwal said every citizen is standing in full solidarity with the government to ensure that Pakistan receives a “strong and lasting lesson.”

    Khandelwal also clarified that there is no shortage of foodgrains or essential commodities in the country. “All goods are abundantly available in the markets, and the government has sufficient reserves. Citizens should not resort to hoarding or panic buying,” he said. He assured that traders would, as they did during the COVID-19 pandemic, maintain the supply chain and, if necessary, ensure doorstep delivery of essential items.

    He further pledged that CAIT traders would strictly follow all government advisories and would not allow panic, misinformation, or unrest to spread under any circumstances.

    Appealing to the trader community, Khandelwal said patriotism is not just an emotion but also a practice rooted in discipline, patience, and faith in the nation’s leadership. “Authorities are closely monitoring the situation and taking all necessary steps. At such a time, the trading community must act in an organised and responsible manner in the national interest,” he said.

    CAIT also urged traders to refrain from making any independent market-related decisions and to wait for official guidance. “This is the time to demonstrate unity, prudence, and patriotic commitment,” Khandelwal said.

    “Devotion to the motherland is not just an emotion—it is a responsibility. And this responsibility will be fulfilled with full discipline and dedication by over 90 million traders across the country,” he added.

    ––IANS

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Bonamici, McBath, Moore, Wilson Introduce Bill to End Corporal Punishment in Schools

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Suzanne Bonamici (1st District Oregon)

    WASHINGTON, DC [05/9/25] – Today Representatives Suzanne Bonamici (D-OR), Lucy McBath (D-GA), Gwen Moore (D-WI), and Frederica Wilson (D-FL) introduced legislation to protect students from corporal punishment in schools. 

    The Protecting Our Students in Schools Act would prohibit the practice of corporal punishment in any school that receives federal funding. It would also provide schools with the support necessary to create more nurturing and inclusive learning environments that employ restorative, evidence-based practices to improve school safety. Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) is leading the companion in the Senate.

    “The disturbing use of corporal punishment in schools must stop,” said Congresswoman Suzanne Bonamici. “Students must feel safe and be safe in school. Fear of physical pain keeps students from reaching their full potential, inflicting damage that can last for decades. I’m grateful to partner with Reps. McBath, Moore, and Wilson to finally put a stop to the use of corporal punishment in schools that receive federal funding.”

    “When parents send their children to school, it’s with the belief that their student will learn in a safe, healthy environment,” said Congresswoman Lucy McBath. “The impacts that cruel, unnecessary punishments have on the next generation are heartbreaking and these practices still exist in Georgia today. I thank my colleagues in the House and Senate for their collaboration on this effort as we protect our children and set them up for strong, successful futures.”

    “Corporal punishment violates children’s fundamental rights to dignity, physical integrity, and protection from violence,” said Congresswoman Gwen Moore. “Every child deserves to be treated with respect and provided with a safe and nurturing learning environment. By eliminating this form of punishment, schools can create a safer, more supportive atmosphere that encourages learning, engagement, and positive relationships between students and educators.”

    “The hallways, classrooms and cafeterias of our schools should be safe, supportive environments for all students,” said Congresswoman Frederica Wilson. “Corporal punishment is a backward practice that has no place in our schools, harming our students, especially Black and Brown children. That’s why I’m proudly co-leading the Protecting Our Students in Schools Act of 2023, which implements positive reinforcement strategies, creating a better environment for our students. With this bill, we can eliminate the shameful stain of corporal punishment and promote evidence-based behavioral interventions for more positive outcomes for our students.” 

    “It’s absurd there are states that still allow educators to strike, paddle, and spank students as a means of discipline,” said Senator Chris Murphy. “This bill puts an end to that cruelty and would give schools the resources they need to create safe, supportive environments where every student can thrive.”

    Corporal punishment, the act of inflicting physical pain as a form of discipline, can result in serious injury with long-term negative consequences for students’ physical and mental health. Research overwhelmingly shows that corporal punishment in schools does not lead to improvements in student behavior; instead it is linked to poor academic performance, physical and emotional harm, and damage to students’ self-esteem and trust of educators. Corporal punishment is disproportionately applied to boys, students of color, and students with disabilities. 

    “Even amid the COVID-19 pandemic, when so many students were learning from home, nearly 20,000 students still endured corporal punishment in schools, of which 2,400 of those students have a disability,” said Dr. Jacqueline Rodriguez, CEO of the National Center for Learning Disabilities. “Corporal punishment has no place in education. On behalf of the National Center for Learning Disabilities and our partners in the disability rights community, I applaud Representative Bonamici, Senator Murphy, and the other co-sponsors for their leadership on this critical bill. Now it’s time for the rest of the members of Congress to step up and ensure all students have a safe, supportive, and high-quality public education.”

    “IDRA is pleased to support the Protecting our Students in Schools Act of 2025, an important piece of legislation that would end the harmful, outdated practice of hitting students in schools,” said Morgan Craven, National Director of Policy, Advocacy, and Community Engagement at the Intercultural Development Research Association (IDRA). “Schools should be places where all young people feel safe and supported to learn, but corporal punishment endangers students, compromises achievement, and weakens the relationships that are the foundation of strong school communities.”

    “Laws permitting educators to assault their own students should have long ago been abolished,” said Justin Driver, Robert R. Slaughter Professor of Law at Yale Law School. “Regrettably, though, the archaic and, indeed, barbaric practice of corporal punishment remains prevalent in our nation’s schools. That state-sanctioned violence prevents far too many of our youngest, most vulnerable Americans from having any real chance of fulfilling their enormous potential. I salute Congresswoman Bonamici for her steadfast leadership in seeking to eliminate the scourge of corporal punishment from our schools. And I fervently hope that this measure will soon become the law of the land.”

    A summary of the Protecting Our Students in Schools Act can be found here. The full bill text can be found here.

    The Protecting Our Students in Schools Act is endorsed by: National Education Association, American Federation of Teachers, National PTA, The Education Trust, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, American Psychological Association, Lives in the Balance, Intercultural Development Research Association (IDRA), GLSEN, NAESP, NASSP, National Parents’ Union, National Center for Learning Disabilities, National Association of Social Workers, Federal School Discipline and Climate Coalition, National Woman’s Law Center, Human Rights Campaign, NAACP, American School Counselor Association, American Civil Liberties Union, National Urban League, Advocating 4 Kids, Inc, All4Ed, American Atheists, American Humanist Association, American Youth Policy Forum, Autistic Self Advocacy Network, Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, Center for Learner Equity, Center for Popular Democracy, Children’s Defense Fund, Committee for Children, Council for Exceptional Children, Council for Administrators of Special Education, Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Dignity in Schools Campaign, Education Reform Now, EduColor, Disability Law Colorado, Elite Educational Consulting, Every Texan, Fannie Education Alliance, First Focus Campaign for Children, Girls, Inc., Gwinnett SToPP, Ibero American Action League, Inc., KIPP Foundation, Lawyers for Good Government, Mississippi Coalition to End Corporal Punishment, National Association of Councils on Developmental Disabilities, National Black Child Development Institute, National Disability Rights Network, National Down Syndrome Congress, New Leaders, Nollie Jenkins Family Center, Inc., Open Society Policy Center, Parent Education Organizing Council, Racial Justice NOW, STAND Up, Texas Appleseed, Texas Kids Can’t Wait, The Advocacy Institute, The Arc of the United States, The Daniel Initiative, TNTP, United Women in Faith, Uplift MN, Volunteer State Seal of Biliteracy, National Association of Counsel for Children, Alliance for Educational Justice, The NOTICE Coalition, End Mass Incarceration Georgia Network, Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Juvenile Law Center, and Represent Justice.

    Original cosponsors of the House version of Protecting Our Students in Schools Act include Representatives Chellie Pingree (D-ME), Don Beyer (D-VA), Danny Davis (D-IL), Mark Takano (D-CA), Darren Soto (D-FL), Jennifer McClellan (D-VA), Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL), Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), Jahana Hayes (D-CT), Bill Keating (D-MA), Joe Courtney (D-CT), Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Mary Gay Scanlon (D-PA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), and Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), and Jill Tokuda (D-HI).

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 12, 2025
  • Study finds how obesity is linked to long Covid

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    lass=”selectable-text copyable-text x15bjb6t x1n2onr6″ dir=”ltr”>People with excess weight are more likely to experience long-term neurological and mental health symptoms after Covid-19, including headaches, vertigo, smell and taste disorders, sleep disturbances, and depression, according to new research.

    The study was conducted by visiting PhD scholar Debora Barbosa Ronca from the Edith Cowan University (ECU) Centre of Precision Health.

    “We anticipated some level of association between excess weight and post-Covid-19 symptoms based on prior evidence linking obesity with worse long-term Covid-19 outcomes. What stood out was the consistency of findings across a wide range of neurological and neuropsychiatric symptoms—including memory problems, depression, sleep disturbances, and sensory impairments,” said Ronca.

    She noted that while the study did not include subgroup analyses by ethnicity, the inclusion of data from 23 countries suggested the global relevance of the findings.

    Excess weight has been associated with the development of long Covid—or Post-Covid-19 Condition—as defined by the World Health Organization.

    While the mechanisms behind this link are not yet fully understood, Ronca suggested it may be related to an exaggerated inflammatory response caused by excess fatty tissue in the body. Additionally, fat tissue may assist the SARS-CoV-2 virus in entering the body and act as a reservoir, allowing it to spread.

    Some studies have shown that long Covid symptoms can persist for 12 months or longer, highlighting the need for long-term medical support.

    “These symptoms can significantly impact quality of life and may linger for months. As we face overlapping public health challenges in the post-pandemic era—such as long Covid, mental health issues, and rising obesity rates—it’s essential to develop personalised and multidisciplinary care strategies to support affected individuals,” Ronca added.

    She emphasised that healthcare providers should be aware that individuals with excess weight may face a higher risk of experiencing long-term neurological and mental health symptoms after Covid-19.

    “This population may require closer monitoring and integrated care. Combining weight management, mental health support, and rehabilitation into post-Covid care plans could improve patient outcomes,” she said.

    (ANI)

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘We’re just doing our best’ – cultural backlash hits Auckland kava business

    By Coco Lance, RNZ Pacific digital journalist

    A new Auckland-based kava business has found itself at the heart of a cultural debate, with critics raising concerns about appropriation, authenticity, and the future of kava as a deeply rooted Pacific tradition.

    Vibes Kava, co-founded by Charles Byram and Derek Hillen, operates out of New Leaf Kombucha taproom in Grey Lynn.

    The pair launched the business earlier this year, promoting it as a space for connection and community.

    Byram, a Kiwi-American of Samoan descent, returned to Aotearoa after growing up in the United States. Hillen, originally from Canada, moved to New Zealand 10 years ago.

    Both say they discovered kava during the covid-19 pandemic and credit it with helping them shift away from alcohol.

    “We wanted to create something that brings people together in a healthier way,” the pair said.

    However, their vision has been met with growing criticism, with people saying the business lacks cultural depth, misrepresents tradition, and risks commodifying a sacred practice.

    Context and different perspectives
    Tensions escalated after Vibes Kava posted a promotional video on Instagram, describing their offering as “a modern take on a 3000-year-old tradition” and “a lifestyle shift, one shell at a time”.

    On their website, Hillen is referred to as a “kava evangelist,” while videos feature Byram hosting casual kava circles and promoting fortnightly “kava socials.”

    The kava they sell is bottled, with tag names referencing the effects of each different kava bottle — for example, “buzzy kava” and “chill kava”.

    Their promotional content was later reposted on TikTok by a prominent Pacific influencer, prompting an influx of online input about the legitimacy of their business and the diversity of their kava circles.

    The reposted video has since received more than 95,000 views, 1600 shares, and 11,000 interactions.

    In the TikTok caption, the influencer questioned the ethical foundations of the business.

    “I would like to know what type of ethics was put into the creation of this . . . who was consulted, and said it was okay to make a brand out of a tradition?”

    Criticised the brand’s aesthetic
    Speaking to RNZ Pacific anonymously, the influencer criticised the brand’s aesthetic and messaging, describing it as “exploitative”.

    “Their website and Instagram portray trendy, wellness-style branding rather than a proud celebration of authentic Pacific customs or values,” they said.

    “I feel like co-owner Charles appears to use his Samoan heritage as a buffer against the backlash he’s received.

    “Not to discredit his identity in any way; he is Samoan, and seems like a proud Samoan too.

    “However, that should be reflected consistently in their branding. What’s currently shown on their website and Instagram is a mix of Fijian kava practice served in a Samoan tanoa. That to me is confusing and dilutes cultural authenticity.”

    Fiji academic Dr Apo Aporosa said much of the misunderstanding stems from a narrow perception of kava as simply being a beverage.

    “Most people who think they are using kava are not,” Aporosa said.

    ‘Detached from culture’
    “What they’re consuming may contain Piper methysticum, but it’s detached from the cultural framework that defines what kava actually is.”

    Aporosa said it is important to recognise kava as both a substance and a practice — one that involves ceremony, structure, and values.

    “It is used to nurture vā, the relational space between people, and is traditionally accompanied by specific customs: woven mats, the tanoa bowl, coconut shell cups (bilo or ipu), and a shared sense of respect and order.”

    He said that the commodification of kava, through flavoured drink extracts and Western “wellness” branding, is concerning, and that it distorts the plant’s original purpose.

    “When people repackage kava without understanding or respecting the culture it comes from, it becomes cultural appropriation,” he said.

    He added that it is not about restricting access to kava — it is about protecting its cultural integrity and honouring the knowledge Pacific communities have preserved for upwards of 2000 years.

    Fijian students at the Victoria University of Wellington conduct a sevusevu (kava ceremony) to start off Fiji Language Week. Image: RNZ Pacific/Koroi Hawkins

    ‘We can’t just gatekeep — we need to guide’
    Dr Edmond Fehoko, is a renowned Tongan academic and senior lecturer at Otago University, garnered international attention for his research on the experiences and perceptions of New Zealand-born Tongan men who participate in faikava.

    He said these situations are layered.

    “I see the cultural appreciation side of things, and I see the cultural appropriation side of things,” Fehoko said.

    “It is one of the few practices we hold dearly to our heart, and that is somewhat indigenous to our Pacific people — it can’t be found anywhere else.

    “Hence, it holds a sacred place in our society. But, we as a peoples, have actually not done a good enough job to raise awareness of the practice to other societies, and now it’s a race issue, that only Pacific people have the rights to this — and I don’t think that is the case anymore.”

    He explained that it is part of a broader dynamic around kava’s globalisation — and that for many people, both Pacific and non-Pacific, kava is an “interesting and exciting space, where all types of people, and all genders, come in and feel safe”.

    “Yes, that is moving away from the cultural, customary way of things. But, we need to find new ways, and create new opportunities, to further disseminate our knowledge.

    ‘Not the same today’
    “Our kava practice is not the same today as it was 10, 20 years ago. Kava practices have evolved significantly across generations.

    “There are over 200 kava bars in the United States . . . kava is one of the few traditions that is uniquely Pacific. But our understanding of it has to evolve too. We can’t just gatekeep — we need to guide,” he said.

    Dr Edmond Fehoko . . . “Kava practices have evolved significantly across generations.” Image: RNZ Pacific/ Sara Vui-Talitu

    He added that the issue of kava being commercialised by non-Pacific people cannot necessarily be criticised.

    “It’s two-fold, and quite contradictory,” he said, adding that the criticism against these ventures often overlooks the parallel ways in which Pacific communities are also reshaping and profiting from the tradition.

    “We argue that non-Pacific people are profiting off our culture, but the truth is, many of us are too,” he said.

    “A minority have extensive knowledge of kava . . . and if others want to appreciate our culture, let them take it further with us, instead of the backlash.

    “If these lads are enjoying a good time and have the same vibe . . . the only difference is the colour of their skin, and the language they are using, which has become the norm in our kava practices as well.

    “But here, we have an opportunity to educate people on the importance of our practice. Let’s raise awareness. Kava is a practice we can use as a vehicle, or medium, to navigate these spaces.”

    Vibes Kava co-founder Charles Byram . . . It’s tough to be this person and then get hurt online, without having a conversation with me. Nobody took the time to ask those questions.” Image: Brady Dyer/BradyDyer.com/RNZ Pacific

    ‘Getting judged for the colour of my skin’
    “I completely understand the points that have been brought up,” Byram said in response to the criticism.

    Tearing up, he said that was one of the most difficult things to swallow was backlash fixated on his cultural identity.

    “I felt like I was getting judged for the colour of my skin, and for not understanding who I was or what I was trying to accomplish. If my skin was a bit darker, I might have been given some more grace.

    “I was raised in a Samoan household. My grandfather is Samoan . . . my mum is Samoan. It’s tough to be this person and then get hurt online, without having a conversation with me. Nobody took the time to ask those questions,” he said.

    The pair also pushed back on claims they are focused on profit.

    “We went there to learn, to dive into the culture. We went to a lot of kava bars, interviewed farmers, just to understand the origin of kava, how it works within a community, and then how best to engage with, and showcase it,” Byram said.

    “People have criticised that we are profiting — we’re making no money at this point. All the money we make from this kava has gone back to the farmers in Vanuatu.”

    Representing a minority
    Hillen thinks those criticising them represent a minority.

    “We have a lot of Pasifika customers that come here [and] they support us.

    “They are ecstatic their culture is being promoted this way, and love what we are doing. The negative response from a minority part of the population was surprising to us.”

    Critics had argued that the business showcased confusing blends of different cultural approaches.

    Byram and Hillen said that it is up to other people to investigate and learn about the cultures, and that they are simply trying to acknowledge all of them.

    Byram, however, added that the critics brought up some good points — and that this will be a catalyst for change within their business.

    “Yesterday, we joined the Pacific Business Hub. We are [taking] steps to integrate more about the culture, community, and what we are trying to accomplish here.”

    They also addressed their initial silence and comment moderation.

    ‘Cycle so self-perpetuating’
    “I think the cycle was so self-perpetuating, so I was like . . . I need to make sure I respond with candor, concern, and active communication.

    “So I deleted comments and put a pause on things, so we could have some space before the comments get out of hand.

    “At the end of the day . . . this is about my connection with my culture and people more than anything, and I’m excited to grow from it. I’m learning, and I’m utilising this as a growth point. We’re just doing our best,” Byram said.

    Hillen added: “You have to understand, this business is super new, so we’re still figuring out how best to do things, how to market and grow along with not only the community.

    “What we really want to represent as people who care about, and believe in this.”

    Byram said they want to acknowledge as many peoples as possible.

    “We don’t want to create ceremony or steal anything from the culture. We really just want to celebrate it, and so again, we acknowledge the concern,” he added.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: 11 May 2025 News release Nursing workforce grows, but inequities threaten global health goals

    Source: World Health Organisation

    The global nursing workforce has grown from 27.9 million in 2018 to 29.8 million in 2023, but wide disparities in the availability of nurses remain across regions and countries, according to the State of the World’s Nursing 2025 report, published by the World Health Organization (WHO), International Council of Nurses (ICN) and partners. Inequities in the global nursing workforce leave many of the world’s population without access to essential health services, which could threaten progress towards universal health coverage (UHC), global health security and the health-related development goals. 

    The new report released on International Nurses Day provides a comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of the nursing workforce at global, regional and country levels. Consolidating information from WHO’s 194 Member States, the evidence indicates global progress in reducing the nursing workforce shortage from 6.2 million in 2020 to 5.8 million in 2023, with a projection to decline to 4.1 million by 2030. But, the overall progress still masks deep regional disparities: approximately 78% of the world’s nurses are concentrated in countries representing just 49% of the global population.  

    Low- and middle-income countries are facing challenges in graduating, employing and retaining nurses in the health system and will need to raise domestic investments to create and sustain jobs. In parallel, high-income countries need to be prepared to manage high levels of retiring nurses and review their reliance on foreign-trained nurses, strengthening bilateral agreements with the countries they recruit from.   

    “This report contains encouraging news, for which we congratulate the countries that are making progress,” said WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. “However, we cannot ignore the inequalities that mark the global nursing landscape. On International Nurses Day, I urge countries and partners to use this report as a signpost, showing us where we’ve come from, where we are now, and where we need to go – as rapidly as possible.”

    Key findings

    The State of the World’s Nursing 2025 (SoWN) report, based on data reported by 194 countries through the National Health Workforce Accounts, shows a 33% increase in the number of countries reporting data since the last edition in 2020. It includes detailed country profiles now available for public access online.

    The report reveals complex disparities between and among countries, regions and socio-economic contexts. The data and evidence are intended to support country-led dialogue to contextualize the findings into policies and actions.

    “We welcome the SoWN 2025 report as an important milestone for monitoring progress on strengthening and supporting the nursing workforce towards global health goals,” said Pam Cipriano, President, International Council of Nurses. “The report clearly exposes the inequalities that are holding back the nursing profession and acting as a barrier to achieving universal health coverage (UHC). Delivering on UHC is dependent on truly recognizing the value of nurses and on harnessing the power and influence of nurses to act as catalysts of positive change in our health systems.”

    Gender and equity remain central concerns in the nursing workforce. Women continue to dominate the profession, making up 85% of the global nursing workforce.

    Findings suggest that 1 in 7 nurses worldwide – and 23% in high-income countries – are foreign-born, highlighting reliance on international migration. In contrast, the proportion is significantly lower in upper middle-income countries (8%), lower middle-income countries (1%), and low-income countries (3%).

    Low-income countries are increasing nurse graduate numbers at a faster pace than high-income countries. In many countries, hard-earned gains in the graduation rate of nurses are not resulting in improved densities due to the faster pace of population growth and lower employment opportunities.  To address this, countries should create jobs to ensure graduates are hired and integrated into the health system and improve working conditions.

    Age demographics and retirement trends reveal a mixed picture. The global nursing workforce is relatively young: 33% of nurses are aged under 35 years, compared with 19% who are expected to retire in the next 10 years. However, in 20 countries – mostly high-income – retirements are expected to outpace new entrants, raising concerns about nurse shortfalls, and having fewer experienced nurses to mentor early career nurses.

    Around two thirds (62%) of countries reported the existence of advanced practice nursing roles – marking significant progress since 2020 (where only 53% reported advanced practice nursing roles).  These types of nurses have been shown to expand access to and quality of care in many different settings.  

    The report also highlights improvements in nursing leadership: 82% of countries reported having a senior government nursing official to manage the nursing workforce. However, leadership development opportunities remain uneven. While 66% of countries report having such initiatives in place, only 25% of low-income countries offer structured leadership development.

    Mental health and workforce well-being remain areas of concern. Only 42% of responding countries have provisions for nurses’ mental health support, despite increased workloads and trauma experienced during and since the COVID-19 pandemic. Addressing this is essential to retain skilled professionals and ensure quality of care.

    Policy priorities for 2026–2030

    The report introduces forward-looking policy priorities, calling on countries to:

    • expand and equitably distribute nursing jobs, especially in underserved regions;
    • strengthen domestic education systems and align qualifications with defined roles;
    • improve working conditions, pay equity, and mental well-being support;
    • further develop nursing regulation and advanced practice nursing roles;
    • promote gender equity and protect nurses working in fragile, conflict-affected settings;
    • harness digital technologies and prepare nurses for climate-responsive care; and
    • advance nursing leadership and ensure leadership development opportunities are equitable.

    The evidence in the report provides an impetus for continued alignment to the policy priorities in the WHO Global Strategic Directions for Nursing and Midwifery 2021–2025, and the actions recommended in the resolution submitted to the 78th World Health Assembly:  Accelerating action on the health and care workforce by 2030.

    Note to editors:

    The State of the World’s Nursing 2025 report presents the most contemporary evidence on the global nursing workforce, including education, employment, migration, regulation, working conditions, leadership and more. The report includes updated indicators and robust estimates on global and regional-level nursing stock, shortage, and projections to 2030. Online county profiles provide national level data in a downloadable (PDF) format.  

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Why doesn’t Australia make more medicines? Wouldn’t that fix drug shortages?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Coomber, PhD Candidate, Pharmaceutical Supply Chains, The University of Queensland

    IM Imagery/Shutterstock

    About 400 medicines are in short supply in Australia. Of these, about 30 are categorised as critical. These are ones with a life-threatening or serious impact on patients, and with no readily available substitutes.

    Since 2024, there has been a nationwide shortage of sterile fluid. This continues to affect health care across Australia.

    However, medicine shortages in Australia are not new. We know from past experience that six classes of medications are the most likely to go short: antibiotics, anaesthesia and pain relief treatments, heart and blood pressure medications, hormonal medications, cancer treatments and epilepsy medications.

    So, could we prevent medication shortages if Australia made more medicines?

    Why are there so many shortages?

    Australia has a very small pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. It mainly makes vaccines and some generic medications (ones no longer protected by a patent). In fact, Australia imports 90% of its medications.

    Most raw ingredients are also imported, including the active pharmaceutical ingredient. This is the ingredient that has a therapeutic effect, such as salbutamol to manage asthma or atorvastatin to lower cholesterol. Australia also imports the inactive ingredients known as excipients. These include fillers, bulking agents and preservatives.

    Then there are medication delivery devices (such as inhalers or syringes) and packaging (which has to be sterile) to source.

    A shortage in one ingredient or component – in Australia or internationally – will affect the production and supply of the finished product. This can lead to shortages.

    Often, there are limited sources (or a single source) for medication components. This makes supply chains particularly vulnerable.

    Australia is a small player, globally

    Australia is a small market for pharmaceuticals, compared with other OECD countries.

    So during a shortage of medications, raw materials or other components, suppliers prioritise larger and therefore more valuable markets.

    Australia’s Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) has an underpinning pricing mechanism to provide affordable medicines for Australians. But this also makes the market less attractive to medication manufacturers.

    Therefore, countries where markets are bigger, and offer larger profit margins, are more attractive. This restricts the type and range of medications offered to the Australian market, including when supplies are short.

    Australia needs medicines, raw ingredients and sterile packaging, all of which can be in short supply.
    RGtimeline/Shutterstock

    So could ramping up local manufacture help?

    The answer is maybe.

    But developing Australia’s limited pharmaceutical manufacturing would take many years to reach a level and capacity for sustainable supply.

    Increasing local manufacturing would address access to some medicines. However, domestic manufacturers also need access to raw ingredients. These could also be made locally.

    For pharmaceutical manufacturing to be viable and profitable in Australia there must be “economies of scale”.

    Considerations include the availability of raw materials, production costs (including labour), access and availability of infrastructure and specialist facilities. To justify their investments, companies will ultimately need to sell enough product to cover these and other costs.

    But Australian manufacturers struggle to achieve economies of scale due to the small domestic market. So they would need to export some of their products to supplement domestic sales.

    To boost Australia’s pharmaceutical manufacturing industry, all states and territories would need a coordinated approach to planning and investment. This would also need bipartisan political support and a strategic long-term commitment.

    What could we do in the short term?

    Health authorities stockpiling medicines is the obvious short-term solution to Australian medication shortages. However, we’d need to carefully manage the stored medicines to ensure supply meets demand. We’d also need to make sure medicines are used before they expire. If not carefully managed, a stockpile risks unnecessary expense and waste.

    Currently, state and territories manage the use of medications in their own hospitals. However, we could standardise medication use in hospitals nationally. With co-operation among states and territories this would allow manufacturers and suppliers to better plan production and distribution of medicines. Not only would this provide more certainty for suppliers, it would reduce the states and territories competing with each other for medicines in short supply.

    We also need to review the pricing mechanism for medicines to make the Australian market more attractive for pharmaceutical imports. This would also help Australia move higher up the priority list when medicines are in short supply.

    Peter Coomber is currently employed by Queensland Health as Senior Director Central Pharmacy, and is a RAAF Reservist Pharmaceutical Officer.

    Lisa Nissen receives funding from NHMRC/MRFF and other state and commonwealth research grant schemes. Lisa was previously the state president for the Pharmaceutical Society of Australia (Qld) branch (2008-2015) and a member of the national board. She has previously held positions on the TGA advisory committee for vaccines and advisory committee on scheduling of medicines. Lisa is a current member of AHPRA’s Scheduled Medicines Expert Committee.

    – ref. Why doesn’t Australia make more medicines? Wouldn’t that fix drug shortages? – https://theconversation.com/why-doesnt-australia-make-more-medicines-wouldnt-that-fix-drug-shortages-255766

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: 2025 Child Protection Month: Let’s root out child abuse together

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    The Department of Social Development (DSD) has launched a nationwide child protection programme to combat child abuse, following alarming statistics revealing that more than 26 000 cases of child abuse and neglect were reported in the 2024/25 financial year.

    DSD Minister Sisisi Tolashe launched the 2025 Child Protection Month and 365 Days child protection programme, aimed at curbing violence against children, in Thaba Nchu in the Free State on Sunday afternoon.

    “This is the continuation of the work done in previous years, however with vigour and a sense of urgency to upscale interventions directed at ending violence against children, as our children are under siege, confronted with high levels of violence, despite progressive laws in place to protect them.

    “As a country, we have made strides, putting various measures in place such as child protection laws, policies, strategies and programmes to ensure the protection of children from abuse; however, our children continue to experience violence,” Tolashe said in written remarks for the occasion.

    The Minister revealed worrying statistics of child abuse, including that some 26 852 cases of child abuse and neglect were reported in the 2024/25 financial year.

    “Cases of sexual abuse remained dominant in all provinces, with 9 859 cases throughout the country. Deliberate neglect is the second most prevalent in all provinces, with 9 485 cases, followed by physical abuse, with 3965 recorded cases and 595 cases of abandonment. 

    “Children falling pregnant as young as 10 to 14 years old is a concern and shows the deep-rooted evil against children, who are sexually abused and sexually exploited,” Tolashe said.

    All hands of deck

    President Cyril Ramaphosa has repeatedly called child abuse and gender-based violence and femicide (GBVF) South Africa’s “second pandemic”.

    The President has also reiterated government’s commitment to rooting it out. He has called on Cabinet to develop and implement a 90-day strategy with impactful programmes to address this sustained violence.

    “In response to the President’s directive to Cabinet, the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster Ministers and senior officials convened a special sitting on the 14th of April 2025. This urgent meeting was convened in response to the alarming surge in GBVF incidents across the country.

    “It culminated in the adoption of a 90-day acceleration programme to intensify the national response and fast track the implementation of the National Strategic Plan on GBVF. A dedicated GBVF priority committee has been established within the National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure,” Tolashe said.

    On a global scale, South Africa has also lent its voice to movements against child abuse.

    Last year at the Global Ministerial Conference in Colombia, South Africa pledged to, in relation to ending violence against children:

    • Parent and caregiver support: Building capacity of parents and caregivers through parenting programmes and ensuring that the home environment is safe for children to help reduce the incidence of child abuse, neglect and exploitation, and stop the use of corporal and physical punishment.
    • Safe environments: Creating safety at home, schools and communities, including safety in digital platforms.
    • Child participation: Advocacy on children’s rights and engaging children in empowerment dialogues.
    • Response care, support and healing:  Promotion of availability and accessibility of psycho-social support, trauma counselling, and raising awareness about available services.
    • Norms and values: Implement social and behaviour change programmes to instil positive norms and values, and working with traditional and religious leaders to address harmful cultural practices and patriarchal norms that normalise the abuse of children.
    • Collaboration and coordination with the African Union: Strengthen collaboration with SADC and the African Union in strengthening child protection systems and creating a better continent that safeguards the well-being of children.
    • Income and economic strengthening: Increase access to the Child Support Grant to reach all vulnerable children in South Africa, and working with Home Affairs to upscale birth registration to enable access to social security and the basket of social protection measures in place to cushion children.

    “Implementing the above-mentioned breakthrough areas will ensure that we address the contributory factors to the high levels of violence against children, preventing its occurrence, whilst also responding to victims of violence,” Tolashe said.

    The Minister emphasised, however, that government cannot root out the scourge on its own and requires citizen participation.

    “[Government] alone cannot succeed in dealing with this monster that we are faced with, hence we appeal to parents, community, religious and traditional leaders to work closer in addressing social ills, harmful social, cultural and religious practices that are detrimental to the well-being of children, and change societal norms and values that perpetuate violence against children.

    “I urge that we continue to scale up interventions at local ward level with all hands on deck to end violence against children, promote care and the protection of children, with a focus on changing societal norms and values that perpetuate violence against children,” Tolashe said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

    May 12, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: G20 is too elite. There’s a way to fix that though – economists

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

    The G20 claims to be “the premier forum for international economic cooperation”.

    But is it?

    As scholars of global economic governance, we are sceptical of this claim. Here are our main reasons.

    • The G20 is insufficiently representative of the 193 member states of the United Nations plus the small number of non-member states.

    • It is a self-selected group of 19 countries and the European and African Unions.

    • It has no mandate to act or speak on behalf of the international community.

    • It has no transparent or formal mechanisms through which it can communicate with actors who do not participate in the G20 but have a stake in its deliberations and their outcomes.

    The growing tensions in the world make it more urgent to improve the efficacy of the G20. Firstly, because there is growing evidence of the loss of interest in global cooperation. Secondly, because rich states are cutting their official development assistance and are failing to meet their commitments to help countries deal with loss and damage from climate impacts and make their economies more resilient to shocks.

    And thirdly, because rich countries are also reluctant to discuss financing sustainable and inclusive development in forums like the upcoming Fourth Financing for Development Conference or the UN, where all states can participate. They prefer exclusive forums like the G20.

    Here, after briefly describing the structure of the G20, we argue that its lack of representation is a major problem. We offer a solution and argue that, as chair of the G20 this year, South Africa is well placed to promote this solution.

    What is the G20 and how does it function?

    The G20 was established in the late 1990s in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. Its members were invited by the US and Germany based on a proposal from the Canadian government. Initially only finance ministers and central bank governors of major advanced and emerging economies were involved. After the financial crisis of 2008-2009 it was upgraded to summit level with the same membership.

    A summit is held annually, under the leadership of a rotating presidency.

    The group accounts for 67% of the world’s population, 85% of global GDP, and 75% of global trade. The membership comprises 19 of the “weightiest” national economies plus the European Union and the African Union. The 19 national economies are the G7 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada), plus Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. These countries are permanently “in”. The remaining 90% of countries in the world are excluded unless invited as “special guests” on an ad hoc basis.

    Representatives of a select group of international organisations including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization also participate, together with those from some UN entities.

    The G20’s work is managed by a troika consisting of the current president with the assistance of the past president and the incoming president. In 2025 this troika consists of South Africa as the current chair, Brazil as the past chair and the US, which will become the G20 president in 2026. The G20 has no permanent secretariat.

    The consistency in G20 membership has proven to be an advantage because it helps foster a sense of familiarity, understanding and trust at the technical level among the permanent members. This is helpful in times of crisis and in dealing with complex problems.

    But its exclusivity and informal status have limited its ability to address major challenges such as the global response to the economic and health consequences of the COVID pandemic. This is because an effective response required agreement and coordinated action by all states and not just those in the G20.

    A solution

    We think that the governance model of the Financial Stability Board offers a solution.

    The Financial Stability Board was established under the umbrella of the G20 in 2009. Its job is to coordinate international financial regulatory standard-setting, monitor the global financial system for signs of stress, and to make recommendations that can help avert potential financial crises.

    It is also an exclusive club. Its membership consists of the financial regulatory authorities in the G20 countries plus those in a few other countries that are considered financially systemically important.

    However, unlike the G20, the Financial Stability Board has made a systematic effort to learn the views of non-members. It has established six Regional Consultative Groups, one each for the Americas, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa.

    The objective is to expand and formalise the Financial Stability Board’s outreach activities beyond its membership and to better reflect the global character of the financial system.

    The regional consultative groups operate in a framework which promotes compliance within each region with the Financial Stability Board’s policy initiatives. The framework enables the group members to share among themselves and with the board their views on common problems and solutions and on the issues on the board’s agenda.

    Importantly, each regional group is co-chaired by an official from a Financial Stability Board member and an official from a non-member institution.

    Applying this model to the G20 would allow the current G20 membership to continue, while obliging the members to establish a consultation process with regional neighbours. This would create a limited form of representation for all the world’s states.

    It would also empower the smaller and weaker members of the G20 because it would enable them to speak with more confidence and credibility about the challenges facing their region.

    This arrangement would also establish a limited form of G20 accountability towards the international community.

    Next steps

    As chair of the G20 chair for 2025, South Africa is well placed to promote this solution to the group’s representation problem. It should work with the African Union to establish an African G20 regional consultative group. South Africa and the African Union could invite each African regional organisation to select one representative to serve on the initial consultative group.

    South Africa could also commit to convey the outcomes of G20 regional consultative group meetings to the G20.

    South Africa can then use this example to demonstrate to the G20 the value of having a G20 regional consultative group and advocate that other regions should adopt the same approach.

    Danny Bradlow, in addition to his position at the University of Pretoria, is the Senior G20 Advisor, South African institute of International Affairs.

    Robert Wade does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. G20 is too elite. There’s a way to fix that though – economists – https://theconversation.com/g20-is-too-elite-theres-a-way-to-fix-that-though-economists-255783

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    May 11, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: G20 is too elite. There’s a way to fix that though – economists

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Danny Bradlow, Professor/Senior Research Fellow, Centre for Advancement of Scholarship, University of Pretoria

    The G20 claims to be “the premier forum for international economic cooperation”.

    But is it?

    As scholars of global economic governance, we are sceptical of this claim. Here are our main reasons.

    • The G20 is insufficiently representative of the 193 member states of the United Nations plus the small number of non-member states.

    • It is a self-selected group of 19 countries and the European and African Unions.

    • It has no mandate to act or speak on behalf of the international community.

    • It has no transparent or formal mechanisms through which it can communicate with actors who do not participate in the G20 but have a stake in its deliberations and their outcomes.

    The growing tensions in the world make it more urgent to improve the efficacy of the G20. Firstly, because there is growing evidence of the loss of interest in global cooperation. Secondly, because rich states are cutting their official development assistance and are failing to meet their commitments to help countries deal with loss and damage from climate impacts and make their economies more resilient to shocks.

    And thirdly, because rich countries are also reluctant to discuss financing sustainable and inclusive development in forums like the upcoming Fourth Financing for Development Conference or the UN, where all states can participate. They prefer exclusive forums like the G20.

    Here, after briefly describing the structure of the G20, we argue that its lack of representation is a major problem. We offer a solution and argue that, as chair of the G20 this year, South Africa is well placed to promote this solution.

    What is the G20 and how does it function?

    The G20 was established in the late 1990s in the wake of the East Asian financial crisis. Its members were invited by the US and Germany based on a proposal from the Canadian government. Initially only finance ministers and central bank governors of major advanced and emerging economies were involved. After the financial crisis of 2008-2009 it was upgraded to summit level with the same membership.

    A summit is held annually, under the leadership of a rotating presidency.

    The group accounts for 67% of the world’s population, 85% of global GDP, and 75% of global trade. The membership comprises 19 of the “weightiest” national economies plus the European Union and the African Union. The 19 national economies are the G7 (US, Japan, Germany, UK, France, Italy, Canada), plus Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Russia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina. These countries are permanently “in”. The remaining 90% of countries in the world are excluded unless invited as “special guests” on an ad hoc basis.

    Representatives of a select group of international organisations including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization also participate, together with those from some UN entities.

    The G20’s work is managed by a troika consisting of the current president with the assistance of the past president and the incoming president. In 2025 this troika consists of South Africa as the current chair, Brazil as the past chair and the US, which will become the G20 president in 2026. The G20 has no permanent secretariat.

    The consistency in G20 membership has proven to be an advantage because it helps foster a sense of familiarity, understanding and trust at the technical level among the permanent members. This is helpful in times of crisis and in dealing with complex problems.

    But its exclusivity and informal status have limited its ability to address major challenges such as the global response to the economic and health consequences of the COVID pandemic. This is because an effective response required agreement and coordinated action by all states and not just those in the G20.

    A solution

    We think that the governance model of the Financial Stability Board offers a solution.

    The Financial Stability Board was established under the umbrella of the G20 in 2009. Its job is to coordinate international financial regulatory standard-setting, monitor the global financial system for signs of stress, and to make recommendations that can help avert potential financial crises.

    It is also an exclusive club. Its membership consists of the financial regulatory authorities in the G20 countries plus those in a few other countries that are considered financially systemically important.

    However, unlike the G20, the Financial Stability Board has made a systematic effort to learn the views of non-members. It has established six Regional Consultative Groups, one each for the Americas, Asia, Commonwealth of Independent States, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa.

    The objective is to expand and formalise the Financial Stability Board’s outreach activities beyond its membership and to better reflect the global character of the financial system.

    The regional consultative groups operate in a framework which promotes compliance within each region with the Financial Stability Board’s policy initiatives. The framework enables the group members to share among themselves and with the board their views on common problems and solutions and on the issues on the board’s agenda.

    Importantly, each regional group is co-chaired by an official from a Financial Stability Board member and an official from a non-member institution.

    Applying this model to the G20 would allow the current G20 membership to continue, while obliging the members to establish a consultation process with regional neighbours. This would create a limited form of representation for all the world’s states.

    It would also empower the smaller and weaker members of the G20 because it would enable them to speak with more confidence and credibility about the challenges facing their region.

    This arrangement would also establish a limited form of G20 accountability towards the international community.

    Next steps

    As chair of the G20 chair for 2025, South Africa is well placed to promote this solution to the group’s representation problem. It should work with the African Union to establish an African G20 regional consultative group. South Africa and the African Union could invite each African regional organisation to select one representative to serve on the initial consultative group.

    South Africa could also commit to convey the outcomes of G20 regional consultative group meetings to the G20.

    South Africa can then use this example to demonstrate to the G20 the value of having a G20 regional consultative group and advocate that other regions should adopt the same approach.

    – G20 is too elite. There’s a way to fix that though – economists
    – https://theconversation.com/g20-is-too-elite-theres-a-way-to-fix-that-though-economists-255783

    MIL OSI Africa –

    May 11, 2025
  • MIL-OSI: Zippy Loan Under Review: Fast Personal Loans with Express Lending Options by ZippyLoan

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)


    Las Vegas, May 10, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —

    In This Article, You’ll Discover:

    • Why millions of Americans are turning to fast personal loans in 2025 to cover emergency expenses
    • What makes ZippyLoan a unique and efficient loan matching service for borrowers across all credit types
    • How the ZippyLoan application process works from start to funding
    • The top benefits of using a digital loan marketplace like ZippyLoan over traditional banks or payday lenders
    • The eligibility requirements to qualify for ZippyLoan’s express lending options
    • What to expect in terms of interest rates, loan amounts, and repayment terms
    • First-hand insights from real ZippyLoan reviews and user experiences
    • Key security, privacy, and compliance measures in place to protect borrower information
    • Important disclaimers around pricing, APR ranges, and state-by-state availability
    • How ZippyLoan compares to other popular fintech personal loan platforms in 2025

    TL;DR – ZippyLoan Under Review: Fast Personal Loans with Express Lending Options

    ZippyLoan is a digital loan marketplace that connects borrowers with a network of trusted lenders offering fast personal loans ranging from $100 to $15,000. Designed for speed, flexibility, and financial inclusivity, ZippyLoan’s platform allows users to apply online in minutes and receive funds as soon as the next business day.

    Whether you’re dealing with an unexpected car repair, urgent rent payment, or a medical emergency, ZippyLoan’s streamlined application process and broad lender network make it a standout solution. Unlike traditional banks, ZippyLoan supports borrowers with poor or limited credit histories, offering express lending options and short-term financing without the lengthy paperwork or collateral requirements.

    This long-form article explores every aspect of ZippyLoan — from application steps and eligibility requirements to real customer feedback and rate disclosures. Readers will gain insight into the pros and cons of this loan matching service, learn how it compares to other fintech lending platforms, and understand how ZippyLoan fits into the evolving landscape of fast personal loans in the digital age.

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan is not a direct lender. Loan terms, rates, and availability vary by lender and state. Pricing is subject to change at any time — always refer to the official website for the most accurate and up-to-date information.

    Understanding the Financial Stress Americans Face Today

    The Rise of Emergency Lending in the Modern Economy

    In recent years, an increasing number of Americans have found themselves just one unexpected expense away from a financial crisis. From surprise medical bills and urgent car repairs to missed rent payments and rising grocery costs, the need for fast personal loans has never been more pressing. Surveys consistently show that nearly 60% of U.S. adults live paycheck to paycheck — a statistic that underscores a widespread dependence on emergency funds that are often non-existent.

    While traditional banks and credit unions can offer relief, their loan approval processes are often lengthy and require higher credit thresholds. That leaves many individuals — especially those with bad credit or no credit history — without options when they need cash most urgently.

    Financial Pain Points in the U.S. Lending Landscape

    Consumers face several consistent barriers that deepen the strain when trying to access emergency loans:

    • Bad credit or no credit history leading to disqualification
    • Lack of collateral required by many traditional lenders
    • High APRs from payday lenders and predatory loan shops
    • Slow approval times that don’t match the urgency of the need
    • Limited access to financial literacy resources that could offer long-term solutions

    These obstacles frequently drive people toward short-term payday loans or high-risk financial decisions that can spiral into greater debt. What’s often needed is a digital loan marketplace that streamlines access to lenders offering flexible terms, quick approvals, and reasonable expectations.

    Changing Expectations and the Need for Real-Time Lending

    Consumers in 2025 expect more from their financial platforms. With the growing popularity of fintech lending, people want services that offer:

    • Real-time loan approval
    • Paperless processing
    • AI-powered lending recommendations
    • Mobile-first platforms for ease and speed

    These trending features are not just buzzwords — they’re redefining how personal loans are delivered. ZippyLoan, with its rapid, user-friendly loan matching system, has become a standout for consumers looking for express lending options and greater financial inclusion.

    Why It Matters Now

    In a post-pandemic world marked by inflation, job instability, and unpredictable life events, having quick access to funds can make the difference between recovery and deeper financial decline. Whether it’s a $300 utility bill or a $1,500 car repair, many Americans need fast personal loans to bridge these gaps safely and responsibly.

    The demand for same-day loan approval, emergency cash loans, and fast lending options for bad credit borrowers continues to trend upward. Platforms that meet these needs —without requiring invasive documentation or long wait times — are rapidly gaining traction.

    What Is ZippyLoan and How It Works

    A Modern Loan Matching Service for Fast Personal Financing

    ZippyLoan is a digital loan marketplace that connects individuals in need of fast personal loans with a curated network of lenders. Unlike traditional financial institutions, ZippyLoan is not a direct lender. Instead, it acts as a centralized platform that streamlines the borrowing experience by offering quick, secure access to multiple lenders through a single online application.

    Borrowers can apply for amounts ranging from $100 to $15,000, with repayment terms stretching from a few months up to 60 months depending on the lender and loan type. What sets ZippyLoan apart in 2025 is its ability to provide real-time results for borrowers of all credit backgrounds, including those with bad credit or thin credit files.

    How ZippyLoan Simplifies the Lending Experience

    The traditional loan process is often weighed down by in-person visits, paperwork, and long wait times. ZippyLoan eliminates these inefficiencies by offering:

    • A fully paperless application process
    • 24/7 online accessibility, allowing borrowers to apply at any time
    • AI-powered loan matching technology that increases the likelihood of approval
    • A lender network that includes partners willing to work with non-prime credit profiles

    These elements contribute to a faster, more inclusive, and user-friendly experience — especially critical when time is of the essence.

    How the Process Works Step by Step

    ZippyLoan’s process is designed for simplicity, speed, and security. Here’s a breakdown of how it works:

    Step 1: Submit a Quick Online Form

    Applicants enter basic information including name, contact details, income status, employment type, and desired loan amount. This initial application does not affect credit scores.

    Step 2: Loan Matching Begins

    ZippyLoan’s system matches your profile with lenders that align with your qualifications. This stage often takes only a few minutes.

    Step 3: Review Lender Offers

    Borrowers are presented with one or more offers and can review the APR, repayment terms, and funding timeline. Offers vary by lender and borrower profile.

    Disclaimer: Rates, terms, and approval decisions are solely determined by the lender. ZippyLoan is not responsible for loan outcomes.

    Step 4: Finalize the Loan

    If a borrower accepts an offer, they complete the loan process directly through the selected lender’s website. Funding may be received as soon as the next business day in some cases.

    The Flexibility of Loan Use

    Loans obtained through ZippyLoan can be used for virtually any legitimate purpose, including:

    • Emergency bills and expenses
    • Home or auto repairs
    • Rent or utility payments
    • Medical costs not covered by insurance
    • Debt consolidation
    • Travel, tuition, or life event funding

    This open-ended structure provides borrowers with the financial versatility needed to navigate both planned and unexpected expenses.

    Key Advantages of ZippyLoan’s System

    • Access to a wide range of loan offers with just one application
    • No obligation to accept an offer if terms are not favorable
    • Speed — many users complete the process and receive funds in under 48 hours
    • Broad credit acceptance, including options for bad credit personal loans
    • Security protocols to protect sensitive financial and personal data

    ZippyLoan’s process is engineered to meet the expectations of today’s borrower: fast, private, and friction-free.

    Need cash fast? Apply with ZippyLoan in minutes and get up to $15,000 as soon as tomorrow. No credit? No problem—start your free application now!

    Pain Points Solved by ZippyLoan

    When Financial Stress Becomes a Crisis

    For many Americans, financial strain doesn’t build gradually—it hits suddenly and without warning. An unplanned expense, a job disruption, or even a medical emergency can create a cash gap that needs immediate resolution. In these situations, people are not only looking for money—they’re searching for speed, trust, and access.

    Unfortunately, traditional banking solutions are not always available to those in urgent need. Whether due to low credit scores, lack of collateral, or rigid lending criteria, borrowers are often left with few viable options.

    Key Challenges Faced by Today’s Borrowers

    ZippyLoan’s services are built to address these specific obstacles:

    Limited Access to Traditional Loans

    Conventional banks tend to favor borrowers with established credit histories and higher income levels. Many consumers—especially freelancers, gig workers, or those rebuilding after a financial setback—are excluded from these channels. ZippyLoan connects these underserved borrowers with alternative lending options through its loan matching platform.

    Long Approval Times

    Time is often the most critical factor. Medical bills, utility shutoff notices, and auto repairs can’t wait 10 to 14 days. ZippyLoan’s digital-first design delivers real-time loan approvals and funding in as little as one business day, helping consumers avoid cascading financial consequences.

    Credit Profile Barriers

    A history of missed payments, high credit utilization, or lack of borrowing activity can disqualify someone from traditional loans. ZippyLoan works with a network that includes lenders specializing in bad credit personal loans, offering realistic solutions even to those with challenged financial pasts.

    Inconvenient Application Processes

    Physically visiting a bank, submitting paperwork, or printing income documents are not feasible for everyone. ZippyLoan’s paperless loan process is optimized for mobile use, enabling loan applications to be submitted securely from anywhere, at any time.

    High-Pressure Loan Offers

    Payday lenders and cash advance stores often trap borrowers in cycles of debt due to aggressive repayment schedules and excessive fees. ZippyLoan’s lender partners typically offer installment loans online, giving borrowers a chance to repay their loans over weeks or months—not just days.

    Why ZippyLoan Is Designed for These Scenarios

    ZippyLoan’s platform delivers on multiple key priorities that align with borrower needs:

    • Speed: Application, approval, and funding all happen rapidly
    • Inclusion: Accepts all credit types without discrimination
    • Flexibility: Loan offers may vary in amount, term, and interest rate, allowing for user choice
    • Simplicity: One short application reaches multiple lenders

    This combination of features makes ZippyLoan especially appealing for those facing financial emergencies, living paycheck-to-paycheck, or managing uncertain incomes.

    The Role of ZippyLoan in Financial Recovery

    While ZippyLoan is not intended to solve long-term financial challenges on its own, it does serve as a bridge during times of instability.By making express lending options accessible to a broader base of borrowers, it supports a more inclusive and resilient financial ecosystem.

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan does not guarantee loan approval or specific terms. All loan agreements are handled directly between the borrower and lender. Use of loan funds should be evaluated in the context of your overall financial health.

    Application Process Step-by-Step

    A Simplified, Secure Path to Fast Personal Loans

    One of the key advantages of ZippyLoan is the speed and simplicity of its application process. Designed to accommodate individuals in urgent financial need, the platform offers a paperless loan process that allows borrowers to apply entirely online, from any device. The entire process can take just a few minutes, and in many cases, qualified applicants receive loan offers almost immediately.

    Here’s a detailed breakdown of how to apply for a fast personal loan using ZippyLoan’s loan matching service:

    Step 1: Complete the Online Application Form

    Applicants begin by accessing the secure online application. This form requires basic personal and financial details, such as:

    • Full legal name and contact information
    • Employment or income status (including self-employment or benefits)
    • Estimated monthly income
    • Requested loan amount (between $100 and $15,000)
    • Purpose of the loan (optional but helps with matching)
    • Banking information to confirm ability to receive direct deposit

    Note: Completing this form does not trigger a hard credit check. ZippyLoan’s system uses the information to match you with lenders, not to determine creditworthiness independently.

    Step 2: Get Matched with Lenders

    After submitting your application, ZippyLoan runs your profile through its AI-powered loan matching platform, which pairs you with one or more lenders from its network that fit your criteria. These lenders may specialize in:

    • Short-term installment loans
    • Emergency personal loans
    • Bad credit loan options
    • Flexible repayment loans for self-employed borrowers

    This phase often takes less than five minutes.

    Step 3: Review Your Loan Offers Carefully

    If matches are found, you’ll be directed to the lender’s platform to review loan terms. Typical elements of the loan offers include:

    • Total loan amount offered
    • Annual Percentage Rate (APR)
    • Estimated monthly payment
    • Total repayment duration
    • Associated fees or penalties for early repayment

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan is not a direct lender and does not control rates, fees, or approval decisions. Terms are set by the lender. Always read loan documents carefully before agreeing to terms.

    Step 4: Accept the Offer and Finalize the Loan

    If you accept a loan offer, you’ll complete the transaction directly on the lender’s website. Most lenders will perform a final verification, which may include a soft or hard credit inquiry, proof of income, or identity validation.

    Once approved, funds are typically deposited into your bank account by the next business day — though same-day funding may be possible depending on the time and day of application.

    Step 5: Begin Repayment Based on Agreed Terms

    Loan repayment is handled directly between you and the lender. Most lenders offer automated withdrawals from your bank account to simplify the process. Repayment terms can vary from 3 months to 60 months, depending on loan type and lender policy.

    Important Application Reminders

    • You are under no obligation to accept a loan offer presented to you.
    • Matching does not guarantee funding; the lender retains full discretion.
    • Always evaluate the total cost of a loan before making a commitment.

    Struggling with bills or repairs? ZippyLoan’s network offers fast personal loans for all credit types. Apply now and receive offers in minutes!

    ZippyLoan Eligibility Criteria Explained

    Who Can Apply for a ZippyLoan Personal Loan?

    One of the strengths of ZippyLoan’s platform is its accessibility. The company has designed its loan matching service to serve a wide range of borrowers, including those with poor or limited credit histories. However, to ensure responsible lending and compliance with federal and state regulations, certain minimum eligibility requirements must be met.

    Below are the key criteria applicants must fulfill to begin the process.

    Basic Requirements to Use ZippyLoan

    To qualify for a loan match through ZippyLoan, applicants must meet the following conditions:

    Age and Citizenship

    • You must be at least 18 years old
    • You must be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident

    Income and Employment

    • You must have a regular source of income, which may include:
      • Full-time or part-time employment
      • Self-employment or freelance work
      • Social Security or disability income
      • Government benefits or retirement income
    • Income must be verifiable and sufficient to cover the potential loan repayment obligations

    Banking and Contact Information

    • You must have an active checking account in your name
    • A valid email address and working phone number are required to receive lender communications
    • The checking account must support direct deposit to receive loan funds

    Credit Score Considerations

    ZippyLoan does not set a minimum credit score requirement, and some of its lending partners offer loans to borrowers with:

    • Bad credit
    • No credit history
    • Past delinquencies or bankruptcies

    This is one of the reasons ZippyLoan is known as a platform that promotes financial inclusion. However, the actual offers and terms available will depend on your credit profile and lender policies.

    Disclaimer: While ZippyLoan accepts applicants with a wide range of credit histories, matching with a lender does not guarantee loan approval or funding. Final decisions are made by individual lenders.

    State-by-State Availability

    ZippyLoan services are available in most U.S. states, but availability may vary depending on local lending regulations. Some lenders in the ZippyLoan network may not operate in certain states.

    Pro Tip: You can verify availability by starting the application process and entering your ZIP code. The platform will notify you if service is not available in your location.

    Who Might Not Qualify?

    While ZippyLoan is designed to support borrowers across a wide financial spectrum, you may not qualify if you:

    • Do not have a valid U.S. checking account
    • Have unverified or insufficient income
    • Are not a resident or citizen of the United States
    • Fail to meet age requirements
    • Submit incomplete or incorrect information

    ZippyLoan’s Key Features and Benefits

    Designed for Speed, Flexibility, and Convenience

    ZippyLoan is more than just an application tool—it’s a comprehensive loan matching platform engineered to make borrowing faster, easier, and more accessible for consumers who don’t have time to waste or perfect credit scores. Whether you’re facing an emergency expense or consolidating debts, ZippyLoan offers a streamlined approach to fast personal loans that puts control back in the borrower’s hands.

    Feature-Rich Lending Access from One Application

    ZippyLoan simplifies the borrowing journey by offering these core features:

    Wide Loan Amount Range

    • Borrow from $100 to $15,000 depending on lender approval
    • Ideal for both minor short-term needs and larger financial challenges
    • Flexible use cases: rent, bills, repairs, consolidation, and more

    Quick Turnaround on Funding

    • Many approved borrowers receive loan funds by the next business day
    • The paperless loan process cuts down on delays
    • No in-person meetings, phone interviews, or long waits

    Inclusive Lending Network

    • Access to lenders serving bad credit, no credit, and fair credit profiles
    • Helps rebuild financial stability through installment loans online
    • Opportunities for credit-building over time with consistent on-time repayments

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan is not a credit repair service. Any credit improvement resulting from loan repayment should be viewed as a potential benefit, not a guaranteed outcome.

    Customizable Repayment Terms

    • Loan durations vary between 3 and 60 months
    • Options for bi-weekly or monthly repayment, depending on lender
    • No obligation to accept a loan if the terms do not suit your financial goals

    One Application, Multiple Offers

    • Applying through ZippyLoan may return multiple lender offers to compare
    • Offers can be reviewed and accepted without pressure
    • No cost to apply or to review offers

    Borrower Control and Transparency

    ZippyLoan places power in the hands of the borrower by:

    • Not requiring collateral or personal guarantees
    • Allowing borrowers to decline offers without penalty
    • Ensuring lender disclosures include APRs, repayment terms, and all fees upfront

    These features are designed to build trust and transparency into what is often a stressful process.

    Optional Use of Funds

    Loans received through ZippyLoan’s partner lenders can be used for:

    • Emergency household expenses
    • Credit card debt consolidation
    • Auto repairs or home maintenance
    • Education or moving costs
    • Travel or unexpected life events

    There are no restrictions on how funds must be spent, as long as usage complies with legal and ethical standards.

    Security and Privacy Built In

    • End-to-end data encryption protocols to protect sensitive borrower information
    • Compliance with digital privacy standards for loan platforms
    • Only trusted lending partners gain access to application data

    Apply in 5 minutes, get up to $15,000—ZippyLoan makes borrowing quick, safe, and easy. Start now with no impact on your credit score!

    Potential Drawbacks to Consider

    A Balanced Look at ZippyLoan’s Limitations

    While ZippyLoan offers speed, access, and flexibility through its loan matching platform, it’s important for borrowers to understand potential limitations before proceeding. As with any financial service, being informed helps avoid surprises and promotes responsible borrowing.

    Not a Direct Lender

    One of the key distinctions about ZippyLoan is that it is not a lender itself. Instead, it operates as a digital loan marketplace that connects users with independent third-party lenders. This model allows for greater variety in loan offers but introduces some uncertainty in terms of:

    • Loan approval criteria
    • Interest rate ranges
    • Repayment schedules
    • Fee structures

    Because every lender operates under its own policies, applicants may find that the final offer terms vary significantly. This lack of standardization can be confusing for some borrowers, especially those comparing multiple offers.

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan does not influence lending decisions, loan terms, or approval outcomes. All final loan agreements are made directly between borrower and lender.

    Interest Rates Can Be High for Some Borrowers

    While the ZippyLoan network includes lenders willing to work with borrowers with bad credit or no credit, the trade-off may be higher APRs or additional fees for riskier credit profiles. It’s not uncommon for personal loans aimed at subprime borrowers to carry interest rates above 30%—a rate that can significantly increase the total repayment amount.

    Borrowers are strongly encouraged to:

    • Review the total repayment cost of any loan
    • Understand the impact of higher interest rates on long-term affordability
    • Compare multiple offers before making a decision

    Disclaimer: Interest rates are determined solely by the lender. Always verify all fees and APRs directly with the lender before accepting an offer.

    Not Available in Every U.S. State

    Due to state lending laws, ZippyLoan and its partner lenders may not be able to serve borrowers in all 50 states. While most states are covered, availability can vary based on your location and the lender’s licensing status.

    To confirm service availability:

    • Begin the application process with your ZIP code
    • The system will automatically alert you if you’re in an unsupported region

    Loan Terms May Vary More Than Expected

    Because the lenders in ZippyLoan’s network operate independently, borrowers may find wide variation in terms, including:

    • Loan amounts (as low as $100 or as high as $15,000)
    • Repayment lengths (from 3 months up to 60 months)
    • Frequency of payments (monthly or bi-weekly)
    • Prepayment penalties or origination fees

    This variability means borrowers must stay vigilant and read the full terms and conditions before proceeding with any agreement.

    Borrower Responsibility and Over-Borrowing

    As with any financial tool, there’s a risk that borrowers may take on more debt than they can realistically repay, especially when offers are fast and accessible. ZippyLoan does not provide financial counseling or debt management services.

    Borrowers should consider:

    • Total cost of borrowing over the full loan term
    • How payments fit into their existing monthly budget
    • Whether the loan is a short-term fix or a long-term liability

    Pro Tip: Use loan calculators or speak with a trusted financial advisor before taking on new debt.

    Customer Testimonials and Third-Party Reviews

    Real User Experiences with ZippyLoan’s Loan Matching Platform

    When evaluating a service like ZippyLoan, firsthand feedback from real users offers valuable insight. While individual experiences vary depending on the lender matched through the platform, common themes have emerged in public reviews that speak to the speed, simplicity, and accessibility of ZippyLoan’s fast personal loans process.

    Positive Reviews and Common Praise

    Many customers report positive experiences, especially in regard to:

    Fast and Simple Application Process

    • Users consistently highlight the paperless loan application as easy to complete within minutes.
    • The instant lender matching process is often described as convenient and stress-free.
    • First-time borrowers frequently mention relief at receiving offers despite having bad credit or no traditional banking relationship.

    Speed of Funding

    • One of the most praised features is the next-day funding capability.
    • Users facing emergencies such as car repairs, overdue bills, or rent obligations report receiving funds in time to avoid larger consequences.

    Flexible Lender Options

    • Customers appreciate being able to review multiple loan offers after submitting a single application.
    • Several reviews mention the diverse lender network, which gives borrowers the ability to choose terms that best fit their needs.
    • Users who didn’t accept a loan still found value in the transparent process and the chance to compare options.

    Constructive Feedback and Common Complaints

    ZippyLoan, like any loan aggregator, also receives mixed reviews due to certain limitations of its model:

    Not Receiving Offers

    • Some users with extremely low income or inconsistent application data report not receiving any loan matches.
    • Others were matched but ultimately denied by the lender after further verification.

    Note: ZippyLoan does not guarantee that every user will receive an offer. Final approvals are determined by the individual lender’s criteria.

    High APRs from Some Lenders

    • Several users were surprised by the interest rates offered—especially those with poor credit histories.
    • Rates offered through the platform can be significantly higher than those of traditional banks, which may create long-term financial strainif not carefully evaluated.

    Disclaimer: Always review APRs, fees, and repayment schedules before agreeing to a loan. ZippyLoan does not control individual lender rates.

    Persistent Follow-Up Emails or Offers

    • A small number of users mention receiving follow-up offers or emails from third-party lenders after submitting an application.
    • While this is part of the matchmaking model, it may be perceived as excessive by users unfamiliar with the process.

    Third-Party Reviews and Consumer Ratings

    Independent reviews from financial comparison sites and consumer forums typically rate ZippyLoan favorably for:

    • Ease of use
    • Speed of approval
    • Accessibility for all credit types
    • Secure data processing

    However, many third-party sources also echo the importance of comparing loan offers carefully and understanding that ZippyLoan is not a lender, but a connector between consumers and independent financial institutions.

    Overall Borrower Sentiment

    In summary, borrower sentiment leans positive for users who:

    • Need emergency cash fast
    • Have limited access to traditional credit channels
    • Are comfortable reviewing loan offers online and acting quickly

    Those with higher credit scores or the ability to wait for traditional financing may prefer to compare ZippyLoan with other platforms.

    Fast cash for life’s surprises—ZippyLoan offers flexible personal loan options online. Apply now and get funded fast without the hassle.

    Security, Privacy, and Legal Compliance

    Protecting Borrower Information in the Digital Lending Age

    With any online financial transaction, data security and privacy are top concerns for consumers. ZippyLoan recognizes this and integrates safeguards to ensure that sensitive personal and financial information is handled with care and confidentiality throughout the loan matching process.

    End-to-End Encryption for Application Data

    ZippyLoan’s website uses SSL (Secure Socket Layer) encryption protocols, which protect data as it is transmitted between the user’s device and the platform. This ensures that key information such as:

    • Social Security numbers
    • Bank account details
    • Employment and income information
    • Contact credentials

    … is encrypted and secured during submission and processing. This is a standard across reputable digital loan marketplaces and provides the first layer of defense against cyber threats.

    Privacy Practices and Data Sharing

    ZippyLoan does not directly fund loans. Instead, it uses the information provided in your application to match you with potential lenders. Your data is only shared with the following:

    • Participating lenders in ZippyLoan’s network
    • Third-party financial partners that may offer additional services relevant to your application

    Disclaimer: By submitting an application through ZippyLoan, you consent to have your information shared with relevant third-party lenders. You are under no obligation to accept any loan offers presented to you.

    Borrowers can typically review and opt-out of further communications from individual lenders after their initial match.

    Regulatory and Legal Compliance

    ZippyLoan operates within the boundaries of federal U.S. lending laws and enforces the following policies among its network of lenders:

    • Truth in Lending Act (TILA) compliance, ensuring full disclosure of loan terms, APRs, and repayment schedules
    • Fair Lending standards, preventing discrimination based on race, gender, age, or credit history
    • State-by-state compliance, meaning offers are filtered based on the legal requirements of each borrower’s state of residence

    Your Role in Ensuring Privacy

    While ZippyLoan takes steps to protect your data, users should also practice good digital hygiene by:

    • Double-checking URLs to avoid phishing sites
    • Reviewing ZippyLoan’s Privacy Policy before submitting personal information
    • Using secure Wi-Fi networks when completing applications
    • Keeping antivirus software updated on your device

    Transparency in Third-Party Interactions

    Some borrowers may receive offers for financial products beyond personal loans (e.g., credit monitoring services or financial planning tools). These are typically sent by partner companies affiliated with ZippyLoan’s lender network.

    Pro Tip: You are not obligated to accept or engage with any third-party product or service offered outside your loan application. Always review terms and privacy policies independently.

    Pricing Transparency & APR Disclosure

    Understanding the Cost of Fast Personal Loans Through ZippyLoan

    While ZippyLoan provides borrowers with convenient access to fast personal loans, it’s important to understand that it does not set loan terms or pricing directly. Instead, all rates, fees, and repayment conditions are determined by the individual lenders within its network.

    This section outlines how pricing works, what to expect in terms of APR, and how to interpret loan costs before committing—ensuring that borrowers remain informed and in control.

    What Is APR and Why It Matters

    APR, or Annual Percentage Rate, is the total cost of borrowing expressed as a yearly percentage. It includes:

    • The interest rate charged by the lender
    • Any origination or processing fees
    • Other associated loan costs rolled into your repayment amount

    A high APR means the loan will cost more over time. For example:

    • A $1,000 loan with a 15% APR over 12 months may cost around $83/month
    • A $1,000 loan with a 30% APR over the same term could exceed $95/month

    APR Ranges Commonly Reported by ZippyLoan Lenders

    APR rates from lenders in ZippyLoan’s network typically fall within the following ranges:

    • As low as 5.99% for prime borrowers with excellent credit and strong income
    • As high as 35.99% or more for subprime borrowers with challenged credit

    These rates vary significantly based on:

    • Credit score
    • Loan amount
    • Term length
    • Income and employment status
    • Lender-specific underwriting standards

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan does not control or guarantee APRs. All rates are determined by third-party lenders based on their internal criteria.

    Loan Amounts and Repayment Terms

    ZippyLoan lenders generally offer:

    • Loan amounts: $100 to $15,000
    • Repayment terms: 3 to 60 months (quarterly, monthly, or bi-weekly options may be available)
    • Payment methods: Typically via direct withdrawal from a linked checking account

    Each offer will include the total repayment amount, monthly payment schedule, and due dates.

    Pro Tip: Always ask lenders about prepayment penalties or early repayment discounts. Some may charge fees if you pay off your loan ahead of schedule, while others encourage it.

    Are There Any Hidden Fees?

    ZippyLoan itself charges no fee to submit an application. However, partner lenders may include:

    • Origination fees (typically 1% to 8%)
    • Late payment fees
    • Non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees for failed withdrawals
    • Prepayment penalties (varies by lender)

    Before signing any agreement, be sure to:

    • Read all fine print in the loan offer
    • Confirm whether fees are included in the APR or listed separately
    • Ask questions directly to the lender’s support team if something is unclear

    Pricing May Vary Over Time

    Because ZippyLoan works with a diverse group of financial institutions, pricing structures can change based on market conditions, lender policies, and borrower demand. Offers available today may not be available tomorrow.

    Skip the bank lines and paperwork—ZippyLoan offers instant loan matching for fast, reliable funding. Apply now and get cash by tomorrow!

    Alternatives to ZippyLoan and Competitive Analysis

    Evaluating the Digital Lending Landscape in 2025

    As personal loan demand surges, so does the number of platforms claiming to offer the best financing options. ZippyLoan’s model as a loan matching service offers distinct advantages, but it’s important to compare it with other digital lending platforms to understand how it stacks up in key areas like speed, flexibility, credit acceptance, and transparency.

    Below, we evaluate ZippyLoan against several leading competitors based on current features, user reviews, and industry positioning.

    How ZippyLoan Compares to Other Platforms

    ZippyLoan vs. LendingClub

    LendingClub is one of the most recognized peer-to-peer lending networks. It offers personal loans starting from $1,000 and caters mostly to borrowers with fair to good credit.

    Key Differences:

    • LendingClub performs a hard credit check during application; ZippyLoan does not at the initial stage
    • LendingClub’s approval and funding process may take several days
    • ZippyLoan focuses on fast personal loans, often within 24 hours

    Best For: Borrowers with fair to excellent credit who want a structured, longer-term loan

    ZippyLoan vs. Upgrade

    Upgrade provides unsecured personal loans with competitive rates and a heavy focus on debt consolidation.

    Key Differences:

    • Upgrade requires a minimum credit score (typically 580+)
    • ZippyLoan offers broader accessibility, including bad credit loan options
    • ZippyLoan may match you with multiple lenders through one form

    Best For: Borrowers with decent credit looking for debt payoff tools and budgeting features

    ZippyLoan vs. OppLoans

    OppLoans is geared toward subprime borrowers and positions itself as a more ethical alternative to payday loans.

    Key Differences:

    • OppLoans is a direct lender, ZippyLoan is a marketplace
    • OppLoans may offer fixed APRs but caps loan amounts lower than ZippyLoan
    • ZippyLoan provides loan amounts up to $15,000 through multiple lending partners

    Best For: Borrowers with poor credit seeking small installment loans without predatory practices

    ZippyLoan vs. Avant

    Avant focuses on mid-tier borrowers with stable income and fair credit. Loans typically range between $2,000–$35,000.

    Key Differences:

    • Avant targets higher loan amounts than most ZippyLoan matches
    • ZippyLoan accommodates smaller, short-term needs and emergency personal loans
    • ZippyLoan has broader network flexibility and quicker turnaround

    Best For: Borrowers with stable employment and moderate credit seeking structured repayments

    Where ZippyLoan Stands Out

    ZippyLoan differentiates itself with:

    • Speed: Same-day or next-day funding potential
    • Inclusion: Credit types from poor to excellent are welcomed
    • Simplicity: One application reaches a network of lenders
    • No upfront fees: The service is free for consumers to use

    ZippyLoan thrives in scenarios requiring urgent action, such as:

    • Avoiding late fees or eviction
    • Paying for emergency car repairs
    • Bridging a paycheck gap

    These situations demand express lending options, and ZippyLoan’s infrastructure is tailored to meet that need.

    When a Competitor May Be Better

    Some borrowers may find better alternatives if they:

    • Need very large loan amounts ($20,000 or more)
    • Have excellent credit and can qualify for low-APR credit union loans
    • Prefer a single lender relationship over marketplace variety
    • Want in-depth financial tools or budgeting software bundled with the loan

    Pro Tip: Always compare offers from ZippyLoan against those from other providers to ensure you’re receiving the most favorable terms for your financial goals.

    Need emergency funds? Apply now with ZippyLoan and access loan offers from $100 to $15,000 in just minutes—fast, easy, and credit-friendly!

    ZippyLoan’s Role in Financial Wellness

    A Bridge, Not a Band-Aid

    In the evolving landscape of consumer finance, services like ZippyLoan play a key role in promoting financial flexibility—especially for individuals facing time-sensitive cash needs. While not a substitute for long-term financial planning, ZippyLoan offers a critical support mechanism when access to traditional lending is limited or unavailable.

    The platform is especially valuable during financial inflection points, helping consumers avoid overdraft fees, manage shortfalls, or stay current on essential bills during periods of instability.

    Supporting Financial Inclusion

    Millions of Americans are either “credit invisible” or underserved by traditional banks. ZippyLoan’s loan matching service supports financial inclusion by:

    • Accepting applications from those with limited credit histories
    • Offering matches that don’t require high credit scores
    • Providing access to legitimate installment loans as alternatives to payday traps

    This accessibility allows a broader range of borrowers to access capital without resorting to high-risk lenders or unregulated financial sources.

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan does not offer credit repair services or financial counseling. Users are encouraged to consult with certified financial advisors when managing debt or exploring credit-building strategies.

    A Tool for Responsible Short-Term Borrowing

    ZippyLoan is best used as a temporary solution—a tool that helps stabilize a financial situation rather than as a recurring resource. Examples include:

    • Covering a sudden medical co-pay not covered by insurance
    • Bridging the gap after a delayed paycheck
    • Paying for urgent car or home repairs
    • Managing temporary income shortfalls due to gig work volatility

    When used responsibly, the platform can help avoid further financial deterioration caused by missed payments, utility shutoffs, or emergency expenses left unpaid.

    Encouraging Repayment Discipline

    Because ZippyLoan’s lender partners typically offer installment-based repayment options, borrowers have more manageable timelines for repayment compared to short-term payday lenders. Staying current on these obligations can indirectly:

    • Improve one’s credit profile
    • Reduce reliance on high-cost financial products
    • Create a foundation for more favorable credit opportunities in the future

    Pro Tip: Set up auto-pay with your lender to reduce the risk of late payments and streamline your debt management.

    Not a Cure-All, But a Strategic Lifeline

    ZippyLoan should not be mistaken for a comprehensive financial solution. It does not replace savings, long-term financial planning, or high-limit lending institutions. However, in a moment of urgency, it provides:

    • Access to legitimate capital quickly
    • A structured process for comparing real offers
    • A confidential, secure lending experience with no upfront obligation

    Financial help shouldn’t take weeks—ZippyLoan matches you with lenders in minutes. Apply now and solve your money stress fast!

    Final Thoughts – Is ZippyLoan the Right Fit for You?

    A Streamlined Option for Fast, Flexible Lending

    ZippyLoan presents a compelling solution for borrowers seeking fast personal loans, especially those facing urgent cash needs or working with less-than-perfect credit. As a digital loan marketplace, ZippyLoan simplifies the borrowing experience by matching applicants with a variety of lenders through one secure, paperless process—often resulting in loan offers within minutes and funds by the next business day.

    If you’re navigating a financial emergency—whether it’s an unexpected repair bill, rent due, or a lapse in income—ZippyLoan’s speed and ease of use may make it a standout option. Unlike traditional banks or high-cost payday lenders, ZippyLoan offers a network-based approach that:

    • Supports bad credit borrowers
    • Allows for customized loan terms
    • Provides fast access to multiple offers
    • Requires no upfront fees to apply

    Ideal for:

    • Borrowers in need of same-day or next-day funding
    • Individuals without strong credit history who need access to legitimate lenders
    • Anyone looking to avoid payday loan traps by opting for structured installment loans

    May Not Be Ideal for:

    • Those seeking loan amounts above $15,000
    • Borrowers with excellent credit who can access lower-rate financing through a bank or credit union
    • Individuals uncomfortable comparing multiple offers online

    Use Responsibly

    It’s important to remember that a personal loan—no matter how fast or flexible—represents a financial obligation. Before accepting any offer, carefully review:

    • The full repayment schedule
    • All fees and APR disclosures
    • How loan payments will fit into your monthly budget

    Disclaimer: ZippyLoan is not a direct lender. All terms are set by third-party lenders. Always check the official ZippyLoan website for the most accurate and up-to-date details. Pricing is subject to change at any time.

    Final Recommendation

    If you need money quickly and value the flexibility of comparing multiple offers, ZippyLoan is a solid platform that delivers speed, convenience, and access. It’s not a long-term financial solution, but as a short-term lending bridge, it can provide vital relief during moments of financial uncertainty.

    Always borrow responsibly and consider how short-term loans fit into your broader financial plan.

    Real money, real fast—ZippyLoan delivers loan offers online with no pressure to accept. Apply now for funding options that fit your needs!

    Frequently Asked Questions (ZippyLoan FAQ)

    What is ZippyLoan and how does it work?

    ZippyLoan is a digital loan marketplace that matches borrowers with a network of independent lenders offering fast personal loans. Users complete a single online application and, within minutes, can be connected with lenders offering loan amounts from $100 to $15,000. The platform supports a wide range of credit profiles, including those with bad credit or limited credit history.

    Is ZippyLoan a direct lender?

    No. ZippyLoan is not a lender. It operates as a loan matching service, helping users find lenders who meet their needs. All decisions regarding loan approval, terms, interest rates, and funding are made by the individual lenders in ZippyLoan’s network.

    Disclaimer: All loan terms are established directly between the borrower and lender. ZippyLoan does not control the underwriting process or guarantee funding.

    How fast can I receive my loan?

    Borrowers who are approved by a lender may receive funds as soon as the next business day, depending on the lender and bank processing times. The application process itself typically takes only a few minutes.

    What types of loans can I get through ZippyLoan?

    Lenders in ZippyLoan’s network typically offer:

    • Installment loans online
    • Bad credit personal loans
    • Short-term emergency loans
    • Debt consolidation loans
    • Flexible repayment term loans (up to 60 months)

    These express lending options are designed to cover a wide variety of needs—from emergency expenses to home repairs.

    Can I apply for a loan with bad credit?

    Yes. ZippyLoan accepts applicants with all credit profiles, including those with bad credit, limited credit history, or previous financial difficulties. Many of its lending partners specialize in working with non-prime borrowers.

    Does applying with ZippyLoan affect my credit score?

    No. Submitting an initial application involves a soft credit pull and does not impact your credit score. If you choose to proceed with a loan offer, the lender may perform a hard credit inquiry before finalizing approval.

    What are the loan amounts and repayment terms available?

    Loan amounts typically range from $100 to $15,000, with repayment terms between 3 and 60 months. Monthly or bi-weekly repayment options may be available, depending on the lender.

    Disclaimer: Loan amounts, rates, and terms vary by lender and state. Always review loan documents carefully before accepting an offer.

    Is there a fee to use ZippyLoan?

    No. ZippyLoan does not charge any fees to use its platform. It is completely free to apply and review loan offers. However, individual lenders may charge:

    • Origination fees
    • Late payment fees
    • Non-sufficient funds (NSF) fees
    • Prepayment penalties (rare)

    Is my personal and financial information secure?

    Yes. ZippyLoan uses SSL encryption and adheres to strict data privacy protocols to ensure your information is protected during transmission. Data is only shared with lenders in the network to facilitate loan matching.

    Is ZippyLoan available in all U.S. states?

    ZippyLoan operates in most states, but some lenders may not offer services in certain locations due to state regulations. The application system automatically identifies location-based availability based on your ZIP code.

    Can I decline a loan offer?

    Yes. There is no obligation to accept any offer you receive. If the interest rate, terms, or lender policies don’t align with your needs, you are free to walk away without penalty.

    What can I use the loan for?

    Loans can typically be used for any legal and personal financial purpose, including:

    • Medical bills
    • Car or home repairs
    • Rent or utilities
    • Travel or relocation expenses
    • Consolidating high-interest credit card debt
    • Education or emergency expenses

    What should I know before accepting a loan?

    Before committing, carefully evaluate:

    • The APR (Annual Percentage Rate)
    • Total repayment amount
    • Loan fees and charges
    • Whether the payments are affordable on your current budget

    Get the cash you need without the wait—ZippyLoan connects you to lenders ready to fund your emergency. Apply now and breathe easier tomorrow!

    • Contact: Zippy Loan
    • Phone: 1-844-379-8621
    • Email: support@zippyloan.com

    Legal Disclaimer and Affiliate Disclosure

    The information provided in this content is for general informational and commercial purposes only. While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy, timeliness, and completeness of the information, no guarantees are offered, and all information is provided “as is” without warranty of any kind. In the event of any errors, omissions, or inaccuracies—whether typographical or factual—no liability will be assumed by the publisher, content distributors, affiliates, or any syndicated partners.

    This article may contain references or links to services, products, or websites operated by third parties. Any such references are provided for informational purposes only and do not constitute an endorsement, sponsorship, or recommendation of the third-party services or entities mentioned.

    Zippyloan is not a financial institution, lender, loan broker, or an agent of a lender or loan broker. It does not originate loans, participate in the approval or underwriting process, or influence lending decisions in any manner. Zippyloan operates solely as a free, no-obligation intermediary that connects individuals seeking personal loan opportunities with a network of independent lenders who may offer such services.

    By submitting information through Zippyloan’s platform, individuals authorize the sharing of that data—including, but not limited to, personally identifiable information such as name, address, employment history, and banking details—with lending partners to assess potential compatibility. This submission does not constitute a loan application. Rather, it enables lenders to determine whether a prospective borrower may preliminarily qualify as a viable lead under their internal lending criteria.

    Zippyloan receives compensation from lenders for facilitating these introductions. The company does not collect, store, or sell loan applications, nor does it intervene or assist in the completion of any actual loan documentation. Any required application, verification, underwriting, or final approval processes are entirely at the discretion of the participating lender. Lending partners may conduct independent verifications through agencies such as CLVerify, Teletrack, or Accurint, among others.

    Loan terms, interest rates, fees, and credit approvals are determined exclusively by the lender, and may vary based on a variety of factors including income, credit profile, state of residence, and individual lender policies. There is no guarantee of approval or any specific loan amount. Not all applicants will qualify for the maximum amount advertised. Loan availability may also be restricted by geographic or regulatory limitations. This service is not available to residents of New York, West Virginia, or Oregon.

    All prospective borrowers are advised to perform due diligence before entering into any loan agreement. Zippyloan does not provide financial advice, nor does it guarantee that any lender introduced through its platform is licensed or legally permitted to offer loans in a given state. Borrowers are responsible for reviewing all terms and disclosures presented by any lender they may engage with. Interest rates, repayment terms, and associated fees may change at any time and without notice.

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    This article may contain affiliate links, meaning the publisher may earn a commission if a reader chooses to engage with or purchase through a linked service. Such compensation has no impact on the objectivity, integrity, or factual basis of the information presented herein.

    The MIL Network –

    May 11, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Africa: Lamola calls for action on women’s heavy burden of conflict and war

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Women disproportionately shoulder the heaviest burdens during times of regional conflict and rising geo-political divisions – a stark reality underscored by Minister of International Relations and Cooperation Ronald Lamola.

    The Minister was speaking at the Solidarity Conference on Women, Peace and Security, held in Tshwane, on Friday.

    Lamola said the world is currently in a rapidly evolving geo-political environment “defined by rising global competition, changing alliances, contested international norms, economic volatility and escalating geo-political tensions”.

    “These deepening geo-political divisions are fuelling mistrust and threatening to undo hard-won progress in addressing global challenges such as poverty, armed conflicts, climate change, pandemics, nuclear proliferation and the rights and wellbeing of women and children.

    “In the midst of these constantly changing global dynamics, the world currently faces more than 50 ongoing armed conflicts spanning a wide range of regions and scales. In these conflicts, no region is spared. These conflicts have caused millions of deaths and displacement of refugees, human rights violations and infrastructure destruction. 

    “In all of this, women bear the heaviest burden as caregivers, as survivors, as protectors of families and communities. But some women are also actively fighting in the field, side by side with men,” the Minister said.

    According to United Nations Women, more than 600 million women and girls lived within 50km of conflict zones in 2023 – a rise of some 50% in the past decade.

    The international body also reports that the proportion of women killed in conflict doubled in 2023 and more than 3 500 cases of conflict-related sexual violence was recorded.

    Lamola said despite the circumstances, women are leaders in their own right and called on the international community to “also listen, learn and follow their lead”.

    “But women are not only victims. African women are leaders, mediators, healers and architects of peace. From the townships of South Africa to the highlands of Ethiopia and from the marketplace of the DRC to the refugee camps of Sudan, women are doing the daily, often invisible work of conflict resolution, mending broken social fabric, advocating for justice and demanding a seat at decision making processes.

    “African women are pioneering local peace processes, creating community resilience programmes, leading truth and reconciliation efforts and holding armed actors accountable,” he said.

    The Minister noted that although much has been done to foster women inclusion in security structures in Africa, “women are not easily found in peace negotiation tables”.

    “We cannot talk about Africa’s future without talking about the safety and dignity of African women. 

    “We cannot dream of unity while half the population is still denied a voice in decisions that shape our collective destiny, and we cannot build peace without those who have always been its most consistent guardians – our mothers, sisters, daughters and grandmothers,” Lamola said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

    May 11, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: Government Alleges San Diego County Brothers Obtained More Than $8 Million in Pandemic Loans by Lying on Applications

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    SAN DIEGO – The United States has filed a civil complaint alleging that two brothers fraudulently obtained more than $8 million in pandemic-related loans by lying on applications and claiming funds for three businesses that don’t exist.

    The loans were issued through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), which was part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, a federal law enacted in March 2020 designed to provide emergency financial assistance to the millions of Americans suffering the economic effects caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The PPP offered relief by authorizing hundreds of billions of dollars in potentially-forgivable loans to small businesses for job retention and certain other expenses.

    The loan applications required the borrower to certify the type of business, the number of employees the business supported, and that the business was in operation as of February 15, 2020. Borrowers were eligible to seek forgiveness of the loans if they spent the loan proceeds on employee payroll and other eligible expenses.

    The civil complaint alleges that between March 25, 2021, and April 28, 2021, brothers Duraid A. Zaia and Kusay Karana obtained four PPP loans for four businesses, two purportedly owned by Zaia and two by Karana. The complaint alleges that the businesses were either non-existent or were grossly exaggerated in size. The complaint alleges that Zaia and Karana obtained approximately $8.3 million dollars in PPP loans through those fraudulent applications.

    In one example, the complaint alleges that Zaia applied for a PPP loan for a business called “Ramona Egg Ranch.” The complaint describes how Zaia certified in his application that this business employed 75 people and had annual payroll costs exceeding $9.5 million. But, according to the complaint, federal income tax returns that Zaia submitted in support of that loan reported annual payroll costs of just $62,848.

    In another example the complaint alleges that soon after Zaia submitted the Ramona Egg Ranch application, he submitted a second application for a business called “The Duriad A. Zaia Sole Proprietorship.” The complaint describes how Zaia certified that the business employed 137 people and that it was established in 2016. But, according to the complaint, the business could not have operated at all in 2020 because it did not have an Employer Identification Number (EIN) until March 30, 2021. As the complaint explains, without an EIN a business could not legally pay employees because it would not have a tax identification number to report employee wages, payroll taxes, or its own income taxes.

    The complaint also alleges that Zaia and Karana bolstered their loans by fabricating lists of employees who worked at their businesses. The complaint asserts that the lists of employees are fraudulent because they show a large percentage of employees simultaneously working at two or more different businesses on a full-time basis. In one example, the complaint describes how Zaia submitted a list of 108 employees that supposedly worked at one of Zaia’s businesses, and Karana submitted a list of 110 employees that supposedly worked at one of Karana’s businesses. But 41 people with the same name and the same full-time equivalent salary appeared on both lists.

    The complaint alleges that after Zaia and Karana were denied forgiveness of their loans and then defaulted on all their loans, the United States, through the Small Business Administration (SBA), repaid the lenders that issued the loans. The complaint asserts that taken together, the principal, interest, and processing fees for the brothers’ loans resulted in a loss of over $8.6 million to the United States.

    The United States’ complaint asserts that Zaia and Karana violated the False Claims Act (FCA). The United States filed its complaint after it intervened in a lawsuit filed by a private citizen against Zaia and the Ramona Egg Ranch. Under its so-called qui tam provisions, the FCA allows private citizens with knowledge of fraud against the federal government to sue on behalf of the government and potentially receive a portion of recovered funds.

    “COVID-relief programs were designed to help people and businesses under extreme financial stress during the pandemic,” said U.S. Attorney Adam Gordon. “This complaint seeks to hold accountable those who took advantage of those programs by fraud. My office will continue to pursue those who knowingly cheat taxpayers by abusing the Paycheck Protection Program and other pandemic-related programs.”

    “Intentional misrepresentation to gain access to SBA program funds intended for the nation’s small businesses will not be tolerated,” said SBA OIG’s Western Region Assistant Special Agent in Charge Jonathan Huang. “Our Office will remain relentless in the pursuit of wrongdoers who seek to exploit SBA’s vital economic programs. I want to thank the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and our law enforcement partners for their dedication and commitment to seeing justice served.”

    This case is being handled by Assistant U.S. Attorney Stephen H. Wong of the Civil Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of California. Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it by calling the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at 866-720-5721 or via the NCDF Web Complaint Form at: https://www.justice.gov/disaster-fraud/ncdf-disaster-complaint-form.

    The complaint contains allegations of unlawful conduct; the allegations must be proven in federal court.

    MIL Security OSI –

    May 10, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Speech by SCST at Europe Day Opening Ceremony (English only)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Following is the speech by the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism, Miss Rosanna Law, at the Europe Day Opening Ceremony today (May 10):

    Ambassador Harvey Rouse, Head of the EU (European Union) Office to Hong Kong and Macao, Consuls General (of European Union Member States), distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, dear French little friends over there,

    Good afternoon. It gives me great pleasure to join you at the opening of Europe Day Festival. And actually indeed, thank you very much for the support that I have got from different Consuls General ever since my appointment to the Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism. I have actually seen quite a number of you over different events in the last five months.
     
    On today’s special occasion, I would like to highlight the pivotal role Hong Kong plays as an East-meets-West centre for international cultural exchange. Hong Kong has deep-rooted cultural origin and bond from the Mainland of China, but we also have for decades cultivated strong cultural ties with foreign countries, including the European Union (EU) and its member states. Through regular exchanges, we have built a solid foundation of mutual understanding and collaboration. I am most delighted to learn from Ambassador Rouse that our local artists, Opera Hong Kong, will be performing “The Story of Carmen”, a classic European Opera, at today’s Festival. In fact, Carmen, was also performed at our Hong Kong Arts Festival earlier this year and I was one of the audience enjoying it. This is an example of how we can bring talent and tradition from different parts of the world, showcasing our efforts and achievements in promoting cultural exchange and collaboration.

    Hong Kong will continue to leverage our distinct institutional strengths under “one country, two systems” to “bring in” diverse cultures from around the world while enabling Chinese culture to “go global”.

    Hong Kong’s creative industries are now economic drivers for our economy. The Greater Bay Area Development and the Belt and Road Initiative provide unprecedented opportunities for our creative talents to shine on the global stage. By working closely with EU member states, we aim to unlock even greater potential for cultural exchanges and economic growth. Thank you very much for having our local Hong Kong artist to do the backdrop named after this meaningful event.

    Sports is another area under my portfolio that is full of exciting opportunities. The Kai Tak Sports Park, Hong Kong’s largest-ever sports infrastructure, was officially commissioned in March this year. I am sure many of you were among the first to enjoy our signature rugby event, Hong Kong Sevens, at this state-of-the-art stadium in end March. Building on that success, we hosted mega international and local concerts in April, each drawing over 40 000 fans per show. And I believe quite a number of you were there for the Coldplay concert either. We have another series of concerts this weekend as well called Mayday from Taiwan, who is also performing in Hong Kong and they pledged to come back every May to perform here. We will fully utilise the opportunities that this new venue present to Hong Kong and stage more mega sports events and competitions for the enjoyment of all. And of course, larger venue means larger parties. As some of you may know, we will soon welcome international football club teams to play at both the Hong Kong Stadium and the Kai Tak Stadium in end May and late July, featuring Manchester United versus Hong Kong, China Representative Team, Liverpool versus AC Milan from Italy, as well as Arsenal versus Tottenham Hotspur. To sports fans from around the world and particularly the European Union – please stay tuned for more exciting sports events in Hong Kong later this year. Through these sporting events, my bureau will continue our efforts in fostering greater passion for sports.

    On tourism, leveraging the robust foundation built over the years, we aspire to further consolidate Hong Kong’s position as a premier world-class tourism destination. With the concerted efforts of the Government and industry players, we witness a strong comeback of our tourism industry after the pandemic. In the first four months of 2025, we welcomed a total of 16 million visitors, representing an increase by 1.2 times as compared to the same period in 2023 when Hong Kong started to resume normal travel. The rebound is particularly strong among visitors from the European Union, which register a surge by 1.4 times compared to 2023. Quoting the Labour Day Golden Week as another example, we recorded a total of around 1.1 million inbound visitors to Hong Kong, among which the number of non-Mainland visitors was around 180 000, representing a year-on-year increase of about 31 per cent. These underscore the resilience of our tourism industry and Hong Kong’s enduring appeal as a world-class travel destination. To ensure continued growth, the Government promulgated the Development Blueprint for Hong Kong’s Tourism Industry 2.0 last December, setting out our vision and mission over the next five years. With the steadfast support and contribution of our industry partners, I am confident that we will reach new heights on tourism in the years to come.

    Before I close, I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the European Union for organising this wonderful event of Europe Day and subsequent events as outlined by Ambassador Rouse just now. I wish it every success and everyone an enjoyable time. Thank you.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    May 10, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Isabel Schnabel: Keeping a steady hand in an unsteady world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at Hoover Monetary Policy Conference “Finishing the Job and New Challenges”, Stanford University

    Stanford, 10 May 2025

    Standard theory of monetary policy rests on a simple premise: a stable relationship between inflation and the output gap. This is the logic behind the Phillips curve, which, in its most common form, relates inflation to a measure of economic slack, expected inflation and supply shocks.[1]

    The relationship between output and inflation was already under scrutiny well before the pandemic.

    After the global financial crisis of 2008, inflation didn’t fall nearly as much as had been implied by conventional Phillips curve estimates. And once economies around the world recovered and unemployment fell, the bounce-back in inflation fell short of model predictions.

    This is why that episode is known as the period of “missing deflation” and “missing inflation”.[2]

    The situation changed fundamentally in the aftermath of the pandemic, when the relationship between inflation and the output gap proved to be much stronger than what would have been expected based on historical estimates. We observed a noticeably steeper Phillips curve across advanced economies, including the euro area (Slide 2).[3]

    In my remarks today, I would like to draw lessons from the instability of the Phillips curve over the past 20 years for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. I will argue that the evidence of a re-flattening of the Phillips curve after the long period of high inflation suggests that, in the euro area, the most appropriate policy response to the potential risks to price stability arising from fiscal expansion and protectionism is to keep a steady hand and maintain rates close to where they are today – that is, firmly in neutral territory.

    Monetary policy and the slope of the Phillips curve

    The slope of the Phillips curve has first-order implications for the conduct of monetary policy.

    If the curve is steep, as it appeared to be in recent years, monetary policy is highly effective in reducing inflation, with only a limited impact on growth and employment. The smaller “sacrifice ratio” suggests that central banks should react more forcefully to deviations of inflation from target, even when the economy is hit by a supply shock that pushes inflation up and output down.[4]

    A steep Phillips curve hence improves the trade-off facing central banks, weakening the case for “looking through”, as forceful policy action minimises the risks of inflation expectations unanchoring and of inflation becoming entrenched.[5]

    Policy prescriptions differ fundamentally if the Phillips curve is flat.

    In this case, a large policy impulse is required to move output sufficiently to generate aggregate price effects. It can then be optimal for policy to tolerate moderate deviations of inflation from target, as the cost of closing a small inflation gap relative to the target may exceed the benefits.

    This prescription holds in both directions.

    When inflation is above the target, a flat Phillips curve would require a sharp rise in policy rates to bring medium-term inflation down from, say, 2.3% to 2%. Such a course of action may imply a substantial rise in unemployment and may thus not be welfare-improving for society at large – a trade-off central banks may face during the last mile of disinflation.[6]

    The experience of the 2010s, when inflation was persistently below the target, demonstrates that the argument also holds in the opposite direction.

    If bringing inflation up from 1.7% to 2%, for example, requires purchasing a large fraction of outstanding government bonds and making potentially time-inconsistent promises about the future path of interest rates, then the central bank must consider carefully whether the benefits outweigh the costs, such as making losses in the future, market dysfunction, rising wealth inequality, financial instability and threats to its reputation.[7]

    The role of inflation expectations

    However, the ability to tolerate moderate deviations of inflation from target critically hinges on a firm anchoring of inflation expectations – that is, a low sensitivity of inflation expectations to realised inflation.

    If inflation expectations are well-anchored, policymakers can tolerate moderate deviations from target, as fluctuations in inflation tend to fade away. If, however, inflation expectations are at risk of unanchoring, central banks should act forcefully.[8]

    There are two challenges to this strategy.

    One is that the anchoring of inflation expectations is endogenous. Central banks themselves can cause an unanchoring if inaction in the face of price shocks is perceived as weakening its commitment to securing price stability.[9]

    History shows that it can be costly to reestablish the credibility of the nominal anchor once it has been lost. This is also because inflation expectations are path-dependent. Research shows that the experience of high inflation may raise the sensitivity of inflation expectations to new inflation surprises.[10]

    The other challenge is that different measures of inflation expectations often yield different results (Slide 3). As such, robust trends cannot easily be identified in real time, much like the slope of the Phillips curve.[11]

    Measures of inflation expectations can even point in opposite directions. Research from the early days of the pandemic showed that most consumers expected the pandemic to raise prices, contrary to the views held by professional forecasters at the time.[12]

    State-dependent pricing and tight labour markets can explain steeper Phillips curve and post-pandemic inflation surge

    The recent period of high inflation illustrates how sensitive policy conclusions can be to the assessment of the slope of the Phillips curve and to measures of inflation expectations that central banks use in their analysis.

    Two key theories have been proposed to explain the post-pandemic inflation surge.[13]

    The first relates to firms’ price-setting behaviour.

    Standard New Keynesian models assume that the probability of firms resetting their prices is constant over time. This is a fair description of aggregate price movements when inflation is low and aggregate shocks are small (Slide 4).

    However, the past few years have demonstrated that this “linear” relationship breaks down in the face of large shocks.[14] When marginal costs increase rapidly and threaten to erode profit margins, firms tend to raise their prices more frequently. As a result, the Phillips curve steepens.

    This feedback loop is strongly asymmetric.[15] It acts as an inflation accelerator when firms face positive demand or adverse cost-push shocks.[16] But it does little to firms’ pricing strategies in the face of disinflationary shocks due to downward price rigidities.

    This helps explain why inflation did not fall much when the pandemic broke out but increased sharply after the reopening of our economies (Slide 5).[17]

    The second theory relates to the tightness of the labour market.

    Downward nominal wage rigidity has been a key factor explaining the “missing deflation” in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.[18] If nominal wages do not fall, or fall only very slowly, firms’ marginal costs change only moderately, and hence disinflationary pressures face a natural lower bound, even if slack is large.

    But when the labour market is tight, wages are more flexible as firms outbid each other in securing their desired workforce.

    Benigno and Eggertsson show that this channel led to a non-linear inflation surge in the United States whenever the number of job vacancies exceeded the number of unemployed workers (Slide 6).[19] In the euro area, the threshold was lower, but the curve still exhibited strong signs of non-linearity.

    Rising near-term inflation expectations may have shifted the Phillips curve up

    New research for the United States, however, suggests that the evidence in favour of the second theory is not very robust.

    Specifically, the finding of non-linearity depends critically on which measure is used to control for inflation expectations: non-linearity holds when controlling for expectations of professional forecasters, but it disappears once inflation expectations of households and firms are considered.[20]

    In other words, it is conceivable that the Phillips curve did not become steeper but rather shifted upwards as inflation expectations rose.[21] Non-linearity has also been rejected recently using a similar approach based on regional data for the euro area.[22]

    Moreover, the expectations that are relevant for such an upward shift are not necessarily the longer-term expectations that central banks typically pay most attention to.

    These have remained remarkably stable over the past few years (Slide 7).

    Rather, inflation expectations over the near term, such as the next 12 months, may be more important in driving macroeconomic outcomes.

    Bernanke and Blanchard, for example, show that one-year-ahead inflation expectations explain a significant share of the recent marked rise in nominal wages, and hence inflation, in the United States.[23] Similar evidence has been found for the euro area and other advanced economies.[24]

    Again, there appears to be an asymmetry: the risks that the Phillips curve shifts downwards are substantially lower. Research shows that consumers tend to respond more to inflationary than disinflationary news, as households value increases in their purchasing power and as they pay less attention to inflation when it is low.[25]

    The impact of tariffs on inflation in the euro area

    Understanding the reasons behind the recent inflation surge is not only important from a conceptual perspective. It also matters for setting monetary policy today, as we are once again confronted with historically large shocks.

    For central banks, this is a difficult environment to navigate.

    Memories of high inflation are still fresh after a long period of sharply rising prices. And just as during the pandemic, there is considerable uncertainty about how firms and households are going to respond to shocks that are largely outside the historical empirical range.

    Ultimately, the impact of current shocks on prices and wages, and hence the appropriate monetary policy response, will depend on the shape and location of the Phillips curve.

    Monetary policy should focus on the medium term and underlying inflation

    Let me illustrate this by looking at the euro area.

    Given the lags in policy transmission, the relevant horizon for monetary policy is the medium term. The past few years, however, demonstrated that inflation forecasting at times of large structural shocks is inherently difficult and plagued by large uncertainty.

    For this reason, the ECB and other central banks have increasingly turned to a data-dependent approach to monetary policy, where the observed dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission are used to cross-check the inflation projections.[26]

    This approach remains valid today.[27] But data dependence is not in contrast to being forward-looking.

    In the current situation, the high level of economic uncertainty, together with the sharp fall in energy prices and a stronger euro exchange rate, will likely dampen headline inflation in the short run, potentially pushing it below our 2% target.

    The question is whether these developments provide meaningful signals about the net impact of current shocks on medium-term inflation.

    During the pandemic, for example, a strong appreciation of the euro against the US dollar, by nearly 14% over seven months, and a marked decline in energy prices were followed by a historical inflation surge.

    Data dependency hence requires examining the potential channels through which current shocks could affect underlying inflation over the medium term.

    In the euro area, there are two main forces that could have the size and persistence to pull underlying inflation sustainably away from our 2% medium-term target.

    One is fiscal policy, which is set to expand on a scale unseen outside periods of deep economic contraction.

    Germany has eased its constitutional debt brake for defence-related spending, and has committed to spending €500 billion, or more than 10% of GDP, on infrastructure and the green transition over the next 12 years. In addition, the European Commission has invited Member States to activate the national escape clause to accommodate increased defence expenditure across the EU.

    The impact of these measures on inflation will depend on how they are implemented, especially their impact on the supply side of the economy. But on balance, the fiscal impulse is likely to put upward pressure on underlying inflation over the medium term.

    Global fragmentation is the second force that could have a lasting impact on prices and wages.

    As we speak, the scale and scope of tariffs, the extent of retaliation as well as how financial markets respond to these developments all remain highly uncertain.

    Ongoing negotiations are a sign that mutually beneficial agreements may still be reached. An ideal outcome – the “zero-for-zero” tariff agreement advocated by the European Commission – could even boost growth and employment on both sides of the Atlantic.

    However, should these negotiations fail, the euro area will simultaneously face adverse supply and demand shocks, as the EU has announced that it will retaliate against higher tariffs.

    Similar to the pandemic, assessing the relative strength of these forces is inherently difficult. Overall, however, there are risks that a lasting and meaningful increase in tariffs will reinforce the upward pressure on underlying inflation arising from higher fiscal spending over the medium term.

    To see this, it is useful to look at the factors driving the macroeconomic propagation of tariffs.

    Euro area foreign demand may prove resilient, with limited effects on inflation

    The severity of the negative demand shock will depend on two factors.

    One is the hit to economic activity in the United States and to global demand from raising tariffs across the board. Under the 2 April tariff rates, the United States will face a supply shock of historic proportions. Inflation is poised to rise, real incomes to fall and unemployment to increase. Retaliatory tariffs would weaken the economy further.

    So even in the absence of demand reallocation, foreign demand can be expected to decline if there is a broad increase in tariffs. The depth and persistence of this decline will also depend on other policies, such as tax and spending cuts and deregulation.

    And it will crucially depend on the final outcome of tariff negotiations, which is likely to be far less severe than the 2 April announcement.

    The second factor affecting the severity of the demand shock relates to the degree of demand reallocation – that is, the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic products. This elasticity is highly uncertain and varies across industries, products and countries.[28]

    However, a robust finding in the literature is that products that are more differentiated tend to be relatively price-inelastic, as they are more difficult to substitute.

    This has great relevance for the euro area, where the bulk of exports to the United States comprise pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and chemicals. These goods are typically highly differentiated (Slide 8, left-hand side).

    For instance, the supply of machines for producing semiconductors is basically monopolised by one Dutch company. Similarly, banknotes in the United States are overwhelmingly printed using machinery from a single German manufacturer.

    These and other machines are not easy to replace in the short run, giving euro area exporters leverage to pass higher costs on to foreign importers and limiting the hit to foreign demand.

    In addition, trade diversion may benefit euro area exports.

    Should prohibitive tariffs on Chinese imports remain in place, they will measurably raise the euro area’s price competitiveness in the US market. This can be expected to stimulate demand for euro area goods if there are no alternatives in the United States itself, especially as the number of industries in which both Chinese and euro area firms have comparative advantages has increased measurably over the past two decades (Slide 8, right-hand side).[29]

    New research corroborates this view.[30] It finds that the euro area stands to win in relative terms from a global trade war, as its net exports to the world will rise rather than fall as global demand is reallocated across the global network, offsetting the hit to domestic consumption.[31]

    In other words, for as long as tariffs are not prohibitive to trade and the uncertainty paralysing activity fades, aggregate euro area foreign demand may prove relatively resilient under a range of potential tariff outcomes.

    The recent appreciation of the euro does not refute this view.

    The euro has gone through two distinct phases since the US presidential election in November last year. It first depreciated in nominal effective terms by 3% until mid-February, before starting to appreciate. So, in net terms, the euro is trading just 2.6% above last year’s average.

    In addition, as most exports to the United States are invoiced in US dollars, the pass-through of changes in the exchange rate to import prices tends to be moderate – by recent estimates just about one-fifth.[32] And potential losses in price competitiveness in third countries are in part compensated by lower import costs, as euro area exports have, on average, a large import content.

    This price inelasticity is also reflected in recent surveys, with manufacturing firms reporting an expansion in output for the first time in more than two years (Slide 9). Also, fewer firms are reporting falling export orders.

    Even if part of these developments may reflect frontloading by firms, it is remarkable how resilient sentiment has remained in the face of the extraordinary increase in economic uncertainty.

    Supply shock puts upward pressure on inflation, reinforced by global supply chains

    The downward effects on inflation caused by lower demand are likely to be offset, partly or even fully, by the supply shock hitting the euro area through retaliatory tariffs imposed by the EU and other economies.

    The strength of this supply shock also depends on two factors.

    One is the extent to which firms pass higher tariffs on to consumers.

    In the United States, evidence from the 2018 tariff increase suggests that, in most cases, the pass-through to import prices was de facto complete.[33] At the same time, many firms chose to absorb part of the increase in import prices in their profit margins, thereby limiting the increase in consumer price inflation, at least in the short run.[34]

    Whether firms will respond similarly to a renewed rise in tariffs in the current environment is uncertain.

    On the one hand, the recent appreciation of the euro, if persistent, provides some margin for euro area firms to buffer cost increases from retaliatory tariffs. On the other hand, profit margins have already been squeezed by high wage growth and a sluggish economy, and the post-pandemic inflation surge may have lowered the bar for firms to pass higher costs on to consumers.

    Overall, recent surveys of companies in the United States and the euro area suggest that they plan to gradually pass higher tariffs on to consumers over the coming years.[35]

    In addition, in order to compensate for the hit to input costs, firms also tend to raise the prices of goods not directly affected by tariffs. There is evidence that retailers broadly adjust price markups even if only a subset of wholesale prices change.[36]

    The second, and related, factor determining the strength of the supply shock relates to global value chains.

    Unlike during the wave of protectionism in the 1930s, today the dominant share of international trade, about 70%, reflects multinational firms distributing production across countries and along the value chain to minimise costs. In this process, parts and components often cross borders many times.

    Prohibitive tariffs between the United States and China are already disrupting supply chains. Shipments of goods are declining, potentially causing future shortages of critical intermediate goods that could reverberate across the world.

    While current conditions are very different from those seen during the pandemic, when supply chain disruptions were a main factor driving the surge in inflation, the impact of tariffs is likely to be amplified as the increase in firms’ marginal costs propagates through the production network.

    ECB staff analysis shows that, even if the EU does not retaliate, higher production costs transmitted through global value chains could more than offset the disinflationary pressure coming from lower foreign demand, making tariffs inflationary overall (Slide 10, left-hand side).[37]

    These effects will become stronger with full retaliation, including intermediate goods. So far, the EU’s retaliatory measures have disproportionately targeted final consumer goods, such as beverages, food and home appliances – precisely to avoid broader cost effects being transmitted through value chains (Slide 10, right-hand side).

    But if the trade conflict intensifies, the scale of retaliation will widen and increasingly include intermediate goods, as these account for nearly 70% of euro area imports from the United States.

    In other words, retaliatory tariffs on intermediate goods would constitute a much broader cost-push shock for euro area firms, reminiscent of the post-pandemic supply chain disruptions.[38]

    It is possible that these effects will be mitigated by China redirecting goods originally destined for the United States towards the euro area and other economies at a discount.

    In practice, however, this mitigation channel is likely to be contained. India, for example, has already raised temporary tariffs on China to curb a surge in imports. Similarly, the European Commission has repeatedly clarified that it intends to protect euro area firms against dumping prices should imports from China rise significantly in response to the evolving trade conflict with the United States.[39]

    Policy implications

    How, then, should the ECB respond to the current shocks?

    The lessons from the post-pandemic surge in inflation suggest that, from today’s perspective, the appropriate course of action is to keep rates close to where they are today – that is, firmly in neutral territory.

    A “steady hand” policy provides the best insurance against a wide range of potential outcomes. In other words, it is robust to many contingencies.

    Specifically, it avoids reacting excessively to volatility in headline inflation at a time when domestic inflation remains sticky and new forces are putting upward pressure on underlying inflation over the medium term. Given lags in policy transmission, an accommodative policy stance could amplify risks to medium-term price stability.

    This steady hand policy also avoids overreacting to concerns that tariffs may destabilise inflation expectations once again.

    In recent months, households’ short-term inflation expectations have reversed and started rising again. According to the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey, expectations for inflation one year ahead increased to 2.9% in March from their trough of 2.4% in September 2024 (Slide 11, left-hand side). Qualitative inflation expectations, as measured by the European Commission, even rose to levels last seen in late 2022 (Slide 11, right-hand side).

    Currently, there are no indications that this rise is persistent, or that inflation expectations are at risk of unanchoring.

    Hence, we can afford to look through the rise in short-term inflation expectations. This could change if we see clear signs of a strong and front-loaded pass-through of potential tariff increases – something that could bring us back to the steep part of the Phillips curve. So far, however, evidence suggests that firms have notably slowed the frequency with which they revise their prices.

    A steady hand policy also addresses risks of a more substantial decline in aggregate demand in response to the trade conflict.

    If tight labour markets were the main culprit for the recent steepening of the Phillips curve, risks of a sharp decline in inflation caused by a rise in unemployment are much more moderate today.

    The reason for this is that in both the United States and the euro area, the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio has fallen markedly and is now at a level that suggests that labour markets are much more balanced (Slide 12).

    We are thus likely to be operating close to, or at, the flat part of the Phillips curve where a change in unemployment has only limited effects on underlying inflation, in stark contrast to the high inflation period.[40]

    We would only need to react more forcefully to the tariff shock if we observed a sharp deterioration in labour market conditions or an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside.

    Both seem unlikely at the current juncture.

    Despite the number of vacancies declining, the euro area labour market has proven resilient, with unemployment at a record low. And most measures of medium-term inflation expectations remain tilted to the upside, including those of professional forecasters (Slide 13).

    Conclusion

    My main message today, and with this I would like to conclude, is therefore simple: now is the time to keep a steady hand.

    In the current environment of elevated volatility, the ECB needs to remain focused on the medium term. Given long and variable transmission lags, reacting to short-term developments could result in the peak impact of our policy only unfolding when the current disinflationary forces have passed.

    Over the medium term, risks to euro area inflation are likely tilted to the upside, reflecting both the increase in fiscal spending and the risks of renewed cost-push shocks from tariffs propagating through global value chains.

    Therefore, from today’s perspective, an accommodative monetary policy stance would be inappropriate, also because recent inflation data suggest that past shocks may unwind more slowly than previously anticipated.

    By keeping interest rates near their current levels, we can be confident that monetary policy is neither excessively holding back growth and employment, nor stimulating it. We are thus in a good place to evaluate the likely future evolution of the economy and to take action if risks materialise that threaten price stability.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Economics –

    May 10, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Banking: Isabel Schnabel: Keeping a steady hand in an unsteady world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Isabel Schnabel, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at Hoover Monetary Policy Conference “Finishing the Job and New Challenges”, Stanford University

    Stanford, 10 May 2025

    Standard theory of monetary policy rests on a simple premise: a stable relationship between inflation and the output gap. This is the logic behind the Phillips curve, which, in its most common form, relates inflation to a measure of economic slack, expected inflation and supply shocks.[1]

    The relationship between output and inflation was already under scrutiny well before the pandemic.

    After the global financial crisis of 2008, inflation didn’t fall nearly as much as had been implied by conventional Phillips curve estimates. And once economies around the world recovered and unemployment fell, the bounce-back in inflation fell short of model predictions.

    This is why that episode is known as the period of “missing deflation” and “missing inflation”.[2]

    The situation changed fundamentally in the aftermath of the pandemic, when the relationship between inflation and the output gap proved to be much stronger than what would have been expected based on historical estimates. We observed a noticeably steeper Phillips curve across advanced economies, including the euro area (Slide 2).[3]

    In my remarks today, I would like to draw lessons from the instability of the Phillips curve over the past 20 years for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. I will argue that the evidence of a re-flattening of the Phillips curve after the long period of high inflation suggests that, in the euro area, the most appropriate policy response to the potential risks to price stability arising from fiscal expansion and protectionism is to keep a steady hand and maintain rates close to where they are today – that is, firmly in neutral territory.

    Monetary policy and the slope of the Phillips curve

    The slope of the Phillips curve has first-order implications for the conduct of monetary policy.

    If the curve is steep, as it appeared to be in recent years, monetary policy is highly effective in reducing inflation, with only a limited impact on growth and employment. The smaller “sacrifice ratio” suggests that central banks should react more forcefully to deviations of inflation from target, even when the economy is hit by a supply shock that pushes inflation up and output down.[4]

    A steep Phillips curve hence improves the trade-off facing central banks, weakening the case for “looking through”, as forceful policy action minimises the risks of inflation expectations unanchoring and of inflation becoming entrenched.[5]

    Policy prescriptions differ fundamentally if the Phillips curve is flat.

    In this case, a large policy impulse is required to move output sufficiently to generate aggregate price effects. It can then be optimal for policy to tolerate moderate deviations of inflation from target, as the cost of closing a small inflation gap relative to the target may exceed the benefits.

    This prescription holds in both directions.

    When inflation is above the target, a flat Phillips curve would require a sharp rise in policy rates to bring medium-term inflation down from, say, 2.3% to 2%. Such a course of action may imply a substantial rise in unemployment and may thus not be welfare-improving for society at large – a trade-off central banks may face during the last mile of disinflation.[6]

    The experience of the 2010s, when inflation was persistently below the target, demonstrates that the argument also holds in the opposite direction.

    If bringing inflation up from 1.7% to 2%, for example, requires purchasing a large fraction of outstanding government bonds and making potentially time-inconsistent promises about the future path of interest rates, then the central bank must consider carefully whether the benefits outweigh the costs, such as making losses in the future, market dysfunction, rising wealth inequality, financial instability and threats to its reputation.[7]

    The role of inflation expectations

    However, the ability to tolerate moderate deviations of inflation from target critically hinges on a firm anchoring of inflation expectations – that is, a low sensitivity of inflation expectations to realised inflation.

    If inflation expectations are well-anchored, policymakers can tolerate moderate deviations from target, as fluctuations in inflation tend to fade away. If, however, inflation expectations are at risk of unanchoring, central banks should act forcefully.[8]

    There are two challenges to this strategy.

    One is that the anchoring of inflation expectations is endogenous. Central banks themselves can cause an unanchoring if inaction in the face of price shocks is perceived as weakening its commitment to securing price stability.[9]

    History shows that it can be costly to reestablish the credibility of the nominal anchor once it has been lost. This is also because inflation expectations are path-dependent. Research shows that the experience of high inflation may raise the sensitivity of inflation expectations to new inflation surprises.[10]

    The other challenge is that different measures of inflation expectations often yield different results (Slide 3). As such, robust trends cannot easily be identified in real time, much like the slope of the Phillips curve.[11]

    Measures of inflation expectations can even point in opposite directions. Research from the early days of the pandemic showed that most consumers expected the pandemic to raise prices, contrary to the views held by professional forecasters at the time.[12]

    State-dependent pricing and tight labour markets can explain steeper Phillips curve and post-pandemic inflation surge

    The recent period of high inflation illustrates how sensitive policy conclusions can be to the assessment of the slope of the Phillips curve and to measures of inflation expectations that central banks use in their analysis.

    Two key theories have been proposed to explain the post-pandemic inflation surge.[13]

    The first relates to firms’ price-setting behaviour.

    Standard New Keynesian models assume that the probability of firms resetting their prices is constant over time. This is a fair description of aggregate price movements when inflation is low and aggregate shocks are small (Slide 4).

    However, the past few years have demonstrated that this “linear” relationship breaks down in the face of large shocks.[14] When marginal costs increase rapidly and threaten to erode profit margins, firms tend to raise their prices more frequently. As a result, the Phillips curve steepens.

    This feedback loop is strongly asymmetric.[15] It acts as an inflation accelerator when firms face positive demand or adverse cost-push shocks.[16] But it does little to firms’ pricing strategies in the face of disinflationary shocks due to downward price rigidities.

    This helps explain why inflation did not fall much when the pandemic broke out but increased sharply after the reopening of our economies (Slide 5).[17]

    The second theory relates to the tightness of the labour market.

    Downward nominal wage rigidity has been a key factor explaining the “missing deflation” in the aftermath of the global financial crisis.[18] If nominal wages do not fall, or fall only very slowly, firms’ marginal costs change only moderately, and hence disinflationary pressures face a natural lower bound, even if slack is large.

    But when the labour market is tight, wages are more flexible as firms outbid each other in securing their desired workforce.

    Benigno and Eggertsson show that this channel led to a non-linear inflation surge in the United States whenever the number of job vacancies exceeded the number of unemployed workers (Slide 6).[19] In the euro area, the threshold was lower, but the curve still exhibited strong signs of non-linearity.

    Rising near-term inflation expectations may have shifted the Phillips curve up

    New research for the United States, however, suggests that the evidence in favour of the second theory is not very robust.

    Specifically, the finding of non-linearity depends critically on which measure is used to control for inflation expectations: non-linearity holds when controlling for expectations of professional forecasters, but it disappears once inflation expectations of households and firms are considered.[20]

    In other words, it is conceivable that the Phillips curve did not become steeper but rather shifted upwards as inflation expectations rose.[21] Non-linearity has also been rejected recently using a similar approach based on regional data for the euro area.[22]

    Moreover, the expectations that are relevant for such an upward shift are not necessarily the longer-term expectations that central banks typically pay most attention to.

    These have remained remarkably stable over the past few years (Slide 7).

    Rather, inflation expectations over the near term, such as the next 12 months, may be more important in driving macroeconomic outcomes.

    Bernanke and Blanchard, for example, show that one-year-ahead inflation expectations explain a significant share of the recent marked rise in nominal wages, and hence inflation, in the United States.[23] Similar evidence has been found for the euro area and other advanced economies.[24]

    Again, there appears to be an asymmetry: the risks that the Phillips curve shifts downwards are substantially lower. Research shows that consumers tend to respond more to inflationary than disinflationary news, as households value increases in their purchasing power and as they pay less attention to inflation when it is low.[25]

    The impact of tariffs on inflation in the euro area

    Understanding the reasons behind the recent inflation surge is not only important from a conceptual perspective. It also matters for setting monetary policy today, as we are once again confronted with historically large shocks.

    For central banks, this is a difficult environment to navigate.

    Memories of high inflation are still fresh after a long period of sharply rising prices. And just as during the pandemic, there is considerable uncertainty about how firms and households are going to respond to shocks that are largely outside the historical empirical range.

    Ultimately, the impact of current shocks on prices and wages, and hence the appropriate monetary policy response, will depend on the shape and location of the Phillips curve.

    Monetary policy should focus on the medium term and underlying inflation

    Let me illustrate this by looking at the euro area.

    Given the lags in policy transmission, the relevant horizon for monetary policy is the medium term. The past few years, however, demonstrated that inflation forecasting at times of large structural shocks is inherently difficult and plagued by large uncertainty.

    For this reason, the ECB and other central banks have increasingly turned to a data-dependent approach to monetary policy, where the observed dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary transmission are used to cross-check the inflation projections.[26]

    This approach remains valid today.[27] But data dependence is not in contrast to being forward-looking.

    In the current situation, the high level of economic uncertainty, together with the sharp fall in energy prices and a stronger euro exchange rate, will likely dampen headline inflation in the short run, potentially pushing it below our 2% target.

    The question is whether these developments provide meaningful signals about the net impact of current shocks on medium-term inflation.

    During the pandemic, for example, a strong appreciation of the euro against the US dollar, by nearly 14% over seven months, and a marked decline in energy prices were followed by a historical inflation surge.

    Data dependency hence requires examining the potential channels through which current shocks could affect underlying inflation over the medium term.

    In the euro area, there are two main forces that could have the size and persistence to pull underlying inflation sustainably away from our 2% medium-term target.

    One is fiscal policy, which is set to expand on a scale unseen outside periods of deep economic contraction.

    Germany has eased its constitutional debt brake for defence-related spending, and has committed to spending €500 billion, or more than 10% of GDP, on infrastructure and the green transition over the next 12 years. In addition, the European Commission has invited Member States to activate the national escape clause to accommodate increased defence expenditure across the EU.

    The impact of these measures on inflation will depend on how they are implemented, especially their impact on the supply side of the economy. But on balance, the fiscal impulse is likely to put upward pressure on underlying inflation over the medium term.

    Global fragmentation is the second force that could have a lasting impact on prices and wages.

    As we speak, the scale and scope of tariffs, the extent of retaliation as well as how financial markets respond to these developments all remain highly uncertain.

    Ongoing negotiations are a sign that mutually beneficial agreements may still be reached. An ideal outcome – the “zero-for-zero” tariff agreement advocated by the European Commission – could even boost growth and employment on both sides of the Atlantic.

    However, should these negotiations fail, the euro area will simultaneously face adverse supply and demand shocks, as the EU has announced that it will retaliate against higher tariffs.

    Similar to the pandemic, assessing the relative strength of these forces is inherently difficult. Overall, however, there are risks that a lasting and meaningful increase in tariffs will reinforce the upward pressure on underlying inflation arising from higher fiscal spending over the medium term.

    To see this, it is useful to look at the factors driving the macroeconomic propagation of tariffs.

    Euro area foreign demand may prove resilient, with limited effects on inflation

    The severity of the negative demand shock will depend on two factors.

    One is the hit to economic activity in the United States and to global demand from raising tariffs across the board. Under the 2 April tariff rates, the United States will face a supply shock of historic proportions. Inflation is poised to rise, real incomes to fall and unemployment to increase. Retaliatory tariffs would weaken the economy further.

    So even in the absence of demand reallocation, foreign demand can be expected to decline if there is a broad increase in tariffs. The depth and persistence of this decline will also depend on other policies, such as tax and spending cuts and deregulation.

    And it will crucially depend on the final outcome of tariff negotiations, which is likely to be far less severe than the 2 April announcement.

    The second factor affecting the severity of the demand shock relates to the degree of demand reallocation – that is, the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic products. This elasticity is highly uncertain and varies across industries, products and countries.[28]

    However, a robust finding in the literature is that products that are more differentiated tend to be relatively price-inelastic, as they are more difficult to substitute.

    This has great relevance for the euro area, where the bulk of exports to the United States comprise pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and chemicals. These goods are typically highly differentiated (Slide 8, left-hand side).

    For instance, the supply of machines for producing semiconductors is basically monopolised by one Dutch company. Similarly, banknotes in the United States are overwhelmingly printed using machinery from a single German manufacturer.

    These and other machines are not easy to replace in the short run, giving euro area exporters leverage to pass higher costs on to foreign importers and limiting the hit to foreign demand.

    In addition, trade diversion may benefit euro area exports.

    Should prohibitive tariffs on Chinese imports remain in place, they will measurably raise the euro area’s price competitiveness in the US market. This can be expected to stimulate demand for euro area goods if there are no alternatives in the United States itself, especially as the number of industries in which both Chinese and euro area firms have comparative advantages has increased measurably over the past two decades (Slide 8, right-hand side).[29]

    New research corroborates this view.[30] It finds that the euro area stands to win in relative terms from a global trade war, as its net exports to the world will rise rather than fall as global demand is reallocated across the global network, offsetting the hit to domestic consumption.[31]

    In other words, for as long as tariffs are not prohibitive to trade and the uncertainty paralysing activity fades, aggregate euro area foreign demand may prove relatively resilient under a range of potential tariff outcomes.

    The recent appreciation of the euro does not refute this view.

    The euro has gone through two distinct phases since the US presidential election in November last year. It first depreciated in nominal effective terms by 3% until mid-February, before starting to appreciate. So, in net terms, the euro is trading just 2.6% above last year’s average.

    In addition, as most exports to the United States are invoiced in US dollars, the pass-through of changes in the exchange rate to import prices tends to be moderate – by recent estimates just about one-fifth.[32] And potential losses in price competitiveness in third countries are in part compensated by lower import costs, as euro area exports have, on average, a large import content.

    This price inelasticity is also reflected in recent surveys, with manufacturing firms reporting an expansion in output for the first time in more than two years (Slide 9). Also, fewer firms are reporting falling export orders.

    Even if part of these developments may reflect frontloading by firms, it is remarkable how resilient sentiment has remained in the face of the extraordinary increase in economic uncertainty.

    Supply shock puts upward pressure on inflation, reinforced by global supply chains

    The downward effects on inflation caused by lower demand are likely to be offset, partly or even fully, by the supply shock hitting the euro area through retaliatory tariffs imposed by the EU and other economies.

    The strength of this supply shock also depends on two factors.

    One is the extent to which firms pass higher tariffs on to consumers.

    In the United States, evidence from the 2018 tariff increase suggests that, in most cases, the pass-through to import prices was de facto complete.[33] At the same time, many firms chose to absorb part of the increase in import prices in their profit margins, thereby limiting the increase in consumer price inflation, at least in the short run.[34]

    Whether firms will respond similarly to a renewed rise in tariffs in the current environment is uncertain.

    On the one hand, the recent appreciation of the euro, if persistent, provides some margin for euro area firms to buffer cost increases from retaliatory tariffs. On the other hand, profit margins have already been squeezed by high wage growth and a sluggish economy, and the post-pandemic inflation surge may have lowered the bar for firms to pass higher costs on to consumers.

    Overall, recent surveys of companies in the United States and the euro area suggest that they plan to gradually pass higher tariffs on to consumers over the coming years.[35]

    In addition, in order to compensate for the hit to input costs, firms also tend to raise the prices of goods not directly affected by tariffs. There is evidence that retailers broadly adjust price markups even if only a subset of wholesale prices change.[36]

    The second, and related, factor determining the strength of the supply shock relates to global value chains.

    Unlike during the wave of protectionism in the 1930s, today the dominant share of international trade, about 70%, reflects multinational firms distributing production across countries and along the value chain to minimise costs. In this process, parts and components often cross borders many times.

    Prohibitive tariffs between the United States and China are already disrupting supply chains. Shipments of goods are declining, potentially causing future shortages of critical intermediate goods that could reverberate across the world.

    While current conditions are very different from those seen during the pandemic, when supply chain disruptions were a main factor driving the surge in inflation, the impact of tariffs is likely to be amplified as the increase in firms’ marginal costs propagates through the production network.

    ECB staff analysis shows that, even if the EU does not retaliate, higher production costs transmitted through global value chains could more than offset the disinflationary pressure coming from lower foreign demand, making tariffs inflationary overall (Slide 10, left-hand side).[37]

    These effects will become stronger with full retaliation, including intermediate goods. So far, the EU’s retaliatory measures have disproportionately targeted final consumer goods, such as beverages, food and home appliances – precisely to avoid broader cost effects being transmitted through value chains (Slide 10, right-hand side).

    But if the trade conflict intensifies, the scale of retaliation will widen and increasingly include intermediate goods, as these account for nearly 70% of euro area imports from the United States.

    In other words, retaliatory tariffs on intermediate goods would constitute a much broader cost-push shock for euro area firms, reminiscent of the post-pandemic supply chain disruptions.[38]

    It is possible that these effects will be mitigated by China redirecting goods originally destined for the United States towards the euro area and other economies at a discount.

    In practice, however, this mitigation channel is likely to be contained. India, for example, has already raised temporary tariffs on China to curb a surge in imports. Similarly, the European Commission has repeatedly clarified that it intends to protect euro area firms against dumping prices should imports from China rise significantly in response to the evolving trade conflict with the United States.[39]

    Policy implications

    How, then, should the ECB respond to the current shocks?

    The lessons from the post-pandemic surge in inflation suggest that, from today’s perspective, the appropriate course of action is to keep rates close to where they are today – that is, firmly in neutral territory.

    A “steady hand” policy provides the best insurance against a wide range of potential outcomes. In other words, it is robust to many contingencies.

    Specifically, it avoids reacting excessively to volatility in headline inflation at a time when domestic inflation remains sticky and new forces are putting upward pressure on underlying inflation over the medium term. Given lags in policy transmission, an accommodative policy stance could amplify risks to medium-term price stability.

    This steady hand policy also avoids overreacting to concerns that tariffs may destabilise inflation expectations once again.

    In recent months, households’ short-term inflation expectations have reversed and started rising again. According to the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey, expectations for inflation one year ahead increased to 2.9% in March from their trough of 2.4% in September 2024 (Slide 11, left-hand side). Qualitative inflation expectations, as measured by the European Commission, even rose to levels last seen in late 2022 (Slide 11, right-hand side).

    Currently, there are no indications that this rise is persistent, or that inflation expectations are at risk of unanchoring.

    Hence, we can afford to look through the rise in short-term inflation expectations. This could change if we see clear signs of a strong and front-loaded pass-through of potential tariff increases – something that could bring us back to the steep part of the Phillips curve. So far, however, evidence suggests that firms have notably slowed the frequency with which they revise their prices.

    A steady hand policy also addresses risks of a more substantial decline in aggregate demand in response to the trade conflict.

    If tight labour markets were the main culprit for the recent steepening of the Phillips curve, risks of a sharp decline in inflation caused by a rise in unemployment are much more moderate today.

    The reason for this is that in both the United States and the euro area, the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio has fallen markedly and is now at a level that suggests that labour markets are much more balanced (Slide 12).

    We are thus likely to be operating close to, or at, the flat part of the Phillips curve where a change in unemployment has only limited effects on underlying inflation, in stark contrast to the high inflation period.[40]

    We would only need to react more forcefully to the tariff shock if we observed a sharp deterioration in labour market conditions or an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside.

    Both seem unlikely at the current juncture.

    Despite the number of vacancies declining, the euro area labour market has proven resilient, with unemployment at a record low. And most measures of medium-term inflation expectations remain tilted to the upside, including those of professional forecasters (Slide 13).

    Conclusion

    My main message today, and with this I would like to conclude, is therefore simple: now is the time to keep a steady hand.

    In the current environment of elevated volatility, the ECB needs to remain focused on the medium term. Given long and variable transmission lags, reacting to short-term developments could result in the peak impact of our policy only unfolding when the current disinflationary forces have passed.

    Over the medium term, risks to euro area inflation are likely tilted to the upside, reflecting both the increase in fiscal spending and the risks of renewed cost-push shocks from tariffs propagating through global value chains.

    Therefore, from today’s perspective, an accommodative monetary policy stance would be inappropriate, also because recent inflation data suggest that past shocks may unwind more slowly than previously anticipated.

    By keeping interest rates near their current levels, we can be confident that monetary policy is neither excessively holding back growth and employment, nor stimulating it. We are thus in a good place to evaluate the likely future evolution of the economy and to take action if risks materialise that threaten price stability.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    May 10, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Cook, Opening Remarks on Productivity Dynamics

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Good afternoon. Thank you for moderating, Peter. It is an honor to be with you today, and it is always great to be back at Stanford and at the Hoover Institution. I spent several formative years of my career here, including as a National Fellow, and always enjoy returning. And it is a privilege to share the panel with Dr. Schnabel, and Presidents Musalem and Hammack. I look forward to our discussion.1
    Before that, I would like to briefly discuss a topic I see as critical to the future path of the economy: productivity growth. Productivity growth has been surprisingly strong in recent years, and this has influenced my view of the appropriate stance of monetary policy. I will also explore two ongoing developments that are likely to influence productivity growth moving forward: changes to trade policy and the wider adoption of artificial intelligence (AI). Productivity dynamics are something I have long studied closely and will continue to pay careful attention to as I consider the appropriate stance of monetary policy.
    It is helpful to start by looking back about three years to the middle of 2022. At that point, the global economy had largely reopened after pandemic closures, a historic amount of federal support had been deployed, and unemployment was falling toward a half-century low. But supply disruptions persisted, and the 12-month inflation rate reached its peak at over 7 percent. The challenge for Federal Reserve policymakers was clear: Move inflation back toward its 2 percent target while maintaining the health of the labor market. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), which I joined that year, began to raise the federal funds rate from near zero, ultimately reaching just above 5 percent by mid-2023. Many forecasters predicted that a recession in 2023 was more likely than not. And yet, one did not materialize. Instead, inflation came down considerably, while unemployment remained low. How did this unusual and welcome outcome happen?
    Two notable factors were the unwinding of pandemic-era conditions that previously constrained the supply of both goods and labor in conjunction with restrictive monetary policy that contributed to a moderation in aggregate demand. Today, I would like to call attention to a third factor: a greater-than-usual increase in productivity during the pandemic recovery.
    Prior to the pandemic, from 2007 to 2019, productivity growth in the business sector averaged 1.5 percent annually. In the past five years productivity growth accelerated to 2 percent. While some of the productivity gains may reflect situations unique to the reopening of the economy, it is notable that the level of productivity, as measured by output per hour, remained above trend throughout 2023 and 2024.2 This increase in productivity was partially driven by pandemic labor shortages themselves. When it was difficult to find employees, as many Americans retired or stepped out of the labor force, many businesses innovated. For example, restaurants adopted online ordering apps and retailers accelerated the implementation of self-checkout systems.3 These changes improved efficiency and contributed to an expansion in potential gross domestic product (GDP). As a result, price pressures eased from their peak while demand remained strong.
    Improved productivity is widely beneficial to the economy. It allows workers to receive pay raises without companies needing to further increase prices and helps ensure consumers have access to the products and services they demand. Furthermore, and particularly relevant to me as a monetary policymaker, a rise in potential output lessens the need to use monetary policy to slow demand. This effect is good for the obvious reason that it allows for increasing economic growth without higher inflation. But importantly, it also lowers the risk of a policy overshoot that could cause the unemployment rate to rise.
    Now that I have reviewed the role that productivity growth played in the post-pandemic recovery, I would like to focus on two countervailing forces on productivity that I am currently studying. These are changes to trade policy and the growth of AI.
    I expect to see a drag on productivity in the near term stemming from the recent changes to trade policy and the related uncertainty, for several reasons. First, uncertainty around trade policy is likely to reduce business investment going forward. At this time, firms do not know the ultimate level and incidence of tariffs or their duration. Firms contemplating large investments might observe conditions that could hold under the paradox of thrift, wondering whether they could get a better deal if they just wait. Higher costs of imported materials and components could also cause firms to delay or scale back their investment plans. This reduction in capital formation can lead to slower technological innovation and adoption and decreased overall efficiency in production processes. Second, protectionist trade policies, while intended to support domestic industries, may inadvertently lead to a less competitive environment, if they prop up less efficient firms. And third, any supply-chain disruptions resulting from the policy changes would make production slower and less efficient. These disruptions can lead to inventory mismatches, production delays, and increased costs as firms scramble to find alternative suppliers or redesign their products to accommodate new input constraints. This set of disruptions could pose a particular challenge for monetary policymakers. A reduction in potential GDP means less slack in the economy, which, in turn, means greater inflationary pressure. According to the Taylor Principle, for which no explanation is needed at this conference, taming higher inflation requires a higher policy rate. I believe that keeping inflation expectations credibly anchored is essential. Therefore, all else equal, lower productivity could cause me to support keeping rates at a higher level for longer.
    The second ongoing economic development I see altering productivity is the rapidly expanding use of AI. I view this emerging technology as likely to have a significant positive effect on productivity growth. In fact, I see AI as poised to be at least as transformative as other general purpose technologies, such as the printing press, the steam engine, and the internet. With wider adoption of AI, we could have a surge in potential output.
    As I have discussed in several recent speeches, AI has the potential to revolutionize numerous sectors of our economy.4 We already see AI assistants boosting productivity in customer service, software development, and medical diagnosis. AI’s ability to process and analyze vast amounts of data could lead to breakthroughs in scientific research and innovation, resulting in an increased arrival rate of new ideas, further amplifying its effect on productivity.
    Of course, an AI productivity boom would come with its own set of challenges. If potential output expands too rapidly, it could leave slack in the economy and the labor market. Moreover, the productivity gains from AI may not be uniform across all sectors, job types, or tasks, leading to a transitional period as the labor market adjusts. Despite these challenges, I am optimistic about AI and its potential to drive significant productivity growth in the coming years.
    To summarize, I see an important role for productivity growth to play in assisting FOMC policymakers to achieve our dual-mandate goals. This dynamic played out, alongside other factors, in recent years when inflation eased from historic highs while the labor market remained solid. Two currently unfolding economic events are likely to influence productivity growth in the coming years—specifically, changes to trade policy and the expansion of AI. Those two developments may prove to run counter to each other, but it is too soon to predict precisely. I will be closely monitoring developments in this space. I look forward to engaging with those studying this topic including, I am sure, many in this room.
    Thank you. I look forward to the discussion.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. For additional discussion, see the box “Labor Productivity since the Start of the Pandemic” in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2025), Monetary Policy Report (PDF) (Washington: Board of Governors, February), pp. 18–20. Return to text
    3. See Austan Goolsbee, Chad Syverson, Rebecca Goldgof, and Joe Tatarka (2025), “The Curious Surge of Productivity in U.S. Restaurants,” NBER Working Paper Series 33555 (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, March). Return to text
    4. See Lisa D. Cook (2024), “Artificial Intelligence, Big Data, and the Path Ahead for Productivity,” speech delivered at “Technology-Enabled Disruption: Implications of AI, Big Data, and Remote Work,” a conference organized by the Federal Reserve Banks of Atlanta, Boston, and Richmond, held in Atlanta, Georgia, October 1. Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News –

    May 10, 2025
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