Category: Politics

MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark – A10-0099/2025

Source: European Parliament

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark

(COM(2024)0479 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

(Consent)

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the draft Council decision (14652/2024),

– having regard to the Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, of the other part (2025-2030) (14781/24),

– having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 43(2) and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a)(v), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0227/2024),

– having regard to its non-legislative resolution of …[1] on the draft decision,

– having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

– having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4) and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on Fisheries (A10-0099/2025),

1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreement;

2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, of the one part, and of Greenland and Denmark, of the other part.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

At the end of 2024, Greenland and the European Union signed a new Protocol on the implementation of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement (SFPA) (2025-2030). This is a mixed agreement that allows the European Union’s vessels to fish species such as cod, Greenland halibut, redfish and Northern prawn. In return, the European Union pays a financial contribution of EUR 17 296 857 per annum, comprising EUR 14 096 857 for access rights and EUR 3 200 000 for support and implementation of Greenland’s fisheries policy, plus the fees paid by vessel owners. In recent years, the fisheries agreement has allowed around 10 of the European Union’s vessels to operate in the autonomous territory’s waters. The new Protocol provides details of the rules and provisions governing this access.

Fisheries in Greenland

The fisheries sector is of central importance for Greenland in socio-economic and cultural terms. It accounts for 15% of the territory’s jobs and over 90% of its exports. Inshore fishing mainly involves small boats (dinghies), and sustains a local economy and jobs. Many remote Inuit communities rely on subsistence fishing. The territory also has a developed offshore fishing fleet and has fisheries agreements in force that allow foreign vessels to fish in the offshore area. Greenland’s fisheries are suffering the effects of climate change on a vulnerable Arctic marine environment, with particular impacts on the species caught. Greenland has put measures in place to limit the impact of fisheries on the marine environment; these include a ban on discards, a plan for the management of bycatch, etc.

New Protocol implementing the SFPA

The new Protocol that has been signed has a term of six years, providing stability and visibility for stakeholders. It contains provisions aimed at providing a framework for access to waters by European vessels and cooperation with Greenland: fishing opportunities, bycatch, scientific cooperation, monitoring, controls, surveillance, fishing areas, observers etc.

A specific characteristic of the agreement is that catches are regulated on the basis of fishing opportunities that are set annually. Your rapporteur is concerned about the fact that, according to the ex-post evaluation, the TACs for several of the targeted species exceed the limits set on the basis of scientific advice. These proven cases of overfishing, or of uncertainty owing to a lack of data, pose a threat to fish populations and the sustainability of fisheries, as in the case of the Northern prawn. Several indicative fishing opportunities have been reduced. The second noteworthy point is linked to the need for additional data regarding the targeted species and marine ecosystems.

The programming of sectoral support will be adopted in the three months following the application of the Protocol. The sectoral support allocated in recent years has made it possible to support research and scientific assessments, the administration of Greenland’s fisheries, controls and also small-scale coastal fisheries. This is assessed positively in the evaluation of the last Protocol.

Conclusions and recommendations

In the context of current diplomatic tensions with the United States and the climate crisis in the Arctic, your rapporteur recalls the importance of the SFPA and relations between Greenland and the European Union in the area of fisheries. Through its sectoral support, the fisheries agreement offers assistance that is welcomed by the authorities and a number of civil society actors in Greenland. Positive developments include the increase in the financial contribution paid by the European Union, in the amount of sectoral support and in the fees paid by vessel owners.

Your rapporteur invites the European Union to provide increased support to coastal fishing communities, with respect for the rights of the indigenous peoples and the FAO’s Guidelines for Securing Sustainable Small-Scale Fisheries. It is advisable to ensure that these peoples, as well as NGOs, are involved in the agreement. Another positive development is the European Union’s support in areas such as controls, the fight against IUU fishing, the collection of data and scientific research.

Your rapporteur underlines the environmental challenges associated with the agreement. As already requested by Parliament in 2021, it is essential to continue efforts in relation to data collection and the fight against overfishing, by following the scientific advice for setting TACs in Greenland and allocating annual fishing opportunities to the European Union. Even though it fishes smaller quantities, the European Union must follow the precautionary principle. The definition of the surplus is controversial in certain cases. The fishing carried out by the European Union’s vessels furthermore has an impact on seabed ecosystems and the emphasis must be on identifying and protecting vulnerable marine ecosystems, with the sector’s help.

Finally, your rapporteur asks for this fisheries agreement to be repositioned in the context of regional fisheries governance. Quota exchanges mean that post-Brexit relations with coastal countries, including Norway, are closely linked to the agreement. The European Union and Greenland must strengthen cooperation and transparency within the RFMOs and the agreements between coastal states. More broadly, the European Union must do more to protect species and the marine environment in the Arctic.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that he has received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report:

Entity and/or person

Delegation of France to the European Union

Delegation of Germany to the European Union

Delegation of Denmark to the European Union

Greenland Ministry of Fisheries

Oceana

Europêche

DG MARE (Commission)

The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that he has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (19.2.2025)

for the Committee on Fisheries

on the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand

(COM(2024)0479 – C10‑0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE))

Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Isabel Benjumea Benjumea

The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

A. whereas the previous 4-year Implementing Protocol to the Agreement will expire on 21 April 2025;

B. whereas the financial contribution for the entire duration of the new Implementing Protocol is EUR 103 781 000, based on:

(a) an annual amount for access to fishery resources for the categories provided for in the Protocol, set at EUR 14 096 857 for the duration of the Protocol;

(b) support for the development of Greenland’s sectoral fisheries policy amounting to EUR 3 200 000 per year for the duration of the Protocol;

C. whereas the implementation of the Protocol requires the use of operational appropriations, as explained below:

DG MARE		Year N	Year N+1	Year N+2	Year N+3	Year N+4	Year N+5	TOTAL
□ Operational appropriations
Budget line 08 05 01	Commitments	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	103.781
Budget line 08 05 01	Payments	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	17.296	103.781

EUR million (to three decimal places)

D. whereas on 21 November 2024, Parliament approved DEC 15/2024 submitted by the Commission on 25 October 2024, which makes available the necessary appropriations on operational line 08 05 01 to honour the 2024 financial obligations resulting from the new Implementing Protocol;

E. whereas the Protocol with Greenland and Denmark was signed and entered into provisional application on 12 December 2024;

1. Notes that the support allocated to the Protocol should meet the objectives of enabling Union vessels to fish in Greenland’s fishing zone, enabling the Union and Greenland to work closely together to further promote the development of a sustainable fisheries policy and the responsible exploitation of fishery resources in Greenland’s fishing zone, and ensuring that the Union and Greenland cooperate to contribute to decent working conditions in the fisheries sector; considers that there should be thorough scrutiny to ensure that the support meets those objectives effectively during the implementation of the Protocol;

2. Recommends that, for future agreements, an impact assessment of the added value and socio-economic benefits derived from the previous agreement be taken into account; considers that this assessment should guide the negotiation and renewal of subsequent agreements to ensure that they align with the objectives of sustainable development and efficient use of the Union’s financial resources;

3. Notes that the transfer of appropriations for an amount of EUR 16 992 434 in commitment appropriations, as submitted by the Commission in DEC 15/2024, was approved by the budgetary authority in the time limit provided for in the Financial Regulation; regrets that the decision on this budgetary matter is disconnected from, and had to be taken prior to, the decision on the consent to be given by Parliament to the new Implementing Protocol; underlines that decisions on the agreement itself and related budgetary matters are inextricably linked, and fears, therefore, that the disconnect risks de facto pre-empting the decision on consent and creating a fait accompli;

4. Calls on the Commission to explain the need for the provisional application of the Implementing Protocol in question, since the existing Implementing Protocol remains in force until April 2025, thus allowing time for the agreement to be finalised without any risk of a gap; calls on the Commission to provide further information about the budgetary implications of the provisional application of the new Implementing Protocol as of 12 December 2024, given the fact that the current Implementing Protocol is still in force;

5. Takes note that DEC 15/2024 does not include any transfer of payment appropriations to the operational line for 2024 on the basis that, according to the Commission, the first access payment linked to this Implementing Protocol will be due by 30 June 2025; asks the Commission to clarify the lack of synchronisation between commitment and payment appropriations;

6. Notes that the 2025 budget as voted on in plenary on 27 November 2024 includes amounts of EUR 150 560 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 135 300 000 in payment appropriations on line 08 05 01, as well as amounts of EUR 59 970 000 in commitment appropriations and EUR 41 620 000 in payment appropriations for fishing activities on reserve line 30 02 02; regrets that the amounts are cumulative and not broken down by fisheries agreements, thus making it difficult for Parliament to scrutinise budget implementation in this field;

7. Stresses that the financial programming of line 08 05 01 needs to be sufficient to cater for the financial obligations in the years 2026-2027 subject to the decision of the budgetary authority in the annual budgetary procedures; calls for scrutiny regarding the financial programming of line 08 05 01 in the annual budgets of 2026 and 2027;

8. Concludes that the Committee on Budgets is in a position to advise the Committee on Fisheries, as the committee responsible, to recommend approval of the proposal for a Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Protocol implementing the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union on the one hand, and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark, on the other hand.

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

Title	Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark
References	14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)
Committee(s) responsible	PECH
Date announced in plenary	BUDG 10.2.2025
Rapporteur for budgetary assessment Date appointed	Isabel Benjumea Benjumea 12.12.2024
Discussed in committee	16.1.2025
Date adopted	19.2.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	23 0 5
Members present for the final vote	Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Tobiasz Bocheński, Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Janusz Lewandowski, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Lucia Yar
Substitutes present for the final vote	Moritz Körner, Tiago Moreira de Sá
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Hildegard Bentele

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

23	+
ECR	Tobiasz Bocheński, Bogdan Rzońca
NI	Thomas Geisel
PPE	Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Hildegard Bentele, Andrzej Halicki, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva
Renew	Fabienne Keller, Moritz Körner, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar
S&D	Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Giuseppe Lupo, Victor Negrescu, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares
Verts/ALE	Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino

5	0
ESN	Alexander Jungbluth
PfE	Tomasz Buczek, Angéline Furet, Tiago Moreira de Sá, Julien Sanchez

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

Title	Implementing Protocol (2025-2030) to the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Government of Greenland and the Government of Denmark
References	14652/2024 – C10-0227/2024 – 2024/0263(NLE)
Date of consultation or request for consent	18.12.2024
Committee(s) responsible	PECH
Committees asked for opinions Date announced in plenary	BUDG 10.2.2025
Rapporteurs Date appointed	Emma Fourreau 18.12.2024
Discussed in committee	27.1.2025	18.3.2025
Date adopted	20.5.2025
Budgetary assessment Date of budgetary assessment	BUDG 19.2.2025
Result of final vote	+: –: 0:	24 1 2
Members present for the final vote	Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ton Diepeveen, Siegbert Frank Droese, Emma Fourreau, Nicolás González Casares, France Jamet, Nora Junco García, Isabelle Le Callennec, Isabella Lövin, Giuseppe Lupo, Giuseppe Milazzo, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, André Rodrigues, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Sander Smit, António Tânger Corrêa, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Substitutes present for the final vote	Sebastian Everding, Marco Falcone, Karin Karlsbro, Rasmus Nordqvist
Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote	Hélder Sousa Silva
Date tabled	28.5.2025

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

24	+
ECR	Stephen Nikola Bartulica, Nora Junco García, Giuseppe Milazzo, Bert-Jan Ruissen
PPE	Carmen Crespo Díaz, Marco Falcone, Isabelle Le Callennec, Francisco José Millán Mon, Jessica Polfjärd, Sander Smit, Hélder Sousa Silva
PfE	Ton Diepeveen, António Tânger Corrêa
Renew	Karin Karlsbro, Emma Wiesner, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
S&D	Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Thomas Bajada, Nicolás González Casares, Giuseppe Lupo, André Rodrigues
The Left	Emma Fourreau
Verts/ALE	Isabella Lövin, Rasmus Nordqvist

1	–
ESN	Siegbert Frank Droese

2	0
PfE	France Jamet
The Left	Sebastian Everding

Key to symbols:

+ : in favour

– : against

0 : abstention

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

(2025/2018(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part [1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

– having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

– having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

– having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina [4],

– having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina [5],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

– having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

– having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

– having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

– having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

– having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

– having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

– having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

– having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

– having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

– having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

– having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

– having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement [6],

– having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

Commitment to EU accession

1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

Democracy and the rule of law

20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

Fundamental freedoms and human rights

35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act [8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act [9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

Socio-economic reforms

58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive [10], the Birds Directive [11] and the Water Framework Directive [12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

73. Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

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75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure – A10-0107/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure

(2025/2007(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Articles 173, 179 and 190 thereof,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025: Moving forward together: A Bolder, Simpler, Faster Union’ (COM(2025)0045),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 September 2023 establishing a framework of measures for strengthening Europe’s semiconductor ecosystem [1] (the Chips Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union [2] (NIS 2 Directive),

– having regard to the detailed report by the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) entitled ‘Foresight Cybersecurity Threats For 2030 – Update 2024’, published in March 2024,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2024 on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements [3] (the Cyber Resilience Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/881 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 on ENISA (the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) and on information and communications technology cybersecurity certification and repealing Regulation (EU) No 526/2013 [4] (the Cybersecurity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/38 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cyber threats and incidents [5] (the Cyber Solidarity Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/37 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2019/881 as regards managed security services [6],

– having regard to the Commission White Paper of 21 February 2024 entitled ‘How to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs?’ (COM(2024)0081),

– having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of 17 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 2 July 2024 entitled ‘State of the Digital Decade 2024’ (COM(2024)0260),

– having regard to Decision (EU) 2022/2481 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 establishing the Digital Decade Policy Programme 2030 [7],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/903 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 laying down measures for a high level of public sector interoperability across the Union [8] (the Interoperable Europe Act),

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1024 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 June 2019 on open data and the re-use of public sector information (recast)[9],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 [10],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2854 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data and amending Regulation (EU) 2017/2394 and Directive (EU) 2020/1828 [11] (the Data Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1309 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on measures to reduce the cost of deploying gigabit electronic communications networks, amending Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 and repealing Directive 2014/61/EU [12] (the Gigabit Infrastructure Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence [13] (the Artificial Intelligence Act),

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2021 establishing the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1316/2013 and (EU) No 283/2014 [14],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240 [15],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing Horizon Europe – the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation, laying down its rules for participation and dissemination, and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1290/2013 and (EU) No 1291/2013 [16],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/696 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme [17],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/588 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2023 establishing the Union Secure Connectivity Programme for the period 2023-2027 [18],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/2085 of 19 November 2021 establishing the Joint Undertakings under Horizon Europe and repealing Regulations (EC) No 219/2007, (EU) No 557/2014, (EU) No 558/2014, (EU) No 559/2014, (EU) No 560/2014, (EU) No 561/2014 and (EU) No 642/2014 [19],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 of 13 July 2021 on establishing the European High Performance Computing Joint Undertaking and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1488 [20],

– having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2024/1732 of 17 June 2024 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1173 as regards a EuroHPC initiative for start-ups in order to boost European leadership in trustworthy artificial intelligence [21],

– having regard to Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (recast)[22],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 as regards establishing the European Digital Identity Framework [23],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 to the European Parliament and the Council entitled ‘EU Action Plan on Cable Security’ (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2020 entitled ‘Secure 5G deployment in the EU – Implementing the EU toolbox’ (COM(2020)0050),

– having regard to the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, which commits ‘to promote a European way for the digital transformation, putting people at the centre’,

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 December 2021 entitled ‘Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European interest’ (IPCEIs) (COM(2021)8481),

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (A10-0107/2025),

A. whereas technological sovereignty should be seen as the whole value chain from excellence in research to creating better competition and achieving greater European sovereignty;

B. whereas the EU relies on non-EU countries for over 80 % of digital products, services, infrastructure and intellectual property;

C. whereas a few technological companies hold concentrated power over key digital markets and control over underlying internet infrastructure, including operating systems, computing, artificial intelligence (AI), search engines, social media capacity, digital advertising and payment services;

D. whereas our technological sovereignty will greatly depend on Europe’s ability to create the market conditions needed for European companies to flourish and compete with each other, thereby increasing the quality of their products;

E. whereas the EU is at risk of failing to meet its digital decade targets and objectives, including the adoption of cloud, big data and AI;

F. whereas European firms contribute a minor share to global research and development (R&D) in software, internet technologies and electronics, while the United States and China lead in these sectors;

G. whereas the Commission’s Digital Compass, Digital Decade Policy Programme, and Competitiveness Compass are essential frameworks for strengthening Europe’s digital ecosystem, securing technological leadership and ensuring long-term economic resilience;

H. whereas digital infrastructure is composed of hardware elements related to connectivity, including fibre, 5G and 6G, submarine cables, satellites and spectrum, and computing, including semiconductors, data centres, HPC and quantum technologies, and of software elements including identity solutions, the Internet of Things, and cloud and AI systems, as well as the intermediary layer including advertising, search engines, payments and communication systems;

I. whereas the EU’s competitiveness will increasingly depend on the digitalisation of all sectors, supported by resilient, safe and trustworthy digital infrastructure; notes, in this context, that the digital single market is a vital asset as it can enable companies to grow and scale up;

J. whereas the full potential of the digital single market remains untapped, with intra-EU trade in digital services representing just 8 % of GDP, which is significantly lower than the 25 % for trade in digital goods;

K. whereas the availability of eID schemes and digital public services and access to e-Health records are increasing, but there are still significant gaps in the provision of privacy preserving, fully user-centric, accessible and sovereign digital public services among Member States due to differences in the adoption of eID;

L. whereas eID is currently available to 93 % of the EU’s population, but achieving 100 % of digital public services for citizens and businesses by 2030 remains challenging;

M. whereas interoperability and interconnectedness would enhance the competitiveness of the European economy and might benefit from policies such as open-source first and public money, public code, and the implementation of common and open standards;

N. whereas digital infrastructure is of key importance for EU industry, including the automotive industry and the possible development of connected and autonomous vehicles; whereas robust data and communications infrastructure is needed to support a secure ecosystem for connected and autonomous vehicles;

O. whereas fibre-optic networks form one of the backbones of the EU’s digital infrastructure, enabling high-speed internet, 5G networks and future technological improvements;

P. whereas the EU is behind on the roll-out of 5G to meet its 2030 targets, with still limited fibre coverage of only about 64 % of European households being included;

Q. whereas investment needs in state-of-the-art connectivity in the EU are immense;

R. whereas resolving challenges related to access to land and grids is key to the successful deployment of digital infrastructure;

S. whereas the EU GOVSATCOM initiative aims to ensure the long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

T. whereas chips play a crucial role in increasing the technological competitiveness and resilience of Europe;

U. whereas the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal and the 2025 Commission Work Programme make little to no mention of semiconductor technologies despite their critical importance for the EU’s industrial ambition;

V. whereas the Chips Act was an ad hoc adaptation mechanism aimed at addressing certain challenges regarding semiconductor shortages; whereas its areas of action are mostly limited to advanced semiconductors; whereas EU engagement on legacy semiconductors is insufficient; whereas the revision of the Chips Act is expected in September 2026;

W. whereas the existing European regional clusters in the semiconductor sector have a role to play and should be further strengthened;

X. whereas processors, memory technologies, graphics processing units (GPUs), and quantum chips are critical to Europe’s digital infrastructure and supply chain security;

Y. whereas cloud services are fundamental to a wide range of computational activities and computing services that have become an essential enabler of competitiveness;

Z. whereas federated models could enhance the competitiveness of the EU market by facilitating the emergence of significant European alternatives, building on local market expertise and presence;

AA. whereas large-scale AI infrastructure, such as AI gigafactories, is essential for enabling open and collaborative development of the most complex AI models;

AB. whereas the AI value chain is still under development and tackling the development of AI models is only part of it; whereas European AI solutions may be developed using Europe’s public and private computing infrastructure, driving innovation, and start-ups and small companies should be in particular beneficiaries of access to public computing infrastructure;

AC. whereas AI models that can be run on widely available hardware at moderate costs allow a greater number of actors to shape how AI systems are created and used, providing more immediate value in applications and enabling a more democratic use of AI;

AD. whereas at the moment, the roll-out, marketing and deployment of AI is often shaped by a small number of big tech companies; whereas some AI features are not being rolled out in the EU at the same time as in non-EU countries, creating a competitive disadvantage for European businesses and consumers;

AE. whereas data centres are an essential part of an advanced digital society, as enablers of distributed processing and effective data storage;

AF. whereas trusted capacity and availability of data storage is essential for European resilience and development; whereas most data centres in Europe are not owned by European companies;

AG. whereas building and operating large-scale data centres requires substantial investment;

AH. whereas around 9 % of global electricity consumption results from data centres, cloud services and connectivity;

AI. whereas submarine cables are critical infrastructure for global connectivity, economic stability and security, carrying over 99 % of international communications through them, and they remain vulnerable to physical damage, cyberthreats and geopolitical risks;

AJ. whereas secure and resilient digital infrastructure is crucial, particularly considering the increasing number of cyberattacks against the EU, its Member States and its industry and society;

AK. whereas the EU toolbox for 5G security is important for preventing cyberespionage and strengthening the resilience of supply chains in the EU’s digital infrastructure;

AL. whereas 21 % of businesses cite compliance and legal uncertainties as a barrier to digital investment;

AM. whereas the ‘one in, one out’ approach ensures that all burdens introduced by Commission initiatives are considered and that administrative burdens are offset by removing burdens of equivalent value in the same policy area;

AN. whereas the energy consumption challenges in AI, cloud and quantum computing, as well as data centres, require the integration of sustainability into digital infrastructure strategies;

AO. whereas data centre power consumption is projected to nearly triple by the end of this decade, increasing from approximately 62 terawatt-hours (TWh) today to more than 150 TWh, thus escalating from 2 % to 5 % of total European power consumption;

AP. whereas the digital skills gap remains a major concern, with only 54 % of European citizens possessing at least basic digital skills – well below the 80 % target set in the digital decade policy programme;

AQ. whereas the shortage of ICT professionals in the EU is projected to reach 12 million by 2030, falling significantly short of the EU’s target of 20 million skilled workers;

AR. whereas the 2024 State of the Digital Decade report and the Draghi report both stress the urgent need to invest in digital and science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) skills to preserve Europe’s technological capabilities and global competitiveness;

AS. whereas 60 % of EU companies report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers in areas such as AI, cybersecurity and clean technologies, posing a significant barrier to innovation, competitiveness and the green and digital transitions;

AT. whereas current labour market developments, including global lay-offs and political instability outside the EU, create an opportunity to attract high-skilled digital talent to the EU;

AU. whereas increasing competitiveness and resilience require appropriate funding; whereas public funding can act as a catalyst and private investment and competitive market forces are key for the long-term development of digital infrastructure;

AV. whereas a robust, agile and excellence-driven research and innovation (R&I) ecosystem is essential to ensure the EU’s global competitiveness and leadership in strategic technologies, such as quantum and AI;

AW. whereas standardisation is at the core of genuine European digital and technological sovereignty; whereas the importance of standards is growing due to increasing technological competition across the world, particularly with the United States and China;

AX. whereas the EU is committed to negotiating comprehensive digital trade agreements (DTAs) to promote secure, resilient and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries;

AY. whereas the Commission has announced landmark DTAs with South Korea and Singapore, setting an important precedent for future agreements;

AZ. whereas Parliament and the Council have agreed on the ‘EU horizontal provisions on Cross-border data flows and protection of personal data and privacy in the Digital Trade Title of EU trade agreements’, which was endorsed by the Commission and remains an important tool in relation to digital trade and the establishment of new DTAs;

General introduction

1. Underlines that European sovereignty is the ability to build capacity, resilience and security by reducing strategic dependencies, preventing reliance on foreign actors and single service providers, and safeguarding critical technologies and infrastructure; calls for the development of a comprehensive risk assessment framework to monitor and address dependencies across the digital value chain; underlines that such a framework should serve as a basis for ensuring EU preparedness and resilience by enhancing European industrial policy and boosting domestic R&D and manufacturing capabilities in strategic technologies;

2. Believes that technological sovereignty is the capacity to design, develop and scale up digital technologies needed for the competitiveness of our economy, the welfare of our citizens and the EU’s open strategic autonomy in a globalised world; believes that this includes ensuring the EU’s ability to make autonomous decisions, engaging with trusted non-EU countries and entities, diversifying and strengthening supply chains and promoting the concept of openness and interoperability to ensure that Europe remains an attractive hub for investment;

3. Recognises the increasing concentration of power in non-EU companies, which constrains Europe’s ability to innovate, compete and maintain control over its digital economy, society and democracy; is concerned by excessive dependencies on non-EU actors in critical areas such as cloud infrastructure, semiconductors, AI and cybersecurity – where market concentration and foreign control threaten to undermine Europe’s competitiveness, democratic resilience and security;

4. Believes that the EU’s industrial tech ambitions should focus on the key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductor technologies or quantum, that contribute to the EU’s open strategic autonomy and are essential for our green, digital and defence transitions;

5. Recognises the shift in the geopolitical landscape and the resulting opportunity for market demand for European products and services; sees this as a window of opportunity to position Europe as a global leader in trusted and secure digital solutions;

6. Underlines the need to foster a supportive regulatory environment that encourages innovation, investment and the development of cutting-edge technologies in Europe, while protecting EU end users from the consequences of extraterritoriality;

7. Recognises the need for a comprehensive European industrial policy for the digital ecosystem, integrating all relevant policy domains such as market access, standardisation, R&D, investment, trade and international cooperation; calls on the Commission to develop this comprehensive policy with the aim of reducing harmful strategic dependencies, strengthening domestic value chains and ensuring a secure, trustworthy and innovation-driven digital ecosystem that adheres to European values;

8. Recalls that the high-tech product and digital services markets depend heavily on external supply chains, posing risks to sovereignty and resilience; stresses the importance of boosting industrial capacity and technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies to support the EU’s open strategic autonomy;

9. Emphasises that boosting Europe’s technological sovereignty in the era of rapid technological development requires enhancing innovation and commercialisation in order to build the necessary capabilities; highlights that Europe must transform itself into a globally attractive and agile business environment by reducing bureaucracy, enhancing regulatory predictability and fostering entrepreneurship and risk-taking;

10. Recognises that open strategic autonomy and democratic resilience must be at the core of the Commission’s agenda and that a comprehensive approach must integrate procurement, funding and long-term institutional frameworks to establish sovereign digital infrastructure in critical domains;

11. Calls on the Commission to analyse and establish a comprehensive list of critical dependencies in digital infrastructure and technologies, assessing, at minimum, storage services, identity and payment systems, communication platforms, as well as the software, protocols and standards that support them, and to propose measures to promote market access for products and services with a strong positive impact on the EU’s technological sovereignty, resilience and sustainability; believes, in that regard, that the use of specific award criteria in public procurement may be promoted in areas where such critical dependencies exist; believes that such criteria can help incentivise competition and strengthen European technological sovereignty by facilitating the procurement of European digital products and services, where possible;

Digital public infrastructure

12. Strongly believes that digital infrastructure is the backbone of our economy and that there should therefore be a base layer of digital public infrastructure (DPI) that ensures sovereignty and a competition-friendly market environment; observes that the market has not developed this base layer in many important areas, which has resulted in monopolies and reliance on foreign actors; underlines that in order to fill this gap, the EU should take the lead in creating a strong foundation for DPI by creating layers of digital technologies consisting of semiconductors, connectivity solutions, cloud infrastructure, software, data and AI; believes that European DPI should be founded on fair and competitive economic models and also use governance models where neither private companies nor governments maintain centralised control; is of the opinion that it should be built on common and open standards, embrace interoperability and interconnectedness, so as to prevent user and vendor ‘lock-ins’, and spur innovation by facilitating new market entrants, and that it should also ensure privacy and security by default;

13. Believes that the deployment of DPI should be focused on areas where critical dependencies exist, as identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list; calls on the Commission to prepare a detailed and comprehensive plan for establishing European DPI by identifying technologies that are best suited to European action, and urges the Commission and the Member States to dedicate appropriate resources to deploying European DPI;

14. Stresses that European DPI should be stimulated by coordinated action at EU level to ensure the presence and competitiveness of European providers as well as a competitive market environment; underlines that these objectives will not be achieved through regulation alone and will require significant public investment; recognises that the forthcoming multiannual financial framework (MFF) should therefore include additional funding for this purpose, focusing on EU added value and financing the base layer of European DPI;

15. Recognises that as part of the forthcoming MFF, the EU must commit to increased spending to achieve technological sovereignty; underlines that this should include a dedicated envelope for the development and deployment of the DPI layers identified in the Commission’s comprehensive list, as well as additional funds to ensure a competition-friendly market environment in other digital areas;

16. Believes that the funding under the forthcoming MFF should prioritise active capacity-building in key hardware, software and service areas, including high-performance computing, quantum computing, encryption and communication, connectivity, cloud, data, web and AI ecosystems, and digital libraries;

17. Is of the opinion that European DPI should be based on EU values and remain open to like-minded non-EU partners; calls on the Commission and the Member States to sustain their efforts and add more impetus to the process with the UN Development Programme on DPI;

18. Recognises e-government services as a key enabler of efficient, secure and accessible public service delivery, which should be designed to facilitate digital identification, government data sharing and public sector payments without distorting markets or undermining existing private sector solutions; emphasises that the EU’s approach to e-government services should focus on strengthening digital government-to-citizen and government-to-business interactions, while ensuring trust, interoperability and accessibility; believes, therefore, that secure and seamless access to public services requires a trustworthy e-identification framework and welcomes the announcement of a ‘business wallet’ aimed at significantly simplifying the interconnection between businesses and public authorities;

19. Calls on the Commission to further develop public interest data platforms, enabling secure cross-border data sharing between public and private entities for use cases, in particular, in healthcare, urban planning and environmental monitoring; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to promote interoperability between public interest and industry-specific data platforms, ensuring the seamless flow of data while minimising administrative burdens; notes that this could be achieved by leveraging existing market-driven solutions that foster innovation, maintain trust and uphold privacy and security standards;

20. Recognises that under the current legal framework, European citizens have the right to control their personal data and that data generated within the EU must be processed in accordance with EU law; stresses that safeguarding privacy and personal data is essential for building trust in the digital economy, allowing European consumers to engage with confidence, regardless of where their data is processed; highlights that European companies – particularly small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – must be able to make use of data in a lawful, ethical and secure manner to drive sustainable growth and competitiveness;

Digital infrastructure

21. Highlights that digital infrastructure is the backbone of Europe’s economy and society and that its importance will continue to grow; calls on the Commission to include in the requested list of critical dependencies a comprehensive assessment of the composition of European digital infrastructure in order to adequately analyse the state of play, assess risks and coordinate action;

22. Believes that in order to strengthen digital infrastructure, it is essential to implement capacity-building initiatives in critical areas at EU level; considers that these initiatives should focus on developing a base layer of public infrastructure, such as a network of AI gigafactories and a European web index model; is of the opinion that this base layer will empower companies to develop their business models and boost technological sovereignty; points to the digital solutions created by the EU, such as the EU digital identity, that can offer innovative infrastructure for the EU’s digital economy;

23. Recognises the strategic importance of critical digital infrastructure and the need to strengthen their security and resilience; understands that critical digital infrastructure includes, but is not limited to, cables (terrestrial and submarine), cellular network towers, satellite communication systems, spectrum and radio equipment, cloud servers that contain sensitive information and data centres that process sensitive information, as well as certain software elements, including security software that protects critical networks and data centres;

24. Highlights the need to ensure that this infrastructure falls under EU jurisdiction, meaning that it fully adheres to EU law; stresses the importance of privacy and security-by-design; calls on the Commission. therefore, to introduce legislation to mitigate risks posed by high-risk vendors from non-EU countries, including risks posed by foreign-controlled energy resource providers;

25. Calls on the Commission, while preparing future legislative proposals and the forthcoming MFF, to concentrate efforts on deepening the single market, in line with the recommendations made in Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’ and in Mario Draghi’s report on ‘The future of European competitiveness’, with the aim of unlocking the potential of the digital single market;

26. Takes note of the recommendations laid down in these two reports that the EU needs a paradigm shift from promoting connectivity in the EU to establishing a single market for electronic communications and connectivity; supports a simplified, harmonised and innovation-friendly telecommunications framework that ensures fair competition and the accessibility of infrastructure;

27. Welcomes the Commission’s white paper on how to master Europe’s digital infrastructure needs, which outlines three pillars: creating the ‘3C Network’ – ‘Connected Collaborative Computing’, completing the digital single market, and secure and resilient digital infrastructure for Europe;

28. Views the white paper and the subsequent consultation process as part of the preparation of the legislative initiatives planned for this term, including the Digital Networks Act; calls on the Commission to take a more holistic view of digital infrastructure throughout this process and to acknowledge that digital infrastructure comprises many elements beyond mere connectivity; underlines the need to accompany any new digital policy measure with an impact assessment;

29. Urges the Commission to simplify and harmonise telecommunications rules as part of the forthcoming Digital Networks Act and the broader Digital Package;

30. Calls on the Commission to introduce an EU cloud and AI development act to strengthen European data infrastructure and the promotion of European cloud providers; underlines that this act should aim to actively build a European single market for cloud and AI;

31. Acknowledges that deploying cutting-edge digital infrastructure across the EU requires substantial investment and recognises that both public and private funding are essential for achieving this goal; expresses concern over the persistent shortage of venture capital and investment financing in Europe, which undermines technological sovereignty; calls on the Commission to significantly scale up public-private investment instruments, including venture capital, strategic platforms and dedicated funding tools for start-ups and scale-ups in critical technology sectors; highlights the importance of leveraging public procurement to support the deployment and scaling of open and interoperable digital solutions and of ensuring that private capital, competition and innovation become the main drivers of Europe’s digital transformation over the medium and long term;

High-speed connectivity

32. Is of the opinion that the upcoming Digital Networks Act must support the objective of providing all EU consumers with high-quality connectivity by 2030, especially in remote and rural areas, as well as removing administrative barriers for the roll-out of 5G, 6G and secure, high-speed broadband;

33. Recognises the increasing convergence of telecommunications infrastructure with cloud and edge technologies, and sees the potential of open radio access networks to deliver advanced technological solutions, reduce costs and enhance the interoperability of connectivity; believes that the future of connectivity lies in the complementarity of diverse technologies such as 5G/6G, Wi-Fi and satellite, where seamless integration benefits both businesses and consumers;

34. Recognises that with cloud and edge services at the core of their transformation, connectivity networks are evolving rapidly into platforms for innovation and will increasingly depend on cloud computing, AI, virtualisation and other technologies;

35. Calls for ambitious targets in the development and innovation of wireless communication networks, acknowledging the need for a broad-based approach that includes cloud computing, AI, edge computing and quantum computing; emphasises that the innovation ecosystem for electronic communications, especially for vertically integrated telecoms, should remain market-driven, and insists that future regulatory measures be based on thorough, knowledge-based impact assessments of existing regulations;

36. Recognises that competition between operators of all sizes remains a key driver of investment in connectivity networks; calls on the Member States to ensure that copper networks are switched off progressively in favour of fibre-optic or 5G technologies, in particular where regular maintenance or updates of the network are needed, thus ensuring that the shift is carried out in an attainable manner and allowing providers to plan logistically and financially in advance;

37. Stresses that all consumers in the EU should have access to adequate quality, reliable and affordable connectivity, thus contributing to increased demand for connectivity services; calls on the Commission and the Member States to expand and upgrade digital networks, especially in rural areas, and to support public-private investments in broadband and 5G/6G deployment, while maintaining cybersecurity standards and secure-by-design principles;

38. Is convinced that, as digital connectivity infrastructure such as fibre, 5G and 6G will be crucial for future industrial competitiveness, the forthcoming MFF should include funds for the large-scale deployment of network infrastructure, bridging the existing deployment gap to achieve the 2030 Digital Decade targets, creating pan-European 5G coverage for citizens’ use and ensuring the successful deployment of Industry 4.0 tools;

Fibre

39. Stresses the importance of accelerating the deployment of fibre-optic networks and modern wireless communications systems that can deliver fast, secure and reliable digital services;

40. Recognises that the need to prioritise direct fibre connections for homes, businesses and public institutions is crucial to ensure ultra-fast and reliable connectivity, in addition to network roll-outs with public works, such as roads, water and electricity, to streamline fibre roll-out;

41. Welcomes the introduction of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act, which responds to the growing needs for faster, reliable and data-intensive connectivity; recognises the importance of the shared use of ducts and poles for deploying very high capacity networks to optimise resources and reduce costs; urges the Member States to streamline permitting processes and harmonise regulations to lower financial and administrative barriers to the expansion of fibre infrastructure;

5G and 6G

42. Believes that private investments are essential for deployment of electronic communication networks, 5G and 6G that are advanced enough in terms of transmission, speed, storage capacity, edge computing power and interoperability;

43. Stresses that the enforcement and implementation of the Gigabit Infrastructure Act is further necessary for the creation of a one-stop shop for permits and a centralised digital permitting process to reduce delays in infrastructure deployment and to ensure uniform rules for infrastructure access, pricing and environmental impact assessments; calls, in this regard, for strong efforts in this area;

44. Takes the view that the EU needs strong cybersecurity protection in all critical infrastructure sectors, with stricter measures to de-risk high-risk vendors in 5G and 6G networks, ensuring dense deployment of small cells and macro towers, particularly in urban and rural areas with inconsistent coverage, and ensuring the sustainability and energy efficiency of the infrastructure so as to support Europe’s global competitiveness in the digital economy;

Spectrum

45. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to work towards enhanced coordination of spectrum allocations, in particular through earlier identification and the harmonisation of the release of new frequencies, starting with 6 GHz frequencies; calls for a radio spectrum policy that promotes investment in Europe, including through the harmonisation of spectrum assignment policies across the Member States to accelerate 5G deployment based on best practices, the promotion of longer license durations and access to new spectrum such as the upper 6 GHz band in order to meet future demand and enable 6G; believes that a shared effort from public and private entities is necessary in order to increase the competitiveness of Europe and not lag behind the fastest growing networks in the world, i.e. in China and South Korea;

Satellites and satellite communication systems

46. Underlines the importance of satellite-based communications in developing EU digital infrastructure, increasing its resilience, strengthening the capabilities of EU actors, and reducing dependence on non-EU providers, particularly in the area of defence; highlights the need to provide alternative connectivity solutions for consumers in remote and rural areas;

47. Highlights the strategic role of the EU space programme, as one of the pillars of EU sovereignty, in providing state-of-the-art and secure positioning, navigation and timing services for Galileo and EGNOS and cost-effective satellite communication services for GOVSATCOM; notes that this allows the EU and its Member States to have greater sovereignty in their satellite capabilities, including geopositioning, earth observation, space surveillance and connectivity; welcomes, in particular, the EU GOVSATCOM and IRIS2 programmes, which aim to ensure the short- and long-term availability of secure, reliable and cost-effective governmental satellite communication services for EU and national public authorities that manage critical security infrastructure and missions;

48. Deplores the strong dependence on non-EU data for the tracking and surveillance of space objects; stresses the need for Europe to urgently reinforce its own capabilities and infrastructure in space situational awareness (SSA) to ensure open strategic autonomy and security; calls on the Commission and the Member States to significantly increase investment in EU-owned surveillance and tracking assets, and to develop effective mechanisms for information-sharing among the Member States, enabling Europe to independently monitor and protect its critical space infrastructure;

49. Stresses the importance of private sector involvement in launcher technologies to further accelerate the deployment of IRIS2; stresses the importance of fostering a robust and competitive European space launch sector through greater private sector involvement and support for upstream and downstream industries; calls on the Commission to promote a European space industrial policy that strengthens sovereignty in space technologies and services by reducing strategic dependencies and improving the operational governance of European space programmes;

50. Calls, to this end, for concrete measures to facilitate the provision of satellite services throughout Europe, including by defining common procedures and conditions; calls, in parallel, for fair competition, with clear and enforceable rules for all satellite constellations accessing the EU market;

51. Notes that there are currently several issues with latency in satellite networks and recognises that the integration of satellite networks with 5G and, in the future, 6G technologies is pivotal in extending the reach and reliability of terrestrial networks;

High-performance computing (HPC) systems

52. Recognises the progress made in recent years in enhancing HPC; calls on the Commission to continuously integrate and enhance the computing power at EU HPC centres, in particular, enhancing the training of AI models and preparing for future advancements in supercomputing;

53. Calls on the Commission to develop a coordinated strategy to bridge the gap between Europe’s cutting-edge HPC technology and its practical, scalable deployment across industries, including by creating a public network for supercomputing; notes that this strategy should foster collaboration between public institutions and private sector partners, including SMEs, to ensure that Europe’s HPC capabilities become a key driver of economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty;

54. Highlights that HPC centres must ensure accessibility for developers and deployers of AI foundation models, generative AI and applied AI; notes that EuroHPC Centres should be available for these use cases and particularly for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; emphasises that this must be seamlessly complemented by initiatives to enable the development and deployment of AI in the EU;

55. Welcomes the creation of new AI factories; underlines that AI factories will upgrade EuroHPC supercomputers to deliver computing capacity for AI and support start-ups and scale-ups in the training and large-scale development of general-purpose and trustworthy AI models;

Hardware for computing: semiconductors, chips and quantum chips

56. Believes that urgent action is needed to boost EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, improving supply chain resilience by forming strategic global partnerships, encouraging start-ups and innovation, fostering cross-border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development and providing financial incentives, regulatory support and market access;

57. Emphasises the need for legal certainty to support semiconductor development, ensuring secure supply chains for critical raw materials and avoiding disruptions caused by investment uncertainties;

58. Urges to give utmost political importance to ensuring a sufficient supply of AI chips in the EU and to make it a focal point of EU digital industry policies; notes the increase in demand for AI chips driven by expanding applications in cloud computing, edge devices, autonomous systems and generative AI;

59. Calls on the Commission to react to the new geopolitical realities and the use of digital supply chains as pressure tools; urges the Commission to find a negotiated solution to the US ban on the export of AI chips to 16 EU Member States;

60. Calls on the Commission to put advanced AI chips, including their design and production, at the core of the revision of the Chips Act; calls on the Commission to present the revision this year, featuring a long-term strategy rooted in current geopolitical realities that builds European strategic indispensability through technological leadership, adequate production capabilities and a strong R&D ecosystem, which will be essential to secure European sovereignty in increasingly troubled times; believes that it is crucial to strengthen the interactions among research, training, suppliers and robust public infrastructure to accelerate the path from research, development, testing and finally full-load production;

61. Believes that the EU should enhance its efforts on quantum chip development if it intends to accelerate the time-to-market for EU industrial innovation in quantum technology;

62. Calls on the Commission to support the manufacturing within the EU of widely used chips e.g., for electronic devices and cars; calls for support for the development of chips that reduce the energy consumption of the digital sector;

63. Underlines the need to support the performance of the circular economy and recalls that information and communications technology products and other electronics are part of the priority product groups in the working plan to be adopted by April 2025 under Regulation (EU) 2024/1781 [24];

64. Believes that additional funding under the forthcoming MFF must be allocated to the development of semiconductor production capacities and other next-generation semiconductor technologies and processes (e.g. photonic chips, wide-bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging) within the EU;

Cloud services

65. Recognises that there is a market need for sovereign solutions that offer enhanced levels of control over data for certain categories of sensitive data and acknowledges the risks associated with reliance on single dominant providers; calls for a strategy for reducing reliance on foreign cloud providers, while fostering European alternatives;

66. Notes that the discussions on the EU Cybersecurity Certification Scheme for Cloud Services have not brought any results; points out that there are sovereignty considerations, in particular related to the extraterritoriality of binding legal regimes, that cannot be solved through technical discussions; calls on the Commission to propose a definition of sovereign cloud and its scope of application in the planned cloud and AI development act;

67. Notes the need to secure data storage and computational power, and distributed computing infrastructure; calls on the Commission to ensure that cloud users have the ability to choose solutions that meet their needs by urgently removing barriers to switching and diversifying providers through multi-cloud strategies, and by fostering a competitive European cloud market, thereby reducing reliance on single providers and enhancing digital sovereignty;

68. Calls on the Commission to leverage initiatives such as 8ra and IPCEI CIS to advance decentralised cloud and edge infrastructure, which are enablers of sovereignty and contribute to reducing reliance on foreign providers and ensuring resilience while enhancing operational flexibility within Europe;

AI systems

69. Welcomes the InvestAI initiative, including the AI gigafactories; emphasises the need for Europe to position itself as a global leader in AI model training, scientific research and quantum computing advancements; is committed to further supporting AI development by launching initiatives such as AI factories to provide computing power for start-ups, scale-ups and researchers;

70. Calls on the Commission to further support the design and development of European AI and to adopt policies and measures that will enable European industrial sectors to benefit from their data and AI deployment;

71. Emphasises that the delayed deployment of AI-driven innovations hinders technological progress, market competitiveness and digital transformation within the EU;

72. Expects that the public-private financing model will unlock unprecedented private investment in AI that will open up access to supercomputers for start-ups and industry to supercomputers;

Quantum

73. Recognises the urgent need to define a clear roadmap for quantum technology development, including quantum computing and quantum encryption, ensuring that public and private investments lead to tangible commercial applications;

74. Calls on the Commission to conduct an assessment of existing national quantum sandbox frameworks and how existing legislation applies to them in order to prevent market fragmentation; welcomes the announcement of the Quantum Strategy and Quantum Act in the Commission’s Competitiveness Compass;

75. Urges the Commission to ensure that the Quantum Act, accompanied by an impact assessment, positions Europe as the leading region for quantum excellence and innovation by investing in R&D and innovation, mobilising funding to scale up the European quantum ecosystem, capabilities and production, and ensuring Europe’s leading quantum research is commercialised in Europe; underlines that it should deliver tangible technological applications by fostering policies that accelerate technological maturity and facilitate the transition from research to commercial success;

76. Calls for targeted investments, industry collaboration and regulatory frameworks that support the development, scaling and market adoption of quantum technologies across key sectors;

77. Calls for a coordinated EU strategy for post-quantum cryptography to protect data from future cyberthreats;

Data centres

78. Calls on the Commission to support ecosystems for sharing industry-specific data within industrial sectors, fostering collaboration and driving innovation, while maintaining data sovereignty and ensuring compliance with EU regulations, as outlined in the Data Act; urges the Commission for strong enforcement to ensure that dominant market players do not impose unfair terms on SMEs and mid-sized enterprises when accessing and sharing data;

79. Believes that there is a need to ensure interconnected infrastructure that would allow data centres to work together efficiently under common standards with high-speed connectivity, while flexibility, security and scalability would be maintained; believes this interconnected system would help in ensuring distributed redundancy so that data and services remain available even in the event of a data centre failure;

80. Calls on the Commission to prioritise interoperability across platforms, enabling the seamless integration of data across businesses and sectors, in alignment with the requirements of the Data Act, which mandate data portability and interoperability obligations for cloud and edge services; stresses the need for the robust enforcement of these provisions to prevent vendor lock-in and ensure that European industrial ecosystems can leverage data-driven innovation without technical or contractual barriers;

81. Recalls the Commission’s plan to make data centres climate-neutral and highly energy efficient by 2030; sees the need to improve the integration of data centres with the energy system, focusing on heat reuse and providing flexibility services to the electricity grid needs; recognises the need to incentivise research for cooling and energy-efficient processors, while special attention should be given to supporting EU data centres; urges the Commission to ensure clear and consistent implementation of existing legal requirements for data centre operators across EU legislation and the Member States;

82. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase and target public investment and to incentivise private investment in digital infrastructure to enable the growth and modernisation of data centres;

Submarine cables

83. Calls on the Commission to take coordinated action to protect submarine cables and reinforce cable security and repair capabilities; stresses the need for continued investment in the construction of new submarine cables to ensure redundancy; welcomes the EU’s role in co-financing such projects to enhance digital infrastructure and connectivity across the Member States; calls on the Commission to explore potential synergies between the maintenance of undersea digital and energy infrastructure;

84. Emphasises the importance of improving EU and Member State repair capabilities and response mechanisms to handle submarine cable disruptions, which are essential for maintaining secure and uninterrupted communications; underlines the importance of international cooperation in repairing sabotaged cables and facilitating the necessary investments, and calls for the establishment of an EU-based rapid-response repair fleet to ensure swift recovery and operational continuity in the event of disruptions; calls on the Commission to carry out an assessment of regulatory measures to ensure fair access and security, regardless of whether the infrastructure is privately or publicly owned;

85. Welcomes the adoption of the action plan on cable security, which will be organised around four pillars: prevention, detection, response and repair, and deterrence; highlights the importance of its full and timely implementation; urges, in the current geopolitical context, increased investment in technologies to strengthen the security and resilience of subsea and offshore infrastructure;

86. Calls on the Commission to promote R&I to enable advanced technological innovations in cable security, including early warning systems and AI-driven threat assessments;

87. Urges the Commission to review available instruments designed to better leverage private investments in support of Cable Projects of European Interest (CPEIs); calls on the Commission to include submarine cable projects in the list of IPCEIs; recognises the need to streamline and simplify the application and administrative process governing IPCEIs;

Cybersecurity

88. Recalls the legislative work carried out over the previous legislative term aimed at significantly improving cybersecurity in the EU; welcomes, in particular, the adoption of the Cyber Resilience Act, the Cyber Solidarity Act and the NIS2 Directive; stresses the need for the harmonised and timely implementation and enforcement of these measures;

89. Calls on the Commission to present an evaluation report on the Cybersecurity Act and to propose a legislative act to review it in order to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity framework, with a particular focus on the interplay between sovereignty and security; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to enhance the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure and prevent foreign interference from entities subject to extraterritorial legislation, as well as accelerating the adoption process for EU cybersecurity certification schemes; calls for ENISA’s mandate to be strengthened to coordinate crisis response, oversee cybersecurity certification for critical infrastructure and ensure uniform implementation of cybersecurity standards across the single market;

90. Emphasises the importance of the upcoming European internal security strategy in strengthening cybersecurity and critical infrastructure protection;

91. Notes with concern that, according to the second report on Member States’ progress in implementing the EU toolbox on 5G cybersecurity, 14 Member States have yet to implement any restrictions on high-risk suppliers, posing significant security vulnerabilities; calls for the full implementation of the EU toolbox for 5G security in order to reduce reliance on high-risk vendors; calls on the Commission to make the toolbox binding, specifically with regard to high-risk vendors in critical infrastructure;

Simplification

92. Notes that to achieve true technological sovereignty, the EU must have viable commercial alternatives; stresses that the EU must urgently pursue a comprehensive agenda of simplification and bureaucracy reduction to foster an innovation-friendly environment capable of supporting competitive European alternatives to dominant global digital players; underlines that excessive administrative burdens, fragmented regulatory frameworks, an incomplete digital single market and overly complex compliance procedures disproportionately impact European start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs, limiting their capacity to compete at global level; recognises that the EU should therefore prioritise regulatory streamlining and the deepening of the digital single market, ensuring that legislation is proportionate, innovation-driven and does not stifle the development of European technological solutions;

93. Emphasises the need for new legislative proposals to be aligned with better regulation principles, ensuring that any new digital policy measure that affects competitiveness is accompanied by an impact assessment, including a competitiveness, SME and small mid-cap check that evaluates whether a given legislative instrument is necessary, proportionate and does not create unnecessary burdens for businesses, especially SMEs, and thus its effects on competitiveness, investment prospects and consumer welfare;

94. Highlights that the simplification of EU legislation must not endanger any of the fundamental rights of citizens and businesses and thus jeopardise regulatory certainty; believes that any simplification proposal should not be rushed or proposed without proper consideration, consultation and an impact assessment;

95. Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to fully implement the principle of burden reduction for companies in EU legislation; calls on the Commission, therefore, to enhance its efforts by aiming to remove more cost and administrative burdens for businesses compared to the benefits that would be derived from any new regulatory requirements introduced at EU level in the same policy area, so that barriers to market entry are removed to help European companies to scale and grow;

96. Calls on the Commission to ensure consistent simplification, implementation and enforcement of EU digital legislation through the Digital Package, streamlining definitions and reporting procedures, assessing ways to alleviate reporting obligations and reducing the gap between industry and government;

97. Believes that supporting companies and innovators to stay in Europe by developing the EU as an attractive and agile business environment is key to enhancing technological sovereignty; emphasises, in that regard, that excessive regulation and administrative burdens should be avoided and that EU rules should be clear, consistent, predictable, proportionate and technologically neutral, thus maintaining a globally competitive regulatory environment; believes that new public procurement methods and the development of regulatory sandboxes and test beds should also contribute to an innovation-friendly framework;

98. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal of a 28th legal regime, recognising that a single, harmonised set of EU-wide rules will be a game changer for digital investment and innovation; believes that reducing regulatory fragmentation across 27 national legal regimes will boost private investment, lower compliance costs and accelerate the deployment of next-generation digital infrastructure, products and services; encourages the Commission to ensure that this framework specifically addresses regulatory barriers in the digital sector, such as permitting and cross-border data flows, in order to create a true digital single market;

99. Urges the Commission to create a single point of contact to simplify the application process for private-sector access to EU funding mechanisms, ensuring that private companies, SMEs and start-ups can more easily participate in digital investment programmes;

Energy

100. Emphasises that data centres will put additional pressure on electricity grids, making it imperative to reinforce them through anticipatory investments; stresses that data centres can also help stabilise the grid by participating in demand-side flexibility; calls for measures to incentivise such contributions based on the implementation of the revision of the European electricity market reform;

101. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to propose and implement instruments that ensure orderly planning of the escalating energy demand from data centres, facilitating their strategic placement near available energy sources and thus minimising reliance on the broader grid infrastructure;

102. Recognises that fibre is more energy efficient than traditional copper networks; acknowledges the importance of reducing energy consumption in data transmission and ensuring long-term stability and efficiency;

103. Calls on the Commission to ensure a reliable and sufficient clean energy and net-zero technology supply to support the digital infrastructure of the future;

Skills

104. Recognises the urgent need for more skilled professionals in digital fields to meet the EU’s strategic objectives; calls on the Member States to develop national strategies and incentives to retain European talent and attract the world’s best digital professionals, thereby strengthening the EU’s innovation capacity and technological leadership;

105. Stresses the importance of closing the digital and STEM skills gap to enhance technological resilience, innovation capacity and open strategic autonomy; calls on the Member States to strengthen investments in digital education, upskilling and reskilling, particularly in areas essential for the green and digital transitions; supports prioritising investments that address digital skills shortages, particularly in AI, cybersecurity, data analysis and clean technologies, in order to support innovation and technological sovereignty;

106. Calls for coordinated strategies at national level to improve access to high-quality STEM education, promote lifelong learning and attract talent to ICT and related fields; encourages partnerships between public institutions, industry and educational providers to ensure alignment between curricula and evolving market needs;

107. Calls for intensified efforts to improve digital literacy and skills across all demographics, focusing on early STEM education, vocational education and training, and lifelong learning in digital technologies; recommends aligning national education and training strategies with the EU Digital Decade goal of 80 % of the population possessing basic digital skills by 2030, with a focus on gender-inclusive policies to increase women’s participation in ICT and STEM fields; calls on the EU institutions to take concrete steps to uphold the commitments referred to in the European Declaration on Digital Rights and Principles for the Digital Decade, both within the EU framework as in the Union’s cooperation with third countries;

108. Supports the establishment of a common EU certification framework for digital and technical skills to improve the recognition and portability of qualifications among the Member States;

109. Encourages the European Investment Bank and national development institutions to support digital talent retention by co-investing in European deep-tech start-ups, ensuring that EU-funded innovation remains within the region and contributes to Europe’s technological sovereignty;

Research and innovation

110. Recognises the importance of bridging the gap between research and commercialisation and calls on the Commission to enhance the valorisation of innovation within the EU;

111. Believes that Europe’s ability to transform research into market-ready solutions is critical for building necessary capabilities and reducing reliance on non-EU technologies;

112. Emphasises that funding needs to be strategically allocated to accelerate the development and market introduction of solutions that strengthen Europe’s technological resilience and drive innovation; underlines the importance of a more agile, excellence-based funding structure, particularly in improving the translation of research into industrial applications; calls for increased investment in R&I to strengthen Europe’s knowledge and technological capabilities and insists that EU research, development and innovation (RDI) funding be based on open competition and excellence;

113. Highlights the need for policies that support industrial innovation, including targeted investment in key strategic technologies where Europe can lead globally, such as quantum computing, in order to build an innovation ecosystem;

114. Believes that private investment in RDI is of utmost importance and calls for the EU to create incentives that effectively leverage private funding for the development of critical technologies, including through public-private partnerships;

115. Stresses the urgent need for stronger incentives to mobilise private sector capital for technology-driven innovation; encourages the Member States to introduce targeted fiscal incentives, regulatory simplification and risk-sharing instruments designed to attract private equity to the technology and digital sectors; highlights the need to streamline cross-border capital flows within the single market to facilitate access to finance for innovative European start-ups;

Standards

116. Strongly believes that promoting interoperability and EU standards is paramount to fostering competitiveness in the technology sector, as it ensures that products can be connected and work with each other, thus fostering innovation and open markets; recalls that both interoperability and common technological standards pave the way for the functioning of the single market;

117. Underlines that the Commission must increase its engagement in existing global standardisation structures and focus on the international uptake of European standards through a bottom-up approach, avoiding centralisation;

Partnerships

118. Welcomes the EU’s commitment to negotiating DTAs that facilitate secure and competitive digital infrastructure development with partner countries; encourages the Commission to increase efforts in negotiating DTAs with additional partner countries;

119. Calls on the Commission to accelerate technical cooperation in multilateral forums such as the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the World Trade Organization (WTO) so as to develop global standards for digital governance, AI regulation, cross-border data flows and emerging technologies;

120. Urges the Commission to advance negotiations on a permanent solution to the WTO moratorium on e-commerce to prevent the introduction of digital tariffs, ensuring international digital trade remains open, predictable and conducive to innovation;

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121. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania – A10-0106/2025

Source: European Parliament

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Albania

(2025/2017(INI))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Albania, of the other part [1],

– having regard to Albania’s application for EU membership, submitted on 24 April 2009,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans [3],

– having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0690),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Albania’ (SWD(2024)0828),

– having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Albania 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0690),

– having regard to the Reform Agenda of Albania submitted under the EU’s Reform and Growth Facility, as approved by the Commission on 23 October 2024,

– having regard to the final report of 29 September 2023 by the Election Observation Mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on Albania’s local elections of 14 May 2023,

– having regard to the final report of 26 July 2021 by the Election Observation Mission of the OSCE/ODIHR on Albania’s parliamentary elections of 25 April 2021,

– having regard to the Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR of 11 December 2020 on the amendments to the Albanian constitution of 30 July 2020 and the amendments to Albania’s electoral code of 5 October 2020,

– having regard to the Sofia Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018, and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

– having regard to the Zagreb Declaration adopted at the EU-Western Balkans summit of 6 May 2020,

– having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits held in Brussels on 13 December 2023 and 18 December 2024,

– having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

– having regard to Reporters Without Borders’ 2024 World Press Freedom Index,

– having regard to Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index,

– having regard to the 2024 Global Gender Gap Report of the World Economic Forum,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Albania,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

– having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0106/2025),

A. whereas enlargement is the most effective EU foreign policy instrument and a geostrategic investment in long-term peace, democracy, stability and security throughout the continent;

B. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be by far Albania’s biggest trade and investment partner and its largest provider of financial assistance;

C. whereas enlargement is a merit-based process based on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; whereas Albania’s EU accession depends on lasting, in-depth and irreversible reforms across fundamental areas, starting with the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions;

D. whereas Albania has been an EU candidate country since 2014, began accession negotiations in July 2022 and successfully completed the screening process in November 2023;

E. whereas Albania opened negotiations on ‘Cluster 1: Fundamentals’ on 15 October 2024 and on ‘Cluster 6: External Relations’ on 17 December 2024;

F. whereas Albania is a reliable foreign policy partner and is fully aligned with the EU’s common foreign and security policy;

G. whereas Albania has been a target of foreign malign influence campaigns aiming to sow discord, provoke tensions and violence and destabilise the whole region, including Russian disinformation and election meddling, as well as questionable investments from non-EU actors such as China; whereas Russian and Iranian cyber attacks against Albania in 2022 and 2023 disrupted critical government functions, illustrating the hybrid threat environment Albania faces as it progresses toward EU integration;

H. whereas electoral shortcomings and serious vulnerabilities persist in Albania’s electoral system; whereas the OSCE/ODIHR recommendations to further improve the conduct of elections in Albania have not yet been fully addressed;

I. whereas Albania participates in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, including in EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina;

J. whereas protection of national and ethnic minorities is crucial for aspiring EU Member States; whereas the implementing legislation on free self-identification and the use of minority languages has been adopted in Albania;

K. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine highlights the critical importance of EU enlargement for ensuring security and stability on our continent;

1. Welcomes Albania’s unwavering commitment to EU integration, reflecting consensus among all political parties, both governmental and opposition, and overwhelming support among citizens, and commends its consistent full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy and promotion of the rules-based international order, including its categorical response to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine through its alignment with the EU’s restrictive measures against Russia and Belarus; acknowledges the country’s active role in the region and in regional initiatives;

2. Welcomes Albania’s ambition of closing accession negotiations by the end of 2027 and the swift progress made in recent years, notably the opening of two clusters of negotiating chapters in 2024; recalls that candidate countries undergo in-depth transformations to fulfil membership criteria during accession negotiations, which last as long as it takes to implement the necessary reforms; stresses the need to strengthen the transparency, accountability and inclusiveness of the accession process, including its parliamentary dimension; cautions against any actions that could undermine the system of checks and balances;

3. Notes that the pace of EU accession is determined by the candidate country’s progress on aligning with the EU acquis, its track record on implementing it and the due functioning of all the country’s institutions, and is grounded in the rule of law, good governance and fundamental rights; urges Albania to accelerate reforms to strengthen the rule of law and economic growth, counter corruption and organised crime, prevent human trafficking, ensure the protection of fundamental rights and make progress in the areas of freedom of expression, freedom of information and media pluralism and independence;

4. Welcomes the EU’s new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, which will provide EUR 922 million in grants and loans to Albania when it meets the conditions set out in its ambitious Reform Agenda;

5. Takes note of Albania’s adoption of the National Plan for European Integration 2024-2026; welcomes the fact that Albania has established the bodies in charge of the integration process; calls for greater efforts to increase transparency and engage in public communication on EU integration;

6. Welcomes the decision to open the European Parliament’s antenna office for the Western Balkans in Tirana; notes that the office will serve as a key contact point between the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society and local partners from across the Western Balkans region;

7. Welcomes the involvement of 18 Albanian participants in the Enlargement Candidate Members initiative launched by the European Economic and Social Committee, which aims to foster closer ties with candidate countries and facilitate their gradual integration into the EU;

Democratic institutions, media and civil society

8. Insists on the importance of constructive political debate and orderly parliamentary conduct as key aspects of democratic governance; reaffirms the joint responsibility of Albania’s political forces to strengthen constructive and inclusive political dialogue and overcome ongoing high political polarisation in the country; deplores the continued confrontations and inflammatory rhetoric by politicians from all parties and the clashes between the ruling majority and the opposition; underlines the need to foster a political culture based on mutual respect and adherence to democratic norms, ensuring that political competition does not undermine institutional stability, and to demonstrate full respect for the role of parliamentarism, by putting an end to political attacks; calls for genuine dialogue to promote political stability and progress, emphasising the need for cross-party consensus on the EU integration agenda and the meaningful involvement of civil society; emphasises the need for more effective parliamentary oversight and improved functioning of institutions;

9. Recognises the growing threat of foreign malign influence and hybrid interference in Albania’s democratic institutions; highlights that Kremlin-aligned narratives have sought to erode public confidence in democratic institutions and promote anti-Western sentiment; calls on Albania to enhance institutional resilience against covert political funding, media manipulation and cyber threats that directly impact its EU accession process; calls for the EU institutions to closely monitor Albania’s exposure to foreign malign influence;

10. Welcomes Albania’s blocking of Russian disinformation domains but stresses the need for a coordinated EU-Albania disinformation response mechanism, modelled on the EUvsDisinfo platform, to rapidly debunk and counteract Kremlin narratives; advocates for increased regional cooperation among Western Balkan countries to share best practice and develop joint strategies in combating disinformation and foreign interference; warns of the increasing footprint of Chinese state-backed media in Albania;

11. Emphasises the Albanian Parliament’s duty to respect the rulings of the Constitutional Court without delay; stresses the fundamental and irreplaceable role of parliament in safeguarding checks and balances; calls on Albania to ensure genuine democratic accountability and stronger, more transparent governance;

12. Takes note of the July 2024 amendments to Albania’s electoral code, which enable out-of-country voting by the Albanian diaspora and introduce partially open candidate lists; takes note of the parliamentary elections of 11 May 2025 and underlines that, based on the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE/ODIHR, the elections were competitive and professionally conducted but took place in a highly polarised environment and contestants did not enjoy a level playing field; expresses concern that the ruling party benefited from the widespread use of administrative resources; calls on all parties to demonstrate political will for a comprehensive and inclusive electoral reform to implement all recommendations from the OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission fully and in a timely manner, including those on the electoral and party financing framework;

13. Regrets that the environment for free media and independent journalists has been declining in recent years; notes with concern that media independence and pluralism in Albania continue to be affected by high market concentration, the overlap of business and political interests, lack of transparency of funding and ownership, intimidation and precarious working conditions for journalists; notes that, according to the 2024 Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index, Albania ranks 99th, reflecting ongoing issues related to media ownership concentration, political interference and threats against journalists; highlights that the lack of transparency in media financing and ownership structures increases the risk of editorial bias and foreign propaganda penetration and undermines public trust in journalism; calls on the Albanian authorities to ensure media ownership transparency and enforce a policy of zero tolerance for the intimidation of journalists; calls on the Albanian Government to support independent fact-checking platforms as a means to ensure public access to accurate information and to uphold the integrity of the information space;

14. Recalls that any revision of media laws should be in line with the Venice Commission recommendations and should take place in a transparent and inclusive manner in consultation with media organisations, with the aim of improving media freedom and self-regulation; welcomes the Platform to promote the protection of journalism and safety of journalists launched by the Council of Europe, together with the EU and a network of prominent press freedom organisations; regrets that there has been no progress in aligning the legislative framework with the EU acquis and EU standards, including the European Media Freedom Act [4]; recalls the need to strengthen investigative journalism, fact-checking and media literacy and to tackle hate speech, disinformation and fake news; expresses concern over enduring inflammatory anti-media rhetoric, including by high-level politicians, public officials and other public figures, which fuels the culture of intimidation; strongly condemns the increasing verbal attacks against journalists reporting on rule of law and corruption matters, as well as misogynistic online harassment targeting women journalists, smear campaigns, violence and rioting, and calls for the final convictions of the attackers to be ensured; regrets that the criminal code does not provide protection to journalists against threats and violence, calls on the authorities to adopt a legal framework that efficiently protects journalists, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against the concerning increase of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs), to decriminalise defamation and to respect the role of independent journalism as a crucial check on power and to engage with the media in a manner that upholds democratic principles;

15. Recalls the responsibility of national and local authorities to improve transparency, accountability and inclusiveness by conducting meaningful and regular public stakeholder consultations; notes with concern that the Albanian Parliament’s implementation of the legal framework for public consultations remains predominantly formal; stresses the need for greater transparency regarding public data and key legislative projects; insists that the financial resources, administrative capacity and fiscal autonomy of local authorities should be improved;

16. Welcomes Albania’s vibrant and constructive civil society, which plays a crucial and positive role in the reform process; welcomes the improvement of electoral monitoring and the increasing participation of civil society in overseeing the democratic process; underlines that civil society is vital in fostering democracy and pluralism and promoting good governance and social progress; encourages the Albanian Government to bolster the role of civil society, including women’s rights organisations, in the EU accession process, from an early stage and in a transparent legislative process; regrets that civil society organisations operate in a challenging environment and receive limited public funding; insists that the groundwork for an effective VAT exemption system be laid in compliance with the commitments taken by Albania under the EU-Albania Cooperation Agreement and the IPA III; urges the authorities to speed up the drafting of the 2024-2027 roadmap for the government policy towards a more enabling environment for civil society development and to closely monitor the implementation of this roadmap;

17. Welcomes the establishment of the new position of Minister of State for Public Administration and Anti-Corruption and underlines the importance of its effectiveness and of delivering public administration and anti-corruption reforms; remains concerned, however, that there has been limited progress in public administration reform; insists that the Albanian authorities effectively implement provisions on merit-based recruitment and review the effectiveness of the current monitoring structures for the new public administration and anti-corruption reforms; underlines the need to foster a culture of accountability, non-partisan access to public information and scrutiny of public institutions, including with regard to the implementation of the Reform Agenda; notes that public entities need to improve their compliance with transparency requirements and their responsiveness to information requests;

18. Regrets that limited progress has been made in aligning the legal framework for procurement with the EU acquis; expresses concern over the newly introduced temporary exemptions in public procurement law; calls on the Albanian authorities to improve competitive procurement procedures in line with the EU acquis;

19. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in improving data transmission to Eurostat;

Fundamental rights

20. Notes that Albania’s legal framework for gender-based violence is not yet fully aligned with the Istanbul Convention; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; welcomes the establishment of a femicide watch by the Ombudsperson; urges the enhancement of support services for victims, particularly healthcare, shelter funding, free legal aid, and victim reintegration and rehabilitation; stresses the need for increased financial and institutional support to be given to prevention programmes, public awareness campaigns, and specialised training for law enforcement and judicial authorities to ensure a victim-centred approach;

21. Expresses concern about persistent shortcomings, such as non-alignment or partial alignment with the EU acquis, regarding persons with disabilities and gender equality; recognises the need for Albania to fully align its legal framework on gender-based violence with the Istanbul Convention; notes that, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2024 Global Gender Gap Report, Albania has fallen six places to rank 23rd globally, indicating a widening gender gap; expresses serious concern that violence against women remains a pressing issue, with the number of femicides remaining high; calls for the full and effective implementation of existing legislation, including stricter enforcement of protective measures and enhanced judicial responsiveness to gender-based violence cases, as highlighted in the European Commission’s 2024 report on Albania;

22. Welcomes the adoption of a new and better-financed national action plan for LGBTI+ persons; regrets, however, that there has been no progress in initiating the necessary legislation in this field and calls on the authorities to adopt the necessary legislation on the recognition of gender identity and sex characteristics, as well as on same-sex partnerships/marriages; deplores the fact that LGBTI+ persons continue to face threats and derogatory media campaigns, with public institutions failing to provide adequate protection; notes that women living in rural and remote areas, Roma and Egyptian women and LGBTI+ individuals continue to face limited access to primary healthcare; urges public institutions to demonstrate strong commitment to protecting LGBTI+ rights and to act decisively against discriminatory and hateful language towards the LGBTI+ community;

23. Welcomes the adoption of the pending implementing legislation on the rights of persons belonging to minorities, specifically on self-identification and the use of minority languages, and underscores that these by-laws have to be fully and effectively implemented in order to render the exercise of minority and education rights feasible in practice; calls on the authorities to increase the capacity of the State Committee on National Minorities; expresses concern over persistent issues of discrimination and social exclusion affecting minority groups in Albania; calls on the Albanian Government to fully respect and protect human rights, including the rights of minorities, and to ensure that all allegations of human rights abuses, including hate speech, are promptly and thoroughly investigated; urges the Albanian authorities to enhance institutional mechanisms to prevent discrimination and ensure the meaningful political participation of all communities, in line with the recommendations of the Commission’s 2024 report on Albania; calls on Albania to protect and promote the cultural heritage, languages and traditions of its national minorities; calls on Albania to provide education for national minorities in minority languages and to ensure adequate access to state primary, secondary and higher education for all of its citizens;

24. Recalls that Albania should safeguard the right to property, in particular, by making decisive progress on first registration and compensation, improving the transparency of the state cadastre and the quality of the property register cadastral data, and ensuring that the right to a fair trial and the right to effective remedy are respected in cases of expropriation and removal of properties;

25. Calls for increased investment in the modernisation of the education system, ensuring its quality and inclusiveness; calls on Albania to implement measures to foster opportunities in employment and education for persons with disabilities;

26. Commends the successful 2024 census held in an atmosphere of trust and transparency and its results; believes that Albania should serve as a positive model for conducting a population census in the region;

27. Welcomes the adoption of the law on personal data protection, aimed at full alignment with the EU acquis; commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of the implementing legislation on the procedure and fair compensation for the use of orphan works and the database of copyright works, but expresses serious concern about the handling of personal data and weaknesses in IT systems; calls on the Albanian authorities to strengthen safeguards against data breaches, enhance prevention and public awareness, and improve institutional capacity in order to effectively implement the new Law on Personal Data Protection; calls on Albania to further collaborate with the EU Intellectual Property Office;

28. Recognises the closer cooperation between Albania and the EU in managing migration flows and border control processes, in particular through the new national strategy on migration for 2024‑2026 and cooperation with Frontex; takes note of the Italy-Albania Memorandum of Understanding;

Rule of law

29. Commends the progress Albania has achieved in the implementation of the justice reforms aimed at strengthening the independence, transparency and accountability of the judiciary, including on the vetting process, completed at first instance; welcomes the new reform process ‘Good governance, rule of law and anti-corruption for Albania 2030’ launched by the Albanian Parliament; stresses that any initiative to strengthen governance, rule of law and anti-corruption efforts must be built on inclusivity, transparency and collaboration;

30. Expresses concern about continued political interference with and pressure on the judicial system; notes with concern shortcomings in the merit-based appointments of non-magistrate members of the High Judicial Council and the High Prosecution Council and their integrity;

31. Calls for urgent steps to ensure judicial independence and institutional integrity;

32. Highlights that Albania ranked 80th in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index, indicating the need for substantial progress in combating high-level corruption and ensuring judicial independence; underscores the key work of Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption and Organised Crime Structure (SPAK) in building up a track record of investigating, prosecuting and convicting in high-level corruption cases as well as cases involving the protection of the EU’s financial interests; stresses the importance of ensuring the full independence of anti-corruption institutions and encourages the strengthening of their operational and investigative capacity; welcomes high-level corruption investigations and proceedings; stresses that increasing the number of final convictions of high-level officials remains an important priority; urges all actors to refrain from any actions that undermine the work of independent institutions such as SPAK; expresses its regret at the environment of intimidation that the judiciary operates in, and at instances of undue pressure that it endures, which pose a serious threat to judicial independence; expresses concern that the lack of institutional support for magistrates facing threats weakens public trust and seriously jeopardises the rule of law and Albania’s EU integration process;

33. Notes the challenges concerning the quality and efficiency of the justice system, including the high number of judicial vacancies, insufficient court staff, the quality of initial and continuous judicial training, the consistency of case-law and the lack of a modern integrated case management system; notes that budget allocations are insufficient, particularly for the court component; underlines that reducing the backlog of unprocessed files in the judicial system should remain a priority; welcomes, however, the fact that the Constitutional Court of Albania has improved its efficiency by reducing its backlog and continues to uphold institutional checks and balances;

34. Welcomes the adoption of national legislation to align with the EU acquis on anti-money laundering; notes the need to establish a strong asset recovery office and to improve vetting procedures and the processes for investigating, prosecuting and obtaining convictions in high-level corruption cases, including through the seizure and final confiscation of criminal assets;

35. Calls on Albania to continue aligning its legal framework, and notably the criminal code, with the EU acquis on the fight against organised crime and the trade in drugs and firearms, as well as combating cybercrime, extremism and terrorist threats; notes the appointment of additional prosecutors to the Special Prosecution Office as well as the establishment of a financial investigation unit; commends Albania’s participation in joint operations and cooperation under the European multidisciplinary platform against criminal threats (EMPACT) on drug trafficking, money laundering and cybercrime; further acknowledges the intensified cooperation with EUROPOL, EUROJUST, FRONTEX, INTERPOL and the CARIN Network in fighting organised crime and dismantling transnational crime networks; encourages Albania to strengthen its mechanisms for sharing intelligence with EU agencies to enhance regional stability; calls for sustained efforts to align Albania’s security policies with EU strategies, fostering a more integrated and resilient regional security framework; calls on Albania to strengthen the fight against human trafficking in cooperation with the Member States and EU agencies; stresses the need to counter the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, as Albania remains both a destination and a transit country; welcomes the adoption of a new strategy for the protection of victims of crime; emphasises the importance of continuous training for migration control personnel to ensure the effective implementation of European regulations and a stronger response to human trafficking networks;

36. Encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to further help boost Albania’s resilience against hybrid threats in the area of cyber security, information manipulation and protection of critical infrastructure; calls on Albania to assess the risks associated with foreign direct investment and to screen such investment, particularly in strategic sectors such as energy, mining and telecommunications, in order to avoid economic dependencies and debt traps and protect national interests, enhance security and ensure consistency with EU standards;

37. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries with a view to facilitating close cooperation and the prosecution of misuse of EU funds; welcomes the fact that Albania has concluded a bilateral working arrangement with the EPPO;

Socio-economic reforms

38. Welcomes Albania’s engagement in implementing the EU’s Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, encompassing EU single market integration, regional economic integration, fundamental reforms and increased financial support;

39. Reiterates the importance of improving the public infrastructure within the Western Balkan countries and developing connections with EU Member States; recalls the potential of the economic and investment plan for the Western Balkans to enhance regional connectivity through rail and road infrastructure; in that respect, urges the authorities in all countries to complete Corridor VIII connecting Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria; recalls the importance of improving flight connections between the Western Balkan countries and with the EU Member States;

40. Welcomes Albania’s Reform Agenda addressing the business environment, human capital, digitalisation, energy and the green transition, fundamental rights and the rule of law; welcomes, furthermore, Albania’s participation in the EU’s Digital Europe programme; welcomes the fact that Albania has been ranked as a regional leader in public administration and digital public procurement by the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management programme, run by the EU and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development;

41. Encourages the Albanian authorities to reduce the risk of poverty and social exclusion by further improving access to education and housing, as well as social and healthcare services, especially for disadvantaged populations and minority groups, including Roma and Egyptians; calls for the implementation of Albania’s National Social Protection Strategy 2024-2030 and National Employment and Skills Strategy 2023-2030; calls on Albania to adopt further measures to fight against youth unemployment and calls on the Albanian authorities to effectively implement the National Agenda for the Rights of the Child by providing assistance to children facing exclusion and poverty;

42. Commends the Albanian authorities for the adoption of legislative acts to reform higher education and for the implementation of the National Strategy for Education 2021-2026; calls on Albania to expand media literacy as a core subject in school curricula while ensuring that teachers receive dedicated training and modern resources to deliver high-quality programmes; encourages collaboration with EU educational initiatives and regional networks such as the Western Balkans Media Literacy Observatory to implement best practices in critical thinking and digital literacy education;

43. Welcomes the progress made by Albania in concluding bilateral agreements with EU Member States on social security and in its preparations to enable the connection of its employment services system to EURES, the European network of employment services;

44. Welcomes the fact that Albania joined the Single Euro Payments Area in November 2024, which reduces costs for citizens and businesses and will contribute to Albania’s further integration into the single market; commends the Albanian authorities on the alignment with the EU acquis on payments (Payment Accounts Directive [5]) and on their actions that have resulted in Albania’s removal from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force; recognises Albania’s efforts to improve economic competitiveness and calls on the government to continue with structural reforms to foster a more attractive business environment in line with EU standards; regrets that the inefficiency in public administration, an excessive regulatory framework, corruption and large informal economy undermines the business environment and impedes competition;

45. Commends the improvement of Albania’s fiscal performance; calls on the Albanian authorities to further enhance fiscal risk analysis by strengthening the relevant Ministry of Finance department; calls for greater transparency and accountability of state-owned enterprises through annual financial reports; calls on Albania to strengthen its public internal financial control and to ensure that the recommendations of the Supreme Audit Institution (ALSAI) are implemented;

46. Welcomes the further alignment of legislation with the EU acquis on private pension funds, bank recovery and the resolution framework; calls on Albania to complete its alignment with the EU acquis on insurance, capital markets, securities markets, investment funds and financial market infrastructures;

47. Welcomes the agreement reached at the Tirana Summit on reduced roaming costs; in this respect, calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to work towards achieving the agreed targets of substantially reducing roaming charges for data and further reducing prices for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU to levels close to domestic prices by 2027; welcomes the implementation of the first phase of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

48. Is concerned about the lack of progress in company law legislation in Albania; calls on the Albanian authorities to complete the alignment of company law legislation with the EU acquis;

Environment, biodiversity, energy and transport, sustainable tourism

49. Stresses that more efforts are needed for Albania to align with the EU acquis on the environment; calls for its alignment with the EU’s Environmental Impact Assessment [6] and Strategic Environmental Assessment [7] directives; underlines the need to strengthen the fight against environmental crime;

50. Highlights the need for transparent and inclusive public consultations in line with the Aarhus Convention, ensuring the active involvement of local communities, NGOs and scientific institutions in environmental decision-making processes, especially on projects with large environmental and socio-economic repercussions; warns that the lack of proper stakeholder engagement undermines governance standards and Albania’s compliance with its obligations under the EU acquis; expresses concern about the economic and environmental impact of non-competitive foreign-funded development projects;

51. Recalls that substantial efforts are needed for Albania to achieve the goals relating to climate protection, energy efficiency, diversification and greening of energy supply and transport; notes that air and water quality and waste management remain particularly challenging issues for the country; urges the central government and local authorities to step up their efforts to improve air quality and reduce potentially lethal pollution; urges the Albanian Government to prioritise the implementation of climate adaptation strategies, the development of renewable energy sources and the modernisation of the country’s waste management system to meet EU standards and support sustainable economic growth; encourages the Albanian authorities to strengthen measures and investments to expand the public transport and railway systems;

52. Firmly believes that environmental protection and sustainable tourism development must go hand in hand; welcomes the establishment of the first wild river national park in Europe, the Vjosa Wild River National Park, and calls for sufficient resources to be allocated to its protection; calls on the authorities to fully respect the national park’s ecological integrity and to reconsider infrastructure projects, notably the water abstraction project on the Shushica river, in line with international biodiversity conservation standards and best practice to ensure that the park’s biodiversity, habitats and ecological functions remain intact; reiterates its concern over the construction of the Vlora airport in the Vjosa-Narta Protected Area, in violation of national and international biodiversity protection norms, and calls on the Commission to address the issue in chapter 27 of the accession negotiations; calls on the Albanian authorities to adopt the implementing legislation for the Law on Cultural Heritage and Museums;

53. Expresses serious concern regarding recent amendments to Albania’s Law on Protected Areas that allow large infrastructure and tourism projects in ecologically sensitive zones; calls for these legislative amendments to be reversed with a view to ensuring full and strict compliance with national and international legal frameworks and conservation standards and addressing marine waste pollution affecting neighbouring countries;

54. Calls on the Albanian authorities to designate and effectively manage key protected areas for the survival of critically endangered species, in particular the Balkan lynx, including through comprehensive biodiversity monitoring programmes, and to implement and strictly enforce anti-poaching legislation; urges Albania to abandon the plans for the Skavica hydropower plant on the Black Drin river, given its severe ecological, social and cultural impacts, including the displacement of local communities;

Regional cooperation and foreign policy

55. Welcomes the Security and Defence Partnership between the EU and Albania, adopted on 19 November 2024, which establishes a platform for enhanced dialogue and cooperation on security and defence issues and represents a significant step forward; stresses the importance of ensuring that this partnership translates into concrete actions, including joint training initiatives, shared intelligence capabilities and enhanced border security measures to address regional and global security challenges; underlines the need for deeper security cooperation within the Western Balkans, fostering closer coordination among regional partners to combat organised crime, cyber threats, and hybrid challenges; calls for strengthened EU support for regional security initiatives that enhance stability and resilience across the Western Balkans; acknowledges that this partnership represents a significant step forward in strengthening Albania’s role as a reliable security partner of the EU; further emphasises that the partnership will, among other things, facilitate joint initiatives and capacity-building efforts, thereby contributing to a more resilient and integrated security architecture in the Western Balkans;

56. Welcomes the adoption of the national security strategy in 2024 to further fight hybrid threats and the new law on cybersecurity; welcomes the joint declaration signed by Albania, Kosovo and Croatia, which aims to improve cooperation and strengthen defence potential, while providing full support for Euro-Atlantic and regional defence integration;

57. Commends Albania’s full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including its support for EU sanctions against third countries, and its positive contribution to common security and defence policy missions, particularly EUFOR Althea, which underlines the country’s commitment to contributing to regional and international security and stability, and welcomes Albania’s participation in operations led by the EU and by NATO, and its collaboration with Europol and Interpol; calls for its further participation in EU-led crisis management operations and common security and defence policy missions such as the maritime security operation EUNAVFOR Aspides; recognises the strategic importance of the Adriatic-Ionian region for European security and economic stability; calls on Albania to enhance its maritime security capabilities in coordination with the EU and NATO;

58. Welcomes the Albanian Government’s continued efforts in promoting good neighbourly relations; recalls, in this respect, the importance of Albania’s undertaking to resolve any border disputes in conformity with the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes and in accordance with the UN Charter and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, including, if necessary, by following the judgments of the International Court of Justice; welcomes Albania’s active contribution to the Berlin Process; further encourages sustained and constructive engagement in regional cooperation initiatives, in line with EU values and enlargement objectives, as it contributes to peace, security and stability in the Western Balkans; cautions against any actions, such as the Open Balkans initiative, that could undermine the common regional market or deviate from the Berlin Process, to the extent that they create obstacles to EU integration and cohesion, potentially jeopardising Albania’s progress toward deeper regional and European integration;

59. Welcomes the ratification by Albania of bilateral agreements on the coordination of social security systems with Croatia, Montenegro and Bulgaria;

60. Emphasises Albania’s constructive role in promoting stability and cooperation in the Western Balkans, particularly through bilateral dialogue with neighbouring countries and its engagement in regional organisations;

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61. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, to the Council, to the Commission, to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Albania.

MIL OSI Europe News –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Jamaica

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 25, 2025

The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the 2025 Article IV consultation with Jamaica on June 12, 2025.
Over the last decade, Jamaica has established an enviable track record of investing in institutions and prioritizing macroeconomic stability which allowed it meet recent shocks and natural disasters in an agile, prudent, and growth-supportive manner.
The continued reforms will increase resilience to future shocks and natural disasters. They need to combine with a multipronged approach to overcome supply-side constraints to growth in support of growth.

Washington, DC: On June 12, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation^[1] with Jamaica and considered and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting. The authorities have consented to the publication of the Staff Report prepared for this consultation.^[2]

Over the last decade, Jamaica has successfully reduced its public debt, firmly anchored inflation and inflation expectations, and strengthened its external position. It has built an enviable track record of investing in institutions and prioritizing macroeconomic stability. Jamaica has met recent global shocks and natural disasters in an agile, prudent, and growth-supportive manner. GDP declined in FY2024/25 due to hurricane Beryl and tropical storm Raphael which damaged agriculture and infrastructure and undermined tourism. Nonetheless, economic activity is projected to normalize as these effects wane. Unemployment has fallen to all-time low levels (3.7 percent in January 2025) and inflation has converged to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ)’s target band of 4-6 percent. The current account has been in surplus for the last two fiscal years with strong tourism revenues and high remittances. The international reserves’ position has continued to improve.

The outlook points to growth settling at its potential rate once the FY2025/26 recovery is complete, with inflation stabilizing within the BOJ’s target range. Nonetheless, global developments require continued close monitoring as downside risks emanating from tighter global financial conditions, lower growth in key source markets for tourism, and trade policy disruptions remain high. Finally, extreme weather events could negatively affect economic activity. The Jamaican authorities are implementing sound macroeconomic policies in the context of strong policy frameworks. A prudent fiscal stance supports a reduction in public debt towards the target in the Fiscal Responsibility Law. The Bank of Jamaica has anchored inflation around the mid-point of the inflation target band and inflation expectations have declined to close to the upper band of the BOJ’s target range. The lowering of the policy rate in 2024 was justified in view of the temporary nature of the weather-related shocks and the expected convergence of inflation to the BOJ’s target. The current fiscal-monetary policy mix places Jamaica in a good position to respond to the various downside global risks, should they realize.

Executive Board Assessment

“In concluding the 2025 Article IV consultation with Jamaica, Executive Directors endorsed staff’s appraisal, as follows:

“Over more than a decade, Jamaica has been implementing sound macroeconomic policies supported by strong policy frameworks. These efforts have allowed Jamaica to accumulate meaningful policy buffers, reduce public debt, anchor inflation, and improve its external position.

“Recent policy efforts have further strengthened fiscal responsibility, improved the effectiveness of public sector compensation, bolstered tax and customs administration, enhanced financial oversight, and built resilience to climate change including in the context of the recently completed PLL/RSF arrangements. These advances allowed agile, prudent, and growth-supportive responses to recent global shocks and natural disasters.

“The economy, which declined in FY2024/25 due to the weather events, is rebounding this year and is projected to grow at its potential rate with risks broadly balanced. The recovery is supported by a rebound in agriculture and tourism and its spillovers to other sectors. Risks comprise extreme weather events posing downside risks for tourism and agriculture, trade policy shocks, and disruptions to tourism or the flow of remittances. Upside risks include a faster-than-expected recovery from recent weather events, favorable tourism trends, and favorable commodity price developments.

“Maintaining primary fiscal surpluses to reach the FRL’s ceiling of 60 percent of GDP by FY2027/28 remains essential. However, fiscal policy could become too pro-cyclical in the face of severe shocks when the debt-to-GDP ratio reaches the FRL’s target. Incorporating an explicit operational medium-term debt anchor in the FRL at a level below 60 percent of GDP would help guide policies and ensure that debt is kept at moderate levels, creating fiscal buffers to respond to adverse events. The timeline for the eventual adoption of an operational debt anchor should be assessed in the context of heightened uncertainties, which could limit the country’s ability to meet a lower debt anchor in the medium-term.

“The authorities continue to improve the fiscal policy framework. The IFC became operational in January 2025 and assessed the consistency of current fiscal plans with the FRL. The A-PEFA assessment was completed in June 2024, providing recommendations to enhance public financial management. Reforms of tax and customs administration are supporting revenue mobilization, and sound debt management continues. The wage bill reform eliminating distortions and improving the transparency and competitiveness of the public pay to help retain skilled employees was completed last FY.

“Ongoing efforts to bolster the monetary and financial policy frameworks should continue. Staff supports the BOJ’s cautious data-dependent monetary policy, noting that there should be scope to lower the policy rate but the heightened global uncertainties call for a cautious approach. An inflation targeting regime with a strong international reserves’ position and stable FX markets have served Jamaica well. Going forward, there is scope to deepen FX markets by reducing surrender requirements and scaling back the BOJ’s FXI. Deepening capital markets, further de-dollarizing the economy, and boosting banking sector competition would improve resource allocation and help strengthen monetary transmission. The adoption of Basel III, the expansion of the BOJ supervisory remit, and unification of financial supervision under a twin-peaks regime are all going in the right direction. Jamaica exited FATF’s increased monitoring (grey list) in June 2024. Building on this achievement, the authorities continue to strengthen AML/CFT and are preparing for the fifth round of the Mutual Evaluation Process (expected by mid-2026).

“A multipronged approach is required to overcome supply-side constraints to growth. Low productivity resulting from the misallocation of resources is amplified by structural impediments including high crime, barriers to competition, poor educational outcomes, inadequate infrastructure, and barriers to trade. The authorities are addressing these barriers through product and labor market reforms, education, infrastructure, trade, and climate-aware reforms including by completing reform measures under the RSF completed last September. These reforms have the potential to catalyze private sector financing for climate-related investment.”

Table. Jamaica: Selected Economic Indicators


Population (2023): 2.84 million	Per capita GDP (2023): US$6,850
Quota (current; millions SDRs/% of total): 382.9/0.08	Literacy rate (2022)/Poverty rate (2021): 91.7%/16.7%
Main products and exports: alumina, tourism, chemicals, mineral fuels, bauxite	Unemployment rate (January 2025): 3.7%
Key export markets: U.S., U.K., Canada
		2022/23	2023/24	2024/25	2025/26
		Act.	Act.	Proj.	Proj.
Output
Real GDP growth (%)		4.7	1.8	-0.8	2.2

Employment
Unemployment (%) 1/		4.5	4.2	3.7	…

Prices
Inflation, end of period (%)		6.2	5.6	5.0	5.0
Inflation, average (%)		9.5	6.2	5.1	5.0

Central government finances 2/
Budgetary revenue (% of GDP)		30.1	30.6	33.3	31.7
Budgetary expenditure (% of GDP)		29.8	30.5	33.0	31.7
Budget balance (% of GDP)		0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0
Of which: central government primary balance		5.8	5.7	5.9	5.2
Public entities balance (% of GDP)		1.4	2.3	1.7	0.0
Public sector balance (% of GDP)		1.7	2.3	2.0	0.0
Public debt (% of GDP)		77.0	73.4	69.2	64.9

Money and credit
Broad money (% change)		9.8	9.1	6.2	9.1
Credit to the private sector (% change)		10.5	9.4	6.1	9.4
Treasury bill rate, end-of-period (%)		8.3	8.1	5.7	…
Treasury bill rate, average (%)		8.2	8.1	7.1	…

Balance of payments
Current account (% of GDP)		1.9	3.1	2.6	1.3
FDI, net (% of GDP)		1.9	1.5	1.0	1.3
Gross international reserves (months of imports)		5.6	6.4	7.2	6.8
External debt (% of GDP)		78.8	69.6	62.6	58.5

Exchange rate
End-of-period REER (appreciation +)		5.4	-0.7	…	…
Sources: Jamaican authorities; UNDP Human Development Report; Information Notice System; and Fund staff estimates and projections.
1/ As of April. In FY2024/25 January 2025.
2/ Fiscal year: April 1 to March 31. Government finances according to the authorities’ definitions.

[1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

[2] Under the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, publication of documents that pertain to member countries is voluntary and requires the member consent. The staff report will be shortly published on the www.imf.org/Jamaica page.

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Brian Walker

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/25/pr25219-jamaica-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation-with-jamaica

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Russia: Djibouti: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: IMF – News in Russian

June 25, 2025

A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

Washington, DC: Djibouti has been navigating regional tensions well, with robust growth, moderate inflation, and recovering reserves. In response to global uncertainties and domestic debt challenges, the authorities plan significant fiscal consolidation, including leveraging state-owned enterprises (SOE) dividends meaningfully, and advancing creditor dialogue. The authorities remain dedicated to investing in human capital and creating favorable investment conditions for job creation.

Djibouti’s economic resilience and contribution to regional stability

Djibouti helps maintain regional stability by supporting maritime security and facilitating humanitarian responses during crises. Djibouti’s GDP per capita has effectively doubled over the past decade thanks to significant investments that have contributed to the modernization of the economy. However, declining government revenues and increasing debt service have placed considerable strain on public finances, leading to unsustainable levels of public debt and diminishing reserves. Growth has not created enough jobs in the formal sector, while fiscal space to finance development needs is limited.

The authorities are leveraging Djibouti’s growth resilience to advance fiscal consolidation and rebuild reserves. Growth is expected to have exceeded 6.5 percent in 2024 due to increased transshipments amid Red Sea tensions, while moderate international food and energy prices kept inflation in check. The government deficit was reduced from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2023 to 2.6 percent in 2024 following a brief period of fiscal overruns and deficit monetization, and reserves have begun to recover partially offsetting the decline observed since late 2023, though they remain below the monetary base.

The outlook is positive but subject to risks in an uncertain global context. Growth is projected to remain dynamic at around 6 percent this year and to continue over the medium term, albeit at a slower pace. Ethiopia’s robust economy is expected to boost Djibouti’s port activities; however, fiscal consolidation and the phasing out of large-scale investments may temper growth. Key risks include regional conflicts potentially increasing migration and affecting social stability amid a constrained fiscal space, and trade policy shifts that could depreciate the dollar and Djibouti franc, enhancing service exports but also raising inflation. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Djibouti has successfully navigated several shocks over the past few years, including COVID-19, the 2022 Tigray crisis, the Ukraine war, and the 2024 Red Sea maritime disruptions.

Leveraging resilience for fiscal sustainability and rebuilding reserves

In the face of high global and regional uncertainty, Djibouti needs to quickly strengthen its economic resilience by restoring debt sustainability, safeguarding the currency board, and fostering inclusive growth. To this end, the authorities intend to strengthen fiscal consolidation and enhance financial transparency and governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to unlock sustainable and meaningful dividend contributions to the national budget, restore reserves, and encourage private sector growth while protecting vulnerable populations.

Durable fiscal consolidation is essential for restoring debt sustainability. The substantial fiscal adjustment frontloaded in the 2025 budget and the balanced budget target for 2026 onward are welcome steps. To sustain progress, it is essential that all governmental entities endorse annual fiscal targets that align with a medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy. Success depends on robust expenditure management via the diligent operationalization of the recently approved Public Financial Management Reform Strategy and Action Plan 2024–27. Furthermore, a comprehensive fiscal roadmap should continue to broaden the tax base by enhancing VAT and capital income taxation, rationalizing tax exemptions included in the investment code and the Free Zones regime, and finalizing the digitization of tax agencies. The effective establishment of the tax policy unit remains a priority for accurately assessing tax bases and enhancing tax reform efficiency. Operationalizing the recently created large taxpayer office will also bolster compliance and revenue collection.

As Djibouti negotiates new terms for debt liabilities with creditors, well-managed and profitable SOEs can significantly aid national fiscal consolidation and restore reserves at the Central Bank of Djibouti (CBD), particularly following the dissolution of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Building on ongoing efforts to improve SOE transparency and governance, it will be critical for the Executive Secretariat in charge of the State Portfolio (SEPE) to collect all SOEs’ financial statements and monitor their performance. Swiftly implementing the Code of Good Governance is also essential for establishing a more transparent dividend policy tied to SOE performance, thereby mobilizing dividends more consistently and meaningfully for the budget, improving SOE efficiency and services, and appropriately right-size them. Additionally, fiscal transparency can be strengthened by discontinuing financial settlement practices for clearing government arrears with SOEs, and by improving coordination among the Ministry of Budget, line ministries, and SEPE for more effective budget risk management.

Alongside fiscal consolidation, completing ongoing debt negotiations and addressing outstanding arrears with external partners are critical for debt sustainability. Equally important is implementing binding limits on borrowing for the central government, SOEs, including their participation in public-private partnerships, and ensuring these are enforced by the Public Sector Debt Committee.

The mission is encouraged by the recent recovery in reserves and urges continued progress. To strengthen the currency board, the authorities plan to amend the CBD law to enhance its autonomy, which will help sustain reserves, exchange rate, and inflation stability. They also plan to introduce reserve requirements as a prudential tool, with implementation expected to follow a phased approach. Additionally, under MENAFATF’s enhanced monitoring, Djibouti is reforming its AML/CFT framework, improving the business climate, and enhancing oversight of the banking sector due to its significant offshore component and rising government exposure. To facilitate policy making, the authorities are leveraging technical assistance provided by the IMF to enhance their coverage and quality of statistics relevant to surveillance, with a focus on national accounts, the fiscal and external sectors.

Advancing inclusivity through private sector development and employment creation

The government aims to foster economic growth and social equity. They aim to improve the existing targeting of the current fuel subsidy scheme. In order to create a more effective and equitable social protection system and reduce budget exposure to international energy prices, the authorities should gradually replace the current subsidy system with the strengthening of targeted cash transfers to the most vulnerable households, relying on the national social register. To attract investments and create jobs, they are enhancing access to education and job training under the 2021–35 education master plan. They aim to diversify the economy in sectors such as logistics and connectivity, tourism, agribusiness, and fisheries. To enable economic diversification, it is essential to develop a comprehensive roadmap with specific actions aimed at enhancing access to finance, streamlining administrative procedures, and expanding reliable and affordable internet services and electricity, including through increased bill collection, technical efficiency, and the adoption of cost-efficient renewable energy. These initiatives will enhance Djibouti’s business environment, which is already supported by a stable macroeconomic climate, a currency board, ports infrastructure, and connectivity to Ethiopia’s large market, all aligning with the objectives of Djibouti Vision 2035.

“The mission team expresses deep appreciation to the Djiboutian authorities and other counterparts for their warm hospitality, excellent cooperation and candid discussions, and looks forward to continuing close engagement.”

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

@IMFSpokesperson

https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/25/djibouti-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

MIL OSI

MIL OSI Russia News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ4: Smart estate management

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

LCQ4: Smart estate management
Question:

In order to enhance management efficiency and service quality of public rental housing (PRH) estates, the Government is actively promoting smart estate management and has selected ten PRH estates (including Hoi Ying Estate in Sham Shui Po) as pilot sites (pilot estates) for smart estate management. According to an opinion poll, over 90 per cent of the responding PRH tenants hope that the Housing Department expeditiously introduces smart management into the estates where they live. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the details and timetable for implementing smart estate management in various pilot estates;

(2) given that the Government will utilize the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence to facilitate daily management in the pilot estates, and will also introduce robots to carry out tasks such as security patrol and cleansing, of the criteria based on which the Government decides to try out such smart equipment and technologies in the pilot estates; whether it will introduce robots into estates other than the pilot estates, and whether it will consider introducing robots of a more interactive nature to act as goodwill ambassadors to residents by answering their daily enquiries; and

(3) whether it will extend the Smartcard Access Control System for buildings to all PRH estates, enabling residents to enter their buildings with smartcards or personalized QR codes and thus reducing the security risk of leaking building access codes, and install smart home monitoring systems for elderly residents; if so, of the details?

Reply:

President,

Under the theme of Housing???I&T initiative, the Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) promotes smart estate management this year so as to enhance efficiency and service quality, strengthen estate security, improve environment, expedite maintenance work, and enhance the sense of well-being and sense of gain of public rental housing (PRH) residents. The HA has selected ten public housing estates as pilot sites for the introduction of innovative technologies to promote smart estate management. In response to the questions raised by the Hon Vincent Cheng, our reply is as follows:

At present, the HA has introduced the following innovative technologies for estate management:

(i) Internet of Things (IoT) sensors

The HA applies a variety of sensors and IoT to digitise various circumstances and information in estates, collect real-time data for analysis and monitoring, and establish early warning systems (such as electricity supply, operation of water pumps and drainage system blockage, etc.) to notify the estate offices immediately for follow-up. Presently, about 700 sets of sensors have been installed in six PRH estates. This would hence enhance the efficiency and service quality and minimise the impact on residents.

(ii) Artificial Intelligence (AI)

AI is able to analyse images to detect irregularities and monitor the common areas of PRH estates in real time, identifying incidents such as objects thrown from height and illegal parking. The AI video analytic system can spare frontline staff from reviewing video footages for long hours, helping staff identify more accurately and efficiently the incidents of objects thrown from height from long videos, thereby shortening the time required for the entire evidence collection process and enhancing the efficiency in handling such incidents. The system has assisted to handle 17 successful point allotment cases.

(iii) Mobile devices

The mobile applications can be used anytime and anywhere by frontline staff, enabling them to record and retrieve information on-site at various locations. The “Mobile Application System for Daily Patrol” developed by the HA trialed in ten pilot estates allows security staff to readily report patrol situation and record in real-time matters requiring cleansing or maintenance services with photos uploaded, replacing the paper reports, reducing the paperwork after patrol duties, and raising the effectiveness of follow-up actions.

(iv) Robots and Small Unmanned Aircrafts (SUAs)

Robots and SUAs have brought significant benefits across various fields. Since mid-2022, maintenance staff of the HA have been utilising SUAs for tasks such as inspecting external walls of 21 estates, lift shafts, trees of 175 estates and 285 green roofs within 22 estates. Not only does the use SUAs save manpower and time, but it also greatly enhances inspection efficiency and avoids the risks brought by scaffold-based inspections. These technologies help complete tasks which are dangerous or difficult for humans to achieve within a short period of time and minimise inconvenience caused to residents. Robots have also been used on a trial basis in three housing estates for routine cleansing and security work to enhance efficiency, reduce conflicts and assist with publicity work. In addition to physical robots, virtual robots also provide considerable assistance to the public. For instance, the public can inquire about information and provide suggestions through interaction with the HA Chatbot.

To further promote innovative technologies in PRH estate management, the HA established a dedicated co-ordination team in mid-2024 to oversee the trial of various technologies across different management functions and review operational models. The co-ordination team also formulates implementation timetable for estates based on their specific conditions, with a view to gradually introducing suitable innovative solutions. For example, security robots are more suitable for use in spacious and flat public spaces. The HA will continue to actively collaborate with the property management sector to explore the implementation of cost-effective projects and maximise outcomes with limited resources. The co-ordination team will adjust its strategies annually based on the pilot results and identify suitable estates for introducing the best new technologies.

In addition, the HA has piloted the use of a smart contactless access control system in Hin Fat Estate, Tuen Mun since September 2024, by using smartcards and mobile QR codes to facilitate control and to monitor the main access of the building. The HA will evaluate the cost-effectiveness of the pilot scheme, the application of the technology and residents’ feedback in the fourth quarter this year. With relevant government departments and research institutions, the HA will also continue to explore other systems, such as the feasibility of applying “iAM Smart” Personal Code to the access control system. Subject to the availability of resources, the HA will trial other smart access control systems in other estates subsequently. Upon analysis and comparison, the HA will gradually extend smart access control systems to suitable PRH estates in phases.

The HA always upholds the values of “caring” and keeps abreast of the times to actively explore measures to address various needs of the elderly residents through the application of innovative technologies. Starting from April this year, the HA launched the pilot scheme of Door Sensor Installation for Elderly Households in Wan Hon Estate in Kwun Tong and Sheung Lok Estate in Ho Man Tin. The elderly households who voluntarily participate in the scheme are equipped with the system which allows designated relatives or friends to keep track of the movement of the elderly in and out of their flats so as to provide timely support when needed. So far, a total of 50 elderly households have participated in the scheme. The Housing Department will actively explore the feasibility of implementing other similar schemes in collaboration with other government departments and social welfare organisations, with a view to benefitting more elderly households in other PRH estates.

Moreover, the HA has also provided subsidy to eligible elderly households to install an emergency alarm system, so that the elderly in need can seek help promptly in case of emergency. A total of about 26 000 applications have been approved since the launch of this scheme. We have also been piloting the installation of smart fall-detection systems in eight accessible toilets in some estates to detect incidents such as falls, faints, or prolonged inactivity.

The HA will continue to listen and make reference to the views of various stakeholders with an open manner and to explore more effective innovative technologies for smart estate management, so as to enhance the service quality and the sense of well-being of the elderly and residents.

Thank you.
Issued at HKT 20:16

NNNN

CategoriesMIL-OSI

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ11: Site safety and contractor management

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

Following is a question by the Hon Carmen Kan and a written reply by the Secretary for Development, Ms Bernadette Linn, in the Legislative Council today (June 25):

Question:

It is reported that fatal industrial accidents and incidents of serious non-compliance committed by contractors have repeatedly occurred in the construction industry in recent years. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(1) of the following information on the contractors with poor performance in relation to industrial accidents and site safety in the construction industry in each of the past five years (set out in a table):

(i) the numbers of fatal and non-fatal industrial accidents (set out by type of operations) and, among which, the numbers of those involving “bamboo scaffolding” or “metal scaffolding” works (set out by cause of accidents);

(ii) in respect of public works projects, the number of government project consultants/contractors with performance ratings of (a)‍ “Poor” or “Very Poor” in site safety and (b) “Poor” or “Very Poor” in overall performance, and among which, the number of consultants and contractors who have been suspended from tendering or removed from the lists concerned (set out by type of non-compliance);

(iii) the numbers of prosecutions instituted by the Government in respect of fatal industrial accidents and the cases convicted and the penalty imposed on each of the convicted cases; and

(iv) the application situation for legal aid in each case of industrial accident involving civil claims (set out by fatal and non-fatal accidents);

(2) given that according to the direct investigation operation report of the Office of The Ombudsman released in April this year in relation to the Government’s regulation of occupational safety and health in the construction industry, from 2018 to 2023, fatal industrial accidents in the construction industry accounted for more than 80 per cent of fatal industrial accidents in all industries, and the Office found that some “competent persons” have failed to properly inspect the safety of bamboo scaffolds before signing the prescribed form (i.e. Form 5), how the authorities will improve the monitoring mechanism and step up enforcement efforts to ensure that the competent persons will strictly discharge their duties;

(3) given that according to the report mentioned in (2), the industrial accidents involving bamboo scaffolding works are related to the unauthorised issue of the prescribed form, whether the Government will review afresh the policy direction of reducing the use of bamboo scaffolds in public works projects; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;

(4) in respect of cases of public works projects in which contractors/consultants with performance ratings of “Poor” or “Very Poor” in overall performance were not suspended from tendering in the end, of the Government’s reasons for making such decisions (set out by cases); whether it will, from the perspective of value for money, review the weightings of the various scores for assessing the performance of contractors/consultants; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that; and

(5) of the measures in place to prevent the relevant personnel of contractors who were removed from the register of general building contractors by the Government due to serious non-compliance from undertaking the Government’s public works projects by means of setting up new companies?

Reply:

President,

The Government attaches great importance to site safety. The Labour Department (LD) has been closely monitoring the levels and changes of occupational safety and health (OSH) risks in various industries, including the construction industry. Pursuant to the risk-based principle, the LD formulates and adjusts strategies for inspection and enforcement, publicity and promotion, as well as education and training to uplift the OSH performance. The Development Bureau (DEVB) from time to time reviews the safety management system of public works, being part of the construction industry, and adopts a multi-pronged approach by implementing measures on various fronts, including project design, tender evaluation, contract provisions, works supervision, technology application, regulation of contractors, as well as publicity and promotion, with a view to uplifting site safety performance of public works.

Having consulted the LD and the Legal Aid Department (LAD), the reply to various parts of the question is as follows:

(1) (i) According to the OSH statistics analysed by the type of accidents by the LD, the breakdown of the numbers of fatal and non-fatal industrial accident cases in the construction industry from 2020 to 2024 (by type of accidents) is at Annex 1.

Among the fatal industrial accident cases, the relevant statistics involving working on bamboo scaffolds and metal scaffolds are at Annex 2. The LD does not maintain relevant statistics on non-fatal industrial accident cases involving bamboo scaffolds and metal scaffolds.
The LAD is not in position to disclose the details of each individual case because of the restriction under the Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance and the Legal Aid Ordinance also contains provisions maintaining confidentiality of information relating to an applicant or aided person.
The LD is planning to develop a “scaffold inspection checklist” for use by competent persons when inspecting scaffolds in order to strengthen the regulation of their inspection work under the OSH legislation and reduce the chance of making false statements on the approved forms.
To further promote the adoption of metal scaffolds, the DEVB recently required 50 per cent of new public works building works contracts of the Government, with tenders to be invited on or after March 21, 2025, to adopt metal scaffolds. Based on the new public works building works contracts in 2025, 50 per cent of new contracts means one to two new building works contracts. With experience gained, the DEVB will continue to maintain close communication with the construction industry and adopt a pragmatic attitude to encourage the industry to keep pace with the times and adopt metal scaffolds in a progressive manner. The Government has no intention to ban bamboo scaffolds and will continue to engage the industry and other relevant stakeholders to jointly explore measures from various aspects (including the application of technology) to enhance work safety of bamboo scaffolds.
In respect of regulating actions, if a contractor is involved in serious site safety incidents (irrespective of whether they occurred on public works sites or those of other public or private sector organisations), we will immediately suspend the contractor from tendering for public works contracts in accordance with the current regulating mechanism. Any tenders that the contractor has already submitted for public works contracts will not be considered during the regulating period. Following this, a Panel of Enquiry will be held to determine the need for further regulating actions against the contractor, including suspension from tendering or even removal from the approved lists.

In addition, if a contractor’s site safety performance is rated as “Very Poor” in the quarterly performance evaluation, its overall performance in the performance report will also be rated as “Very Poor”. If a contractor’s overall performance is rated as “Very Poor” for two consecutive quarters, we will suspend the contractor from tendering for public works contracts until its performance consistently meets satisfactory level. In general, upon receiving a “Very Poor” report, a contractor will implement effective improvement measures immediately. As for engineering consultants, we have a similar regulating mechanism in place as well.

Although some contractors or engineering consultants have been rated as having “Poor” or “Very Poor” overall performance, their performance has not yet met the threshold for triggering suspension of their tendering qualifications. However, under the current tender evaluation mechanism, a contractor’s past site safety performance, accident rate in public works contracts, and its records of serious site safety incidents (regardless of whether they occurred on public works sites or those of other public or private sector organisations) are key attributes assessed. These attributes make up about 30 per cent of the overall technical score. Therefore, if a contractor’s site safety performance is rated as “Poor” or “Very Poor”, the overall technical score of its tender will be lower, directly impacting its chance of winning future public works contracts. We will continue to review and enhance the performance evaluation and regulating systems for public works contractors and engineering consultants as needed.
When applying for admission to the approved lists, a contractor must fulfil a series of admission criteria, including project experience, site safety, financial capability, management, staff employment, and integrity, etc. In reviewing an application for admission, we consider the contractor’s relevant project experience, senior management, safety personnel and technical staff employed, financial capability (such as employed capital and working capital as reflected in audited financial statements in the past three years), and the past site safety performance of the company and relevant responsible persons. Therefore, it is not possible for a delisted contractor to easily regain approval simply by establishing a new company.

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI: State of Utah Renews 5-Year Electronics Recycling Contract with Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR), Taking Advantage of Increased Discounts and Services
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

SALT LAKE CITY, June 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR) is proud to announce it has been awarded a second consecutive 5-year statewide contract (MA 4483) to provide Electronics Recycling and Secure Data Destruction services for the State of Utah, including all departments, agencies, institutions, and political subdivisions.

This new contract, effective through May 2029, reinforces ATR’s position as the State’s premier choice for responsible, secure, and cost-effective management of end-of-life electronics and IT assets.

“We’re honored to renew our partnership with the State of Utah and excited to expand our services to both local government and private sector clients throughout the region,” said Pete Swavely, National Business Development Manager at ATR. “Whether you’re a public agency or an enterprise looking to improve your IT asset management strategy, ATR offers proven performance, unbeatable value, and personalized lifecycle management solutions.”

Contract Award Highlights
- Top-ranked vendor: ATR once again earned the highest score on the State’s competitive scoring algorithm, maintaining its leading position from the 2019–2024 contract period.
- Second consecutive win: This marks ATR’s second successful contract term, reinforcing a strong performance history with the State of Utah.
- Cost-efficient provider: ATR outscored the other two qualifying vendors by a wide margin in the cost evaluation, demonstrating unmatched value and affordability.
- Best-in-class service: Selection criteria also prioritized logistics, compliance, service capabilities, and regulatory performance—areas where ATR continues to excel.
- Strategic West Coast expansion: Services will be supported by ATR’s upgraded Salt Lake City facility; part of a broader expansion aimed at strengthening logistics and asset management coverage across the Western U.S.
Why Advanced Technology Recycling Was the Clear Winner

The State of Utah’s Evaluation Committee—comprised of subject matter experts from the Department of Government Operations, Department of Agriculture, and Jordan School District—conducted a rigorous, multi-phase scoring process following the Utah Procurement Code (Part 7), with oversight from the Division of State Purchasing.

Out of 1,000 possible points, ATR earned the highest total score across all evaluated categories, securing its place as the top-ranked and most cost-effective vendor.

Final Total Scores (out of 1,000 points)

Vendor Technical Score Cost Score Total

Advanced Technology Recycling 597.50 262.71 860.21

Vendor #2 570.00 104.58 674.58

Vendor #3 577.50 59.02 636.52

Key Takeaways
- ATR led in both technical and cost categories.
- ATR outscored the second-place vendor by nearly 200 points.
- ATR’s pricing model received full cost points, showing exceptional value.
- ATR met or exceeded top scores in data destruction, security, and surplus resale categories critical to State and agency compliance.
What Makes ATR Different?

At Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR), we recognize the complex challenges facing today’s IT industry, particularly in implementing sustainable Information Technology Asset Disposition (ITAD) strategies that reduce risk and drive measurable value. Our ability to support your organization’s triple bottom line —people, planet, and profit —is what truly sets us apart.

ATR’s proprietary asset management database enables our team to create a fully customized Statement of Work (SOW) for each customer, with individual asset-level tracking from pickup through final disposition. This powerful system ensures end-to-end transparency and compliance for every project, regardless of scale.

Through our secure web-based portal, customers gain 24/7 access to real-time reports, scheduling tools, audit trails, and downloadable compliance documentation. This centralized platform is currently managing millions of assets and is trusted by an expanding list of Fortune 100 and 500 companies across the United States.

Designed for scalability, ATR’s technology and services adapt to meet the needs of both small enterprises and large, distributed organizations. Our nationwide infrastructure, advanced security standards, and commitment to innovation make us the ideal partner for companies seeking to transform their IT lifecycle management while meeting sustainability and regulatory goals.

About Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR)

Advanced Technology Recycling (ATR) is a nationally recognized, multi-certified IT Asset Disposition (ITAD) and electronics recycling provider, proudly serving Utah since 2016. We are fully ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) registered and GSA Schedule approved, delivering secure and scalable solutions for data centers, enterprises, and government clients across the United States.

With over 30 years of industry expertise since our founding in 1992, ATR has remained at the forefront of innovation in electronics lifecycle management. Our seasoned team of technology professionals leverages advanced tools and best practices to design tailored, cost-effective strategies that help clients optimize IT infrastructure, enhance data security, and meet or exceed sustainability objectives.

As part of our continued national growth, ATR has opened a new, state-of-the-art facility located within the Salt Lake City retail district at:

Advanced Technology Recycling
1967 South 300 West, Salt Lake City, UT 84115

This facility expands our operational footprint in the western U.S. It enhances our capacity to support government agencies, educational institutions, and commercial organizations with streamlined logistics, rapid response times, and full regulatory compliance.

At ATR, we are committed to providing secure, transparent, and environmentally responsible electronics recycling and ITAD services—because protecting your data and the planet shouldn’t be a compromise.

The MIL Network –
June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall: The Reconciliation Bill Will Give Us More Prosperity and Security

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

Senator Marshall Joins Newsmax to Discuss the Iran and Israel Conflict and the Reconciliation Package in the Senate.
Washington – On Tuesday night, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-Kansas), joined Ed Henry on Newsmax’s The Briefing to discuss the President’s handling of the Iran and Israel conflict, the President’s push for peace worldwide, and what the Senate is doing to pass the reconciliation package.

Click HERE or on the image above to watch Senator Marshall’s full remarks.
On CNN’s Iran Aftermath Report
“I think it’s more lies from fake news. But you know, the proof will be in the pudding, and we’ll see what the pictures are in a week or two. I think it would take a year just to remove the rubble to get to where this facility once was. I just can’t imagine. …14 bombs we dropped, these were all a direct strike, the likes of which we’ve never seen. These are 30,000 pounds each – I’m going to bet on the United States Air Force. They know what they’re doing. It was a direct strike. I bet we got our mission done. We’ll wait for the final pictures here.”
On President Trump being the ‘Peace President’:
“President Trump is the most transparent President in history. This morning, we knew exactly where he was. He didn’t have to send an aide to go tell Bibi to knock it off – he told him in front of the whole world, and that’s who President Trump is.
“I think that the regime in Iran is more worried about regime change than they are about nuclear weapons in the future. I think that’s what their big fear is. They’re trying to save face as well. And here’s President Trump offering another olive branch. He wants peace. He cares about the Iranian people who have been tortured and murdered by their government for decades as well. So, I think it’s another master class in negotiations by President Trump.
“Look, we’re tired of the killing. That’s all I can say, we’re tired of the killing here. We’re tired of the killing in Gaza. We’re tired of the killing in Ukraine. President Trump wants to end all that, and when that happens, the economy, the world economy, will improve if we can get all these wars back under control.”
On Democrats’ hypocrisy on foreign precision strikes:
“And this is what I was talking about earlier, going from Trump obsession to Trump psychosis. And this is what you have, that they are dissociated from truth, from reality. The President has a constitutional duty to protect this nation. Iran was one week away from having a nuclear warhead – they had enough 60% enriched uranium to build 10 atomic bombs. The President had a duty to protect us. That’s what he did.
“You pointed this out early, the hypocrisy of Obama, who did similar things. Clinton did similar things. President Nixon, of course, as well. So, this is psychosis. Thank God for President Trump that this is not phasing him, it’s not slowing him down. He’s going to do the right thing. I even saw some polling recently, 90% of Republicans support how President Trump has handled all this – I think he’s growing stronger, more popular. The United States is respected more. This is what peace through strength looks like.”
On the next steps in the reconciliation process:
“Like you said, President Trump’s done his job. Now it’s time for us to do our job. This bill is not perfect, but it’s going to prevent the largest tax increase for hard-working, middle-income families in the history of our country. It’s going to build 2000 miles of barrier. It’s going to give us border security funding for four years – we’re going to run out of funding very soon to secure the border. It’s going to give our military pay raises, make the military stronger for the next four years as well.
“You know, some things that people aren’t talking about out there that I think are very important… this is going to defund Planned Parenthood. It’s going to allow us to purchase short-barreled rifles again. It’s going to give more flexibility with 529 education plans and with Pell Grants as well. … There are so many good things in this. It’s going to increase your Child Tax Credits to $2200 – If we don’t do this, it would be $1,000. So, there are so many great things in this bill. It’s going to be a rising tide that floats all boats. It’s going to give us more prosperity and security. We don’t have a choice – we need to get it done.”

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall Leads Fight for Federal Disaster Aid for Kansas Communities

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

WICHITA – Following multiple rounds of severe weather in May 2025, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-KS) joined by U.S. Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS), and U.S. Congressmen Tracey Mann (R-KS-01), Derek Schmidt (R-KS-02), and Ron Estes (R-KS-04) have sent a letter to President Trump in support of the state’s request for a federal disaster declaration. If approved, the Federal government would be able to provide much-needed public assistance funding to ensure necessary repairs and the rebuilding of public infrastructure.
In their letter, Kansas’ Republican Congressional Delegation wrote:
“This devastating weather event included at least seven EF3 tornadoes, which caused widespread destruction, leveling entire towns and inflicting significant property loss across dozens of Kansas communities. Critical transportation routes, including Interstate 70, were closed due to storm damage, and widespread devastation affected utilities, public infrastructure, and private property.”
If approved, the following Kansas counties would be eligible for public assistance: Bourbon, Cheyenne, Edwards, Gove, Kiowa, Logan, Pratt, Reno, Scott, Sheridan, and Stafford.
Communities across Kansas sustained damage, with Plevna and Grinnell seeing near-total destruction. Upon approval of the disaster declaration, local governments and public utility providers would be eligible to submit storm-related expenses to FEMA for reimbursement.
Click HERE to read the full text of the letter.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Senator Marshall Leads Fight for Federal Disaster Aid for Kansas Communities

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Kansas Roger Marshall

WICHITA – Following multiple rounds of severe weather in May 2025, U.S. Senator Roger Marshall, M.D. (R-KS) joined by U.S. Senator Jerry Moran (R-KS), and U.S. Congressmen Tracey Mann (R-KS-01), Derek Schmidt (R-KS-02), and Ron Estes (R-KS-04) have sent a letter to President Trump in support of the state’s request for a federal disaster declaration. If approved, the Federal government would be able to provide much-needed public assistance funding to ensure necessary repairs and the rebuilding of public infrastructure.
In their letter, Kansas’ Republican Congressional Delegation wrote:
“This devastating weather event included at least seven EF3 tornadoes, which caused widespread destruction, leveling entire towns and inflicting significant property loss across dozens of Kansas communities. Critical transportation routes, including Interstate 70, were closed due to storm damage, and widespread devastation affected utilities, public infrastructure, and private property.”
If approved, the following Kansas counties would be eligible for public assistance: Bourbon, Cheyenne, Edwards, Gove, Kiowa, Logan, Pratt, Reno, Scott, Sheridan, and Stafford.
Communities across Kansas sustained damage, with Plevna and Grinnell seeing near-total destruction. Upon approval of the disaster declaration, local governments and public utility providers would be eligible to submit storm-related expenses to FEMA for reimbursement.
Click HERE to read the full text of the letter.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congresswoman Tenney Reintroduces the Fairness in Vineyard Data Act to Support NY-24 Grape Growers

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Claudia Tenney (NY-22)

Washington, DC – Congresswoman Claudia Tenney (NY-24) today reintroduced the Fairness in Vineyard Data Act to expand the federal government’s vineyard data collection to better reflect the needs of grape growers in New York and other top-producing states.

Congressman Joe Morelle (NY-25) joined Rep. Tenney in reintroducing this legislation.

Currently, the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) only collects comprehensive vineyard data from the top two grape-producing states, leaving out key grape-producing regions. This bill expands data collection on vineyard production to include the top five grape-growing states, including New York, giving grape growers better insight into industry trends. This data will help them adapt their cultivation practices and improve wine production.

“New York’s grape growers and winemakers are a vital part of our economy, especially in NY-24, home to the renowned Finger Lakes wine region. By expanding federal vineyard data collection, the Fairness in Vineyard Data Act ensures our growers have access to more information when it comes to trends, pricing, and production forecasts. This bill promotes fairness, transparency, and gives our NY-24 grape growers the tools they need to thrive in a competitive marketplace,” said Congresswoman Tenney.

“New York’s wine grapes are a vital part of our region’s culture and economy, supporting good-paying jobs and agritourism. Our farmers need—and deserve—the best data to stay competitive. I’m proud to work across the aisle with Congresswoman Tenney on our Fairness in Vineyard Data Act and look forward to getting it passed into law,” said Congressman Morelle.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Bentz Participates in the Natural Resources Committee’s Markup of His Bill Which Would Facilitate Expansion of the City of The Dalles’ Drinking Water Supply

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Cliff Bentz (R-Ontario)

Washington, D.C.— This week in the Natural Resources Committee, Congressman Cliff Bentz’s (R-OR) bill, The Dalles Watershed Development Act, was included in the full committee markup. This critical legislation, if enacted, would transfer 150 acres of U.S. Forest Service land within The Dalles’ municipal watershed to city ownership.

Said Congressman Bentz: “On April 29, 2025, my bill H.R. 655, was included in the Federal Lands Subcommittee hearing marking the critical first step in the legislative process. The bill received support among the subcommittee as well as the acknowledgement of the United States Forest Service that a land transfer would greatly benefit the community. The bill has now moved to the second step which is today’s “markup”. It was voted out of committee and will now move to the floor. If passed across the floor, it will move to the Senate.”

The City of The Dalles has long relied on its municipal watershed for 80% of its annual water supply. Protecting this watershed is essential to maintaining water quality, meeting future demand, and ensuring public safety. This bill would allow the city to expand the size of its reservoir and allow much less red tape in taking action to protect city water infrastructure works and the city’s watershed.

“The City of The Dalles has maintained a great working relationship with the Forest Service, but the need for expansion of the reservoir, on land owned by the federal government, would be unnecessarily burdened by lengthy federally required administrative reviews.” said Congressman Bentz. “To afford to expand its water storage capacity, avoiding unnecessary costs is absolutely crucial. This transfer of land would help avoid costs. Water security is a top priority, and this legislation will provide the land needed to meet the city’s future growth.”

Congressman Bentz will continue to work with the Natural Resources Committee, House Leadership, local leaders and federal agencies to advance this legislation.

Read the bill text, here.

Watch the hearing here.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Bentz Statement on Public Lands

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Cliff Bentz (R-Ontario)

WASHINGTON, D.C.– To be clear – I do support and encourage sale or exchange of parcels of federal land when there is a clear economic or social demand for such disposition, and when that disposition follows appropriate procedure and is generally supported by those affected. I include congressional action as an appropriate procedure. I do not support a mandated disposition of millions of acres of federal land, the amount of which was arbitrarily established, the primary goal not being to respond to demand, but instead being the removal of land from federal ownership.

A policy to permanently dispose of massive amounts of land currently owned and managed for multiple use by the federal government should not be included in a reconciliation package where debate, by design, is truncated or completely avoided. A decision to irreversibly divest the nation of federally owned land is an important policy issue that must be carefully discussed with and designed by those of us representing states impacted by this policy.

Of particular concern in making any decision to sell public land is the sale’s impact on those who have rights in the land or currently have some type of use of the land. Indian Tribes, neighbors, grazing permittees, those utilizing public access across the land, hunters, watershed function, holders of easements, and environmental impact are some of the issues that must be taken into account in making a decision to alter ownership. These realities make the process used in selecting parcels of federal land offered for sale extremely important.

Some might argue that the abject failure of the federal government to adequately manage BLM and Forest Service land justifies its sale. But sale of this land to someone else is no way to assure it’s proper management. The best way to protect this land is to identify and correct the reasons these agencies are failing in their mission. The easiest observation to make is that environmental organizations, using the ESA, CWA, CAA, and other environmental laws, compliant federal judges, and the Access to Justice Act, (an act that pays the attorney fees of plaintiffs who successfully sue the federal government) through protracted and expensive litigation, make a mockery of agency’s attempts to craft management plans. If our nation is to be a landowner (and it is), it must take care of that land. This means that the laws that are being perverted to line the pockets of environmental organizations at the expense of the taxpayer and our forests and rangelands, must be changed so that such perversion is stopped.

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MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Africa: International Monetary Fund (IMF) Executive Board Concludes the 2025 Article IV Consultation with Libya

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

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The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV Consultation with Libya.[1] The Executive Board’s decision was taken on a lapse-of-time basis.

Real GDP growth is estimated to have declined to around 2 percent in 2024 from 10 percent in 2023, driven by a contraction in the hydrocarbon sector. At the same time, non-hydrocarbon growth remained robust on the back of sustained government spending. Both the current and the fiscal accounts have swung from a surplus in 2023 to a deficit in 2024. Reported inflation remained low.

The outlook continues to be dominated by developments in the oil sector. Real GDP growth is projected to rebound in 2025, primarily driven by an expansion of oil production, before moderating to about 2 percent over the medium term. Non-hydrocarbon growth is set to remain between 5 and 6 percent in the medium term, supported by sustained government spending. The current account is slated to post a small surplus in 2025 (0.7 percent of GDP) before turning into a small deficit over the medium term, as oil prices remain subdued. The fiscal balance is projected to remain in deficit—albeit at a much lower level than in 2024—under the weight of continued large government spending.

Risks are tilted to the downside. Domestic risks stem from political instability, potentially evolving into active conflict, disrupting oil production and exports, and preventing progress on much-needed economic reforms. The economy is exposed to global downside risks through its heavy dependence on oil exports and a large import bill.

Executive Board Assessment[2]

Economic activity and fiscal and external accounts are poised to remain heavily dependent on developments in the oil sector and subject to downside risks. Following a rebound in oil production, economic growth is expected to be in double digits in 2025, before moderating over the medium term. Despite the expected increase in oil exports, the current account and fiscal balances are set to remain in deficit over most of the forecast horizon, weighed down by the projected softening of oil prices and large fiscal spending. The outlook is subject to downside risks, including the potential intensification of domestic political tensions, which could disrupt oil production and exports, and adverse global economic and geopolitical developments, which would put additional downward pressure on oil prices. To mitigate these risks, accelerating reforms aimed at restraining fiscal spending and diversifying the economy away from oil will be crucial.

Controlling expenditure will be key to ensure sustainability and to achieve intergenerational equity. The authorities should remain steadfast in their efforts to agree on a unified budget that outlines priority spending and enhances the transparency and credibility of government fiscal operations. Until such an agreement is reached, pressures to increase spending on salaries and subsidies should be resisted. Over the medium term, a sizable adjustment will be required to set the fiscal position on a sustainable trajectory and preserve intergenerational equity. The adjustment should be carefully designed to rationalize current spending, particularly wages and energy subsidies, and mobilize non-oil revenues, while maintaining capital expenditures at levels that support economic diversification.

A well-designed monetary and exchange rate policy framework will be essential to help manage economic cycles and mitigate the depreciation pressures. Introducing a well-defined policy rate will enhance the CBL’s capacity in smoothing the economic cycle and alleviating pressures on the dinar and provide a benchmark for the pricing of credit by both conventional and Islamic banks. Phasing out the foreign exchange tax alongside other exchange restrictions in line with Libya’s Article VIII obligations will reduce distortions, lower economic agents’ need to resort to the parallel market and help unify the exchange rate.

Reforms are needed to reinforce the banking sector’s contribution to economic activity. Impediments to a more active role by banks in the economy remain pervasive. Introducing well-designed savings plans will help to reduce cash hoarding, expand banks’ deposit base, establish bank-customer relationships, and support the provision of credit to the private sector. Enhancing transparency and accountability within the banking sector and promoting financial literacy among the public would foster confidence in banks and increase their footprint in Libya’s economy. Strengthening the AML/CFT framework, including by aligning it with international standards, will be paramount to support the stability of correspondent banking relationships and to ensure that Libyan banks’ operations remain uninterrupted.

Structural and governance reforms would foster the emergence of a diversified, sustainable, and private sector-led economy. Forging a comprehensive reform program aimed at reducing dependence on oil revenues should be at the top of the authorities’ agenda. Key elements of the reform program should promote a more active engagement of the private sector in economic activity, including by enhancing the business environment and access to finance and introducing labor market measures that encourage private sector employment. Taking decisive actions to tackle corruption, strengthen governance, and enhance the rule of law will support economic diversification further.

There is a need to enhance data provision and statistical capacity. Data gaps continue to significantly hamper staff’s ability to conduct analysis and provide policy advice. There is a need for the authorities to implement the technical assistance recommendations in the areas of national accounts and external sector statistics, and monetary and financial statistics, and improve data collection and reporting.

(Main Export: Crude Oil)

				Est.	Proj.
	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030
(Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)
National income and prices
Real GDP (at market price)	28.3	-8.3	10.2	1.9	16.1	4.4	1.6	1.7	1.9	2.2
Nonhydrocarbon	5.9	7.9	-0.6	14.3	2.9	5.9	4.2	4.4	4.8	5.3
Hydrocarbon	45.0	-17.0	17.8	-5.5	25.6	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Nominal GDP in billions of Libyan dinars 1/	159.0	208.2	211.9	234.3	251.2	254.2	265.5	277.9	292.0	306.6
Nominal GDP in billions of U.S. dollars 1/	35.2	43.3	44.0	48.4	47.2	47.7	49.8	52.2	54.8	57.6
Per capita GDP in thousands of U.S. dollars	5.2	6.4	6.4	7.0	6.8	6.8	7.0	7.3	7.5	7.8
GDP deflator	90.4	42.7	-7.6	3.6	-3.3	-3.1	2.8	2.9	3.1	2.8
CPI inflation
Period average	2.9	4.5	2.4	2.1	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
End of period	3.7	4.1	1.8	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3	2.3
(In percent of GDP)
Central government finances
Revenues	79.5	85.8	73.6	69.8	67.9	61.1	58.5	56.6	54.5	52.4
Of which: Hydrocarbon	78.1	83.9	71.6	55.4	62.1	59.2	56.7	54.7	52.6	50.4
Expenditure and net lending	64.7	62.2	65.4	94.8	73.2	64.6	61.8	59.5	57.1	54.8
Of which: Capital expenditures	10.9	8.4	8.7	34.6	20.1	12.8	12.1	11.4	11.0	10.9
Overall balance	14.8	23.6	8.2	-25.1	-5.3	-3.5	-3.3	-2.9	-2.7	-2.5
Overall balance (in billions of U.S. dollars)	5.2	10.2	3.6	-12.1	-2.5	-1.7	-1.6	-1.5	-1.5	-1.4
Nonhydrocarbon balance	-63.3	-60.3	-63.4	-80.5	-67.5	-62.7	-60.0	-57.6	-55.2	-52.9
(Annual percentage change unless otherwise indicated)
Money and credit
Base Money	2.8	-16.9	47.9	6.6	36.8	9.0	9.2	10.0	10.2	16.7
Currency in circulation	-20.0	-1.4	37.6	13.3	10.5	2.2	1.5	5.0	5.0	5.0
Money and quasi-money	-20.3	12.0	28.3	12.2	4.0	4.5	4.5	5.0	5.0	5.0
Net credit to the government (Libyan Dinar, billion)	-94.1	-114.9	-110.9	-128.8	-130.4	-121.4	-112.7	-104.6	-96.8	-89.3
Credit to the economy (% of GDP)	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
(In billions of U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated)
Balance of payments
Exports	25.9	32.1	30.9	28.4	32.0	31.3	31.6	32.0	32.5	32.9
Of which: Hydrocarbon	24.5	30.0	28.8	26.3	29.9	29.1	29.2	29.7	30.3	29.9
Imports	17.0	17.2	17.7	21.6	21.9	20.5	20.6	20.8	21.0	21.2
Current account balance	5.7	10.0	8.0	-2.0	0.3	-0.3	-0.2	-0.2	-0.1	-0.1
(As percent of GDP)	16.1	23.2	18.3	-4.2	0.7	-0.5	-0.4	-0.3	-0.3	-0.1
Capital Account (including E&O)	-7.0	-5.3	-3.8	6.5	-2.8	-1.4	-1.4	-1.4	-1.3	-1.3
Overall balance 2/	1.1	4.7	4.3	4.5	-2.5	-1.7	-1.6	-1.5	-1.5	-1.4
Reserves
Gross official reserves	69.4	74.1	78.4	82.9	81.1	79.4	77.8	76.3	74.8	73.4
In months of next year’s imports	32.2	32.8	34.2	29.6	31.0	32.3	31.5	30.5	29.6	28.8
Gross official reserves in percentage of Broad Money	317.0	318.2	261.3	250.3	262.9	246.4	230.9	215.6	201.4	188.2
Total foreign assets	79.7	84.2	88.5	93.6	91.6	89.7	87.9	86.2	84.5	82.9
Exchange rate
Official exchange rate (LD/US$, period average)	4.5	4.8	4.8	4.8	…	…	…	…	…	…
Parallel market exchange rate (LD/US$, period average)	5.1	5.1	5.2	6.9	…	…	…	…	…	…
Parallel market exchange rate (LD/US$, end of period)	5.0	5.2	6.1	6.4	…	…	…	…	…	…
Crude oil production (millions of barrels per day – mbd)	1.2	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.4	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Of which: Exports	1.0	0.8	1.0	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Crude oil price (US$/bbl) 3/	64.4	89.6	75.0	73.6	66.9	62.4	62.7	63.6	64.3	64.9

Sources: Libyan authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

1/ Nominal GDP data are at market prices.

2/ Includes revaluation of gold holdings of U$10.5 billion in 2024.

3/ The crude oil price was adjusted for Libya up to 2024.

[2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

– on behalf of International Monetary Fund (IMF).

MIL OSI Africa –

June 26, 2025

MIL-OSI Africa: The Success Story of Tamura Oil – Burundi’s Red Gold

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

Beneath the shade of oil palms, a quiet yet powerful revolution is underway. The Dukundane Cooperative, led by women (95% of its members), stands as a beacon of resilience and innovation, having transformed a once small-scale activity into a thriving semi-industrial enterprise.

Founded in 2014 following women’s leadership training under the Women’s Peace and Humanitarian Fund (WPHF), the cooperative initially brought together women crafting and selling brooms from palm fibers. By 2020, they had taken a transformative step – launching artisanal palm oil production.

The foundation for this transformation was laid in 2018 under axe 6 of the WPHF, which supports the socio-economic recovery and political participation of women and girls in peacebuilding contexts. That year, 175 women peace actors and dialogue facilitators – locally known as Abakanguriramahoro or “women mediators”—received financial support in Karonda. These women had already been active in conflict prevention and community mediation.

With a grant of USD 180,000 from the WPHF, they expanded their economic activities using a holistic approach to palm tree valorization: from palm oil extraction to soap production from palm nuts and organic fertilizer from processing residues.

This marked a turning point in women’s economic empowerment in the region. Yet, the initiative still faced challenges due to limited equipment and technical capacity, underscoring the need for more structured support.

By 2025, with new backing from the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and UN Women, the group officially became the Dukundane Cooperative. With a total investment of 603 million Burundian francs, a modern semi-industrial processing plant was established with the help of the implementing partner FVS “Amie des Enfants.” The plant features: a Sterilizer, Sorting table, Destemmer, Kneader, Oil press, Decanters, Steam cooking pots, Water tank and Steam boiler.

Today, the cooperative processes 10,000 kg of palm bunches daily, yielding approximately 2,500 to 3,000 liters of oil under the Tamura Oil brand.

“We thank all our partners who made it possible to establish this semi-industrial unit capable of producing refined oil that can compete in the market,”
— Frida Ndagijimana, President of the 185-member cooperative, including 175 women.

A Tool for Peace and Empowerment

Beyond oil production, the cooperative now manages over two hectares of oil palm plantations. The facility includes a sorting shed, storage shed, staff toilets and changing rooms, and an office building.

With support from national technical bodies such as the National Center for Food Technology (CNTA), Burundi Bureau of Standards (BBN), Palm Oil Office (OHP), and implementing partner CREOP-JEUNES, Dukundane has become a national model for women’s economic empowerment and local development.

But the story doesn’t end with economic gains. This initiative is a concrete manifestation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which emphasizes the critical role of women in peacebuilding. In Karonda, that vision is now firmly rooted—and bearing fruit.

– on behalf of UN Women – Africa.

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MIL OSI Africa –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: Djibouti: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

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Djibouti has been navigating regional tensions well, with robust growth, moderate inflation, and recovering reserves. In response to global uncertainties and domestic debt challenges, the authorities plan significant fiscal consolidation, including leveraging state-owned enterprises (SOE) dividends meaningfully, and advancing creditor dialogue. The authorities remain dedicated to investing in human capital and creating favorable investment conditions for job creation.

Djibouti’s economic resilience and contribution to regional stability

Djibouti helps maintain regional stability by supporting maritime security and facilitating humanitarian responses during crises. Djibouti’s GDP per capita has effectively doubled over the past decade thanks to significant investments that have contributed to the modernization of the economy. However, declining government revenues and increasing debt service have placed considerable strain on public finances, leading to unsustainable levels of public debt and diminishing reserves. Growth has not created enough jobs in the formal sector, while fiscal space to finance development needs is limited.

The authorities are leveraging Djibouti’s growth resilience to advance fiscal consolidation and rebuild reserves. Growth is expected to have exceeded 6.5 percent in 2024 due to increased transshipments amid Red Sea tensions, while moderate international food and energy prices kept inflation in check. The government deficit was reduced from 3.5 percent of GDP in 2023 to 2.6 percent in 2024 following a brief period of fiscal overruns and deficit monetization, and reserves have begun to recover partially offsetting the decline observed since late 2023, though they remain below the monetary base.

The outlook is positive but subject to risks in an uncertain global context. Growth is projected to remain dynamic at around 6 percent this year and to continue over the medium term, albeit at a slower pace. Ethiopia’s robust economy is expected to boost Djibouti’s port activities; however, fiscal consolidation and the phasing out of large-scale investments may temper growth. Key risks include regional conflicts potentially increasing migration and affecting social stability amid a constrained fiscal space, and trade policy shifts that could depreciate the dollar and Djibouti franc, enhancing service exports but also raising inflation. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Djibouti has successfully navigated several shocks over the past few years, including COVID-19, the 2022 Tigray crisis, the Ukraine war, and the 2024 Red Sea maritime disruptions.

Leveraging resilience for fiscal sustainability and rebuilding reserves

In the face of high global and regional uncertainty, Djibouti needs to quickly strengthen its economic resilience by restoring debt sustainability, safeguarding the currency board, and fostering inclusive growth. To this end, the authorities intend to strengthen fiscal consolidation and enhance financial transparency and governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to unlock sustainable and meaningful dividend contributions to the national budget, restore reserves, and encourage private sector growth while protecting vulnerable populations.

Durable fiscal consolidation is essential for restoring debt sustainability. The substantial fiscal adjustment frontloaded in the 2025 budget and the balanced budget target for 2026 onward are welcome steps. To sustain progress, it is essential that all governmental entities endorse annual fiscal targets that align with a medium-term fiscal consolidation strategy. Success depends on robust expenditure management via the diligent operationalization of the recently approved Public Financial Management Reform Strategy and Action Plan 2024–27. Furthermore, a comprehensive fiscal roadmap should continue to broaden the tax base by enhancing VAT and capital income taxation, rationalizing tax exemptions included in the investment code and the Free Zones regime, and finalizing the digitization of tax agencies. The effective establishment of the tax policy unit remains a priority for accurately assessing tax bases and enhancing tax reform efficiency. Operationalizing the recently created large taxpayer office will also bolster compliance and revenue collection.

As Djibouti negotiates new terms for debt liabilities with creditors, well-managed and profitable SOEs can significantly aid national fiscal consolidation and restore reserves at the Central Bank of Djibouti (CBD), particularly following the dissolution of the Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). Building on ongoing efforts to improve SOE transparency and governance, it will be critical for the Executive Secretariat in charge of the State Portfolio (SEPE) to collect all SOEs’ financial statements and monitor their performance. Swiftly implementing the Code of Good Governance is also essential for establishing a more transparent dividend policy tied to SOE performance, thereby mobilizing dividends more consistently and meaningfully for the budget, improving SOE efficiency and services, and appropriately right-size them. Additionally, fiscal transparency can be strengthened by discontinuing financial settlement practices for clearing government arrears with SOEs, and by improving coordination among the Ministry of Budget, line ministries, and SEPE for more effective budget risk management.

Alongside fiscal consolidation, completing ongoing debt negotiations and addressing outstanding arrears with external partners are critical for debt sustainability. Equally important is implementing binding limits on borrowing for the central government, SOEs, including their participation in public-private partnerships, and ensuring these are enforced by the Public Sector Debt Committee.

The mission is encouraged by the recent recovery in reserves and urges continued progress. To strengthen the currency board, the authorities plan to amend the CBD law to enhance its autonomy, which will help sustain reserves, exchange rate, and inflation stability. They also plan to introduce reserve requirements as a prudential tool, with implementation expected to follow a phased approach. Additionally, under MENAFATF’s enhanced monitoring, Djibouti is reforming its AML/CFT framework, improving the business climate, and enhancing oversight of the banking sector due to its significant offshore component and rising government exposure. To facilitate policy making, the authorities are leveraging technical assistance provided by the IMF to enhance their coverage and quality of statistics relevant to surveillance, with a focus on national accounts, the fiscal and external sectors.

Advancing inclusivity through private sector development and employment creation

The government aims to foster economic growth and social equity. They aim to improve the existing targeting of the current fuel subsidy scheme. In order to create a more effective and equitable social protection system and reduce budget exposure to international energy prices, the authorities should gradually replace the current subsidy system with the strengthening of targeted cash transfers to the most vulnerable households, relying on the national social register. To attract investments and create jobs, they are enhancing access to education and job training under the 2021–35 education master plan. They aim to diversify the economy in sectors such as logistics and connectivity, tourism, agribusiness, and fisheries. To enable economic diversification, it is essential to develop a comprehensive roadmap with specific actions aimed at enhancing access to finance, streamlining administrative procedures, and expanding reliable and affordable internet services and electricity, including through increased bill collection, technical efficiency, and the adoption of cost-efficient renewable energy. These initiatives will enhance Djibouti’s business environment, which is already supported by a stable macroeconomic climate, a currency board, ports infrastructure, and connectivity to Ethiopia’s large market, all aligning with the objectives of Djibouti Vision 2035.

“The mission team expresses deep appreciation to the Djiboutian authorities and other counterparts for their warm hospitality, excellent cooperation and candid discussions, and looks forward to continuing close engagement.”

– on behalf of International Monetary Fund (IMF).

MIL OSI Africa –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Africa: United Nations (UN) Women Executive Board lauds progressive gender equality and women’s empowerment work in Zimbabwe

Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

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UN Women Executive Board’s visit to Zimbabwe from 4-10 May 2025 marked a pivotal moment in the country’s ongoing efforts to advance gender equality and women’s empowerment. The visit, led by H.E. Ms. Nicola Clase, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations and President of the UN Women Executive Board, provided an opportunity to showcase the impact of UN Women’s programming in the country while strengthening strategic partnerships with key stakeholders.

“I note the strong legal frameworks for gender equality and women’s empowerment,”acknowledged Ambassador Nicola Clase, President of the UN Women Executive Board. “We encourage the government and partners to focus on the effective implementation of these laws.”

High-Level Engagements

Throughout the week, the delegation engaged with government officials, development partners, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, the private sector, and women’s rights organizations to deepen collaboration and assess progress on gender-responsive policies and initiatives.

In a productive meeting with the country’s president , H.E Emmerson Mnangagwa, there was reaffirmation of Zimbabwe’s commitment to gender equality. “We believe gender equality is not only a fundamental right, but also a necessity for national growth. Zimbabwe remains steadfast in its commitment to empowering women and girls,” assured President Mnangagwa.

The delegation also met Senator Monica Mutsvangwa, Minister of Women Affairs, Community, and Small and Medium Enterprises Development. She highlighted the government’s ongoing initiatives saying,”Zimbabwe has made significant strides in advancing women’s rights, and will continue to strengthen policies that ensure women’s full participation in economic and social development.”

Jacob Francis Mudenda, Speaker of Parliament, emphasized the importance of inclusive governance. “Ensuring women’s full participation in governance and business will drive Zimbabwe forward into a more inclusive future,” he said.

Field Visits Showcasing Impact

The Executive Board members visited Umzingwane Safe Market, Epworth Safe Market, Maker Space Innovation Hub, and the Knowledge Hub at Rosaria Memorial Trust where the team saw the impact of innovative approaches to supporting women’s economic empowerment and safety in informal marketplaces. These engagements demonstrated UN Women’s commitment to creating sustainable opportunities for women, improving livelihoods, and fostering gender-responsive practices.

Speaking about her transformation as a clothing trader in the market, Sarah Muchengeti had this to say, “The biggest challenge before the Epworth Safe Market was finding a secure and reliable place to work. This initiative gave me a proper workspace, where I can now take larger orders and grow my operation. My vision has changed—I am no longer just working to survive; I am building a legacy. My family now sees me as a successful businesswoman, and my children are inspired by what I have accomplished.”

Reflections from the Region and Country

The visit by the board was a proud moment for the UN Women Zimbabwe team, whose extensive preparations ensured a seamless and impactful experience.

Anna Mutavati, Regional Director for East and Southern Africa, emphasized the significance of the engagement, “This visit reinforced the importance of partnerships in driving change. It is inspiring to see the Executive Board acknowledge the progress we’ve made in Zimbabwe.”

Fatou Lo, UN Women Zimbabwe Country Representative, who spearheaded the visit, highlighted the collaborative effort involved, “This was a collective achievement, the dedication of our teams and partners made it possible to showcase our work and deepen strategic discussions on gender equality.”

Lovenes Makonense, Deputy Country Representative, reflecting on the experience, said, “Being able to present the tangible impact of our work was incredibly rewarding. The enthusiasm from stakeholders reaffirmed our mission to empower women across all sectors.”

Looking Ahead

As the Executive Board concluded its visit, the momentum gained from these discussions will continue to shape UN Women’s programming in Zimbabwe. The visit amplified the power of collaboration and the need for sustained investment in gender equality initiatives.

UN Women Zimbabwe remains deeply appreciative of all partners, stakeholders, and government officials who contributed to the success of this visit. As the team reflects on the week-long engagements, one message remains clear: the commitment to empowering women in Zimbabwe is stronger than ever.

– on behalf of UN Women – Africa.

MIL OSI Africa –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: LEADER JEFFRIES: “THE FACT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION CONTINUES TO RUN AWAY FROM CONFRONTING THESE SITUATIONS ON CAPITOL HILL IS VERY PROBLEMATIC”

Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Hakeem Jeffries (8th District of New York)

Today, Democratic Leader Hakeem Jeffries appeared on MSNBC’s Morning Joe where he emphasized that Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States and the Trump administration must follow the Constitution and stop hiding its actions in the Middle East from Congress and the American people.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Leader Jeffries, thanks so much for being with us. I’m wondering, do you consider his win last night in New York City, do you think it provides a roadmap for Democrats running in 2026 on how to energize the base?

LEADER JEFFRIES: I think what’s clear is that the relentless focus on affordability had great appeal all across the City of New York. He also clearly out-worked, out-organized and out-communicated the opposition. And when someone is successful in being able to do all three things at the same time, it’s usually going to work out for them.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Yeah, The New York Times editorialized that he was not qualified to be mayor. Of course, The Wall Street Journal and others say that he is far too extreme on economic issues and even issues involving Israel. I’m curious what your thoughts are on him ideologically. Is that—does he have an ideology that you would want your candidates in 2026 to have?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, from the standpoint of House Democrats and what our focus has been, clearly, we have an affordability crisis in the United States of America, and our focus will continue to be on driving down the high cost of living in this country. Donald Trump promised to lower costs on day one. Costs haven’t gone down. They’re going up. He’s crashing the economy in real time, his tariffs are going to impose thousands of dollars in additional cost on everyday Americans per year and he may even be driving us toward a recession. That’s the reason why Donald Trump has become so unpopular, it’s because he’s failed the country on the economy. And so, our vision is going to be for an affordable America—work hard, play by the rules, live the good life, provide a comfortable living for yourself and for your family. That means being able to actually afford a home, educate your children, have access to healthcare, go on vacation with your children and your family every now and then and, of course, Joe, one day retire with grace and dignity.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Democrats look at Donald Trump’s approval ratings and you have a lot of other Democrats and people on media asking the question, why is the Democratic Party’s approval ratings, why are they lower than Donald Trump’s? I take it that’s something that you all grapple with every day. Why has the Democratic Party over the past year found itself at sort of its lowest ebb in recent history? And how do Democrats get out of that?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Yeah, no, it’s a very important question and, listen, institutions are unpopular right now in the United States of America and that includes, of course, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party. The dynamics that we have to work through, of course, one, Donald Trump and Republicans have given the American people every reason to run away from them, and it’s going to be important for us to continue to make clear why this administration failed on the economy, failed foreign policy, trying to take away healthcare from tens of millions of Americans, ripping food out of the mouths of children and seniors and veterans. Of course, all of that is problematic, all of that is unpopular. That’s why the One Big Ugly Bill has such a high disapproval rate in the United States of America. We also recognize, as Democrats, that it’s going to be important for us to articulate our affirmative agenda, what we stand for, this principle of working hard and playing by the rules, being able to live the good life, an affordable life for hardworking American taxpayers. And that is something that we’re going to have to lean into. The other thing I’d note, Joe, as you know, perhaps the most important thing in terms of a midterm election dynamic, is what’s the generic ballot say to us? Every single significant generic ballot poll has House Democrats beating House Republicans consistently, including a recent Fox News poll that had us up by about eight points. And so, at the end of the day, yes, we have to lean into improving the Democratic brand. But at the end of the day, what will be most significant, most important is how our vision contrasts with the management of this President, which has been a failure in the United States of America.

JONATHAN LEMIRE: Leader Jeffries, let’s turn you now to the situation in Iran. We played some sound from you earlier in the show, expressing unhappiness that the administration briefing was postponed. The White House saying it’s well, it’s so Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense can be part of it later this week. Is that acceptable to you, and do you have concerns that the administration is not being fully forthcoming as to what actually transpired in Iran over the weekend?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Yes, there’s every reason to be concerned. There was this briefing that had been scheduled to take place in the House of Representatives and in the Senate. There was absolutely no reason that we’ve been provided that it should have been canceled in terms of the important questions that need to be asked and answered by the Trump administration. What was the imminent threat to the safety and security of the United States of America that justified this strike without seeking the congressional authorization required by the Constitution? What is the assessment of the damage that was done to Iran’s nuclear program? Was it completely and totally decimated? No evidence to date has been provided to suggest that that representation made by Donald Trump is accurate. What is the plan to avoid another costly failed war in the Middle East? Why was aggressive diplomacy abandoned by the Trump administration, notwithstanding the success that had taken place under President Obama’s administration in actually pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations. These are questions that need to be answered by the administration. And the fact that they continue to run away from confronting these situations on Capitol Hill is very problematic.

JONATHAN LEMIRE: So, Leader Jeffries, to that point, you and many people who have had your position in the decades before this, have expressed frustration when presidents don’t seek congressional authority for military action like this. Do you feel like that a greater good was achieved here if Iran’s program was, if not destroyed, but at least significantly delayed? What should be the next steps for this administration in this process?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, to be clear, Iran can never be allowed to become a nuclear-capable power. Iran is a sworn enemy of the United States, of Israel, of Jordan, of our allies in the Middle East, a sworn enemy of the free world. But the question, of course, is, was this strike successful in meaningfully pushing back Iran’s nuclear aspirations, or is it going to complicate things in the Middle East in ways that put our men and women in uniform, American troops and America in harm’s way? That’s simply the reason that having an all-Member briefing on Capitol Hill sooner rather than later is important so these answers can be obtained for the American people, the representatives of the American People, in the United States Congress. That is the reason, fundamentally, why it’s been Congress that was given the power to declare war, to authorize military force and when administrations act differently, they have an obligation and a responsibility to provide the facts, the evidence and the truth, justifying their actions to the American people.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, this has been the debate, and we talked about it yesterday with another Member of Congress. This has been a debate going back 30, 40, 50 years. Obviously Republicans were saying this after Barack Obama attacked Libya. Republicans were saying this with Bill Clinton in the 1990s on Kosovo. But if you’re going to have a surprise attack with B-2 bombers that are going to be going over to Iran, striking their nuclear facilities. Do you think it’s a good idea to inform 535 members of Congress before that operation takes off?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, the key here is what was the imminent nature of the threat that justified immediate military action and surprise military action—

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right—

LEADER JEFFRIES: If there was no imminent threat—

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Well, the United Nations, I’m curious if you’re concerned, like the United Nation’s nuclear agency, the IAEA had said that Iran had already enriched uranium up to 60 percent, and as you know, the jump from 60 to 100 percent is negligible, and had enough enriched uranium for several weapons. Would you consider that to be considerable enough? A considerable enough threat to strike Iran under those circumstances?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Well, certainly it’s a challenging situation, but one of the reasons why we need a briefing, Joe, is to have an understanding, was that enriched uranium even damaged or was it removed by the Iranians prior to the strike? We don’t know the answers to that question. It certainly is something that should be talked about, and the American people should be informed about the reality of whether it was a successful strike or not. In terms of the Iranian nuclear threat, I think we’ve all been clear that Iran can never be permitted to become nuclear capable. But the constitution is not a mere inconvenience, it’s the reality and if members of the executive branch, if hawkish individuals across the country want to change things, there’s Article I, Section 8, Clause 11. They can put forward a constitutional amendment but the framers of this country saw fit to vest this authority within the House and the Senate, not the executive branch.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: Right. And at what point should that be triggered? Should it be triggered by every strike, like, for instance, Barack Obama in 2011 in Libya, or countless strikes by the Bush administration and the Obama administration after September the 11th? Is it every strike or is it when you are going in sending troops in? When do you think that action is triggered?

LEADER JEFFRIES: Seems to me, and it’s a great question, Joe, that it has to relate to whether the step that was taken, one, is in response to an imminent threat to American interests, and two, whether it’s an act of war. And part of the reason why, after the fact, it’s important for Members of Congress to be able to have a briefing with the administration that is comprehensive and that gives Members the opportunity to ask questions so we can provide these answers to the American people who clearly do not want another failed, costly, deadly war in the Middle East.

JOE SCARBOROUGH: All right. Leader Hakeem Jeffries, thank you so much for being with us.

Full interview can be watched here.

###

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Government Technology recognizes 2024 Oregon Summer EBT for best practices

Source: US State of Oregon

he Oregon Department of Human Services (ODHS) was recognized in a national Government Technology Case Study for its excellence in the use of smart technology in rolling out the Summer EBT program. As a result, more than 362,000 children were able to get more food during summer 2024.

About Summer EBT

Thousands of children in Oregon rely on free or reduced-price school meals. But what happens in the summer months when these meals are gone? This is called the summer hunger gap. To address this gap, the federal government last year rolled out a new program to provide food to school-aged children during the summer months.

Oregon was one of 35 states to pick up on the federal Summer Electronic Benefits Transfer (EBT) program, which provided a total of $120 in nutrition benefits for each eligible child when school is out.

Summer EBT qualification is based on income. For families to qualify, the household income needs to be under 185 percent of the federal poverty level.

“The majority of the people we served are working. It could be part time or they’re just starting off – they are bringing in income but it’s just not enough. The Summer EBT helps supplement their food budget for their children,” Singer said.

A tight timeline

It was go-time for ODHS in early 2024. There was only 16 weeks to set up a new program, bring in community partners, identify and reach out to eligible families, create communication plans and products, and establish the innovative technology needed to accomplish this task. ODHS is the lead agency and administers this program in partnership with the Oregon Department of Education (ODE).

“It was a very short amount of time to build an entire system. The challenge was to quickly build a system to deliver quality services not only for this year but next year also,” Nate Singer, ODHS Oregon Eligibility Partnership (OEP) Director, said. OEP is responsible for determining eligibility for people applying for benefits and processing applications to deliver those benefits.

Goal setting

Initial estimates in 2024 projected that Oregon would provide Summer EBT to at least 294,000 children.

“The one thing I wanted for the project was to exceed that expectation because that would mean we would be providing more services for families and we could increase our outreach for all the of the services ODHS offers,” said Christine Doody, Self-Sufficiency Programs Policy Business Manager and Program Manager for Summer EBT.

The expectation was exceeded about 68,000, meaning more than 362,000 children were able to get food benefits last summer.

Innovation in action

To identify eligible children, OEP used data from ODHS and ODE. Most children who received the benefit were “automatically eligible” because they receive other benefits. These families didn’t need to apply, and the benefit was automatically added to their Oregon EBT card.

Other families needed to apply. ODHS brought in contractors Amazon Web Services and Deloitte Consulting to help with the technology and planning to make applying easy.

“We tried to make it simple as possible. People could apply with a paper application or online. The online application could be done on a mobile phone. If someone had questions about whether they needed to apply or needed help to apply, they could call the Summer EBT Call Center to talk to someone. The call wait time was below five minutes. People could hear right then, on the phone, they would get their benefits if they applied. It took minutes,” Singer said.

The Oregon Summer EBT Call Center included an Interactive Voice Response system offering self-service options for supported languages: English, Spanish, Russian, Vietnamese, Somali, Mandarin, Cantonese, Arabic, Ukrainian, and Chuukese. For other languages, or for other assistance, the calls could be routed to help.

“This gave families the ability to take control of their case. They could use voice activation to say, ‘I want text messages’ from us, or they could change their demographic information or ask for a new card. The family could do that on their own,” Doody said.

This population of customers – families with children in school – are used to getting texts and email from their schools, so they were already familiar with getting information this way. In fact, 99 percent of families that needed to apply chose to use the online application rather than a paper application. Those that used the online caption reported a 96 percent satisfaction rating.

Communications and community engagement

There was also communications and community engagement support, as well as an effective feedback loop. A workgroup with community representatives, such as the Oregon Food Bank and Partners for a Hunger Free Oregon, was in place. The community partners advised on all communication products such as news releases, the application design and social media kits.

“We worked together to get the information as far out to communities as we could. We were also able to get good data from the Call Center to let us know how we were doing. We had a strong feedback loop that we responded to quickly,” Christy Sinatra, ODHS Senior Communications Advisor, said.

For example, people asked if children in charter, private schools, or home schools could be included in Summer EBT. The answer was, yes, if they are found to be eligible. It was also important to communicate to people that the Summer EBT benefits expired after 122 days – so it was important to use them before then.

“We are trying to increase equity and access. There’s not just one approach. We pushed many communications and engagement levers – technology, in-person outreach, digital communications, community partnerships, media exposure. All those things working together to make the program successful and making sure every eligible kid gets this,” Sinatra said.

“The Oregon Summer EBT program demonstrated the strength of cross-agency collaboration and intentional program design. Staff were equipped with thoughtful tools and invited to shape how the program would operate, ensuring that those on the ground had a voice in critical decisions. That partnership—from planning to implementation—meant that families and children not only received meaningful support but also felt seen, heard, and cared for. The feedback from the community speaks volumes about the impact of that collective effort,” Singer said.

“The project was just overwhelmingly amazing. I just hope that people read this and apply for this summer,” Doody said.

2025 Summer EBT began May 22

The 2025 Summer EBT launched Thursday, May 22, 2025. Applications will be accepted through Wednesday, September 3, 2025.

ODHS will be running the whole program this summer – setting a goal of serving 375,000 children.

“We will be doing additional outreach, based on data and staff feedback, and providing new ways to engage with people such as going out to more schools and community events,” Doody said.

The program is set to: expand tactics to better reach people and communities that data showed were underserved; help schools connect families to Summer EBT; and increase strategic partnerships that serve priority audiences.

Resources:

Learn more about Summer EBT including how to apply for this benefit for your children: https://www.oregon.gov/odhs/food/pages/sebt.aspx.

Double Up Food Bucks Oregon: Visit https://doubleuporegon.org/ to learn how to double your SNAP and Summer EBT dollars at farmer’s markets, produce stands, community supported agriculture programs and grocery stores.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

Is there voter backing?

Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Natasha Lindstaedt, Professor in the Department of Government, University of Essex

During Donald Trump’s first term, he made clear that he wanted his foreign policy to be as unpredictable as possible, stating: “I don’t want them to know what I’m thinking.”

With the US’s recent attack on Iran, Trump certainly kept everyone in suspense. While US enemies may not have known what Trump was thinking, the problem was neither did US allies nor US legislators. Trump apparently did not bother to inform his own vice-president, J.D. Vance, when he had made the decision.

Trump has portrayed this as a strength, that he is the only one capable of getting certain things done in foreign policy because his unpredictability and risk-taking behaviour gives him more leverage.

But thus far he has had fewer successes than wins with this approach. His dalliance with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Trump’s first term only resulted in the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear programme.

His great relationship with Vladimir Putin has so far led to no concessions from Moscow regarding the war in Ukraine, even causing Trump to effectively give up trying to resolve that crisis, at least for now.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

In Trump’s second term his Maga base has been a bit more divided than in his first. On the issue of tariffs, key Republican senators begged him to backpedal with concerns that the new tariffs would be catastrophic for the US economy – one of the issues that propelled him to victory. Yet he went ahead with the tariffs anyway, as some members of his base were in support.

With the Middle East crisis, Trump supporters appeared to be mostly against the US getting involved in a foreign conflict, with “no more wars” being a common slogan on the campaign trail.

In the lead up to the US strikes, key leaders in the Maga movement criticised the idea of the US getting involved in the conflict. Right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson told hawkish Senator Ted Cruz that he should know far more about the regime that the senator wanted to topple. Former Trump strategist Steve Bannon and Representative Marjorie Taylor Green were also calling for the US to stay out of the conflict.

Before the attacks, a YouGov poll showed that 60% of Americans did not want the US to get involved in the conflict, which has since increased to 80%. However when asked more specifically about support for US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, as many as 94% of Maga Republicans gave their approval.

Trump announces that the US has carried out air strikes on Iran.

Is there voter backing?

Trump also believes he can sell the strikes on Iranian nuclear sites as a huge win, making good on his promise to eradicate Iran’s nuclear programme. The US intelligence community is saying otherwise, but Trump has rejected this.

Trump took an early victory lap, claiming that Iran’s nuclear programme had been “completely destroyed”. It was arguably comparable to George W. Bush’s “mission accomplished” announcement in May 2003, after Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq was ousted by US-led forces. Bush’s approval ratings were as high as 70% in the immediate aftermath, but had plunged by 40 points by 2008 after five years of fighting the Iraqi insurgency that emerged in Hussein’s absence.

Trump seems to be revelling in taking more risks and being more unpredictable. As he has become increasingly bold in his second term, he has been more willing to test the loyalty of his base when they don’t agree with his instincts. Though the isolationist wing of Maga has been critical, Trump assumes that his base will unite and rally around him.

Trump was more careful to not betray his base in his first term. Trump had ordered strikes on Iran in 2019, but backed down at the last minute. But now he has gone so far as to suggest the door may be open to regime change in Tehran.

With the ceasefire now in place (at least in theory), Trump is heralding his action as a huge win. Iran has backed down after a limited attack on its nuclear facilities.

Just weeks ago, the US seemed less relevant in the Middle East, and more likely to follow Israel’s instructions than the other way around. With Trump’s confidence growing, it is now Trump that is telling Israel that he is not happy.

For Trump the risks involved were huge. There may appear to be the potential for some short-term domestic political gains if the ceasefire holds. But Trump may not have thought through the long-term implications of his decision on stability in the Middle East more generally, or what voters will think about his foreign policy gambles when the next election rolls around.

Natasha Lindstaedt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Will Trump’s high-risk Iran strategy pay dividends at home if the peace deal holds? – https://theconversation.com/will-trumps-high-risk-iran-strategy-pay-dividends-at-home-if-the-peace-deal-holds-259736

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simona Grasso, Assistant Professor & Ad Astra Fellow in Food Science and Nutrition, University College Dublin

Wonky veg are ‘upcycled’ from the dustbin. Civil/Shutterstock

Whether customers are pleased to hear it or not, firms are selling “upcycled” food to tackle food waste internationally.

Food with ingredients that were saved from the waste heap via verifiable supply chains is said to be “upcycled”. The term originated in the US, though it’s also been adopted on this side of the Atlantic.

This rather broad definition includes byproducts from the food industry, such as spent grains left over from beer manufacturing, or apple pulp that doesn’t make it into juice.

If you’re not familiar with the idea, perhaps you have already bought upcycled produce in the form of wonky carrots and potatoes. This is food that does not meet the visual standards of most supermarkets but is nevertheless still tasty to eat. Elsewhere, food manufacturers are making products that include upcycled ingredients.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

Why upcycle food in the first place? The US Environmental Protection Agency rates it as just as effective as donating or redistributing food to restaurants and shelters for reducing the environmental impact of the food system. Wasted food, after all, can generate potent greenhouse gases such as methane if left to rot in landfills.

So it’s good for the planet if ingredients that would not have gone to human consumption are transformed into new food-grade products. But just how good exactly?

How much of a product contains upcycled ingredients will influence its sustainability credentials. If they are listed at the beginning of the ingredients on the packaging then that indicates a large percentage of inclusion. Far down at the bottom suggests a smaller percentage.

How much of a food has to be upcycled to count?
Dean Drobot/Shutterstock

Of course, there is only so much of an upcycled ingredient that can be added to food before it affects the colour, taste or flavour of the final product. It is important to keep a balance.

According to the US upcycled food certification standard, a product only needs to contain a minimum of 10% upcycled inputs by weight in order to be certified as upcycled. This may only make a slight difference to a single product’s overall sustainability.

Compare it with organic food. Both in the US and in the EU, a product must contain a minimum of 95% of certified organic ingredients to be labelled organic. The EU loosely defines “organic” as food that “respects the environment and animal welfare”.

This is very far from the 10% required by the certified standard for upcycling used in the US. Of course, it would be quite hard to make an upcycled product with at least 95% upcycled ingredients. Think about a biscuit. Most of the major ingredients – flour, butter, sugar – would need to be upcycled. On the other hand, would 10% be enough to encourage you to buy food certified as upcycled?

Before you spend on spent grain …

While I believe that attempts to include upcycled ingredients in food formulations should be encouraged, however big or small, it is important to have rules in place.

In the EU, upcycled foods are not regulated and there are no certification standards, though some product packaging may claim it contains upcycled ingredients. Consumers might buy a product with a sprinkling of upcycled ingredients thinking that it is a more sustainable choice.

For example, a loaf of bread recently sold in Tesco was reported to contain 2.5% spent grain by weight. In other cases, the level of inclusion appears to be quite substantial. Granola sold in Ireland claims 30% spent grain from brewers, but it is not clearly stated in the ingredient list.

Put to good use: spent grains from beermaking.
BearFotos/Shutterstock

Often, consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled food, even though it contains ingredients that would have otherwise gone to waste. This is because the producers are often small start-ups with high production costs that they must recoup with high prices.

If sustainability claims are at stake, and if consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled foods, it is important to prevent deceptive marketing that could present products as more sustainable than they actually are. One way to do so is by carrying out a life-cycle assessment, a measurement of a product’s environmental impact from its production to its disposal. The manufacturer could do this as a way of reassuring the consumer and backing up any claims with evidence.

If we want upcycled foods to become more common, and so reduce waste, we have to make sure consumers aren’t being misled. If consumers trust, value and understand these products, they are more likely to succeed in the market.

Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

Simona Grasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know – https://theconversation.com/upcycled-food-is-on-the-rise-heres-what-you-need-to-know-253306

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Simona Grasso, Assistant Professor & Ad Astra Fellow in Food Science and Nutrition, University College Dublin

Wonky veg are ‘upcycled’ from the dustbin. Civil/Shutterstock

Whether customers are pleased to hear it or not, firms are selling “upcycled” food to tackle food waste internationally.

Food with ingredients that were saved from the waste heap via verifiable supply chains is said to be “upcycled”. The term originated in the US, though it’s also been adopted on this side of the Atlantic.

This rather broad definition includes byproducts from the food industry, such as spent grains left over from beer manufacturing, or apple pulp that doesn’t make it into juice.

If you’re not familiar with the idea, perhaps you have already bought upcycled produce in the form of wonky carrots and potatoes. This is food that does not meet the visual standards of most supermarkets but is nevertheless still tasty to eat. Elsewhere, food manufacturers are making products that include upcycled ingredients.

Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.

Why upcycle food in the first place? The US Environmental Protection Agency rates it as just as effective as donating or redistributing food to restaurants and shelters for reducing the environmental impact of the food system. Wasted food, after all, can generate potent greenhouse gases such as methane if left to rot in landfills.

So it’s good for the planet if ingredients that would not have gone to human consumption are transformed into new food-grade products. But just how good exactly?

How much of a product contains upcycled ingredients will influence its sustainability credentials. If they are listed at the beginning of the ingredients on the packaging then that indicates a large percentage of inclusion. Far down at the bottom suggests a smaller percentage.

How much of a food has to be upcycled to count?
Dean Drobot/Shutterstock

Of course, there is only so much of an upcycled ingredient that can be added to food before it affects the colour, taste or flavour of the final product. It is important to keep a balance.

According to the US upcycled food certification standard, a product only needs to contain a minimum of 10% upcycled inputs by weight in order to be certified as upcycled. This may only make a slight difference to a single product’s overall sustainability.

Compare it with organic food. Both in the US and in the EU, a product must contain a minimum of 95% of certified organic ingredients to be labelled organic. The EU loosely defines “organic” as food that “respects the environment and animal welfare”.

This is very far from the 10% required by the certified standard for upcycling used in the US. Of course, it would be quite hard to make an upcycled product with at least 95% upcycled ingredients. Think about a biscuit. Most of the major ingredients – flour, butter, sugar – would need to be upcycled. On the other hand, would 10% be enough to encourage you to buy food certified as upcycled?

Before you spend on spent grain …

While I believe that attempts to include upcycled ingredients in food formulations should be encouraged, however big or small, it is important to have rules in place.

In the EU, upcycled foods are not regulated and there are no certification standards, though some product packaging may claim it contains upcycled ingredients. Consumers might buy a product with a sprinkling of upcycled ingredients thinking that it is a more sustainable choice.

For example, a loaf of bread recently sold in Tesco was reported to contain 2.5% spent grain by weight. In other cases, the level of inclusion appears to be quite substantial. Granola sold in Ireland claims 30% spent grain from brewers, but it is not clearly stated in the ingredient list.

Put to good use: spent grains from beermaking.
BearFotos/Shutterstock

Often, consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled food, even though it contains ingredients that would have otherwise gone to waste. This is because the producers are often small start-ups with high production costs that they must recoup with high prices.

If sustainability claims are at stake, and if consumers are asked to pay more for upcycled foods, it is important to prevent deceptive marketing that could present products as more sustainable than they actually are. One way to do so is by carrying out a life-cycle assessment, a measurement of a product’s environmental impact from its production to its disposal. The manufacturer could do this as a way of reassuring the consumer and backing up any claims with evidence.

If we want upcycled foods to become more common, and so reduce waste, we have to make sure consumers aren’t being misled. If consumers trust, value and understand these products, they are more likely to succeed in the market.

Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

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Simona Grasso does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. ‘Upcycled’ food is on the rise – here’s what you need to know – https://theconversation.com/upcycled-food-is-on-the-rise-heres-what-you-need-to-know-253306

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed?

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Caleb H. Wheeler, Senior Lecturer in Law, Cardiff University

The recent US attack on Iran’s nuclear sites has prompted renewed questions about whether the UN charter’s prohibition on the use of force is meaningful.

Considered one of the keystones of international law, article 2(4) of the charter specifically forbids member states from using force – or threatening to do so – against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state, or “in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations”.

A significant amount of commentary exists about what the prohibition entails. This tries to clarify ambiguities around the terms “force”, “threats of force”, “territorial integrity” and “political independence”. Although no absolute consensus has been reached, it is commonly thought that member states are prohibited from launching armed attacks against other states, or threatening to do so, unless acting in self-defence or with the authorisation of the UN security council.

Other exceptions have been suggested. These include use of force as part of a larger humanitarian intervention operation. There’s also a question of whether it’s permissible when a state is rescuing its nationals abroad. But the legality of either of these situations is contentious and remains unsettled.

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Early in its existence, the UN made concerted efforts to protect and respect article 2(4) and to comply with its provisions. In 1950, the security council authorised UN member states to provide South Korea with the assistance necessary to repel the armed attack launched by North Korea, triggering the increased internationalisation of the Korean war.

While article 2(4) was not explicitly mentioned in resolution 83, it was alluded to through repeated references to North Korea’s “armed attack” against South Korea. As such, it can be interpreted as an effort by the security council to use its authority to address a violation of article 2(4), even if it did not clearly frame it in those terms.

The security council also authorised member states in 2011 to take all necessary measures to protect civilians in Libya. Unfortunately, it quickly became apparent that the member states may have exceeded their authority in Libya and carried out acts that could themselves be construed as violations of the UN charter.

Rather than just protecting civilians, as the security council resolution instructed, legal experts were concerned they had effectively intervened in a civil war. Any possible violations went unpunished by the security council.

Security council actions taken with regard to Korea were, in many ways, the high watermark for the prohibition of the use of force, given the scale of the conflict. There are two reasons for that. First, a significant proportion of the wars taking place after 1945 have been domestic and not subject to the provisions of article 2(4). The prohibition specifically applies to a member state’s international relations so is not inapplicable when a member state attacks a group within its own borders.

Second, the UN has failed to address many of the acts occurring after 1945 that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4). The reason for this inaction lies primarily in the flawed structure on which the UN is built.

Chapter VII of the charter makes the security council responsible for addressing acts of aggression that would constitute uses of force under article 2(4). But it has repeatedly failed to fill that role, allowing states to commit these acts without meaningful response.

The UN veto problem

UN security council decisions can only be enacted when at least nine members vote in favour. This must also include the affirmative vote or abstention of all five of the permanent members: the US, Russia, China, the UK and France. This essentially gives each of the permanent members the right to veto security council resolutions.

Permanent members have commonly used the threat of their veto in their own political interests. This can be seen in a variety of instances, most notably the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. Both situations clearly involved uses of force prohibited by article 2(4), and in both situations the security council was prevented from acting by some of its permanent members.

This inaction is consistent with the UN’s failure to address many other acts that might fall under the provisions of article 2(4), including US involvement in south-east Asia in the 1960s and the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The security council’s failure to adequately perform its role has caused some to try and find a workaround. The Council of Europe, disappointed at the lack of accountability for Russia’s acts of aggression against Ukraine, has entered into an agreement with Ukraine to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine.

In the special tribunal’s draft statute, an act of aggression is defined to almost exactly mirror the type of conduct that would constitute a use of force under the UN charter.

Bombing Iran

Which brings us to the current situation in Iran. There is little question that the US violated article 2(4) when it bombed Iranian nuclear sites in Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan on the evening of Saturday June 21. This is a clear use of force against the territory of another state.

But even if the attacks themselves were not enough to establish a violation, they were also accompanied by US president Donald Trump’s suggestion that a regime change in Iran might be appropriate. These comments, coming immediately after the initial attack, could be construed as a threat of further force against Iran’s political independence should such a change not occur.

Under the UN charter, such threats and uses of force should elicit a response from the security council. But just as with Iraq in 2003 and Ukraine in 2022, none will probably be forthcoming as the US will block any efforts to hold it to account.

But equally chilling is the lack of condemnation of the US actions by its allies. German chancellor Friedrich Merz saw “no reason to criticise” the bombings, and Nato secretary general Mark Rutte insisted that the bombings did not violate international law.

As the respected Dutch scholar of international law André Nollkaemper suggests, this refusal to condemn a clear violation of the prohibition of the use of force creates a real danger that the bar for when a state can legally use force will be lowered.

Should that be allowed to happen it could further hollow out the prohibition, effectively making it less likely that states will be held to account for violating international law. Further, it could also lead to the return of a world where “might makes right”. This would undo more than a century of legal evolution.

Caleb H. Wheeler does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Bombing Iran: has the UN charter failed? – https://theconversation.com/bombing-iran-has-the-un-charter-failed-259751

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: People with severe diabetes cured in small stem cell trial

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Craig Beall, Senior Lecturer in Experimental Diabetes, University of Exeter

A man having his continuous glucose monitor checked by his doctor. Halfpoint/Shutterstock

The cure for diabetes is a life free from daily insulin injections. Based on that criterion, ten out of 12 people (83%) in a new clinical trial were cured of their diabetes one year after receiving an advanced stem cell therapy.

This study used laboratory-grown pancreatic islet cells. They were infused into the liver, where they took up residence. Within a year, most participants no longer required insulin injections.

One of the most striking benefits was the rapid prevention of dangerously low blood sugar levels, called hypoglycaemia. Before transplantation, all participants had at least two episodes of severe hypoglycaemia within the previous year.

After transplantation, these episodes disappeared for all participants.

These are impressive results, but what are stem cell therapies? How does the treatment work? How do they compare to other treatments? And what are the possible side-effects?

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What are stem cell therapies?

Stem cells are cells that can be turned into almost any other cell type. The major benefit is that scientists in the lab can create the correct cells, the ones needed to treat a disease, and in the desired amount.

In the case of type 1 diabetes, the required cells are pancreatic islets. Most of the cells in these islets make insulin.

How does the treatment work?

The laboratory-grown cells are infused into the body. A common place is in a liver vein, where the cells attach. The advantage here is that insulin delivered towards the liver works much better than, say, just under the skin.

This is because switching off excessive liver glucose production is the primary action of insulin to correct blood sugar levels.

In the current study, the function of the transplanted cells, a treatment called XV-880, improved within the first three months. Blood glucose levels were better controlled. No severe hypoglycaemia was found and a marker of insulin production improved.

Throughout the first year, participants were able to reduce the amount of insulin they took, until most were free from insulin injections.

What are the side-effects?

The biggest downside of this new treatment is that all participants will need to take immunosuppressant drugs for the rest of their lives. This will reduce the immune system’s ability to recognise the transplanted cells and remove them.

This increases the risk of infections and certain types of cancer. That’s because the immune system plays an important role in removing potentially cancerous cells.

In this new study, two participants died. On closer inspection, these were unrelated to the treatment itself. Most participants had upset tummies, with diarrhoea as the most common side-effect, in 11 of 14 people. More than half also had headaches and nausea.

Is it better than other treatments?

For many years, people struggling with severe hypoglycaemia have been able to receive new pancreatic islets from deceased donors. For a minority, this also leads to freedom from insulin injections over the longer term.

Typically, two or three donor pancreases need to be pooled together to give to one recipient. People may also need a second infusion within a relatively short time frame. Islet transplants are typically limited by the amount of donor cells available, which is not enough.

This new approach gives a standardised dose of cells, of known quality. The timing of the procedure is also not tied to the deaths of donors.

This new study is also not the first. In 2024, a 25-year-old woman with type 1 diabetes received a stem cell-derived islet transplant, which also led to freedom from insulin injections.

A 59-year-old man with poorly controlled type 2 diabetes was also cured with another type of stem cell transplant.

Both of these treatments will require lifelong immunosuppression. This is undesirable for many people and may limit uptake.

This is driving efforts to create treatment versions that do not require immunosuppression. There are efforts to enclose the transplanted cells inside devices that let insulin out but prevent the immune cells from getting in. There are also genetic editing techniques being used to cloak cells from the immune system.

However, these approaches are further behind in clinical development.

When might this be more widely available?

This is difficult to estimate. Larger trials with XV-880 are planned. The same company planned to test an immunosuppression-free version of their cell therapy, called XV-264. However, this failed to work well enough in a small pilot study and will no longer progress through trials.

There is also the issue of cost. It is not yet clear how much a treatment like this will cost. This will affect who can access advanced cell therapies. We also don’t yet know if and when the transplanted cells may start to fail.

In this trial, the company is monitoring recipients for ten years in total. An initial five-year follow-up then a five-year extension study.

This gives an idea of how long we might need to wait. Despite this, the recent developments give reason for cautious optimism. It may be possible in the not-so-distant future to have a life without daily insulin injections.

Craig Beall currently receives funding from Diabetes UK, Breakthrough T1D, Steve Morgan Foundation Type 1 Diabetes Grand Challenge, Medical Research Council, NC3Rs, Society for Endocrinology and British Society for Neuroendocrinology.

– ref. People with severe diabetes cured in small stem cell trial – https://theconversation.com/people-with-severe-diabetes-cured-in-small-stem-cell-trial-259569

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Blane Savage, Lecturer in MA Creative Media Practice and BA(Hons) Graphic Art & Moving Image, University of the West of Scotland

Artist, writer, playwright, illustrator – and the man who made the Oscar-winning film Poor Things possible – Alasdair Gray was one of Scotland’s great creative polymaths and eccentrics, now celebrated every year on “Gray Day” (February 25). A new exhibition at the Kelvingrove Art Gallery in Glasgow has opened to reveal a selection of nine previously unseen artworks from The Morag McAlpine Bequest.

This is the first time works have been on display from the bequest gifted by him to Glasgow Life Museums following the death of his wife in 2014, which comprises artworks he created for her on anniversaries, birthdays and Christmas.

A small show like this cannot fully do justice to the vibrancy and volume of Gray’s output, but these nine pieces give a broad flavour of the artist’s working style and idiosyncratic idea development.

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Gray was a graduate of Glasgow School of Art where he specialised in murals and stained glass. In addition to being a talented artist and writer, he was also a professor of creative writing at Glasgow University.

His landmark novel Lanark: A Life in Four Books (1981), a story within a story of adolescence, with the mythical Unthank standing in for Glasgow, has been praised as a modern classic.

His influence on the Scottish art and literary scene was a powerful one. Regarded as the father figure of the Scottish Renaissance in art and literature, Gray’s postmodern work was a merging of realism, fantasy and science fiction, interwoven with his socialist political views. This was supported by his own book illustrations and typography. He inspired many young Scottish writers, including Irvine Welsh and Iain Banks.

Gray was also a strong Scottish nationalist. Inspired by a poem by Dennis Lee, Gray’s epigram, “Work as if you live in the early days of a better nation” was inscribed on the wall of the new Scottish Parliament building when it opened in 2004.

His creative works are deeply embedded in the psyche of the west end of Glasgow. Several of his murals are on display there, such as the one at the top of the escalators in Hillhead subway station, the surreal collages in The Ubiquitous Chip restaurant and the extraordinary night-sky ceiling fresco in Òran Mór, a church-turned-bar. These murals are a hybrid of styles, often black and white linear illustrations filled with colour, traditional painting and printmaking techniques.

These “new” artworks on display show different aspects, stages and details of Gray’s creative practice when designing artwork for print, such as the Tippex-infused works that allowed him to merge disparate elements of his cut-out collages.

The highlights of the show include the original artwork for his novel Poor Things, a subversive post-modern rewrite of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, set in and around Glasgow, and adapted by filmmaker Yorgos Lanthimos in 2023.

Read more:
Poor Things: meet the radical Scottish visionary behind the new hit film

The illustration features the anti-hero Godwin Baxter hugging two smaller figures – the reanimated Bella Baxter and Archibald McCandless MD, the primary narrator of the novel. They are surrounded by anatomical illustrations of body parts and in the centre a woman’s head has been cut open revealing her brain. Gray’s illustrative style utilises bold ink outlines, watercolour washes and solid blocks of colour.

The front cover illustration of Agnes Owen’s A Working Mother (1994) with black line work and solid acrylic colour washes, reflects Gray’s interest in everyday life and how alcohol smooths over the cracks. Hung beside it are two versions of working class figurative character sketches for People Like That (1996), in a similar style.

A black and white illustrated jacket design for Old Negatives (1989), Gray’s four-verse sequence describing aspects of love in its “absences and reverses”, has been designed using solid blocks of black with repeating motifs engraved within them.

Also included is a self-portrait of Gray as playwright, together with a series of 12 small black-and-white portraits of the performers of his play in Working Legs: A Play for Those Without Them (1997) performed by the Bird of Paradise Theatre Company. Set in a world of wheelchair users, those who can walk are monitored by the welfare state.

Gray was known for illustrating friends and family as revealed in his artwork Simon Berry and Bill MacLellan, Glasgow Publishers, Jim Taylor, Australian Writer and Printer, Shelley Killen, USA artist, where are all the figures of the title are roughly drawn with pencil and ink. The solid blue background is painted in acrylic, overlaid with Gray’s inked observations of each.

On the ground floor is what Gray called “my best big oil painting”, of a Cowcaddens streetscape in the 1950s which is by far the strongest piece on display here. Gray takes a wide-angled, almost fish-eye lens perspective to capture a famous Glasgow neighbourhood that was partially demolished and modernised in postwar development.

St Aloysius Church in Garnethill and Speir’s Wharf at Port Dundas can still be clearly seen, connecting us to the Glasgow of the present day. Gray’s narrative-driven imagery of daily life plays out, with local characters, playing children and besuited pals going out for the evening, all framed by street lamps and tenements immersed in a dark foreboding industrialised landscape.

Gray’s illustrations and artworks resonate not only with a celebration of Glasgow’s places, characters and life, they also give us insights into the intensely personal psyche of a creative genius. It’s a shame that more of this particular bequest could not have been displayed, but an opportunity to see these previously unseen works is most welcome.

Alasdair Gray: Works from the Morag McAlpine Bequest will be on show at the Fragile Gallery, Kelvingrove Art Gallery and Museum, Glasgow until June 2026

This article features references to books that have been included for editorial reasons, and may contain links to bookshop.org. If you click on one of the links and go on to buy something, The Conversation UK may earn a commission.

Blane Savage does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Alasdair Gray: unseen artworks offer insight into a profoundly creative and original artist – https://theconversation.com/alasdair-gray-unseen-artworks-offer-insight-into-a-profoundly-creative-and-original-artist-259470

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: The South African apartheid movement’s close relationship with the American right – then and now

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Daniel Conway, Reader in Politics and International Studies, University of Westminster

The allegations of a “white genocide” against Afrikaner farmers that emerged during the tense Oval Office meeting between the US president, Donald Trump, and South Africa’s president, Cyril Ramaphosa, on May 21 shocked many around the world. But it was merely the latest example of what has been a long-running obsession for Trump, which has been evident since well before he took office in January.

In early February, Trump issued an executive order: “Addressing Egregious Actions of The Republic of South Africa”. The order included the allegation of “unjust racial discrimination” against the white Afrikaner community and recommended the establishment of an Afrikaner refugee scheme. In his meeting with Ramaphosa, Trump doubled down on US hostility to the South African government. He repeatedly claimed – and produced purported evidence of – so-called genocide against Afrikaner farmers.

This level of hostility towards multi-racial, post-apartheid South Africa may seem to have come out of the blue. Some may think it was inspired by Trump’s close relationship, at the time at least, with South Africa-born business leader Elon Musk – who could be seen standing in the corner of the Oval Office watching the uncomfortable scene unfold. But the claim that white Afrikaners are victims of violent and vengeful black South Africans has a much longer history.

It’s a history that goes back almost five decades. It connects white supremacy in southern Africa and the apartheid government’s international disinformation strategy with the evangelical Christian right in American politics. Some of the individuals and institutions that were vocal advocates of white-minority rule against the threat of black government in South Africa are the same people who have the Trump administration’s ear today.

As the South African academic Nicky Falkof has observed, the claim of white victimhood is nothing new. She believes that “entire political agendas develop around the idea that white people must be protected because they face exceptional threats”.

Read more:
Trump and South Africa: what is white victimhood, and how is it linked to white supremacy?

The apartheid years

The idea that white South Africans face an existential threat emerged in the violent final decade of apartheid rule. It was a key narrative that the National Party government of president P.W. Botha liked to present to the outside world.

In 2021, a former apartheid intelligence officer named Paul Erasmus published his autobiography detailing his work for Stratcom, the apartheid government’s international covert communications and intelligence agency. Erasmas detailed his work in the US and, in particular, Stratcom’s close links with Republican policymakers.

One of the primary US conservative contacts was said to be Dr Edwin Feulner, a founder and president of the Heritage Foundation. Erasmus wrote that Feulner, who was a foreign policy advisor to Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, was “already well positioned to serve Stratcom the kind of high-level advice that we needed to temper growing international affection for the ANC as the first ruling party of a democratic South Africa”.

The Conversation approached Dr Feulner through the Heritage Foundation to seek his comments on specifically whether he had any past association with the apartheid-era government in South Africa and received no reply on the matter. But in 1986, during Feulner’s presidency of the Heritage Foundation, it published a report presenting alleging “close links between the ANC [African National Congresss] and the communists and the way in which the communists exploit the ANC to manipulate Western opinion”.

This history is key to understanding Trump Oval Office meeting with the South African president. The Heritage Foundation continues to have close links with Afrikaner nationalists. And it is well known that the foundation is central to Trump’s governing strategy, having published its Project 2025 on which much of this administration’s policy is based.

The South African media outlet, the Daily Maverick, has investigated links between the self-defined Afrikaner minority rights movement, Afriforum, the Heritage Foundation and the Republican Party. Since Trump was first inaugurated in 2017, Afriforum representatives – including CEO Kallie Kriel and his deputy Dr Ernst Roets – have made several visits to Washington, most recently in February 2025, to speak with senior representatives of the Trump administration and representatives of the Heritage Foundation. For some time, Afriforum has claimed there is a white genocide against Afrikaner farmers.

When asked directly about its relationship with Afriforum, a Heritage Foundation spokesperson denied any particularly close links between the two organisations, saying: “We meet with hundreds of individuals and groups every year.” He pointed to the Heritage Foundation’s recent round table and stressed the foundations’s “well-documented and long-running effort to work with leaders from across Africa”.

Trump began to tweet about the killing of farmers in South Africa in 2018 and is very opposed to South Africa’s recently passed Expropriation Act. This act allows for the expropriation of land without compensation, but only if it is “just and equitable and in the public interest” to do so.

In May 2024, the Heritage Foundation called for the cancellation of US aid to South Africa. It accused the ANC government of supporting Hamas and not aligning “with American values”.

Religious links

America’s evangelical Christian community was a strong supporter of the apartheid regime in South Africa. This is a key constituency of Trump’s electoral base. The historian Augusta Dell’Omo has documented the South African government lobbying of US televangelists such as Pat Robertson – an outspoken supporter of apartheid South Africa. As Dell’Omo argues, Christian evangelicals were not just vexed by threats to apartheid in South Africa. They were drawing a “direct link between the causes of Black grievances in the US and South Africa and a global threat to conservative and religious values”.

There is not just an historical – but also an ideological – link between Trump’s attitudes to farm killings and land expropriation in South Africa and his vehement opposition to diversity, equality and inclusion (DEI) programmes in the US. This white grievance politics continues to consider South Africa as a symbol of the overthrow of white privilege and the disorder that multiculturalism and black-led government ostensibly creates.

As academic Nicky Falkof has argued in The Conversation: “The architecture of white supremacy depends on the idea that white people are extraordinary victims. This is the driving notion beneath the great replacement theory, a far-right conspiracy theory claiming that Jews and non-white foreigners are plotting to ‘replace’ whites.”

Trump’s accusations against the current government in South Africa have their roots in the murky international disinformation campaigns of apartheid’s final years and the willing cooperation of key actors on the right of US politics and society. That white-supremacist politics from the past would continue to have currency in today’s White House is shocking. It should be opposed by all who support a democratic, multiracial and prosperous South Africa.

Daniel Conway does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. The South African apartheid movement’s close relationship with the American right – then and now – https://theconversation.com/the-south-african-apartheid-movements-close-relationship-with-the-american-right-then-and-now-257663

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

June 26, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”

US Senate News:

Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

06.25.25

Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), senior member of the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, released the following statement in response to the latest proposal from U.S. Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) to sell off America’s public lands to the highest bidder.

Lee’s most recent draft comes after the Senate Parliamentarian rejected his opening gambit because it fails to meet strict Senate rules governing the budget process that Senate Republicans are relying on to circumvent the Senate filibuster, which normally curtails divisive partisan proposals. It is expected that Lee will continue to modify his controversial land sales proposal to pass muster with the parliamentarian until right up to the Senate votes on the measure later this week as part of the larger reconciliation bill. After the Senate Parliamentarian rejected Lee’s opening gambit — deeming the proposal ineligible under budget reconciliation process rules — Lee responded, “I’m doing everything I can to support President Trump and move this forward.” He promised, “We’re just getting started.”

“Republicans seem hell bent on trying to sell public lands. Members need to stand up and stop this giveaway of our natural heritage. The latest Lee proposal is just one more attempt to see if Congress blinks. A massive change to our public land policy should not be included in a budget bill. We need climbers, hikers, hunters, gateway communities, and everyone who loves the outdoors to call their elected representatives right away to say our public lands are not for sale,” Sen. Cantwell said.

Lee’s revised language would require the Secretary of Interior to sell between 0.25 percent and 0.50 percent of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) land in the 11 Western states, minus Montana. It would also allow for the nominations of BLM land to be sold. The land would have to be in a 5-mile radius of the border of a population center.

Yesterday, Sen. Cantwell hosted a virtual press conference to push back on Lee’s proposal. She was joined by Boise Mayor Lauren McLean, professional athletes and outdoorsmen Tommy Caldwell and Graham Zimmerman, REI leader Susan Viscon, and Backcountry Hunters & Anglers spokesperson Kaden McArthur.

READ MORE:

The Associated Press: GOP plan to sell more than 3,200 square miles of federal lands is found to violate Senate rules

The Seattle Times: Pitch to sell public lands hits snag. What does that mean for WA?

The Spokesman Review: Public land sales provision would violate Senate rule, but its backer pledges to try again

The Tri-City Herald: What public lands near Tri-Cities could be sold under new Trump tax plan?

Video of yesterday’s virtual press conference is available HERE; a transcript of Sen. Cantwell’s opening remarks is HERE.

MIL OSI USA News –

June 26, 2025

Vendor	Technical Score	Cost Score	Total
Advanced Technology Recycling	597.50	262.71	860.21
Vendor #2	570.00	104.58	674.58
Vendor #3	577.50	59.02	636.52

Category: Politics

DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (19.2.2025)

PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

IMF Communications Department

MEDIA RELATIONS

About Summer EBT

A tight timeline

Goal setting

Innovation in action

Communications and community engagement

2025 Summer EBT began May 22

Resources:

Is there voter backing?

Is there voter backing?

Before you spend on spent grain …

Before you spend on spent grain …

The UN veto problem

Bombing Iran

What are stem cell therapies?

How does the treatment work?

What are the side-effects?

Is it better than other treatments?

When might this be more widely available?

The apartheid years

Religious links

Cantwell Statement on Continued Lee Efforts to Sell Off America’s Public Lands: “The Latest Lee Proposal Is Just One More Attempt To See If Congress Blinks”