Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Alexey Overchuk opened the renovated Russian House in Dushanbe.

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    As part of the visit of the Russian delegation to the Republic of Tajikistan, Deputy Prime Minister Alexey Overchuk took part in the opening ceremony of the renovated Russian Center for Science and Culture (Russian House) in the capital of Tajikistan, Dushanbe.

    Alexey Overchuk emphasized that the Russian House has been operating in Dushanbe since 2011 and during this time many useful and creative projects have already been implemented that contribute to the development of humanitarian ties between Russia and Tajikistan. There are educational courses to prepare for admission to Russian universities, including under the quota of the Government of the Russian Federation, events are held to improve the qualifications of teachers, clubs and sections for talented youth operate, educational exhibitions are held, literature and textbooks are distributed – in 2024 alone, more than 19.5 thousand copies of educational, methodological and fiction literature in Russian were donated.

    “We are very grateful to see such a good response among the residents of Dushanbe. Today we saw a large number of children and young people here who come and learn something new,” the Deputy Prime Minister noted.

    The new building of the Russian Center for Science and Culture in Dushanbe with an area of 1.3 thousand square meters is located in the very center of the city and has the necessary infrastructure for conducting full-fledged educational and cultural-educational activities. On two floors there are modern classrooms and public spaces for education and creative workshops.

    The Russian House hosts preparatory courses for high school students who dream of entering Russian universities, and for those who want to study Russian, Russian language courses are taught mainly by participants in the Russian Teacher Abroad project. There is a consultation center for applicants on career guidance and admission to universities, and Olympiads and entrance examinations are held. The additional education center “Russia is with you” has been opened to popularize the Russian language and culture, science and engineering education.

    “We live in the era of the fourth industrial revolution and the data economy, when knowledge and culture are not only a key resource for national development, but also the most reliable bridge connecting peoples. The Russian Center for Science and Culture is called upon to serve as such a bridge to support cultural and humanitarian interaction between Russia and Tajikistan. We hope that this house will be strengthened as a platform where new projects and initiatives will be born that contribute to the development of science and culture in our common civilizational space,” Alexey Overchuk emphasized.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: “Artek” is the standard of quality children’s recreation in Russia and around the world

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    A festive concert dedicated to the 100th anniversary of the International Children’s Center “Artek” was held at the National Center “Russia”. The participants were greeted by Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko and Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov.

    The Deputy Prime Minister noted that this marked the start of a large marathon of festive events dedicated to the 100th anniversary of Artek.

    “We, born in the USSR, of course, have special feelings when we say the word “Artek”. We understand that this international children’s recreation center is a standard of quality for all Russians and for the whole world. Over 100 years, more than 2 million children from 150 countries have experienced this and have become Artek members forever. Here they participated in educational programs, improved their health, played sports and were creative, but most importantly, as our President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin says, “Artek teaches friendship,” he emphasized.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko added that the President had ordered the creation of an organizing committee, which had prepared a large-scale program of festive events, including the launch of a rocket, the filming of documentaries, the release of jubilee medals, commemorative postage stamps, and much more. And the culmination of the celebrations will be the final grand event, which will take place on June 16 in Artek itself.

    The Deputy Prime Minister also expressed gratitude to everyone who contributes to the development of the education system.

    For the anniversary of Artek, the honorary badge “Counselor of Russia” was established, and a competition of the same name will soon be launched.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko presented the first badge “Counselor of Russia” for significant contribution to the education and enlightenment of the younger generation. The award was received by the excellent public education worker of the Russian Federation, the counselor of “Artek” in 1965-1966 Roza Yakovlevna Shatyro from the Republic of Tatarstan.

    In her response, Roza Yakovlevna noted that during her work as a counselor, she gave her heart to thousands of children.

    “You and I are very happy people because we are friends and carry this friendship throughout the world. Thanks to Artek, I have friends all over the planet. I keep in touch with everyone, we congratulate each other on holidays,” she added.

    Minister of Education Sergei Kravtsov took to the stage with Valentina Nikolaevna Cherkasova. As a child, she survived the siege of Leningrad, and after the war, in 1949, she vacationed in Artek. Together they performed the song “Artek Oath”, written by journalists of “Pionerskaya Pravda” Vladimir Boganov and Anatoly Anufriev.

    “Today, Artek is the best international children’s center. Artek counselors are the best counselors in the world. Everyone who has ever been to Artek becomes an example for their peers. And just like 100 years ago, today all children strive to get to the center. We continue to support and develop Artek, its branches operate in the Zaporizhzhya region and in Sevastopol. The center trains school directors’ advisors on education. And we will do everything so that a piece of Artek is in the soul of every schoolchild,” noted Sergey Kravtsov.

    Guests of the anniversary concert were representatives of 89 regions of Russia. Among them were ministers of education, heads of subjects, children recognized as stars of “Artek” in different years, veterans of the International Children’s Center “Artek”. In addition, the event was attended by foreign delegations from about 30 countries.

    “People from all over Russia and the world have gathered here in Moscow today – representatives of all regions, different ages and cultures. Artek has always been a symbol of childhood, dreams and international cooperation. And today it has once again proven its strength, bringing together those who believe in goodness, mutual understanding and common values. Schoolchildren and adults, counselors and guests – everyone brought their own history, traditions and energy here, creating a unique atmosphere of Artek warmth,” emphasized Konstantin Fedorenko, Director of the International Children’s Center “Artek”.

    On June 16, 2025, the International Children’s Center “Artek” will celebrate its 100th anniversary. Earlier, the State Duma and the Federation Council hosted thematic photo exhibitions. An important event was the publication of the decree of President Vladimir Putin on awarding the Artek team with the Order of Honor.

    Five films were shot for the anniversary, including the film “100 Years of Happy Childhood”, the premiere of which was organized in January 2025. Together with Samara University and the Foundation for Assistance to Innovations, a branded small spacecraft was launched into space, and on February 28, a launch vehicle with the anniversary logo of “Artek” was launched at the Baikonur Cosmodrome. At the end of May, the anniversary shift started at the children’s center, which will last until June 17-18.

    On June 5, there will be a press screening of the adventure film “Artek. Through the Centuries”, which was filmed on the territory of the International Children’s Center. On June 9, the GUM (Moscow) will host the opening of an exhibition under the slogan “Artek at 100!”, where unique archival materials will be presented. Guests will also enjoy an interactive program from the camp counselors. On June 12, the International Children’s Festival “Let There Always Be Sunshine” will start.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: “The AI Mothership Has Landed”: Legendary Tech Investor Reveals Musk’s Most Powerful Project Yet

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — In a new briefing from bestselling author and tech entrepreneur James Altucher, startling revelations are emerging about Musk’s most ambitious AI undertaking yet — a project known as “Project Colossus.”

    According to Altucher, this facility — now operational in Memphis — will soon power what he calls Artificial Superintelligence, ushering in a second wave of AI unlike anything we’ve seen before. And it’s happening alongside the return of Donald Trump, who Altucher says has already “cleared the path” for AI developers like Musk to move forward at full speed.

    Musk’s “AI Mothership” Quietly Built in Memphis

    Altucher opens his briefing with a bold claim: Elon Musk has already surpassed all major tech competitors — including OpenAI, Meta, and Microsoft — with a covert project few have even heard of.

    “Elon Musk has created the AI mothership… an innovation of such enormous proportion… that he has already surpassed all the leading AI developers.”

    “Right here, inside this warehouse in Memphis, Tennessee… lies a massive supercomputer Musk calls ‘Project Colossus.’”

    According to Altucher, this isn’t speculation — it’s already functional and has been acknowledged by Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, who reportedly called it:

    “The fastest supercomputer on the planet.” — Jensen Huang

    AI 2.0: The Rise of Artificial Superintelligence

    Altucher claims the world is on the verge of an entirely new technological era — one that goes beyond ChatGPT and the public’s current understanding of AI.

    “This will lead to the rise of AI 2.0… Or what I call ‘Artificial Superintelligence.’

    “AI 1.0 gives us all the world’s knowledge at our fingertips. AI 2.0… gives that knowledge to intelligent machines that I believe will solve our problems for us.”

    A Presidential Greenlight

    In the same briefing, Altucher highlights Donald Trump’s early move to eliminate restrictions that were previously in place under President Biden.

    “In one of his FIRST acts as President… Donald Trump overturned Executive Order #14110.”

    “That’s why Donald Trump REPEALED Biden’s AI executive safety order on Day 1… Clearing the path for leading AI developers like Musk.”

    Trump has also unveiled a $500 billion AI infrastructure plan, which Altucher says reflects the seriousness of the new administration’s approach.

    “Trump also announced the LARGEST AI investment in history… Stargate… a massive, AI data center and infrastructure project with an estimated $500 billion price tag.”

    What Comes Next: A 10X Expansion?

    Altucher warns that the biggest developments are yet to come — and soon.

    “In a matter of weeks, Elon plans to unveil a critical new update to Project Colossus that is expected to increase its power by 10-fold.”

    “That’s when I predict Elon could announce a major update to this new AI project. One that some say will essentially 10X its power – overnight.”

    He adds, “This second wave of ARTIFICIAL SUPERINTELLIGENCE… Will rival all of the great innovations of the past. Electricity… the wheel… even the discovery of fire.”

    A Life’s Work Converging

    Altucher isn’t just reporting from the sidelines — he claims to have been immersed in AI for more than 40 years.

    “I’ve been working in the artificial intelligence field for the better part of the last four decades.”

    “I helped pioneer AI trading on Wall Street.”

    “At one point, I was recruited by IBM to help them develop their Deep Blue AI supercomputer… the one that beat the world chess champion, Gary Kasprov, in 1997.”

    What’s at Stake

    Altucher closes his report by pointing to a quote from Russian President Vladimir Putin as a sobering reminder of what this technology represents on the world stage.

    “Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” — Vladimir Putin

    With Trump clearing regulatory barriers and Musk ramping up development, Altucher believes the United States is poised to enter a defining moment in global technology leadership.

    About James Altucher

    James Altucher is a former hedge fund manager, computer scientist, and the author of over 20 books on finance, technology, and personal growth. A longtime pioneer in digital innovation, Altucher has advised startups, traded for top funds, and interviewed some of the most influential figures in business and tech. His latest work focuses on exposing the hidden infrastructure behind emerging AI technologies and preparing readers for the changes ahead.

    Media Contact:
    Derek Warren
    Public Relations Manager
    Paradigm Press Group
    Email: dwarren@paradigmpressgroup.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy – A10-0092/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on strengthening rural areas in the EU through cohesion policy

    (2024/2105(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ (COM(2024)0450),

     having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on EU border regions: living labs of European integration[1],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 May 2025 on the ninth report on economic and social cohesion[2],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 15 March 2023 on targets and tools for a smart rural Europe[3],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 1 December 2022 on enhancing Cohesion Policy support for regions with geographic and demographic handicaps  (Article 174 TFEU)[4],

     having regard to Articles 39, 174, 175 and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2116 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 on the financing, management and monitoring of the common agricultural policy and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[8],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[9],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/694 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Digital Europe Programme and repealing Decision (EU) 2015/2240[10],

     having regard to the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 240/2014 of 7 January 2014 on the European code of conduct on partnership in the framework of the European Structural and Investment Funds[11],

     having regard to Principle 20 of the European Pillar of Social Rights on access to essential services,

     having regard to its resolution of 4 April 2017 on women and their roles in rural areas[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the role of cohesion policy in promoting innovative and smart transformation and regional ICT connectivity[13],

     having regard to its resolution of 13 December 2022 on a long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas – towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040[14],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions[15],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 June 2021 entitled ‘A long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas – Towards stronger, connected, resilient and prosperous rural areas by 2040’ (COM(2021)0345),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food – Shaping together an attractive farming and agri-food sector for future generations (COM(2025)0075),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 25 March 2021 on an action plan for the development of organic production (COM(2021)0141),

     having regard to the Commission report of 17 June 2020 on the impact of demographic change (COM(2020)0241),

     having regard to the Commission green paper of 27 January 2021 on ageing – fostering solidarity and responsibility between generations (COM(2021)0050),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘A Farm to Fork Strategy for a fair, healthy and environmentally-friendly food system’ (COM(2020)0381),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 May 2020 entitled ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 – Bringing nature back into our lives’ (COM(2020)0380),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 November 2021 entitled ‘EU Soil Strategy for 2030 – Reaping the benefits of healthy soils for people, food, nature and climate’ (COM(2021)0699),

     having regard to the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and Other People Working in Rural Areas, adopted by the Human Rights Council on 28 September 2018,

     having regard to general recommendation No 34 (2016) of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women on the rights of rural women, adopted on 7 March 2016,

     having regard to its resolution of 3 May 2022 on the EU action plan for organic agriculture[16],

     having regard to the study commissioned by Parliament’s Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development entitled ‘The future of the European Farming Model: Socio-economic and territorial implications of the decline in the number of farms and farmers in the EU’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in April 2022,

     having regard to its resolution of 24 March 2022 on the need for an urgent EU action plan to ensure food security inside and outside the EU in light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine[17],

     having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2018 on addressing the specific needs of rural, mountainous and remote areas[18],

     having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2021 on the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives[19],

     having regard to the Commission report of August 2019 entitled ‘Evaluation of the impact of the CAP on generational renewal, local development and jobs in rural areas’[20],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Committee of the Regions of 26 January 2022 entitled ‘A long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[21],

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘How post-27 LEADER and CLLD programming could contribute to better implementation of the long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas’[22],

     having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 23 March 2022 entitled ‘Long-term Vision for the EU’s Rural Areas’[23],

     having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on generational renewal in the EU farms of the future[24],

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report on the future of the single market, published in April 2024,

     having regard to the study requested by Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development, entitled ‘EU Cohesion Policy in non-urban areas’, published by the Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies in September 2020,

     having regard to the declaration on the future of rural areas and rural development policy in the European Union, adopted by the Rural Pact Coordination Group on 12 December 2024,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0092/2025),

    A. whereas, currently, 137 million European citizens – nearly one in three – live in rural areas, which account for approximately 83 % of the EU’s territory; whereas one third of the population of rural areas lives in a border region; whereas 77 % of land used for farming (134 million hectares) and 79 % of forest (148 million hectares) are located in rural areas;

    B. whereas according to Eurostat, average income in rural areas is 87.5 % of average income in urban areas;

    C. whereas there are still disparities in cohesion policy funding between urban and rural areas, with urban areas receiving three times more cohesion funding than rural areas[25];

    D. whereas since 1991, in rural areas, the LEADER method, subsequently covered by the community-led local development policy instrument (CLLD) through local action groups (LAGs), has demonstrated that it can mobilise and empower local actors around innovative and tailored strategies;

    E. whereas rural areas are a cornerstone of the European economy, home to many ‘hidden European Champions’, and are integral to Europe’s cultural diversity; whereas they are essential for food production and security, serving as guardians of our landscapes, living rural heritage, social and cultural traditions; whereas they play a key role in promoting the strategic autonomy of the EU through the agricultural sector, which remains a strategic priority of the EU; whereas rural areas symbolise many of the aspects that make Europe attractive and liveable;

    F. whereas the promotion of minority languages can enhance awareness of local specificities, increasing the attractiveness of tourism and fostering economic activities linked to culture, education, craftsmanship and traditional products;

    G. whereas the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted a shift in perception among the public, who have recognised the potential of rural areas as a solution to the challenges arising from crises by providing a safer, more sustainable and reliable living environment;

    H. whereas cohesion policy funds alone cannot answer the increasing needs and challenges faced by rural areas in the EU; whereas greater synergies and complementarities with other EU policies, in particular with the common agricultural policy (CAP), must be ensured in order to maximise the impact of investments in rural areas, advancing the modernisation of agriculture and the development of essential services and infrastructure;

    I. whereas over 40 % of land in rural areas is used for agriculture yet sadly the contribution of agriculture, forestry and fisheries to rural regions has decreased, both in economic and employment terms, to 12 % of all jobs and 4 % of gross value added;

    J. whereas Parliament’s study on the future of the European farming model notes that the EU could lose 6.4 million farms by 2040, falling from 10.3 million in 2016 to 3.9 million;

    K. whereas, in accordance with Articles 174, 175 and 349 TFEU, the EU aims to reduce development gaps between the different regions and coordinate its policies, including using the European Structural and Investment Funds to achieve the objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion, with a particular focus on rural areas;

    L. whereas all regions must remain eligible for funding in future cohesion policy, even strong regions facing significant transformation challenges;

    M. whereas regional actors have a deeper understanding of which projects should be prioritised for support through cohesion funds, ensuring that resources are allocated in a way that best meets the specific needs of their territories;

    N. whereas cohesion policy funds to rural areas should be further simplified with the objective of reducing administrative burdens, not only for the final beneficiaries but also for the relevant authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    O. whereas rural areas in particular are facing demographic and structural challenges, such as ageing, population decline, brain drain, growing inequalities between men and women, disparities with urban areas, structural changes in the agricultural and forestry sectors, the consequences of natural disasters, the increase of energy and transport prices, a lack of services and infrastructure, in particular for vulnerable people and persons with disabilities, the impact of these challenges on income level and on the labour market, with a consequent higher unemployment rate, and a persistently large digital gap;

    P. whereas demographic challenges are particularly acute in the EU farming population, with the majority of farmers being over 50 years old;

    Q. whereas strengthening cohesion in rural areas requires the adoption of measures and initiatives aimed at supporting families, also by helping young people and parents in balancing family and professional life, thereby contributing to the sustainable development of those communities;

    R. whereas Europe’s rural areas and European farmers already play a crucial role in the climate transition, as they are the most affected by climate change both economically and socially, and whereas thanks to their efforts, some of the adverse impact of agriculture on the environment has been significantly reduced over the years; whereas the EU agricultural sector significantly reduced its greenhouse gas emissions by 24 % between 1990 and 2021 and it is responsible for 72 % of renewable energy production and holds 78 % of the untapped potential;

    S. whereas demographic changes do not affect all countries and regions equally, but have a greater impact on less developed regions, as they exacerbate existing territorial and social imbalances; whereas solutions must be found for regional imbalances and for the uneven pace of convergence between regions, some of which remain stuck in a development trap; whereas less developed regions require particular attention and support, as is the case with the EU’s rural areas and the outermost regions, due to their specific characteristics;

    T. whereas the overall percentage of the population living in rural areas has fallen significantly across the EU over the past 50 years, particularly as a result of ageing and emigration; whereas the highest percentage of people over the age of 65 is found in rural areas[26]; whereas estimates suggest that by 2033 the population of Europe’s rural areas will have shrunk by 30 million people compared with 1993;

    U. whereas the lack of or poor access to healthcare, water services, affordable housing, transport, digital infrastructure, education, financial services and recreational and cultural activities worsen the reputation of regions, and particularly rural, borderland, inland, cross-border, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as places to live and work, especially for women, young people, ageing populations and minorities; whereas cross-border areas are particularly affected by the lack of regional connectivity in terms of transport and digital infrastructure; whereas rural areas are strongly affected by the lack of stable employment opportunities, which forces young people, in particular women, to migrate;

    V. whereas the availability and quality of water play a critical role in ensuring equitable, sustainable and productive rural livelihoods;

    W. whereas greater emphasis should be placed on preventive measures to strengthen the resilience of Europe’s rural areas to natural disasters; whereas an integrated approach to water resources management is essential both to prevent floods and to cope with droughts, in particular through a coherent use of EU funds;

    X. whereas rural areas, especially in eastern, southern and Mediterranean Europe, are the most directly affected by energy poverty and face specific challenges related to desertification, forest fires, climate change and its associated asymmetrical risks, water resource scarcity and weak infrastructure, which require a targeted approach within cohesion policy;

    Y. whereas rural areas are home to the majority of the EU’s biodiversity, yet protected habitats and species remain in poor conservation status and continue to decline due to climate change and the degradation of soil and water quality, with a negative impact on natural resources; whereas biodiversity loss has severe economic consequences for the agricultural sector and negatively affects the attractiveness of rural tourism;

    Z. whereas the clean energy transition, the diversification of the economy and the expansion of renewable energy sources present significant opportunities for rural and less developed regions, allowing them to leverage their natural resources and geographic advantages and to exploit their full potential for the future production of renewable energy;

    AA. whereas these areas bear the brunt of depopulation, and whereas it is mainly young people leaving them as a result of job shortages and dim career prospects, and this fuels the rural exodus, resulting in an increased share of older residents and a greater risk of social isolation;

    AB. whereas rural areas have the highest share (12.6 %) of young people aged 15-29[27] not in employment, education or training (NEETs);

    AC. whereas generational renewal is one of the nine key objectives of the CAP;

    AD. whereas farms, dairy farms, wine-growers and olive oil producers across Europe go out of business every day, and few farms like these are managed by farmers below the age of 35; whereas the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities and also risks for economic, social and territorial cohesion, as well as for European agriculture;

    AE. whereas the way we produce food has shaped the landscapes that define Europe; whereas dynamic rural areas foster quality food production which in turn supports their economy; whereas reinvigorating these connections between food and territory and revitalising rural areas will be essential for the future of farming in Europe;

    AF. whereas a robust cohesion policy is essential to guaranteeing the effective application of the ‘right to stay’ principle in rural areas, which requires action on many levels, including by fostering economic stability and preventing depopulation; stresses that ensuring access to a basic set of public goods and services for all citizens, especially young people, regardless of where they live, is crucial; whereas it is necessary, to this end, to promote targeted investment in infrastructure, services, education, and innovation;

    1. Welcomes the Commission report of 27 March 2024 entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’ and agrees with its overarching objectives;

    2. Takes note of the four areas of action underpinning the rural vision and the 30 actions making up the EU rural action plan; calls on the Commission and the Member States to place its implementation at the top of the agenda;

    3. Stresses the key role rural areas have to play in shaping the economic models and the social and territorial organisation of the various Member States, particularly as the cradle of agricultural and food production, but also as custodians of an irreplaceable cultural and landscape heritage; notes, however, that their significance remains under-appreciated and inadequately funded; believes that the EU has a duty to push for a true revival and regeneration of these areas, going to extra lengths to endow our rural areas with the right tools to overcome the considerable long-term challenges they are facing and which are having an ever greater impact on regional competitiveness and social cohesion, in order to preserve European diversity and ensure that the Union’s progress does not come at the expense of rural areas and their populations;

    4. Considers it important to develop short supply chains and to promoting the use of labelling schemes to acknowledge the quality and variety of traditional products from rural areas; stresses that public canteens, such as school and hospital canteens, can play a significant role in the development of short agrifood supply chains;

    5. Recognises the key role of small and medium-sized towns as development centres in rural regions and calls on the Commission and the Member States to specifically strengthen their economic, social and infrastructural functions, revitalise city centres, better utilise synergies between rural areas and large metropolitan regions, and ensure more balanced territorial development;

    6. Stresses the urgent need for measures to combat poverty in rural areas by developing targeted strategies to improve social security, create economic opportunities, and support particularly vulnerable populations, in order to break the cycle of poverty;

    7. Stresses that rural areas are key players in mitigating the effects of climate change; emphasises the need for increased investment in research and innovation for rural areas, particularly in the fields of sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, digital transformation and innovative mobility solutions, to enhance the competitiveness and resilience of rural regions and create energy self-sufficiency and new employment opportunities; encourages the sustainable management of forests and the prevention of forest fires, also by promoting the use of biomass which is gathered without harm to forest ecosystems;

    8. Calls for the expansion of renewable energy in rural areas based on their potential to reduce energy costs with the involvement of civil society and local communities; emphasises the need for financial incentives, measures such as renewable energy communities and simplified administrative processes to boost regional energy independence and sustainability while avoiding negative impacts on food production, land availability and prices, as well as on social cohesion; calls for a dedicated financing mechanism for the installation of photovoltaic, wind and other renewable energy sources;

    9. Calls for increased support for the preservation, restoration and conversion of older buildings, including historical buildings, churches and other places of worship, sports halls and schools in rural areas to improve energy efficiency, sustainability and safety; urges investments in the modernisation of public infrastructure while preserving historical structures where possible; calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote targeted policies that support the renovation and energy-efficient retrofitting of rural housing, financial incentives for first-time rural homebuyers, in particular for young people and families, and the development of sustainable and affordable housing projects adapted to the needs of local communities that contribute to the attractiveness and revitalisation of these regions;

    10. Asks the Commission to assess and to implement Article 174, 175 and 349 TFEU in full to close the development gap among regions, including in relation to infrastructure, and to see to it that all EU policies not only apply the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, but also that they follow a more assertive ‘promote cohesion’ approach wherever possible, particularly in rural areas and in areas particularly affected by industrial transition, demographic challenges and depopulation, and those at risk of depopulation, such as outermost regions, islands, border, cross-border and mountain regions;

    11. Calls on the Commission to devise a rural strategy for the post-2027 programming period; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure the incorporation of a rural dimension in relevant policies and to make sure that the strategy promotes the economic and social development of rural areas and to allocate specific resources to the modernisation of agriculture, supporting rural small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and start-up and promoting short supply chains in order to make rural areas more connected, competitive, resilient and attractive to young people and investors, thereby ensuring balanced and sustainable development in the long term and enhancing the quality of life; stresses, in this regard, the importance of having a truly effective rural proofing mechanism at EU level so to assess the potential of all relevant policies and to mitigate any possible negative impacts they may have on rural areas;

    12. Stresses that in order to ensure the long-term prosperity of rural areas and support a strong agricultural sector to maintain this prosperity in rural areas, it is essential to strengthen the synergies between EU Structural and Investment Funds and Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research and innovation programme, and the CAP in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    13. Calls on the Commission to present, by 2027, a report on the application of the rural proofing mechanism to policies and interventions at EU level, as well as the results obtained;

    14. Calls on the Commission to prioritise focused investments and policy measures to support the transition to a new generation of farmers in order to modernise EU agriculture and create more opportunities in rural areas;

    15. Highlights the crucial role of cohesion policy for the development of rural areas as a decentralised, powerful tool for economic and social development, allowing all regions to tackle these specific challenges of the Union; underlines in this regard that cohesion policy should continue to be a key pillar of the MFF post-2027, with an allocation that is maintained at a minimum threshold equivalent to the current MFF 2021-2027 levels, ensuring its fundamental role in reducing regional disparities and shaping a more resilient and competitive Europe that leaves no one behind; calls for the option of providing adequate resources for rural and mountainous areas to be explored in the next cohesion policy framework and complementing GDP at regional level with other indicators; recalls that the fundamental principles of cohesion policy, such as partnership, multi-level-governance, a place-based approach and shared management, must be respected in order to foster development and to meet the specific needs and challenges of rural areas with a particular focus on tools supporting sustainable growth and development and youth and female employment, including among victims of violence against women, and improving services and infrastructure;

    16. Believes that smart specialisation and economic diversification strategies could promote more opportunities in rural areas; emphasises, in particular, the key importance of integrating the concept of smart villages into cohesion policy and of explicitly supporting the development of smart villages, with flexible funding and an integrated approach, as an innovative tool for enhancing the quality of life and revitalising rural areas and services through digital and social innovation and initiatives such as the promotion of working spaces in order to attract workers, including remote workers, and to contribute to revitalising local economies;

    17. Encourages initiatives that promote economic and social sustainability, including support for rural entrepreneurship, rural tourism and new business models based on innovation and digitalisation;

    18. Calls on the Commission to ensure a strong and holistic focus on the development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, in such a way that all policy initiatives are consistent with the goal of reducing territorial disparities; believes it is essential to devise long-term strategies to support rural areas, centred on the principles of cohesion and sustainability and providing the necessary tools to address demographic, social and economic challenges, in order to ensure that these areas do not become forgotten places, but rather key players in Europe’s future without needing to continually depend on extraordinary measures; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to support the significant development of rural areas in the future cohesion policy, and to commit to setting up local info points and offering a platform and financial support to enable Member States to exchange information and best practice on funding possibilities, with a view to providing local authorities with effective support and assisting with resource management and the implementation of development initiatives; emphasises, furthermore, that the effective participation of regional, local and rural authorities and a strong administrative capacity are crucial for the reduction of the excessive administrative burden and complex requirements for recipients and for the effective execution of cohesion policy funds; highlights that multi-funding still appears difficult in some countries and calls on the Commission to enhance complementarities between the EAFRD and cohesion policy funds;

    19. Stresses the need for an integrated European strategy for the revitalisation of rural areas, including through the development of bio-districts, recognising their potential to diversify the rural economy by targeting fiscal, economic and social measures to maintain the active population; also highlights the value of introducing incentives for the relocation of health, education and public administration professionals, as well as the importance of partnerships between local authorities and the private sector for the creation of new jobs;

    20. Underlines that expanding integrated territorial investment (ITI) plans and unlocking their full potential could establish them as a cornerstone for integrated regional, local, and rural development; emphasises that strengthening ITIs’ role in rural areas is essential to foster territorial cohesion, enhance connectivity and drive inclusive economic growth by supporting key sectors such as agriculture, rural SMEs, tourism and renewable energy; calls, furthermore, for greater flexibility in ITI implementation, increased financial allocations and reinforced synergies with other EU funding mechanisms, including LEADER and CLLD, key instruments for fostering bottom-up participatory rural development and for keeping and restoring living and thriving local rural economies, to maximise impact and actively involve regional and local authorities and civil society in line with the partnership principle;

    21. Suggests that all relevant Directorates-General of the Commission conduct a territorial impact assessment of their respective policies at least twice per programming period; believes that these evaluations would establish a more precise baseline and identify ways to integrate the characteristics of rural areas into EU policies more effectively;

    22. Calls on the Member States to make full use of all measures supporting rural, inland, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as cross-border regions and regions at the EU’s external borders, including those bordering Russia, Belarus and Ukraine which are most affected by the war, to mitigate economic disruption and to secure their future and prosperity; welcomes the new BRIDGEforEU Regulation and asks the Member States to implement it, enhancing the cooperation between cross-border regions to enable economies of scale when providing basic services and infrastructure in the rural areas affected;

    23. Stresses the diversity of the EU’s rural areas, for which the long-term vision calls for solutions that are tailored to the needs and resources of rural areas while reinforcing long-term strategies for sustainable growth; underlines in this regard the need to fully involve local and regional authorities, which are best placed to identify current challenges and needs at the regional and local levels; highlights the importance of maintaining a decentralised model for the programming and implementation of cohesion policy based on the principle of partnership and multi-level governance and a place-based bottom-up approach; calls, therefore, for the strong involvement of regional and local authorities to ensure more direct access for local and regional authorities to cohesion policy funds, reducing bureaucratic complexity and shortening disbursement times, through more streamlined procedures, intuitive digital platforms and increased technical support for local beneficiaries; proposes encouraging the use of pre-financing and advance payment schemes for small projects in rural areas;

    24. Stresses that centralisation may lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies and delays in fund absorption, ultimately reducing the effectiveness of EU investments in rural development;

    25. Highlights that the management approach to rural areas’ development policies needs to be coordinated, integrated and multi-sectoral in its implementation and that reinforcing a multi-level approach in line with the subsidiarity principle is essential to ensure its success;

    26. Highlights that resilience is essential to enable authorities at local and regional levels to mitigate, adapt to and recover from sudden challenges, ensuring community well-being, security and long-term sustainability;

    27. Calls for an adequate share of cohesion policy funding to be allocated to the border regions and calls in this regard for the European Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTCs) to be granted a higher degree of autonomy in selecting projects and using funds, in particular by designating EGTCs as managing authorities for Interreg programmes, strengthening their institutional and financial capacity; recommends furthermore that EGTCs be granted a more significant role in achieving policy objective 5, namely bringing Europe closer to its citizens;

    28. Underlines the need to strengthen democratic and political participation in rural areas by promoting active civic engagement and digital tools; calls on the Commission to support initiatives that foster local democratic processes to improve cohesion between urban and rural regions;

    29. Highlights the need for rural areas to be able to provide essential high-quality services of general interest to the public to improve their livelihood and to harness their strengths to achieve sustainable development, for which they should receive sufficient financial support; underlines, to that end, the need to provide equal access, in particular to vulnerable people and people with disabilities, to all healthcare services, transport and connectivity services, including innovative mobility solutions, specific plans for affordable housing, water services, education and training services, digital infrastructure, and other basic services such as postal and banking services, ensuring their accessibility and affordability in order to guarantee proper living conditions; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to facilitate access to funding and tailored support measures for social economy initiatives that address local needs and contribute to regional development and, at the same time, to reinforce the financial support offered to rural SMEs, in particular through easing access to financial resources, cooperatives and local value chains that foster economic diversification;

    30. Stresses the strategic importance of water resources for rural areas and highlights the need to provide sufficient resources, under the cohesion policy and in rural development programmes, for maintaining and upgrading the water network; recommends, in particular, the inclusion of measures to combat leakage, improve the efficiency of supply systems and promote the sustainable use of water resources in rural areas;

    31. Regards it as essential to place greater emphasis on preventive measures to enhance the resilience of Europe’s rural areas in the face of natural disasters; believes that an integrated approach to managing water resources is paramount in order to simultaneously prevent floods and tackle drought – two growing threats in many rural regions – within both agriculture and the food sector; acknowledges that depending on the context, building dams and reservoirs or upgrading existing facilities is a priority, while striking a balance between built infrastructure and relatively low cost soft measures, not least because they can be a clean source of energy; notes that although cohesion policy already supports initiatives in this area, additional projects and increased investment are needed, in line with national and regional risk management strategies, to ensure that rural areas are better prepared for, and able to withstand, climate-related extreme weather events;

    32. Stresses the growing threat of climate risks such as natural disasters, desertification and water scarcity for many rural areas in Europe, particularly in southern Europe and in the Mediterranean basin; calls on the Commission to promote forward looking adaptation strategies at national, regional and local levels, including water management, resilient infrastructure and disaster preparedness, and calls for investments in innovative water infrastructure, such as the reuse of treated wastewater and smart irrigation systems, and the construction of reservoirs for rainwater harvesting;

    33. Notes that rural areas suffer from limited access to essential healthcare services, with a shortage of facilities and medical personnel, and therefore calls for improved access to quality healthcare, including mental health services;

    34. Calls on the Member States and local authorities to safeguard essential services that are vital to the development of rural areas by refraining from imposing economic constraints on healthcare in rural areas, as this would lead to the closure, or a fall in the number of, first-aid facilities and basic hospital structures, which should be strengthened;

    35. Calls on the Commission and Member States to develop a plan for mobile medical units and for telemedicine, the strengthening of medical services including medical spa services, community health nurses and digital health solutions and incentives for doctors working in rural and remote areas;

    36. Calls on the Commission to incorporate specific measures targeting areas identified as rural into its eHealth strategy, in order to provide local healthcare units with practical support for technological upgrades, and to promote the services such units offer; stresses that Member States should also be offered a screening programme targeting rural areas and that administrative support should also be put in place to assist with the drawing up of plans and prevention registers; calls on the Member States to take into account the particular characteristics of these areas and to encourage rural pharmacies to be set up, in order to specifically adapt pharmacy networks to a rural area, with coordination arrangements for medicines and medical devices supply, with the aim of streamlining and adapting the needs of healthcare units to the individual area; calls on the Member States to improve the provision of primary care and support services among these pharmacies termed ‘rural’;

    37. Highlights the key role that infrastructure development has to play in the economic and social growth of rural areas, given the need for transport systems, particularly public ones, with the capacity to improve connectivity and access to essential services, for energy networks, including renewables, and for suitable digital connectivity infrastructure; notes, in particular, that the quality of transport and digital connectivity should be improved so that people have easy access to labour, schools, hospitals, public services and job opportunities; underlines that road, rail and maritime transport links need to be developed or upgraded through EU co-funded programmes to reduce the isolation of rural areas, in particular from urban centres, narrowing the existing gap, and to facilitate sustainable mobility of people and goods; calls for a comprehensive strategy to improve mobility in rural areas, with a strong focus on sustainability, the expansion of charging infrastructure and the promotion of e-mobility; emphasises the need for targeted investments in public transport, shared mobility solutions and alternative transport models to ensure accessibility and connectivity for rural populations;

    38. Stresses that the digital divide between rural and urban areas remains significant, hindering equal opportunities for all residents; calls on the Commission and the Member States to accelerate investments in broadband connectivity, including 5G, better mobile coverage, high-speed internet networks, digital farming solutions and rural innovation hubs, ensuring that digital transformation benefits rural communities, while paying special attention to the regions less prepared for this transformation, including remote areas and outermost regions; stresses that these investments are crucial to enhancing productivity, supporting small farms’ entrepreneurship, facilitating remote working, accessing e-services and online teaching and ensuring that rural areas remain competitive in the digital age; stresses the need for digital literacy and vocational training initiatives to support the integration of digital technologies into the rural economy and to bridge the existing technological and economic divides;

    39. Stresses the importance and interconnectedness of military mobility, rural infrastructure development and regional security; underlines the overlap between the EU military mobility network and the Trans-European Transport Network;

    40. Calls for strategies to address vacant buildings and promote alternative housing concepts in rural areas, including affordable housing, renovation projects and intergenerational living; emphasises the need for incentives to repurpose empty properties, support community-driven housing initiatives and ensure sustainable, inclusive living spaces;

    41. Stresses the importance of promoting priority policies that support young people, as the main actors of the rural exodus, and calls on the Commission to ensure them an effective application of the ‘right to stay’ through targeted measures, designed to stem the demographic decline in rural areas and to encourage talented people to remain there; believes that individuals who wish to contribute to the development of their local communities should be provided with ample opportunities, and that it is therefore urgent to eliminate barriers and the significant disparities between young people in urban and rural areas in terms of access to high quality education, economic independence, social and political engagement, and intergenerational social interaction; calls for concrete measures and targeted funding programmes, including a brain drain action plan from the Commission, to support young people and young entrepreneurs, providing them with all the tools and resources they need to help them to access agricultural lands, jobs and business opportunities; notes that such measures should include improved access to public services, educational and cultural facilities, access to housing, low-interest loans and, with due regard to the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, tax-related incentives to help young people build a stable future in line with their aspirations, without needing to abandon their place of origin, and creating incentives to settle down in or return to rural areas; considers it necessary, therefore, to promote measures to diversify the rural economy by harnessing local potential, including in areas outside agriculture and tourism, and to create quality jobs;

    42. Highlights the importance of boosting vocational education and training while also fostering youth-led initiatives and non-formal learning for young people to develop specific skills related to the economy of rural areas, as a tool for social cohesion and quality employment, with a view to combating depopulation in those areas;

    43. Highlights the key role of awareness raising and knowledge-sharing campaigns in advancing various education campaigns and programmes, and the importance of making them an integral part of school curricula; stresses the increasingly worrying data on early school leaving and to that end, calls on national and local authorities to reorganise their school systems to guarantee the right to education in their territories, bearing in mind the serious and objective difficulties they may face; calls on the Member States and local authorities, therefore, not to merge existing schools management structures in those areas;

    44. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to provide for new subsidised credit facilities that can support young entrepreneurs and women in their activities, including alternative forms of guarantees for access to credit; calls for financial support to empower young farmers, ensuring growth in rural economies;

    45. Welcomes the new EUR 3 billion loan financing package from the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group for agriculture, forestry and fisheries across Europe as a tangible initiative to close the funding gaps for SMEs in agriculture and the bio-economy and facilitate financing for young farmers and women; calls on the EIB Group to explore new forms of support to provide liquidity for actors along agricultural and rural value chains;

    46. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote local start-ups and incentive programmes for the return of young people and for the purchase and renovation of housing by young people in rural areas;

    47. Calls on the Commission to establish a European fund for youth entrepreneurship in rural areas, with a special focus on regions affected by high youth unemployment and brain drain; notes that this fund should support rural start-ups, innovative agriculture, sustainable tourism and digitalisation through dedicated financial instruments and tax incentives;

    48. Draws attention to the need for universal equal access to measures enabling everyone to develop the high-quality skills they need to achieve their professional goals, and to vocational and educational training; laments the fact that in rural areas, in many fields, the work of women is currently not rewarded with equal opportunities and conditions, as they often face extra challenges, including limited access to job opportunities, a lack of adequate measures to help them juggle work and family, and a shortage of childcare facilities; emphasises the need to foster an environment conducive to female employment, with support for all families, ensuring high quality early childhood education and care systems and parental support;

    49. Calls for increased support for women in rural areas, particularly through measures to improve access to employment, education, healthcare and social infrastructure, as well as protection from violence and violence prevention, to promote their economic and social participation; emphasises that targeted programmes should be created to support female entrepreneurs in rural regions in order to strengthen their economic independence;

    50. Stresses that support for women in rural areas is imperative for a variety of reasons, including promoting gender equality, fostering economic growth, advancing community development, reducing poverty and ensuring environmental sustainability; highlights that women play a multilevel role in rural development, as workers, farmers and business owners, and stresses that their importance in rural areas and local economies is often overlooked; stresses that special attention should be paid to women in rural areas when designing structural social support and regional development programmes; highlights that addressing these barriers is crucial for empowering women and unlocking their full potential in rural communities;

    51. Calls on the Member States and the Commission to boost awareness regarding existing and future EU funding possibilities for women entrepreneurs in rural areas and to make it easier for them to access financial support; encourages the Member States and regional and local authorities to make use of the existing EU structural and investment funds to promote women entrepreneurs;

    52. Calls for gender-equality employment policies and targeted measures to promote a better work-life balance in rural areas, including flexible working models, digital work opportunities, improved leisure and education offerings, and the promotion of community-based care and support structures for families;

    53. Urges the Commission to adopt measures to protect the family farming model that underpins the rural territory, is more environmentally friendly and guarantees food security in the EU; stresses the need for a EU system of incentives to limit the accumulation of agricultural land in private investment funds and the consequent increase in land prices; insists on the protection of small and medium-sized farms by strengthening the role of cooperatives and professional farmers in EU policies; furthermore, encourages the Member States to implement concrete measures to support these farms by simplifying access to credit, modernising rural infrastructure and giving impetus to agricultural cooperatives;

    54. Stresses the key role played by agriculture and the agri-food sector in food production, ensuring food security in the EU and job creation – a role worth championing since as it constitutes a mainstay of the local economy and is a key factor in ensuring sustainable land management, and also drives the growth and development of inland and rural areas, which often enjoy international recognition for their outstanding typical products; notes that it is necessary to help farmers innovate and diversify, while at the same time fostering farm competitiveness; believes that the transition to a more sustainable model requires a balanced approach, mindful of local specificities and the economic needs of rural communities, without imposing changes liable to hinder their long-term development; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to take strong and targeted action by reducing excessive regulatory burdens and ensuring fair market conditions, to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and encourage generational renewal; calls for adequate support to promote food self-sufficiency and crop diversification; highlights in particular the specific structural challenges of the outermost regions and their rural areas;

    55. Urges the Commission and the Member States, in order to strengthen food security and ensure that European farmers do not face unfair competition from products that do not meet the same environmental, animal welfare and food security standards, to enforce strict equivalence of production standards for agricultural products imported into the EU and calls  on the Commission, in this regard, to ensure that trade agreements uphold European agricultural standards and ensure a level playing field for EU farmers;

    56. Acknowledges that the ambitious goals of the green transition entail opportunities as well as risks for EU agriculture; emphasises that the number of farms in the EU decreased between 2005 and 2020 by about 37 % and calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this regard, to take action to mitigate the decline in the number of farms and support their revenues and competitiveness, in order to stem the desertion of these areas and encourage generational renewal;

    57. Points to the need to simplify administrative procedures for accessing EU funds by reducing red tape for farmers and small rural businesses and improving coordination between the institutional levels involved in the management of funds in order to ensure that resources are provided more efficiently and in a more timely manner;

    58. Points also to the need to provide these areas, as well as businesses and farm and forest holders, with sufficient financial support, including support for the purchase and maintenance of equipment, with a view to increasing European competitiveness;

    59. Is fully aware that rural areas play a key role in the green and digital transitions; underlines that the transitions have to be implemented gradually, along the lines of achievable goals; calls in this regard for EU funding to be better linked with environmental sustainability and biodiversity protection;

    60. Highlights the need to support rural communities in European regions that have been most adversely affected by the trade in or export of Ukrainian agricultural products;

    61. Points to the importance of compensatory measures for farmers and rural businesses to ensure that the ecological transition is fair and practical and does not lead to new socio-economic disparities; highlight that for this transition to be successful, the full involvement and collaboration of all stakeholders, in particular farmers and foresters, will be key;

    62. Highlights that promoting agriculture is a necessary component of any strategy for rural development, but that on its own it is not sufficient, as not all people in rural areas are employed in the agricultural sector or live in agricultural structures;

    63. Recognises that tourism is frequently a major source of income for rural, mountainous, insular and outermost regions, as well as in the Mediterranean region, with the potential to encourage job creation and entrepreneurship and to draw in growing numbers of visitors curious to discover their nature, traditions and cultural heritage through the unique experiences on offer; believes, for that reason, that tourism should be supported through investment in the rural economy, in synergy with the agricultural, fishing, food and cultural sectors, and that the EU should promote the co-existence and further development of these sectors;

    64. Highlights that rural and agro-tourism can be a complementary activity to agriculture, offering opportunities for diversifying farm incomes and benefiting the development of rural areas, and that resources should therefore be allocated to the development of tourism and HoReCa activities;

    65. Underlines the need to promote rural tourism in a way that is sustainable; highlights the importance of optimising the economic benefits of tourism for rural areas, while minimising the potential negative impacts on local communities and ecosystems;

    66. Emphasises the importance of protecting and promoting linguistic minorities in the rural areas of the EU, recognising them as an integral part of Europe’s cultural heritage and as a driver of regional development; therefore calls on the Commission and the Member States to allocate cohesion policy resources to support projects for linguistic promotion, training, cultural tourism and local entrepreneurship connected to the linguistic and cultural traditions of the regions;

    67. Urges the Commission and the Member States to boost tourism in rural and depopulated areas or areas at risk of depopulation, by financing initiatives that enhance historic villages and traditional local products and establishing new green paths and other nature trails, as well as a label recognising outstanding environments in rural and nature tourism along similar lines to the ‘blue flag’ awarded to beaches;

    68. Notes that in some Member States, municipalities play a crucial role as drivers of regional economic development, benefiting from substantial tax revenues generated by their local economies; highlights that these revenues can motivate municipalities to invest EU cohesion funds in increasing their future tax base, promoting long-term local economic growth and securing long-term tax revenues; to this end, calls on the Commission, with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity in fiscal matters, to initiate a dialogue on the potential benefits of sharing taxes on economic activities with municipalities;

    69. Insists that excessive bureaucracy should not prevent farmers from focusing on sustainable food production and rural economic development; calls on the Commission and the Member States to include a strong rural dimension in the future cohesion policy regulations and to promote better regulation as a matter of priority, in order to reduce administrative burdens and to take steps to ensure the competitiveness of rural businesses, particularly SMEs, cooperatives and citizen-led communities, and to promote easier and more efficient access to funds, cost reductions and simplified application and evaluation processes for EU funding, especially for small beneficiaries; reaffirms that optimising procedures, cutting red tape and enhancing transparency are vital to improving access to the available resources; calls on the Commission, therefore, to provide adequate advisory services and technical assistance to managing authorities, thereby also contributing to increased absorption rates;

    70. Calls for a more integrated approach between EU industrial and cohesion policies, ensuring that regional development strategies are aligned with industrial transition efforts, particularly in northern, sparsely populated areas;

    71. Emphasises the importance of SMEs in technological sectors for rural digitalisation and economic resilience; calls on the Commission to ensure that public measures support local businesses and foster proximity-based economies, avoiding criteria that may disadvantage smaller enterprises;

    72. Stresses the need for better alignment between existing territorial development instruments and Structural Funds, including initiatives such as Harnessing Talent and the Covenant of Mayors;

    73. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility – A10-0098/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    (2024/2085(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     

     having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[1] (RRF Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC[2] (REPowerEU Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4] (MFF Regulation),

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[5] (the IIA),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[6] (Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility[9],

     having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’[10],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

     having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

     having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

     having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

     having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

     having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

     having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’[11],

     having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

     having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

     having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

     having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

     

    A. whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B. whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C. whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D. whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E. whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F. whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G. whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H. whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I. whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J. whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K. whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197.46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108.68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L. whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M. whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    N. whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    O. whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    P. whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    Q. whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

     

    1. Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2. Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3. Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4. Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5. Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1.4 % compared with 2.3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0.8 %; notes that the  long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6. Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7. Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8. Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation[14]; observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9. Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10. Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11. Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12. Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7.5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13. Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14. Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15. Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16. Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

     

    17. Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18. Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385.8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19. Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20. Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21. Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

     

    22. Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23. Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25. Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26. Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27. Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29. Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30. Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31. Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32. Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33. Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34. Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35. Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36. Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37. Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38. Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39. Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40. Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41. Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42. Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43. Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44. Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

     

    45. Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(3) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46. Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47. Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48. Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    49. Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    50. Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    51. Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    52. Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    53. Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    54. Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    55. Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2.8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

     

    56. Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    57. Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    58. Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    59. Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    60. Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    61. Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    62. Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    63. Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    64. Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    65. Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    66. Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    67. Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    68. Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    69. Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    70. Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    71. Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    72. Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    73. Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    74. Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    75. Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    76. Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    77. Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    78. Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    79. Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    80. Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    81. Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    82. Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    83. Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    84. Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    85. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes the Fifth Review under the Policy Coordination Instrument for Rwanda

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today concluded the fifth review under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI). The PCI continues to support Rwanda’s reform agenda aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability, promoting sustainable and inclusive growth, and advancing climate-resilient development.
    • Rwanda’s economic growth remains among the strongest in sub-Saharan Africa, despite rising fiscal and external pressures linked to large investment projects and reduced concessional financing. Continued fiscal consolidation, supported by stronger domestic revenue mobilization and spending efficiency, is essential to safeguard macroeconomic stability and debt sustainability.
    • Program performance under the PCI has been strong. All quantitative targets were met, and most reform commitments were implemented, including in SOE governance, monetary statistics, and digital public financial management. The approval of the comprehensive tax policy package and the rollout of the Global Master Repurchase Agreement were implemented with a delay. Rwanda continues to demonstrate leadership in integrating climate considerations into macroeconomic policy and leveraging institutional reforms to mobilize climate finance.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the fifth review under the Policy Coordination Instrument (PCI) for Rwanda.[1]

    Rwanda’s economy expanded by 8.9 percent in 2024, driven by a rebound in agriculture and continued strength in the services and construction sectors. Inflation remained within the National Bank of Rwanda’s 2–8 percent target band, reflecting tight monetary policy and improved domestic food supply. The current account deficit widened in 2024 due to strong consumer and capital goods imports, but reserves remained adequate at 4.7 months of imports as of end-year.

    Going forward, the fiscal position will be under pressure from the large infrastructure investment in the New Kigali International Airport and the expansion of RwandAir, as well as the recent pension reform. Public debt is expected to peak in FY2025/26, with the PCI debt anchor now projected to be reached in 2033. Accelerating domestic revenue mobilization and maintaining a credible fiscal consolidation path are crucial to restoring policy space and ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability. Continued vigilance is also needed to manage risks from SOEs, rising debt service costs, and constrained access to concessional financing.

    Monetary policy should remain data-driven to contain inflation and support external adjustment. Exchange rate flexibility will be essential to absorb shocks, while reforms to strengthen FX market functioning should continue. Close oversight of credit expansion—including in the microfinance sector—and improved monitoring of large exposures are important to safeguard financial stability.

    Program implementation under the PCI remains strong. All quantitative targets were met and most structural benchmarks for this review were completed, including those on SOE governance, PFM digitalization, and monetary statistics expansion. The remaining two structural benchmarks on the Cabinet approval of the comprehensive tax policy package and the rollout of the Global Master Repurchase Agreement were implemented with a delay. The authorities continue to build on the strong foundation established under the now-completed RSF. Progress on climate-related reforms has remained strong, including efforts to implement a climate budget tagging system, develop green taxonomies, and advance the climate finance agenda. Developing a pipeline of viable, bankable green projects will be essential to fully leverage available resources and sustain momentum.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Bo Li, Deputy Managing Director, and Acting Chair, made the following statement:

    “Rwanda’s economy has demonstrated impressive resilience, recording strong growth supported by robust activity in the services, construction, and agriculture sectors. Inflation has remained within the NBR target range, aided by prudent monetary policy and improved domestic food supply. However, the macroeconomic environment has become more complex due to a need to implement difficult reforms against the background of worsening external conditions, including aid withdrawals and regional tensions.

    “Sustaining fiscal consolidation remains vital to preserving macroeconomic stability and ensuring debt sustainability. The recently adopted tax reform package is a welcome step toward broadening the tax base and enhancing equity and efficiency. Continued expenditure rationalization and close monitoring of fiscal risks, particularly from SOEs and the ambitious priority investment project, are essential. The fiscal implications of pension reform and the financing needs for the priority infrastructure project must be carefully managed to maintain fiscal discipline.

    “Monetary and financial policies remain focused on stability, but vigilance is warranted. Inflationary pressures from fiscal loosening and tax policy changes may necessitate a tightening of the policy stance. Greater exchange rate flexibility is crucial to support external adjustment and safeguard reserve adequacy. The authorities’ efforts to modernize the monetary policy framework and strengthen FX market functioning are welcome. Enhancing risk monitoring, particularly in the microfinance sector, and large exposures, along with building additional capital buffers, will be key to safeguarding financial stability.

    “Rwanda continues to advance structural reforms under the PCI, including improvements in SOE governance, public financial management digitalization, and financial sector statistics. Progress on climate-related reforms under the RSF is commendable. Looking ahead, Rwanda’s efforts to build a pipeline of bankable green projects and improve climate finance coordination will be instrumental in mobilizing additional resources. Continued commitment to reform and strong engagement with development partners will be critical to sustaining progress and supporting Rwanda’s ambitious development agenda.”

    [1] The PCI arrangement was approved on December 12, 2022.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/pr-25178-rwanda-imf-concludes-the-5th-review-under-the-policy-coor-instrument

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the Third and Fourth Reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement and Approves US$58 Million Disbursement for the Central African Republic

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board today completed the third and fourth reviews under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for the Central African Republic (CAR). The completion of the third and fourth reviews allows for an immediate disbursement of SDR 43.22 million (about US$58 million) to CAR to address protracted balance of payment needs and sustaining priority spending on basic public services.
    • Economic growth is expected to accelerate to 3 percent in 2025, up from 1.9 percent in 2024, while inflation is projected to decline gradually. The outlook depends on faster fuel market and governance reforms, and increased grant and concessional financing.
    • Program performance was mixed, while downside risks remain substantial.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed today the third and fourth reviews of the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for the Central African Republic (CAR). The ECF arrangement, with access of SDR 147.48 million (about US$197 million), was approved by the IMF Executive Board in April 2023 (see Press Release No. 23/129). The completion of these reviews allows for the immediate disbursement of SDR 43.22 million (about US$58 million) bringing total disbursements under the ECF arrangement to SDR 92.29 million (around US$124 million).

    In completing the reviews, the Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for waivers of nonobservance of the performance criteria (PC) for the end-June 2024 and end-December 2024 domestic primary fiscal balance and net domestic financing. The Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for a waiver of nonobservance of the continuous PC on non-accumulation of new external arrears. Further, the Executive Board completed the financing assurances review under the ECF arrangement.

    The ECF arrangement is part of coordinated efforts by international financial institutions to support the people of CAR. It will continue to help the country meet the protracted balance of payments needs and sustain spending on basic public services, including in the health and education sectors. Program implementation has helped anchor structural reforms and financing. Fuel supply and revenue have improved. Progress is being made in digitalizing the revenue administration and PFM systems, along with enhancements to the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Court of Audit. Completing the combined reviews creates new opportunities for positive outcomes.

    Economic activity is projected to expand by 3 percent in 2025, up from 1.9 percent in 2024, driven by higher energy use, mining recovery, infrastructure projects, and improved security. Inflation would ease by end-2025, in part helped by the cut in pump prices in May 2025. Still, a tighter fiscal stance is needed to arrest rising debt vulnerabilities. The domestic primary deficit would narrow to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2025 from 4.9 percent in 2024, assuming bold political backing for the agreed measures on tax administration and compliance. Reinforced spending controls are also key ahead of elections and cuts in humanitarian aid.

    The overhaul of the fuel market remains pivotal for macroeconomic stabilization and both sustained and inclusive growth in CAR. The fuel procurement audit should be accelerated to underpin price reforms and address persistent inefficiencies. Despite recent supply increases and price cuts, pump prices remain high due to costly and opaque imports. Transparent use of the recent diesel grant and a thorough audit of costs and margins could help enhance competition, improve supply efficiency, and boost fiscal revenue.

    Following the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Kenji Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Acting Chair, issued the following statement:

    “The Central African Republic (CAR) has shown renewed commitment to structural reforms under the ECF-arrangement despite facing deep-rooted fragility and significant uncertainty. Both financial and technical support from development partners remain vital to the program’s success, to overcome weak capacity, elevated revenue volatility, and to alleviate humanitarian needs.

    “Program performance for the combined third and fourth reviews was mixed, which is being addressed with strong corrective actions. Half of the six PCs for end-June and end-December 2024 were met. Still, the domestic primary deficit and net domestic financing targets were missed by wide margins, as was the continuous PC on non-accumulation of external arrears. The indicative targets for social spending and expenditures via extraordinary procedures were also missed.

    “Strengthening tax compliance and controls is key to boosting revenue but requires strong political support. Accelerating the fuel procurement audit is also essential to address inefficiencies and enable further reductions in pump prices. A well-functioning fuel market is vital for fiscal and macroeconomic stability.

    “Program performance depends on stronger public financial management (PFM), particularly spending controls ahead of the elections. Improved PFM is essential to prevent arrears, limit extraordinary procedures, and ensure effective social spending. It would also help mobilize grants and concessional financing, reduce costly regional borrowing, and safeguard debt sustainability.

    “Enhancing governance will reinforce PFM efforts. Progress in strengthening the Financial Intelligence Unit and the Court of Audit is welcome. Adopting the new forestry code and implementing the mining code are key to unlocking CAR’s growth potential. Prompt operationalization of the asset declaration system is also critical to maintaining donor support.

    “Policies to enhance growth potential and improve equality should be anchored on the National Development Plan (NDP) (2024-2028). A steadfast execution of the NDP is also crucial to catalyze donor support and start attracting foreign private investment flows.

    CAR’s economic program will remain supported by the implementation of policies and reforms agreed among CEMAC regional institutions, which notably aim at supporting an increase in regional net foreign assets which are ultimately critical to program’s success.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/pr-25179-car-imf-completes-3rd-4th-rev-under-ecf-arrang-and-approves-us-58-mil-disburse

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Strategic importance of the Central Communication Port for military mobility and EU security – E-002096/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002096/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Michał Dworczyk (ECR)

    With work on updating the Action Plan on Military Mobility and the preparation of a new Multiannual Financial Framework ongoing, I would like to draw the Commission’s attention to the strategic importance of the Central Communication Port – a multimodal project designed as an element of dual-use infrastructure, which is vital both for civilian transport and for the rapid deployment of allied forces in crisis situations. The Central Communication Port is of transnational importance and is able to play a key role in ensuring the EU’s security, especially in light of its location on NATO’s eastern flank and the geopolitical situation following Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although the project has been significantly scaled back, fortunately, thanks to public pressure, it has not been completely abandoned, and there is still a possibility of adapting it to its original objectives.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.Does the Commission deem the Central Communication Port project to be important for military mobility and EU security, and will the Commission classify the project as a strategic infrastructure element in the updated Action Plan on Military Mobility?
    • 2.Does the Commission consider the Central Communication Port project to be eligible for support under the Connecting Europe Facility, in particular in the area of dual-use transport infrastructure?
    • 3.Is the Commission considering recognising the Central Communication Port as a project of common interest (PCI) or granting it EU support, given its importance for the EU’s resilience and preparedness in terms of military transport, as well as its ability to respond to threats on the eastern flank?

    Submitted: 26.5.2025

    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Al Jazeera – E-001439/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    To date, the EU has imposed restrictive measures in the broadcasting sector in the form of the broadcast or dissemination restrictions only in clearly defined circumstances, most notably in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, as set out in Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP[1] and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014[2] concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine.

    The restrictions on the broadcasting and dissemination of content of certain media outlets (designated entities), including those under the control of the Russian Federation in this sanctions regime are justified by the designated outlets’ essential and instrumental role in systematically spreading disinformation and propaganda campaigns in support of that war of aggression, and by their permanent direct or indirect control by the leadership of the Russian Federation as justified in the relevant statement of reasons.

    Under the Council Decision 2014/512/CFSP and Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 any proposal to consider restrictive measures against a media outlet would need to be assessed in light of such criteria, namely substantial evidence of systemically spreading disinformation and propaganda and a demonstrable link to Russian state control.

    Any potential restrictive measures on media outlets operating within the jurisdiction of the EU would fall under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and require unanimous agreement by the Council.

    • [1] OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 13-17.
    • [2] OJ L 229, 31.7.2014, p. 1-11.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Wang Yi, Director of the Office of the CPC Central Committee’s Foreign Affairs Commission, Meets with UAE Presidential Envoy for China Affairs

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 4 (Xinhua) — Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the CPC Central Committee, met with Khaldoon Khalifa Al Mubarak, special envoy of the President of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for Chinese affairs, in Beijing on Wednesday.

    The Chinese diplomat noted that under the strategic guidance of the leaders of the two countries, relations between China and the UAE have maintained positive development dynamics.

    Wang Yi said that China hopes to work with the UAE to provide mutual support on issues affecting each other’s core interests, expand mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields, maintain close coordination on international and regional affairs, and promote the deepening and further development of the China-UAE comprehensive strategic partnership.

    Khaldoon Khalifa Al Mubarak, for his part, said that the UAE intends to strengthen high-level exchanges with China to further enhance the level of interstate relations of a comprehensive strategic partnership characterized by special friendship.

    The UAE firmly adheres to the one-China principle and will adhere to the principles of independence and self-sufficiency, steadily advancing cooperation with China, the special envoy assured. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Decisions on terrorist attacks in Kursk and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation were made in Ukraine at the political level — Russian President

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 /Xinhua/ — The decisions on terrorist attacks in the Kursk and Bryansk regions of the Russian Federation were made in Ukraine at the political level, Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Wednesday.

    “The blowing up of railway tracks in the Bryansk and Kursk regions is, of course, a terrorist act. The decisions to commit such crimes were, of course, made in Ukraine at the political level,” V. Putin noted during a meeting with members of the government. The Russian President emphasized that what happened in Bryansk was a targeted attack on civilians aimed at disrupting the negotiation process.

    According to the Russian leader, Kiev’s “illegitimate regime is degenerating into a terrorist organization, and its sponsors are becoming accomplices of terrorists.” Ukraine “is trying to intimidate Russia with terrorist attacks” because “it is suffering huge losses and retreating along the entire front line,” the head of state said.

    V. Putin noted that Moscow is not surprised by Kyiv’s refusal to agree to a truce for humanitarian reasons for 2-3 days. According to him, “the Kyiv regime does not need peace at all,” since it would mean the loss of power.

    “Peace means the loss of power. And power for this regime, apparently, is more important than peace and the lives of people, whom they do not consider people at all,” the Russian president pointed out. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russia protests Japan over training shootings in open sea without warning — Russian Foreign Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 (Xinhua) — Moscow lodged a strong protest with Tokyo over the Japanese military’s shooting exercises near the Russian border, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday.

    “On June 4, a strong protest was lodged with the Japanese Embassy in Moscow in connection with the training exercises conducted on May 23 in the open sea 18.5 km northeast of Cape Shiretoko (Hokkaido Island) involving the patrol boat Kawagiri of the Japan Maritime Safety Agency without prior notification to foreign ships and vessels,” reads a statement published on the agency’s website.

    It is stated that “irresponsible actions of this kind in the immediate vicinity of the borders of the Russian Federation constitute a clear violation of international law, create direct risks for civil shipping, the life and health of Russian citizens and are categorically unacceptable.”

    “The corresponding note from the Russian Foreign Ministry also sets out a demand for the Japanese side to properly explain the essence of what happened and take comprehensive measures to ensure that similar incidents do not recur in the future,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Russian economy enters cooling period — Russian Minister of Economic Development

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 (Xinhua) — Russia’s economy has entered a period of cooling after high growth rates in the previous two years, Russian Economic Development Minister Maxim Reshetnikov said. The ministry’s press service reported this on Tuesday.

    Speaking in the Federation Council of Russia, M. Reshetnikov noted that more and more industries in the real sector are demonstrating a decline in output. The growth rate of consumer demand is slowing down, and the increase in the population’s income is being sent to savings, while a slowdown in inflation is being recorded, the minister added.

    M. Reshetnikov pointed out that Russia needs to go through the cooling-off period wisely and expressed hope for a timely easing of monetary policy in order to maintain GDP growth rates of 3 percent in the long term. In addition, he also assured that the government is taking steps to optimize the investment programs of the largest companies. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: V. Zelensky called the Russian memorandum with the terms of the ceasefire an ultimatum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    KYIV, June 4 (Xinhua) — The document listing the terms of the ceasefire that Russia handed over to Ukraine on June 2 is not a memorandum of understanding, but an ultimatum, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said at a briefing on Wednesday, Interfax-Ukraine reported.

    According to him, in the memorandum, Moscow set out demands in an ultimatum form, the fulfillment of which is obviously impossible. First of all, we are talking about Russia’s territorial claims. V. Zelensky emphasized that these claims contradict the UN Charter, the Constitution of Ukraine and “common sense.”

    The Ukrainian leader added that the demand for the country’s neutrality is also unfulfillable.

    On June 2, the second round of peace talks between Ukraine and Russia since 2022 took place in Istanbul. At this meeting, Kyiv received a memorandum from Moscow on the terms of a ceasefire. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Cooperation between China and Russia in the field of cinema is an important factor in strengthening friendship between the peoples of the two countries and a contribution to the global cultural treasury – Russian Foreign Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, June 4 (Xinhua) — Cooperation between China and Russia in the film industry is an important factor in strengthening friendship and mutual understanding between the peoples of the two countries, as well as a contribution to the global treasury of culture and art, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said at a briefing on Wednesday, answering a question from a Xinhua correspondent.

    “I think that this is an important factor for strengthening mutual understanding, good-neighborly relations and friendship between the peoples of our countries. But I will say more: I think that this is a good, correct and very necessary contribution to the global treasury of culture and art – our bilateral cooperation in the field of cinematography,” she noted, commenting on the recent release in Russia of the highest-grossing Chinese animated film in the world, “Nezha Defeats the Dragon King” /”Nezha 2″/.

    As M. Zakharova noted, cooperation between China and Russia in the field of cinematography is developing steadily and dynamically. “This area is in the focus of attention of the leaders of our countries,” she emphasized, adding that issues of developing joint film production were discussed by the heads of state on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan in October last year.

    In addition, during the state visit of the Chairman of the People’s Republic of China Xi Jinping to Moscow in May of this year, an action plan in the field of joint film production was signed between the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation and the State Film Administration of the People’s Republic of China until 2030. “The document provides for a number of specific projects, measures for further promotion of specialized contacts. They are already, as you know, rich in content, and it is expected that they will be developed further,” explained M. Zakharova.

    The official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry also recalled the 18th meeting of the Subcommittee on Cooperation in Cinematography of the Bilateral Commission on Humanitarian Cooperation held in May, during which new creative projects were presented. In addition, the Chinese Film Festival was held in Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan.

    M. Zakharova congratulated the creators of the cartoon “Nezha 2” on the impressive results and high praise from experts. “We are happy about the success of our Chinese partners in the field of cinematography,” she noted, assuring that she would try to find time to watch the new Chinese cartoon.

    “I am confident that this animated film was made at a high technological level,” the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized, expressing hope that Russian viewers will like this film.

    “We need to fully support the development of cinematography, taking into account the traditions that our countries have,” urged M. Zakharova. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China’s Finance Ministry issues 12.5 billion yuan in treasury bonds in Hong Kong

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, June 4 (Xinhua) — China’s Ministry of Finance on Wednesday issued its third batch of yuan-denominated Treasury bonds this year in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), totaling 12.5 billion yuan (about 1.74 billion U.S. dollars).

    According to the department, the current bond issue includes 2-year bonds worth 3.5 billion yuan, 3-year bonds worth 3 billion, 5-year bonds worth 3 billion, and 10-year bonds worth 3 billion. The interest rates on these securities are 1.49 percent, 1.52 percent, 1.6 percent, and 1.75 percent, respectively.

    The Ministry of Finance also noted that the bond issue was positively received by investors, with the total amount of subscriptions for the purchase of securities exceeding the amount issued into circulation by 3.96 times.

    In May, the agency announced that it would issue 68 billion yuan worth of yuan-denominated treasury bonds in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by the end of the year. The issue will be carried out in six stages. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary Rubio’s Meeting with Danish Foreign Minister Rasmussen

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    The below is attributable to Spokesperson Tammy Bruce:

    Secretary of State Marco Rubio met with Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen today in Brussels. Secretary Rubio reaffirmed the strong relationship between the United States and the Kingdom of Denmark. They discussed shared priorities including increasing NATO defense spending and burden sharing, and addressing the threats to the Alliance, including those posed by Russia and China. They also reviewed ongoing coordination to enhance stability and security in Europe and to secure an enduring peace in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of State Marco Rubio with Scott Jennings on SiriusXM Patriot

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

    Washington, D.C.

    QUESTION:  Scott Jennings sitting here on SiriusXM Patriot 125, normally the David Webb Show.  I am guest hosting for Mr. Webb today, and it is our honor to welcome to the airwaves this morning the Secretary of State of the United States Marco Rubio, former senator from Florida, and now, thanks to President Trump, the United States Secretary of State. 

    Mr. Secretary, welcome to the show. 

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Hey, thanks for having me. 

    QUESTION:  I appreciate you being on this morning.  You’re on the move.  You have just returned from your first foreign trip.  You went to Panama, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic.  I want to jump right in this morning and just ask how was the trip, what did we accomplish, and what’s the disposition in those countries towards the United States now that we have a new administration?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  I think the disposition is very positive.  I think these are countries that want to be aligned with the United States.  That’s why we picked them.  They also happen to be countries that are on the migratory route, on the drug routes, and face tremendous challenges because of that.  These are the places people cross in order to come to the U.S., so each of them are very different. 

    Like in the case of Panama, obviously we have an issue with the canal and foreign influence over it, and so we raised that.  And I think we’re going to make a couple of announcements.  We saw the – Panama pulled out of the Belt and Road Initiative with China, which is the first country in the Western Hemisphere to actually pull out of that.  And I think we’ll hear more things.  They’ve got to work through their own processes there, but I think we’ll see even more in the days to come.  So, it’s very positive. 

    Costa Rica is an advanced economy.  They’re doing very well, of course, but they do have some challenges where drug rings are running through there, and so we partner with them to stop that.  But that’s a very pro-American government, and we wanted to interact with them.  They’re very good partners and, also, have been very strong at standing up to the Chinese Communist Party’s influence in the region, and so that’s been great. 

    And then moved on to El Salvador.  We have a great partner there in Nayib Bukele.  I’ve known him for a long time, and he made a very generous offer.  I don’t know if it can happen because of our own laws, but he offered to not only take in gang members that are illegally in the country but also any Americans who are in our jails – almost like outsourcing.  So, it was an interesting offer from him.  But he’s a great pro-American leader and, again, someone that has been very popular in his country by the way.  He’s like 90 percent approval rating. 

    Guatemala is a country that obviously is right on the border with Mexico.  They struggle with the migration.  They’re a source country, but they’re also a transit country for drugs and people.  And so, they’re trying to – they’re doing the best they can with their limited resources, and we’re helping them to stop the drugs and the migration.  But they’ve also – they’re going to almost double the number of deportation flights they’re going to take, and they’re also going to accept third-country people, people from other countries that are not from Guatemala, as part of this process, and then from there move them on to the – their nation of origin. 

    And then we finished in the Dominican Republic, which really the biggest challenge they face there are two-fold.  The one is what’s happening right across their border with Haiti, which they’re deporting people back to Haiti every day.  That – we can’t really visit Haiti right now, but that’s as close as we could get.  And so, we wanted to talk about that from there, and that’s important because that also poses a threat to the United States that there’s a mass migration event.  And it’s just a horrifying situation with these gangs taking over Port-au-Prince or large parts of it. 

    And then they’re also a great partner stopping drugs.  A lot of drug rings are – bring – try to bring drugs into the Dominican Republic because from there, over the Mona Passage, they get to Puerto Rico.  And once you get into Puerto Rico, you’re in the U.S.  There’s no more customs after that.  There’s no more border protection after that.  So, it’s something we’re going to work with them on. 

    So, it’s a good start to the trip, and then we finished off on Friday going to Southern Command, which is the Pentagon’s command for the whole region, and talked through some of these issues with them and the partnerships they have in the region.  So, it’s a good way to start my – I guess my second – end my second week as Secretary of State.

    QUESTION:  Yeah, most folks when they start a new job in the second week are still looking for the bathroom, and here you are in all these other countries.  It’s a really good way to get going.

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, well, we’re still looking for the bathrooms but – finding out where everything is at in the building, but it was important to get out there and visit these countries early. 

    QUESTION:  So, you raised an issue that I think Donald Trump, President Trump, deserves a lot of credit for tackling immediately, and that is the concept of the United States combatting Chinese influence in this region, in this hemisphere.  And obviously, this has been an issue with Panama and the Panama Canal, but it’s really an issue everywhere.  Can you talk a little bit about this?  Is this one of your principal missions to make sure that the United States, and not China, is the dominant superpower at a minimum in this region and in the world?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Yeah, look, China is a rich, powerful country and that’s what they’re going to be.  Like that’s not going to change, right?  They’ve got over a billion people.  They’ve got a big economy, second-largest economy in the world.  I mean, and we’re going to be competing with them for the rest of the century and beyond.  And I think the story of the 21st century is going to be about what happened between the U.S. and China. 

    What we can’t allow is for that to come at our expense.  What we can’t allow is an imbalance, a dangerous imbalance, to build up where they’re more powerful than we are, and then – or we become dependent on them.  And that danger is already there that we’ve become dependent on them for supply chains, for manufacturing, economically, all these sorts of things.

    So, what’s happened in part of the region is that they swoop in.  And look, they’re doing what I would do.  If I was in charge of China, I would do exactly what they’re doing.  But I have to – I I’m not in charge of China.  I run the State Department for the United States and I’m an American citizen, so I’ve got to do what’s good for America.  That’s what President Trump is for.  And that includes not getting run out of the Western Hemisphere, not waking up one day and finding out that China has more influence over our neighboring countries than we do, that China has more presence in our neighboring countries than we do.  That’s – it’s – geography is real and it’s right on top of us, and these are countries that are our neighbors, and we just – we can’t live in a world in which they have more influence and more presence than we do in the countries closest to us.

    QUESTION:  So, on the prospect of American influence in the world – and I wholeheartedly agree with you about our need to stand up to China – a lot of people are wondering about the reorientation of American soft power in the world.  Obviously, President Trump and his administration and working with you have made some dramatic shifts in the way we distribute foreign aid and the bureaucracy, the USAID bureaucracy, which you are now also simultaneously in charge of. 

    I think there’s a lot of misinformation out there and a lot of political attacks out there of people trying to score points.  I just kind of want to set the record straight here about what we’re doing.  And we’ve eliminated some bureaucracy, but you’re in charge of American soft power and you’re in charge of our influence around the world.  Can you kind of give us an idea of how this is going to work, and why the American people should be reassured that American influence is going to be top of mind for your State Department?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, first of all, we’re not walking away from foreign aid.  We will be involved in foreign aid.  I believe that foreign aid done right is good for the country, but it has to be done right.  Now, the idea that somehow we spend between $40 and $60 billion on foreign aid and all that money is well spent or on things that make sense is absurd.  There’s a lot of it that isn’t.  And so the goal is very simple:  Go through all of our foreign aid – a lot of it is through USAID, some of it is through State Department; identify the foreign aid that makes sense, the foreign aid that actually supports our country and that supports our national interests, and continue to do that; and then get rid of the ones that are a waste of money, or in some cases or run counter to our foreign – to our national interest and to our interests around the world.  And that’s what we’re going through right now. 

    The problem is that this foreign aid industrial complex has built up of NGOs and all kinds of groups that benefit from these programs, and argue that you can’t get rid of a single one of them; if you cut any of them, if you even ask questions about them, you’re undermining American soft power.  So, this is not – despite some of these reports, this is not about walking away from foreign aid.  This is about doing the aid that makes sense and getting rid of the aid that does not make sense.  That’s it.  That’s what this is about.

    So we were in Guatemala, right?  And they have a program where we help them to improve their police department so they can stop and identify fentanyl before it gets into America.  That’s foreign aid we’re going to support.  In fact, I issued a waiver so we can continue that program.  There are other things that we’re not going to do.  We shouldn’t be sponsoring LGBTQ operas.  I don’t know how that foreign – furthers the national interest. 

    And this is taxpayer money.  Look, if someone wants to pay for that stuff, you’re more than happy to go out, go ahead.  It’s legal.  Go out and raise all the money, private-sector money, and spend it on that.  But we shouldn’t be spending taxpayer money or using American Government agencies to sponsor things that make absolutely no sense.  So, we put a pause on all foreign aid, and now we’re going through it project by project.  We’re going to get rid of the ones that don’t make sense, and we’re going to keep or even build on the ones that do make sense. 

    QUESTION:  So, the things that make sense in your mind – fighting drugs, fighting illegal immigration.  What about lifesaving issues?  There’s been a lot of back and forth in the media about things that we do from a humanitarian perspective that are lifesaving medical-type programming, particularly in Africa with PEPFAR and malaria and such.  How do you view those things?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  I’m a supporter of PEPFAR.  I have been in Congress.  I am now as Secretary of State.  It’s a program we want to continue.  Obviously, we’re going to have questions about it.  Look, if PEPFAR is working well, it’s a program that should be getting smaller over time, not bigger, right?  Because you’re preventing HIV, you’re preventing the spread of HIV, and so people aren’t testing positive because their viral load gets down, they’re not passing it on to their children. 

    So ideally, it’s a program that over time shrinks, not expands, because less and less people are getting HIV or are transmitting it to their children.  That was always the goal was an AIDS-free generation, so no child was born with HIV.  And – but it’s a program I’ve supported, and we want to continue to do it.  And things like are people going to starve to death, are we going to have a famine?  Is it going to destabilize a country in a way that would be negative to our national interest and open the door for radical jihadists or others to take advantage?  We’re going to continue to do those.  But the problem is that the definition of humanitarian has expanded beyond that – to all kinds of other things that do not make sense.  That doesn’t mean they’re bad ideas.  Someone should do it.  It just shouldn’t be the American taxpayer. 

    So that’s the kind of things that we’re going through right now and identifying.  And by the way, we issued a waiver which allowed all these lifesaving programs to continue.  And obviously, there’s – any time you have a pause or some hiccups about how to restart the payment programs, but all that’s going to get taken care of here very quickly, and those programs will continue.  We’re not walking away from foreign aid.  We are walking away from foreign aid that’s dumb, that’s stupid, that wastes American taxpayer money.  We’re just not going to continue to do those.

    QUESTION:  I think that what you’re doing is long overdue.  This whole bureaucracy existed, and it really existed with very little political oversight.  And really all that the Trump Administration, at your direction, is doing is making sure that whatever money we spend somehow helps the national interest.  And I think every American taxpayer wants the money we spend to help the national interest.  And Trump and you, Mr. Secretary, on the right side of what I think is an 80-20 issue here.  And so, you see this amazing disconnect in the media, people fussing about this. 

    But some of these projects that you’ve identified are patently ridiculous.  And so, by moving this into your office and by taking personal political oversight over it, not only are you saving us money, but you’re just aligning our spending with what’s in direct interest of the United States foreign policy under the direction of the President of the United States.  I mean, that’s the point of elections.  That’s the point of having a government, not to let unelected bureaucrats determine our national direction but to let our political leadership do it.

    Mr. Secretary, in the time that we have, I want to move ahead.  You’re about to embark on your second foreign trip.  You’re going to the Munich Security Conference, and then you’re going to the Middle East.  I think you’re going to Israel, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia – obviously a hot spot or region.  What is your mission here?  What are we trying to accomplish in the Middle East?  What’s your message at the Munich Security Conference later this week?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, in Munich, I think it’s just to reaffirm to everybody – even though it’s located in Europe – obviously, that’s where the forum is – it’s not just about Europe.  People from all – leaders from all over the world go that conference.  But the top of mind for everyone is going to be war in Ukraine, and the President has been very clear.  President Trump has been clear that the war in Ukraine needs to end.  There’s a – he’s going to sort of begin to lay out a broad path forward, and he wants that war to end.  It’d be in the interest of everybody for that war to end, and so obviously we’ll be discussing that with foreign ministers and other leaders there. 

    And then in the Middle East, beyond just the – what we know has happened with – after October 7th, there’s some potentially exciting opportunities to really change the dynamic in that region, and that’s the things we want to talk about.  We’ve seen in Lebanon where a new government is now in place and Hizballah has been – I mean, imagine a region where you have a stable Lebanese government and Hizballah is no longer controlling the southern part of Lebanon and threatening Israel every day.  Imagine potentially – we’ve got to wait and see, right? – but a Syria no longer under Assad, no longer with Iranian or Russian influence, no longer with ISIS, sort of no longer a security threat to Isreal.  Imagine a region where Israel now feels secure because of what’s happened in Lebanon and in Syria that they can enter into a peace deal with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf kingdoms; a Sunni-Israeli peace deal akin to the Camp David Accords with Egypt and the peace with Jordan.  Suddenly you have a very different region where all kinds of things that were not possible before are now possible. 

    And that’s the opportunity that we hope to explore and see if it’s possible.  We have an obligation to explore, at the end.  I mean, President Trump has made very clear that part of his agenda is promoting peace in the world; and if there’s a chance to create conditions for peace, that’s certainly something we’re going to do our best to try to foster and be a part of. 

    QUESTION:  I want to ask you briefly about the hostage deal that was in place as Biden was exiting and President Trump was coming in.  Obviously, a few hostages have been released.  Some of the video of the hostages is, frankly, horrific.  What they had done to them in captivity at the hands of Hamas is nothing short of barbaric.  I saw that President Trump last night on the way to the Super Bowl made a comment about this and said he’s seen some of these abductees coming out.  He said, “They look like Holocaust survivors.  I know there’s an agreement that Hamas releases a little every week, but I don’t know how long I’ll continue to endure this.  My patience is running out.”

    Is this something you’re going to discuss when you’re in the Middle East?  Are we – is our patience running thin here, and are these hostages being more mistreated than we could have even imagined before?

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, I don’t think there’s any coincidence in the schedule that they’re being released where they obviously released the ones, they thought were in the best condition first, then over time you’re starting to see the impact of this.  But I also think it’s very revealing of who Hamas is and what Hamas is. 

    You look at these images of what they – first of all, the humiliation that they have to go through.  Just put aside for a moment the horrifying conditions they were kept and the horrifying things that happened to some of those hostages, on top of the fact that these were innocent civilians.  I mean, none of these were soldiers.  These are not combatants.  These are just people that were abducted for purposes of being used as leverage.  And they’re getting, what, 200 certified killers in exchange for one innocent hostage.  But it reveals who Hamas is.

    Look at these humiliation, they put them through before they’re released, where they do these big public displays of force.  Do any of those Hamas fighters look like they’ve been skipping meals?  Do any of those Hamas fighters that you see look like they’ve been suffering over the last year and a half?  Clearly, these people are – the ones suffering are the people from Gaza, but not them.  And then the conditions they’re held in.  So, it’s incredibly revealing about what we’re dealing with.  This is an evil organization.  Hamas is evil.  It’s pure evil.  These are monsters.  These are savages.  That’s a group that needs to be eradicated. 

    And let me tell you, if they still are the dominant power in Gaza when all this is done, there is not going to peace in the Middle East, as long as a group like Hamas physically controls territory and is the most dominant power in Gaza or anywhere in the Middle East.  And I hope people can see who these people actually are, in the condition of these hostages – not just the conditions that they’re in when they’re released, but what they have to endure on the way out.

    QUESTION:  You raise the issue of Gaza, and before you go, obviously President Trump made some news on this last week.  And it strikes me that what you’re executing is a realistic foreign policy.  I mean, we’re in the common-sense doctrine era of the United States, which people are saying thank goodness, finally.

    On Gaza, on the idea of a two-state solution, is this no longer the policy of the United States?  It seems to me that you all are injecting realism into this situation and that most of the people the Israelis have had to deal with over time simply don’t want peace, and we’ve been trying to put a square peg in a round hole here.

    What is our policy?  That people that run Gaza eventually are going to have to accept peace? And that’s not what – that’s just not been the disposition of the folks we’ve been dealing with heretofore.

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Well, the big challenge for this whole two-state solution has not been Isreal. It’s been:  Who’s going to govern that second state?  Who’s going to be in charge of it?  If the people in charge of it are Hamas or Hizballah or anybody like that, these are groups that – whose goal is the destruction of the Jewish state.

    So, I don’t know how you’re going to have peace if you’re turning over territory to a group whose stated purpose is the destruction of the Jewish state.  Why would any country in the world agree to create a second state on their border that is governed by armed elements who kidnap babies and murder babies and rape teenage girls and abduct innocents and whose stated goal and purpose for existing is the – is your destruction?  Who would agree to that?  So that’s the fundamental challenge.

    On the broader challenge of Gaza, the President’s just pointed to the obvious.  I mean, Gaza is a place that, in addition to all the damage it suffered in the war – Hamas hides in the tunnels.  It’s the civilians who they hide behind and underneath that have suffered the consequences of this.  But that’s a place where there’s all kinds of unexploded munitions and bombs that Hamas has, that’s been used in the conflict.  Someone’s got to go in – for anybody to be able to live there, someone’s got to – you’ve got to clean it up.  You’ve got to clean all that out of there even before you begin the process of removing rubble and debris and rebuilding housing, like permanent structures.  Who’s going to do that? 

    And right now, the only one who’s stood up and said I’m willing to help do it is Donald Trump.  All these other leaders, they’re going to have to step up.  If they’ve got a better idea, then now is the time.  Now is the time for the other governments and other powers in the region, some of these very rich countries, to basically say, okay, we’ll do it.  We’re going to pay for this; we’re going to step forward; we’re going to be the ones that take charge.  None of them is offering to do it.  And I think that you can’t go around claiming that you’re a fighter for, an advocate for the Palestinian people, but you’re not willing to do anything to help rebuild Gaza.  And so far, we haven’t seen a lot of – they’ve all – they’ll all tell you what they’re not for.  But we’re still waiting for more countries to step forward and say here’s what we’re willing to do.  And right now, they’ve not been willing to do anything and – or at least anything concrete.

    So that’s a challenge that President Trump’s put out there.  And it’s outside the box, but that’s what he always is.  I mean, he is going to state the obvious.  It’s the one thing about Donald Trump – he doesn’t hide behind silly, traditional lies and things of that nature.  He’s going to put out blunt truth.  And the blunt truth is that the Middle East has, for too long, been a region of places all of whom love to talk but don’t want to do.  So, it’s time – if they don’t like Donald Trump’s plan, then it’s time for these countries in the region to step forward and offer their solution. 

    QUESTION:  Well, I think under President Trump’s leadership, under your leadership, we’re living in a common-sense era, we’re in an aspirational era, and we’re in a realistic era.  And I think the American people are grateful for it.  You have had an amazing run already, just in the first few weeks of being in office.  You had an amazing first foreign trip.  You’ve got one coming up this week.

    The foreign affairs wins of the Trump Administration are already piling up, with Mexico agreeing to send troops to their border; Canada playing ball on their border issues; Colombia accepting the repatriation flights; Panama ending its Belt and Road Initiative deal with China; the ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon.  We’ve taken out an ISIS leader in Somalia.  You guys are off to an amazing start.  And I think that’s why Donald Trump has a high approval rating right now, and why people are so grateful that you accepted this job as U.S. Secretary of State.

    Secretary Rubio, thanks for being with us on SiriusXM Patriot today. 

    SECRETARY RUBIO:  Thanks for having me on.

    QUESTION:  All right.  Safe travels.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Italy National Day

    Source: United States Department of State (4)

    Marco Rubio, Secretary of State

    On behalf of the United States of America, I extend our congratulations to the people of the Italian Republic on your National Day.

    Italy is a key Ally in the Euro-Atlantic region. As we confront global security challenges together, we urge all European NATO Allies to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP. We appreciate Italy’s continued support for efforts to end the Russia-Ukraine war and value our ongoing cooperation with Prime Minister Meloni to combat illegal immigration, reduce energy dependency on hostile regimes, and counter unfair trade practices. The United States welcomes Italy’s leadership in advancing critical technologies and building a resilient, mutually beneficial industrial base across Europe.

    With over 17 million Americans proudly claiming Italian heritage, our bond is rooted in both history and purpose. Together, we will continue delivering results – ensuring freedom, security, and prosperity for both our nations.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Kyrgyz Republic

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 4, 2025

    • The Kyrgyz Republic has shown strong economic performance despite global uncertainties with robust growth, stabilizing inflation, and declining public debt.
    • Growth is expected to gradually moderate as external trade normalizes and domestic demand slows, while inflation remains stable with continued prudent monetary policy.
    • Sustaining macroeconomic stability and strengthening inclusive growth will require rebuilding policy buffers, enhancing fiscal sustainability, safeguarding monetary policy independence, and advancing structural reforms to boost productivity.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the Article IV Consultation for the Kyrgyz Republic on a lapse of time basis on May 22, 2025.[1]

    The Kyrgyz Republic has performed remarkably well amid a highly uncertain external environment. The economy grew by 9 percent annually since 2022, headline inflation has returned to the central bank’s target range, and public debt declined to 36.6 percent of GDP in 2024.

    Looking ahead, growth is projected to moderate to 6.8 percent in 2025 and converge to about 5¼ percent in the medium term as re-export trade moderates and domestic demand eases. Inflation is expected to remain broadly stable under the assumption of prudent monetary policy. The large-scale public investments would widen the overall fiscal deficit, but public debt would remain contained under 42 percent of GDP thanks to robust GDP growth.

    In view of the heightened global uncertainty, medium term priorities include rebuilding policy buffers and advancing structural reforms to strengthen economy’s resilience to shocks and support higher and more inclusive growth.

     

    Executive Board Assessment

    The Kyrgyz Republic has demonstrated remarkable resilience amidst global economic uncertainty. The economy has sustained robust growth supported by considerable expansion of external trade, inflows of remittances and labor, and resilient domestic demand. Inflation has moderated to mid-single digits, though underlying demand pressures warrant vigilance to keep inflation within the central bank’s target range. Lower public debt provides the needed fiscal space for priority investment in public infrastructure, energy generation capacity and human capital development.

    Looking ahead, economic activity is expected to moderate from the exceptionally high levels of the past three years as re-export trade normalizes. Growth is projected to converge to its potential rate of 5¼ percent in the medium term, but the outlook is highly uncertain and depends on regional geopolitical developments. A further escalation of sanctions on Russia could weaken remittances and growth due to a depreciation of the ruble and slower growth in Russia. Conversely, a lasting peace in the region could have the opposite impact, but may also unwind some of the trade and financial flows that have boosted growth in recent years. In an increasingly uncertain world, the medium-term priority is to strengthen resilience of the Kyrgyz economy to future shocks by rebuilding policy buffers and enhance prospects for higher and more inclusive growth through structural reforms.

    Strong revenue performance and a prudent fiscal stance coupled with high GDP growth have contained public debt. To further strengthen fiscal sustainability and create fiscal space for large development needs, the authorities should enhance tax policy by reducing tax exemptions and special tax regimes, increasing progressivity of the Personal Income Tax, and further strengthening revenue administration. Containing the public wage bill and energy subsidies, channeling Kumtor profits to the budget, and privatization of nonstrategic commercial SOEs would also contribute to fiscal sustainability and provide additional fiscal resources. Containing fiscal deficits would also limit borrowing and ease inflation pressures.

    Preserving monetary policy independence is essential to contain inflationary pressures and maintain price stability. In view of robust domestic demand, further efforts are needed to ensure that inflation remains within the central bank’s target range. Tightening of interest rates and liquidity conditions might be warranted, if inflation pressures persist or rise. Monetary policy effectiveness could be enhanced by lifting interest rate caps, extending instrument maturities, phasing out subsidized lending, and enhancing exchange rate flexibility. Staff supports the discontinuation of domestic gold purchases by the NBKR and recommends halting NBKR profit transfers to the budget until its capital reaches the statutory threshold.

    Sustaining high growth rates requires structural reforms to increase productivity and improve the business climate. Priority reform areas include governance and SOE management, competition policies, labor markets, and climate adaptation. If duly implemented, the authorities’ anti-corruption strategy could lay a solid foundation for a more resilient and dynamic economy. Strengthening the rule of law and protection of property rights, reducing the SOE footprint and enhancing competition are crucial for building trust in public institutions and improving the business climate to encourage private investment and innovation. Reforms aimed at increasing labor market flexibility, reducing gender gaps, and improving social safety nets would also support more inclusive economic growth, while investments in sustainable energy and infrastructure, and health and education remain vital to enhance resilience to climate risks.

    Table 1. Kyrgyz Republic: Select Economic Indicators

     


    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board. The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/04/pr25176-kyrgyz-republic-imf-executive-board-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s Middle East pivot aims to counter China’s rising influence

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Maria Papageorgiou, Leverhulme Early Career Researcher, School of Geography, Politics, and Sociology, Newcastle University

    The US president, Donald Trump, claimed he was able to secure deals totalling more than US$2 trillion (£1.5 trillion) for the US on his tour of the Gulf states in May. Trump said “there has never been anything like” the amount of jobs and money these agreements will bring to the US.

    However, providing a lift for the US economy wasn’t the only thing on Trump’s mind. China’s influence in the wider Middle East region is growing fast – so much so that it was even able to mediate a detente between bitter regional rivals Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023.

    Trump’s attempt to strengthen ties with countries in the Middle East is probably also a deliberate attempt to contain China’s growing regional ambitions.

    China has spent the past two decades building up its economic and political relations with the Middle East. In 2020, it replaced the EU as the largest trading partner to the Gulf Cooperation Council, which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Bilateral trade between them was valued at over US$161 billion (£119 billion).


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The Middle East has also become an important partner to China’s sprawling Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Massive infrastructure projects in the region, such as high-speed railway lines in Saudi Arabia, have provided lucrative opportunities for Chinese companies.

    The total value of Chinese construction and investment deals in the Middle East reached US$39 billion in 2024, the most of any region in the world. That year, the three countries with the highest volume of BRI-related construction contracts and investment were all in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the UAE.

    China has also strengthened its financial cooperation with Middle Eastern countries, particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia. As part of China’s efforts to reduce global reliance on the US dollar for trade, it has arranged cross-border trade settlements, currency swap agreements, and is engaging in digital currency collaboration initiatives with these countries.

    American security guarantees have historically fostered an alignment between the Gulf states and the west. The string of agreements Trump signed with countries there reflects an attempt to draw them away from China and back towards Washington’s orbit.

    Countering China

    One of the more significant developments from Trump’s trip was an agreement to deepen US technological cooperation with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The US and UAE announced they would work together to construct the largest AI data centre outside of the US in Abu Dhabi.

    Technology is one of the key areas where China has been trying to assert its influence in the region. Through Beijing’s so-called “Digital Silk Road” initiative, which aims to develop a global digital ecosystem with China at its centre, Chinese firms have secured deals with Middle Eastern countries to provide 5G mobile network technology.

    Chinese tech giants Huawei and Alibaba are also in the process of signing partnerships with telecommunications providers in the region for collaboration and research in cloud computing. These companies have gained traction by aligning closely with national government priorities, such as Saudi Arabia’s initiative to diversify its economy through tech development.

    American companies, including Amazon, Microsoft and Google, have spent years building regional tech ecosystems across the Gulf. Trump is looking to recover this momentum. He was joined in the Middle East by more than 30 leaders of top American companies, who also secured commercial deals with their peers from the Gulf.

    US quantum computing company Quantinuum and Qatari investment firm Al Rabban Capital finalised a joint venture worth up to a US$1 billion. The agreement will see investment in quantum technologies and workforce development in the US and Qatar.

    There are two other areas where Trump is trying to cut China off. American companies and Abu Dhabi’s state-run oil firm agreed a US$60 billion energy partnership. China is heavily dependent on the Middle East for energy, with almost half of the oil it uses coming from the region. Greater alignment with the US could hamper Beijing’s ability to secure the resources it needs.

    Trump also signed a raft of defence deals with Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These included a US$1 billion deal for Qatar to acquire drone defence technology from American aerospace conglomerate Raytheon RTX, and a US$142 billion agreement for the Saudis to buy military equipment from US firms.

    These moves underscore Washington’s intention to limit China’s influence in key defence sectors. China is a key player in the global market for commercial and military drones, providing Saudi Arabia and the UAE with a large share of their combat drones.

    One final aspect of Trump’s trip was his brief meeting with Syria’s interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa. Trump signalled possible sanctions relief, which has since come into effect. This constituted more than a diplomatic thaw.

    With China positioning itself as a regional mediator and Russia struggling with a diminished role following the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, the US is looking to reassert itself as the primary power broker in the region.

    Dr Maria (Mary) Papageorgiou receives funding from the Leverhulme Trust.

    ref. Trump’s Middle East pivot aims to counter China’s rising influence – https://theconversation.com/trumps-middle-east-pivot-aims-to-counter-chinas-rising-influence-257366

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Tip of the Iceberg: Innovations and Technologies of the Tower at MIEM Tech

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    At the end of May, the festival of technological presentations MIEM Tech Day was held in the atrium of the HSE building on Pokrovsky Boulevard. The event brought together the main educational, research and project tracks Moscow Institute of Electronics and Mathematics named after A.N. Tikhonov (MIEM) HSE, carried out in close cooperation with partners – leading companies, research and financial organizations of Russia.

    Engineers at the forefront of science

    On this day, the festival guests were treated to an extensive program: a Technoshow from the MIEM project block, a demo Engineering and Mathematical School HSE and VK, consultations on all educational programs of the institute, presentations and stands of partner companies, quizzes, competitions, numerous interactive zones from the festival organizers, companies, student organizations.

    The event was attended by students and teachers from HSE and other universities, representatives of MIEM partner companies, IT experts, and schoolchildren.

    In their greetings during the short opening ceremony of MIEM Tech Day, the speakers noted the importance of the engineering direction in shaping the modern portrait of the university.

    “The Higher School of Economics is a classical university, we have a wide range of areas, including engineering, which is so relevant today,” said Irina Martusevich, Vice-Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics. “MIEM is the heart of engineering at HSE. The university is at the forefront of scientific thought. This is also due to MIEM.”

    The general partner of the event was VK.

    “For MIEM, cooperation with leading representatives of the industry and business is, first and foremost, a growth point,” emphasized Dmitry Kovalenko, Vice-Rector of HSE and Director of MIEM. “We understand that we will not be able to reach a new level in education and research without our partners, both internal, representing HSE departments and campuses, and external, including VK, the Bank of Russia, the Element Group of Companies, MTS, InfoWatch, EkoNiva, MCST and others. The list is constantly expanding. Today, there are many companies that want to move into a new history, to a new stage of development, together with MIEM.”

    Showcase of achievements

    A striking example of the established unique joint project-based educational model is the Engineering and Mathematical School of the National Research University Higher School of Economics and VK. The annual demo of the school took place on the main stage of the festival.

    “Universities provide a solid academic base, our task is to bring in a practical component by attracting experts, interacting with students, providing cases and the opportunity to work on real projects,” says Georgy Shchelkanov, Director of University Relations at VK. “For three years now, VK, together with the National Research University Higher School of Economics, has been implementing an advanced format of project laboratories: today, students of the IMS workshops are engaged not only in educational projects, but also in applied scientific research and development. This experience allows students to develop key skills and build a career in technology.”

    Three workshops, six speakers and hundreds of listeners — the participants presented the final projects prepared during the training. For the first time, the demo was held in an open format; usually such presentations are held only among workshop participants.

    “We are holding a demo of the HSE IMS and VK in an expanded format. Last year it took place in the chamber atmosphere of St. Petersburg, and now we have gathered in the atrium on Pokrovka,” explained Fyodor Ivanov, director Center for the organization of work on the project “Advanced Engineering and Mathematical School” HSE University. — I am glad that this event took place. For the workshop participants, studying at IMS is an opportunity to touch real projects, to try themselves in a place where the future of the IT industry is being created. In addition, we invited IMS graduates working at VK to the demo. They shared their experience of building a career track with the audience. As a result, it was a great event, in which there was a lot of communication and exchange of experience, professional and career.”

    Among the presented student developments are MLSecOps tools for analyzing vulnerabilities of machine learning models, as well as a system for monitoring the security of ML models and datasets using deduplication.

    In the field of speech synthesis, a model for assessing TTS metrics was presented, replacing human expertise with synthetic data, and a zero-shot TTS project with a Russian-language dataset. Attacks on multimodal vision-language models were also investigated, and Russian-language benchmarks were developed to assess their quality.

    The main space of the atrium hosted the showroom of the project Technoshow, an annual exhibition of the best project developments by MIEM students. This year, Technoshow was held for the seventh time, but for the first time in the atrium of the main building of the HSE. A total of 60 products of project activity, implemented in close cooperation with MIEM partners, were presented.

    Innovations, projects, developments

    An important feature of MIEM projects is their practical orientation and the use of modern technological and innovative solutions.

    “The IT industry is constantly being replenished with new technologies, this is a continuous process,” noted Ilya Semichasnov, head of Project Development Management Center MIEM. – Now, for example, no one is surprised by LLM programs that talk like a real person, but literally two years ago it was wow. Even if our students demonstrate something that already exists on the market in their developments, under the hood there will still be some innovation, a student invention.”

    All student projects presented at the Technoshow were implemented within the framework of the unique project model operating at MIEM, focused on close interaction with the institute’s partners and the reproduction of working models and mechanics used in the work of project teams in leading IT companies. The exhibition featured partner projects with VK, the Bank of Russia, Element Group, InfoWatch Group, EkoNiva and other companies. In many ways, it is this advantage of the project environment at MIEM that allows large technology companies not only to apply their own educational practices when implementing joint projects with MIEM, but also to consider the institute as an experimental platform for testing new models of project-educational cooperation with universities.

    “Our group of companies is currently a leader in the microelectronics industry, and we recognize our significant social responsibility, the need for the entire industry to develop methods for training personnel,” said Nail Vyalshin, head of education at Element Group. “In this sense, MIEM is of great importance to us: we plan to use it as a basis for building such an innovative mechanism for implementing our educational programs, including network programs, when the institute houses the head center of expertise and competencies. We plan to further broadcast this new model in the field of higher education in microelectronics when implementing educational programs at other universities.”

    The key areas of project presentations were defined: a digital university with innovative educational solutions, games and interactive applications with a focus on game design, robots and gadgets with autonomous technologies, industrial technologies for production automation, business solutions and startups based on artificial intelligence, information security solutions (from antifraud to AI protection), medical technologies for improving diagnostics, space with satellite systems, video technologies using AI, as well as clusters of projects from the joint Engineering and Mathematics School of the Higher School of Economics and VK and the MIEM Student Design Bureau with applied hardware and software projects, Center for Software Development and Digital Services with IT and IB services. As a result, MIEM’s design developments filled the entire space of the largest HSE site.

    “This is the first time that MIEM has presented itself so widely at Pokrovka,” said Veronika Prokhorova, Deputy Director of MIEM HSE. “It’s great that there are so many interested parties today. Students, teachers, and staff come up to us, ask questions, and are interested. For us, Technoshow and MIEM Tech Day are the tip of the iceberg. Today, we have gathered here the very best of what we do throughout the year. We are finally bringing it to the public and saying, ‘Guys, take a look and rejoice with us. We are great.’”

    Most of the developments presented at Technoshow are of an applied nature. Evgeny Kruk, scientific director of MIEM, notes the importance of applied sciences for introducing students to scientific research activities: “Our projects have a lot of applied science, and this is the right track for students focused on research work. A project is an entry into applied science, and applied science is the entry into fundamental science. And there is a gigantic field for discoveries.”

    The festival partners shared their impressions of the joint projects presented at Technoshow.

    “Today, milk production and agriculture in general are no longer just a plough and shovels, they are artificial intelligence, they are cutting-edge technologies that need to be implemented. In this regard, cooperation with the Higher School of Economics is a priority for us,” shared Anastasia Ornova, manager for work with the personnel reserve of the EkoNiva agricultural holding. “We have several joint projects. For example, a project on soybean phenotyping, the purpose of which is to conduct research in the field. Another project is aimed at analyzing logistics in the supply of raw milk from the agro-complex to the plant. In the near future, we are planning to hold the first joint hackathon with the National Research University Higher School of Economics.”

    “The event featured student projects, including those prepared by master’s students of the joint program with the Bank of Russia, “Information Security in the Credit and Financial Sphere,” says Elena Stavitskaya, consultant of the Department of Financial Cyber Literacy and Educational Initiatives of the Department of Methodology and Standardization of Information Security and Cyber Resilience of the Information Security Department of the Bank of Russia. “Some of the work is theoretical in nature, while others were presented in the form of implemented applied models. I would like to note the seriousness, depth, and, undoubtedly, practical nature of the projects, their focus on solving socially significant problems.”

    Thus, a joint project with the Information Security Department of the Bank of Russia offered everyone who wanted to deceive (almost always unsuccessfully) the protected algorithm of biometric identification by photo created at MIEM. Another project with the Bank of Russia presented a method for comparing countries by the level of fraud pressure, allowing to evaluate the success of the work of the structures interested in this.

    The festival also included an informal open day at MIEM HSE, as all of MIEM’s bachelor’s, specialist’s and master’s degree programs were presented in a separate area.

    In addition, the festival guests were treated not only to a scientific and educational program, but also to a variety of entertainment activities for relaxation and communication, including bingo with the opportunity to win merch from MIEM and IMS, areas for bead weaving and playing chess, as well as an area with anti-stress coloring books.

    The guests were also greatly interested in the stands and activities of partner companies and MIEM student communities – the MIEM Student Scientific and Technical Society and the MIEM Student Design Bureau.

    “MIEM Tech Day is not only an exhibition of the best technological products, but also a platform for exchanging experience,” emphasized Karina Lebedeva, consultant of the financial market training department of the Department for the Development of New Technologies in Education of the Bank of Russia. “In addition to student projects, the event featured presentations of the best cases of MIEM HSE partners. The stands of partners deserve special attention, where a large number of necessary handouts were presented. Thank you for the high level of organization of the event and the opportunity to literally touch student developments.”

    As a result, the day was filled with an atmosphere of friendly professional communication among all participants of the event – students, professionals, and those simply interested in the development of modern technologies and IT engineering.

    “What is MIEM Tech Day for me? First of all, it is people, student communities, teams, those who create the atmosphere of the event. Secondly, it is innovation, and thirdly, it is fun, because it is really fun here, it is fun to look at it, it is fun to touch it all. This is a very cool event! Finally, it is the team that organized this wonderful holiday,” concluded Ilya Semichasnov.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia has been working on creating drones that ‘call home’, go undercover and start fires. Here’s how they work

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Marcel Plichta, PhD Candidate in the School of International Relations, University of St Andrews

    Russia launched its largest single drone attack of the war against Ukraine’s cities on June 1. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that they faced 472 unmanned one-way attack (OWA) drones overnight.

    The record may not stand for long. The prior record was on May 26, when Moscow launched some 355 drones. The day before Russia had set a record with 298 Shaheds, which itself surpassed the May 18 tally.

    Russia’s enormous OWA drone attacks came as a surprise to politicians and the general public, but it’s the culmination of years of work by the Russia military. Initially purchased from Iran, Russia began building factories in 2023 to assemble and then manufacture Shaheds (Iranian-designed unmanned drones) in Russia. Greater control over production gave Russia the opportunity to expand the number of Shaheds quickly.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    It also helps them gradually upgrade their drones. Investigations into downed Shaheds show that Russia has been coating the drones in carbon, which resists detection by radar by absorbing incoming waves instead of reflecting them back. They have also been adding SIM cards to transmit data back to Russia through mobile networks.

    Shaheds also had their warheads upgraded. On May 20 the Ukrainian media reported that Shaheds were using newer incendiary and fragmentation warheads which start fires and spread large volumes of shrapnel respectively to increase their effectiveness.

    Russia hit Kyiv with its biggest ever drone strike a few days ago.

    These upgrades were simple in order to keep the cost of the drone, its major advantage over a missile, under control. These drones are both inexpensive and long-range.

    This means that an attacker such as Russia can launch hundreds every month at targets across Ukraine with little concern about how many are lost along the way. Meanwhile, the defender is stuck figuring out how to shoot all incoming drones down at a reasonable cost indefinitely.

    The problem is made even more complicated by the fact that air defence systems are sorely needed at the front line to shoot down hostile aircraft, making it a difficult trade-off.

    Adding to the problem is the recent production of decoy Shaheds. While they carry no warhead and pose little threat by themselves, Ukrainian air defence cannot always tell the decoy from the real thing and still need to shoot them down. In late May, Ukrainian officials told the media that up to 40% of incoming Shaheds were decoys.

    Consequently, Russia’s 472-drone attack reflects all of Russia’s innovations so far. These have improved the number of drones that survive, increased lethality, while using decoys alongside armed drones to ensure as many as possible reach their target.

    What are the challenges for Ukraine?

    Ukraine shoots most incoming Shaheds down. Even the 472-drone attack still had 382 claimed interceptions, a rate of 81%. However, the relatively high interception rate disguises the Shahed’s benefits for Russia.

    Shaheds are cheap by military standards, so launching constant attacks is a disproportionate burden for Ukrainian air defence units. Kyiv has mobilised an enormous amount of resources to protect its cities, from mobile units in trucks to counter-Shahed drones that function like a cheaper anti-aircraft missile.

    That said, these systems often have short ranges, which means that the savings per interception are somewhat offset by the need to maintain many hundreds of systems across a country as large as Ukraine. Ukraine also has the option of trying to strike Russia’s Shahed factories, which they have attempted a few times.

    Despite Ukraine’s evolving air defence, Russia still sees military benefits to constant Shahed attacks. In a study I contributed to last year, we found that Russia’s initial OWA drone strategy in 2022 and 2023 did little to force Ukraine to negotiate an end to the war on terms favourable to Russia.

    That may still be the case now, but the volume of drones and the high tempo of attacks means that Russian strategy could well be aimed at systematically exhausting Ukrainian air defence.

    As Ukraine grapples with unpredictable US military support, Kyiv is more vulnerable to running out of ammunition for its more advanced air defence systems. This means that constant Shahed attacks make it more difficult for Ukraine to stop incoming missiles, which carry much larger warheads.

    Ukraine’s drone strike this week.

    Of course, Ukraine has its own versions of the Shahed, which it uses to routinely launch strikes against Russian military and oil facilities. Less is known about Ukraine’s OWA drones, but they often use many similar features to Shaheds such as satellite navigation.




    Read more:
    Ukraine ‘spiderweb’ drone strike fails to register at peace talks as both sides dig in for the long haul


    For Russia’s Vladimir Putin, using Shaheds is not all about military benefit. Politically, he has increasingly used Shahed attacks to project a sense of power to his domestic audiences. On May 9, Russia paraded Shaheds through Moscow’s streets as part of its annual Victory Day celebrations, which had not been done in years past.

    Ukraine has begun employing its own OWA drones as part of the “Spiderweb” operation to attack military and oil infrastructure across Russia.

    Russia’s 472-drone attack is unlikely to remain its largest attack for long. Putin has shown a determination to expand the scale and tempo of its drone campaign and resist Ukaine’s calls for a permanent “ceasefire in the sky”, but this week Ukraine’s drone strategy has shown that prolonging the drone war can also have serious and unexpected effects for Moscow.

    So long as the conflict continues, Ukraine’s defenders will find themselves facing more, and better, drones aimed at their cities. But increasingly it looks like Russia must worry about Ukraine’s drone capabilities too.

    Marcel Plichta works for Grey Dynamics Ltd. as an intelligence instructor.

    ref. Russia has been working on creating drones that ‘call home’, go undercover and start fires. Here’s how they work – https://theconversation.com/russia-has-been-working-on-creating-drones-that-call-home-go-undercover-and-start-fires-heres-how-they-work-257699

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Damien Hirst at 60: a genius who never stops stretching our understanding of art and life – or a tired trickster ruined by his riches?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Daisy Dixon, Lecturer in Philosophy, Cardiff University

    “I’m an artist, I have no idea about money.”

    Damien Hirst is never far from scandal. Perhaps best known for immersing animal corpses into formaldehyde and selling them as art, the “enfant terrible” of the 1990s Young British Artists (YBA) movement seems to court controversy for a living – and has made an extraordinary amount of money in the process. Reputedly worth around £700 million, this working-class lad “easily” topped a recent list of the world’s richest artists.

    Money is at the root of a lot of the questions that hover around Hirst’s legacy to the art world as he reaches his 60th birthday. Few artists have stress-tested the question of artistic value (and price) more than him – not least in his 2007 work For The Love of God: a platinum cast of a human skull encrusted with thousands of flawless diamonds.

    It cost £14 million to produce and had an asking-price of £50 million. Praised by Guardian art critic Jonathan Jones as “the most honest work of art” in its shameless reflection of capitalist consumption, Observer columnist Nick Cohen accused it of not being ironic at all in its supposed critique of the art market – but rather, “rolling in it and loving it”. Hirst himself said of the skull piece: “It’s iconic and ironic. It has the two meanings.”

    Last year, Hirst’s money-related motives were called into question again in an investigation by the Guardian which revealed he had backdated three formaldehyde sculptures to the 1990s when they were, in fact, made in 2017. The report also found he had backdated some of the 10,000 original spot paintings from his NFT project The Currency to 2016, despite them being made between 2018 and 2019.

    Hirst’s company, Science Ltd, defended the artist by reminding critics that his art is conceptual – and that he has always been clear that what matters is “not the physical making of the object or the renewal of its parts, but rather the intention and the idea behind the artwork”. His lawyers pointed out:

    The dating of artworks, and particularly conceptual artworks, is not controlled by any industry standard. Artists are perfectly entitled to be (and often are) inconsistent in their dating of works.

    But some of the art world did not respond kindly to this approach. Writing about Hirst’s “backdating scandal”, New York’s Rehs Galleries asked not only if Hirst could be sued by buyers and investors, but whether he was in creative decline. And Jones accused Hirst of being stuck in the past, calling the Guardian’s findings a “betrayal” for the artist’s admirers which could “threaten to poison Hirst’s whole artistic biography”.


    The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.


    Ever since Hirst burst on the art scene in the 1990s with his macabre readymades (or “objets trouvé”) of dead animals in vitrines, he has divided art critics and the public alike. He has faced – and deniedmultiple allegations of plagiarism and been censored by animal rights activists, while also being acclaimed as a “genius” and one of the leading global artists of the 20th and 21st centuries. Amid all the eye-watering auction sales, he has donated artworks to numerous charities throughout his career.

    So, was the backdating incident another instance of Hirst mastering the art of the concept – and even offering a sly critique of consumerism and the art world machine, of which he is such a large cog? Or was it really just a big lie by a multi-millionaire artist seeking even more financial gain?

    As philosophers of art, we think our discipline can shed light on these complex questions by exploring the nature of conceptual art, aesthetic deception and the ethics of the art market. As we contemplate the legacy of Hirst at 60, we ask: must artists always be truthful?

    What only the best art can attain

    Hirst had a humble upbringing. Born in the English port city of Bristol in 1959, he was raised in Leeds by his Irish mother, who encouraged him to draw. He never met his father and got in trouble with the police on a few occasions in his youth. His early artistic education was rocky too: he got a grade E in art A-Level and was rejected a handful of times by art schools.

    But as a teenager, he had fallen in love with Francis Bacon’s paintings, later explaining that he admired their visceral expressions of the horror of the fragile body, and that he “went into sculpture directly in reaction … to Bacon’s work”. Hirst would also use his work experience in a morgue to hone his anatomical drawing skills.

    His love of conceptual art blossomed when he began studying fine art at London’s Goldsmiths University in 1986 – taught by art world legends such as Michael Craig-Martin and catching the attention of collector and businessman Charles Saatchi. Craig-Martin had risen to fame for his conceptual artwork An Oak tree (1973), consisting of a glass of water on a pristine shelf with a text asserting that the glass was, in fact, an oak tree. Hirst has described this artwork as “the greatest piece of conceptual sculpture – I still can’t get it out of my head”.

    In 1990, the owner of the Saatchi gallery, Charles Saatchi, attended one of Hirst’s co-curated shows. He reportedly stood staring, mouth agape, at his piece consisting of a rotting cow head being engulfed by maggots, before buying it. It seems a rather apt beginning to their stormy relationship.

    Hirst’s fascination with death culminated in his most notorious work of art, The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living (1991) – a dead tiger shark, caught off the coast of Queensland in Australia, preserved in formaldehyde in a glass vitrine.

    We encountered the work, separately and ten years apart, in London and New York. We both felt inclined to dislike and dismiss it. Instead, we were simply overwhelmed. By forcing us to stare death in the face, literally, the work put everything on its edge – awe-inspiring and horrifying, life-affirming and fatal, in your face yet somehow apart and absent.

    Like it or not, Hirst’s shark achieved what only the best art can: jolting us out of our everyday registers – making us confront mortality, the value of life, and the human condition.

    Video: Khan Academy.

    Not everyone agreed, of course. After it was exhibited in the first YBA show at the Saatchi Gallery in 1992, there was a swarm of hate. According to the Stuckist Art Group (an anti-conceptual art movement), a dead shark isn’t art. Of Hirst’s entire oeuvre, the group’s co-founders have said: “They’re bright and they’re zany – but there’s fuck all there at the end of the day.”

    After Hirst won the Turner Prize in 1995 for Mother and Child, Divided (a bisected cow and calf in glass tanks) Conservative politician Norman Tebbit asked whether the art world had “gone stark raving mad”. Art critic Brian Sewell exclaimed that Hirst’s work is “no more interesting than a stuffed pike over a pub door”.

    But Hirst never seemed to care about such criticism as he tackled controversial themes ranging from death, science and religion to the unrelenting power of capitalism. Along the way, he has used his power to criticise the very art world of which he forms such an important part, and from which he has gained such enormous riches.

    You might say his art reached a logical endpoint with The Currency in 2021 – a conceptual experiment in which 10,000 unique, hand-painted spot paintings were reduced to money itself, as they corresponded to 10,000 non-fungible tokens (NFTs). Buyers were given the choice of keeping either the physical or the digital version, while the other would be destroyed. Speaking to the actor and art enthusiast Stephen Fry, Hirst said of these paintings:

    What if I made these and treated them like money? … I’ve never really understood money. All these things – art, money, commerce – they’re all ethereal. It relies not on notebooks or pieces of paper but belief, trust.

    How Hirst makes his art

    It’s not just what Hirst’s art supposedly means that sometimes rocks the boat, but how he makes it.

    While he began his career by personally making and manipulating his chosen artistic materials – from paint and canvas to flies and maggots – he now unapologetically relies on a studio populated by numerous assistants to produce the works that bear his name. It is largely these studio workers who pour the paint on spinning canvases, handle the formaldehyde, construct the glass boxes, and source the dead animals.

    Hirst has fully endorsed the conceptual artist’s mantra of “the art is the idea”. If the artwork is the idea rather than the material object, then it should suffice merely for the artist to think or conceptualise the objects for them to count as his works of art. According to this perspective, exactly who makes the objects which are exhibited, sold and debated in the media is entirely unimportant.

    But to some, this adds to the ways in which they feel deceived or “had” by Hirst. After all, at least in the western artistic tradition, the connection between artist and artwork has for hundreds of years been considered unique, sacred even. If an artist doesn’t actually make the art any more, to what extent can they really be said to be an artist at all?

    Except that, in this respect, Hirst is not particularly unusual. Outsourcing the physical act of making an artwork is almost standard among contemporary artists such as Anish Kapoor, Rachel Whiteread and Jeff Koons – all of whom have long relied on trainee artists, engineers, architects, constructors and more to build their large structural works.

    And while Andy Warhol was the trendsetter in this regard from the early 1960s – calling his studio The Factory for its assembly line-style of production – the practice predates even him by hundreds of years. The great masters of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, having acquired sufficient fame and fortune, were rarely the sole creators of their masterpieces.

    The 17th-century Flemish artist Rubens, for example, would often leave the painting of less central or prominent features in his works to his studio assistants – many of whom, including Anthony van Dyck and Jacob Jordaens, went on to highly successful artistic careers of their own. Even 14-year-old Leonardo da Vinci started out as a studio apprentice in the workshop of the Italian sculptor and painter Andrea del Verrocchio.

    Unlike Rubens, however, Hirst now only rarely makes any kind of material contribution to his works, beyond adding his signature. The Currency series involved Hirst merely adding a watermark and signature to the thousands of handmade spot paintings.

    Video: HENI.

    Also, Hirst’s works make no formal recognition of this studio input, whereas for Rubens, the arrangement was fairly transparent. Indeed, the division of labour was sometimes even negotiated with the painting’s buyer – the more a buyer was willing to pay, the more Rubens would paint himself.

    But Hirst makes no secret of his lack of physical involvement in the material process, explaining:

    You have to look at it as if the artist is an architect – we don’t have a problem that great architects don’t actually build the houses … Every single spot painting contains my eye, my hand and my heart.

    Hirst’s social media pages often show the artist arriving at his studio while his team are busy at work. And clearly, not all potential buyers care about his “hands-off approach” – a large part of what they value is, precisely, the signature. In 2020, Hirst told The Idler magazine’s editor Tom Hodgkinson:

    If I couldn’t delegate, I wouldn’t make any work … If I want to paint a spot painting but don’t know how I want it to look, I can go to an assistant … When they ask how you want it to look, you can say: ‘I don’t know, just do it.’ It gives you something to kick against or work against.

    In the past decade, though, Hirst says he has scaled back his studio, admitting his art life felt like it was out of control:

    You start by thinking you’ll get one assistant and before you know it, you’ve got biographers, fire eaters, jugglers, fucking minstrels and lyre players all wandering around.

    The product of a specific place and time

    Hirst disrupts our beliefs about art to an extent matched by few of his contemporaries. Always in the business of fragmenting the already vague expectations of the art market – and wider general public – he continues the trajectory outlined by fellow experimental conceptual artists such as Marcel Duchamp, Joseph Beuys, Adrian Piper, Sol LeWitt, Joseph Kosuth and Yoko Ono – now well over 50 years ago.

    When the making of art moves into this level of abstraction, a historical fact like the precise inception date seems harder to pin down – and it becomes much less clear which aspects of the creative process should determine when the work was “made”.

    Of course, the same question arises outside the confines of this artistic genre. How should we deal with performative arts such as theatre, jazz or opera? Is it all that important to date John Coltrane’s Blue Train to its first recording in 1957, rather than any of the other dates on which the American jazz legend performed it? Surely some aesthetic and artistic qualities are added on each occasion?

    However, art in general, be it Blue Train or one of Hirst’s spot paintings, is always the product of a specific place and time. It is undoubtedly a significant fact about Hirst’s Cain and Abel (1994) – one of the artworks highlighted by the Guardian misdating investigation – that it was “made” in the YBA boom of the 1990s.

    Can we engage with these pieces without bringing knowledge of this fact into our experience of them? Yes. Can we grasp at least some of their wider meaning? Almost certainly. But can we fully appreciate them as cultural objects – defining a precise moment in the evolution of art and society at large, perhaps foreseeing a certain shift in our larger value systems including what art means to us? Maybe not.

    Hirst may well believe he is following a robust and historical line of artistic reasoning, and therefore telling the truth as he sees it. This is certainly the line his lawyers took in their public statement in response to the backdating allegations.

    But there is another possibility we need to consider – one that touches on the worries of some of Hirst’s critics. What if Hirst intentionally misled the public for financial and commercial gain, and that the dating debacle has nothing to do with his cunning conceptual practice?

    Jon Sharples, senior associate at London-based law firm Howard Kennedy – one of the first UK practices to advise on art and cultural property law – observed a few reasons why an artist might deliberately fudge or mislead on the origin of their art:

    The potential for commercial pressure to do so is obvious. If works from a certain period achieve higher market prices than works from other periods, there is a clear incentive to increase the supply of such works to meet the demand for them.

    Kazimir Malevich’s Black Square.
    State Russian Museum/Wikimedia Commons

    Another reason Sharples offered is an art-historical one – to make the artist appear more radical: “In the linear, western conception of art history – in which ‘originality’ is often elevated above all other artistic virtues, and great store is placed in being the ‘first’ artist to arrive at a particular development – artists have sometimes been given to tampering with the historical record.”

    Here, Sharples referenced the famous example of “the father of abstraction”, Russian artist Kazimir Malevich, backdating the first version of his Black Square by two years.

    So, has Hirst just told a big fib about the origins of some of his art?

    Philosophers largely agree that lying involves asserting something you believe to be untrue; speaking seriously but not telling the truth. And most of the time, we all assume that people around us abide by the norm that everyone ought to speak truthfully to each other. If we didn’t believe this, we would barely be able to communicate with one another. Lying involves violating this “truth norm”.

    Yet, the case of art seems to stand in stark contrast to this. When we ask whether an artist has lied as part of their artistic practice, it is often not clear that there is a straightforward truth norm in the art world to be violated: it’s not clear that the artist is speaking ‘seriously’ in the first place.

    I (Daisy) have researched in depth the reasons why lying in the art world is such a tricky business. In many exhibitions, it is the aesthetic experience that is of primary value. If what matters is creating beauty, then straightforward truth is not the point.

    Moreover, even in cases where the art is designed to convey a specific message, it’s tricky to say in what sense they ought to tell “the truth”. Many artworks represent fictional scenarios which needn’t be fully accurate.

    For instance, it was quite acceptable in the 16th century for painters of religious paintings to give central biblical figures inaccurate clothing – and for portrait artists not to paint their sitter’s flaws and blemishes. And in the perplexing art world of the 21st century, many post-1960 artforms are designed to challenge and critique the very nature of truth itself.

    All of which means straightforward “truth games” do not operate as smoothly in the art world as they do in the ordinary world. With its self-reflective and self-critical structure, the art world of today offers a space to think open-endedly and creatively. Do you expect everything you see in an art gallery, or even speeches by conceptual artists, to be straightforwardly “true”? We don’t think so.

    The art world is hardly renowned for its straightforwardly communicated messages. To accuse Hirst of lying assumes he is playing the truth game that the rest of us are signed up to in the first place. And it’s not clear he is.

    Hirst might be closer to a novelist or actor who plays with and explores the very nature of truth and falsehood. In this way, he’s maybe at most a “bullshitter” who doesn’t play – or care for – the truth game at all.

    The real problem?

    But this fascination with Hirst’s dating practices may overlook the more important – if equally complex – problem of how his art works were made, rather than when. Are the ethical concerns about the production of Hirst’s enormous oeuvre the real issue in assessing his legacy as an artist?

    For instance, Hirst has been criticised for treating his staff as “disposable”. During the peak of the COVID pandemic, he laid off 63 of his studio assistants even though his company had reportedly received £15 million of emergency loans from the UK government.

    And while Hirst’s lawyers insist his studios always adhere to health-and-safety regulations, some of the “factory line” workers producing artworks for The Currency were allegedly left with repetitive strain injuries. One artist described their year-long toil as “very, very tedious”. Another commented on the work tables being at a low level, forcing them to constantly bend down.

    Hirst has publicly praised assistants such as the artist Rachel Howard, who he described as “the best person who ever painted spots for me”. Likewise, Howard described working with Hirst as “a very good symbiotic” relationship.

    Another area of enduring controversy is Hirst’s use of animals. In 2017, Artnet magazine estimated that nearly 1 million animals had been killed for his artworks over the years, including 36 farm animals, 685 sea creatures, and 912,005 birds and insects. The same year, Italian animal rights group 100% Animalisti summarised the concerns about animal ethics in Hirst’s art:

    Hirst is famous for exhibiting slain animals … and for the use of thousands of butterflies whose wings are torn and glued on various objects. Death and the taste of the macabre serve to attract attention. Then wealthy collectors such as Saatchi and even the prestigious Sotheby’s artificially inflate the prices of Hirst’s junk. It’s a squalid commercial operation based on death and contempt for living and sentient beings.

    Video: Channel 4 News.

    Indeed, some of Hirst’s macabre formaldehyde pieces are known for rotting a little too much. The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living originally deteriorated due to an improper preservation technique, and had to be replaced by another shark caught off the same Australian coast. It’s not clear how many sharks have now been killed – or will need to be killed in the future – to preserve this masterpiece.

    Further concerns have been raised about the environmental ethics of Hirst’s art, including that The Currency project incurred a hefty carbon footprint because of its reliance on blockchain technology. While Hirst used a more environmentally-friendly sidechain to release his NFTs, he still received payment via bitcoin, which has a far higher energy consumption.

    All of this raises wider questions about the art world’s role, for both good and bad, in modern life – from the treatment of workers in the gig economy to the climate emergency, biodiversity and animal rights.

    Traditionally, art historians, critics and investors have championed an artwork’s meaning over any of its moral flaws in its production. But the ethics of artmaking are now being questioned by philosophers such as ourselves, as well as by many influential figures in the art world. Artworks that incur large carbon footprints, cause damage to ecosystems, or use and kill animals, are now considered morally flawed in these ways.

    Philosophers such as Ted Nannicelli argue that these ethical defects can actually diminish the artistic value of the work of art. Meanwhile, artists such as Angela Singer and Ben Rubin and Jen Thorp use their art for animal and eco-activism, while doing no harm to creatures or the ecosystem in the process.

    As we both acknowledge, Hirst’s shark expressed a laudable meaning in an arresting way. But is this enough to excuse the (repeated) killing of this awesome animal? Do we become complicit in its death by praising it as art? It is a question anybody who was impressed by its sheer aesthetic presence all those years ago should ask themselves.

    In this and many other ways, Hirst’s work continues to raise fundamental questions about art – long after it was created, or dated. If nothing else, surely this confirms his enduring position in the British art establishment.

    Damien Hirst’s representatives were contacted about the criticisms of Hirst that are highlighted in this article, but they did not respond by the time of publication.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Elisabeth Schellekens has received funding from Vetenskapsrådet (Swedish Funding Council) as Principal Investigator for research into Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic Cognition (2019-22), and an AHRC Innovation Award on Perception and Conceptual Art with Peter Goldie (2003).

    Daisy Dixon does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Damien Hirst at 60: a genius who never stops stretching our understanding of art and life – or a tired trickster ruined by his riches? – https://theconversation.com/damien-hirst-at-60-a-genius-who-never-stops-stretching-our-understanding-of-art-and-life-or-a-tired-trickster-ruined-by-his-riches-257921

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Microsoft launches new European security initiative

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Microsoft launches new European security initiative

    As AI and digital technologies advance, the European cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, presenting new challenges that require stronger partnerships and enhanced solutions. Ransomware groups and state-sponsored actors from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea continue to grow in scope and sophistication, and European cyber protection cannot afford to stand still.

    That is why, today, in Berlin, we are announcing a new Microsoft initiative to expand our longstanding work to help defend Europe’s cybersecurity. Implementing one of the five European Digital Commitments I shared in Brussels five weeks ago, we are launching a new European Security Program that adds to the company’s longstanding global Government Security Program.

    This new program expands the geographic reach of our existing work and adds new elements that will become critical to Europe’s protection. It puts AI at the center of our work as a tool to protect traditional cybersecurity needs and strengthens our protection of digital and AI infrastructure.

    We are launching the European Security Program with three new elements:

    • Increasing AI-based threat intelligence sharing with European governments;
    • Making additional investments to strengthen cybersecurity capacity and resilience; and
    • Expanding our partnerships to disrupt cyberattacks and dismantle the networks cybercriminals use.

    We are making this program available to European governments, free of charge, including all 27 European Union (EU) member states, as well as EU accession countries, members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the UK, Monaco, and the Vatican.

    Together, these efforts reflect Microsoft’s long-term commitment to defending Europe’s digital ecosystem—ensuring that, no matter how the threat landscape evolves, we will remain a trusted and steadfast partner to Europe in securing its digital future.

    The need for new steps – the current threat environment

    Microsoft continues to observe persistent threat activity targeting European networks from nation state actors, with Russian and Chinese activity being particularly prolific in Europe. Unsurprisingly, Russia continues to be especially focused on targets in Ukraine and European nations providing support to Ukraine. Nation-state actors, including those engaging in malicious activity from Iran and North Korea, are predominantly pursuing espionage objectives in Europe through credential theft or the exploitation of vulnerabilities to gain access to corporate and government networks. Several campaigns, including those from China, have also targeted academic institutions, compromising accounts to access sensitive research data or conduct geopolitical espionage against think tanks. Cybercriminals continue to develop Ransomware-as-a-Service beyond nation-state threats. We have seen the emergence of illicit websites rapidly gaining followings by leaking ransomware insights to be used by criminal groups to conduct attacks across Europe.

    The rise of AI is also augmenting and evolving threat actor behavior. Microsoft has observed AI use by threat actors for reconnaissance, vulnerability research, translation, LLM-refined operational command techniques, resource development, scripting techniques, detection evasion, social engineering, and brute force attacks. This is why Microsoft now tracks any malicious use of new AI models we release and proactively prevents known threat actors from using our AI products. This also underscores the importance of secure development and rigorous testing of AI models, leveraging AI to benefit cyber defenders, and close public-private partnerships to share the latest insights about AI and cybersecurity.

    Increasing AI-based threat intelligence sharing with governments

    Microsoft’s Government Security Program (GSP) has long provided governments with confidential security information and resources to help them better understand our products and the evolving threat landscape, particularly threats from nation-state actors. Building on existing efforts, our new European Security Program will increase the flow and expand access to actionable threat intelligence to European governments. Tailored to discrete national threat environments using AI insights, and delivered, when possible, in real time, this program is designed to help governments stay ahead of advancing cyber threats through:

    • Leveraging threat intelligence insights – Microsoft tracks the most sophisticated nation-state cyber activity, offering timely insights into evolving global threats. We use AI to support our analysis, which has improved our visibility and accelerated our ability to share the latest intelligence on the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by advanced persistent threat actors, including the malicious use of AI. By providing more information and faster, Microsoft will help European governments strengthen their cyber resilience and enable proactive defense.
    • Expanding cybercrime reporting – The Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) plays a critical role in detecting and disrupting global cybercriminal infrastructure, generating invaluable real-time intelligence in the process. As part of this new effort, we are expanding the availability of this intelligence to trusted European partners to support rapid response and coordinated enforcement action through the Cybercrime Threat Intelligence Program (CTIP).
    • Providing foreign influence operations updates – The Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) continues to monitor influence operations in Europe, which are increasingly using AI to mislead and deceive with deepfake synthetic media. MTAC also uses AI to look for commonalities across operations and will provide regular intelligence briefings on foreign influence, offering timely insights into the tactics, narratives, and digital platforms leveraged by state-affiliated actors. These briefings help policymakers and security stakeholders stay ahead of evolving disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats targeting democratic institutions and public trust.
    • Identifying vulnerabilities and prioritizing security communications – Microsoft is committed to proactive and transparent security communications, particularly in the face of emerging threats and evolving vulnerabilities. We provide customers with timely, actionable intelligence through structured programs such as the Threat Microsoft Security Update Guide, Vulnerability Reporting process, and Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management. As part of this expanded commitment, we will offer prioritized notice of security communications, including vulnerability remediation guidance to our European Security Program partners, helping to enhance situational awareness and enabling faster responses.

    Participating governments will have a dedicated Microsoft point of contact to coordinate responses and escalate concerns. These efforts are designed to improve situational awareness and to support faster, more coordinated action across borders.

    Making additional investments to strengthen cybersecurity capacity and resilience

    Digital resilience—the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to cyber threats and disruptions—requires more than technology. It requires investment in people, institutions, and partnerships. As part of the European Security Program, we are investing additional resources to further our work with European governments, civil society, and innovators to strengthen local capabilities and build long-term resilience. Highlights include:

    • Strengthening public-private collaboration – Microsoft has launched a new pilot program with Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), embedding Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) investigators at EC3 headquarters in The Hague to enhance intelligence sharing and operational coordination. Through this enhanced collaboration, we will enable joint investigations, identify faster threat identification, and be better positioned to disrupt cybercriminal activity targeting European institutions and citizens more effectively.
    • Supporting civil society and defending against ransomware – Microsoft has renewed our three-year partnership with the CyberPeace Institute to support NGOs and to promote accountability for bad actors, including nearly 100 Microsoft employees volunteering their time and expertise to help defend the most vulnerable in cyberspace. We will continue to support the Institute’s efforts to trace ransomware origins, identify safe havens, and uncover potential links to nation-state actors.
    • Expanding cybersecurity support to the Western Balkans – Through a new collaboration with the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre (WB3C), Microsoft will scale cybersecurity in a region where malicious actors have long sought to destabilize countries bordering the EU. Microsoft stands firmly in defense of Ukraine and is now extending that commitment with WB3C to help scale cybersecurity capabilities in a geopolitically sensitive and digitally under-resourced region, aligning with broader European cybersecurity priorities.
    • Advancing AI security and innovation – Microsoft is investing additional resources to support research, expand the cybersecurity talent pipeline, and test advanced AI-assisted security tools in real-world environments using Microsoft’s security stack and Azure and Copilot capabilities. We’re working with the UK’s Laboratory for AI Security Research (LASR), a public-private partnership established to advance AI security in support of UK’s national security and economic prosperity. Together, we’re launching a joint research program focused on AI-cybersecurity challenges with a focus on critical infrastructure and agentic AI security, with an initial investment from Microsoft and research-collaboration between LASR and Microsoft Security Research Center.
    • Securing open-source innovation Through the recently launched GitHub Secure Open Source Fund, we will support open-source projects that underpin the digital supply chain, catalyze innovation, and are critical to the AI stack. By raising the security posture for European projects such as Log4J and Scancode, which are critical to the IT systems of governments and companies across the continent, the program aims to reduce future security vulnerabilities. Ensuring these tools can continuously withstand and sustainably defend against sophisticated cyber threats is essential to strengthening cyber resilience.

    These new and enhanced initiatives reflect our belief that cybersecurity is a collective endeavor—and that Europe’s digital resilience must be built from the ground up.

    Expanding partnerships to disrupt cyberattacks and dismantle cybercriminal networks

    Finally, as part of our European Security Program we are expanding our partnerships with law enforcement and regional actors to proactively identify new and innovative ways to disrupt malicious and criminal activity.

    For instance, last month, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) worked with Europol and others to take down Lumma, a prolific infostealer malware used to steal passwords, financial data, and crypto wallets. In just two months, Lumma infected nearly 400,000 devices globally, many of them in Europe. The operation seized or blocked over 2,300 command-and-control domains. Off the back of this action, we are working with Europol to identify new opportunities to continue to meaningfully disrupt and deter cybercrime.

    Lumma-infected devices by country in Europe

    To accelerate future takedowns, we also launched the Statutory Automated Disruption (SAD) Program in April 2025. This initiative automates legal abuse notifications to hosting providers, enabling faster removal of malicious domains and IP addresses. Focused initially on Europe and the U.S., SAD raises the cost of doing business for cybercriminals and makes it harder for them to operate at scale.

    In addition, we’re working with local internet service providers to help remediate affected users and ensure governments have greater visibility into emerging threats.

    The DCU has long played a leading role in proactively combating cyber threats, including those originating from nation-state actors. Since 2016, Microsoft has filed seven legal actions to spotlight and disrupt nation-state threat actors from countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which we refer to internally by the weather-themed names Blizzard, Typhoon, Sandstorm, and Sleet, respectively. Most recently, in September 2024, Microsoft initiated a disruption action against the Russian actor Star Blizzard, mentioned above, known for hacking political targets surrounding UK’s 2022 elections and targeting NATO countries to advance its geopolitical interests involving Ukraine. Microsoft exposed the Russian actors and directly seized over 140 malicious domains in total, substantially blunting ongoing campaigns and forcing Star Blizzard to significantly alter its attack methods to other platforms, which Microsoft Threat Intelligence thereafter publicly exposed in a security blog. We will continue to act against those seeking to harm customers, governments, and individual users. These efforts are part of our broader strategy to partner with law enforcement across Europe. We are already working on coordinated disruptions to protect the digital ecosystem, and we stand ready to provide robust incident response services during crises, ensuring our partners and customers are never alone in the face of cyber adversity.

    We also believe that deterrence is a critical pillar of modern cybersecurity. The EU’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox plays a vital role in this effort, helping to coordinate crisis response and send a clear message that malicious activity will not go unanswered—legally, operationally, or reputationally.

    Taken together, operations like the Lumma disruption, the launch of SAD, and future coordinated disruptions are helping to prevent cybercriminals and state actors from establishing malicious infrastructure in Europe.

    * * *

    At Microsoft, our commitment to Europe is deep, enduring, and unwavering. We believe that Europe’s digital future is one of the most important opportunities of our time—and protecting that future is a responsibility we share. We will stand shoulder to shoulder with European governments, institutions, and communities to defend against threats, build capacity, and strengthen resilience. We are proud to be a trusted partner to Europe, and we will continue to work every day to earn trust through transparency, collaboration, and a steadfast commitment to protecting what matters most.

    Tags: Brad Smith, cybersecurity, Digital commitments, Europe

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Russia: European Commission approves Bulgaria’s transition to euro in 2026

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Brussels/Sofia, June 4 (Xinhua) — Bulgaria has met the criteria to adopt the euro as of January 1, 2026, making it the 21st member of the eurozone, the European Commission (EC) announced on Wednesday.

    The conclusion of the Commission’s 2025 Convergence Report, prepared at Bulgaria’s request, confirms that the country meets the four nominal convergence criteria required for adoption of the euro. The assessment also took into account broader economic indicators such as market integration and the balance of payments. The findings were also supported by a parallel report from the European Central Bank (ECB).

    Based on the conclusion, the European Commission proposed that the EU Council adopt a decision and a regulation on the introduction of the euro in Bulgaria. The final decision should be taken by the EU Council in the first half of July after consultations with the Eurogroup, the European Council, the European Parliament and the ECB.

    “This brings Bulgaria one step closer to adopting the euro,” said EC President Ursula von der Leyen, adding that eurozone membership would strengthen the country’s economy through increased trade, investment and access to finance.

    Bulgarian Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov welcomed the positive assessment, calling it the result of years of reforms and coordination with other European partners. He is expected to make a formal statement later on Wednesday.

    Meanwhile, public opinion in Bulgaria remains divided on the issue. A recent poll by the Trend Research Center found that only 21 percent of respondents support switching to the euro in 2026, while 33 percent want to delay the introduction of the single currency and 38 percent reject the idea entirely. In recent weeks, protests have been held across the country demanding a referendum on keeping the national currency, the lev. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: 11 killed, 50 injured in stampede at cricket stadium in Bangalore, India /more details/

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    NEW DELHI, June 4 (Xinhua) — At least 11 people were killed and 50 others injured in a stampede near a cricket stadium in the southern Indian city of Bangalore on Wednesday, multiple local media reported.

    The stampede occurred outside the Mangalam Chinnaswamy Stadium where thousands of cricket fans had gathered to celebrate Royal Challengers Bengaluru (RCB) winning their first Indian Premier League title.

    “The injured were taken to Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital and Vaidehi Hospital. Seven people succumbed to their injuries in Bowring and four others succumbed to their injuries in Vaidehi,” New Delhi-based News18 reported.

    RCB won the league title for the first time in 18 years, which led to a rush of jubilant fans filling the stadium and surrounding areas to see their idols.

    Karnataka Deputy Chief Minister D.K. Shivakumar confirmed the deaths but did not specify the number of casualties.

    “I apologize for the stampede,” he said. “We have deployed over 5,000 personnel. We are dealing with a young, lively crowd and cannot use lathis (long batons used by Indian police) against them,” DK Shivakumar added.

    Television channels showed thousands of people, some waving the team’s red flags, lining the streets leading to the stadium as the cricket team arrived at the venue by bus. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Lawler Reintroduces Bill to Evaluate NATO-Style Alliance in the Indo-Pacific

    Source: US Congressman Mike Lawler (R, NY-17)

    Washington, D.C. – 6/4/25… Today, Congressman Mike Lawler (NY-17) introduced the Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization Act, legislation that would establish a task force to evaluate the feasibility of a NATO-style collective security framework for the Indo-Pacific region.

    The task force would assess current security challenges posed by the Chinese Communist Party and the North Korean government, and explore whether a formal multilateral defense agreement among the United States and Indo-Pacific allies could serve as a credible deterrent to further aggression in the region.

    “As Chairman of the MENA Subcommittee, I see every day how our adversaries, notably China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, are coordinating to undermine global stability and democracy,” said Congressman Lawler. “This bill is about ensuring our allies in the Indo-Pacific have the support and structure they need to stand firm in the face of that aggression, and that we can too.”

    “There is certainly appetite in the Indo-Pacific, our allies want a deeper, more reliable security cooperation with the United States,” continued Lawler. “A NATO-style alliance in the region may be the best way to bolster deterrence and ensure long-lasting peace.”

    “We can’t afford to take a wait-and-see approach while the CCP threatens Taiwan, coerces its neighbors, and expands its military reach,” Lawler concluded. “This task force will help lay the groundwork for a strategic alliance rooted in democratic values, mutual defense, and long-term security in the Indo-Pacific.”

    The Indo-Pacific Treaty Organization Act is part of Congressman Lawler’s broader effort to strengthen U.S. alliances and reinforce American leadership on the global stage.

    Congressman Lawler is one of the most bipartisan members of Congress and represents New York’s 17th Congressional District, which is just north of New York City and contains all or parts of Rockland, Putnam, Dutchess, and Westchester Counties. He was rated the most effective freshman lawmaker in the 118th Congress, 8th overall, surpassing dozens of committee chairs.

    ###

    Full text of the bill can be found HERE.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: German Techno

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Izmailovsky Park will host a unique lecture dedicated to the history of German electronic music. Guests will learn how in the 1970s in Dusseldorf, the Kraftwerk group laid the foundations for this trend, creating the very machine sound that later became the hallmark of German techno.

    Participants will learn how experiments with synthesizers and rhythm boxes turned into an entire movement that inspires generations of musicians. Listeners will find themselves in Frankfurt in the 1980s — the epicenter of the emerging club culture. The final part of the event will highlight the key musical confrontations of the 1990s: the creative rivalry of EBM (Electronic Body Music) and techno house, as well as the formation of the German trance wave. Guests will learn about the characteristic features of each style, the most significant performers and bands, as well as the global influence of the German electronic scene on the world music industry.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: // Rytlet.mos.ru/Event/347738257/

    MIL OSI Russia News