For decades, scientists have known that platypuses and echidnas – Australia’s unique egg-laying mammals – have another developmental quirk: they don’t use the same genetic toolkit as other mammals to develop male and female embryos.
What’s more, just how they do it has been a mystery. Until now.
In a recent study published in Genome Biology, our research team has found strong evidence that monotreme sex comes down to a single gene – one that’s much more like what we see in some fish and amphibians than other mammals.
The search for the secret of monotreme sex
The Australian platypus and echidna are monotremes, the most ancient living group of mammals. These unique creatures are famously the only mammals to lay eggs, and they also have other reptile-like features.
Humans and many other mammal species have two sex-determining chromosomes, X and Y. An embryo with an XX pair of chromosomes will develop as female, while an XY pair leads to a male embryo.
In many mammals, the process that makes an embryo develop as male is triggered by a gene called SRY on the male Y chromosome. However, the SRY gene in monotremes has never been found.
About 20 years ago, it was discovered that monotremes have an entirely different system that uses multiple X and Y chromosomes. Scientists assumed the Y chromosomes must still hold a gene that determined sex, but very little was known about what it might be.
In 2008 a full genome sequence of a platypus was published, which was a step in the right direction. However, the genome was from a female so it had no information about Y chromosomes.
Our new research provides the first real evidence that an adapted version of AMH found on one of the monotreme Y chromosomes (dubbed AMHY) is the sex determination gene in monotremes.
We showed that changes in the AMH gene long ago, early in the evolution of monotremes, could explain how AMHY arose and took on a role in male sexual development.
This event would have set the stage for the evolution of the novel sex chromosome system in the ancestor of today’s platypus and echidna, about 100 million years ago when the AMH gene on the XY chromosomes embarked on separated paths.
We showed that although the AMHY gene has changed significantly from the original AMH gene (AMHX), it has retained its essential features. Importantly, we could show for the first time that AMHY is turned on in the right tissue and at the right time to direct development of the testes during male development, which was an important missing piece of the puzzle.
A first for mammals
Unlike the other mammal sex determination genes, which act directly on the DNA to switch on other genes that lead to male development, AMHY is a hormone. It does not interact with DNA, but instead acts at the surface of cells to turn genes on or off.
There is growing evidence that AMHY also plays a role in sex determination in a number of fish and amphibian species. However, AMHY in monotremes would be the first known example of a hormone playing a sex-determining role in mammals.
What’s next? Our ongoing research investigate in detail how AMHX and AMHY work differently in monotremes compared to other mammals.
The work discussed in this article was carried out by researchers from the University of Adelaide, the University of Melbourne, the University of Queensland, Monash University and Currumbin Wildlife Sanctuary.
Linda Shearwin receives funding from the Australian Research Council.
Frank Grützner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Beach Boys in 1962 in Los Angeles, California. Brian Wilson is on the left. Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images
Brian Wilson, leader, songwriter and producer of the Beach Boys, has passed away at age 82.
He leaves behind a legacy of beautiful, joyous, bittersweet and enduring music, crafted over a career spanning six decades.
While this news isn’t unexpected – Wilson was diagnosed with dementia last year and entered a conservatorship after the loss of his wife, Melinda – his passing marks the end of a long and extraordinary chapter in musical history.
A life of music
Formed in the early 1960s in Hawthorne California, the Beach Boys were built on a foundation of family and community: brothers Brian, Dennis and Carl Wilson, their cousin Mike Love, and school friend Al Jardine.
Growing up, the Wilson household was a turbulent place; their father, Murry Wilson, was strict and at times violent. Music was the one way in which the family could connect.
During these early years Brian discovered the sounds that would shape his musical identity: Gershwin, doo wop groups, early rock and roll, and, a particular favourite, the vocal group the Four Freshmen, whose tight-harmony singing style Wilson studied meticulously.
The Beach Boys in rehearsal in 1964; Brian Wilson sits at the piano . Photo by Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images
It was an unexpected combination of influences for a pop band. Even from the Beach Boys’ earliest recordings – the surf, the cars, the girls – the stirrings of the complexity and musical adventurousness Wilson is known for is audible. Listen to the unexpected structure of The Lonely Sea (1962), the complex chords of The Warmth of the Sun (1963), or the subtle modulation in Don’t Worry Baby (1964).
These early innovations hinted at a growing creativity that would continue to evolve over the rest of the 1960s, and beyond.
A story of resilience
In later years, Brian Wilson often appeared publicly as a fragile figure. But what stands out most in his story is resilience.
His ability to produce such an expansive and diverse catalogue of work while navigating difficult family relationships, intense record label pressures, misdiagnosed and mistreated mental health conditions, addiction and much more, is extraordinary. Wilson not only survived, but continued to create music.
Brian Wilson on the piano and Al Jardine on guitar perform in Los Angeles in 2019. Scott Dudelson/Getty Images
He eventually did something few Beach Boys’ fans would have imagined – he returned to the stage.
Wilson’s unexpected return to public performance during the Pet Sounds and SMiLE tours in the early 2000s began a revival interest in the Beach Boys, and a critical reconsideration of their musical legacy. This continues with a consistent release of books, documentaries, movies and podcasts about Wilson and the legacy of the Beach Boys’ music.
The focus of a thesis
I grew up near Surfers Paradise on the Gold Coast in Queensland. Their early songs about an endless summer had a particular resonance to my hometown, even if, like Brian Wilson, I only admired the beach from afar.
I chose to study the Beach Boys’ music for my PhD thesis and spent the next few years charting the course of their musical development from their early days in the garage to creating Pet Sounds just five years later.
The Beach Boys perform onstage around 1963. Brian Wilson is on the left. Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images
I was fascinated by how a band could create such a groundbreaking volume of work and progress so quickly from the delightful, yet wobbly Surfin’ to the complex arrangements of God Only Knows.
To understand their music, I spent years listening to Beach Boys’ tracking sessions, take after take, to hear how their songs were so cleverly and delicately put together.
What struck me just as powerfully as the music itself was the sound of Brian Wilson’s voice in those recordings. Listening to Wilson leading hours of tracking sessions was to hear an artist at the top of their game – decisive, confident, funny, collaborative and deeply driven to make music that would express the magic he heard in his mind, and connect with an audience.
One of the more unexpected discoveries in my analysis of the Beach Boys’ music came from their lyrics. Using a word frequency tool to examine all 117 songs in my study, I found that the most common word was “now”.
The Beach Boys pose for a portrait around1964. Brian Wilson stands at the back. Michael Ochs Archives/Getty Images
In many cases, it appears in a conversational sense – “Well, she got her Daddy’s car, and she cruised through the hamburger stand now” – but on a broader level, it perfectly encapsulates what Brian Wilson’s music offered so many listeners.
He created an endless present: a world where the sun could always be shining, where you could feel young forever, and you could visit that world any time you needed to.
Jadey O’Regan with Brian Wilson, Enmore Theatre, Sydney 2010. Jadey O’Regan
In 2010, I had the remarkable experience of meeting Brian Wilson in his dressing room before his performance at the Enmore Theatre in Sydney. He was funny and kind. He sat at a small keyboard, taught me a harmony and for a moment, we sang Love and Mercy together.
It was one of the most magical moments of my life. It is also one of Wilson’s most enduring sentiments: “love and mercy, that’s what we need tonight”.
Farewell and thank you, Brian. Surf’s up.
Jadey O’Regan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
If you live in the southern hemisphere and have been stopped in your tracks by a recent sunset, you may have noticed they seem more vibrant lately. The colours are brighter and bolder, and they linger longer in the sky.
Why are sunsets “better” at some times of the year compared to others? We can use science to explain this.
There are many ingredients for a “good” sunset, but the main three are clear skies, low humidity, and the Sun sitting low in the sky.
In winter, sunsets sometimes look much more vivid that in summer – and yes, temperature plays a role. Jeremy Bishop/Unsplash
From light to colour
To understand why we get such vibrant sunsets in the colder months of the year, we first need to know how colours appear in the sky.
All visible light is actually energy that travels in waves; the length of those waves determines the colour that our eyes see.
Although sunlight might look white to us, it’s actually a mix of different wavelengths of light that make up all the visible colours – from fiery reds and oranges (longer wavelengths) to deep blues and purples (shorter wavelengths).
The wavelength of light determines the colour we see. At shorter wavelengths, the colours are purple and blue, while at longer wavelengths they are red and orange. DrSciComm/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA
These individual colours become visible when sunlight is “scattered”, which is precisely what happens when it passes through the invisible gas molecules in Earth’s atmosphere – mostly nitrogen and oxygen.
When sunlight hits these molecules, it’s absorbed and shot back out (scattered) in different directions. Blue and violet light is scattered more strongly than red and orange light – this is also why the sky looks blue during the day.
The path of the Sun
In the middle of the day when the Sun is high in the sky, sunlight travels a more direct path through the atmosphere.
The path of the Sun’s light through the atmosphere is longer at sunset than it is at noon. The Conversation
But when the Sun is closer to the horizon, the path is less direct. This means that during sunrises and sunsets, sunlight travels through more of Earth’s atmosphere. And more atmosphere means more scattering.
In fact, during sunsets, the blue and violet light encounters so many oxygen and nitrogen molecules that it is completely scattered away. What we’re left with is the longer wavelengths of light – the reds and oranges. In other words, more atmosphere means more fiery sunsets.
But why are sunsets especially magnificent during winter? One reason is the Sun’s position in the sky during different times of the year.
The Sun travels a longer and higher path in the sky in summer compared to winter. This affects the duration of sunsets. The Conversation, Shutterstock
Earth rotates on its axis every 24 hours, giving us day and night. But this axis isn’t perfectly “upright” relative to the Sun – it’s tilted at an angle of about 23.5 degrees. This tilt is why we have seasons. The southern hemisphere is tilted towards the Sun around the start and end of the calendar year (southern summer), and away from the Sun around the middle of the year (southern winter).
Because of this tilt, the Sun sits lower in the sky during winter, which is why the days are shorter. And because the Sun sits lower, it spends more time near the horizon as it rises and sets. That’s why winter sunsets often seem to last longer.
Earth has seasons because its axis is tilted. The axis always points in the same direction as our planet orbits the Sun. Bureau of Meteorology
The quality of the air
Humidity and air quality also play a big role when it comes to vibrant winter sunsets.
In winter, humidity is typically much lower than in the warmer summer months, meaning there’s less moisture in the air. Humid air often contains tiny water droplets, which can scatter incoming sunlight. This scattering is slightly different to how the oxygen and nitrogen molecules scatter light – here, even red and orange light can be affected.
When humidity is high, the extra scattering by these small water droplets can cause sunsets to appear softer or more washed out.
Even on a clear summer’s night, the sunset will appear more muted if the air humidity is high. Doug Bagg/Unsplash
In drier winter air, with fewer of these water droplets in the way, sunlight can travel through the atmosphere with less interference. This means the colours can shine through more vividly, making for crisper and more vibrant sunsets.
If you’re looking to a catch a spectacular sunset, you’ll want to wait for a nice, clear winter’s evening. Cloud cover and air pollution can block the sunlight and mute the colours we see.
So the next time you find yourself wrapped up in a warm jumper at dusk, be sure to look up – there could be a spectacular light show playing out just above you.
Chloe Wilkins does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Our brains swear for good reasons: to vent, cope, boost our grit and feel closer to those around us. Swear words can act as social glue and play meaningful roles in how people communicate, connect and express themselves – both in person, and online.
In our new research published in Lingua, we analysed more than 1.7 billion words of online language across 20 English-speaking regions. We identified 597 different swear word forms – from standard words, to creative spellings like “4rseholes”, to acronyms like “wtf”.
The findings challenge a familiar stereotype. Australians – often thought of as prolific swearers – are actually outdone by Americans and Brits, both in how often they swear, and in how many users swear online.
Facts and figures
Our study focused on publicly available web data (such as news articles, organisational websites, government or institutional publications, and blogs – but excluding social media and private messaging). We found vulgar words made up 0.036% of all words in the dataset from the United States, followed by 0.025% in the British data and 0.022% in the Australian data.
Although vulgar language is relatively rare in terms of overall word frequency, it was used by a significant number of individuals.
Between 12% and 13.3% of Americans, around 10% of Brits, and 9.4% of Australians used at least one vulgar word in their data. Overall, the most frequent vulgar word was “fuck” – with all its variants, it amounted to a stunning 201 different forms.
We focused on online language that didn’t include social media, because large-scale comparisons need robust, purpose-built datasets. In our case, we used the Global Web-Based English (GloWbE) corpus, which was specifically designed to compare how English is used across different regions online.
So how much were our findings influenced by the online data we used?
Telling results come from research happening at the same time as ours. One study analysed the use of “fuck” in social networks on X, examining how network size and strength influence swearing in the UK, US and Australia.
It used data from 5,660 networks with more than 435,000 users and 7.8 billion words and found what we did. Americans use “fuck” most frequently, while Australians use it the least, but with the most creative spelling variations (some comfort for anyone feeling let down by our online swearing stats).
Teasing apart cultural differences
Americans hold relatively conservative attitudes toward public morality, and their high swearing rates are surprising. The cultural contradiction may reflect the country’s strong individualistic culture. Americans often value personal expression – especially in private or anonymous settings like the internet.
Significantly, the only religious-based swear word in our dataset, “damn”, was used most frequently by Americans.
Research suggests swearing is more acceptable in Australian public discourse. Certainly, Australia’s public airing of swear words often takes visitors by surprise. The long-running road safety slogan “If you drink, then drive, you’re a bloody idiot” is striking – such language is rare in official messaging elsewhere.
Australians may be comfortable swearing in person, but our findings indicate they dial it back online – surprising for a nation so fond of its vernacular.
In terms of preferences for specific forms of vulgarity, Americans showed a strong preference for variations of “ass(hole)”, the Irish favored “feck”, the British preferred “cunt”, and Pakistanis leaned toward “butt(hole)”.
The only statistically significant aversion we found was among Americans, who tended to avoid the word “bloody” (folk wisdom claims the word is blasphemous).
Being fluent in swearing
People from countries where English is the dominant language – such as the US, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Ireland – tend to swear more frequently and with more lexical variety than people in regions where English is less dominant like India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Ghana or the Philippines. This pattern holds for both frequency and creativity in swearing.
But Singapore ranked fourth in terms of frequency of swearing in our study, just behind Australia and ahead of New Zealand, Ireland and Canada. English in Singapore is increasingly seen not as a second language, but as a native language, and as a tool for identity, belonging and creativity. Young Singaporeans use social swearing to push back against authority, especially given the government’s strict rules on public language.
One possible reason we saw less swearing among non-native English speakers is that it is rarely taught. Despite its frequency and social utility, swearing – alongside humour and informal speech – is often left out of language education.
Cursing comes naturally
Cultural, social and technological shifts are reshaping linguistic norms, blurring the already blurry lines between informal and formal, private and public language. Just consider the Aussie contributions to the July Oxford English Dictionary updates: expressions like “to strain the potatoes” (to urinate), “no wuckers” and “no wucking furries” (from “no fucking worries”).
Swearing and vulgarity aren’t just crass or abusive. While they can be used harmfully, research consistently shows they serve important communicative functions – colourful language builds rapport, expresses humour and emotion, signals solidarity and eases tension.
It’s clear that swearing isn’t just a bad habit that can be easily kicked, like nail-biting or smoking indoors. Besides, history shows that telling people not to swear is one of the best ways to keep swearing alive and well.
Martin Schweinberger has received funding from from the Centre for Digital Cultures and Society and the School of Languages and Cultures at the University of Queensland. He is currently funded by the Language Data Commons of Australia, which has received investment from the Australian Research Data Commons, funded by the National Collaborative Research Infrastructure Strategy.
Kate Burridge does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
All children in England living in households claiming universal credit will soon be eligible for free school meals, the UK government has announced. This will improve the lives of 500,000 more children and save their families £500 per year.
This will reduce hunger at school. But it will not solve the UK’s child poverty crisis.
In her spending review on 11 June, Chancellor Rachel Reeves described the move – as well as investment in education – as “a downpayment ahead of publication of the Child Poverty Strategy in the autumn”. However, the two-child benefit cap, which the government is considering scrapping, and challenging school budgets, remain major barriers to addressing child poverty and food insecurity.
According to analysis from the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the new free school meals policy will ultimately lift 100,000 children out of poverty and cost £1 billion a year. Under the current system, only families in receipt of universal credit and earning below £7,400 a year qualify for free school meals. This incredibly low threshold has excluded a huge number of children living in poverty from getting a good meal at school.
Reactions have been justifiably positive. Nick Harrison, CEO of social mobility charity the Sutton Trust, has called the move “a significant step towards taking hunger out of the classroom”.
The Institute for Fiscal Studies pointed out, however, that the implied poverty reducing benefits of the policy will only be realised in the long term.
Eligibility for free school meals had temporarily widened during the roll out of universal credit. Juice Flair/Shutterstock
This is partly because, since 2018, the eligibility for free school meals has been temporarily widened to mitigate the impact of changes in the welfare system (the roll out of universal credit) on families. During this period, which ended in April this year, children still received free school meals even if family entitlements to universal credit changed.
This means that many children made eligible for free school meals under the new policy are already receiving them. And far fewer than 100,000 children will immediately be “lifted out of poverty”, as the government had claimed.
A mission against child poverty?
The education secretary, Bridget Phillipson, called the new school meals entitlement part of “the moral mission of this government to tackle the stain of child poverty”. She said: “Today this government takes a giant step towards ending it with targeted support that puts money back in parents’ pockets.”
Such forceful language almost does justice to the scale of the problem. In the UK, 4.45 million children live in poverty. One in five children live in food insecure households – meaning their families struggle to put food on the table.
My own research shows that a fifth of all schools now run a food bank. Extending free school meals is an undoubtedly positive step but it will only scratch the surface of these much deeper problems.
Given the depths of child poverty in the UK, the government must build on this development if it really wants to tackle the problem. Firstly, the government must commit to removing the two-child benefit cap, which limits benefits paid for children to the first two children in a family. Doing so would lift 350,000 children out of poverty immediately and reduce the number of children turning up to school too hungry to learn.
Extending free schools meal coverage is the less contentious policy option. There is, rightly or wrongly, public support for the two-child limit.
But it is also the comparatively less ambitious and effective one. Lifting the two child benefit cap would help more children at a lower cost per child.
Secondly, too often the government asks schools to meet essential costs, duties and innovations out of their existing budgets. In the long run, this disadvantages all children and particularly those living in poverty. This needs to change.
For example, the government currently only funds 75% of the costs of the new national school breakfast clubs. Next year schools will have to find £400 million from their existing budgets to fund pay rises for teachers. This figure dwarfs the amount schools will receive next year for extending free school meals.
Finally, we need to tackle the root causes of poverty and build viable pathways out of it. This cannot be achieved by largely focusing on education and providing more funding to schools – important as this is.
Child poverty is shaped by how our welfare and benefits system is organised, insecure and low-paid work, the high costs of housing and bills, and the absence of high-quality services and community resources that help children thrive. Only by tackling all of these issues in a coordinated and progressive way will be able to make child hunger and poverty things of the past, which is where they belong.
Will Baker does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Imagine your parents leave you and your siblings a share of land that’s been in your family for generations. Several of your relatives already live on the land, and you’d like to do the same; but you can’t get a loan to build or renovate a home without permission from all the relatives who also share ownership. And at any moment, another heir could sell their share, triggering a court-ordered sale that could force you off the land – and lose everything you’ve invested in.
This is the reality of what’s known as heirs’ property: land passed down informally, without clear wills or deeds, which results in a “tangled” or “clouded” title.
It’s more common than you might think in the U.S., especially in rural areas, and it presents significant challenges to long-term housing stability.
Research shows that within 44 states and the District of Columbia, there are an estimated 508,371
heirs’ properties, with an assessed value of US$32 billion. (There wasn’t reliable enough data in six states.)
It’s more of an issue in some states, such as Alabama. But it’s also a problem in cities such as New York City and Philadelphia.
Because it’s so difficult to finance home construction on this land, sell it or leverage it, heirs’ property can leave families vulnerable to exploitation and perpetuate cycles of poverty. Despite these challenges, many families have nonetheless lived together and supported one another on shared land for generations.
As faculty and collaborators with Auburn University’s Rural Studio, we study heirs’ property and its role in shaping housing access. Based in Hale County, Alabama, Rural Studio has completed over 200 projects – many of them homes built on heirs’ property – providing critical housing for families facing complex land ownership challenges.
Land with no clear owner
The lack of a clear will or deed often happens due to inadequate access to – and distrust of – the legal system.
Once the land is passed down to the next generation, the heirs are known as “tenants in common,” meaning they own an undivided interest in the entire property. As the property continues to pass down from generation to generation, the number of tenants in common increases exponentially.
When a couple passes down land to their children – and then those kids pass it down to their kids – the number of heirs dramatically increases. Auburn University Rural Studio, CC BY-SA
Without clear title, no single person or group can make decisions about the property. Every heir must legally sign off on any action, which makes it nearly impossible to secure traditional forms of financing, obtain insurance, access disaster relief, or use the land as collateral.
Those living on the land often pay their share of property taxes, but distant or unaware heirs might not, which puts the entire property at risk of being lost through a tax lien sale. This leaves families with property in “tangled” status exposed to predatory land acquisition practices that often lead to land loss.
Any tenant in common can sell their share to an outside party. These outside parties – either individuals or companies – can then request a court to order what’s called a partition by sale, which can push every other owner off the land.
Imagine three siblings inherit a piece of land from their parents and are now tenants in common. One sibling sells their share to a real estate investor. That investor then goes to court and requests a partition by sale. The court then orders the entire property sold and the proceeds split among the owners, effectively forcing the other two siblings off the land, even if they wanted to keep it.
Our research in Hale County, Alabama, finds that Black families in particular have supported one another for generations while living on heirs’ property.
These multigenerational kinship networks rely on one another for child care, elder care, food, transportation and shared utility costs. But the value of this sort of living situation goes beyond social and economic benefits. The land can be woven into family lore or be steeped in the history of the surrounding area.
So, despite the legal and financial challenges, many extended families will do whatever they can to continue living together on their land. Even a small stake in heirs’ property offers connection to the past and a place to return home in the future.
Family members often live in different homes spread across heirs’ property, which often exists in a legal gray area. Auburn University Rural Studio, CC BY-SA
These informal kinship networks can provide support and resilience in ways that traditional forms of land and homeownership do not. Putting all of the people who own the land on the title – what’s known as “clearing title” – is not only costly and time-consuming, but it also often requires dividing up the property into smaller parcels, which can prevent some family members from living on the land altogether.
Meanwhile, traditional legal and financial products – think mortgages and land-use agreements with farmers – tend to be structured with sole ownership in mind. Most banks and institutions simply won’t lend to heirs’ property with tangled titles.
There have been recent efforts to protect these informal arrangements. The Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act, which has been enacted in 25 states, ensures due process and sets up safeguards against immediate partition by sale actions.
For example, if a suit is brought by a co-owner, a fair market value appraisal – or an agreed-upon value by all parties – must be conducted. The other shareholders of the land also have the option to buy out the shareholder bringing the suit. Under the statute, additional partition methods may be considered. And if a sale is required, it’s done on the open market.
Many organizations are working to address issues related to heirs’ property and tangled titles. Most of the work centers on clearing title, establishing shared land agreements and teaching landowners how to avoid having their property fall into a tangled title situation. For example, the Florida Housing Coalition, Housing Assistance Council and the Alabama Heirs Property Alliance are actively engaged in community education, legal support, data mapping and policy advocacy.
Build first, ask permission later
Many rural families on heirs’ property have limited pathways to homeownership. Financial constraints, limited access to quality housing options and lot restrictions have often forced residents to settle for older, substandard, manufactured homes. Small utility sheds have even begun to replace broken-down trailer homes in many rural areas.
Utility sheds are increasingly being used as homes across the U.S. South. Auburn University Rural Studio, CC BY-SA
There’s clearly a need for safe, durable housing that enables these families to build generational wealth. And that’s where Rural Studio comes in.
Building new housing or renovating existing structures means dealing with a web of zoning laws, building codes and land development ordinances, which are all tied to financing and lending systems. While many efforts to address heirs’ property aim to change legal policies, we approach this issue through housing.
We use what we call a “build first” strategy. Using funds from research grants and donations, we simply start building on heirs’ properties with the permission of families. In the process, we show that if tangled titles were no longer an obstacle, much more housing could be built.
One of our recent Rural Studio projects is the 18×18 House, a compact, multistory home built for a young man living on heirs’ property in Alabama.
The 18X18 House is a multistory home that was on heirs’ property in Alabama. Auburn University Rural Studio. Photo by Timothy Hursley, CC BY-SA
The home is nestled between several other family members’ homes. We had to work around existing electrical lines, a septic field, roads and steep topography. Despite these site constraints, the house is an ideal starter home: big enough for the young man and a future partner to live comfortably on the family plot. If he ever decides to leave, other family members can move in.
Rather than focusing on one-off products, our goal with the 18×18 House is to develop replicable housing prototypes that respond to the realities of intergenerational living on family land. We also hope that tangible housing will help policymakers understand the value of reform.
The question isn’t whether design can respond to these challenges, but how it can lead by pushing antiquated regulatory and legal frameworks to evolve.
Jennifer Pindyck receives funding from Fannie Mae, Wells Fargo and the Center for Architecture, in partnership with AIA New York. She is affiliated with the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture and is a registered architect in the state of Georgia.
Christian Ayala Lopez work is funded through a diverse range of organizations such as Fannie Mae, USDA, and Center for Architecture NY. He is affiliated to Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, National Council of Architectural Registration Boards, and member of Florida Housing Coalition.
Rusty Smith receives funding from Fannie Mae, USDA, Wells Fargo and Regions Bank. He is affiliated with the Housing Assistance Council, the American Institute of Architects, the Association of Collegiate Schools of Architecture, the National Renewable Energy Laboratory Innovation Incubator, the EPA Collegiate/Underserved Community Partnership and the Bipartisan Policy Center.
Like most people, you probably would do some math before answering this question. You would add up the money in your bank accounts, the value of your investments and any equity in a home you own, then subtract your debts, such as mortgages and car loans.
But many economists believe this approach, known as calculating your net worth, leaves out a big chunk of your wealth: the benefits you’ll get in the future from Social Security, if you live in the United States, or similar government benefits programs that help retirees pay their bills in other countries.
As a sociologist who studies income and wealth inequality, I wanted to figure out just how much government safety net programs are worth to their recipients, and whether they truly can substitute for private savings.
A $40 trillion trove
A team of researchers recently estimated that future Social Security payments amounted to more than US$40 trillion as of 2019 – about $123,000 for everyone in the U.S. That huge number, which is not adjusted for inflation, was nearly one-third of the $110 trillion of Americans’ collective net worth in that year.
In a recent peer-reviewed study, published in April 2025 in Socio-Economic Review, I found that even this expanded definition of wealth leaves some important things out: unemployment insurance, the child tax credit and other widely available benefits. People who have access to these programs don’t have to dip into their savings as much when unexpected costs come up.
Social Security is by far the largest of these programs. As of 2019, the typical worker nearing retirement had banked about $412,000 in future Social Security benefits, I found – nearly as much as the $472,000 in private retirement savings such workers had. This estimate doesn’t include Social Security benefits to orphans, widows or people with disabilities.
The value of Social Security retirement benefits varies according to workers’ income and work history, ranging from $271,000 for the poorest 10% of recipients to $669,000 for the richest 10%.
Benefits from smaller safety net programs can also add up. Because some programs differ by state, I analyzed California and Texas, the two largest states. In California, I calculated that the average 45-year-old worker can count on almost $12,000 in unemployment insurance over 26 weeks, while in Texas the same worker would be eligible for more than $15,000 over the same period.
Meanwhile, under current law, many families having a child in 2025 can expect to receive about $29,000 through the federal child tax credit over the course of that kid’s lifetime.
Texas doesn’t mandate paid family leave, but California requires that each parent receive eight weeks of their salary. That’s worth another $13,000 to a family earning $90,000 a year – the median in my study – and more if the parents have higher incomes.
Where there’s even more hidden wealth
These somewhat hidden sources of wealth are worth far more in many other countries, especially Scandinavian ones. Norway provides a useful contrast.
The typical Norwegian worker retires with more than $510,000 in public pension wealth, I calculated. The exact amount they collect will vary depending on what they’ve earned and how long they live, as is the case with Social Security. But, unlike in the U.S., if they get sick, Norwegians are eligible for a up to a year of paid sick leave – worth about $57,000 to the median worker.
Norwegians can get unemployment insurance benefits for almost two years, amounting to $70,000 for the average worker, depending on their wages. And the combination of Norway’s child benefit and parental leave is worth between $60,000 and $80,000 from the time each child is born until they turn 18, depending on the parents’ exact income.
In the past few years, researchers have estimated the wealth value of public pensions – though not other government benefits – in several countries, including Australia, Austria, Germany, Poland and Switzerland, among others.
In many nations, this value rivals or exceeds that of all stocks, real estate and other private assets held by their residents combined.
Because so many people are eligible for Social Security or its equivalent public pension programs in other countries, there is also much less inequality in total retirement wealth than in standard measures of net worth.
Wealth vs. income
Wealth is much more unequally distributed than income just about everywhere. In the United States, for example, the richest 5% of the population has 32% of all income, but 70% of all wealth.
For these reasons, many politicians, scholars and activists have proposed ambitious policies to reduce inequality in private wealth, such as a wealth tax. Another idea gaining in popularity is to start issuing “baby bonds,” which give each newborn a prefunded savings account.
Wealth embedded in government benefits offers a complementary method of addressing wealth inequality. Even today, when Social Security and similar pension programs in other places are counted alongside private savings, inequality in retirement wealth is much lower than in privately held wealth alone.
Less flexible source of wealth
To be sure, the wealth you’re eventually due through Social Security and other government programs isn’t the same as the private assets you might own.
You can’t sell or borrow against your future Social Security benefits to meet an unexpected expense or make a down payment on a home. And if you die before reaching retirement age, you won’t receive any payments from the Social Security system yourself, although your spouse or heirs may be eligible for survivor benefits.
Also, government programs are not set in stone. Eligibility requirements can change, and benefit levels can be cut.
For these reasons, having a combination of private savings and government benefits offers the most promising way for everyone to prepare for their future. This can also help society address wealth inequality.
Robert Manduca has received funding from the Washington Center for Equitable Growth.
As summer arrives, people are turning on air conditioners in most of the U.S. But if you’re like me, you always feel a little guilty about that. Past generations managed without air conditioning – do I really need it? And how bad is it to use all this electricity for cooling in a warming world?
If I leave my air conditioner off, I get too hot. But if everyone turns on their air conditioner at the same time, electricity demand spikes, which can force power grid operators to activate some of the most expensive, and dirtiest, power plants. Sometimes those spikes can ask too much of the grid and lead to brownouts or blackouts.
Research I recently published with a team of scholars makes me feel a little better, though. We have found that it is possible to coordinate the operation of large numbers of home air-conditioning units, balancing supply and demand on the power grid – and without making people endure high temperatures inside their homes.
Studies along these lines, using remote control of air conditioners to support the grid, have for many years explored theoretical possibilities like this. However, few approaches have been demonstrated in practice and never for such a high-value application and at this scale. The system we developed not only demonstrated the ability to balance the grid on timescales of seconds, but also proved it was possible to do so without affecting residents’ comfort.
The benefits include increasing the reliability of the power grid, which makes it easier for the grid to accept more renewable energy. Our goal is to turn air conditioners from a challenge for the power grid into an asset, supporting a shift away from fossil fuels toward cleaner energy.
Originally, the U.S. electric grid was built to transport electricity from large power plants to customers’ homes and businesses. And originally, power plants were large, centralized operations that burned coal or natural gas, or harvested energy from nuclear reactions. These plants were typically always available and could adjust how much power they generated in response to customer demand, so the grid would be balanced between power coming in from producers and being used by consumers.
But the grid has changed. There are more renewable energy sources, from which power isn’t always available – like solar panels at night or wind turbines on calm days. And there are the devices and equipment I study. These newer options, called “distributed energy resources,” generate or store energy near where consumers need it – or adjust how much energy they’re using in real time.
One aspect of the grid hasn’t changed, though: There’s not much storage built into the system. So every time you turn on a light, for a moment there’s not enough electricity to supply everything that wants it right then: The grid needs a power producer to generate a little more power. And when you turn off a light, there’s a little too much: A power producer needs to ramp down.
The way power plants know what real-time power adjustments are needed is by closely monitoring the grid frequency. The goal is to provide electricity at a constant frequency – 60 hertz – at all times. If more power is needed than is being produced, the frequency drops and a power plant boosts output. If there’s too much power being produced, the frequency rises and a power plant slows production a little. These actions, a process called “frequency regulation,” happen in a matter of seconds to keep the grid balanced.
This output flexibility, primarily from power plants, is key to keeping the lights on for everyone.
I’m interested in how distributed energy resources can improve flexibility in the grid. They can release more energy, or consume less, to respond to the changing supply or demand, and help balance the grid, ensuring the frequency remains near 60 hertz.
Some people fear that doing so might be invasive, giving someone outside your home the ability to control your battery or air conditioner. Therefore, we wanted to see if we could help balance the grid with frequency regulation using home air-conditioning units rather than power plants – without affecting how residents use their appliances or how comfortable they are in their homes.
From 2019 to 2023, my group at the University of Michigan tried this approach, in collaboration with researchers at Pecan Street Inc., Los Alamos National Laboratory and the University of California, Berkeley, with funding from the U.S. Department of Energy Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy.
We recruited 100 homeowners in Austin, Texas, to do a real-world test of our system. All the homes had whole-house forced-air cooling systems, which we connected to custom control boards and sensors the owners allowed us to install in their homes. This equipment let us send instructions to the air-conditioning units based on the frequency of the grid.
Before I explain how the system worked, I first need to explain how thermostats work. When people set thermostats, they pick a temperature, and the thermostat switches the air-conditioning compressor on and off to maintain the air temperature within a small range around that set point. If the temperature is set at 68 degrees, the thermostat turns the AC on when the temperature is, say, 70, and turns it off when it’s cooled down to, say, 66.
Every few seconds, our system slightly changed the timing of air-conditioning compressor switching for some of the 100 air conditioners, causing the units’ aggregate power consumption to change. In this way, our small group of home air conditioners reacted to grid changes the way a power plant would – using more or less energy to balance the grid and keep the frequency near 60 hertz.
Moreover, our system was designed to kept home temperatures within the same small temperature range around the set point.
Smart thermostats could have frequency regulation capabilities available to interested consumers, to help balance the electricity grid. Danielle Mead/iStock/Getty Images Plus
Testing the approach
We ran our system in four tests, each lasting one hour. We found two encouraging results.
First, the air conditioners were able to provide frequency regulation at least as accurately as a traditional power plant. Therefore, we showed that air conditioners could play a significant role in increasing grid flexibility. But perhaps more importantly – at least in terms of encouraging people to participate in these types of systems – we found that we were able to do so without affecting people’s comfort in their homes.
We found that home temperatures did not deviate more than 1.6 Fahrenheit from their set point. Homeowners were allowed to override the controls if they got uncomfortable, but most didn’t. For most tests, we received zero override requests. In the worst case, we received override requests from two of the 100 homes in our test.
In practice, this sort of technology could be added to commercially available internet-connected thermostats. In exchange for credits on their energy bills, users could choose to join a service run by the thermostat company, their utility provider or some other third party.
Then people could turn on the air conditioning in the summer heat without that pang of guilt, knowing they were helping to make the grid more reliable and more capable of accommodating renewable energy sources – without sacrificing their own comfort in the process.
Johanna Mathieu works for the University of Michigan. She has received funding from the National Science Foundation, Department of Energy, ARPA-E, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. She is affiliated with the IEEE.
Demonstrators clash with counterdemonstrators at the entrance to Lee Park in Charlottesville, Va., on Aug. 12, 2017. AP Photo/Steve Helber
A man named Regan Prater was charged with arson for the burning of Highlander Center in New Market, Tennessee, on May 7, 2025. The nonprofit has a long history of involvement in the Civil Rights Movement. The FBI stated in a court document that Prater participated in neo-Nazi Telegram group chats online.
In the past several years, extremists have started using the term “accelerationism” to describe their desire to create social chaos and societal collapse that leads to a race war and the destruction of liberal democratic systems, paving the way for a white ethnostate.
Scholars who study extremism have used the term “accelerationism” since the 1980s, but it wasn’t widely associated with right-wing extremist violence until the late 2010s. People calling themselves “eco-fascists,” for example, often endorse mass violence as a means to reduce population and spark societal collapse.
Accelerationism is often connected to the white replacement theory, a white nationalist conspiracy theory that falsely asserts that there is a deliberate plot to diminish the influence and power of white people by replacing them with nonwhite populations.
While not all extremists who advocate violent confrontation use the label, the calls for violent disruption strive for the same results. Brenton Harrison Tarrant, the Australian white supremacist who perpetrated the Christchurch mosque shootings on March 15, 2019, in New Zealand, labeled an entire section of his online manifesto Destabilization and Accelerationism: Tactics for Victory.
Members of the neo-Nazi National Socialist Movement salute and shout ‘sieg heil’ during a rally in front of the State House in Trenton, N.J., on April 16, 2011. AP Photo/Mel Evans
This primer provides an overview of some of the key groups that have embraced accelerationist thinking, posing significant threats to public safety, democratic institutions and social cohesion.
The Order
One of the first American groups to embody this ideology was The Order – also known as Brüder Schweigen, or the Silent Brotherhood – which continues to influence newer generations of extremist organizations, both directly and indirectly.
Robert Jay Mathews, who founded The Order in 1983, was inspired by the apocalyptic vision laid out in the novel “The Turner Diaries.” The 1978 book by William Luther Pierce – under the pseudonym Andrew Macdonald – calls for a violent, apocalyptic race war to overthrow the U.S. government and exterminate Jews, nonwhite people and political enemies. Pierce founded the National Alliance – a neo-Nazi, white supremacist organization advocating for a white ethnostate and violent revolution – in 1974.
The call for violent insurrection and radical societal overhaul has since served as a blueprint for white supremacists and right-wing extremists.
The Order believed the U.S. federal government was under the control of Jews and other minority groups, and it aimed to overthrow it to create a white ethnostate. The Order funded its activities through robberies, including US$3.6 million taken from an armored car near Ukiah, California, on July 19, 1984.
Its criminal and violent actions escalated to murder, most notably the 1984 assassination of Jewish radio host Alan Berg in Denver by Order member Bruce Pierce.
Russell had been active on a neo-Nazi web forum IronMarch.org since 2014 and announced the group’s formation on the site. He used the handle “Odin” to connect with other far-right extremists.
AWD quickly gained notoriety for its violent, neo-Nazi ideology, advocating for a race war and the collapse of the U.S. government through terrorism. The group drew inspiration from the writings of white supremacist James Mason, particularly his collection of essays titled “Siege.”
By 2020, AWD unraveled due to law enforcement pressure, prosecutions and internal splits. Though not fully gone, it effectively stopped operating under its name. Members helped form the National Socialist Order, which continues to promote Mason’s “Siege” and violent accelerationism.
Neo-Nazi counterdemonstrators shout angrily at the marchers from behind police barricades during the Lesbian and Gay Pride March on Fifth Avenue in New York, on June 25, 1995. AP Photo/Kathy Willens
Beginning in December 2020, The Active Club Network formed as a loosely affiliated, decentralized web of white supremacist, fascist and accelerationist groups that operate under a shared banner promoting physical training, brotherhood and militant white nationalism.
The Base
Founded around 2018, The Base represents one of the most explicit modern expressions of white nationalist accelerationism: as it is known by members, its “Siege Culture.”
Founded by Rinaldo Nazzaro, an American living in Russia who used the name Roman Wolf, the group recruited ex-military and survivalists preparing for collapse through self-sufficiency, aiming to spark a race war. The Base was directly influenced by James Mason’s book “Siege.”
The Base operates as a decentralized network of cells trained in paramilitary tactics, sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Their online propaganda explicitly calls for violent action to destabilize society.
Although several members have been arrested and convicted on a variety of crimes, including conspiracy to commit murder, civil disorder, firearm charges, vandalism and other violent crimes, The Base illustrates a fundamental feature of accelerationism: “leaderless resistance,” or a lack of a centralized leadership, which helps it survive and thrive. Its ideology and tactics are spread through online forums dedicated to white supremacist propaganda.
The goals of the organizers of the Unite the Right rally included unifying the American white nationalist movement and opposing the proposed removal of the statue of Robert E. Lee, the general who led the Confederate troops of slave states during the Civil War, from Charlottesville’s former Lee Park. The rally sparked a national debate over Confederate iconography, racial violence and white supremacy.
The Patriot Front defines itself as an organization of “American nationalists.” According to the Anti-Defamation League, since 2019 the Patriot Front has been responsible for a majority of white supremacist propaganda distributed in the United States, using flyers, posters, stickers, banners and the internet to spread its ideology.
Understanding the motivations and tactics of accelerationist groups and individuals, I believe, is critical to recognizing and countering the dangers they represent.
Art Jipson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In Florida, a bill that bans cellphone use in elementary and middle schools, from bell to bell, recently sailed through the state Legislature.
Gov. Ron DeSantis signed it into law on May 30, 2025. The same bill calls for high schools in six Florida districts to adopt the ban during the upcoming school year and produce a report on its effectiveness by Dec. 1, 2026.
Parents are divided on the issue. According to a report from Education Week, many parents want their kids to have phones for safety reasons – and don’t support bans as a result.
We are experts in media use and public health who surveyed 1,510 kids ages 11 to 13 in Florida in November and December 2024 to learn how they’re using digital media and the role tech plays in their lives at home and at school. Their responses were insightful – and occasionally surprising.
Adults generally cite four reasons to ban phone use during
school: to improve kids’ mental health, to strengthen academic outcomes, to reduce cyberbullying and to help limit kids’ overall screen time.
But as our survey shows, it may be a bit much to expect a cellphone ban to accomplish all of that.
What do kids want?
Some of the questions in our survey shine light on kids’ feelings toward banning cellphones – even though we didn’t ask that question directly.
We asked them if they feel relief when they’re in a situation where they can’t use their smartphone, and 31% said yes.
Additionally, 34% of kids agreed with the statement that social media causes more harm than good.
And kids were 1.5 to 2 times more likely to agree with those statements if they attended schools where phones are banned or confiscated for most of the school day, with use only permitted at certain times. That group covered
70% of the students we surveyed because many individual schools or school districts in Florida have already limited students’ cellphone use.
How students use cellphones matters
Some “power users” of cellphone apps could likely use a break from them.
Twenty percent of children we surveyed said push notifications on their phones — that is, notifications from apps that pop up on the phone’s screen — are never turned off. These notifications are likely coming from the most popular apps kids reported using, like YouTube, TikTok and Instagram.
This 20% of children was roughly three times more likely to report experiencing anxiety than kids who rarely or never have their notifications on.
They were also nearly five times more likely to report earning mostly D’s and F’s in school than kids whose notifications are always or sometimes off.
Our survey results also suggest phone bans would likely have positive effects on grades and mental health among some of the heaviest screen users. For example, 22% of kids reported using their favorite app for six or more hours per day. These students were three times more likely to report earning mostly D’s and F’s in school than kids who spend an hour or less on their favorite app each day.
They also were six times more likely than hour-or-less users to report severe depression symptoms. These insights remained even after ruling out numerous other possible explanations for the difference — like age, household income, gender, parent’s education, race and ethnicity.
Banning students’ access to phones at school means these kids would not receive notifications for at least that seven-hour period and have fewer hours in the day to use apps.
Phones and mental health
However, other data we collected suggests that bans aren’t a universal benefit for all children.
Seventeen percent of kids who attend schools that ban or confiscate phones report severe depression symptoms, compared with just 4% among kids who keep their phones with them during the school day.
This finding held even after we ruled out other potential explanations for what we were seeing, such as the type of school students attend and other demographic factors.
We are not suggesting that our survey shows phone bans cause mental health problems.
It is possible, for instance, that the schools where kids already were struggling with their mental health simply happened to be the ones that have banned phones. Also, our survey didn’t ask kids how long phones have been banned at their schools. If the bans just launched, there may be positive effects on mental health or grades yet to come.
In order to get a better sense of the bans’ effects on mental health, we would need to examine mental health indicators before and after phone bans.
To get a long-term view on this question, we are planning to do a nationwide survey of digital media use and mental health, starting with 11- to 13-year-olds and tracking them into adulthood.
Even with the limitations of our data from this survey, however, we can conclude that banning phones in schools is unlikely to be an immediate solution to mental health problems of kids ages 11-13.
Grades up, cyberbullying down
Students at schools where phones are barred or confiscated didn’t report earning higher grades than children at schools where kids keep their phones.
This finding held for students at both private and public schools, and even after ruling out other possible explanations like differences in gender and household income, since these factors are also known to affect grades.
There are limits to our findings here: Grades are not a perfect measure of learning, and they’re not standardized across schools. It’s possible that kids at phone-free schools are in fact learning more than those at schools where kids carry their phones around during school hours – even if they earn the same grades.
We asked kids how often in the past three months they’d experienced mistreatment online – like being called hurtful names or having lies or rumors spread about them. Kids at schools where phone use is limited during school hours actually reported enduring more cyberbullying than children at schools with less restrictive policies. This result persisted even after we considered smartphone ownership and numerous demographics as possible explanations.
We are not necessarily saying that cellphone bans cause an increase in cyberbullying. What could be at play here is that at schools where cyberbullying has been particularly bad, phones have been banned or are confiscated, and online bullying still occurs.
But based on our survey results, it does not appear that school phone bans prevent cyberbullying.
Overall, our findings suggest that banning phones in schools may not be an easy fix for students’ mental health problems, poor academic performance or cyberbullying.
That said, kids might benefit from phone-free schools in ways that we have not explored, like increased attention spans or reduced eyestrain.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – USA – By Tatishe Nteta, Provost Professor of Political Science and Director of the UMass Amherst Poll, UMass Amherst
President Donald Trump signs an executive order barring transgender female athletes from competing in women’s or girls sporting events on Feb. 5, 2025, in Washington.AP Photo/Alex Brandon
Since becoming president, Donald Trump has aggressively sought to fulfill his campaign promise to reverse the Biden administration’s protection of transgender Americans.
Trump is not alone in attacking the rights of transgender Americans. In 2025, 53 bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress and over 900 bills have been introduced in 49 states that aim to limit the rights of transgender Americans in education, health care and athletics, according to the Trans Legislation Tracker.
While legal and ethical questions remain about these efforts, restricting the rights of transgender Americans seems to enjoy support among a majority of Americans.
For example, support for restricting the ability of medical professionals from providing gender-affirming care to minors has risen from 46% in 2022 to 56% in 2025, according to the Pew Research Center.
We wanted to know what factors contribute to majority support among Americans for these measures. We found that authoritarian attitudes – the desire for social conformity and an aversion to difference – play an important role in Americans’ willingness to restrict transgender rights.
A member, left, of the Idaho Liberty Dogs, a far-right extremist group, argues with attendee Kimberly Rumph near the entrance of the first Pride festival ever held in Nampa, Idaho, on June 9, 2024. Kyle Green for The Washington Post via Getty Images
Preferring conformity, suppressing social difference
Here, we refer to authoritarianism not as a type of political system or the characteristics of a leader, but rather as a person’s preference for social conformity and desire to suppress social difference.
According to this perspective, the attack on transgender rights is intended to appeal to Americans with authoritarian inclinations. As seen in authoritarian regimes such as Russia and Turkey, political leaders first mobilize their citizens on the basis of their desire to suppress transgender individuals in order to advance a broader movement to undermine democracy and restrict the rights of other groups that fail to conform to majority values.
While this perspective is quickly gaining media coverage, there hasn’t yet been hard evidence that authoritarians are particularly supportive of anti-trans legislation. Our goal was to assess the link between authoritarian attitudes and support for measures that restrict transgender rights.
We are political scientists who study the role of authoritarianism in American politics and who field polls that explore Americans’ views on a number of pressing issues.
In April 2025, we fielded a nationally representative survey of 1,000 American adults, asking about their perceptions of the first months of the second Trump presidency, their views toward various groups in society, and their policy preferences. We also asked them for their views about restrictions on the provision of gender-affirming care to transgender Americans.
Here’s how we analyzed and interpreted their responses.
To measure authoritarianism, scholars use a scale that asks respondents to express their preferences for a range of child-rearing practices. The scale asks whether a respondent tends to prefer children who are obedient, well behaved and well mannered or children who are independent, creative and considerate. Those who tend to favor obedient children are scored as having more authoritarian views.
Child-rearing preferences seem to be unrelated to attitudes about conformity in society. But there is good reason to believe that an adult who prefers conformity, obedience and uniformity in children also desires the same in society at large.
This work consistently shows that individuals who are less authoritarian are more likely to support policies that recognize diverse views. Those who rank high on authoritarianism prefer policies that highlight social unity and conformity.
Thus, we expected that Americans with more authoritarian attitudes would more strongly support state laws that seek to restrict transgender Americans’ access to gender-affirming care.
In line with other polling on this issue, our survey found that a little over one-third of Americans – 36% – express support for legislation that would make providing gender-affirming medical care to transgender youth a crime. Among the remaining respondents, 38% expressed opposition, and 26% expressed ambivalence toward this proposal.
We looked at support for banning gender-affirming care by level of authoritarianism. We found clear differences between the most and least authoritarian Americans.
Among those who score highest on the authoritarian scale, 46% express support for this ban, with 18% in opposition. The remaining 36% responded “neither support nor oppose” this ban. Examining the views of Americans who exhibit the least authoritarian views, we find that while 21% support these bans, 61% oppose them and 18% expressed an ambivalent view.
Authoritarianism remains an important contributor to Americans’ support for a ban on gender-affirming care for transgender youth, even after we take into account other considerations that influence this attitude.
Republican partisanship, conservative ideology and religiosity all increase support for a ban on gender-affirming care. After accounting for these factors, as well as for characteristics such as education, income, age and knowing a transgender person, more authoritarian people are still more likely to support the ban.
The findings from our survey suggest that while partisanship, ideology and religiosity all play key roles in explaining the popularity of these policies, a missing piece of the puzzle is authoritarianism.
Given their aversion to diversity and difference and their preference for the status quo, Americans with authoritarian inclinations likely believe that transgender people pose a threat to the social order. Thus, they are more likely than Americans low in authoritarianism to support policies that seek to restrict transgender rights in order to restore social conformity.
It’s not clear whether the passage of anti-transgender policies alone will lead the nation to turn away from a largely diverse and open democracy toward a more closed and intolerant society. But the fight over transgender rights is not a sideshow in American politics. Instead, it is one of the first of many battles over diversity and difference that will determine the nation’s political future.
Jesse Rhodes has received funding from the National Science Foundation, the Demos Foundation, and the Spencer Foundation. He is a member of the American Civil Liberties Union.
Adam Eichen, Lane Cuthbert, and Tatishe Nteta do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – USA – By Peter C. Mancall, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences
A statue of Christopher Columbus, toppled by protesters, is loaded onto a truck on the grounds of the state capitol on June 10, 2020, in St Paul, Minn.Stephen Maturen/Getty Images
Nonetheless, Trump posted in April 2025, “Christopher is going to make a major comeback.” By using Columbus’ name, which means “Christ-bearer,” a president who covets the praise of faith leaders yoked the explorer to his campaign promise: “For those who have been wronged and betrayed, I am your retribution.”
By reasserting the importance of Columbus, the president took a stand against the toppling and vandalism of statues of Columbus. In this case, his act of retribution for his supporters focused on the holiday, which he could declare more easily than returning icons of a fallen man to empty pedestals.
As a historian of early America, I am familiar with how grievance marked the colonial era. Throughout this period, grievance fueled rage and violence.
European grievance in America
Europeans who arrived in the Americas following Columbus’ 1492 journey claimed the territories in the Western Hemisphere through an obsolete legal theory known as the “doctrine of discovery.”
Spanish, English, French, Dutch and Portuguese rulers, according to this notion, owned portions of the Americas, regardless of the claims of Indigenous peoples. This presumption of ownership justified, in their minds, the use of violence against those who resisted them.
In 1598, for example, Spanish soldiers patrolling the pueblo of Acoma in New Mexico demanded food from local residents, whom the colonizers saw as their subordinates. The town’s inhabitants, believing the request excessive, fought instead, killing 11 Spaniards.
In response, the governor of New Mexico, a territory almost entirely populated by Indigenous peoples, ordered the systematic amputations of the hands or feet of residents whom the soldiers thought had participated in the attack. They also enslaved hundreds in the town. Roughly 1,500 residents of Acoma died in the conflict, according to the National Park Service, a response seemingly driven more by grievance than strategy.
English colonizers proved just as quick to deploy extraordinary violence if they believed Native Americans deprived them of what they thought was theirs.
The English labeled the event a “barbarous massacre,” using language that dehumanized the Powhatans and cast them as villainous raiders. An English pamphleteer named Edward Waterhouse castigated these Indigenous people as “wyld naked Natives,” “Pagan Infidels” and “perfidious and inhumane.”
Opechancanough was paramount chief of the Powhatan Confederacy in present-day Virginia from 1618 until his death in 1646. mikroman6/Getty Images
War began almost immediately. Colonial soldiers embraced a scorched-earth strategy, burning houses and crops when they could not locate their enemies. On May 22, 1623, one group sailed into Pamunkey territory to rescue captives.
As historians who have studied the Salem witch trials have argued, many of the accusers in agricultural Salem Village – modern-day Danvers – harbored resentments against neighbors who had closer ties to nearby Salem Town, which was more commercial.
The aggrieved found a spokesman in the Rev. Samuel Parris, whose own earlier failure in business had led him to look for a new path forward as a minister. Parris’ anger about his earlier disappointments fueled his indignation about what he saw as inadequate economic support from local authorities.
In a sermon, he underscored his financial irritation by emphasizing Judas’ betrayal of Jesus for “a poor & mean price,” as if it was the amount that mattered. The resentful residents and their bitter minister fueled the largest witch hunt in American history, which left at least 20 of the accused dead.
The most obvious forerunner of today’s grievance-fueled politics was a rebellion in the spring and summer of 1676 by backcountry colonists in Virginia who battled their Jamestown-based colonial government. They were led by Nathaniel Bacon, a tobacco farmer who believed that provincial officials were not doing enough to protect outlying farms from attacks by Susquehannocks and other Indigenous residents.
Acts of grievance come in different forms, depending on historical and political circumstance. But the urge to reclaim what someone thinks should be theirs can lead to deadly violence, as earlier Americans repeatedly discovered.
Peter C. Mancall has received support from the University of Southern California, the Huntington Library, the National Endowment for the Humanities, and Oxford University to support his research on early America.
Imagine you’re a copper miner in southeastern Europe in the year 3900 B.C.E. Day after day you haul copper ore through the mine’s sweltering tunnels.
You’ve resigned yourself to the grueling monotony of mining life. Then one afternoon, you witness a fellow worker doing something remarkable.
With an odd-looking contraption, he casually transports the equivalent of three times his body weight on a single trip. As he returns to the mine to fetch another load, it suddenly dawns on you that your chosen profession is about to get far less taxing and much more lucrative.
What you don’t realize: You’re witnessing something that will change the course of history – not just for your tiny mining community, but for all of humanity.
An illustration of what the original mine carts used in the Carpathian mountains may have looked like in 3900 B.C.E. Kai James via DALL·E
Despite the wheel’s immeasurable impact, no one is certain as to who invented it, or when and where it was first conceived. The hypothetical scenario described above is based on a 2015 theory that miners in the Carpathian Mountains – now Hungary – first invented the wheel nearly 6,000 years ago as a means to transport copper ore.
The theory is supported by the discovery of more than 150 miniaturized wagons by archaeologists working in the region. These pint-sized, four-wheeled models were made from clay, and their outer surfaces were engraved with a wickerwork pattern reminiscent of the basketry used by mining communities at the time. Carbon dating later revealed that these wagons are the earliest known depictions of wheeled transport to date.
It has long been assumed that wheels evolved from simple wooden rollers. But until recently no one could explain how or why this transformation took place. What’s more, beginning in the 1960s, some researchers started to express strong doubts about the roller-to-wheel theory.
After all, for rollers to be useful, they require flat, firm terrain and a path free of inclines and sharp curves. Furthermore, once the cart passes them, used rollers need to be continually brought around to the front of the line to keep the cargo moving. For all these reasons, the ancient world used rollers sparingly. According to the skeptics, rollers were too rare and too impractical to have been the starting point for the evolution of the wheel.
But a mine – with its enclosed, human-made passageways – would have provided favorable conditions for rollers. This factor, among others, compelled my team to revisit the roller hypothesis.
A turning point
The transition from rollers to wheels requires two key innovations. The first is a modification of the cart that carries the cargo. The cart’s base must be outfitted with semicircular sockets, which hold the rollers in place. This way, as the operator pulls the cart, the rollers are pulled along with it.
This innovation may have been motivated by the confined nature of the mine environment, where having to periodically carry used rollers back around to the front of the cart would have been especially onerous.
The discovery of socketed rollers represented a turning point in the evolution of the wheel and paved the way for the second and most important innovation. This next step involved a change to the rollers themselves. To understand how and why this change occurred, we turned to physics and computer-aided engineering.
Simulating the wheel’s evolution
To begin our investigation, we created a computer program designed to simulate the evolution from a roller to a wheel. Our hypothesis was that this transformation was driven by a phenomenon called “mechanical advantage.” This same principle allows pliers to amplify a user’s grip strength by providing added leverage. Similarly, if we could modify the shape of the roller to generate mechanical advantage, this would amplify the user’s pushing force, making it easier to advance the cart.
Our algorithm worked by modeling hundreds of potential roller shapes and evaluating how each one performed, both in terms of mechanical advantage and structural strength. The latter was used to determine whether a given roller would break under the weight of the cargo. As predicted, the algorithm ultimately converged upon the familiar wheel-and-axle shape, which it determined to be optimal.
A computer simulation of the evolution from a roller to a wheel-and-axle structure. Each image represents a design evaluated by the algorithm. The search ultimately converges upon the familiar wheel-and-axle design. Kai James
During the execution of the algorithm, each new design performed slightly better than its predecessor. We believe a similar evolutionary process played out with the miners 6,000 years ago.
It is unclear what initially prompted the miners to explore alternative roller shapes. One possibility is that friction at the roller-socket interface caused the surrounding wood to wear away, leading to a slight narrowing of the roller at the point of contact. Another theory is that the miners began thinning out the rollers so that their carts could pass over small obstructions on the ground.
Either way, thanks to mechanical advantage, this narrowing of the axle region made the carts easier to push. As time passed, better-performing designs were repeatedly favored over the others, and new rollers were crafted to mimic these top performers.
Consequently, the rollers became more and more narrow, until all that remained was a slender bar capped on both ends by large discs. This rudimentary structure marks the birth of what we now refer to as “the wheel.”
According to our theory, there was no precise moment at which the wheel was invented. Rather, just like the evolution of species, the wheel emerged gradually from an accumulation of small improvements.
This is just one of the many chapters in the wheel’s long and ongoing evolution. More than 5,000 years after the contributions of the Carpathian miners, a Parisian bicycle mechanic invented radial ball bearings, which once again revolutionized wheeled transportation.
Ironically, ball bearings are conceptually identical to rollers, the wheel’s evolutionary precursor. Ball bearings form a ring around the axle, creating a rolling interface between the axle and the wheel hub, thereby circumventing friction. With this innovation, the evolution of the wheel came full circle.
This example also shows how the wheel’s evolution, much like its iconic shape, traces a circuitous path – one with no clear beginning, no end, and countless quiet revolutions along the way.
Kai James receives funding from The National Science Foundation.
Uganda is one of the countries most exposed to recent cuts in international aid, particularly with the dissolution of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). In 2023, about 5% of gross national income – a measure of a country’s total income, including income from foreign sources – was received in aid.
The cuts have given new impetus to the drive to increase taxes raised from domestic businesses.
Less than half (45%) of the Ugandan budget is financed through domestic revenue. The remainder is funded largely through debt and budget support (grants) from bilateral and multilateral donors. Corporate income tax makes up around 8% of total domestic revenue. Firms also collect employee income tax (pay-as-you-earn), value added tax, excise duties and fuel duties.
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) contribute a small share of overall corporate income tax collection. But they make up over 90% of the private sector. The economy is heavily reliant on these firms for employment and growth.
These businesses struggle to navigate an increasingly complex tax system.
The complexity of Uganda’s tax system makes for a time-consuming tax filing process, compounded by low taxpayer knowledge and high levels of distrust in the Uganda Revenue Authority. The time, money and effort incurred by taxpayers to meet their tax obligations adds to their total tax burden.
These compliance costs also have real economic consequences. Firms might miss out on tax benefits or artificially constrain business growth to avoid greater reporting requirements. Since smaller firms are more constrained in their ability to document revenues, accurately calculate tax liabilities and file returns, they might even pay more tax than necessary.
At the margin, compliance costs affect the economic choices people make: the fear of high compliance costs might induce a potential entrepreneur to take a salaried job instead of starting a new business.
Relieving this burden could unlock greater productivity and growth, and encourage innovation and investment.
For my PhD in economics I collaborated with the Uganda Revenue Authority to generate detailed measures of tax compliance costs, using data from a survey of nearly 2,000 taxpaying SMEs. My research finds that the burden of compliance is significant, even for firms with very little tax revenue to contribute.
Solutions should focus on making compliance easier and ensuring that tax thresholds are set appropriately to exclude unproductive small firms.
The burden
The median firm faces total annual compliance costs of about US$800, equivalent to just under 2% of turnover. These costs are also highly regressive: smaller firms face costs exceeding 20% of turnover, versus less than 1% for the largest firms.
A more troubling result is that many firms, and particularly smaller ones, spend more on completing their tax returns than they pay in actual income tax.
Much of this burden stems from labour time. Employees and firm owners dedicate over 30 hours a month on compliance-related activities, primarily compiling tax documentation and preparing returns. For firm owners personally involved in tax compliance, this responsibility consumes around 20% of their working hours, on average.
Somewhat surprisingly, the amount of time spent on tax compliance does not increase significantly with firm size.
To compensate for limited tax knowledge, many firms use the services of a tax agent. These include external accountants, consultants, or other tax specialists who assist with tax compliance. My research finds that the use of agents is common across all taxpayer categories and is primarily driven by a desire to ensure proper compliance, rather than to minimise tax liabilities.
Although these agents do not necessarily reduce compliance costs, since firms spend an average of US$54 per month on agents’ fees, related research shows that they have a broadly positive impact on the quality of tax returns submitted.
What can be done
The Ugandan parliament recently voted on the 2025 tax amendment bills, with measures aiming to bolster revenue collection and simplify compliance. For instance, policymakers propose to use the national identity document as a taxpayer identification number, rather than requiring separate tax registration.
Firstly, the administrative thresholds for corporate income tax and presumptive tax (a simplified tax on business income for the smallest firms) have not been adjusted for over a decade. In a high inflation environment, this means that the tax system is capturing many firms with very little profit, and no tax to pay. Yet, these firms still bear compliance costs, and the revenue service incurs administrative costs registering and monitoring unproductive taxpayers.
Roughly 30% to 35% of firms filing returns each year file a nil return, meaning that they report zero on all significant fields of the tax return. Even these firms report compliance costs of, on average, around US$500 per year.
Rather than chasing the “little guy”, bigger revenue gains are likely to come from focusing on the largest businesses. For instance, research shows that tax incentives and exemptions cost Uganda over US$40 million in lost revenue per year.
Secondly, the Ugandan corporate income tax return is particularly long, complex, and more suited to the business structure of very large firms, rather than the SMEs making up most of the Ugandan economy. In addition to changing the thresholds, simplifying the return would be beneficial.
Filing processes could also be eased through automated pre-filling, for instance by using information from a firm’s monthly VAT returns to pre-populate parts of the corporate income tax return. The rollout of the Uganda Revenue Authority’s electronic invoicing system for VAT is a promising step in this direction, although it has been met with resistance by taxpayers.
Adrienne Lees receives funding from the International Centre for Tax and Development (ICTD). Through the ICTD, the research described in this article has been supported by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation and the Gates Foundation.
Earlier this year, I attended a housing conference in Sydney. The event’s opening address centred on the way Australia seems to be becoming like 18th-century England – a country where inheritance largely determines one’s opportunities in life.
There has been a lot of media coverage of economic inequities in Australian society. Our tax system has been partly blamed for this problem. The case for long-term, visionary tax reform has never been stronger. And one area of tax reform could be a wealth tax.
First, let’s be clear about one thing. Unlike the superannuation tax reforms currently being debated for those with more than A$3 million in superannuation, the wealth tax we’re talking about would apply to a very different cohort: billionaires.
A recent article in the Financial Times re-examined a proposal to impose such a tax on the world’s highest-net-worth individuals. It also pointed out these efforts would need to be globally coordinated.
Such taxes could collect significant sums of money for governments. It’s previously been estimated a billionaire tax could raise US$250 billion (more than A$380 billion) globally if just 2% of the net worth of the world’s billionaires was taxed each year.
The case for a wealth tax
Inequality is on the rise and the argument for a wealth tax can’t be ignored – not least here at home. According to the Australia Institute, the wealth of Australia’s richest 200 people has soared as a percentage of our national gross domestic product (GDP) – from 8.4% in 2004 to 23.7% in 2024.
If that sounds dramatic, the picture is far worse in the United States. So, what would a wealth tax look like in Australia (noting that in reality a globally coordinated effort would be needed)?
The starting point for this is understanding of why high-net-worth individuals seemingly pay very low taxes.
High net worth, low tax rate
Income taxes only take into account any amounts that are received in the hands of the taxpayer – whether that is a company, a person or a trust.
Most high-net-worth individuals do not receive much income directly but “store” their wealth in companies and other corporate structures.
In Australia, the maximum applicable tax rate for companies is 30%. Note that the highest tax rate in Australia for individuals is 45% plus the 2% medicare levy, effectively 47%.
Assets such as real estate may also be held by companies or trusts, and the increase in value of these assets is not taxed until they are sold (through capital gains tax).
Even then, those gains may not be paid out directly to the high-net-worth individual who owns these entities.
Unrealised gains
So, how do we tax wealth that is sitting in various businesses (company structures) or other entities, but isn’t taxed at present because the “income” or “gains” from these are not taxable in the hands of the wealthy individuals who own them?
This goes into the murky area of taxation of unrealised gains. Here, we need to tread very carefully. But we also need to recognise that we already do this, albeit rather subtly, and most of us are not billionaires.
In your rates notice from your local council, for example, the increase in value of your residence or investment property is used to calculate your rates.
The real difficulty, to carry on with this example, is that your residence or investment property is typically held in your name and so the tax can be directly levied on you.
A luxury residence in Miami Beach, Florida, owned by Jeff Bezos, founder of Amazon. The US is home to the most billionaires of any country in the world. Felix Mizioznikov/Shutterstock
Making tax unavoidable
As we’ve already explained, the bulk of the assets or net worth of wealthy individuals is not directly attributable to them. Does this mean we should give up altogether?
Not quite. UNSW professor Chris Evans has pointed out that while we may not be able to effectively tax all the net worth of the wealthy, there are some things we can tax and they can’t avoid it.
An obvious example is real estate. You can pack your bags and bank accounts and move to a low-tax country, but you can’t move your mansion overlooking Sydney Harbour.
Real estate, both residential and commercial, provides one clear way in which we could implement a partial wealth tax. This method (which also has fewer valuation issues than value stored in a company in the form of retained profits) also counters the argument that the wealthy will simply move to other jurisdictions that won’t tax them.
There is plenty of academic research looking at various wealth tax initiatives in other countries. We should learn from these, including the experience in Switzerland and Sweden.
In Sweden, for instance, research found the behavioural effects of wealth taxation were less pronounced than those of income taxation, but the system had so many loopholes that evasion was an option for some people.
Change faces headwinds
In a very uncertain world that features ongoing wars and an unpredictable US president, any change that seeks to address issues of inequity is going to be met with resistance by those who hold power.
Some billionaires in the US, however, have expressed their support for being taxed more in a letter signed by heirs to the Disney and Rockefeller fortunes. That offers some hope, and suggests the discussion about wealth taxes should not be relegated to the “too hard” basket.
Some steps towards taxing the uber-rich would be better than the status quo.
Venkat Narayanan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Last week, President Donald Trump ordered an investigation into “who ran the United States while President Biden was in office”, alleging top aides masked the “cognitive decline” of his predecessor. The announcement referenced revelations in a new book by journalists Jake Tapper (CNN) and Alex Thompson (Axios).
Original Sin made headlines last month for revealing that Biden’s declining physical and cognitive health had been hidden from the public by his closest aides and his loyal but overly protective wife, Jill Biden.
Whatever merit there is in Trump’s order must be seen alongside his bottomless cynicism. He seizes on the two authors’ investigative journalism to continue tarnishing his predecessor’s reputation, while doing everything in his power to bully news companies such as CBS over almost meritless defamation cases and to cut the funding of public media organisations PBS and NPR.
Review: Original Sin – Jake Tapper and Alex Thompson (Hutchinson Heinemann)
In November 2020, Biden was seen by many as a hero. He won the American election and saved the country from Donald Trump, who scholars judged among the worst presidents in the nation’s history, not least because just over 384,500 people died from COVID-19 that year.
Today, just as many see Biden as a villain. He said he would be a “bridge” president. He knew he would have ended his second term aged 86 if he had won and served it, so said he would hand over to a successor well in time for the 2024 election. But he didn’t. Not until three and a half weeks after his wincingly bad performance in a debate with Trump last June.
By then it was too late for his Democratic Party to go through its usual primaries process. Biden anointed his vice president Kamala Harris as his successor, but with only 107 days to campaign before the election, it is more accurate to say he gave her what football commentators call a “hospital pass”.
Donald Trump regained the presidency. Four months into his second term, all but his most loyal supporters (and this time he has made sure to surround himself only with loyal supporters) think it is already much worse than his first.
Whatever Biden achieved in his presidency is being forgotten amid the horror at watching America’s democratic institutions assaulted by an authoritarian leader determined to undo Biden’s policies, especially on climate change.
What on earth happened? How much responsibility does Biden bear? Did the news media subject Biden to sufficient scrutiny before the debate last June? Was everyone except the MAGA base suffering from a new variant of what conservative commentators long ago dubbed “Trump derangement syndrome”?
In short order, the answers are: Biden declined faster and worse than had been anticipated; a lot; the media possibly didn’t scrutinise him enough, but it’s more complicated than that – and, yes, “Trump derangement syndrome” was a factor, though not quite in the way conservative commentators thought.
Clooney’s alarm
Original Sin’s most spectacular revelation was that at a Democrat fundraising event last year, Biden did not appear to recognise George Clooney – who as well as being an actor, is a longtime Democrat supporter and a friend of the president.
Clooney was shocked by Biden’s frail appearance. “Holy shit,” he thought, according to the authors, as he watched Biden enter the room, taking tiny steps with “an aide guiding him by his arm”. The book describes the excruciating moment in detail:
“You know George,” the assisting aide told the president, gently reminding him who was in front of him.
“Yeah, yeah,” the president said to one of the most recognizable men in the world, the host of this lucrative fundraiser. “Thank you for being here.”
“Hi, Mr. President,” Clooney said.
“How are ya?” the president replied.
“How was your trip?” Clooney asked.
“It was fine,” the president said.
It was obvious to many standing there that the president did not know who George Clooney was. […]
“George Clooney,” the aide clarified for the president.
“Oh, yeah!” Biden said. “Hi, George!”
A Hollywood VIP who witnessed the moment told the authors “it was not okay”, describing it as “uncomfortable”. Clooney felt he had to sound the alarm publicly, which he did in an impassioned opinion piece for The New York Times a few weeks later, on July 10. He wrote about how he loved and respected Biden, but
the one battle he cannot win is the fight against time. None of us can. It’s devastating to say it, but the Joe Biden I was with three weeks ago at the fund-raiser was not the Joe ‘big F-ing deal’ Biden of 2010. He wasn’t even the Joe Biden of 2020. He was the same man we all witnessed at the debate.
Just days after publicity about the book began, news broke that Biden has stage four prostate cancer – and that he had not had a prostate test for more than a decade.
The ‘loyalty police’
Tapper and Thompson’s book derives not only from their day jobs, but from reporting they have done since last November’s election, including interviews with 200 people. Some of them, even now, prefer to speak on background rather than be named.
Through them, they tell a bracing story with three main themes.
First, there is the unblinking loyalty of close aides. Chief strategist Mike Donilon had been with Biden since 1981. Bruce Reed was a speechwriter and longtime political consultant. Steve Ricchetti had been Biden’s chief of staff when he was vice president, and was also a friend who would watch the morning political shows with him. All four of Richetti’s children worked in the Biden administration, the authors write.
Jill Biden’s longtime aides, Annie Tomasini and Anthony Bernal, were fiercely protective of the Bidens as much as the office of the president. “Are you a Biden person?” they would ask, leading other aides to label them the “loyalty police”.
Collectively, the close aides were known as The Politburo. Kamala Harris’ aides called them a “cabal of the unhelpful”. Time and again, they responded to queries about Biden’s health with firm assurances he was doing fine – even though the president needed to be supplied with cue cards when he was meeting his cabinet secretaries.
Biden, like previous presidents, had an annual medical check-up and was given a clean bill of health. But doctors outside the White House noted that his cognitive abilities were not tested. Asked about this, aides – and Biden himself – would say he passed a cognitive test every day of his presidency, which was a superficially plausible but practically meaningless statement.
Some aides genuinely believed in Biden, while others harboured doubts. The latter suppressed those to focus on the task of defeating Trump in 2024. One told Tapper and Thompson: “He just had to win, and then he could disappear for four years – he’d only have to show proof of life every once in a while.” Which sounds pretty much like the plot of the 1989 movie, Weekend at Bernie’s, except the situation was anything but comic.
Biden’s aides admonished journalists, including Alex Thompson, for even raising the issue of the president’s health. Worse, they shielded Biden from what his own pollsters were saying about his dire prospects for re-election.
The oldest presidential candidates
For Biden, work usually began at 9am, included two hours in the afternoon for “POTUS time”, and finished at 4.30pm when he had dinner. Availability for evening events was limited. By 2024, cabinet secretaries in the Biden administration told Tapper and Thompson that Biden could not be relied upon to be available at 2am for the kind of emergency the presidency can require.
After the Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell, born the same year as Biden, froze in public a second time, in 2023, his fellow Republican Nikki Haley said, “The Senate is the most privileged nursing home in the country […] You have to know when to leave.”
When the Democrats did unexpectedly well at the 2022 midterm elections, Biden’s aides took that as a sign he should run again, rather than note the level of protest in the midterm vote, which came soon after the Supreme Court overturned the 1973 Roe v Wade decision on abortion.
The opinion polls, though, were telling. An early November 2022 Ipsos poll had the president’s approval rating at a low 39%, Tapper and Thompson report. Two thirds of those surveyed said they thought the country was on the wrong track. When Ipsos ran a poll after the midterm election, 68% said Biden might not be up for the challenge of running in 2024. Worse, almost half of Democrats agreed.
Biden’s aides may have been right to marvel at what their boss could still do, and to resent the media harping on about Biden’s age while turning a blind eye to his cheeseburger-chomping, Coke-slurping political nemesis, only four years younger. The bitter fact for them is that by 2020 Biden looked and sounded frail while Trump looked and sounded commanding.
Trump may have lied repeatedly during the debate last June, but in a real sense that was not news; Trump lies as easily as he breathes. What was news was watching a mumbling, open-mouthed US president freeze on live television.
Grisly anecdotes and Hunter Biden
Original Sin is replete with grisly anecdotes about Biden’s decrepitude. “The guy can’t form a fucking sentence”, thought one aide attending to him onboard Air Force One. This leads to the second main theme: the tragic circumstances that appear to have accelerated the decline.
It is well known that personal tragedy has scarred – and in crucial ways shaped – Biden’s life and career. He lost his first wife, Neilia, and their one-year-old daughter, Naomi, in a car accident in 1972. Their young sons, Beau and Hunter, were in the car. They survived but Hunter suffered a fractured skull, an injury with lifelong effects, according to Tapper and Thompson.
Beau served as an army officer in the Iraq war. On his return, he was elected attorney-general of Delaware in 2006 and 2010. He planned to run for governor in 2016. But a year earlier, the brain cancer for which he was first treated in 2013 recurred; he died in May 2015. In a worrying precursor to later actions, the Bidens kept Beau’s illness a secret. “Beau’s death aged him significantly,” a longtime Biden confidant told Tapper and Thompson. “His shoulders looked smaller. His face looked more gaunt. In his eyes, you could just see it.”
A year later, Hunter Biden became addicted to crack cocaine. Ashley, Biden’s daughter by his second wife Jill, also struggled with addiction. Both spiralled downwards after Beau’s death, which weighed heavily on their father. As the authors write:
After Beau’s death in 2015, Biden desperately and understandably clung to Hunter. He would privately refer to him as ‘my only living son.’ But Biden aides felt that Hunter manipulated his father’s blind love for his own aims. The president struggled to say no to Hunter. Aides felt that he had tragically become Hunter’s chief enabler.
In 2021 Hunter published a memoir, Beautiful Things, and travelled round the country in an effort to provide hope to others struggling with addiction. The memoir’s candour provided valuable information to David Weiss, a special counsel appointed by Attorney-General Merrick Garland in 2023.
Weiss had been previously appointed by the first Trump administration to investigate the contents of a laptop Hunter Biden left at a repair shop. Biden had not interfered with Garland’s decision, as he did not want to be seen as behaving the way his predecessor had.
Weiss charged Hunter Biden over his possession of a handgun while being addicted to cocaine. A plea deal broke down and Hunter faced trial in 2024. The Biden family attended each day of the trial. Biden felt guilty, believing Hunter would never have been on trial if he wasn’t the president’s son.
There is little doubt the Republicans weaponised Hunter Biden’s actions, but he gave them plenty of ammunition. He had had an extramarital affair with his brother’s widow and had introduced her to cocaine, to which she became addicted. There is more, but you get the (tawdry) picture.
Then, after the election in November, Biden did what he had repeatedly said he wouldn’t, exercising his power as president to pardon his son. It may have been the understandable action of a besieged father, but Biden did not frame it that way, blaming Garland, wrongly, for pursuing the case.
Equally to the point, the authors report that Trump’s lawyers took note, believing the Hunter Biden pardon “gave them a great deal of leeway on whether they could pardon and free from prison the hundreds of convicted January 6 insurrectionists” from the 2021 Capitol riot. Which of course Trump did as soon as he took office in January 2025.
The old adage has it that two wrongs don’t make a right. But for a politician who had won the presidency promising to be everything Trump was not, it was a fatal, final blow to Biden’s credibility.
The media ‘missed a lot’
The third theme of the book asks how much of all this the news media reported during Biden’s presidency. Some, but not all of it – including some by Thompson, who recently won a White House Correspondents’ Association award for his disclosures.
Both he and his co-author acknowledge they and other journalists did not dig hard enough to reveal the extent to which the Biden administration was hampered by the president’s declining health. Said Thompson:
Being truth-tellers also means telling the truth about ourselves. We – myself included – missed a lot of this story, and some people trust us less because of it […] We should have done better.“
It is worth keeping this in perspective. The news media’s failings in the lead up to the Iraq war in 2003 were more significant. Then, too many journalists swallowed the administration’s lines justifying its decision to invade a country, while the work of those who did report sceptically was buried well inside the newspaper. There, it “played as quietly as a lullaby”, as The New York Times’ first public editor, Daniel Okrent, wrote in 2003.
The war’s reporting led to a lot of soul searching in American newsrooms. If there was a coverup in the media about the Biden administration, it wasn’t very effective, wrote media critic Jon Allsop in the New Yorker. “Not least because the majority of the public thought Biden was too old long before the debate.”
The other element infecting both the mainstream media and social media is divisiveness, rancour and hostility. It is hard, for journalists and the public, to see political information other than through a hyper-partisan lens. I felt this acutely when reading the section in Original Sin about Biden getting drawn into the FBI’s investigation of Trump for withholding classified documents – when the FBI found Biden had done essentially the same thing. (Though it should be stressed Biden, unlike Trump, cooperated at all times.)
‘Well-meaning, elderly man with a poor memory’
It was through this investigation that special counsel Robert Hur’s recording of a long interview with Biden came to light. Journalists were backgrounded that Hur was a right-wing operative; he was anything but that, write Tapper and Thompson. He treated Biden fairly and respectfully. In the interview, excerpts of which run to seven pages of the book, Biden rambles and needs regular reminding of facts – including the year his son Beau died.
In Hur’s report, released in 2024, he found Biden had inappropriately retained classified documents but he did not recommend pressing charges. To a jury, Hur concluded, Biden would present “as a sympathetic, well-meaning, elderly man with a poor memory”. He was making the kind of decision prosecutors routinely make about the likelihood of a conviction.
Hur was attacked by the White House and much of the media as a partisan warrior who had brought up the death of the president’s son in the interview, when it was Biden who mentioned it himself. If Hur really had been a partisan warrior, the authors write, he would have recommended continuing with the prosecution.
Several months later, after the disastrous Biden-Trump debate, friends and colleagues texted Hur saying he must have felt vindicated. “Hur told them that all he felt was sad. How could anyone look at Joe Biden at that debate and not feel bad?”
It is true that aides, and sometimes the news media, have covered up previous presidents’ health issues, such as Franklin Roosevelt’s paralysis from polio, John Kennedy’s debilitating back pain that required heavy doses of painkillers, and Ronald Reagan’s Alzheimer’s disease.
Tapper and Thompson argue the coverup of Biden’s health problems is the most consequential in presidential history.
Underplays Biden’s achievements
The authors successfully prosecute their case about Biden’s responsibility for his own demise. Perhaps worried they may not be believed by Democrat supporters, they continue amassing evidence well beyond that point, which means the minutiae of aides continuing to deny the reality of Biden’s decline becomes repetitive.
Their relentless focus on Biden’s decline also means they underplay both his achievements as a president and the breadth of his character. At one point, they admiringly refer to Richard Ben Cramer’s book about the 1988 presidential campaign, What it Takes, which includes Biden’s failed attempt to win the Democratic nomination for the presidency.
Cramer’s book is a massive 1,047 pages. He interviewed more than a thousand people and took so long on the book it came out during the next presidential campaign, in which Bill Clinton was elected.
One reviewer, Richard Brownstein, wrote of it: “Presidential elections are the white whale of American journalism – and in Cramer they have found a manic Melville.” But it is written in an intimate, novelistic style, taking the reader deep into the lives and thoughts and feelings of the candidates, George H.W Bush, Bob Dole, Michael Dukakis, Richard Gephardt, Gary Hart and Biden.
Cramer told Robert Boynton in an interview for his 2005 book, The New New Journalism, he was amazed political journalists spend so little time talking to childhood friends, family and early colleagues.
If you want to understand how someone got to the point where he [sic] is a credible candidate for president of a nation of 250 million people, you’d better godamn-well know how he is wonderful. But most journalists don’t care about that.
As such, Cramer provides a deeper, richer portrait of Biden as an idiosyncratic and flawed, but also impressive politician, who was a force of nature in his youth. By comparison, Original Sin reads like an autopsy: which in a way, it is. If you want to remember why Biden became an effective politician in the first place, seek out a copy of What it Takes.
In the end, though, whatever achievements Biden had as president are being overtaken by his disastrous decision to try to hang on for a second term. By the evidence presented in Original Sin, “Honest Joe” was, like many politicians, prey to ego and overvaulting ambition, and prone to secrecy when it suited him.
He and his aides thought – and astonishingly still do think – he was the person best able to repel the return of a person they feared (with good reason) would do enormous damage to the country. Biden said this after the November election, earning Harris’s ire, for which he apologised, and Donilon affirmed it in an interview with the authors early this year.
The savage irony is, by their actions, Biden and his team eased Trump’s path to victory last November. Now, it is not just Americans but the rest of the world who are left to deal with the second Trump administration.
Matthew Ricketson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
You may have come across those “what I eat in a day” videos on social media, where people – usually conventionally attractive influencers wearing activewear – list everything they consumed that day.
They might seem like harmless fun but in fact they can reinforce dangerous ideas about food, weight and body image.
I’ve worked with people with eating disorders who watch these videos and have seen first hand how harmful this content can be.
Here’s what the research says and what you need to know.
Videos that promote ‘health’ can be unhealthy
“What I eat in a day” videos have been popular for over a decade, with views reaching in the billions.
They target both men and women and many claim to promote health and nutrition. Yet videos such as these can do more harm than good.
Very few of these creators have formal qualifications in health or nutrition, increasing the potential for misinformation.
They often depict low calorie diets, exclude entire food groups or promote “clean eating” (a problematic idea at best).
They can also send harmful messages about body image. Many such videos use beauty filters to create images promoting unrealistic body ideals.
These videos often feature shots of how the person looks from the front, the side, in the gym, and in tight, form-fitting clothes. There may even be some “before and after” weight loss pics, sending the harmful message this should be everyone’s goal.
The subtext is clear: “eat what I eat in a day and you can look like me”.
But that’s not just a dangerous idea – it’s a totally false and erroneous one.
Knowing what a certain person “eats in a day” doesn’t mean you’ll look like them if you follow their lead.
In fact, a 24-hour rundown of one person’s food intake doesn’t even provide accurate information about that person’s nutritional health – let alone yours.
Links between health and diet are best examined over time, not in a single day.
Basing our food intake on a brief snapshot of what someone else eats is unlikely to lead to better health. It might leave you worse off overall.
5 ways these videos can affect mental health
What we watch online can affect our mood, behaviour and body image.
Alarm bells should ring if you frequently see these videos and notice you’re doing or experiencing these five things:
1. disordered eating. Eating less than your body needs, skipping meals, cutting out entire food groups, binge eating and purging are all signs of disordered eating that can lead to serious mental health problems such as eating disorders
2. low mood. Watching videos promoting low-calorie diets can worsen our mood; you might find yourself feeling deflated after comparing yourself to others (or rather, to the version of themselves they promote online)
3. poor body image. Research shows watching “what I eat in a day” videos can leave people feeling worse about their bodies and appreciating them less
4. obsessive thinking and anxiety. Obsessing over the “perfect” diet can increase anxiety about food and eating. Diets that encourage a very detailed approach to nutrition – including breaking meals down into components such as carbohydrates and proteins or weighing food – can further fuel obsessive thoughts
5. narrow life focus. Having your social media feed filled with these types of videos can create an overemphasis on the importance of food, eating and body image on your self-worth. This ultimately affects your health and wellbeing.
What we watch online can affect our mood, behaviour, and body image. GaudiLab/Shutterstock
OK, so what can I do?
If you’re encountering “what I eat in a day” videos often and find they’re affecting your mood, eating behaviour or sense of self-worth you can try to:
understand that these videos are not tailored to your individual health or nutritional needs and that many contain harmful messaging
avoid engaging with videos that promote disordered eating, idealised beauty standards or that make you feel bad after you watch them
unfollow accounts that regularly post such videos, or tap “not interested” on the TikTok video to stop the algorithm showing you more of them
balance your social media feed with content focused on other areas of life besides food and eating (such as art, design, animals, books, sports or travel). Fill your feed with interests that improve your personal sense of wellbeing
consider taking regular breaks from social media and seeing if you feel better overall.
If you do want to view posts about food, seek out creators attempting to buck these negative trends by focusing more on fun and taste.
And if you’re experiencing low mood, disordered eating or body image issues, seek help from your local GP. They can connect you with practitioners who provide evidence-based therapies such as cognitive behavioural therapy.
If you have a history of an eating disorder or suspect you may have one, you can contact the Butterfly Foundation’s national helpline on 1800 334 673 (or via their online chat).
Ultimately, “what I eat in a day” videos aren’t really helpful. They contain very little useful information to guide your health or nutritional goals.
If you are considering making changes to your diet, it’s important to consult a qualified professional, such as an accredited practising dietitian, who can learn about your situation and monitor any risks.
Catherine Houlihan consults with an eating disorders service owned and operated by the Butterfly Foundation.
As more and more people spend time chatting with artificial intelligence (AI) chatbots such as ChatGPT, the topic of mental health has naturally emerged. Some people have positive experiences that make AI seem like a low-cost therapist.
But AIs aren’t therapists. They’re smart and engaging, but they don’t think like humans. ChatGPT and other generative AI models are like your phone’s auto-complete text feature on steroids. They have learned to converse by reading text scraped from the internet.
When someone asks a question (called a prompt) such as “how can I stay calm during a stressful work meeting?” the AI forms a response by randomly choosing words that are as close as possible to the data it saw during training. This happens so fast, with responses that are so relevant, it can feel like talking to a person.
But these models aren’t people. And they definitely are not trained mental health professionals who work under professional guidelines, adhere to a code of ethics, or hold professional registration.
Where does it learn to talk about this stuff?
When you prompt an AI system such as ChatGPT, it draws information from three main sources to respond:
background knowledge it memorised during training
external information sources
information you previously provided.
1. Background knowledge
To develop an AI language model, the developers teach the model by having it read vast quantities of data in a process called “training”.
Where does this information come from? Broadly speaking, anything that can be publicly scraped from the internet. This can include everything from academic papers, eBooks, reports, free news articles, through to blogs, YouTube transcripts, or comments from discussion forums such as Reddit.
Are these sources reliable places to find mental health advice? Sometimes.
Are they always in your best interest and filtered through a scientific evidence based approach? Not always. The information is also captured at a single point in time when the AI is built, so may be out-of-date.
A lot of detail also needs to be discarded to squish it into the AI’s “memory”. This is part of why AI models are prone to hallucination and getting details wrong.
2. External information sources
The AI developers might connect the chatbot itself with external tools, or knowledge sources, such as Google for searches or a curated database.
When you ask Microsoft’s Bing Copilot a question and you see numbered references in the answer, this indicates the AI has relied on an external search to get updated information in addition to what is stored in its memory.
Meanwhile, some dedicated mental health chatbots are able to access therapy guides and materials to help direct conversations along helpful lines.
3. Information previously provided
AI platforms also have access to information you have previously supplied in conversations, or when signing up to the platform.
When you register for the companion AI platform Replika, for example, it learns your name, pronouns, age, preferred companion appearance and gender, IP address and location, the kind of device you are using, and more (as well as your credit card details).
On many chatbot platforms, anything you’ve ever said to an AI companion might be stored away for future reference. All of these details can be dredged up and referenced when an AI responds.
And we know these AI systems are like friends who affirm what you say (a problem known as sycophancy) and steer conversation back to interests you have already discussed. This is unlike a professional therapist who can draw from training and experience to help challenge or redirect your thinking where needed.
What about specific apps for mental health?
Most people would be familiar with the big models such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT, Google’s Gemini, or Microsofts’ Copilot. These are general purpose models. They are not limited to specific topics or trained to answer any specific questions.
But developers can make specialised AIs that are trained to discuss specific topics, like mental health, such as Woebot and Wysa.
However, these studies have all examined short-term use. We do not yet know what impacts excessive or long-term chatbot use has on mental health. Many studies also exclude participants who are suicidal or who have a severe psychotic disorder. And many studies are funded by the developers of the same chatbots, so the research may be biased.
This evidence all suggests AI chatbots may be an option to fill gaps where there is a shortage in mental health professionals, assist with referrals, or at least provide interim support between appointments or to support people on waitlists.
Bottom line
At this stage, it’s hard to say whether AI chatbots are reliable and safe enough to use as a stand-alone therapy option.
More research is needed to identify if certain types of users are more at risk of the harms that AI chatbots might bring.
It’s also unclear if we need to be worried about emotional dependence, unhealthy attachment, worsening loneliness, or intensive use.
AI chatbots may be a useful place to start when you’re having a bad day and just need a chat. But when the bad days continue to happen, it’s time to talk to a professional as well.
Aaron J. Snoswell previously received research project funding from OpenAI in 2024-2025 to develop new evaluation frameworks for measuring moral competence in AI agents.
Laura Neil receives funding through the Australian government Research Training Program Scholarship.
Centaine Snoswell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In recent years, artificial intelligence (AI) has taken centre stage across various industries. From AI-generated art to chatbots in customer service, every sector is seemingly poised for disruption.
It’s not just in your news feed every day – venture capital is pouring in, while CEOs are eager to declare their companies “AI-first”. But for those who remember the lofty promises of other technologies that have since faded from memory, there’s an uncanny sense of déjà vu.
In 2017, it was blockchain that promised to transform every industry. Companies added “blockchain” to their name and watched stock prices skyrocket, regardless of whether the technology was actually used, or how.
Now, a similar trend is emerging with AI. What’s unfolding is not just a wave of innovation, but a textbook example of a tech hype cycle. We’ve been here many times before.
Understanding the hype cycle
The tech hype cycle, first defined by the research firm Gartner, describes how emerging technologies rise on a wave of inflated promises and expectations, crash into disillusionment and, eventually, find a more realistic and useful application.
Recognising the signs of this cycle is crucial. It helps in distinguishing between genuine technological shifts and passing fads driven by speculative investment and good marketing.
It can also mean the difference between making a good business decision and a very costly mistake. Meta, for example, invested more than US$40 billion into the metaverse idea while seemingly chasing their own manufactured tech hype, only to abandon it later.
In 2017, blockchain was everyone’s focus. Presented as a revolutionary technology, blockchain offered a decentralised way to record and verify transactions, unlike traditional systems that rely on central authorities or databases.
US soft drinks company Long Island Iced Tea Corporation became Long Blockchain Corporation and saw its stock rise 400% overnight, despite having no blockchain product. Kodak launched a vague cryptocurrency called KodakCoin, sending its stock price soaring.
These developments were less about innovation and more about speculation, chasing short-term gains driven by hype. Most blockchain projects never delivered real value. Companies rushed in, driven by fear of missing out and the promise of technological transformation.
The results were mostly negative. Klarna soon saw a decline in customer satisfaction and had to walk back its strategy, rehiring humans for customer support this year. BuzzFeed’s AI content push failed to save its struggling business, and its news division later shut down. Tech media company CNET published AI-generated articles riddled with errors, damaging its credibility.
These are not isolated incidents. They’re signals that AI, like blockchain, was being over hyped.
Why do companies chase tech hype?
There are three main forces at play: inflated expectations, short-term view and flawed implementation. Tech companies, under pressure from investors and media narratives, overpromise what AI can do.
Leaders pitch vague and utopian concepts of “transformation” without the infrastructure or planning to back them up. And many rush to implement, riding the hype wave.
They are often hindered by a short-term view of what alignment with the new tech hype can do for their company, ignoring the potential downsides. They roll out untested systems, underestimate complexity or even the necessity, and hope that novelty alone will drive the return on investment.
The result is often disappointment – not because the technology lacks potential, but because it’s applied too broadly, too soon, and with too little planning and oversight.
Where to from here?
Like blockchain, AI is a legitimate technological innovation with real, transformative potential.
Often, these technologies simply need time to find the right application. While the initial blockchain hype has faded, the technology has found a practical niche in areas like “asset tokenization” within financial markets. This allows assets like real estate or company shares to be represented by digital tokens on the blockchain, enabling easier, faster and cheaper trading.
The same pattern can be expected with generative AI. The current AI hype cycle appears to be tapering off, and the consequences of rushed or poorly thought-out implementations will likely become more visible in the coming years.
However, this decline in hype doesn’t signal the end of generative AI’s relevance. Rather, it marks the beginning of a more grounded phase where the technology can find the most suitable applications.
Recognising the patterns of tech hype is essential for making smarter decisions. Instead of rushing to adopt every new innovation based on inflated promises, a measured, problem-driven approach leads to more meaningful outcomes.
Long-term success comes from thoughtful experimentation, implementation, and clear purpose, not from chasing trends or short-term gains. Hype should never dictate strategy; real value lies in solving real problems.
Gediminas Lipnickas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – USA – By Lincoln Mitchell, Lecturer, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University
Heavy equipment and military vehicles arrive in Jessup, Md., for the U.S. Army’s 250th anniversary parade on June 14, 2025, which coincides with President Donald Trump’s 79th birthday. Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images
Melania Trump and President Donald Trump joined French President Emmanuel Macron and his wife, Brigitte Macron, to watch the annual Bastille Day military parade in Paris on July 14, 2017, an event that inspired Trump to seek a parade in Washington, D.C. Mustafa Yalcin/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images
Trump vs. NYC
New York is a parade town. It’s also a city with which Trump has a long, complex relationship.
Trump was born in New York and began his business career there. Before Trump was a politician, or even a reality TV star, he was a fixture in the New York tabloids. His marriages, divorces, dating life and business successes and failures were splashed across more headlines than can be easily counted beginning in the early 1980s, but Trump was always presented as a clownish figure, albeit a very rich one.
In those years, continuing into the first decade of this century, the local media always presented him as gaudy, loud and not quite as business savvy as he claimed – hence the coverage of his bankruptcies.
While much of the rest of the country bought the Trump narrative that he was a brilliant businessman surrounded by beautiful women, doting staff and fawning celebrities, many New Yorkers never did.
And the city celebrates with big parades honoring everything from sports championships, which used to be much more common for New York teams, to the U.S. winning wars, most recently following the first Gulf War in 1991. Additionally, New York has parades for many of the hundreds of ethnic groups that make up the city.
For decades on Thanksgiving Day, as they roast their turkey, prepare the stuffing and finalize preparations for the traditional feast, millions of Americans have watched the Thanksgiving parade, which is always held in Manhattan, frequently referred to as the Macy’s Day parade because Macy’s has long sponsored the event.
Some, like the Thanksgiving parade, have their own rituals, such as watching the balloons being inflated behind the American Museum of Natural History on the evening before Thanksgiving.
However, the most famous of all parade types in New York is the ticker-tape parade. Dating from the days when paper, not computers, dominated trading floors and offices, people would throw ticker tape and other papers out their windows as the parade passed through the Financial District area that became known as the Canyon of Heroes.
But New Yorkers never throw parades for their politicians and tend to favor drums and floats rather than tanks and soldiers at these events.
An avalanche of confetti rains down on Aug. 13, 1969, honoring the three astronauts of the Apollo 11 mission, who became the first people to walk on the Moon. Bettman/Getty Images
No ticker tape for Trump
While there are parades for all kinds of people and events in New York, there has never been a parade there for Donald Trump. There was a pretty massive street party in the city when it was announced that Trump had lost the 2020 election.
Although Trump changed his primary residence to Florida in 2019, Trump was a New Yorker for many years and like many longtime residents had the chance to see many heroes – Mickey Mantle, John Glenn, Tom Seaver, Derek Jeter, Eli Manning, Nelson Mandela, American war veterans, numerous foreign leaders and many others – feted with a parade down the Canyon of Heroes. Jeter was celebrated five times, John Glenn and Mickey Mantle twice.
It is impossible to know Trump’s motivations for pushing the parade in the nation’s capital. But we also know that he is a man who holds himself in high regard and craves attention. Trump will likely never get a parade in his erstwhile hometown, so Washington must be the next best thing.
Trump’s newfound parade fetish underscores his love-hate relationship with New York.
A Washington, D.C., parade celebrating an unappreciated New Yorker who years ago decamped to Florida and Washington is a pale imitation of the Canyon of Heroes, where New Yorkers honor beloved leaders, war heroes, explorers and their favorite sports stars. But it is all Trump has.
Lincoln Mitchell does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The recent decision by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband has important lessons for any country facing a seemingly intractable insurgency. On May 12, the group stated that following its 12th Congress it will “dissolve the PKK’s organizational structure and end the armed struggle method”. The organisation has said that it will now pursue its goals “through democratic politics”.
The PKK’s decision follows talks between the Turkish government and the group’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in Turkish custody since 1998. Regional dynamics, Turkish domestic politics, and personal ambition have all played key roles in bringing the conflict to this point.
Much uncertainty remains. The PKK and Turkey have embarked on peace processes before, only to return to conflict. But the group’s formal announcement of its intention to disband marks an important step towards ending an insurgency that has lasted over 40 years. If so, it will bring to an end a conflict that has cost all sides involved tens of thousands of lives.
The possibility of ending this insurgency not only raises questions about this specific conflict, but also what we know more broadly about how insurgencies end.
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The PKK has a long track record of combining military action with political struggle. As with many other insurgent organisations, the group has worked to gain and maintain public support among ethnic Kurds, despite its use of violence.
Its strategy has also evolved over the years to adapt to circumstances. It moved away from the its original Marxist beginnings with the end of the cold war and over the years changed its fundamental aim from separatism to increased regional autonomy and local government, through the system of what it calls democratic confederalism. Over the decades the group and its affiliates have also decreased their use of terrorism in Europe and western Turkey.
This is in keeping with characteristics that researchers have found facilitate the transformation of organisations from armed groups to participants in institutional politics. There are a large number of cases in which insurgencies or terrorist organisations shifted – successfully or unsuccessfully – to either transform into a political party or combine with one.
There’s no doubt that military pressure has been important in downgrading the PKK as an insurgency. But military victories over the PKK have failed to end the conflict – in fact military oppression against the PKK has often backfired and reinforced public support for the group.
Many of the factors that have made it possible for the PKK to transform itself have been political, rather than narrowly military. Research by the RAND Corporation thinktank has found that rather than simply aiming to defeat an insurgency, it’s usually more effective to combine military pressure with political reform that aims to remove the reasons for the insurgency.
But Ankara has in parallel cut off financial flows to the organisation, while strengthening economic opportunities for Kurdish citizens – particularly in western Turkey. Many Kurds moved west to escape violence in the traditionally Kurdish regions in Turkey’s southeast: Istanbul is now the city with the largest Kurdish population in Turkey.
The Turkish government has also strengthened its relationships with other Kurdish groups, primarily the Kurdistan Democratic Party in northern Iraq, to provide both military and political support.
This case is another example of the importance of blending strictly military tactics with diplomacy, economic policy and strategic communications. The celebrated Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz said that war is politics by other means – and many insurgencies are fundamentally political in nature. So this requires multiple lines of effort to be pursued in parallel to effectively respond to this – with an emphasis on political solutions rather than just the use of force.
Successfully bringing insurgencies to and through a negotiated settlement requires long-term investment and effort. The issues that caused the insurgency in the first place do not simply disappear when the document is signed. In the case of the PKK, there are a number of ways in which this recent progress could be reversed. Concerns have been raised about whether the Turkish government will deliver on promised constitutional reforms or prisoner releases. There is also the question of whether PKK fighters will be willing and able to demobilise and reintegrate into society.
Research has indicated that states with flawed democracies have more difficulty ending insurgencies on favourable terms. Freedom House and similar organisations currently rank Turkey as “Not Free”. The country has been backsliding for years under the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.
Despite these misgivings, the initial success of Turkey’s approach support previous research on how insurgencies end, and how armed groups might turn instead to politics. For the governments of countries facing insurgency, it means taking a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach to encourage this to happen. Governments may also need to move away from a binary definition of “winning” or “losing” to a more nuanced understanding of how all parties stand to gain from the end of an insurgency.
Rebecca Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
In the U.S., both scholars and news media have been highlighting the connections between far-right Christian ideology and politics.
Trump’s first presidential term ended with the Jan. 6, 2021 violent attack on the U.S. Capitol. Scholars like Matthew Taylor, author of The Violent Take it by Force, have pointed to Christian nationalism and other far-right ideologies as factors that motivated the rioters.
American sociologists Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry define Christian nationalism as “a cultural framework that blurs distinctions between Christian identity and American identity, viewing the two as closely related and seeking to enhance and preserve their union.”
It’s tempting to read “Christian idenity” and “American identity” and assume it does not affect Canada.
Christian nationalism is not synonymous with Christianity or any specific branch of Christianity, like evangelical Christianity.
According to U.S. sociologist Daniel Miller, Christian nationalism is not a set list of ideological or religious beliefs. Instead, Miller says, Christian nationalism emerges when people identify with “a very narrow, idealized prototype of the ‘real or ‘authentic’ American.”
He says two mechanisms connect people to Christian nationalism. The first is perceived loss of power by the people who historically held power. This is known as a “power devaluation crisis.” The second is a narrative of decline — known as a a “declensionist narrative” — which asserts that American society has declined since the 1960s and needs repair and reclamation.
Poilievre’s signals to Christian nationalists
Poilievre is not open about his religion and does not call for Canada to be a Christian nation. But whether Poilievre intends to stir up Christian nationalists, some of his rhetoric has indicated support for the classic definitions of Christian nationalism.
According to Miller, support for Christian nationalism is not always direct. It can be activated by stoking a crisis of lost power, like the decline of the “traditional” family or by asserting a narrative of decline, like “Canada is broken.”
For example, Poilievre’s 2025 campaign mobilized both of the narrative mechanisms that attract Christian nationalist mentioned by sociologists: a power devaluation crisis and the narrative of decline.
In the lead-up to his 2025 campaign, Poilievre repeatedly calledCanada “broken.”. He cited increased crime, addiction, high grocery prices and more as evidence of Canada’s brokenness, accusing the Liberal government of erasing Canada’s past.
When Poilievre calls Canada “broken,” it affirms the world view of Christian nationalists.
Of course, visits to churches are not enough to signal alignment with Christian nationalists. And Poilievre has not espoused any Christian evangelical ideals in any public speech.
But it’s still important for Canadians to remain alert about Christian nationalists and their ambitions to become part of mainstream politics.
Canadian Christian nationalism
A study from the U.S. has linked the rise in Christian nationalist ideologies to attacks on religious minorities. The 2024 qualitative data from the study indicates that when politicians rhetorically supported Christian nationalist values, there was a increased violence against minority groups.
While I know of no studies showing the rise of the far right is directly leading to violence in Canada, Canadians should be aware of the pattern in the U.S. Research shows that growing Christian nationalists and far-right world views south of the border are, in fact, connected to a rise in violence.
Lisa Gasson-Gardner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Jamie Seabrook, Professor, Department of Epidemiology and Biostatistics; Professor, Department of Paediatrics; Professor, Brescia School of Food and Nutritional Sciences, Western University
As cannabis use among youth rises in Canada — and THC potency reaches record highs — emergency departments are seeing a surge in cases of a once-rare condition: cannabis hyperemesis syndrome (CHS).
Characterized by relentless vomiting, abdominal pain and temporary relief through compulsive hot showers or baths, CHS is increasingly affecting adolescents and young adults. Yet few people — including many clinicians — know it exists.
As public health and substance use researchers, and authors of a recent review on CHS in youth, we are struck by how misunderstood and misdiagnosed this condition remains.
A silent side-effect of heavy cannabis use
Canada ranks among the highest globally for youth cannabis use, with 43 per cent of 16-19-year-olds reporting use in the past year. Usage peaks among those 20–24 years, with nearly half (48 per cent) reporting past-year use.
This rise in regular, heavy use coincides with a 400 per cent increase in THC potency since the 1980s. Strains with THC levels above 25 per cent are now common. As cannabis becomes more potent and accessible, clinicians are seeing more cases of CHS, a condition virtually unheard of before 2004.
What is CHS?
CHS unfolds in three phases:
Prodromal phase: Nausea and early morning discomfort begin. Users increase cannabis consumption, thinking it will relieve symptoms.
Hyperemetic phase: Intense vomiting, dehydration and abdominal pain follow. Hot showers or baths provide temporary relief — a hallmark of CHS.
Recovery phase: Symptoms resolve after stopping cannabis entirely.
Diagnosis is often delayed. One reason is because CHS mimics conditions like gastroenteritis or eating disorders, leading to costly CT scans, MRIs and gastric emptying tests. One telltale sign — compulsive hot bathing — is frequently overlooked, despite its strong diagnostic value.
Nausea and early morning discomfort begin in the early stages of CHS. (Shutterstock)
Some youth use cannabis to self-medicate for mental health concerns and increase their use when symptoms of CHS appear, mistakenly believing cannabis will help. Others are reluctant to disclose their use due to stigma, fear of judgment or legal consequences.
In our recent review, we found that CHS is frequently misdiagnosed as bulimia nervosa because of the vomiting and unintended weight loss. But unlike bulimia, CHS-related vomiting is involuntary and not motivated by body image concerns. A clue is that those with CHS often return to normal eating and bathing patterns during symptom-free periods, which is not typical for an eating disorder.
Compulsive hot bathing is a telltale sign of CHS. (Shutterstock)
A burden on the health system and individual
CHS doesn’t just take a toll on youth — it strains the health-care system. Emergency department visits for CHS have spiked in recent years, with a study in Ontario showing a significant rise after cannabis commercialization following legalization in 2018. Repeated ER visits, missed school or work and emotional distress compound the burden. In rare cases, CHS can lead to kidney failure due to severe dehydration and electrolyte imbalance.
The most effective long-term solution to treating CHS is cannabis cessation. For youth who use cannabis to cope with anxiety, quitting can lead to withdrawal symptoms and distress. This makes harm reduction strategies critical: gradual reduction plans, mental health supports and non-judgmental conversations between providers and patients.
Clinicians should systematically screen youth presenting with cyclic vomiting for cannabis use and hot bathing behaviour. Youth are more likely to disclose cannabis use when asked in an empathetic, stigma-free way.
Public health campaigns can play a major role. We need honest, accessible education — in schools, clinics and online — that explains what CHS is, how to recognize it and how to seek help. In our view, the addition of CHS content to youth health curriculums, pediatric training programs and cannabis use screening tools is overdue.
A preventable crisis
CHS is a preventable but growing consequence of chronic cannabis use in young people. As legalization continues to reshape social norms and access, it is essential to ensure that youth — and those who care for them — are informed about the full spectrum of cannabis-related health risks.
This story was co-authored by Morgan Seabrook, an undergraduate research assistant at the Human Environments Analysis Laboratory at Western University.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
These conversations are important, but clinicians’ and patients’ time together is often limited, and it’s hard to demonstrate trustworthiness and build trust. That’s where we believe — and evidence suggests — artificial intelligence (AI) can help.
We’re part of a team researching how chatbots can be developed to help clinicians practise difficult conversations about vaccines. These tools have the potential to provide low-cost, emotionally engaging and psychologically safe simulations for health professionals like doctors, nurse practitioners and pharmacists.
These kinds of tools are especially valuable in rural and remote areas, where access to in-person workshops or continuing education may be limited. Even for busy clinicians in well-resourced areas, chatbots can offer a flexible way to hone communication skills and to learn about circulating concerns.
Chatbots provide an opportunity to deliver this kind of training at scale. In recent work, computational social scientist David Rand and colleagues have demonstrated how AI-based agents can be trained to engage in social conversations and generate responses that effectively persuade.
These principles can be applied to the clinician–patient setting, allowing professionals to test and refine different ways of engaging with vaccine hesitancy before stepping into real-world conversations.
Simulating conversations between clinicians and patients can help clinicians prepare for actual encounters. (Shutterstock)
Practising communication
We believe chatbots can be used to train clinicians in a type of presumptive language known as the AIMS method (announce, inquire, mirror and secure trust). Similar approaches, drawing on motivational interviewing, have been tested in Québec, where it has demonstrated success in helping clinicians increase vaccine confidence and uptake among new parents.
This kind of intervention will simulate conversations with patients with vaccine questions, allowing physicians to practice AIMS techniques in a low-stakes environment. For example, the chatbot could play the role of a parent, and the physician would begin by announcing that it is time for the parents to vaccinate their children.
Then, if the “parent” (the chatbot) expresses vaccine hesitancy, the physician would inquire about what is driving the hesitancy. Importantly, when the “parent” responds to the questions, the AIMS approach teaches the physician not to respond directly to the concerns, but instead first mirror the response to show the parent that they are being heard and understood.
Finally, and sometimes after multiple rounds of inquiry and mirroring, the physician can move on to securing the parent’s trust.
Becoming adept at methods of conversational approaches like AIMS takes practice. That’s what a chatbot can offer: repeated, flexible, low-risk rehearsal. Think of it like a flight simulator for conversations.
Staying ahead of misinformation
The landscape of misinformation is constantly shifting. New conspiracy theories, viral videos and misleading anecdotes can gain traction in days. Clinicians shouldn’t have to confront these narratives for the first time during a brief patient visit.
By having the AI model underlying the chatbot constantly trawling the web for the latest misleading claims and updating chatbot scenarios regularly, we can help clinicians recognize and respond to the kinds of misinformation circulating now. This is especially important when trust in institutions is wavering and personalized, empathetic responses are most needed.
Conversations build trust
While we propose chatbots can be used to teach doctors how to address vaccine skepticism, motivational interviewing has already been employed via AI-based chatbots to address smoking cessation, with some promising results.
Using this approach as part of (continuing) clinical education could help better prepare the frontlines to serve as a successful bulwark against vaccine concerns not rooted in science.
In the face of falling vaccination rates and rising distrust, clinicians are on the front lines of public health. We owe them better tools to prepare and build trust.
Trust isn’t built in a moment. It’s built in conversation. And those can be practised.
Jaigris Hodson is on the advisory board of the Clarity Foundation. She receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
Heather Lanthorn is a senior advisor to the Clairity Foundation.
David Rand has received funding from Google, Meta, and the Gates Foundation.
Heather Lanthorn is the Senior Advisor to the Clarity Foundation.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adam Behr, Senior Lecturer in Popular and Contemporary Music, Newcastle University
There’s immense variety in popular music careers, even beyond the extremes of one-hit wonders and the long-haulers touring stadiums into their dotage. There are those who embody a specific era, burning briefly and brightly, and those whose legacy spans decades.
Straddling both of those, and occupying a distinctive space in popular music history, is Sylvester Stewart, better known as Sly Stone, who died at the age of 82 on Monday June 9.
A pioneer of funk whose sound spread far beyond the genre, his band Sly and the Family Stone synthesised disparate strands of American popular music into a unique melange, tracking the musical and social shifts as the 1960s wore into the 1970s.
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A musical prodigy and multi-instrumentalist from a young age, Stone was born in Texas in 1943 and raised in California, in a religious Pentecostal family. He had put out his first single aged 13 – a locally released gospel song with three of his siblings, who would later join him in Sly and the Family Stone.
A record producer and DJ by his early twenties, he imbibed the music of British acts like The Beatles and Rolling Stones, and applied his eclectic tastes and musical versatility to producing local psychedelic and garage rock acts in the emergent San Francisco scene.
By the time commercial popular culture had flowered into a more exploratory “counterculture” in 1967’s Summer of Love, the ebb and flow of personnel across local bands had coalesced into a line-up including the Stone siblings – Sly, Freddie, and their sister Vaetta, with their other sister Rose joining in 1968. Pioneering socially, as well as aesthetically, Sly and the Family Stone had diversity at its core – a mixed sex, multi-racial and musically varied band.
This was notable for a mainstream act in an America still emerging from the depths of segregation, and riven with strife over the struggle for civil rights. While their first album in 1967 A Whole New Thing enjoyed comparatively little traction, 1968‘s Dance to the Music presaged a run of hits.
Their sonic collision of sounds from across the commercial and social divide – psychedelic rock, soul, gospel and pop – struck a chord with audiences simultaneously looking forward with hope to changing times, and mindful of the injustice that was still prevalent.
Singles like Everyday People, Stand, and I Want to Take You Higher, melded a party atmosphere with social statements. They were calls for action, but also for unity: celebratory, but pushing the musical envelope.
While the band wore its innovations lightly at first, their reach was long. Bassist Larry Graham was a pioneer of the percussive slap bass that became a staple of funk and fusion. And their overall sound brought a looser, pop feel to the funk groove, in comparison to the almost militaristic tightness of that other funk pioneer, James Brown.
Where Brown’s leadership of his group was overt, exemplified by his staccato musical directions in the songs, and the call and response structure, Stone’s band had more of an ensemble feel. Musical lines and solos were overlaid upon one another, often interweaving – more textured rather than in lock-step. It was a sound that would reach an almost chaotic apogée with George Clinton’s Funkadelic later in the 1970s.
The party couldn’t last. As the optimism of the 1960s gave way to division in the 1970s, Stone’s music took a darker turn, even if the funk remained central. The album There’s A Riot Going On (1971), and its lead single It’s Family Affair contained lyrics depicting social ills more explicitly. The music – mostly recorded by Sly himself – was sparser, the vocals more melancholic.
The unity of the band itself was also fracturing, under pressure from Stone’s growing cocaine dependency. The album Fresh (1973) featured classics like In Time and If You Want Me To Stay, but they were running out of commercial road by 1974’s Small Talk, and broke up soon after.
Periodic comebacks were punctuated by a troubled personal life, including, at its nadir, reports of Stone living out of a van in Los Angeles, and arrests for drug possession. By the time he achieved a degree of stability, his star may have faded, but his legacy was secure.
Stone embodied the contradictions of American popular music – arguably even America itself: brash and light-hearted on the one hand, with a streak of darkness and self-destructiveness on the other.
The handclaps and joyous shouts harked back to his gospel roots, but his embrace of electric instruments aligned soul with rock and pop. He was a funk artist who played at the archetypal hippie festival, Woodstock, and a social commentator whose party sounds were shot through with urgency.
He paved the way for the likes of Prince and Outkast, but also informed jazz and fusion. Jazz pioneer Miles Davis acknowledged Stone’s influence on his own turn towards electric and funk sounds in the late 1960s and early 1970s on landmark albums like Bitches Brew.
Sly Stone’s joyful provocations may not have lasted at the commercial centre, but his mark was indelible. His struggles were both personal and social, but his sense of groove, and of a collective voice, demonstrated the value of aligning traditions with new ideas – a musical America that was fractious, but still a family affair.
Adam Behr has received funding from the Arts and Humanities Research Council
The leader of Reform UK, Nigel Farage, recently announced that if in government, his party would abolish the two-child limit on benefits. This social security policy restricts the payment of means-tested benefits to the first two children of a family.
Farage explained the announcement as being pro-natalist – intended to encourage a higher birth rate – as well as being “pro-worker”. Farage said that the abolition of the two-child limit “makes having children just a little bit easier” for “lower paid workers”.
He noted that Reform wanted “to encourage people to have children”. Such arguments are familiar in the European political right, although the UK’s Conservative opposition criticised Reform’s proposal.
To be in government, Reform has two possible routes: to build a coalition of voters for it, or to split left-leaning voters. Its proposal to abolish the two-child limit may be aimed at both.
On the one hand, it might be supported by left-leaning voters who are able to accept Reform’s broader policy agenda. On the other hand, it might be aimed at encouraging left-leaning voters who find Reform’s agenda problematic to move to parties (such as the Greens and Liberal Democrats) who are less equivocal in their commitment to abolishing the two-child limit than the Labour government.
Social security policies winning votes
Social security policies have long been used as part of political strategising. The situation with the two-child limit is complicated, though, because both anti- and pro-natalist views of social security (and it predecessors) have been popular at particular moments.
Political and popular arguments have long been made that supporting the poorest families leads to them having too many children. This, so the argument goes, reproduces, rather than addresses, the poverty they face. Examples can be found, for instance, in the 1834 poor law commission report in relation to “bastardy” and large families, Sir Keith Joseph’s 1970s focus upon the “cycle of deprivation”, as well as “underclass” arguments in the 1980s and 1990s.
The two-child limit was announced in the 2015 budget and introduced in 2017 with the reasoning that “those in receipt of tax credits should face the same financial choices about having children as those supporting themselves solely through work.”
The two-child limit on benefits restricts welfare payments for children to the first two children in a family. Len44ik/Shutterstock
In contrast, the architect of the British welfare state, William Beveridge, noted in 1942 that children’s allowances (now child benefit) would help “housewives as mothers” in their “vital work in ensuring the adequate continuance of the British race and of British ideals in the world.” The 1945 Labour election victory in support of the welfare state suggests pro-natalist policies can contribute to electoral success.
The expansion of tax credits in the 1990s and 2000s were partly explained in pro-natalist terms. Tony Blair, for instance, noted: “The working tax credit enables half a million mothers to choose to stay at home.” That, in other words, tax credits enabled women to choose having and raising children over paid work.
Recent polling, however, suggests that the anti-natalist two-child limit polls well among voters, especially Reform voters. In 2024, for example, YouGov found 60% of Britons thought the two-child limit should be kept. The figure was 84% for Reform voters.
Targeting voters
The abolition of the two-child limit may have been adopted to increase Reform’s appeal to left-leaning voters. Providing additional support for families through social security may be attractive to voters concerned with social injustice. The two-child limit increases child poverty. Affected families are unable to provide even the most basic needs, such as food, clothing and heating.
Nevertheless, Reform’s proposal is also embedded in caveats and would be paid for through means appealing to its existing voters. So, for example, Farage emphasised that the abolition of the two-child limit would be restricted to only British families. It would not be extended to families “who come into the country and suddenly decide to have a lot of children”.
By keeping the two-child limit for migrant families, Reform’s proposals are consistent with existing immigration and asylum policies. It has been observed in an inquiry by All Party Parliamentary Groups on poverty and on migration that policies like this are, at least in part, “designed to push people into poverty in the hope that it will deter others from moving to the UK.” And, therefore, the abolition of the two-child limit can be seen as part of Reform’s pledge to severely curtail immigration.
Farage also argued that the abolition of the two-child limit would be paid for by other policies that are central to Reform’s electoral agenda. These include stopping asylum seekers being housed in hotels and the abolition of net zero policies. It is also consistent with Reform’s view that jobs in Britain should be filled by British people. This, it believes, will help reduce reliance on migrant labour from overseas.
There is little evidence that the introduction of the two-child limit had the desired impact on lowering poorer households’ birth rates. And it is unclear whether the proposed abolition of the two-child limit rooted in a British-only, pro-natalist agenda is enough to attract left-leaning voters.
These voters might, for example, be more concerned with Reform’s position on immigration and asylum seeking, as well as the social injustice of the undoubted poverty in which families subjected to the two child limit on benefits live.
Reform’s strategy then may be to further encourage those voters to turn from its closest rival – the Labour party – to other political parties. Whichever is the case, the situation will undoubtedly shift if the Labour government does take the step of abolishing the two-child limit.
Chris Grover does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Source: The Conversation – UK – By Steve Schifferes, Honorary Research Fellow, City Political Economy Research Centre, City St George’s, University of London
UK chancellor Rachel Reeves faces her biggest test with the government’s departmental spending plans for the three years from next April until the general election. With nearly £600 billion a year to spend, her decisions will impact on every aspect of public life and shape the political weather for years to come.
She believes the key to reviving Labour’s fortunes as its poll ratings tumble lies in boosting economic growth.
So the government has promised that its policies will increase the UK’s anaemic growth rate and enhance productivity. Reeves is looking to capital spending on big projects that will boost the economy, such as the £14.2 billion government investment in a new nuclear power plant at Sizewell in Suffolk.
Last year she revised the government’s fiscal rules to give herself the space to borrow an extra £113 billion over three years to transform Britain’s ageing infrastructure. She has already made it clear that she wants to boost transport investment outside of London, as well as invest in research and development, including green energy.
But there are challenges ahead. In the first place, the effect of infrastructure investment takes a long time to feed through. This is partly because of the lag between planning the projects and when they come on-stream.
It will take time before the full effect will be felt on productivity, which has been growing more slowly than expected. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) suggested in March that the latest government plans for planning reform might increase productivity by just 0.2% in the longer term.
There are also some real trade-offs as to where the increased capital investment will go – and which sectors will benefit most. The chancellor has emphasised her commitment to putting more money into projects outside London and south-east England that have had less public investment in the past.
But London and the south-east is where productivity is highest and where further investment might have a bigger effect on economic growth.
It appears that there may be less funding for social housing, which may threaten the government’s ambitious target of building 1.5 million homes over the parliament. There may also be less available to repair schools and hospitals.
And the plans to boost defence spending on expensive military equipment – such as frigates and fighter planes – will also count as capital spending. As such, it could further reduce the amount available for infrastructure investment.
The departmental trade-offs
Despite the relative abundance of cash for infrastructure, the tighter fiscal rules on day-to-day spending mean that many departments are facing a squeeze on their budgets. The government plans to allow total day-to-day departmental spending on average to rise by just 1.2% per year in real terms during the next three years. This probably spells a real-terms cut for some “unprotected” departments.
This is because the money will not be distributed equally. The Department of Health and Social Care gets 40% of all departmental spending and is likely to be the big winner.
It has already received a big increase in the last spending round, with an 11% increase in capital spending is likely to get even more to realise an ambitious ten-year plan for improving services in the NHS in England.
If health spending were to go up by 2.5% (well under its historic average), this could mean very little increase for many other government departments. And if it is increased by 3.5% this will imply real-terms cuts for other areas.
The situation is made more difficult by the government’s decision to prioritise two other areas: defence and schools. For defence, it is committed to raising spending to 2.5% by 2027 and to 3% in the next parliament.
And for education, Reeves has pledged an extra £4.5 billion per year for more teachers, childcare places and free school meals. The decisions have a strong political dimension, as health and education tend to be the most popular spending priorities among the public.
The spending review, however, only covers half of total government spending. The more unpredictable part is annually managed expenditure, mainly on benefits and interest payments on government debt.
The Treasury sets an overall target (known as the spending envelope) on how much will be spent in these areas. But it now faces a crunch point over the unpopular decisions to cut disability benefits and keep the two-child benefit cap.
Reeves’ partial U-turn on the winter fuel payment, which will now be paid to 9 million pensioners, will cost an additional £1.25 billion a year but may have been a political necessity.
But a full U-turn on the two other issues will be much more expensive. Taken together, such a change might breach the fiscal rules, which give only £10 billion of “headroom” in a total government budget of more than £1.2 trillion. So while there will be some rowing back, the finances suggest any more major U-turns are unlikely.
To make matters worse, these spending plans are based on an economic forecast made by the OBR in March. This did not include the effect of US president Donald Trump’s tariff plans. Since then, both the IMF and the OECD downgraded their UK growth forecasts for both 2025 and 2026, and despite a recent small upgrade by the IMF, growth is still significantly lower than previously expected.
Even though Britain seems to have secured a deal with the US, the effect of tariffs on global growth will still damage the UK’s prospects as a trading nation.
This will make it harder for the government to meet its fiscal targets in the autumn budget while sticking to the departmental spending plans. The chancellor will then have three options. She can look for more cuts in benefits spending.
She could try to find other sources of tax revenue, for example by tweaking the rules on taxing pensions or extending the freeze on upgrading tax bands. Or, more radically, she could modify the fiscal rules to give herself more flexibility – for example by having only one economic forecast a year, as the IMF has suggested.
Ultimately Labour’s electoral prospects will depend on whether it has succeeded in boosting living standards. While the productivity drive could work, the UK economy remains at the mercy of wider global economic forces.
Steve Schifferes does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Former chairman Zia Yusuf has rejoined Reform after quitting days previously. Yusuf had said he no longer wanted to work to get the party into government when new MP Sarah Pochin called for a ban on burqas in the UK. However, he seems to have had a change of heart and will return, ostensibly to lead the party’s “department of government efficiency”.
Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s bromance, however, is on much rockier ground. There’s no sign of the world’s richest man reconciling with the US president, his former employer.
These spats, at first glance, might seem like little more than, put politely, teething problems in (relatively) new political operations. Or, a little less politely, the unedifying spectacle of people in or seeking power being completely unable to act like adults.
However, it also points to something more akin to a canary in the coalmine for radical right parties around the world. Their increasing reliance on an ultra-wealthy donor class presents an ideological puzzle that may not be solvable.
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Reform currently operates on what has been described as vibes alone. That is to say, there’s very little meaningful common ground between the people who vote for Reform and the party elite. The only continuity is their sense of anger at the current political system.
This, as we are seeing in election after election, is an incredibly powerful (and compelling) force. The problem is, of course, that you can’t oppose forever. You often end up having to actually do something. All boxers, Mike Tyson will be glad to tell you, have a plan – until they get punched in the face.
And what makes them such a powerful force at the moment, is precisely that which may cause challenges further down the line. At least for me, given it’s my bread and butter research-wise, I see this when I follow the money.
And I’m increasingly asked a lot of questions about the kind of people who are either giving money to Reform – or who Reform are courting (and at the moment it is decidedly the latter which is the case).
Then you have a Silicon Valley-reared tech-bro libertarian. This group already runs on a “move fast and break things” philosophy so the idea of an insurgent party which proclaims, on entering parliament, that “the fox is in the henhouse” naturally appeals.
There are some places where the interests of these groups align – most notably a distaste for government interference and red tape (though not necessarily a smaller state in terms spending on public services). They also share a sense that progressive politics, broadly defined, ought to be pegged back a bit (but with an emphasis on a bit).
They differ on a great deal else, to the extent that you can only really please two out of the three, but never everybody. And, unfortunately, without all three the project starts collapsing. This is what we have been seeing in the fractious relationships between Trump and Musk and Farage and Yusuf.
Two out of three ain’t bad – but it’s not enough
Yusuf (and Musk) are very much representative of the new tech-bro class. And, when Yusuf called questions about banning the burqa “dumb” he was speaking at both an ideological and organisational level.
At the ideological level it is, frankly, a bit rich for his blood, because “philosophically I am always a bit uneasy about banning things which, for example, would be unconstitutional in the United States”.
Organisationally, it pushes Reform much closer to what journalist Fraser Nelson calls “a tactic more akin to the old BNP”. Indeed, Reform started “just asking questions” about burqas at the same time as it started twisting footage to claim that Anas Sarwar, leader of Scottish Labour, wants to prioritise the needs of Pakistanis.
This kind of dog-whistle politics appeals to some, but puts off a lot more, including, I think, some of the (saner) tech-bro right.
Indeed, Ian Ward at Politico perceptively notes that if we want to explain the current Musk-Trump meltdown we should look back to Christmas 2024, when cracks first started appearing over immigration policy.
The tech-bro right are, generally speaking, much less hardline on the flow of people than the Maga-populist right (think Steve Bannon and Tommy Robinson). In fact, they are pro-high skilled immigration as it tends to benefit them and their business interests.
Tech-bros also like the idea of moving fast and breaking things in theory. But when things start moving fast and actually breaking in practice (or Tesla stocks start to plummet), they tend to get a bit freaked out.
In other words, it’s not just that they don’t like government, they don’t like governing and the inevitable compromise that comes with it. When they say move fast and break things, I get the sense what they really mean is “leave me alone so I can make billions in peace”.
This, of course, is quite appealing to traditional hedge-fund conservatives, but is also the politics that literally built the economic grievances that much of the white-working class support for the populist radical right is, in turn, built on.
Two out of three ain’t bad, but you do need all three. So, don’t be surprised if despite Farage’s seemingly genuine affection for Yusuf, it all falls apart again before long.
Ultimately, Reform will need to decide how they are going to spin these plates. The good news is that it might well be that they can, indeed, get by on vibes alone until the next general election. The bad news, unfortunately, is that winning an election is the easy bit. Just ask Boris Johnson and Keir Starmer. After all, everyone has a plan.
Sam Power receives funding from the Economic and Social Research Council and the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
If you visit a zoo, you might be captivated by the animals you see — majestic lions, curious meerkats, soaring birds of prey. But this is not always the case. Some zoos don’t always give us that impression of “happy animals” where they can behave naturally and be left alone by visitors if they wish.
The UK, Scottish and Welsh governments recently released new zoo standards for Great Britain. So what does this mean for the future of zoos?
I have been working in and with zoos for over 20 years. I am a bit of a zoo-nerd but that doesn’t mean that I like them all. I am an advocate for good animal welfare in zoos and so I can recognise the ones that are good and not so good.
Britain is one of a few countries such as Belgium, South Korea and New Zealand that have specific zoo legislation. The new British standards will be enforced in 2027, giving below-par zoos two years to up their game.
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I speak here in my role as associate professor of zoo animal welfare at Nottingham Trent University, but I also sit on the UK Zoos Expert Committee and helped to write the new standards. One of the biggest changes is the replacement of the word “should” with “must”. The standards now say: “Zoos must provide appropriate accomodation”. This makes all elements of the guidance much more enforceable.
One of the most common complaints I hear when I say I work with zoos is that the animals don’t have as much space as they do in the wild. That is correct: zoos cannot provide the same amount of space for a lot of species. But good quality space can allow these animals to behave like they would in wild habitats.
One of the most controversial animals when talking about space is elephants. In 2017 the UK government issued updated requirements for them which brought in enclosure-size requirements, something that had never happened for any species in British zoos before.
Under the new standards, zoos will have until 2040 to increase their elephant provisions. Indoor space allocation for a herd of up to four females has been doubled to 600m². This then increases by 100m² for each additional elephant (compared to 80m² in the 2017 requirements).
Bull facilities – zoos that house individual male elephants – need to provide 320m² of indoor space per bull. Outdoor areas for bull and cow elephants must provide a minimum shared space of 20,000m² (or 2.8 UK sized football pitches) for up to five group-living adults. This must be increased by at least 2,500m² for each additional animal over two years old. This is over 30 times larger than the current standards.
The new standards stipulate that zoos must provide more natural habitats that better replicate how elephants live in the wild. There are also requirements for more detailed behavioural monitoring and things that help keep elephants active and engaged in their environment.
Howver, animal welfare charity the RSPCA still feels that these updates are not good enough. It believes that elephants (and some other species) are not suitable for captivity as they have complex cognitive needs and space requirements.
From my perspective, Britain has the most specific (and now) welfare-driven standards for elephants in the world. If Britain were to ban the housing of elephants, we would be shipping them to lower quality habitats, care and monitoring. Is this really what we want for the elephants in British zoos?
What else is changing
Another area where there has been much criticism in the past relates to providing animals from specific climates or environments with the correct conditions, such as reptiles, amphibians, tropical birds and primates. While a high number of animals seem to cope well in the UK’s colder climate, there is research to show that some animals need specialised environments, without which they can suffer from severe health problems, low welfare and even death.
The new standards require zoos to develop detailed environmental management plans for species that rely on artificial life-support systems such as aquariums, vivariums, tropical houses or desert habitats. Animals also cannot be removed from their enclosures for interactions or talks with the public.
These environmental management plans outline the environmental parameters required for that animal to thrive and behave naturally, and they need to be monitored to ensure that provisions do not slip.
There are also extra requirements for birds of prey. Although controversial, tethering is currently a recognised management practice for birds of prey, including owls, hawks and falcons. You don’t need to be a welfare scientist to understand how a bird might feel about being tethered to a post for long periods of time.
The 2012 standards stipulated that tethered birds should be flown at least four times per week, though there were no time restrictions on how long they could be tethered. The new standards emphasise that birds can only be tethered for a maximum of four hours in a 24 hour period and only as a management tool that benefits the bird (such as training for flight displays, transportation or veterinary treatment).
There is new emphasis on what is known as behavioural enrichment. Whether it’s puzzle feeders for primates, scent trails for big cats or novel objects for parrots, enrichment helps prevent boredom, reduce stress and promote natural behaviour.
Enrichment can be resource intensive and therefore difficult to implement, but the new standards make it a core requirement. Enrichment activities must aim to replicate natural behaviour such as foraging, climbing or problem solving. Zoos are required to document and evaluate these activities, track how animals respond and adjust strategies accordingly.
These updates reflect a deeper understanding of what animals need to thrive, not just survive. As a zoo welfare scientist, I feel there is always more that can be done to improve the welfare of animals in zoos (such as banning touch pools and tethering altogether).
But it is important that zoos and aquariums evaluate the costs (to the animals) and benefits (to the visitors) to make ethical and welfare-based decisions themselves.
These new standards will improve the conditions for animals in zoos, as well as help zoos to make the right decisions about the animals they house and care for.
Samantha Ward is the welfare specialist on the Zoo Experts Committee, part of DEFRA, who helped write the new zoo standards.
The UK government will soon face a momentous decision over whether to approve production in the Rosebank oilfield off the coast of Shetland.
Rosebank is the UK’s biggest undeveloped field. Its proponents – the largest of which is Norwegian state-owned petroleum company, Equinor – estimate that it will produce the equivalent of up to 500 million barrels of oil between 2026 and 2051. When burned, this oil will generate up to 200 million tonnes of carbon dioxide, which is more than the combined annual emissions of 28 low-income countries.
Thanks to recent courtcases, the climate effects of those “combustion emissions” will need to be taken into account by the government when it decides whether to approve production at Rosebank. In a new report, two colleagues and I reviewed the evidence concerning the implications of new oil and gas fields in the UK.
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There is a rapidly dwindling global carbon budget for holding temperature increases to below 1.5°C of warming (the more conservative end of the Paris agreement’s temperature goal).
Globally, the emissions from burning the fossil fuels in oil and gas fields and coalmines that are already operating or under development far exceed that budget. In this context, Rosebank’s combustion emissions are highly significant, as they add considerably to that excess.
We also found that the projected production from existing fields is sufficient to meet or exceed global oil and gas demand in modelled economic scenarios in which climate warming is restrained to within 1.5°C. This is further evidence that new fields are not consistent with achieving globally agreed temperature goals.
However, it is often asserted by supporters of new fields that keeping UK oil in the ground won’t reduce global emissions, because another producer will supply the demand and reap the benefits. This is a gross and dangerous oversimplification which, according to the United Nations Environment Programme, “defies basic economics of supply and demand”.
Allowing a new field like Rosebank would increase the supply of oil globally, resulting in a fall in its price which, though small, would cause more oil to be consumed. As UK government advisers at the Climate Change Committee have acknowledged, new petroleum projects “support a larger global market overall” for petroleum. Stopping Rosebank would have the opposite effect, and lead to less oil consumed.
Rosebank is found about 80 miles west of Shetland and its puffins. Philippe Clement / shutterstock
The oil industry likes to trumpet the UK’s relatively low upstream emissions – that is, from the process of extracting oil – compared with those of competitors overseas. But this is a distraction from the bigger issue: the additional greenhouse gases emitted from consuming the extra oil that new fields produce.
A recent peer-reviewed study by economists and experts in the emissions-intensity of oil and gas production concluded that limiting oil supply will almost always lead to lower overall emissions, regardless of the intensity of upstream emissions from different fields. It is highly likely that leaving Rosebank’s oil in the ground will result in lower global greenhouse gases than would occur if the field were developed.
However, this focus on Rosebank’s aggregate emissions ignores two further reasons the field’s development consent should be refused on climate grounds.
A litmus test of climate leadership
First, exploiting new sources of oil supply like Rosebank locks in future oil and gas production, ultimately making it economically, politically and legally harder to wind the industry down.
Second, as the Climate Change Committee also stated, decisions by the UK government concerning petroleum production have an important “signalling effect” internationally and at home.
Internationally, the UK government has rightly acknowledged that climate action “must be accelerated drastically” to keep the average global temperature rise “below 1.5°C”.
The UK has a proud reputation for climate leadership. It was the first country to enact a legally binding framework to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it rapidly phased out coal-fired power generation, and in 2019 it became the first country to adopt a net zero emissions target.
Building on this legacy, the foreign secretary David Lammy has vowed to “push for the ambition needed to keep 1.5 degrees alive”. But approving Rosebank would signal to the world that the UK government is not sincere about keeping the Paris agreement’s 1.5°C goal “alive”, after all.
Some might think that aspirations to climate leadership are futile given the Trump administration’s “drill, baby, drill” approach to fossil fuels. But Trump’s recklessness at a critical time for global climate efforts makes UK climate leadership more important than ever.
The UK already chairs a suite of international energy transition alliances focused on the international phase-out of coal-fired power, the scale-up of renewables, and the financing of these transitions. It could plug a gap in its influence by rejecting Rosebank and joining the Beyond Oil & Gas Alliance, a “club” of (currently) 25 national and sub-national governments that are working to phase-out oil and gas production and persuade other countries to follow suit.
And it could deepen cooperation with the EU to drive down oil and gas demand and scale up clean energy throughout the region, yielding benefits that will outlive the Trump administration.
Domestically, rejecting Rosebank would send a powerful signal to investors about the sincerity of the government’s commitment to achieve economic growth by becoming a “clean energy superpower”, as the governing Labour party pledged to do at the last election.
But the benefits of clean prosperity must extend to the people and communities caught up in the transition, too. The UK’s North Sea oil and gas reserves, along with the jobs their production supports, are in terminal decline.
Oil and gas workers and the communities in which they are based already face a volatile future. New fields like Rosebank would create some additional jobs in this declining industry. But they cannot arrest its long-term decline.
The government recognises that this transition is already taking place and will continue. With targeted regional and industrial investment, support for workers and their families, and careful planning that meaningfully involves affected communities, the UK has an opportunity to demonstrate to the world how to achieve a just transition away from oil and gas.
Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?
Fergus Green has received consulting fees from and provided expert evidence on behalf of an environmental nongovernmental organisation engaged in climate-related litigation against a fossil fuel company. He informally consults with a number of environmental nongovernmental organisations in relation to fossil fuel production issues in the UK and elsewhere. He is a member of the Just Transition Expert Group of the Powering Past Coal Alliance (the role is unremunerated).
