Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Dan Goldman Delivers Poignant Address on Corruption, Erosion of Accountability, and a Roadmap for Restoring Public Trust

    Source: US Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10)

    Rep. Dan Goldman: “Democracy depends on a basic understanding: that we, the people, entrust elected officials with power in exchange for their service for the public good. That trust is not a given—it must be earned. And when those in power use their positions to enrich themselves, to favor allies, or to punish enemies, that contract begins to dissolve.” 

    Goldman: “Restoring faith in our system is going to take more than these specific and tangible legislative objectives. We can’t predict every possible ethics violation or potential corrupt deal. The voters – the people – must have higher expectations of their elected officials, and must hold them accountable.” 

    Watch the Full Address Here: 

    New York, NY – Congressman Dan Goldman (NY-10) delivered the featured speech at New York Law School’s 199th CityLaw Breakfast titled, “Democracy on the Brink: Corruption and the Public Trust.”  

    In a moment of historic political upheaval, Goldman issued a candid assessment of how public corruption and the erosion of guardrails and forms of accountability – on both sides of the political aisle and at every level of government – are threatening the very foundation of American democracy and the willingness of the public to buy into the American social contract.  

    Drawing on recent cases, public opinion data, and a call to action for institutional reform, Congressman Goldman offered both a warning and a roadmap for restoring public confidence in government and the imperative of doing so to preserve liberal democracy. 

    Remarks as prepared are available below: 

    Rep. Dan Goldman

    “We gather here today at a time when the very foundations of our democracy are enduring a stress test. 

    To be sure, we are facing threats abroad from Russia, Iran and China, and partisan gridlock in Washington makes it incredibly difficult to govern as the framers imagined.  

    But I’m not referring to those challenges, which are ones that our great nation has grappled with – and conquered – many times over our 250 year history.  

    I’m instead talking about something far more insidious — something that corrodes from within and is a more significant existential threat to the future of the republic. That threat is naked, unbridled, and brazen corruption at the highest levels of our government.   

    In so many ways, our founding fathers anticipated many potential obstacles and pitfalls in drafting the constitution – including the fundamental concept that the separation of powers among three branches of government would naturally provide the necessary checks and balances to preserve and protect the will of the people.  

    Article One confers to Congress the power of the purse and the power to declare war.  

    Article Two requires the Executive Branch to faithfully execute the laws passed by Congress and to oversee foreign relations. 

    And Article III charges the judiciary with saying what the law is, properly insulated from political pressure by lifetime tenure for judicial appointees. 

    This daring and innovative structure presupposed two assumptions that, if lacking, would crater the entire system:  

    • First, that members of one branch of government would prioritize their own power and authority over pure tribalism;  

    • and second, that the President of the United States would unconditionally believe in the validity and authority of the Constitution in the first place. 

    Sadly, we are witnessing the combination of these two conditions that has our system of government teetering on the brink. No President – not even Nixon – so disregarded the law and the constitution as Donald Trump does. And I can think of no majority in the Congress that has so completely turned over all of its own power and authority to a different branch of government as this Republican Congress has to President Trump.  

    But this inflection point did not come out of nowhere. We can have as many laws and institutions as we want, but if the American people do not have trust that those laws are fairly and equally applied or that those institutions are placing the public good ahead of personal interests, then they aren’t worth the paper they are written on or the dilapidated buildings they reside in. 

    Sadly, trust in elected representatives is at an all-time low. The National Election Study has been tracking public trust in government since 1958, when the percentage of Americans who said they trust the government to do what is right “just about always” or “most of the time” was 73 percent. In 1964 it was 77 percent. 

    Today, that number stands at a horrifying 22 percent. Only 2 percent of respondents say they trust the government to do what is right “just about always.” Two percent. Since 2007, the share of Americans saying they trust the government hasn’t broken 30 percent. 

    And while Donald Trump has taken official corruption to new lows, he is only able to do that because the erosion of the public trust has been well underway for years – by both parties, especially here in New York. 

    As the lead counsel in the first impeachment of Donald Trump for corruptly abusing his official power to try to coerce a foreign government to help his personal campaign, very little that Donald Trump does surprises me.  If there is anything that does, it is not that he is engaged in widespread abuse of his power for personal gain, but rather how openly and brazenly he is doing it.    

    Take just a couple of examples. 

    A few weeks ago, President Trump accepted a reported $400 million luxury jet from the royal family of Qatar without the consent of Congress — a clear violation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause, which requires Congress to consent to any foreign gift, title or emolument. Remember, President Ulysses S. Grant requested consent from Congress to receive the Statue of Liberty from France, and as far as I know it was never going to be used by Grant’s presidential library after he left office. 

    President Trump openly bragged about the plane just a couple of days after he announced a $2 billion financial deal with the UAE in connection to a crypto stablecoin recently issued by his own crypto company, which yielded him hundreds of millions of dollars.  He literally announced this deal on his first official international trip.  

    And he’s grifting at home too. He sold 25 VIP White House tours to the top 25 shareholders of his crypto company – without any known national security vetting – that saw the value of his shares go up by 50%.  

    Yesterday, the Senate voted on stablecoin legislation that very well may make it to the resolute desk for his signature – yes, he might be asked to sign legislation that has a direct impact on his own financial interests.  

    Remember when the public was outraged during his first term when he only ceased day-to-day involvement in the Trump Organization, rather than fully divesting his interests? 

    Now he is soliciting foreign investments in his crypto company and selling White House tours to the largest investor, and there isn’t a hint of an investigation from the Department of Justice nor from the Republican majority in Congress. 

    *************************** 

    Perhaps some of the reasons for such little outrage can be summed up in a statement I hear all the time: “oh, every politician is corrupt.” Too many people simply have come to accept an expectation that elected officials are corrupt and – someway, somehow – every politician is making money from his or her office. 

    As frustrated as I get hearing that over and over, it’s hard to argue with.  
     

    Just look here at our great city and state.  Our current mayor was charged last year for alleged honest services fraud and campaign finance violations tied to foreign money and influence. And while I do think the legal basis for the corruption charge was suspect, I couldn’t help but notice that the most common conversation I had with people about the Indictment began with the question, “is what he did really worthy of a federal indictment?”  

    In other words, expectations are so low for politicians that some degree of corruption is expected and accepted, so much so that federal charges should be saved for only the most egregious conduct.  

    Those who believe that are sadly in very good company: the Supreme Court also seems to believe that is what the law requires.  

    The running joke nowadays is that in order to be convicted of federal corruption charges, the FBI needs to find gold bars in your closet. 

    That of course is what happened to former Democratic Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey, who was convicted of honest services fraud here in the Southern District of New York after accepting gold bars in exchange for a variety of official actions taken on behalf of the Egyptian government, which gave him the gold bars. 

    We can be frustrated that the Supreme Court has repeatedly narrowed the reach of federal corruption law but it’s not actually a close call in their mind: just about every Supreme Court ruling from the McDonell opinion to the present has been unanimous, 9-0. That includes the Buffalo Billions case and Joe Percoco here in New York, and it caused both State Senate Majority Leader Dean Skelos and Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver to be retried before they were each ultimately convicted.   

    The fact of the matter is that both Democrats and Republicans have repeatedly succumbed to personal greed over the public good.  And while Donald Trump is attacking all forms of political accountability – including weaponizing the Department of Justice to reward his allies and punish his enemies – the stage had long ago been set for a wannabe dictator like Trump to come along and take a battering ram to a rule of law that had been fraying at the edges for some time.   

    The damage to our system goes far beyond any individual tragedy. It goes to the very foundation of our democracy.  

    Democracy depends on a basic understanding: that we, the people, entrust elected officials with power in exchange for their service for the public good. That trust is not a given—it must be earned. And when those in power use their positions to enrich themselves, to favor allies, or to punish enemies, that contract begins to dissolve.  

    That broken trust – that decaying social contract – is, in my view, what paved the way for the resurrection of the current resident of the White House. He has turned suspicion into toxic cynicism. He has turned facts into a partisan debate. He has used distrust of the system to frame himself as that system’s victim. 

    The question asked is no longer whether politicians are true to their oaths of office. It is instead a question of moral relativism – is she as bad as he is? And once the average voter believes that all politicians are corrupt, that no facts can be trusted, that the pursuit of power justifies any means necessary, the foundations of our democracy crumble and we invite a dangerous new normal: where truth is optional, ethics are flexible, and accountability is partisan. 

    There are many things to be concerned about these days.  We are dealing with many threats to the rule of law and our basic democratic values and foundations.

    But I firmly believe that the path towards restoring faith in our government – in this great experiment that we call democracy – must start by addressing public corruption.  And that is not only through revising our criminal statutes but also by altering the structure of our electoral system. 

    ********************** 

    So if you aren’t ready to crawl into a hole after that ever-so-uplifting recitation of the current state of distrust in our system, let me try to propose some ideas and solutions that can restore confidence in our elected officials – and, by extension, our government.  

    First, voters must see a renewed commitment to ethical government from candidates for office. Donald Trump has normalized the once-heretic idea that a President of the United States does not believe in the constitution. That must end, and it must end now. Not just by following the law, but by holding politicians to a higher standard – and by those within the same party.  

    It frustrates me to no end when I hear people say that some alleged misconduct is okay because the official was not criminally charged or convicted.  That is not the standard we should hold each other to.  

    A criminal conviction is an incredibly high standard – 12 unanimous jurors must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the admissible evidence was sufficient to meet every legal element of the charge.  That must not be – it can not be – the standard that elected representatives are held to.  

    Second, we must set an example by setting guardrails for ourselves. 

    Take stock trading by members of Congress.  I’ve been in Congress about two and a half years, and I’m confident that I haven’t received a single piece of confidential information through my official duties that would have helped me play the market.  But it doesn’t matter – because simply the appearance of receiving confidential information is more than enough to raise questions about whether that information was used in connection with trading stocks by members for their personal gain. 

    And that’s simply why members of Congress should not be permitted to buy and sell individual stocks.  

    When I came into Congress, I sold all of my individual stocks and put my money in a blind trust. But that should be the norm, not the exception. We must pass a law prohibiting individual stock trading by members of Congress.  We can set an example for ourselves. 

    There are other actions that we can take to restore trust in our democracy and our elected officials. 

    We must eliminate big money in politics – at a minimum there must be full transparency in campaign finance. No more dark money. Sunlight is the best disinfectant.  

    We must set clear rules and guidelines on gifts and conflicts of interests – and there must be consequences for violating them.  

    Similarly, we can no longer trust that our elected officials – especially our president – will view the plain language of the Constitution as binding. So we must pass legislation that not only creates an enforcement vehicle for the Emoluments Clause, the Hatch Act, and other ethics laws and rules, but imposes consequences as well.    

    I believe we must draft legislation to codify the independence of the Department of Justice from personal influence by the President.  The evisceration of the Public Integrity Section, the firing of so many apolitical and upstanding career prosecutors, Executive Orders by the President directing the FBI to investigate political enemies – all must be addressed and prohibited.  That is the stuff of banana republics, not a constitutional republic.  

    And finally, we need to rewrite federal public corruption law, which I am in the process of working on right now. The Supreme Court has repeatedly urged Congress to revise the corruption statute, and I plan to take them up on their suggestion. Every branch of government – elected officials, prosecutors, and judges – must have a clear understanding of what is – and is not – official corruption. 

    But restoring faith in our system is going to take more than these specific and tangible legislative objectives. We can’t predict every possible ethics violation or potential corrupt deal. The voters – the people – must have higher expectations of their elected officials, and must hold them accountable. 

    I ran for Congress to preserve and protect our democracy and ensure that the rule of law remains our nation’s guiding light. And I believe that if we are honest with the public, accountable in our actions, uncompromising in what we expect of ourselves, and courageous in our convictions, we can restore the trust that has been lost. 

    But that work starts with integrity. It starts with doing the right thing, not the easy thing. It starts with a willingness to look the American public in the eye, to admit the fault of those we share this awesome responsibility with, and to pledge that we can, we must, we will do better. 

    History is watching.” 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Putting Alberta-made businesses on the map

    Alberta is a province where locally made businesses can reach their full potential and become known through international markets. Across the world, Alberta is recognized as a trusted trade partner thanks to its high-quality services and products and hard-working entrepreneurs. To help small- and medium-sized businesses continue to grow, Alberta’s government is investing in the Trade Accelerator Program (TAP), which empowers them to increase their exports and revenue, while also creating new jobs for Albertans.

    In 2017, TAP was established nationally and Calgary Economic Development started administering the program within Alberta in 2018. Since its creation, TAP has helped more than 550 companies in Alberta receive the knowledge, mentorship and resources they need to help their businesses grow and reach international markets.

    Through a new $2.8-million investment, Alberta’s government is ensuring Calgary Economic Development has the resources it needs to continue delivering TAP for another five years, which is expected to help up to 650 more companies.

    “Increasing trade is a priority for our government, which is why we are helping small- and medium-sized businesses grow. More than ever, we need to diversify our global trade and give businesses the tools they need to succeed. In return, Alberta will see more jobs, more investment and a stronger economy with programs like this.”

    Joseph Schow, Minister of Jobs, Economy, Trade and Immigration

    “With global markets shifting rapidly, Alberta’s small- and medium-sized businesses need every advantage to stay ahead. This support from the Government of Alberta invests in entrepreneurs’ big ideas and helps ensure that local businesses can access the tools and expertise they need to scale globally. Stronger trade capacity means stronger businesses – and a stronger, more resilient Alberta.”

    Brad Parry, president and CEO, Calgary Economic Development

    In addition to the continued operation of TAP, this funding will also facilitate the creation of a new program from Calgary Economic Development called “Levelling Up.” This program will launch in 2026 and will include additional sector- and market-specific trade programming to support businesses in their complex global market expansion needs. “Levelling Up” will also include the ongoing Global Trade Classroom Series along with online resources. It is a program designed for companies who have participated in TAP, with targeted trade support for entering more complex markets.

    “Calgary Economic Development and the Government of Alberta have been pivotal in accelerating naturemary’s growth, innovation and global reach. Their support empowers us to thrive, create jobs and elevate pain relief and wellness from Alberta to the world.”

    Kapil Kalra, president & co-founder, naturemary, (TAP alumni) 

    Companies like naturemary, Rok Water, Knead Technologies and Zeno Renewables began in Alberta as small businesses but received training and support through TAP. Now these companies, like many others, have grown to receive recognition and business in markets around the world.

    Alberta’s government remains focused on continuing to build a resilient and diversified economy that is better positioned to withstand external shocks and ensure long-term prosperity.

    Quick facts

    • TAP supports businesses across Alberta through provincewide delivery, with past sessions hosted in Calgary, Edmonton, Red Deer, Grand Prairie, Canmore, Lethbridge and Medicine Hat.
    • The program is open to any Alberta-based company and businesses can attend sessions in any region.
    • Upcoming TAP cohorts across Alberta include:
      • Calgary, Sept. 9 – Oct. 22
      • Red Deer, Oct. 15 – Nov.20
      • Edmonton, Nov. 4 – Dec. 10

    Related information

    • Trade Accelerator Program
    • Alberta Export Expansion Program
    • Government of Alberta mission calendar

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: New Mental Health Group Home for Youth Opens in Prince Albert

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on June 25, 2025

    Today, the Government of Saskatchewan and Prince Albert Outreach celebrated the grand opening of Peggy’s Compass Home, a new mental health group home for youth in Prince Albert. The government is providing $800,000 in annual operating funding for the five-space home that will support youth ages 12-18 who are experiencing mental health and addictions challenges.  

    “Group homes like Peggy’s Compass Home help children and youth in crisis get the support they need close to home,” Social Services Minister Terry Jenson said. “This new group home will provide a safe, stable environment for young people to heal, grow, and access the mental health and addictions services they need to move forward.” 

    The opening of this home fulfills the 2023-24 Provincial Budget commitment to develop three mental health group homes with a $2.4 million investment. Peggy’s Compass in Prince Albert is the third home to open following EGADZ’s Garden of Hope in Saskatoon and Joe and Irene’s Home operated by Eagle Heart Centre in Regina. Each home is jointly funded by the ministries of Social Services and Health, with each ministry contributing $400,000 annually toward operational costs. 

    “I am happy to see an overall expansion of mental health care for youth through the important work that will be done at Peggy’s Compass Home,” Mental Health and Addictions Minister Lori Carr said. “By increasing our capacity to offer treatment and specialized care to address addictions and mental health challenges, we are helping youth lead healthier lives.” 

    Referrals for youth with chronic mental health and/or addictions issues to this facility will be made through a partnership with the Saskatchewan Health Authority and the Ministry of Social Services.  

    The local Youth Advisory Team collaborated with Prince Albert Outreach to develop programming for the group home using a youth-centered approach. Youth will have input into the programming, their goals and case plans and day-to-day programming. A multidisciplinary team will offer 24/7 mental health, addictions and cultural services.  

    “Today marks the beginning of a safe, supportive home for youth – Peggy’s Compass Home,” PA Outreach Program Executive Director Bill Chow said. “It honours our founder Peggy Rubin’s legacy of tireless dedication to guiding young people toward opportunity and hope. By investing in youth today, we are helping to build a stronger, brighter future for our community.” 

    The Ministry of Social Services partners with Prince Albert Outreach to provide various youth and family support initiatives including cultural services, outreach, court advocacy, a drop-in centre and additional youth-focused support services. 

    For more information about Prince Albert Outreach, visit: www.princealbertoutreach.com.

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: Micron Technology, Inc. Reports Results for the Third Quarter of Fiscal 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Record revenue in fiscal Q3 with growth across end markets
    Fiscal Q4 revenue projected to grow another 15% sequentially

    BOISE, Idaho, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Micron Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: MU) today announced results for its third quarter of fiscal 2025, which ended May 29, 2025.

    Fiscal Q3 2025 highlights

    • Revenue of $9.30 billion versus $8.05 billion for the prior quarter and $6.81 billion for the same period last year
    • GAAP net income of $1.89 billion, or $1.68 per diluted share
    • Non-GAAP net income of $2.18 billion, or $1.91 per diluted share
    • Operating cash flow of $4.61 billion versus $3.94 billion for the prior quarter and $2.48 billion for the same period last year

    “Micron delivered record revenue in fiscal Q3, driven by all-time-high DRAM revenue including nearly 50% sequential growth in HBM revenue. Data center revenue more than doubled year-over-year and reached a quarterly record, and consumer-oriented end markets had strong sequential growth,” said Sanjay Mehrotra, Chairman, President and CEO of Micron Technology. “We are on track to deliver record revenue with solid profitability and free cash flow in fiscal 2025, while we make disciplined investments to build on our technology leadership and manufacturing excellence to satisfy growing AI-driven memory demand.”

    Quarterly Financial Results
    (in millions, except per share amounts) GAAP(1)   Non-GAAP(2)
    FQ3-25 FQ2-25 FQ3-24   FQ3-25 FQ2-25 FQ3-24
                   
    Revenue $ 9,301   $ 8,053   $ 6,811     $ 9,301   $ 8,053   $ 6,811  
    Gross margin   3,508     2,963     1,832       3,623     3,053     1,917  
    percent of revenue   37.7 %   36.8 %   26.9 %     39.0 %   37.9 %   28.1 %
    Operating expenses   1,339     1,190     1,113       1,133     1,046     976  
    Operating income   2,169     1,773     719       2,490     2,007     941  
    percent of revenue   23.3 %   22.0 %   10.6 %     26.8 %   24.9 %   13.8 %
    Net income   1,885     1,583     332       2,181     1,783     702  
    Diluted earnings per share   1.68     1.41     0.30       1.91     1.56     0.62  
                                           

    For the third quarter of 2025, investments in capital expenditures, net(2) were $2.66 billion and adjusted free cash flow(2) was $1.95 billion. Micron ended the quarter with cash, marketable investments, and restricted cash of $12.22 billion. On June 25, 2025, Micron’s Board of Directors declared a quarterly dividend of $0.115 per share, payable in cash on July 22, 2025, to shareholders of record as of the close of business on July 7, 2025.

    Business Outlook

    The following table presents Micron’s guidance for the fourth quarter of 2025:

    FQ4-25 GAAP(1)Outlook Non-GAAP(2)Outlook
    Revenue $10.7 billion ± $300 million $10.7 billion ± $300 million
    Gross margin 41.0% ± 1.0% 42.0% ± 1.0%
    Operating expenses $1.35 billion ± $20 million $1.20 billion ± $20 million
    Diluted earnings per share $2.29 ± $0.15 $2.50 ± $0.15
         

    Further information regarding Micron’s business outlook is included in the prepared remarks and slides, which have been posted at investors.micron.com.

    Investor Webcast

    Micron will host a conference call on Wednesday, June 25, 2025 at 2:30 p.m. Mountain Time to discuss its third quarter financial results and provide forward-looking guidance for its fourth quarter. A live webcast of the call will be available online at investors.micron.com. A webcast replay will be available for one year after the call. For Investor Relations and other company updates, follow us on X @MicronTech.

    About Micron Technology, Inc.

    We are an industry leader in innovative memory and storage solutions transforming how the world uses information to enrich life for all. With a relentless focus on our customers, technology leadership, manufacturing, and operational excellence, Micron delivers a rich portfolio of high-performance DRAM, NAND, and NOR memory and storage products through our Micron® and Crucial® brands. Every day, the innovations that our people create fuel the data economy, enabling advances in artificial intelligence (AI) and compute-intensive applications that unleash opportunities — from the data center to the intelligent edge and across the client and mobile user experience. To learn more about Micron Technology, Inc. (Nasdaq: MU), visit micron.com.

    © 2025 Micron Technology, Inc. All rights reserved. Micron, the Micron logo, and all other Micron trademarks are the property of Micron Technology, Inc. All other trademarks are the property of their respective owners.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements regarding our technologies, demand for our products, our investments, our industry and our financial and operating results, including our expectations and guidance for the fourth quarter of 2025 and full fiscal year. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. Please refer to the documents we file with the Securities and Exchange Commission, including our most recent Form 10-K and our upcoming Form 10-Q. These documents contain and identify important factors that could cause our actual results to differ materially from those contained in these forward-looking statements. These certain factors can be found at investors.micron.com/risk-factor. Although we believe that the expectations reflected in the forward-looking statements are reasonable, we cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance, or achievements. We are under no duty to update any of the forward-looking statements to conform these statements to actual results.

    (1) GAAP represents U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.
    (2) Non-GAAP represents GAAP excluding the impact of certain activities, which management excludes in analyzing our operating results and understanding trends in our earnings, adjusted free cash flow, and business outlook. Further information regarding Micron’s use of non-GAAP measures and reconciliations between GAAP and non-GAAP measures are included within this press release.
       
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (In millions, except per share amounts)
    (Unaudited)
     
      3rd Qtr. 2nd Qtr. 3rd Qtr. Nine Months Ended
      May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
    May 29,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
               
    Revenue $ 9,301   $ 8,053   $ 6,811   $ 26,063   $ 17,361  
    Cost of goods sold   5,793     5,090     4,979     16,244     14,485  
    Gross margin   3,508     2,963     1,832     9,819     2,876  
               
    Research and development   965     898     850     2,751     2,527  
    Selling, general, and administrative   318     285     291     891     834  
    Other operating (income) expense, net   56     7     (28 )   61     (267 )
    Operating income (loss)   2,169     1,773     719     6,116     (218 )
               
    Interest income   135     108     136     350     398  
    Interest expense   (123 )   (112 )   (150 )   (353 )   (426 )
    Other non-operating income (expense), net   (68 )   (11 )   10     (90 )   (24 )
        2,113     1,758     715     6,023     (270 )
               
    Income tax (provision) benefit   (235 )   (177 )   (377 )   (695 )   172  
    Equity in net income (loss) of equity method investees   7     2     (6 )   10     (11 )
    Net income (loss) $ 1,885   $ 1,583   $ 332   $ 5,338   $ (109 )
               
    Earnings (loss) per share          
    Basic $ 1.69   $ 1.42   $ 0.30   $ 4.79   $ (0.10 )
    Diluted   1.68     1.41     0.30     4.75     (0.10 )
               
    Number of shares used in per share calculations          
    Basic   1,118     1,115     1,107     1,114     1,104  
    Diluted   1,125     1,123     1,123     1,123     1,104  
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (In millions)
    (Unaudited)
     
    As of May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    August 29,
    2024
           
    Assets      
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 10,163   $ 7,552   $ 7,041  
    Short-term investments   648     663     1,065  
    Receivables   7,436     6,504     6,615  
    Inventories   8,727     9,007     8,875  
    Other current assets   945     963     776  
    Total current assets   27,919     24,689     24,372  
    Long-term marketable investments   1,402     1,375     1,046  
    Property, plant, and equipment   44,773     42,528     39,749  
    Operating lease right-of-use assets   628     637     645  
    Intangible assets   426     423     416  
    Deferred tax assets   483     552     520  
    Goodwill   1,150     1,150     1,150  
    Other noncurrent assets   1,616     1,699     1,518  
    Total assets $ 78,397   $ 73,053   $ 69,416  
           
    Liabilities and equity      
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses $ 8,761   $ 6,176   $ 7,299  
    Current debt   538     504     431  
    Other current liabilities   836     1,197     1,518  
    Total current liabilities   10,135     7,877     9,248  
    Long-term debt   15,003     13,851     12,966  
    Noncurrent operating lease liabilities   600     599     610  
    Noncurrent unearned government incentives   603     836     550  
    Other noncurrent liabilities   1,308     1,257     911  
    Total liabilities   27,649     24,420     24,285  
           
    Commitments and contingencies      
           
    Shareholders’ equity      
    Common stock   126     126     125  
    Additional capital   12,960     12,711     12,115  
    Retained earnings   45,559     43,839     40,877  
    Treasury stock   (7,852 )   (7,852 )   (7,852 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive income (loss)   (45 )   (191 )   (134 )
    Total equity   50,748     48,633     45,131  
    Total liabilities and equity $ 78,397   $ 73,053   $ 69,416  
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF CASH FLOWS
    (In millions)
    (Unaudited)
     
    Nine Months Ended May 29,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
         
    Cash flows from operating activities    
    Net income (loss) $ 5,338   $ (109 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net income (loss) to net cash provided by operating activities:    
    Depreciation expense and amortization of intangible assets   6,203     5,794  
    Stock-based compensation   722     620  
    Change in operating assets and liabilities:    
    Receivables   (123 )   (2,562 )
    Inventories   148     (125 )
    Other current assets   (206 )   (435 )
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   38     846  
    Other current liabilities   (681 )   769  
    Other   356     304  
    Net cash provided by operating activities   11,795     5,102  
         
    Cash flows from investing activities    
    Expenditures for property, plant, and equipment   (10,199 )   (5,266 )
    Purchases of available-for-sale securities   (1,203 )   (1,110 )
    Proceeds from government incentives   1,294     267  
    Proceeds from maturities and sales of available-for-sale securities   1,249     1,433  
    Other   (30 )   (35 )
    Net cash used for investing activities   (8,889 )   (4,711 )
         
    Cash flows from financing activities    
    Proceeds from issuance of debt   4,430     999  
    Repayments of debt   (3,604 )   (1,816 )
    Payments of dividends to shareholders   (392 )   (384 )
    Payments on equipment purchase contracts       (127 )
    Other   (220 )   (40 )
    Net cash provided by (used for) financing activities   214     (1,368 )
         
    Effect of changes in currency exchange rates on cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash   (3 )   (15 )
         
    Net increase (decrease) in cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash   3,117     (992 )
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at beginning of period   7,052     8,656  
    Cash, cash equivalents, and restricted cash at end of period $ 10,169   $ 7,664  
    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES
    (In millions, except per share amounts)
     
      3rd Qtr. 2nd Qtr. 3rd Qtr.
      May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
           
    GAAP gross margin $ 3,508   $ 2,963   $ 1,832  
    Stock-based compensation   115     89     80  
    Other       1     5  
    Non-GAAP gross margin $ 3,623   $ 3,053   $ 1,917  
           
    GAAP operating expenses $ 1,339   $ 1,190   $ 1,113  
    Stock-based compensation   (148 )   (144 )   (137 )
    Patent license charges   (57 )        
    Other   (1 )        
    Non-GAAP operating expenses $ 1,133   $ 1,046   $ 976  
           
    GAAP operating income $ 2,169   $ 1,773   $ 719  
    Stock-based compensation   263     233     217  
    Patent license charges   57          
    Other   1     1     5  
    Non-GAAP operating income $ 2,490   $ 2,007   $ 941  
           
    GAAP net income $ 1,885   $ 1,583   $ 332  
    Stock-based compensation   263     233     217  
    Patent license charges   57          
    Loss on debt prepayments   46     4      
    Other   1         3  
    Estimated tax effects of above and other tax adjustments   (71 )   (37 )   150  
    Non-GAAP net income $ 2,181   $ 1,783   $ 702  
           
    GAAP weighted-average common shares outstanding – Diluted   1,125     1,123     1,123  
    Adjustment for stock-based compensation   19     20     13  
    Non-GAAP weighted-average common shares outstanding – Diluted   1,144     1,143     1,136  
           
    GAAP diluted earnings per share $ 1.68   $ 1.41   $ 0.30  
    Effects of the above adjustments   0.23     0.15     0.32  
    Non-GAAP diluted earnings per share $ 1.91   $ 1.56   $ 0.62  
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP MEASURES, Continued
     
      3rd Qtr. 2nd Qtr. 3rd Qtr.
      May 29,
    2025
    February 27,
    2025
    May 30,
    2024
           
    GAAP net cash provided by operating activities $ 4,609   $ 3,942   $ 2,482  
           
    Expenditures for property, plant, and equipment   (2,938 )   (4,055 )   (2,086 )
    Payments on equipment purchase contracts           (45 )
    Proceeds from sales of property, plant, and equipment   12     7     41  
    Proceeds from government incentives   266     963     33  
    Investments in capital expenditures, net   (2,660 )   (3,085 )   (2,057 )
    Adjusted free cash flow $ 1,949   $ 857   $ 425  
     

    The tables above reconcile GAAP to non-GAAP measures of gross margin, operating expenses, operating income, net income, diluted shares, diluted earnings per share, and adjusted free cash flow. The non-GAAP adjustments above may or may not be infrequent or nonrecurring in nature but are a result of periodic or non-core operating activities. We believe this non-GAAP information is helpful in understanding trends and in analyzing our operating results and earnings. We are providing this information to investors to assist in performing analysis of our operating results. When evaluating performance and making decisions on how to allocate our resources, management uses this non-GAAP information and believes investors should have access to similar data when making their investment decisions. We believe these non-GAAP financial measures increase transparency by providing investors with useful supplemental information about the financial performance of our business, enabling enhanced comparison of our operating results between periods and with peer companies. The presentation of these adjusted amounts varies from amounts presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP and therefore may not be comparable to amounts reported by other companies. Our management excludes the following items as applicable in analyzing our operating results and understanding trends in our earnings:

    • Stock-based compensation;
    • Gains and losses from settlements;
    • Gains and losses from debt prepayments;
    • Restructure and asset impairments; and
    • The estimated tax effects of above, non-cash changes in net deferred income taxes, assessments of tax exposures, certain tax matters related to prior fiscal periods, and significant changes in tax law. The divergence between our GAAP and non-GAAP income tax provision relates to the difference in our GAAP and non-GAAP estimated annual effective tax rates, which are computed separately.

    Non-GAAP diluted shares are adjusted for the impact of additional shares resulting from the exclusion of stock-based compensation from non-GAAP income.

    MICRON TECHNOLOGY, INC.
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP TO NON-GAAP OUTLOOK
     
    FQ4-25   GAAP Outlook   Adjustments   Non-GAAP Outlook
                   
    Revenue $10.7 billion ± $300 million         $10.7 billion ± $300 million
    Gross margin 41.0% ± 1.0%   1.0%   A   42.0% ± 1.0%
    Operating expenses $1.35 billion ± $20 million   $147 million   B   $1.20 billion ± $20 million
    Diluted earnings per share(1) $2.29 ± $0.15   $0.21   A, B, C   $2.50 ± $0.15
    Non-GAAP Adjustments
    (in millions)
               
                   
    A Stock-based compensation – cost of goods sold   $ 119  
    B Stock-based compensation – research and development     93  
    B Stock-based compensation – sales, general, and administrative     54  
    C Tax effects of the above items and other tax adjustments     (27 )
                  $ 239  
    (1) GAAP earnings per share based on approximately 1.13 billion diluted shares and non-GAAP earnings per share based on approximately 1.15 billion diluted shares.
       

    The tables above reconcile our GAAP to non-GAAP guidance based on the current outlook. The guidance does not incorporate the impact of any potential business combinations, divestitures, additional restructuring activities, balance sheet valuation adjustments, strategic investments, financing transactions, and other significant transactions. The timing and impact of such items are dependent on future events that may be uncertain or outside of our control.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: New climate reporting rules start on July 1. Many companies are not ready for the change

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Rachel Baird, Senior Lecturer , University of Tasmania

    PaeGAG/Shutterstock

    A new financial year starts on July 1. For Australia’s large companies, that means new rules on climate-related disclosures come into force.

    These requirements are the culmination of years of planning to ensure companies disclose climate-related risks and opportunities for their business. The Albanese government passed the legislation in September 2024.

    To be clear, the time to prepare is gone. From July 1, large public companies and financial institutions must gather significant amounts of information and data to include in a new year-end sustainability report. Collecting all this information is one challenge; another is finding the specialists across many fields to compile the reports.

    This is a huge change for corporate Australia. It is a whole new reporting regime, supported by volumes of technical detail. Directors will need to sign off on the report. Investors must also upskill to make sense of the disclosures. Neither of these outcomes is assured.

    And it is not clear the increased disclosures will do anything to reduce actual emissions.

    Climate impacts in focus

    Though it’s called a sustainability report, in reality it is very much focused on climate-related disclosures. If you go looking for wider sustainability matters such as social impact, environmental performance and ethical choices, you will be disappointed.

    Markets and ultimately the millions of Australians who hold shares will be watching to find out if:

    1. Corporate Australia is prepared for the transition to this new regulatory regime

    2. End users of the new reports are equipped to decipher and understand the huge amount of additional data.

    My research suggests the answer to both questions is a resounding no.

    Starting with the big end of town

    The government has wisely adopted a three-year transition for the new reporting regime, with only the big end of town facing the music this year. Think the big four banks, big supermarkets and large miners.

    Some large corporations have been publishing sustainability reports for years. National Australia Bank, for example, published its first one in 2017.

    Over the next two years, medium and then smaller companies will join the fold. By 2027–28, companies will be required to report if they meet two of three thresholds: consolidated revenue of A$50 million, or consolidated gross assets of $25 million, or more than 100 employees.

    The reasoning behind the transition is they have the benefit of watching how the larger companies adapt to the new laws.

    What has to be disclosed?

    Reporting entities must include:

    – climate statements for the year plus any notes, and

    – the directors’ declaration about these statements and notes

    This sounds rather simple and straightforward, but it is not.

    Arriving at a completed sustainability report involves an understanding of two detailed documents: the international standards and a new Australian Accounting Sustainability Standard.

    The Australian standards are mandatory and based on the international rules. In broad terms, companies will be required to gather and disclose information on many micro-level issues, which are grouped into four categories. These are: governance, strategy, risk management, and metrics and targets.

    Some issues will straddle all four categories.

    For example, the physical risk of climate change (floods, uninsurable properties, supply chain disruption) can be considered at the board level and in dedicated climate committees (goverance); in planning for alternative supply chains in a climate transition plan (strategy); in risk assessment (risk management) and in data prediction of the costs involved (metrics and targets).

    The big challenge for corporate Australia is that the people, expertise and time required to deliver a sustainability report are in short supply.

    More than a quarter of ASX 200 companies do not use the international standards. This means they are not positioned to adapt to the new reporting regime. Even for those that have been early adopters, there has been selective use of the four categories.

    For the smaller companies that will follow the first reporting year, the stakes are high.

    More information is not always better

    The amount of new information (much of it technical) to be disclosed will be overwhelming for the producers of the sustainability reports – and for the readers, whether they are institutional or mum-and-dad investors.

    The cost of collecting and making sense of the data required to meet detailed reporting requirements will lead to many companies being swamped in data. More data collected does not equal better data.

    Deciding what data to collect and then making sense of it so it supports disclosures will be a major headache for most companies.

    The new climate disclosure rules will have a profound impact on corporate Australia. There is a significant gap in capacity and capability to meet the requirements of the new reporting regime. And there is a corresponding need to educate the readers of these new reports to make effective use of the disclosed information.

    Rachel Baird does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. New climate reporting rules start on July 1. Many companies are not ready for the change – https://theconversation.com/new-climate-reporting-rules-start-on-july-1-many-companies-are-not-ready-for-the-change-258706

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘I’m not going to give up’: how to help more disadvantaged young people go to uni and TAFE

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lucas Walsh, Professor and Director of the Centre for Youth Policy and Education Practice, Monash University

    Oliver Rossi/ Getty Images

    On Wednesday, Education Minister Jason Clare hailed an increase in the numbers of Australians starting a university degree. In 2024, there was a 3.7% increase in Australian students starting a degree, compared to the year before.

    This follows Clare’s ambition to see more Australians with a tertiary qualification. The federal government wants 80% of workers to have a TAFE or university qualification by by 2050, up from the current 60%.

    A key part of this will be supporting more young people from disadvantaged backgrounds to go on to further study.

    How can we do this? New data from the OECD and a new report from The Smith Family give us further insight into the issues and shows what is working for a group of disadvantaged young Australians.

    Young people and career uncertainty

    Last month, the OECD launched a tool to track teenagers’ career readiness across internationally comparable indicators.

    This shows us how disadvantaged Australian students are less likely than advantaged students to have certainty about the kind of job they would like at age 30 (69% compared to 77%).

    In this context, we are talking about socioeconomic disadvantage, including parents’ education and occupation and resources at home. This can have a “powerful influence” on students’ learning outcomes.

    Career uncertainty is an issue because studies suggest teenagers who have clear plans typically have better employment outcomes.

    What about ambition?

    Even for those with some certainty about the kind of occupation they would like to be working in at age 30, there is a significant gap between advantaged and disadvantaged students’ ambitions.

    The OECD tool shows 55% of disadvantaged students aspire to work as a senior manager or professional, compared to 80% of advantaged students. Similarly, 56% of disadvantaged students aspire to undertake tertiary education (either via a short course or university) compared to 85% of advantaged students.

    Disadvantaged students are also more likely to aspire to an occupation that requires tertiary education while not planning to complete a qualification at that level. One in four (26%) disadvantaged students are misaligned in such ambitions compared to 9% of advantaged students.

    Disadvantaged students are less likely to say they feel well-prepared for their future after school (57% compared to 70%) and less likely to have searched the internet for information about careers (80% compared to 91%).

    These trends suggest a need to enhance career education in school that supports disadvantaged students to better plan and prepare for their post-school pathways.

    What can help?

    A new report provides insight into how we can better support disadvantaged young people in their careers.

    From 2021 to 2023, The Smith Family did surveys and interviews with the same group of financially disadvantaged young people. There were almost 800 young people in the group, who were in Year 12 in 2020. They came from all Australian states and territories.

    Echoing the OECD data, participants were often uncertain about where to go for help or how to develop and pursue a career pathway they valued. The study showed several things can help young people find a path to work, training or study after school. They include:

    • a focus on direct career development skills both at school and post-school. This should include personalised career advice and support, which helps young people articulate their post-school plans and the steps required to achieve this plan

    • support that starts earlier than Year 12

    • support for family members’ to access up-to-date labour market, education and training information and support strategies

    • providing more opportunities to meet employers and build career-related adult networks.

    One young person, Byron, talked about how his careers adviser at school had organised for him to meet a paramedic and find out what the role involved.

    [My teacher] helped me get information for how I could achieve that goal […].

    Braden – whose parents had not finished school – also talked about emotional support provided by his high school teachers:

    There were a lot of teachers who were very supportive and really wanted to see me make it through.

    Does it work?

    With these supports, most young people in the study were trying to build their careers, through work, study or a combination of both.

    By their third year after leaving school, 87% were working and/or studying and 60% were on track to complete a post-school qualification. This is up from 77% in the first year of the study. As Evanna, who is working towards her goal of joining the police, said “I’m not going to give up”.

    Lucas Walsh receives funding from the Australian Research Council. He has worked with The Smith Family and sits in a voluntary capacity on the Growing Careers Project External Reference Group. He was not involved in the creation of the report discussed in this article

    ref. ‘I’m not going to give up’: how to help more disadvantaged young people go to uni and TAFE – https://theconversation.com/im-not-going-to-give-up-how-to-help-more-disadvantaged-young-people-go-to-uni-and-tafe-259444

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: 500,000 Australians live with mental illness but don’t qualify for the NDIS. A damning new report says they need more support

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sebastian Rosenberg, Associate Professor, Health Research Institute, University of Canberra, and Brain and Mind Centre, University of Sydney

    stellalevi/Getty

    Half a million Australians are living with moderate to severe mental illness, but they don’t qualify for the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) and cannot access the support they need.

    In a damning report released on Tuesday, the Productivity Commission says addressing this gap must be an urgent priority for all governments.

    The commission is currently reviewing the Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Agreements, signed by the federal government and each state and territory. They aim to improve the community’s mental health and reduce suicide.

    The commission has found little progress, calling the agreements “not fit for purpose”.

    So, how did we get here? And what should happen next?

    More than a lack of funding

    In 1992, the year of Australia’s first national mental health policy, 7.25% of the total health budget was allocated to mental health. In 2022-23, it was still only 7.31%.

    Yet, mental health and drug and alcohol issues account for nearly 15% of Australia’s total burden of disease. While mental health remains woefully underfunded, it is hard to expect much change.

    However, the commission’s main criticism isn’t about funding – it’s about the fragmented way mental health is tackled and the failure of federal and state governments to work together.

    While the agreements may have set out “what to do”, the report says they have failed to describe how change should happen.

    This lack of specific objectives, goals and targets has prevented national mental health reform at the scale required.

    Psychosocial supports

    The report says addressing the lack of psychosocial supports outside the NDIS – a gap that affects 500,000 Australians – must be an urgent priority for states, territories and the federal government.

    Psychosocial supports are non-clinical services for people experiencing mental illness that enable them to live independently and safely in the community.

    For decades, community and charitable organisations have provided these support services in Australia. They can connect people with mental illness to health, housing, employment, education or other community services. This helps people socialise and maintain relationships and daily living skills.

    There is already very strong Australian evidence that psychosocial support services can help people recover from even severe mental illness, improve their quality of life, provide earlier intervention and reduce the burden on hospital-based mental health care.

    Yet, Australia has never adequately funded psychosocial care.

    In 1992, these services received just under 2% of total spending on mental health by the states and territories. In 2022-23, it was 6%.

    The ‘missing middle’

    The lack of psychosocial services, and of community-based mental health care more broadly, is one of the key gaps in Australia’s existing mental health system, giving rise to the term “the missing middle”. This describes people with needs too complex for primary care (such as general practice), but not urgent enough to warrant hospital admission.

    The introduction of the NDIS failed to arrest this gap – and may have made it worse. The scheme was only ever designed to provide support to 64,000 Australians with the most severe, enduring, psychosocial disability.

    In providing funds to set up the NDIS, the federal government, in fact, closed some psychosocial programs it had only recently begun, such as Partners in Recovery and Personal Helpers and Mentors. State and territory funding for psychosocial services was already extremely limited, but they, too, withdrew some community-based supports.

    The neglect of psychosocial services fits into a broader pattern that affects all community mental health services because responsibility for mental health is split.

    The federal government manages primary mental health services, mostly provided by GPs and psychologists under Medicare. Meanwhile, state and territory governments focus on hospital-based, emergency, acute inpatient and outpatient services.

    Currently, nobody is responsible for community mental health care. No wonder these “secondary” services, both clinical and psychosocial, have failed to flourish.

    What’s next?

    The Productivity Commission’s interim report rightly recommends Australia urgently address this gap in psychosocial care.

    Governments are now considering a “foundational supports” funding stream, which would provide psychosocial services for people outside the NDIS.

    However, in 2020, the Productivity Commission found our mental health system to be fragmented and disorganised. Just adding one more funding stream or program to this environment probably won’t help.

    Before considering who funds what, real mental health reform should be based on a clear map that lays out how our mental health system should be organised and the respective role of medical, clinical and psychosocial care in that system.

    Where does the evidence indicate people should go for care? What services should they receive? And what should happen next if their mental health improves or declines?

    This kind of system-wide map can guide investments and prioritise reform, region by region. This would properly put the person, not the funders, at the centre of care.

    If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call Lifeline on 13 11 14.

    Sebastian Rosenberg does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. 500,000 Australians live with mental illness but don’t qualify for the NDIS. A damning new report says they need more support – https://theconversation.com/500-000-australians-live-with-mental-illness-but-dont-qualify-for-the-ndis-a-damning-new-report-says-they-need-more-support-259549

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Global: How Israel’s domestic crises and Netanyahu’s aim to project power are reshaping the Middle East

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Spyros A. Sofos, Assistant Professor in Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University

    Israel’s recent strikes on Iranian territory have been widely framed as an act of deterrence or yet another episode in a protracted regional rivalry.

    Such interpretations overlook the deeper motivations behind Israel’s actions.

    As a global humanities scholar who specializes in Middle Eastern politics, I believe the world is watching the convergence of a domestic political crisis and a profound strategic shift as Israel evolves into a more aggressive entity in a fragmented international order.

    Political survival

    At the centre of Israel’s current strategic turn lies Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — a beleaguered leader fighting for political survival, but also considered a calculating, opportunistic operator with a particular vision of the Middle East.

    At home, Netanyahu, confronting an unprecedented convergence of challenges — multiple corruption indictments, mass protests against what many consider a self-serving judicial overhaul and a fragile governing coalition — has leaned into military escalation as both a defensive reflex and a political instrument. He’s seemingly deploying it to both mute dissent at home and assert control abroad.

    Israelis opposed to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul plan set up bonfires and block a highway during a protest in March 2023.
    (AP Photo/Ohad Zwigenberg)

    But Netanyahu’s ambitions appear to extend beyond his immediate political survival. He seems to be striving for a legacy-defining “1967 moment” — a transformative reordering of the regional landscape in the Middle East that sidelines the Palestinian issue and entrenches Israeli supremacy.

    This dual imperative — domestic survival and amassing power in the region — likely shapes Netanyahu’s recent actions, including the strike on Iran, the expanded occupation of Syrian territory, the October 2024 attack on Lebanon and the ongoing assaults on Gaza and the West Bank.

    By describing each military campaign as a reluctant necessity — forced upon him by Iran, Hamas or even his coalition hardliners — Netanyahu maintains public support as he consolidates power. His government has used war-time conditions to suppress public protest, push forward its radical constitutional agenda and advance his geopolitical vision.

    The result is a volatile but calculated strategy that is likely to mark Netanyahu’s tenure, though with significant repercussions for regional stability.

    Israel’s grand strategy

    While Netanyahu’s actions could serve his immediate political ends, they also reflect a longer-term shift in Israeli grand strategy. Following the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks, Israel intensified a long-standing pattern of pre-emptive strikes and campaigns to neutralize its adversaries. This strategy has been pursued at an unprecedented scale in Gaza, but often without a clearly articulated political endgame.

    This pattern echoes a regional policy doctrine Netanyahu laid out in his 1993 book A Place Among the Nations when he asserted “the only peace that will endure in the region is the peace of deterrence.”

    This policy advocates the projection of overwhelming Israeli power, the emasculation of regional challengers and efforts to radically reorder the Middle East.

    Netanyahu’s doctrine, a more aggressive revision of Israel’s earlier pre-emptive security traditions, stands in sharp contrast to the approach pursued by the Oslo Accords-era leadership of the 1990s and 2000s — figures such as Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and later Ehud Barak.

    They emphasized diplomacy over coercive leverage and perpetual confrontation. They sought genuine political settlements and a negotiated co-existence with Palestinians and neighbouring Arab states. This strategy — rooted in compromise and limited reconciliation — has now been decisively eclipsed by Netanyahu’s highly militarized approach and his vision for achieving strategic power in the Middle East.

    This approach underpins all of Israel’s modern-day actions — from its reoccupation of parts of Lebanon to its growing military footprint in Syrian territory, the obliteration of Gaza, its aggression against Iran and the increasing calls for Iranian regime change from the current Israeli cabinet.

    From buffer to power projection

    Nowhere is this clearer than in Israel’s expanding operations across its northern front. In Syria, Israel seized upon the post-Bashar al-Assad vacuum to entrench military control over at least 12 square kilometres of new terrain, constructing infrastructure and outposts far beyond prior ceasefire lines.

    This had less to do with protecting minority populations or deterring Iranian proxies — as officials claimed — and more with establishing long-term buffer zones and projecting dominance into a fragile post-war Syria.

    A similar pattern is evident in Lebanon. Following months of border escalation, Israel has sought not only to undermine Hezbollah’s capacity but to create no-go zones controlled by the Israeli military along the frontier. These operations reflect older strategic instincts but are now integrated in the ongoing process of Israel’s northern border redesign.

    Finally, Israel’s bombing campaign against Iran reflects a doctrine to move beyond containment toward strategic dismantlement of the Iranian regime’s regional power and to erode its ability to control its own territory.

    The escalation is the outcome of Israel’s pursuit of a favourable regional moment — the weakening of the so-called “Axis of Resistance” following the Abraham Accords of 2020 aimed at establishing diplomatic relations between Israel and several Arab nations — and months of war in Lebanon and Syria.

    From ‘western ally’ to regional challenger

    A constellation of domestic and international changes has enabled Israel’s transformation.

    These include a shift in Israeli political culture encouraged by Netanyahu’s rejection of efforts to pursue some sort of regional co-existence and co-operation; the far right’s growing influence in government; and the ongoing disruption of the international order amid Donald Trump’s second presidency in the United States that gave Israel more room to manoeuvre.

    This constellation has eroded the few constraints the liberal international order had in the past imposed on Israel’s pursuit of its regional policies amid an era of expansionism, permanent conflict and the aggressive management — not resolution — of the Palestinian issue.

    Israel is now heading down the same path as Russia and Turkey, capitalizing on vast disparities in military and intelligence capabilities among regional powers to its advantage, disregarding international norms, undermining diplomacy and preferring transactional alliances instead of long-term peace processes.

    The U.S. has facilitated this transformation. Former president Joe Biden and now Trump have made very little effort to constrain Netanyahu.

    Trump’s “Gaza Riviera” plan, along with his isolationist rhetoric, have effectively left regional decision-making to Israel while he continues to underwrite Israeli military dominance and its use of overwhelming force to reshape its regional environment.




    Read more:
    Why Israel and the U.S. are sure to encounter the limits of air power in Iran


    Netanyahu’s reluctance to accept the current ceasefire as a definitive end to hostilities with Iran reveals his and his cabinet’s regional revisionist reflexes.

    Broader regional destabilization lies ahead as Israel seeks to destroy threats with immense military power without any strategic foresight.

    Spyros A. Sofos does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How Israel’s domestic crises and Netanyahu’s aim to project power are reshaping the Middle East – https://theconversation.com/how-israels-domestic-crises-and-netanyahus-aim-to-project-power-are-reshaping-the-middle-east-259359

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: What is reconciliation − the legislative shortcut Republicans are using to push through their ‘Big Beautiful Bill’?

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Linda J. Bilmes, Daniel Patrick Moynihan Senior Lecturer in Public Policy and Public Finance, Harvard Kennedy School

    Senate Majority Leader John Thune speaks with reporters about the reconciliation process to advance President Donald Trump’s spending and tax bill on June 3, 2025. AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

    The word “reconciliation” sounds benign, even harmonious.

    But in Washington, D.C., reconciliation refers to a potent legislative shortcut that allows the party in power to avoid opposition and enact sweeping changes to taxes and spending with a simple majority vote. Democrats used the process to pass the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022. Reconciliation helped Republicans pass large tax cuts in 2017.

    Reconciliation is also at the heart of the current budget debate, as Senate Republicans rush to advance their version of the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act,” also known by its acronym OBBBA, which passed the House in May 2025.

    I served as assistant secretary of Commerce for management and budget during the Clinton administration, when my colleagues and I helped forge bipartisan legislation that balanced the federal budget and produced surpluses over four years, from 1998 to 2001. We were even able to pay off some debt.

    But since 2001, the country’s fiscal situation has deteriorated significantly. And the reconciliation process has strayed from its original purpose as a mechanism to promote sound fiscal policy. Instead, it is now used to pass partisan legislation, often without regard to its economic impact on future generations of Americans.

    Reconciliation 101

    The reconciliation process was created by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which was overwhelmingly supported by both parties. It was designed to align policy goals with budget targets to help rein in deficits.

    The rules specify that a bill using the reconciliation process must pertain directly to budgetary or fiscal matters, cannot change Social Security, Medicare or the budget process itself, or deliberately extend deficits beyond a 10-year window. As part of the process, the parliamentarian goes through each element of the bill and determines whether it meets the requirements, removing any that don’t.

    In the Senate, reconciliation has special procedural advantages. Debate is limited to 20 hours. Conveniently for the party in power, the final bill can pass with a simple majority of 51 votes. This avoids the usual 60-vote threshold needed to overcome a filibuster.

    Over its 50-year history, 23 reconciliation bills have become law.

    Reconciliation on rise as budget process breaks down

    Over time, reconciliation has become the dominant method for enacting major tax and spending legislation, as the regular congressional budget process has broken down.

    Since 1974, there have been multiple government shutdowns, near-shutdowns and short-term, stopgap “continual resolutions” instead of annual budgets, accompanied by rising deficits and national debt.

    With few other tools at its disposal, Congress has used reconciliation to push through many pieces of major economic legislation, including the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts under President George W. Bush, the 2017 tax cuts during President Donald Trump’s first term, and the American Rescue Plan in 2021 and the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022 during the Biden administration.

    However, reconciliation has significant flaws. Because debate is limited, senators often vote on bills over 1,000 pages long with little time to review the details. And once tax cuts are enacted under reconciliation, it is devilishly hard to get rid of them.

    Given the compressed timelines and lack of transparency inherent in such huge, messy spending bills, it is fairly easy for lawmakers to slip in earmarks, tax loopholes and other extraneous items that that don’t get removed by the parliamentarian.

    House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries argues Republicans’ spending and tax bill will ‘explode the deficit.’
    AP Photo/J. Scott Applewhite

    What’s in the bill?

    At the heart of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, passed by the House, is an extension of President Trump’s tax cuts from his first term, which would otherwise expire at the end of 2025, according to the procedural rules for reconciliation.

    But it also includes multiple new tax cuts – such as an end to taxes on overtime and tips and lower estate taxes – introduces new Medicaid work requirements and repeals various energy credits. In line with the Trump administration’s policies, the bill slashes federal funding for education, Medicaid, public housing, environmental programs, scientific research and some national park and public land protection programs. It also boosts defense spending.

    The bill would sharply worsen the nation’s fiscal outlook, according to analyses by the nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office and other organizations.

    Currently, the national debt exceeds US$36 trillion, according to the U.S. Treasury, and net interest payments account for some 16% of federal revenue, based on the Congressional Budget Office’s projections for 2025.

    In its analysis, the Congressional Budget Office – which was also created by the 1974 act – said the House-passed version would increase deficits by more than $3.1 trillion over the next decade. The overwhelming share of this cost comes from the permanent extension of individual tax cuts initially enacted in 2017.

    According to the Congressional Budget Office’s analysis, by 2035 households earning at least $1 million would receive an average annual tax cut of about $45,000. Most middle- and lower-income households would receive a cut of less than $500 per year, if anything.

    The costs of reconciliation

    A number of Senate Republicans have questioned some aspects of the reconciliation package. Since they hold only a 53-47 majority, and with all Democrats expected to vote “no,” they need to use reconciliation to pass their version.

    Although it differs from the House version in many ways, the Senate version still favors tax cuts for high-income households and large corporations.

    Senate Republicans also employ a flawed accounting gimmick to minimize its apparent cost. It assumes the 2017 Trump tax cuts, which are set to expire, have already been extended and embeds that assumption into the budget baseline.

    This makes extending the tax cuts appear costless, even though it would grow the debt substantially. The move violates normal scorekeeping conventions and misleads the public. Honest accounting would show that the Senate plan would add to the debt about $500 billion more than the House version.

    Abusing the process

    Lots of wrangling and changes are expected before the Senate is able to pass its version. After that, the House and Senate will need to resolve their differences in a conference committee of Republicans from each house of Congress.

    Once they agree on a final version, each house votes again – and the Senate version will still need to meet the terms of reconciliation in order to pass with a majority vote. President Trump is pressuring Congress to deliver the bill to his desk before he goes on July Fourth vacation.

    In my view, while reconciliation remains a powerful budgetary tool, its current use represents a fundamental inversion of its original purpose. Americans deserve an honest debate about trade-offs, rather than more debt in disguise. Some estimates of the fiscal impact of the Senate’s version of the bill are as high as $3.8 trillion over a decade. Simply waving a magic accounting wand won’t make them go away.

    Linda J. Bilmes served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of the US Department of Commerce from 1997-1998 and as CFO and Assistant Secretary for Management, Budget and Administration from 1999-2001.

    ref. What is reconciliation − the legislative shortcut Republicans are using to push through their ‘Big Beautiful Bill’? – https://theconversation.com/what-is-reconciliation-the-legislative-shortcut-republicans-are-using-to-push-through-their-big-beautiful-bill-255487

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women Commend San Marino on Aligning Citizenship Rights with International Standards, Ask about Temporary Special Measures and Incentives to Encourage Female Employment

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women today concluded its consideration of the combined first to fifth periodic reports of San Marino, with Committee Experts commending the State party on ensuring equal transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines, while raising questions on temporary special measures and incentives to promote female employment.

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the efforts and improvements made to align citizenship rights of a small landlocked nation with international standards, ensuring that the rules for transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines were now aligned.

    A Committee Expert asked what kind of temporary special measures were already implemented in legislation and in the judicial branch?  What temporary special measures had been adopted in the area of parity to achieve increased representation of women?  Were there any examples of positive discrimination for women in fields such as the military?  Another Expert said there was an ongoing debate in the country about how to enforce the political participation of women in San Marino.  How did San Marino plan to achieve parity in public life. 

    One Committee Expert asked what was being done to facilitate women’s return to employment? Was there a wage gap?  Could more information be provided regarding measures to increase work life balance and incentivise employers to employ women? 

    On temporary special measures, the delegation said measures to guarantee women’s political life in the country were linked to two laws.  Women made up 50 per cent of the public administration.  Women’s representation within the judiciary was fully granted; a few years ago, the President of the San Marino court was a woman. San Marino did not intend to use the instrument of quotas again, as the results did not justify its existence, and the quotas were intended to be a temporary measure. 

    The delegation said San Marino had been providing incentives for female employment for several years, including that employers would pay less tax for female workers. As of 2025, the labour force in San Marino was better balanced, with the gender gap reduced.  If a female worker had a child and wished to return to work, she could transform her contract into one that was parttime.  This was a key provision which would help women balance their professional and private lives. 

    Introducing the report, Marcello Beccari, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said significant progress had been made to combat gender-based violence in recent years.  On 29 October 2024, the Congress of State adopted delegated decree no. 161 on amendments to law no. 97 of 20 June 2008 – prevention and repression of violence against women and gender violence – and subsequent amendments and to the Criminal Code, which aimed to ensure a more effective system of prevention, protection and support for victims of violence.  In particular, the definition of violence against women and gender-based violence was rephrased.  The Authority for Equal Opportunities was responsible for keeping and disseminating data on gender-based violence.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Beccari thanked the Committee for the dialogue which had enabled the State to review the legislation and all areas where discrimination against women could occur.  The institutions of San Marino were actively engaged in the implementation of the Convention.

    In her closing remarks, Marianne Mikko, Committee Vice-Chair, thanked the delegation of San Marino for the constructive dialogue, which had provided further insight on the situation of women in the country. 

    The delegation of San Marino was comprised of representatives of the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Employment; the Department of Foreign Affairs; the Department of Institutional and Internal Affairs; the Department of Health and Social Security; the Department of Education and Culture; the Office of the French Border; the Single Court; the Gendarmerie Corp; the Office for Gender Violence and Minors; the Authority for Equal Opportunities; and the Permanent Mission of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’s ninety-first session is being held from 16 June to 4 July.  All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet at 10 a.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the fifth periodic report of Chad (CEDAW/C/TCD/5).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the the combined initial to fifth periodic reports of San Marino (CEDAW/C/SMR/1-5).

    Presentation of Report

    MARCELLO BECCARI, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva, said the ratification of the Convention in 2003 had been long-awaited by San Marino society, in light of the undeniable steps forward that the country had made since the 1960s.  Unfortunately, women’s rights in San Marino had been denied for centuries: women had had, de jure and de facto, a position inferior to that of men.  San Marino women exercised their voting right for the first time only in 1964, and it was only in 1974 that they could be elected in the general elections and become members of the San Marino Parliament. 

    At the end of the 1990s, a serious discrimination experienced by San Marino women persisted: only men could transmit San Marino citizenship, which made it impossible for the children of a San Marino woman to become San Marino citizens if the father was not a San Marino citizen.  This discrimination was finally eliminated in 2000.  It was only at this time that the country aligned its legal system with the requirements of the Convention. 

    Significant progress had been made to combat gender-based violence in recent years. On 29 October 2024, the Congress of State adopted delegated decree no. 161 on amendments to law no. 97 of 20 June 2008 – prevention and repression of violence against women and gender violence – and subsequent amendments and to the Criminal Code, which aimed to ensure a more effective system of prevention, protection and support for victims of violence.  In particular, the definition of violence against women and gender-based violence was rephrased.  The Authority for Equal Opportunities was responsible for keeping and disseminating data on gender-based violence.  The data was provided by all the institutions that come into contact with women victims of violence, including the courts, the mental health service and the counselling centre, the Minors’ Protection Service, and all three police forces. 

    San Marino authorities recently implemented comprehensive policies with the adoption of two national plans for the prevention of gender-based violence, including all competent institutional and civil society actors: the comprehensive national plan to combat violence against women 2024–2026, and the multi-year national plan on the elimination of violence and harassment and discrimination in the world of work to implement International Labour Organization Convention no.190 on the elimination of violence and harassment in the world of work.  The 24-hour on-call service of Social Workers and Psychologists was introduced and regulated, and the Emergency Centre was set up, where victims, including those with children, could receive psychosocial, health and legal assistance. 

    Every year on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women, San Marino organised numerous meetings and initiatives to raise awareness, including a recent media campaign “the new languages of violence”.  The University of San Marino organised compulsory vocational training courses annually for a wide range of professionals, including magistrates, police forces, professional associations, socio-health services, school staff and family mediators.  The University also actively collaborated with schools to foster an innovative and inclusive educational approach.

    An initiative speared by civil society, the law regulating civil registered partnerships (law no. 147 of 20 November 2018), allowed same-sex couples to obtain a form of legal recognition of their relationship equivalent to marriage. Another action which originated from civil society was the Referendum for the decriminalisation and legalisation of the voluntary termination of pregnancy in February 2021.  One year after the historic overwhelming result which saw more than 77 per cent of San Marino citizens vote in favour of decriminalising abortion, the San Marino Parliament approved law no. 147 of 7 September 2022 regulating voluntary termination of pregnancy.  This law contained the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code for both the decriminalisation of the act and the protection of the procedure.

    Despite the progress that had been made in recent years, some challenges persisted in San Marino in the area of elimination of discrimination against women, particularly when it came to eliminating gender stereotypes.  Mr. Beccari said he would ensure the dialogue was open, useful and fruitful. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    ERIKA SCHLÄPPI, Committee Expert and Country Rapporteur, said this was the first report submitted by the State party.  It was regretful that no reports had been received from civil society. Were the Convention’s provisions directly applicable in San Marino?  Were they referred to in practice in the courts?  What had been done to raise the visibility of the Convention?  Were there any plans to revise article 4 paragraph 1 of the San Marino Constitution to include other forms of discrimination, including gender identity?  Were there plans to introduce a body of laws preventing discrimination in the private and public spheres?  How did the San Marino authorities integrate a gender perspective in the legislative process? 

    What legal procedures could women currently use for submitting complaints about discriminatory acts?  What were the possible barriers for women to make use of existing legal remedies?  How were judges and lawyers trained to ensure gender equality in administrative procedures?  The Committee was concerned about the lack of disaggregated data in San Marino.  It was welcomed that authorities were considering taking measures to improve the data collections system.  What were the plans to improve data collection in the areas of gender equality? What were the timelines?  Did the State plan to enact a comprehensive law to prohibit discrimination?   

    Responses by the Delegation 

     

    The delegation said civil society organizations were informed about the drafting report and had several opportunities to get in touch.  Work had been carried out on the report with the San Marino Union for Women. Women’s rights were a topic close to the heart of San Marino citizens.  The Authority for Equal Opportunities conducted important work on the issue of violence against women.  The data on cases of violence was quite thorough.  San Marino was going through a process to join the European Union and it was hoped that once they had joined, a body on data gathering could be established. Data gathering was currently a weak point for the State and they would appreciate any specific advice from the Committee in this regard. 

    Work was underway to create a statistical body, and in the meantime, an office was charged with data collection and gathering.  Article 4 contained a list of protections which was not exhaustive.  This was to simplify the way such protection was worded. The Convention was fully applicable to San Marino’s legal body.  The State had signed the Istanbul Convention.  Women who were victims of violence could directly submit a complaint to the police, which would be passed on to the court.  There were nine police brigades which controlled the whole territory in San Marino, and there was an office dedicated to gender-based violence against minors.  A complaint could be received by the main police station, and victims needed to be informed of their rights.  Personnel of the gender-based violence office attended a three-week training course, in collaboration with the Italian police. 

    Data was gathered by the Authority on Equal Opportunities on gender-based violence and violence against minors, as well as discrimination in the world of work.  A new office, the Office of Statistics, was being created, which would act as a house for data, and would be used to answer questions from international bodies.  The State was striving to have data collected by all different agencies, including the police forces, to have a global vision on the issue.   

    While direct reference to the Convention was not that common, the legal framework of the State fully supported the provisions of the Convention. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said San Marino had demonstrated a commitment to promoting gender equality through several institutional frameworks, including the Commission for Equal Opportunities, which addressed a broad range of discrimination, including gender, disability and sexual orientation.  Could the State party clarify the mandate and resource allocations for the Commission and the Authority for Equal Opportunities?  What were the responsibilities of each body? How were they coordinated?  How were gender perspectives currently integrated into public policy?  The Authority for Equal Opportunities managed a fund for victim support.  Could updated information be provided on human and financial resources available for the bodies responsible for gender equality? Were steps being taken to ensure sustainability in line with their growing mandates? 

    San Marino had a vibrant civil society, with groups including the San Marino Union for Women contributing to reforms.  How were women’s organizations formally included in the development and monitoring of gender equality policies?  What measures were taken to ensure the participation of civil society organizations in national platforms?  Could an update be provided on the process and timeline for establishing a national human rights institution?  How would it ensure compliance with the Paris Principles?

    Another Expert asked what kind of temporary special measures were already implemented in legislation and in the judicial branch?  What temporary special measures had been adopted in the area of parity to achieve increased representation of women?  Were there any examples of positive discrimination for women in fields such as the military? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said there needed to be a radical mind shift within San Marino society. Education at schools and universities played a key role in this regard.  If men felt they had a right to discriminate against women, it meant they were not being educated properly.  This applied to other challenges, including racism and intolerance towards minorities. 

    Work was being done to create an Office of the Ombudsman in San Marino.  The office was expected to be operational in 2026.  The key elements of the office, including monitoring, combatting discrimination, complaints mechanisms, and mediation, among others, had already been identified.  The Ombudsman would have an independent budget and would have a six-year mandate. 

    The State endorsed civil society organizations in fighting gender-based violence and discrimination.  A petition called for the creation of mechanisms to combat discrimination.  A register was being developed for civil society organizations active in the field of women’s rights to facilitate work with these organizations.  San Marino was a small State and its services were fully adequate.  The victims’ reception centre had a 24/7 hotline which provided assistance. 

    A decree had set norms for the employment of specific roles, with incentives for the employment of women.  In April 2025, the gap between men and women was significantly reduced, highlighting the effectiveness of these norms. 

    San Marino was in the process of developing an independent human rights commission, in line with the Paris Principles. The bill would come into force in 2025 and become operative in 2026. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert asked how the effectiveness of training was being assessed?  What complaints mechanisms existed for discrimination against minority women?  Why was psychological harm not considered to be a criminal case?  Had the campaigns targeting men been assessed?  Was the State considering covering witnesses? Did judges, lawyers and law enforcement receive mandatory training in this regard?

    It was welcomed that the State provided services, including shelters for victims of violence.  Could women with disabilities and migrant women have access to these services?  Were there enough of these services?  What economic, labour and housing initiatives were provided for victims?  How many judicial sentences regarding gender-based violence had been handed down?  What period of time elapsed between the complaint and the finalised sentence? What public funds did civil society organizations currently receive when they provided assistance and support to victims?  How many victims of violence and their children had received reparation?  What kind of reparation did they receive?

    Another Committee Expert said the strong demand for foreign labour in the State created opportunities for trafficking.  The State party had reported that no investigations had been launched to date regarding trafficking cases.  When was the State party expecting to finalise work on the national action plan on trafficking?  What funds would be allocated to ensure its success?  How would the State party ensure that all relevant stakeholders were up to speed concerning their role in the fight against trafficking?  What steps was the State party taking to put in place national procedures and mechanisms to ensure the referral of trafficking victims?  Several sectors of the economy had been identified as being susceptible to trafficking, including domestic work.  Was the State party planning to follow the recommendation to raise awareness of the risk of trafficking among the general public?  Was the State party planning to decriminalise sex work?

    Responses by the Delegation 

     

    The delegation said San Marino was carrying out activities to improve its expertise in the area of trafficking.  The State currently had no cases directly relating to human trafficking, demonstrating the phenomenon was limited in the country, possibly due to its limited size, as well as the control and efficacy of law enforcement agencies.  The national strategy for combatting trafficking was currently being drafted.  Since trafficking cases were non-existent in San Marino, it was unlikely the topic would be addressed extensively in training courses, but it would be mentioned. The anti-violence network included magistrates and representatives of the legal system and law enforcement agencies. 

    Since the visit of the Council of Europe Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings to San Marino, there had been no indication of risks or cases reported. Work was carried out in collaboration with the Italian State in terms of training opportunities, and new modules were being designed for labour inspectors.  The Labour Inspectorate carried out direct interviews with the home carers and had reported no issues in this regard.  The State would continue to remain vigilant about trafficking, particularly for high-risk sectors, but at present this risk was not prevalent.

    Psychological violence was included in the decree of 2024, which addressed domestic violence against women.  It was defined as any intentional behaviour which impacted the psychological integrity of women.  In 2024, there were four orders of protection enacted by the judge.  Parliament recently adopted a law regarding the duration of trial, which would ensure an improvement in the duration of cases pertaining to violence. 

    Over the last year, training had been dedicated to preventive action against discrimination. The State had a duty to punish perpetrators, and to ensure their rehabilitation.  The union contract had been signed for the 24-hour availability of social servants, for cases of discrimination or violence.  A protocol was in place with the authorities and Order of Psychologists, where psychologists received a financial contribution for completing mandatory training for victims of violence. 

    The State had a list of pro-bono lawyers who could assist victims, but were also working on a specific agreement with the Bar Association, to ensure that victims had legal assistance.  This assistance would be entirely covered by the Authority of Equal Opportunities.  A project was underway to support women victims of violence who did not have access to an income.  Two years ago, a training module was created for journalists to raise awareness about gender stereotypes in the media, with work carried out directly with the Association of Journalists.

    A new emergency centre was created in 2024 and had been operating 24/7, welcoming women victims of violence and their children, as well as unaccompanied minors.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    An Expert said the crime of trafficking affected all countries; was size of the country considered an acceptable excuse for the lack of trafficking cases? 

    A Committee Expert said there was an ongoing debate in the country about how to enforce the political participation of women in San Marino.  How did San Marino plan to achieve parity in public life.  How did the State party explain the low representation of women in the cabinet?  Were there legal or policy measures in place to ensure the representation of women? What would be done to increase the number of women in leading positions in the public administration and the judiciary? 

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the efforts and improvements made to align citizenship rights of a small landlocked nation with international standards, ensuring that the rules for transmission of citizenship for maternal and paternal lines were now aligned.  The Committee also welcomed the approval concerning the “amendment on citizenship” to remove the obligations for applicants to renounce their existing citizenship.  However, it was regretful that there was no data in the report enabling the Committee to assess the impact of these acts.  It was also concerning that San Marino was yet to ratify key conventions relating to stateless persons. 

    What was the number of women who had obtained citizenship through naturalisation compared to men?  Was the State party considering abolishing the requirement of the interdiction of dual citizenship?  What support mechanism were in place to ensure eligible individuals were able to access the right to San Marino citizenship?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said approximately 50 per cent of the San Marino population lived abroad. Until the year 2000, San Marino citizenship could only be transmitted through the paternal line.  Those who held San Marino citizenship could hold others as well.  The obligation to renounce other nationalities was linked to the naturalisation process.

    Some diplomats believed there were in fact too many women in the diplomatic core, as there had been significant progress in this regard.  Measures to guarantee women’s political life in the country were linked to two laws.  Women made up 50 per cent of the public administration.  Women’s representation within the judiciary was fully granted; a few years ago, the President of the San Marino court was a woman.  San Marino did not intend to use the instrument of quotas again, as the results did not justify its existence, and the quotas were intended to be a temporary measure.  Instead, the State had introduced a cultural mind shift through better awareness raising.  Measures had been introduced to support families, to allow all citizens to participate in the life of the country. 

    The judiciary had strong female representation, with six female representatives.  The coordinator for the civil administrative sector was a woman.   Psychical criteria had been adjusted for entering the gendarmerie corps, meaning there were new female recruits.  In 2025, 25 per cent of officers within the gendarmerie where female, which was a common trend across all law enforcement agencies.  Women had been able to ascend within law enforcement agencies, with women colonels responsible for several units. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee commended the State party for achieving literacy rates for both women and men at a rate of 100 per cent.  Was the education system full inclusive to migrant girls and girls with disabilities?  The Committee congratulated the State party for ensuring that equality and inclusion started from primary school.  How did San Marino’s schools directly address topics of human rights, gender stereotypes, racism and gender equality?  Were human rights and gender equality issues explicitly addressed in education curricula? What were the specific recommendations made to prevent cyber bullying against women and girls?  Could sex disaggregated data be provided regarding access to financial aid for students? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said San Marino had two dedicated decrees related to education, including for students with learning disabilities.  There were training courses for teachers to ensure they could provide support to students with disabilities and deal with individual cases. Indications were introduced in all San Marino institutions, from kindergarten to secondary school.  Even at university level, courses offered to students related to gender-based violence and racial discrimination.  The curriculum of schools included specific projects for awareness raising.  This initiative was also passed on to families involved in this approach. 

    On 5 July, an exhibition entitled “Open Dreams” would open, gathering works of elementary and secondary school students, created during school projects relating to human rights and gender parity.  This exhibition would be open to the San Marino people and was part of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization celebration for education for peace. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert said the Committee appreciated policies aimed at better integrating women into the labour force, including the one focusing on women over 50.  However, it was concerning that women were underrepresented in the labour market, but overrepresented in part time jobs. Around 95 per cent of those dismissed during the COVID-19 pandemic were women.  Could the State party provide disaggregated statistical data on the employment of women? Why were women the majority of those who lost their employment in the pandemic?  What was done to facilitate their return to employment?  Was there a wage gap?  Could more information be provided regarding measures to increase work life balance and incentivise employers to employ women? 

    What percentage of fathers had benefitted from parental leave since its introduction? What measures were taken to strengthen childcare and support services?  What was being done to strengthen the monitoring of labour conditions of vulnerable groups?  What measures were being taken to combat sexual harassment in the workplace?  What was being done to increase the low numbers of women in leadership positions in the private sector?  Was there a specific law prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said in San Marino law, selection of an individual for employment was based on merit and the candidate’s skillset.  San Marino’s labour market was fully open, meaning employers were free to make their selection specific to the profile they were looking for.  The labour inspectorate would then provide opportunities for the unemployed.  San Marino had been providing incentives for female employment for several years, including that employers would pay less tax for female workers. 

    As of 2025, the labour force in San Marino was better balanced, with the gender gap reduced. If a female worker had a child and wished to return to work, she could transform her contract into one that was part-time.  There were fiscal incentives for employers who were ready to hear needs of their female workers.  This part time contract was valid for the first three years of the child’s life and could be extended for an additional three years.  This was a key provision which would help women balance their professional and private lives.  There were no distinctions in the area of training and lifelong learning between men and women. 

    San Marino had adopted the International Labour Organization convention on workplace discrimination, and the State had adopted a national action plan in this regard. There were several types of paternal leave.  The San Marino legal system encouraged fathers to request permission to accompany children to the doctor and for other needs.  The legal system also provided for parental leave for foster children. 

    Discriminatory acts in San Marino were punishable under the law.  If this occurred in a work environment, the sentence would be further strengthened.  There were harsher punishments for sexual violence when it occurred in a work environment. 

     

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert asked what the State party was doing to ensure the right of minorities to health?  What were the current challenges faced by the Women’s Health Centre?  How was its sustainability guaranteed?  What measures were taken to ensure sexual and reproductive health, as well as modern, free and low-cost contraceptive measures, especially for more disadvantaged groups?  How was appropriate information provided on how to access appropriate gynaecological and obstetric care? 

    Forced sterilisation was sanctioned under the Penal Code but could be authorised on the grounds of psycho-social disability.  What measures would be taken to combat this harmful practice?  Had changes been made to the Penal Code which recognised exceptions to the general prohibition of abortion, including incest and rape?  How many women had access to legal abortion in 2023 and 2024?  What steps were being taken by the State party to have a team to support female victims of gender violence?  How were women’s needs in mental health being taken into account? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the law to support families included rights for mothers, fathers, natural and adopted children.  For years, the Women’s Health Centre had been working to support women, including counselling them.  This was a dedicated body which fought to protect women, their children, and families. The Centre offered counselling for women and couples, providing them with information and contraceptives. Activities in schools were tailored depending on the age of the pupils. 

    The Constitutional Court in San Marino had issued a ruling on the desire to de-penalise abortion, reflecting the mind shift already present in society.  Screenings for cancer risks were directly managed by the San Marino hospital.  The Women’s Health Centre was tasked with prevention and monitoring of such risks. There was no forced sterilisation in the country.  Close monitoring of contraception occurred under the supervision of medical personnel. 

    A series of events were organised in schools dedicated to sexuality, which were optional for elementary school pupils and mandatory for older pupils.  The content of these events differed depending on the age of the students.  Training courses had been developed to raise awareness among younger populations about sexual health.  These interventions had been favourably welcomed by San Marino households.  In 2023, a new hub providing psychological support was opened, accessible to all pupils.  Mental health support was available through the hub.  Adolescents and young people could freely access the human papillomavirus vaccine. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert congratulated the State party on law no. 158 of 2022, which provided a regulatory framework for the protection and support of women who went through pregnancy and postpartum in conditions of psychological, economic and social discomfort, as well as single pregnant women, and single parent families.  How many single pregnant women and single-parent families had benefited since the adoption of the law in November 2022? 

    Had the State party considered instituting surveillance and monitoring mechanisms to specifically track progress in inclusive social security systems?  What laws and policies had been implemented to promote women’s entrepreneurship, access to economic assets, and business ownership?  Were there government-led programmes that provided support to women entrepreneurs? Were there training or capacity building initiatives in key sectors like financial technology, e-commerce, digital technologies, artificial intelligence, and robotics, where women remained underrepresented?  What actions were being taken to increase the number of women in leadership roles within sports and cultural institutions? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said a new law provided favourable conditions for both male and female entrepreneurs.  More and more women were opting for activities in the e-commerce space.  Employers and employees could have access to the family allowance.  This was provided by the State to better support childcare.  Law 158 from 2022 supported pregnant women and single parent families.  The State was currently considering a reform bill which resulted in further allowances to support households with young children, particularly new fathers, to close the gap between men and women in the household. 

    In 2024, there were 22 cases of voluntary abortion in the country.  The San Marino Olympic Committee promoted equality.  In 2024, the University of San Marino organised a day focusing on sports and disability, using sports as a tool for inclusion and equality.  This special day was open to all sports operators and coaches in the country to raise awareness regarding inclusion and combatting all kinds of discrimination in sports. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said around five per cent of the State resided in rural areas, being predominantly involved in agriculture or domestic work.  Could information on the social conditions of rural women in San Marino be provided?  San Marino had 258 migrant workers employed in the private sector as caregivers or badanti. The Committee noted with satisfaction the establishment of the one stop shop set up to provide assistance to these badanti.  What was currently being done to prevent violence against badanti? 

    What measures were in place to ensure inclusive employment for women with disabilities? Since June 2019, discrimination on the ground of gender identity was expressly banned in San Marino.  What steps were being taken to recognise same sex marriage for citizens? 

    A Committee Expert asked for more information on forced sterilisation which had been imposed on women with disabilities over the past five years, possibly authorised by a legal guardian? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said it was difficult to distinguish between urban and rural areas in San Marino. All people living in San Marino enjoyed universal health coverage.  A desk had been organised for badanti to answer questions and deal with issues affecting them, and for families who wished to benefit from their services. There was no discrimination towards badanti in the country; efforts were made to protect their work. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    A Committee Expert welcomed the law which allowed a judge to order the removal of the aggressor in cases of gender-based violence, among other initiatives.  How did the courts deal with custody and the visiting rights of parents?  How were the best interests of a child taken into account from a gender perspective? How many children had been able to receive their mothers surname since 2016?  What mechanisms existed to provide oversight for family mediation procedures and ensure the Convention standards were respected? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    The delegation said the interests of minors were always protected when it came to custody matters.  Judges would take into account the circumstance of violence within the household. When it came to separation between the parents, mediation was ruled out if there was violence within the household. 

    Closing Remarks

    MARCELLO BECCARI, Permanent Representative of San Marino to the United Nations Office at Geneva and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue which had enabled the State to review the legislation and all areas where discrimination against women could occur.  The institutions of San Marino were actively engaged in the implementation of the Convention.  The recommendations by the Committee would be carefully considered.

    MARIANNE MIKKO, Committee Vice-Chair, thanked the delegation of San Marino for the constructive dialogue, which had provided further insight on the situation of women in the country.  

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CEDAW25.017E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Kazakhstan, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Ask about Excessive Use of Force during 2022 Demonstrations and Internet Censorship

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Kazakhstan on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending the State’s abolition of the death penalty, and raising issues concerning excessive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations in January 2022 and internet censorship.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, and other Committee Experts commended Kazakhstan for its abolition of the death penalty and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.

    A Committee Expert cited reports of excessive use of force during demonstrations in January 2022 that resulted in the deaths of several peaceful protesters.  Investigations into these incidents were reportedly insufficient. What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?

    Another Committee Expert said Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval.  Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    Botagoz Zhaxelekova, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said that, as part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation said that the 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.

    On internet censorship, the delegation said this year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked.  Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act. It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Ms. Zhaxelekova, in concluding remarks, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans, she said.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Soh said the delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    The delegation of Kazakhstan was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population; Ministry of Culture and Information; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Court Administration; Anti-Corruption Agency; Prosecutor General’s Office; and the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the initial report of Guinea Bissau (CCPR/C/GNB/1).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/KAZ/3).

    Presentation of the Report

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said international obligations were an integral part of Kazakhstan’s national legal system.  The provisions of the Covenant took precedence over national legislation, and the State’s primary priority was the protection of citizens’ rights.

    During the reporting period, the State made far-reaching reforms aiming to consolidate democracy and build a just Kazakhstan. In 2022, constitutional reforms reinforced human rights protections for all Kazakh citizens, moving the State from a super-Presidential form of Government to a Presidential Republic with a strengthened Parliament.  The President could now serve only a single seven-year term and could not seek re-election. Rural mayors were now directly elected, and regional authorities had been granted greater autonomy. 

    The role of the lower house of Parliament in forming the Government had been strengthened – Parliament’s consent was now required for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.  The lower house was also empowered to hear reports from the Government, including on human rights issues.

    In addition, the registration process for political parties had been simplified; the electoral process had been improved; and the registration threshold had been reduced fourfold, from 20,000 to 5,000 members.  For the first time, six political parties, including opposition parties, were represented in the lower house.  Nearly half of the members of Parliament had been newly elected, including independent candidates.  A 30 per cent quota for women, youth, and persons with disabilities was introduced for the allocation of party list mandates.  The Mazhilis (lower house of Parliament) now included 18 women, six persons with disabilities, and eight individuals under the age of 35.

    The Constitutional Court had been re-established as a key mechanism for protecting rights and freedoms.  All citizens could appeal to it free of charge, and interpretation services were available.  To date, the Court had issued over 500 rulings and 71 final decisions.  In 20 per cent of reviewed cases, legal provisions were found to be unconstitutional.

    Constitutional law had expanded the powers of the Human Rights Commissioner, who could now directly address the President, both chambers of Parliament, and the Government with proposals to improve human rights mechanisms and initiate systemic legislative measures.  The Ombudsman was empowered to file lawsuits to defend the rights of an unlimited number of individuals, access all penal institutions freely, interview any person, and intervene in cases of rights violations. Regional Ombudspersons for the rights of children and for socially vulnerable groups had also been appointed across the country.

    Extensive work had been carried out in the field of lawmaking.  Laws adopted during the reporting period included the law on peaceful assemblies, which introduced a notification-based system for assemblies; a law decriminalising defamation; a law granting citizens and civil society organizations the right to oversee Government and quasi-public entities; a law obliging the Government to respond to petitions that received more than 50,000 signatures; a law expanding journalists’ rights to access and disseminate information; and the Social Code, which guaranteed equality and the inadmissibility of discrimination in all areas of life and increased State social benefits by 15 per cent. 

    Other laws adopted included a law aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence, which led to the annual number of crimes against women decreasing by 2.5 times; legislation increasing penalties for crimes against the sexual integrity of children; a law granting public monitoring commissions and the national preventive mechanism unrestricted access to all closed facilities in the country without prior notice and establishing criminal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment; and a law on combatting human trafficking.

    As a result of preventive measures, the number of registered torture cases had declined each year.  In 2024, the number fell by 40 per cent.  Since 2020, a Compensation Fund for Victims of Torture had been operating, and over the past five years, more than 3,000 compensation payments had been made.

    Kazakhstan was also taking measures to protect its citizens abroad.  From 2019 to 2021, the country carried out special operations repatriating 754 individuals from Syria, including 526 children and citizens of neighbouring countries.  All children received passports and women were supported to return to a normal life.

    As part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  A total of 94 actions had been planned, more than 75 per cent of which had already been implemented.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  This commitment was also enshrined in the Constitution.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.  In 2023, Kazakhstan also ratified two Optional Protocols: one to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and another to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 

    To ensure the effective implementation of decisions and requests from United Nations committees, a working group was established in 2022.  It included representatives from the main State authorities.  Kazakhstan had responded positively to decisions on individual communications by United Nations committees, including through the payment of compensation in the cases of Gerasimov, Bayramov and Malykhin. 

    The State party had also incorporated the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner Volker Türk, who visited Kazakhstan in 2023, into a comprehensive action plan on human rights and the rule of law.  The action plan focused on protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities; combatting domestic violence; strengthening labour rights; and safeguarding freedom of association.

    The Government has been actively engaging with civil society on all major reforms.  One notable example of this engagement was the “Dialogue Platform for the Human Dimension” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Since 2013, more than 50 meetings had been held, and their outcomes were reflected in three human rights action plans, including recently adopted laws on combatting human trafficking, the criminalisation of domestic violence, and the fight against torture.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed Kazakhstan’s abolition of the death penalty and its ratification of the Second Optional Protocol in 2022, as well as the strengthening of the Constitutional Court in 2023 and the establishment of several mechanisms and institutions.  The Committee had, in recent years, issued a substantial number of Views concluding violations of the Covenant by the State party, but had received disturbing information that most of these had not been followed up.  Would the State party extend the mandate of the interagency working group, which was tasked with analysing these Views?  What measures had been taken to give full effect to the Committee’s recommendations?  How were members of the judiciary trained on international procedures?

    The adoption of the international treaties act enhanced the role of international treaties in the national legal order. Did the Covenant have direct effect? The Committee welcomed national plans related to human rights.  How effective had implementation of these plans been?  Domestic courts had assessed a substantial number of cases involving the Covenant.  Had these courts directly implemented the Covenant?  Was training on the Covenant for the judiciary compulsory?  How was the public educated on the Committee’s work?

    The Committee welcomed that the Human Rights Commission’s mandate had been expanded but noted that it had “B” status since 2012. Had the State worked to have it accredited with “A” status?  What were the obstacles in this regard?  How did the State party guarantee a transparent and independent procedure for appointing members of the Commission?  How did the Commissioner monitor the implementation of the Covenant?  Could the Commissioner be held accountable for inaction?  The State party had invested in the national preventive mechanism against torture, but this institution depended on the Human Rights Commission to carry out its operations and reportedly needed to announce visits to places of detention in advance.  How would the State party strengthen the mechanism?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed the significant changes to the national framework, including the establishment of the national Anti-Corruption Agency.  There were concerns about the influence of public officials over this institution. What measures were in place to ensure the independence of the Agency?  Media reportedly faced political pressure when reporting on corruption, with some having been imprisoned.  What measures were in place to protect media personnel investigating corruption?

    The law on countering extremism included a vague definition of “extremism” that allowed for arbitrary interpretation.  Would this definition be revised?  Were media personnel pressured to expose colleagues’ actions to reduce sentences against them?  Did the State party plan to remove people convicted of non-violent crimes from the list of people accused of financing terrorism?  Which objective standards were used in courts to define extremist activities?  The Committee called for statistics on persons tried for extremist crimes.

    The Committee welcomed legal safeguards against surgical sterilisation, but was concerned about uneven access to contraception and high rates of teenage pregnancy.  What steps had been taken to expand access to affordable contraceptives and family planning programmes?  The Committee was concerned by reports of forced sterilisation and abortion, particularly targeting persons with disabilities, and gender stereotypes embedded in school curricula.  What measures were in place to address these issues and develop adequate sexual and reproductive health education?

    A Committee Expert said that demonstrations in December 2011 resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians, and reported torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals put under trial related to these protests.  Investigations into these incidents and many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations were reportedly insufficient.  What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?  How many investigations had been carried out thus far and what convictions had been handed down?

    The Committee welcomed measures taken to address the high suicide rate in detention centres, but this high rate reportedly persisted.  What further measures were planned to reduce the suicide rate and to investigate all deaths in custody?

    One Committee Expert said that the State party’s laws on discrimination did not address all forms of discrimination included in the Covenant, despite high levels of discrimination against certain groups in the State party.  Efforts to revise anti-discrimination laws seemed to have stalled.  Was there a plan to revive these?

    The Committee welcomed the State party’s efforts to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.  Would it remove discriminatory language in its laws related to persons with disabilities?

    In 2020, the Dungan community experienced ethnic violence resulting in deaths, injuries, property damage, and the displacement of thousands of community members.  Law enforcement authorities reportedly ignored these incidents, delaying investigations and prosecutions.  What progress had been made in setting up a reconciliation committee and in providing remedies to victims?

    There were credible reports of violence and discrimination targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals. Why had organizations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons been denied formal registration and the right to peaceful assembly?  The Kazakhstan Union of Parents had submitted a petition seeking to ban “propaganda” related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  How had the Government responded to this petition?  Public funding had been removed from gender reassignment surgery and the minimum age for such procedures had been raised to 21.  How would the Government support persons who sought such surgery?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed that Kazakhstan’s law prohibited gender-based discrimination, but expressed concern that women accounted for only 27 per cent of the Mazhilis, and had limited representation in decision-making positions in public and private bodies.  There was a major salary gap between men and women, and the law did not ensure equal pay for equal work.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure substantive equality between men and women and to address discrimination in access to education, land and property rights?  How did the State party promote women’s representation in decision-making bodies and managerial roles?  What measures were in place to address the gender pay gap?

    The Committee welcomed that the State party had financed gender equality initiatives, but noted that the gender equality strategy had been replaced with the gender and family policy.  The 2009 law on domestic violence was limited to violence by immediate family members.  What legislative and other measures had been taken to combat violence against women and girls?  How had the State party tackled the rise in domestic violence observed during the COVID-19 pandemic?  How was it addressing issues such as forced and early marriages and ensuring a victim-centred approach to investigations and prosecutions? 

    Stigma surrounded reporting of cases of domestic and gender-based violence and police were reportedly reluctant to act on such cases. How did the State party encourage reporting of violence by victims, ensure adequate funding for victim support services, and collect data on complaints, investigations and sentences? What measures were in place to strengthen awareness raising campaigns on violence against women targeting public officials and civil society?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Covenant was directly applicable in Kazakhstan and took precedence over domestic legislation. Over the past eight years, over 7,000 decisions were handed down by the courts that referenced the Covenant. Training seminars on Covenant rights were held for members of the judiciary.  The Government had made good progress on the human rights action plan, having implemented around 75 action points thus far, including actions promoting gender equality and women’s representation in decision-making bodies, as well as the investigation of torture.

    The Ombudsperson’s status was enshrined in the Constitution.  It did not report to Government bodies and had immunity in carrying out its activities. Its financial independence was guaranteed and it had direct access to all Government bodies.  In 2023, the Ombudsperson representatives carried out more than 700 monitoring visits and issued over 600 recommendations, some 70 per cent of which were implemented.  An assessment of institutional capacity was carried out in 2023 by the Human Rights Commissioner towards its accreditation with “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

    The independent national preventive mechanism consisted of 126 members, a large percentage of whom were representatives of non-governmental organizations.  They were elected through a transparent process by the coordination council.  The Ombudsperson was working on improving the professional knowledge of the mechanism’s members.  Its annual budget was spent exclusively on its needs.  It had unlimited access to all detention centres in the country and did not need prior permission to conduct visits.

    The Anti-Corruption Agency was independent. It had held several high-level officials accountable for corruption and had seized several millions of dollars in assets from those officials, investing those assets directly in Government programmes such as school construction projects.  The Agency provided free consultations with citizens periodically and worked with citizen volunteers who monitored corruption.

    The State ensured the safety of journalists who investigated corruption, providing all assistance necessary to those journalists. Journalists had broad rights to receive answers to their questions from public officials and to attend public events.

    The concepts of “extremism” and “terrorism” defined in national legislation and the Constitution were in line with those of international law.  The State party welcomed the Committee’s recommendations for improving these laws. All inclusions in the list of organizations linked to terrorism financing were based on the sentences of judges.  Around 1,000 persons had been removed from the list after review, including persons already serving sentences under the Criminal Code and persons found to have given up extremist views.

    Kazakhstan’s Health Code guaranteed the right to reproductive healthcare.  Women had the right not to be subjected to forced abortions or sterilisation and had access to all sexual and reproductive health services.  Gynaecologists determined whether terminations of pregnancy were necessary.  Minors could seek terminations with the written permission of their parents. Family planning and contraception services were provided by the State.  Medical, out-patient and in-patient services had been established in rural areas – 308 medical facilities had been built last year. Events were held that promoted reproductive health and aimed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies.  Increased access to maternal health services had led to a reduction in maternal mortality and the number of abortions.

    The Prosecutor’s Office had conducted investigations into the events of December 2011, as had monitoring bodies from the United Nations.  The Government had allowed representatives of non-governmental organizations and the media to attend trials related to these events.  Some 1,100 witness testimonies were conducted as part of investigations, which led to the sentencing of 13 officials.  All persons who had been arrested were now released. Investigations found that there was no evidence of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of arrested persons by public officials.  One official had been charged with granting officers permission to use lethal firearms, which led to the death of 12 persons.  These victims’ families had been granted damages by the courts.

    Discrimination was not allowed on grounds of sex, ethnicity, race, status, property or religion, among other characteristics. The State party had created a committee promoting inter-ethnic harmony, which had developed guidelines on access to legal remedies for victims of discrimination and recommendations for improving legislation on discrimination. 

    All citizens were equal before the law and no person could be subject to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community had access to all fundamental rights.  The State party had agreed to conduct research on the impact of propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in response to the petition it had received.  Sex changes were regulated by domestic law; persons aged 21 or over with legal capacity had the right to change their sex.

    Some 87 persons had been convicted for having taking part in mass unrest in 2020 affecting the Dungan community, damaging property and obstructing the actions of the police.  All victims had had their property restored.

    The law on persons with disabilities granted persons with category two disabilities priority access to public housing. National standards were in place that supported access to infrastructure and services for persons with disabilities. The accessibility level of buildings was mapped by the State party, and more than 124,000 buildings had been adapted to promote accessibility.

    In April 2024, a law was adopted that aimed to protect women and girls from violence.  There was criminal liability for battery and bodily harm.  Police were obliged to investigate all suspected cases of domestic violence, even when there was no report.  The punishment for sexual violence had been increased to up to life imprisonment.  Forced marriage was punished with up to 10 years imprisonment.  Measures were in place to ensure that victims could file complaints.  The Government funded a specific unit on combatting domestic violence and provided training to officials on responding to domestic violence.  Courts issued restraining orders and instructions relating to behaviour in domestic violence cases as required.  Mobile units responded in a timely manner to reports of violence; they had worked with more than 100,000 families.

    The share of women in local assemblies was 22.7 per cent. There were three women ministers and eight women vice-ministers, and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a woman.  Some 53 per cent of judges were women.  The State party was working actively to ensure that the quota of 30 per cent female candidates was respected.

    The ideology of the gender equality strategy had not changed.  The State party was working with United Nations agencies to promote gender-sensitive budgeting and establish bodies within ministries with gender-related mandates.

    Around 15 per cent of senior public officials were women. Since 2018, some 7,000 women had served in military operations and 15 Kazakh women had served in United Nations peacekeeping roles.  Equal pay for equal work for men and women was enshrined in the Constitution. Discrimination on any grounds was not allowed.  The Labour Code prohibited discrimination on the grounds of gender.  Women who felt they had been discriminated against could turn to the courts to seek remedies.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that the procedure for follow-up on Views had led to legal changes and the payment of compensation to victims.  The Expert also welcomed efforts made by the State party to inform the public about the Committee’s work.  Another Committee Expert welcomed measures promoting access to registration for civil society organizations.  One Committee Expert commended the participation of 15 Kazakh women in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the increasing number of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said he was impressed by the abolition of the death penalty and progress in improving the representation of women, but noted that there were still issues that needed to be addressed.

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on how the State party promoted the independence of the Ombudsperson, despite the President’s role in appointing its members; investigations into individual cases of killings and claims of torture occurring during December 2011 protests and reparations provided to victims’ families, and whether an official public apology had been issued for these human rights violations; whether the State party would formally recognise the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons to protection from discrimination; details on planned revisions to discrimination legislation; the status of research into propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons; whether a law on gender-based harassment would be promulgated soon; and resistance to laws on violence against women from conservative segments of society.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national preventive mechanism carried out more than 500 monitoring visits per year.  It had issued more than 16,000 recommendations to institutions as of 2020, of which 44 per cent had been implemented.

    An investigation was carried out into events related to December 2011 protests.  There was no evidence of the acts of torture that were alleged, preventing judicial investigation of those allegations.  The investigations into the murder of 12 individuals and the injury of six determined that arms were used with unlawful intent, inflicting grievous bodily harm, but not necessarily murder.  One official had refused to provide medical care to an injured person and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

    Issues related to discrimination legislation and the petition on propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons would be considered once research into these issues was completed. Civil society was invited to join discussions related to the petition and other Government measures.

    National legislation allowed for liability for various forms of harassment.  Last year, changes were brought to the Criminal Code banning sexual activity with minors under age 16.  The Government was assessing the effectiveness of current legislation on gender-based violence, which would be revised in 2027.

    The 2022 constitutional law on the Human Rights Commissioner expanded the powers of the Ombudsperson and the mandate of the Human Rights Commissioner.  The findings of the visits of the national preventive mechanism were published in its annual report.  As a result of its findings, disciplinary actions had been taken against over 440 officials.  In addition to the national preventive mechanism, members of Parliament, judges, prosecutors and the Commissioner for the Rights of the Child could also visit places of detention without prior authorisation. 

    The Ombudsperson could participate in discussions on national reports for human rights treaty bodies.  They had not exercised their right to appeal to the Constitutional Court, as they had been able to address all complaints they had received through other legal recourses.  This did not indicate a refusal to exercise this authority.

    The Labour Code prohibited discrimination against women and regulated workers’ rights to respect and dignity. Employers were obliged to ensure safe and healthy working conditions.  Workers could submit complaints of workplace harassment to the Workplace Ethics Committee or to the police.

    There were 170 suicides in prisons between 2017 and 2024.  For each case, an investigation was carried out to determine the causes, and around 150 officials had been sanctioned for not fulfilling their care duties. Training was provided to prison guards on identifying at-risk inmates and preventing suicides, and to prisoners on promoting self-confidence and preparing for release.  Several additional measures had been implemented in prisons to prevent suicides.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the State party did not have a specific law on the use of force and firearms by officials.  Did it plan to enact such a law that was in line with international standards?  There were allegations of excessive use of force during January 2022 protests, which had led to the death of several peaceful protesters.  Did the State party plan to conduct thorough, independent investigations into these allegations, hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies for victims?  The mass detention of protesters reportedly led to disappearances, and detainees had been denied access to lawyers and medical care.  What further steps would the State party take to ensure that all detainees were informed of their rights, provided access to a lawyer and medical treatment, and to investigate all allegations of mistreatment of detainees and hold those responsible accountable?

    Peaceful assemblies held without advanced authorisation were typically dispersed by authorities, with demonstrators arrested. How would the State party bring its administrative detention practices in line with international standards? Courts had a high rate of extending pre-trial detention.  How did the State party ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a last resort, and in line with international standards?

    Another Committee Expert said that the State party had not sufficiently responded to the Committee’s previous recommendation to align legal definitions of torture with those of the Convention against Torture. Despite the high number of torture cases, few effective punishments were imposed on perpetrators, and some persons who reported torture were punished for the crime of reporting false information. What steps had been taken to bring the definition of torture in the Criminal Code in line with international standards and ensure timely investigations?  How many complaints of torture had been filed, legal proceedings launched, and officials punished?

    Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval. Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?  Laws adopted in 2023 and 2024 expanded State control over free speech, resulting in politically motivated trials against journalists and political opposition figures.  What steps had been taken to fully decriminalise defamation?  Could the State party provide statistics on detentions of journalists and human rights defenders?  What had the working group on the protection of human rights defenders achieved?

    A Committee Expert commended steps to transfer prison health services from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health.  How was the State party supporting drug-dependent inmates and working to ensure the availability of sufficient medical equipment in prisons?  Were medical staff trained in detecting torture? Military schools were excluded from the mandate of the national preventive mechanism.  Did the State party intend to address this?

    The Committee was concerned that the right to conscientious objection to military services was not defined in law.  Were there plans to define this in law and establish an alternative to military service?  What steps had been taken to revise religious law to ensure full compliance with the Covenant?  The Committee was concerned by reports that some individuals had been imprisoned for engaging in non-violent religious expression.  How did the State party ensure that persons were not detained solely for expressing religious beliefs?

    What steps had been taken to remove complex registration requirements for non-governmental organizations and trade unions, and to prevent excessive State control of the activities of those organizations?

    Minorities continued to face discrimination and limited access to decision-making positions.  What was the legal and administrative framework covering political parties?  What steps had been taken to promote the effective participation of members of the Roma community in political life?

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the 2024 law on combatting trafficking in persons and the amendment to article 128 of the Criminal Code.  How did the State party ensure the effective implementation of these reforms? There were reports of a lack of training for labour inspectors on trafficking.  How were inspectors trained to detect trafficking?  How did the State party ensure that the cases of all potential trafficking victims were assessed before deportation, and that all migrant children were properly registered and documented?  The Committee welcomed efforts to enhance trafficking penalties, but was concerned that trafficking offences were often not appropriately classified, leading to lower penalties.  Would this be addressed?

    There was no de facto procedure for processing asylum applications and authorities were reportedly reluctant to grant asylum to persons of Russian or Uzbek nationality.  Reportedly, migrants had been detained without being given access to legal representation.  Was the State party addressing these issues?  How did it ensure protection against refoulement?  Individuals were required to renounce their citizenship to apply for Kazakh nationality.  Would the State revise this law to prevent the risk of statelessness?

    What State services were provided to victims of domestic violence, including children?  Could children obtain these services independently of their parents? The Committee was concerned that the State party had not prohibited all forms of corporal punishment.  Would this be done?  Could children file complaints of mistreatment with the Human Rights Commissioner?  Workers at an orphanage had been caught on video beating children.  How was the State party working to prevent such abuse and promoting the foster family system?  Children born outside of medical institutions to undocumented parents did not receive birth certificates.  Would the State party address this issue?

    Another Committee Expert asked how the State party guaranteed the independence of Supreme Court judge candidates, who were nominated by the President, and of lawyers?  There were reports of corruption throughout the judicial system. How was the State fighting this? Had any judicial officials been found guilty of corruption?  Attorneys were not automatically appointed to suspects, and did not always get access to all case files.  How would this be addressed?  How were suspects made aware of their rights?  How did the State party prevent cases being unduly declared “secret”?  What percentage of court cases were now solely held online?  How did the State ensure proper proceedings in online cases?

    To what extent were spontaneous assemblies possible in Kazakhstan?  How did the State party ensure that notification procedures did not create delays or restrictions preventing assemblies?  Could people appeal restrictions on assemblies?  Foreigners were prohibited from participating in assemblies.  How did the State party ensure that foreigners’ assembly rights were respected?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that in cases of mass violence, the State had the authority to use force to ensure public security.  The 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Changing the law on the excessive use of force was unnecessary, as the law functioned effectively.  All persons affected by violence related to this incident were provided with appropriate medical assistance, including detainees. Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.  There were 29 minors who had been detained after carrying out serious offences; they had since been released.

    There were 1,500 peaceful assemblies organised legally between 2017 and 2024.  Some 400 planned demonstrations had been cancelled because authorities had responded to complaints before the demonstration was held.  Some 1,000 demonstrations held during the reporting period were deemed unlawful as protesters had failed to respect notification deadlines or to correctly submit notification documents.  The State party continued to inform the public about notification procedures; this had led to a two-fold decrease in the number of illegal assemblies between 2022 and 2024.  Organisers of such assemblies were brought to court only in exceptional circumstances; in most cases, they were issued fines or warnings.  Law enforcement bodies needed to provide alternative proposals if the location for a planned demonstration was already being used by another event.

    As of 2019, exemption from liability for torture was not possible in Kazakhstan, nor were suspended sentences for perpetrators of torture.  There were 40,000 video cameras placed in detention centres to prevent torture. There had been a downward trend in the number of torture cases reported, from around 800 in 2019 to around 100 in 2024. More than 200 officials had been convicted of torture offences, and no officials found guilty of torture had received amnesties.  Housing and compensation payments were provided to the families of victims of torture. The State party intended to increase the amount of compensation provided to victims of torture ten-fold.

    This year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked. Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act.  It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Defamation had been downgraded to an administrative offence.  There had been a downward trend in the number of cases of defamation in recent years. In 2024, only four cases of spreading misinformation were registered.  Journalists and activists were not prosecuted for defaming public officials.  Persons could not be charged for defaming public or private institutions.

    All persons who entered prisons were provided with a medical assessment.  Detainees requiring specialised assistance were brought to outpatient clinics, and they were isolated when they showed symptoms of contagious diseases.  Legal amendments were made to allow detainees with serious diseases to serve their sentences in appropriate facilities or to have their sentences commuted.

    Over the past few years, there had been an increase in religious practitioners and missionaries, and a decrease in the number of people fined for religious activities.  In the first quarter of this year, only 46 people had been fined. Kazakhstan recognised the right to practice and disseminate religion.  Only persons who practiced religion for financial or extremist purposes were sanctioned.  Legislation on religion was in line with the Covenant.  Members of religious institutions could be released from the obligation to carry out military service.

    Kazakhstan was a multi-ethnic State.  It had a special quota for members of the Senate who were representatives of different ethnic groups.  There were no limitations on the political participation of ethnic groups.

    The national preventive mechanism operated under the Ombudsperson, but maintained operational independence.  Work was underway to expand the national preventive mechanism’s mandate to include facilities under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence.  A draft law on the national preventive mechanism was currently under discussion with State authorities.

    In 2023, the State adopted a law reducing the number of members needed to form a public association to three.  There were no restrictions on organizations receiving foreign funding.  To date, 543 trade unions had been registered.  Political parties’ activities could be restricted when they threatened public order, but such restrictions were temporary.  Liquidation of political parties could only be forced by a court order.

    A law on combatting trafficking in persons was introduced in 2024, which aimed to bring the State’s mechanisms for combatting trafficking in line with international standards, and to increase identification and support for victims.  New offences had been established linked to trafficking, including related to procuring a minor for prostitution and online trafficking. Some 170 labour inspections had been held thus far this year.  These had led to the identification of trafficking victims and the disbanding of organised crime groups, the members of which were held criminally liable. Over 190 victims had been identified and punishments of up to 20 years imprisonment were issued to perpetrators.

    Legislation on refugees and asylum seekers was in line with international law.  Kazakhstan abided by the principle of non-refoulement.  Refugees had the right to seek medical assistance and education, and could apply for permanent or temporary residence in the State. Kazakhstan did not permit the extradition of individuals whose asylum requests were under consideration. Individuals had the right to appeal extradition requests to the Supreme Court.  Kazakhstan was a party to the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which included provisions specifying that signatories needed to respect international norms related to non-refoulement.

    Only citizens could participate in demonstrations in Kazakhstan; foreigners and stateless persons could not.  However, they could pursue other means to lodge complaints with the State.  Police did not monitor whether demonstrators were foreigners or not.

    The Judicial Office provided free legal assistance to persons involved in court cases.  Many court cases took place online.  Artificial intelligence helped judges to automate routine cases, allowing for the analysis of millions of cases and for the maintenance of judicial standards.  Court materials were provided in accessible formats.

    The State party had revised the judiciary’s financing model, allowing the judicial administrative body to set the budget. This had led to a large increase in the judicial budget.  There were sanctions imposed for judges who engaged in corrupt practices.  Cases of corruption were assessed by a judicial panel.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on criteria used to determine whether to send warning letters to citizens regarding online content; alternatives to residential care facilities being developed; plans to prohibit corporal punishment; whether spontaneous protests were possible; whether persons who did not respect notification laws were restricted from filing future notifications; how the judiciary ensured that artificial intelligence was used in a safe manner that protected citizens’ rights; whether the Government intended to abolish the registry of organizations with foreign funding sources; and planned reforms to the registration process for non-governmental organizations.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there was a specialised structure that monitored the information space and detected violations of Kazakh law.  When violations were detected, warning letters were sent to offending parties, often through social network operators, that explained why the content was illegal and needed to be removed.

    The State paid particular attention to the rights of children.  New legislation discouraged corporal punishment.  The number of beatings of children recorded by the State had been falling year-on-year; last year, there were only 250 cases.  Thorough investigations were carried out into complaints of corporal punishment in residential homes.  Video surveillance tools were installed in schools and kindergartens.  There was a hotline for reporting violence and providing consultations to children.

    There was no plan to amend the registry of organizations funded by foreign sources, which was developed in line with international principles.  The State party did not plan to develop a bill on foreign agents.

    All judicial services that used artificial intelligence had been assessed in terms of their implications on security.  They were implemented by the judiciary independently.  The State party had implemented use of electronic monitoring bracelets in around 1,000 cases as an alternative to pre-trial detention.

    Closing Remarks

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, expressed gratitude to the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and to all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The State party welcomed the 22 alternative reports submitted by Kazakh civil society organizations, which it had reviewed carefully.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans.  The State party thanked the Committee for its contributions to human rights in Kazakhstan and around the world.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the constructive dialogue. The delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, the right to peaceful assembly, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Exposes Spies, Lies and Mismanagement at the U.S. Agency for Global Media

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing titled, “Spies, Lies, and Mismanagement: Examining the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s Downfall.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks-

    The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the efficacy of the US Agency for Global Media, by allowing members the opportunity to discuss the agency’s history of national security concerns, the use of taxpayer dollars, and the Trump administration’s vision for a path forward. And I’m now going to recognize myself for an opening statement. As we meet to discuss the downfall of the US Agency for Global Media, or USAGM as we call it, an independent government agency.

    It’s an agency that can trace its roots back to fighting Nazi propaganda during World War II. But instead of staying true to its mandate of combating our adversaries and advocating for American values, in recent decades USAGM has unfortunately lost its way. Prior to this administration taking office again, the agency was riddled with OIG reports and investigations demonstrating that USAGM had been a cesspool of spies, lies and mismanagement.

    That is not an exaggeration. The agency has promoted the very propaganda that it was created to defeat.

    A case in point is Voice of America, or VOA as it’s known, a media outlet overseen directly by USAGM and funded by the American taxpayer, of course — because of Chinese pressure, Voice of America censored interviews with Chinese dissidents.

    VOA hired an admitted Taliban fighter, a jihadist, to criticize President Trump’s terror travel ban decision — it’s reminiscent of a headline that would be in the Babylon Bee: Terrorist hired to criticize President Trump’s travel ban — while instructing its reporters not to call Hamas terrorists, unless they used air quotes when they did so.

    VOA suppressed negative stories about Iran and its terrorist proxies. And VOA, which peddled the Russian collusion hoax, hired foreign nationals who previously worked for Russian state sponsored news outlets to tell that story.

    USAGM is a government agency tasked with promoting American ideals. But instead, it’s hired foreign adversaries with your tax dollars, who promoted anti-American propaganda, both at home and abroad.

    This is only a partisan issue because President Trump is in the White House. The fact is, Republicans and Democrat administrations alike have exposed USAGM’s hiring, vetting and messaging failures.

    During the Biden era, the State Department Inspector General found that USAGM skirted federal hiring guidelines when doling out jobs to foreign nationals. Many of these foreign nationals were quite literally security risks, yet they were given access to extremely sensitive information. To be specific, what’s known as tier 3 and tier 5, which are the equivalent of secret and top secret information. Everybody should be asking themselves why foreign nationals hired to be journalists need access to top secret information that most foreign militaries don’t get access to.

    This was not just incompetence. It was taxpayer funded self-sabotage. American taxpayers would have been better off if that money had just been lit on fire.

    Before President Trump won his historic second term, USAGM embraced and regurgitated enemy propaganda. It became a mouthpiece for our adversaries paid for, again, by your tax dollars. And we’re here to say that the grift is over.

    It’s not that USAGM has never provided any value. It’s that USAGM had drastically lost their way and allowed themselves to become a source of espionage. However, it’s clear that USAGM cannot continue to operate as it has in recent times. Drastic measures have to be taken to ensure that every taxpayer dollar for where those dollars come from, the American people. Not Xi Jinping. Not Vladimir Putin, not the Ayatollah.

    I want to thank our witness, Kari Lake, for appearing in front of this committee today. I’m looking forward to hearing your testimony. I’m looking forward to a productive and probably a rowdy discussion about the Trump administration’s vision for the future of US broadcasting.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olli Hellmann, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waikato

    The winter school holidays will mean families across Aotearoa New Zealand will be looking for indoor activities to entertain children. With millions of visitors each year, museums focused on the country’s history will inevitably play host to local and international visitors.

    Museums tend to enjoy a high level of trust among the public. They’re widely seen as neutral, factual sources of historical knowledge.

    But like all forms of storytelling, museums present the past in particular ways. They narrate events from a certain group’s or individual’s perspective and explain why events unfolded in the way they did.

    In this respect, museums are not so different from historical films. Consider the different ways two recent movies – 1917 and the remake of All Quiet on the Western Front – narrate the first world war.

    In 1917, the storyteller takes the British side, encouraging viewers to invest in the bravery and endurance of British soldiers. But All Quiet on the Western Front is narrated from a German perspective, inviting viewers to grieve for German soldiers as victims of a political system that glorified war.

    Museum exhibitions tell stories in a similar way. Visitors should be asking not just what story is told, but why.

    Spoiler alert: it often has to do with national identity. Museums tell particular stories of the past because these stories support a particular image of New Zealand as a nation.

    Four questions for your next museum visit

    At its core, every story has two basic ingredients: actors and events. To turn these into a compelling narrative, the storyteller connects the events into a plot, so they build on each other. The storyteller also transforms actors into characters by giving them particular traits — brave, selfish, wise, cruel and the like. Museums do this, too.

    As you move through a museum exhibition, try asking yourself the following questions:

    1. Which historical events are included — and which are left out?

    Every story begins somewhere. Museums choose which events to include and which to leave out, shaping how visitors understand what happened and why.

    Take Te Papa’s Gallipoli: The Scale of Our War exhibition. It opens with the landing at ANZAC Cove but skips over events in the lead-up to WWI — such as Britain’s earlier moves to seize Ottoman territories like Cyprus and Egypt.

    Leaving these out helps frame Gallipoli as a noble – albeit tragic – “coming of age” for New Zealand. But in reality, ANZAC soldiers were fighting to support Britain’s imperial ambitions in the Middle East.

    2. How are events organised into a plot?

    Museums don’t just say “this happened, then that happened”. They link events into a larger plot — a chain of cause and effect that explains how one thing led to another. This can happen through text, but also through spatial layout, lighting, sound and other techniques that guide visitors through rising and falling moments of narrative tension.

    Often, museums use familiar plot types to connect events. One common example is the quest narrative — a story in which heroes must navigate unknown terrain, and where mistakes are part of the journey and threaten to derail the mission. It’s a bit like The Lord of the Rings: a journey full of challenges, wrong turns and personal growth.

    At Te Kōngahu Museum of Waitangi, Aotearoa New Zealand’s Treaty story is told using this quest structure. The Treaty is presented as something unique and unfamiliar and the British, confronted with this unknown, fall back on familiar colonial practices — the “mistake” that led to the New Zealand wars.

    Because this misstep is treated as part of the learning curve typical of any quest, the exhibition avoids harder questions about this violent part of history, and instead preserves the image of Aotearoa New Zealand as fundamentally tolerant and respectful.

    3. Who are the main actors in the story — and who is missing?

    Every story needs protagonists, and whose perspective frames the story matters. In many smaller regional museums, history is still told almost entirely from the viewpoint of European settlers. But what about Māori experiences of colonisation? Or the histories of Chinese communities and other migrants who arrived in the 1800s?

    By focusing narrowly on European settlers as the main actors, these museums present a one-sided view of the past and construct an image of New Zealand as a European nation — one that expects others to assimilate.

    4. How are the main actors characterised — and how are we meant to feel about them?

    It’s not surprising that museums portray some actors positively and others less so. What’s more revealing is how certain individuals are elevated as symbols of the nation and how museums invite us to form personal connections with them.

    In Te Papa’s Gallipoli exhibition, visitors can open drawers and boxes containing soldiers’ personal belongings. This intimate activity encourages us to feel close to these figures — not just learning about them, but identifying with them as embodying national qualities: bravery, resilience and a commitment to peace.

    Why does this matter?

    Historical museum narratives aren’t necessarily inaccurate — but, much like historical movies, they are selective. They highlight certain events, actors and cause-and-effect chains to tell a particular kind of story. Often, that story supports a specific idea of what it means to be an Aotearoa New Zealander.

    By reading museum exhibitions with a critical eye, visitors can better understand not just the past, but how storytelling shapes national identity in the present — and imagine how it might be shaped differently.

    Olli Hellmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays – https://theconversation.com/whose-story-is-being-told-and-why-4-questions-museum-visitors-should-ask-themselves-this-school-holidays-259538

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Scotland: Amnesty ‘deeply concerned’ about transparency and accountability of Scottish Enterprise review

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International has today expressed its deep concern around the transparency and accountability of the review into Scottish Enterprise’s human rights checks, after the Scottish Government announced that the review had been completed.

    The review, undertaken in-house by Scottish Enterprise, came after sustained pressure from Amnesty International and others after it was revealed that — despite Scottish Enterprise awarding grants worth millions of pounds to arms companies linked to states like Israel and Saudi Arabia — no company had ever failed one of its human rights checks. 

    Issuing an update today, the Scottish Government said that the review — which took place behind-closed-doors — was complete and that Scottish Enterprise was putting in place some changes to its processes. But with the update light on detail and being published only a day before MSPs break up for summer recess, Amnesty have criticised the lack of transparency around the process, as well as the inability of MSPs to now scrutinise the review’s conclusions. 

    Responding today, Neil Cowan (Scotland Director at Amnesty International) said:

    “The update released by the Scottish Government was not only light on detail, but it was published the day before the Scottish Parliament enters a two-month recess in the knowledge that MSPs will have no opportunity to scrutinise it. 

    Amnesty has been deeply concerned from the outset about the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding this review. And the manner in which the review has finally concluded makes clear we were right to be concerned. 

    The Scottish public must be assured that this review has not simply swept the issues under the carpet. Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish Government need to urgently publish their findings and recommendations in full.”

    View latest press releases

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Video: Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4) – Curtain-raiser Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (video statements)

    The Deputy Secretary-General, Amina J. Mohammed, accompanied by Ambassador Héctor Gómez Hernández, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, and Ambassador Chola Milambo, the Permanent Representative of Zambia to the United Nations, briefed reporters today to preview the upcoming Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development, which will be taking place in Sevilla, Spain.

    Ahead of the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), UN deputy chief Amina J. Mohammed said that the Conference offers a chance to “change course, to catalyze investment, to address debt and sustainable development, to reform the rules of the system and to put people’s needs at the center.”

    The Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FFD4), to take place in Sevilla, Spain, from 30 June to 3 July 2025, will bring together world leaders to advance solutions to financing challenges threatening the achievement of sustainable development. Governments, international organizations, financial institutions, businesses and civil society will come together to commit to financing our future through a renewed global framework for financing for development.

    Rising debt burdens, falling investment, and shrinking aid are among the financing challenges confronting the world today. With progress on the Sustainable Development Goals off track and rising systemic risks, including due to climate change and conflicts, the Conference provides a once-in-a-decade opportunity to mobilize finance at scale and reform the rules of the system to put people’s needs at the center.

    The Conference is expected to adopt the Compromiso de Sevilla, an intergovernmentally negotiated outcome, which was approved for adoption by consensus at the Fourth Preparatory Committee Meeting for FFD4 on 17 June.

    The Conference will mark the beginning of implementation of the outcome document, signaling a new phase of collective action on financing for development. Coalitions of countries and diverse stakeholders will announce ambitious commitments and concrete solutions under the Sevilla Platform for Action that will boost the renewed financing framework and setting out a turning point from dialogue to delivery.

    Related Link:
    4th International Conference on Financing for Development (30 June – 3 July 2025) – Website
    https://financing.desa.un.org/ffd4

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ATlnayBgbE

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Promise of gender equality: another case of possible misuse of EU funding in Gaza – E-002605/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU has a robust policy in place to monitor and evaluate projects and programmes implemented under its financial support. Independent final evaluations provide information on the results and impact reached and help to inform EU’s programming. They notably systematically include cross-cutting themes of human rights and gender.

    The specific support to the Palestinian Authority (PA) channelled through PEGASE mechanism[1] directly benefits thousands of civil servants and vulnerable families by contributing to the payment of salaries, pensions and social allowances. Selection of beneficiaries follows a strict safeguard mechanism through ex-ante and ex-post screening.

    Within the framework of the EU’s cooperation with Palestine[2] for the period 2014-2021, for a total amount of EUR 2.4 billion, the EU’s strategy has been aligned with the needs of the most vulnerable Palestinian populations and has played a key role in support to the PA to provide basic services to end beneficiaries.

    Gender equality is a cross-cutting issue within the five pillars of the European Joint Strategy in support to Palestine 2021-2024[3]. The Joint Strategy implementation report for 2022-2023[4] showed progress in improving gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls through the PA gender transformative agenda, the fight against gender-based violence and the promotion of economic, labour and social rights.

    It noted challenges in achieving comprehensive gender equality, aggravated by the current conflict. The EU Gender Action Plan III for the period 2021-2025 is under implementation in Palestine[5].

    • [1] ‘Mécanisme Palestino-Européen de Gestion et d’Aide Socio-économique’ launched in 2008.
    • [2] * This designation shall not be construed as recognition of a State of Palestine and is without prejudice to the individual positions of the Member States on this issue.
    • [3] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/european-joint-strategy-support-palestine-2021-2024_en?s=206.
    • [4] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2024/EJS%20Implementation%20Report_2022%202023.pdf.
    • [5] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/palestine-occupied-palestinian-territory-west-bank-and-gaza-strip/eu-gender-action-plan-iii-country-level-implementation-plan-west-bank-and-gaza-2021-2025_en?s=206.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024 – A10-0114/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025 – 2025/0138(BUD))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3], and in particular point 10 thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2024 on RESTORE – Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1057[8], and in particular the budgetary assessment attached to it,

     having regard to the EEA Report No 1/2024 – European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA)[9],

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0114/2025),

    A. whereas in September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Austrian authorities at EUR 1 711,6 million;

    B. whereas in September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Polish authorities at EUR 3,04 billion;

    C. whereas in September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck entire Czechia which led to flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Czech authorities at EUR 2,82 billion;

    D. whereas as of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions which led to the levels of the Danube and Morava rivers significantly rising resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Slovakian authorities at EUR 84,3 million;

    E. whereas in September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit several districts of Moldova resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Moldovan authorities at EUR 7,8 million;

    F. whereas in October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in several parts of the country resulting in total direct damages estimated by the authorities at EUR 841,85 million;

    G. whereas above mentioned occurrences caused by severe natural disasters are a result of global climate change; whereas the European State of the Climate 2024 confirms that 2024 was the warmest year ever recorded in Europe and that 30 % of the continent’s river network exceeded the “high” flood threshold while 12 % exceeded the “severe” threshold, resulting in the most widespread flooding since 2013;

    1. Expresses its deepest solidarity with all the victims, their families and all the individuals affected by the destructive floods in Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as with the national, regional and local authorities involved in the relief efforts;

    2. Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas, including with those in partner countries;

    3. Reiterates the importance of communicating to the public the tangible benefits brought about by the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), also to further increase citizens’ awareness of Union tools and programmes in the Member States and countries involved in accession negotiations with the Union;

    4. Highlights the increasing number of severe, destructive and deadly natural disasters in Europe and calls on Member States and the Commission to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation measures to avoid human and economic losses; underlines that in 2024 storms and flooding affected an estimated 413 000 people, resulting in the loss of at least 335 lives and that the damage from storms and flooding across Europe during the year is estimated to have cost at least EUR 18 billion[10]; considers that the budget of the EUSF or its equivalent should be substantially expanded in view of the upcoming Commission proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and subsequent inter-institutional negotiations and that the EUSF or its equivalent must provide assistance commensurate to the magnitude of such disasters to citizens; notes that substantially increasing the EUSF would allow Member States to respond more effectively and quickly to disasters while other instruments, particularly cohesion funds whose primary purpose is not disaster response, could be preserved; urges also the Commission to explore all possible avenues for accelerating the mobilisation of the EUSF, in particular by amending current rules and granting higher advance payments to applicant countries;

    5. Calls on the Commission to develop dedicated crisis-response instruments for the post-2027 period, recognising that the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, health emergencies, geopolitical instability, and economic shocks require more agile and tailored financial mechanisms at the Union level; underlines the need for enhanced coordination with national civil protection systems and early-warning mechanisms, ensuring a more integrated and data-driven Union-wide disaster response; emphasises the importance of dedicated support for cross-border and regional cooperation in preparedness, mitigation, and recovery efforts, particularly in vulnerable or high-risk areas;

    6. Stresses that the EUSF is only a curative instrument and that the Union should also continue to address climate change adaptation and mitigation by supporting European and national policies to prevent natural disasters; underlines that EEA Report No 1/2024 ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’ warned that the Union is unprepared for the effects of climate change even if the world manages to keep global temperature rise to 1,5 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, and stresses the need for action to avoid the climate risks identified reaching critical levels; recalls the need for effective synergies with other Union policies and programmes and underlines that Member States should make best use of funding opportunities in particular, of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the rural development programmes; calls on the Commission to assess with due urgency any reasoned requests by Member States to reallocate funds within the National Recovery and Resilience plans to natural disaster assistance, in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council[11]; stresses also the need for preventive measures, not only to mitigate future damage but also to prevent the exacerbation of risk conditions following catastrophic events, such as floods, wildfires, landslides or the drying up of lakes and rivers; emphasises that all reconstruction financed by the EUSF must be climate-resilient; underlines the importance of adequate flexibility between the different programmes; underscores that assistance provided under the EUSF should not be to the detriment of Union funding received by Member States under other Union policies or programmes; recalls that Member States can grant State aid, in accordance with the applicable Union rules, notably for agricultural businesses that have suffered damages due to natural disasters;

    7. Recalls that RESTORE[12] and the specific measures under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)[13] provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural disasters through further flexibilities in the use of the funds; stresses that Member States should make use of the new opportunities; underlines also that RESTORE provided limited flexibility for some Member States as the implementation of the current Multiannual Financial Framework is very advanced;

    8. Recalls the importance of rapid and solid damage assessment that takes due account of the economic repercussions and calls for increased operational efforts to be made in order to reduce the average time for the release of advanced payments to offer timely assistance to regions affected by natural disasters and extreme weather events, while ensuring the Union budget is protected; stresses that Member States should, in the context of disaster response and recovery measures, give due priority to the needs of the affected population, with particular attention to vulnerable groups;

    9. Stresses the urgent need to release immediate financial assistance through the EUSF to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner;

    10. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;

    11. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

    12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.

     

     

    ANNEX: DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[14], and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[15], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

    Having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16], and in particular point 10 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Whereas:

    (1) The European Union Solidarity Fund (‘the Fund’) aims to enable the Union to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to emergency situations in order to show solidarity with the population of regions struck by major or regional natural disasters or major public health emergency.

    (2) The Fund is not to exceed the ceilings laid down in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2020/2093, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765[17].

    (3) On 29 November 2024, Austria submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (4) On 29 November 2024, Poland submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (5) On 4 December 2024, Czechia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (6) On 7 December 2024, Slovakia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (7) On 5 December 2024, Moldova submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (8) On 27 December 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in October 2024.

    (9) Those applications meet the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the Fund, as laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    (10) The Fund should therefore be mobilised to provide a financial contribution to Austria, Poland,  Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    (11) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the Fund, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    For the general budget of the Union for the financial year 2025, the European Union Solidarity Fund shall be mobilised as follows in commitment and payment appropriations in relation to natural disasters:

    (a) the amount of EUR  42 789 075 shall be provided to Austria in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (b) the amount of EUR 75 998 939 shall be provided to Poland in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (c) the amount of EUR 113 979 781 shall be provided to Czechia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (d) the amount of EUR 2 108 187 shall be provided to  Slovakia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (e) the amount of EUR 195 196 shall be provided to Moldova in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (f) the amount of EUR 45 669 725 shall be provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to floods in October 2024.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    It shall apply from [the date of its adoption][*].

     

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President  The President

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Commission proposes to mobilise the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 (EUSF regulation) for an amount of EUR 280 740 903 to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the natural disaster (floods) that took place in 2024.

     

    Austria – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 16 September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding. Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Vienna were particularly affected. In some parts of Lower Austria, 300-420 mm of rain fell in five days. The entire province of Lower Austria was declared a disaster area. Protective measures had to be put in place along the Danube River. In Lower Austria, nearly 2 000 houses had to be evacuated, thousands of households were without electricity, drinking water and sewerage for days. The floods led to five fatalities and 24 people were injured in Lower Austria.

     

    Austria estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 1 711.6 million. This amount represents 0.38% of Austria’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Austria is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Poland – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 11 and 16 September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers. The most impacted provinces were the Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces. Subsequently, nearly 10 600 residential and more than 2 000 farm buildings were flooded. Over 200 000 people were directly affected by the disaster. Numerous businesses were forced to temporarily suspend or significantly reduce their operations which led to significant financial losses.

     

    The Polish authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 3.04 billion. According the EUSF regulation, where the natural disaster concerns several regions at NUTS level 2, the threshold shall be applied to the average GDP of those regions weighted according to the share of total damage in each region. The direct damage expressed as a percentage of total weighted regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces is 8.46%. This amount exceeds 1.5% of the weighted average regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces.

     

    Czechia – major natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 17 September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck the entire country which led to flooding. The most affected regions were the Moravian-Silesian and the Olomouc Region. Dozens of houses and approximately 1 000 road and railway bridges and 2 000 km of roads and railway lines were destroyed, or damaged. More than 350 schools were flooded. Over 250 000 households were left without electricity, heat and drinking water. As a result, over 13 000 people, as well as several hospitals had to be evacuated. The floods also led to eight fatalities.

     

    The Czech authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 2.82 billion. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Czechia of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 1.58 billion in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Slovakia – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    As of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions. Both the Danube and Morava rivers saw significant water level rises, with return periods exceeding 100 years in some locations. Cumulative rainfall reached up to 400 mm in the Záhorie region, exacerbating the impact. The most significant damage was attributed to smaller rivers, where levee breaches were reported, amplifying the flooding and leading to destruction in both rural and urban areas. Roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure were severely affected, straining emergency response efforts.

     

    Slovakia estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 84.3 million. This amount represents 0.07% of Slovakia’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Slovakia is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Moldova – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 14 and 16 September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit the Cantemir, Hincesti, Leova, Straseni, Floresti and Telenesti districts of Moldova. Over 200 000 people were affected by the disaster. The floods destroyed or damaged 20 bridges, 8 educational institutions and several public buildings. Dozens of houses and cellars were flooded and over 60 people needed to be rescued.

     

    The Moldovan authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 7.8 million. The Moldovan authorities submitted the application under the “regional natural disaster” criterion as laid down in Article 2(3) of the EUSF Regulation, which is any natural disaster in a region at NUTS level 2 of an eligible State resulting in direct damage exceeding 1.5% of that region’s gross domestic product (GDP).

     

    Bosnia and Herzegovina – major natural disaster: floods in October 2024

     

    Between 3 and 17 October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall, which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in the central, southern and western parts of the country. Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Zenica-Doboj and Canton 10 were the most affected cantons. In addition to power outages lasting several days and disruptions to landline and mobile phone services, there was also a complete disruption to road and rail transport. This caused severe physical and financial damage to residential and commercial buildings, as well as to the transport, water and sewage system. The floods led to 27 fatalities and 22 people were injured. Many families were forced to leave their homes and were accommodated in temporary shelters.

     

    The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 841.85 million. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Bosnia and Herzegovina of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 138.33 million in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Conclusion

     

    The methodology for calculating the aid was set out in the 2002-2003 Annual Report on the EUSF and accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commision therefore proposes to the budget authority to mobilise the following amounts for the applications submitted by Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina:

     

    Disaster

    Total direct damage (EUR)

    Applied disaster threshold

    (EUR)

    2,5% of total direct damage (up to the threshold for major diasters) (EUR)

    6% of direct damage above the major disaster threshold (EUR)

    2.5% of total direct damage

    Total amount of aid proposed (EUR)

    Advance paid

    (EUR)

    Balance to be paid

    (EUR)

    Austria-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    1 711 563 002

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    42 789 075

    42 789 075

    10 663 587

     

    32 125 488

    Poland-floods

    (regional disaster)

    3 039 957 574

    538 909 893

    N/A

    N/A

    75 998 939

    75 998 939

    N/A

     

    75 998 939

    Czechia

    (major disaster)

    2 821 143 019

    1 579 680 000

    39 492 000

    74 487 781

    N/A

    113 979 781

    N/A

     

    113 979 781

    Slovakia-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    84 327 482

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    2 108 187

    2 108 187

    N/A

     

    2 108 187

    Moldova-floods

    (regional disaster)

    7 807 840

    226 331

    N/A

    N/A

    195 196

    195 196

    N/A

     

    195 196

    Bosnia and Herzegovia-floods

    (major disaster)

    841 851 670

    138 325 000

    3 458 125

    42 211 600

    N/A

    45 669 725

    N/A

     

    45 669 725

    TOTAL

    280 740 903

    10 663 587

    270 077 316

     

     

    Council Regulation 2024/765[18] of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 split the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) in two separate instruments: the European Solidarity Reserve and the Emergency Aid Reserve. The European Solidarity Reserve with an annual amount of EUR 1 016 million (in 2018 prices, corresponding to EUR 1 167.1 million in 2025 prices) will be used for assistance to respond to emergency situations covered by the EUSF.

    In order to avoid an early depletion of the annual allocation, Article 3(7) of the EUSF Regulation and Article 9(2), second subparagraph, of the amended MFF Regulation stipulate  that 25% of the annual EUSF allocation (i.e. EUR 291.8 million for 2025) shall remain available on 1 October of each year.

    Finally, according to the Article 4a(4) of the EUSF Regulation, the amount of EUR 50 000 000 has been already inscribed in the EU general budget 2025 (in commitments and payments appropriations) for the payment of possible advances.

    Therefore, the maximum amount that can be used by the EUSF at this stage is EUR 908,95 million (excluding the reserve for advances and the amound that will become available on 1 October). After this mobilisation EUR 980,64 million will remain available for upcoing mobilisastions.

     

    Amount available under the EUSF in 2025 (EUR):

     

    Total annual 2025 EUSF allocation (incl. 1 October tranche)

    1 167 064 638

    Amount carried over from 2024 (incl. unused advances) (+)

    194 316 161

    Credits reserved for advance payments (-)

    50 000 000

    Amount already used for advances to Spain and Austria (-)

    110 663 587

    Amount available only after 1 October (-)

    291 766 160

    Total amount currenty available (excl. reserve for advances and 1 October tranche)

    908 951 052

    Amount proposed for mobilisation under current  Mobilisation Decision (only balance to be paid)

    270 077 316

    Remaining amount for future applications (inc. for advances and 1 October tranche)

    980 639 896

     

     

    The Rapporteur recommends the swift approval of the Commission proposal for a decision annexed to this report, leading to the rapid mobilisation of the aforementioned amounts, as a sign of European solidarity with Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rapporteur calls on the Commission that this financial contribution should be delivered with particular urgency.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner & Kaine Introduce Bill to Protect Access to Reproductive Health Care

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C.—Yesterday, on the third anniversary of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade, U.S. Senator Mark R. Warner and Senator Tim Kaine, a member of the Senate, Health, Education and Labor (HELP) Committee, joined Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), and Patty Murray (D-WA) in introducing the Women’s Health Protection Act, legislation to guarantee access to abortion care across the country. The bill’s introduction comes as the Trump Administration and Republicans continue to attack reproductive freedom. Virginia is the last southern state where abortion is still legal, and Virginia has seen an increase in demand for abortions after other states have passed laws restricting access.

    “In the three years since Roe v. Wade was overturned, we’ve seen the consequences unfold in real time: women denied lifesaving care, doctors forced to navigate confusing and dangerous legal gray areas, and families left to deal with the fallout. Decisions about pregnancy should be made between a woman and her doctor, not by politicians,” said Warner. “This bill would once and for all restore the constitutional right to abortion, permanently making it safe and legal nationwide.”

    “Three years ago, the Supreme Court took away Americans’ ability to access reproductive health care, and since then, we’ve seen the tragic impacts of this decision for women across the country,” said Kaine. “I’m proud to be joining my colleagues in introducing this legislation to protect access to abortion nationwide and restore Americans’ freedom to make their own health care decisions.”

    Since the Dobbs decision, 19 states have banned abortion or severely restricted women from being able to access the procedure, leaving one in three American women without access to safe, legal abortion care. Additionally, state legislatures across the country have introduced hundreds of bills to include medically unnecessary restrictions that limit access to abortion care. In his second term, President Trump has continued to attack reproductive rights, including freezing Title X funding for clinics that offer reproductive care, cutting Biden-era emergency abortion protections, and fighting to defund Planned Parenthood. Additionally, the House-passed Republican budget bill kicks 16 million people off their health insurance and defunds Planned Parenthood, threatening the closure of 200 health centers across the country and putting access to vital reproductive care for millions of families at risk.

    The Women’s Health Protection Act guarantees the right to access an abortion—and the right of an abortion provider to deliver these services—free from medically unnecessary restrictions that interfere with a patient’s individual choice or the provider-patient relationship. The bill also protects the ability to travel out of state for an abortion, which has become increasingly common in recent years.

    Following the Dobbs decision, Warner and Kaine have strongly advocated for legislation to protect Americans’ access to reproductive health care. The senators cosponsored legislation to protect the right of women to travel across state lines for abortion services and help protect medical providers from being punished for providing patients with this care. Kaine has also introduced the bipartisan Reproductive Freedom for All Act to protect abortion rights and contraception access.

    In addition to Warner, Kaine, Baldwin, Blumenthal, and Murray, the Women’s Health Protection Act is cosponsored by Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Senators Angela Alsobrooks (D-MD), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Chris Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Maggie Hassan (D-NH), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Angus King (I-ME), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ben Ray Luján (D-NM), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Jon Ossoff (D-GA), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Gary Peters (D-MI), Jack Reed (D-RI), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Tina Smith (D-MN), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Reverend Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Peter Welch (D-VT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), and Ron Wyden (D-OR).

    Full text of the legislation is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Welch Grills Bove During Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing 

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, grilled Emil Bove III, President Trump’s pick to serve on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on multiple allegations of ethical misconduct throughout Mr. Bove’s tenure as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY). Senator Welch also called out Mr. Bove’s refusal to acknowledge that President Biden won the 2020 Presidential Election.  
    Senator Welch: “This question of temperament obviously is relevant. You’d acknowledge that?” 
    Mr. Bove: “Yes, Senator.”   
    Senator Welch: “I was a defense attorney, worked with many prosecutors, had enormous respect for those prosecutors. So, the temperament issue doesn’t always get into the question of whether it’s an ethical violation. But it does get into the temperament and why that—in my view—is very important whatever our job is, but particularly for a judge where you’ve got that incredible power.” 
    Watch Senator Welch’s full remarks below: 

    Similar to other Trump nominees, Mr. Bove refused to acknowledge that President Biden had won the 2020 presidential election: 
    Senator Welch: “Who won the 2020 election for President of the United States?” 
    Mr. Bove: “President Biden was certified as the winner of that election.”   
    Senator Welch: “So, you give the standard answer. You can’t say that he won because he got the majority of votes and also got the electoral college victory?”   
    Mr. Bove: “I think that the characterizations that you just made, Senator, are both political. And so, I can’t address them under the canons, and they’re also tied up in ongoing litigation.”   
    Senator Welch: “Help me understand how it’s political to state who got the most votes in any election.”   
    Mr. Bove: [PAUSE] “…Senator, I’m just trying to be precise. The process by which our country declares the victor in an election is a certification process. President Biden was certified.” 
    Ahead of Mr. Bove’s nomination hearing today, Senator Welch joined six Senate Judiciary Committee colleagues in requesting personnel records relevant to Mr. Bove’s conduct throughout his career in the Southern District of New York. Last month, Senator Welch and Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) led their colleagues in referring Mr. Bove to the Office of the Inspector General and called for an investigation into Mr. Bove’s potential abuse of prosecutorial authority within the Civil Rights Division.   

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray Presses Secretary Collins on Politicization of VA’s Work, Jeopardizing Care for Veterans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ***WATCH: Senator Murray’s questioning with VA Secretary*** 

    Washington, D.C. — Today, at a hearing on President Trump’s fiscal year 2026 budget request for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a senior member and former chair of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, pressed VA Secretary Doug Collins on recent decisions that jeopardize care for veterans and stifle VA’s critical work.

    In opening comments, Vice Chair Murray said:

    “Secretary Collins—you are charged with making sure we keep our promises to our veterans. And I will tell you, as the daughter of a veteran—one who had great need for the VA benefits—I take this work seriously.

    “Mr. Secretary, I know you hate scaring our veterans. But here’s what I know: when you fire thousands of VA staff with no rationale beside Musk said so—that really scares veterans.

    “When you cancel hundreds of contracts—including a cancer registry in my state—that scares veterans. When you muzzle our researchers—that scares veterans.

    “When you eliminate the VASP program which helped save veterans from foreclosure on their homes–that scares veterans.

    “When you remove language saying veterans and doctors can’t be discriminated against based on their political views or marital status—with no explanation until after people call it out—that scares veterans.

    “And more than just scaring veterans, it puts the care and the support they have not only earned but are entitled to in serious jeopardy. 

    “So if you are concerned about scaring veterans, my suggestion is to stop doing what you’re doing. Focus on what matters: stop implementing policies with no explanation or analysis. Lift the hiring freeze and get our facilities fully staffed.

    “To that end, I have a few questions about some of the actions that veterans have told me they are deeply concerned about, and I hope today you can put their minds at ease—to give us clear, straightforward answers.”

    [VA’S DISCRIMINATION GUIDELINES]

    Senator Murray began by asking about VA’s recent decision to explicitly remove language in anti-discrimination guidelines to ensure all veterans get the care they need: “Secretary Collins, there has been a lot of discussion regarding your decision to modify VA provider guidelines that would open the door to discrimination. You struck the words age, national origin, politics, marital status, and disability from the anti-discrimination policy that was applied to our VA hospitals and clinics. When you changed the guidelines and removed the words making clear when discrimination is not tolerated, what you actually signaled to veterans across the country that they may be denied the care they need. Mr. Secretary, if you insist these categories are already covered by federal law and therefore your changes do not provide openings for discrimination, will you commit then to reinstating the previous policy?”

    Instead of responding on the substance, Secretary Collins blamed news outlets for reporting on the changes he made, stating in part: “I appreciate you taking my own words because it’s about time that somebody decided that they were not going to continue to repeat false rings to keep people in veterans from actually trusting the VA…the Guardian who wanted clickbait, decided to run with something and then it was amplified. It’s scaring veterans. And if they’re concerned—”

    “You took words out—” said Senator Murray, pushing Secretary Collins on why he made the change if he insists the policy isn’t changing.

    Secretary Collins interrupted to continue railing against coverage of the decision instead of answering Senator Murray’s question about whether he would restore the language and the policy.

    Senator Murray reiterated, “Mr. Secretary, I have the floor for a second. What I am telling you is what veterans hear and what Americans hear. Please listen. When you take something out, it says that’s been eliminated, period.”

    “No, it does not,” responded Secretary Collins.

    “Well it does—” said Senator Murray.

    “Only when you have a cheap magazine like the Guardian who wants to put it out there and put it in a position,” replied Secretary Collins, again interrupting.

    Senator Murray pressed, “Ok, your position is: it doesn’t change anything.”

    Secretary Collins answered, “It doesn’t.”

    Senator Murray then asked: “Well, do you think it is possible to be eligible for care and still discriminated against when you try to access health care?”

    “No one is discriminated against at the VA,” demurred Secretary Collins.

    Senator Murray noted, “Well Mr. Secretary, in fact many of us have heard from women veterans—”

    “Did you help correct them?” Secretary Collins attempted to avoid the question.

    Senator Murray flipped the question back to Secretary Collins, “Did you? You took the words out, I did not.”

    Secretary Collins replied, “I did. I put out videos and have done everything because of a false article.”

    “Mr. Secretary, I’m simply telling you, when you took those words out, people heard it in a specific way. Therefore, I’m asking you, why don’t you put them back in and eliminate—” said Senator Murray, attempting to clarify that veterans are viewing this language change as loss of protections, even if VA does not intend that.

    “No. They heard it in a specific way because a reporter who looked for clicks, decided to write an article that he knew was false,” said Secretary Collins, again attempting to place the blame of veterans’ reactions on reporting on his decision-making.

    “Again, I’ve heard from women veterans about experiences, which is why—” responded Senator Murray.

    Secretary Collins again avoided the issue at hand, that there were veterans who were upset with the change in language, regardless of VA intent, “Do you have an example that you can give to me? Cause I’ll make sure it’s corrected. Nobody is to be discriminated against.

    Senator Murray pushed back, “Well, if you are going to call each individual woman in the country and tell them they are not going to be discriminated against… Let me move on.”

    [TOXIC EXPOSURE FUND]

    Senator Murray next asked Secretary Collins about guardrails to ensure Toxic Exposure Fund (TEF) resources are spent appropriately and no veterans’ care is affected by the administration’s request to spend out of the TEF: “Congress has already appropriated funding for Medical Care, which has been passed into law. Your budget request proposes to cancel $18 billion of that money and shift it over to the Toxic Exposures Fund. I am supportive of putting funds where they are needed, but I do want to make sure that you are aware that there are specific limitations for the use of those funds that are in statute. These are guardrails to prevent misuse and address concerns, we put that in because of concerns from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who were very concerned about turning that into a slush fund. Can you commit to us that you will abide by those limitations for all of the funds being spent from the TEF, to include agreements which made with the Committee about what ‘expenses incident to the delivery of care’ means?”

    Secretary Collins replied, “We are committed to following the law on the stuff we are supposed to.”

    “All I’m asking is, you are asking to remove $18 billion into that fund. Are you committed to following the guardrails that the language, that the statute language that surrounds those funds? Because Mr. Secretary, if that is true, then how can you commit that the veterans who were not eligible for care that is unrelated to toxic exposures will not have their care cut off or limited because of the $18 billion decrease to funds?” pressed Senator Murray.

    “Because, as we look at our budgets and take the money that is coming in, we are going to meet the needs of the veterans who come before us,” said Secretary Collins.

    [VA RESEARCH]

    Senator Murray then pressed Secretary Collins on VA directives to prevent researchers from publishing their findings without clearance from Trump administration political appointees: “I have repeatedly raised concerns over the direction VA is taking with the research program. And now it was reported that VA officials are ordering physicians and scientists to not publish their work without seeking approval from Trump’s political appointees. According to a VA official, this policy is specifically in place to prevent ‘negative national exposure.’”

    “So, Mr. Secretary, if a research finding would advance veterans’ health but does not align with the administration’s priorities, will you allow it to be published?”

    “I’m not familiar with the question you have and I’m not going to answer a hypothetical, but I don’t foresee anything, but we have not done anything to restrict our researchers going forward,” said Secretary Collins, refusing to answer the question.

    Senator Murray pressed, “This is on your website.”

    Secretary Collins ignored the fact that this is on the VA website and said, “We are not restricting our researchers. I don’t know how else to answer the question.”

    “If you are ordering physicians and scientists to not publish their work without seeking approval, you can answer that… by saying yes, of course we are not going to say no. But then I’m asking you—” said Senator Murray, clarifying her question before being interrupted.

    “I’m going to reach here and say this is also discussing a policy that had nothing to do with research and publishing research. It had a meeting about talking to media on other issues. I’m happy to take this and see what you are actually discussing, but nothing has changed as far as we know. Researchers can do their research,” responded Secretary Collins.

    Senator Murray again pressed, “All researchers? You will not deny research that shows whatever helps veterans?”

    Secretary Collins again avoided the question, “Again, hypotheticals, we can go down all that. I can’t answer a question if we don’t have an exact question on the end.”

    “Well, it leaves me with the question, that arbitrarily you are going to say no to any kind—” said Senator Murray in part, before again not being able to further clarify her point because she was again interrupted.

    Secretary Collins said, “At this point, I’m not saying either way. I’m sitting here saying that we’re not restricting it.”

    Senator Murray concluded, “Well, that leaves me very curious about how you’re going to move forward on research.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: FACT SHEET: Trump’s Rescission Package Would Gut Bipartisan Foreign Policy Investments 

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    Rescissions package that Senate Republicans are debating—and House Republicans passed—would decimate core foreign policy investments made on a bipartisan basis 

    Lifesaving programs like PEPFAR, GAVI, humanitarian assistance; U.S. treaty obligations; investments to advance U.S. interests all on the chopping block  

    Washington, D.C. – Ahead of a hearing on President Trump’s $9.4 billion rescissions request with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Russ Vought, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, released a new fact sheet detailing how the rescission package would devastate core bipartisan foreign policy investments—and breaking down the Trump administration’s misleading talking points on its request. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: This package would simply cut “woke” Biden-era initiatives—or a highly-selective short list of *past* examples of funded projects that the Trump administration finds objectionable.

    FACT: President Trump himself signed most of these funds into law in March—and his administration has flexibility to determine how exactly to fulfill the objectives provided by Congress for the funding. 

    While Congress specifies particular objectives for the foreign assistance it has provided to advance U.S. interests, the Trump administration has discretion over how exactly to execute the funding in compliance with the law—just as any administration does. 

    The Trump administration has trotted out a highly-selective, tiny list of past initiatives funded by these broader pots of money allocated by Congress—but the plain fact is it now is in charge of executing these programs, and most of the funds in the rescission request were signed into law by Trump himself. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The cuts are merely to “wasteful foreign assistance spending” that is “antithetical” to American interests. 

    FACT: Passing the rescission package would gut funding provided for all manner of important, bipartisan foreign policy objectives. 

    Passing this package would: 

    • Rip away $900 million provided for global health programs that save millions of lives and protect Americans from public health threats. The package would cut $400 million from PEPFAR and another $500 million for other global health programs, which address maternal and child health, family planning, and diseases like malaria, TB, and Polio. 
    • Rescind $4.6 billion for economic and development assistance—half of the total amount provided for fiscal year 2025. This funding pot is used to support cybersecurity, the Counter PRC Influence Fund, critical mineral supply chain diversification, support to partners in the Indo-Pacific, food security programs, support for U.S. businesses abroad, efforts to address irregular migration in our hemisphere, and many other bipartisan initiatives. 
    • Zero out $1 billion to meet U.S. treaty obligations and contributions to international organizations. This includes funds to cover dues to the United Nations, support peacekeeping missions, support UNICEF, and more—ceding ground to countries like China to expand their influence and shape the rules of the road without the United States. 
    • Eliminate $1.3 billion provided for humanitarian assistance, leading to needless suffering, promoting instability, and undermining U.S. interests. This includes emergency food needs, shelter, and other commodities that help stabilize conflict and disaster-stricken populations and stabilize partner governments. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The Trump administration has transparently detailed what this package would mean for bipartisan foreign policy objectives long supported by Congress. 

    FACT: The Trump administration has refused to tell Congress or the public how it plans to effectuate the sweeping cuts it seeks, allowing Russ Vought and President Trump to decide what specific initiatives to slash well after Congress debates and passes the package.  

    The Trump administration’s proposed rescissions of a variety of foreign policy priorities only spell out cuts to high-level accounts—not the specific programs and initiatives funded from within those accounts that they will cut if this package passes.

    We do not know which humanitarian responses that Congress intended to support will be reduced. We do not have details on which infectious disease programs or support for maternal and child health will be curtailed. We do not know which economic and development programs are going to be cut off, undermining congressional direction. Will they cut funding to counter the Chinese government, support American farmers—both? We don’t know. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The $400 million cut to PEPFAR funding is surgical, and the package will preserve all life-saving assistance. 

    FACT: The package does not protect lifesaving care, nor does it detail what specifically will be cut or how—the Trump administration retains that discretion and has so far refused to provide details on what it plans to cut. Cutting preventative assistance means cutting lifesaving assistance, too.  

    Without robust prevention efforts, more people will become infected with HIV—costing lives and many more dollars in treatment down the line. Every dollar invested in prevention saves $20 in HIV treatment and care costs. The Trump administration’s decision to curtail support for prevention efforts is already seriously setting back efforts to end the H.I.V. epidemic. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: Rescinding these funds will help “put the Nation’s fiscal house back in order.” 

    FACT: The requested cuts spanning multiple fiscal years represent less than 0.12% of all federal spending in fiscal year 2025. Rescinding these investments will do nothing to meaningfully tackle our debt—but President Trump and Republicans’ “Big Beautiful Bill” would explode it by $4 trillion. 

    While some Republicans insist making these cuts is necessary in the interest of fiscal responsibility, the plain fact is President Trump and congressional Republicans’ “One Big Beautiful Bill,” which Senate Republicans are laboring to pass this week, would add $4 trillion to the national debt over just the next 10 years.  

    While rescinding these investments to advance U.S. interests abroad would do exceptionally little to address the deficit or our national debt, they would decimate core objectives Congress has long supported on a bipartisan basis. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran – RC-B10-0284/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0284/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0285/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0296/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0299/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0300/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Daniel Attard, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Aurelijus Veryga, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Kris Van Dijck
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Alice Kuhnke
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Jonas Sjöstedt

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran

    (2025/2753(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmad Reza Djalali, a specialist in emergency medicine and a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces;

    B. whereas Djalali was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018;

    C. whereas Djalali has been denied adequate medical care despite the severe deterioration in his physical health and the risk to his life, including a recent heart attack at Evin prison; whereas Iran has continued to threaten to implement his death sentence;

    D. whereas hundreds of individuals have already been executed in 2025 and at least 972 were executed in 2024, a 14 % increase on 2023;

    E. whereas the Iranian Government refuses to recognise Djalali’s Swedish citizenship;

    F. whereas this case is part of a systematic pattern of unlawful detentions and hostage diplomacy by the Iranian regime;

    1. Calls on Iran to immediately release Dr Djalali along with all political prisoners currently being detained; calls on Iran to put a moratorium on executions and to abolish the death penalty;

    2. Strongly condemns Djalali’s sham trial and the Iranian authorities’ brutal treatment of him, amounting to torture and ill treatment, as he was subjected to months of interrogation in solitary confinement, and then sentenced to death;

    3. Urges Iran to provide Djalali, whose health is deteriorating, with immediate and unrestricted access to necessary specialised medical care at an external hospital; urges Iran, furthermore, to provide Djalali with legal representation and legal defence, and allow him regular contact with his family;

    4. Calls on the relevant Member States and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts and adopt targeted measures in response to Iran’s continued detention of EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and others, as part of its hostage diplomacy and in violation of international law;

    5. Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for taking EU nationals hostage and for mass executions of opposition voices and other human rights violations;

    6. Demands that Iran grant full access to UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, and the EU’s full support and increase support for civil society organisations;

    7. Emphasises that EU-Iran engagements must be founded on tangible progress on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the release of all political prisoners;

    8. Asks the VP/HR to raise Djalali’s case publicly and in all engagements with her Iranian counterparts;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government of Iran, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli – RC-B10-0282/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0282/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0287/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0289/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0290/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0295/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Loucas Fourlas, Krzysztof Brejza
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Waldemar Tomaszewski
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Lena Schilling, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Per Clausen

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    (2025/2752(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, a journalist and co-founder of Batumelebi and Netgazeti outlets, was arrested during pro-European protests on 12 January 2025 and faces four to seven years in prison for a provoked incident involving a police officer;

    B. whereas the adoption of draconian legislation – such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, Code of Administrative Offences and Law on Grants – constitutes a dangerous acceleration of democratic backsliding and deliberate authoritarian strategy by Georgian Dream to silence critical voices in civil society and independent media and persecute the political opposition;

    C. whereas the authorities have virtually annihilated remaining independent media outlets in the country; whereas the public information space is fully dominated by pro-government media, spreading Russian-style propaganda and anti-European disinformation;

    D. whereas in Mzia Amaglobeli’s case, the authorities ignored procedural safeguards, imposed pre-trial detention without a clear legal basis, contested by the Public Defender, and assigned a presiding judge lacking qualifications in criminal law; whereas she is being punished for exposing corruption and reporting on election fraud during the 2024 elections;

    E. whereas she reportedly suffered inhumane treatment and undertook a 38-day hunger strike;

    F. whereas Estonia and Lithuania have imposed personal sanctions on Georgian judges and police officers linked to Mzia Amaglobeli’s case;

    1. Demands Mzia Amaglobeli’s immediate and unconditional release and the withdrawal of all charges against her, and denounces her politically motivated arrest and prosecution;

    2. Strongly condemns the Georgian Dream regime’s systemic assault on democratic institutions, political opposition, independent media, civil society and judicial independence;

    3. Expresses deep concern over arbitrary detentions and the harassment of, and violence against, journalists in Georgia, including smear campaigns, legal persecution, abuse and gender-based violence in detention; calls for independent investigations and urges the authorities to immediately end intimidation and ensure journalists’ safety and freedom;

    4. Urges the Georgian authorities to release all political prisoners and other illegally detained persons without delay, including activist Mate Devidze, opposition leaders Zurab Japaridze, Nika Melia and Nika Gvaramia, and former President Mikheil Saakashvili, and denounces the violent abduction of UNM Chair Tina Bokuchava’s husband and the reported threats to her children’s safety;

    5. Calls for the immediate repeal of all repressive legislation, the restoration of democracy, and full protection of media freedom and civil liberties;

    6. Calls for the EU to step up support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society following the entry into force of the FARA, and monitor ongoing trials;

    7. Regrets the persistent inaction of the Council, Member States and Commission and reiterates its repeated call on Member States to impose bilateral sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, President Zourabichvili, and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Protection of Hungarian citizens’ fundamental rights in the context of biometric identification and surveillance at public gatherings – E-002415/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002415/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Kim Van Sparrentak (Verts/ALE), Brando Benifei (S&D), Svenja Hahn (Renew), Birgit Sippel (S&D), Leila Chaibi (The Left), Maria Walsh (PPE), Markéta Gregorová (Verts/ALE), Pernando Barrena Arza (The Left), Tineke Strik (Verts/ALE), Sophie Wilmès (Renew), Sebastian Everding (The Left), Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew), Klára Dobrev (S&D), Kai Tegethoff (Verts/ALE), Fabienne Keller (Renew), Alessandro Zan (S&D), Nela Riehl (Verts/ALE), Saskia Bricmont (Verts/ALE), Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle (Renew), Damian Boeselager (Verts/ALE), Evin Incir (S&D), Anna Strolenberg (Verts/ALE), Olivier Chastel (Renew), Reinier Van Lanschot (Verts/ALE), Dainius Žalimas (Renew), Thomas Waitz (Verts/ALE), Daniel Freund (Verts/ALE), Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE), Marc Angel (S&D), Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Hanna Gedin (The Left), Rasmus Andresen (Verts/ALE), Özlem Demirel (The Left), Jaume Asens Llodrà (Verts/ALE), Catarina Vieira (Verts/ALE), Alexandra Geese (Verts/ALE), Maria Ohisalo (Verts/ALE), Rudi Kennes (The Left), Lena Schilling (Verts/ALE), Mounir Satouri (Verts/ALE), Benoit Cassart (Renew), Mélissa Camara (Verts/ALE), Alice Kuhnke (Verts/ALE), Elio Di Rupo (S&D), Sara Matthieu (Verts/ALE), Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus (S&D), Gordan Bosanac (Verts/ALE), Petras Auštrevičius (Renew), Katrin Langensiepen (Verts/ALE), Anja Hazekamp (The Left), David Cormand (Verts/ALE), Per Clausen (The Left), Murielle Laurent (S&D), Benedetta Scuderi (Verts/ALE), Lucia Yar (Renew), Marco Tarquinio (S&D), Majdouline Sbai (Verts/ALE), Diana Riba i Giner (Verts/ALE), Elisabeth Grossmann (S&D)

    Recent reports suggest that a new Hungarian law may allow the use of facial recognition technology to identify individuals participating in public demonstrations banned by the government[1].

    • 1.Can the Commission assess whether such use complies with the Artificial Intelligence Act’s prohibition on real-time biometric identification[2], applying all legal safeguards and criteria, and confirm that post-remote identification cannot be used to bypass Article 5, which has already entered into force[3]?
    • 2.Does the use of remote biometric identification in this situation bring additional risks to the fundamental rights and freedoms in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, such as freedom of assembly and association, as enshrined in Article 12 of the Charter?
    • 3.If the national authorities responsible for oversight are unable or unwilling to act ‘independently, impartially and without bias’, as required by the Artificial Intelligence Act[4], will the Commission commit to taking action – including infringement proceedings if needed – to ensure that Hungarian citizens are effectively protected under the Artificial Intelligence Act and the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    • [1] Spike, J., ‘Hungary’s new anti-LGBTQ+ law bans Pride events and sparks protests’, Associated Press, 19 March 2025, https://apnews.com/article/hungary-pride-ban-orban-lgbtq-rights-e7a0318b09b902abfc306e3e975b52df.
    • [2] Article 5(1), point (c) and Article 5(2) of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    • [3] Article 26(10) of the Artificial Intelligence Act.
    • [4] As required by Article 70 of the Artificial Intelligence Act.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Transfer of biometric data to the Trump administration – E-002416/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002416/2025
    to the Council
    Rule 144
    Özlem Demirel (The Left)

    The Enhanced Border Security Partnership (EBSP) is a security agreement that the US Government obliges countries to sign if they wish to participate in the Visa Waiver Programme (VWP). This gives US authorities direct access to police-maintained biometric databases for such personal data as fingerprints and facial images. However, the initiative has raised legal and political concerns as it runs counter to the common EU legal framework. Critics also warn of an imbalance because it is unclear whether the data exchange is to be on a reciprocal basis. Such an agreement is open to abuse, particularly under the current US administration.

    • 1.Does the Council know whether the Trump administration, like its predecessor, is requiring countries participating in the VWP to sign up to the EBSP, and whether and how it differs from previous demands?
    • 2.In what formats has the EBSP or a comparable programme been discussed between the EU and the Trump administration to date?
    • 3.To what end, and with what outcome, was the issue discussed at the EU-US Justice and Home Affairs ministerial meeting in early June 2025?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU cooperation with OCCRP in the context of USAID termination – E-002383/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002383/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Petr Bystron (ESN)

    The Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) is an influential globalist propaganda network, established in 2007, which maintains close ties with the United States and in the past received substantial funding from the US Agency for International Development (USAID). According to investigative reports, between 2014 and 2023, OCCRP received approximately USD 1.1 million from the EU, in addition to funding from several individual European countries. This non-transparent and politically biased organisation uses the so-called ‘fight against corruption’ as a pretext for undermining democratic principles and discrediting critical views on various issues such as the war in Ukraine, US foreign policy or the actions of the Commission.

    Therefore, we would like to ask the Commission:

    • 1.How much funding has the Commission and its agencies provided to the OCCRP annually since 2020?
    • 2.How does the Commission justify its partnership with a foreign-funded, politically biased organisation that undermines democratic debate under the pretext of anti-corruption efforts?
    • 3.When does the Commission intend to terminate its cooperation with or financial support of OCCRP in light of the recent termination of USAID funding by US President Donald Trump?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026 – A10-0113/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    (COM(2025)0304 – C10‑0110/2025 – 2025/0158(NLE))

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2025)0304),

     having regard to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0110/2025),

      having regard to the Commission Convergence Report 2025 and the European Central Bank Convergence Report of June 2025,

     having regard to Rule 108 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0113/2025),

    1. Approves the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4. Instructs its President to forward Parliament’s position to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup and the governments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Bulgaria joining the euro area sends a strong political and economic signal of confidence in the enduring viability and appeal of the European Union’s single currency. More than two decades after the euro’s introduction, Bulgaria’s readiness to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026 reaffirms the Union’s cohesion and the euro’s role as a global symbol of stability and unity. Bulgaria has achieved substantial progress towards full economic convergence, making it well-positioned to become the twenty-first member of the euro area.

    Bulgaria introduced its currency board framework on 1 July 1997, pegging the Bulgarian lev to the German mark and subsequently to the euro. Since its EU accession in 2007, Bulgaria has held the status of a “Member State with a derogation,” subject to regular convergence assessments by the European Commission and the European Central Bank.

    At the European Parliament level, the Euro Accession Countries Working Group was established by a decision of the ECON Coordinators on 18 November 2019. It remained active throughout the entire 9th legislative term, scrutinising Bulgaria’s readiness to join the euro area and holding four dedicated sessions with experts, as well as Bulgarian Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Finance. 

    On 25 February 2025, Bulgaria submitted a request for a convergence assessment. The ECB and Commission reports of 4 June 2025 include an examination of the compatibility between Bulgaria’s national legislation, notably the statute of its national central bank, with Articles 130 and 131 of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. The reports also examine whether a high degree of sustainable convergence has been achieved, by reference to the fulfilment of the convergence criteria, and take account of several other factors required under the final sub-paragraph of Article 140(1) of the Treaty.

    Based on its own convergence report and that of the ECB, the Commission proposed that Bulgaria adopt the euro as of 1 January 2026. In accordance with Article 140(2) TFEU, the Council shall decide, by qualified majority and on a proposal from the Commission, which Member States with a derogation meet the necessary conditions for adopting the euro, as defined in Article 140(1) TFEU. This decision is to be made following consultation with the European Parliament and on the basis of the Commission and ECB reports. The Parliament is thus consulted on the legislative proposal for a Council decision to allow Bulgaria to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026.

    On the Convergence Criteria under Article 140(1) of the TFEU, the Rapporteur observes:

    1. Compatibility of National Legislation with Articles 130 and 131 TFEU and the Statutes of the ECB

    Bulgaria’s national legislation, including the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, is fully aligned with EU requirements. The law guarantees the independence of the national central bank and of the members of its decision-making bodies, the prohibition of monetary financing and privileged access, and ensures compliance with the objectives of the ESCB as formulated in Article 127 of the Treaty.

    2. Achievement of a High Degree of Price Stability

    Over the 12 months to April 2025, Bulgaria recorded an average inflation rate of 2.7%, below the reference value of 2.8%. An analysis of a broad set of indicators reveals no concerns regarding the sustainability of price stability. The reference value is calculated as the average inflation rate of the three best-performing EU Member States in terms of price stability, plus 1.5 percentage points. For the period from May 2024 to April 2025, the reference value of 2.8% is based on the inflation rates of Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%), and Italy (1.4%). No Member States were considered statistical outliers in this calculation, as none showed inflation deviations significantly above the euro area average due to country-specific factors.

    3. Sustainability of the Government Financial Position

    Bulgaria is currently not subject to a Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Its general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value, and its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value since 2007. 

    4. Compliance with the Normal Fluctuation Margins of the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at least the past 2 years

    The Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate. Bulgaria has fulfilled nearly all of its post-entry commitments under ERM II. Further efforts are needed related to anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures.

    5. Durability of Convergence, as Reflected in Long-Term Interest Rate Levels

    In the twelve months ending April 2025, Bulgaria’s average long-term interest rate was 3.9%, well below the reference value of 5.1%. The reference value for April 2025 is calculated as the simple average of the average long-term interest rates in Ireland (2.8%), Finland (2.9%) and Italy (3.7%) plus 2 percentage points, yielding a reference value of 5.1%.

    6. Economic Integration and Convergence (Article 140(1), Second Subparagraph TFEU) 

    In accordance with Article 140 TFEU, the Commission’s assessment must also consider additional factors relevant to economic integration and convergence, as these provide insight into a Member State’s capacity to join the euro area without significant difficulties. These include developments in the balance of payments and product, labour, and financial market integration.

    In this context, Bulgaria’s external position has improved, with its combined current and capital account close to balance in 2024. The country is well integrated with the euro area through trade and investment, benefiting from increased banking and financial integration and access to the broader euro area market. Bulgaria continues to make progress but further actions are needed to address the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and regulatory quality. 

    While the financial sector is small and bank-dominated, it is well embedded in the euro area, supported by Bulgaria’s participation in the banking union since 2020. Market-based financing remains underdeveloped, but potential financial stability risks are being mitigated by the Bulgarian National Bank’s conservative macroprudential policy and the robustness of the banking system. The Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report found no need for an in-depth imbalance review, but emphasized the importance of closely monitoring developments in competitiveness, the housing market, and credit growth.

    Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), supported by €5.7 billion in EU grants (2021–2026), targets structural reforms, competitiveness, and reducing regional disparities. A revised RRP was submitted in April 2025 to accelerate implementation, especially in decarbonisation, governance, and business environment. Cohesion policy funds (€10.7 billion for 2021–2027) further support competitiveness, the green transition, social inclusion, and education, with implementation progressing overall, despite some remaining challenges.

    7. Note regarding Consultation of the European Parliament

    In accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure, when Parliament is consulted pursuant to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the committee responsible shall submit a report to Parliament advocating approval or rejection of the proposed act on the basis of which Parliament shall deliberate. Parliament shall take a single vote on the proposed act, to which no amendments may be tabled, which shall apply also to the vote in committee. On 19 March 2025, ECON Coordinators agreed the file to be treated swiftly with plenary vote in July and to allocate the rapporteurship on this file as soon as possible.

    Based on the above, the Rapporteur recommends that the derogation be lifted and Bulgaria adopts the euro on 1 January 2026.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

     

    Entity and/or person

    Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification

    Minister of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union

    Chair of the Committee on Budget and Finance in the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Association of Banks in Bulgaria

    Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank

    Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Bulgarian Commission for Consumer Protection

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    MEP Rada Laykova

    Minority position under Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    The supposed job of the EP is to scrutinize the Commission´s assessment on behalf of the people, as they will pay the price of the ignored Maastricht criteria – mathematical rules to ensure no Ponzi scheme happens to the Euro.

    However, what did it do?

     Ignore incoherence between findings within the Commission report and its final assessment, which strongly suggests a political decision that ignores Maastricht criteria and math to the detriment of the people;

     ignore the suspicious Bulgarian budget data sent to the Commission with absurd income projections and concealed expenses;

     ignore the suppressed referendum in Bulgaria;

     replace the scrutiny by a gleeful statement cheerleading Bulgaria´s boarding of the “Eurotanic”, ignoring the obvious state of the Euro, which shows several classic terminal signs of a flat currency. A short statement like “shared sorrow is half sorrow” would have been more honest.

    The lack of diligence might have serious and far-reaching consequences for the people in the Eurozone or Bulgaria as it recreates certain aspects of Greece´s accession into the Euro.

    Here, the EU´s “democracy in action” was “democracy in name only” and the people will pay the price, as evidenced in the past.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

    (2024/2053(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

     having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

     having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

     having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank[1],

     having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

     having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

     having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

     having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

     having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

     having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

     having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

     having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

     having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

     having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

     having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

     having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

     having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform[8],

     having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[9],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU  policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

    B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

    C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

    D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

    E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

    F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

    G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

    H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

    I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

    J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed[10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

    K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade[11];

    L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

    M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

    N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

    O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

    General remarks

    1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

    2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

    3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

    4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

    5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

    6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

    7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

    8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

    9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

    12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

    13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

    14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

    15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

    16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

    17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

    18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

    19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

    Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

    20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria[13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

    21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

    22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

    23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

    24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

    25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

    26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation[15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

    27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

    Financing peace, security and defence

    28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for  2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

    29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation[16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

    31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

    32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

    33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

    34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

    Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

    35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

    36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

    37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

    38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

    39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

    40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

    41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

    42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

    Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

    44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

    45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

    46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative[17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

    47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

    48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

    49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

    50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

    EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

    51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

    52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

    53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

    54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

    55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

    57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

    58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

    59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

    60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

    Governance: accountability and transparency

    61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

    62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

    63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

    65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

    66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

    67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

    68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

    °

    ° °

    69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

     having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

     having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

     having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

     having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

     having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

     having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

     having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

     having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

     having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

     having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

     having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

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    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

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