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Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI: Best Online Casinos 2025: 7Bit Casino Rated As Top Real Money Casino

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

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    Legal Disclaimer

    This content is for informational and entertainment purposes only and is not legal, financial, or gambling advice. Information is presented “as is,” with no warranties on accuracy or completeness. Readers must verify information and ensure compliance with local gambling laws. The publisher and authors are not liable for losses or consequences from using this information.

    Affiliate Disclosure

    Some links may be affiliate links, earning a commission at no cost to you. Recommendations are based on objective criteria, and affiliate partnerships do not influence content or conclusions.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/c2b1b32c-15fa-44db-8e7f-2136c3a99b3b

    The MIL Network –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: NSU graduate talks about Novosibirsk residents’ contribution to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    A graduate gave an open public lecture “Novosibirsk residents to the front” at Novosibirsk State University Humanitarian Institute of NSU, Honorary Archivist of the Russian Federation, Leading Archivist of the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region Igor Samarin. He spoke about the creation of the 133rd Rifle (later the 18th Guards Insterburg) Division in Novosibirsk in 1939 and its combat path during the Great Patriotic War, as well as about the formation of the 1st Siberian Volunteer Division. It was in its ranks that Mikhail Perevozchikov, Olga Zhilina, Boris Bogatkov, whose names are given to streets in Novosibirsk, fought.

    “Breakthrough Division”

    This is what the 133rd Rifle Division (later the 18th Guards Insterburg) was called during the Great Patriotic War. The division covered itself with unfading glory in the Battle of Moscow in late 1941 – early 1942, in the Rzhev-Sychevka offensive operation, in the Oryol and Vitebsk-Orsha offensive operations, in the East Prussian offensive operation, as a result of which the city of Insterburg and the city of Koenigsberg, considered impregnable, were captured. The “breakthrough division” ended its combat path by capturing the seaport – the Pillau fortress.

    The 133rd separate rifle division was formed in the military town of Novosibirsk in 1939 according to the order of the Military Council of the Siberian Military District dated September 8. It was formed on the basis of the 78th and 71st rifle divisions and their assigned personnel, living in the settlements of Altai and Siberia.

    — The division’s fighters received the news of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War at the summer camps in the vicinity of Biysk, where they were training. Early in the morning of June 22, 1941, there was a parade dedicated to the opening of military training. After the parade, sports competitions began. They were interrupted by a government radio message about the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union. After 2-3 hours, rallies were held in all regiments. And the next day, by order of the Siberian Military District command, all personnel of the 133rd Division regiments returned to winter quarters. Only one day was allocated for training to be sent to the front. At night, the fighters received combat equipment. In 24 hours, ammunition, weapons, camouflage, draft power and transport were collected, — said Igor Samarin.

    The division was immediately thrown into defensive battles near Moscow, which went into a counteroffensive by winter. On July 5, 1941, the 2nd Battalion of the 133rd Division arrived at the destination station of Vyazma. After a long march, the battalion occupied a defensive line on the Dnieper River. The battalion was advanced by the lead detachment 70 km. On July 7, 1941, the 133rd Division, having unloaded at Vyazma station and joined the 24th Army, moved to the concentration area and took up defensive positions on the eastern bank of the Dnieper River. From July 10, it participated in the Battle of Smolensk.

    On September 1, 1941, by order of the General Command, the 133rd Rifle Division was transferred to the Velikiye Luki direction, to the area of the city of Andreapol in the Kalinin region, where it became part of the 22nd Army of Major General V.A. Yushkevich. Two days later, units of the 133rd Rifle Division, having arrived in the concentration area of the Soblago-Pena station, went out to occupy a new line of defense. The division fought fierce battles in the area of Mosty, Vitbino, Zhabero, Okhvat, where, having inflicted significant damage on the enemy, it delayed his advance from the eastern side. In this area, it advanced 10-12 km through fighting and liberated about 20 settlements. And on September 30, 1941, the great battle of Moscow began. It is divided into two periods: defensive (September 30 – December 4, 1941) and counteroffensive (December 5–6, 1941 – January 7–8, 1942), which then grew into a general offensive of our troops in the Western (Moscow), Northwestern and Southwestern directions (January 7–10 – April 20, 1942).

    In January – early March 1942, the 133rd Rifle Division fought as part of the 49th Army. As a result of battles and offensive actions, units of the division liberated 88 settlements.

    On March 17, 1942, for the heroism, discipline and exemplary performance of combat missions in the fight against German fascism, the 133rd Separate Rifle Division was transformed into the 18th Guards Rifle Division by order of the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR No. 78 of March 17, 1942, and on May 3 of the same year, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the division was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for successful combat operations against the Nazi invaders.

    From March 20, 1942 to February 9, 1943, the division fought heavy defensive battles on the 15 km long Sukov line (the villages of Novo-Sukovka and Sukovka), nicknamed “Little Sevastopol”.

    Igor Samarin illustrated the story of the combat path of the “Breakthrough Division” with a vivid presentation with pictures of priceless archival documents and frontline photographs. Among them is the division’s combat log, which, in addition to the advances of the combat unit and the awards received by the soldiers and commanders, also contains information about losses. In January 1942 alone, the division, numbering 12-13 thousand people, lost 2,725 soldiers and officers, in February – 2,534, and in March – 4,314.

    — At that time, positional warfare was being waged on this section of the front. There was no large-scale offensive or large-scale defense, but there were fierce battles — the so-called “trench warfare.” The division’s fighters drew off enemy forces that, under other conditions, could have replenished the enemy army rushing to Moscow. If “trench warfare” had not been waged on some sections of the front, there would have been no decisive attacks and breakthroughs on others. However, this division participated not only in heavy positional battles, otherwise it would not have been called a “breakthrough division.” It had many heroic attacks and assaults on enemy fortifications, but its most striking feat was the capture of Königsberg. Not only does this city stand on a hill, it is also surrounded by high medieval fortress walls. An impregnable stronghold. But our fighters did what seemed impossible, — explained Igor Samarin.

    Photographs and documents from the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region contain evidence of the exploits of the fighters of the “Breakthrough Division”. The lecturer showed the audience photo portraits of its heroes. Among them was Private Ikram Tashmetov, who initiated the sniper movement in the division and personally destroyed 105 fascists – an enemy company – in 9 months. Another sniper, Sergeant Ivan Saenko, destroyed 240 German soldiers and officers from February 1942 until the end of the war. This fact is confirmed by a certificate issued to him by the commander of the unit in which he served his military career.

    The grandson of the legendary hero of the civil war Vasily Chapaev, Alexander, also served in the division as an artillery squad commander. His photo was published in a front-line newspaper, which has been preserved in the archives to this day.

    A photo of the orchestra of the 18th Guards Rifle Division has also survived. At the beginning of the war, the divisional orchestra consisted of 30 people and was led by Mikhail Kazakov. Three regimental brigades were created on the basis of the divisional orchestra, which operated directly on the front line. They gave concerts in dugouts and bunkers, even if there were only 10-15 spectators and the performances took place in several stages. The repertoire of the divisional orchestra was not limited to bravura marches. It was wide and varied, including classical works.

    The division also had its own newspaper, “Defense of the Motherland,” and printed leaflets. It even had its own artist, Ivan Titkov. His pencil drawings have been perfectly preserved to this day. The subjects were varied: our soldiers on the offensive, on defense, on reconnaissance, during rest hours, and captured enemy soldiers.

    Volunteers

    The 1st Siberian Volunteer Division of Siberian Warriors was created in July 1942 on the initiative of the Novosibirsk Regional Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Subsequently, it was named the 150th Rifle Division, then became the 22nd Guards Riga Division. It was in this famous division that our fellow countrymen fought, after whom streets in Novosibirsk are named – Mikhail Perevozchikov, Olga Zhilina, Boris Bogatkov.

    — In the summer of 1942, the enemy was still strong and was gathering new forces for an offensive on the Caucasus, Moscow, and Stalingrad. In these conditions, volunteer divisions began to form in many regions of our country. Novosibirsk Oblast was no exception. This initiative was formalized and sent to Joseph Stalin. His consent was received a few days later, on July 2. And already on July 4, the first application was submitted. And by July 7, there were already 2,723 of them. By July 22, 5,410 privates and 715 junior officers were accepted into the volunteer division, and another 984 people from the regular junior staff arrived. In total, the division at that time numbered 7,179 soldiers and junior officers. And the recruitment of volunteers did not end there, — said Igor Samarin.

    The first commander of the division was Nikolai Guz. The lecturer showed the audience a unique document – his award sheet for the Order of the Red Banner, stored in the Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and said that Nikolai Olimpievich was an outstanding officer. He commanded the 345th Rifle Division, which participated in the defense of Sevastopol (the division was completely destroyed, but the banner was saved), was the commander of the 150th Rifle Volunteer Division named after Stalin, and then the 22nd Guards Rifle Division and the 338th Rifle Division. Cavalier of the Order of the Red Banner and the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree.

    — The party leadership of the Novosibirsk region was given the task of not just creating a volunteer division, but also providing it with comprehensive assistance and replenishment. That it would fully assist and replenish it, which was done with great dedication and efficiency, — noted Igor Samarin.

    Among the volunteers was Mikhail Perevozchikov. Since he was the secretary of the Novosibirsk regional committee of the Komsomol, he had a deferment, but nevertheless, Mikhail Georgievich persistently sought to get to the front. He went to the front as a volunteer and died in a fierce battle with the fascists near the city of Bely on November 25, 1942, repelling an enemy tank attack. A street in the Zaeltsovsky district of Novosibirsk is named after him.

    One of the streets in the Central District of Novosibirsk is named after Olga Zhilina, who was one of the first girls to apply to be included in the 22nd Volunteer Division.

    — The life of this amazing woman is shrouded in mystery. The exact date of her birth is unknown, only the year — 1914. Olga Vasilievna was born in Kolyvan, and as a child, she lost her parents and was taken into the care of her aunts, who took her to Novosibirsk. Today, employees of the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region have tried to establish her date of birth. To do this, they turned to the registers of Orthodox churches in Kolyvan. From 1914, only two churches out of three that existed at that time have preserved registers. Olga Zhilina’s birth and baptism were not recorded in them. The third register could not be found, — the lecturer said.

    Olga graduated from high school, studied at the workers’ faculty, but did not graduate. For some time she worked as a saleswoman in a store, and then mysteriously ended up in the personnel department of the regional party committee. Then – in the personnel department of the NKVD administration for the Novosibirsk region, and then she even headed the military department in the Central district party committee. In addition, Olga Zhilina was engaged in shooting, showing excellent results, was fond of sports, ran cross-country, and studied German. She, like Mikhail Perevozchikov, also had an “iron” exemption, but nevertheless, she preferred to take nursing courses and become a front-line medical instructor.

    During her two years at the front as a medical battalion instructor, Olga Zhilina suffered eight wounds, carrying the wounded out of the heaviest battles. At the same time, she was also a sniper and has killed enemy soldiers and officers.

    On October 8, 1944, in the area of the village of Bumbieri near Riga, she carried 17 wounded soldiers out of a burning barn set on fire by the Nazis. She was mortally wounded there. But even here there were mysteries. Later, an eyewitness to these events was found. The woman said that Olga Zhilina came out of the ill-fated barn alive, but with two wounds. She refused to have her wounds bandaged. Then they went together to the front line to carry the wounded from the battlefield. And it was there that Olga Vasilyevna was killed.

    Olga Zhilina received 4 military awards for her military exploits, including the Order of the Red Star, the Order of the Red Banner, the Medal for Military Merit, and the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st degree, posthumously.

    The young Novosibirsk poet Boris Bogatkov also fought in the 22nd Siberian Volunteer Division. His poems began to be published in 1940 in the magazine “Sibirskie Ogni”. In 1941, he volunteered for the front, but after a concussion he was evacuated to Novosibirsk. In 1942, despite the doctors’ prohibitions, he returned to the front. He died a year later in the Smolensk region, raising his platoon to attack. According to eyewitnesses, at that moment his platoon was going at the enemy with his song. He was only 20 years old.

    Boris Bogatkov was posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War, 1st class. A street, school and library in Novosibirsk are named after him.

    “Novosibirsk residents to the front”

    Novosibirsk residents made a significant contribution to the Victory in the Great Patriotic War not only on the battlefields, but also in the deep rear. They provided assistance to the residents of Leningrad – they sent trains with butter, clothes, food and everything necessary.

    – “Novosibirsk Komsomolets” – the so -called columns of tanks and squadrons of planes, and there were six of them. The State Archive of the Novosibirsk Region stores amazing documents-signature sheets on raising funds for the construction of the second squadron “Novosibirsk Komsomolets” among students of grades 2-3 of schools of the Suzunsky district. Children gave their pocket money, saying about adults who donated their savings. There are cases when people who were awarded the Stalin Prize, all of it were given to the defense fund without a trace, or sent to the construction of the Novosibirsk Komsomolets air squadron or “for their homeland!”. Industrial enterprises, collective farms, state farms, various labor collectives participated in financing the construction of combat aircraft and tanks. Also, 24 guards mortars of BM-13 Katyusha were built at the expense of the workers, which were transferred to the 4th Guards mortar Sevastopol Regiment, over which our region took patronage. The submarine “Novosibirsk Komsomolets” was also completed with folk money. The construction of the submarine began before the war, and it was intended to be sent to the Black Sea Fleet, but for some reason the work was discontinued. The Novosibirsk made an initiative to raise money to complete the construction and proposed transferring the submarine to the Northern Fleet. With the assistance of the Komsomol regional committee and a large -scale response by the population, the necessary amount was collected. The submarine was completed, the name “Novosibirsk Komsomolets” was given to her and sent by rail to the Northern Fleet base to the city of Polar. The delegation of the Novosibirsk Komsomol members was present on August 10, 1943 at a rally on the occasion of the transfer of the Novosibirsk Komsomolets to the Northern Fleet sailors. In total, this boat made 4 military campaigns, according to official figures, one transport was sunk, but the boat crew itself claimed that 2 enemy ships of a large displacement were destroyed. Since then, there is always a submarine with the name “Novosibirsk Komsomolets” in the Northern Sea Fleet, ”said Igor Samarin.   

    During the war, Novosibirsk lived by one motto: “Everything for the front, everything for victory.” Igor Samarin voiced some data collected with historians and archival employees to justify assigning Novosibirsk the title of “City of Labor Valor.” This information is impressive: Novosibirsk defense enterprises produced almost a third of the shells (about 125 million) and a quarter of the combat fighters (more than 15 and a half thousand). Collective and state farms of the Novosibirsk region prepared more than 1 million 750 thousand tons of grain and more than 70 thousand tons of meat for the state, transferred almost 4 thousand cars and tractors, about 28 thousand horses for the needs of the front.

    Igor Samarin accompanied his lecture with vivid presentations with photos of unique and rare documents from the State Archives of the Novosibirsk Region and the archives of the Novosibirsk Military Historical Scientific Society, which was perceived by the audience with particular interest, especially since the majority of them were undergraduate and graduate students in the field of History, as well as employees of the Humanities Institute of NSU.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: NSU scientists have improved one of the key elements of fiber lasers

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    Research staff Department of Laser Physics and Innovative Technologies, Novosibirsk State University (OLFIT NSU) optimized birefringent filters for use in fiber lasers. NSU scientists were far from the first specialists in the field of photonics who, with varying degrees of success, used these filters in fiber lasers, but they summarized and analyzed the previous experience of their colleagues and proposed their own innovative solution for their optimization. The results of this work are presented in the article by the head of the Department of Laser Physics and Innovative Technologies of NSU, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Sergey Kobtsev “Bifractive Filters in Fiber Systems” (“Birefringent filters in fiber systems”), which was published in the international scientific journal “Journal of the Optical Society of America B” It became one of the most downloaded in January-March 2025.

    — We have been working with birefringent filters for many years. Several works were devoted to improving filters of this type, in which we considered birefringent filters as the main selectors of liquid and solid-state tunable lasers. Filters of this type have proven themselves in our traditional lasers from the best side. Naturally, there was a desire to use them in fiber lasers. It turned out that when adapting birefringent filters to fiber lasers, essentially only the operating principle of these filters remains, and their configuration undergoes significant changes. The article “Birefringent filters in fiber systems” shows options for these changes, analyzes the capabilities and limitations of modified filters. The article, of course, is of interest to a wide range of researchers and developers in the field of photonics, — explained Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences Sergey Kobtsev.

    Interest in laser spectral-selective components from photonics specialists is quite high, since such elements allow in many cases to achieve the required laser line width and/or control the radiation wavelength. Birefringent filters, whose action is based on changing the polarization of radiation when passing through a birefringent optical material, have long established themselves as one of the best spectral-selective components for lasers with a relatively wide gain band.

    Filters of this type are widely used in tunable dye lasers or titanium-sapphire lasers. They typically contain one or more birefringent plates (usually made of crystalline quartz) inclined at the Brewster angle to the beam.

    The inclined surfaces of the plates act as partial radiation analyzers, and the plates themselves act as radiation polarizers. The wavelengths of radiation whose polarization does not change when passing through the filter are generated.

    — Most fiber lasers are tunable, their radiation wavelength can be changed by tens of nanometers. This change can be made using birefringent filters, but they require adaptation to fiber lasers. As a result of attempts to use these filters in fiber lasers, there was a need for new solutions to adapt birefringent filters to a relatively new platform with original properties. The article “Birefringent filters in fiber systems” is devoted to the analysis of changes in these filters (material, configuration, controllability, etc.) associated with their use in new conditions. Optimized birefringent filters are in demand in many fiber lasers, widely used in various tasks – from medicine to cooling atoms. It would not be an exaggeration to say that thanks to the efforts of NSU scientists, one of the key elements of fiber lasers is being improved, — explained Sergey Kobtsev.

    The research described in the article is carried out within the framework of the project “New fiber short-pulse laser systems including advanced composite materials, intelligent technologies and metrological extensions”, supported by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI China: SCO health institutions to deepen telehealth collaboration

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    XI’AN, April 27 — Telehealth, powered by advances in information technology, came into sharp focus on Sunday as health leaders gathered in Xi’an, northwest China’s Shaanxi Province, to discuss hospital collaboration among member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

    The seventh SCO Hospital Cooperation Conference, held in the lead-up to the eighth SCO Health Ministers’ Meeting on Monday, brought together more than 100 representatives from government health authorities, medical associations, and healthcare institutions.

    Attendees called for greater efforts to harness the potential of artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and other technological advances to strengthen telemedicine and smart healthcare services across SCO member states, in support of the broader goal of building a shared health community within the organization.

    Geographic barriers remain among the greatest challenges to healthcare provision in many SCO member states, where vast territories and low population densities often hinder access to medical services. This reality underscores the critical role of telemedicine in bridging health gaps, said Muhammad Ashraf Nizami, president of the Pakistan Medical Association (Lahore).

    Nizami praised China’s leadership in developing domestic telehealth systems and its efforts to share expertise and resources with SCO member countries, including Pakistan.

    A highlight of the conference was the signing of a tripartite cooperation agreement among Tianjin First Central Hospital, the Management Office of the Tianjin Medical Association, and Nizami’s organization. The agreement aims to deepen public health cooperation in telemedicine and related fields.

    Wang Xudong, head of the Tianjin Municipal Health Commission, hailed the agreement as a new chapter in healthcare collaboration between Tianjin and SCO countries. “We are confident that this new partnership will produce transferable best practices for broader cooperation in the future,” the official said.

    Wang also said that Tianjin, which will host an SCO summit this autumn, is aligning its policies and institutional frameworks to support comprehensive healthcare partnerships across the organization.

    “We are spearheading the development of replicable models for cross-border healthcare, integrating telemedicine into clinical practice, traditional medicine systems, and public health management,” he said.

    The conference also witnessed the signing of four additional cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between Chinese hospitals and universities and their counterparts in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

    Kanat Zhumanov, from the University Medical Center of Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan, told Xinhua that Kazakhstan is eager to learn from China’s experience in integrating AI applications, telemedicine services, and robotic technologies into medical practice.

    The University Medical Center of Nazarbayev University signed an MoU with the Second Affiliated Hospital of Xi’an Jiaotong University to collaborate on research, clinical knowledge-sharing, and healthcare workforce development, with a focus on oncology, chronic disease management, and maternal and child health.

    These agreements mark another milestone for the SCO Hospital Cooperation Alliance, which was founded in 2018 as a collaborative platform among member hospitals.

    The alliance now counts 134 hospitals among its members — 100 from China and 34 from eight other SCO countries. Through events like Sunday’s conference, remote exchanges, specialized collaborations, and professional networking, the alliance has fostered strong partnerships in healthcare under the SCO framework.

    According to Liu Qian, president of the Chinese Hospital Association — a key architect of the alliance — future priorities for the alliance include strengthening telemedicine infrastructure, expanding specialized networks, and launching talent development programs to diversify cooperation.

    “The collaborative spirit I witnessed here today is truly inspiring,” said Zhumanov. “Our partnership promises real-world impact far beyond what is written in these agreements.”

    MIL OSI China News –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: In talking with Tehran, Trump is reversing course on Iran – could a new nuclear deal be next?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jeffrey Fields, Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

    A mural on the outer walls of the former US embassy in Tehran depicts two men in negotiation. Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

    Negotiators from Iran and the United States are set to meet again in Oman on April 26, 2025, prompting hopes the two countries might be moving, albeit tentatively, toward a new nuclear accord.

    The scheduled talks follow the two previous rounds of indirect negotiations that have taken place under the new Trump administration. Those discussions were deemed to have yielded enough progress to merit sending nuclear experts from both sides to begin outlining the specifics of a potential framework for a deal.

    The development is particularly notable given that Trump, in 2018, unilaterally walked the U.S. away from a multilateral agreement with Iran. That deal, negotiated during the Obama presidency, put restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. Trump instead turned to a policy that involved tightening the financial screws on Iran through enhanced sanctions while issuing implicit military threats.

    But that approach failed to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.

    Now, rather than revive the maximum pressure policy of his first term, Trump – ever keen to be seen as a dealmaker – has given his team the green light for the renewed diplomacy and even reportedly rebuffed, for now, Israel’s desire to launch military strikes against Tehran.

    Jaw-jaw over war-war

    The turn to diplomacy returns Iran-US relations to where they began during the Obama administration, with attempts to encourage Iran to curb or eliminate its ability to enrich uranium.

    Only this time, with the U.S. having left the previous deal in 2018, Iran has had seven years to improve on its enrichment capability and stockpile vastly more uranium than had been allowed under the abandoned accord.

    As a long-time expert on U.S. foreign policy and nuclear nonproliferation, I believe Trump has a unique opportunity to not only reinstate a similar nuclear agreement to the one he rejected, but also forge a more encompassing deal – and foster better relations with the Islamic Republic in the process.

    The front pages of Iran’s newspapers in a sidewalk newsstand in Tehran, Iran, on April 13, 2025.
    Alireza/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

    There are real signs that a potential deal could be in the offing, and it is certainly true that Trump likes the optics of dealmaking.

    But an agreement is by no means certain. Any progress toward a deal will be challenged by a number of factors, not least internal divisions and opposition within the Trump administration and skepticism among some in the Islamic Republic, along with uncertainty over a succession plan for the aging Ayatollah Khamenei.

    Conservative hawks are still abundant in both countries and could yet derail any easing of diplomatic tensions.

    A checkered diplomatic past

    There are also decades of mistrust to overcome.

    It is an understatement to say that the U.S. and Iran have had a fraught relationship, such as it is, since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran the same year.

    Many Iranians would say relations have been strained since 1953, when the U.S. and the United Kingdom orchestrated the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran.

    Washington and Tehran have not had formal diplomatic relations since 1979, and the two countries have been locked in a decadeslong battle for influence in the Middle East. Today, tensions remain high over Iranian support for a so-called axis of resistance against the West and in particular U.S. interests in the Middle East. That axis includes Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

    For its part, Tehran has long bristled at American hegemony in the region, including its resolute support for Israel and its history of military action. In recent years that U.S. action has included the direct assaults on Iranian assets and personnel. In particular, Tehran is still angry about the 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

    Standing atop these various disputes, Iran’s nuclear ambitions have proved a constant source of contention for the United States and Israel, the latter being the only nuclear power in the region.

    The prospect of warmer relations between the two sides first emerged during the Obama administration – though Iran sounded out the Bush administration in 2003 only to be rebuffed.

    U.S. diplomats began making contact with Iranian counterparts in 2009 when Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns met with an Iranian negotiator in Geneva. The so-called P5+1 began direct negotiations with Iran in 2013. This paved the way for the eventual Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2015. In that agreement – concluded by the U.S., Iran, China, Russia and a slew of European nations – Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program, including limits on the level to which it could enrich uranium, which was capped well short of what would be necessary for a nuclear weapon. In return, multilateral and bilateral U.S. sanctions would be removed.

    Many observers saw it as a win-win, with the restraints on a burgeoning nuclear power coupled with hopes that greater economic engagement with the international community that might temper some of Iran’s more provocative foreign policy behavior.

    Yet Israel and Saudi Arabia worried the deal did not entirely eliminate Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, and right-wing critics in the U.S. complained it did not address Iran’s ballistic missile programs or support for militant groups in the region.

    Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, draws a red line on a graphic of a bomb while discussing Iran at the United Nations on Sept. 27, 2012.
    Mario Tama/Getty Images

    When Trump first took office in 2016, he and his foreign policy team pledged to reverse Obama’s course and close the door on any diplomatic opening. Making good on his pledge, Trump unilaterally withdrew U.S. support for the JCPOA despite Iran’s continued compliance with the terms of the agreement and reinstated sanctions.

    Donald the dealmaker?

    So what has changed? Well, several things.

    While Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA was welcomed by Republicans, it did nothing to stop Iran from enhancing its ability to enrich uranium.

    Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, eager to transform its image and diversify economically, now supports a deal it opposed during the Obama administration.

    In this second term, Trump’s anti-Iran impulses are still there. But despite his rhetoric of a military option should a deal not be struck, Trump has on numerous occasions stated his opposition to U.S. involvement in another war in the Middle East.

    In addition, Iran has suffered a number of blows in recent years that has left it more isolated in the region. Iranian-aligned Hamas and Hezbollah have been seriously weakened as a result of military action by Israel. Meanwhile, strikes within Iran by Israel have shown the potential reach of Israeli missiles – and the apparent willingness of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to use them. Further, the removal of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria has deprived Iran of another regional ally.

    Tehran is also contending with a more fragile domestic economy than it had during negotiations for JCPOA.

    With Iran weakened regionally and Trump’s main global focus being China, a diplomatic avenue with Iran seems entirely in line with Trump’s view of himself as a dealmaker.

    A deal is not a given

    With two rounds of meetings completed and the move now to more technical aspects of a possible agreement negotiated by experts, there appears to be a credible window of opportunity for diplomacy.

    This could mean a new agreement that retains the core aspects of the deal Trump previously abandoned. I’m not convinced a new deal will look any different from the previous in terms of the enrichment aspect.

    There are still a number of potential roadblocks standing in the way of any potential deal, however.

    As was the case with Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his first term, the president seems to be less interested in details than spectacle. While it was quite amazing for an American leader to meet with his North Korean counterpart, ultimately, no policy meaningfully changed because of it.

    On Iran and other issues, the president displays little patience for complicated policy details. Complicating matters is that the U.S. administration is riven by intense factionalism, with many Iran hawks who would be seemingly opposed to a deal – including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security adviser Mike Waltz. They could rub up against newly confirmed Undersecretary of Defense for policy Elbridge Colby and Vice President JD Vance, both of whom have in the past advocated for a more pro-diplomacy line on Iran.

    As has become a common theme in Trump administration foreign policy – even with its own allies on issues like trade – it’s unclear what a Trump administration policy on Iran actually is, and whether a political commitment exists to carry through any ultimate deal.

    Top Trump foreign policy negotiator Steve Witkoff, who has no national security experience, has exemplified this tension. Tasked with leading negotiations with Iran, Witkoff has already been forced to walk back his contention that the U.S. was only seeking to cap the level of uranium enrichment rather than eliminate the entirety of the program.

    For its part, Iran has proved that it is serious about diplomacy, previously having accepted Barack Obama’s “extended hand.”

    But Tehran is unlikely to capitulate on core interests or allow itself to be humiliated by the terms of any agreement.

    Ultimately, the main question to watch is whether a deal with Iran is to be concluded by pragmatists – and then to what extent, narrow or expansive – or derailed by hawks within the administration.

    Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

    – ref. In talking with Tehran, Trump is reversing course on Iran – could a new nuclear deal be next? – https://theconversation.com/in-talking-with-tehran-trump-is-reversing-course-on-iran-could-a-new-nuclear-deal-be-next-254770

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Why film and TV creators will still risk it all for the perfect long take shot

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kristian Ramsden, PhD Candidate, University of Adelaide

    Apple TV

    In the second episode of Apple TV’s The Studio (2025–) – a sharp satirical take on contemporary Hollywood – newly-appointed studio head Matt Remick (Seth Rogen) visits the set of one of his company’s film productions.

    He finds the crew anxiously attempting to pull off an extremely audacious and technically demanding shot known as a “oner”, or “long take”. Chaos ensues.

    But despite the difficulties associated with it, the long take has a long history and continues to be a promising creative choice in contemporary film and television.

    High stakes on the set

    The long take is a shot which captures a scene in a single, unbroken take.

    It’s a risky endeavour. While most film and TV production is constructed through the use of coverage – different shots edited together – the long take can’t hide behind the editing process. Every minute detail needs to be perfectly planned, executed and captured.

    As a result, the oner is often associated with big, ostentatious, showstopping set pieces that exemplify technical and directorial prowess. Think of the “Copacabana” sequence from Goodfellas (1990), or the opening scene of Children of Men (2006).

    The shot has gained a cultish type of reverence among film enthusiasts, with countless online articles and videos counting down the “best long takes in film history”.

    Yet the practice also has its detractors. Film critic A.A. Dowd’s recent article for The Ringer says that “to the unimpressed, oners often come across as an act of glorified self-glorification”.

    This dichotomy is also highlighted in The Studio, when one executive complains long takes are just directors showing off. Rogen’s character counters the oner is, in fact, “the ultimate cinematic achievement”.

    A theory of the long take

    The long take has existed in nearly every stage of film history – from silent films to sound, from Asian films to European, and from art-house to mainstream.

    The greatest advocate of the long take was arguably French film theorist André Bazin. In his piece The Evolution of Film Language, Bazin argued cinema’s greatest asset was its ability to capture reality – and the long take was central to his understanding of how film achieved that.

    For Bazin, editing “did not show us the event, but alluded to it”. To illustrate his point, he examines a scene from Robert Flaherty’s controversial silent documentary Nanook of the North (1922), in which a hunter patiently waits for his prey.

    The passage of time could have been suggested by editing but, as Bazin notes, Flaherty “confines himself to showing the actual waiting period”. If the act of editing creates a synthetic manipulation of space and time, then the long take does the opposite – bringing us closer to a true representation of reality. For Bazin, the length “is the very substance of the image”.

    The tradition of the long take – of showing “reality” – is perhaps most upheld in the world of art-house cinema. Directors such as Chantal Akerman, Béla Tarr, Hou Hsiao-Hsien and Tsai Ming-liang have used the long take to “de-dramatise” narrative, creating a deliberately slow pace to prompt audiences to contemplate aspects of existence traditional narratives usually ignore.

    Mainstream cinema also uses the long take to show “reality”, albeit in a different manner. Here, the long take has often been used as a mark of authenticity for the amazing feats of practical performers, whether this is the wild stunts or camera trickery of Buster Keaton, the balletic graces of Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers or this white-knuckled fight scene from The Protector (2005), starring Thai martial artist Tony Jaa.

    However, our strong association between the oner and a distinct directorial vision likely began with Citizen Kane (1941). In this film, screen reality itself is manipulated, as director Orson Welles and cinematographer Gregg Toland liberated the camera to move as if it was its own player in the drama.

    In the below example, the camera starts outside, before reversing backwards through a window and two different rooms. The actors are constantly repositioning themselves around the camera for dramatic impetus, rather than for reality.

    Bazin would refer to this as “shooting in depth”. Subsequent auteurs also embraced this technique, including William Wyler, Max Ophüls, Stanley Kubrick and Steven Spielberg.

    Many viewed it as a chance to up the ante from Welles, something the director did himself with the remarkable opening sequence of his 1958 film Touch of Evil.

    The future of the long take

    There are far too many oners for me to list here, and they seem to only be increasing. It’s now common to see entire films seemingly shot in one take, such as Russian Ark (2002), Birdman (2014), 1917 (2019) and Boiling Point (2021), to name a few.

    Technological advancements have made the long take more achievable. Camera stabilisers enable greater freedom of movement, while digital camera tech allows us to record for longer durations.

    Furthermore, digital compositing has made it easier to fake the long take, such as in Birdman and 1917. Both of these films use multiple long takes that are strategically edited to look like a single shot. Impossible-to-see cuts may be hidden in dark moments, or through fast whip pans.

    Prestige television has also lifted the oner practice, with examples from shows such as Mr. Robot (2015-19), True Detective (2014–), The Bear (2022-), Severance (2022) and, of course, The Studio.

    But perhaps the most remarkable recent example comes from Netflix’s Adolescence (2025), a show in which four separate standalone episodes are all shot in a single long take.

    In the age of TikTok and shortening attention spans, it should strike us as positive to see a resurgence of the long take as a creative choice in so much contemporary film and TV.

    Kristian Ramsden receives funding, in the form of a research stipend, from The University of Adelaide.

    – ref. Why film and TV creators will still risk it all for the perfect long take shot – https://theconversation.com/why-film-and-tv-creators-will-still-risk-it-all-for-the-perfect-long-take-shot-254796

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Peter Dutton: a Liberal leader seeking to surf on the wave of outer suburbia

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    In searching for the “real” Peter Dutton, it is possible to end up frustrated because you have looked too hard.

    Politically, Dutton is not complicated. There is a consistent line in his beliefs through his career. Perhaps the shortest cut to understanding the Liberal leader is to go back to his maiden speech, delivered in February 2002.

    The former Queensland policeman canvassed “unacceptable crime rates”, the “silent majority”, the “aspirational voters”, how the “politically correct” had a “disproportionate say in political debate”, the “grossly inadequate sentences” dispensed by the courts, and the centrality of national security. The way the last was handled was “perhaps the most significant challenge our society faces today,” the novice MP told the House of Representatives.

    “National security” would be a foundational pillar of Dutton’s career, as well as his political security blanket.

    Dutton had been a member of the Liberal Party since about age 18 and hoped “to use my experience both in small business and in law enforcement to provide perhaps a more practical view on some of the issues and problems” of the day.

    The 32-year-old Dutton, who’d recently been in the building business with his father, following his nine years in the police force, arrived in parliament on a high, as something of a dragon-slayer in his Brisbane seat of Dickson. He had defeated Labor’s Cheryl Kernot, former leader of the Australian Democrats who had jumped ship in a spectacular defection in October 1997.

    Dutton came from Brisbane’s outer suburbia, just as the Liberals were reorienting their focus towards this constituency, the so-called “Howard battlers”.

    The eager newcomer was soon noted by the prime minister who, after the 2004 election, appointed him to the junior ministry. One Liberal insider from the time says that when campaigning in Dickson, John Howard saw Dutton “was very good at establishing himself in a marginal seat”. (Years later, when a redistribution turned Dickson into a notional Labor seat for the 2010 election, Dutton tried to do a runner to the safe seat of McPherson. But he failed to win preselection; in the event he held Dickson with a hefty swing. This election Dickson is on 1.7%.)

    Dutton brought to his first ministry, workforce participation, the view he had expressed in his maiden speech: “We are seeing an alarming number of households where up to three generations – in many cases by choice – have never worked in their lives, and a society where in many cases rights are demanded but no responsibility is taken.”

    By 2006 he had been promoted by Howard to assistant treasurer, a job that gave the ambitious Dutton a chance to work closely with Treasurer Peter Costello. Nick Minchin was finance minister then. He paints a picture of Dutton as a sort of guard dog protecting the revenue. In the cabinet expenditure review committee, “Peter was particularly helpful and supportive of Costello and my fending off the demands of spending ministers”.

    The one-time police officer was “strong and resolute in questioning ministers”. Minchin was impressed; the junior minister was “obviously going places”.

    From defensive to offensive

    After the Liberals went into opposition, Dutton “shadowed” health, becoming health minister in Tony Abbott’s government after the 2013 election.

    His legacy from the health portfolio dogs him in this campaign. He presided over the government’s failed attempt in the 2014 budget to put a co-payment on bulk-billed services. A poll conducted by Australian Doctor magazine voted him the worst health minister in memory.

    A former senior public servant who observed him at the time presents a more positive picture, saying it was a very difficult time and Dutton was well across the complexity of the portfolio. On the notorious co-payment, Abbott says it was not Dutton’s idea: “It was absolutely 150% my idea”.

    When in December 2014 Abbott moved him to immigration and border protection, Dutton was both in his comfort zone and on the escalator. Looking back, Abbott says Dutton was “a better match” for that portfolio. “In health the Coalition tends to play a defensive game. In border protection it plays an offensive game.”

    Partnered by empire-building bureaucrat Mike Pezzullo, Dutton agitated for the creation of a mega security department (a push that earlier originated with Scott Morrison when he was in immigration). Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull felt the need to accommodate Dutton – then one of his conservative backers – with the creation of the home affairs super department, which was controversial and divided ministers. Someone who observed him closely in that portfolio says Dutton was always clear what he wanted, but didn’t get too deeply involved in the processes of policy.

    Dutton, however, had another goal, and the turmoil surrounding Turnbull’s leadership seemed to offer the opportunity to shoot for the top. It was a false hope. Tactically outsmarted by Turnbull, Dutton lost the first face-off between the two in August 2018. The second bout, later the same week, provided not victory but a pathway to the prime ministership for Scott Morrison.

    It wasn’t all downside for Dutton: during the Morrison government he became defence minister. The post suited a China hawk when the bilateral relationship was in a deep trough.

    Early on, he met with one-time Labor defence minister (and later Labor leader) Kim Beazley. Beazley recalls: “He wanted to talk to me about what being defence minister was like”. They spoke about submarines: Beazley suggested Australia should cancel its then-existing contract for French conventional submarines and get a new contract for their nuclear subs (this was before AUKUS).

    “He knew a fair bit,” Beazley says. “So he was looking to think a way through the huge problems we confronted.” Dutton was “aware we were slipping into an era of constant danger. He had all the attitude you would want of a contemporary defence minister” (although, Beazley adds, the Morrison government had “a propensity for unfunded defence annoucements”).

    Leadership and control

    By the time the Liberals went into opposition, Dutton was the only leadership candidate standing. His long-term rival Josh Frydenberg had lost his seat – a bonus for Dutton, who hasn’t had to look over his shoulder in the past three years, but a big loss for a party deprived of choice. The Liberals’ moderate wing had been decimated with the rise of the “teals”.

    Many immediately declared Dutton unelectable, a view that would soften over time, then return again, to an extent, close to the election.

    As opposition leader, Dutton’s laser-like focus was on keeping the party together, avoiding the backbiting and schisms that often follow a serious loss. Colleagues found him approachable and willing to listen. A backbencher says: “He was always very respectful of people in the party room. He will make himself available if people want to talk.”

    Yet how much was he willing to hear? The same backbencher says, “I don’t think there was a lot of consultation in the development of policy – it was a bit of a black box. The emphasis has been on unity and discipline.”

    Russell Broadbent, a moderate Liberal who defected to the crossbench in 2023 when he lost preselection for his seat of Monash (which he is recontesting an an independent) says, “I’ve never had a cup of tea or a meal with [Dutton]. I wasn’t in his group – I was on the wrong side of the party somewhere.” He says their only conversation was when Dutton told him his preselection was under threat. Broadbent said he knew his opponents had the numbers: Dutton asked whether he’d go to the crossbench. “I said, ‘probably’”.

    Anthony Albanese gave his opponent a big political break, when the Voice, opposed by the Coalition, crashed spectacularly in October 2023. The prime minister had invested heavily in a doomed and faulty campaign that misread the mood of Australians, just when many people were being dragged down by the cost of living.

    It took Albanese well over a year to recover his stride. Indeed, he did not do so fully until early 2025, when a pre-campaign burst of announcements put the government in a strong position. Dutton’s miscalculation was to believe that when he had Albanese down, his opponent would be out for the count.

    Dutton gambled by holding back key policies until the campaign and making the opposition a relatively small target. The big exception was the nuclear pitch, released fairly early and driven in part by the need to keep the Nationals, a number of whom were restive about the Coalition commitment to the 2050 net zero emissions target, in the tent. Saturday’s result will be the ultimate test of the “hold back” tactic.

    As the election neared, there was increasing criticism in Coalition ranks of the handling of the campaign, which has been shambolic at times. One example was the delay in producing modelling for a signature policy – the proposal for a gas reservation scheme. That pales beside the fiasco of the (aborted) plan to force Canberra public servants back into the office.

    The bold defence policy, to take spending to 3% of GDP within a decade, was not only released after pre-polling had started, but came without detail.

    On strategy and tactics, Dutton is controlling, wanting to keep things tight, in his own hands or those of a small group. Perhaps it is the policeman’s mindset. Certainly it has worked to the disadvantage of his campaign, which has appeared under-cooked on large and small things. Among the latter, Dutton’s office insisted on doing his transcripts, rather than having them done by the campaign HQ. Predictably, they were overwhelmed and the transcripts ran late.

    Dutton seemed to be working on the assumption he was in a similar situation to Abbott in 2013, when Labor was gone for all money. But this election people needed to be convinced the alternative was robust and, late in the day, many swinging voters remained sceptical about that. Dutton is a strong negative campaigner, who hasn’t put much work into strengthening his weaker skill set to be a “positive” voice as well.

    Going into the campaign’s final days, Labor held the edge in the polls. But the Liberals maintained that in key marginals, the story was rather different.

    There is a degree of mismatch between the private Dutton and the public figure. Often those who meet or know him remark that one-to-one or in small groups he is personable. Yet his public demeanour is frequently awkward and somewhat aloof. This leaves him open to caricature, and raises the question of why he has been so unsuccessful in projecting more of his private self into his public image.

    The latest Newspoll, published Sunday night, had Dutton’s approval rating at minus 24, compared to Anthony Albanese’s minus 9. A just-released Morgan poll on trust in leaders found Dutton had the highest net distrust score (when people were asked in an open-ended question to nominate whom they trusted and distrusted). It’s a long-term thing: he was third in the 2022 list.

    The gender problem that dogs the Liberals

    One of Dutton’s problems has been the women’s vote. The Poll Bludger’s William Bowe says looking at the polls, “Dutton wasn’t doing too badly [with women] in the first half of the term, but a gap opened up in 2024 and substantially widened in 2025”. Sunday’s Newspoll found 66% of female voters had “little or no confidence” the Coalition was ready to govern, compared to 58% of male voters.

    Retiring Liberal senator Linda Reynolds, who preceded Dutton in the defence portfolio, has worked on gender issues in the Liberal Party for 15 years. She believes this is “a party problem, not specifically a Peter Dutton problem”. She says the Liberals’ failure to embrace and deal with gender issues “leaves the leader of the day vulnerable”.

    Kos Samaras, from Redbrige political consultancy, agrees. “It’s a brand issue, rather than him personally. He’s just the leader of [the brand].” Scott Morrison made the brand problem a lot worse. “It’s gone back to a normal [Liberal] problem, be it still bad.”

    There are differences between constituencies, but there is a “very significant problem with professional women”, Samaras says, which highlights the Liberals’ challenge with the “teal” seats.
    Dutton is classic right-wing on law and order, defence policy, nationalism, anti-wokeness, and much more. But he can be pragmatic when the politics demands.

    He was personally opposed to marriage equality, but was behind the postal survey that enabled the Turnbull government to achieve it, so removing the issue from the agenda. And the China hawk has recently softened his line on that country, in part to facilitate a pitch for the votes of Chinese-Australians, alienated by the Morrison government.

    In this campaign, Dutton has been painted by his opponents as “Trump-lite”. Confronted with this in the third leaders’ debate, he was unable to provide an answer. Initially expecting the election of Trump would be potentially helpful for the opposition, he failed to appreciate the dangers for him, which only increased as the new president became more arbitrary and unpredictable.

    The opposition leader’s anti-public service attitude might be a milder version of Trump’s stand but it is also a Queenslander’s view of Canberra, as well as typical of what the Liberals roll out before elections. But his appointment of Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price as shadow minister for government efficiency was blatantly and foolishly Trumpian.

    Dutton is not nimble or nuanced. He is also prone to going off half-cocked, which can lead to missteps (as when he wrongly said the Indonesian president had announced a Russian request to base planes in Papua). Earlier examples are easy to find. In his autobiography A Bigger Picture, Turnbull wrote of him that he would do interviews with right-wing shock jock in which he would “echo their extreme views […] He always apologised for going too far, and I generally gave him the benefit of the doubt”.

    Dutton talks little about Liberal Party history, or political philosophy. Is he ideological? Abbott says he is ideological in the way Howard was. “He has strong instincts, he has convictions but they are more instinctual than ideological.”

    Dutton at every opportunity points to Howard as his lodestar. Howard also came from a small business family, didn’t have much time for the public service, and had the quality of political doggedness. Regardless of some similarities, however, it is a very long stretch to see Dutton walking in Howard’s shoes.

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Peter Dutton: a Liberal leader seeking to surf on the wave of outer suburbia – https://theconversation.com/peter-dutton-a-liberal-leader-seeking-to-surf-on-the-wave-of-outer-suburbia-254590

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump’s war on the media: 10 numbers from US President’s first 100 days

    Reporters Without Borders

    Donald Trump campaigned for the White House by unleashing a nearly endless barrage of insults against journalists and news outlets.

    He repeatedly threatened to weaponise the federal government against media professionals whom he considers his enemies.

    In his first 100 days in office, President Trump has already shown that he was not bluffing.

    “The day-to-day chaos of the American political news cycle can make it hard to fully take stock of the seismic shifts that are happening,” said Clayton Weimers, executive director of RSF North America.

    “But when you step back and look at the whole picture, the pattern of blows to press freedom is quite clear.

    “RSF refuses to accept this massive attack on press freedom as the new normal. We will continue to call out these assaults against the press and use every means at our disposal to fight back against them.

    “We urge every American who values press freedom to do the same.”

    Here is the Trump administration’s war on the press by the numbers: *

    • 427 million – Weekly worldwide audience of the USAGM news outlets silenced by Trump

    In an effort to eliminate the US Agency for Global Media (USAGM) by cutting grants to outlets funded by the federal agency and placing their reporters on leave, the government has left millions around the world without vital sources of reliable information.

    This leaves room for authoritarian regimes, like Russia and China, to spread their propaganda unchecked.

    However, RSF recently secured an interim injunction against the administration’s dismantling of the USAGM-funded broadcaster Voice of America,which also reinstates funding to the outlets  Radio Free Asia (RFA) and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN).

    • 8,000+ – US government web pages taken down

    Webpages from more than a dozen government sites were removed almost immediately after President Trump took office, leaving journalists and the public without critical information on health, crime, and more.

    • 3,500+ – Journalists and media workers at risk of losing their jobs thanks to Trump’s shutdown of the USAGM

    Journalists from VOA, the MBN, RFA, and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty are at risk of losing their jobs as the Trump administration works to shut down the USAGM. Furthermore, at least 84 USAGM journalists based in the US on work visas now face deportation to countries where they risk prosecution and severe harassment.

    At least 15 journalists from RFA and eight from VOA originate from repressive states and are at serious risk of being arrested and potentially imprisoned if deported.

    • 180 – Public radio stations at risk of closing if public media funding is eliminated

    The Trump administration reportedly plans to ask Congress to cut $1.1 billion in allocated funds for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which supports National Public Radio (NPR) and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). These cuts will hit rural communities and stations in smaller media markets the hardest, where federal funding is most impactful.

    • 74 – Days the Associated Press (AP) has been banned from the White House

    On February 11, the White House began barring the Associated Press (AP) news agency from its events because of the news agency’s continued use of the term “Gulf of Mexico,” which President Trump prefers to call the “Gulf of America” — a blatant example of retaliation against the media.

    Despite a federal judge ruling the administration must reinstate the news agency’s access on April 9, the White House has continued to limit AP’s access.

    • 64 – Disparaging comments made by Trump against the media on Truth Social since inauguration

    In addition to regular, personal attacks against the media in press conferences and public speeches, Trump takes to his social media site nearly every day to insult, threaten, or intimidate journalists and media workers who report about him or his administration critically.

    • 13 – Individuals pardoned by President Trump after being convicted or charged for attacking journalists on January 6, 2021

    Trump pardoned over a dozen individuals charged with or convicted of violent crimes against journalists at the US Capitol during the January 6 insurrection.

    • 6 – Federal Communications Commission (FCC) inquiries into media companies

    Brendan Carr, co-author of the Project 2025 playbook and chair of the FCC, has wasted no time launching politically motivated investigations, explicit threats against media organisations, and implicit threats against their parent companies. These include inquiries into CBS, ABC parent company Disney, NBC parent company Comcast, public broadcasters NPR and PBS, and California television station KCBS.

    • 4 – Trump’s personal lawsuits against media organisations

    While Trump settled a lawsuit with ABC’s parent company Disney, he continues to sue CBS, The Des Moines Register, Gannett, and the Pulitzer Center over coverage he deemed biased.

    • $1.60 – Average annual amount each American pays for public media

    Donald Trump has threatened to eliminate federal funding for public broadcasting, framing the move as a cost-cutting measure.

    However, public media only costs each American about $1.60 each year, representing a tremendous bargain as it gives Americans access to a wealth of local, national, and lifesaving emergency programming.

    * Figures as of the date of publication, 24 April 2025. Pacific Media Watch collaborates with RSF.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 28, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ5: Nurturing foreign language talents

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    LCQ5: Nurturing foreign language talents 
    Question:
     
         In 2018, the State President stated at the National Conference on Education that vigorous efforts should be made to nurture international talents proficient in foreign languages and adept at Chinese-foreign negotiations and communications. There are views that as the country’s super connector and super value-adder, as well as the premier international financial centre connecting the country and the Middle East market, Hong Kong needs to nurture a large pool of foreign language talents. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
     
    (1) when Government officials make overseas visits and when the Government releases videos and hands out publications overseas to promote Hong Kong, whether local mother tongues of the relevant places have been used as the medium of communication; if so, of the details; if not, the reasons for that;
     
    (2) as it is learnt that there are a number of language universities in the country, such as Beijing Foreign Studies University, which is approved to teach more than a hundred foreign languages, whether the Government will study allocating more resources to tertiary institutions to strengthen training in foreign languages other than English, or establishing foreign language universities drawing on the models of the Mainland, with a view to nurturing multilingual talents in public and private organisations, so that they can tell the good stories of Hong Kong in different languages; and
     
    (3) whether it will study enhancing the existing “biliterate and trilingual” policy by turning it into a “triliterate and quadrilingual” policy?
     
    Reply:
     
    President,
     
         Hong Kong is a cosmopolitan city. In recent years, various national strategies have even brought about tremendous development opportunities for Hong Kong, which require us to strengthen exchanges and co-operation with the Mainland and overseas regions and countries by capitalising on our advantage of “linkage with our Motherland and close connection to the world”. To enhance our international competitiveness and strengthen our position as an international post-secondary education hub, we have been striving to nurture talents who are biliterate and trilingual, and proficient in other languages.
     
         Having consulted the Commerce and Economic Development Bureau and the Information Services Department (ISD), I would like to reply to the Hon Benson Luk’s questions as follows:
     
    (1) Currently, in taking forward overseas promotion work, the overseas Economic and Trade Offices (ETOs) of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) Government and Invest Hong Kong (InvestHK) will make appropriate arrangements taking into account the common languages of the relevant places. For instance, apart from the English version of the relevant ETOs’ websites, languages commonly used in the countries/regions under their respective purview are also available, e.g. Japanese, Thai, German, Arabic to facilitate local people in understanding the information disseminated by ETOs. Also, for meetings between officials of the HKSAR Government and local officials/representatives of the political and business sectors and preparation of relevant promotional materials, the ETOs concerned will arrange interpretation and prepare and issue the relevant promotion materials in local languages as appropriate.
     
         In addition, to facilitate investors from around the world to understand the latest information about Hong Kong’s business environment, InvestHK’s website is available in a number of major languages, including simplified Chinese, traditional Chinese, English, Japanese, Spanish, French, Italian, as well as Arabic, which has been newly added. Separately, InvestHK’s promotional videos are mainly in English and Putonghua. Depending on the origin of individual successful case studies, subtitles may be available in the local language. As for InvestHK’s client meetings and promotional materials, Putonghua and simplified Chinese are used on the Mainland, while English and the local language where necessary are used in overseas markets. Interpretation will also be arranged at investment promotion seminars.
     
         On external promotion, the ISD produces a series of creative contents in multiple languages for placement in overseas and Mainland cities through digital and social media platforms, as well as outdoor advertising, in the form of short videos and banner advertisements to tell the good stories of Hong Kong. These creative contents are available in Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, Dutch, English, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Malay, Thai, Vietnamese, etc. The ISD also translated and printed the promotional booklet entitled “HK Connect” into foreign languages such as Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, Malay and Thai for distribution to target recipients at promotional activities during senior officials’ overseas visits.
     
         Moreover, the ISD has held the “Immersive Hong Kong” promotional roving exhibitions in Jakarta, Indonesia; Bangkok, Thailand; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and Guangzhou, China since July 2023. It will also be staged in Dubai, the Middle East next month. In addition to English, the exhibition information is also available in the local languages of each stop to enhance the publicity effect.
     
    (2) The eight University Grants Committee (UGC)-funded universities have all along been making flexible use of their resources to offer a wide range of publicly-funded programmes with regard to their respective roles and positioning, as well as providing diversified learning opportunities for students in response to market demands. Learning foreign languages can help students to understand multiculturalism and strengthen their connections with different parts of the world, thereby enhancing their competitiveness in entering the workforce, pursuing further studies or starting their own businesses in the future. University education also aims to encourage students to acquire knowledge and skills in different fields, and nurture the high-calibre talents required by different industries, so as to inject impetus into the development of Hong Kong.
     
         In recent years, the eight UGC-funded universities have offered as many as 12 contemporary foreign languages for learning, including Arabic, French, German, Italian, Japanese, Kiswahili, Korean, Portuguese, Russian, Swedish, Spanish and Thai. They also offer a range of specialised programmes majoring in individual foreign languages or cultures for students who aspire to become professionals in relevant fields in the future. As for students pursuing undergraduate programmes in other areas such as engineering technology, business or social sciences, a number of universities also offer minor options or foreign language courses as free electives for interested students to pursue having regard to their personal aspirations and abilities. In addition, a number of self-financing institutions at present offer post-secondary programmes related to different foreign languages and relevant elective subjects according to market demand.
     
         The above arrangements for major, minor and free electives enable students to study foreign languages having regard to their learning objectives in an appropriate manner. The existing arrangements meet practical needs with flexibility; hence the Government has no plans to set up a foreign language university. Nevertheless, we will continue to encourage the UGC-funded universities to provide students with opportunities to learn foreign languages, and through various avenues, such as student exchange programmes and experiential learning activities, enable students to gain exposure to the cultures of more places, broaden their horizons, seize Hong Kong’s unique advantages, and be better prepared for their future development.
     
    (3) Over the years, the Government has been collaborating with the Standing Committee on Language Education and Research, other advisory bodies and stakeholders to enable the Hong Kong people, particularly students and working adults, to become biliterate and trilingual, through sponsoring and implementing various measures using the Language Fund. Moreover, the Education Bureau (EDB) endeavours to develop students’ multilingual competence, enabling them to make life planning based on their own interests, abilities and aspirations, and to connect to the world. Over the years, the EDB has offered “other languages” courses (Note 1) (Category C of the Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education Examination) for senior secondary students to study as an elective subject. As announced in the 2024 Policy Address, the EDB will implement a pilot scheme to invite schools to apply for additional resources to provide opportunities for junior secondary students to learn “other languages” (Note 2), in order to facilitate a stronger articulation in their learning of “other languages” as an elective subject at the senior secondary level.
     
         Thank you, President.
     
    Note 1: The EDB subsidises schools to offer courses of the six “other languages”, i.e. French, German, Japanese, Korean, Spanish and Urdu, for secondary four to six students.
     
    Note 2: Schools can use the funding to offer junior secondary courses of the six designated “other languages” (i.e. French, German, Japanese, Korean, Spanish and Urdu), which are the senior secondary elective subjects. Arabic and Russian could also be considered.
    Issued at HKT 15:40

    NNNN

    CategoriesMIL-OSI

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

    April 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: President Meloni meets with President Zelensky at Palazzo Chigi

    Source: Government of Italy (English)

    Vai al Contenuto Raggiungi il piè di pagina

    26 Aprile 2025

    The President of the Council of Ministers, Giorgia Meloni, met with the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, at Palazzo Chigi today.

    During the meeting, the leaders reaffirmed their support for President Trump’s efforts to reach a just and lasting peace, able to guarantee a future of security, sovereignty and freedom for Ukraine.

    Also on behalf of the Government, President Meloni expressed her condolences for the victims of the recent Russian attacks, reiterating the firm condemnation of such acts and stressing the urgency of an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, as well as the need for a concrete commitment from Moscow to initiate a peace process. President Meloni welcomed Ukraine’s full readiness for an immediate ceasefire. A concrete demonstration also from Russia of its willingness to pursue peace is now awaited.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Western Hemisphere Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 26, 2025

    Participants:

    Mr. Rodrigo Valdes, Director of Western Hemisphere Department, International Monetary Fund

    Ms. Ana Corbacho, Deputy Director of Western Hemisphere Department, International Monetary Fund

    Mr. Nigel Chalk, Deputy Director Western Hemisphere Department, International Monetary Fund

    Moderator: 

    Ms. Julie Ziegler, Senior Communications Officer, International Monetary Fund

     

     

    MS. ZIEGLER: Good afternoon and welcome.  This is the press briefing for the Regional Economic Outlook for the Western Hemisphere.  I am Julie Ziegler with the Communications Department.  And let me start by introducing our panel today.  To my left is Rodrigo Valdes, who is the Director of the Western Hemisphere Department, and he is joined by Deputy Directors in the Western Hemisphere Department as well, Ana Corbacho and Nigel Chalk. 

    We are going to begin with opening remarks from Rodrigo before taking your questions.  So, Rodrigo, the floor is yours. 

    MR. VALDES: Well, thank you, Julie.  Good afternoon, everybody.  Welcome to this briefing on Latin America and the Caribbean.  Before starting, let me express my sympathy to all the affected people by the recent earthquake in Ecuador. 

    So, I will frame my remarks today around two key themes.  Okay.  One is the uncertainties that we have to navigate, and second, the certainties that we can build upon.  Importantly, these two topics, these two themes, converge in one single message: and that it’s imperative for the countries in the region to continue strengthening economic resilience. 

    Let me first summarize how we see the economic outlook for the region.  In line with the changes that you have seen in the global context since our last Regional Economic Outlook in October last year, we expect average growth in the region to moderate.  Specifically, for Latin America and the Caribbean, on average, we expect growth to slow down from 2.4 percent last year to 2 percent this year, 2025 — against 2.5 that we were expecting six months ago.  After that, we expect growth will edge back to 2.4 percent. 

    Activity has remained largely driven by consumption in the region amid resilient labor markets.  However, slower global growth, elevated uncertainty, the impact of tariffs and tighter domestic policies in some countries will weight on growth.

    Behind this average, there is significant heterogeneity.  Following tight macro policies and, of course, being more affected by U.S. trade policies, Mexico’s GDP is expected to decline slightly this year.  We also continue to expect a relevant deceleration in Brazil driven by, let me underscore, appropriate tighter policies in Argentina and Ecuador, which have programs supported by the IMF, we expect an important rebound this year.

    On the inflation front, convergence to targets last year was relatively slow, slower than before.  Fading global disinflation was behind this and also effects in the region that was depreciating.  We expect though that the declining inflation should continue, although most countries will not reach their targets before 2026. 

    Today, as you know, we have a landscape that is shaped by very complex phenomena that are interplaying, and tariffs, value chains, disruptions, commodity price movements, financial market volatility and policy uncertainty are all together.  The impact of these factors on growth is relatively clear; it is negative, although a few countries may enjoy some trade diversion and cushion this. 

    However, although [that] part of [the] activity is clear, the inflation outcome is quite ambiguous and will depend on how these factors unfold in each country’s specific context.  [It] also depends on domestic risks, such as potential fiscal slippages.  For example, while tariffs are a negative demand shock in tariff countries or the region, pushing prices down, value chain disruptions create negative supply shocks for the world economy with an opposite effect on prices.  And even though tariffs to the region are relatively low in comparison to the rest, the acceleration in global growth could affect commodity demand, prices, and, indirectly, inflation through exchange rate depreciation.  With this in mind, we see downside risks to growth and upside risks to inflation, although the balance on the latter or inflation will depend on how global developments play out. 

    Let me move to policies, what countries can do in this environment.  In our last Regional Economic Outlook, we called for the need to rebalance the policy mix.  That meant basically tighter fiscal to make space for looser monetary policy.  This remains broadly relevant, although with greater emphasis on the need to strengthen public finances.  At the margin, certainty is very important in this juncture.  This is not the moment to alter policy frameworks or abandon fiscal plans.  Many countries have very good policy frameworks.  It is the moment to stick with them. 

    It is important to allow exchange rates to absorb shocks when fundamentals move, and also to use the IMF Integrated Policy Framework as a guide, perhaps, for interventions to address financial stability risks from disorderly market movements.  Thus far, the regional markets have continued to function effectively. 

    Now, in terms of monetary policy, in the last few quarters we have seen quite a bit of a heterogeneity in the region.  Some central banks are hiking, some other central banks are being easing.  Future actions should carefully strike a balance between durably bringing inflation back to targets, but at the same time trying to avoid an undue economic contraction.  Incoming data will be critical, while central bank independence, as you have seen throughout this week, remains a key anchor to inflation expectations.

    What remains certain is the imperative to rebuild fiscal buffers and policy buffers in general.  There is high public debt in several places and an unfavorable combination of rising financing cost and low growth.  Thus, we believe that fiscal consolidation should continue without delays, at least for now, while protecting priority public spending and social spending. 

    And, of course, there is this long challenge of lifting the very low potential growth that we have in the region.  So structural reforms continue to be urgent.  This will require first strengthening governance and security.  Security has been a topic in the region for long.  Second, enhancing productivity by improving the business environment, striving for policy predictability, and reducing informality.  And third, fostering greater intraregional trade. 

    I would also like to mention that since the last time we met in October, Suriname successfully completed the last review of its program.  It wasn’t an easy program at the beginning but was a very successful one and ended very well.  And we launched new programs with El Salvador and Argentina.  We continue supporting a number of other countries with either precautionary or drawing arrangements. 

    Before finishing, let me go back to my starting point.  In a world marked by uncertainty, the case for reinforcing macroeconomic frameworks that work well and increasing economic resilience and growth opportunities is clear.  For our part, we will continue supporting countries in the region, closely engaging through policy advice, capacity development, and financial support if needed. 

    With this, we are happy to take your questions. 

    MS. ZIEGLER: Thank you, Rodrigo.  So, before we take your questions, let me quickly run through some housekeeping items.  First, just a reminder that this is on the record and that we also have simultaneous translation in Spanish and Portuguese.  And second, if you do ask a question and if you are called on, please make sure to state your name and your affiliation before asking your question.  Third, if you are joining us online, please keep your camera on.  We won’t be able to take your question if we cannot see you.  And finally, please keep your questions brief.  We will try to get to as many as we can in the time that we have today. 

    And so now we are going to kick it off with questions, and let’s start with questions, groups of questions on the region.  That would be questions on Latin America, the Caribbean, or the entire Western Hemisphere.  And we will come to country specific questions after that. 

    So, may I ask, does anyone have a question on the region?  Woman in the red. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, Mr. Rodrigo.  Can you share with us if the authorities of U.S. have been participating in the meeting committee?  Have the members spoken with Mr. Vincent?  And I had another question. 

    MS. ZIEGLER: Is that a question for the region though?  We’re starting with the — with the region first.  Not country specific questions. 

    QUESTIONER: I thought that I could do it for all the — it’s for all the regions.  But if you don’t think —

    MS. ZIEGLER: It’s okay.  Do you have a broader question there for the region? 

    QUESTIONER: Yes, I had another question.  I want to know your outlook about the immigration policies in U.S. and the impact on the remittances to our region.  Thank you.

    MS. ZIEGLER: And I have a question.  While we are on that, let me just go to a question that we had online from Efe, which is, you’ve said that this is not the moment to alter policy frameworks or abandon fiscal plans.  Is this message addressed to any country in particular?  And you also consider that what remains certain is the imperative to build policy buffers.  Is the region lagging behind in this respect? 

    So, is there any other?  I’ll take one more on the region.  On the region? 

    QUESTIONER: It is on the region, but it’s with a little country in it.  I wanted to know what role does the IMF see Guyana and Suriname, major oil-producing countries, now playing in ensuring Caribbean economic growth and stability while satisfying the demands by ordinary people in those oil-producing nations for increased wages and salaries?  And at the same time, what advice would you give to temper spending and borrowing using that resource as leverage? 

    MR. VALDES: Okay, so let me start by what authorities met, et cetera.  I think it is a question for the authorities, not for us.  So, I would prefer that you go directly to the authorities. 

    Your question on immigration is very important.  Our baseline considers an important decline on immigration, of immigration towards the U.S, okay.  Basically, that undocumented immigration goes basically to zero.  There is documented immigration still, and there are some people being sent back.  That has an effect first for the U.S. economy that maybe Nigel would like to add a bit of color on that.  What is the implication?  But also has, as you mentioned, an effect in the region.  And this is particularly important for Central America and Mexico, and if I have to say, more Central America than Mexico, given the relative size. 

    And here one issue is remittances.  We expect remittances to decline going forward.  How much is a very open question.  In the short run, we’re seeing the opposite.  Remittances are increasing, but we see that mostly as temporary.  So this will be a challenge for the economists to manage.  Since this is a shock that is probably more persistent, probably you will have to adjust to that shock.  It will have effects on consumption and probably also in economic activity. 

    There is also a challenge of absorbing people who would have migrated otherwise or that are coming back.  That’s also an opportunity.  There are countries which there is a shortage of people to work, but labor. rkets will be attuned to this.  There are a few countries that already have programs to reinsert people, that is correct.  We support that view. 

    Let me move to the second question and at the end I will go to Nigel, on basically the immigration question in the U.S.  Look, this message is not for any particular country.  I would put it the opposite.  It doesn’t apply to very few countries.  I don’t want to mention those.  But in general, in the region, we have seen some delays in fiscal consolidation in the last couple of years.  In many, many countries we have debt levels, debt ratios that are back to the peak after COVID.  So, after one year, when they decline, then they are back.  So, there is an important case to continue, at least in the short run, with this.  Are countries lagging the rest of the world?  The issue of fiscal is very generalized in many, many countries, not only Latin America, but I would say that that doesn’t make the homework less important and less urgent. 

    Finally, on the Caribbean and the questions, let me phrase it, and perhaps Ana would like to add on this.  But Suriname and Guyana are two countries that are living through important discoveries of oil, and that is a very challenging situation.  You probably know that there are lessons in history that these discoveries, or more generally natural resources, can be a blessing or can be a curse depending on how you manage that. 

    We are seeing very good management in Guyana.  Now. Suriname has to establish the framework for this to work well for them.  And for the region in general, of course, two countries, one country is already growing double digits and more, and the other one will be growing fast.  And those, of course, will be important for the region. 

    With that, let me go to Nigel, and perhaps Ana would like to add something on the Caribbean too. 

    MR. CHALK: On the immigration question in the U.S.  So, we have built into our forecast a significant decline in immigration flows into the U.S.  To give you a sense of magnitude, around the last couple of years, we have seen somewhere between three and three and a half million new foreign workers coming, foreign individuals coming into the U.S.  Only around 20 percent of those come through the formal immigration channels, green cards, and formal visas.  So our expectation, judging by what we can see on the statistics so far in border encounters, is that there’ll be a significant drop of that group that’s not coming through those formal channels.  And we essentially assume that’s going to go close to zero on a net basis. 

    So, what does that do to the U.S. economy?  I would point to a couple of things.  Probably the first important thing is in labor markets.  That inflow of foreign workers over the past few years has been very important in terms of helping the U.S. labor markets equilibrate, reducing wage growth, and then ultimately bringing down inflation.  So, it’s been an important disinflationary force that’s helped the Federal Reserve move inflation back towards their target.  That disinflationary force is going to go away, we expect, in the next couple of years. 

    Secondly, that group of individuals contributes to demand in the U.S. economy.  So, they come here, they need housing, they consume.  So that is going to provide a drag as a headwind on the demand side.  We think the supply-side forces are going to probably be the more dominant ones.  And we particularly see that a lot of that immigrant foreign labor group is concentrated in a few sectors.  So, you can think about retail, construction, agriculture.  And so, we are expecting we’ll probably see more tight labor markets in many of those sectors.

    MS. CORBACHO: Let me make a few specific remarks on Guyana.  Guyana has been the fastest-growing economy not only in the Caribbean but in the whole world, with average growth rates of 47 percent between 2022 and 2024.  We expect Guyana to continue to have very fast growth rates in an environment of macroeconomic stability.  In the current global uncertain environment, maintaining this macroeconomic stability is very critical, as well as continuing to strengthen resilience to shocks.  This includes shocks from oil prices, as well as continue to build very strong institutions so that the benefits of the oil wealth can be shared across generations.  Currently, all revenues are already helping Guyana address very significant development needs.  The Sovereign Wealth Fund has about 13 percent of GDP in buffers, and this is going to be very crucial to mitigate the impact of any global shocks.  And over time, we have emphasized the need to gradually close fiscal deficits again to preserve that wealth for the future.  Thank you.

    MS. ZIEGLER: Great.  So any other, just maybe a question or two.  Anyone?  Last in the region?  Okay, the gentleman in the blue shirt in the aisle. 

    QUESTIONER: Good afternoon.  Eastern Caribbean related questions.  Regarding tariffs, what recommendation would the IMF give to the small island states in the OECS, more specifically, or small island states in the Caribbean to mitigate against the potential fallout from the U.S. trade tariffs?  And a related question.  What should member states of the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union do — considering the potential effect of the dollar failure — as the Eastern Caribbean currency is currently pegged to the U.S. dollar?  And finally, climate change.  What should these small island states within the Eastern Caribbean do to protect themselves in light of the United Nations, the United States, and other developed nations cutting back when it comes to climate change assistance? 

    MS. ZIEGLER: Okay, maybe one last question and then we can move on to country questions.  Does anybody else have a question on the region?  Yes, please.  The woman there.

    QUESTIONER: Of course, inflation it is a thing, but in the Western Hemisphere it’s not really versus other regions.  So, I would really want to know if we should concentrate on debt, fiscal risks, or we should concentrate on growth?  Of course, the ideal thing is that they come together.  But right now, sometimes it feels like it is one thing or another.  Thank you. 

    MS. ZIEGLER: Anyone else?  The gentleman there.  And then we will move on to country questions after this. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, what challenges and opportunities does the IMF see for the Caribbean countries in light of the uncertainties created by the new administration in Washington, given the historic links between the United States and the Caribbean in trade remittances and as a major tourism source market. 

    MR. VALDES:  Okay, perhaps I can kind of start with a few ideas on the Caribbean and perhaps Ana would like to add some note.  But first, of course, tariffs.  And the global cycle is a headwind for tourism in the Caribbean.  So, what to do with this?  Basically, we think that it’s very important to keep the macroeconomy as stable as possible.  And that means that countries which have lot of homework in terms of rebuilding fiscal space, they have to continue doing it.  The risks of not doing that is to face at the end a disorderly macroeconomy.  And that at the end of the day is much worse.  We have to recognize that it may be raining, but it’s reality.  It is reality that we will have this cycle. 

    Now, the data we have seen and the authorities view on the same is that tourism is usually made reservations in advance, and we haven’t seen yet a change or cancellations of the size that could produce big problems.  Second point, we are not worried at all about the peg in the ECCU.  They have a very good ratio in reserves to money.  It is important to keep consistent policies for that.  Natural resources, sorry not natural.  The problem of climate change and the Caribbean. The MD said something very important.  And I would like just to mention that.  The Caribbean is special when you compare with other countries because basically natural disasters are macro-critical and very close every day.  Therefore, it is important to work towards building a structure of financing and infrastructure to be able to basically confront these problems.  Well, we are there to work with the countries on that. 

    Then I move to the question of supporting growth or adjusting.  The first thing is to notice that the way this shock is playing out is still very uncertain.  And I would say that part of the discussions we had with authorities is that before deciding actively what to do, we have to wait a bit more and understand better.  That is the very first point.  Second point, there are countries that may have some space to react fiscally if needed, but many others in reality do not have that space.  But working again in the fiscal risk side opens up space for monetary policy. 

    It is very different for a central bank to face an economy where fiscal risks are increasing, are becoming more and more complex compared to another one where the fiscal continues to adjust and there’s no problems of fiscal credibility.  Therefore, we see that this call that we had before of rebalancing monetary and fiscal policies continues to be very important.  Ana, would you like to add on the Caribbean? 

    MS. CORBACHO: Rodrigo addressed already the priorities of course to build fiscal buffers, stay the course on improving fiscal positions as well as continuing to work on addressing resilience to natural catastrophes and extreme weather events.  I wanted to touch on a third very important area of policy efforts.  When it has to do with structural reforms, we expect the Caribbean to converge to a level of medium-term growth or potential growth that is quite low.  This is an agenda that is long standing and the current conditions of uncertainty and the need to boost growth and productivity becomes even more urgent right now.  This has of course the area of resilience, growth and productivity, including enhancing human capital and expanding access to finance.  And particularly in the current environment seeking synergies from intra-regional cooperation and integration where the Caribbean can really expand scope for capacity by working together across states. 

    MS. ZIEGLER:  Let’s turn to country questions now.  The woman in the green in the middle there.

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you for having my question.  Rodrigo, you mentioned that level [inaudible] is being back to [inaudible] COVID.  This is the Brazilian case, right.  And given the complex global landscape, what are the IMF recommendations to Brazil regarding fiscal and monetary policies?  And do you believe that the early debate about the presidential election next year impacts, you know, policies, activity, or anything else?  Thank you.

    MS. ZIEGLER:  Okay, let me take another question.  So, I have two questions about my country and thank you for your condolence because of the earthquake today.  I would like to know is there any answer or did you finish already the revision of the program?  And we were waiting for that last week, I think because IMF says it’s going to be an answer after the elections.  So, is there any results?  Is it possible to have the money this week or this month, when it’s going to happen?  And the second one is about the Ecuadorian requests for RSF program.  I know we were waiting about that.  The government said it is going to be possible to have that this year.  But I don’t know if any updates on that.

    MS. ZIEGLER:  Okay, do we have any other in Ecuador in particular?  Anybody?  Okay, let us take those and we’ll move on to other countries in the next round. 

    MR. VALDES:  Okay, let me again, Ana, will may want to add on Brazil, but let me start from the following.  First, elections happen in all the countries of the region.  It is normal to have these cycles.  There is nothing special from that.  Second, as you mentioned, Brazil has a fiscal challenge.  The authorities are very well aware of this, and they are taking measures for that to stabilize debt and eventually also to have the debt ratio in a downward path in the future.  Of course, one thing is to have that and then is the measures.  And the discussions with them is always about whether we can have more measures for ensure that this will happen.  But I would like to say that they have been taking measures; their fiscal rule this year with the objective that they have on the primary is very important to be met and we support that. 

    In terms of monetary policy in Brazil, the central bank has been tightening policies appropriately basically to bring inflation back to target.  As I mentioned at the beginning, giving certainty in this environment is very important.  And part of the certainties that many countries have, Brazil included, is to have a central bank that is committed to its target and also acts with full independence. 

    On Ecuador, we had an election not long ago, two weeks ago.  So, it’s not that things are not as fast as we would like.  No.  So,we had to expect to wait for the election to happen.  We are in conversations with the authorities.  We have had many meetings these days here.  There’s good progress in the discussions, but we cannot give you a precise date of [the] next steps.  No, we are working on that.  We hope to move fast. ON RSF, the RSF was a possibility for the authorities, but they have decided to postpone it for a while. They haven’t decided to officially ask for it later, but it’s a possibility. But with the purpose of facilitating this review which comes on the heels of very good performance of the program. That is what I can say. The authorities have been implementing strongly their program. At the same time, we have news — the world, lower oil prices — which need to be factored in the program. And that is what we are doing.

    MS. CORBACHO:  Let me start with a brief addition on Ecuador that the dialogue with the authorities continues to be extremely productive and very close.  We are taking stock of the implications of global developments on the macroeconomic framework for Ecuador.  And we continue to advance in securing the second review of the EFF arrangement.  We will come back on specific dates as soon as we have more information to give you to.

    MS. ZIEGLER: I am going to read a question online that we have from Ion Group.  It is on El Salvador.  Is El Salvador shifting around bitcoin from one account to the next?  Is that how they are adding to its bitcoin reserves versus straight out purchases?  And maybe we’ll take one other question from the, from the audience on a country matter. Okay, go ahead.  I know that’s Argentina over there.  We’ll come to Argentina.  You’ll get your own section. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you everyone.   Why the contribution the Monetary Fund to Honduras and the other country of the region in the context confusion and trade tension.  Additionally, what is the factor we leverage economic growth this year and the Honduras economy. 

    MS. ZIEGLER:  Okay, let us take those and [the] next round will be Argentina. 

    MR. VALDES:  So first let me start from Honduras.  Honduras just had a staff-level agreement with the Fund.  That means that we are ready to go to the Board for the review of the program, the second review.  Things have moved very well for the country.  It is an example of an old say of the Fund that is you repair your roof when it’s sunny outside.  And they took advantage of times that things were calmer, and they moved policies, both structural aspects and importantly macro aspects.  And today are in a much better position to withstand the global cycle. 

    They improve their reserves that they have, they mobilize resources from other IFIs.  They were able to lower inflation, and they have been growing pretty fast and also making progress in their fiscal adjustments.  So, I would say it’s a good case of preparedness.  So, the country is in a much better position now than it was before.

    In terms of El Salvador, let me say that I can confirm that they continue to comply with their commitment of non-accumulation of bitcoin by the overall fiscal sector, which is the performance criteria that we have.  But on top of that, I think this is very important for the discussion in El Salvador.  The program of El Salvador is not about bitcoin.  It’s much more, much deeper in structural reforms, in terms of governance, in terms of transparency.  There is a lot of progress there.  And also, on fiscal.  And authorities have been making a lot of progress implementing the reform. 

    We are preparing the first review of the program now.  This is, as you know, a 40-month program with 1.4 billion but what the money that they can mobilize from other IFIs, it is about $3.5 billion.  It has an important fiscal adjustment that the authorities are implementing.  At the end, this program is expected to create the conditions for stronger private investment and stronger growth in El Salvador.  Taking advantage, basically, or a much better macro on top of the dividends that the immense improvement in security will yield.

    MS. ZIEGLER: And now we will move to Argentina and we are going to take.  We are going to compile questions, and I will also, once we go into the — the questions in the room.  I am going to take a question online from [Liliana] as well.  So please feel free. Whoever would like, I will start on the aisle here. 

    QUESTIONER: The Argentina staff report mentions contingency planning in case of an external shock.  Wondering if you are expecting an external shock this year.  And in that case, what are the policy changes that you would expect Argentina to take to mitigate?

    QUESTIONER:    There’s been reports of pressure from the management to some of the Board directors in order to approve the IMF new program.  I was wondering if you could comment on that and also on the remarks that were made yesterday by Ms. Georgieva.  She said that Argentina should not derail from change, speaking about the elections.  And the opposition has accused her of meddling with the national elections. 

    MS. ZIEGLER:  Okay, any more Argentina questions in the room?  We are going to go to Webex, and we will take a question. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you for taking my questions.  And I have two — what inflation rates does the IMF project for this year?  I mean end of period and for the next year.  And the second question is, what are the potential risks facing Argentina’s economy program?

    MS. ZIEGLER: Okay, we’ll leave it there. 

    MR. VALDES: Okay, thank you.  Look, from the first questions and the two last questions, I will invite you to look at the Staff Report.  Really, I don’t have anything to add on.  We don’t work, we don’t change the view in a week of a country.  So, what is there really is the contingencies plans and the inflation forecast that we have not changed and are part of the WEO.  And also, the official documents of the program. 

    I want to say a few words on this article on the pressure to the Board and the words from our Managing Director.  Let me start from the second part.  Today the MD said something about this and said something very simple.  Elections are for the Argentine people, not for us. So, it’s very clear to me, the message.  I also can say that what she was underscoring was the importance of policy continuity to support Argentina’s stability and recovery.  Her comments reflect the economic opportunities ahead and the importance for the government to stay the course implementing those.  It’s not a view on the political process or its outcome.  In fact, the Fund never takes positions on this. 

    In terms of this article, what I can say basically is that all the decisions that the IMF-supported programs are taking on — are done by the Executive Board based on what staff, technical assessment and in line with Fund policies produce.  The program for Argentina was approved by the Executive Board following a very rigorous evaluation.  Lot of engagement from staff to the Board throughout the process and also reflecting the authorities very strong track record and commitment to the stabilization and to reform.   

    MS. ZIEGLER:  Okay, we are going to take a final question, and it will be online. 

    QUESTIONER:  Mr. Valdez, you talk about the fiscal consolidation in some countries in this year.  In Chile, the Ministry of Finance, despite the fact that the Ministry committed to a new adjustment this year, say that it will not meet the selling cost fiscal target again and they have to change it.  Is this a concern for you?  The fiscal situation in Chile, how well prepared do you see Chile today for this scenario, global slowdown and mainly worsening in the next years?  Thank you. 

    MR. VALDES: The view from the Fund is that after the slight widening of the fiscal deficit in Chile last year, it will be very important to decisively bring the deficit back to a downward path.  The authorities’ commitment to do this in 2025 and their medium-term strategy and also adhering to their debt ceiling is very commendable.  Now, given the worst starting position for this year, it looks appropriate to smooth the adjustment.  Okay, so to move a bit the calendar.  Nevertheless, we see that with the new target of 1.5 percent, they will need measures of around 0.5 percent to be identified. 

    They just announced yesterday measures.  We have been discussing with authorities those measures.  But we need some time to fully understand the size and the timing of those effects.  These announcements of corrective fiscal actions are clearly a step towards this goal and are welcome.  But at the same time, we need to assess them more carefully.  And also given the context of uncertainty, it will be important for fiscal policy to remain very agile and respond further if the revenue and expenditure measures that are being taken disappoint.

     MS. ZIEGLER:  Those are all the questions that we have time for today.  I want to thank you, Rodrigo, Ana, and Nigel.  If you have any other questions and thank everyone for joining us in person and on the line.  And if you have any other questions, please be sure to send them by email to media@imf.org.  Thank you again and have a good afternoon. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Julie Ziegler

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/26/tr042525-western-hemisphere-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: 80 years after Benito Mussolini’s death, what can democracies today learn from his fascist rise?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Matthew Sharpe, Associate Professor in Philosophy, Australian Catholic University

    Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Everett Collection/Shutterstock

    This Monday marks 80 years since Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was killed in an Italian village towards the end of the Second World War in 1945. The following day, his body was publicly desecrated in Milan.

    Il Duce, as Mussolini was known, was Hitler’s inspiration.
    State Library of Victoria

    Given the scale of Adolf Hitler’s atrocities, our image of fascism today has largely been shaped by Nazism. Yet, Mussolini preceded Hitler. Il Duce, as Mussolini was known, was Hitler’s inspiration.

    Today, as commentators, bloggers and scholars are debating whether the governments of US President Donald Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Russian President Vladimir Putin are “fascist”, we can learn from Il Duce’s career about how democracies fail and dictators consolidate autocratic rule.

    The early years

    The term “fascist” itself originated around the time of Mussolini’s founding in 1914 of the Fasci d’Azione Rivoluzionaria, a militaristic group promoting Italy’s entry into the First World War.

    Mussolini had been raised in a leftist family. Before WWI, he edited and wrote for socialist newspapers. Yet, from early on, the young rebel was also attracted to radically anti-democratic thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, George Sorel, and Wilfred Pareto.

    When WWI broke out, Mussolini broke from the socialists, who opposed Italy’s involvement in the conflict. Like Hitler, he fought in the war. Mussolini considered his front-line experience as formative for his future ideas around fascism. His war experience led him to imagine making Italy great again – an imperial power worthy of the heritage of ancient Rome.

    In March 1919, Mussolini formed the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento in Milan. This group brought together a motley collection of war veterans, primarily interested in fighting the socialists and communists. They were organised in squadristi (squads), which would become known for their black shirts and violence – they forced many of their targets to drink castor oil.

    The political success of Mussolini’s fascist ideals, however, was neither instant nor inevitable. In the 1919 Italian elections, Mussolini received so few votes, communists held a mock funeral march outside his house to celebrate his political death.

    The rise to power and the march on Rome

    Fascism became a part of national political life in 1920-21, following waves of industrial and agricultural strikes and worker occupations of land and factories.

    As a result, rural and industrial elites turned to the fascist squadristi to break strikes and combat workers’ organisations. Fascist squads also overturned the results of democratic elections in Bologna and Cremona, preventing left-wing candidates from assuming office.

    Mussolini’s political capital, remarkably, was boosted by this violence. He was invited to enter Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi’s first government in July 1921.

    The following October, fascists occupied the towns of Bolzano and Trento. The liberals, socialists and Italian monarchy were indecisive in the face of these provocations, allowing Mussolini to seize the moment. Mustering the fascist squads, he ordered the famous “march on Rome” in late October 2022 to demand he be appointed prime minister.

    All the evidence suggests if the government had intervened, the march on Rome would have disbanded. It was a bold piece of political theatre. Nevertheless, fearing civil war — and the communists more than the black shirts — King Victor Emmanuel III caved in without a shot being fired.

    Mussolini was made leader of a new government on October 31, 1922.

    The consolidation of dictatorship

    Like Hitler in 1933, Mussolini’s rule started as the head of a coalition government including non-fascist parties. Yet, with the repressive powers of the state now at his disposal, Mussolini exploited the division among his rivals and gradually consolidated power.

    In 1923, the communist party was targeted with mass arrests and the fascist squads were brought under official state control as a paramilitary force. Mussolini began to use state powers to surveil all non-fascist political parties.

    In the 1924 general election, with fascist militia menacingly manning the polls, Il Duce won 65% of the vote.

    Then, in June, socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti was kidnapped and murdered by black shirts. When investigations pointed to Mussolini’s responsibility, he at first denied any knowledge of the killing. Months later, however, Mussolini proudly admitted responsibility for the deed, celebrating the fascists’ brutality. He faced no legal or political consequences.

    The last nail in the coffin of Italy’s enfeebled democracy came in late 1926. Following an assassination attempt in which Mussolini’s nose was grazed (he wore a bandage for a time afterwards), Mussolini definitively banned all political opposition.

    The “lesser evil”

    Following his death in April 1945, Mussolini’s dictatorship was often portrayed as “dictatorship-lite”, a “lesser evil” compared to Nazism or Stalinist Russia. This narrative, bolstered by German crimes against Italians in the last months of the war, has understandably been embraced by many Italians.

    Yet, Mussolini’s was the first regime to advertise itself as totalitarian. Styling himself as a “man of destiny”, Mussolini claimed that fascism embodied the “spiritual renewal” of the Italian people.

    His goal of making Italy a power again required total control of the state. His 1932 “Doctrine of Fascism” describes the need “to exercise power and to command” all administrative, policing, and judicial institutions. This included censorship of the press and educational institutions.

    Mussolini announcing Italy’s declaration of war on France and Britain in 1940.
    Australian War Memorial

    While portraying fascism as a “populist” movement, Mussolini also shut down independent trade unions, bailed out big banks, and prevented the right to strike. As a result, economic inequality between Italians actually grew wider under his rule.

    Mussolini also pursued an imperialist dream by invading Ethiopia. Defying international conventions, Il Duce’s troops used chemical weapons and summary executions to quell acts of resistance. Over 700,000 Ethiopians are estimated by scholars to have been killed by the invaders, with around 35,000 forced into internment camps.

    Italian Ca-111 bombers over Ethiopia in the 1930s.
    Getty Images/Wikimedia Commons

    Mussolini’s fascists ran over 30 concentration camps from 1926–45, almost all of them offshore. Some 50–70,000 Libyans alone died in camps set up under Italy’s brutal colonial regime from 1929–34. Many more died through executions, starvation and ethnic cleansing.

    When the notorious SS leader Heinrich Himmler visited Libya in in 1939, he deemed the Italian colony a successful model to emulate.

    And after Mussolini’s forces aided the Axis invasions of Yugoslavia, Albania and Russia in the Second World War, more than 80,000 more prisoners were interned in camps. At the camp on the Croatian Island of Rab, more than 3,000 prisoners died in grossly inhumane conditions in 1942–43, at a mortality rate higher than the Nazi camp at Buchenwald.

    Slovenian prisoner of the Italian Rab concentration camp.
    Archives, Museum of Modern History, Ljubljana/Wikimedia Commons

    From late 1943, Italian fascists also participated in the rounding up of over 7,000 Italian Jews to transfer to Auschwitz. Almost all of them were murdered.

    Following the war, even with Il Duce dead, few perpetrators faced justice for these atrocities.

    Lessons for democracies after 80 years

    The infamy of the crimes associated with the word “fascism” has meant that few people today claim the label – even those attracted to the same kinds of authoritarian, ethnonationalist politics.

    Mussolini, even more than Hitler, can seem a bombastic fool, with his uniform, theatrical gestures, stylised hyper-masculinity and patented steely jaw.

    Yet, one of the lessons of Mussolini’s career is that such political adventurists are only as strong as the democratic opposition allows. To fail to take them seriously is to enable their success.

    Mussolini pushed his luck time and again between 1920 and 1926. As the wonderful recent teleseries of his ascent, Mussolini, Figlio del Seculo shows, time and again, the opposition failed to concertedly oppose the fascists’ attacks on democratic norms and institutions. Then it was too late.

    Democracies mostly fall over time, by a thousand cuts and shifts of the goalposts of what is considered “normal”. Fascism, moreover, depends in no small measure on shameless political deception, including the readiness to conceal its own most radical intentions.

    Fascist “strongmen” like Mussolini accumulate power thanks to people’s inabilities to believe that the barbarisation of political life – including open violence against opponents – could happen in their societies.

    And there is a final, unsettling lesson of Mussolini’s career. Il Duce was a skilled propagandist who portrayed himself as leading a popular revolt to restore respectable values. He was able to win widespread popular support, including among the elites, even as he destroyed Italian democracy.

    Yet, if the monarchy, military, other political parties and the church had attempted a principled, united opposition to fascism early enough, most of Mussolini’s crimes would likely have been avoided.

    Matthew Sharpe has in the past (2013-17) received funding from the ARC to study religion and politics in the contemporary world.

    – ref. 80 years after Benito Mussolini’s death, what can democracies today learn from his fascist rise? – https://theconversation.com/80-years-after-benito-mussolinis-death-what-can-democracies-today-learn-from-his-fascist-rise-251154

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Quigley Statement on the Retirement of Democratic Whip and Senator Dick Durbin

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Mike Quigley (IL-05)

    Chicago, Ill. – Today, U.S. Representative Mike Quigley (IL-05) released the following statement regarding the announcement that U.S. Senator Dick Durbin (IL) will not seek re-election:

    “After serving the people of Illinois for over 40 years in Congress, my colleague Senator Dick Durbin has shared that he plans to retire at the end of his term. 

    “From securing federal funds to extend Chicago’s Red Line and bolster anti-flooding infrastructure, to supporting full LGBTQ+ equality, Senator Durbin has been an essential partner in solving problems right here at home. As the Senate Democratic whip for two decades, Durbin has also mobilized my Democratic colleagues to vote for transformative legislation, including the Affordable Care Act, First Step Act, and the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. In recent years, I have also been honored to work with Senator Durbin in advocating for Ukraine in the war against Russian aggression.

    “Senator Durbin’s decision to retire embodies the essence of public service—doing what is best even when it is difficult. I will miss his partnership and advocacy in the Senate, but I look forward to seeing him thrive in this next chapter.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 27, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Spokesperson Statement on Colombia

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 26, 2025

    Washington, DC: Julie Kozack, Director of Communications at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), issued the following statement today:  

    “From April 26, 2025, Colombia’s continued qualification for the IMF’s Flexible Credit Line (FCL) is contingent on the completion of both the ongoing Article IV consultation (see staff statement issued on April 18, 2025) and a subsequent FCL mid-term review. The FCL arrangement was approved on April 26, 2024, for a two-year period with a mid-term review to assess continued qualification.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Jose De Haro

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/pr-25124-colombia-imf-spokesperson-statement

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-Evening Report: 80 years after Benito Mussolini’s death, what can democracies today learn from his fascist rise?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Matthew Sharpe, Associate Professor in Philosophy, Australian Catholic University

    Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Everett Collection/Shutterstock

    This Monday marks 80 years since Italian dictator Benito Mussolini was killed in an Italian village towards the end of the Second World War in 1945. The following day, his body was publicly desecrated in Milan.

    Il Duce, as Mussolini was known, was Hitler’s inspiration.
    State Library of Victoria

    Given the scale of Adolf Hitler’s atrocities, our image of fascism today has largely been shaped by Nazism. Yet, Mussolini preceded Hitler. Il Duce, as Mussolini was known, was Hitler’s inspiration.

    Today, as commentators, bloggers and scholars are debating whether the governments of US President Donald Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Russian President Vladimir Putin are “fascist”, we can learn from Il Duce’s career about how democracies fail and dictators consolidate autocratic rule.

    The early years

    The term “fascist” itself originated around the time of Mussolini’s founding in 1914 of the Fasci d’Azione Rivoluzionaria, a militaristic group promoting Italy’s entry into the First World War.

    Mussolini had been raised in a leftist family. Before WWI, he edited and wrote for socialist newspapers. Yet, from early on, the young rebel was also attracted to radically anti-democratic thinkers like Friedrich Nietzsche, George Sorel, and Wilfred Pareto.

    When WWI broke out, Mussolini broke from the socialists, who opposed Italy’s involvement in the conflict. Like Hitler, he fought in the war. Mussolini considered his front-line experience as formative for his future ideas around fascism. His war experience led him to imagine making Italy great again – an imperial power worthy of the heritage of ancient Rome.

    In March 1919, Mussolini formed the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento in Milan. This group brought together a motley collection of war veterans, primarily interested in fighting the socialists and communists. They were organised in squadristi (squads), which would become known for their black shirts and violence – they forced many of their targets to drink castor oil.

    The political success of Mussolini’s fascist ideals, however, was neither instant nor inevitable. In the 1919 Italian elections, Mussolini received so few votes, communists held a mock funeral march outside his house to celebrate his political death.

    The rise to power and the march on Rome

    Fascism became a part of national political life in 1920-21, following waves of industrial and agricultural strikes and worker occupations of land and factories.

    As a result, rural and industrial elites turned to the fascist squadristi to break strikes and combat workers’ organisations. Fascist squads also overturned the results of democratic elections in Bologna and Cremona, preventing left-wing candidates from assuming office.

    Mussolini’s political capital, remarkably, was boosted by this violence. He was invited to enter Prime Minister Ivanoe Bonomi’s first government in July 1921.

    The following October, fascists occupied the towns of Bolzano and Trento. The liberals, socialists and Italian monarchy were indecisive in the face of these provocations, allowing Mussolini to seize the moment. Mustering the fascist squads, he ordered the famous “march on Rome” in late October 2022 to demand he be appointed prime minister.

    All the evidence suggests if the government had intervened, the march on Rome would have disbanded. It was a bold piece of political theatre. Nevertheless, fearing civil war — and the communists more than the black shirts — King Victor Emmanuel III caved in without a shot being fired.

    Mussolini was made leader of a new government on October 31, 1922.

    The consolidation of dictatorship

    Like Hitler in 1933, Mussolini’s rule started as the head of a coalition government including non-fascist parties. Yet, with the repressive powers of the state now at his disposal, Mussolini exploited the division among his rivals and gradually consolidated power.

    In 1923, the communist party was targeted with mass arrests and the fascist squads were brought under official state control as a paramilitary force. Mussolini began to use state powers to surveil all non-fascist political parties.

    In the 1924 general election, with fascist militia menacingly manning the polls, Il Duce won 65% of the vote.

    Then, in June, socialist leader Giacomo Matteotti was kidnapped and murdered by black shirts. When investigations pointed to Mussolini’s responsibility, he at first denied any knowledge of the killing. Months later, however, Mussolini proudly admitted responsibility for the deed, celebrating the fascists’ brutality. He faced no legal or political consequences.

    The last nail in the coffin of Italy’s enfeebled democracy came in late 1926. Following an assassination attempt in which Mussolini’s nose was grazed (he wore a bandage for a time afterwards), Mussolini definitively banned all political opposition.

    The “lesser evil”

    Following his death in April 1945, Mussolini’s dictatorship was often portrayed as “dictatorship-lite”, a “lesser evil” compared to Nazism or Stalinist Russia. This narrative, bolstered by German crimes against Italians in the last months of the war, has understandably been embraced by many Italians.

    Yet, Mussolini’s was the first regime to advertise itself as totalitarian. Styling himself as a “man of destiny”, Mussolini claimed that fascism embodied the “spiritual renewal” of the Italian people.

    His goal of making Italy a power again required total control of the state. His 1932 “Doctrine of Fascism” describes the need “to exercise power and to command” all administrative, policing, and judicial institutions. This included censorship of the press and educational institutions.

    Mussolini announcing Italy’s declaration of war on France and Britain in 1940.
    Australian War Memorial

    While portraying fascism as a “populist” movement, Mussolini also shut down independent trade unions, bailed out big banks, and prevented the right to strike. As a result, economic inequality between Italians actually grew wider under his rule.

    Mussolini also pursued an imperialist dream by invading Ethiopia. Defying international conventions, Il Duce’s troops used chemical weapons and summary executions to quell acts of resistance. Over 700,000 Ethiopians are estimated by scholars to have been killed by the invaders, with around 35,000 forced into internment camps.

    Italian Ca-111 bombers over Ethiopia in the 1930s.
    Getty Images/Wikimedia Commons

    Mussolini’s fascists ran over 30 concentration camps from 1926–45, almost all of them offshore. Some 50–70,000 Libyans alone died in camps set up under Italy’s brutal colonial regime from 1929–34. Many more died through executions, starvation and ethnic cleansing.

    When the notorious SS leader Heinrich Himmler visited Libya in in 1939, he deemed the Italian colony a successful model to emulate.

    And after Mussolini’s forces aided the Axis invasions of Yugoslavia, Albania and Russia in the Second World War, more than 80,000 more prisoners were interned in camps. At the camp on the Croatian Island of Rab, more than 3,000 prisoners died in grossly inhumane conditions in 1942–43, at a mortality rate higher than the Nazi camp at Buchenwald.

    Slovenian prisoner of the Italian Rab concentration camp.
    Archives, Museum of Modern History, Ljubljana/Wikimedia Commons

    From late 1943, Italian fascists also participated in the rounding up of over 7,000 Italian Jews to transfer to Auschwitz. Almost all of them were murdered.

    Following the war, even with Il Duce dead, few perpetrators faced justice for these atrocities.

    Lessons for democracies after 80 years

    The infamy of the crimes associated with the word “fascism” has meant that few people today claim the label – even those attracted to the same kinds of authoritarian, ethnonationalist politics.

    Mussolini, even more than Hitler, can seem a bombastic fool, with his uniform, theatrical gestures, stylised hyper-masculinity and patented steely jaw.

    Yet, one of the lessons of Mussolini’s career is that such political adventurists are only as strong as the democratic opposition allows. To fail to take them seriously is to enable their success.

    Mussolini pushed his luck time and again between 1920 and 1926. As the wonderful recent teleseries of his ascent, Mussolini, Figlio del Seculo shows, time and again, the opposition failed to concertedly oppose the fascists’ attacks on democratic norms and institutions. Then it was too late.

    Democracies mostly fall over time, by a thousand cuts and shifts of the goalposts of what is considered “normal”. Fascism, moreover, depends in no small measure on shameless political deception, including the readiness to conceal its own most radical intentions.

    Fascist “strongmen” like Mussolini accumulate power thanks to people’s inabilities to believe that the barbarisation of political life – including open violence against opponents – could happen in their societies.

    And there is a final, unsettling lesson of Mussolini’s career. Il Duce was a skilled propagandist who portrayed himself as leading a popular revolt to restore respectable values. He was able to win widespread popular support, including among the elites, even as he destroyed Italian democracy.

    Yet, if the monarchy, military, other political parties and the church had attempted a principled, united opposition to fascism early enough, most of Mussolini’s crimes would likely have been avoided.

    Matthew Sharpe has in the past (2013-17) received funding from the ARC to study religion and politics in the contemporary world.

    – ref. 80 years after Benito Mussolini’s death, what can democracies today learn from his fascist rise? – https://theconversation.com/80-years-after-benito-mussolinis-death-what-can-democracies-today-learn-from-his-fascist-rise-251154

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: European Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

     MR. HELGE BERGER, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MS. OYA CELASUN, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MR. ALFRED KAMMER, Director, European Department, IMF

    MODERATOR: 

    MS. CAMILA PEREZ, Senior Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    P R O C E E D I N G S

    (10:00 a.m.)

    MS. PEREZ: Hi everyone.  Thank you so much for joining today’s press conference on the European Economic Outlook.  I’m Camila Perez.  I’m a Communications Officer with the IMF.  We’re pleased to be joined today by Alfred Kammer, sitting next to me, Director of the European Department here at the IMF.  Also, with us we’ve got Oya Celasun and Helge Berger, both Deputy Directors of the Department. 

    We’ll begin as usual with some opening remarks from Alfred, and then we’ll take your questions.  I see some colleagues joining online, so we will also go to your questions online.  Alfred, over to you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Welcome to this press conference on Europe. I have posted my opening remarks and also circulated.  You should have them.  So, I will just make a few points for emphasis. 

    First of all, in terms of the outlook, we have had a meaningful downgrade for Europe that reflects the impact of tariffs, partially compensated by an increase in infrastructure spending and defense spending, in particular from Germany.  But the biggest impact is coming from uncertainty and tighter financial conditions.  The impact is different for the Euro area versus CESEE (Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe).  CESEE is more affected as it has a larger manufacturing sector and is more exposed to tariffs. 

    Second point to make is when we are looking at the medium term, we see rather weak growth, and that has not changed from our previous outlook.  And that is a clear result of a large productivity gap Europe has to the global economy.  And that is something which clearly needs to be fixed.  We were talking about internal barriers; we are talking about financial barriers which need to be overcome.  So that’s part of the medium-term growth story, and that is something for the policy part. 

    On the policy recommendations, first, our recommendation is more trade is better and therefore we are very encouraged that the European Union is continuing to move forward on trade agreements.  Those who have been — which have been negotiated, they should be brought to a conclusion. 

    The second policy advice is on the monetary side.  In the Euro area, we had success in the disinflation effort.  We are forecasting now that we hit the target in the second half of 2025.  What does that mean for ECB monetary policy?  One more cut in the summer of 25 basis points and then keep the rate on hold at 2 percent until — unless major shocks ask for a recalibration of that monetary stance.  A bit different in CESEE, where inflation is more persistent and still higher, and there needs to be taken more caution in terms of the easing part.

    On fiscal consolidation, fiscal consolidation should continue.  Europe needs to build up buffers for the next shock.  But also, Europe needs to build fiscal space for long-term spending pressures, which we have on aging, health care, the energy transition, and of course, now an accelerated need is on defense spending. 

    Final point, focus needs to be on structural reforms.  In Europe, we have been making suggestions on reforms which could be taken at the EU level.  Draghi Letta, we have a shared diagnostic.  We also have an understanding of the policy solutions.  These reforms should be undertaken with urgency.  We selected a number of key reforms which are under discussion.  If we are looking at the benefit of the implementation, it would add 3 percent to the level of GDP in Europe.  So, these reforms need to be pushed forward with urgency. 

    There’s also a need for national structural reforms.  There’s lots of benefit to those.  Priority in Europe actually is on the labor market side, including on upskilling and reskilling of workers.  We put together, country by country, a set of priority reform areas.  If countries actually close the gap to the best-performing countries, best-practice countries in these areas by only 50 percent, it would give a boost to the level of GDP by 5 percent for advanced European countries, by 6 to 7 percent for CESEE countries and for the Western Balkan countries, the number is 9 percent increase in GDP.  So, the reform areas are discussed, the reform areas are agreed.  What now needs to happen is the political will, and that is not easy to overcome vested interests, but it needs to be done because this is to secure the future of Europe.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks so much, Alfred. We can now start with your questions.  We will go to the room.  Please raise your hand when called, identify yourself, name, and outlet.  We’re going to get started with the lady sitting here.  Thank you.  First row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  So, in recent weeks financial market has shown increasing pressure on U.S. Treasury while demand on the European debt appears to be rising.  Do you believe this shift represents a sustainable trend?  And more broadly, do you think that what some have termed European exceptionalism could eventually supplant the American exceptionalism in the global economic and financial order?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: First, to move to European exceptionalism. It’s still a long and hard road away, and it starts with utilizing the single market in order to create the productivity gains necessary actually to create markets to scale and to create financing to scale so that we get a dynamic business sector going.  And that is a must, which needs to be done in order to increase growth, and also, given all of the spending needs coming to secure the European welfare state. 

    On your other question, we should not overinterpret the shifts which have taken place on the portfolio side over the last few weeks.  When markets are adjusting, you would expect rebalancing to take place.  At this stage, way too early to say whether there has been a structural shift. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you, Alfred. We’re going to go now to the gentleman in the fourth row with the blue jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Mr. Kammer, Germany has been very praised here during the Spring Meetings for its new fiscal stimulus package.  But in Germany we have a little bit of different discussion.  A lot of economists criticize the lack of structural reforms in Germany.  Do you have already a first assessment of how the fiscal stimulus package could boost the weak German potential growth?  And do you think that the expenditures are in line with the EU fiscal rules, or must the EU fiscal rules be reformed again so that Germany just can spend the money in the end?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: On your first question, yes, we do. And I hand over to Oya. 

    MS. CELASUN: Thank you very much. So, you’re asking how the fiscal stimulus will impact the German economy and how it fits in with the broader structural reform agenda.  So, it will bring some — blow some energy into the economy after several years of weak growth.  We don’t expect the ramp-up in expenditures to be very quick.  We expect the peak effect in 2026.  Basically in ’25, it will bring some partial offset to the increased drags we are seeing from the trade side from global uncertainty, weak consumer and business confidence.  But as we move into 2026 and 2027, it will be a dominant factor offsetting the expected ongoing drag from trade tensions.  So, it will certainly lift aggregate demand. 

    And the part on infrastructure spending is very welcome.  For years we’ve pointed to deficient public infrastructure as a factor holding back growth in Germany.  So not only will it help growth in the near-term through aggregate demand, but it should have, if fully spent, it should have an effect on lifting potential growth in the long-term as well.  It is one of the important areas we see for lifting potential growth as Germany moves into a period with weak growth in its workforce — in fact, a sharp contraction in the coming five years.  So that’s very welcome.  But there are other important areas.  One of them is cutting red tape, actually important for lifting public infrastructure spending as well.  It’s important for Germany to be a leader in pushing European integration and also deal with its shrinking labor force by helping women work full-time.  Thanks. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks, Oya. We’re —

    QUESTIONER: [off mic]

    MS. CELASUN: So maybe the important thing to mention is that Germany has fiscal space, it has low debt, it has low deficits, it has low borrowing costs. So that’s very important.  We, our own forecasts suggest that Germany, once you exclude defense spending of about 1.5 percent of GDP relative to 2021, will keep its deficits below 3 percent.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go now to the center. Gentlemen on the second row.  Thank. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  In the updated World Economic Outlook, the IMF downgraded its projection for Ukraine up to 2 percent this year compared with the November forecast, which was 2.5-3.5 percent.  Could you please elaborate on the aspects that have affected the current forecast?  What share of this is due to the global and regional slowdown, domestic factors, war, or external support?  And secondly, may I ask you to comment on the issue of debt restructuring for Ukraine?  Do you have communication with the Ukrainian government on this, and how do you evaluate the risks for Ukraine if they couldn’t reach a deal on this issue?  Thank you.

    MS. PEREZ: Let me see if there’s any other questions on Ukraine. The lady in the third row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: I also want to ask you about the crisis and there are — have many — many different cases, many countries have had their debt written off.  And do you recommend the creditors write off part of Ukraine’s debt, and is this option being considered now?  Thank you.

    MR. KAMMER: So, let me start with a question on growth first. What we are seeing is lower growth momentum carrying forward from 2024.  That is a reflection of the bombing of the energy infrastructure and that is hampering the economy.  It’s also reflecting a very tight labor market and it’s reflecting continued uncertainty of the length of the war and how the war will evolve and affect the economy.  And that is clearly weighing on growth in 2025. 

    I should say, of course, and emphasize again that the Ukraine economic team, Minister of Finance, Central Bank Governor are doing an extraordinary job to maintain macro stability under these conditions and also to prepare the economy for a post-war reconstruction period.  And important for that is the need to work on the medium-term national revenue strategy because Ukraine will need revenue in order to provide all of the necessary service of a modern state and their support the reconstruction.  So, I think that’s very important.  But praise again for the economic team to operate and attain macro stability in this difficult situation. 

    On the debt part, what we are seeing is that there is a credible process underway with private creditors that is proceeding, and that is an important element of the Fund program.  So that in the end, under the Fund program, we are going to see that sustainability in Ukraine emerging. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go to this side of the room.  The lady in the second row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  A question on the UK.  There’s a lot of speculation in the UK about a potential trade deal with the U.S.  Will it make any difference to growth?  And our finance minister was on the radio this morning saying our trading relationship with Europe was arguably even more important because they’re nearer to us.  Do you agree with that?

    MR. KAMMER: Helge?

    MR. BERGER: We agree with everybody who concludes that more trade is better than less trade. We understand that trade has been sort of in the past and will be in the future, I’m sure, an engine for growth and productivity improvements. So, in that spirit, sort of any trade agreements that the UK will be concluding with any country going forward that will improve sort of the trading relationships that they already have are very welcome.  And we would generally encourage all countries to follow this path. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go.  The gentleman in the second row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi. I was just wondering, during the meetings this week, there seem to be differing opinions among European leaders about the prospects of a trade deal with the United States.  The French saying they think perhaps a deal might be some way off.  The Germans expressing more optimism.  I just wondered from your vantage point how important you think it is that a deal be done for growth for the European Union and for Europe more broadly.  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so clearly our message is more trade is better. Trade tensions are bad for growth.  And so, we are encouraging to have constructive negotiations.  And the U.S. is a large trading partner of the European Union, so we are hoping that there will be successful negotiations taking place.  And in our discussions with European leaders, I don’t sense any difference of views with regard to the importance of that relationship and that an effort needs to be made to de-escalate and to negotiate a deal. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go online now. Go ahead please.  You can unmute yourself. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you so much.  Trade between Russia and Europe has shrunk dramatically due to sanctions and counter-sanctions.  How does the IMF characterize the current state of Russia-Europe trade flows?  Are we essentially seeing a permanent decoupling of the Russian economy from its European trading partners, or are there still significant economic interactions that could influence the outlook?  Moreover, what does the IMF foresee for the future of these trade relations?  Is any normalization expected within the forecast horizon, taking into account U.S. tariffs, or will they remain at minimal levels?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: So, it would be speculative on my side to pronounce on what the future will bring with regard to the European Russian relations. Fact is that there has been a decoupling taking place, or trade has been reduced quite considerably. And Russia, in response, has increased domestic production, import substitution, and reoriented trade relations, in particular to China and India.  So that has taken place.  When we are looking at the Russian economy, what we are seeing is a quite sharp slowdown this year from last year’s growth, and that shows the strain the war is imposing on the Russian economy.  Importantly, what we see is if this isolation of Russia is going to continue, it will impact, of course, on the transfer of technology.  And we are forecasting that potential growth in Russia has fallen significantly to 1.2 percent.  And with such a potential growth rate, it will not converge to Western European living standards.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks. We’re going to go with the first row.  The gentleman in the jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Italy’s growth forecast was cut in half, almost from 0.7 to 0.4.  Was it just on account of trade or for other factors?  And if you have any policy recommendation for the government.  And also, another question on the ECB, you are recommending that they cut 2 percent.  Most economists expect the rate to go down below 2 percent.  Are you suggesting they should stay at that level.

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, maybe I’ll start with the ECB question, and Helge can take the question on the growth performance of Italy. So, what we are seeing is that inflation is coming down as expected. The uncertainty at this stage is at the wage side.  But here we also see a slowdown, and we are expecting wages to converge to projections by the end of this year.  And the bottom line of this is that we expect that the inflation target of 2 percent will be sustainably met in the second half of 2025.  We will see that headline inflation may be a bit below and that reflects the impact of lower energy prices.  We will see that core inflation may stay a bit above 2.  The bottom line on our side is we are looking at a monetary policy stance which will maintain sustainably this inflation rate at 2 percent.  And we are seeing that can be achieved with another 25-basis point cut and then hold at 2 percent.  We don’t see a need for going lower than 2 percent. 

    This, of course, is subject to major shocks affecting the monetary policy stance in the future.  We should not forget.  And we are emphasizing major shocks because the impact on monetary policy on inflation is not going to become evident within the first 18 months.  So, this is a long-term endeavor whenever you are changing the monetary stance.

    MS. PEREZ: Helge. 

    MR. BERGER: Italy.  So, thanks for the question.  The downgrade as in 2025, this year, 2.4 from 0.7, and next year from 0.9 to 0.8, is roughly in line what we have seen in other countries.  So, there are two factors at play.  One is the trade tensions.  They have a direct element, so there’s an exposure to tariffs.  But there’s also trade uncertainty.  And this uncertainty has also left its marks on financial conditions which have tightened.  So, all these factors sort of slow down growth. 

    In ’26, the downgrade is a bit lower because some of these effects are less urgent.  But we also do have some countervailing factors such as the NRP public investment surging as the program comes to an end.  And that’s something we welcome.  The government is making good progress in this area, and we like the public investment and reforms attached to it.  It is also clear that after ’26, when this program is over, there is an opportunity to ramp up domestic structural reforms.  The country has a comprehensive agenda which we encourage it to continue on.  That includes reforms in education and upskilling, includes business environment reforms.  And finally, labor market participation is a perennial issue in Italy, as we heard.  It’s also an issue in other countries, but I think Italy is part of this. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go towards the back of the room.  The lady in the light green jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  I would like to ask about Turkish economy.  In the World Economic Outlook report, unlike most countries, we see a slight upward revision in Türkiye’s growth forecast this year.  And the country’s economic growth is also projected to accelerate next year.  How do you assess the current state of Turkish economy?  Also, how does the IMF view the country’s progress in controlling inflation? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so what we are seeing under growth performance is to some extent a carryover from a very strong momentum in the second half of 2024.  And that led to a growth upgrade, a small one, but compensating.  And that is important for the negative impact of tariffs and uncertainty on the outlook. 

    With regard to the government’s disinflation program that is moving forward.  The economic team is implementing disinflation program.  Our recommendation remains, disinflation should happen faster and that requires a tighter macroeconomic policy mix.  And the linchpin of that needs to be tighter fiscal policy.  And why do we advocate that?  The longer the disinflation effort is dragging out the longer the time of vulnerability and being hit by shocks which we don’t know yet to even think about it.  So, disinflation program accelerate linchpin is tied to fiscal policy. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row.  Thank you. 

    QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon.  Mr. Kammer, you strongly advocate trade agreements between Europe and other countries.  As you well know, France is quite reluctant to sign the Mercosur Agreement.  The whole political spectrum is very reluctant, saying that there are issues on farming and environment.  What would you say to convince France and other maybe reluctant countries to sign this Mercosur Agreement? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, I would say first, it’s not just Mercosur.  Mercosur is one aspect.  There are other trade agreements in place.  And when you’re looking at the success of technology and of trade in terms of lifting up living standards globally, is just immense.  It’s not just putting people out of poverty, it is helping the rich world also grow richer. 

    There’s no question that whenever you have technological changes or when you are getting rid of trade barriers, that some sectors and some industries and the people working there will be negatively affected.  And on that our recommendation has always been and continues to be, and this has to be a continuous focus when you’re looking at the transformation which will be triggered by technological progress and artificial intelligence in particular, to make sure that the people have a social safety net to fall into.  It’s one part. 

    But then also, and that is as important, and that needs to be strengthened, to upskill skills of the labor force so that they find jobs in growing new dynamic sectors.  And that has to be a focus.  If I see one model which works and worked very well in the global economy, it’s the Flexicurity program in Denmark, which allows workers to move to jobs quickly, including getting the reskilling and upskilling.  And I think that needs to be the focus. 

    But it’s very clear we need to take care of those who are displaced and who are losing their jobs.  And we know how to do this, but it needs to be done. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go to the first row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  In the context of European and European market integration, do you see that it’s possible Bulgaria to become next member of the euro area in the next year?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: The answer is definitely yes.  But Helge, you may want to elaborate. 

    MR. BERGER: Thanks for the setup.  So, yes, we’re following this closely, of course.  I think it’s clear that Bulgaria has made major progress towards fulfilling the conditions for the access to the eurozone.  We have seen deficits in line with the EU fiscal framework of 3 percent.  We have seen inflation coming down.  So, the next step is for the European authorities to speak to this, the European Commission, the ECB, will speak to accession and then we expect the process to continue.

    From our end, this would be a welcome step for the country.  EU accession, sorry, euro accession means lower trading costs, more beneficial environment for the FDI flows, and so on.  So, there’s, there are a lot of upsides for the country, but of course it should enter strongly, just as strongly as it has performed in the last few years.  That means sort of taking care of fiscal policy, remain prudent, have an open eye on any financial sector risks that could come, including from accession, and last, not least, sort of work to complete the structural form agenda that the government has.  You know, you want to enter the euro, but you want to enter it on a strong footing. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go online now.  Olena, please unmute yourself.

    QUESTIONER:  Hi, everyone.  I have a question related to Europe.  Although you mentioned that increased defense spending is an upside risk, do you think that trade wars and tariffs can undermine its role for growth on European continent?  And if we compare, how do you evaluate the implementation of your policy recommendations by Europe comparing to the previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Sorry, I didn’t get the last part. 

    QUESTIONER:  How do you evaluate the implementing of policy recommendations in Europe comparing to your previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay, good.  So, clearly tariffs do have an impact and the longer they last, the more pronounced the impact will be, including on the medium-term outlook.  And therefore, our call on talking in terms of de-escalating and negotiating agreements, but also in general the idea of trade matters and more trade is better to look for new opportunities to lower trade barriers. 

    When it comes to our recommendations with regard to Europe, I would say on the macroeconomic front, both on the monetary policy side and also on the fiscal policy side, the right steps were taken, and the right steps are being implemented.  And clearly, on the monetary policy side, they are already showing the results.  Monetary policy, again, showed that it works in order to bring inflation down.  That was doubted at one point in time over the last few years.

    Where we seem to be repeating our policy recommendations is under EU reforms and also under structural reform sides.  And those reform areas are more difficult to tackle.  They are facing political economy considerations and resistance.  And so, clearly what we are happy about is that there is a shared diagnostic and there is a shared understanding of the policy solutions. 

    And I could tell you in our discussion with the European policymakers during these meetings, that is the case.  They all agree on the diagnostics and they all agree also on what needs to be done on the policy solution side.  And what we discussed was, so how to actually do it.  There’s willingness to do it, but it is some of the things are technical.  But there’s a lot of resistance, of course, from certain sectors and in certain countries towards change.  And what one needs to consider is maybe have a bigger approach to that and to start not discussing and negotiating just individual areas of reform where you have perceived winners and losers, but to think about more of a package deal where everybody can see something which is a win situation, and they need to make compromise on other parts. 

    I think on our side, what we are trying to do in messaging, it is very little understood, and it’s not really communicated by policymakers and politicians of the huge value an integrated single market is created for Europe.  You usually hear a point towards net contribution to a very small European budget, which is 1 percent of European GDP.  That is just a rounding mistake in the bigger scheme of things, of what wealth that single market already has created for all of the member countries and what it can create in the future by deepening this market.  And I think that is something where we are trying to help policymakers with, to change that narrative that Europe is a burden.  No.  Europe is a winner for all the 27 countries which are participating in the European Union.  And I think that’s an important message to make. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re running out of time, so we’ll take one or two more questions.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thanks.  I have two questions.  One is, could you a little bit elaborate more on your policy advice?  For example, in Austria we have a big debate about should wage costs go down in order to bring back industry.  But if I’m correct, I hear that you see more potential in kind of a stronger integration in Europe. 

    And my second question is, I was just at the Peterson Institute where they said basically that this 10 percent appreciation of the euro versus the dollar is more or less equivalent to the 20 percent additional tax.  So what was your assumption on the exchange rate of the dollar and the euro?  And is there a danger that this might lead to more trouble if the dollar keeps getting weaker?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: Mm-hmm.  Oya, do you want to take this question? 

    MS. CELASUN: Sure.  On the Austrian side, basically what we have, we’ve recently concluded a consultation with Austria and the reforms that we found to be the most important ones were to lift female and elderly labor force participation because Austria, like others, is aging rapidly.  And for that, childcare and elder care availability and access are very important.  Also, Austria is yet another country where we would see a strong push, we would like to see a strong push for European integration.  Especially the regulatory growth financing environment for startups need to be bolstered and that those require, in our view, reforms at the European level. 

    On the second side, I don’t think I caught everything. 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay.  So, on the euro, first of all, we shouldn’t translate swings and volatility into long-term trends.  We need to be careful about that.  But, of course, the exchange rate will have an impact on Europe, including on the inflation outlook, if persistent.  But what I would point towards is, there is a narrative out there that Europe is not competitive.  And that narrative is actually wrong.  Europe is competitive.  Europe has a current account surplus versus the rest of the world.  What we are arguing is that Europe has a gap in its productivity and in particular a gap in labor productivity.  And it is that to focus on in order to actually create more income.  And that’s the important stuff. 

    Now, how to deal with changes in the external environment.  The key message to Europe for that is external shocks are going to persist.  Transformations will have to take place because technology is moving, energy security needs to be established.  The green transition is a key policy priority for Europe.  And for that we need a more dynamic business sector.  And we don’t have that in Europe.  When you’re looking at startups in particular, it’s not that Europe doesn’t have the capacity to innovate, it does.  Does Europe have the startups?  Europe has the startups.  But we don’t have the environment for these startups to flourish.  They don’t need bank loans, bank loans need collateral.  And many of the startups are in the intellectual sphere in terms of what they’re providing.  And so, what you need for that is risk capital, equity and venture capital for those startups to move forward.  Many will die, but there will be winners, and they need to scale up.  And for that you need to have this risk capital.  And what happens right now is they’re going to the U.S. for that.  And that’s one part of the business dynamism which is actually taken away from Europe because companies cannot scale up.  We have these internal barriers. 

    And companies cannot scale up because we have the financial barriers.  And the financial barriers are, in Europe, we don’t have deep capital markets which can provide debt risk capital to these young startups.  We have an abundance of small and medium-sized enterprises in Europe and when you’re looking at comparison to the U.S. these small and medium term and medium sized enterprises, they are old, and their productivity is not that high.  But the young spectrum is missing.  And when we have successes, then you need to for these success stories to have the market to operate in and scale up.  We don’t yet.  And you need the capital for those companies to grow to scale.  And again, many of these companies who reach that state, they list at the New York Stock Exchange because European capital markets are too small. 

    So, if I point towards a big issue in order to address many of the problems we are seeing in the future, it must be a more dynamic business sector, including more exit of firms which are not viable. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you so much.  I’m afraid we’re going to have to leave it here, but please do come to us bilaterally for the questions we couldn’t take.  I would like to thank our speakers and thank you here, joining us, and colleagues joining us online with this.  We can wrap it up.  Have a good day everyone. 

    MR. KAMMER: Thank you. 

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-eur-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Press Briefing Transcript: European Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

     MR. HELGE BERGER, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MS. OYA CELASUN, Deputy Director, European Department, IMF

     MR. ALFRED KAMMER, Director, European Department, IMF

    MODERATOR: 

    MS. CAMILA PEREZ, Senior Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    P R O C E E D I N G S

    (10:00 a.m.)

    MS. PEREZ: Hi everyone.  Thank you so much for joining today’s press conference on the European Economic Outlook.  I’m Camila Perez.  I’m a Communications Officer with the IMF.  We’re pleased to be joined today by Alfred Kammer, sitting next to me, Director of the European Department here at the IMF.  Also, with us we’ve got Oya Celasun and Helge Berger, both Deputy Directors of the Department. 

    We’ll begin as usual with some opening remarks from Alfred, and then we’ll take your questions.  I see some colleagues joining online, so we will also go to your questions online.  Alfred, over to you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Welcome to this press conference on Europe. I have posted my opening remarks and also circulated.  You should have them.  So, I will just make a few points for emphasis. 

    First of all, in terms of the outlook, we have had a meaningful downgrade for Europe that reflects the impact of tariffs, partially compensated by an increase in infrastructure spending and defense spending, in particular from Germany.  But the biggest impact is coming from uncertainty and tighter financial conditions.  The impact is different for the Euro area versus CESEE (Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe).  CESEE is more affected as it has a larger manufacturing sector and is more exposed to tariffs. 

    Second point to make is when we are looking at the medium term, we see rather weak growth, and that has not changed from our previous outlook.  And that is a clear result of a large productivity gap Europe has to the global economy.  And that is something which clearly needs to be fixed.  We were talking about internal barriers; we are talking about financial barriers which need to be overcome.  So that’s part of the medium-term growth story, and that is something for the policy part. 

    On the policy recommendations, first, our recommendation is more trade is better and therefore we are very encouraged that the European Union is continuing to move forward on trade agreements.  Those who have been — which have been negotiated, they should be brought to a conclusion. 

    The second policy advice is on the monetary side.  In the Euro area, we had success in the disinflation effort.  We are forecasting now that we hit the target in the second half of 2025.  What does that mean for ECB monetary policy?  One more cut in the summer of 25 basis points and then keep the rate on hold at 2 percent until — unless major shocks ask for a recalibration of that monetary stance.  A bit different in CESEE, where inflation is more persistent and still higher, and there needs to be taken more caution in terms of the easing part.

    On fiscal consolidation, fiscal consolidation should continue.  Europe needs to build up buffers for the next shock.  But also, Europe needs to build fiscal space for long-term spending pressures, which we have on aging, health care, the energy transition, and of course, now an accelerated need is on defense spending. 

    Final point, focus needs to be on structural reforms.  In Europe, we have been making suggestions on reforms which could be taken at the EU level.  Draghi Letta, we have a shared diagnostic.  We also have an understanding of the policy solutions.  These reforms should be undertaken with urgency.  We selected a number of key reforms which are under discussion.  If we are looking at the benefit of the implementation, it would add 3 percent to the level of GDP in Europe.  So, these reforms need to be pushed forward with urgency. 

    There’s also a need for national structural reforms.  There’s lots of benefit to those.  Priority in Europe actually is on the labor market side, including on upskilling and reskilling of workers.  We put together, country by country, a set of priority reform areas.  If countries actually close the gap to the best-performing countries, best-practice countries in these areas by only 50 percent, it would give a boost to the level of GDP by 5 percent for advanced European countries, by 6 to 7 percent for CESEE countries and for the Western Balkan countries, the number is 9 percent increase in GDP.  So, the reform areas are discussed, the reform areas are agreed.  What now needs to happen is the political will, and that is not easy to overcome vested interests, but it needs to be done because this is to secure the future of Europe.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks so much, Alfred. We can now start with your questions.  We will go to the room.  Please raise your hand when called, identify yourself, name, and outlet.  We’re going to get started with the lady sitting here.  Thank you.  First row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  So, in recent weeks financial market has shown increasing pressure on U.S. Treasury while demand on the European debt appears to be rising.  Do you believe this shift represents a sustainable trend?  And more broadly, do you think that what some have termed European exceptionalism could eventually supplant the American exceptionalism in the global economic and financial order?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: First, to move to European exceptionalism. It’s still a long and hard road away, and it starts with utilizing the single market in order to create the productivity gains necessary actually to create markets to scale and to create financing to scale so that we get a dynamic business sector going.  And that is a must, which needs to be done in order to increase growth, and also, given all of the spending needs coming to secure the European welfare state. 

    On your other question, we should not overinterpret the shifts which have taken place on the portfolio side over the last few weeks.  When markets are adjusting, you would expect rebalancing to take place.  At this stage, way too early to say whether there has been a structural shift. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you, Alfred. We’re going to go now to the gentleman in the fourth row with the blue jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Mr. Kammer, Germany has been very praised here during the Spring Meetings for its new fiscal stimulus package.  But in Germany we have a little bit of different discussion.  A lot of economists criticize the lack of structural reforms in Germany.  Do you have already a first assessment of how the fiscal stimulus package could boost the weak German potential growth?  And do you think that the expenditures are in line with the EU fiscal rules, or must the EU fiscal rules be reformed again so that Germany just can spend the money in the end?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: On your first question, yes, we do. And I hand over to Oya. 

    MS. CELASUN: Thank you very much. So, you’re asking how the fiscal stimulus will impact the German economy and how it fits in with the broader structural reform agenda.  So, it will bring some — blow some energy into the economy after several years of weak growth.  We don’t expect the ramp-up in expenditures to be very quick.  We expect the peak effect in 2026.  Basically in ’25, it will bring some partial offset to the increased drags we are seeing from the trade side from global uncertainty, weak consumer and business confidence.  But as we move into 2026 and 2027, it will be a dominant factor offsetting the expected ongoing drag from trade tensions.  So, it will certainly lift aggregate demand. 

    And the part on infrastructure spending is very welcome.  For years we’ve pointed to deficient public infrastructure as a factor holding back growth in Germany.  So not only will it help growth in the near-term through aggregate demand, but it should have, if fully spent, it should have an effect on lifting potential growth in the long-term as well.  It is one of the important areas we see for lifting potential growth as Germany moves into a period with weak growth in its workforce — in fact, a sharp contraction in the coming five years.  So that’s very welcome.  But there are other important areas.  One of them is cutting red tape, actually important for lifting public infrastructure spending as well.  It’s important for Germany to be a leader in pushing European integration and also deal with its shrinking labor force by helping women work full-time.  Thanks. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks, Oya. We’re —

    QUESTIONER: [off mic]

    MS. CELASUN: So maybe the important thing to mention is that Germany has fiscal space, it has low debt, it has low deficits, it has low borrowing costs. So that’s very important.  We, our own forecasts suggest that Germany, once you exclude defense spending of about 1.5 percent of GDP relative to 2021, will keep its deficits below 3 percent.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go now to the center. Gentlemen on the second row.  Thank. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  In the updated World Economic Outlook, the IMF downgraded its projection for Ukraine up to 2 percent this year compared with the November forecast, which was 2.5-3.5 percent.  Could you please elaborate on the aspects that have affected the current forecast?  What share of this is due to the global and regional slowdown, domestic factors, war, or external support?  And secondly, may I ask you to comment on the issue of debt restructuring for Ukraine?  Do you have communication with the Ukrainian government on this, and how do you evaluate the risks for Ukraine if they couldn’t reach a deal on this issue?  Thank you.

    MS. PEREZ: Let me see if there’s any other questions on Ukraine. The lady in the third row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: I also want to ask you about the crisis and there are — have many — many different cases, many countries have had their debt written off.  And do you recommend the creditors write off part of Ukraine’s debt, and is this option being considered now?  Thank you.

    MR. KAMMER: So, let me start with a question on growth first. What we are seeing is lower growth momentum carrying forward from 2024.  That is a reflection of the bombing of the energy infrastructure and that is hampering the economy.  It’s also reflecting a very tight labor market and it’s reflecting continued uncertainty of the length of the war and how the war will evolve and affect the economy.  And that is clearly weighing on growth in 2025. 

    I should say, of course, and emphasize again that the Ukraine economic team, Minister of Finance, Central Bank Governor are doing an extraordinary job to maintain macro stability under these conditions and also to prepare the economy for a post-war reconstruction period.  And important for that is the need to work on the medium-term national revenue strategy because Ukraine will need revenue in order to provide all of the necessary service of a modern state and their support the reconstruction.  So, I think that’s very important.  But praise again for the economic team to operate and attain macro stability in this difficult situation. 

    On the debt part, what we are seeing is that there is a credible process underway with private creditors that is proceeding, and that is an important element of the Fund program.  So that in the end, under the Fund program, we are going to see that sustainability in Ukraine emerging. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go to this side of the room.  The lady in the second row.  Thank you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, good morning.  A question on the UK.  There’s a lot of speculation in the UK about a potential trade deal with the U.S.  Will it make any difference to growth?  And our finance minister was on the radio this morning saying our trading relationship with Europe was arguably even more important because they’re nearer to us.  Do you agree with that?

    MR. KAMMER: Helge?

    MR. BERGER: We agree with everybody who concludes that more trade is better than less trade. We understand that trade has been sort of in the past and will be in the future, I’m sure, an engine for growth and productivity improvements. So, in that spirit, sort of any trade agreements that the UK will be concluding with any country going forward that will improve sort of the trading relationships that they already have are very welcome.  And we would generally encourage all countries to follow this path. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you. We’re going to go.  The gentleman in the second row. 

    QUESTIONER: Hi. I was just wondering, during the meetings this week, there seem to be differing opinions among European leaders about the prospects of a trade deal with the United States.  The French saying they think perhaps a deal might be some way off.  The Germans expressing more optimism.  I just wondered from your vantage point how important you think it is that a deal be done for growth for the European Union and for Europe more broadly.  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so clearly our message is more trade is better. Trade tensions are bad for growth.  And so, we are encouraging to have constructive negotiations.  And the U.S. is a large trading partner of the European Union, so we are hoping that there will be successful negotiations taking place.  And in our discussions with European leaders, I don’t sense any difference of views with regard to the importance of that relationship and that an effort needs to be made to de-escalate and to negotiate a deal. 

    MS. PEREZ: We’re going to go online now. Go ahead please.  You can unmute yourself. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you so much.  Trade between Russia and Europe has shrunk dramatically due to sanctions and counter-sanctions.  How does the IMF characterize the current state of Russia-Europe trade flows?  Are we essentially seeing a permanent decoupling of the Russian economy from its European trading partners, or are there still significant economic interactions that could influence the outlook?  Moreover, what does the IMF foresee for the future of these trade relations?  Is any normalization expected within the forecast horizon, taking into account U.S. tariffs, or will they remain at minimal levels?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: So, it would be speculative on my side to pronounce on what the future will bring with regard to the European Russian relations. Fact is that there has been a decoupling taking place, or trade has been reduced quite considerably. And Russia, in response, has increased domestic production, import substitution, and reoriented trade relations, in particular to China and India.  So that has taken place.  When we are looking at the Russian economy, what we are seeing is a quite sharp slowdown this year from last year’s growth, and that shows the strain the war is imposing on the Russian economy.  Importantly, what we see is if this isolation of Russia is going to continue, it will impact, of course, on the transfer of technology.  And we are forecasting that potential growth in Russia has fallen significantly to 1.2 percent.  And with such a potential growth rate, it will not converge to Western European living standards.  Thank you. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thanks. We’re going to go with the first row.  The gentleman in the jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Italy’s growth forecast was cut in half, almost from 0.7 to 0.4.  Was it just on account of trade or for other factors?  And if you have any policy recommendation for the government.  And also, another question on the ECB, you are recommending that they cut 2 percent.  Most economists expect the rate to go down below 2 percent.  Are you suggesting they should stay at that level.

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, maybe I’ll start with the ECB question, and Helge can take the question on the growth performance of Italy. So, what we are seeing is that inflation is coming down as expected. The uncertainty at this stage is at the wage side.  But here we also see a slowdown, and we are expecting wages to converge to projections by the end of this year.  And the bottom line of this is that we expect that the inflation target of 2 percent will be sustainably met in the second half of 2025.  We will see that headline inflation may be a bit below and that reflects the impact of lower energy prices.  We will see that core inflation may stay a bit above 2.  The bottom line on our side is we are looking at a monetary policy stance which will maintain sustainably this inflation rate at 2 percent.  And we are seeing that can be achieved with another 25-basis point cut and then hold at 2 percent.  We don’t see a need for going lower than 2 percent. 

    This, of course, is subject to major shocks affecting the monetary policy stance in the future.  We should not forget.  And we are emphasizing major shocks because the impact on monetary policy on inflation is not going to become evident within the first 18 months.  So, this is a long-term endeavor whenever you are changing the monetary stance.

    MS. PEREZ: Helge. 

    MR. BERGER: Italy.  So, thanks for the question.  The downgrade as in 2025, this year, 2.4 from 0.7, and next year from 0.9 to 0.8, is roughly in line what we have seen in other countries.  So, there are two factors at play.  One is the trade tensions.  They have a direct element, so there’s an exposure to tariffs.  But there’s also trade uncertainty.  And this uncertainty has also left its marks on financial conditions which have tightened.  So, all these factors sort of slow down growth. 

    In ’26, the downgrade is a bit lower because some of these effects are less urgent.  But we also do have some countervailing factors such as the NRP public investment surging as the program comes to an end.  And that’s something we welcome.  The government is making good progress in this area, and we like the public investment and reforms attached to it.  It is also clear that after ’26, when this program is over, there is an opportunity to ramp up domestic structural reforms.  The country has a comprehensive agenda which we encourage it to continue on.  That includes reforms in education and upskilling, includes business environment reforms.  And finally, labor market participation is a perennial issue in Italy, as we heard.  It’s also an issue in other countries, but I think Italy is part of this. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go towards the back of the room.  The lady in the light green jacket, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  I would like to ask about Turkish economy.  In the World Economic Outlook report, unlike most countries, we see a slight upward revision in Türkiye’s growth forecast this year.  And the country’s economic growth is also projected to accelerate next year.  How do you assess the current state of Turkish economy?  Also, how does the IMF view the country’s progress in controlling inflation? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, so what we are seeing under growth performance is to some extent a carryover from a very strong momentum in the second half of 2024.  And that led to a growth upgrade, a small one, but compensating.  And that is important for the negative impact of tariffs and uncertainty on the outlook. 

    With regard to the government’s disinflation program that is moving forward.  The economic team is implementing disinflation program.  Our recommendation remains, disinflation should happen faster and that requires a tighter macroeconomic policy mix.  And the linchpin of that needs to be tighter fiscal policy.  And why do we advocate that?  The longer the disinflation effort is dragging out the longer the time of vulnerability and being hit by shocks which we don’t know yet to even think about it.  So, disinflation program accelerate linchpin is tied to fiscal policy. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row.  Thank you. 

    QUESTIONER:  Good afternoon.  Mr. Kammer, you strongly advocate trade agreements between Europe and other countries.  As you well know, France is quite reluctant to sign the Mercosur Agreement.  The whole political spectrum is very reluctant, saying that there are issues on farming and environment.  What would you say to convince France and other maybe reluctant countries to sign this Mercosur Agreement? 

    MR. KAMMER: Yeah, I would say first, it’s not just Mercosur.  Mercosur is one aspect.  There are other trade agreements in place.  And when you’re looking at the success of technology and of trade in terms of lifting up living standards globally, is just immense.  It’s not just putting people out of poverty, it is helping the rich world also grow richer. 

    There’s no question that whenever you have technological changes or when you are getting rid of trade barriers, that some sectors and some industries and the people working there will be negatively affected.  And on that our recommendation has always been and continues to be, and this has to be a continuous focus when you’re looking at the transformation which will be triggered by technological progress and artificial intelligence in particular, to make sure that the people have a social safety net to fall into.  It’s one part. 

    But then also, and that is as important, and that needs to be strengthened, to upskill skills of the labor force so that they find jobs in growing new dynamic sectors.  And that has to be a focus.  If I see one model which works and worked very well in the global economy, it’s the Flexicurity program in Denmark, which allows workers to move to jobs quickly, including getting the reskilling and upskilling.  And I think that needs to be the focus. 

    But it’s very clear we need to take care of those who are displaced and who are losing their jobs.  And we know how to do this, but it needs to be done. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go to the first row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  In the context of European and European market integration, do you see that it’s possible Bulgaria to become next member of the euro area in the next year?  Thank you. 

    MR. KAMMER: The answer is definitely yes.  But Helge, you may want to elaborate. 

    MR. BERGER: Thanks for the setup.  So, yes, we’re following this closely, of course.  I think it’s clear that Bulgaria has made major progress towards fulfilling the conditions for the access to the eurozone.  We have seen deficits in line with the EU fiscal framework of 3 percent.  We have seen inflation coming down.  So, the next step is for the European authorities to speak to this, the European Commission, the ECB, will speak to accession and then we expect the process to continue.

    From our end, this would be a welcome step for the country.  EU accession, sorry, euro accession means lower trading costs, more beneficial environment for the FDI flows, and so on.  So, there’s, there are a lot of upsides for the country, but of course it should enter strongly, just as strongly as it has performed in the last few years.  That means sort of taking care of fiscal policy, remain prudent, have an open eye on any financial sector risks that could come, including from accession, and last, not least, sort of work to complete the structural form agenda that the government has.  You know, you want to enter the euro, but you want to enter it on a strong footing. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re going to go online now.  Olena, please unmute yourself.

    QUESTIONER:  Hi, everyone.  I have a question related to Europe.  Although you mentioned that increased defense spending is an upside risk, do you think that trade wars and tariffs can undermine its role for growth on European continent?  And if we compare, how do you evaluate the implementation of your policy recommendations by Europe comparing to the previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Sorry, I didn’t get the last part. 

    QUESTIONER:  How do you evaluate the implementing of policy recommendations in Europe comparing to your previous outlook? 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay, good.  So, clearly tariffs do have an impact and the longer they last, the more pronounced the impact will be, including on the medium-term outlook.  And therefore, our call on talking in terms of de-escalating and negotiating agreements, but also in general the idea of trade matters and more trade is better to look for new opportunities to lower trade barriers. 

    When it comes to our recommendations with regard to Europe, I would say on the macroeconomic front, both on the monetary policy side and also on the fiscal policy side, the right steps were taken, and the right steps are being implemented.  And clearly, on the monetary policy side, they are already showing the results.  Monetary policy, again, showed that it works in order to bring inflation down.  That was doubted at one point in time over the last few years.

    Where we seem to be repeating our policy recommendations is under EU reforms and also under structural reform sides.  And those reform areas are more difficult to tackle.  They are facing political economy considerations and resistance.  And so, clearly what we are happy about is that there is a shared diagnostic and there is a shared understanding of the policy solutions. 

    And I could tell you in our discussion with the European policymakers during these meetings, that is the case.  They all agree on the diagnostics and they all agree also on what needs to be done on the policy solution side.  And what we discussed was, so how to actually do it.  There’s willingness to do it, but it is some of the things are technical.  But there’s a lot of resistance, of course, from certain sectors and in certain countries towards change.  And what one needs to consider is maybe have a bigger approach to that and to start not discussing and negotiating just individual areas of reform where you have perceived winners and losers, but to think about more of a package deal where everybody can see something which is a win situation, and they need to make compromise on other parts. 

    I think on our side, what we are trying to do in messaging, it is very little understood, and it’s not really communicated by policymakers and politicians of the huge value an integrated single market is created for Europe.  You usually hear a point towards net contribution to a very small European budget, which is 1 percent of European GDP.  That is just a rounding mistake in the bigger scheme of things, of what wealth that single market already has created for all of the member countries and what it can create in the future by deepening this market.  And I think that is something where we are trying to help policymakers with, to change that narrative that Europe is a burden.  No.  Europe is a winner for all the 27 countries which are participating in the European Union.  And I think that’s an important message to make. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you.  We’re running out of time, so we’ll take one or two more questions.  We’re going to go with the gentleman on the fifth row, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Thanks.  I have two questions.  One is, could you a little bit elaborate more on your policy advice?  For example, in Austria we have a big debate about should wage costs go down in order to bring back industry.  But if I’m correct, I hear that you see more potential in kind of a stronger integration in Europe. 

    And my second question is, I was just at the Peterson Institute where they said basically that this 10 percent appreciation of the euro versus the dollar is more or less equivalent to the 20 percent additional tax.  So what was your assumption on the exchange rate of the dollar and the euro?  And is there a danger that this might lead to more trouble if the dollar keeps getting weaker?  Thanks.

    MR. KAMMER: Mm-hmm.  Oya, do you want to take this question? 

    MS. CELASUN: Sure.  On the Austrian side, basically what we have, we’ve recently concluded a consultation with Austria and the reforms that we found to be the most important ones were to lift female and elderly labor force participation because Austria, like others, is aging rapidly.  And for that, childcare and elder care availability and access are very important.  Also, Austria is yet another country where we would see a strong push, we would like to see a strong push for European integration.  Especially the regulatory growth financing environment for startups need to be bolstered and that those require, in our view, reforms at the European level. 

    On the second side, I don’t think I caught everything. 

    MR. KAMMER: Okay.  So, on the euro, first of all, we shouldn’t translate swings and volatility into long-term trends.  We need to be careful about that.  But, of course, the exchange rate will have an impact on Europe, including on the inflation outlook, if persistent.  But what I would point towards is, there is a narrative out there that Europe is not competitive.  And that narrative is actually wrong.  Europe is competitive.  Europe has a current account surplus versus the rest of the world.  What we are arguing is that Europe has a gap in its productivity and in particular a gap in labor productivity.  And it is that to focus on in order to actually create more income.  And that’s the important stuff. 

    Now, how to deal with changes in the external environment.  The key message to Europe for that is external shocks are going to persist.  Transformations will have to take place because technology is moving, energy security needs to be established.  The green transition is a key policy priority for Europe.  And for that we need a more dynamic business sector.  And we don’t have that in Europe.  When you’re looking at startups in particular, it’s not that Europe doesn’t have the capacity to innovate, it does.  Does Europe have the startups?  Europe has the startups.  But we don’t have the environment for these startups to flourish.  They don’t need bank loans, bank loans need collateral.  And many of the startups are in the intellectual sphere in terms of what they’re providing.  And so, what you need for that is risk capital, equity and venture capital for those startups to move forward.  Many will die, but there will be winners, and they need to scale up.  And for that you need to have this risk capital.  And what happens right now is they’re going to the U.S. for that.  And that’s one part of the business dynamism which is actually taken away from Europe because companies cannot scale up.  We have these internal barriers. 

    And companies cannot scale up because we have the financial barriers.  And the financial barriers are, in Europe, we don’t have deep capital markets which can provide debt risk capital to these young startups.  We have an abundance of small and medium-sized enterprises in Europe and when you’re looking at comparison to the U.S. these small and medium term and medium sized enterprises, they are old, and their productivity is not that high.  But the young spectrum is missing.  And when we have successes, then you need to for these success stories to have the market to operate in and scale up.  We don’t yet.  And you need the capital for those companies to grow to scale.  And again, many of these companies who reach that state, they list at the New York Stock Exchange because European capital markets are too small. 

    So, if I point towards a big issue in order to address many of the problems we are seeing in the future, it must be a more dynamic business sector, including more exit of firms which are not viable. 

    MS. PEREZ: Thank you so much.  I’m afraid we’re going to have to leave it here, but please do come to us bilaterally for the questions we couldn’t take.  I would like to thank our speakers and thank you here, joining us, and colleagues joining us online with this.  We can wrap it up.  Have a good day everyone. 

    MR. KAMMER: Thank you. 

    *  *  *  *  *

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Camila Perez

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Panel established to review EU duties on battery electric vehicles from China

    Source: World Trade Organization

    DS630: European Union — Definitive Countervailing Duties on New Battery Electric Vehicles from China

    China submitted its second request for the establishment of a dispute panel with respect to the definitive countervailing duties imposed by the European Union on new battery electric vehicles from China. The request also concerns the underlying investigation that led to the imposition of the duties. The EU had said it was not ready to accept China’s first request for the panel at a DSB meeting on 24 March .

    China said it considers the EU measures inconsistent with various WTO provisions. It added that it was open to constructive discussions and remains committed to resolving the dispute within WTO rules.

    The EU said it strongly maintains that its measures are entirely justified. The EU said it is confident it will succeed in this dispute

    The DSB agreed to the establishment of the panel. 

    Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, India, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Norway, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the United States reserved their third-party rights to participate in the proceedings.

    DS597: United States — Origin Marking Requirement (Hong Kong, China)

    The United States again raised the matter of the panel ruling in DS597, which was circulated on 21 December 2022 and which the US appealed on 26 January 2023. The US said it was raising the matter again as a result of further developments in Hong Kong, China regarding free speech and human rights. The US referred to its previous statements regarding its position on essential security and its reasons for placing this item on the DSB agenda.

    Hong Kong, China said it was disappointed that the United States continues to raise the matter at DSB meetings. It said the panel ruling in DS597 provided an impartial assessment and the interpretation of WTO agreements cannot be unilaterally rewritten by WTO members.

    China reiterated its concern over the item being placed again on the DSB agenda. It said the security exception under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994 is not entirely self-judging, as found by the panel in DS597 and six previous panels.

    DS588: India — Tariff Treatment on Certain Goods in the Information and Communications Technology Sector

    India and Chinese Taipei said they sought to continue engagement with each other for a resolution of this dispute. They again requested additional time for the DSB to consider for adoption the panel report circulated on 17 April 2023 in the case initiated by Chinese Taipei regarding India’s tariffs on certain high-tech goods.

    The parties asked that the DSB further delay consideration of the panel report until 24 October 2025. The DSB had agreed to six previous requests from India and Chinese Taipei to delay consideration of the reports.

    The DSB agreed to the latest requests from Chinese Taipei and India.

    Appellate Body appointments

    Colombia, speaking on behalf of 130 members, introduced for the 86th time the group’s proposal to start the selection processes for filling vacancies on the Appellate Body. The extensive number of members submitting the proposal reflects a common interest in the functioning of the Appellate Body and, more generally, in the functioning of the WTO’s dispute settlement system, Colombia said.

    The United States said it does not support the proposed decision and noted its longstanding concerns with WTO dispute settlement that have persisted across US administrations. The US said the panel report in DS597 provided examples of its concerns regarding WTO dispute settlement overreach. The US reiterated that fundamental reform of WTO dispute settlement is needed and that it will reflect on the extent to which it is possible to achieve such a reformed WTO dispute settlement system.

    More than 20 members took the floor to comment, one speaking on behalf of a group of members. Several members urged others to consider joining the Multi-party interim appeal arrangement (MPIA), a contingent measure to safeguard the right to appeal in the absence of a functioning Appellate Body. 

    Colombia, on behalf of the 130 members, said it regretted that for the 86th occasion members have not been able to launch the selection processes. Ongoing conversations about reform of the dispute settlement system should not prevent the Appellate Body from continuing to operate fully, and members shall comply with their obligation under the Dispute Settlement Understanding to fill the vacancies as they arise, Colombia said for the group.

    Surveillance of implementation

    The United States presented status reports with regard to DS184, “US — Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan”,  DS160, “United States — Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act”, DS464, “United States — Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Large Residential Washers from Korea”, and DS471, “United States — Certain Methodologies and their Application to Anti-Dumping Proceedings Involving China.”

    The European Union presented a status report with regard to DS291, “EC — Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products.”

    Indonesia presented its status reports in DS477 and DS478, “Indonesia — Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products.” 

    Next meeting

    The next regular DSB meeting will take place on 23 May 2025.

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: African Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    PARTICIPANTS:

    Speaker: ABEBE AEMRO SELASSIE, Director, African Department, IMF

    Moderator: KWABENA AKUAMOAH-BOATENG, Communications Officer, IMF

    *  *  *  *  *

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Good morning, good afternoon, and good evening to all of you here in the room and those joining us online. My name is Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng.  I am with the Communications Department of the IMF, and

    I will be your moderator for today. 

    Welcome to today’s press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa. I am pleased to introduce Abebe Aemro Selassie, Director of the IMF’s African Department.  Abebe will share key insights from our new report titled Recovery Interrupted. 

    But before I turn to Abebe, a reminder that we have simultaneous interpretation in French and Portuguese, both online and in the room.  And the materials for this press briefing, the report, are all available online at IMF.org/Africa. Abebe, the floor is yours.

    MR. SELASSIE: Good morning and good afternoon to colleagues joining us from the region and beyond. Thank you for being here today for the release of our April Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa.

    Six months ago, I highlighted our region’s sluggish growth, and the steep political and social hurdles governments had to overcome to push through essential reforms.  Today, that fragile recovery faces a new test: the surge of global policy uncertainty so profound it is reshaping the region’s growth trajectory.

    Just when policy efforts began to bear fruit, with regional growth exceeding expectations in 2024, the region’s hard-won recovery has been overtaken by a sudden realignment of global priorities, casting a shadow over the outlook.  We now expect growth in Sub-Saharan Africa to ease to 3.8 percent in 2025 and 4.2 percent in 2026, marked down from our October projections, and these have been driven largely by difficult external conditions: weaker demand abroad, softer commodity prices, and tighter financial markets.

    Any further increase in trade tensions or tightening of financial conditions in advanced economies could further dampen regional confidence, raise borrowing costs further, and delay investment.  Meanwhile, official development assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is likely to decline further, placing extra strain on the most vulnerable population.

    These external headwinds come on top of longer-standing vulnerabilities. High debt levels constrain the ability of many countries to finance essential services and development priorities.  While inflationary pressures have moderated at the regional level, quite a few countries are still grappling with elevated inflation, necessitating a tighter monetary stance and careful fiscal policy.

    Against this challenging backdrop, our report underscores the importance of calibrating policies to balance growth, social development, and macroeconomic stability.  Building robust fiscal and external buffers is more important than ever, underpinned by credibility and consistency in policymaking.

    In particular, there is a premium on policies to strengthen resilience: mobilize domestic revenue, improve spending efficiency, and strengthen public finance management and fiscal framework and fiscal frameworks to lower borrowing costs.  Reforms that enhance growth, improve the business climate, and foster regional trade integration are also needed to lay the groundwork for private sector-led growth.  High growth is imperative to engender the millions of jobs our region needs. 

    A strong, stable, and prosperous Sub-Saharan Africa is important for its people but also the world.  It is the region that will be the main source of labor and incremental investment and consumption demand in the decades to come.  External support as the region goes through its demographic transition is of tremendous strategic importance for the future of our planet. 

    The Fund is doing its part to help, having dispersed over $65 billion since 2020 and more than $8 billion just over the last year.  Our policy advice and capacity development efforts support more countries still. 

    Thank you and I’m happy to answer your questions. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Thank you, Abebe. Before we turn to you for your questions, a couple of ground rules, please. If you want to ask a question, raise your hand, and we’ll come to you.  Identify yourself and your organization and please limit it to one question.  For those online, you can use the chat function, or you can also raise your hand, and then we’ll come to you.  I will start from my right. 

    QUESTIONER: Good morning.  Thank you for taking my question.  You mentioned several things in your report.  The recovery that is going on the continent as well as some of the challenges that the continent is facing and the dividends that the continent currently has in its youth.  Leaders on the continent are working — I was at an event yesterday where they are looking at ways to raise funds to develop projects.  So, what is your recommendation for projects?  We’re seeing a need for projects like this as well as revenue mobilization on the continent.  So, is your recommendation to leaders on the continent on how to source these funds that are needed, given that some of the advanced economies are cutting back? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, any related questions before we go to Abebe?

    QUESTIONER: Abebe, you just made the point that the recovery has been hit by these uncertainties.  Beyond just policy direction, is there any scope to do anything in terms of, for example, maybe you dispense some money though, but maybe a little more to expect — to countries that are coming off defaults and what have you to help in this recovery, even at such a time?  This is also aided by, beyond the fact that some are coming, they have no buffers whatsoever.  And then, coming from defaults, things become very difficult for some of these countries to even have the money to do this.  Could there be any extra funding, even if on a regional level, to back the policy prescriptions that you have proposed? 

    MR. SELASSIE: I think there’s two different points here. The first one is more of a broader meta point, whether financing is the only constraint that is hindering more investment, more robust economic activity, and job creation. Of course, financing plays a role, but it is not the only constraint. It depends on country-to-country circumstances, what sectors we are talking about.  But it really is important to recognize that there are many other things that can be done to engender higher growth to facilitate more investment. 

    One of the issues that we have seen in our region over the years is that a lot of growth has –in many countries– been driven by public spending and public investment for many years.  That, of course, has made a major contribution.  It has facilitated all the investment that we have seen in infrastructure, building schools, building clinics.  So, that has a role to play. But I would say that going forward it will be as important to see if we can find ways in which the private sector is the main engine of growth. So, there are reforms that can be done to facilitate this growth. 

    The second one I am sensing from both your questions is about the circumstance right now where a combination of cuts in aid [and] tighter financing conditions are causing dislocation [and difficulties for governments. We have been, more than anybody else, stressing just what a difficult environment our governments have been facing.  We have been talking about the brutal funding squeeze that countries are under.  It has ebbed a little bit and flowed, you know, like the external market conditions, for example. There have been periods when they have been opened and some of our market access countries have been able to borrow, and then other periods where they have been closed, and we are going through one right now.  And this is on top of the cuts in aid that we have seen and tighter domestic financing conditions.  

    When this more cyclical point is playing out, I think it’s important for countries to be a bit more measured in how they are seeking to tackle their development needs.  So, maybe it means a bit more relying on domestic revenue mobilization, expenditure prioritization when conditions are particularly difficult as they are now, and, as I said earlier, going back to see what can be done to find ways to engender growth over the medium-term.  But it is a difficult period, as we note in our report, and one that is causing quite a bit of dislocation to our countries. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will come to the middle. The lady in the front.

    QUESTIONER: My first question is around recovery, of course, your reports are called “interrupted”.  So, with recovery slipping, growth downgraded, debt pressures mountain, is Sub-Saharan Africa at risk of another lost decade?  Because in your report you mentioned that the last four years have been quite turbulent for Africa, and we are trying to get back on track.  What is IMF’s message on bold actions that leaders must take now to avoid being left behind in the global economy and to avoid Africa being in a permanent state of vulnerability?  Because we always hear that we are in a permanent state of vulnerability.  Then for Nigeria, macros are under threat right now.  How can the government — what are your suggestions on how the government can actually push through deep reforms that deliver tangible growth for its people?  Of course, for your report, you did mention the millions and millions of people that you know live below $2.15 a day. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Any more Nigeria questions? I will take the gentleman right here.

    QUESTIONER: In your report you said that debt has stabilized.  And when you look at Nigeria’s debt profile, what insights can you share as to where the borrowings are going to?  Are you seeing more of long-term loans or short-term loans?  So that’s one.  So, what — recently the World Bank expressed concerns about the performance of Nigeria’s statistical body, saying that the institution is performing Sub optimally.  Do you share that sentiment?  Thank you very much. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: I will take one more on Nigeria. The gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTIONER: I [would] like to know in specific terms, Nigeria has already undertaken several reforms, especially removed oil subsidies and floated the naira.  What more specific things do you expect of Nigeria in terms of reform?

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thank you. Abebe?

    MR. SELASSIE: So, in terms of the reforms that have been going on in Nigeria and the particularities of the challenge, the first thing to note is that we have been really impressed by how much reforms have been undertaken in recent years. Most notably, trying to go to the heart of the cause of the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria, which are related to the fact that, oil subsidies were taking up a very large share of the limited tax revenues that the government have and not necessarily being used in the most effective way to help the most vulnerable people. The issues related to the imbalances on the external side with the exchange rate extremely out of line. 

    So it’s been really good to see the government taking these on, head-on, address those, and also beginning to roll out the third component of the reforms that we have been advocating for and of course, the government has been pursuing, which is to expand social protection, to target generalized subsidies to help the most vulnerable.  This has all been very good to see, but more can be done, particularly on the latter front, expanding social protection and enhancing a lot more transparency in the oil sector so that the removal of subsidies does translate into flow of revenue into the government budget.  So, there is still a bit more work to do in these areas. 

    We just had a mission in Nigeria where there was extensive discussions on these and other issues on the macroeconomic area, but also other areas where there is a need to do reforms to engender more private sector investment and also how more resources can be devoted to help Nigeria generate the revenues it so desperately needs to build more schools, more universities, and, of course, more infrastructure.  So, there is a comprehensive set of reforms that Nigeria can pursue that would help engender more growth and help diversify the economy away from reliance on oil.  And this diversification is, of course, all the more important given what we are seeing happening to commodity prices.  So, I think this is an important agenda. 

    Second, as the government is doing this, of course there will be a financing need.  And here what is needed is really a judicious and agile way of dealing with the financing challenges the country faces.  In the long run, the financing gap can only be filled by permanent sources such as revenue mobilization.  But in the interim, carefully looking at all the options the country must borrow in a contained way will be part of that solution.  And I think the government has been going about this prudently and cautiously so far, and we are encouraged by that. 

    And lastly, on data issues in Nigeria we really applaud the effort the government’s making to try and revise and upgrade data quality in Nigeria.  This task is not an easy one in our countries, given the extent of informality there is, given the extent of relative price changes that play out in our economies.  So doing this cautiously is what is needed methodically.  And that is exactly what we see happening.  We welcome, though, the efforts the government is making because without good data, it is difficult to make good policies.  So, we really applaud the effort the government is making to try and upgrade data quality. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take a round of questions online.

    QUESTIONER: There are bills in the UK Parliament and the New York State Assembly that aim to force holdout private creditors to accept debt treatments on comparable terms to other creditors and to limit or stop such litigation.  Are these bills needed, do you think, or is the current international debt architecture sufficient?  So, you know, IMF, DSAs, creditor groups, the common framework, where applicable. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead with your question.

    QUESTIONER: Earlier this month, the IMF reached a staff-level agreement with Burkina Faso to complete the Third Review of the country’s program.  So as part of the review, the IMF allowed a greater fiscal flexibility, allowing Burkina Faso to raise its public deficit target to 4 percent, up from the 2 percent cap set by the West African Economic Monetary Union.  So, given that the country’s challenges, such as persistent insecurity, high social demands, are common across the region, wouldn’t it be wiser to consider applying this flexibility more broadly to the West African Economic Monetary Union?  And my second question will be about the downward revision of the growth forecast for 2025 and 2026 in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Does the IMF view this new crisis – I am talking about the global uncertainty and the recent U.S. tariff measures.  Does the IMF view this crisis as potentially more severe and with broader consequences for the region than previous shocks such as COVID and the war in Ukraine? 

    MR. SELASSIE: On the first question on debt workouts and the challenges there, I am not fully informed about the specifics of the bills that Rachel, you are talking about, indeed, we have seen from time to time some private creditor groups holding out, trying to hold out, but I am not sure that a bill is what’s needed, but rather, force of argument to try and bring people to the table. And in recent restructurings, at least I am not aware of this being the main hindrance in advancing discussions.  There have been many other factors, including just the complexity of the current creditor landscape, that have played a role. 

    On Burkina Faso, flexibility under the program or the deficit targets for the WAEMU countries more generally, just it is important to distinguish between particular years’ fiscal deficit targets that the government wants to pursue and we, incorporate in the program and just the more medium-term criteria, convergence criteria that there is for the WAEMU countries. 

    So, the 3 percent target criteria are for the medium- to long-term.  And it has been very clear that when there are shocks or when there are pressing social development needs, countries do have the scope to deviate from that.  In fact, often the constraint on the Sahel countries has been not having enough, sufficient, enough financing to be able to meet these to advance development objectives.  The other constraint of course is that overall, the more you exceed this 3 percent target and add to the overall debt burden, the more you are going to have – you are likely to build up debt vulnerabilities. 

    So, in the work that we do with countries, whether it is Burkina Faso or other WAEMU countries or indeed beyond, what we try and help with is of course to help countries strike this balance between addressing the immediate and pressing needs that they have while avoiding medium-term debt sustainability problems.  I think one is just thinking about how to strike this balance.  And then second, we put resources on the table very cheaply to help countries, avoid, at least in the near term, more difficult financing difficulties.  So, for Burkina and others, it is just about striking this balance.

    And on growth, whether this latest shock is as bad for the region as the previous ones. I think it is really important also to point out that as difficult, I mean the last four or five years have been incredibly difficult time for our countries, a lot of challenges, a lot of dislocation, but there is also been quite a lot of resilience, and I think that is important to stress.  I would note that, even now, it is this year, 11 out of the 20 fastest growing economies in the world are from Sub-Saharan Africa.  So, there are quite a lot of countries that are going to be sustaining significant growth in the region.  So, we should also not lose sight of this resilience. 

    Second, and more broadly, the buildup of uncertainties I think is very negative.  And this is interrupting what we are seeing in terms of a recovery.  But growth is not, we are not projecting growth to collapse.  And our hope is that as things calm down, the region can resume its growth trajectory also.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We will take three more questions online, then we will come back to the room.

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to know about Senegal, in terms of whether funds would be repaid after the misreporting of data and if the IMF has learned anything from that?  And also, just if you can, the status of the IMF’s programs and even operations in Sudan and South Sudan? 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Please go ahead.

    QUESTIONER: The IMF is urging countries to focus on domestic revenue mobilization.  But you may have seen that South Africa’s Finance Minister has withdrawn the VAT increase that he had proposed in the budget, in the face of opposition from coalition partners.  Does the IMF see any alternative sources of revenue that are feasible for the South African government as the parties hoped?  And are there any lessons here for other countries trying to mobilize domestic revenue?                                                         

    QUESTIONER: Building on the question that Hilary has asked that the REO does make the case for domestic revenue mobilization, and you made that argument, I believe, in the last two Regional Economic Outlook reports as well.  But poverty is still endemic.  Incomes, as far as I can tell, have not really recovered to pre-pandemic levels.  So other than broadcast to tax exemptions what else can be done to raise tax-to-GDP ratios?  One last question on this.  Has there been any progress that has been made in the Sovereign Debt Roundtable in deciding how debt from Afreximbank, and Trade and Development Bank should be treated, at least under the common framework for countries like Ghana and Zambia?  Now, do they qualify to not have their debt restructured in the same way that the IMF, the World Bank’s credit lines?

    MR. SELASSIE: On Senegal, I was recently in Dakar for discussions building on work that our team has been doing. What we are waiting for is the government to finalize the work that’s ongoing.  Right now, the audits are going on and reconciliation work is going on. 

    On the extent of domestic and external debt.  We have been very clear in welcoming the transparency and really robust and collegial way in which the government has been engaging on the issues that have arisen in the misreporting case and we look forward to the numbers stabilizing, and engaging in discussions on the next steps in terms of bringing the, the findings to our Executive Board and next steps in our engagement with Senegal. 

    On South Sudan, it has just been a difficult period of course for South Sudan.  They have been hosting hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing from the conflict in the north.  The conflict has also interrupted, disrupted heavily their main source of tax revenue, oil exports through the pipeline.  So, it’s been a really wrenching period.  Over the last three, four years we have provided, you know, we have been trying to provide South Sudan with emergency financing and trying to find a way in which we can engage with a more structured longer-term program.  We remain hopeful that we are going to be able to do that.  But first and foremost, I think we need to see what can be done to make sure that the policy making environment is as robust and as strong as it is, and as transparent, so we can come in, step in and support South Sudan.

    On revenue mobilization, I want to just first link this to the point I made earlier that what we have observed and again there is a risk of generalizing, but what we’ve observed over the last 10, 15 years in the region is that governments have made a very significant effort to invest in really important infrastructure needs in building schools, in building health clinics and much else.  And you see very positive outcomes.  Look at the electricity coverage in our region, look at the human development indicators and how much they have moved over the years in the region. 

    But we have also seen that despite a lot of investment, for example, in electricity generation capacity and electricity coverage in our countries, many roads are being built.  The returns of all this investment have not been captured in the tax revenue, which is one of the points, the pressure points where debt levels have gone up and the interest-to-revenue ratio.  So, the interest payment-to-revenue ratio has also been rising.  And this has been one of the key points of vulnerability in many economies and why a few countries have gotten into debt difficulty and needed to restructure. 

    So going forward, I think it’s very clear that to be able to continue investing; to be able to continue expanding economies and the government doing its core function, it has to find more ways other than borrowing to address this. 

    Now, in the past, governments have been quick to cut spending, and that has, we found, again and again, to be very detrimental to development progress and growth outcomes.  I think this, again, at the risk of generalizing, was the approach that was generally pursued in the 1980s and found to be very problematic, very challenging, very depressing to growth.  So, we would very much love for countries to avoid this. When there are pressing spending needs, there’s generally only a couple of ways that you can finance this.  Spending cuts or revenue mobilization.  You can borrow, of course, but as I said, borrowing is not optimal. 

    Now, this doesn’t mean revenue mobilization is easy.  Far, far from it. It requires not only political engagement, but also a lot of communication, a lot of effort to show that the resources the government is trying to generate are going to be going to the right areas to help strengthen the social contract.  So, it’s a deep and engaged process, and we are very, very cognizant of that.  But I do think that this is the most optimal way, the most economically sensible way in which our countries can help address the tremendous development needs that we have.

    Now, specifically on South Africa, ultimately when issues like this arise, these are deeply domestic political issues to be resolved as to what the best way to do the financing is.  So, if a tax rate increase for a particular tax is not possible, then maybe finding ways to expand the tax base, maybe trying different tax angles or if all of those are not possible, then revisiting spending priorities may be one of the ways that countries must handle this.  And this is typically what we see playing out in countries in the region when financing constraints are binding. 

    So, whether it is in Kenya, South Africa, or other countries the issue of revenue mobilization is a live one, but one that is extremely complex.  We are very cognizant of that.  And one that requires quite a lot of consensus building, quite a lot of discussion to be able to advance, and of course, broader societal support.  And we absolutely see countries engaging in this and do what we can to help bring lessons from other countries where we are asked to.

    Then there was a question about the GSDR.  So, this Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable, this is the initiative launched by the Fund and the Bank to try and bring creditors and debtors together around the table to find ways in which debt work[outs] can be easier because you are discussing general principles rather than country-specific debt restructuring issues. And we have seen this making quite a lot of progress. Perhaps the most recent development has been the preparation of a debt work[out] playbook that is a very helpful document that has been put out building on the experience of recent work[outs].  What has worked particularly well.  What kind of information sharing ahead of debt work[outs] have been helpful in terms of accelerating debt processes.  Debt restructurings are one of the most contentious and challenging issues that there are between states, between creditors and debtors, and it requires quite a lot of discussion, and it is not such an easy thing to do, including what the parameter of debt should be.  I think one of the questions that was raised is about the debt parameter.  This is fundamentally an issue for the debtor countries and creditors to resolve, and intra-creditor disputes also have to be done. 

    So, in terms of the principles that generally we see creditors apply when these kinds of disputes arise about what the right parameter should be or not and who gets preferential treatment. I think there’s generally been two rules of thumb. One is that the terms in which new financing is being provided or the financing is provided, whether it’s commercial or concessional has been a factor that most creditors look at in terms of whether a particular credit should be included in the parameter or not, and then also the extent to which new financing is being made available.  So, what differentiates senior creditors like the IMF, the World Bank, of course, is that for most countries we operate providing concessional financing very long-term.  And we are the ones that come in and provide financing consistently through crisis and otherwise. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have time for one more round of questions. I will start with the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: The U.S. is your largest shareholder, and we are seeing mixed messages this week from the Treasury Secretary mentioning that he remains committed to the Fund but also calling on you to hold countries accountable to program performance, empower staff to walk away if reform commitment is lacking. 

    So, I wanted to ask you, should we expect the IMF spigot to start closing in response to U.S. pressure?  Or if not, are you changing your approach to countries, what you are telling them and how to deal with their issues?  Are you being a little more stringent in your requirements? 

    You have talked about Senegal, maybe Ghana, Ethiopia, related to that issue of the U.S stepping in.  The CEMAC negotiations this week, we saw American energy companies working with the CEMAC on repatriation of funds dedicated to the rehabilitation of oil sites.  I’m wondering if you have a stance on that, what the IMF position is?  I understand the U.S is trying to get the IMF involved in that.

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: All right, thanks. Gentleman. 

    QUESTIONER: Kenyan authorities here have indicated the need to present a credible fiscal framework as they try and unlock a new program for Kenya.  Would you offer more color into the discussions this week, noting again that the same credibility questions led to the cancellation or the termination of the program at its final review?  

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: We have a question online “what is the IMF’s view on Kenya’s debt position?”

    MR. SELASSIE: So, on the first question, I would like to refer you to Kristalina who gave comprehensive responses to the Secretary’s IMFC Statement. What I want to add though is that in the region, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of programs, the calibration of reforms, incorporation of reforms, I would say that we are always in terms of each program has its particularities and what we always try and do in these programs is make sure that we’re striking a balance of helping countries address the long term challenges and also the cyclical challenges that are often the ones that cause them to come to us.  And I would say that I don’t think there are many countries that think that the adjustment efforts that they’re being asked to make are easy ones.

    On CEMAC.  Just to be very clear there is this dispute that is going on between member states, the BEAC, and oil companies with respect to what are called restitution funds.  The funds under contracts that countries have with oil companies are meant to be available to help restore the sites where oil is extracted back to their pre-extraction standards. 

    What has been a bit frustrating is that we are not privy to the contents of these documents. We have been calling on members and the companies involved to be transparent about this, to publish these documents.  They are after all documents that are about how countries natural resource wealth are used.  And we’ve been on record going seven, eight, nine years pushing for production sharing agreements, the terms of these things to be published so that each side can hold the other accountable.  I think that is the first thing that could be done to bring more transparency and light and understanding to the rest of the world about what is going on in these discussions. 

    Second, we have also made it clear to both parties that given that we do not have full information, it is difficult for us to know what to say.  But in general, any encumbrances in terms of how we look at foreign exchange reserves and these standards are published, any encumbrances like the type that we think there may be in the document, i.e., that is the expectation that these resources will be used for specific purposes means they’re not general use reserves.  So, they would not be classified as part of reserves. 

    On Kenya, we have had a very strong engagement with Kenya over the years and will continue to have such engagement going forward.  As we have noted, government has asked for a follow-on program to try and address the remaining challenges in Kenya, and we are discussing how to do that including in the context of these meetings. 

    It has been good to hear and see that the economy has been performing quite well in some parts.  Particularly the external adjustment front seems to have been proceeding well.  The current account has been narrowing.  So, there are quite a lot of strengths.  But also of course there remain fiscal challenges which were a significant part of the last program’s objectives that need to be advanced.  So, we are going to engage with the government and do everything that we can to be able to help it go forward. 

    MR. AKUAMOAH-BOATENG: Unfortunately, that is all the time we have. So, if you have any questions that we didn’t get to, please send them to me or to Media at IMF.org and we will try and get back to you as soon as possible.  So, also to mention that the report is now available at IMF.org/Africa.  The Spring Meetings continue.  Later this morning, we have the press briefing for the European Department and later in the afternoon we have the IMFC, and the Western Hemisphere Department press briefings. 

    On behalf of Abebe and the African and Communications Departments, thank you all for coming to this press briefing and see you next time. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Kwabena Akuamoah-Boateng

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-african-department-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: IMFC, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    Speaker:

    Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director, IMF

    Mohammed Aljadaan, IMFC Chair, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

     

    Moderator:

    Julie Kozack, Director, Communications Department, IMF

     

     

    Ms.  Kozack: I am delighted to have with me the Chair of the IMFC, His Excellency Mohammed Aljadaan. He is also the Minister of Finance of Saudi Arabia. And of course, our Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva.

    Minister Aljadaan and the Managing Director will first share some takeaways with you and then when that is concludes we will turn to you for your questions.  Your Excellency, the floor is yours.

    Minister. Aljadaan: Thank you, Julie. Thank you, Kristalina. And thanks to all of you for being here. At the outset, let me highlight an important development that took place the first time in these meetings, which is the IMFC welcoming its 25th member, the third chair of Africa. Obviously, this is an important milestone that strengthens the voice and representation of the African continent in a global economic dialogue. I would like to thank all members who made this possible.  

    On the IMF agenda, going forward, the Fund must continue to focus on its core mandate, including supporting international monetary cooperation, encouraging the expansion of trade and economic growth, and discouraging policies that would harm prosperity.

    In recent days, the IMFC members welcomed steps to further strengthen the effectiveness of the IMF’s three core functions, its surveillance of global economic trends, its lending where we welcome the review of program design conditionality, and its capacity development assistance, which helps ensure growth in so many member countries and within countries.

    Addressing global debt vulnerabilities remains a priority for our members, especially for low‑income and vulnerable countries. They welcome the progress made in debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework. They also express their commitment to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systemic manner.

    Members encouraged the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the three‑pillar approach to address debt service pressures. We appreciate the tremendous efforts of the members in shaping the medium‑term direction of the IMF and contributing to the Diriyah Declaration.

    The Diriyah Declaration represents a forward‑looking approach to strengthening the IMFC process and advancing governance reforms and has received full support from the members. Just to clarify, when I say the Diriyah Declaration, this is the Declaration that was prepared by the Deputies in their meetings in Saudi Arabia earlier this month in preparation for this meeting.

    Here we aim to ensure that the Fund remains well‑equipped to meet future challenges in line with its core mandate. Before I hand it over to Kristalina, I have to comment on the topic of the day, which I think a lot of people are talking about, trade tension. Many members have told me how the trade situation has created significant uncertainty. Indeed, the buzz word was uncertainty all over this week, and indeed it also carries with it market volatility, presenting real risks to the global growth and financial stability. But as Kristalina said recently, these threat conflicts have been like forgetting a pot boiling on a stove. Well, now that pot is boiling over. In other words, we should not be surprised that there are trade tensions. And this situation is an opportunity for us all to have constructive conversations about how we will move forward together. This is a challenging time, but I have always been optimist and absolutely make no apologies for that. I will explain to you why. History tells us that the bigger the challenge, the more it requires us to come together to convene and to have an honest conversation. That is exactly what happened this week. That is exactly the power of the IMF to actually be able to convene everybody around the same table in closed rooms and discuss issues in a constructive way.

    I have told colleagues, I arrived in Washington a week ago with a lot of noise in my ears from reading the news and following social media. I have told them, everyone that I met in the early days, please keep your thoughts cool, and we will see where we are going to end. Actually, today we are ending in a lot better position than when we started the week. People understand the consequences and are working together in a constructive manner to resolve tensions.  

    I am also confident that because of the IMF, the IMF is really watching us very closely, following the global situation and is really providing advice to its members in real‑time, offering an assessment of the potential impacts and the best way to proceed.  

    This week we have seen an incredible assurance confirming the position of the IMF and its convening power and contributing to positive development, including in relation to Syria. Gathering together to talk about Syria and building on our meetings in AIUla has given us a new sense of urgency and purpose, to turn a conflict‑affected state, which is Syria, into a stable and economically successful one, benefiting the region and the world. It is not just about the money. It is about the work that the IMF and other partners can deliver on capacity development, quality data, and timely advice.

    Again, I would like to thank Kristalina and the IMF staff. And I can tell you, it was an incredible, unanimous position today to thank the IMF for their incredible, incredible brain cells power, which was able really to produce a very comprehensive report about what is happening in the world in a very short period of time, and it was fantastic. Thank you, Kristalina. Thanks to all the IMF staff and thank you again for being here. The floor is yours.

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, Minister Aljadaan, for your kind words now, but above all for your exemplary leadership of the IMFC. I want to tell everybody here that the way you chaired the meetings brought the members together to speak openly, frankly and as a result to find a path to common understanding that is so necessary in the current environment because, as we all know, our meetings take place against a challenging backdrop. You have seen our World Economic Outlook. It shows that the global economy is facing a significant slowdown and also that risks are on the downside.

    Understandably Ministers and Governors are concerned, but at the same time they have also exhibited a remarkably constructive spirit in these meetings, coming together, showing willingness to take on the challenges facing the global economy. Minister Aljadaan laid out the substance and achievements of our discussions. Let me add just three points. First, Ministers and Governors agreed on the importance of reducing uncertainty and working together to clarify policies.

    Second, importantly, they recognized that they need to seize the moment to put their own houses in order. And I saw very firm resolve to tackle difficult and, in many cases, delayed reforms at home, to strengthen resilience, to remove impediments to productivity and lift up their medium and long‑term growth prospects, and to address underlying domestic imbalances which drive external imbalances. To put it simply, addressing external imbalances starts at home.

    Finally, we discussed how the IMF can help countries successfully navigate this period of change and build resilience. I was very heartened to hear from the membership strong support for our work to promote macroeconomic and financial stability and to do it through robust bilateral, multilateral and regional surveillance, be there for our members when they need to cope with balance of payments problems, finance—finance them, but also finance them with the clear objective that they can strengthen their economies. I can say the words of support for our capacity development, in other words, helping countries have strong institutions, strong policies. That support was overwhelming.

    At this period of complex challenges for the membership, they also gave us homework. I want to emphasize two areas where we will further deepen our work. One, do more work on external imbalances, dig deeper, when they could become a source of concern and provide advise how to address them through policies. Two, continue to scan the financial sector to identify potential sources of instability, especially in the non‑bank sector, and provide advice on how best to enhance resilience.

    Overall, what I can tell you is that what I heard this week was an incredible determination by our members to steer economies through this period of change and uncertainty. And it gave me confidence that we actually can take challenge and make opportunity, that we can have a more resilient, more balanced world economy.

    Like Minister Aljadaan, I started the week more anxious of our capacity as a global community to come together, and I finished the week with more confidence that this is exactly what we will do.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you very much, Minister, Managing Director. We will now open the floor to your questions, so please raise your hand if you have a question and please identify yourself and your outlet. I will start here in the middle. I am going to go to the gentleman in the kind of White shirt. Yes, right here.

    Question: Thank you, Julie. Question for Minister Aljadaan and Managing Director Georgieva. You both pointed out that we ended a week in a way better position than when we started it. Managing Director, during your Curtain Raiser Speech, you also raised the hope that this week might be an opportunity for everybody to discuss. How do you feel like? Could you elaborate perhaps on how this week dialing down the uncertainty that you talked about and the global tensions when it comes to trade? Thank you very much.

    Managing Director: Finding a path to solutions starts from looking at the problem from a—seeing the problem with the same eye view. Let me start this again. To resolve a problem, you have different parties. To resolve a problem, they need to have information about the problem that allows them to have a meaningful conversation. I can say that I am very, very grateful to the staff of the IMF because what we did was to offer the members information that allows them to see what is ahead of them and expand their horizon. If you look at a problem only from a narrow point of view, it is difficult to have a meaningful conversation to resolve it.

    Secondly, what I saw was a genuine openness to present views in a candid way and to listen to each other.

    Third, and the third is the most important, it is a traction and engagement among members that could then bring a better—faster and better outcome. I do not want to sugarcoat. We still have quite a challenging time. It is challenging not just because of the tariffs and the uncertainty. It is also challenging that there are other transformational forces in play. Because of the overwhelming attention to tariffs, we stopped talking about other things, like artificial intelligence, demographics transition, and I think that that sense that we can have an engagement in a comprehensive way on a complex set of challenges, that came during the meetings quite strongly. Does it mean that everybody agrees with everybody else? No. But do we have an open conversation, engaged conversation with the fair space for everybody to present their views? Yes.

    Minister Aljadaan: Thank you. If I may, Julie, I think just to complement the Managing Director’s views, I think overall what do you need to resolve conflicts like this or tensions like this? A, you need to make sure that you understand the parties’ positions, where they are coming from, why they are taking these positions, and what are they seeking to achieve. Second, make sure that they actually talk. And that is largely what happened this week. So to have everybody who is party to all this trade tensions, which is almost everybody, all the members, around the same table in a candid discussion that is closed even—some of it has been in the restricted sessions—to really be open and talk about what are they doing, why they are doing it, what is their view of what is going to happen in the next even short period of time is very assuring. Sharing that information is very assuring. Understanding the implications of these actions on other nations, including low‑income countries, emerging economies and implications of that is actually very helpful for them to appreciate the consequences of their positions.

    I can tell you without—I cannot disclose some of the discussion that has taken place, but I can tell you there was a very clear, frank discussion, including a projection of a timeline for a resolution of some of these issues. So that is very assuring.

    Managing Director: Can I just add one point, that when people are in the same room, the abstract policies become more human because then we understand these policies are affecting people, and the whole world—the people of the whole world are then present, and that makes the conversation different. No longer it is an academic conversation. It is a very real-life conversation.

    Ms. Kozack: Thank you. I will go to this side. I will go to the second row, gentleman with the blue jacket and the glasses.

    Question: Thank you so much for taking my question. I am from Bangkok. Your Excellency, you have mentioned uncertainty around the world in your opening remarks. So, I want to ask specifically on the consequences for the emerging markets as a whole, and what is your policy advice for the situation and also do you see any short‑term lasting impacts to these countries? Thank you.

    Minister Aljadaan: I will give it a time and then you can complement. First of all, I look forward to our renewal meeting in Thailand next year and seeing the preparations from now, I think a lot of people are excited and waiting for our meetings there. I am sure it will be very constructive in the hospitable country of Thailand and the Kingdom of Thailand.

    Obviously emerging economies, particularly emerging economies with limited fiscal space have little room to maneuver to deal with shocks. And even if these shocks have been resolved, there is some lasting impact. The earlier, the faster that these shocks or trade tensions in this context is resolved, the better for everybody. But we are not in a perfect world and things may take time and countries may get an impact, and that is where the IMF excels. That is where is IMF capacity building, advice comes into actual real play. So, the Managing Director is here and her staff with an incredible talent will be able to actually provide that support to emerging economies.

    Managing Director: As a group, emerging markets by and large are generally highly open. They rely on—many of them rely on exports as an engine for growth. They are quite active in international bond markets, so because they are highly exposed, the impact on emerging markets is quite significant. Some of the emerging markets, especially those that were in a tougher position after the multiple shocks, also face very limited and some of them non‑existing policy space to act.

    We have downgraded growth projections for emerging markets and developing economies to 3.7 percent for 2025. This is a 0.6 percent downgrade. And to 3.9 percent for 2026. What does that mean? It means that some of them would see a significant slowdown in their convergence to higher‑income countries. And they are also seeking ways to overcome the challenges ahead. What works for them is emerging markets have been fantastic in building resilience to shocks. And when I look at the universe of emerging market economies, quite a number of countries have become more agile in their policymaking, are more mature in how they approach their fiscal and monetary policy. That puts them in a better position.

    To use an analogy, it is like they have gone through multiple periods of being tested and they got immune to shocks to a certain degree. They would be seeing possibly somewhat less inflationary pressure. Why? Because when you are on the receiving end of tariffs, what it means is that actually domestically you do not have pressure on prices. We can expect emerging markets to look at their policy tools very carefully. We urge them, be very careful with fiscal measures. Do not rush to provide fiscal support willy‑nilly because you cannot afford to lose fiscal space. Have a medium long‑term framework to rebuild this fiscal space. On the monetary policy side, watch pressures. We are saying inflation is likely to slow down but watch it and watch inflation expectations. Do what is necessary, given the data you have. And very important, allow the exchange rate to be a shock absorber.

    We have the integrated policy framework that offers advice to countries how to approach exchange rate issues with great care. You are an emerging market. Actually, the Minister is not saying that, but one thing emerging markets can do for themselves is, get your own house in order. Pursue reforms relentlessly because this is what makes you stronger.

    Ms. Kozack: We have time for just one last question. So, I am going to go second row, the gentleman in the blue suit.

    Question: Thank you, Ms. Kozack. Mr. Aljadaan, Managing Director Georgieva. I am from Lebanon. My question is addressed to both of you. How will the IMF support Syria and what role will it play in Syria’s reconstruction. Thank you.

    Ms. Kristalina Georgieva: Minister Aljadaan in the opening recognized that Syria has returned to the international community. We had a meeting with Syrian representatives in AIUla during an emerging market conference. We had a meeting on fragile and conflict‑affected states. And at that time, we made the first step to create a coordinating group so different institutions that can support Syria can start working together. We held a meeting here in Washington during the Spring Meetings. It was co‑chaired by Minister Aljadaan, President Banga and myself, with the Finance Minister and the Central Bank Governor of Syria. In this meeting we discussed how we can start rebuilding institutions and policy capacity in Syria and how different institutions can play on their comparative advantage to help. For the Fund specifically, what it means is, of course, cautiously but engage to first define data, what is available, how we can rebuild credible data capability.  

    Second, central bank capacity. How can we rebuild the functioning of Syria’s central bank.

    Third, tax policy and how can the country rebuild capacity to create revenues for its functions.

    We have appointed a Mission Chief for Syria. We have not had Article IV Consultations with Syria for a long, long time. We hope that we can contribute in putting the foundation of knowledge, economic policy knowledge in Syria to get the country back on track. 

    I mean, just imagine, they have been in a Civil War for 14 years. A big part of the population is not in Syria. They are in Lebanon. They are in Iraq. They are in Jordan. The fabric of the Syrian society is deeply wounded. It is going to take a lot of work by the Syrians themselves to rebuild it. This is when international organizations can play a constructive role. Lebanon, you are not asking about Lebanon.

    Question: I heard the meetings went quite well by the end, especially since the Lebanese Parliament voted about the banking sequencing. That is more in line with international standards, so what are you—

    Managing Director: You are not asking because you know. That is very good.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to have the last word?

     

    Minister Aljadaan: I have a few things. First of all, I really thank the IMF and the World Bank in stepping up their support to Syria and other states who are emerging from fragility. Syria in particular is a case where we have an opportunity. We have a government that is willing, and we have regional partners who are also providing support and willing really to provide whatever it takes to make sure that we bring back Syria, support its people and make sure that we also move cautiously through that process, recognizing that obviously there are sanctions that we need to deal with and other impediments. But even with that, I think standing with them, providing capacity support and advice and some regional and bilateral, even financial support is very crucial. The Syrian people deserve that support. And that does not stop at Syria. We are talking about Syria as an example, we have Yemen, we have Palestine, we have Sudan, we have other countries that really need the support, including Lebanon. They need to know that the international community, if they put their act together, the international community will stand by them, so we will continue that.

    Ms. Kozack: We are almost five minutes over our time.

    Managing Director: Ask your question short, and we will try to answer.

    Ms. Kozack: And have a very brief answer.

    Managing Director: It is my fault. I am the one that is professorial.

     

    Question: My question is to the MD concerning the global uncertainty on trade tensions shaping sub‑Saharan Africa’s debt risk, servicing costs as well as our fiscal future and its coordination with creditors such as you, so how are Africa also in all of these conversations? Thank you.

     

    Managing Director: As Minister Aljadaan said, Africa was more present this time because we now have three sub‑Saharan African representatives in the IMFC. But beyond that, very much on our minds, quite a number of the Governors of the Fund spoke about the importance to pay attention to countries that are particularly severely affected by this turbulence because they have a high level of debt and that suppresses their ability to cope.

    By the way, countries with high level of debt are not just in sub‑Saharan Africa. We have them all over the world.

    What has been done during these meetings is threefold. First, very strong emphasis on the three‑pillar approach of the IMF and the World Bank for countries that experience liquidity constraints. They are not yet facing debt sustainability problems, but they are on the way to there. And for these countries to concentrate support for domestic resource mobilization, concentrate attention to how to mobilize more international financing and very important, concentrate on how the private sector can play a bigger role in the economy.   

    Second, for countries where debt is not sustainable, how to make debt restructuring faster and more effective. We have issued this week a playbook for debt restructuring that was the outcome of the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable. What it shows are the steps that need to be taken.

    As you recall under the Common Framework, there was some confusion around how exactly to go about it, what is the timeline, what is the exact sequencing of steps. This is now being clarified. If we follow the playbook, we play by the book, we get debt restructuring in less than 12 months. And the third thing, very important for the Fund, is that our members have put in place a way to expand our capacity to finance low‑income countries through the Poverty Reduction Growth Trust so the Fund can step up financing for countries, so they do not need to—they do not need to go through a super painful adjustment because of this burden of debt. We can ease their path. But, again, we want to see countries act decisively on reforms so they—you do not borrow your way out of debt. You grow your way out of debt. So, when countries have that growth potential enhanced, then they can also reduce debt vulnerability. It was not very short. My apologies.

    Ms. Kozack: Minister, would you like to add?          

    Minister Aljadaan: I am fine. I think the Managing Director did a great job in answering.

    Managing Director: Look, you have to forgive me. I was for 14 years a professor. It kicks in.

     

    Minister Aljadaan: We enjoy it, Kristalina

    Managing Director: Thank you very much, everybody.

    Ms. Kozack: This does bring us to an end, so thank you for joining us. And let me just add that the full transcript of the press briefing will be available online on the IMF website. And, of course, should you have further questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to my colleagues at IMF media.org. Thank you.

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/tr-04252025-imfc-press-briefing-transcript

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Inadequate consideration of eastern EU countries’ significance and contribution to European security in EU defence industry initiatives – E-001541/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001541/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Michał Dworczyk (ECR)

    For decades, eastern European countries have been covered by the security umbrella provided by the United States, neglecting their own defence investments and not fulfilling their commitments as allies. Now, with the security situation deteriorating, countries such as Poland – which has been allocating over 2% of its GDP to defence for many years, thereby fulfilling its NATO commitments and responding to threats from Russia – find themselves at the heart of EU defence. However, in the Commission’s latest initiatives on the defence industry and EU security[1], these countries’ committed and long-standing positions have been neither appreciated nor reinforced. Also lacking are any preferential mechanisms and a recognition of the scale of their financial effort and strategic commitment. The need for a geographically even distribution of investments and to support the development of eastern EU countries’ potential has also been overlooked.

    In light of the above:

    • 1.In its initiatives on defence and the defence industry, why has the Commission not provided for any mechanisms to support, give preference to or, at the very least, recognise Member States that have been allocating at least 2% of their GDP towards defence for years and which, in practice, guarantee the security of the whole EU?
    • 2.Will the Commission also consider Member States’ level of defence spending and geostrategic location, particularly for countries on the EU’s eastern flank, in current and future initiatives?

    Submitted: 15.4.2025

    • [1] White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030, ReArm Europe Plan, draft SAFE regulation, draft EDIP regulation.
    Last updated: 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee against Torture Praise Measures to Prevent Torture in Ukraine, Ask about Alleged Torture of Russian Prisoners of War and Reports of Corruption and Torture in Prisons

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee against Torture today concluded its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Ukraine, with Committee Experts praising the State’s legislative and policy measures to prevent torture, and raising questions about alleged torture of Russian prisoners of war, as well as reports of torture and corruption in prisons.

    Claude Heller, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, said Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.  More than three years of war had led to numerous military and civilian deaths and serious violations of international human rights law, including summary executions, torture and ill-treatment, and arbitrary detentions.

    Mr. Heller said that, over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  He welcomed that the national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture, the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention, and the State’s ratification of the Rome Statute in 2024.

    Since February 2022, Mr. Heller said, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities. How many people had been detained illegally?

    Peter Vedel Kessing, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war. Some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption. Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and there was reported overcrowding in prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions?

    Introducing the report, Liudmyla Suhak, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level. The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system introduced a system for combatting torture by law enforcement, while the national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture.

    Ms. Suhak said that the conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  To ensure that prisoners of war were not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, the delegation added, clear legal procedures had been developed.  Military officials were trained on the rights of prisoners of war.

    The delegation said that the State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates.  In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were also introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.

    In closing remarks, Mr. Heller said that the State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population.  The rest of the world was hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    In her concluding remarks, Ms. Suhak said that Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.  Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia, and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    The delegation of Ukraine consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Social Policy; Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision; Prosecutor General’s Office; Security Service; Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Justice; State Migration Service; State Bureau of Investigation; National Police; Ministry of Health; the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office at Geneva; and the European Court of Human Rights.

    The Committee will issue concluding observations on the report of Ukraine at the end of its eighty-second session on 2 May.  Those, and other documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, will be available on the session’s webpage.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, and webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Tuesday, 29 April at 4 p.m. to hear the presentation of reports on follow-up to articles 19 and 22 of the Convention and reprisals.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the seventh periodic report of Ukraine (CAT/C/UKR/7).

    Presentation of Report

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration of Ukraine and head of the delegation, said Ukraine was systematically implementing measures to prevent and combat torture at the national level.  The 2021 strategy for combatting torture in the criminal justice system outlined the development of a national system for combatting torture committed by law enforcement personnel.  The national human rights strategy had been updated to include specific strategic goals for combatting torture and ensuring the right to liberty and security of person. The strategy for the reform of the penitentiary system 2021-2026 aimed to address structural problems and create a humanistic system for the execution of criminal penalties.

    During the reporting period, several amendments were made to criminal legislation.  The Criminal Code had been revised to bring the definition of torture into line with the provisions of the Convention, and to introduce criminal liability for the crime of enforced disappearance. Additionally, legislation was revised to guarantee the right of detainees to be held in proper conditions and to facilitate the consideration of complaints about improper detention conditions.  The criminal penalty system now also included probation supervision. 

    In 2024, amendments were made to the Code of Administrative Offences to distinguish between domestic violence, gender-based violence and sexual harassment, to increase administrative liability for such acts.  Several legislative initiatives were currently under consideration by Parliament, including a draft law on the penitentiary system, as well as other draft laws that would introduce a standard for minimum cell space of four square metres per detainee, the right of convicts to short-term visits outside the colony under certain conditions, and revised procedures for detaining persons.

    New internal regulations for the temporary detention centres of the national police adopted in 2023 stipulated that police officers were not allowed to carry out acts of torture or other forms of inhuman treatment on detainees.  In 2018 and 2019, internal regulations for pre-trial detention centres and penitentiary institutions of the State Penitentiary Service were approved.  These rules were regularly updated.  In 2024, the Security Service’s procedure for holding persons in temporary detention facilities was revised. 

    Ukraine provided unhindered access for both national and international monitoring mechanisms. In 2024, the national preventive mechanism of the Ombudsperson conducted 543 visits to penitentiary institutions, and the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine carried out 44 visits between 2018 and 2024.

    Efforts were being made to develop a child-friendly juvenile justice system.  As a result, over the past five years, there had been a steady reduction in juvenile crime, and over the past seven years, the number of minors registered by probation authorities had dropped three-fold.

    In 2024, a Commissioner for Missing Persons under Special Circumstances was appointed within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a specialised unit for combatting torture and other ill-treatment of persons, staffed with 157 investigators, had been launched within the State Bureau of Investigation.  Within the Office of the Prosecutor General, separate specialised units had been established to combat human rights violations in the law enforcement and penitentiary sectors, as well as to combat crimes committed in the context of the armed conflict.  The Ministry of Justice also had a separate Department of Penitentiary Inspections.

    In 2024, persons responsible for observing the rights of convicts and preventing torture were introduced into the staff of 56 penal institutions.  The State had developed the digital infrastructure of both law enforcement agencies and the penitentiary system, launching registers of convicted persons, persons taken into custody, and missing persons under special circumstances.  An automated exchange of information on detained persons between law enforcement agencies and free legal aid centres was being introduced.  In cases of violence or torture against detainees and convicts, they had the right to free legal representation in court.

    State social programmes aimed at preventing and combatting domestic violence, gender-based violence, and human trafficking were being implemented.  Free secondary legal aid was provided to victims of domestic violence and human trafficking.

    In response to Russia’s armed aggression against Ukraine, Ukrainian law enforcement agencies had initiated investigations into 163,700 war crimes and crimes of aggression on Ukrainian territory.  In 2024, the Criminal Code was amended to ensure criminal prosecution for the most serious international crimes, as well as to bring it into line with the Rome Statute, which entered into force for Ukraine in 2025. 

    In 2022, the procedure for the detention of prisoners of war was approved.  It stipulated that the interrogation of prisoners of war should be carried out in a language they understood, without the use of torture or other coercive measures.  The conditions of detention for Russian prisoners of war complied with international humanitarian law and had been inspected 112 times by the International Committee of the Red Cross between 2018 and 2024.  Conversely, Russian authorities continued to deny access to Ukrainian prisoners of war, as well as civilian detainees, held by Russia in violation of international humanitarian law.

    Ukraine had also been taking measures to support victims and those affected by armed aggression. Since 2022, victims of a number of criminal offences, including torture or cruel treatment, had been entitled to free secondary legal aid.  In 2024, the legal status of victims of sexual violence related to Russia’s armed aggression and the legal basis for providing them with urgent interim reparations were determined at the legislative level.  An international compensation mechanism for damages caused by Russia’s aggression was being developed.  In 2024, 40 categories of claims that could be submitted to the International Register of Damages were approved, including some related to torture, deprivation of liberty, and sexual violence.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed the delegation’s presence, considering that Ukraine had suffered a devastating war since the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation on 24 February 2022, in flagrant violation of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.  After more than three years of war, hundreds of thousands of military personnel on both sides were estimated to have died, with many more wounded, missing in action and in captivity.  From February 2022 to February 2025, there had been more than 12,800 civilian deaths and more than 30,000 injuries in systematic attacks on civilian towns, cities, and infrastructure, while the number of deaths of Russian civilians was expected to have risen to 360.  These were very conservative elements.

    The war had led to serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including summary executions; torture and ill-treatment; arbitrary detentions; forced transfer of people, including minors, to the occupying State; and acts of sexual violence. More than 13 million people required humanitarian assistance, more than two million homes had been destroyed in Ukraine, and there were 10.6 million displaced people in Ukraine.

    Over the past decade, Ukraine had made considerable amendments to legislation and ministries, including with respect to the occupied territories.  The national strategy for human rights had been updated to include strategic goals for combatting torture.  The adoption of the strategy to combat torture and the related plan of action and the appointment of human rights inspectors in places of detention would contribute to preventing torture and facilitating investigations.  It was also welcome that in 2024, a commissioner for disappeared persons was appointed within the police force, and that Ukraine had ratified the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance.

    The Committee was concerned that not all the elements of the Convention had been incorporated in the Criminal Code, which did not establish the State’s responsibility to hold public officials accountable when they committed acts of torture under orders from superiors.  Why was the number of cases of torture that reached court much smaller than the number of investigations carried out?

    The Ombudsperson carried out independent monitoring of constitutional rights and freedoms.  However, the body lacked financial resources and experts on monitoring.  There was a lack of transparency in the selection of its staff, and a lack of balanced regional representation.  The national preventive mechanism had also been criticised for its lack of experts and funding, delays in its investigations, and its lack of cooperation with civil society. There was a low level of implementation of recommendations made by the Ombudsperson; only one-third of the recommendations made in 2023 were addressed.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    State bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rights of detainees appeared to have been ineffective. Victims of torture were allegedly subjected to reprisals by authorities and the Istanbul Protocol was not applied well by the State.  Could the delegation comment on this?

    In 2015, Parliament had adopted a decision to suspend certain obligations stemming from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights and impose martial law until the cessation of the Russian aggression. The Committee was concerned by acts carried out by armed groups in eastern Ukraine from 2014 to 2017. During this period, more than 100 criminal cases were brought against Ukrainian security officials, including related to offences of torture and sexual violence.  Had court proceedings concluded?

    The State party had taken a significant step by ratifying the Rome Statute in 2024.  The implementation law partially harmonised criminal law with the Statute, requiring acts of torture systematically committed against the civilian population to be tried as crimes against humanity.  However, the law did not amend legislation on war crimes to bring it in line with the Statute.  Would the State do this?

    Both Russia and Ukraine had mutually accused each other of acts of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment against civilians.  There were more than 6,000 Ukrainian prisoners under Russian custody, who reportedly lacked access to food and medical support.  There were credible reports that Russian authorities had carried out around 80 executions of Ukrainian forces.  The United Nations Independent Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine had reported widespread torture of civilians in areas under Russian control. Persons arrested in these territories were tried by non-recognised courts and were not granted access to lawyers of their choice.  Information on trials was not provided to families.  Could the State party provide information on the number of such trials carried out?

    Since February 2022, 240 Russian prisoners of war had reported suffering torture during the armed conflict in Ukrainian detention centres.  Could the delegation comment on these accusations?  What measures had been taken in cases where torture had been confirmed, and how was the State party preventing torture?  The Committee was concerned about reports of illegal detentions by Ukrainian authorities.  How many people had been detained illegally?  There had also been allegations of arbitrary detention of civilians suspected of collaborating with Russia after territories were reclaimed.

    The Committee was also concerned about the impact of the conflict on the rule of law.  Several cases of threats and violence against journalists had been reported.  Ukraine introduced a procedure in 2022 to prohibit broadcasts that “could jeopardise the independence and sovereignty of the country”.  Some journalists had been criminalised after working in occupied territories, despite there being no evidence of having committed unlawful acts. Could the delegation comment on this issue?

    More than 2,000 criminal lawsuits had been filed on the glorification of Russian actions.  This had reportedly given rise to 443 guilty verdicts involving non-custodial sentences.  Authorities had imposed security restrictions, including limiting access to information.  A bill before Parliament sought to restrict access to court decisions until the cessation of martial law, and several other bills had sought to limit certain rights for human rights defenders.  There was deep-rooted impunity for crimes against activists.

    There had been an unprecedented increase in gender-based violence in Ukraine.  The number of cases of domestic violence had increased by more than 30 per cent in 2024, with a number of these cases involving men returning from the front. The State was seemingly reluctant to hold members of the armed forces accountable for such crimes.

    A 2017 law amended legislation regarding psychiatric care in response to past violations of patients’ rights. Norms allowing for involuntary sterilisation were eliminated.  However, there were reports of excessive hospitalisation of persons with psychosocial disabilities, including children, and a lack of provision of alternative, community-based care services.  There were allegations of torture and ill-treatment in psychiatric hospitals; could the delegation comment on this?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said that the situation in Ukraine was tragic after three years of war.  Mr. Kessing commended Ukraine’s commitment to its human rights obligations in these difficult times, adopting laws and policies to strengthen human rights protections.  Ukraine had continued to engage with the European Court of Human Rights since 2022, resulting in the closure of 75 cases.

    What steps had been taken to ensure that Ukrainian soldiers and State officials did not engage in torture? What training did these officials receive on the Convention?  Could the delegation confirm that its derogations from international law in the martial law period did not relate to the Convention?  Did Ukraine continue to apply international human rights law in situations of armed conflict?

    The State party needed to prosecute and hold accountable all those who committed torture on occupied territories when it regained control of the territory.  What steps had been taken to document such acts?  How had the State party ensured that Ukrainian citizens who were victims of torture had access to remedies when they returned to Ukraine? Ukraine had developed a draft law on compensation for victims of violent crimes and a related State fund.  Had this law been adopted?

    There had been reports of beatings of men who sought to avoid conscription.  In one case, a man claimed he had been drafted illegally as he had not undergone a medical examination.  Could the delegation provide statistical information on injuries and deaths linked to hazing and investigations into such incidents?  How did the State ensure that conscripts were treated in line with international obligations?

    There had been reports of excessive use of force by Ukrainian police over the reporting period.  Detainees in police detention did not have access to food or drinking water.  What steps had been taken to prevent ill-treatment in police detention? Access to a lawyer was not always provided for arrested persons; how would the State ensure this?  Video recording of interrogation was discretionary. Would the State make recording mandatory and ensure that recorded footage of interrogations was kept?  Were Russian prisoners of war and civilians arrested by Ukrainian forces provided with procedural safeguards?  How many children had been held in pre-trial detention over the last three years?  Were there time limits on the detention of children, and were children separated from adults in detention?

    Prisons under Ukrainian control were suffering under the war; some faced frequent shelling by Russian troops, and were reportedly becoming hotbeds of torture and corruption.  Since winter 2024, there had been increased raids on prisons by special forces.  The Committee commended that human rights observers had been appointed in some prisons. What actions did they carry out and were they now appointed in all prisons? 

    Newly arrived prisoners were reportedly routinely beaten, and special forces used illegal force against inmates. Was it necessary to deploy special forces in prisons?  Would the State abandon this practice?  There was reported overcrowding in prisons, with inmates in one prison forced to alternatively sleep on the floor.  There were also reports of limited access to fresh air, clean drinking water and sunlight in some prisons.  What steps had been taken to reduce overcrowding and improve prison conditions? Some prisoners were appointed as “duty” prisoners and given duties to oversee other prisoners.  Had steps been taken to eliminate this practice and protect all prisoners’ rights?

    Medical staff in prisons reportedly did not document inmates’ injuries.  Could the delegation provide information on the number of deaths in custody over the last three years?  What steps had been taken to strengthen healthcare in prisons?  There were no rules banning force-feeding in prisons; did the Government intend to elaborate such rules?  Did the Ukrainian Ombudsperson have access to all places of detention and could it conduct unannounced visits?  To what extent could non-governmental organizations access places of detention?  Article 391 of the Criminal Code made it an offence to disobey orders by prison staff. This provision was reportedly abused by staff to engage in corrupt practices; would it be revised?

    Other Committee Experts asked questions on measures taken by State authorities to respond to and prevent domestic violence; the status of the draft bill criminalising domestic violence and sexual violence; measures to ensure penalties for domestic and sexual violence were commensurate with the gravity of the crime; the number of investigations and convictions for domestic violence cases over the reporting period; efforts made to establish civil registries to facilitate birth registration and prevent trafficking of children; whether the State party held Ukrainian forces that were returned to the State accountable when they were accused of torture; how the State treated prisoners of war from third countries; and whether the clergy and staff of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church had been provided with support after the banning of the Church.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the State party provided training on the Convention and other international and European human rights norms for penitentiary staff.  Currently, there were 119 children held in pre-trial detention and 177 children held in juvenile detention facilities, including just one girl. Judges assessed the necessity of detention for children once every three months.

    The State party had undertaken measures to combat corruption and ill-treatment of inmates in the penitentiary system.  An internal security unit had been created to investigate reports of violations by penitentiary staff and inmates and to initiate criminal proceedings against accused persons; the Government was currently recruiting staff for the unit. The State party had recruited 54 out of 56 human rights inspectors for its prisons and adopted a resolution on their scope of activity.  These inspectors reported directly to the State about the problems they witnessed.

    Currently, there were 37,000 inmates in places of deprivation of liberty in Ukraine.  The prison population was declining gradually.  More than 8,000 prisoners had been voluntarily mobilised at the beginning of the war.  The Government had allocated funds to build a new detention facility in Kyiv that could accommodate more than 1,000 detainees and decrease the population of other prisons. Norms on construction had been revised to protect prisons from shelling and improve security.  Despite budget cuts, over 7,500 places had been newly created in detention centres since 2022.

    The State party was fighting the spread of criminal influence and a criminal subculture in prisons.  It sought to proactively prosecute crimes occurring within prisons and to adopt a law on prison labour, which would increase salaries paid to prisoners who engaged in labour and improve conditions for prison labour.

    There had been 432, 376 and 368 deaths in prisons respectively in 2022, 2023 and 2024.  Some 98 per cent of prisoners infected with AIDS and 93 per cent of prisoners with disabilities were held in inclusive settings.  The Ministry of Justice supported the idea of transferring the management of healthcare services in prisons to the Ministry of Health; discussions on this would begin soon.  Rules on force-feeding were adopted two years ago.

    The Ombudsperson had not complained about not being able to access any detention facilities.  Some non-governmental organizations had been granted access to penitentiary facilities.  An anonymous, online complaints system for prisons had been set up; last year, 6,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners on various topics. A commission was also being created that would handle complaints of improper conditions in prisons. Discussions were underway on the revision of article 391 of the Criminal Code.

    All prisoners of war were kept in common conditions.  Persons with criminal records were separated from those without.  Ukraine fully followed its international obligations under the Geneva Conventions.  It had allowed 400 monitoring missions to visit its detention facilities for prisoners of war.

    Since 2014, the State party had lost 34 penitentiary institutions located in occupied territories, including seven since 2022, in which more than 3,000 inmates were held.  More than 1,000 of these inmates had already served their sentences, but had no money or documents needed to return to Ukraine. The State was working with non-governmental organizations to support their return.  More than 500 persons had thus far returned.

    On 10 October last year, Parliament adopted a law on the ratification of the Rome Statute.  Ukraine had taken on board comments from the International Criminal Court regarding its legislation on crimes against humanity and the responsibility of superiors; the State had amended its Criminal Code in response.

    Certain restrictions could be imposed on rights and freedoms under martial law, but Ukraine had not restricted the right to freedom of religious belief.  The President had last year signed a Presidential Order that banned the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church, which was based on the ideology of the regime of the Russian Federation and condoned Russia’s war crimes.

    Ukraine had not introduced severe restrictions on freedom of expression.  Domestic media faced challenges, including the mobilisation of journalists as soldiers, dwindling resources, and damaged infrastructure caused by the Russian aggression.  The State party sought to bring its media legislation in line with that of the European Union.  Ukraine had risen 18 places in the World Press Freedom Index thanks to the reforms implemented.

    The national police continued to manage custody records, which recorded arrests, pre-trial detention and releases, as well as detainees’ injuries.  These records were kept for 25 years.  There was constant video surveillance of police detention sites and independent monitoring visits were carried out.  The Criminal Procedural Code had been amended to ensure that officials involved in arrests were not responsible for managing detainees’ stay in police detention. Detainees in temporary detention were provided with three hot meals per day.  Standards for detention facilities stipulated that cells needed to have a water supply that detainees could access.

    Since February 2022, 83,000 criminal proceedings had been instigated related to missing civilians and military officers.  Some 9,000 missing persons had been found alive, while many deaths were also identified. Specialised departments for the investigation of crimes committed in the armed conflict had been established in police departments in several regions and a centre for tracing missing persons had been established in Kyiv.

    The police force had recorded 179,000 administrative offences related to domestic violence, registered 19,000 perpetrators for monitoring, and had set up specialised units for tackling domestic violence in more than 60 regions.  In 2024, more than 5,000 officers were trained on combatting domestic and gender-based violence.

    The State constantly looked for crimes of human trafficking and took prompt responses when cases were identified. As of May 2025, 1,500 criminal offences of human trafficking had been investigated.  International organizations supported training for State officials on trafficking in persons.  Ukraine had joined two international taskforces to combat trafficking in persons, through which more than 3,000 Ukrainian victims of trafficking were identified across the world.

    Eleven years since the Maidan revolution, investigators were continuing to investigate crimes related to it. Courts had issued 11 guilty verdicts against 14 people.  The State Bureau of Investigation had suspected 340 people. The former President of Ukraine and other former high-level officials were under suspicion of having facilitated the murders of more than 67 persons between 2013 and 2014.  In this period, police officers were deployed to supress protests, and courts had found activists guilty on spurious grounds.  In some cases, police officers beat activists and even participated in premeditated murders.  In total, there were more than 4,000 cases of criminal activity and more than 2,000 victims.  There was now an opportunity to bring justice for these past crimes. There were three criminal proceedings underway related to armed gangs that had attacked individuals and homes.

    War crimes were investigated by the national security service and the police.  In 2024, 149 Ukrainians had been executed by Russians, and 54 had so far been executed this year.  These were conservative estimates.  Almost every Ukrainian prisoner of war had suffered some form of violence. 

    There were around 20 cases under examination of war crimes committed by Ukrainians.  Doctors who provided medical examinations of prisoners of war were required to document signs of torture.

    According to Ukrainian law, information about persons in detention was immediately communicated to the legal aid centre.  If evidence was gathered while a defence lawyer was absent, there was a high likelihood that courts would not admit it.  The State was providing legal support for prisoners who had been illegally transferred to Russia and supporting them to serve the remainder of their sentences in Ukraine.  Persons with disabilities and older persons could access legal aid if they had low income or were internally displaced.  Legal aid was provided to minors and victims of gender-based violence and trafficking in persons.

    National standards on detention of prisoners of war stipulated that detainees’ human dignity and international law needed to be respected.  No violations of human rights or cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment had been found while monitoring visits of places of detention.

    Pre-trial investigations were underway into alleged war crimes against Ukrainian prisoners of war by Russia, including extrajudicial executions and the use of physical, psychological and sexual violence.  These prisoners were systematically subjected to violence over the course of their detention; this had been confirmed by medical examinations.  Some 4,000 prisoners had been returned to Ukraine.

    Since February 2022, some 433 persons were detained for crimes of collaboration with Russia.  The draft law of December 2022 on collaboration included provisions to improve liability for collaboration; it was currently under consideration.  Some 819 investigations were underway on cases of collaboration related to healthcare and education.  The teaching of school subjects based on the standards of the aggressor State did not constitute an offence.  Some teachers deliberately carried out propaganda in educational institutions; this could constitute an offence. 

    Around 22 doctors had been notified of being under suspicion of collaboration.  Criminal liability was excluded for actions carried out while providing healthcare to patients.  Since February 2022, pre-trial investigations on collaboration had been carried out into 97 affiliates of religious organizations, including more than 20 clerics of the Orthodox Church.  The security service had declared 197 minors as suspects in offences such as high treason, sabotage and damage to property.  Many cases involved minors who were recruited by the Russian special services. Training was provided for investigators who interviewed children on the best interests of the child.

    To ensure that prisoners of war were well-treated and not tortured during transfers to detainment camps, clear legal procedures had been developed.  The Chief of Defence had issued orders to ensure that international human rights law was strictly followed in this process. Military officials were trained on capturing enemy combatants and on the rights of prisoners of war.

    To ensure that human rights were followed during mobilisation and conscription, clear legislation had been established.  Persons could apply for deferment of conscription for medical or family reasons. An investigator had been appointed within the Land Force Command to investigate allegations of human rights violations occurring during conscription.

    The Ministry of Health had made changes to ensure that only psychiatric patients who posed a danger to themselves or others were isolated for legally defined periods.  All primary health care providers were obligated to undergo training on identifying mental health issues and referring patients to mental health care services.  These measures would help to decrease the number of patients needing institutionalisation.

    More than 34,000 persons with disabilities and older persons lived in residential institutions.  The Government had developed a strategy to reform these institutions and support community-based care and assisted living. Approximately 7,000 people received day care services.  There were around 4,600 children cared for in institutions.  The Government had approved a strategy to ensure the right of every child in Ukraine to grow up in a family environment by 2028.  A law preventing violence against children had been adopted in 2024 and the State was currently developing a procedure for responding to cases of violence against children.

    In 2024, around 182,000 reports of domestic violence had been received by the State.  A programme for addressing traumatic war experiences had been developed. Measures had been implemented to coordinate policies on domestic violence and protect victims.

    In 2022, Parliament adopted a law on amending the Criminal Code in line with the Convention.  The revised law’s definition of torture addressed the liability of persons who conspired to commit torture.  Discriminatory motives for the crime of torture were considered to be aggravating offences and carried a harsher penalty.  The law also addressed the criminal liability of officials who ordered acts of torture.  Amnesty was not issued to persons who committed torture crimes.

    No derogations had been made from the State party’s obligations under international human rights law during the martial law period.  Martial law foresaw the ability to prohibit peaceful assembly, but in practice, this restriction had not been applied.  The Government took steps to provide compensation for victims of various types of crimes.

    A special draft law had been developed that sought to improve the institutional capacity of the Ombudsperson, including by lowering the age limit for members of the Ombudsperson’s Office and imposing restrictions on reductions to the Office’s budget.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair and Country Co-Rapporteur, welcomed information on measures to provide compensation for victims of human rights violations.  Up to mid-February 2025, 159,000 criminal cases had been recorded related to the armed conflict, but it was unclear how many of these cases related to torture.  The justice system had not been prepared to deal with the challenges brought by these cases.  Acts of torture committed in occupied territories, difficulties in verifying evidence, and the internal displacement of victims hindered investigations.  There was a lack of guarantees of a fair trial for trials in absentia, in which 95 per cent of accused persons were sentenced. Articles 27 and 28 of the Criminal Code needed to be amended to protect the victims and witnesses of serious international crimes.

    Crimea was annexed 11 years ago, and the freedom of the media had been called into question under the Russian occupation.  Russian authorities reportedly curtailed the rights to freedom of expression and assembly. Lawyers and human rights defenders had been victims of persecution and had been unable to perform their work. The European Court of Human Rights had recently found that Russia followed a pattern of criminally sentencing persons in Crimea who discredited the Russian forces.  Had there been cases of torture in Crimea?

    PETER VEDEL KESSING, Committee Expert and Country Co-Rapporteur, said it was positive that overcrowding had been reduced, that a new prison facility had been established, that an electronic register had been established, and that measures were taken to remove the prison hierarchy and improve access to health care.  How could prisoners access the internet to make complaints to the Prison Service?  How did the Service respond to complaints?  Did any concern torture?  Human rights monitors in prisons were commendable.  Did these monitors also perform other functions in prisons?  How many complaints had been received from human rights monitors and what follow-up had been conducted?  There was reportedly a risk of reprisals for prisoners who lodged complaints.  What measures were in place to counter reprisals against prisoners?

    Prisoners of war were at a high risk of ill-treatment.  What measures were taken to monitor that Russian prisoners of war were treated in line with requirements under international law?  Did they undergo medical exams and was there video recording of interrogations?  Was there a procedure for releasing prisoners of war who required medical treatment?

    Another Committee Expert asked follow-up questions on the situation of prisoners and prison conditions in Crimea, including on the transfer of prisoners and cases of torture occurring during transfers; the situation in closed psychiatric institutions and steps taken to protect vulnerable groups such as children, and to improve conditions and oversight of these institutions; and measures taken to promote the return of children forcibly transferred from Ukraine to Russia and to ensure accountability for such acts.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said around 7,000 complaints had been submitted by prisoners, around 1,700 of which were submitted electronically.  Inmates could access specific web pages where they could submit complaints using tablets in a dedicated room.  Human rights inspectors reported suspected cases of torture to the Chief of Police. Their work was supplemented by the internal security unit, which started disciplinary proceedings that could result in criminal investigations.  There had been complaints submitted to the Ombudsperson regarding reprisals against prisoners.  These were under investigation.

    The State party was gathering evidence on war crimes and crimes against humanity occurring in occupied territories. It transferred evidence of such crimes to the International Criminal Court on request.  A working group had been established to improve the implementation of the Rome Statute in Ukraine, including through legal amendments.  Last year, the State had documented over 2,800 Ukrainian civilians and over 4,000 prisoners of war who were victims of torture. Many liberated civilians chose to move to different countries rather than return to Ukraine, making investigations difficult.

    Ukrainian non-governmental organizations had reported that there were at least 4,700 transfers of detainees from Crimea to the territory of the Russian Federation, including 220 female detainees. The Russian Federation had failed to provide information in response to the judgement of the European Court of Human Rights that obliged Russia to return these prisoners to Ukraine.

    The Government had adopted several measures to address the issue of the forcible displacement of Ukrainian children, including a procedure for identifying and returning such children, a register of deported and forcibly displaced children, and an inter-agency commission on the issue.

    Concluding Remarks

    CLAUDE HELLER, Committee Chair, said that, based on the dialogue, the Committee would issue concluding observations, which would include recommendations that the State party could implement within one year, as well as other recommendations that would require more time to implement.  The Committee believed that its recommendations would support the implementation of the Convention in Ukraine.

    The State party’s efforts to engage in the dialogue were commendable in the context of the bloodthirsty war.  The issues discussed were not issues of the past but were ongoing.  The last dialogue with Ukraine happened over 11 years ago and many things had happened since.  Ukraine sought to protect its territorial integrity and the well-being of its population. The rest of the world was looking on, hoping for an end to the war that respected the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The dialogue had been constructive and frank.  The Committee hoped that its next dialogue with Ukraine would take place in conditions of peace, prosperity and democracy.

    LIUDMYLA SUHAK, Deputy Minister of Justice for European Integration and head of the delegation, thanked the Committee for the dialogue and civil society organizations that had submitted alternative reports.  Ukraine would actively work to implement the Committee’s concluding observations.

    Tens of thousands of Ukrainian citizens were being held by Russia.  More than 170 torture chambers had been identified in Russia and virtually every Ukrainian citizen who had been returned from Russia had suffered some form of torture, which was carried out in a systemic, widespread manner by Russian authorities.  The State party was grateful to the Committee for keeping the issue of Russian war crimes on the international agenda.  Ukraine urged Russia to fully comply with its obligations under international law and to end its illegal war of aggression.  The Committee’s efforts would help to hold Russia to account.

    ___________

     

     

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CAT.007E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: Europe’s hydrogen initiatives and renewable energy auctions to accelerate region’s energy transition, says GlobalData

    Source: GlobalData

    Europe’s hydrogen initiatives and renewable energy auctions to accelerate region’s energy transition, says GlobalData

    Posted in Power

    Three years into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Europe has significantly diminished its reliance on Russia. Even though the EU has been importing liquified natural gas (LNG) primarily from the US, Norway, and Qatar since the onset of hostilities, the continent has decreased its overall consumption of fossil fuels, particularly the power sector has progressively become cleaner. The structural modifications to the permitting process for renewable energy projects and hydrogen initiatives are expected to further accelerate the region’s energy transition, says GlobalData, a leading data and analytics company.

    GlobalData’s latest report, “Europe Renewable Energy Policy Handbook 2025,” reveals that in response to structural changes in permitting, EU countries acted in a united and prompt manner. Merely weeks following Russia’s incursion into Ukraine, the leaders of the 27 EU member states resolved to expedite the EU’s transition away from reliance on Russian fossil fuels by diversifying energy supplies and sources, curtailing the use of fossil fuels, and accelerating the transition to cleaner energy sources. Subsequently, the European Commission introduced the REPowerEU plan—a strategic framework aimed at enhancing the EU’s energy independence and promoting the adoption of clean energy.

    The EU, with its “Fit for 55” package, is committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% by 2030, thereby aligning its energy targets with an emphasis on renewable energy. In 2023, the EU, under the revised REPowerEU plan, set a goal for a 42.5% renewable energy share by 2030. Member states are encouraged to contribute through their respective National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs). The EU is promoting clean energy through auctions and hydrogen energy.

    Sudeshna Sarmah, Power Analyst at GlobalData, comments: “The EU is actively pursuing a variety of strategies to broaden the adoption of renewable technologies. The implementation of the Innovation Fund auction and the Renewable Energy Sources Auction platform is anticipated to garner support for renewable hydrogen projects and serve as a catalyst for renewable power auctions, respectively. These initiatives are expected to foster a favorable environment for investment opportunities within the EU.”

    In the Innovation Fund’s 24th auction, which concluded in February 2025, member countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) were given the opportunity to enhance projects with additional national funding through the Auctions as a Service (AaaS) mechanism. Spain, Lithuania, and Austria chose to participate in the IF24 AaaS, collectively committing over EUR 700 million (approximately $740.3 million) in national funds to support renewable hydrogen production projects within their territories.

    Launched in May 2024, the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) Auctions Platform represents a critical component of the European Commission’s Wind Power Action Plan. This platform consolidates vital information from Member States concerning upcoming renewable energy auctions within the European Union. Its purpose is to provide companies with improved visibility of expected deployment volumes, thus aiding the industry in planning their investments more efficiently.

    Sarmah concludes: “The European Hydrogen Strategy sets an ambitious annual consumption target of 20 million tons of hydrogen by the year 2030. Of this total, approximately 10 million tons are expected to be produced within the European Union. To facilitate the domestic manufacture of such significant volumes of green hydrogen, the development of an infrastructure capable of supporting 40 GW of electrolysis capacity will be essential by the decade’s end, indicating a promising trajectory for the growth of green hydrogen in the region.”

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Reed, Smith Lead National Security Lawmakers in Denouncing Trump Ultimatum for Ukraine

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed
    WASHINGTON, DC – Today, U.S. Senators Jack Reed (D-RI), Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and U.S. Representative Adam Smith (D-WA), Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee led a joint statement in response to the ultimatum that President Donald Trump and his Administration are forcing on Ukraine, noting that the President puts pressure only on Ukraine while giving “Putin exactly what he wants.”
    Smith and Reed were joined in issuing the joint statement by U.S. Representatives Gregory Meeks (D-NY), Ranking Member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Jim Himes (D-CT), Ranking Member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL), Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party; and U.S. Senators Chris Coons (D-DE), Ranking Member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee; and Mark Kelly (D-AZ), a member of both the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees. 
    The lawmakers expressed deep concern about the Trump Administration’s one-sided approach to negotiating an end to Russia’s war on Ukraine, stating:
    “President Trump’s ultimatum to Ukraine would give Putin exactly what he wants and force Ukraine to accept a Russian-dictated plan that would leave them vulnerable to future attack. If the president follows through, his peace plan would fail and he would be abandoning Ukraine.
    “Ukraine has already agreed to an unconditional general ceasefire. Putin has not. During this conflict, Ukraine has continually exceeded expectations on the battlefield and has continued to inflict huge losses on Russia. They have bent over backward to accommodate the administration’s focus on a minerals deal. It makes no sense to force Ukraine to cede land illegally seized in Russian invasions now and remove economic sanctions against Russia. Rather than seeking concessions from Russia, the administration is shifting the pain to Ukraine. This ultimatum would reward Putin’s aggression and only allow Russia time to rearm and attack Ukraine again, undoing the work of American service members and taxpayers, partners and allies, and valiant Ukrainian fighters defending their sovereignty.
    “It also grants Putin’s war aims something no other American president has done—legitimacy. This plan risks widening the conflict and threatening even more catastrophic fallout. It would be a sign that America can no longer be trusted to stand with allies and partners. It would undermine the strength and stability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the coalition of over 50 countries that have come together to defend Ukraine, and the rules-based order that has held that no country should be allowed to take another country’s territory through sheer force. The ramifications would be felt worldwide and for generations to come. You can be sure that China, Iran, North Korea, and global extremists are watching closely.
    “For the sake of U.S. national security and global stability, we urge the president to withdraw this demand and shift pressure from Ukraine to Russia to conclude a durable and just peace.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Keynote Speech – Canning House Mexico-UK Summit

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Keynote Speech – Canning House Mexico-UK Summit

    During the Canning House’s Mexico-UK Summit, His Majesty’s Ambassador to Mexico, Susannah Goshko, highlight the bilateral opportunity between our countries.

    The UK-Mexico Partnership in 2025 

    Good morning everyone.  It’s great to be here at Canning House’s inaugural Mexico-UK Summit.  Canning House plays a hugely important role in bringing the UK and Mexico closer together.

    I would therefore like to begin by thanking Jeremy Browne and his team for organising this Summit and fostering the valuable exchange of ideas between business, government and academia.

    As many of you will know, I arrived in Mexico at the end of last year: so I am now just a few months into my posting as British Ambassador to Mexico. And what a time to arrive.  A new government in Mexico and a new government in the UK.  A world that is changing more rapidly than any of us could have predicted.  Let me start therefore by talking about the bilateral opportunity, before coming on to how the UK and Mexico can work together on the global stage.

    The relationship between the UK and Mexico dates back over 200 years.  One of the first things I did in my role here was accompany the High Sheriff of Cornwall to Hidalgo where British miners – from Cornwall – first arrived in the 19th century, drawn by the opportunities that Mexico offered.  They brought with them football and Cornish pasties – both of which live on to this day, although the pasties turn out to be a little more picante than we are used to them in Cornwall.

    The first record of a football match being played in Mexico was between those Cornish miners and the Mexicans who lived in Hidalgo.  On that occasion – for perhaps the first and last time – the Brits beat the Mexicans.  And this is a nice anecdote but actually, it’s more than that.  It’s evidence of the culture and history that continue to bind us today.

    In fact, our rich cultural and people-to-people links are one of the most important aspects of this relationship: whether it’s the numerous Mexicans who play in the English Premier League, the more than 3000 Mexican students have been awarded Chevening scholarships since 1983, or the fact that the largest number of Beatlemaniacs in the world are not in fact in the UK but are right here in Mexico.

    But the policy agenda is – perhaps – even more exciting.  When the new government in the UK was elected last summer, it was on the basis of a number of very clear priorities – or missions as the PM has described them.  These include:

    • Reducing barriers to opportunity for all
    • Building a health system fit for the future
    • Making the UK a green energy super power by 2030
    • And kickstarting economic growth.

    I have been struck in my first few months here, how much of that agenda resonates with what the government in Mexico is trying to achieve. In the language we use and in the priorities we choose, there is much alignment between our approaches.

    The growth agenda

    Let me start by talking about economic growth. Growth is at the heart of the UK government’s agenda because – like Mexico – the British government has made important commitments around addressing social inequality.  To meet these ambitious commitments, it will be essential for us both to have thriving economies.

    So all British diplomats have been given clear marching orders: we must do all we can to build economic prosperity for the UK but also for the countries in which we are working. And what does that mean here? Well, trade between the UK and Mexico is good: Our markets are complementary, so we are not in competition with each other, and we have an more or less equally balanced trading relationship.

    But we can afford to be much more ambitious: two way trade is currently worth around £6.1bn a year – as two G20 countries, both committed to open and free trade – this should and could be much higher.  It is in both of our interests to ensure that it is, if we are to build the equitable and prosperous societies we are both seeking.

    The first step on this journey will be Mexican ratification of the UK’s accession to CPTPP which we hope will happen shortly.   This will accelerate growth by deepening British and Mexican participation in our respective supply chains. It will diversify our trade in innovative sectors such as electromobility, health-tech and advanced manufacturing and will provide greater certainty to UK investors in Mexico and Mexican investors wanting to set up and grow their business in the UK.

    At the same time, a new industrial strategy in the UK and Plan Mexico here will drive growth in both our countries in sectors of mutual interest and expertise, among them healthcare and life sciences, financial services, and education. We must grasp this opportunity.

    There is much success to build upon: last year we saw innovative British bank Revolut secure their banking licence in Mexico. Astrazeneca opened their second largest global research plant in Jalisco. Orbia expanded their presence in the UK with an additional £75m investment, creating 100 new jobs.

    These are just a small selection of success stories from the last twelve months.  I am confident that there will be many more to come driven by a determination from both our governments to put sustainable growth at the heart of our plans.

    Climate

    The second area where I see enormous potential is on climate and energy.  I am delighted that Minister for Environment, Alicia Barcena will speak later in the day. Minister Barcena has been a great friend of the UK as well as a champion of our shared commitment to tackling the climate and nature emergency.

    This is one of the most profound threats to face us and future generations. We must work together to ensure a liveable planet for all. Our future prosperity and security depends on what we do now.

    For the British government, combatting climate change and biodiversity loss must be done alongside eradicating social inequality. We believe firmly that this can be achieved without compromising economic growth. In fact, done right, we believe that the energy transition can be an economic advantage.  As testament to this, I offer the fact that in the UK we have reduced emissions by 54% whilst also growing our GDP by 84% on 1990 levels.

    Under the leadership of President Sheinbaum and Prime Minister Starmer we have an unparalleled opportunity to deepen our cooperation in this area.

    When I presented my credentials to the President some two weeks ago, I congratulated her for her leadership on Mexico’s NDC commitment and the newly announced Net Zero goal. The UK stands ready to offer any support that we can in their development and implementation.

    Our vision to do this is one where there’s space for every part of society to contribute and benefit from ambitious climate action. We have, for instance, worked with local communities and civil society in Sonora to pilot solar energy projects, increasing access to electricity and diversifying sources of income for families.

    And our scientific and academic links are also a fundamental asset to tackle climate change. Mexican and British research institutions are working together to deploy solutions to manage sargassum proliferation, which has greatly impacted the tourism industry in Mexico and many Caribbean nations.

    And there’s, of course, the role of private sector. No climate target will ever be met without industries and financiers actively playing a part in addressing the climate and biodiversity crisis. Private investment in innovative technologies such as offshore wind energy will be essential to boost renewable energy generation in Mexico whilst ensuring the protection of energy sovereignty. Many British companies are keen to be part of this journey.

    While the task might feel unsurmountable at times, I am convinced that by working together, Mexico and the UK can bring us closer to building a liveable, more equitable planet for all.

    The Global Context

    Now let me come on and talk a bit about the global context.  Of course, to ensure that prosperous democracies like ours can thrive we need geopolitical stability. Across the world we are living in uncertain times with brutal conflicts still waging in Sudan, the Middle East and Ukraine.

    Mexico’s historic bridging role in multilateral fora means it is uniquely placed to bring countries together in support of our shared values of democracy, sovereignty and a commitment to human rights.

    During my career, I have observed the vast experience and talent of Mexican diplomats in multilateral fora, sharing our concern to protect the institutions that ensure world peace. Their ability to bring together different points of view and chart a path forward that everyone can agree is part of Mexico’s USP: one of my formative memories is of watching a Mexican diplomat rescue a biodiversity negotiation from the brink of collapse at the eleventh hour and find an almost impossible consensus.

    In this increasingly complex world, we need this more than ever. Those countries that share our commitment to the rules based international order must continue working together to ensure that multilateral institutions remain strong and relevant.

    For example, in February, the UK and Mexico united with other nations in the UN to mark the third anniversary of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine.

    The security threats we face have been transformed in the last decade. We are all confronting the unprecedented rate at which threats to information integrity are growing.  Misinformation and disinformation are both more common than ever and increasingly difficult to distinguish from the truth.

    As democratic governments, the UK and Mexico must be proactive about countering this threat. We also have a responsibility to uphold the principles of an open civil society and free media to take on this challenge. I’m proud therefore that here in Mexico we support a vibrant Civil Society Group ‘Las Linternas’ to strengthen their fact checking, identify false stories and build media literacy. Our resilience to these threats domestically depends – like so much else – on our ability to work together.

    Conclusion

    So there is much to do. Perhaps I’ll end where I began: Lord Canning – after whom Canning House is named – was the first British foreign secretary, some 200 years ago, to devote a large proportion of his time and energies to Latin America and to foresee the important political and economic role the region would one day play.

    We are once again at a moment of enormous geopolitical change.  We too should choose to strengthen and trust in this bilateral relationship.  Together I am confident that the UK and Mexico can do brilliant things.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Representatives of the State University of Management became winners of the federal competition “Leaders of Law”

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    The results of the VIII federal scientific and educational competition of draft laws among young lawyers “Leaders of Law” have been summed up; representatives of the State University of Management won.

    Over the course of six months and three stages, 50 teams from Moscow, Saratov, Penza, Altai Krai, Nizhny Novgorod, Veliky Novgorod and other regions competed for the title of best legislator. The works were assessed by a strict and competent jury of active judges, prosecutors, justice generals and other highly qualified specialists.

    The team of the State University of Education “AzBukiVedi”, headed by the 4th year student of the “Jurisprudence” program Karina Meshcheryakova, presented a draft law on the legal regulation of spiritual and moral security and protection of the Russian language, and in a difficult fight became the winner! The team also included Varvara Yupatova.

    Karina Meshcheryakova received a well-deserved winner’s diploma, a certificate from the deputy of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg Lyubov Mendeleyeva and was awarded a valuable gift.

    In addition, the scientific supervisor of our legislators – candidate of legal sciences, associate professor, associate professor of the Department of Private Law Svetlana Titor was recognized as the winner in the nomination “Mentor in Law”.

    But that’s not all! The organizers of the “Leader of Law” competition invited the winners to take part in the XIII St. Petersburg International Legal Forum (youth section), which will be held from May 19 to 21, where our team will be able to present their draft law.

    The competition was organized by the Interregional Public Organization of Graduates “Association of Graduates of SYU-SGAP-SGUA” together with the Saratov State Law Academy and the Association of Lawyers of Russia.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/25/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Foreign students of the State University of Management wrote the “Victory Dictation”

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    Today, foreign students of the State University of Management joined the All-Russian historical campaign on the theme of the events of the Great Patriotic War “Victory Dictation”. Students from Algeria, Vietnam, China, Mali, Syria, Great Britain, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Chad, Egypt, Pakistan, Senegal and other countries were united by the main task – preserving the connection between generations and the memory of the events that shook our country almost 80 years ago.

    The Victory Dictation consisted of 25 tasks, 15 of which were multiple-choice and 10 were short-answer tasks, and was conducted in the form of testing. The time for writing the “Victory Dictation” was 45 minutes. The questions were about important battles, military leaders, home front workers, the cultural heritage of the war years, as well as about current events in the SVO zone.

    Since 2019, the Victory Dictation has been held annually in all regions of the Russian Federation, bringing together schoolchildren, students, and adults. This year, the Victory Dictation was held not only in Russia, but also in 90 countries around the world, bringing together participants at 35,000 venues. The tasks were translated into ten foreign languages. The winners at the federal level will traditionally receive an invitation to the Victory Parade on May 9 on Red Square in Moscow.

    “Victory Dictation” has become a truly national project and has become an integral part of the Victory Day celebration. The State University of Management preserves historical memory and a reverent attitude towards the great heritage of our country.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/25/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: GUU and ACIM combine competencies to form a digital economy

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On April 23, 2025, a meeting of the Board of the Association “Digital Innovations in Mechanical Engineering” (ACIM) was held, at which a decision was made to admit a new founder to ACIM – the State University of Management, as well as to include the rector of the State University of Management Vladimir Stroyev in the Board of Trustees of the Association.

    The unification of the competencies of the State University of Management and the Center for Information Technologies and Communications will promote active innovation in the development of digital enterprise management models, the search for new forms of digital interaction between enterprises to form value chains, ensuring interoperability and cybersecurity of automated control systems, as well as the development of new educational programs for training specialists and managers in the field of digital transformation and digital enterprise management.

    Participation in the activities of the Board of Trustees of the Rector of the State University of Management Vladimir Stroev will accelerate the development of interaction between the university and leading Russian IT companies, and will also allow acquiring new competencies in the field of managing complex processes of digital transformation of industry, will facilitate the introduction of new IT systems in the educational process and the development of new educational programs for training personnel in the interests of developing the digital economy.

    The Association “Digital Innovations in Mechanical Engineering” was founded in 2019. Currently, it is one of the leading competence centers in the field of digital transformation and the formation of an ecosystem of digital mechanical engineering and related industries. The founders of the Association are leading universities (Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin, Ulyanovsk State University, MSTU “STANKIN” and others), large domestic IT companies (1C, GC “TSIFRA”, JSC “Iteko”, JSC “ASCON”, LLC “Tesis” and others), high-tech industrial enterprises and corporations (JSC “USC”).

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/25/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chair’s Statement: Fifty-First Meeting of the IMFC – Mr. Mohammed Aljadaan, Minister for Finance of Saudi Arabia

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 25, 2025

    In the context of the Fifty-First Meeting of the IMFC that took place in Washington, D.C. on 24th and 25th April, IMFC members welcomed the ongoing efforts to end wars and conflicts, recognizing that peace is essential to restoring stability and fostering sustainable growth. IMFC members underscored that all states must act in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter in its entirety. They acknowledged, however, that the IMFC is not a forum to resolve geopolitical and security issues which are discussed in other fora.

    The world economy is at a pivotal juncture. Following several years of rising concerns over trade, trade tensions have abruptly soared, fueling elevated uncertainty, market volatility, and risks to growth and financial stability. Near-term growth is projected to slow and intensifying downside risks dominate the outlook. We will step up our efforts to strengthen economic resilience and build a more prosperous future. We underline the critical role of the IMF in helping us navigate this challenging environment, as a trusted advisor and champion of strong policy frameworks. We thank our Deputies for discussing the medium-term direction of the IMF during their meeting in Diriyah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 6-7, 2025, and we agree on the annexed Diriyah Declaration.

     

    1. The world economy is at a pivotal juncture. Following several years of rising concerns over trade, trade tensions have abruptly soared, fueling elevated uncertainty, market volatility, and risks to growth and financial stability. Near-term growth is projected to slow, while disinflation is expected to continue but at a slower pace. Intensifying downside risks dominate the outlook, in an already challenging context of weak growth and high public debt. Wars and conflicts impose a heavy humanitarian and economic toll. Transformative forces, such as digitalization/artificial intelligence, demographic shifts, and climate transitions are creating opportunities, but also challenges.
    1. We will step up our efforts to strengthen economic resilience and break from the low-growth, high-debt path, while harnessing transformative forces, to build a more prosperous future. Comprehensive and well calibrated, well sequenced, and well communicated reforms and policy actions are needed to boost private sector-led growth, productivity, and job creation. We will pursue sound macroeconomic policies and advance structural reforms to improve the business environment, streamline excessive regulation, fight corruption, and mobilize innovation and technology adoption. We will deepen our pivot toward growth-friendly fiscal adjustments to ensure debt sustainability and rebuild buffers where needed. Fiscal adjustments should be mindful of distributional impacts and underpinned by a credible medium-term consolidation plan, while strengthening the efficiency of public spending, protecting the vulnerable, and supporting growth-enhancing public and private investments, taking into account country circumstances. Central banks remain strongly committed to maintaining price stability, in line with their respective mandates, and will continue to adjust their policies in a data dependent and well-communicated manner. We will continue to closely monitor and, as necessary, tackle financial vulnerabilities and risks to financial stability, while harnessing the benefits of innovation. We will work together to improve the resilience of the world economy and build prosperity and ensure the stability and effective functioning of the international monetary system. We will also work together to address excessive global imbalances, support an open, fair and rules-based international economic order, and reinforce supply chain resilience. We reaffirm our April 2021 exchange rate commitments.
    1. We will continue to support countries as they undertake reforms and address debt vulnerabilities and debt service challenges. We acknowledge the specific challenges faced by low-income and vulnerable countries, including fragile and conflict-affected states (FCS) and small developing states (SDS), which are further compounded by recent decrease in official development assistance. We underline the importance of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Trust. We welcome the progress made on debt treatments under the G20 Common Framework (CF) and beyond. We remain committed to addressing global debt vulnerabilities in an effective, comprehensive, and systematic manner, including further stepping up the CF’s implementation in a predictable, timely, orderly, and coordinated manner, and enhancing debt transparency. We look forward to further work at the Global Sovereign Debt Roundtable on ways to address debt vulnerabilities and restructuring challenges. We encourage the IMF and the World Bank to help advance the implementation of the 3-pillar approach to address debt service pressures in countries with sustainable debt, including through supporting them to implement growth-enhancing reforms, mobilize domestic resources, and attract private capital. We look forward to the review of the Low-Income Country Debt Sustainability Framework (LIC-DSF).
    1. We welcome the Managing Director’s Global Policy Agenda.
    1. We support further sharpening the focus of surveillance based on analytical rigor, evenhandedness, and tailored policy advice. We welcome a strong focus on helping countries strengthen their economic resilience and achieve macroeconomic and financial stability and sustainable growth by increasing productivity, addressing macro-critical risks, reducing excessive imbalances, achieving debt sustainability, and mitigating disruptive capital flows and exchange rate volatility. We look forward to the Comprehensive Surveillance Review that will set future surveillance priorities and modalities; and the Review of Financial Sector Assessment Programs to keep financial surveillance in step with evolving financial stability risks.
    1. We look forward to the Review of Program Design and Conditionality to strengthen further the effectiveness of IMF-supported programs and to the Review of the Short-Term Liquidity Line. We also look forward to the assessment of the Global Financial Safety Net, including the role of Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs), and its ability to safeguard global financial stability.
    1. We support efforts to further strengthen capacity development and to ensure the sustainability of financing. We welcome the IMF’s ongoing work with the World Bank on the Joint Domestic Resource Mobilization Initiative. We welcome a more flexible and tailored delivery, better integrated with policy advice and program design, as set out in the 2024 Capacity Development Strategy Review.
    1. We reaffirm our commitment to a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at the center of the GFSN. We have advanced the domestic approvals for our consent to the quota increase under the 16th General Review of Quotas and we look forward to the finalization of this process as soon as possible. We recognize that realignment in quota shares should aim at better reflecting members’ relative positions in the world economy, while protecting the voice of the poorest members. We acknowledge, however, that building consensus among members on quota and governance reforms will require progress in stages. In this regard, we agree on the annexed Diriyah Declaration on the way forward.
    1. We underline the critical role of the IMF in helping us navigate the current challenging environment, as a trusted advisor and champion of strong policy frameworks. We reaffirm our commitment to the institution and look forward to discussing further ways to ensure the Fund remains agile and focused, working in collaboration with partners and other IFIs. We reiterate our appreciation for staff’s high-quality work and dedication to support the membership and continue to encourage further efforts to improve regional and women’s representation within staff positions, and women’s representation at the Executive Board and in Board leadership positions.
    1. Our next meeting is expected to be held in October 2025.

    Annexed Diriyah Declaration

    Recalling the October 2024 IMFC Chair’s Statement, which stated: “We reiterate our strong commitment to the Fund on its 80th anniversary and look forward to further discussing at our next meeting ways to ensure the Fund remains well-equipped to meet future challenges, in line with its mandate, and in collaboration with partners and other IFIs. We ask our Deputies to prepare for this discussion.”; and

    Drawing on the work advanced by our Deputies, who met in the historic town of Diriyah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 6-7, 2025, to prepare for this discussion;

    We thank our Deputies and agree on the following Diriyah Declaration on the way forward with regard to IMFC processes and IMF quota and governance reforms.

    *****

    Enhancing IMFC Processes

    We agree that the IMFC plays a key role in the IMF’s governance structure, offering the IMF Board of Governors trusted advice and providing strategic direction to the work and policies of the Fund through structured, high-level, and consensus-driven policy guidance on all relevant issues.

    To enhance its effectiveness as a forum for effective engagement and consensus-building on complex challenges, we agree to further strengthen IMFC processes. To this end, we welcome recent improvements to the format of the Introductory IMFC session and the use of concise, accessible communiqués to effectively convey key IMFC messages to a broader audience. Moreover, we agree that deputy-level meetings focused on strategic rather than routine issues could support the work of IMFC principals.

    We appreciate the value of engagement across the international financial architecture, including with Regional Financing Arrangements (RFAs), to enhance cooperation and strengthen the resilience of the international monetary system.

     

    Strengthening IMF Governance

    We note that the world economy currently faces significant challenges and agree that the IMF makes a vital contribution to international cooperation, providing a long-established and trusted institution for policy discussions informed by rigorous analysis. We stress that the IMF’s mandate to promote macroeconomic and financial stability remains as relevant as ever, and its role to support members in addressing macroeconomic challenges through analysis and policy advice, capacity development, and financing where relevant, is key. We agree on the need to ensure that the institution remains strong, quota-based, adequately resourced, and efficiently managed to fulfil its mandate at the center of the global financial safety net.

    We agree that a strong, inclusive, and representative governance framework is fundamental to maintaining the Fund’s credibility and legitimacy among its diverse membership. Strengthening IMF governance will support its continued ability to effectively promote consensus among the membership in addressing global challenges. These efforts are also essential to fostering multilateralism and international cooperation.

    Given the strategic importance of governance reforms, we recognize that progress toward consensus should be made in stages. In this context, we agree to develop as a first step a set of general principles to guide future discussions and help foster convergence of views. Work on these principles should be completed in a timely manner to help ensure the efficient progression of future General Reviews of Quotas (GRQs), including under the 17th GRQ. Establishing these guiding principles would help ensure that governance changes are gradual, widely acceptable, and reflective of the interests of the entire membership, as well as maintain the Fund’s financial soundness.

    The Way Forward

    We agree that implementation of the 16th GRQ remains a priority. We recognize that realignment in quota shares should aim at better reflecting members’ relative positions in the world economy, while protecting the voice of the poorest members. To build consensus on future governance reforms, including under the 17th GRQ, we call on the Executive Board to develop, by the 2026 Spring Meetings, a set of principles to guide future discussions on IMF quotas and governance, drawing from the deliberations by IMFC Deputies during their meeting in Diriyah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on April 6-7, 2025. We look forward to a discussion of the status of advancement of this work at our next meeting. We ask our Deputies to prepare for this discussion.

    INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL COMMITTEE

     ATTENDANCE 

    Chair

    Mohammed Aljadaan, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia

    Managing Director

    Kristalina Georgieva

    Members or Alternates

    Ayman Alsayari, Governor of the Saudi Central Bank, Saudi Arabia (Alternate for Mohammed Aljadaan, Minister of Finance, Saudi Arabia)

    Mohammed bin Hadi Al Hussaini, Minister of State for Financial Affairs, United Arab Emirates

    Edgar Amador Zamora, Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Mexico

    Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury, United States

    Edouard Normand Bigendako, Governor, Bank of the Republic of Burundi

    Luis Caputo, Minister of Economy, Argentina

    Tiff Macklem, Governor of the Bank of Canada (Alternate for Francois-Philippe Champagne, Minister of Finance, Canada)

    Sang Mok Choi, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea

    Giancarlo Giorgetti, Minister of Economy and Finance, Italy

    Gabriel Galipolo, Governor, Central Bank of Brazil (Alternate for Fernando Haddad, Minister of Finance, Brazil)

    Jan Jambon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Pensions, National Lottery and Federal Culture Institutions, Belgium

    Katsunobu Kato, Minister of Finance, Japan

    Daniela Stoffel, State Secretary for International Finance, Federal Department of Finance, Switzerland (Alternate for Karin Keller-Sutter, Minister of Finance, Switzerland)

    Lesetja Kganyago, Governor, South African Reserve Bank, South Africa

    Jörg Kukies, Federal Minister of the Ministry of Finance, Germany

    François Villeroy de Galhau, Governor of the Bank of France (Alternate for Eric Lombard, Minister for the Economy, Finance and Industrial and Digital Sovereignty, France)

    Adebayo Olawale Edun, Minister of Finance and the Coordinating Minister of the Economy, Nigeria

    Gongsheng Pan, Governor of the People’s Bank of China

    Rachel Reeves, Chancellor of the Exchequer, H.M. Treasury, United Kingdom

    Pavel Snisorenko, Director, Department of International Financial Relations (Alternate for Anton Siluanov, Minister of Finance, Russian Federation)

    Sanjay Malhotra, Governor, Reserve Bank of India (Alternate for Nirmala Sitharaman, Minister of Finance, India)

    Mehmet Simsek, Minister of Treasury and Finance, Republic of Türkiye

    Salah-Eddine Taleb, Governor, Bank of Algeria

    Perry Warjiyo, Governor, Bank of Indonesia

    Ida Wolden Bache, Governor, Bank of Norway

    Observers

    Agustín Carstens, General Manager, Bank for International Settlements (BIS)

    Elisabeth Svantesson, Chair, Development Committee (DC) and Minister for Finance, Sweden

    Christine Lagarde, President, European Central Bank (ECB)

    Valdis Dombrovskis, Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, European Commission (EC)

    Klaas Knot, Chair, Financial Stability Board (FSB) and President of De Nederlandsche Bank

    Celeste Drake, Deputy Director-General, International Labour Organization (ILO)

    Mathias Cormann, Secretary-General, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)

    Mohannad Alsuwaidan, Economic Analyst, Petroleum Studies Department, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

    Achim Steiner, UNDP Administrator, United Nations (UN)

    Rebeca Grynspan, Secretary-General, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

    Ajay Banga, President of the World Bank Group, The World Bank (WB)

    Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Director-General, World Trade Organization (WTO)

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    @IMFSpokesperson

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/25/pr-123-imfc-chairs-statement-fifty-first-meeting-of-the-imfc

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    April 26, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: In talking with Tehran, Trump is reversing course on Iran – could a new nuclear deal be next?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Jeffrey Fields, Associate Professor of the Practice of International Relations, USC Dornsife College of Letters, Arts and Sciences

    A mural on the outer walls of the former US embassy in Tehran depicts two men in negotiation. Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

    Negotiators from Iran and the United States are set to meet again in Oman on April 26, prompting hopes the two countries might be moving, albeit tentatively, toward a new nuclear accord.

    The scheduled talks follow the two previous rounds of indirect negotiations that have taken place under the new Trump administration. Those discussions were deemed to have yielded enough progress to merit sending nuclear experts from both sides to begin outlining the specifics of a potential framework for a deal.

    The development is particularly notable given that Trump, in 2018, unilaterally walked the U.S. away from a multilateral agreement with Iran. That deal, negotiated during the Obama presidency, put restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief. Trump{,} instead turned to a policy that involved tightening the financial screws on Iran through enhanced sanctions while issuing implicit military threats.

    But that approach failed to disrupt Iran’s nuclear program.

    Now, rather than revive the maximum pressure policy of his first term, Trump – ever keen to be seen as a dealmaker – has given his team the green light for the renewed diplomacy and even reportedly rebuffed, for now, Israel’s desire to launch military strikes against Tehran.

    Jaw-jaw over war-war

    The turn to diplomacy returns Iran-US relations to where they began during the Obama administration, with attempts to encourage Iran to curb or eliminate its ability to enrich uranium.

    Only this time, with the U.S. having left the previous deal in 2018, Iran has had seven years to improve on its enrichment capability and stockpile vastly more uranium than had been allowed under the abandoned accord.

    As a long-time expert on U.S. foreign policy and nuclear nonproliferation, I believe Trump has a unique opportunity to not only reinstate a similar nuclear agreement to the one he rejected, but also forge a more encompassing deal – and foster better relations with the Islamic Republic in the process.

    The front pages of Iran’s newspapers in a sidewalk newsstand in Tehran, Iran, on April 13, 2025.
    Alireza/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Images

    There are real signs that a potential deal could be in the offing, and it is certainly true that Trump likes the optics of dealmaking.

    But an agreement is by no means certain. Any progress toward a deal will be challenged by a number of factors, not least internal divisions and opposition within the Trump administration and skepticism among some in the Islamic Republic, along with uncertainty over a succession plan for the aging Ayatollah Khamenei.

    Conservative hawks are still abundant in both countries and could yet derail any easing of diplomatic tensions.

    A checkered diplomatic past

    There are also decades of mistrust to overcome.

    It is an understatement to say that the U.S. and Iran have had a fraught relationship, such as it is, since the Iranian revolution of 1979 and takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran the same year.

    Many Iranians would say relations have been strained since 1953, when the U.S. and the United Kingdom orchestrated the overthrow of Mohammad Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran.

    Washington and Tehran have not had formal diplomatic relations since 1979, and the two countries have been locked in a decadeslong battle for influence in the Middle East. Today, tensions remain high over Iranian support for a so-called axis of resistance against the West and in particular U.S. interests in the Middle East. That axis includes Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen.

    For its part, Tehran has long bristled at American hegemony in the region, including its resolute support for Israel and its history of military action. In recent years that U.S. action has included the direct assaults on Iranian assets and personnel. In particular, Tehran is still angry about the 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

    Standing atop these various disputes, Iran’s nuclear ambitions have proved a constant source of contention for the United States and Israel, the latter being the only nuclear power in the region.

    The prospect of warmer relations between the two sides first emerged during the Obama administration – though Iran sounded out the Bush administration in 2003 only to be rebuffed.

    U.S. diplomats began making contact with Iranian counterparts in 2009 when Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs William Burns met with an Iranian negotiator in Geneva. The so-called P5+1 began direct negotiations with Iran in 2013. This paved the way for the eventual Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2015. In that agreement – concluded by the U.S., Iran, China, Russia and a slew of European nations – Iran agreed to restrictions on its nuclear program, including limits on the level to which it could enrich uranium, which was capped well short of what would be necessary for a nuclear weapon. In return, multilateral and bilateral U.S. sanctions would be removed.

    Many observers saw it as a win-win, with the restraints on a burgeoning nuclear power coupled with hopes that greater economic engagement with the international community that might temper some of Iran’s more provocative foreign policy behavior.

    Yet Israel and Saudi Arabia worried the deal did not entirely eliminate Iran’s ability to enrich uranium, and right-wing critics in the U.S. complained it did not address Iran’s ballistic missile programs or support for militant groups in the region.

    Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, draws a red line on a graphic of a bomb while discussing Iran at the United Nations on Sept. 27, 2012.
    Mario Tama/Getty Images

    When Trump first took office in 2016, he and his foreign policy team pledged to reverse Obama’s course and close the door on any diplomatic opening. Making good on his pledge, Trump unilaterally withdrew U.S. support for the JCPOA despite Iran’s continued compliance with the terms of the agreement and reinstated sanctions.

    Donald the dealmaker?

    So what has changed? Well, several things.

    While Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA was welcomed by Republicans, it did nothing to stop Iran from enhancing its ability to enrich uranium.

    Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, eager to transform its image and diversify economically, now supports a deal it opposed during the Obama administration.

    In this second term, Trump’s anti-Iran impulses are still there. But despite his rhetoric of a military option should a deal not be struck, Trump has on numerous occasions stated his opposition to U.S. involvement in another war in the Middle East.

    In addition, Iran has suffered a number of blows in recent years that has left it more isolated in the region. Iranian-aligned Hamas and Hezbollah have been seriously weakened as a result of military action by Israel. Meanwhile, strikes within Iran by Israel have shown the potential reach of Israeli missiles – and the apparent willingness of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to use them. Further, the removal of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria has deprived Iran of another regional ally.

    Tehran is also contending with a more fragile domestic economy than it had during negotiations for JCPOA.

    With Iran weakened regionally and Trump’s main global focus being China, a diplomatic avenue with Iran seems entirely in line with Trump’s view of himself as a dealmaker.

    A deal is not a given

    With two rounds of meetings completed and the move now to more technical aspects of a possible agreement negotiated by experts, there appears to be a credible window of opportunity for diplomacy.

    This could mean a new agreement that retains the core aspects of the deal Trump previously abandoned. I’m not convinced a new deal will look any different from the previous in terms of the enrichment aspect.

    There are still a number of potential roadblocks standing in the way of any potential deal, however.

    As was the case with Trump’s meetings with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un during his first term, the president seems to be less interested in details than spectacle. While it was quite amazing for an American leader to meet with his North Korean counterpart, ultimately, no policy meaningfully changed because of it.

    On Iran and other issues, the president displays little patience for complicated policy details. Complicating matters is that the U.S. administration is riven by intense factionalism, with many Iran hawks who would be seemingly opposed to a deal – including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and national security adviser Mike Waltz. They could rub up against newly confirmed Undersecretary of Defense for policy Elbridge Colby and Vice President JD Vance, both of whom have in the past advocated for a more pro-diplomacy line on Iran.

    As has become a common theme in Trump administration foreign policy – even with its own allies on issues like trade – it’s unclear what a Trump administration policy on Iran actually is, and whether a political commitment exists to carry through any ultimate deal.

    Top Trump foreign policy negotiator Steve Witkoff, who has no national security experience, has exemplified this tension. Tasked with leading negotiations with Iran, Witkoff has already having been forced to walk back his contention that the U.S. was only seeking to cap the level of uranium enrichment rather than eliminate the entirety of the program.

    For its part, Iran has proved that it is serious about diplomacy, previously having accepted Barack Obama’s “extended hand.”

    But Tehran is unlikely to capitulate on core interests or allow itself to be humiliated by the terms of any agreement.

    Ultimately, the main question to watch is whether a deal with Iran is to be concluded by pragmatists – and then to what extent, narrow or expansive – or derailed by hawks within the administration.

    Jeffrey Fields receives funding from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

    – ref. In talking with Tehran, Trump is reversing course on Iran – could a new nuclear deal be next? – https://theconversation.com/in-talking-with-tehran-trump-is-reversing-course-on-iran-could-a-new-nuclear-deal-be-next-254770

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 26, 2025
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