Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping Meets with President of Belarus /detailed version-1/

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 4 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko in Beijing on Wednesday. Once again congratulating Lukashenko on his re-election as president of Belarus, Xi Jinping noted that China and Belarus are true friends and good partners who have always treated each other with sincerity and trust.

    Xi Jinping noted that the traditional friendship between the two countries is growing stronger day by day, political mutual trust remains unshakable, and cooperation in all areas is advancing comprehensively. China has always viewed and developed China-Belarus relations from a strategic height and a long-term perspective, he added.

    Xi Jinping said that China is ready to work together with Belarus to promote the sustainable development of bilateral ties and mutually beneficial cooperation.

    The Chinese President stressed that the two sides should strengthen coordination and cooperation within multilateral formats such as the United Nations (UN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), jointly oppose despotism, hegemony and bullying, and uphold international fairness and justice.

    A. Lukashenko, in turn, noted that he was visiting China for the 15th time, adding that during each of these visits he felt a sense of deep friendship on the part of China.

    Thanking China for the enormous support and assistance it has provided to Belarus over a long period of time, A. Lukashenko stated that Belarus has a high degree of trust in China and will actively develop cooperation with it.

    China resolutely defends multilateralism and opposes unilateralism, sanctions and pressure in international affairs, setting an example for the whole world, the President of Belarus noted. He expressed deep admiration and readiness to make joint efforts with China to protect international impartiality and justice. -0-

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: China accelerates high-quality grid connections

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 4 (Xinhua) — China has made continuous efforts to expand access to electricity to meet growing demand for high-quality energy services and ensure the country’s economic and social development.

    The relevant guideline, jointly issued by the National Reform and Development Commission and the State Energy Administration, calls on energy authorities and power grid operators across the country to take concrete steps to further expand the coverage of electricity access services so as to build a modern and efficient electricity service business environment nationwide by 2029.

    The aim set out in the guidelines includes providing simple and convenient electricity connection services, ensuring high-quality electricity supply, promoting green energy, providing inclusive services and conducting coordinated inspections to improve overall service quality.

    The document emphasizes that the provision of electricity services is an important component in the formation of a first-class internationalized business climate in the country, characterized by compliance with market principles and the rule of law. The document is aimed at further increasing the satisfaction of the population with services in the above-mentioned area.

    It outlines measures in 14 key areas aimed at improving the quality of electricity supply services, such as expanding “zero investment” low-voltage power grid connection services for non-state enterprises, introducing strict time frames for completing connection procedures, etc.

    The guidelines also call for innovative electricity services, such as new hotspots to meet temporary power needs during spring irrigation and autumn harvesting, as well as to meet the needs of street stall owners and night market vendors. These efforts are aimed at revitalizing rural life and stimulating consumption. -0-

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Istanbul to Remain Platform for Russia-Ukraine Negotiations — Russian Foreign Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 /Xinhua/ — There is no question of changing Istanbul as a venue for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko.

    Answering the question about whether the Vatican could become the venue for the next round of negotiations, the diplomat said: “/Russian Foreign Minister/ Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov very clearly expressed our point of view. Istanbul is a platform where a certain experience of communication has already been accumulated,” TASS quotes A. Grushko as saying.

    A representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry noted that “the issue is not about the platforms, the issue is about the essence.” “Therefore, at present, the issue of choosing some new platform in the practical plane is not worth it. It is not even worth thinking about,” he emphasized.

    The second round of direct talks between Russia and Ukraine took place in Istanbul on Monday. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: South Korean President appoints prime minister and top officials

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    SEOUL, June 4 (Xinhua) — President of the Republic of Korea (ROK) Lee Jae-myung has appointed a prime minister and senior officials after being sworn in as the country’s 21st president, the presidential office said.

    Kim Min-seok, a lawmaker from the ruling Toburo Democratic Party and co-chairman of Lee Jae-myung’s election campaign, has been nominated for the post of cabinet chief.

    The prime minister’s candidacy must be approved by the National Assembly (parliament), controlled by the Toburo Democratic Party, after appropriate hearings.

    Lee Jae-myung appointed ruling party lawmaker Kang Hoon-sik as presidential chief of staff and diplomat Wi Sung-rak, who was first elected to parliament last April from the Toburo Democratic Party, as top national security adviser to the president.

    The president also appointed former Unification Minister Lee Jong-suk as director of the National Intelligence Service.

    Lee Jae-myung was sworn in as South Korea’s new president at the National Assembly on Wednesday, officially beginning his first five-year term in office. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Nine killed in road accident in central India

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    NEW DELHI, June 4 (Xinhua) — At least nine people, including three women, were killed and two others injured in a road accident in central India on Wednesday morning, local police said.

    Among the victims were a woman and a child.

    The incident took place around 3:00 am in Jhabua district of Madhya Pradesh in the central part of the country. A truck carrying bags of cement overturned on a van carrying passengers, trapping them underneath.

    The police added that the deceased were in an accident while returning from a relative’s wedding. The injured were hospitalized. –0–

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping Congratulates Lee Jae-myung on Election as President of the Republic of Korea

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 4 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Wednesday congratulated Lee Jae-myung on his election as president of the Republic of Korea (ROK).

    Noting that China and the ROK are important close neighbors and cooperative partners, Xi said that in the 33 years since the establishment of diplomatic ties, the two sides have overcome differences in ideology and social systems, advanced hand in hand and achieved mutual successes, achieving stable and healthy development of bilateral relations.

    He added that this not only improved the well-being of the peoples of the two countries, but also made a positive contribution to promoting regional peace, stability, development and prosperity.

    The Chinese leader stressed that he attaches great importance to developing relations with the Republic of Korea.

    In the modern world, changes unseen in a century are occurring at an accelerated pace and destabilizing factors in the international and regional situation are increasing, he noted.

    China and the ROK are important countries in the world and the region, and Beijing is willing to work with Seoul to remain committed to the spirit that guided the establishment of their diplomatic ties, uphold good-neighborliness and friendship, and adhere to the goal of mutual benefit and win-win, so as to jointly promote the continuous development of the bilateral strategic cooperative partnership and bring more benefits to the two peoples, Xi said. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Cambodia, Thailand to discuss border issues next week: spokesman

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    PHNOM PENH, June 4 (Xinhua) — A joint meeting of the Cambodia-Thai Boundary Commission will be held in Phnom Penh on June 14 to discuss border issues, Cambodian Foreign Ministry spokesman Cham Soonri said on Wednesday.

    “Cambodia is committed to the peaceful resolution of border issues through technical mechanisms and in accordance with international law,” he wrote in a text message sent to media outlets on the Telegram messenger.

    He noted that the main focus of the meeting would be on the area where the incident recently occurred.

    The representative also stated that Cambodia, firmly committed to protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, intends to transform its borders with neighboring countries into zones of peace, friendship, cooperation and development for the benefit of all countries and peoples.

    The meeting was planned after a brief shootout between soldiers from the two countries in the Emerald Triangle on May 28, which resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier.

    The Emerald Triangle is the area where the borders of Cambodia, Thailand and Laos meet.

    Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet said on Sunday that at an upcoming commission meeting, Cambodia will propose to Thailand that the issue of border disputes involving the Emerald Triangle region, as well as the issue of the Ta Moan Thom, Ta Moan Toch and Ta Krabei temples, be referred to the International Court of Justice. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China launches campaign to stimulate consumption of services

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    NANJING, June 4 (Xinhua) — A nationwide service consumption campaign was launched in Nanjing, capital of east China’s Jiangsu Province, on Tuesday, the latest major initiative to boost growth in the sector.

    The event, organized by the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and China Media Group, with the support of the Jiangsu Provincial Bureau of Commerce and the Nanjing People’s Government, aims to cultivate new consumption points in the service sector and thereby create a new consumption architecture characterized by interaction and favorable circulation between supply and consumption.

    The campaign will involve more than 160 key events involving government agencies, national industry associations and leading enterprises to create new consumption scenarios, stimulate consumer potential and expand the supply of high-quality services to meet the diverse demands of the population.

    In 2024, Jiangsu Province’s service consumption expenditure accounted for 46.3% of the province’s total consumption expenditure, 0.2 percentage points higher than the national average. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Sultan Qaboos University and HSE Discuss Scientific and Educational Cooperation

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    © Higher School of Economics

    On May 29, 2025, a delegation from Sultan Qaboos University paid an official visit to HSE. The meeting was held on Pokrovsky Boulevard and was dedicated to the development of partnership in science and education. The delegation was led by the Rector of Sultan Qaboos University, His Highness Dr. Fahd Al Said. During the visit, an agreement on cooperation and exchange between the universities was signed.

    The parties discussed possible formats of cooperation: academic and student exchanges, joint research, teaching Arabic to HSE students, and joint publications in international scientific journals. The participants noted their interest in establishing direct contacts between the research teams of the two universities.

    HSE Rector Nikita Anisimov noted that interest in the Middle East countries, including the Sultanate of Oman, is growing, and stressed the importance of dialogue with universities in the region. According to him, Russian higher education today is focused on technological development in both engineering and humanitarian fields, and HSE is actively involved in implementing the priorities outlined by the Russian Government for the next decade. The Rector specifically emphasized that Russian society faces several key challenges, one of which is overcoming the technological gap. HSE contributes to solving these problems by creating in-demand scientific and applied developments.

    Rector of Sultan Qaboos University His Highness Fahd Al Said spoke about the history and key areas of work of the university, noting its strong positions in international rankings, high competition for admission and active research activities. He expressed hope that HSE students will also be able to study in Oman, and proposed to identify specific steps for developing the partnership within two months.

    The meeting was also attended by the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Sultanate of Oman to Russia, Mr. Hamud Salim Abdullah Al Tuwaikh. On behalf of the HSE, the meeting was attended by Nadezhda Orlova, Director Institute of Agricultural Research and academic director of the educational program “Bioinformatics in agrobiotechnologies“, Anna Shestakova, director Institute of Cognitive Neurosciences, Anton Yanovsky, director Center for commercialization of developments and technology transfer, as well as Director of Internationalization Kirill Kisel.

    The parties expressed confidence that educational and scientific cooperation will strengthen ties between the states.

    Sultan Qaboos University was founded in 1986 and is one of two public universities in the Sultanate of Oman. The university is ranked 1st in the country and 362nd in the world according to QS 2025. It offers programs in arts and social sciences, economics, political science, education, law, medicine and natural sciences, and many other areas. Most of the educational programs at Sultan Qaboos University are taught in English.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: No restrictions on train traffic between Novye Cheryomushki and Oktyabrskaya are planned for June

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Restrictions on the section between the stations “Novye Cheryomushki” and “Oktyabrskaya” of the Kaluzhsko-Rizhskaya line are no longer planned in June. They were necessary to create a transition to the future metro station “Akademicheskaya” of the Troitskaya line.

    “To minimize inconvenience to passengers, we introduced restrictions on weekends, when fewer people use transport. In addition, we launched free compensation buses, which transported more than 113 thousand people. Employees of the Passenger Mobility Center were on duty at stations and helped build alternative routes,” said the Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Transport and Industry

    Maxim Liksutov.

    The first two sections Troitskaya line opened Sergei Sobyanin last year. The line will connect the ZIL station with Troitsk. By 2030, the length of this line will be more than 43 kilometers. It will become the longest metro line outside the Moscow Ring Road. Now, you can transfer from the Troitskaya Line to Sokolnicheskaya and Bolshaya Koltsevaya, in the future, there will be transfers to Kaluzhsko-Rizhskaya and the Moscow Central Circle.

    Quickly find out the main news of the capital inofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

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    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/154814073/

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Schools, clinics and sports complexes: what social facilities are being built in the city

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    About 230 social infrastructure facilities are being built in the capital using municipal and extra-budgetary funds. Among them are educational, medical, sports and cultural institutions. This was reported by the Deputy Mayor of Moscow for Urban Development Policy and Construction Vladimir Efimov.

    “Currently, 149 educational and 45 sports facilities, more than 20 buildings for medical organizations and 12 for cultural institutions are being built in the capital using all sources of financing. Of the total number of social facilities under construction, 193 are being built by investors. Among them are 128 educational facilities, 42 sports complexes, 15 health and wellness institutions and eight cultural and educational facilities. In particular, in total, more than 78 thousand school and preschool places will be created in the capital at the expense of the city and investors, and clinics and medical centers will be able to accept about four thousand patients per shift,” said Vladimir Efimov.

    Modern buildings appear next to new residential developments and also complement the social infrastructure of historically established areas of the city.

    “Developers are actively involved in creating comfortable and modern social infrastructure: they are building kindergartens, schools, medical centers and sports complexes along with housing. In the future, the educational facilities they build will provide the capital with an additional 68 thousand school and preschool places. For example, in the Yuzhnoye Medvedkovo district, a kindergarten is being built on the territory of a new residential area on Polyarnaya Street. The area of the building will be about 4.4 thousand square meters, it is designed for 220 pupils,” added the Minister of the Moscow Government, Head of the Department of Urban Development Policy of the City of Moscow

    Vladislav Ovchinsky.

    Permits for the construction of all facilities were issued by the capital’s State Construction Supervision Committee. According to the head of the department Anton Slobodchikova, the committee supervises 209 buildings of various social purposes. As part of control and supervision activities, inspectors check the compliance of the erected structures and materials used with the requirements of the design documentation. Specialists of the subordinate Center for Expertise, Research and Testing in Construction carry out instrumental control, including finishing work. This guarantees the quality and safety of schools and kindergartens during their further operation.

    Investors also pay great attention to the development of sports infrastructure. Thus, in the Severnoye Butovo district, a sports and recreation complex with a football field and tennis courts will appear. Its total area will be more than 10 thousand square meters. The facility will appear near the Butovsky forest park at the address: Sadki communal zone, Polyany street, building 12, plot 2.

    Schools, kindergartens and sports centers: what social infrastructure facilities are being built in the capital

    Earlier, Sergei Sobyanin announced plans for a large-scale renovation district sports facilities.

    The construction of social facilities in Moscow corresponds to the goals and initiatives of the national project “Infrastructure for life”.

    Get the latest news quickly official telegram channelthe city of Moscow.

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    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/154791073/

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova – A10-0096/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Moldova

    (2025/2025(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Republic of Moldova 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0698),

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 17 June 2022 on the application by the Republic of Moldova (hereinafter ‘Moldova’) for membership of the European Union (COM(2022)0406) and the joint staff working document of 6 February 2023 entitled ‘Association Implementation Report on the Republic of Moldova’ (SWD(2023)0041),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2025/535 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 March 2025 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova[1],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Moldova,

     having regard to the Commission analytical report of 1 February 2023 on Moldova’s alignment with the EU acquis (SWD(2023)0032),

     having regard to the proposal of 9 October 2024 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova (COM/2024/0469),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 9 October 2024 on the Moldova Growth Plan (COM/2024/0470),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to Moldova on 25-27 February 2025,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0096/2025),

    A. whereas, following Moldova’s application for EU membership of 3 March 2022, the European Council granted it candidate status on 23 June 2022 and subsequently decided to open accession negotiations on 14 December 2023;

    B. whereas in June 2024 negotiations on Moldova’s EU accession started;

    C. whereas Moldova held a referendum on 20 October 2024, the outcome of which confirmed the embedding of EU accession into its Constitution, despite various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks;

    D. whereas the Association Agreement[2], which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (AA/DCFTA), remains the basis for political association and economic integration between the EU and Moldova, and a regular political and economic dialogue is ongoing between the two sides;

    Progress with EU accession-related reforms, in particular on the rule of law and governance

    1. Commends Moldova’s exemplary commitment and steady progress with EU accession-related reforms despite significant internal and external challenges – such as Russia’s full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine – which made it possible for accession negotiations to start in June 2024, half a year after the relevant decision by the European Council on 14 December 2023 and less than two years after the country’s application for EU membership on 3 March 2022;

    2. Recognises that EU-Moldova relations have entered into a new phase, with intensifying cooperation, gradual alignment across all policy areas of the EU acquis and advancement on the EU integration path; welcomes the progress achieved in the bilateral screening process since it started in July 2024 and the recent closing of screening for cluster 1 (fundamentals) and cluster 2 (internal market); commends and supports the ambition of the Moldovan Government to open negotiations on cluster 1 (fundamentals), cluster 2 (internal market) and cluster 6 (external relations) in the coming months, as well as completing the screening process for all clusters by the end of 2025; calls on the Commission to enhance its support to the Moldovan Government in order to ensure the successful achievement of these key objectives; encourages the Council to take a merit-based approach in its decisions on Moldova’s negotiation process; deplores the bilateralisation and instrumentalisation of the EU accession process, such as the opposition of the Hungarian Government to opening negotiations on clusters 1, 2 and 6, which has led to a delay and serves Russia’s objective of obstructing the European integration of the region;

    3. Believes that Moldova’s capacity to consolidate its current progress with EU accession-related reforms and sustain the ambitious pace towards EU membership will require the strong and genuine support of a parliamentary majority after the elections in autumn 2025;

    4. Notes that the outcomes of both the constitutional referendum on EU accession, held on 20 October 2024, and the presidential election, held on 20 October 2024 and 3 November 2024, confirmed the support of a majority of the people of Moldova for the country’s goal of EU membership and the required pro-EU reforms; underlines that this referendum and election were held professionally and with an extraordinary sense of duty and dedication, despite a massive hybrid campaign by Russia and its proxies which used various tools, such as the strategic exploitation of social media, AI-generated content, ‘leaks’ of fake documents, intimidation, which entailed various forms of manipulative interference to destabilise the country, illicit financing of political actors, vote-buying, including by Russia’s instrumentalisation of parts of the clergy from the Metropolis of Chisinau and All Moldova, disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks; recalls that these attacks had four key strategies: divide society, delegitimise institutions, discredit democratic actors and promote Russian influence; welcomes the outcome of the 2024 constitutional referendum which enshrined the commitment to joining the EU in the country’s constitution; strongly condemns the increasing attempts by Russia, pro-Russian oligarchs and Russian-sponsored local proxies to destabilise Moldova, sow divisions within Moldovan society and derail the country’s pro-EU direction through hybrid attacks, the instrumentalisation of energy supplies, disinformation, manipulation and intimidation campaigns targeting civil society organisations and independent media;

    5. Notes that the upcoming parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025 will be of crucial importance for the continuation of Moldova’s pro-EU trajectory; is concerned about the likely intensification of foreign, in particular Russian, malign interference and hybrid attacks ahead of the elections; calls for the EU to increase its support, including financial and technical support, for the Moldovan Government’s efforts to counter such interference in the country’s democratic process, including through additional sanctions listings, an extension and consolidation of the mandate and resources of the EU Partnership Mission (EUPM) in Moldova and the granting of additional support thereto, and the sharing of expertise in foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), countering hybrid threats and strengthening resilience; calls similarly for an increase in efforts by the Moldovan authorities and the EU in support of independent media and pro-democracy civil society, in order to enable journalists at national and regional level to counter FIMI and to strengthen digital literacy;

    6. Stresses the importance of strategic communication, debunking and combating false, Russia-promoted narratives about the EU and its policies and of highlighting the concrete short- and long-term benefits of EU accession for the people of all of Moldova, with a special focus on regions such as Gagauzia as well as socio-economically disadvantaged communities in rural areas; calls for the EU to step up its support for Moldova in this regard;

    Socio-economic reforms

    7. Welcomes the Commission’s Moldova Growth Plan,  which is aimed at supporting Moldova’s socio-economic and fundamental reforms and enhancing access to the EU’s single market; welcomes the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, which underpins the Growth Plan and is worth EUR 2.02 billion, making it the largest EU financial support package for Moldova since its independence; underlines that this facility provides Moldova with EUR 520 million in non-repayable support and a maximum amount of EUR 1.5 billion in loans, with an 18 % pre-financing rate, demonstrating the EU’s recognition of the urgency of supporting Moldova’s reforms and resilience; calls on the Commission to support the Moldovan authorities in implementing the necessary Reform Agenda for the effective absorption of funds from this facility, ensuring that the benefits of this support are promptly felt by Moldova’s citizens; looks forward to the announced impact assessment of the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova in the form of a Commission staff working document within three months of the adoption of the corresponding regulation;

    8. Calls on the Commission to include adequate dedicated pre-accession funds for Moldova in the EU’s next multiannual financial framework, and to begin preparing Moldova for the efficient use of future pre-accession funds as a newly designated EU candidate country;

    9. Reiterates that the support of the people of Moldova for European integration can be strengthened with a tangible improvement in their livelihoods, by strengthening state institutions and public administration in order to use project funding effectively and to implement and enforce the EU acquis, ensuring a robust welfare system and fighting corruption and oligarchic influence and ensuring accountability; calls on the Moldovan authorities to continue to ensure the meaningful involvement of civil society organisations, diaspora, vulnerable groups and social partners, including trade unions, in order to strengthen trust in democratic institutions and processes and boost public support for EU accession-related reforms;

    10. Stresses the importance of civil society organisations in monitoring governance and progress with EU-related reforms, promoting transparency, defending human rights and countering disinformation and external malign influence by anti-reform political actors and Russian proxies;

    11. Calls for comprehensive social policy reforms to address poverty and persistent large-scale emigration, increase healthcare coverage, strengthen public education, improve working conditions and develop adequate social protection systems; emphasises that economic development must be inclusive and sustainable, with opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises; stresses the need for targeted social investment in Moldova’s young people and rural areas to reduce regional disparities and safeguard social cohesion;

    12. Calls for special emphasis on Moldova’s participation in EU social, educational, and cultural programmes in order to promote social convergence, innovation and technological advancement;

    13. Calls on Moldova to implement the Reform Agenda, which outlines the key socio-economic and fundamental reforms to accelerate the growth and competitiveness of Moldova’s economy and its convergence with the EU on the basis of enhanced implementation of the AA/DCFTA;

    14. Strongly calls for the acceleration of Moldova’s gradual integration into the EU and the single market by continuing to align its legal and regulatory framework with the EU acquis and associating the country to more EU programmes and initiatives, including through the granting of observer status to Moldovan officials and experts in relevant EU bodies, which would deliver tangible socio-economic benefits even before the country formally joins the EU; congratulates Moldova on its inclusion in the geographical scope of the Single Euro Payments Area payment schemes, facilitating transfers in euro and reducing costs for Moldova’s citizens and businesses; welcomes Moldova’s recent progress in the transposition of the EU’s roaming and telecommunications acquis and expresses support for a swift decision on the inclusion of Moldova into the EU ‘roam like at home’ area; calls on the service providers to cooperate in good faith with the Moldovan authorities on implementing ‘roam like at home’;

    15. Welcomes the renewal of the EU’s temporary trade liberalisation measures in July 2024 in order to support Moldova’s economy, substituting the loss of trade caused by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and its unfriendly policies towards Moldova; calls for the EU to take swift and significant steps towards the permanent liberalisation of its tariff-rate quotas, in order to ensure predictability and increase the country’s attractiveness to investors;

    16. Notes that the recent decision of the US administration to suspend support for civil society, independent media, key reforms and infrastructure projects has created additional urgent needs in Moldova, regarding which the EU should step in; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to increase its funding for EU instruments supporting democracy, such as the European Endowment for Democracy, and for other key projects that had until recently been funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other US agencies;

    Human rights

     

    17. Notes Moldova’s progress towards achieving gender equality, including its adoption of the Programme for Promoting and Ensuring Equality between Women and Men for the 2023-2027 period, and calls for its continued efforts in this regard, particularly to reduce the gender pay gap, fight against stereotypes, discrimination and gender-based violence, and to increase the representation of women in politics and business;

    18. Welcomes the efforts by the Moldovan authorities to combat violence against women and improve protection for survivors, in particular the adoption of the National Programme on Preventing and Combatting Violence against Women and Domestic Violence for the 2023-2027 period; notes that the impact of this, however, is still lacking and therefore calls for the establishment of more shelters for survivors of domestic violence, for adequate attention by the justice system to violence against women and for policy changes and increased awareness-raising among men regarding gender-based violence;

    19. Calls on the Moldovan Government to strengthen its efforts, including the effective implementation of its legislative framework, to combat racial discrimination, marginalisation, racist hate speech and hate crimes targeting members of ethnic minority groups, including the Roma;

    20. Commends Moldova’s efforts to improve the rights of the LGBTIQ+ community in recent years;

    21. Calls on the Moldovan Government to fully align its legislation on the rights of persons with disabilities with the EU acquis and to tackle the systemic problem of children with intellectual disabilities being placed in psychiatric institutions;

    Energy, environment and connectivity

    22. Condemns Russia’s instrumentalisation of energy against Moldova, most recently by halting gas supplies to the Transnistrian region on 1 January 2025, in violation of contractual obligations, and thereby provoking a serious crisis in the region; applauds the Commission’s swift proposal of a Comprehensive Strategy for Energy Independence and Resilience and its support package worth EUR 250 million, which will reduce the energy bills of Moldovan consumers, including in the Transnistrian region, support Moldova’s decoupling from Russia’s energy supplies and integrate Moldova into the EU energy market; emphasises the need for the EU and the Moldovan authorities to effectively communicate about the substantial EU support package aimed at addressing Moldova’s energy crisis;

    23. Commends the alignment of the Moldovan energy sector with the EU acquis; calls on the Moldovan Government to continue its efforts, with EU support that includes the tools available from the Reform and Growth Facility for Moldova, to diversify gas and electricity supply routes, develop connectivity, increase energy efficiency and its internal production and storage capacity, as well as advance its full integration into the EU energy market in order to ensure Moldova’s energy security and resilience; stresses the importance of the completion of the Vulcanesti-Chisinau 400 kV overhead power line by the end of 2025 in order to reduce Moldova’s reliance on energy infrastructure in the Transnistrian region; calls on the EU to mobilise the necessary resources to help compensate for the withdrawal of USAID support for Moldova’s energy sector;

    24. Commends the Moldovan Government for its progress on decarbonisation, energy efficiency and transitioning to a green economy, including doubling the share of renewable energy to 30 % by 2030; encourages the EU and its Member States to continue to provide financial support and expertise to Moldovan counterparts in this area; welcomes the adoption in 2023 of Moldova’s National Climate Change Adaptation Programme until 2030 and its Action Plan for this purpose; calls on the Moldovan Government to adopt and begin implementing its National Energy and Climate Plan for the 2025-2030 period; notes the importance of implementing the commitments of the Energy Community’s Decarbonisation Roadmap, and implementing the Monitoring, Reporting, Verification and Accreditation package with a view to introducing carbon pricing and aligning with the EU emissions trading system;

    25. Believes that an extension of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) corridor Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Aegean Sea (Corridor IX) to include the route of Chisinau-Constanta-Varna-Bourgas would be a strategic investment in the region’s transport infrastructure, enhancing connectivity and promoting economic growth, in view of the enlargement of the EU to the east and the potential positive impact of this extension on the region’s security and stability, serving as a key logistics route for NATO and enhancing the EU’s geostrategic autonomy;

    Rule of law and good governance

    26. Underlines that comprehensive justice reform remains key for the success of Moldova’s democratic and EU accession-related reforms; recognises Moldova’s sustained efforts to build an independent, impartial, accountable and professional judicial system and conclude the vetting process by the end of 2026; calls, therefore, for the EU to continue actively supporting the justice reform and the process of vetting both judges and prosecutors, including the attraction, training and recruitment of qualified judicial personnel and increase in judicial capacity;

    27. Notes that Moldova has achieved progress in the fight against and prevention of corruption, but stresses the need to continue the fight against money laundering; welcomes the entry into force in February 2024 of Moldova’s National Integrity and Anti-Corruption Programme for 2024-2028; highlights the need to ensure enhanced coordination among all key anti-corruption and justice institutions in order to implement comprehensive reforms and to ensure that they have adequate resources and capacities; stresses that results in terms of prosecution and conviction in corruption cases need to be delivered in order to ensure public trust in the ongoing reforms;

    28. Recalls the importance of continuing the investigation and bringing to justice those responsible for the 2014 bank fraud; welcomes the fact that, after long efforts by the Moldovan authorities, Interpol has finally added one of the alleged perpetrators, Vladimir Plahotniuc, to its list of internationally wanted persons;

    29. Welcomes the adoption by Moldova in 2023 of a new national strategy for preventing and combating human trafficking, aligned with the EU acquis, and the cooperation of Moldova with Europol in combating drug trafficking;

     

    30. Expresses its readiness to continue supporting the Parliament of Moldova through mutually agreed democracy support activities that respond to the needs of the institution, its elected members and staff; underlines the importance of the Parliament of Moldova in fostering public debate about the country’s European future and achieving a broad consensus over, and democratic legitimacy of, EU accession-related reforms across political parties and among broader society; highlights the decision of 10 March 2025 to open a European Parliament office in Chisinau to further strengthen Parliament’s engagement with the Eastern Partnership region;

    Cooperation in the field of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and progress on resolving the Transnistrian conflict

    31. Welcomes Moldova’s consistent cooperation on foreign policy issues and the significantly increased rate, notably from 54 % in 2022 to 86 % in 2024, of its alignment with the EU’s CFSP positions and restrictive measures; invites it to continue to improve this alignment, including on restrictive measures against Russia, and to continue cooperation on preventing the circumvention of sanctions against Russia and Belarus related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

    32. Underlines that Moldova is a key contributor to the regional and European security, including through its unwavering support to Ukraine since the start of Russia’s war of aggression, for example by welcoming Ukrainian war refugees, and through its contributions to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, for example by deploying firefighting teams to tackle severe wildfires in Greece;

    33. Expresses its support for the EUPM in Moldova and calls on the Member States to contribute the necessary experts and financial resources, in anticipation of a potential intensification of hybrid threats; welcomes the recent extension of the EUPM’s mandate until April 2026; encourages the Moldovan authorities to make full use of the EUPM’s expertise to enhance its preparedness, particularly in view of repeated electoral interference ahead of the parliamentary elections on 28 September 2025; calls for the EU to draw from the experience gained in Moldova in protecting the electoral process and democratic institutions in the EU itself; encourages the European External Action Service and the Commission to use all available EU instruments in the area of countering hybrid threats, in order to continue to support Moldova, including by swiftly deploying a Hybrid Rapid Response Team; welcomes the establishment of Moldova’s Centre for Strategic Communications and Countering Disinformation, as a means of coordinating the fight against foreign interference among the various Moldovan institutions, and of the National Agency for Cyber Security and the National Institute for Cyber Security Innovations; notes that Moldova’s National Security Strategy, adopted in December 2023, highlights EU accession as a key objective and for the first time identifies Russia as the source of major threats to Moldova’s security; stresses the importance of improving information sharing and intelligence cooperation between Moldova and the EU and its Member States on security threats;

     

    34. Reiterates its full commitment to Moldova’s territorial integrity and to the peaceful resolution of the conflict, based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova in its internationally recognised borders;

    35. Welcomes the Commission’s initiatives to include proactive support for the Transnistrian region in its energy emergency support packages, and exchange of information and practical cooperation between the Moldovan Government and the de facto authorities of the Transnistrian region throughout the energy crisis caused by Russia; welcomes the progress regarding the conditionalities for Tiraspol in light of the recent gas transit agreement and calls for the full implementation of these conditionalities, including the release of all political prisoners by Tiraspol and the dismantling of the remaining illegal checkpoints;

    36. Welcomes Moldova’s keen interest in contributing to the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the fact that Moldova is the first country to sign a security and defence partnership with the EU; welcomes Moldova’s continued active participation in EU missions and operations under the CSDP, its interest in participation in PESCO projects and the ongoing negotiations on a framework agreement with the European Defence Agency; calls on the EU to include Moldova in the EU security and defence programmes and related budget allocations, including the European Defence Industry Programme and Readiness 2030, allowing the country to participate in joint procurement alongside the Member States;

    37. Welcomes the allocation of EUR 50 million to modernise the defence capacities of the Moldovan Armed Forces in the context of the current security challenges through the European Peace Facility (EPF) for 2024; notes that Moldova is the second-largest EPF beneficiary after Ukraine, with a total of EUR 137 million allocated since 2021; welcomes the announced support of EUR 60 million to be provided to Moldova from the EPF budget in 2025; calls on the Member States to progressively increase the EPF funding for Moldova to further enhance the country’s defence capabilities;

    °

    ° °

    38. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Moldova.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro – A10-0093/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Montenegro

    (2025/2020(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

     having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

     having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

     having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

     having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

     having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

     having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

     having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

     having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

     having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

     having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[4],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

     having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B. whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D. whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G. whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2. Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3. Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4. Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5. Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6. Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7. Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8. Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9. Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10. Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11. Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12. Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13. Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14. Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights[6]; urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15. Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17. Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19. Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20. Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary,  and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21. Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22. Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23. Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24. Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25. Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26. Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27. Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28. Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29. Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30. Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32. Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33. Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34. Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35. Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36. Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37. Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38. Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39. Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40. Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41. Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42. Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44. Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45. Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46. Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47. Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48. Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49. Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51. Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52. Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53. Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54. Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55. Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56. Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58. Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59. Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60. Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61. Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62. Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63. Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

     

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    64. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU Fact Sheets – Russia – 03-06-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    EU-Russia relations have been strained since 2014 because of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, support for separatist groups in eastern Ukraine, destabilisation policies in the neighbourhood, disinformation and interference campaigns and internal human rights violations. After Russia launched its unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the remaining political, cultural and scientific cooperation was suspended.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Allies to agree new capability targets at meeting of NATO Defence Ministers

    Source: NATO

    Allied Defence Ministers will gather in Brussels on Thursday 5 June 2025 to finalise preparations for the Summit in The Hague.

    “At this Ministerial, we are going to take a huge leap forward” Mr Rutte stated, “We will strengthen our deterrence and defence by agreeing ambitious new capability targets.” He went on to identify air and missile defence, long-range weapons, logistics, and large land manoeuvre formations as among the Alliance’s top priorities.

    “We need more resources, forces and capabilities so that we are prepared to face any threat, and to implement our collective defence plans in full” the Secretary General emphasised, adding that, in order to deliver on our new targets, “we will need significantly higher defence spending. That underpins everything.”

    The Meeting of NATO Defence Ministers will be preceded by a meeting of the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) – the international coalition of Allies and partners chaired by the UK and Germany, providing practical support to Ukraine as it resists Russian aggression.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: IQ121 Launches Advanced Legacy Building App, Digitally Safeguarding Vital Documents and Preserving Cherished Memories

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LONDON, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — A loved one’s passing brings both emotional pain and the heavy weight of complex legal and administrative tasks, leaving families with more to manage than just grief during their time of loss. Today, IQ121 announces the launch of its new legacy building platform, allowing users to safely organise, store and share their most important digital assets. This helps family members and business partners easily navigate paperwork, access important records and feel connected to their loved ones through the memory, photo and video-sharing capability.

    IQ121 stores essential items, including:

    • Legal documents (powers of attorney, trusts, vehicle documentation)
    • Finances (bank account details, investments, pension documentation)
    • Insurance policies covering life, property, high value items
    • Property deeds of title, jewelry collections, any other high value items
    • Health records
    • Passwords, security Q&As and account recovery steps
    • Wills and medical directives
    • Videos and photos
    • Memories and personal documents (family birth certificates, marriage certificates)

    The idea for IQ121 was generated by Hollywood actor Kunal Nayyar, best known for his role in “The Big Bang Theory,” during the COVID-19 pandemic. While organising his parents’ trip from India to the U.S., struggling to gather flight numbers, passport details and hotel confirmations, the frustration led him to question: “Why isn’t there an easier way to share this information?” With the pandemic causing many family members to experience sudden, unprecedented loss, the idea progressed into addressing other vital records people accumulate throughout life. Motivated by both a personal loss and a desire to ease others’ suffering, Nayyar created IQ121 to help people prepare for life’s hardest moments.

    “Navigating grief is already unbearable; the last thing families need is to feel confused or unprepared. IQ121 brings comfort, structure and lasting peace of mind during times of unimaginable difficulty,” Nayyar said. “We wanted to create a way to guide anyone facing loss through those times, with humanity and dignity, so they could focus on what truly matters most: honouring loved ones and coping with grief. IQ121 empowers people to take control of their legacy, because everyone’s story deserves to be honoured, shared and remembered.”

    IQ121 is not just for seniors; people of all ages can become members to store and protect their digital records accumulated over time. Plans will automatically pass down through trusted successors, ensuring a family’s legacy lives on.

    “IQ121 goes beyond file storage. It is a place to preserve what makes a person’s life meaningful,” said Tim Ashley Sparks, spokesperson for IQ121. “Members can create video messages for future birthdays or tell a story to a grandchild. The app is designed not just for estate planning, but for fostering connection and ensuring memories live on.”

    Backed by military-grade AES-256 encryption — the same technology trusted by banks and governments — IQ121 is a secure end-of-life planning app. It also offers a flexible subscription model to fit every member’s particular goals, allowing for added storage as needed.

    Available on iOS and Android, IQ121 is the only end-of-life planning app that supports six major languages (English, Japanese, Chinese, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian), making it globally accessible for multilingual users.

    A media kit of photos, videos, logos and headshots is available here. To learn more, visit www.iq121.com.

    About IQ121
    IQ121 (pronounced IQ One-Two-One) is a first-of-its-kind comprehensive digital platform designed to help individuals, families and professionals organise, manage and safely store essential life documents and digital assets. With the growing need for secure and easily accessible digital solutions, IQ121 offers an encryption-backed, all-in-one platform that simplifies estate planning, digital asset management and legacy preservation.

    Media Contact
    Julia Cappiello
    Uproar by Moburst for IQ121
    julia.cappiello@moburst.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Premiere of the film “Impostors”. Life against the backdrop of historical events and a dialogue with Pushkin

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    A pre-premiere screening of Maria Reizen’s film “Impostors” took place. The action takes place in October 1993: against the backdrop of historical events, two lovers try to understand the circumstances of the death of a famous director and save his last film.

    Producer Georgiy Lordkipanidze said: “We must remember that we live in a history textbook. It does not end, and God willing, it will not end for a long, long time. It is fascinating and pleasant in its own way. This knowledge makes life much easier when you understand that you live in history, and it continues. This is its lesson – what happened once in one form or another will definitely happen again, will happen again.”

    The film “Impostors” is a very transparent statement on this topic. It is about people who find themselves on yet another broken-off ice floe among moving tectonic plates. The relationship of oneself to events, proportion – it seems that this is what the film screams about, if the entry point into it is the story of the main character. And the understanding that everything is repeating itself, and people have not drawn global conclusions, does not save the viewer from his own drama.

    The authors rethink Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov” through the “Time of Troubles” – the autumn of 1993. It seems to be the first artistic attempt to live through that period. 30 years is a sufficient period for a film to become historical. With every detail verified, the film is more of a discourse, a metaphor and a philosophical statement. Godunov runs through the film like a dotted line, but such that the main action is perceived precisely through him – as a foundation on which everything is strung.

    Pushkin the philosopher

    Alexander Sergeyevich wrote Boris Godunov 200 years ago, and it was, as the creators of the film rightly note, the first realistic historical drama filled with psychologism, the author of which violates all the laws that prevailed not only in Russian but also in world dramaturgy – the unity of place, time and action, the unity of genre and style of speech, the subordination of the plot to a love affair.

    At that moment, Pushkin becomes a historian and political thinker, gives a philosophical definition of the fate of Russia. And perhaps such a film seems to give the viewer a new Pushkin, which significantly expands the boundaries of the film itself. This intersection with many worlds at once: literature, philosophy, history, is the beginning of a big conversation, which, of course, goes on continuously, but the film brings it to a wider audience. An interesting phenomenon is how cinema becomes a starting point for a big discourse and how, going beyond itself, it can lay claim to eternity.

    “It seems to me that the form of this film allows us to hope that it will be seen not only by those who watch it in the coming weeks of distribution or later, when it goes on television platforms. This is a film that you can discover for yourself after some time,” explains Georgy Lordkipanidze. As in Pushkin’s “Boris Godunov”, the plot of “The Impostors” centers on ordinary people. The complicated, year-long relationship of the main characters is a real love drama. They find themselves drawn into a detective story, which is intensified by the events that take place. The turmoil of autumn 1993 erases everything that was, becomes stronger for each of them, but gives life new meaning. This is a personal tragedy and a tragedy for the country.

    Multi-layered and precise in every detail

    “The Impostors” is a multi-layered film. The viewer can be on one level, or can try to exist on all of them at once, which is certainly better because it provides a deeper immersion. But still, this is a film for everyone – and it is exactly what the person watching it is: well-read, living his own drama, searching or tired.

    The film contains many metaphors. The theme of the holy fool refers, for example, to the very essence of foolishness in Rus’, and to films, and to parables. The creators of “The Impostors” ask themselves and the viewer precisely calibrated questions, but great art always implies that the answers must be sought independently.

    This carefully assembled picture from the autumn of 1993 is the perfect work of production designer Evgeny Mitta, who accurately recreated the spirit of that time. “In general, this is already considered a historical film by cinematic standards. Quite a lot of time has passed, all this equipment no longer exists in the current media space. And we had to search quite well for some individual parts of the equipment and try to recreate it all,” says Evgeny Mitta.

    But it all started with a script written by Sergei Shumakov, the general director and editor-in-chief of the Kultura channel. That is why the story through the eyes of journalists looks as plausible as possible. Sergei Shumakov, in essence, showed the work of those he understands best, especially since he himself worked in television in 1993 and was in the television center building on the night of October 3-4.

    “I think the experience of documentary filmmaking helps, because the chronicle was the most difficult thing we did. The entire process of finishing the film took three years, but the chronicle took one and a half of that. Plus, during the preparation process, we worked on the chronicle, because there were documentary filmmakers who were separately from me preparing it for the set. In order to watch it before the motor, the group watched the chronicle – everyone remembered what happened. Some did not remember, but saw it for the first time – those who were younger. In general, the chronicle was probably the most difficult,” says Maria Reizen.

    Reincarnations

    The cast of “The Pretenders” is so impressive that it’s worth watching the movie just for them: Linda Lapinsh, Sergey Shakurov, Egor Beroev, Vladimir Guskov, Anna Mikhalkova, Mikhail Filippov, Aleksandr Adabashyan and others. It’s especially nice to see Ildar Gainutdinov, who plays the role of False Dmitry.

    “As for the role, my hero, it was very multi-staged. If we specifically proceed not from the excerpt, if, let’s say, we take on a full-fledged character, then we could take, for example, a story – how a person is changed by his desire for power, how his dream becomes some kind of nightmare. That is, this is a very, very complex work,” notes Ildar Gainutdinov.

    “The Pretenders” is a film that goes beyond itself. It is a serious attempt to understand the autumn of 1993, a large open dialogue with Alexander Pushkin, a history of stories, a film with a very precise inner time and brilliant work of the entire team. A magnificently depicted life of ordinary people who found themselves in the center of a historical breakdown.

    The film will be released on June 5th and can be seen in the Moskino chain of cinemas.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/154812073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Polytechnic students have developed a model for shelf development

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    The Institute of Industrial Management, Economics and Trade of SPbPU together with the international logistics company “Aurora Logistics” held a student case championship. Participants were looking for practical solutions for the formation of an effective transport and logistics model for the development of hydrocarbon deposits on the shelf.

    The championship started in early April, when the teams received tasks from the company. For one and a half months, 25 teams from 14 cities in Russia, Belarus and Uzbekistan prepared solutions to defend them in the final. The event was held in a mixed format: in person, online and remotely.

    The guys worked on effective transport and logistics solutions for the development of offshore hydrocarbon deposits. Difficult climatic conditions, environmental risks and the need to minimize costs dictate the search for breakthrough solutions. The participants presented projects that combine digital technologies, environmental responsibility and economic efficiency.

    For our institute, it is important to organize and hold events together with the economic sector. It is the case championship format that puts participants in a real situation of finding solutions in conditions of time shortage and uncertainty with some data. The key here is the presence of tasks from partner companies and the competitive element, plus online materials and webinars with experts. All this involves students in the process, motivates, and provides practical experience, – noted Vladimir Shchepinin, Director of the Institute of Industrial Management, Economics and Trade.

    The jury included representatives of Aurora Logistics: Deputy General Director for Offshore Project Logistics Alexander Kornalevsky and Head of the HR Department Olga Abramova, as well as Director of the Higher School of Industrial Management Olga Kalinina, Professors Mikhail Afanasyev and Alexander Ilyinsky, Associate Professors Anna Timofeeva, Natalya Alekseeva, Lyudmila Medvedeva and Dmitry Metkin, Senior Lecturer Vyacheslav Melokhin and Assistant Konstantin Sharlai.

    The first place was taken by Elizaveta Dasayeva, Karina Malyukova, Yulia Eroshenko and Maria Vshivkova, representing the G. I. Nosov Magnitogorsk State Technical University.

    Second place was awarded to students of the Higher School of Industrial Management of SPbPU Anastasia Malashchitskaya, Egor Korolev, Denis Krutov and Alexander Khomyakov.

    Third place was shared between two teams. These are students of the Belarusian State Economic University Ekaterina Meshkova, Maria Zakharchuk, Olga Shutova, Ksenia Sarkan. And students of the Higher School of Industrial Management of SPbPU Artur Prokhorov, Diana Svitkova, Alexandra Karkhanova and Nikolai Kazmin.

    The students were awarded winners’ diplomas, certificates, special diplomas for individual nominations and valuable gifts from Aurora Logistics.

    This championship is the result of a strategic partnership between the Higher School of Industrial Management and the company “Aurora Logistics”, fixed in a cooperation agreement. It is extremely important for us that students solve real cases, not abstract problems. This is how our model of practice-oriented education works: through interaction with the industry, we prepare specialists who are ready to immediately get involved in work on complex projects, be it the Arctic or other points of economic growth, – emphasized the director of the Higher School of Industrial Management Olga Kalinina.

    The students immersed themselves in the specifics of developing offshore hydrocarbon deposits and showed themselves to a potential employer. Special thanks to the members of the organizing committee: the head of the HR department of Aurora Logistics Olga Abramova and associate professor of the higher school Anna Timofeeva, – noted the main organizer of the championship, academic director of educational programs in oil and gas management Mikhail Afanasyev.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: “Young Architects Are Changing the Face of Moscow” — Hussam Shakuf on New Principles in Organizing the Urban Environment

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Monumentality, modern technologies and movement into the future – this is how British architect and urban designer Hussam Shakuf sees Moscow. He visited the capital in 2021, and when he returned four years later, he did not recognize it at first – and does not hide his delight at the changes.

    Hussam Shakuf visited the 6th Moscow Interior and Design Week, which took place in the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall. There he gave a lecture entitled “Beyond Borders: Creating Inspiring Interiors and Public Spaces”. And in an interview with a correspondent from the mos.ru portal, the architect talked about what he likes about the Russian capital, whether new buildings should be combined with cultural heritage monuments, and what his vision of a smart city is.

    From old to new

    Hussam Shaqouf is best known for the projects he worked on with the renowned British firm Zaha Hadid Architects for 17 years. Among others, he designed an asymmetrical diamond-shaped shell in North Africa and the ellipsoidal headquarters of a major smartphone manufacturer in Shenzhen. Hussam Shaqouf also participated in the design of a business center in the southeast of Moscow, consisting of flat squares stacked on top of each other.

    The specialist highly praised the changes that have taken place in the capital’s architecture in recent years.

    “In Moscow, there are more buildings created by young architects who use parametrics in their design – computer modeling based on mathematical algorithms. These buildings feel dynamic, moving into the future,” the architect believes.

    From his point of view, there is also dynamism in the proximity of cultural heritage sites to modern buildings – this is a hint at the transition from the past to the present and future.

    “On the one hand, it is important when the city has buildings that are reminiscent of past eras. In those distant times, they were also a symbol of progress, and, of course, they need to be restored and maintained. On the other hand, when planning new objects, we always look ahead, asking ourselves: how will they fit into the metropolis in five years? Is it worth building retro-style buildings now just so as not to violate the concept of the street? I admit, I am for contrast. Let old mansions and avant-garde towers stand next to modern houses. After all, the future belongs to the new. Of the old that I see in Moscow now, Stalinist architecture is closest to me: these houses, although built in the middle of the 20th century, seem to be a foundation, a model for creating ultra-modern buildings, they have a sense of monumentality,” says Hussam Shakuf.

    He calls himself a bearer of the avant-garde DNA. At the same time, the architect admits that even in postmodernist projects it is important to take into account the cultural characteristics of the country and the city and organically integrate them into fantastic ideas and new technologies. Such is, for example, the Heydar Aliyev Center in Baku, created by Zaha Hadid Architects: the outlines of its roof reflect the waves of the Caspian Sea, and the swaying flames, referring to the ancient cult of fire that existed in Azerbaijan, and geometric figures – a triangle, a rectangle, a trapezoid.

    A city built with intelligence

    According to Hussam Shakuf, a modern city should be comfortable to live in. However, despite the architect’s commitment to everything modern, he is against a metropolis consisting entirely of roads and cars.

    “It’s healthier to walk. If you walk for 35 minutes, you’ll quickly relieve stress, which means you’ll be happier and more productive. I’d also install smart traffic lights everywhere, which would reduce car traffic,” says our interlocutor.

    Another thing is that the size of Moscow and other world capitals hardly allows for walking. But Hussam Shakuf knows how to solve this problem.

    “Large cities need large multifunctional complexes where people can live, study, work, and have fun, then they won’t have to go anywhere, and the economy of the area where such a complex is built will develop. And this is exactly the concept I call a smart city,” the architect notes.

    He also does not support the widespread launch of air taxis, as is planned in some cities in the future. “This means that passengers will land on roofs and enter buildings from above. What is the point of having a ground floor then? If this is the method of moving around the city that wins in the future, we will have to design buildings completely differently,” says Hussam Shakuf.

    Places for communication

    According to Hussam Shaqouf, the interior structure of a building is what connects architecture with man.

    “I recently worked on a project for a business center for a Chinese smartphone manufacturer in Shenzhen. First of all, I tried to put myself in the shoes of the company’s employees and understand what could inspire them when they come to work. Firstly, it is a view of the city and the Shenzhen Bay, so the walls are glass. Secondly, convenient passages from one tower to another, and you can get into the buildings both from the street and from the interior. Thirdly, spacious rooms where people communicate with each other and drink coffee,” the architect says.

    In his opinion, the most important thing in the interior is accessible and at the same time isolated public spaces. In particular, he would like to build houses in Moscow where the courtyard is at the level of the second floor and is a podium: so residents could walk with their children and talk to each other without being distracted by passers-by and what is happening on the streets.

    “We currently discuss business and personal interests mainly on social networks. But is it really possible to really get to know a person this way? If every home or office had a place to meet with neighbors and colleagues, there would be no need for online correspondence,” Hussam Shakuf sums up.

    More than 50 applications have already been submitted for the competition “Best Implemented Project in the Field of Construction”A Round Kindergarten, a Ribbon Roof, and a “Flying” Metro. The Laureates of the City’s Architectural Prize in Different Years — in DetailFrom Denmark with Love. Urbanist and Architect Jan Gehl Shares His Impressions of MoscowFirm determination. French urbanist Nicolas Bouchaud on changes in Moscow, similarities with Paris, and climate strategyDavid Adjaye’s Utopia and Zaha Hadid’s Curves: Architecture of the Future in Moscow

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/154800073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UNECE study identifies pathways for digital and green energy transition in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia

    Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe

    The transition to clean energy in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia necessitates a comprehensive overhaul of power systems, with investment needs estimated at $150 billion by 2030. However, by embracing digitalization across all sectors – from generation and transmission to distribution and end-use – and integration with renewable energy, these countries could reduce their carbon emissions by up to 70% and energy costs by as much as 80%, subject to system-wide optimization, outlines the UNECE study “Integrating twin transition with legacy energy systems”   

    The study analyses opportunities and challenges for a digital transformation of energy systems in Albania, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, North Macedonia, Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine, where about 60% of the total energy mix today comes from natural gas and coal.   

    The study underscores that digital solutions and innovations such as Artificial Intelligence, Internet of Things, Digital Twins, and Virtual Power Plants, offer significant opportunities in managing and integrating distributed, often variable renewable energy-based resources. It also highlights potential to optimize legacy systems and enhance both cybersecurity and grid resilience. 

    This will require robust policy measures and initiatives to boost investments in advanced, resilient grids. It will also necessitate increased support for innovation and research, strategic planning and massive professional training.   

    Overcoming challenges 

    The study identifies key challenges to be addressed in the region’s largely outdated energy systems: 

    • Ageing energy infrastructure, much of which was built during the Soviet era. For example, in Belarus, over 60% of the thermal power plants are over 30 years old, resulting in high maintenance costs; in Georgia, the average age of electricity transmission lines exceeds 30 years, resulting in transmission losses estimated at 12%.  

    • Energy security risks due to dependence on fossil fuel imports. For example, the Republic of Moldova imports approximately 70% of its electricity, primarily from Romania and Ukraine; in Belarus, about 50% of energy needs are met through natural gas imports from the Russian Federation. 

    • Limited financial resources to invest in modernizing energy systems. For instance, Albania has struggled to secure funding for proposed solar and wind projects totalling approximately $300 million; in Belarus only about 5% of the necessary investments have been secured for planned RE installations; financial constraints limit modernization of ageing hydropower infrastructure in Kyrgyzstan. 

    • Lack of skilled workforce. For example, in Georgia, around 30% of energy sector professionals lack formal training in RE technologies.  

    • Climate and health impacts. For instance, Belarus emits approximately 8 million tonnes of CO2 annually from its energy sector alone, with coal-fired plants being significant contributors. North Macedonia’s reliance on coal contributes to air pollution levels among the highest in Europe.  

    Key strategies identified in the study include: 

    • Cross-border infrastructure projects, such as Trans-Caspian high-voltage direct current lines, are vital for enhancing regional energy trade and digital connectivity; 

    The report identifies three priority action areas: (1) scaling energy efficiency through retrofitting that embraces digital technologies; (2) promoting hybrid energy models that combine gas with hydrogen; and (3) advancing smart grids, standardization, and regional integration. 

    Importantly, the study promotes a human-centered approach to digitalization that  balances innovation with ethical considerations and prioritizes equity, social considerations, and long-term sustainability for a just transition. 

    From research to action 

    The study was showcased during a workshop “Assessing the readiness of the energy sector to implement smart digital energy-efficient technologies in Belarus in view of climate change mitigation” held in Minsk, Belarus, and online on 22 May 2025. The hybrid workshop, organized by UNECE in cooperation with UNDP Belarus and the Department of Energy Efficiency of the State Committee for Standardization of the Republic of Belarus, brought together over 100 participants including government officials, energy sector representatives, and international experts, to explore how smart digital tools can support energy efficiency, clean mobility, and climate action in Belarus.  

    For more information about UNECE work on Energy Efficiency, please visit: https://unece.org/sustainable-energy/energy-efficiency 

     Photo credit: Adobe Stock Images by Sergii.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Georgia: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Tbilisi: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Mr. Alejandro Hajdenberg conducted discussions for the 2025 Article IV consultation with Georgia from May 21 to June 4, 2025, in Tbilisi. At the end of the visit, Mr. Hajdenberg issued the following statement:

    Georgia’s economy has been remarkably resilient despite heightened domestic and geopolitical uncertainty. Growth approached double digits in 2024, is projected at 7.2 percent this year, and is expected to converge to its long-term trend of 5 percent. Inflation has ticked up but remains close to its 3 percent target. Meanwhile, foreign exchange reserves have recovered from last year’s lows and continued fiscal discipline has contributed to a further decline in public debt. However, risks to the outlook are elevated and challenges persist due to still high structural unemployment and income inequality. In this context, the National Bank of Georgia (NBG) should prioritize building additional reserve buffers while monitoring potential financial sector risks. Strengthening NBG’s governance and independence remains central to macroeconomic stability. Fiscal reforms should aim to raise additional revenues to finance development priorities, improve spending efficiency, and contain fiscal risks. Structural reforms should focus on sustaining strong growth and making it more inclusive, including by enhancing labor market opportunities and outcomes.

    Recent economic developments, outlook, and risks

    Economic activity has remained robust. Real GDP grew by 9.4 percent in 2024 despite domestic political tensions. Growth was driven by consumption, marking a shift from previous years when investment and net exports were the main contributors. Tourism rebounded to pre-Covid levels, while the information and communications technology (ICT) and transport sectors remained key drivers of growth, continuing to benefit from high skilled migrants and transit trade. The unemployment rate continued to decline, albeit remaining structurally high. With strong momentum continuing in the first four months of 2025, growth is projected to moderate slightly to 7.2 percent for this year before converging to its medium-term potential rate of 5 percent.

    Inflation has returned to target after undershooting for two years. Headline inflation averaged 1.8 percent over 2023 and 2024 but rose to 3.5 percent year-on-year in May 2025, mainly due to increasing food prices. Core inflation, however, remains subdued, with the NBG keeping the policy rate unchanged at 8 percent since May 2024. Inflation is projected to average 3.4 percent in 2025 and to converge to the NBG’s 3 percent target in 2026 along with easing domestic demand.

    The current account deficit narrowed in 2024 to 4.4 percent of GDP, with a similar projection for 2025, but reserve coverage remains below adequate levels. The improvement in 2024 was driven by lower imports, partly reflecting lower oil prices. Foreign direct investment (FDI) declined for the second straight year, in part reflecting the absence of new large greenfield projects. Gross international reserves have fallen from a peak of $5.4 billion in August 2023 to $4.5 billion as of April 2025––equal to 80 percent of the Fund’s Assessment of Reserve Adequacy (ARA) metric. Recent favorable inflows have allowed the NBG to offset the sizeable foreign exchange sales made before the October parliamentary elections.

    The fiscal deficit held steady at 2.4 percent of GDP in 2024, despite it being an election year, and is expected to remain unchanged in 2025. Robust tax revenues––supported by strong growth, tax policy measures in the financial and gambling sectors, and improved revenue administration––have helped finance social and capital spending. Amid stronger-than-expected economic activity, the 2025 budget target of 2.5 percent of GDP deficit is well within reach. Public debt, at 36 percent of GDP, has returned to pre-pandemic levels, with an increasing share denominated in local currency. The USD 500 million Eurobond maturing in April 2026 is expected to be rolled over smoothly.

    While uncertainty remains exceptionally high, risks to the outlook appear broadly balanced. The direct impact from tariffs imposed by the U.S. is limited as the U.S. accounts for only 2 percent of total exports—mainly ferroalloys, which are exempt. However, the indirect effects of heightened global trade tensions could be more significant. Weaker investor confidence and slower trading partner growth pose negative risks, but Georgia could benefit from lower oil prices and sustained trade diversion through its territory. A resolution of the war in Ukraine could unwind some gains linked to migration and transit trade but increased regional stability and reconstruction in Ukraine could be offsetting positive factors. Persistent domestic political uncertainty and sanctions affecting Georgia could dampen FDI, discourage tourism, and further pressure the lari. Healthy fiscal and financial sector buffers mitigate these risks.

    Monetary and exchange policies

    The NBG should maintain a broadly neutral policy stance while remaining flexible and data driven to ensure inflation expectations remain anchored. Although wage and employment growth have moderated and business confidence has weakened, heightened global uncertainty warrants caution in considering further policy rate cuts, particularly as the recent increase in domestic food prices may not prove transitory. Should inflationary pressures persist, a tightening of the policy stance may be warranted.

    Exchange rate flexibility, opportunistic reserve accumulation, and monetary policy communication should be enhanced. Efforts to rebuild reserve buffers should be sustained while allowing the exchange rate to act as a shock absorber. The NBG should continue to strengthen monetary policy transmission, effectiveness, transparency, and credibility. Communication of monetary policy should be strengthened by clarifying the NBG’s assessment of the balance of risks and how this informs policy decisions.

    Strengthening NBG governance and independence remains central to macroeconomic stability. The filling of the board vacancies and the governor position is a welcome first step. Efforts should now focus on amending the NBG law to: (i) ensure a non-executive majority on the NBG’s oversight board, (ii) limit the possibility of discretionary financial transfers to the government, and (iii) clarify and further strengthen [the NBG succession framework and] board member qualification criteria. Moving from a presidential to a collegial decision-making model is also advisable.

    Fiscal policy

    With public debt at sound levels, maintaining a broadly neutral policy stance over the medium term is appropriate. A fiscal deficit of 2.3–2.5 percent of GDP would help stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio near its current level. The shift toward domestic debt should proceed carefully, avoiding crowding out the private sector and monitoring borrowing costs and risks linked to a stronger sovereign-bank nexus. While good progress has been made, further tax policy and administration reforms that broaden the tax base and streamline tax expenditures—supported by a stronger medium-term revenue strategy—are needed to secure revenue for spending priorities.  

    There is considerable scope to enhance spending efficiency and further strengthen public investment management (PIM). Despite elevated levels of public investment, infrastructure quality remains below that of many emerging market peers, highlighting the need for more effective implementation of PIM processes, building on recent years’ improvements. Spending on education and health could be more efficient, to achieve better outcomes at similar expenditure levels. Spending reviews could help in this regard. Social assistance is relatively generous but targeting could be improved to prioritize the most vulnerable households.

    Sustained efforts are needed to manage fiscal risks and increase fiscal transparency. The authorities have taken significant steps in enhancing the Ministry of Finance’s financial oversight of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and maintaining this momentum will be important. Efforts should focus on legislation that would separate the state’s shareholder, regulatory, and policy functions beyond the energy sector, where implementation has recently taken place, and strengthen the corporate governance of SOEs. The authorities should address gaps in the coverage of fiscal reporting, particularly from non-market SOEs with significant fiscal risks.

    Financial sector

    Continued vigilance and reforms will help address long-standing and emerging financial sector risks. The banking system remains well capitalized and profitable, and the implementation of the IMF’s 2021 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) recommendations is nearly complete. Key priorities going forward include enhancing the consolidated supervision of financial groups—particularly non-bank subsidiaries and cross-border activities, operationalizing a fully-fledged bank resolution framework, and improving competition in financial services. The NBG continues to implement its long-term dedollarization policy to support financial stability, and recently raised the FX loan threshold for unhedged borrowers further to GEL 750,000. Nevertheless, the share of unhedged foreign currency bank loans is still high, and the deposit dedollarization trend was interrupted amid heightened political uncertainty. Banks—especially smaller ones—have faced lari funding pressures, and the cost of funding has risen, potentially weighing on profitability. Consumer loans have grown rapidly, while riskier nonbank financing—including foreign currency bond issuances by real estate developers—has increased considerably. Neither risk is assessed to be systemic at this stage, but continued close monitoring is warranted.

    Structural reforms

    Structural reforms are needed to sustain high growth and make it more inclusive and job rich. Potential growth remains constrained by structurally high long-term and youth unemployment, low educational attainment, infrastructure bottlenecks in the transport and logistics sectors, and low sectoral productivity, especially in agriculture. An aging population, outward migration, and informality pose challenges for the labor market, along with persistent income inequality. Better targeting of agricultural support, improving teacher quality, and expanding vocational training would help raise rural labor force participation and facilitate the integration of workers into the formal economy. Remittances and return migration could be better leveraged to boost productive investments and knowledge transfers from returning migrants. Continued investment in transport and logistics infrastructure, as well as coordination with regional partners to harmonize fees and procedures, are important to support long-term competitiveness. Finally, the authorities should enhance judicial independence and strengthen the autonomy of the Anti-Corruption Bureau to improve the business environment.

    The mission team would like to thank the Georgian authorities and other counterparts for their close collaboration, candid and informative discussions, and warm hospitality.

    Table 1. Georgia: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2024–28

     

     

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

     

    Actual Projections

    National accounts and prices

    (annual percentage change; unless otherwise indicated)

    Real GDP

    9.4

    7.2

    5.3

    5.0

    5.0

    Nominal GDP (in billions of laris)

    91.9

    102.5

    111.7

    121.5

    131.9

    Nominal GDP (in billions of U.S. dollars)

    33.8

    36.7

    39.2

    41.4

    43.6

    GDP per capita (in thousands of U.S. dollars)

    9.1

    9.9

    10.6

    11.2

    11.8

    GDP deflator, period average

    3.8

    4.1

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    CPI, period average

    1.1

    3.4

    3.1

    3.0

    3.0

    CPI, end-of-period

    1.9

    3.6

    3.0

    3.0

    3.0

    Consolidated government operations

    (in percent of GDP)

    Revenue and grants

    28.0

    27.7

    27.8

    27.7

    27.6

    o.w. Tax revenue

    25.3

    25.0

    25.6

    25.6

    25.6

    Total Expenditure

    30.3

    30.0

    30.1

    29.9

    29.8

    Current expenditures

    22.5

    22.6

    22.5

    22.5

    22.5

    Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets

    7.7

    7.4

    7.5

    7.5

    7.3

    Net lending/borrowing (GFSM 2001)

    -2.3

    -2.3

    -2.3

    -2.3

    -2.2

    Augmented net lending/borrowing 1/

    -2.4

    -2.4

    -2.4

    -2.4

    -2.3

    Public debt

    36.1

    34.7

    34.1

    34.3

    34.5

      o.w. Foreign-currency denominated

    25.2

    23.1

    22.0

    21.7

    20.9

    Money and credit

    (annual percentage change; unless otherwise indicated)

    Credit to the private sector

    18.5

    13.7

    9.0

    8.7

    8.6

    In constant exchange rate

    17.0

    15.5

    8.5

    7.4

    7.3

    Broad money

    14.5

    13.3

    11.5

    11.3

    11.2

    Excluding FX deposits

    10.4

    13.7

    11.9

    11.7

    11.6

    Deposit dollarization (in percent of total)

    52.7

    52.1

    51.9

    51.7

    51.4

    Credit dollarization (in percent of total)

    42.9

    42.5

    42.1

    41.7

    41.3

    Credit to GDP (in percent) 2/

    66.0

    67.4

    67.4

    67.4

    67.4

    External sector

    (in percent of GDP; unless otherwise indicated)

    Current account balance (in billions of US$)

    -1.5

    -1.6

    -1.8

    -2.0

    -2.1

    Current account balance

    -4.4

    -4.4

    -4.6

    -4.8

    -4.8

    Trade balance

    -19.2

    -18.9

    -19.1

    -19.2

    -19.3

    Terms of trade (percent change)

    -2.8

    -0.2

    0.1

    -0.3

    0.5

    Gross international reserves (in billions of US$)

    4.4

    4.7

    4.9

    5.5

    6.2

    In percent of IMF ARA metric 3/

    79.6

    81.1

    82.4

    88.0

    95.5

    In months of next year’s imports

    2.7

    2.6

    2.6

    2.7

    2.9

    Gross external debt

    66.8

    62.4

    58.5

    55.9

    53.0

     Sources: Georgian authorities; and Fund staff estimates.

    1/ Augmented Net lending / borrowing = Net lending / borrowing – Budget lending.

    2/ Banking sector credit to the private sector.

    3/ IMF’s adequacy metric for assessing reserves in emerging markets.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Mayada Ghazala

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/06042025-mcs-georgia-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • US-backed Gaza aid group halts distribution, UN to vote on ceasefire demand

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    The U.S.-backed Gaza Humanitarian Foundation will not give out any aid on Wednesday as it presses Israel to boost civilian safety beyond the perimeter of its distribution sites, a day after dozens of Palestinians seeking aid were killed.

    The GHF said it has asked the Israeli military to “guide foot traffic in a way that minimizes confusion or escalation risks” near military perimeters; develop clearer guidance for civilians; and enhance training to support civilian safety.

    “Our top priority remains ensuring the safety and dignity of civilians receiving aid,” said a GHF spokesperson. An Israeli military spokesperson warned civilians against moving in areas leading to GHF sites on Wednesday, deeming them “combat zones”.

    The Israeli military said on Tuesday that it opened fire on a group of people it viewed as a threat near a GHF food aid distribution site. The International Committee of the Red Cross said at least 27 people were killed and dozens injured. The GHF said the incident was “well beyond” its site.

    Palestinians who collected food GHF boxes on Tuesday described scenes of pandemonium, with no-one overseeing the handover of supplies or checking IDs, as crowds jostled for aid.

    The U.N. Security Council is also set to vote on Wednesday on a demand for a ceasefire between Israel and Palestinian militants Hamas and humanitarian access across Gaza, where aid has trickled amid chaos and bloodshed after Israel lifted an 11-week blockade on the enclave where famine looms.

    “It is unacceptable. Civilians are risking – and in several instances losing – their lives just trying to get food,” U.N. spokesperson Stephane Dujarric said on Tuesday, adding that the aid distribution model backed by the U.S. and Israel was “all a recipe for disaster, which is exactly what is going on.”

    That model is run by the newly created GHF, which started operations in the enclave a week ago and said on Tuesday that it has given out more than seven million meals from three so-called secure distribution sites. GHF Interim Executive Director John Acree urged humanitarians in Gaza: “Work with us and we will get your aid delivered to those who are depending on it.”

    U.S. VETO?

    The U.N. and other aid groups have refused to work with the GHF because they say it is not neutral and the distribution model militarizes aid. GHF uses private U.S. security and logistics companies to get aid to the distribution sites.

    It is the latest in a string of efforts to get more aid into the enclave, where experts say the entire population of some 2.1 million people is at risk of famine. Jordan last year spearheaded humanitarian air drops, while the U.S. briefly installed a floating aid pier, but it was beset by challenges.

    The U.N. has long-blamed Israel and lawlessness in the enclave for hindering the delivery of aid into Gaza and its distribution throughout the war zone. Israel accuses Hamas of stealing aid, which the group denies.

    Israel said on Tuesday that three of its soldiers had been killed in fighting in northern Gaza. Gaza health officials said at least 18 more Palestinians were killed in other military strikes in the territory on Tuesday. Reuters could not independently verify the reports in northern and southern Gaza.

    The 10 elected members of the U.N. Security Council have asked for the 15-member body to vote on Wednesday on a draft resolution that demands “an immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire in Gaza respected by all parties.”

    The draft text, seen by Reuters, also demands the release of all hostages held by Hamas and others, and the immediate lifting of all restrictions on the entry of aid and its safe and unhindered distribution, including by the U.N., throughout Gaza.

    “The time to act has already passed,” Slovenia’s U.N. Ambassador Samuel Zbogar told Reuters. “It is our historical responsibility not to remain silent.”

    As U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration tries to broker a ceasefire in Gaza, it was not immediately clear if Washington would veto the draft text. A spokesperson for the U.S. mission to the U.N. said: “We cannot preview our actions currently under consideration.”

    A resolution needs nine votes in favor and no vetoes by the permanent members – the United States, Russia, China, Britain or France – to pass.

    The war in Gaza has raged since 2023 after Hamas militants killed 1,200 people in Israel in an October 7 attack and took some 250 hostages back to the enclave, according to Israeli tallies.

    Israel responded with a military campaign that has killed over 54,000 Palestinians, according to Gaza health authorities, which do not distinguish between fighters and non-combatants.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Biometrics is the most profitable way to pay for transport. For the 4th year in a row!

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    As Maxim Liksutov reported, a single trip using biometrics costs 63 rubles. For comparison, payment for a “Wallet” ticket is 4 rubles higher, and for a bank card – 11 rubles higher.

    Biometrics in numbers:

    more than 400 thousand users

    over 160 thousand trips every weekday

    156 million passes since the launch of the service

    “Nowhere in the world is the most innovative biometric payment method developed on such a large scale and with such convenience as in Moscow. It is important that this is an absolutely secure service thanks to the banking level of protection. All data is securely encrypted. By the end of this year, at the request of Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin, we will connect all metro turnstiles to the face recognition payment service,” added Maxim Liksutov.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: SPbGASU and the Union of Restorers of St. Petersburg signed a cooperation agreement

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Ekaterina Voznyak, Alexandra Komissarova, Evgeny Korolev and Nadezhda Akulova

    On June 2, the Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering and the Union of Restorers of Saint Petersburg signed a cooperation agreement. The document was signed by Evgeny Korolev, Vice-Rector for Research, and Alexandra Komissarova, Deputy Director General of the Union of Restorers of Saint Petersburg.

    The activities of the Union of Restorers of St. Petersburg are aimed at preserving and restoring the architectural heritage of the Northern capital. It unites professionals in the field of complex restoration, suppliers of materials, and design organizations.

    The parties intend to cooperate in the field of science and education, popularization of cultural heritage sites, protection, preservation and popularization of historical sites and buildings, historical and cultural monuments; promote the development of the restoration industry as a complex of exclusive types of work to preserve architectural and cultural heritage; develop volunteerism.

    Following the signing ceremony, the parties outlined further steps aimed at training highly qualified professionals. Together with Evgeny Korolev and Alexandra Komissarova, the constructive dialogue was attended by the Dean of the Faculty of Architecture Ekaterina Voznyak, Advisor to the General Director of the Union of Restorers of St. Petersburg Lidiya Vernik, Associate Professor of the Department of Architectural and Urban Heritage Nadezhda Akulova.

    “We can tell about the possibilities of the SPbGASU educational programs to the members of the Union of Restorers so that they can send their employees to relevant training programs in order to improve their qualifications and develop the restoration industry of St. Petersburg. It also seems interesting to cooperate in the formation of educational programs aimed at improving the training of professional personnel involved in organizing and carrying out work on the preservation of architectural monuments. Organizations that are part of the Union of Restorers have extensive experience in restoration work, they are also valuable and interesting from the point of view of opportunities to replenish the teaching staff. Thus, we will act as a coordinator and accumulator of information on the joint activities of our organizations,” said Alexandra Komissarova.

    “The University is ready for joint activities. Those who are engaged in practical restoration and those who develop restoration science and teach future professionals must cooperate,” emphasized Evgeny Korolev.

    “The agreement was signed within the framework of the general strategy for the development of the university in the field of architectural restoration, as well as the activities of the Scientific and Educational Laboratory for the Restoration and Renovation of Architectural Heritage (NOL RAS). Our university and the Department of Architectural and Urban Heritage closely interact with the union, and now this interaction will reach a new level,” said Nadezhda Akulova, Associate Professor of the Department of Architectural and Urban Heritage.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The secret to Ukraine’s battlefield successes against Russia – it knows wars are never won in the past

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew Sussex, Associate Professor (Adj), Griffith Asia Institute; and Fellow, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

    The iconoclastic American general Douglas Macarthur once said that “wars are never won in the past”.

    That sentiment certainly seemed to ring true following Ukraine’s recent audacious attack on Russia’s strategic bomber fleet, using small, cheap drones housed in wooden pods and transported near Russian airfields in trucks.

    The synchronised operation targeted Russian Air Force planes as far away as Irkutsk – more than 5,000 kilometres from Ukraine. Early reports suggest around a third of Russia’s long-range bombers were either destroyed or badly damaged. Russian military bloggers have put the estimated losses lower, but agree the attack was catastrophic for the Russian Air Force, which has struggled to adapt to Ukrainian tactics.

    This particular attack was reportedly 18 months in the making. To keep it secret was an extraordinary feat. Notably, Kyiv did not inform the United States that the attack was in the offing. The Ukrainians judged – perhaps understandably – that sharing intelligence on their plans could have alerted the Kremlin in relatively short order.

    Ukraine’s success once again demonstrates that its armed forces and intelligence services are the modern masters of battlefield innovation and operational security.

    Finding new solutions

    Western military planners have been carefully studying Ukraine’s successes ever since its forces managed to blunt Russia’s initial onslaught deep into its territory in early 2022, and then launched a stunning counteroffensive that drove the Russian invaders back towards their original starting positions.

    There have been other lessons, too, about how the apparently weak can stand up to the strong. These include:

    • attacks on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s vanity project, the Kerch Bridge, linking the Russian mainland to occupied Crimea (the last assault occurred just days ago)

    • the relentless targeting of Russia’s oil and gas infrastructure with drones

    • attacks against targets in Moscow to remind the Russian populace about the war, and

    • its incursion into the Kursk region, which saw Ukrainian forces capture around 1,000 square kilometres of Russian territory.

    On each occasion, Western defence analysts have questioned the wisdom of Kyiv’s moves.

    Why invade Russia using your best troops when Moscow’s forces continue laying waste to cities in Ukraine?

    Why hit Russia’s energy infrastructure if it doesn’t markedly impede the battlefield mobility of Russian forces?

    And why attack symbolic targets like bridges when it could provoke Putin into dangerous “escalation”?

    The answer to this is the key to effective innovation during wartime. Ukraine’s defence and security planners have interpreted their missions – and their best possible outcomes – far more accurately than conventional wisdom would have thought.

    Above all, they have focused on winning the war they are in, rather than those of the past. This means:

    • using technological advancements to force the Russians to change their tactics

    • shaping the information environment to promote their narratives and keep vital Western aid flowing, and

    • deploying surprise attacks not just as ways to boost public morale, but also to impose disproportionate costs on the Russian state.

    The impact of Ukraine’s drone attack

    In doing so, Ukraine has had an eye for strategic effects. As the smaller nation reliant on international support, this has been the only logical choice.

    Putin has been prepared to commit a virtually inexhaustible supply of expendable cannon fodder to continue his country’s war ad infinitum. Russia has typically won its wars this way – by attrition – albeit at a tremendous human and material cost.

    That said, Ukraine’s most recent surprise attack does not change the overall contours of the war. The only person with the ability to end it is Putin himself.

    That’s why Ukraine is putting as much pressure as possible on his regime, as well as domestic and international perceptions of it. It is key to Ukraine’s theory of victory.

    This is also why the latest drone attack is so significant. Russia needs its long-range bomber fleet, not just to fire conventional cruise missiles at Ukrainian civilian and infrastructure targets, but as aerial delivery systems for its strategic nuclear arsenal.

    The destruction of even a small portion of Russia’s deterrence capability has the potential to affect its nuclear strategy. It has increasingly relied on this strategy to threaten the West.

    A second impact of the attack is psychological. The drone attacks are more likely to enrage Putin than bring him to the bargaining table. However, they reinforce to the Russian military that there are few places – even on its own soil – that its air force can act with operational impunity.

    The surprise attacks also provide a shot in the arm domestically, reminding Ukrainians they remain very much in the fight.

    Finally, the drone attacks send a signal to Western leaders. US President Donald Trump and Vice President JD Vance, for instance, have gone to great lengths to tell the world that Ukraine is weak and has “no cards”. This action shows Kyiv does indeed have some powerful cards to play.

    That may, of course, backfire: after all, Trump is acutely sensitive to being made to look a fool. He may look unkindly at resuming military aid to Ukraine after being shown up for saying Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky would be forced to capitulate without US support.

    But Trump’s own hubris has already done that for him. His regular claims that a peace deal is just weeks away have gone beyond wishful thinking and are now monotonous.

    Unsurprisingly, Trump’s reluctance to put anything approaching serious pressure on Putin has merely incentivised the Russian leader to string the process along.

    Indeed, Putin’s insistence on a maximalist victory, requiring Ukrainian demobilisation and disarmament without any security guarantees for Kyiv, is not diplomacy at all. It is merely the reiteration of the same unworkable demands he has made since even before Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022.

    However, Ukraine’s ability to smuggle drones undetected onto an opponent’s territory, and then unleash them all together, will pose headaches for Ukraine’s friends, as well as its enemies.

    That’s because it makes domestic intelligence and policing part of any effective defence posture. It is a contingency democracies will have to plan for, just as much as authoritarian regimes, who are also learning from Ukraine’s lessons.

    In other words, while the attack has shown up Russia’s domestic security services for failing to uncover the plan, Western security elites, as well as authoritarian ones, will now be wondering whether their own security apparatuses would be up to the job.

    The drone strikes will also likely lead to questions about how useful it is to invest in high-end and extraordinarily expensive weapons systems when they can be vulnerable. The Security Service of Ukraine estimates the damage cost Russia US$7 billion (A$10.9 billion). Ukraine’s drones, by comparison, cost a couple of thousand dollars each.

    At the very least, coming up with a suitable response to those challenges will require significant thought and effort. But as Ukraine has repeatedly shown us, you can’t win wars in the past.

    Matthew Sussex has received funding from the Australian Research Council, the Atlantic Council, the Fulbright Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Lowy Institute and various Australian government departments and agencies.

    ref. The secret to Ukraine’s battlefield successes against Russia – it knows wars are never won in the past – https://theconversation.com/the-secret-to-ukraines-battlefield-successes-against-russia-it-knows-wars-are-never-won-in-the-past-258172

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia

    Source: Council of the European Union

    Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/957 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/1484 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Russia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the EU on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

    Source: Council of the European Union

    Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/963 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain countries concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities

    Source: Council of the European Union

    Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with Council Decision (CFSP) 2025/966 of 20 May 2025 amending Decision (CFSP) 2024/2643 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s destabilising activities.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: To the participants and guests of the XI Book Festival “Red Square”

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    The book festival will take place from June 4 to 7, 2025 on Red Square in Moscow.

    Dear friends!

    I am glad to welcome you to the main square of the capital, which has become these days the center of attraction for all who love to read, as well as representatives of the book industry, writers and poets, publishers, and librarians.

    Every year this large-scale celebration, which is held on the birthday of Alexander Sergeevich Pushkin and Russian Language Day, is gaining more and more popularity. Participants and guests get acquainted with literary novelties, long-awaited works of favorite authors, rare editions, communicate with masters of the word, exchange creative ideas.

    In the year of the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory, preserving historical memory and countering attempts to falsify it acquire special significance. It is thanks to books about the war that the younger generation can imagine the events of those years, learn about the courage and heroism of the people who defended their Fatherland, and about the greatest feats of the Soviet people. This is not just a tribute to the past, but the foundation of our future, a guarantee that such tragedies will never be repeated.

    I wish you interesting meetings and new discoveries, all the best.

    M. Mishustin

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Biometrics: The Most Cost-Effective Way to Pay for Public Transport for the 4th Year Running!

    As reported by Maksim Liksutov, a single trip using biometric payment costs 63 rubles. In comparison, payment via the «Wallet» ticket is 4 rubles more expensive, and payment by bank card costs 11 rubles more.

    Biometrics by the Numbers:

    – Over 400,000 users

    – More than 160,000 trips every weekday

    – 156 million entries since the service’s launch

    Nowhere in the world is the most innovative biometric payment method as extensively and conveniently developed as it is in Moscow. Importantly, this is an absolutely secure service with bank-level protection. All data is reliably encrypted. By the end of this year, following the directive of Moscow Mayor Sergey Sobyanin, we will enable facial recognition payment at all metro turnstiles, — added Maksim Liksutov.

    MIL OSI Russia News