NewzIntel.com

Category: Politics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Harvard University Loses Student and Exchange Visitor Program Certification for Pro-Terrorist Conduct

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: Harvard University Loses Student and Exchange Visitor Program Certification for Pro-Terrorist Conduct

    lass=”text-align-center”>Harvard is being held accountable for collaboration with the CCP, fostering violence, antisemitism, and pro-terrorist conduct from students on its campus

    WASHINGTON – Today, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem ordered DHS to terminate the Harvard University’s Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) certification

    This means Harvard can no longer enroll foreign students and existing foreign students must transfer or lose their legal status

    Harvard’s leadership has created an unsafe campus environment by permitting anti-American, pro-terrorist agitators to harass and physically assault individuals, including many Jewish students, and otherwise obstruct its once-venerable learning environment

    Many of these agitators are foreign students

    Harvard’s leadership further facilitated, and engaged in coordinated activity with the CCP, including hosting and training members of a CCP paramilitary group complicit in the Uyghur genocide

    “This administration is holding Harvard accountable for fostering violence, antisemitism, and coordinating with the Chinese Communist Party on its campus,” said Secretary Noem

    “It is a privilege, not a right, for universities to enroll foreign students and benefit from their higher tuition payments to help pad their multibillion-dollar endowments

    Harvard had plenty of opportunity to do the right thing

    It refused

    They have lost their Student and Exchange Visitor Program certification as a result of their failure to adhere to the law

    Let this serve as a warning to all universities and academic institutions across the country

    ”
    On April 16, 2025, Secretary Noem demanded Harvard provide information about the criminality and misconduct of foreign students on its campus

    Secretary Noem warned refusal to comply with this lawful order would result in SEVP termination

    This action comes after DHS terminated $2

    7 million in DHS grants for Harvard last month

    Harvard University brazenly refused to provide the required information requested and ignored a follow up request from the Department’s Office of General Council

    Secretary Noem is following through on her promise to protect students and prohibit terrorist sympathizers from receiving benefits from the U

    S

    government

    Facts about Harvard’s toxic campus climate:

    A joint-government task force found that Harvard has failed to confront pervasive race discrimination and anti-Semitic harassment plaguing its campus

    Jewish students on campus were subject to pervasive insults, physical assault, and intimidation, with no meaningful response from Harvard’s leadership

    A protester charged for his role in the assault of a Jewish student on campus was chosen by the Harvard Divinity School to be the Class Marshal for commencement

    Harvard’s own 2025 internal study on anti-Semitism revealed that almost 60% of Jewish students reported experiencing “discrimination, stereotyping, or negative bias on campus due to [their] views on current events

    ”
    In one instance, a Jewish student speaker at a conference had planned to tell the story of his Holocaust survivor grandfather finding refuge in Israel

    Organizers told the student the story was not “tasteful” and laughed at him when he expressed his confusion

    They said the story would have justified oppression

    Meanwhile, Pro-Hamas student groups that promoted antisemitism after the October 7 attacks remained recognized and funded

    Instead of protecting its students, Harvard has let crime rates skyrocket, enacted racist DEI practices, and accepted boatloads of cash from foreign governments and donors

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Winners Announced in NASA’s 2025 Gateways to Blue Skies Competition

    Source: NASA

    A team from South Dakota State University, with their project titled “Soil Testing and Plant Leaf Extraction Drone” took first place at the 2025 NASA Gateways to Blue Skies Competition, which challenged student teams to research aviation solutions to support U.S. agriculture.
    The winning project proposed a drone-based soil and tissue sampling process that would automate a typically labor-intensive farming task. The South Dakota State team competed among eight finalists at the 2025 Blue Skies Forum May 20-21 in Palmdale, California, near NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center. Subject matter experts from NASA and industry served as judges.
    “This competition challenges students to think creatively, explore new possibilities, and confront the emerging issues and opportunity spaces solvable through aviation platforms,” said Steven Holz, assistant project manager for University Innovation with NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate and Blue Skies judge and co-chair. “They bring imaginative ideas, interesting insights, and an impressive level of dedication. It’s always an honor to work with the next generation of innovators participating in our competition.”

    Steven holz
    Assistant Project Manager for University Innovation

    The winning team members were awarded an opportunity to intern during the 2025-26 academic year at any of four aeronautics-focused NASA centers — Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, Glenn Research Center in Cleveland, Ames Research Center in California’s Silicon Valley, or Armstrong Flight Research Center in Edwards, California.  
    “It’s been super-rewarding for our team to see how far we’ve come, especially with all these other amazing projects that we were competing against,” said Nathan Kuehl, team lead at South Dakota State University. “It wouldn’t have been possible without our graduate advisor, Allea Klauenberg, and advisor, Todd Lechter. We want to thank everybody that made this experience possible.”
    Other awards included: 

    Second Place — University of Tulsa, CattleLog Cattle Management System
    Best Technical Paper — Boston University, PLAANT: Precision Land Analysis and Aerial Nitrogen Treatment

    Sponsored by NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate, this year’s competition asked teams of university students to research new or improved aviation solutions to support agriculture that could be applied by 2035 or sooner. The goal of the competition, titled AgAir: Aviation Solutions for Agriculture, was to enhance production, efficiency, sustainability, and resilience to extreme weather. 
    At the forum, finalist teams presented concepts of aviation systems that could help the agriculture industry.Students had the opportunity to meet with NASA and industry experts, tour NASA Armstrong, and gain insight into the agency’s aviation mission.
    U.S. agriculture provides food, fuel, and fiber to the nation and the world. However, the industry faces significant challenges. NASA Aeronautics is committed to supporting commercial, industrial, and governmental partners in advancing aviation systems to modernize agricultural capabilities.  
    The Gateways to Blue Skies competition is sponsored by NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate’s University Innovation Project and is managed by the National Institute of Aerospace.
    The National Institute of Aerospace has made available a livestream of the competition, as well as information about the finalists and their projects, and details about the 2025 competition.

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: AI Data Security: Best Practices for Securing Data Used to Train & Operate AI Systems

    News In Brief – Source: US Computer Emergency Readiness Team

    Executive summary

    This Cybersecurity Information Sheet (CSI) provides essential guidance on securing data used in artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) systems. It also highlights the importance of data security in ensuring the accuracy and integrity of AI outcomes and outlines potential risks arising from data integrity issues in various stages of AI development and deployment.

    This CSI provides a brief overview of the AI system lifecycle and general best practices to secure data used during the development, testing, and operation of AI-based systems. These best practices include the incorporation of techniques such as data encryption, digital signatures, data provenance tracking, secure storage, and trust infrastructure. This CSI also provides an in-depth examination of three significant areas of data security risks in AI systems: data supply chain, maliciously modified (“poisoned”) data, and data drift. Each section provides a detailed description of the risks and the corresponding best practices to mitigate those risks. 

    This guidance is intended primarily for organizations using AI systems in their operations, with a focus on protecting sensitive, proprietary, or mission critical data. The principles outlined in this information sheet provide a robust foundation for securing AI data and ensuring the reliability and accuracy of AI-driven outcomes.

    This document was authored by the National Security Agency’s Artificial Intelligence Security Center (AISC), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Australian Signals Directorate’s Australian Cyber Security Centre (ASD’s ACSC), the New Zealand’s Government Communications Security Bureau’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NZ), and the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-UK). 

    The goals of this guidance are to: 

    1. Raise awareness of the potential risks related to data security in the development, testing, and deployment of AI systems;
    2. Provide guidance and best practices for securing AI data across various stages of the AI lifecycle, with an in-depth description of the three aforementioned significant areas of data security risks; and
    3. Establish a strong foundation for data security in AI systems by promoting the adoption of robust data security measures and encouraging proactive risk mitigation strategies.

    Download the PDF version of this report: 

    Introduction

    The data resources used during the development, testing, and operation of an AI1 system are a critical component of the AI supply chain; therefore, the data resources must be protected and secured. In its Data Management Lexicon, [1] the Intelligence Community (IC) defines Data Security as “The ability to protect data resources from unauthorized discovery, access, use, modification, and/or destruction…. Data Security is a component of Data Protection.” 

    Data security is paramount in the development and deployment of AI systems. Therefore, it is a key component of strategies developed to safeguard and manage the overall security of AI-based systems. Successful data management strategies must ensure that the data has not been tampered with at any point throughout the entire AI system lifecycle; is free from malicious, unwanted, and unauthorized content; and does not have unintentional duplicative or anomalous information. Note that AI data security depends on robust, fundamental cybersecurity protection for all datasets used in designing, developing, deploying, operating, and maintaining AI systems and the ML models that enable them.

    Audience and scope

    This CSI outlines potential risks in AI systems stemming from data security issues that arise during different phases of an AI deployment, and it introduces recommended protocols to mitigate these risks. This guidance builds upon the NSA’s joint guidance on Deploying AI Systems Securely [2] and delves deeper into securing the data used to train and operate AI-based systems. This guidance is primarily developed for organizations that use AI systems in their day-to-day operations, including the Defense Industrial Base (DIB), National Security System (NSS) owners, Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies, and critical infrastructure owners and operators. Implementing these mitigations can help secure AI-enabled systems and protect proprietary, sensitive, and/or mission critical data.

    Securing data throughout the AI system lifecycle

    Data security is a critical enabler that spans all phases of the AI system lifecycle. ML models learn their decision logic from data, so an attacker who can manipulate the data can also manipulate the logic of an AI-based system. In the AI Risk Management Framework (RMF) [3], the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines six major stages in the lifecycle of AI systems, starting from Plan & Design and progressing all the way to Operate & Monitor. The following table highlights relevant data security factors for each stage of the AI lifecycle: 

    Table 1: The AI System Lifecycle with key dimensions, necessary ongoing assessments, focus areas for data security, and particular data security risks covered in this CSI. [3] 
    AI Lifecycle Stage Key Dimensions Test, Evaluation, Verification, & Validation (TEVV) Potential Focus Areas for Data Security Particular Data Security Risks Covered in this CSI
    1) Plan & Design Application Context Audit & Impact Assessment Incorporating data security measures from inception, designing robust security protocols, threat modeling, and including privacy by design Data supply chain
    2) Collect & Process Data Data & Input Internal & External Validation Ensuring data integrity, authenticity, encryption, access controls, data minimization, anonymization, and secure data transfer Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data
    3) Build & Use Model AI Model Model Testing Protecting data from tampering, ensuring data quality and privacy (including differential privacy and secure multi-party computation when appropriate and possible), securing model training, and operating environments   Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data
    4) Verify & Validate AI Model Model Testing Performing comprehensive security testing, identifying and mitigating risks, validating data integrity, adversarial testing, and formal verification when appropriate and possible Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data
    5) Deploy & Use Task & Output Integration, Compliance Testing, Validation Implementing strict access controls, zero-trust infrastructure, secure data transmission and storage, secure API endpoints, and monitoring for anomalous behavior Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data,
    data drift
    6) Operate & Monitor Application Context Audit & Impact Assessment Conducting continuous risk assessments, monitoring for data breaches, deleting data securely, complying with regulations, incident response planning, and regular security auditing Data supply chain,
    maliciously modified data, data drift

    Throughout the AI system lifecycle, securing data is paramount to maintaining information integrity and system reliability. Starting with the initial Plan & Design phase, carefully plan data protection measures to provide proactive mitigations of potential risks. In the Collect & Process Data phase, data must be carefully analyzed, labeled, sanitized, and protected from breaches and tampering. Securing data in the Build & Use Model phase helps ensure models are trained on reliably sourced, accurate, and representative information. In the Verify & Validate phase, comprehensive and thorough testing of AI models, derived from training data, can identify security flaws and enable their mitigation. 

    Note that Verification & Validation is necessary each time new data or user feedback is introduced into the model; therefore, that data also needs to be handled with the same security standards as AI training data. Implementing strict access controls protects data from unauthorized access, especially in the Deploy & Use phase. Lastly, continuous data risk assessments in the Operate & Monitor phase are necessary to adapt to evolving threats. Neglecting these practices can lead to data corruption, compromised models, data leaks, and non-compliance, emphasizing the critical importance of robust data security at every phase.

    Best practices to secure data for AI-based systems

    The following list contains recommended practical steps that system owners can take to better protect the data used to build and operate their AI-based systems, whether running on premises or in the cloud. For more details on general cybersecurity best practices, see also NIST SP 800-53, “Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations.” [33]

    1. Source reliable data and track data provenance
    Verify data sources use trusted, reliable, and accurate data for training and operating AI systems. To the extent possible, only use data from authoritative sources. Implement provenance tracking to enable the tracing of data origins, and log the path that data follows through an AI system. [7],[8],[9] Incorporate a secure provenance database that is cryptographically signed and maintains an immutable, append-only ledger of data changes. This facilitates data provenance tracking, helps identify sources of maliciously modified data, and helps ensure that no single entity can undetectably manipulate the data.
    2. Verify and maintain data integrity during storage and transport
    Maintaining data integrity2 is an essential component to preserve the accuracy, reliability, and trustworthiness of AI data. [4] Use checksums and cryptographic hashes to verify that data has not been altered or tampered with during storage or transmission. Generating such unique codes for AI datasets enables the detection of unauthorized changes or corruption, safeguarding the information’s authenticity.

    3. Employ digital signatures to authenticate trusted data revisions
    Digital signatures help ensure data integrity and prevent tampering by third parties. Adopt quantum-resistant digital signature standards [5][6] to authenticate and verify datasets used during AI model training, fine tuning, alignment, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), and/or other post-training processes that affect model parameters. Original versions of the data should be cryptographically signed, and any subsequent data revisions should be signed by the person who made the change. Organizations are encouraged to use trusted certificate authorities to verify this process.
    4. Leverage trusted infrastructure
    Use a trusted computing environment that leverages Zero Trust architecture. [10] Provide secure enclaves for data processing and keep sensitive information protected and unaltered during computations. This approach fosters a secure foundation for data privacy and security in AI data workflows by isolating sensitive operations and mitigating risks of tampering. Trusted computing infrastructure supports the integrity of data processes, reduces risks associated with unverified or altered data, and ultimately creates a more robust and transparent AI ecosystem. Trusted environments are essential for AI applications where data accuracy directly impacts their decision-making processes.
    5. Classify data and use access controls
    Categorize data using a classification system based on sensitivity and required protection measures. [11] This process enables organizations to apply appropriate security controls to different data types. Classifying data enables the enforcement of robust protection measures like stringent encryption and access controls. [33] In general, the output of AI systems should be classified at the same level as the input data (rather than creating a separate set of guardrails).
    6. Encrypt data
    Adopt advanced encryption protocols proportional to the organizational data protection level. This includes securing data at rest, in transit, and during processing. AES-256 encryption is the de facto industry standard and is considered resistant to quantum computing threats. [12],[13] Use protocols, such as TLS with AES-256 or post-quantum encryption, for data in transit. Refer to NIST SP 800-52r2, “Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations” [14] for more details.
    7. Store data securely
    Store data in certified storage devices that enforce NIST FIPS 140-3 [15] compliance, ensuring that the cryptographic modules used to encrypt the data provide high-level security against advanced intrusion attempts. Note that Security Level 3 (defined in NIST FIPS 140-2 [16]) provides robust data protection; however, evaluate and determine the appropriate level of security based on organizational needs and risk assessments.
    8. Leverage privacy-preserving techniques 
    There are several privacy-preserving techniques [17] that can be leveraged for increased data security. Note that there may be practical limitations to their implementation due to computational cost.

    • Data depersonalization techniques (e.g., data masking [18]) involve replacing sensitive data with inauthentic but realistic information that maintains the distributions of values throughout the dataset. This enables AI systems to utilize datasets without exposing sensitive information, reducing the impact of data breaches and supporting secure data sharing and collaboration. When possible, use data masking to facilitate AI model training and development without compromising sensitive information (e.g., personally identifiable information [PII]).
    • Differential privacy is a framework that provides a mathematical guarantee quantifying the level of privacy of a dataset or query. It requires a pre-specified privacy budget for the level of noise added to the data, but there are tradeoffs between protecting the training data from membership inference techniques and target task accuracy. Refer to [17] for further details.
    • Decentralized learning techniques (e.g., federated learning [19]) permit AI system training over multiple local datasets with limited sharing of data among local instances. An aggregator model incorporates the results of the distributed models, limiting access on the local instance to the larger training dataset. Secure multi-party computation is recommended for training and inferencing processes.

    9. Delete data securely
    Prior to repurposing or decommissioning any functional drives used for AI data storage and processing, erase them using a secure deletion method such as cryptographic erase, block erase, or data overwrite. Refer to NIST SP 800-88, “Guidelines for Media Sanitization,” [20] for guidance on appropriate deletion methods.
    10. Conduct ongoing data security risk assessments
    Conduct ongoing risk assessments using industry-standard frameworks, such as the NIST SP 800-3r2, Risk Management Framework (RMF) [4][21], and the NIST AI 100-1, Artificial Intelligence RMF [3]. These assessments should evaluate the AI data security landscape, identify risks, and prioritize actions to minimize security incidents. Continuously improve data security measures to keep pace with evolving threats and vulnerabilities, learn from security incidents, stay up to date with emerging technologies, and maintain a robust security posture. 

    Data supply chain – risks and mitigations

    Relevant AI Lifecycle stages: 1) Plan & Design; 2) Collect & Process Data; 3) Build & Use Model; 4) Verify & Validate; 5) Deploy & Use; 6) Operate & Monitor

    Developing and deploying secure and reliable AI systems requires understanding potential risks and methods of introducing inaccurate or maliciously modified (a.k.a. “poisoned”) data into the system. In short, the security of AI systems depends on thorough verification of training data and proactive measures to detect and prevent the introduction of inaccurate material.

    Threats can stem from large-scale data collected and curated by third parties, as well as from data that is not sufficiently protected after ingestion. Data collected and/or curated by a third party may contain inaccurate information, either unintentionally or through malicious intent. Inaccurate material can compromise not only models trained using that data, but also any additional models that rely on compromised models as a foundation.  

    It is crucial, therefore, to verify the integrity of the training data used when building an AI system. Organizations that utilize third-party data must take appropriate measures to ensure that: 1) the data is not compromised upon ingestion; and 2) the data cannot be compromised after it has been incorporated into the AI system. As such, both data curators and data consumers should follow the best practices for digital signatures, data integrity, and data provenance that are described in detail above.

    General risks for data consumers3 

    The use of web-scale databases includes all of the risks outlined earlier, and one cannot simply assume that these datasets are clean, accurate, and free of malicious content. Third-party models trained on web-scraped data used to train a model for downstream tasks could also affect the model’s learning process and result in behavior that was unintended by the AI system designer.

    From the moment data is ingested for use with AI systems, the data acquirer must secure it against insider threats and malicious network activity to prevent unauthorized modification. 

    Mitigation strategies: 

    • Dataset verification: Before ingest, the consumer or curator should verify, as much as possible, that the dataset to be ingested is free of malicious or inaccurate material. Any detected abnormalities should be addressed, and suspicious data should not be stored. The dataset verification process should include a digital signature of the dataset at time of ingestion.
    • Content credentials: Use content credentials to track the provenance of media and other data. Content credentials are “metadata that are secured cryptographically and allow creators the ability to add information about themselves or their creative process, or both, directly to media content…. Content Credentials securely bind essential metadata to a media file that can track its origin(s), any edits made, and/or what was used to create or modify the content…. This metadata alone does not allow a consumer to determine whether a piece of content is ‘true,’ but rather provides contextual information that assists in determining the authenticity of the content.” [24]
    • Foundation model assurances: In the case where a consumer is not ingesting a dataset but a foundation model trained by another party, the developers of the foundation model need to be able to provide assurances regarding the data and sources used and certify that their training data did not contain any known compromised data. Take care to track the training data used in various model lineages. Exercise caution before using a model without such assurances.
    • Require certification: Data consumers should strongly consider requiring a formal certification from dataset and model providers, attesting that their systems are free from known compromised data before using third-party data and/or foundation models.
    • Secure storage: After ingest, data needs to be stored in a database that adheres to the best practices for digital signatures, data integrity, and data provenance that are described in detail above. Note that an append-only cryptographically signed database should be used where feasible, but there may be a need to delete older material that is no longer relevant. Each time a data element is updated (e.g., resized, cropped, flipped, etc.) for augmentation purposes in a non-temporary fashion, then the updated data should be stored as a new entry with documented changes. The database’s certificate should be verified at the time the database is accessed for a training run. If the database does not pass the certificate check, abort the training and conduct a comprehensive database audit to discover any data modifications. 

    2023 investigations by various industry professionals explored low-resource methods for introducing malicious or inaccurate material into web-scale datasets, and potential strategies to mitigate this risk.  [29] These vulnerabilities depend on the fact that curators or collectors do not have control over the data, as seen in cases of datasets curated by third parties (e.g., LAION) or datasets that are continually updated and released (e.g., Wikipedia). 

    Risk: Curated web-scale datasets

    Curated AI datasets (e.g., LAION-2B or COYO-700M) are vulnerable to a type of technique known as split-view poisoning. This risk arises because these datasets often contain data hosted on domains that may have expired or are no longer actively maintained by their original owners. In such cases, anyone who purchases these expired domains gains control over the content hosted on them. This situation creates an opportunity for malicious actors to modify or replace the data that the curated list points to, potentially introducing inaccurate or misleading information into the dataset. In many instances, it is possible to purchase enough control of a dataset to conduct effective poisoning for roughly $1,000 USD. In some cases, effective techniques can cost as little as $60 USD (e.g., COYO-700M), making this a viable threat from low-resource threat actors. 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Raw data hashes: Data curators should attach a cryptographic hash to all raw data referenced in the dataset. This will enable follow-on data consumers to verify that the data has not changed since it was added to the list.
    • Hash verification: Data consumers should incorporate a hash check at time of download in order to detect any changes made to it, and the downloader should discard any data that does not pass the hash check.
    • Periodic checks: Curators should periodically scrape the data themselves to verify that the data has not been modified. If any changes are detected, the curator should take appropriate steps to ensure the data’s integrity.
    • Verifying data: Curators should verify that any changed data is clean and free from inaccurate or malicious material. If the content of the data has been altered in any way, the curator should either remove it from their list or flag it for further review.
    • Certification by curators: Since the data supply chain begins with the curators, the certification process must start there as well. To the best of their ability, curators should be able to certify that, at the time of publication, the dataset contains no malicious or inaccurate material. 

    Risk: Collected web-scale datasets

    Collected web-scale datasets (e.g., Wikipedia) are vulnerable to frontrunning poisoning techniques. Frontrunning poisoning occurs when an actor injects malicious examples in a short time window before websites with crowd-sourced content collect a snapshot of their data. Wikipedia in particular conducts twice-monthly snapshots of their data and publishes these snapshots for people to download. Since the snapshots happen at known times, it is possible for malicious actors to edit pages close enough to the snapshot time so that malicious edits will be captured and published before they can be discovered and corrected. Industry analysis demonstrated potential malicious actors would be able to successfully poison as much as 6.5% of Wikipedia. [29]

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Test & verify web-scale datasets: Be cautious when using web-scale datasets that are vulnerable to frontrunning poisoning. Check that the data hasn’t been manipulated, and only use snapshots verified by a trusted party.
    • (For web-scale data collectors) Randomize or lengthen snapshots: Collectors such as Wikipedia should defend against actors making malicious edits ahead of a planned snapshot by:
    1. Randomizing the snapshot order.

    2. Freezing edits to content long enough for edits to go through review before releasing the snapshot.

      These mitigations focus on increasing the amount of time a malicious actor must maintain control of the data for it to be included in the published snapshot. Any reasonable methods that increase the time a malicious actor must control the data are also recommended. 

      Note that these mitigations are limited since they rely on trusted curators who can detect malicious edits. It is more difficult to defend against subtle edits (e.g., attempts to insert hidden watermarks) that appear valid to human reviewers but impact machine understanding.

    Risk: Web-crawled datasets 

    Web-crawled datasets present a unique intersection of the risks discussed above. Since web-crawled datasets are substantially less curated than other web-scale datasets, they bring increased risk. There are no trusted curators to detect malicious edits. There are no original curated views to which cryptographic hashes can be attached. The unfortunate reality is that “updates to a web page have no realistic bound on the delta between versions which might act as a signal for attaching trust.” [29]

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Consensus approaches: Data consumers using web-crawled datasets should rely on consensus-based approaches, since notional determinations of which domains to trust are ad-hoc and insufficient. For example, an AI developer could choose to only trust an image-caption pair when it appears on many different websites to reduce susceptibility to poisoning techniques, since a malicious actor would have to poison a sufficiently large number of websites to be successful.
    • Data curation: Ultimately, it is incumbent on organizations to ensure malicious or inaccurate material is not present in the data they use. If an organization does not have resources to conduct the necessary due diligence, then the use of web-crawled datasets is not recommended until some sort of trust infrastructure can be implemented.

    Final note on web-scale datasets and data poisoning

    Both split-view and frontrunning poisoning are reasonably straightforward for a malicious actor to execute, since they do not require particularly sophisticated methodology. These poisoning techniques should be considered viable threats by anyone looking to incorporate web-scale data into their AI systems. The danger here comes not only from directly using compromised data, but also from using models which may themselves have been trained on compromised data. 

    Ultimately, data poisoning must be addressed from a supply chain perspective by those who train and fine-tune AI models. Proper supply chain integrity and security management (i.e., selecting reliable model providers and verifying the legitimacy of the models used) can reduce the risk of data poisoning and system compromise. The most reliable providers are those who assure that they do everything possible to prevent the influence and distribution of poisoned data and models. [34] 

    Every effort must be made by those building foundation models to filter out malicious and inaccurate data. Foundation models are evolving rapidly, and filtering out inaccurate, unauthorized, and malicious training data is an active area of research, particularly at web-scale. As such, is currently impractical to prescribe precise methods for doing so; it is a best-effort endeavor. Ideally, data curators and foundation model providers should be able to attest to their filtering methods and provide evidence (e.g. test results) of their effectiveness. Likewise, if possible, downstream model consumers should include a review of the security claims as part of their security processes before accepting a foundation model for use. 

    Maliciously modified data – risks and mitigations

    Relevant AI Lifecycle stages: 2) Collect & Process Data; 3) Build & Use Model; 4) Verify & Validate; 5) Deploy & Use; 6) Operate & Monitor

    Maliciously modified data presents a significant threat to the accuracy and integrity of AI systems. Deliberate manipulation of data can result in inaccurate outcomes, poor decisions, and compromised security. Note that there are also risks associated with unintentional data errors and duplications that can affect the security and performance of AI systems. Challenges like adversarial machine learning threats, statistical bias, and inaccurate information can impact the overall security of AI-driven outcomes.

    Risk: Adversarial Machine Learning threats

    Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) threats involve intentional, malicious attempts to deceive, manipulate, or disrupt AI systems. [7],[17],[22] Malicious actors employ data poisoning to corrupt the learning process, compromising the integrity of training datasets and leading to unreliable or malicious model behavior. Additionally, malicious actors may introduce adversarial examples into datasets that, while subtle, can evade correct classification, thereby undermining the model’s performance. Furthermore, sensitive information in training datasets can be indirectly extracted through techniques like model inversion4, posing significant data security risks.

    Mitigation Strategies:

    • Anomaly detection: Incorporate anomaly detection algorithms during data pre-processing to identify and remove malicious or suspicious data points before training. These algorithms can recognize statistically deviant patterns in the data, making it possible to isolate and eliminate poisoned inputs.
    • Data sanitization: Sanitize the training data by applying techniques like data filtering, sampling, and normalization. This helps reduce the impact of outliers, noisy data, and other potentially poisoned inputs, ensuring that models learn from high-quality, representative datasets. Perform sanitization on a regular basis, especially prior to each and every training, fine-tuning, or any other process that adjusts model parameters.
    • Secure training pipelines: Secure data collection, pre-processing, and training pipelines to prevent malicious actors from tampering with datasets or model parameters.
    • Ensemble methods / collaborative learning: Implement collaborative learning frameworks that combine an ensemble of multiple, distinct AI models to reach a consensus on output predictions. This approach can help counteract the impact of data poisoning, since malicious inputs may only affect a subset of the collaborative models, allowing the majority to maintain accuracy and reliability.
    • Data anonymization: Implement anonymization techniques to protect sensitive data attributes, keeping them confidential while allowing AI models to learn patterns and generate accurate predictions.

    Risk: Bad data statements

    Bad data statements5 [7][23], such as missing metadata, can significantly influence AI data security by introducing data integrity issues that can lead to faulty model performance. Error-free metadata provides valuable contextual information about the data, including its structure, purpose, and collection methods. When metadata is missing, it becomes difficult to interpret data accurately and draw meaningful conclusions. This situation can result in incomplete or inaccurate data representation, compromising AI system performance and reliability. If metadata is modified by a malicious actor, then the security of the AI system is also at risk.

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Metadata management: Implement strong data governance practices to help ensure metadata is well-documented, complete, accurate, and secured.
    • Metadata validation: Establish data validation processes to check the completeness and consistency of metadata before data is used for AI training.
    • Data enrichment: Use available resources, such as reference data and trusted third-party data, to supplement missing metadata and improve the overall quality of the training data.

    Risk: Statistical bias6 

    Robust data security and collection practices are key to mitigating statistical bias. Executive Order (EO) 14179 mandates that U.S. government entities “develop AI systems that are free from ideological bias or engineered social agendas.” [25] Note that “an AI system is said to be biased when it exhibits systematically inaccurate behavior.” [26] Statistical bias in AI systems can arise from artifacts present in training data that can lead to artificially slanted or inaccurate outcomes. Sampling biases or biases in data collection can affect the overall outcomes and performance of AI. Left unaddressed, statistical bias can degrade the accuracy and effectiveness of AI systems. 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Regular training data audits: Regularly audit training data to detect, assess, and address potential issues that can result in systematically inaccurate AI systems.
    • Representative training data: Ensure that training data is representative of the totality of the information relevant to any given topic to reduce the risk of statistical bias. Also ensure that AI data is properly divided into training, development, and evaluation sets without overlap to properly measure statistical bias and other measures of performance.
    • Edge cases: Identify and mitigate edge cases that can cause models to malfunction.
    • Test and correct for statistical bias: Create a repository with instances of observed model output bias. Leverage that information to improve training data audits and with reinforcement learning to “undo” some of the measured bias.

    Risk: Data poisoning via inaccurate information

    One form of data poisoning (sometimes referred to as “disinformation” [27]) involves the intentional insertion of inaccurate or misleading information in AI training datasets, which can negatively impact AI system performance, outcomes, and decision-making processes. 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Remove inaccurate information from training data: Identify and remove inaccurate or misleading information from AI datasets to the extent feasible.
    • Data provenance and verification: Implement provenance verification mechanisms during data collection to help ensure that only accurate and reliable data is used. This process can include methods such as cross-verification, fact-checking, source analysis, data provenance tracking, and content credentials.
    • Add more training data: Increasing the amount of non-malicious data makes training more robust against poisoned examples—provided that these poisoned examples are small in number. One way to do this is through data augmentation—the creation of artificial training set samples that are small variations of existing samples. The goal is to “outnumber” the poisoned samples so the model “forgets” them. Note that this mitigation can only be applied during training, and therefore does not apply to an already trained model. [28]
    • Data quality control: Perform quality control on data including detecting poisoned samples through integrity checks, statistical deviation, or pattern recognition. Proactively implement data quality controls during the training phase to prevent issues before they arise in production.

    Risk: Data duplications

    Unintended duplicate data elements [7] in training datasets can skew model performance and cause overfitting, reducing the AI model’s ability to generalize across a variety of real-world applications. Duplicates are not always exact; near-duplicates may contain minor differences like formatting, abbreviations, or errors, which makes detecting them more complex. Duplicate data often leads to inaccurate predictions, making the AI system less effective in real-world applications.

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Data deduplication: Implement deduplication techniques (such as fuzzy matching, hashing, clustering, etc.) to carefully identify and handle duplicates and near-duplicates in the data.

    Data drift – risks and mitigations

    Relevant AI Lifecycle stages: 5) Deploy & Use; 6) Operate & Monitor

    Data drift, or distribution shift, refers to changes in the underlying statistical properties of the input data to an operational AI system. Over time, the input data can become significantly different from the data originally used to train the model. [7],[8] Degradation caused by data drift is a natural and expected occurrence, and AI system developers and operators need to regularly update models to maintain accuracy and performance. Data drift ordinarily begins as small, seemingly insignificant degradations in model performance. Left unchecked, the degradation caused by data drift can snowball into substantial reductions in AI system accuracy and integrity that become increasingly difficult to correct. 

    It is crucial to distinguish between data drift and data poisoning attacks designed to affect an AI model. Continuous monitoring of system accuracy and performance provides important indicators based on the nature of the changes observed. If the changes are slow and gradual over time, it is more likely that the model is experiencing data drift. If the changes are abrupt and dramatic in one or more dimensions, it is more likely that an actor is trying to compromise the model. Cyber compromises often aim to manipulate the model’s performance quickly and significantly, leading to abrupt changes in the input data or model outputs.

    AI system operators and developers should employ a wide range of techniques for detecting and mitigating data drift, including data preprocessing, increasing dataset coverage of real-world scenarios, and adopting robust training and adaptation strategies. [30] Packages that automate dataset loading assist AI system developers in creating application-specific detection and mitigation techniques for data drift.

    There are many potential causes of data drift, including: 

    1. A change in the upstream data pipeline not represented in the model training data (e.g., the units of a particular data element change from miles to kilometers)
    2. The introduction of completely new data elements that the model had not previously seen (e.g., a new type of malware not recognized in the ML layer of an anti-virus product)
    3. A change in the context of how inputs and outputs are related (e.g., a change in organizational structure due to a merger or acquisition could lead to new data access patterns that might be misinterpreted as security threats by an AI system)

    The data associated with a given AI model should be regularly checked for any updates to help ensure the model still predicts as expected. [7],[8],[9] The interval for this update and check will depend on the particular AI system and application. For example, in high-stakes applications such as healthcare, early detection and mitigation of data drift are critical prior to patient impact. Thus, continuous monitoring of model performance with additional direct analysis of the input data is important in such applications. [30] 

    Mitigation strategies:

    • Data management: Employ a data management strategy in keeping with the best practices in this CSI to help ensure that it is easy to add and track new data elements for model training and adaptation. This management strategy enables identification of data elements causing drift for appropriate mitigation or action.
    • Data-quality testing: AI system developers should use data-quality assessment tools to assist in selecting and filtering data used for model training or adaptation. Understanding the current dataset and its impact on model behavior is critical to detecting data drift.
    • Input and output monitoring: Monitor the AI system inputs and outputs to verify the model is performing as expected. [9] Regularly update your model using current data. Utilize meaningful statistical methods that measure expected dataset metrics and compare the distribution of the training data to the test data to help determine if data drift is occurring. [7] 

    Data management tools and methods are currently an active area of research. However, data drift can be mitigated by incorporating application-specific data management protocols that include: continuous monitoring, retraining (regularly incorporating the latest data into the models), data cleansing (correcting errors or inconsistencies in the data), and using ensemble models (combining predictions of multiple models). Incorporation of a data management framework into the design of AI systems from the beginning is essential for improving the overall integrity and security posture. [31]

    Conclusion

    Data security is of paramount importance when developing and operating AI systems. As organizations in various sectors rely more and more on AI-driven outcomes, data security becomes crucial for maintaining accuracy, reliability, and integrity. The guidance provided in this CSI outlines a robust approach to securing AI data and addressing the risks associated with the data supply chain, malicious data, and data drift.

    Data security is an ever-evolving field, and continuous vigilance and adaptation are key to staying ahead of emerging threats and vulnerabilities. The best practices presented here encourage the highest standards of data security in AI while helping ensure the accuracy and integrity of AI-driven outcomes. By adopting these best practices and risk mitigation strategies, organizations can fortify their AI systems against potential threats and safeguard sensitive, proprietary, and mission critical data used in the development and operation of their AI systems. 

    References

    1 In this document, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the meaning set forth in 15 U.S.C. 9401(3): 
    “… a machine-based system that can, for a given set of human-defined objectives, make predictions, recommendations, or decisions influencing real or virtual environments. AI systems use machine- and human-based inputs to:
      (A) Perceive real and virtual environments;
      (B) Take these perceptions and turn them into models through analysis in an automated manner; and
      (C) Use model inference to formulate options for information or action.”

    2 Data integrity is defined by the IC Data Management Lexicon [1] as “The degree to which data can be trusted due to its provenance, pedigree, lineage and conformance with all business rules regarding its relationship with other data. In the context of data movement, this is the degree to which data has verifiably not been changed unexpectedly by a person or NPE.”

    3 The term data consumers is defined as technical personnel (e.g. data scientists, engineers) who make use of data that they themselves did not produce or annotate to build and/or operate AI systems. 

    4 Model inversion refers to the process by which an attacker analyzes the output patterns of an AI system to reverse-engineer and uncover details about the training dataset, such as individual data points or patterns. This process can potentially expose confidential or proprietary information from the data that was used to train the AI models.

    5 “A data statement is a characterization of a dataset that provides context to allow developers and users to better understand how experimental results might generalize, how software might be appropriately deployed, and what biases might be reflected in systems built on the software.” [23] 

    6 “In technical systems, bias is most commonly understood and treated as a statistical phenomenon. Bias is an effect that deprives a statistical result of representativeness by systematically distorting it, as distinct from random error, which may distort on any one occasion but balances out on the average.” [26],[32] 

    Works cited

    [1] Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The Intelligence Community Data Management Lexicon. 2024. https://dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/IC_Data_Management_Lexicon.pdf   
    [2] National Security Agency et al. Deploying AI Systems Securely: Best Practices for Deploying Secure and Resilient AI Systems. 2024. https://media.defense.gov/2024/Apr/15/2003439257/-1/-1/0/CSI-DEPLOYING-AI-SYSTEMS-SECURELY.PDF  
    [3] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). NIST AI 100-1: Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework (AI RMF 1.0). 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-1  
    [4] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-37 Rev. 2: Guide for Applying the Risk Management Framework to Federal Information Systems. 2018. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2  
    [5] NIST. Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.204  
    [6] NIST. FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.205  
    [7] Bommasani, R. et al. On the Opportunities and Risks of Foundation Models. arXiv:2108.07258v3. 2022. https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.07258v3  
    [8] Securing Artificial Intelligence (SAI); Data Supply Chain Security. ESTI GR SAI 002 V1.1.1. 2021. https://etsi.org/deliver/etsi_gr/SAI/001_099/002/01.01.01_60/gr_SAI002v010101p.pdf  
    [9] National Cyber Security Centre et al. Guidelines for Secure AI System Development. 2023. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/files/Guidelines-for-secure-AI-system-development.pdf  
    [10] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-207: Zero Trust Architecture. 2020. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-207  
    [11] NIST. NIST IR 8496 ipd: Data Classification Concepts and Considerations for Improving Data Protection. 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8496.ipd  
    [12] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), NSA, and NIST. Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography. 2023. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/quantum-readiness-migration-post-quantum-cryptography 
    [13] NIST. FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.203  
    [14] NIST. NIST SP 800-52 Rev. 2: Guidelines for the Selection, Configuration, and Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) Implementations. 2019. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-52r2  
    [15] NIST. FIPS 140-3, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. 2019. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-3    
    [16] NIST. FIPS 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules. 2001. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.140-2  
    [17] NIST. NIST AI 100-2e2023: Trustworthy and Responsible AI, Adversarial Machine Learning: A Taxonomy and Terminology of Attacks and Mitigations. 2024. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.100-2e2023  
    [18] Adak, M. F., Kose, Z. N., & Akpinar, M. Dynamic Data Masking by Two-Step Encryption. In 2023 Innovations in Intelligent Systems and Applications Conference (ASYU) (pp. 1-5). IEEE. 2023 https://doi.org/10.1109/ASYU58738.2023.10296545    
    [19] Kairouz, P. et al. Advances and Open Problems in Federated Learning. Foundations and Trends in Machine Learning 14 (1-2): 1-210. arXiv:1912.04977. 2021. https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.04977  
    [20] NIST. NIST SP 800-88 Rev. 1: Guidelines for Media Sanitization. 2014. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-88r1  
    [21] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-3 Rev. 2: Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy. 2018. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r2  
    [22] U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Preparedness Series June 2023: Risks and Mitigation Strategies for Adversarial Artificial Intelligence Threats: A DHS S&T Study. 2023. https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-12/23_1222_st_risks_mitigation_strategies.pdf  
    [23] Bender, E. M., & Friedman, B. Data Statements for Natural Language Processing: Toward Mitigating System Bias and Enabling Better Science. Transactions of the Association for Computational Linguistics (TACL) 6, 587–604. 2018. https://doi.org/10.1162/tacl_a_00041  
    [24] NSA et al. Content Credentials: Strengthening Multimedia Integrity in the Generative AI Era. 2025. https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jan/29/2003634788/-1/-1/0/CSI-CONTENT-CREDENTIALS.PDF  
    [25] Executive Order (EO) 14179: “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence” https://www.federalregister.gov/executive-order/14179   
    [26] NIST. NIST Special Publication 1270: Framework for Identifying and Managing Bias in Artificial Intelligence. 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1270  
    [27] NIST. NIST AI 600-1: Artificial Intelligence Risk Management Framework: Generative Artificial Intelligence Profile. 2023. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.AI.600-1  
    [28] Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP). AI Exchange. #Moretraindata. https://owaspai.org/goto/moretraindata/  
    [29] Carlini, N. et al. Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical. arXiv:2302.10149. 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.10149  
    [30] Kore, A., Abbasi Bavil, E., Subasri, V., Abdalla, M., Fine, B., Dolatabadi, E., & Abdalla, M. Empirical Data Drift Detection Experiments on Real-World Medical Image Data. Nature Communications 15, 1887. 2024. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-46142-w  
    [31] NIST. NIST Special Publication 800-208: Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes. 2020. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-208  
    [32] The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Glossary of statistical terms. 2008. https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264055087-en  
    [33] NIST. NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5: Security and Privacy Controls for Information Systems and Organizations. 2020. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r5 
    [34] OWASP. AI Exchange. How to select relevant threats and controls? risk analysis. https://owaspai.org/goto/riskanalysis/  

    Disclaimer of Endorsement

    The information and opinions contained in this document are provided “as is” and without any warranties or guarantees. Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government, and this guidance shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

    Purpose

    This document was developed in furtherance of the authoring organizations’ cybersecurity missions, including their responsibilities to identify and disseminate threats, and to develop and issue cybersecurity specifications and mitigations. This information may be shared broadly to reach all appropriate stakeholders. 

    Notice of Generative AI Use

    Generative AI technology was carefully and responsibly used in the development of this document. The authors maintain ultimate responsibility for the accuracy of the information provided herein.

    Contact 

    U.S. Organizations

    National Security Agency

    Australian organizations

    • Visit cyber.gov.au/report or call 1300 292 371 (1300 CYBER1) to report cybersecurity incidents and vulnerabilities.

    New Zealand organizations

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: ‘Make America Smoggy Again:’ Governor Newsom responds to illegal Senate vote aiming to undo state’s clean air policies

    Source: US State of California 2

    May 22, 2025

    What you need to know: Governor Newsom announced California will fight the U.S. Senate’s illegal vote aiming to undo key parts of the state’s clean vehicles program in court.

    SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom and Attorney General Rob Bonta announced today the state will file a lawsuit as Republicans in the U.S. Senate target California’s clean vehicles program – a move that will “Make America Smoggy Again.”

    The Republican-controlled Senate is illegally using the Congressional Review Act (CRA) to attempt to revoke California’s Clean Air Act waivers, which authorize California’s clean cars and trucks program. This defies decades of precedent of these waivers not being subject to the CRA, and contradicts the non-partisan Government Accountability Office and Senate Parliamentarian, who both ruled that the CRA’s short-circuited process does not apply to the waivers.

    “This Senate vote is illegal. Republicans went around their own parliamentarian to defy decades of precedent. We won’t stand by as Trump Republicans make America smoggy again — undoing work that goes back to the days of Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan — all while ceding our economic future to China. We’re going to fight this unconstitutional attack on California in court.”

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    The state’s efforts to clean its air ramped up under then-Governor Ronald Reagan when he established the California Air Resources Board. California’s Clean Air Act waivers date back to the Nixon Administration – allowing the state to set standards necessary for cleaning up some of the worst air pollution in the country. 

    “With these votes, Senate Republicans are bending the knee to President Trump once again,” said Attorney General Rob Bonta. “The weaponization of the Congressional Review Act to attack California’s waivers is just another part of the continuous, partisan campaign against California’s efforts to protect the public and the planet from harmful pollution. As we have said before, this reckless misuse of the Congressional Review Act is unlawful, and California will not stand idly by. We need to hold the line on strong emissions standards and keep the waivers in place, and we will sue to defend California’s waivers.”

    California’s clean air authority

    Since the Clean Air Act was adopted in 1970, the U.S. EPA has granted California more than 100 waivers for its clean air and climate efforts. California has consistently demonstrated that its standards are feasible, and that manufacturers have enough lead time to develop the technology to meet them. It has done so for every waiver it has submitted. 

    Although California standards have dramatically improved air quality, the state’s conditions, including its unique geography means air quality goals still require continued progress on vehicle emissions. Five of the ten cities with the worst air pollution nationwide are in California. Ten million Californians in the San Joaquin Valley and Los Angeles air basins currently live under what is known as “severe nonattainment” conditions for ozone. People in these areas suffer unusually high rates of asthma and cardiopulmonary disease. Zero-emission vehicles are a critical part of the plan to protect Californians.

    If upheld, the Republican rollback of these three regulations – against the rulings of the Senate Parliamentarian and GAO – would cost Californian taxpayers an estimated $45 billion in health care costs. 

    Making driving less affordable

    With today’s efforts by Congressional Republicans, not only are they trying to make clean air a thing of the past, they’re making driving a car more expensive. Zero-emission vehicles are often less expensive than their gas counterparts due to avoiding the need to pay for gasoline at the pump and smaller costs associated with maintenance and repair over the years. The regulations would provide $91 billion in cumulative net relief and economic benefits to Californians between next year and 2040.

    Giving the keys to China

    Despite being home to the technologies that have pioneered the clean car industry, the U.S. is rapidly ceding its dominance to China. 

    In the first quarter of this year, global electric vehicle sales rose by 35%, primarily driven by the growing affordability of electric models. China is the world’s EV manufacturing hub, responsible for more than 70% of global production, with Chinese imports making up three-quarters of the increase in EV sales across all emerging economies outside of China in 2024. Meanwhile, the U.S. is a net importer of electric vehicles.

    California’s climate leadership

    Pollution is down and the economy is up. Greenhouse gas emissions in California are down 20% since 2000 – even as the state’s GDP increased 78% in that same time period.

    The state continues to set clean energy records. Last year, California ran on 100% clean electricity for the equivalent of 51 days – with the grid running on 100% clean energy for some period two out of every three days. Since the beginning of the Newsom Administration, battery storage is up to over 15,000 megawatts – a 1,900%+ increase.

    Press releases, Recent news

    Recent news

    May 22, 2025

    News What you need to know: The Pacific Coast Highway, which was closed following the Palisades Fire, will reopen to public travel ahead of schedule this Friday in advance of Memorial Day Holiday.  LOS ANGELES – Following through on his commitment to reopen a critical…

    May 22, 2025

    News Sacramento, California – Governor Gavin Newsom today issued a proclamation declaring May 22, 2025, as “Harvey Milk Day.”The text of the proclamation and a copy can be found below: PROCLAMATIONToday, we honor Harvey Milk – a hero for not just his own community,…

    May 21, 2025

    News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:Armen Meyer, of San Francisco, has been appointed Senior Deputy Commissioner for the Division of Consumer Financial Protection at the California Department of Financial Protection and…

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: THE PCH IS REOPENING: Governor Newsom, local partners will reopen the iconic roadway ahead of schedule and in time for Memorial Day Weekend

    Source: US State of California 2

    May 22, 2025

    What you need to know: The Pacific Coast Highway, which was closed following the Palisades Fire, will reopen to public travel ahead of schedule this Friday in advance of Memorial Day Holiday. 

    LOS ANGELES – Following through on his commitment to reopen a critical stretch of highway that connects beach communities and businesses in Los Angeles in time for the busy summer season, Governor Gavin Newsom today announced that State Route 1/Pacific Coast Highway (PCH) will reopen to all drivers at 8 a.m. Friday, May 23, in time for the Memorial Day weekend. 

    The opening comes ahead of schedule for the “end of May” deadline set by the Governor last month and with up to two lanes in each direction available to travelers. The roadway had previously only been open to first responders, construction crews and local residents. 

    “In California, we get stuff done, period. We’re opening the PCH back up early, with more lanes before Angelenos hit the road this Memorial Day. We are able to do this thanks to the tireless work of hundreds of construction and road crews and with help from our partners at the Army Corps of Engineers.”

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    The race to reopen the highway and clear parcels along the Pacific Ocean was performed in close coordination with local partners from the City and County of Los Angeles. All parties worked urgently to support local businesses who rely on summer visitors and tourism for critical revenue. 

    A robust security presence will remain at the neighborhood level following the highway reopening. Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass has directed LAPD to continue its increased deployment in the Palisades, including staffing check points 24 hours a day. 

    “The reopening of Pacific Coast Highway marks an important step forward in our recovery effort in the Palisades, which is on track to be the fastest in state history,” said Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass. “I thank Governor Newsom, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and partners at all levels of government for their partnership and collaboration as we work around the clock to get families home and businesses reopened. As Pacific Coast Highway reopens, we will continue to protect the safety and security of Palisades neighborhoods through a strict security plan established in coordination with the State. All of us have a shared goal – to ensure residents can safely and quickly rebuild and return to their community. We will continue working together toward that goal and recommit to clearing any barrier that stands in the way of recovery.” 

    Last month, the Governor directed his Office of Emergency Services and Caltrans to work closely with the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to prioritize the cleanup of parcels along PCH by surging additional crews into the area so that these parcels can be cleared of debris quickly. 

    With the busy summer months along the coast fast approaching, crews have worked around the clock – literally 24/7 – to demolish the damaged and collapsed homes, remove toxic ash and soot, repair the roadways, and install new utility equipment. 

    “I’m grateful to Governor Newsom and the State for their unwavering partnership in keeping the Pacific Palisades safe over the past four and a half months. The reopening of PCH marks an important milestone in our recovery, but the work is far from over. As we enter this next phase, safety must remain our top priority — for residents, workers, and everyone traveling along the coast. I look forward to continuing this collaboration as we accelerate our rebuilding work.” said Los Angeles City Councilwoman Traci Park, who represents the Palisades. 

    “Instead of having to hang a u-turn on PCH, Angelenos can now ‘hang ten’ with Malibu businesses and residents. I want to offer a big thanks to federal, state, and local partners who made this happen!” said Assemblymember Jacqui Irwin. 

    “I’m grateful for the men and women who have worked day-in and day-out to get us to this point and the support from the Administration and local partners that has helped make this recovery effort move quickly. The reopening of PCH is an important milestone that will relieve badly impacted businesses and help impacted communities get back on their feet,” said State Senator Ben Allen.

    “As we recover from the Palisades Fire, Governor Newsom’s reopening of PCH marks an important step in reconnecting our communities. Safety remains our top priority. Our Sheriff’s Department will have elevated patrols to ensure that both our unincorporated communities and the City of Malibu receive the public safety support needed during this transition. We must stay vigilant as debris removal and recovery efforts continue,” said Los Angeles County Supervisor Lindsey Horvath. 

    “I’m extremely proud of our teams and partners whose relentless dedication has led to the successful completion of more than 5,500 properties—representing over half of all currently eligible properties in both areas impacted by these devastating wildfires. Clearing critical areas along the Pacific Coast Highway has been particularly vital, given its sensitive ecological importance and its role as a lifeline for local communities. This effort exemplifies our unwavering commitment to environmental stewardship and community resilience,” said Brig. Gen. William Hannan, Commanding General, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Task Force Phoenix.

    “The reopening of Pacific Coast Highway marks an important step in Malibu’s ongoing recovery from the recent wildfires. While significant challenges remain, this development helps restore limited access for residents and travelers along the coast. We recognize the coordinated efforts by Governor Newsom’s office, Caltrans, the LA County Sheriff’s Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Guard in addressing fire debris removal. Their involvement has contributed to making this reopening possible, though much work lies ahead. The City remains focused on ensuring public safety as we enter the summer season, and we continue to monitor conditions closely,” said Malibu Mayor Marianne Riggins.

    “Pacific Palisades Chamber of Commerce is deeply grateful to Governor Newsom for hastening the cleanup and reopening of Pacific Coast Highway, and to the National Guard for protecting Malibu so diligently. Opening PCH will be like the sun finally rising after a long, dark night for Malibu’s remaining businesses, which have struggled valiantly to survive. Truly this is a moment of truth. Here’s hoping visitors will drive out, ready to enjoy the gorgeous beaches and take time to shop and dine. Malibu’s iconic town is counting on it,” said Malibu Pacific Palisades Chamber CEO Barbara Bruderlin.

    “The reopening of PCH is great news for Santa Monica and all beachfront businesses. The business community is ready to welcome back everyone to stunning ocean views, culinary delights at local restaurants, peaceful getaways at coastal hotels, and loads of fun on the Santa Monica Pier. Easy access to our vibrant coastal community is critical for businesses to thrive now more than ever,” said Santa Monica Chamber CEO Judy Kruger.

    This rapid pace of reopening PCH is part of a broader effort by the state to accelerate the cleanup and recovery from the devastating LA Fires. Previously, more than 9,000 properties were cleared of hazardous materials in record time and already more than 7,600 homes sites have been cleared of ash, soot and debris across Los Angeles and 5,600 lots have been signed off. The governor has also signed numerous executive orders to expedite the rebuilding process and cut red tape on permitting. 

    As part of the cleanup on PCH and in the Pacific Palisades more than 100 USACE crews (consisting of excavators, metal crushing equipment, and dump trucks) continue working to clear parcels damaged along the PCH removing nearly 1,284 truckloads of debris per day.

    What to Expect for Travelers 

    • Be aware that repairs will continue even after two lanes in both directions are opened to the public.
    • For the safety of repair crews and first responders, drivers are asked to please use caution while driving through the area, Move Over if possible, and slow down. A 25 mile per hour speed limit will remain in effect. 
    • Due to the volume of traffic expected over the holiday weekend and ongoing construction, drivers should expect delays on PCH. Please allow extra time for travel or find an alternate route to your destination.
    • Caltrans and CHP reminds drivers that traffic fines can be doubled in an active work zone.

    To stay up to date on the latest and track progress in wildfire recovery visit: https://www.ca.gov/LAfires/

    Press releases, Recent news

    Recent news

    May 22, 2025

    News Sacramento, California – Governor Gavin Newsom today issued a proclamation declaring May 22, 2025, as “Harvey Milk Day.”The text of the proclamation and a copy can be found below: PROCLAMATIONToday, we honor Harvey Milk – a hero for not just his own community,…

    May 21, 2025

    News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:Armen Meyer, of San Francisco, has been appointed Senior Deputy Commissioner for the Division of Consumer Financial Protection at the California Department of Financial Protection and…

    May 20, 2025

    News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:Matthew Read, of Sacramento, has been appointed Chief Counsel at the Governor’s Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation. Read has been Acting Chief Counsel at the Governor’s Office of…

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Newsom proclaims Harvey Milk Day 2025

    Source: US State of California 2

    May 22, 2025

    Sacramento, California – Governor Gavin Newsom today issued a proclamation declaring May 22, 2025, as “Harvey Milk Day.”

    The text of the proclamation and a copy can be found below:

    PROCLAMATION

    Today, we honor Harvey Milk – a hero for not just his own community, but for every Californian fighting for freedom and equality. Born on this day in 1930, Milk settled in San Francisco and found a thriving LGBTQ community that faced widespread hostility and had no voice in government.

    In response to injustice in the community, Milk began to organize fearlessly, working with labor and civil rights activists. He built coalitions on the idea that freedom and dignity should extend to all human beings, regardless of sexual orientation or identity.  

    His fierce advocacy for the LGBTQ community, and the community as a whole, helped him win a seat on San Francisco’s Board of Supervisors in 1977, making him one of the first openly gay elected officials in the United States and the first openly gay person elected in California. Just a year into his term on the Board, Milk was struck down by an assassin’s bullet.

    Although his time in office was brief, the scale and scope of his legacy are remarkable. Despite death threats and prejudice, Milk would not compromise on his values or commitment to either the LGBTQ community or San Franciscans more broadly, fighting for anti-discrimination laws and better community services like day care centers for working mothers and affordable housing. Before he was elected, Milk declared: “I have tasted freedom. I will not give up that which I have tasted.” Fighting for all those he served and represented, and doing so without shame, Milk showed people what the world could look like if we recognize the humanity in each other. 

    Milk’s powerful legacy remains salient, a reminder that we cannot and will not go back, even as we weather relentless attacks on the LGBTQ community. California stands firmly with the LGBTQ community in the fight for equality, freedom, and acceptance for all.

    NOW THEREFORE I, GAVIN NEWSOM, Governor of the State of California, do hereby proclaim May 22, 2025 as “Harvey Milk Day.”

    IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Great Seal of the State of California to be affixed this 21st day of May 2025.

    GAVIN NEWSOM
    Governor of California

    ATTEST:
    SHIRLEY N. WEBER, Ph.D.
    Secretary of State   

    Recent news

    May 21, 2025

    News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:Armen Meyer, of San Francisco, has been appointed Senior Deputy Commissioner for the Division of Consumer Financial Protection at the California Department of Financial Protection and…

    May 20, 2025

    News SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced the following appointments:Matthew Read, of Sacramento, has been appointed Chief Counsel at the Governor’s Office of Land Use and Climate Innovation. Read has been Acting Chief Counsel at the Governor’s Office of…

    May 20, 2025

    News What you need to know: Governor Newsom issued a statement today after U.S. Senate Republicans announced plans for an illegal vote this week that would undo California’s clean cars and trucks program. SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today issued a statement on…

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: 10th EU Day Against Impunity event emphasises protection of the independence and integrity of international judicial authorities who are investigating and prosecuting core international crime

    Source: Eurojust

    International judicial authorities are increasingly confronted with challenges such as sanctions, funding limitations, and lack of cooperation. These obstacles risk disrupting ongoing investigations and proceedings, ultimately undermining justice for the victims of some of the most heinous crimes.

    The opening remarks provided by Eurojust, the Polish Ministry of Justice and the European Commission, underscored the significance of international judicial institutions, including the International Criminal Court (ICC), in ensuring justice for core international crimes.

    Mr Michael Schmid, Eurojust President: Delivering justice for core international crimes is not optional. It is essential for security, stability and the rule of law. The EU Day Against Impunity reminds us that accountability cannot wait and that the EU will not look the other way. Together with independent international justice systems, we will be a force for accountability and make global justice part of who we are.

    Mr Adam Bodnar, Minister of Justice of Poland: Our unified European support for international accountability for war crimes is more important than ever. But we should not forget that independence of judicial authorities is one part of the story. The other is what we do in order to document war crimes and for this I’m grateful for Eurojust’s support and the work of authorities in other EU Member States.

    Mr Michael McGrath, European Commissioner for Democracy, Justice, the Rule of Law and Consumer Protection: The independence and impartiality of international judicial bodies are not negotiable. These institutions do not serve geopolitical interests; they serve the law; and the law serves the people it is enacted to protect.

    The event also featured a keynote address from Mr Frank Hoffmeister, Head of the Legal Department of the European External Action Service, as well as a panel discussion featuring representatives from the ICC, Council of Europe, civil society, and EU Member States. The panellists examined how these challenges undermine the effective delivery of justice and restrict victims’ access to it. They emphasised the urgent need for strong collaboration among states, international organisations, and civil society to safeguard the integrity and impartiality of judicial bodies in an increasingly complex landscape.

    Since 2016, Eurojust has joined the Genocide Prosecution Network, European Commission and Presidency of the Council of the EU to host an event on or around 23 May to raise awareness of the most heinous crimes and promote national investigations and prosecutions. In previous editions, they have discussed topics such as the cumulative prosecution of foreign terrorist fighters, accountability for core international crimes committed in Syria, and the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the 1994 genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda.

    These annual events highlight the efforts and commitment of EU Member States in enforcing international criminal law with the support of the EU. To see an overview of all previous editions, visit our website.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Meeting of 16-17 April 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    Account of the monetary policy meeting of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank held in Frankfurt am Main on Wednesday and Thursday, 16-17 April 2025

    22 May 2025

    1. Review of financial, economic and monetary developments and policy options

    Financial market developments

    Ms Schnabel recalled that President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 of unexpectedly high tariffs had sparked a sharp sell-off in global equity markets and in US bond markets, leading to a surge in financial market volatility. The severity of the tariffs and the manner in which they had been introduced had led to a breakdown of standard cross-market correlations, with a sell-off of US equities occurring at the same time as a sell-off of Treasuries in the context of a marked depreciation of the US dollar against major currencies.

    Movements in euro area risk-free rates reflected the opposing impacts of the historic German fiscal package and the global trade conflict. At the long end of the yield curve, the expected positive growth impulse from fiscal policy, as well as expectations of tighter monetary policy in the future, had been the dominant factors, pulling up nominal and real interest rates. At the short end of the yield curve, the decline in inflation compensation, driven mainly by falling inflation risk premia, had been larger than the rise in real yields, leading to a decline in nominal rates. These developments reflected both the negative fallout from tariffs and lower commodity prices. Investors expected the ECB to react to the evolving situation by lowering rates more than had previously been anticipated, but to start raising them again in the coming year. Amid the market turbulence, euro area bond markets had continued to function smoothly, and the bond supply had been absorbed well in the context of strong investor demand and well-functioning dealer intermediation. On the back of the sharp correction in stock prices and the marked appreciation of the euro exchange rate, financial conditions in the euro area had tightened, despite lower nominal short-term rates.

    Turning to market developments since the previous Governing Council meeting, President Trump’s announcement on 2 April 2025 had led the VIX volatility index to temporarily reach levels not seen since the COVID-19 pandemic. Within a few days the S&P 500 index had dropped by 12%, triggering sharp corrections in stock markets around the world, including in the euro area. Despite a rebound after the pausing of “reciprocal” tariffs on 9 April 2025, the US benchmark equity index had lost 8% in the year to date while euro area stock markets were almost back to the levels seen at the start of the year. Stocks in trade-sensitive US sectors had been hit much harder than other stocks, and they had also dropped by much more than their euro area counterparts.

    The market turbulence had spilled over to government bond markets, but the reaction had differed markedly between the euro area and the United States. US government bond yields had risen at the same time as the US equity sell-off, which was highly unusual because Treasury bonds normally benefited from safe-haven flows. US ten-year asset swap spreads had likewise risen sharply, which was also unusual. Meanwhile, Bund yields had declined and the spread between the Bund and overnight index swap (OIS) rates had narrowed substantially as German government bonds had continued to perform their role as a safe-haven asset.

    The risk-off sentiment had also affected the dynamics of the US dollar exchange rate, but this too had reacted differently from what would normally have been expected. In January 2025 the EUR/USD exchange rate had hit a low of 1.02, but the euro’s downward trend had been reversed around the time of the announcement in early March 2025 of the reform of the German debt brake, with a positive growth narrative for Europe emerging in light of higher defence and infrastructure spending. The euro exchange rate had received a second major boost after the 2 April tariff announcement in the United States. This strong upward move had not been driven, as was usually the case, by changes in the yield differential, which had moved in the opposite direction, but by US dollar weakness as investors had revised down their US growth expectations. Over recent weeks the US dollar had thus not benefited from the widespread risk-off mood.

    Recent developments had been reflected in global portfolio flows. The March 2025 round of the Bank of America Fund Manager Survey had recorded the strongest shift out of US equities on record, with 45% of managers reporting that they had reduced their positions. At the same time, a significant share of fund managers had reported that they had changed their positioning in favour of euro area equities. This marked a significant shift of perspectives away from US exceptionalism towards Europe being seen as the bright spot among major economies, given the expected fiscal boost in Germany and the pick-up in European defence spending.

    Dynamics in risk-free bond markets illustrated the opposing impacts of the German fiscal package and the tariff announcements over recent weeks. In the euro area, the overall increase in longer-term nominal interest rates had been driven by a rise in real rates, indicating that market participants viewed the German fiscal package as fostering long-term growth. Real rates had kept rising during the tariff tensions, as investors had continued to expect, on balance, an improved growth outlook for the euro area. By contrast, inflation compensation had decreased across the yield curve after increasing only briefly in response to the German fiscal package.

    Ms Schnabel then turned to the drivers of developments in euro area inflation compensation. On the one hand, bond market investors were pricing in higher inflation compensation owing to the expansionary German fiscal measures to be implemented over the next decade. On the other hand, concerns about the trade war had pulled inflation compensation lower, more than compensating for the impact of the German fiscal package on short to medium-term maturities. One important driver of the downward revision had been the sharp drop in oil prices in the wake of the tariff announcements and rising fears of a global recession.

    Market participants currently expected the ECB to implement a faster and deeper easing cycle towards a terminal rate of around 1.7% in May 2026. However, the ECB was expected to start raising rates again in 2026 in a J-curve pattern, with rate expectations picking up notably over longer horizons.

    In corporate bond markets, credit spreads had increased globally in response to the risk-off sentiment and the sharp sell-off in risk asset markets. However, the surge in US investment-grade corporate bond spreads had been more pronounced compared with developments in their euro area counterparts.

    Sovereign spreads had remained resilient over the past few weeks. The marked rise in the Bund yield after the announcement of the German fiscal package in March 2025 had not translated into an increase in sovereign spreads, which had even declined slightly at that time. The benign reaction of euro area government bond markets over recent weeks could be explained by expectations of positive economic spillovers from Germany to the rest of the euro area, possible prospects of increased European unity and, in the case of Italy, positive rating action.

    Government bond issuance in the euro area had continued to be absorbed well as investor demand had remained robust, with primary and secondary markets continuing to function smoothly. Higher volatility in government bond markets had not led to a meaningful deterioration in liquidity conditions, unlike in previous stress episodes. Hence, the turbulence in US Treasury markets had not had repercussions for the functioning of euro area sovereign bond markets.

    Ms Schnabel concluded by considering the implications of recent market developments for overall financial conditions. Since the March monetary policy meeting financial conditions had tightened, mainly owing to lower equity prices and a stronger nominal effective exchange rate of the euro, which had more than compensated for the easing impulse stemming from lower nominal short-term interest rates. Real rates had gradually shifted up across the yield curve. Overall, recent market developments might not only be a reflection of short-term market disturbances but also of a broader shift in global financial markets, with the euro area being one potential beneficiary.

    The global environment and economic and monetary developments in the euro area

    Starting with inflation in the euro area, Mr Lane stated that the disinflation process was well on track. Inflation had continued to develop as expected, with both headline inflation in the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) and core inflation (HICP inflation excluding energy and food) declining in March. Headline inflation had declined to 2.2% in March, from 2.3% in February. Energy inflation had decreased to -1.0%, in part owing to a sharper than expected decline in oil prices, while food inflation had increased to 2.9% on the back of higher unprocessed food prices. Core inflation had declined to 2.4% in March, from 2.6% in February. While goods inflation remained stable at 0.6%, there had been a marked downward adjustment in services inflation, which had dropped to 3.5% in March from 3.7% in February, confirming the more muted repricing momentum in some services that had been expected.

    Most exclusion-based measures of underlying inflation had eased further in March. The Persistent and Common Component of Inflation (PCCI), which had the best predictive power for future headline inflation, had decreased to 2.2% in March from 2.3% in February. Domestic inflation was unchanged in March after declining to 3.9% in February, down from 4.0% in January. The differential between domestic inflation and services inflation reflected the significant deceleration of inflation in the traded services segment seen in the recent data.

    Wage growth was moderating. The annual growth rate of compensation per employee had declined to 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 4.5% in the third quarter and below the March 2025 projection of 4.3%. Negotiated wage growth had also come in at 4.1% in the fourth quarter of 2024. According to the April round of the Corporate Telephone Survey, leading non-financial corporations in the euro area had reduced their wage growth expectations for 2025 to 3.0%, down from 3.6% in the previous survey round. Respondents to the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises had marked down their wage growth expectations for the next 12 months to 3.0%, from 3.3% in the last survey round. Looking ahead, the ECB wage tracker also pointed to a substantial decrease in annual growth of negotiated wages between 2024 and 2025, with one-off payments becoming a less dominant component of salary increases. Wage expectations reported in the Survey of Professional Forecasters and the Consensus Economics survey also signalled an easing of labour cost growth in 2025 compared with last year (between 0.7 and 1.0 percentage point), which was broadly in line with the March projections.

    Looking ahead, inflation was expected to hover close to the inflation target of 2% for the remainder of the year. Core inflation, and in particular services inflation, was expected to decline until mid-2025 as the effects from lagged repricing faded out, wage pressures receded, and past monetary policy tightening continued to feed through. Surveys confirmed this overall picture, while longer-term inflation expectations had remained well anchored around the 2% target. At the same time, market participants had markedly revised down their expectations for inflation over shorter horizons, with the one-year forward inflation-linked swap rates one year ahead, two years ahead and four years ahead declining by around 20 basis points to 1.6%, 1.7% and 1.9% respectively.

    Global growth was expected to have maintained its momentum in the first quarter of the year, with the global composite output Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) released on 3 April averaging 52.0. The manufacturing PMI had been recovering and stood above the threshold indicating expansion, while the services PMI had lost some momentum in advanced economies. However, global growth was likely to be negatively affected by the US-initiated increases in tariffs and the resulting financial market turmoil, which had come against the backdrop of already elevated geopolitical tensions.

    Triggered by concerns about global demand, oil and gas prices, along with other commodity prices, had declined sharply since 2 April. Compared with the assumption for the March projections, Brent crude oil prices were now approximately 10% lower in US dollar terms and 18.3% lower in euro terms. Gas prices stood 37% below the value embedded in the March projections. The euro had strengthened over recent weeks as investor sentiment had proven more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies, with the EUR/USD exchange rate up 9.6% and the nominal effective exchange rate up 5.5% compared with the assumptions for the March projections.

    Euro area economic growth had slowed to 0.2%, quarter on quarter, in the fourth quarter of 2024, down from 0.4% in the third quarter. This figure was 0.1 percentage points higher than had been foreseen in the March projections. As projected, growth had been entirely driven by domestic demand. The economy was also likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. The initial tariff announcements by the United States in early 2025 had so far seemed not to have materially dampened economic sentiment and might even have led to some frontloading of trade. However, some more recent surveys indicated a decline in sentiment. These included the latest Consumer Expectations Survey, the ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment and the Sentix Economic index.

    The labour market remained resilient. The unemployment rate had edged down to 6.1% in February. At the same time, labour demand was cooling. The job vacancy rate had remained unchanged at 2.5% in the fourth quarter of 2024 and now stood 0.8 percentage points below its peak in the second quarter of 2022. Total job postings and new postings were 16% and 26% lower respectively compared with a year ago. Additionally, fewer firms had reported that labour was a limiting factor for production. The employment PMI had remained broadly neutral in March at 50.4, pointing to stable employment conditions in the first quarter of 2025.

    Fiscal policies were identified as another potential source of resilience. Newly announced government measures were expected to have a relatively limited impact on the fiscal stance of the euro area compared with the assessment included in the March projections. But the scope for infrastructure investment and climate transition investment, as well as spending on defence in the largest euro area economy, had been substantially increased as a result of the loosening of the German debt brake, together with enhanced flexibility for greater spending on defence across euro area countries as a result of EU initiatives.

    The economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty, however. Downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and the associated uncertainty were likely to lower euro area growth by dampening exports and investment. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions and increased risk aversion, and could make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    Increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and the appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could raise inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also raise inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, risk-free interest rates had declined in response to the escalating trade tensions. However, the risk-free ten-year OIS rate was about 20 basis points higher than at the cut-off date for the March projections. Bank bond spreads had increased by nearly 30 basis points. Credit spreads had increased by 23 basis points for investment-grade corporate bonds and by as much as 95 basis points for the high-yield segment. The Eurostoxx index had fallen by around 4.8% since the cut-off date for the March projections, while indicators of market volatility had increased.

    The latest information on the availability and cost of credit for the broader economy predated the market tensions but continued to indicate a gradual normalisation in credit conditions, though with some mixed evidence. The interest rate on new loans to firms had declined by 15 basis points in February, to 4.1%, which was about 120 basis points below its October 2023 peak. However, interest rates on new mortgages had increased by 8 basis points in February, to 3.3%, which was around 70 basis points below their November 2023 peak. Loan growth was picking up at a moderate pace. Annual growth in bank lending to firms had increased to 2.2% in February, from 2.0% in January, amid marked month-on-month volatility. Corporate debt issuance had been weak in February, but the annual growth rate had stabilised at 3.2%. Lending to households had edged up further to 1.5% on an annual basis in February, from 1.3% in January, led by mortgages. According to the latest bank lending survey for the euro area, which had been conducted between 10 and 25 March 2025, credit standards had tightened slightly further for loans to firms and consumer credit in the first quarter, while there had been an easing of credit standards for mortgages. This evidence resonated with the results of the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises, which also showed almost unchanged availability of bank loans to firms in the first quarter, owing to concerns about the economic outlook and borrower creditworthiness, compounded by high uncertainty.

    Monetary policy considerations and policy options

    In summary, the incoming data confirmed that the disinflation process remained well on track. Both headline and core inflation in March had come in as expected. In particular, the projected drop in services inflation in March had been confirmed in the data and underpinned confidence in the underlying downward trajectory. The more forward-looking indicators of underlying inflation remained consistent with inflation settling at around the target in a sustained manner, with domestic inflation also coming down on the back of lower labour cost growth, which was decelerating somewhat faster than had been expected. The euro area economy had been building up some resilience against global shocks, but the outlook for growth had deteriorated materially owing to rising trade tensions. Increased uncertainty was likely to reduce confidence among households and firms, and the adverse and volatile market response to the recent trade tensions was likely to have a tightening impact on financing conditions and thereby further weigh on the euro area economic outlook.

    Based on this assessment, Mr Lane proposed lowering the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was rooted in its updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. A further cut at the present meeting was important in ensuring that inflation stabilised at the target in a sustainable manner, while also avoiding the possibility that external adverse shocks to the economic outlook could be exacerbated by too high a level of the policy rate.

    Looking ahead, it remained more important than ever to maintain agility in adjusting the stance as appropriate on a meeting-by-meeting basis and to not pre-commit to any particular rate path.

    2. Governing Council’s discussion and monetary policy decisions

    Economic, monetary and financial analyses

    Regarding global conditions, members stressed that the outlook for global growth was highly uncertain. In reaction to the frequent – and often contradictory – tariff announcements and retaliation over the last few weeks, the International Monetary Fund was currently revising its World Economic Outlook. Since the Governing Council’s last monetary policy meeting the euro had appreciated by 4.2% in nominal effective terms and by 6.4% against the US dollar, driven by market expectations of a narrowing growth differential between the euro area and the United States and possibly by a broad-based investor reassessment of the risk attached to exposures to the United States. Energy and food commodity prices had also declined sharply owing to growth concerns as the trade war intensified. The combined effect of a weakening dollar and declining oil and gas prices meant that, in euro terms, oil prices had fallen by 18.3% and gas prices by 37% since the March Governing Council meeting. Macroeconomic data did not yet reflect fully the ongoing trade war, which would only show through more clearly in the data during the second quarter of 2025. The composite output PMI for global activity excluding the euro area had remained broadly stable in March.

    Global trade was expected to slow significantly. This reflected lower imports primarily from the United States, China, Mexico and Canada – all countries with sizeable reciprocal trade relations. In the first quarter trade had still been strong owing to a rebound at the beginning of the year, in part driven by a frontloading of imports in anticipation of future tariffs. However, high-frequency and more timely data (based on vessel movements) had already started weakening, in particular for US imports. Private sector forecasts for US growth in 2025 had started trending down in the run-up to the 2 April tariff announcement. However, that event, together with the deterioration in financial conditions that followed, had led to a further downward revision to US GDP growth prospects for this year, as the high uncertainty around US policies was expected to hold back investment and economic activity. In this context the impact of the confidence channel was regarded as particularly important. While most economists had assumed that with higher tariffs and a trade war the US dollar would appreciate, the latest developments pointed to adverse confidence effects and the self-defeating nature of tariffs weakening the dollar. Private sector forecasts for Chinese growth in 2025 had also been revised down since early April, as the contribution from net exports – a key source of support for Chinese growth in 2024 – was expected to decline significantly this year. The Chinese Government’s announcement of additional fiscal support to boost consumption was seen as likely to only partially offset the loss of international trade.

    In general, protectionism and policy unpredictability were seen as the ultimate sources of distress. This raised the question of whether the impact of these factors could unwind when the policy approach that had generated them might reverse. Indeed, the view was expressed that mutually beneficial trade agreements could be reached, leading to a much more benign outcome. At the same time, it was argued that, first, a complete unwinding of the 2 April tariff policy announcement was unlikely and, second, even in the event of a complete policy turnaround, it was questionable whether the world economy could return to its previous status quo.

    The recent strong appreciation of the euro was largely explained by portfolio rebalancing due to growing concerns among investors about US economic policies and the risks that these posed to large exposures to the United States. Overall, the current state of the world economy was not regarded as being at an equilibrium, and it might take several years before the global economy reached a new equilibrium. For a long time the world had been in a configuration centred on the United States running large current account deficits, with optimistic consumers, high private sector investment rates and a large fiscal deficit.

    Looking ahead, two polar scenarios could be seen. One was a stabilisation of the situation, whereby the US current account deficit was structural and largely financed by capital inflows. In this situation, the ongoing portfolio rebalancing across currencies would eventually reverse in favour of the United States, leading to a renewed real appreciation of the US dollar, partly driven by relative price adjustments. However, recent events had eroded trust in the US system, and it was challenging to envisage how it might be restored.

    The other possible direction that the global order could take was a continuation of current rebalancing trends. Such a situation could lead temporarily to much higher US inflation as a result of the combined effects of tariffs and a potentially weaker exchange rate. More generally, the new equilibrium could entail high tariffs, an increase in home bias – for trade balance or security reasons – and a more fragmented world. This more fragmented environment was likely to be characterised by stronger inflationary pressures. In addition, the move to a new equilibrium would involve costly adjustment dynamics, as firms, households and governments would have to re-optimise in light of the new constellation, but also owing to the high levels of uncertainty in the transition period. In the meantime, the erosion of confidence in the US economy and in the global order of international trade and finance was expected to result in a higher global cost structure arising from protectionist policies and a higher risk premium arising from unpredictability. An intermediate scenario was also possible, in which the euro would become increasingly attractive, thus expanding its international role as a reserve currency.

    Overall, even if it was known with certainty where the new equilibrium lay, there would still be major adjustment dynamics along the way. In addition, as global supply chains had been shaped over the years to best adapt to the old equilibrium, they would need to adjust to the new one, with a likely loss of market value for those firms that had been most engaged in the old global order. Throughout this process there would be path dependence in the dynamics of the economy.

    With regard to economic activity in the euro area, members concurred that the economic outlook was clouded by exceptional uncertainty. Euro area exporters faced new barriers to trade, although the scope and nature of those barriers remained unclear. Disruptions to international commerce, financial market tensions and geopolitical uncertainty were weighing on business investment. As consumers became more cautious about the future, they might hold back from spending, thus delaying further the more robust consumption-led recovery that the staff projections had been foreseeing for a number of projection rounds.

    At the same time, the euro area economy had been building up some resilience against the global shocks. Domestic demand had contributed significantly to euro area growth in the fourth quarter of 2024, with business investment and private consumption growing robustly in spite of the already high uncertainty. The manufacturing output PMI had risen above 50 in March for the first time in two years, while the services business activity PMI had remained in expansionary territory, with relatively solid industrial production numbers confirming information from the soft indicators. While the trade conflict was a significant drag on foreign demand, the expected fiscal spending would counter some of those effects. The economy was likely to have grown in the first quarter of the year, and manufacturing had shown signs of stabilisation. Unemployment had fallen to 6.1% in February, its lowest level since the launch of the euro. Looking ahead, a strong labour market, higher real incomes and the impact of an easier monetary policy stance should underpin spending.

    For the near term, it was argued that the likely slump in trade and the surge in uncertainty were hitting the euro area at a critical juncture, when the recovery was still weak and fragile. It was seen as becoming increasingly clear that the impact of the trade shock might be very strong in terms of activity in the United States, with potentially substantial spillovers to the euro area. Even with the additional spending on defence and infrastructure, it was likely that, on balance, euro area growth would be worse in 2025 than previously expected. Incorporating the impact from the most recent escalation of trade tensions, potential retaliatory measures from the EU and the financial market turbulence of recent weeks could weaken activity in 2025 significantly. As a result, it was suggested that the probability of a recession over the next four quarters in the euro area and the United States had increased measurably.

    However, it was also argued that, while complicated, the situation still had upside potential. First, the strong market reaction might impose some discipline on the US Administration. Second, there was room for mutually beneficial trade agreements which would de-escalate the severity of the tariff increase threatened in the 2 April announcement. Regarding the fallout for growth, the ultimate effects of the new trade frictions would crucially depend on the substitutability of items imported by the United States. The bulk of exports from the euro area to the United States comprised pharmaceuticals, machinery, vehicles and chemicals, and these were highly differentiated products which were difficult to substitute away from in the short run. This rigidity would limit the drag on the euro area’s foreign demand. Moreover, the almost prohibitive tariffs between China and the United States were seen as likely to redirect demand towards euro area firms.

    A further factor that could attenuate the repercussions of trade frictions and uncertainty was the announcement of the German fiscal package and the step-up in European defence spending, which would raise domestic demand. This new factor was seen as unmitigated good news, as it would help to revive the European growth narrative and foster confidence in the euro area. What mattered was not only the direct effects of fiscal spending on demand and activity, but also the expected crowding-in of private investment in anticipation of the future fiscal stimulus. In the Corporate Telephone Survey, firms were already reporting that they were planning to enhance capacity in view of the defence and infrastructure initiatives. The Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises also pointed to greater optimism among firms on investment. Construction was set to recover further. It was therefore argued that the negative impact of tariffs could be seen as more or less the same size as the positive impact coming from the fiscal expansion in Germany. Of course, the time profiles of the impacts of the two major shocks – tariff increases and fiscal stimulus – were different. In the short term the negative effects on demand would dominate, as additional investment in defence and infrastructure would take time to come on stream and support growth.

    At the same time, the view was expressed that even in the medium term defence spending would not be a clear game changer, because it would not only materialise with a delay, but would likely lift euro area GDP growth by at most a couple of tenths of a percentage point. In any case, the fiscal stimulus was still uncertain in terms of its scale and modalities of implementation. In this context, it was noted that the reaction of the markets to the fiscal announcement from Germany suggested that the euro area economy was likely to respond to the new fiscal impulse with an increase in GDP and only a very mild increase in inflation. This demonstrated that the euro area economy was not seen as constrained by structural problems.

    Overall, members assessed that downside risks to economic growth had increased. The major escalation in global trade tensions and associated uncertainties would likely lower euro area growth by dampening exports, and it might drag down investment and consumption. Deteriorating financial market sentiment could lead to tighter financing conditions, increase risk aversion and make firms and households less willing to invest and consume. Geopolitical tensions, such as Russia’s unjustified war against Ukraine and the tragic conflict in the Middle East, also remained a major source of uncertainty. At the same time, an increase in defence and infrastructure spending would add to growth.

    In view of all the uncertainties surrounding the outlook, the view was expressed that for the coming meetings of the Governing Council it was important to develop alternative scenarios. These should factor in the prevailing very high level of uncertainty and assist in identifying the relevant channels and quantifying the impact on growth, jobs and inflation. In addition to scenario analysis, it was important to use high-frequency and unconventional sources of information to better understand the direction the economy was taking. There was also a need to broaden the set of indicators to be monitored, given the challenges in interpreting some of the standard statistics which were influenced and distorted by special factors such as the frontloading of orders and the associated build-up of inventories.

    A silver lining in the turbulent situation that Europe was facing was a strong impetus for European policymakers to swiftly implement the structural reforms set out in the reports by Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta. If effective, such concrete action had the potential to become a major tailwind for the euro area economy in the future, amplifying the stimulating effect of the additional fiscal spending that was planned in Germany. At the same time, it was cautioned that, to reap all the benefits from reform, Europe had to act quickly and on an ambitious scale.

    The important policy initiatives that had been launched at the national and EU levels to increase defence spending and infrastructure investment could be expected to bolster manufacturing, which was also reflected in recent surveys. In the present geopolitical environment, it was even more urgent for fiscal and structural policies to make the euro area economy more productive, competitive and resilient. The European Commission’s Competitiveness Compass provided a concrete roadmap for action, and its proposals, including on simplification, should be swiftly adopted. This included completing the savings and investment union, following a clear and ambitious timetable, which should help savers benefit from more opportunities to invest and improve firms’ access to finance, especially risk capital. It was also important to rapidly establish the legislative framework to prepare the ground for the potential introduction of a digital euro. Governments should ensure sustainable public finances in line with the EU’s economic governance framework and prioritise essential growth-enhancing structural reforms and strategic investment.

    With regard to price developments, members concurred with the assessment presented by Mr Lane. In spite of all remaining uncertainties, the recent inflation data releases had been broadly in line with the March ECB staff projections, with respect to both headline and core inflation. This suggested that inflation was on course for the 2% target, with long-term inflation expectations also remaining well anchored. Taking the February and March inflation data together, there was now much more confidence that the baseline scenario for inflation in the March projections was materialising. This held even without the appreciation of the euro or the decline in oil prices and commodity prices that had taken place since the finalisation of the projections.

    Looking ahead, it was argued that inflation would likely be lower in 2025 than foreseen in the March projections if the exchange rate and energy prices remained around their current levels. Recent market-based measures of inflation expectations also indicated that inflation might be falling faster than previously assumed. Inflation fixings now implied that investors expected inflation (excluding tobacco) to remain just below 2% in 2025 and to decline to around 1.2% in early 2026, before returning to around 1.6% by mid-2026. This signalled that risks to price stability might now be tilted to the downside, especially in the near term. The latest information also suggested that wage growth was moderating at a slightly faster pace than previously expected. Over a longer horizon, the tighter financial conditions, including the appreciation of the euro, the sharp drop in oil and gas prices and the headwinds from weaker economic activity, were seen as important new factors dampening inflation. There was now a risk that inflation could fall well below 2% at least over the remainder of the current year. Trade diversion and price concessions by Chinese exporters could also compound the ongoing depreciation of the renminbi and exert further downward effects on inflation, if not countered by measures by the European Commission. If there were to be retaliation against the tariffs imposed on US imports from the euro area, the direct inflationary impact could be counterbalanced by other factors, including the exchange rate, weaker raw material prices or possibly tighter financial conditions. Over the short term, the countervailing effects from increased fiscal spending were, moreover, unlikely to offset the further disinflationary pressures emanating from the international environment.

    At the same time, it was underlined that upside risks had not vanished. The rising momentum that had been detected in the PCCI indicators of underlying inflation warranted monitoring to confirm whether this increase was temporary and related to repricing early in the year in line with previous seasonal patterns. Although market-based measures of inflation compensation had fallen significantly, owing to lower inflation risk premia, genuine inflation expectations had been revised to a much lesser extent, and analysts’ inflation expectations were mostly well above inflation fixings. It also had to be considered that the likely re-flattening of the Phillips curve, which reflected among other things less frequent price adjustments, implied that meaningful downward deviations of inflation from target were unlikely in the absence of a deep and protracted recession. But such an event had a low probability in light of the expected fiscal impulse. In addition, the precise impact of the stronger euro was uncertain, especially given that one of the reasons behind the appreciation was a positive confidence shock as Europe offered stability in turbulent times. Moreover, successful trade negotiations and the resolution of trade disputes could give a boost to energy prices, changing the inflation picture very quickly. Finally, while the newly announced fiscal stimulus was unlikely to cause inflationary pressure over the short term in view of the underutilised capacities, the economy was likely to bump up against capacity constraints over the medium term, especially in the labour market. Indeed, inflation expectations reported in the Consumer Expectations Survey, the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises and the Survey of Professional Forecasters remained tilted to the upside over longer horizons. It was argued that, taken as a whole, the current environment posed some downside risks to inflation over the short run, but notable upside risks over the medium term. If retaliation against US tariffs affected products that were hard to substitute, such as intermediate goods, the inflationary impact could be sizeable and persistent as higher input costs from tariffs would be gradually passed on to consumers. This could more than offset the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand. The closely interconnected global trade system implied that tariffs might be passed along entire supply chains. The need to absorb tariffs in profit margins at a time when these were already squeezed because of high wage growth would increase the probability and strength of the pass-through. Upside risks to inflation over the medium term were seen to hold especially in a scenario in which the trade war led to a permanently more fragmented global economy, owing to a less efficient allocation of resources, more fragile supply chains and less elastic global supply.

    Overall, increasing global trade disruptions were adding more uncertainty to the outlook for euro area inflation. Falling global energy prices and an appreciation of the euro could put further downward pressure on inflation. This could be reinforced by lower demand for euro area exports owing to higher tariffs and by a re-routing of exports into the euro area from countries with overcapacity. Adverse financial market reactions to the trade tensions could weigh on domestic demand and thereby also lead to lower inflation. By contrast, a fragmentation of global supply chains could increase inflation by pushing up import prices. A boost in defence and infrastructure spending could also lift inflation over the medium term. Extreme weather events, and the unfolding climate crisis more broadly, could drive up food prices by more than expected.

    Turning to the monetary and financial analysis, members highlighted that the period since the 5-6 March meeting had been characterised by exceptional financial market volatility. This had led to some financial data indicating sizeable daily moves that were several standard deviations away from their mean. Risk-free interest rates had declined since the March meeting in response to the escalating trade tensions, although long-term risk-free rates were still higher than at the cut-off date for the March staff projections. Equity prices had fallen amid high volatility and corporate bond spreads had widened around the globe. Partly in response to the turmoil, financial markets were now fully pricing in the expectation of a 25 basis point rate cut at the current meeting.

    The euro had strengthened considerably over recent weeks as investor sentiment proved more resilient towards the euro area than towards other economies. While the appreciation of the euro had been sizeable, since the inception of the euro the bilateral EUR/USD exchange rate had fluctuated in a relatively wide band, with the rate currently somewhere in the middle of the range. The recent adjustment across asset prices was atypical, as the financial market turbulence had come together with a rebalancing of international portfolios away from US assets towards exposures to other regions, such as the euro area. One explanation, which was supported by the coincidental weakening of the US dollar and by some initial market intelligence, was that domestic and foreign investors had moved out of US assets, possibly reflecting a loss of confidence in US fiscal and trade policies.

    Turning to broader financing conditions, the latest official statistics on corporate borrowing, which predated the market tensions, continued to indicate that past interest rate cuts had made it less expensive for firms to borrow. The average interest rate on new loans to firms had declined to 4.1% in February, from 4.3% in January. The cost to firms of issuing market-based debt had declined to 3.5% in February but there had been some upward pressure more recently. Moreover, growth in lending to firms had picked up again in February, to 2.2%, while debt securities issuance by firms had grown at an unchanged rate of 3.2%. At the same time, credit standards for business loans had tightened slightly again in the first quarter of 2025, as reported in the April round of the bank lending survey. This was mainly because banks were becoming more concerned about the economic risks faced by their customers. Demand for loans to firms had decreased slightly in the first quarter, after a modest recovery in previous quarters.

    The average rate on new mortgages, at 3.3% in February, had risen on the back of earlier increases in longer-term market rates. Mortgage lending had continued to strengthen in February, albeit at a still subdued annual rate of 1.5%, as banks had eased their credit standards and households’ demand for loans had continued to increase strongly.

    Monetary policy stance and policy considerations

    Turning to the monetary policy stance, members assessed the data that had become available since the last monetary policy meeting in accordance with the three main elements that the Governing Council had communicated in 2023 as shaping its reaction function. These comprised (i) the implications of the incoming economic and financial data for the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation, and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Starting with the inflation outlook, members widely agreed that the latest data, including the HICP inflation figures for February and March and recent outturns for services inflation, provided further evidence that the disinflationary process was well on track. They thus expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target in line with the March baseline projections.

    However, the March baseline projections had not incorporated the latest US policy announcements, which had increased downside risks to growth and inflation over the short term. The most recent forces at play, such as the negative demand shock linked to the tariff proposals and the related pervasive uncertainty, the appreciation of the euro and the decline in oil and gas prices, would further dampen the inflation outlook in the near term.

    Over the medium term the picture for inflation remained more mixed, as the effects of fiscal spending, retaliatory tariffs and the disruption of value chains might point in different directions, with each shock having an impact on growth and inflation with a different time profile. It was pointed out that the inflationary effects of tariffs might outweigh the disinflationary pressure from reduced foreign demand over the medium term, especially if the European Union retaliated by imposing tariffs on products that were not easily substitutable, such as intermediate goods. As a result, firms might suffer from rising input costs that would, over time, be passed on to consumers as the erosion of profit margins made cost absorption difficult. If this occurred at the same time as the support to economic activity from fiscal policy kicked in, there would be a significant risk of higher inflation. Overall, it was too early to draw firm conclusions at a time when many trade policy options were still on the table.

    Turning to underlying inflation, members concurred that most indicators were pointing to a sustained return of inflation to the 2% medium-term target. Wage growth had been slowing further – slightly faster than expected. In view of the high uncertainty, companies were also likely to be cautious about accepting high wage demands. Domestic inflation had remained unchanged, after falling slightly in February. This suggested that inflation had been quite stubborn despite the marked decline in services inflation, although progress had also been seen in this indicator when looking back over the past six months. The PCCI, which had the best leading indicator properties for inflation and still showed rising momentum, warranted further monitoring.

    Finally, incoming data confirmed that the transmission of monetary tightening remained largely as intended. Bank credit growth was overall on a gradual, slow recovery path, although from quite subdued levels. Nevertheless, it was increasing somewhat more strongly than had previously been expected for both non-financial corporations and households. There had been an easing of credit standards and strong demand for housing loans, which could foreshadow a pick-up in construction activity. At the same time, market-based indicators pointed to a tightening of financial conditions and, despite recent interest rate cuts, the latest round of the bank lending survey pointed to tighter credit standards for both firms and consumer credit. This was due to anticipated higher default risks against a background of weaker growth. Moreover, uncertainty had been very high and, in the presence of high uncertainty, the response of intermediaries to lower risk-free rates and, more generally, the transmission mechanism of monetary policy, were seen as more sluggish.

    Monetary policy decisions and communication

    Against this background, all members agreed with the proposal by Mr Lane to lower the three key ECB interest rates by 25 basis points. In particular, lowering the deposit facility rate – the rate through which the Governing Council steered the monetary policy stance – was justified by the updated assessment of the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. Members expressed increased confidence that inflation would return to target over the medium term and that the fight against the inflation shock was nearly over.

    Some members indicated that, before the US tariff announcement on 2 April, they had considered a pause to rate cuts at the current meeting to be appropriate, preferring to wait for the next round of projections for greater clarity on the medium-term inflation outlook. These members attached a higher probability to the possibility that the trade shock would be inflationary beyond the short term, in view of the destructive effects of breaking up global value chains. While the inflationary effects of the proposed tariffs might differ for the United States and Europe, the pandemic experience had shown that, despite different weights attached to demand versus supply factors, in the end inflation developments in the two economies had been quite synchronous, and the same might occur again this time. Overall, this pointed to upside risks to inflation in the medium to long term that counterbalanced the downside risks stemming from weaker economic activity. However, recent events had convinced these members that cutting interest rates at the current meeting provided some insurance against negative outcomes and avoided contributing to additional uncertainty in times of financial market volatility. In addition, a cut at the present meeting could be seen as frontloading a possible cut at the June meeting, which underlined the need to retain full optionality for the upcoming meetings.

    At the same time, it was felt that the tariff tensions did not seem to come with the inflationary effects that many members had previously associated with such an event, at least not over the short to medium-term horizons. In part, this was because the euro was seemingly turning into more of a safe-haven currency and was subject to revaluation pressures. Disinflationary forces were thus likely to dominate in the short term. In addition, the growth outlook had weakened, with tariffs, related uncertainty and geopolitical tensions acting as a drag. In this regard, it was argued that a 25 basis point rate cut would lean against the substantial risks to growth in the short term and the tightening of financial conditions that had resulted from the tariff events, without the risk of fuelling inflation further down the line.

    In these turbulent times, members stressed the need to be a beacon of stability, thus instilling confidence and not causing more surprises in an already volatile environment, which might amplify market turbulence. This spoke in favour of a 25 basis point cut.

    A standard 25 basis point rate reduction was seen as consistent with the fact that, while very uncertain, the range of potential outcomes from the current situation still entailed some upside risks to inflation for the euro area economy. On the one hand, countervailing forces that would bring the US Administration to change course could eventually emerge. One such force had been the observed outflows from the US Treasuries market, which might have contributed to the 90-day pause applied to most US tariffs. On the other hand, there had been – and could be further – mitigating factors in the euro area. These included a more growth-supportive fiscal outlook as well as an opportunity to make swift progress on other European policy initiatives. Another factor potentially protecting against more adverse scenarios could be a stronger commitment by the Chinese Government to domestic demand-led growth in China. In addition, a possible structural increase in international demand for the euro, while entailing downside risks to inflation, was also a symptom of a largely positive development, namely a shift into European assets. A portfolio shift could lower long-term interest rates in the euro area and lead to cheaper financing for planned investment projects. Finally, the appreciation of the euro would further reduce the price of energy imports in euro terms, which could counterbalance some of the negative effects of the tariffs and the exchange rate on energy-intensive exporters.

    These arguments notwithstanding, a few members noted that they could have felt comfortable with a 50 basis point rate cut. These members attached more weight to the change in the balance of risks since the Governing Council’s March meeting, pointing out that downside risks to growth had increased and, even in the event of a relatively mild trade conflict, uncertainty was already discouraging consumption and investment. In this context, they emphasised that downside risks to inflation had clearly increased. The same members also argued that a larger interest rate cut could have offset more of the recent tightening of financial conditions, including higher corporate bond spreads and lower equity prices, which had weakened the transmission of past monetary policy decisions. In this respect it was argued that surprising the markets should not be excluded, and it was recalled that there had been previous cases in which the Governing Council had not shied away from surprises when appropriate.

    At the same time, it was argued that the optimal monetary policy response depended on the outcome of tariff negotiations, including the scope of the tariffs and the extent of potential retaliation, and on how tariffs fed through global supply chains. The view was also expressed that a forward-looking central bank should only act forcefully to the tariff shock if it expected a sharp deterioration in labour market conditions or an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside. However, the initial conditions, featuring a still resilient labour market and elevated momentum in underlying inflation and services inflation, made such a scenario unlikely. Moreover, the economy was coming out of a high-inflation period with consumers’ and firms’ inflation expectations one year ahead still standing at almost 3%. In such a situation, an unanchoring of inflation expectations to the downside was highly unlikely, while the higher than expected food and services inflation in March and rising momentum in services underlined the continued need to monitor inflation developments. If the decline in economic activity turned out to be short-lived, an accommodative response of monetary policy might, given transmission lags, exert its peak impact when the economy was already recovering and inflation was rising, and would therefore be misguided. It could also coincide with when fiscal policy was starting to boost domestic demand, although anticipation channels could lead to some of the impact of infrastructure and defence spending on inflation being smoothed out and dampened in the medium term. Finally, it was argued that cutting interest rates further could no longer be justified by the intention to return to neutral territory since, by various measures, monetary policy was no longer restrictive. Bank lending was recovering, domestic demand was expanding and the level of interest rates was contributing measurably to demand for all types of loan, as shown in the most recent bank lending survey.

    Looking ahead, members stressed that maintaining a data-dependent approach with full optionality at every meeting was warranted more than ever in view of the high uncertainty. Keeping a cautious approach and a firm commitment to price stability had contributed to the success so far, with inflation back on track despite unprecedented challenges. However, agility might be required in the present environment, with the need for the Governing Council to be ready to react quickly if necessary.

    Turning to communication aspects, members noted that it was time to remove the phrase “our monetary policy is becoming meaningfully less restrictive” from the monetary policy statement. Reference to a restrictive policy stance, in various formulations, had proven useful over past phases in which inflation had still been high, providing a clear message that monetary policy was contributing to disinflation. Such a signal was no longer needed. In the present conditions, dropping the sentence avoided the perception that the neutral level of interest rates was the end point of the current cycle, which was not necessarily the case. However, dropping the sentence did not imply that monetary policy had necessarily left restrictive territory. At the current juncture, there was no need to take a stand on whether monetary policy was still restrictive, already neutral or even moving into accommodative territory. Such a categorisation, especially in the current turbulent context, was very hard to provide. Instead, the change in wording was seen as consistent with an approach that was not guided by interest rate benchmarks but by the need to always determine the policy stance that was appropriate. In other words, policy would be set so as to provide the strongest assurance that inflation would be anchored sustainably at the medium-term target, given the set of initial conditions and the shocks that the Governing Council had to tackle at any given time.

    Members reiterated that the Governing Council remained determined to ensure that inflation would stabilise sustainably at its 2% medium-term target. Its interest rate decisions would continue to be based on its assessment of the inflation outlook in light of the incoming economic and financial data, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission. While noting that markets were functioning in an orderly manner, it was seen as helpful to reiterate that the Governing Council stood ready to adjust all instruments within the ECB’s mandate to ensure that inflation stabilised sustainably at the medium-term target and to preserve the smooth functioning of monetary policy transmission.

    Taking into account the foregoing discussion among the members, upon a proposal by the President, the Governing Council took the monetary policy decisions as set out in the monetary policy press release. The members of the Governing Council subsequently finalised the monetary policy statement, which the President and the Vice-President would, as usual, deliver at the press conference following the Governing Council meeting.

    Monetary policy statement

    Monetary policy statement for the press conference of 17 April 2025

    Press release

    Monetary policy decisions

    Meeting of the ECB’s Governing Council, 16-17 April 2025

    Members

    • Ms Lagarde, President
    • Mr de Guindos, Vice-President
    • Mr Centeno*
    • Mr Cipollone
    • Mr Demarco, temporarily replacing Mr Scicluna*
    • Mr Dolenc, Deputy Governor of Banka Slovenije
    • Mr Elderson
    • Mr Escrivá
    • Mr Holzmann*
    • Mr Kazāks
    • Mr Kažimír
    • Mr Knot*
    • Mr Lane
    • Mr Makhlouf
    • Mr Müller
    • Mr Nagel
    • Mr Panetta
    • Mr Patsalides
    • Mr Rehn
    • Mr Reinesch*
    • Ms Schnabel
    • Mr Šimkus
    • Mr Stournaras
    • Mr Villeroy de Galhau
    • Mr Vujčić
    • Mr Wunsch

    * Members not holding a voting right in April 2025 under Article 10.2 of the ESCB Statute.

    Other attendees

    • Mr Dombrovskis, Commissioner**
    • Ms Senkovic, Secretary, Director General Secretariat
    • Mr Rostagno, Secretary for monetary policy, Director General Monetary Policy
    • Mr Winkler, Deputy Secretary for monetary policy, Senior Adviser, DG Monetary Policy

    ** In accordance with Article 284 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

    Accompanying persons

    • Mr Arpa
    • Ms Bénassy-Quéré
    • Mr Debrun
    • Mr Gavilán
    • Mr Kaasik
    • Mr Kelly
    • Mr Koukoularides
    • Mr Kroes
    • Mr Lünnemann
    • Ms Mauderer
    • Mr Martin
    • Mr Nicoletti Altimari
    • Mr Novo
    • Mr Rutkaste
    • Ms Schembri
    • Mr Šiaudinis
    • Mr Šošić
    • Mr Välimäki
    • Ms Žumer Šujica

    Other ECB staff

    • Mr Proissl, Director General Communications
    • Mr Straub, Counsellor to the President
    • Ms Rahmouni-Rousseau, Director General Market Operations
    • Mr Arce, Director General Economics
    • Mr Sousa, Deputy Director General Economics

    Release of the next monetary policy account foreseen on 3 July 2025.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon reports preliminary results of shareholder vote at 2025 annual meeting

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon reports preliminary results of shareholder vote at 2025 annual meeting

    BASKING RIDGE, NJ – Verizon Communications Inc. (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) has announced preliminary results of the shareholder vote at its annual meeting, which was held today in a virtual-only format.

    Verizon’s shareholders elected each of Verizon’s 10 directors to a one-year term. Shareholders also voted in favor of two management proposals:

    • Approved the compensation of the company’s named executive officers as described in the 2025 proxy statement; and
    • Ratified the appointment of Ernst & Young LLP as the company’s independent registered public accounting firm.

    All three shareholder proposals were defeated: issue report on climate lobbying alignment; issue  report on lead-sheathed cables; and assess risks related to discrimination in advertising services.

    Vote tallies are considered preliminary until the final results are tabulated and certified by independent inspectors of election. The final results will be posted on Verizon’s website at www.verizon.com/about/investors.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: DG Okonjo-Iweala, IPU Secretary General Chungong urge parliaments to ratify WTO Fisheries Agreement

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Adopted at the WTO’s 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) in June 2022, the Agreement tackles some of the most harmful forms of fisheries subsidies, including those that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, the depletion of overfished stocks, and unregulated high seas fishing.

    “We are on the verge of a major milestone,” said WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo- Iweala. “This Agreement is not only about preserving deteriorating fish stocks: it is about people’s livelihoods and food security. It’s about responding to problems of the global commons – and demonstrating that the multilateral trading system is delivering global public goods. We need 12 more acceptances to bring it into force. It is now time for the remaining parliaments to take action. This is about improving economic and environmental sustainability – it would be wonderful if we can get this done in time for next month’s 2025 United Nations Oceans Conference in France.”

    IPU Secretary General Martin Chungong added: “Parliaments are the vital link between global agreements and national action. By ratifying this Agreement, they can help restore marine ecosystems, support livelihoods and show that multilateralism works.”

    The joint call for action builds on the letter sent by the IPU Secretary General and the WTO Director-General in September 2023 encouraging parliamentarians to get involved in the campaign to promote the ratification of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies.

    The upcoming 2025 United Nations Oceans Conference, taking place from 9 to 13 June in Nice, France, presents a timely opportunity for the Agreement’s ratification and entry into force, building political momentum for action to address rapidly deteriorating fish stocks.

    A prompt entry into force of the Agreement would send a powerful signal of global resolve to implement Sustainable Development Goal 14.6, which aims to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies and promote the sustainable use of marine resources.

    The 2022 Agreement has already shown that WTO members can deliver meaningful multilateral outcomes, even amid geopolitical tensions and economic uncertainty. Finalizing ongoing negotiations on additional disciplines to address subsidies contributing to overcapacity and overfishing would further strengthen efforts toward long-term sustainability.

    The Agreement holds particular significance for coastal communities in small, vulnerable economies (SVEs) and least-developed countries (LDCs), which depend heavily on marine resources for food security, employment, and economic resilience. Many SVEs and LDCs have already ratified the Agreement, recognizing its potential to preserve marine ecosystems and advance fairness in ocean governance. Even landlocked members see value in the Agreement because it helps address food insecurity. The full list of WTO members that have deposited their instruments of acceptance is available here.

    The WTO Fisheries Funding Mechanism (Fish Fund) is ready to become operational once the Agreement enters into force. In collaboration with international partners, the Fund will provide technical assistance and capacity-building to developing economies that have ratified the Agreement. More information is available here.

    The WTO Secretariat and the IPU reaffirm their commitment to working with national and regional parliaments through technical briefings, outreach activities, and targeted support to ensure swift ratification and effective implementation of the Agreement.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Frank Elderson: Nature’s bell tolls for thee, economy!

    Source: European Central Bank

    Keynote speech by Frank Elderson, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board of the ECB, at the Naturalis Biodiversity Center

    Leiden, 22 May 2025

    Thank you for inviting me to speak at this annual biodiversity dinner. The wide range of speakers here this evening – on international biodiversity day – is testament to the relevance of biodiversity across disciplines.

    Nature isn’t just the roots and shoots of biologists, macroecologists and natural scientists. Beyond its intrinsic value, nature provides vital services that are relevant for all of us – for entrepreneurs, workers, policymakers and bankers, but also for central bankers and financial supervisors.

    A thriving natural environment provides vital benefits that sustain our well-being and serve as a crucial driving force for the global economy. Think of fertile soils, pollination, timber, fishing stocks, clean water and clean air.

    But we are well aware of the daunting facts that confirm the dire state of ecosystem services. Intensive land use, the climate crisis, pollution, overexploitation and other human pressures are rapidly and severely damaging our natural resources.

    75% of land surface ecosystems and 66% of ocean ecosystems have been damaged, degraded or modified.

    We are using natural resources 1.7 times faster than ecosystems can regenerate them. Consequently, the contribution that nature can make to our economies – and our way of life – is steadily diminishing every day.

    These fateful facts and figures confront us as vividly as Edvard Munch’s iconic scream. Yet, accounting for nature and the services it provides is challenging. What nature provides to the economy is typically not measured directly in statistics like GDP.

    We price portfolios instead of pollinators, we monitor markets instead of mangroves and we watch wages instead of water supplies. However, the reality is that while our economies are heavily reliant on ecosystem services, the economic value of those pollinators, mangroves and water supplies is not sufficiently taken into account.

    Nature is too often still wrongly seen as a free good, readily available and abundant in supply, without opportunity costs. For such a good, there is no market – and therefore no price.

    So, why can’t governments intervene by pricing and creating a market for nature as has been done for emissions?

    Unlike for the climate crisis – which can be quantified through carbon emissions and their direct links to rising temperatures – there is no single metric that can be used to quantify the wide range of ecosystem services.

    What is the common denominator of clean air, fertile soils and coasts protected by mangrove forests? Nature is beautifully complex, but this complexity makes it harder to establish a market for nature than a market for climate, such as the carbon markets created through emissions trading systems.

    For central banks to effectively fulfil their mandates, we need to enhance our capacity to measure the vital services that nature provides to our economy and identify the financial risks caused by the degradation of these services. And while this is admittedly not an easy task, it is encouraging that multiple stakeholders are making progress, including academia, firms and also the ECB. We are enhancing our tools, methodologies and data to assess the economic implications of ecosystems and their degradation. And I am pleased to be able to share some of our latest insights this evening.

    I will argue that while nature services may appear to be freely available, they are in fact not abundant at all and there are substantial costs to using and losing them. Costs that we currently overlook when headlines report on GDP growth.

    Accounting for nature in monetary policy and banking supervision

    Nature being of vital importance for the economy and the financial system is hardly a novel insight. Besides scientists, a number of central banks and prudential supervisors have also been highlighting their interlinkages for several years now.[1] And while the climate crisis has received most of the attention, it is encouraging that work on nature-related risks has also significantly evolved.

    Moreover, the ECB has taken significant steps to account for nature-related risks in the pursuit of its mandate. For instance, we take into account the effects nature degradation can have on banks’ balance sheets. The degradation of nature could damage companies’ production processes and consequently weaken their creditworthiness, which might in turn impair loans granted by banks. In our role as the supervisor of Europe’s largest banks, we therefore aim to ensure that the banks we supervise adequately manage both climate-related and nature-related risks.[2] Encouragingly, we are seeing a growing set of good practices among the banks we supervise in terms of identifying, quantifying and managing nature-related risks.

    But are we fully aware of – and sufficiently alert to – how nature degradation could eventually hit balance sheets?

    Advancing our understanding does not mean that economists and supervisors should start studying ants in Aragon, ladybirds in Lombardy or honeybees in Holland (although it is very important that entomologists do!).

    Instead, central banks and supervisors need to gain a better understanding of just how vulnerable the economy and the financial system are to nature degradation.[3]

    Capturing the risks related to ecosystem degradation

    An ECB study in 2023 found that nearly 75% of banks’ corporate lending goes to firms that are highly dependent on at least one ecosystem service.[4] This finding underscores just how interconnected nature, the economy and the financial system really are.[5] But that study does not tell us exactly how much of our economic activity is at risk, or which economic sectors and regions will be most affected.

    To better understand this impact, the ECB has teamed up with the Resilient Planet Finance Lab at the University of Oxford.

    The interdisciplinary team has developed systemic risk indicators that move beyond dependency analysis to a comprehensive assessment of nature-related financial risks. In essence, this indicator assesses the economic implications of the deteriorating state of ecosystems. It shows how much of the economic value added by a particular industry– what economists call “gross value added” – is at risk when ecosystem services degrade. Tomorrow we will publish a blog post showing some of the preliminary results of our work, but I can already share some findings with you this evening.

    Water – the natural currency underwriting purchases, investments and trades

    Our preliminary findings indicate two things. First, water – too little, too much or too dirty water that is –has been identified as posing the most significant risk to the euro area economy. Losses related to water scarcity, poor water quality and flood protection emerge as the most critical from a value added perspective. Concretely, surface water scarcity alone puts almost 15% of the euro area’s economic output at risk. This is not surprising because water is not just any resource – it is one of the most essential natural resources we possess. Second, agriculture is the most exposed sector, as it would suffer the largest proportional output losses due to a decline in surface water. But other sectors are also likely to be significantly affected.

    Chart 1

    Proportion of national gross value added (GVA) at risk due to surface water scarcity in Europe and globally (supply chain risks)

    Water is, for instance, an indispensable resource in industry. In the Netherlands, industry alone uses over 2.6 trillion litres of fresh water a year.[6] This water usage is more than three times the total annual water consumption of all households in the Netherlands. Water is also essential for energy production, not only in hydropower plants but also in thermal power plants – including nuclear – where it is used for cooling and steam generation. It is consumed in vast quantities for mining and mineral processing, which are crucial for the energy transition, as well as in the construction sector for producing concrete, to name just a few examples.

    The risk posed by water scarcity is not hypothetical, we are already experiencing the impact today. I am sure that many of you remember when the summers of 2018, 2019 and 2020 brought severe droughts and heatwaves even to the Netherlands. In 2018 alone, economic losses in the Netherlands were up to €1.9 billion for agriculture and €155 million for shipping, with widespread but hard-to-quantify damage to ecosystems. This year’s drought is especially alarming: spring 2025 is on track to become the driest ever recorded in the Netherlands, likely surpassing the previous record set nearly 50 years ago. And droughts are only projected to increase further as the climate crisis continues to develop. Worryingly, in the driest scenario an average summer in the 2040s will be about as dry as an extremely dry summer now.

    Effective water management will thus be crucial for sustaining production. However, the risk persists that during periods of drought, production might need to be scaled down. Some industrial processes may become economically unviable and might need to relocate.

    For example, some have even gone as far as to point at a risk that more frequent droughts could render traditional tulip-growing regions such as the Bollenstreek unsuitable for bulb cultivation.[7] This may compel growers to explore better-positioned locations where water is more reliably available to safeguard the iconic Dutch tulip industry.

    Hence, as a consequence of water scarcity, our economies could produce less, and production costs are likely to rise during any inevitable transition phase.

    Let me also point out that biodiversity is a critical – and often underestimated – factor in ensuring the availability and quality of fresh water. Ecosystems such as forests and wetlands regulate the quantity, timing and purity of water flows by stabilising soils and filtering pollutants. Maintaining healthy and diverse ecosystems will be crucial for resilient water provisioning as climate change intensifies, particularly in regions facing growing water stress.

    Beyond these macroeconomic impacts, ecosystem degradation can significantly affect financial stability, for example through the loans that banks grant to households and firms. In essence, the greater the impact on firms, the higher the risk of defaults and the higher the risk on banks’ balance sheets.

    For example, in our research with the University of Oxford we found that more than 34% of banks’ total outstanding nominal amount – over €1.3 trillion – is currently extended to sectors exposed to high water scarcity risk.

    As the next step in our research, we will examine changes in the probability of default in the sectors most affected by dwindling ecosystems. Think about it as stress-testing the resilience of banks’ credit portfolios to nature degradation. We plan to publish these results later this year, complete with a more in-depth analysis on the topic, so stay tuned.

    Multiple stakeholders are taking action

    Encouragingly, our work with the University of Oxford is not an isolated case. We are in fact seeing a wide range of stakeholders taking action to better account for ecosystem services.

    For instance, I hear that our host this evening – the Naturalis Biodiversity Center – has teamed up with banks to combine insights from science and finance to further develop indicators quantifying ecosystem services.

    We are also seeing a growing set of good practices among the banks we supervise in terms of identifying, quantifying and managing nature-related risks. Banks typically conduct materiality assessments to understand where they are most affected. And banks also grapple with the challenge that nature-related risks are difficult to express in a single metric. Once they know where they are exposed, they then typically conduct deep dives on specific topics.

    One bank, for example, has conducted a quantitative scenario analysis to understand how the profitability of its customers could be affected if a water pollution tax were to be implemented.

    Other banks design customer scorecards and engage with the most vulnerable counterparties, sometimes offering small discounts or other incentives when customers meet key performance indicators that increase their resilience.

    It is also encouraging that progress is being made at the international level. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS) – a network of 145 central banks and supervisors from around the world – has developed a conceptual framework offering central banks and supervisors a common understanding of nature-related financial risks and a principle-based risk assessment approach.[8][9] And the Financial Stability Board recently took stock of supervisory and regulatory initiatives among its members, finding that a growing number of financial authorities are considering the potential implications of nature-related risks for the financial sector.[10]

    So scientists, banks, policymakers and supervisors are in fact taking action. That’s good news. Given the high level of uncertainty regarding impacts, non-linearities, tipping points and irreversibility, continuous scientific input and engagement are essential to determine the transmission channels from nature to our economies.

    Reliable and comparable data are key to managing risks and identifying opportunities

    Before I conclude, let me stress a vital enabler to better measure ecosystem services: data. Closer cooperation with natural scientists can help us better understand the data they have available on the status of nature and the ecosystem services it provides. The National Hub for Biodiversity Information provided by our host tonight is an excellent example.[11]

    Moreover, continuous engagement with the scientific community can also help improve our understanding of non-linearities, tipping points and the irreversibility of the biodiversity crisis.

    Similarly, the availability of reliable and comparable data from companies is essential for us to know where the risks are hiding and where opportunities can be found. Such data can, for example, provide insights into companies’ reliance on fresh water for their production processes. In this context, the reporting requirements in the EU’s sustainable finance framework are not merely a “nice to have”, they are providing indispensable information about financial risks and are a solution to the patchwork of different reporting criteria.

    Does that mean that there is no room for simplification? Does it mean that there is no room to ease the reporting burden on smaller firms?

    Of course not.

    As the ECB noted in its recent opinion[And they do!
    Send not to know
    For whom the bell tolls.
    It tolls for thee, ECOnomy!

    Thank you for your attention.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: UK: Immigration stats reveal Government substituting ‘one form of unfairness for another’

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Responding to the Government’s latest immigration figures released today (22 May), Steve Valdez-Symonds, Amnesty International UK’s Refugee and Migrant Rights Director, said:

    “Today’s figures make clear that the Home Office asylum backlog is not going away. The Government continues to refuse asylum to thousands of people seeking safety – including Afghans, Iranians and Eritreans – despite the real and ongoing dangers they face.

    “Deciding people’s claims but not doing this safely simply replaces one form of unfairness and inefficiency with another. Instead of resolving the backlog, the Government is shifting it, leaving many people still in limbo only moved to the appeals process.

    “Leadership requires accepting responsibilities, not passing these on – whether to other parts of the system or onto other countries.

    “We urge the Government to focus on making the asylum system fair and efficient – one that assesses each claim on its true merit – rather than wrongly denying asylum to some in the cruel hope this may deter others from seeking it.”

    Rates of asylum being granted to people coming from Afghanistan, Iran and Eritrea fell despite there being no real improvement in these countries. According to the immigration figures released today for year ending March 2025, only 44% of Afghans were granted asylum down from 98%; 58% Iranians down from 84% and 86% Eritreans down from 99% compared to a year ago.

    View latest press releases

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Mali: Investigation into executions of civilians in Diafarabé must be conducted urgently

    Source: Amnesty International –

    The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and Amnesty International condemn the extrajudicial executions of around 20 civilians committed, according to witnesses, by the Malian armed forces (FAMa) accompanied by Dozo militia fighters in Diafarabé, a commune in the cercle of Ténenkou in the Mopti Region.

    The two organizations are calling on Malian judicial authorities for an independent, impartial and diligent investigation to shed light on these incidents and bring the perpetrators to justice. FIDH and Amnesty International denounce the serious crimes repeatedly committed against civilians by the warring parties in the context of the conflict in Mali. The events that occurred in Diafarabé may constitute war crimes.

    The two organizations are warning the international community and Mali’s international partners about the urgent need to take concrete measures to support both the fight against impunity and victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparations.

    Initially, they arrested at least 30 people […] they released anyone who wasn’t Fulani.

    A survivor

    On Monday, 12 May, the day of the weekly market in Diafarabé, during a patrol around 10 Malian soldiers accompanied by Dozo militia fighters from Diafarabé and surrounding areas arrested at least 30 men at the local livestock market, according to witnesses interviewed by the two organizations. Though some were released immediately, between 23 and 27 men were taken, bound, blindfolded and transported onto canoes on the south bank of the river, before their throats were slit and their bodies buried in mass graves.

    One survivor recounted: “On Monday, at around 11am, six soldiers in plain clothes arrived at the small livestock market, followed by uniformed FAMa soldiers. They surrounded the market and started arresting people. Initially, they arrested at least 30 people, but after quickly checking their ethnicity, they released anyone who wasn’t Fulani. They tied our arms and blindfolded us. They led us to the opposite bank, near the Danguere Mamba cemetery some distance from the village. Once we arrived at the place where they had already dug pits, the soldiers and the Dozo militia fighters began slitting people’s throats one by one. I wasn’t tied up properly, so I lowered the blindfold covering my eyes and saw them slitting the throat of my older brother, who was the third victim. I fled as they slit the fourth person’s throat. They tried to shoot me twice, but I managed to reach the river and swim across. I want to make it clear that Dozos, including some from Nouh Bozo, participated in these executions.” 

    Immediately after 12 May, the people of Diafarabé denounced the arrests and organized spontaneous protests to demand information about the fate of their husbands and relatives.

    Some of us were able to identify our relatives from among the victims.

    A member of the delegation that went to the site

    One of the female protesters explained to FIDH and Amnesty International: “We tried to go to the scene of crime to see for ourselves because we had heard two gunshots, but the soldiers stopped us. They told us that the people who had been arrested were alive and promised to bring them back to us the next day. This did not happen. On 14 May, a delegation of military authorities came from Mopti to listen to the locals. That’s when we received confirmation that our loved ones were gone forever, because they acknowledged their execution and promised to punish the perpetrators.”

    At around 5pm on 15 May, with the military’s permission, local councillors, traditional authorities and victims’ relatives crossed the river to view the victims’ remains.

    One of the members of the delegation told FIDH and Amnesty International: “To prevent us from filming the crime scene and bodies, the military prevented us from carrying smartphones to the scene. When we arrived, we saw the stacked, rotting corpses of our slaughtered loved ones. Some of us were still able to identify our relatives from among the victims. There were about 22 bodies. When we returned, the women began the ritual mourning of their husbands because everyone now knew that they had been killed by the military.”

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Moran Applauds House Passage of ‘One, Big, Beautiful Bill’ to Reignite the American Dream

    Source: Congressman Nathaniel Moran (R-TX-01)

    Today, Congressman Nathaniel Moran (R-TX-01) released the following statement after the House passed the “One, Big, Beautiful Bill,” sending it to the Senate for consideration:

     

    Washington, D.C.—Today, Congressman Nathaniel Moran (R-TX-01) released the following statement after the House passed the “One, Big, Beautiful Bill,” sending it to the Senate for consideration:

    “With today’s passage of the One, Big, Beautiful Bill, House Republicans delivered on the promises we made to the American people. This legislation puts working families, small businesses, and rural communities back at the center of our economic future—right where they belong.

    “In Texas’ First Congressional District, where the median income is just $62,000, a family of four was on track to see their taxes increase by over $1,100—a staggering 22% hike—had we failed to act. That’s six weeks’ worth of groceries. That’s money that could fix a truck, invest in a small business, or be saved for a child’s future. By passing this bill, we’ve protected those hard-earned dollars. But more than that, we’ve advanced liberty by empowering families, workers, and small businesses to thrive without the government taking more of what they earn. This bill expands opportunity, restores dignity in work, and strengthens the American Dream. That’s worth fighting for.”


    Watch Congressman Moran’s Full Remarks     HERE

    Background on the “One, Big, Beautiful Bill”: 

    For Small Businesses:

    • Makes permanent the 199A small business deduction and expands to 23%, supporting over 1 million new jobs and generating $750 billion in economic growth

    • Reinstates immediate expensing for R&D

    • Revitalizes American manufacturing by renewing 100% immediate expensing for new factories, equipment, and facility improvements

    • Doubles section 179 Small Business Expensing to $2.5 million, allowing small businesses to invest in their employees

    • Reduces administrative burdens by repealing the Democrats’ $600 1099-K gig worker rule, and re-setting it to $2,000 threshold

    For Families:

    • Expands tax relief for families and seniors—including no tax on tips, relief on car loan interest, tax relief for those working overtime, and additional tax relief for seniors

    • Expands the enhanced standard deduction and increases the Child Tax Credit for over 40 millions families

    • Empowers working families through permanent paid leave tax credits, expanded child care access, and new savings accounts for every child at birth

    • Increases access to the Adoption Tax Credit for those families looking to change the lives of our little ones through the gift of adoption

    For Rural America:

    • Protects family farms and rural small businesses by making the doubled Death Tax exemption permanent and increasing it

    • Revives and expands Opportunity Zones to bring $100 billion in investment to rural and distressed communities

    • Unleashes rural growth with 100% expensing for new factories, agricultural improvements, and equipment—empowering producers to expand and invest 

    For the Broader Economy:

    What’s at Stake:

    • Without this bill, a family of four earning the national median income ($80,610) will face a $1,695 tax hike starting in 2026—equal to 9 weeks of groceries

    • In Texas’ First Congressional District, families earning the median income of $62,182 will see a $1,142 increase—a staggering 22% spike in their tax bill

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: LaMalfa Applauds House Passage of Budget Reconciliation Package

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Doug LaMalfa 1st District of California

    Washington, D.C.—Congressman Doug LaMalfa (R-Richvale) released the following statement after the House passed the budget reconciliation package.

    “This bill is the course correction we desperately needed. For years, taxpayers have been footing the bill for wasteful programs, unchecked spending, and handouts to people gaming the system,” said Rep. LaMalfa. “It delivers a significant tax cut, providing relief for working families and much needed reforms to government spending. It starts the process of eliminating fraud in programs like Medicaid and SNAP. It also includes major wins for folks in the West, allocating $2 billion to expand water storage, and much needed funding for the Secure Rural Schools program. It’s a big win across the board, and I’m happy to see the House pass this crucial piece of legislation.”

    Background:

    • Tax Relief for Working Americans: Delivers significant tax cuts, cutting tax bills by about 15% for Americans earning $30,000–$80,000. No tax on tips or overtime.
    • Medicaid and SNAP Reform: Ends benefits for 1.4 million illegal immigrants and restores work requirements for able-bodied adults receiving assistance.
    • Support for Farmers: Strengthens crop insurance and conservation tools without adding red tape.
    • Water Storage Expansion: Includes $2 billion to upgrade and expand Bureau of Reclamation surface water storage, helping the West store more water in wet years.
    • Secure Rural Schools: Provides a 3-year reauthorization of SRS to support education in rural areas with large amounts of federal land.
    • Energy and Resource Development: Repeals Green New Deal-style handouts and boosts American oil, gas, and mineral production.
    • Border Security and Immigration Enforcement: Fully funds Trump’s border wall, ramps up deportations, and hires thousands of new ICE and Border Patrol agents.

    Congressman Doug LaMalfa is Chairman of the Congressional Western Caucus and a lifelong farmer representing California’s First Congressional District, including Butte, Colusa, Glenn, Lassen, Modoc, Shasta, Siskiyou, Sutter, Tehama and Yuba Counties.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI: Intchains Group Limited Reports First Quarter 2025 Unaudited Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Total revenues of US$18.2 million exceeds guidance, up 445.5% YoY

    Total ETH-based cryptocurrency units were approximately 7,023, up 23.2% QoQ

    Income from operations reach US$5.1 million, achieving turnaround from prior-year period

    SINGAPORE, May 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Intchains Group Limited (Nasdaq: ICG) (“we,” or the “Company”), a company that engages in the provision of altcoin mining products, the strategic acquisition and holding of Ethereum-based cryptocurrencies, and the active development of innovative Web3 applications, today announced its unaudited financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2025.

    First Quarter 2025 Operating and Financial Highlights

    • Sales Volume of Altcoin Mining Products Measured by Number of Embedded ASIC Chips: Since we offer a wide range of altcoin mining products, with each unit incorporating anywhere from tens to hundreds of ASIC chips, it is more meaningful to measure the sales of our altcoin mining products by the number of embedded ASIC chips. Our sales volume of ASIC chips for Q1 2025 was 709,857 units, compared to 494,235 units for the same period last year, representing an increase of 43.6%.
    • Revenue: Our revenue for Q1 2025 reached RMB132.4 million (US$18.2 million), reflecting a increase of 445.5% from RMB24.3 million for the same period of 2024.
    • Income/(Loss) from Operations: We recorded income from operations of RMB36.9 million (US$5.1 million) for Q1 2025, compared to a loss from operations of RMB34.6 million for the same period of 2024.
    • Net Loss: Our net loss for Q1 2025 was RMB34.0 million (US$4.7 million), reflecting an increase of 129.8% from RMB14.8 million for the same period in 2024.
    • Non-GAAP Adjusted Net Loss: Non-GAAP adjusted net loss in the first quarter of 2025 was RMB32.0 million (US$4.4 million), reflecting an increase of 139.6% from RMB13.3 million for the same period in 2024. Non-GAAP adjusted net loss excludes share-based compensation expenses. For further information, please refer to “Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures” in this press release.
    • Cryptocurrencies: As of March 31, 2024, the fair value of our cryptocurrency assets other than stablecoins such as USDT and USDC was RMB101.6 million (US$14.0 million), primarily comprised of approximately 7,023 ETH-based cryptocurrencies, valued at RMB93.7 million (US$13.1 million).

    Intchains Group Achieves Milestones in Innovative Solutions and Cryptocurrency Strategy

    Mr. Qiang Ding, Chairman of the Board of Directors and Chief Executive Officer, commented, “In the first quarter of 2025, the cryptocurrency market encountered considerable headwinds. Nevertheless, the Company demonstrated agility and foresight by promptly launching the Aleo series mining machines in response to shifting market dynamics. These altcoin mining machines delivered substantial profitability for miners amid challenging macro market conditions while driving sustainable corporate growth –further validating our expertise in altcoin mining machine innovations and our competitive edge through differentiated market positioning.

    In addition, the Company introduced Goldshell Byte, an innovative dual-mining machine. This milestone reflects the Company’s unique capability to design and manufacture advanced mining machines spanning multiple altcoin protocols. The modular design—featuring a standard miner with pluggable mining cards—offers strategic flexibility for miners and encourages wider participation by retail users. Its compact, home-friendly form factor further promotes widespread participation in the decentralized network.

    During the quarter, small- and mid-cap cryptocurrencies, including Ethereum, experienced downward pressure. Despite this, the Company remained committed to its long-term dollar-cost averaging strategy. As of March 31, 2025, the Company held approximately 7,023 ETH, representing a 23.2% increase quarter-over-quarter.

    In the second quarter of 2025, Ethereum completed its Pectra upgrade, and the Ethereum Foundation reaffirmed its long-term vision with the appointment of a new board of directors. The Company views these developments as positive signals and continues to believe in the enduring value of blockchain technology. As a long-term accumulator of Ethereum, the Company will continue to build its position in alignment with its strategic outlook on decentralized applications.”

    First Quarter 2025 Financial Results

    Revenue

    Revenue was RMB132.4 million (US$18.2 million) for the first quarter of 2025, representing an increase of 445.5% from RMB24.3 million for the same period in 2024. The substantial growth was primarily driven by strong market demand for our newly-launched Aleo series mining machines, which accounted for 74.8% of the total revenue for the first quarter of 2025.

    Cost of Revenue

    Cost of revenue was RMB57.0 million (US$7.9 million) for the first quarter of 2025, representing an increase of 273.8% from RMB15.3 million for the same period of 2024. The percentage increase in cost of revenue was lower than the percentage increase in our revenue, which was primarily due to the higher gross margins for the Aleo series mining machines sold in the first quarter of 2025.

    Operating Expenses

    Total operating expenses were RMB38.4 million (US$5.3 million) for the first quarter of 2025, representing a decrease of 11.8% from RMB43.6 million for the same period of 2024. The decrease was primarily due to a decrease in research and development expenses, partially offset by an increase of general and administrative expenses.

    • Research and development expenses decreased by 27.9% to RMB26.4 million (US$3.6 million) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB36.5 million for the same period of 2024. The decrease was primarily due to lower expenses related to preliminary research costs conducted for new projects.
    • Sales and marketing expenses increased by 37.8% to RMB2.2 million (US$0.3 million) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB1.6 million for the same period of 2024, mainly driven by increased personnel-related expenses.
    • General and administrative expenses increased by 81.8% to RMB9.8 million (US$1.4 million) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB5.4 million for the same period of 2024, mainly driven by increased professional fees, as well as the personnel-related expenses.

    Interest Income

    Interest income decreased by 24.0% to RMB3.2 million (US$0.4 million) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB4.2 million for the same period of 2024, mainly due to a lower cash level resulting from our strategy of allocating part of our operating cash flow to acquire ETH-based cryptocurrencies.

    Change in fair value of cryptocurrencies

    Change in fair value of cryptocurrencies was RMB70.8 million (US$9.8 million) loss for the first quarter of 2025, compared to RMB5.4 million gain for the same period of 2024. The loss was primarily due to an approximately 46.0% decline in the price of ETH, while we simultaneously increased our holdings of ETH-based cryptocurrency as part of our ongoing ETH accumulation strategy.

    Other Income, Net

    Other income, net remained steady at RMB0.1 million and RMB0.2 million (US$0.03 million), respectively, for the first quarter of 2024 and 2025.

    Net Loss

    As a result of the foregoing, our net loss increased by 129.8% to RMB34.0 million (US$4.7 million) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB14.8 million for the same period of 2024.

    Non-GAAP Adjusted Net Loss

    Non-GAAP adjusted net loss increased by 139.6% to RMB32.0 million (US$4.4 million) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB13.3 million for the same period of 2024.

    Basic and Diluted Net Loss Per Ordinary Share

    Basic and diluted net loss per ordinary share both increased by 133.3% to RMB0.28 (US$0.04) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB0.12 for the same period of 2024.

    Non-GAAP Basic and Diluted Net Loss Per Ordinary Share

    Non-GAAP adjusted basic and diluted net loss per ordinary share increased by 145.5% to RMB0.27 (US$0.04) for the first quarter of 2025 from RMB0.11 for the same period of 2024. Each ADS represents two of the Company’s Class A ordinary shares.

    Recent Development

    Aleo Mining: In the first quarter of 2025, we led the market with the launch of our Aleo series mining machines, which were well-received by the crypto mining communities globally despite sustained macro market pressures. By the end of May 2025, we had released five key models of the Aleo series, which have demonstrated strong competitiveness in the PoW sector in terms of daily profitability.

    Goldshell Byte: On March 26, 2025, we officially launched Goldshell Byte, our latest flagship product, and an innovative dual-mining machine. Designed to allow miners to dynamically respond to market changes, Goldshell Byte combines standardized hardware with modular pluggable cards, drawing upon the our deep and extensive experience across multiple altcoin ecosystems. This innovation is expected to further strengthen our market position in the altcoin mining space.

    Conference Call Information

    The Company’s management team will host an earnings conference call to discuss its financial results at 8:00 PM U.S. Eastern Time on May 22, 2025 (8:00 AM Beijing Time on May 23, 2025). Details for the conference call are as follows:

    Event Title: Intchains Group Limited First Quarter 2025 Earnings Conference Call

    Date: May 22, 2025

    Time: 8:00 PM U.S. Eastern Time

    Registration Link: https://register-conf.media-server.com/register/BI0dda68e5b19a4a7daade5ed1cf188ed8

    All participants must use the link provided above to complete the online registration process in advance of the conference call. Upon registering, each participant will receive a set of dial-in numbers and a personal access PIN, which will be used to join the conference call.

    Additionally, a live and archived webcast of the conference call will also be available at the Company’s website at https://ir.intchains.com/.

    About Intchains Group Limited

    Intchains Group Limited is a company that engages in the provision of altcoin mining products, the strategic acquisition and holding of Ethereum-based cryptocurrencies, and the active development of innovative Web3 applications. For more information, please visit the Company’s website at: https://intchains.com/.

    Exchange Rate Information

    The unaudited United States dollar (“US$”) amounts disclosed in the accompanying financial statements are presented solely for the convenience of the readers. Translations of amounts from RMB into US$ for the convenience of the reader were calculated at the noon buying rate of US$1.00=RMB7.2567 on the last trading day of the first quarter of 2025 (March 31, 2025). No representation is made that the RMB amounts could have been, or could be, converted into US$ at such rate.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Certain statements in this announcement are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties and are based on the Company’s current expectations and projections about future events that the Company believes may affect its financial condition, results of operations, business strategy and financial needs. Forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements about: (i) our goals and strategies; (ii) our future business development, formed condition and results of operations; (iii) expected changes in our revenue, costs or expenditures; (iv) growth of and competition trends in our industry; (v) our expectations regarding demand for, and market acceptance of, our products; (vi) general economic and business conditions in the markets in which we operate; (vii) relevant government policies and regulations relating to our business and industry; (viii) fluctuations in the market price of ETH-based cryptocurrencies; gains or losses from the sale of ETH-based cryptocurrencies; changes in accounting treatment for the Company’s ETH-based cryptocurrencies holdings; a decrease in liquidity in the markets in which ETH-based cryptocurrencies are traded; security breaches, cyberattacks, unauthorized access, loss of private keys, fraud, or other events leading to the loss of the Company’s ETH-based cryptocurrencies; impacts to the price and rate of adoption of ETH-based cryptocurrencies associated with financial difficulties and bankruptcies of various participants in the industry; and (viii) assumptions underlying or related to any of the foregoing. Investors can identify these forward-looking statements by words or phrases such as “may,” “could,” “will,” “should,” “would,” “expect,” “plan,” “intend,” “anticipate,” “believe,” “estimate,” “predict,” “potential,” “project” or “continue” or the negative of these terms or other comparable terminology. The Company undertakes no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statements to reflect subsequent occurring events or circumstances, or changes in its expectations, except as may be required by law. Although the Company believes that the expectations expressed in these forward-looking statements are reasonable, it cannot assure you that such expectations will turn out to be correct, and the Company cautions investors that actual results may differ materially from the anticipated results and encourages investors to review other factors that may affect its future results in the Company’s registration statement and other filings with the SEC.

    Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    In evaluating Company’s business, the Company uses non-GAAP measures, such as adjusted income (loss) from operations and adjusted net income (loss), as supplemental measures to review and assess its operating performance. The Company defines adjusted income (loss) from operations as income (loss) from operations excluding share-based compensation expenses, and adjusted net income (loss) as net income (loss) excluding share-based compensation expenses. The Company believes that the non-GAAP financial measures provide useful information about the Company’s results of operations, enhance the overall understanding of the Company’s past performance and future prospects and allow for greater visibility with respect to key metrics used by the Company’s management in its financial and operational decision-making.

    The non-GAAP financial measures are not defined under U.S. GAAP and are not presented in accordance with U.S. GAAP. The non-GAAP financial measures have limitations as analytical tools and investors should not consider them in isolation, or as a substitute for net income, cash flows provided by operating activities or other consolidated statements of operations and cash flows data prepared in accordance with U.S. GAAP. One of the key limitations of using adjusted net income is that it does not reflect all of the items of income and expense that affect the Company’s operations. Share based compensation expenses have been and may continue to be incurred in Company’s business and are not reflected in the presentation of adjusted net income. Further, the non-GAAP financial measures may differ from the non-GAAP information used by other companies, including peer companies, and therefore their comparability may be limited. The Company mitigates these limitations by reconciling the non-GAAP financial measures to the most comparable U.S. GAAP performance measures, all of which should be considered when evaluating the Company’s performance.

    For investor and media inquiries, please contact:

    Intchains Group Limited
    Investor relations
    Email: ir@intchains.com

    Redhill
    Belinda Chan
    Tel: +852-9379-3045
    Email: belinda.chan@creativegp.com

    INTCHAINS GROUP LIMITED
    UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (All amounts in thousands, except share and per share data, or as otherwise noted)
      As of December 31,   As of March 31
      2024    2025
      RMB   RMB US$
    ASSETS        
    Current Assets：        
    Cash and cash equivalents 322,252     243,316   33,530
    USDC 1,690     3,458   476
    Cryptocurrency, current 30,079     11,674   1,609
    Inventories, net 98,614     92,494   12,746
    Prepayments and other current assets, net 69,703     67,857   9,351
    Short-term investments 198,562     300,530   41,414
    Total current assets 720,900     719,329   99,126
    Non-current Assets:        
    Cryptocurrencies, non-current 148,790     101,566   13,996
    Long-term investments 20,569     21,913   3,020
    Property, equipment, and software, net 157,065     155,934   21,489
    Intangible assets, net 3,552     3,424   472
    Right-of-use assets 272     —   —
    Deferred tax assets 28,942     26,173   3,607
    Other non-current assets 9,419     9,712   1,338
    Total non-current assets 368,609     318,722   43,922
    Total assets 1,089,509     1,038,051   143,048
    LIABILITIES, AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY        
    Current Liabilities:        
    Accounts payable 14,847     5,191   715
    Contract liabilities 37,447     28,866   3,979
    Income tax payable 2,023     1,241   171
    Lease liabilities 272     —   —
    Provision for warranty 161     241   33
    Accrued liabilities and other current liabilities 21,692     17,367   2,393
    Total current liabilities 76,442     52,906   7,291
    Total liabilities 76,442     52,906   7,291
    Shareholders’ Equity:        
    Ordinary shares (US$0.000001 par value; 50,000,000,000 shares authorized, 120,081,456 and 120,803,478 shares issued, 120,020,962 and 120,742,984 shares outstanding as of December 31, 2024 and March 31, 2025, respectively) 1     1   —
    Subscriptions receivable from shareholders (1 )   (1 ) —
    Additional paid-in capital 195,236     201,629   27,785
    Statutory reserves 51,762     51,912   7,154
    Accumulated other comprehensive income 3,777     3,459   477
    Retained earnings 762,292     728,145   100,341
    Total shareholders’ equity 1,013,067     985,145   135,757
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity 1,089,509     1,038,051   143,048
    INTCHAINS GROUP LIMITED
    UNAUDITED CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS AND COMPREHENSIVE LOSS
    (All amounts in thousands, except share and per share data, or as otherwise noted)
      For the Three Months ended March 31,  
      2024    2025  
      RMB   RMB US$  
    Products revenue 24,271     132,391   18,244  
    Cost of revenue (15,262 )   (57,045 ) (7,861 )
    Gross profit 9,009     75,346   10,383  
    Operating expenses:        
    Research and development expenses (36,540 )   (26,354 ) (3,632 )
    Sales and marketing expenses (1,623 )   (2,237 ) (308 )
    General and administrative expenses (5,410 )   (9,838 ) (1,356 )
    Total operating expenses (43,573 )   (38,429 ) (5,296 )
    Income/(Loss) from operations (34,564 )   36,917   5,087  
    Interest income 4,150     3,154   435  
    Foreign exchange loss, net (254 )   (179 ) (25 )
    Change in fair value of cryptocurrencies 5,442     (70,814 ) (9,758 )
    Other income, net 139     193   27  
    Loss before income tax expenses (25,087 )   (30,729 ) (4,234 )
    Income tax (expense)/benefit 10,292     (3,268 ) (450 )
    Net loss (14,795 )   (33,997 ) (4,684 )
    Foreign currency translation adjustment, net of nil tax 108     (318 ) (44 )
    Total comprehensive loss (14,687 )   (34,315 ) (4,728 )
             
    Weighted average number of shares used in per share calculation        
    — Basic 119,888,044     120,053,052   120,053,052  
    — Diluted 119,888,044     120,053,052   120,053,052  
    Net loss per share        
    — Basic (0.12 )   (0.28 ) (0.04 )
    — Diluted (0.12 )   (0.28 ) (0.04 )
    INTCHAINS GROUP LIMITED
    RECONCILIATIONS OF GAAP AND NON-GAAP RESULTS
    (All amounts in thousands, except per share data)
      For the Three Months ended March 31,
      2024   2025
      RMB   RMB US$
    Income/(Loss) from operations (34,564 )   36,917   5,087  
    Add:        
    Share-based compensation expense 1,452     2,022   279  
    Non-GAAP adjusted operating income/(loss) (33,112 )   38,939   5,366  
    Net loss (14,795 )   (33,997 ) (4,684 )
    Add:        
    Share-based compensation expense 1,452     2,022   279  
    Non-GAAP adjusted net loss (13,343 )   (31,975 ) (4,405 )
             
    Non-GAAP adjusted net loss per share        
    — Basic (0.11 )   (0.27 ) (0.04 )
    — Diluted (0.11 )   (0.27 ) (0.04 )
    INTCHAINS GROUP LIMITED
    UNAUDITED CRYPTOCURRENCY-ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
     
    As of Quarter Ended Cryptocurrency Approximate
    Number of
    Cryptocurrency
    Held at End of
    Quarter    		 Original Cost
    Basis    		 Approximate
    Average Cost
    Price Per Unit
    of
    Cryptocurrency    		 Lowest Market
    Price Per Unit of
    Cryptocurrency
    During Quarter
    (a)    		 Market Value of
    Cryptocurrency
    Held at End of
    Quarter Using
    Lowest Market
    Price (b)    		 Highest Market
    Price Per Unit of
    Cryptocurrency
    During Quarter
    (c)    		 Market Value of
    Cryptocurrency
    Held at End of
    Quarter Using
    Highest Market
    Price (d)    		 Market Price
    Per Unit of
    Cryptocurrency at End of Quarter
    (e)    		 Market Value of
    Cryptocurrency
    Held at End of
    Quarter Using
    Ending Market
    Price (f)
        Unit USD USD USD USD USD USD USD USD
    March 31, 2025 ETH 6,347 18,031,664 2,841 1,754 11,132,638 3,746 23,775,862 1,842 11,691,174
    ETH-Coinbase Staked 676 1,954,713 2,892 1,914 1,293,864 4,065 2,747,940 2,017 1,363,492
    Bitcoin 12.66 946,882 74,793 76,555 969,186 109,358 1,384,472 83,416 1,056,047
    USDT&USDC 2,108,065 2,111,681 1 1 2,091,378 1 2,124,947 1 2,107,951
    Others Multiple * 84,283 Multiple * Multiple * 33,817 Multiple * 94,121 Multiple * 37,553
      Total   23,129,223     15,520,883   30,127,342   16,256,217
                         
    December 31, 2024 ETH 5,075 15,102,524 2,976 2,309 11,718,175 4,109 20,853,175 3,414 17,326,050
    ETH-Coinbase Staked 627 1,800,713 2,872 2,487 1,559,349 4,450 2,790,150 3,701 2,320,527
    Bitcoin 10.29 720,567 70,026 58,864 605,711 108,389 1,115,323 95,285 980,483
    USDT&USDC 4,425,484 4,428,159 1 1 4,384,335 1 4,469,357 1 4,419,574
    Others Multiple * 78,298 Multiple * Multiple * 30,694 Multiple * 101,589 Multiple * 69,389
      Total   22,130,261     18,298,264   29,329,594   25,116,023
                         
    September 30, 2024 ETH 3,522 10,115,116 2,872 2,116 7,452,552 3,563 12,548,886 2,596 9,143,112
    ETH-Coinbase Staked 627 1,800,713 2,872 2,290 1,435,830 3,926 2,461,602 2,807 1,759,989
    Bitcoin 8.47 549,364 64,860 49,050 415,454 70,000 592,900 63,552 538,285
    USDT&USDC 9,847,687 9,849,266 1 1 9,814,682 1 9,857,395 1 9,845,929
    Others Multiple * 105,405 Multiple * Multiple * 36,415 Multiple * 72,441 Multiple * 53,661
      Total   22,419,864     19,154,933   25,533,224   21,340,976
                         
    June 30, 2024 ETH 1,937 6,179,744 3,190 2,814 5,450,718 3,974 7,697,638 3,394 6,574,178
    ETH-Coinbase Staked 480 1,301,108 2,711 2,954 1,417,920 4,243 2,036,640 3,645 1,749,600
    Bitcoin 3.95 265,883 67,312 56,500 223,175 72,777 287,469 61,613 243,371
    USDT&USDC 10,422,648 10,423,276 1 1 10,386,315 1 10,458,980 1 10,404,063
    Others Multiple * 107,484 Multiple * Multiple * 54,226 Multiple * 122,435 Multiple * 64,202
    Total   18,277,495     17,532,354   20,603,162   19,035,414
                         
    March 31,2024 ETH 346 999,180 2,888 2,100 726,600 4,094 1,416,524 3,618 1,251,828
    ETH-Coinbase Staked 479 1,297,687 2,709 2,236 1,071,044 4,341 2,079,339 3,842 1,840,318
    Bitcoin 0.67 44,995 67,157 38,501 25,796 73,836 49,470 70,407 47,173
    USDT&USDC 99,583 99,583 1 1 99,583 1 99,583 1 99,583
    Others Multiple * 81,571 Multiple * Multiple * 67,814 Multiple * 124,481 Multiple * 91,346
    Total   2,523,016     1,990,837   3,769,397   3,330,248

    * The ‘Others’ category encompasses various cryptocurrencies that are not reported individually due to their lower significance. This category is labeled as ‘Multiple’ to indicate the presence of diverse prices associated with different type of cryptocurrency. Due to their immaterial nature, detailed price listings are not provided.
    (a) The “Lowest Market Price Per Unit of Cryptocurrency During Quarter” represents the lowest market price for a single unit of cryptocurrency reported on the Coinbase exchange during the respective quarter, without regard to when we obtained any of the cryptocurrency.
    (b) The “Market Value of Cryptocurrency Held at End of Quarter Using Lowest Market Price” represents a mathematical calculation consisting of the lowest market price for a single unit of cryptocurrency reported on the Coinbase exchange during the respective quarter multiplied by the number of cryptocurrency we held at the end of the applicable period.
    (c) The “Highest Market Price Per Unit of Cryptocurrency During Quarter” represents the highest market price for a single unit of cryptocurrency reported on the Coinbase exchange during the respective quarter, without regard to when we obtained any of the cryptocurrency.
    (d) The “Market Value of Cryptocurrency Held at End of Quarter Using Highest Market Price” represents a mathematical calculation consisting of the highest market price for a single unit of cryptocurrency reported on the Coinbase exchange during the respective quarter multiplied by the number of cryptocurrency we held at the end of the applicable period.
    (e) The “Market Price Per Unit of Cryptocurrency at End of Quarter” represents the market price of a single unit of cryptocurrency on the Coinbase exchange at midnight UTC+8 time on the last day of the respective quarter, which aligns with our revenue recognition cut-off.
    (f) The “Market Value of Cryptocurrency Held at End of Quarter Using Ending Market Price” represents a mathematical calculation consisting of the market price of a single unit of cryptocurrency on the Coinbase exchange at midnight UTC+8 time on the last day of the respective quarter multiplied by the number of cryptocurrency we held at the end of the applicable period.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, May 22, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    May 22, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone and welcome to this IMF Press Briefing.  It is wonderful to see you all today on this rainy Washington morning, especially those of you here in person and of course also those of you joining us online.  My name is Julie Kozak.  I’m the Director of Communications at the IMF.  As usual, this press briefing will be embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  And as usual, I will start with a few announcements and then I’ll take your questions in person on WebEx and via the Press Center.  

    So first, our Managing Director, Kristalina Georgieva, and our First Deputy Managing Director, Gita Gopinath, are currently attending the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meeting taking place in Canada right now.  Second, on May 29th through 30th, the Managing Director will travel to Dubrovnik, Croatia to attend a joint IMF Croatia National Bank Conference focused on promoting growth and resilience in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.  The Managing Director will participate in the opening panel and will hold meetings with regional counterparts.  

    On June 2nd, the Managing Director will travel to Sofia, Bulgaria to attend the 30th Anniversary celebration of the National Trust Ecofund.  During her visit, she will also hold several bilateral meetings with the Bulgarian authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, will travel to Paraguay, Brazil, and the Netherlands next month.  On June 6th, he will launch the IMF’s new regional training program for South America and Mexico, which will be hosted in Asuncion by the Central Bank of Paraguay.  From there, he will travel to Brasilia to deliver a keynote speech on June 10th during the Annual Meeting of the Caribbean Development Bank.  He will also then travel to the Netherlands on June 12th to 13th to participate in the 2025 Consultative Group to Assist the Poor Symposium and to meet with the Dutch authorities.  

    Our Deputy Managing Director, Kenji Okamura, will be in Japan from June 11th to 12th for the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum to discuss fiscal frameworks and GovTech in the Asia Pacific region.  

    And finally, on a kind of housekeeping or scheduling issue, the Article IV Consultation for the United States will be undertaken on a later timetable this year, with discussions to be held in November.  

    And with those rather extensive announcements, I will now open the floor to your questions.  For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking.  All right, let’s open up.  Daniel.

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks for taking my question.  I just wonder if the IMF has any reaction to the passage of last night in the House of Representatives of the One Big, Beautiful bill.  And a related question, how concerned are you by the increase in yields on long-dated U.S. treasuries?  What do you think it says about the market’s view of U.S. debt going into the future and sort of any possible spillovers for IMF borrowers as well?  MS. KOZACK: On the first question, what I can say is we take note of the passing of the legislation in the House of Representatives earlier this morning.  What we will do is we will look to assess a final bill once it has passed through the Senate and also once it’s been enacted.  And, of course, we will have opportunities to share our assessment over time in the various products where we normally would convey our fulsome views.  

    On your second question, which was on the bond market.   What I can say there is that we know that the U.S. government bonds are a safe haven asset, and the U.S. dollar, of course, plays a key role as the world’s reserve currency.  The U.S. bond market plays a critical role, of course, in finance and in safe assets.  And this is underpinned by the liquidity and depth of the U.S. market and also the sound institutions in the U.S.  We don’t see any changes in those functions.  And, of course, what we can also say is that although there has been some volatility in markets, market functioning, including in the U.S. Treasury market, has so far been orderly.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Ukraine.  Two topics particularly.  So, the first one, when is the next review of the Ukraine’s EFF is going to be completed, and what amount of money would be disbursed to Kyiv?  And could you please outline the total sum that is remaining within the current program?  And the second part, it’s about debt level.  What is the IMF assessment of current Ukraine’s government debt level?  Is it stable?  Do you see any vulnerabilities and any risks for Ukraine?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Ukraine?  Does anyone online want to come in on Ukraine?  Okay, I don’t see anyone.  

    What I can say on Ukraine is that just two days ago, our Staff team started policy discussions with the Ukrainian authorities on the eighth review under the eff.  So, the team is on the ground now.  The discussions are taking place in Kiev and the team will provide an update on the progress at the end of the mission.

    In terms of the potential disbursement, I’m just looking here; that’s the seventh disbursement.  We will come back to you on the size of the disbursement, but it should show in the Staff report for the Seventh Review what would be expected for the Eighth Review.  And it would also show the remaining size of the program.  But we’ll come back to you bilaterally with those exact answers.  

    And what I can then say on the debt side is at the time of the Seventh Review under the program, we assessed debt, Ukraine’s debt to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis and as with every review that the team of course, will update its assessment as part of the eighth review discussion.  We’ll have more to say on the debt as the eighth review continues.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just one more thing on Ukraine.  Does it make sense for them to consider using the euro as a defense currency for their currency, given the shifting geopolitical sense and what we are seeing with the dollar? MS. KOZACK: So right now, under the program, Ukraine has an inflation targeting regime, and that is where what the program is focused on, our program with Ukraine. So, they have an inflation targeting regime.  They are very much focused on ensuring the stability of that monetary policy regime that Ukraine has.  And, of course, that involves a floating exchange rate.  And I don’t have anything beyond that to say on the currency market.

     

    QUESTIONER: The agreement with the IMF established a target for the Central Bank Reserve to meet by June.  According to the technical projection, does the IMF believe Argentina will meet this target?  And if it’s not met, is it possible that we will grant a waiver in the future?

    MS. KOZACK: anything else on Argentina?  

    QUESTIONER: About Argentina, what is your assessment of the progress of the program agreed with Argentina more than a month after its announcement in last April?  

     

    QUESTIONER: The government is about to announce a measure to gain access to voluntarily, of course, but to the dollars that are “under the mattress”, as we call them, undeclared funds to probably meet these targets that Roman was asking about.  I was wondering if this measure has been discussed with the IMF.  And also, you mentioned Georgieva visiting Paraguay and Brazil, if you there’s any plan to visit Argentina as well?  

    QUESTIONER: President Milei is about to announce, you know, Minister Caputo, in a few minutes that there is a measure to use similar to attacks Amnesty.  Is the IMF concerned that this could violate its regulations against illicit financial flows? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, with respect to Argentina, on April 11th, I think, as you know, our Executive Board approved a new four-year EFF arrangement for Argentina.  It was for $20 billion.  It contained an initial disbursement of $12 billion.  And that the aim of that program is to support Argentina’s transition to the next phase of its stabilization program and reforms.  

    President Milei’s administration’s policies continued to deliver impressive results.  These include the rollout of the new FX regime, which has been smooth, a decline in monthly inflation to 2.8 percent in April, another fiscal surplus in April, and reaching a cumulative fiscal surplus of 0.6 percent of GDP for the year, and efforts to continue to open up the economy.  At the same time, the economy is now expanding, real wages are recovering, and poverty continues to fall in Argentina.  

    The Fund continues to support the authorities in their efforts to create a more stable and prosperous Argentina.  Our close engagement continues, including in the context of the upcoming discussions for the First Review of the program.  This First Review will allow us to assess progress and to consider policies to build on the strong momentum and to secure lasting stability and growth in Argentina.  And in this regard, there is a shared recognition with the authorities about the importance of strengthening external buffers and securing a timely re-access to international capital markets.  

    What I can say on the question about the announcements on that — the question on the undeclared assets.  All I can say right now is that we’re following developments very closely on this, and of course, the team will be ready to provide an assessment in due course.  

    On the second part of that question, I do want to also note, and this is included in our Staff report, that the authorities have committed to strengthening financial transparency and also to aligning Argentina’s AML CFT, the Anti-Money Laundering framework, with international standards, as well as to deregulating the economy to encourage its formalization.  So, any new measures, including those that may be aimed at encouraging the use of undeclared assets, should be, of course, consistent with these important commitments.  

    And on your question about Paraguay and Brazil, I just want to clarify that it is our Deputy Managing Director, Nigel Clarke, who will be traveling to Brazil and Paraguay, not the Managing Director.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Two questions on Syria.  With the U.S. and EU announcing the lifting of sanctions recently, how does this affect any sort of timeline with providing economic assistance?  And secondly, the Managing Director has said that the Fund has to first define data.  Can you just walk through what that entails?  

    MS. KOZACK: Can you just repeat what you said?  The Managing Director has said?

     

    QUESTIONER: The need to define data.  Just sort of a similar question.  I’m just wondering, following the World Bank statement last week about, you know, Syria now being eligible to borrow from the bank, what sort of discussions the Fund has had with the Syrian authorities since the end of the Spring Meetings and, you know, any update you can give us around possible discussions around an Article IV.  

     

    QUESTIONER: About the relationship and if there’s any missed planned virtual or on the ground? 

    MS. KOZACK: Let me step back and give a little bit of an overview on Syria. So, first, you know, we’re, of course, monitoring developments in Syria very closely.  Our Staff are preparing to support the international community’s efforts to help with Syria’s economic rehabilitation as conditions allow.  We have had useful discussions with the new Economic Team who took office in late March, including during the Spring Meetings.  And, of course, you will perhaps have seen the press release regarding the roundtable that was held during the Spring Meetings.  IMF Staff have already started to work to rebuild its understanding of the Syrian economy.  We’ve been doing this through interactions with the authorities and also through coordination with other IFIs. And just to remind everyone, our last Article IV with Syria was in 2009.  So, it’s been quite some time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria.  Syria will need significant assistance to rebuild its economic institutions.  We stand ready to provide advice and targeted and well-prioritized technical assistance in our areas of expertise. I think this goes a little bit to your question on, like, what do we mean by defining data.  I think what the Managing Director was really referring to there is since it has been such a long time since we have had a substantive engagement with Syria, the last Article IV, as I said, was in 2009.  I think there, what she’s really referring to is the need to really work with the Syrian authorities to rebuild basic economic institutions, including the ability to produce economic statistics, right, so that we — so that we and the authorities and the international community of course, can conduct the necessary economic analysis so that we can best support the reconstruction and recovery efforts.  

    With respect to the lifting of sanctions, what I can say there is that, of course, the lifting of sanctions and the lifting of sanctions are a matter between member states of the IMF.  What we can say in serious cases that the lifting of sanctions could support Syria’s efforts to overcome its economic challenges and help advance its reconstruction and economic development.  Syria, of course, is an IMF member, and as we’ve just said, you know, we are, of course, engaged closely with the Syrians to explore how, within our mandate, we can best support them.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is on Russia.  In what ways is the IMF monitoring Russia’s economy under the current sanctions and conflict conditions, and have regular Article IV Consultations or other surveillance activities with Russia resumed to track its economic developments?  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say with respect to Russia is that we are, our Staff, are analyzing data and economic indicators that are reported by the Russian authorities.  We are also looking at counterparty data that is provided to us by other countries, and this is particularly true for cross-border transactions, as well as data from third-party sources. So, this data collection using official and other sources does allow us to put together a picture of the Russian economy.  

    We did provide an assessment in the 2025 April WEO, the one that we just released about a month ago.  In this WEO, we assess Russia’s growth at — we expect Russia to grow at 1.5 percent in 2025, 0.9 percent in 2026, and we expect inflation to come down to 8.2 percent in 2025 and 4.4 percent in 2026.  And I don’t have a timetable for the Article IV at this time.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I’d like to ask about Deputy Management Director Okamura’s visits to Japan.  So, my question is, what economic topics will be on the agenda during his stay?  Could you tell me a bit more in detail?  

    MS. KOZACK: Deputy Managing Director Okamura will travel to Japan, as I said, from June 11th to 12th, and he will be attending the Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  So, this will be the 10th Tokyo Fiscal Forum.  It’s an annual conference that we co-host in Japan every year and the focus is on issues of fiscal policy. In this particular one, Deputy Managing Director Okamura will be discussing fiscal frameworks. It’s very important for all countries to have sound fiscal frameworks so they can implement sound fiscal policy.  He will also be discussing GovTech not only in Japan but in the Asia Pacific region.  And of course, GovTech is very important for countries because it’s a way of modernizing and making government both provision of services in some cases but also potentially collection of revenue more effective and more efficient.  So, those will be the focus of his discussions in Tokyo.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on the recent bailout package by IMF to Pakistan.  The Indian government has expressed a lot of displeasure with Pakistan planning to use this package to build — rebuild — areas that allegedly support cross-border terrorism.  Does the IMF have any assessment of this?  Secondly, I also have another question.  Could you please provide information on the majority vote that was received in approving this bailout package for Pakistan on May 9th?  If you can disclose the information.  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Pakistan?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just adding to that, do you have an update on the implications of the escalation of facilities in that border between Pakistan and India on both economies.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thanks a lot.  I guess the only spin I would put on is generally what safeguards does the IMF have that its funds won’t be used for military or in support of military actions, not only there but as a general matter.  And I also, if you’re able to, there was some controversy about the termination of India’s Executive Director of the IMF, K.V. Subramanian.  Do you have any insight into–there are reports there–what it was about but what do you say it’s about?  Thanks a lot.  

    MS. KOZACK: With respect to the Indian Executive Director who had been at the Fund, all I can say on this is that the appointment of Executive Directors is a member for the — is a matter for the member country.  It’s not a matter for the Fund, and it’s completely up to the country authorities to determine who represents them at the Fund.  

    With respect to Pakistan and the conflict with India, I want to start here by first expressing our regrets and sympathies for the loss of life and for the human toll from the recent conflict.  We do hope for a peaceful resolution of the conflict.  

    Now, turning to some of the specific questions about the Board approval of Pakistan’s program, I’m going to step back a minute and provide a little bit of the chronology and timeframe.  The IMF Executive Board approved Pakistan’s EFF program in September of 2024.  And the First review at that time was planned for the first quarter of 2025.  And consistent with that timeline, on March 25th of 2025, the IMF Staff and the Pakistani authorities reached a Staff-Level Agreement on the First Review for the EFF.  That agreement, that Staff-Level Agreement, was then presented to our Executive Board, and our Executive Board completed the review on May 9th.  As a result of the completion of that review, Pakistan received the disbursement at that time.  

    What I want to emphasize here is that it is part of a standard procedure under programs that our Executive Board conducts periodic reviews of lending programs to assess their progress.  And they particularly look at whether the program is on track, whether the conditions under the program have been met, and whether any policy changes are needed to bring the program back on track.  And in the case of Pakistan, our Board found that Pakistan had indeed met all of the targets.  It had made progress on some of the reforms, and for that reason, the Board went ahead and approved the program.  

    With respect to the voting or the decision-making at our Board, we do not disclose that publicly.  In general, Fund Board decisions are taken by consensus, and in this case, there was a sufficient consensus at the Board to allow us to move forward or for the Board to decide to move forward and complete Pakistan’s review.  

    And with respect to the question on safeguards, I do want to make three points here.  The first is that IMF financing is provided to members for the purpose of resolving balance of payments problems.  

    In the case of Pakistan, and this is my second point, the EFF disbursements, all of the disbursements received under the EFF, are allocated to the reserves of the central bank.  So, those disbursements are at the central bank, and under the program, those resources are not part of budget financing.  They are not transferred to the government to support the budget. 

    And the third point is that the program provides additional safeguards through our conditionality.  And these include, for example, targets on the accumulation of international reserves.  It includes a zero target, meaning no lending from the central bank to the government.  And the program also includes substantial structural conditionality around improving fiscal management.  And these conditions are all available in the program documents if you wanted to do a deeper dive.  And, of course, any deviation from the established program conditions would impact future reviews under the Pakistan program.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Egypt.  There is a mission in Egypt for the First Review of the EFF loan program.  So, can you please update us on the ongoing discussions, especially since the Prime Minister of Egypt announced yesterday that the program could be concluded in 2027 rather than 2026?  

    MS. KOZACK: Any other questions on Egypt?  I have a question from the Press Center on Egypt, which I will read aloud.  The question is when will the Fifth Review currently underway with the Egyptian government be concluded, and when will the Executive Board approve this review?  And how much money will Egypt receive once the review is approved?  

    So, here’s what I can share on Egypt.  First, let me start here.  So first, I just want to say that the Fund remains committed to supporting Egypt in building its economic resilience and fostering higher private sector-led growth.  Egypt has made clear progress on its macroeconomic reform program, with notable improvements in inflation and foreign exchange reserves.  For the past few weeks, IMF Staff has had productive discussions with the Egyptian authorities on economic performance and policies under the EFF.  As Egypt’s macroeconomic stabilization is taking hold, efforts must now focus on accelerating and deepening reforms that will reduce the footprint of the state in the Egyptian economy, level the playing field, and improve the business environment.  Discussions will continue between the IMF and the Egyptian authorities on the remaining policies and reforms that could support the completion of the Fifth Review.  

     

    QUESTIONER: My question is about Sri Lanka.  Sri Lanka’s program is subject to IMF Board approval.  The review is subject to IMF Board approval, but we still haven’t got any word on when that would be.  Is there any delay in this?  And is this delay attributed to the pending electricity adjustments, tariff adjustments, that the Sri Lankan government has committed to?  

    MS. KOZACK: So just stepping back for a minute.  On April 25th, IMF Staff and the Sri Lankan authorities reached Staff-Level Agreement on the Fourth Review of Sri Lanka’s program under the EFF.  And once the review is approved by our Executive Board, Sri Lanka will have access to about $344 million in financing.  Completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board, and we expect that Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  

    The precise timing of the Board meeting is contingent on two things.  The first is implementation of prior actions, and the main prior actions are relating to restoring electricity, cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.  And the second contingency is completion of the Financing Assurances Review, which will focus on confirming multilateral partners, committed financing contributions to Sri Lanka and whether adequate progress has been made in debt restructuring.  So, in a nutshell, completion of the review is subject to approval by the Executive Board.  We expect the Board meeting to take place in the coming weeks.  And it’s contingent on the two matters that I just mentioned.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Thank you for having my questions on Ecuador.  Since the IMF is still completing the second review under the EFF program for Ecuador, do you think it’s going to be time to change the program, the goals, or maybe the amount of the program?  Because Ecuador is now facing different challenges compared to 2024.  The oil prices are falling, so that is going to affect the fiscal situation for Ecuador.  And also, I would like to know if Ecuador is still looking for a new program under the RSF.  And the last one, I would like to know if, do you think that Ecuador is going to need to make some important changes this year on oil subsidies and a tax reform?  I think, as I said, Ecuador now is facing some important challenges in the fiscal situation, so do you think it’s going to be possible because of, you know, all the social protests and all that kind of stuff?  Do you think it’s going to be possible to do that in Ecuador?  

     

    QUESTIONER: Is there a request, an official request, in place to modify the program?  And if there is, of course, details of the new one, you can share.  

    MS. KOZACK: And then I have one question online from the Press Center regarding Ecuador.  Is the sovereign negotiating new targets, given their fiscal position deteriorated compared to last year?  Our understanding is that $410 million was not dispersed under the First Review.?

    So let me share what I can on Ecuador.  So, right now, representatives from the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank are in Quito this week to meet with the authorities and discuss the strengthening of financial and technical support to the country.  As part of this tripartite visit, we have a new IMF Mission Chief who is participating, and she is also using that opportunity to have courtesy meetings with the authorities and to continue discussions and advance toward a Second Review under Ecuador’s EFF.  

    What else I can add, just as background, is that the Executive Board in December approved the First Review of Ecuador’s 48-month EFF.  About $500 million was disbursed after the approval of that Frist Review.  And at that time, the Executive Board also concluded the Article IV Consultation.

    I can also say that the authorities have made excellent progress in the implementation of their economic program under the EFF.  And regarding the precise timing of the Second Review, we will provide an update on the next steps in due course and when we’re able to do so.  

     

    QUESTIONER: Just a quick question on tariffs.  I’m just wondering if the IMF has a response to the U.S.-China deal that was struck in Geneva earlier this month.  You know, if the deal holds, I appreciate it’s a 90-day pause, but if the deal holds, how would you foresee that changing the Fund’s current economic forecast for the U.S. and China and for the global economy?  Thanks.  

    MS. KOZACK: As you noted, earlier in May, China and the U.S. announced a 90-day rollback of most of the bilateral tariffs imposed since April 2nd, and they established a mechanism to discuss economic and trade relations.  The two sides reduced their tariff from peak levels, leaving in place 10 percent additional tariffs.  So, the additional tariffs before this agreement were 125 percent.  Now, the additional tariff has agreed to be 10 percent, you know, for the 90 days.  This is obviously a positive step for the world’s two largest economies.

    What I can also add is that for the U.S., you may recall, during the Spring Meetings, we talked a lot about the overall effective tariff rate for the U.S.  At that time, we assessed it at 25.5 percent.  This announcement and the reduction in tariffs will bring the U.S. effective tariff rate down to a bit over 14 percent.  

    Now, with respect to the impact, what I can say is that the reduction in tariffs and the easing of tensions does provide some upside risk to our global growth forecast.  We will be updating that global growth forecast as part of our July WEO.  And so that will give us an opportunity to provide a full assessment.  All of this said, of course, the outlook, the global outlook in general does remain one of high uncertainty.  And so that uncertainty is still with us.  

     

    QUESTIONER: I have a broad question regarding the following – at the IMF World Bank Spring Meeting, the recent one,  the Treasury Secretary Bessent called for the IMF and the World Bank to refocus on their core mission on macroeconomic stability and development.  Did the IMF start any discussion on this topic with the U.S. administration?  And my second question, do you foresee any changes to your lending programs to take into account the views of the Trump Administration regarding issues like climate change and international development?  Thank you.  

    MS. KOZACK: What I can say on this is the U.S. is our largest shareholder, and we greatly value the voice of the United States.  We have a constructive engagement with the U.S. authorities, and we very much appreciate Secretary Bessent’s reiteration of the United States’ commitment to the Fund and to our role.  The IMF has a clearly defined mandate to support economic and financial stability globally.  Our Management Team and our entire Staff are focused exactly on this mandate, helping our 191 members tackle their economic challenges and their balance of payments risks.  

    What I can also add is that at the most recent Spring Meetings, the ones we just had in April, our membership identified two areas where they’ve asked the IMF to deepen our work.  And the first is on external imbalances, and the second is on our monitoring of the financial sector.  So they’re looking for us to really deepen our work in these two areas.  

    As far as taking that work forward, we will continue working with our Executive Board on these areas, as well as to carry out some important policy reviews.  And I think the Managing Director referred to these during the Spring Meetings.  The first is the Comprehensive Surveillance Review, which will set out our surveillance priorities for the next five years.  And the second is the review of program design and conditionality.  And that will carefully consider how our lending can best help countries address low growth challenges and durably resolve their balance of payments weaknesses.  

    I have a slight update for you on Ukraine, which says — so the eighth — so if we look at the documents that were published at the time of the Seventh Review program, the one that was approved by the Executive Board a little while ago, based on that, the Eighth Review disbursement would be about $520 million.  And, the discussions of the Eighth Review are ongoing, and any disbursement, as always, is subject to approval by our Executive Board. 

    And with that, I will bring this press briefing to a close.  So first, let me thank you all for your participation today.  As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Time in the United States.  As always, a transcript will be made available later on IMF.org.  In case of any clarifications or additional queries, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at media@imf.org.  This concludes our press briefing, and I wish everyone a wonderful day.  I look forward to seeing you next time.  Thanks very much.

     

      

    *  *  *  *  *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: At the 78th WHA session, China called for international solidarity and mutual support to build a healthy world

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    GENEVA, May 22 (Xinhua) — Chinese Vice Premier Liu Guozhong has called for international solidarity and mutual support to build a healthy world.

    Liu Guozhong, also a member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, made the remarks on May 20 while delivering a speech at a high-level welcome ceremony for the 78th World Health Assembly (WHA) in Geneva, Switzerland.

    The Vice Prime Minister of China recalled that five years ago, Chinese President Xi Jinping called on all countries to join efforts to build a community of hygiene and health for all mankind at the 73rd session of the WHA. According to Liu Guozhong, China has firmly fulfilled its commitments and taken concrete actions, in particular, the international community has recognized China’s role and contribution in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Noting that global public health security faces serious challenges under the influence of unilateralism and power politics, Liu Guozhong stressed that China has always adhered to the principle of “people and life come first,” implemented the “health first” strategy, actively participated in global health governance, and promoted the building of a community of hygiene and health for mankind.

    He said the international community should adhere to multilateralism, firmly support the leading and coordinating role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in global health governance, uphold fairness and reasonableness, and firmly support the legitimate demands of developing countries in matters such as public health planning, vaccine distribution and technology transfer.

    The Vice Premier also stressed that the international community should adhere to openness and innovation, seizing the historic opportunities provided by the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation, to deepen cooperation in the field of health-related innovation.

    The WHA session, which is the highest decision-making body of WHO, is attended by heads of state and government, high-level representatives from more than 100 countries, and heads of international organizations. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Israeli PM recalls negotiating delegation from Doha

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    JERUSALEM, May 22 (Xinhua) — Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Thursday ordered the return of the Israeli delegation from Doha. A senior Israeli official confirmed to Xinhua that talks with the Palestinian Hamas movement on a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the release of hostages have “reached a dead end.”

    Israel recalled its senior negotiating team for consultations on May 20 after a week of indirect talks, and now the working group that remained in Doha is also returning, a source said on condition of anonymity.

    Hamas, in a statement on May 20, accused the Jewish state’s government of thwarting the talks, saying the low-level Israeli group remaining in Doha lacked the authority to conclude an agreement. The Palestinian movement accused Netanyahu of “misleading international public opinion by pretending to participate in the negotiating process.” Hamas claimed that no substantive talks had taken place since May 17.

    As reported by the Israeli state television Kan, citing a diplomatic source in Israel, the talks broke down over a key disagreement: Israel insisted on a temporary truce in exchange for the release of only some of the hostages, while Hamas demanded international guarantees, primarily from the United States, that Israel would not resume hostilities in exchange for the release of all hostages. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China’s Vice Chairman Calls for Promoting Transformation of Global Trade and Investment

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 22 (Xinhua) — Chinese Vice President Han Zheng on Thursday called for joint efforts to promote the transformation of global trade and investment in the digital and intelligent era.

    Han Zheng made the announcement while speaking at the opening ceremony of the 2025 Global Trade and Investment Facilitation Summit in Beijing.

    According to him, the widespread use of new industries and technologies, including the digital economy and artificial intelligence, is transforming the landscape of global trade and investment, opening up broad prospects for development.

    The Vice President of China called for expanding the innovative application of digital and intelligent technologies to stimulate the recovery and development of the world economy. According to him, it is necessary to jointly promote open cooperation, mutual benefit and win-win, uphold fairness and inclusiveness, and fill the digital and intellectual gaps to create more favorable conditions for international trade and investment cooperation.

    Han Zheng also pointed out the need to use digital and intelligent technologies to ensure the stable and smooth operation of global industrial and supply chains.

    China is committed to expanding high-level opening-up and promoting high-quality development, providing broad opportunities for enterprises around the world, the vice president stressed.

    The Global Trade and Investment Promotion Summit, organized by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, was held for the first time in 2022.

    This year’s summit focuses on entering the digital and intelligent era and working together for common development. More than 800 people are attending the event, including heads of foreign government departments, international organizations, overseas business associations and world trade promotion organizations, as well as representatives of Chinese and overseas enterprises. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Hollywood Man Sentenced to Nearly 5 Years in Prison for Fraudulently Seeking Millions of Dollars in COVID Tax Breaks

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    LOS ANGELES – A Hollywood man who admitted to seeking more than $65 million from the IRS by falsely claiming on tax returns that his nonexistent farming business was entitled to COVID-19-related tax credits was sentenced today to 57 months in federal prison.

    Kevin J. Gregory, 57, was sentenced by United States District Judge Josephine L. Staton, who also ordered him to pay $2,769,173 in restitution.

    Gregory, who has been in federal custody since May 2023, pleaded guilty on January 17 to one count of making false claims to the IRS.

    In response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic impact, Congress authorized an employee retention tax credit that a small business could use to reduce the employment tax it owed to the IRS, also known as the “employee retention credit.”

    To qualify, the business had to have been in operation in 2020 and to have experienced at least a partial suspension of its operations because of a government order related to COVID-19 (for example, an order limiting commerce, group meetings or travel) or a significant decline in profits. The credit was an amount equal to a set percentage of the wages that the business paid to its employees during the relevant time period, subject to a maximum amount.

    Congress also authorized the IRS to give a credit against employment taxes to reimburse businesses for the wages paid to employees who were on sick or family leave and could not work because of COVID-19. This “paid sick and family leave credit” was equal to the wages the business paid the employees during the sick or family leave, also subject to a maximum amount.

    From November 2020 to April 2022, Gregory made false claims to the IRS for the payment of nearly $65.3 million in tax refunds for a purported Beverly Hills-based farming-and-transportation company named Elijah USA Farm Holdings.

    The IRS issued a portion of the refunds Gregory claimed, and Gregory used a significant portion – more than $2.7 million – for personal expenses.

    Specifically, in January 2022, Gregory made a false claim to the IRS for the payment of a tax refund in the amount of $23,877,620, which he submitted as part of Elijah Farm’s quarterly federal tax return. Gregory claimed Elijah Farm employed 33 people, paid nearly $1.6 million in quarterly wages, had deposited nearly $18 million in federal taxes, and was entitled to nearly $6.5 million in COVID-relief tax credits.

    In fact, Gregory knew that Elijah Farm employed nobody and paid wages to no one and had not made federal tax deposits to the IRS in the amounts stated on his tax return.

    IRS Criminal Investigation investigated this matter.

    Assistant United States Attorney Kristen A. Williams of the Major Frauds Section prosecuted this case.

    On May 17, 2021, the Attorney General established the COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force to marshal the resources of the Department of Justice in partnership with agencies across government to enhance efforts to combat and prevent pandemic-related fraud. The Task Force bolsters efforts to investigate and prosecute the most culpable domestic and international criminal actors and assists agencies tasked with administering relief programs to prevent fraud by, among other methods, augmenting and incorporating existing coordination mechanisms, identifying resources and techniques to uncover fraudulent actors and their schemes, and sharing and harnessing information and insights gained from prior enforcement efforts. More information on the Justice Department’s response to the pandemic may be found here. 

    Anyone with information about allegations of attempted fraud involving COVID-19 can report it to the Department of Justice’s National Center for Disaster Fraud (NCDF) Hotline at (866) 720-5721 or via the NCDF online complaint form.

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn Provision for Texas Border Security Reimbursement Included in House ‘One Big Beautiful Bill Act’

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) released the following statement after the U.S. House of Representatives passed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which includes $12 billion in funding to reimburse states like Texas for stepping up during the Biden administration to secure the border due to President Biden’s dereliction of duty:
    “The State of Texas spent more than $11 billion taxpayer dollars to protect and defend the southern border in the Biden administration’s absence, and I commend the House for passing language that serves as a good starting point in the One Big Beautiful Bill to secure billions in critical funding for Texas, which did the job of the federal government amidst the Biden border crisis,” said Sen. Cornyn. “I will continue to spearhead the fight in the Senate for border security reimbursement funding and strengthen the language to ensure that Texas will be rightfully repaid for Operation Lone Star. I thank Congressman Chip Roy and all Texas Republicans in the House for making this reimbursement funding a priority and look forward to working with my Senate colleagues to send the One Big Beautiful Bill Act with these funds included to President Trump’s desk.”
    Background:
    Senator Cornyn has led the fight in Washington to secure federal reimbursement for Texas by:

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: To the President’s Desk: Fischer’s Resolution to Overturn California’s EV Mandate, Protect Truckers and Consumers

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Nebraska Deb Fischer

    Today, the U.S. Senate approved Senator Deb Fischer’s (R-Neb.) resolution of disapproval to repeal California’s Advanced Clean Trucks (ACT) regulation which imposed unrealistic and stringent emissions requirements for heavy-duty trucks and heavy-duty diesel engines.

    A companion resolution passed the House on April 30, 2025. Now, the resolution will head to the President’s desk where it is expected to be signed into law.

    Fischer also spoke on the Senate Floor in support of her resolution to highlight the necessity in overturning the waiver to stop one state from dictating emission policies for the entire country.

    Click the image above to view a video of Fischer’s remarks

    Click here to download audio
    Click here to download video

    Transcript of Fischer’s remarks as prepared for delivery:

    M. President,

    Today, the United States Senate voted on and passed my resolution to overturn the EPA’s waiver for California’s Advanced Clean Trucks Act.

    First, I’d like to thank my friend and colleague, Chairman Capito, for her strong leadership and work on this very important issue.

    This heavy-handed regulation imposes unrealistic emissions requirements for heavy-duty trucks and heavy-duty diesel engines.

    This government mandate handed down to vehicle manufacturers demand they sell zero-emission trucks at an increased rate from 2024 to 2035.

    We aren’t under any illusion as to what this means.

    We know that the goal is to effectively end the sale of internal combustion engine trucks.

    Now – I’m not here today to disparage electric vehicles – and I’m certainly not here to discourage the manufacturing and purchasing of EVs, either.

    What I am concerned about is the federal government dictating which cars and which trucks are acceptable, and which are not.

    If Americans want to drive an electric or a hybrid car – that’s fine; however, the government should not pick winners and losers in the vehicle marketplace.

    M. President – I believe in the power of America’s free markets – and I believe we should allow the markets to determine the viability of clean trucks.

    Here’s the truth: This California waiver and subsequent regulation is simply not based in reality – and it will have real-world consequences.

    By requiring truckers to meet California’s standards – even while working outside of the state – operator costs will increase, fleet upgrades will be impacted, and interstate commerce will be disrupted.

    And American consumers will bear the brunt of increased costs.

    Hardworking families are already dealing with the high cost of everyday goods and services – and they cannot afford this regulation.

    Let me be clear: This action is necessary to stop one state from dictating emission policies for the entire country.

    Prior to this waiver being granted, California’s own Air Resources Board readily admitted this action would extend beyond its own state borders – and several states have already followed suit.

    I’d also like to address the eligibility of Congress disapproving rules.

    A few weeks ago, I questioned the Government Accountability Office Comptroller during an Appropriations Subcommittee hearing.

    The Comptroller explicitly stated that GAO’s role is just an advisory one – and that it is up to Congress to determine what constitutes a rule.

    Again, let me be clear: We are reclaiming our Congressional authority under the Congressional Review Act.

    I’m proud that this body passed my resolution, which is a commonsense step to keep government overreach at bay, protect consumers, and support America’s free markets.

    With the passage of the House version of this resolution and with the passage of the Senate’s today – it will now head to the President’s desk to be signed into law.

    Thank you, M. President – I yield the floor. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Canada: People facing barriers to employment will gain experience for in-demand jobs

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    The Province, in partnership with the Government of Canada, is providing $7.7 million over two years to create work opportunities for people facing significant barriers to employment.

    “We want people to have the support they need, especially amid global inflation, increased cost of living and uncertainty from tariffs,” said Sheila Malcolmson, B.C. Minister of Social Development and Poverty Reduction. “For those who want to work but face barriers, this funding will provide paid work experience and help them build a path to rewarding employment.”

    Administered by United Way BC over two years, the Work Experience Opportunities Grant (WEOG) will offer grants to non-profit organizations to create time-limited paid work opportunities for people on income and disability assistance and Indigenous people receiving equivalent federal assistance. The program will provide additional income without affecting income or disability-assistance benefits.

    “Many British Columbians face significant barriers to employment,” said Kim Winchell, chief program and impact officer, United Way BC. “United Way BC is committed to supporting people in need throughout our province. Program participants receive paid, hands-on work experience in non-profits to improve their skills and employability, preparing them for in-demand jobs. We’re excited for people to build professional networks and connections that can help them in their future careers.”

    Placements will provide participants with opportunities to contribute to their communities and enhance their job security while gaining skills and experience. Participants will have access to career-transition services, including job-placement support, further training opportunities or mentorship that can help them in future careers.

    This program is funded through the Canada-British Columbia Labour Market Development Agreement.

    Quotes:

    Patty Hajdu, federal Minister of Jobs and Families –

    “On-the-job experience is the surest path to lasting employment. Today’s $7.7-million investment in the Work Experience Opportunities Initiative is helping pair more Canadians seeking work with job openings in high-demand sectors. The federal government is supporting Canadian talent, removing barriers to employment, and building the strongest workforce in the G7.”

    Ross Oh, food hub manager, Collingwood Neighbourhood House –

    “We welcome this new grant as a meaningful step toward building more inclusive communities. At Collingwood Neighbourhood House, we’ve seen first-hand how providing employment opportunities to individuals on income or disability assistance not only strengthens our programs, but also fosters dignity, purpose and connection. This support will allow us to enhance services like our Community Lunch Program while ensuring that those who face barriers to employment are included and empowered.”

    Quick Facts:

    • The Work Experience Opportunities Grant (WEOG) is expected to support as many as 1,200 people.
    • Participants will complete 200-240 hours of work experience. 
    • United Way BC is partnered with more than 800 non-profit organizations throughout the province, including arts, culture, environmental, Indigenous, social services and sport groups.   
    • Grant applications may be made from June 2, 2025 until July 15, 2025.
    • This year, the Government of British Columbia will receive nearly $300 million through the Canada-British Columbia Labour Market Development Agreement, supporting approximately 130,000 people in B.C. annually. 

    Learn More:

    For more information about the Work Experience Opportunities Grant, visit: https://uwbc.ca/program/grants/#provincial   

    To learn more about available WorkBC Employment services, visit: https://www.workbc.ca/discover-employment-services   

    MIL OSI Canada News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Congressman Brad Sherman Hosts +5,000 in Telephone Town Hall before Voting Against Trump’s “Big Ugly” Bill in the Dead of Night

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Brad Sherman (D-CA)

    SHERMAN OAKS, CALIFORNIA – Last night, Congressman Brad Sherman (CA-32)hosted more than 5,000 constituentsin a liveTelephone Town Hall just before casting his vote against President Donald Trump’s “Big Bill” — a massive Republican budget plan loaded with tax breaks for the ultra-wealthy and deep cuts to vital healthcare and nutrition assistance programs for American families. 

    “The energy during last night’s Town Hall meeting made it clear: people are alert, informed, and demanding leadership that’s willing to stand up to this administration’s outrageous corruption and brazen abuses of power,” said Congressman Sherman.

    Congressman Sherman used the Town Hall to brief constituents on his efforts to push back against what he called “a coordinated assault on working families, democracy, and ethics” tied to Trump’s policy comeback and personal profiteering.

    At the start of the event, Congressman Sherman broke down the contents of the Republican budget reconciliation bill, which slashes Medicaid funding, repeals key climate initiatives, and includes major tax breaks for the wealthy. He explained why he would be voting no right after the Town Hall: “This big, ugly bill epitomizes the true nature of Trump’s entire policy agenda — one that favors billionaires over everyday Americans.”

    The Congressman also addressed recent corruption schemes surrounding Trump’s business dealings:

    -The Qatari government’s offering Trump a luxury jet while lobbying his allies in Washington;

    -China’s state-affiliated entities purchasing large stakes in a Trump-branded cryptocurrency initiative, raising red flags about foreign influence and national security;

    -A $2 million investment from Abu Dhabi into Trump’s so-called “stablecoin” crypto venture, which Sherman characterized as “yet another pay-to-play scheme cloaked in blockchain buzzwords.”

    “These aren’t isolated incidents — they form a pattern of transactional politics and foreign entanglements that put personal gain over public duty in a way that’s dangerously unprecedented,” Sherman told constituents.

    He also laid out broader Democratic efforts to resist Trump’s broader agenda, including fighting attempts to roll back voting rights, immigrant protections, safeguards for consumers and more. 

    Constituents brought forward their own concerns, ranging from the future of reproductive rights, the health of our economy amid Trump’s tariffs, to the safeguarding of our democracy in the face of rising extremism — areas where Sherman said Congress must act with urgency and resolve.

    Shortly before heading to the Capitol to cast his vote against Trump’s massive and extremist budget bill, the Congressman concluded the Town Hall meeting by encouraging constituents to stay engaged and continue raising their voices against the on-going assault on our democratic norms.

    During the Town Hall, Sherman requested input from residents by asking a series of survey questions about their thoughts and concerns.

    The results of the survey questions are as follows:

    1. Do you approve of President Trump’s performance as President so far?
    • Approve: 7%
    • Disapprove: 90%
    • Unsure: 2%
    1. Should your Member of Congress vote for legislation that they think is good for the country, or should they vote NO on everything that Republican Speaker Johnson is willing to propose and Trump is willing to sign?
    • Obstruction & Resistance: Vote NO on all of Speaker Johnson and President Trump’s legislation: 38%
    • Negotiate with Republicans but only vote for a bill Democrats think is good: 55%
    • Vote with Republicans: 3%
    • Unsure: 4%
    1. Should I vote for the Republican reconciliation bill that provides a tax cut of $82,000 to those who make over $1 million per year, takes away healthcare from 14 million Americans, and increases the U.S. debt by over $5 trillion?
    • Yes, vote for the Republican bill: 4%
    • No / Hell No, don’t vote for the Republican bill: 91%
    • Unsure: 4%

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Lamont Directs Flags To Half-Staff Monday for Memorial Day

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    (HARTFORD, CT) – Governor Ned Lamont today announced that he is directing U.S. and state flags in Connecticut lowered to half-staff from sunrise until noon on Monday, May 26, 2025, in observance of Memorial Day to honor and mourn all military personnel who have died while serving the U.S. Armed Forces.

    As is customary and unique for this holiday, flags are lowered in the morning and then raised to full-staff promptly at noon, where they remain for the remainder of the day.

    In addition, Governor Lamont announced that both the Pearl Harbor Memorial Bridge, which carries I-95 across the Quinnipiac River in New Haven, and the parking structure at the Stamford Transportation Center will be illuminated in red, white, and blue lights each night this holiday weekend, beginning on the evening of Friday, May 23, and continuing through the evening of Monday, May 26. Both structures operate under the management of the Connecticut Department of Transportation.

    “Our nation’s service members put their lives on the line to protect the freedoms and liberties that make this country the greatest in the world, and we honor and pay tribute to all of the fallen heroes,” Governor Lamont said. “On this Memorial Day, I urge everyone in Connecticut to take time to reflect on those who have given their lives in service to our nation, keep their families in your prayers, and thank all of those currently enlisted and our veterans for their service.”

    “As we observe Memorial Day weekend, let us remember the heroic men and women who have consistently demonstrated an unwavering sense of duty, resilience, and bravery in their service to our country,” Lt. Governor Susan Bysiewicz said. “We owe a great debt to the members of the U.S. military, and we should honor those service members who made the ultimate sacrifice so that we may enjoy our freedom. I hope that Connecticut’s residents will join me, not only this weekend but every day, in paying tribute to these heroes and their families.”

    In accordance with the governor’s directive, flags will be at half-staff on the Connecticut State Capitol building and all other state-operated buildings, grounds, and facilities statewide. Individuals, businesses, schools, municipalities, and any other private entities and government subdivisions are encouraged to lower their flags for this same duration of time. Since no flag should fly higher than the U.S. flag, all other flags, including state, municipal, corporate, or otherwise, should also be lowered.

    To receive email alerts when the governor orders flags to half-staff, visit portal.ct.gov/governor/news/sign-up-for-news-updates.

     

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: There is a growing number of ‘super-sized’ schools. Does the number of students matter?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Emma Rowe, Associate Professor in Education, Deakin University

    LBeddoe/Shutterstock

    Earlier this week, The Sydney Morning Herald reported one of Sydney’s top public high schools had more than 2,000 students for the first time, thanks to the booming population in the area.

    This follows similar reports of other “super-sized” schools in Victoria, Western Australia and Queensland.

    Parents may be wondering if a school’s size will impact their child’s opportunities or experience. What does the research say?

    A controversial subject

    Policy-makers have been concerned about school sizes for decades. This largely relates to declining enrolments in some areas and growing demand in others. For example, in Victoria during the Kennett government in the 1990s, some schools were merged into “super schools”.

    Super schools are attractive to policy-makers due to their ability to pool resources. However, anecdotally, parents have tended to oppose mergers on the basis that big schools detract from the community feel and personal relationships.

    There is no national data on average school size, although you can check individual school sizes on the MySchool website.

    Education authorities consider a school to be “small” if it has fewer than 300 students for primary school and fewer than 700 for high school.

    What does the research say?

    Australian-based research tends to support larger schools, on the basis they provide more curriculum choices. In a 2014 study published in the Journal of Education Policy, the authors wrote:

    large schools have more resources and are therefore better placed to offer a large range of curriculum, often including both academic and vocational subjects.

    A 2023 study similarly argued:

    smaller schools are generally less able to offer a wide range and diversity of curricular offerings compared to larger schools.

    Small schools can be beneficial

    But other education advocates argue small schools better facilitate participatory democratic environments for young people, improve discipline and sense of community.

    A 2009 review of 57 studies (the majority from the United States) published after 1990 recommended high schools do not have more than 1,000 students.

    The review said smaller schools can offer a community-like feel for students and are more likely to have smaller class sizes. A smaller school may be particularly advantageous for neurodiverse students if there are lower levels of noise and movement.

    A US-based study from 1991 found schools with less than 400 students lead to better student participation, attendance and satisfaction with school:

    The two primary arguments for large schools, cost savings and curriculum enhancement, pale in comparison with the positive schooling outcomes […] achieved by small schools.

    Smaller schools can offer a stronger sense of community.
    Dean Drobot/ Shutterstock

    But context matters

    In 2000, the Gates Foundation had a “big idea” to break up large high schools and turn them into “small learning communities” of 400 or fewer students.

    The foundation believed the initiative would lift graduation rates and student achievement, especially among minority students, because of the close relationships between students and teachers.

    But by 2008, the foundation conceded it had not worked – there had been no “dramatic improvements” in the number of students who leave high school adequately prepared for further study.

    But it’s not really about size

    So the research offers a mixed picture – this strongly suggests the size of a school on its own is not the most important factor.

    We also need to look at factors such as class size. Research shows smaller class sizes and lower teacher to student ratios are beneficial for student outcomes.

    Smaller class sizes and lower teacher to student ratios can lead to more one-on-one attention, improved relationships and lower noise levels in a classroom.

    Some studies have categorised “small classes” as between 13-17 students and larger classes as between 22-25 students.

    Teaching quality may also be improved with a smaller class size, as the teacher has more time to tailor their instruction to individual students.

    Importantly, the size of a school overall does not necessarily determine class sizes. A large school or a small school can still have large class sizes, and still struggle for quality one-on-one time.

    Similarly, a large school can still offer a strong sense of community and positive relationships between teachers and peers, depending on the way the school is organised (for example, a “school-within-a-school” or specific learning group within the school).

    If a small school is not well-resourced or does not have enough teachers, it may struggle to provide a positive, happy learning environment.

    The point is the school size on its own is not necessarily a positive or negative. What matters is what else is going on inside that school and whether it has the funding and resources to offer smaller class sizes, specialised teachers and access to a wide variety of subjects.

    Emma Rowe receives funding from the Australian Research Council.

    – ref. There is a growing number of ‘super-sized’ schools. Does the number of students matter? – https://theconversation.com/there-is-a-growing-number-of-super-sized-schools-does-the-number-of-students-matter-257012

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australian roads are getting deadlier – pedestrians and males are among those at greater risk

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Milad Haghani, Associate Professor & Principal Fellow in Urban Risk & Resilience, The University of Melbourne

    At least ten people died in fatal crashes earlier this month in a single 48-hour period on Victorian roads. It was the latest tragic demonstration of the mounting road trauma in Australia.

    In the decade up to 2020, the national road toll was gradually declining, albeit with some fluctuations. But the trend has since reversed, with fatalities rising steadily year after year.

    According to the latest official data, 1,296 people died on Australian roads in the year to April. 108 lives were lost last month alone, almost 15% more than the average for April over the previous five years.

    While our population has increased by about 6% over this five-year period, our road deaths have gone up by 18.5%.

    Road fatalities rarely follow evenly distributed averages. They sometimes spike, as they have in Victoria. And while we must never lose sight of the fact that these are people, and not just data, there is value in interrogating clusters when they occur.

    Victoria breakdown

    In the 12 months to May 20 this year, 118 lives were lost on Victorian roads, up 8.3% on the previous year and well above the five-year average of 100 annual deaths.

    The sharpest increases by transport mode have been among pedestrians (up 24%), one of the most vulnerable road-user groups. And a new threat has emerged with the first publicly reported case in Australia of a pedestrian dying after being struck by an electric bike.

    At least one pattern stands out from the recent cluster: five of the eight crashes occurred outside metropolitan Melbourne. This reflects the longstanding reality that fatal collisions remain disproportionately common in regional and remote areas. Over the 12 months, country road deaths have risen by 11%, compared to a 2% increase in metropolitan Melbourne.

    A large share of road deaths continue to occur in the country.
    Inge Blessas/Shutterstock

    Another striking detail is the gender distribution. Male deaths are up 22% on the previous period and now comprise nearly 80% of all fatalities. In contrast, female deaths have declined by 33%.

    Another trend that stands out is the rising toll among older road users. In the last 12 months, 40 people aged 60 and over have died on Victorian roads – a 25% increase on the previous period.

    4 National trends

    The national road fatality data tells us some of these trends are not exclusive to Victoria. They reflect what is happening across the country.

    1. Vulnerable road users: Nationally, pedestrians and motorcyclists have experienced sustained increases in lives lost for at least four years in a row. The share of pedestrians in total road deaths has risen from 11% in 2021 to 14% in the latest period. Despite the growing number, motorcyclist fatalities have remained relatively stable at about 20% of all deaths.

    2. Gender disparity: Men continue to be disproportionately represented in the national road toll, accounting for approximately 75% of all road deaths in Australia.

    3. Older age groups: In the 12 months to April 2025, deaths among individuals aged 75 and over increased by nearly 19% to 185.

    4. Regional and remote areas: in the 12 months to April 2024, there were roughly 818 deaths on country roads, compared to 400 in metropolitan areas.

    What do the trends tell us?

    There are several key points in the data.

    First, the persistent over-representation of men in fatalities remains a defining feature of the road toll. This gender imbalance is not specific to Australia.

    But put simply, we still know very little about what’s driving this pattern. Known behavioural and physiological sex-based differences don’t fully explain the scale of the disparity.

    The rise in fatalities among older Australians does not appear to be particularly abnormal when tracked with demographic changes. From 2020 to 2024, the number of Australians aged 75 and over increased by nearly 31%. In comparison, fatalities in this age group rose by around 25% over the same period. This suggests that the relative risk for older Australians has not necessarily increased.

    As for rural and regional areas, approximately two-thirds of road deaths occur in these areas, while only one-third of Australians reside there. Despite years of acknowledgment, this urban–rural divide in road safety remains wide and unresolved.

    SUVs a menace?

    While vehicles have become safer for their occupants, they have become more dangerous for other road users, especially pedestrians.

    One contributing factor could be the fast growing dominance of SUVs and light trucks in Australia.

    A recent international review that pooled the findings of 24 studies found SUVs were associated with significantly higher fatality rates in crashes involving vulnerable road users, compared to smaller cars. The effect was particularly pronounced for children.

    Heavier vehicles, such as SUVs, pose a higher road risk to pedestrians.
    King Ropes Access/Shutterstock

    The dangers are not limited to pedestrians. In two-vehicle collisions, increasing the striking vehicle’s weight by around 450 kilograms raises the probability of a fatality in the other vehicle by 40–50%.

    New targets

    Australian governments have adopted a Vision Zero goal of no road deaths or serious injuries by 2050.

    The complete elimination of fatalities should remain our moral benchmark. But the current data suggests intermediate targets are urgently needed.

    A more achievable near-term priority may be to first reverse the rising national toll by focusing on where the greatest preventable harms persist: vulnerable road users, especially pedestrians, males and non-urban roads.

    Milad Haghani receives funding from The Australian Government.

    Iman Taheri Sarteshnizi does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Australian roads are getting deadlier – pedestrians and males are among those at greater risk – https://theconversation.com/australian-roads-are-getting-deadlier-pedestrians-and-males-are-among-those-at-greater-risk-256994

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Lawler Reacts to the Horrific Antisemitic Attack at the Capital Jewish Museum

    Source: US Congressman Mike Lawler (R, NY-17)

    Washington, D.C. – 5/22/2025… Today, Congressman Mike Lawler (NY-17), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, reacts to the heartbreaking antisemitic attack last night. This is part of a trend of rising antisemitic violence around the country in the wake of the October 7th attack in Israel and the failures of college administrators, local and state governments, to address antisemitism seriously. 

    “I am shocked and saddened by this act of violence right in the heart of our nation’s capital. My prayers are with the families of the victims, the Jewish people, and the Israeli embassy staff as they mourn,” wrote Chairman Lawler.

    “May the perpetrator of this heinous act of antisemitic violence be swiftly served justice,” concluded Chairman Lawler. 

    Congressman Lawler is one of the most bipartisan members of Congress and represents New York’s 17th Congressional District, which is just north of New York City and contains all or parts of Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, and Westchester Counties. He was rated the most effective freshman lawmaker in the 118th Congress, 8th overall, surpassing dozens of committee chairs.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Sara Jacobs Calls Out Trump Administration For Failing to Prioritize Sudan

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congresswoman Sara Jacobs (D-CA-53)

    May 22, 2025

    Rep. Sara Jacobs (CA-51), Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, today called out the Trump Administration for failing to prioritize Sudan and helping to bring an end to the war and genocide in Sudan.

    Watch Rep. Sara Jacobs’ Opening Remarks Here

    Rep. Sara Jacobs said:

    “Thank you, Chairman Smith, and thank you to all of our witnesses joining us today to testify and bring attention to the ongoing catastrophe in Sudan. Last month marked two years since the outbreak of war in Sudan. It is now the largest humanitarian crisis in the world. Nearly 25 million people – half of Sudan’s population – are facing acute hunger, and more than half a million people are facing famine. More than 13 million Sudanese have been displaced from their homes since the conflict began, including nearly four million people forced to flee across Sudan’s borders as refugees. I have seen this suffering firsthand when I traveled to Chad and met with Sudanese refugees last year.

    “And let’s be clear: this is a war of choice. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and allied militias have waged this war, committing war crimes and holding the Sudanese people captive for their own selfish interests. And their external backers, particularly the United Arab Emirates with their support to the RSF, in addition to Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia, have turned this war into a regional proxy war by supporting and arming either side, risking further regional destabilization.

    “But despite this, the Trump Administration is nowhere to be found. In fact, the Administration’s actions have only worsened the suffering of the Sudanese people. The Trump Administration’s sham “foreign assistance review” was really just a pretext to end most foreign assistance – like food aid, disaster relief, global health programs, development and economic aid, and more. In Sudan, it’s meant cancelling millions of dollars in U.S.-funded life-saving aid. For instance, before it was illegally dismantled, USAID was supporting the heroic efforts of the Sudanese Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) to open community kitchens and provide basic meals to Sudanese civilians throughout the country. Following the massive cuts to U.S. foreign assistance, which included USAID support to the ERRs, more than 80% of the roughly 1500 community kitchens across Sudan have been forced to close their doors – cutting off vulnerable Sudanese civilians from life-saving food assistance. 

    “And the Administration hasn’t stopped there. Yesterday, they announced over $87 million worth of cancelled humanitarian programs, including $30 million for emergency nutrition, water, and food aid in Darfur. The SAF and the RSF continue to commit atrocities against the Sudanese people, and the people of Darfur are facing a second genocide in 20 years at the hands of the RSF. Yet despite the clear need for the United States to play an active role in negotiations to end this brutal conflict, the Trump Administration has failed to dedicate the resources necessary to do so. 

    “More than four months into President Trump’s term, the Administration has still failed to nominate an Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs at the State Department, an NSC Senior Director for Africa, or a Special Envoy for Sudan – a position the Administration is required by law to fill. And just yesterday, during Secretary Rubio’s testimony, he actually refused to say the word genocide and reaffirm his previous statements that the RSF is in fact committing a genocide.

    “These actions – or lack thereof – show that Sudan is not a priority for the Trump Administration. And while the Administration ignores the conflict and its human consequences, it chooses instead to provide weapons to the UAE – a country that is arming the RSF, fueling the war and facilitating a genocide in Darfur. There is widespread and credible reporting that the UAE continues to funnel arms to the RSF, even though the UAE continues to deny this publicly. But instead of pressuring the UAE to stop arming the RSF forces currently carrying out a genocide, the Trump Administration has chosen to blow through a Congressional hold by Ranking Member Meeks and proceed with arms sales worth more than $1 billion. 

    “Just as I did under the Biden Administration, I believe that the United States needs to use its significant leverage with the UAE to pressure them to finally end their support to the RSF. That is why I, along with Ranking Member Meeks, introduced Joint Resolutions of Disapproval last week to block the Administration’s arms sales to the UAE. If the United States wanted to, we could take tangible actions and make sensible policy decisions that would help bring an end to the war in Sudan and a sustainable peace agreement that ends military rule, establishes a civilian government, and provides a clear roadmap to democratic elections. Instead, this Administration seems to be ignoring the problem and selling weapons that are fueling genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. 

    “The Sudanese people have suffered enough. It is time for the United States and the international community to step up and focus on bringing an end to this war so that the Sudanese people can finally rebuild their country. Thank you, Chairman Smith, and with that, I yield back.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –