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Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Future of Nuclear Energy: Lecture by Russia’s Leading Designer Vitaly Petrunin

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    The Institute of Energy hosted a lecture by the First Deputy General Director — General Designer of JSC Afrikantov OKBM, Honored Designer of the country Vitaly Petrunin. The topic of the speech was “Scientific and technical problems and prospects for the development of low-power nuclear power plants and atomic-hydrogen energy.”

    Vitaly Petrunin analyzed the role of nuclear energy in the Russian energy balance, examining its historical development and current state. In his speech, he emphasized that revolutionary leaps are impossible in the nuclear sphere, and development occurs in stages, in an evolutionary way.

    The expert presented a detailed analysis of the RITM-200 reactor plant used in nuclear icebreakers, as well as its land-based modification RITM-200N for SNPP. He highlighted the main differences between the ship and land-based versions, and spoke about scientific research into the reliability and safety of these solutions.

    The scientist examined key aspects of modern hydrogen production and its prospects. In the context of the predicted growth of the hydrogen market to 400 million tons by 2050, including a 20-fold increase in consumption in the transport sector, the expert particularly emphasized the need to switch to low-carbon production technologies. Nuclear-hydrogen solutions were presented as a promising direction for decarbonization of this sector of the Russian economy.

    “It is a great honor for me to learn directly from the creators of low-power reactors about a project that is today called one of the most promising in the field of peaceful atomic energy. The lecture was extremely informative, but the main thing is that I received answers to questions that I had been looking for for a long time and which are almost not covered in the literature,” said Yaroslav Vladimirov, Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Energy.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: NSU is represented in 10 RAEX subject rankings

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    Yesterday, the RAEX agency for the fourth time published subject rankings of the “Three University Missions” family. The lists of the best included 166 universities from 40 regions of Russia. This year, ratings were prepared in 35 subject areas – mathematics, a wide range of natural science and engineering specialties, social and humanitarian areas, etc. The ratings were formed on the basis of only objective data, the results of expert surveys were not used. NSU is represented in 10 ratings – 2 more than in 2024. Among the new areas in which the university is positioned are “information technology” and “mechanical engineering and robotics”.

    NSU took the highest positions in the areas of “biology” and “chemistry”: the university entered the top 3 best universities in Russia. NSU is also in 5th place in “physics” and in 6th place in “mathematics”. The university’s positions in these four subject areas have not changed compared to last year.

    The university improved its position in “information technology”: last year NSU was not positioned in this area, and compared to 2023, it rose by 2 positions and took 17th place. In “history and archeology”, it rose by one position and entered the top 10; in “sociology” – by 3 positions and took 11th place. For the first time this year, NSU is positioned in “mechanical engineering and robotics”: the university took 11th place.

    — Novosibirsk State University traditionally occupies high positions in the natural sciences. The Faculty of Natural Sciences, the Physics Department and the Mechanics and Mathematics Department are known at the federal and global level, so applicants from all over the country come to us. Thus, at the Faculty of Natural Sciences, the share of out-of-town students exceeds 70%. The university also has strong training in the field of information technology, and NSU is currently actively developing such a promising area as artificial intelligence and machine learning. In the new educational model, we pay attention to the engineering research track. We have achieved significant results in this area, which is confirmed by our fairly high positions in the subject ranking for “mechanical engineering and robotics”, which we entered for the first time this year, — commented NSU Rector, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Mikhail Fedoruk.

    Reference:

    Subject rankings are based on the assessment of three university missions: educational, scientific, and social. When assessing the first — educational — mission of universities, the quality of training of enrolled applicants, the university’s staffing, the competitiveness of the master’s program, the amount of funding, the results of students’ performance at Russian student Olympiads, and the number of massive online courses are assessed.

    The indicators of the Science group include bibliometric indicators (publications and their citations), according to the Web of Science and RSCI databases, research income adjusted for scale, the scale of training highly qualified personnel (postgraduate studies), the number of dissertation defenses, as well as the share of extra-budgetary sources in the total volume of expenditure on scientific research and development.

    When assessing the third, public mission of universities, both subject and institutional indicators related to the university as a whole were taken into account. For example, the university’s contribution to training personnel for the region, the share of students in the field on a national scale, the share of target students, the share of first-year students from other regions.

    The methodology of subject rankings is developed taking into account the characteristic features of different spheres. Therefore, subject rankings use different sets of indicators and different weights. Thus, for the natural sciences and engineering areas, the weight of the “Science” group is 35%, while for the social and humanitarian spheres it is 25%. The weight of the “Education” group indicators for the natural sciences and engineering areas is 40%, while for the social and humanitarian spheres it is 50%. All indicators of the third group, “Society”, in both cases are 25%.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Minister for European Union Relations’ Lecture at the Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Minister for European Union Relations’ Lecture at the Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe

    A lecture delivered by the Minister for European Union Relations, The Rt Hon Nick Thomas-Symonds, at the Conference on Baltic Studies in Europe, University of Cambridge

    Introduction

    It’s a pleasure to be here with you all. Before I begin, I would like to thank the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies for hosting this important conference.

    I would also like to thank my friend Charles Clarke, not only for the invitation to speak here today.

    [political content removed]

    As part of that career, his time as Home Secretary, he had to deal daily with the implications of a complex and dangerous world, encapsulated by the heinous 7/7 attacks.

    While the nature of the threats our country faces have evolved since then – we know that the threats to our security, our economy and way of life are as pronounced now as they have been at any time in post war history.

    And these challenges do not just face the UK – or any one of our allies – alone; we face them, together. Therefore, it is crucial to ask how we can leverage our longstanding international relationships – and build upon them – to face these challenges together.

    The United Kingdom and the Baltic States enjoy an alliance built on shared values, on open trade, on a strategic, robust approach to defence.

    We respect one another, and it is through this respect that we work alongside each other – whether directly or through international organisations – to the benefit of our societies.

    Our citizens not only celebrate freedoms, but also realise that they are hard won and must be defended.

    I believe that – through the UK’s mission to go beyond the status quo with the European Union and grow our strategic alliance with our biggest trading partner – we could build on our relationship even further, to make us more prosperous, safer and better defended.

    I should clarify that – in the spirit of this broad alliance – while I will mainly be talking about Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, I will also be touching on the Baltic Sea States, the other countries that share the same icy waters, including Sweden, Poland and Finland, which I understand follows the remit of this centre.

    Relationship with the Baltics

    Just over a month ago, the Times journalist Oliver Moody gave a talk at this university – at the Centre for Geopolitics – about his book ‘Baltic: The Future of Europe’.

    He spoke about the remarkable journey that the Baltic Sea States have taken over the last century: not just armed conflict, but the push and pull between independence, occupation and independence again.

    Reflecting on where we are now, he said: “This is the most coherent that north-eastern Europe has ever been. You have the Nordic and Baltic States working on a more equal footing than ever before, you have Poland starting to look north, and Germany is getting more involved”. He capped his remarks off by saying that this teamwork would have delighted the former Prime Minister of Estonia – Jaan Tonisson – who campaigned for a Scandinavian Superstate in 1917. Moody said that this cooperation is nothing short of “Jaan Tonisson’s dream, on steroids”.

    That claim is probably for the experts in this room to take a view on, but what is clear is the sheer depth of the shared objectives, opportunities and challenges.

    When you consider the history of these countries, this state of play is all the more remarkable. After all, to study the 20th Century developments of the Baltic States is to study world history. I am proud to say that, in many ways, the United Kingdom has been a positive part of that history, especially with Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

    When the British public were rejoicing throughout the UK on Armistice Day in 1918, the Royal Navy had no time to rest, as they started their campaign in the Baltic. They were playing their part to establish an independent Estonia and Latvia, providing weapons, ammunition and much-needed support, where over 100 naval servicemen bravely lost their lives for Baltic independence. In May 2022, the UK and Lithuania agreed a Joint Declaration to mark 100 years of bilateral relations, but it also looked towards the future. It outlined an agreement to boost defence and security collaboration, build closer trade ties, and promote people-to-people links.

    We already start from a strong place, as the UK is a home to many Baltic people – well over 350,000 of them.

    We host Latvia’s largest diaspora, as well as Lithuania’s and Estonian’s largest European diaspora. Our trading relationship is positive, which accounts for over £6bn in goods and services – up from last year. Who would have thought, from just over thirty years of Estonian independence, that there would be an Estonian bank running offices in London, Manchester and Leeds, or an Estonian defence company setting up a production facility for air defence missiles in Wales.

    I greatly admire the spirit, the fortitude and the determination of the Baltic States; they have known what it is to lose their freedom, their independence and – as a result – are embracing its benefits. The Baltic tech sector – for example – has one of the strongest and most innovative ecosystems within Europe, a fact elegantly demonstrated at this year’s Oscars, when a wholly digitally designed film from Latvia won the Best Animated Feature, against long-established studios like the US’s Pixar and the UK’s Aardman Animations.  

    Many Baltic firms are key investors in the UK, and have excelled in areas where others have stumbled, because they have had a clear focus on innovation and progress.

    Indeed, I have deeply appreciated my time with the Baltic Sea States. Last year, in Opposition, I visited Estonia – to meet with various leaders who are working tirelessly to defend their homeland. I was struck not only by the scale of the Russian threat their face – especially in areas like cyber-warfare – but also by their determination to rise to that challenge.

    Also, during a visit to Stockholm, I went to the SAAB Headquarters – who recently announced that they will be supplying the Latvian Government with a short-range ground-based air defence system. We spoke openly about the importance of cross-Europe defence, and they were very grateful for the UK’s renewed focus on European defence, and the Prime Minister’s leadership.

    Ukraine

    This historic collaboration – these well-defined relationships – only adds to our collective strength when we consider countering the complex situation, facing the world reshaped by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

    Of course, to many of the Baltic Sea States, Russian aggression is nothing new. Indeed, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are ardent supporters of the Ukrainian fighters seeking to overcome this illegal Russian invasion. And they have shown this support in many ways – including as key hosts for Ukrainian refugees. According to the U.S. think tank The Wilson Centre, Estonia has hosted approximately 40,000 Ukrainian refugees, Latvia has around 50,000, and Lithuania has issued more than 50,000 visas.  A record of support that the UK also shares, and I am proud of the role my own constituency is playing in hosting Ukrainian families.

    In stepping up to defend the freedoms the UK and Baltic nations enjoy we recognise the hard-won sovereignty and dignity which the Baltic States have worked so hard to secure.

    I know from my own personal experience from meeting those defence officials – many with frontline experience on their border with Russia and Ukraine – that the threat they feel is not theoretical, it is existential. The defence of the Baltic Sea is – unquestionably – as important now as ever. That is why NATO takes this issue so seriously, launching the ‘Baltic Sentry’ mission to increase surveillance of ships crossing those cold waters.

    The UK also takes the security of the Nordic and Baltic states incredibly seriously. It’s why we were so supportive of NATO expansion for Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia – and others – in 2004. As the then UK Prime Minister – and Charles’s former boss – Tony Blair, said these invitations meant “a significant contribution to European security, and secures the place of the new Allies in the Euro-Atlantic community”.

    It’s also why we formed – with our Baltic counterparts and Nordic countries – the Joint Expeditionary Force, set up in 2018. To ensure our commitment to European security and international stability remains strong.

    It was only in November last year that we demonstrated the effectiveness of this Force with ‘Exercise Joint Protector’. More than 300 personnel were deployed to Liepāja in Latvia, and worked with staff in the UK. This – and the many other exercises the Force has undertaken – shows just how ready we and our partners are to respond to crises in the Baltic and Nordic regions.

    Keir visited British troops serving with NATO in December 2023 in Estonia.  There is an incredibly powerful image of him on that trip – standing with our brave troops.  Showing how committed he is to supporting the vital work they do, working with NATO allies to keep this continent safe.

    [Political content removed]

    The UK and Euro-Atlantic Security

    Here in the UK, we have been unequivocal about the need to bolster security across the European continent. We must look at how we safeguard each other – through our alliances; NATO, the Joint Expeditionary Force and through direct country-to-country connections too.

    We need to work better together on key issues facing our continent’s security. I mean everything – from how we improve our defence capabilities to ensuring we have the technological edge in conflict, how we finance these improvements, to how we bolster our industrial capacity across the continent. The Prime Minister will make this point on the world stage at the Joint Expeditionary Force Summit in Oslo next month, and NATO’s Hague Summit in June.

    Much of this work is underway. You may have seen His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales visit British troops in Estonia last month, who – under Operation Cabrit – are providing a deterrent to Russian aggression, bolstering NATO’s presence in Europe.

    At the centre of this is our absolute commitment to securing a just and lasting peace in Ukraine. The Prime Minister has been clear that for this plan to succeed, it must have strong US backing – and he is working closely with President Trump on this. I know other leaders – including those in the Baltics – have joined the chorus demanding that Ukraine’s voice must be at the heart of any talks.

    The importance of this cannot be overstated. Indeed, it was a point the Prime Minister made absolutely clear at the ‘Leading the Future’ Summit hosted here in the UK. There, he convened the ‘Coalition of the Willing’, building on our efforts to put pressure on Putin, keep military aid flowing to Ukraine and strengthen sanctions on the Russian war machine. This was followed by the announcement from the Defence Secretary of an additional £450m to Ukraine, which will fund hundreds of thousands of new drones, anti-tanks mines and supplies to make necessary repairs to military vehicles.

    This work is of vital importance. When Europe is under threat, then the Europeans have to – and are – stepping up on defence and security.

    We are living through a generational moment in the history of our continent. This is a point I made at a recent Baltic Breakfast event where I welcomed the further expansion of NATO to include Finland and Sweden. With both these countries, we are building on our defence and security relationship – whether it’s the strategic partnership we share with Sweden or the Memorandum of Understanding between the UK and Finland on civil nuclear, strengthening our energy security.

    The UK knows we have a responsibility to help secure the continent and that, even though we have left the EU, we would never turn our back on our allies in Europe. That’s why we have committed to reaching 2.5% of GDP on defence spending by 2027, with an ambition to achieve 3% in the next parliament. In practice, that means spending over £13 billion more on defence every year from 2027. This is the biggest sustained increase in defence spending since the Cold War, and it will safeguard our collective security and fund the capabilities, technology and industrial capacity needed to keep the UK and our allies safe for generations to come.

    It has been good to see other European nations doing the same, especially across the Baltic States. Lithuania continues to set the standard within NATO. Your desire to increase defence spending to 5% or even 6% GDP is admirable. Latvia now spends 3.45% of its GDP on defence, and is investing heavily in areas, such as air and coastal defence. And Estonia is aspiring to increase defence spending to 5% of its GDP.

    Given the political context, it is of vital importance for European countries to take on responsibility for their own security. As one of Europe’s leading NATO powers, it is essential that the UK and the EU work together to strengthen European security. We have substantial shared interests and objectives and, crucially, we both have the means and influence to effect change on a global stage.

    But we cannot shy away from the reality of the situation we find ourselves in. Europe faces war on the continent, as well as an urgent need to ramp up our collective defence capabilities, and we have already seen a step-change in European cooperation.

    At the same time the UK and EU are facing global economic challenges. These are shared problems which require a collective response, with mutual interests.

    And I believe a firm alliance between the UK and the EU is undeniably a part of that – and mutually beneficial. We need to put an end to ideology and build a new strengthened partnership with Europe.

    Now, Charles, I promise not to make a point of mentioning you throughout my lecture, but I wanted to touch on something from the recent past.

    After he left Government, Charles became the Visiting Professor at the University of East Anglia for their School of Political, Social and International Studies, where – during a series of lectures – he posited the idea of the ‘Too Difficult Box’, the place where important political decisions get put when things got too complicated to solve.

    As he explained in a lecture eleven years ago at the University of South Wales – just south of my constituency of Torfaen – plenty of short-term challenges face politicians when they are trying to solve the long-term problems this country faces, which means decisions get delayed, politicians don’t feel empowered or convinced enough to act, the ‘Too Difficult Box’ fills up.

    I think everyone in this room can recognise at least one important national decision that has been left to grow dust in the ‘Too Difficult Box’.

    Which is why this Government has chosen to behave differently towards our national interests. Indeed, it is precisely the difficulty of our challenges which urges us to act. The ‘Plan for Change’ recognises the complex world we live in and redefines the way that Central Government responds to the problems of the day, to work across-Departments to tackle some of the most challenging problems we face – whether it’s breaking down the barriers to opportunity, making the UK a clean energy superpower, or building an NHS that is fit for the future.

    At the heart of all of this work are what we call our ‘Strong Foundations’, which are economic stability, secure borders and national security. To me, these priorities are inseparable; you cannot have one without the other two.

    I also believe that our relationship with the European Union has an important role in these foundations, we must find pragmatic solutions that work in the national interest.

    The kind of pragmatic approach that Charles promoted with the ‘Too Difficult Box’ is exactly the kind of approach we must take when redefining our relationship with the EU, as we move towards a strengthened partnership with our biggest trading partner.

    So far, by my count, we have seen over seventy different direct engagements between UK Ministers and their EU counterparts.

    This work was exemplified by the meeting the Prime Minister had with the President of the European Commission last October, a meeting where both agreed to put our relationship on a more solid, stable footing. They agreed to work together on some of the most pressing global challenges including economic headwinds, geopolitical competition, irregular migration, climate change and energy prices. In December, the Chancellor attended a meeting of the EU finance ministers – the first time a British Chancellor has been invited to the Eurogroup since Brexit. And I have been having regular meetings with my counterpart Maroš Šefčovič to maintain forward momentum on our shared agendas.

    However, I want to be clear: we fully respect the choice made by the British public to leave the European Union, that was clear in our manifesto.  As were the clear red lines we set out, around the Customs Union, the Single Market and Freedom of Movement.   

    We are also demonstrating our role as good faith actors through the implementation of the Trade and Co-operation Agreement and the Windsor Framework.

    But I also believe that this global moment requires us to go further. It is an opportunity to build our partnership – where our continental security is paramount, where our collective safety is guaranteed, where our respective economies flourish together. It is in our mutual self interest. 

    The Three Pillars

    I mentioned that the defining structure of our future relationship with the European Union has three important pillars – prosperity, safety and security.

    On prosperity, we must boost growth and living standards, by creating export and investment opportunities for UK business and reducing barriers to trade with our biggest trading partners.

    Already we have started work on this. We have said that we will seek to negotiate a Sanitary and Phytosanitary agreement – which is one of the clear barriers to trade across the continent, and it was particularly pleasing to see a number of UK businesses writing in last weekend’s Financial Times supporting this plan.

    Let me turn to safety. Now, of all audiences, I don’t need to explain the importance of a strong and secure border, but we must do all we can to strengthen our continental collective ability to tackle organised crime and criminality, working together on irregular migration. We see – every day – the threats across our continent from criminals with no respect for international borders.  From terrorism, to vile people smuggling gangs and drug smugglers – the threat to our communities is real. If we want to protect our respective borders and keep our citizens safe, then we need to work together.

    Already, we have made important progress on this work. Within the first few weeks of coming into power, the Prime Minister stated that border security would be at the very heart of our plans to reset our relationship with the European Union. We have committed to deepening our partnerships with Europol and its European Migrant Smuggling Centre. But I believe that we can go further in this work. We need to find ways to better coordinate law enforcement. We must do all we can to strengthen the tools available to aid our collective ability to tackle organised crime, which will only lead to more secure borders.

    We recognise that the Baltic states have faced a unique challenge when it comes to irregular migration, Russian led instrumentalisation of migration is an appalling use of human beings for political gain.

    I saw the nature of this myself on a recent visit to the Polish / Belarussian border. We absolutely condemn states instrumentalising human beings and putting them in danger, and support efforts to combat this issue at the EU’s external border. Whilst the UK may face different migration challenges, there are clear commonalities – underlining the imperative of working together on the shared priority of securing our borders.

    Which brings me on to the final point, security. I have made clear throughout this lecture that we must respond to the collective security challenge that we all face. An ambitious UK-EU security and defence relationship must be a part of this.

    All of us in the UK Government appreciate the steps that the EU is taking on this, and we welcome their recent Defence White Paper, which recognises the UK as an “essential European ally”. But we should also recognise the importance of the Baltic Sea States within that Paper.

    As Oliver Moody pointed out in his talk, the significance and the symbolism of that paper cannot be overlooked. He said: “It was presented by an Estonian high representative, a Lithuanian defence commissioner, with a great deal of input from a Latvian economics commissioner, a Polish budget commissioner, a Finnish vice-president of the commission for technological sovereignty and security, all in tandem under the leadership of a German president of the European Commission […] this would have been completely unimaginable in the 1990s.”

    He’s right to point out the importance of this unity, both in the Baltic region and across our continent. 

    We have made it clear to our EU partners that we are ready to negotiate a Security & Defence Partnership with the EU. We believe it should build on the EU’s existing partnership agreements with other third countries, while recognising the unique nature of our security relationship. It will complement NATO and our NATO First approach, while boosting our bilateral cooperation with European partners.

    But we want to go further, trying to create new ways to ramp up our defence industrial capacity, financing and capability development.

    UK-EU Summit

    All of these points I have mentioned will no doubt be crucial discussion points when the UK welcomes European Union leaders to the first UK-EU Leaders’ Summit on 19th May.

    The Prime Minister will host the President of the European Council, António Costa, and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.

    The Summit will provide an opportunity to make further progress on our shared priorities and we shall set out further details in due course. What I can tell you now is that this will be the first of regular UK-EU summits, which we committed to when the Prime Minister met the President of the European Commission in October last year. We expect these to take place annually, in addition to regular engagements at Ministerial level, recognising that new agreements will take time to agree.

    Conclusion

    Ladies and gentlemen, it is clear to me that the future of Europe – whether that’s innovative businesses or the most resilient of responses to Russian aggression – has a home in the Baltic.

    The UK wants to be an important part of that future, and we are working hard – right across the Government – to change our relationship with the EU for the mutual benefit of all European states.

    We are living through a time of generational challenge to our very way of life.  I know that in the face of this, an alliance – across our continent, in pursuit of freedom – will be vital.

    So, I thank all of you here for your interest in this vital area, I thank Charles for the invitation to address this group – and I look forward to working with many of you to deliver a secure and prosperous future for our people.

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: “Engineers of Victory” was shown in the White Hall

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    For three days, the White Hall hosted a theatrical performance dedicated to the memory of the Polytechnic students and teachers who participated in the Great Patriotic War. Students from all areas of SPbPU training were involved in this large-scale event. The audience and performers were united by the desire to preserve the historical truth and convey it through art.

    The play “Engineers of Victory” became an important part of the events of the Polytechnic University dedicated to the celebration of the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.

    The contribution of our university to the Victory is great. More than 4.5 thousand Polytechnicians fought at the front, the hydro corps housed a school for riflemen and radio operators, and the main building housed a hospital. Thanks to the engineers of the Polytechnic Institute, some of the best guns in the history of military equipment went on combat duty. From the stage of the White Hall, they told about the graduate of the mechanical engineering faculty Mikhail Koshkin, who created the legendary T-34 tank, about the graduate of the electromechanical faculty Pyotr Kapitsa, who received liquid oxygen and saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of soldiers, about the Road of Life, about the protection of the navy from the enemy mine threat. But the most poignant moment of the production was the voiced letters from the front line.

    “We listened with special trepidation to the letters of students who went to the front,” shared IMMIT first-year student Sofya Kochkina. “And when you see their portraits with the date of their death, it is impossible to hold back your tears. They were the same age as us!”

    The production about the Polytechnic students of the war years involved today’s students: soloists of the SPbPU pop-symphony orchestra, members of the Student Theatre, the Polyhymnia Youth Choir, the Polytechnic Chamber Choir, and students of the Humanities Institute, which made the performance unusually touching and symbolic.

    Particular attention in the stage action was given to the atmosphere – lighting, video footage, sound effects allowed the audience to immerse themselves in the events of those years, to feel the pain of loss and the joy of Victory.

    “The audience stood up to the sounds of the metronome, because there was no other way to listen to the beats, which became a call to freeze and remember the Polytechnicians, whose portraits floated like a river through the White Hall as the Immortal Regiment. The audience also stood up when the choir performed the final composition, “Where does the Motherland begin?” said Marina Arkannikova, scriptwriter and director of the production “Engineers of Victory”, director of the Higher School of Media Communications and Public Relations of the State Institute of Culture, artistic director of the Directorate of Cultural Programs and Youth Creativity. “Of course, the production was special for all of us. This is our duty to the fallen heroes of the Great Patriotic War and such an important need today to talk to young people about our great historical past as part of our identity, about our contribution to the present and future of humanity.”

    The production, created by the Directorate of Cultural Programs and Youth Creativity with the support of the Polytechnic Museum, became a living history lesson for students.

    In a few days, the Immortal Regiment will “stand” on the SPbPU campus and on the territory of student dormitories — 80 portraits of polytechnic students who went to the front from their student days — so that everyone can feel that the Great Victory is backed by the lives of those who studied at our university, so that May 9 will forever become not only a date on the calendar, but also the history of every heart.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Polytechnic University, Xi’an University Strengthen Cooperation at Anniversary Meeting

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    A delegation from Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University visited Xi’an University of Technology. The visit was led by Vice-Rector for Educational Activities Lyudmila Pankova. SPbPU representatives took part in the ceremonial events dedicated to the 70th anniversary of one of the leading technical universities in China.

    This visit was an important step in the development of a long-term strategic partnership between the two universities, which includes joint educational programs, scientific research and academic exchanges. The meeting began with a reception of the SPbPU delegation by the President of STU, Professor Yao Yao, who noted that cooperation between the universities, which officially began in 2018, is developing dynamically. During this time, significant progress has been achieved in joint projects, including the establishment of the Joint Polytechnic Institute in 2023 – a key link in the training of engineering personnel for Russia and China. President Yao Yao proposed expanding cooperation in master’s and postgraduate educational programs.

    Lyudmila Pankova conveyed congratulations from SPbPU Rector Andrey Rudskoy, who in his address called STU “a forge of talents” and emphasized that the joint initiatives of the two universities laid a solid foundation for long-term partnership. In response, the Chinese colleagues expressed gratitude for the support and noted that interaction with the Polytechnic University opens up new opportunities for students and researchers of both countries.

    The central event of the visit was the participation of the SPbPU delegation in a symposium on international education, where Lyudmila Pankova gave a report on “A New Model of Personnel Training to Achieve Technological Leadership”. In her speech, she shared the Polytechnic University’s experience in implementing innovative educational programs aimed at training specialists capable of responding to the challenges of the global economy.

    During the talks with Vice-Rector for Education and International Affairs Yan Li and Director of the Joint Polytechnic Institute STU-SPbPU Niu Tongjin, the parties discussed further development of cooperation, including expansion of student exchanges, joint research projects in the field of new materials, artificial intelligence and energy, as well as deepening interaction within the Joint Polytechnic Institute. The SPbPU delegation also visited advanced laboratories and research centers of STU, where they got acquainted with the latest developments of Chinese scientists.

    The visit ended with a constructive dialogue. Representatives of both universities confirmed their interest in further developing cooperation in science, education and technology, emphasizing the importance of sustainable ties between Russia and China.

    “Our cooperation with Xi’an University of Technology is not just an exchange of knowledge, but the creation of a single educational space where breakthrough ideas are born. The joint polytechnic institute has become a living example of how the academic traditions of Russia and the innovative potential of China are united to train highly qualified specialists of the new generation. Those who will determine the technological landscape of tomorrow,” noted Lyudmila Pankova.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: International Book Day at the State University of Management was celebrated with a presentation of an author’s collection and a discussion on the role of AI in literature

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On April 23, 2025, on International Book and Copyright Day, the Scientific Library of the State University of Management held a ceremony to present author’s copies of the collection of creative works “Towards Happiness” based on the materials of the II Inter-University Festival of Book Clubs “Living Hat”.

    Among the authors of the collection were representatives of Russian universities and colleges:

    State University of Management; All-Russian State University of Cinematography named after S.A. Gerasimov; State University of Education; College of Telecommunications of Moscow Technical University of Communications and Informatics; Moscow Business Academy; Moscow State University of Psychology and Education; Kutafin Moscow State Law University (MSAL); Moscow Financial and Industrial University “Synergy”; National Research Nuclear University MEPhI; Russian University of Sport “GTSOLIFK”; Plekhanov Russian University of Economics; Saint Petersburg State University; Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation.

    The meeting was opened by the Rector’s Advisor, Head of the Department of State and Municipal Administration, and member of the Union of Writers of Russia, Sergei Chuev.

    “Now every author can publish his work, but being published among the best is a great source of pride for the author,” said Sergei Vladimirovich.

    Director of the Scientific Library of the State University of Management Olga Kharlamova expressed gratitude to the participants for their attention to the Inter-University Festival of Book Clubs “Living Hat” and invited them to join the work of the festival’s organizing committee in November.

    The head of the Literary and Theatre Club “GUUmanist”, a leading specialist of the Institute of Distance Education of the State University of Management Tatyana Rachek noted that such meetings are a huge incentive to support cultural values, to form patriotism in young people, and wished all participants of future competitions and festivals inspiration and new ideas.

    Leading specialist of the Scientific Library Evgeniya Drits invited new clubs to participate in the Festival in 2025.

    After the award ceremony, an interesting discussion took place. One of the main questions was whether it is acceptable to use AI in literature:

    Can neural networks be trusted to create full-fledged works of art? Does AI help develop a writer’s imagination or, on the contrary, hinder the manifestation of creative individuality? Should AI’s work be perceived as a threat to classical creativity or as a useful tool to support the writer?

    The participants spoke openly and sincerely, with many arguments and examples from personal experience. Some said that AI is a new thing, and, like everything new, we are free to treat it with caution. But this does not mean that neural networks are bad. Their use is acceptable in the context of helping the author. Others insisted that the use of neural networks in literature is unacceptable, and AI is only good for pulp novels. Some supported the idea that AI helps to complete images, complement existing ideas. It is just a tool, it does not generate texts entirely and can only help a person, but not replace him. And neural networks that generate images help aspiring authors who want to promote their work, but cannot afford the services of an illustrator. In this case, AI is beneficial, since it helps to promote new talents. Most participants agreed that artificial intelligence can really become an excellent assistant to a writer, complementing and enriching creative ideas. It is important to remember that true art is created by man, and the tools only support the flight of his imagination.

    The authors shared stories about their first attempt at writing, discussed the problem of the author’s responsibility for their readers, and reflected on imitating the style of the greats. They also read their poems and prose. The participants of the event left autographs and good wishes for the Scientific Library of the State University of Management.

    Representatives of book, literary, and poetry clubs highly appreciated the initiative of the Scientific Library of the State University of Management to form an active community that supports cultural values, uniting students who are passionate about reading, and supporting the creativity of young authors.

    The collection “Towards Happiness” is already in the collection of the Scientific Library of the State University of Management.

    Until next time, full of warmth, smiles and interesting conversations!

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/25/2025

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: A representative of Setl Group held a master class on the Renga program for the finalists of the TIM Championship

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – During the master class

    In the era of import substitution and well-known geopolitical events, the focus of attention of enterprises, developers, and educational institutions is focused on the transition to domestic digital solutions. The finalists of the All-Russian TIM Championship at SPbGASU. SPO League 2025 developed competition projects in the Renga program – a Russian comprehensive BIM system for automated three-dimensional design using the technology of information modeling of buildings and structures. Therefore, the master class of the chief engineer of the architectural bureau “Setl Group” Dmitry Sergeev aroused keen interest among the contestants.

    “When assessing the situation with foreign vendors, we tested many domestic products. We took into account the labor costs associated with them, time, capabilities, compliance with the standards that we need to organize the work process. Renga was the best choice. But we understood that for objective reasons, third-party libraries would not work for us, because some contain slightly different information, while others do not have what we need at all. Therefore, we created our own library of standard elements that we and our clients use in modeling. A year later, we made it widely available: anyone can download it for use both for educational purposes and for work. As a pilot project, we designed a standard residential complex of varying heights in Renga, the highest section is 23 floors. And then we realized that the existing computers could not handle the full model, so we divided it into sections. Subsequently, we purchased more powerful computers,” said Dmitry Sergeev.

    Using this project as an example, the expert explained the entire design process step by step, including water supply, electricity and other utilities, architectural drawings, and finishing materials. In addition, he clarified how and why the team made this or that decision during the design process.

    “All this work is carried out by teams, which include many young specialists. Our architectural bureau is happy to employ them. There is a mentoring system for adaptation, so we will be glad to see you in our architectural bureau. For internships, employment, you can contact the career start on our company’s website by sending an application,” concluded Dmitry Sergeev.

    Victoria Zinchenko, a student at the Novgorod Construction College, noted that she was pleased to listen to a lecture directly from an industry representative working at Renga.

    “It was interesting to learn how the bureau created all the families for further work in the program. We work on this software at college, and I believe that even with the existing nuances, the program can become a worthy competitor in the market. I am very grateful to the organizers for the opportunity to gain such practical knowledge about it,” Victoria shared.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Digital Transformation of Management: All-Russian Conference Held at GUU

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On April 24, the Institute of Information Systems of the State University of Management hosted the VII All-Russian scientific and practical conference “Digital Transformation of Management: Problems and Solutions”.

    Traditionally, the purpose of the conference is to exchange experience, information, and research results between scientists from leading universities, practicing specialists from IT companies, and start-up entrepreneurship, shaping the formation of “education-business-science” clusters.

    The organizers selected the best reports for participation, reflecting the modern scientific and practical interests of scientists from leading Russian universities in the field of developing digital solutions and control automation: State University of Management, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow Aviation Institute, Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, Saratov State Technical University named after Yu.A. Gagarin, Crimean Federal University named after Vernadsky, Kazan Innovative University, etc.

    The event discussed issues of forming an individualized educational trajectory using a composition of educational technologies, integrating artificial intelligence into management processes, ensuring corporate information security, priorities and drivers of digitalization in agribusiness, using unmanned aerial vehicles and building platform solutions and hybrid DSS for managing processes in agriculture, developing a computer vision model for detecting documentary areas of interest, using mathematical modeling tools for analyzing mortgage lending, labor migration, etc.

    At the conference, Sergei Golovashov, Head of the Competence Center at Bell Integrator, also shared his experience in ensuring corporate information security.

    It is noteworthy that young scientists took an active part in this year’s conference: senior bachelors, master’s students and postgraduates of the IIS SUM.

    Participants of the conference “Digital Transformation of Management: Problems and Solutions” noted that holding such scientific events has great theoretical and practical significance for improving the processes of digitalization of management and solving new problems that arise as challenges to the development of modern society.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/25/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: GUU took part in the discussion of the ECG rating and the role of large families in the development of Russia

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    Director of the Center for Assessment and Development of Management Competencies of the State University of Management Anton Velichko, as part of the national standard project “Index of Business Reputation of Entrepreneurs (EKG-rating)”, took part in the work of the Annual All-Russian Scientific and Practical Conference of the D. I. Mendeleyev Institute of Demographic Policy “From the Year of the Family to the Century of the Family”.

    The plenary session of the conference was attended by Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Deputy Chairperson of the Presidential Council for the Implementation of State Demographic and Family Policy Tatyana Golikova, Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Central Federal District, member of the Presidential Council for the Implementation of State Demographic and Family Policy Igor Shchegolev, Head of the Presidential Administration for Public Projects Sergei Novikov, Chairman of the State Fund for Support of Participants of the NVO “Defenders of the Fatherland”, State Secretary – Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Anna Tsivileva, Chairperson of the Federation Council Committee on Science, Education and Culture, Executive Secretary of the Presidential Council for the Implementation of State Demographic and Family Policy Liliya Gumerova and others.

    The event was attended by more than 400 representatives of government bodies, scientific, educational and public organizations, and businesses.

    The past Year of the Family allowed us not only to focus on the demographic agenda, but also to understand the fact that the Russian family should never again fall out of the sight of the state and society if we are talking about the preservation and development of the Russian nation and statehood.

    The aim of the conference is to find effective solutions in the area of population conservation and improvement of demographic policy, as well as corporate practices to support families with children.

    The annual All-Russian scientific and practical conference of the D. I. Mendeleyev Institute of Demographic Policy “From the Year of the Family to the Century of the Family” is organized with the support of the Administration of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/25/2025

    Центра оценки и развития управленческих компетенций ГУУ Антон Величко в рамках проекта национальный стандарт «Индекс деловой репутации субъектов предпринимательской деятельности (ЭКГ-рейтинг)» принял участие в работе Ежегодной всероссийской научно-практической конференции Института демографической политики имени Д….” data-yashareImage=”https://guu.ru/wp-content/uploads/IMG_9380-scaled.jpg” data-yashareLink=”https://guu.ru/%d0%b3%d1%83%d1%83-%d0%bf%d1%80%d0%b8%d0%bd%d1%8f%d0%bb-%d1%83%d1%87%d0%b0%d1%81%d1%82%d0%b8%d0%b5-%d0%b2-%d0%be%d0%b1%d1%81%d1%83%d0%b6%d0%b4%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b8-%d1%8d%d0%ba%d0%b3-%d1%80%d0%b5/”>

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Successes in Reverse Engineering: GUU Project Receives Positive Opinion from RAS

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    The research team of the State University of Management, implementing the project “Development of scientific and methodological foundations for managing technological processes of reverse engineering in the transport industry of mechanical engineering”, received a positive conclusion from the Russian Academy of Sciences based on the results of the reporting period in 2024.

    The fundamental research is aimed at developing theoretical and methodological principles of industrial economics, as well as tools for making management decisions to ensure import substitution. The relevance of the research is confirmed by the consideration of issues of managing technological processes of reverse engineering when solving complex problems of import substitution in the transport industry of mechanical engineering of the Russian Federation.

    Scientific results of the first stage of work:

    The study of the state of the transport industry during the period of import substitution was carried out, risks were identified and solutions were outlined; the role of reverse engineering as a tool for import substitution in the transport engineering industry was substantiated and the main stages of reverse engineering were determined; an overview and assessment of existing reverse engineering technologies for transport engineering products using Russian and imported equipment were proposed; a methodology and an information model in the form of an algorithm were developed that take into account the most frequently used tasks of reverse engineering; a methodology for decision-making and risk assessment was developed that takes into account technical, technological and economic aspects, which allows preventing and minimizing possible negative consequences of reverse engineering; the role of standardization as one of the important tools of import substitution contributing to an increase in the orderliness of production, acting as a guarantor of the quality and competitiveness of products was proven.

    According to experts, the results obtained during the implementation of the first stage of the project are significant for the development of this field of science in Russia and the solution of specific applied problems. The methodology for managing technological processes developed during the study is universal and will be useful not only for industrial enterprises in the transport industry, but also for any enterprises in the mechanical engineering industry.

    “The results of the study may be relevant for optimizing the existing scheme for organizing reverse engineering processes in the transport industry of mechanical engineering, as well as for forming an effectively functioning scheme for organizing the management of reverse engineering processes in the transport industry of mechanical engineering in the short, medium and long term. The significance of the obtained results for specific applied tasks of the Russian Federation is confirmed by the possibility of their use in the educational process when giving lecture courses on industrial policy, supporting government decision-making in the industrial sphere and ensuring national security issues, including import substitution issues, including in the transport industry,” the RAS experts noted.

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 04/25/2025

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: Students of Novosibirsk State University will be able to study development using programs from Yandex Education

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    The educational modules were developed by Yandex experts and will be integrated into bachelor’s programs for IT specialists and will be enhanced with applied disciplines and company cases. At NSU, the platform for the implementation of the new modules will be Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics. The university will be able to integrate one or several modules: on backend, frontend and mobile development. The program will have an academic supervisor from Yandex, who will be responsible for the content of the module and its adaptation at the university.

    — It is important for us that high-quality IT education is available to students all over Russia, so we are expanding our partnership with regional universities. Universities get access to educational content from the company’s experts and a course for teachers on modern methods of teaching IT disciplines. We also involve Yandex employees in teaching programs. And already in the new curriculum, students from 17 regions of the country will be able to study development on our modules — from Primorsky Krai to Kaliningrad Oblast, — noted Daria Kozlova, Director of Yandex Education.

    Students will master applied development in Python, JavaScript, React or Django, learn to work with API services and manage server infrastructure.

    — The Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics strengthens partnerships with companies. We are glad that this year students of the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics will be able to become full participants in the program from Yandex Education. Now we are recruiting teachers, and then it is up to the students. I know that our students are interested in relevant applied knowledge, but the company’s course is a responsible matter, when choosing it, you need to correctly approach the balance of study time, — emphasized Anastasia Karpenko, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics of NSU.

    From September 2025, educational programs from Yandex Education will appear for the first time in 5 new regions: Voronezh, Kaliningrad, Rostov, Tula regions and Krasnoyarsk Krai.

    This initiative is part of Yandex’s large-scale program to develop education. In 2025, Yandex will invest more than 5 billion rubles in training specialists in IT and artificial intelligence, launching new educational programs, and developing solutions for school and higher education. The total number of Yandex partner universities will reach 39, and the number of joint programs with universities will exceed 70. More than 15 thousand students will be able to study in them, which is 50% more than last year.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: FF student is the strongest weightlifter in Novosibirsk region

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    In the weightlifting competitions within the framework of the 48th Universiade among students of higher educational institutions of the Novosibirsk region, NSU was represented by only one athlete, but he showed the best result in the weight category up to 102 kg.

    Physics student Alexander Burov won a brilliant victory in the biathlon, which includes the clean and jerk and the snatch. Three attempts are given for each exercise, and the total is the sum of the maximum weights lifted.

    Shortly before the Universiade, Alexander also won the Novosibirsk Region Championship, lifting a total of 217 kg.

    Congratulations to the athlete on his gold medals at the regional competitions! We wish him further success in sports and studies!

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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  • MIL-OSI Russia: NSU plans to create specialized international classes to prepare for university admission on the basis of Chinese schools

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    Novosibirsk State University plans to begin training Chinese schoolchildren for university admission. For this purpose, specialized “international classes” with a total of 60 people will be created on the basis of Chinese schools. The training will be conducted in the natural sciences, and the curriculum will be built on the model SUNC NSU (Physics and Mathematics Schools). Classes are scheduled to open in September 2025.

    NSU is taking a strategically important step by creating a school-university system for Chinese students. This will not only attract talent to Russia, but also strengthen scientific and educational cooperation between the countries.

    From March 28 to April 4, a working trip of the heads of educational institutions of Novosibirsk and Izhevsk to Henan Province, PRC was organized. The initiators of this project were Novosibirsk State University and Izhevsk State Technical University named after M.T. Kalashnikov. The delegation included: Head of the Education Export Department of NSU E.I. Sagaydak, Director of the Novosibirsk Institute for Monitoring and Development of Education of the Novosibirsk Region N.V. Yaroslavtseva, Deputy Director of the Institute O.V. Nedosyp, Head of the Education Department of the Kochenevsky District Administration A.S. Bobin, Director of the NSTU Engineering Lyceum M.A. Bezlepkina and Director of School No. 112 V.N. Platonov, as well as other directors of schools and lyceums from Izhevsk.

    During the week, the Russian delegation visited several secondary educational institutions, including the school at the Shaolin Monastery, Kaifeng Vocational College and the education departments of the cities of Henan Province: Dengfeng, Zhongmou, Kaifeng and Xinxiang, as well as the Russian Cultural Center in Beijing.

    During the visit, a productive exchange of experience in the field of teaching methods and pedagogical practices took place. Particular attention was paid to the development of a cooperation strategy in the following areas: teaching Russian and Chinese languages, academic mobility of schoolchildren and teachers, and the development of joint educational programs, including the creation of “international classes”.

    Four schools in Henan Province — Zhongmou Foreign Language Middle School, Zhongmu No. 3 Senior School, Xinxiang No. 7 Senior School, and Henan Normal University Affiliated Xinxiang Middle School — held official ceremonies to award these schools a special status: training talents for admission to Novosibirsk State University. These schools will host Olympiads in mathematics, physics, and information technology, and the winners and prize winners will be able to study in Russia at the expense of the Russian Federation budget.

    — One of the tasks that NSU sets for itself is to increase the number of foreign students, including those from China. We strive to select the most talented and gifted schoolchildren. Therefore, NSU is selecting strong secondary schools in China to create specialized “international classes” where joint training of schoolchildren will be organized for early career guidance and preparation for admission to our university, — noted Evgeniy Sagaydak, Head of the NSU Education Export Department.

    Teaching in “international classes” will be conducted in the last three years of school: in the first year, students will study Russian with a visiting teacher from Russia; in the second year, they will study mathematics, physics and chemistry under the guidance of teachers from the NSU SUNC; in the third year, students will study at home or be invited to the NSU SUNC. The students will be trained in the natural sciences using the model of early entry into science, which has been successfully implemented and used for over 60 years at the NSU Physics and Mathematics School.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

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  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI—Hagerty Joins Kudlow on Fox Business to Discuss Russia-Ukraine War, Tariff Negotiations

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Tennessee Bill Hagerty
    NASHVILLE, TN—United States Senator Bill Hagerty (R-TN), a member of the Senate Appropriations, Banking, and Foreign Relations Committees and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, today joined Kudlow on Fox Business to discuss the ongoing negotiations to bring a peace deal to the Russia-Ukraine war, along with President Donald Trump’s strength in tariff negotiations with China.

    *Click the photo above or here to watch*
    Partial Transcript
    Hagerty on Trump’s toughness against Russia: “President Trump has continued not only to retain sanctions in place, but actually enforced them, which the Biden Administration never did. The Biden Administration talked tough, but they did not enforce sanctions. What President Trump has done is actually gone into secondary sanctions. I think you read about the fact that President Trump has gone in and sanctioned a Chinese refinery, the buyer of Russian crude [oil]. That is the way to deal with this. That’s the way to put maximum pressure on Russia, their banks, the purchasers of crude oil. That’s the way to deal with this. He’s doing it. The pressure has been maintained and mounting on Vladimir Putin.”
    Hagerty on weakening Russia by regaining U.S. energy independence: “You’re absolutely right, Dave. And President Trump’s been extremely clear about not only wanting to get back to energy independence, but energy dominance for America. That’s bad for Russia, that’s bad for Iran, that’s bad for Venezuela, but it’s great for our allies and for us.”
    Hagerty on the need to end the Russia-Ukraine war: “I think about the fact that [Treasury Secretary] Scott Bessent traveled to Ukraine to put in place a deal for critical minerals that would’ve engaged our economy with theirs. Zelenskyy said, of course I’ll sign it, but I’d like to wait [until] I get to meet with Vice President [JD] Vance in Munich. He goes to Munich—Vice President Vance is courteous enough to meet with him—and he tells Vice President Vance, I’d like to actually sign it with the president at the White House. We accede to that. We let him come to the White House, and what does he do? He tries to re-trade the deal on international TV in front of everybody. I think it really is amazing. I think how congenial President Trump has been in dealing with both of these parties. He wants to bring this to an end, and I’d like to say this: Dave, every week this waits, we’re losing roughly another 5,000 lives. It’s time for both parties, Russia and Ukraine, to get to the table and bring this to an end […] I don’t know the answer in terms of who’s advising Zelenskyy, and I would say this: had it been [Former President] Joe Biden in that Oval office, in that meeting, it would’ve worked, but it certainly is not going to work with President Trump. He wasn’t going to tolerate that sort of behavior. He wasn’t so hungry for a deal to be celebrating it in the Rose Garden. He sent Zelenskyy home, and he should have.”
    Hagerty on Trump’s strength against Iran’s terror regime: “Well, Dave, I’ll remind you that everyone said that the Abraham Accords couldn’t be done, but President Trump was able to deliver on that. If anybody can deliver peace in the Middle East, it’s Donald Trump. I think the Iranians should understand and appreciate the fact that President Trump is not going to take this anymore. It’s going to be maximum pressure. They are the greatest state sponsors of terror, not only in the region, but in the world. They’re in a very difficult place right now. You mentioned, Dave, oil prices are coming down. That’s not good for Iran, right? We started enforcing sanctions, rather than just talking about it the way the Biden Administration said, that’s not good for Iran. Their economy’s in a tough spot right now. Now is the time to negotiate. Now is the time to end this program of terror, to end their nuclear program, and bring peace back to the Middle East.”
    Hagerty on the tariff negotiations between the U.S. and China: “[China tends] to overplay their hand, whether it’s their use of the Belt and Road Initiative, or whether it’s the situation they find themselves in now, again, retaliating against President Trump when he warned them not to, and find themselves in an extraordinarily difficult box. China has a very export dependent economy. They’ve also not played by the same rules that every other major economy does. They steal intellectual property. They subsidize industries. They need to come to the table now and look to actually make a deal […] I worked very closely with the team that negotiated the phase one deal in the first Administration, because they worked with me on the two trade deals that we did with Japan. They committed, at that point, to $200 billion worth of purchases from America. They fell short. China needs to keep its word; China needs to step up. If you think about what happened during the Covid crisis, if you think about the spy balloon that flew across America, there’s a real issue of trust right now. That issue needs to be resolved. China needs to prove that it’s a reliable partner.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Press Briefing Transcript: Middle East and Central Asia Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 24, 2025

    Speaker: Mr.Jihad Azour, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF

    Moderator: Ms. Angham Al Shami, Communications Officer, IMF

    MS. AL SHAMI: Good morning. Thank you for joining us in this press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. My name is Angham Al Shami, from the Communications Department here at the IMF. 

    If you’re joining us online, we do have Arabic and French interpretations that you can access on the IMF Regional Economic Outlook webpage and the IMF Press Center as well.  And for those of you in the room, you also have equipment to access that. 

    Today I’m joined by Jihad Azour, the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, who will give us an overview of the outlook of the region, and then we will open the floor for your questions. With that, over to you, Jihad.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much, Angham. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF 2025 Spring Meetings. Before answering your questions, I will briefly outline the economic outlook for the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Let me first start with a few words on the recent developments.

    The global economy stands at a delicate crossroads.  The global recovery of recent years faces new risks as governments reorder their policy priorities.  The recent escalation in trade tensions has already damaged global growth prospects while triggering intense financial volatility.  More broadly, the extraordinary increase in global uncertainty associated with trade policy and increased geopolitical fragmentation will continue to erode confidence for quite some time and represents a serious downside risk to global growth.

    For MENA and CCA economies, these developments are adding to existing regional source of uncertainty, including ongoing conflicts, pockets of political instability and climate vulnerability.  We continue to assess the impact of recently announced U.S. tariffs on MENA and CCA economies.  While the direct effects are expected to be modest, giving limited trade exposure and exemptions for energy products, the indirect effects could be more pronounced.  Slower growth will weaken external demand and remittances, while tighter financial conditions may challenge countries with elevated public debts.  Oil exporting economies could also see fiscal and external positions deteriorate due to the lower oil prices.  Some countries may benefit from trade diversion, but such gains could be short lived in a broader environment of trade contraction. 

    Let me now turn to the Middle East and North Africa.  Last year was particularly challenging for the region.  Conflict caused severe human and economic costs.  Regional growth in 2024 reached 1.8 percent, a downgrade revision of 0.2 percentage point from the October World Economic Outlook forecast.  Conflicts weigh on growth in some oil importing countries and extended OPEC+ voluntary production cuts continue to dampen activity in oil exporting economies.  For GCC countries, strong non-oil growth and diversification efforts were largely offset by oil production cuts. 

    Despite these challenges and high uncertainty, growth is projected to pick up in 2025 and 2026, assuming oil output rebounds, conflict related impacts stabilize, progress is made on structural reform and implementation.  However, expectations have been revised down compared to the October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook, reflecting weaker global growth and more modest effect of these drivers.  We now project growth at 2.6 percent in 2025 and 3.4 percent in 2026, a downward revision of 1.3 and 1 percentage points, respectively.  Inflation is projected to continue declining across MENA economies, remaining elevated only in few cases. 

    Let me now turn to the outlook for the Caucuses and Central Asia.  In contrast, economic activity in the CCA exceeded expectations in 2024, growing by 5.4 percent, driven by spillover effects from the war in Ukraine, which boosted domestic demand.  However, as these temporary effects normalize over the next few years, growth is expected to moderate due to weaker external demand, plateauing growth of hydrocarbon production, and reduced fiscal stimulus.  Despite the moderation in overall growth, inflation is expected to increase somewhat across the region and remain elevated in a few cases, reflecting still strong domestic demand. 

    Let me now turn to the risks to the outlook.  These projections are subject to extraordinary uncertainty and the risks to the baseline forecast remain tilted to the downside.  Four key risks stand out.  First, trade tension as a further escalation could dampen global demand, delay in oil production recovery, and tighten financial conditions.  Our analysis shows that persistence spikes in uncertainty triggered by global shocks are associated with large output losses both in MENA and CCA.  The second risk is geopolitical conflict.  The third one is climate shocks.  And the last one is the reduction in official development assistance.  This could further exacerbate food insecurity and humanitarian conditions in low-income and conflict-affected economies.  However, upside risks also exist.  The swift resolution of conflict and accelerated implementation of structural reforms could substantially improve regional growth prospects.  The implications of a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the CCA region also remain uncertain. 

    Now the question is what are the policies that we recommend for countries and how they should prioritize them.  In the face of extraordinary uncertainty, MENA and CCA economies should respond along two key dimensions, manage short term instability, and use the opportunity to advance structural reforms for long-term growth.  The first priority is adapt to the new environment.  Countries must take steps to shield their economies from the impact of worst-case scenarios and prioritize safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability.  The appropriate policy response will vary depending on each country’s initial conditions and vulnerability to risk. 

    Turning to more the long-term, countries should transform their economies.  Recent developments underscore the urgent need to accelerate the long-discussed structural reforms agenda across the region.  To reduce vulnerabilities to shocks and seize opportunities arising from the evolving global trade and financial landscape, it is essential to enhance governance, invest in human capital, advance digitalization, and foster a dynamic private sector.  Establishing strategic trade and investment corridors with other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as within the region, including between GCC and Central Asia or GCC and North Africa, can help mitigate exposure to external uncertainty, enable greater risk sharing, and drive sustainable economic development. 

    We will delve into these policy priorities at the launch of our Regional Economic Outlook in Dubai next week and in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, where on May 3 we are organizing jointly with the Uzbek government a GCC-CCA Economic Conference where Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks from both regions, as well as representatives of IFIs and private sectors, will discuss deepening economic ties between these two regions.  We also invite you to join us tomorrow at 2:30 p.m. at the Atrium for a public panel discussion on the economic consequences of the high uncertainty in the MENA and CCA regions. 

    Before I open the floor to questions, I want to underscore the IMF’s deep commitment to supporting countries throughout the region with policy advice, technical assistance, and, in many cases, financial support.  Since early 2020, we have approved almost $50 billion in financing to countries across the MENA region, Pakistan, and the CCA, of which 14.8 have been approved since early 2024. 

    In closing, I want to highlight our engagement to post-conflict economies.  Strengthening economic fundamentals and rebuilding institutions will be essential to successful recovery.  The IMF, in coordination with the World Bank and regional partners, has established an informal coordination group to support recovery in conflict-affected states in the Middle East.  Our focus will be on capacity building, policy guidance, and financial assistance.  We are also working closely with authorities to help stabilize their economies, restore confidence, and lay foundations for sustainable growth. 

    Again, thank you very much for joining us this morning, and now I would like to welcome your questions.               

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad, and now we will take your questions. And let’s start with the gentleman here in the first row, please.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Angham and Jihad.  I’m Amir Goumaa from Asharq Bloomberg.  IMF raised the gross forecasting for Egypt dispIte the regional downgrade.  Why is that?  And how can the MENA region turn the country trade disputes into opportunities? 

    MR. AZOUR: Excuse me?

    QUESTIONER: How can the MENA region turn the current trade disputes and tariffs into opportunities?  Like how can they make the best use of it? 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much for your question.

    MS. AL SHAMI: Should we take more questions on Egypt? Perhaps should we take more questions on Egypt. We’ll start with this gentleman and then the gentleman in the back.  This one first. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello everyone.  My name is Ahmad Yaqub.  I’m the managing editor of Al Youm Al-Sabah Egyptian Newspaper.  I have two questions about Egypt.  The first one is about the expected exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar by the end of 2026, the next year, and the expected inflation rate and the economic growth rate of Egypt.  The second question is the next trench of the program, current program with the Egyptian authorities.  What is the timing of the next trench and the total amount of it?  Thank you so much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: And then the gentleman here.

    QUESTIONER: Ramy Gabr from Al-Qahera News.  The global economic outlook carries good news.  Maybe for Egypt in terms of the economic growth in 2025.  How do you see that and what’s the facts and numbers led to this outlook?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Over to you.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. Yes, please.

    QUESTIONER: I’m Lauren Holtmeier from S&P Global.  I wanted to ask about the fiscal break-even prices for oil production, specifically for the countries with high fiscal break-even prices like Saudi Arabia and Iraq.  And how will the lowered expectations for oil prices over the next couple of years affect their ability and their economic outlook?  And I recognize that the answer for those two countries might be very different. 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. I had three sets of questions. One on trade and the impact of the recent trade developments on the region and how those could be turned into an opportunity.  The second set of questions were on Egypt, and the third one was on the GCC and the oil market.  Let me start with the first one. 

    Countries of the region have limited trade dependence on the U.S., and therefore the recent trade and tariff decisions will have limited direct impact on those economies.  Yet it’s important also to highlight that there would be indirect impact.  And also those indirect impact may take different channels.  One impact is the impact that this could have on financial stability and capital flows.  We saw widening of spreads over the last few years, which is an issue that could affect the capacity of emerging economies and middle-income countries who have high levels of debt.  The second potential impact is impact on oil market.  We saw some softening in the oil price, as well as the forwards of oil price are showing a certain extension of those softening over the year.  And the third type of effect is the second-round impact due to trade diversion. 

    I will maybe go into more details about what are the policies that we recommend for countries to address those challenges.  Few countries have more exposure to the U.S. trade like Pakistan or Jordan, and those are specific cases.  I can address those.  Opportunities, of course, in any change there are opportunities, and over the last few years we saw successive shocks and transformation on the geopolitical front and the geoeconomic front, and those have affected the region.  The region stands at the crossroads between East and West, and therefore trade routes, connectivity, as well as also opportunities go through this region.  This would require, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, for countries in the region to seek new opportunities in terms of strengthening their economic relationships and trade ties with regions close to them, as well as also within countries in the region, which will call for new way of increasing connectivity and cooperation in the region. 

    The second set of questions is on Egypt.  Over the last year, growth in Egypt has improved, and we expect growth for the fiscal year 2025 to reach 3.8 percent.  For comparison, in 2024 it was 2.4 percent, and we expect that the growth will keep improving in 2026 and reach 4.3 percent.  Also, inflation went down from 33 percent on average for fiscal year 2024 to 19.7 percent in 2025, and we expect it to reach 12 percent in 2026, despite the various shocks.  Those positive developments reflect the implementation of the reform program that was supported by the IMF and was augmented back in March last year in order also to help Egypt address some of the external shocks, in particular the decline in revenues from the Suez Canal. 

    As you remember, the program is based on four pillars.  One, macroeconomic stability by addressing inflation that constitutes the main issue for economic stability through tightening the monetary policy.  The second is to address the debt issue by improving the primary surplus and also through an active debt management strategy and strengthening debt management organization to reduce gradually the debt and the weight of the debt through the debt service on the economy.  The third important pillar is to preserve the economy from external shocks, and this is the role of the flexibility in the exchange rate.  Flexibility in the exchange rate in a time of high level of uncertainty plays an important way to protect the Egyptian economy from external shocks, and its flexibility has proven to be beneficial to the stability of the Egyptian economy.  The fourth pillar is growing the economy and give a bigger weight to the private sector, and we encourage the authorities to strengthen and accelerate the reinvestment strategy that would allow more investment to come to the Egyptian economy, would give more space to the private sector, and will help the Egyptian economy and the Egyptian people get better opportunities in a time where those international changes would require an acceleration of economic transformation.  The review has been completed in March, and as you know, we had also another facility that was provided to Egypt to help Egypt deal with climate issues, and our engagement with the authorities remain very active.  Shall I move to GCC? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes.

    MR. AZOUR: The next trench will be with the next review. On the GCC, well, of course the direct impact of the trade shock on the region has been limited except that with the prospect of the decline in oil price, it comes at a time where we see a resumption of increase of oil production with the implementation of what has been agreed, though at a slower pace, of the December decision of the OPEC+ agreement.

    As you know, countries of the GCC have different fundamentals and different level of buffers, and therefore there is no one break-even point for all countries.  Our estimates are showing, though, that a decline in oil price of $10 would weaken the fiscal situation by somewhat between 2.3 to 2.7 percent of GDP, and it also, it has similar impact on the external account between 2.5 to 2.7 percent of GDP. 

    I would like to highlight two additional points that some countries have used the opportunity of their diversification strategy to both reduce their dependence on oil as a source of income, but also to diversify fiscally and reduce the impact of oil revenues, which we encourage other countries to follow suit. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. So we’ll take another round of questions from the room, and then we will turn to online. The lady in the first row, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Dr. Jihad, thank you for taking my question.  Nour Amache from Asharq Bloomberg.  I wanted to ask about Lebanon and Syria and to follow up on what my colleagues here asked about Egypt.  They were asking about the next review, if it’s in June, and the next tranche in June, if we can elaborate on that.  Now, regarding Lebanon, today the parliament passed the law of lifting bank secrecy.  Will this make or will this make the program with the IMF faster?  Will this increase the prospects of a program with Lebanon anytime soon, especially since I know the Lebanese authorities represented by the Finance Minister, the Economy Minister, and the Central Bank Governor are all here in Washington, and a lot of meetings have been undergoing?  That’s regarding Lebanon.  And regarding Syria, also a big Syrian delegation is here.  What has been reached so far with the Syrian counterparts?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. One more question. Maybe we’ll go to the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Mohammad Al-Lubani from Jordan Al-Mamlaka TV.  I’d like to ask in Arabic.  In light of our dependence on American exports, [ESQUAH] said that 25 percent of the exports go to the United States.  How would the tariffs affect Jordan, and are there any estimates of these losses by the Fund?  And what are the recommendations of the Fund in order to face these challenges? 

    MR. AZOUR: The discussions are, you know, continuing, and the engagement with the authorities is taking place during the Spring Meetings. As I mentioned earlier, we look forward to the next review to see an acceleration of the divestment strategy that is one of the key priorities because of its critical impact on sustaining growth in Egypt, providing opportunities to the private sector, and also helping in the effort that Egypt is pursuing in reducing the debt. In the context of high interest rate, it’s very important to address debt service issue, and this would be accelerated by reducing the debt.  Therefore, we look forward to see progress on the authorities’ plan in terms of divestment.

    On Lebanon, the Fund has been supportive of Lebanon, and a staff-level agreement has been reached in 2022.  Lebanon staff, Lebanon team, is and remained actively engaged with the authorities, providing technical assistance.  And recently, we had two staff visits to Lebanon and the authorities have engaged with our team in order to reactivate a potential program.  They have expressed their interest for that.  The Lebanese economic and financial situation has been made

    more challenging with the recent implications of the war and the massive destruction that in addition to the need to address the financial and economic situation, Lebanon is also facing the need to deal with the reconstruction. 

    The pillars of the program will remain valid as they were negotiated.  Macroeconomic stability, based on addressing the legacy of the financial sector.  The legacy of debt, address the debt issue.  Second pillar is to deal with the macroeconomic stability through fiscal consolidation.  Third pillar is to strengthen governance by reforming SOEs and also increasing and improving the confidence factor.  And third is to address social issues, especially now with issues related to the reconstructions.  Discussions are taking place and staff is on active dialogue with the Lebanese authorities. 

    We are in discussion and therefore I think the discussions that we are having during the Spring Meetings are giving the opportunity for us to understand what are the reform priorities of the Lebanese government.  As you know, staff had a couple of visits in the last few weeks, and we will keep our active engagement with the Lebanese authorities.

    On Syria.  Of course, Syria has been absent for the last 15 years due to the war, and their engagement with the institution has been fairly limited since 2011.  The last Article IV consultation with Syria took place in 2009.  The international community and the regional community has been actively engaged in order to see how we could help Syria recover from a long period of war. 

    We had a preparatory meeting preparatory meeting in AlUla back in February where regional institutions and the international community have agreed to have another follow-up coordination meeting that took place last Tuesday where representatives from international institutions, bilaterals, have convened in order to assess the needs of Syria and also to develop a framework of coordination.  The Fund is engaged to support the international community in its engagement with Syria.  We have already started our assessment of the macroeconomic situation, the institutional capacity, and we look forward to continue our engagement with the Syrian authorities. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Then you have one more question on Jordan.

    MR. AZOUR: Yes, Jordan. In Arabic?  Okay.  Jordan is one of the countries that have been affected by the tariffs, but this is still limited because of the kind of exports or the relationship between Jordan and the United States.  And Jordan managed to overcome, in the recent years, to overcome several shocks, including shocks related to the variability and volatility and the effect of the Gaza issues on the economy of Jordan.  And the latest reviews emphasized the need for Jordan to keep stability and also, despite the external shocks, to take the needed measures in order to improve the macroeconomic situation and to reinforce the economy.  And there has been discussions about supporting Jordan through a new mechanism, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, in order to help Jordan in the measures that would help it improve adaptation with the climate change and other shocks and other pandemics.  There is actually progress in this regard.  And there will be a review next month by the Executive Board of the Fund about Jordan. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: We’ll turn to Dania, who’s on Webex online. Dania, please go ahead. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello, can you hear me? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, you can hear you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi.  Hello Dr. Jihad, I just have a follow-up question on the break-even oil prices for the Gulf.  In the October report, countries like Saudi Arabia had a very high break-even price of around 90.  I think it was the second biggest highest in the GCC after Bahrain.  I just wanted to see, this figure is likely to increase given the high expenditures, the lower oil prices.  How will the lower oil prices — you mentioned about the impact on GDP, but the prices, I think, since the beginning of the year have dropped by more than $10.00.  So, the impact has it been considered in the Regional Economic Report?  And especially because I don’t know the report, did it include the impact of the tariffs and the impact of the increase in OPEC production from May, which is accelerated?  And just one clarification, with regards to Saudi break-even, some analysts include the expenditure of the Public Investment Fund.  Is that part of the IMF estimates for the break-even?  What’s included in the break-even?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Any additional questions on GCC? Okay, let’s take the gentleman in the middle. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello Mr. Azour, Madame Al Shami, thank you for the opportunity.  Philippe Hage Boutros from L’Orient-Le Jour, Lebanon.  How does the IMF assess the potential impact of declining oil revenues stemming from a possible drop in prices amid the tariff crisis on the capacity and willingness of the Gulf countries to fund international aid, particularly for countries like Lebanon and Syria that urgently need reconstruction financing?  Does it anticipate a significant or relatively limited effect?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we had one more question on Saudi that we received online. In light of the global trade repercussions, what is the effect on the Saudi market, especially on inflation and growth?  This question comes from Mohammed Al Sulami from Al Akhbariyah in Saudi Arabia. 

    MR. AZOUR: Let me start with Dania’s question. Dania, let me start by saying that over the last few years from a fiscal perspective, Saudi has made a significant improvement through various reforms in order to diversify revenues outside oil and also reduce certain expenditures, including on the subsidy side. And this effort to diversify revenues has led to an increase of non-oil revenues in the GDP for Saudi.  Of course, the last couple of years have been beneficial in terms of providing Saudi and other GCC countries with surplus in the fiscal as well as also in the current account, which have led to increase in buffers.  Of course, still the oil sector represent an important source of revenue and it’s still also an important source of foreign currencies. 

    Coming to the fiscal strategy, Saudi has established a medium-term fiscal framework that anchors policies and also help them deal with the volatility in oil price and become less pro cyclicals.  Of course, the increase in oil price, sorry, the decline in oil price will have impact on the fiscal and will lead to a potential additional drop in fiscal situation. 

    As I mentioned earlier, a decline of $10.00 per barrel or a decline of $1 million of production will have an impact on the fiscal between 2 to 3 percent.  The decline in oil price is accompanied with a recovery in oil production and Saudi was one of the largest, I would say, contributor to the voluntary drop in oil export. 

    When it comes to the link between fiscal and the investment strategy, the investment strategy has been also put in the medium-term framework in the context of the Vision 2030 and regularly there are updates, recalibration and also phasing, based on the capacity to implement and the priorities.

    In our projections, although developments were taking place almost at the time when we were releasing our outlook, we took into consideration the new assumptions on the oil price for this year as well as also on the growth projections. 

    The second question related to Saudi.  The impact of the latest developments on the Saudi economy.  Undoubtedly, the trade relations regarding the non-oil sector is limited with the United States and therefore the impact will also be limited on trade related to tariffs, especially as oil and gas are exempt from the increase in tariffs.  But there will be an indirect impact, as we’ve said.  Saudi Arabia also has a dollarized economy, whether on the side of exports or imports, and therefore the impact will be limited. 

    On the other hand, the reduction or the depreciation of the dollar will affect services, especially tourism.  And this is a sector that Saudi Arabia is trying to develop by establishing new expansion for tourism in Saudi Arabia.

    The other related question on support to the reconstruction in the region.  Let me first say two things.  One, ODA has declined over the last few years, and more recently with the decisions to stop some of the international assistance by USAID and others.  This will have an important impact, especially on countries in fragility who depend heavily on aid.  Countries like Somalia, Sudan, countries like Yemen.  And this represents a risk not only on the fiscal side, but also on the humanitarian side on food security.  This is the first point. 

    The second point is the region is, we’re talking here about the Levant, is going through an important prospect of post-conflict recovery.  Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and hopefully, Yemen, and Sudan.  This would require strong international and financial assistance.  Of course, this also would require to accelerate certain number of reforms that will allow the private sector to provide financing.  Those countries have strong diasporas, and the recovery could also be co-led by international assistance, also by private sector support.  And some of the reforms, be it in Lebanon or in Syria, are very important to regain confidence and will allow private sector to play its key role in recovering those economies. 

    The region has been very supportive.  And when we look at the official assistance and the interest that is being shown by several countries in the region, be it in the recent meeting that took place in Saudi Arabia, in Al Ula, where ministers of finance from the GCC and regional institutions convened in order to explore opportunities to provide more assistance to those countries. 

    Again, I think it’s very important also to highlight that assistance has to accompany reform programs that will lay the ground to strong institutions will provide confidence for both citizens and also international, private and public community, in order to accelerate the recovery. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We’ll take one more round of questions.  The lady on the second row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Hello, I’m Mariam Ali from Dawn News Pakistan.  My question is how will the global tariff war uniquely impact Pakistan?  Any need of buffers in place to mitigate risks to the country?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Let’s take maybe one more question. The gentleman here sitting in the front. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, , Director Azour.  My question is on Yemen.  Igor Naimushin, RIA News Agency, D.C. Bureau.  So, last week U.S. struck Ras Isa fuel part in Yemen.  I would like to ask you to outline what repercussions this strike will have on energy security and economic situation in Yemen and broadly in region?  And if you could, provide any details how the IMF — what is the IMF view on longer-term risks for the region as U.S. operation on Yemen continues to unfold?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. We’ll take one more question from the gentleman here in the –.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Magnus Sherman.  I wanted to return to Lebanon.  The new Prime Minister has pledged to not touch the hard currency deposits.  Does the IMF support that position? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we have an online question from Camille Faris Abu Rafael. How can low- and middle-income countries in MENA balance urgent social needs with long-term fiscal sustainability amid rising debt and global uncertainty and persistently high interest rates?  We’ll take these questions, and we’ll take another round.  Thank you. 

    MR. AZOUR: On Pakistan. Pakistan made significant progress in restoring macroeconomic stability over the last 18 months and the numbers are, for Pakistan, are showing improvement both in terms of growth as well as also in inflation that dropped from 12.6 percent last year in 2024 fiscal year to 6.5 percent this year, expected to stay at this level for next year.  Debt is also stabilizing in the case of Pakistan, and recently Pakistan has been upgraded by rating agencies. 

    Of course, trade tensions will affect relatively Pakistan maybe more than the average in the region.  But I would say the impact on Pakistan directly can be offset by other measures that would allow the Pakistani economy to reposition itself in a world that is in the midst of one of the largest transformation in terms of trade, economic opportunities, and to reposition itself in order to address any risks, but also to potentially benefit from change in the trade routes. 

    The question on Yemen the situation on Yemen is extremely preoccupying at the humanitarian level, both in terms of food security as well as also in terms of human suffering.  And this situation has been inflicting heavy toll on the Yemeni people for a long period of time.  Of course, broadly speaking, instability has been one of the main issues that the region is dealing with.  Instability is one of the key sources of uncertainty for the region.  Addressing this instability is key in providing security for people to improve their living conditions, providing stability for the trade routes, and also provide opportunities for people to rebuild and reconstruct.  The Fund is engaged to (A) keep a very strong contacts with Yemen, provide technical assistance at a time where we cannot provide because of the security situation, financial assistance.  Therefore, we are actively supporting through technical assistance.  And we are also in regular engagement with the authorities. 

    Our next plan is to reengage through Article IV in order to assess the economic situation in Yemen, help the internationally recognized government assess the overall debt situation and the debt liabilities in order, later on, to help Yemen deal with the debt situation, and provide right assessment for the donor community to provide assistance. 

    Political stabilization security is very important to preserve human and social conditions, and the Fund stands ready to help Yemen as well as also other countries facing fragility and conflicts in the region.  And this is something that we are increasing our resources to provide support to those countries. 

    Lebanon.  Lebanon problems are complex in terms of how to address the overall financial challenge.  The solution has to deal through a comprehensive approach with all the financial issues that Lebanon is facing.  A piecemeal approach is not what Lebanon needs today.  A reform package that restores confidence, addresses the legacy of the past, provides opportunities for the economy to recover, by also promoting the capacity of the financial system to finance the recovery, mobilize international assistance to help Lebanon dealing with the reconstruction needs, and also support the reforms are priorities that our team is currently discussing with the Lebanese authorities. 

    The question related to balancing short-term and medium-term.  I think it’s a very important question.  We live currently in a world of high uncertainty and in our outlook this spring we have — and I would encourage you to read it,  it’s very interesting piece — we have tried to assess the impact of uncertainty on the region and the uncertainty is of multiple layers.  A global uncertainty, regional, geopolitical and conflict situation, but also internal or local uncertainties.  Those are important issues for countries to address. 

    In very brief, countries need to in the short term to preserve stability and that would require to increase their buffers.  And for those who have limited buffers to accelerate fiscal consolidations to reduce the risk, address some of their financing issues, especially countries who have high level of debt and for those who have buffers, preserve those and use them when they need.  But I think what is really important, especially given the lasting negative impact of uncertainties on countries, is to address the medium-term issues.  And addressing the medium-term issues will help unlock growth, accelerating structural reforms, improving economic conditions, provide stronger social protection framework by moving from untargeted subsidies to something that is more meaningful in terms of social support would be extremely beneficial for countries in the region. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad and I’m afraid we have run out of time. Thank you all for participating with us today and as always, we will be posting the transcript online.  But just a reminder that we will be launching our report next week on May 1 so stay tuned for that.  And as Jihad mentioned, please join us tomorrow at 2:30 for the seminar on how countries can navigate uncertainties.  Jihad, any last words? 

    MR. AZOUR: Only to say thank you. And thanks to our friends here, the journalists. We look forward to provide you with more details in Dubai next week with all the details, as well as also country-specific information on our Regional Economic Outlook.  And two days after that, in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, on the outlook for Caucasus and Central Asia.  Thank you very much. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Press Briefing Transcript: Middle East and Central Asia Department, Spring Meetings 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 24, 2025

    Speaker: Mr.Jihad Azour, Director of Middle East and Central Asia Department, IMF

    Moderator: Ms. Angham Al Shami, Communications Officer, IMF

    MS. AL SHAMI: Good morning. Thank you for joining us in this press briefing on the Regional Economic Outlook for the Middle East and Central Asia. My name is Angham Al Shami, from the Communications Department here at the IMF. 

    If you’re joining us online, we do have Arabic and French interpretations that you can access on the IMF Regional Economic Outlook webpage and the IMF Press Center as well.  And for those of you in the room, you also have equipment to access that. 

    Today I’m joined by Jihad Azour, the Director of the Middle East and Central Asia Department, who will give us an overview of the outlook of the region, and then we will open the floor for your questions. With that, over to you, Jihad.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much, Angham. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to the IMF 2025 Spring Meetings. Before answering your questions, I will briefly outline the economic outlook for the Middle East and North Africa as well as the Caucasus and Central Asia.  Let me first start with a few words on the recent developments.

    The global economy stands at a delicate crossroads.  The global recovery of recent years faces new risks as governments reorder their policy priorities.  The recent escalation in trade tensions has already damaged global growth prospects while triggering intense financial volatility.  More broadly, the extraordinary increase in global uncertainty associated with trade policy and increased geopolitical fragmentation will continue to erode confidence for quite some time and represents a serious downside risk to global growth.

    For MENA and CCA economies, these developments are adding to existing regional source of uncertainty, including ongoing conflicts, pockets of political instability and climate vulnerability.  We continue to assess the impact of recently announced U.S. tariffs on MENA and CCA economies.  While the direct effects are expected to be modest, giving limited trade exposure and exemptions for energy products, the indirect effects could be more pronounced.  Slower growth will weaken external demand and remittances, while tighter financial conditions may challenge countries with elevated public debts.  Oil exporting economies could also see fiscal and external positions deteriorate due to the lower oil prices.  Some countries may benefit from trade diversion, but such gains could be short lived in a broader environment of trade contraction. 

    Let me now turn to the Middle East and North Africa.  Last year was particularly challenging for the region.  Conflict caused severe human and economic costs.  Regional growth in 2024 reached 1.8 percent, a downgrade revision of 0.2 percentage point from the October World Economic Outlook forecast.  Conflicts weigh on growth in some oil importing countries and extended OPEC+ voluntary production cuts continue to dampen activity in oil exporting economies.  For GCC countries, strong non-oil growth and diversification efforts were largely offset by oil production cuts. 

    Despite these challenges and high uncertainty, growth is projected to pick up in 2025 and 2026, assuming oil output rebounds, conflict related impacts stabilize, progress is made on structural reform and implementation.  However, expectations have been revised down compared to the October 2024 Regional Economic Outlook, reflecting weaker global growth and more modest effect of these drivers.  We now project growth at 2.6 percent in 2025 and 3.4 percent in 2026, a downward revision of 1.3 and 1 percentage points, respectively.  Inflation is projected to continue declining across MENA economies, remaining elevated only in few cases. 

    Let me now turn to the outlook for the Caucuses and Central Asia.  In contrast, economic activity in the CCA exceeded expectations in 2024, growing by 5.4 percent, driven by spillover effects from the war in Ukraine, which boosted domestic demand.  However, as these temporary effects normalize over the next few years, growth is expected to moderate due to weaker external demand, plateauing growth of hydrocarbon production, and reduced fiscal stimulus.  Despite the moderation in overall growth, inflation is expected to increase somewhat across the region and remain elevated in a few cases, reflecting still strong domestic demand. 

    Let me now turn to the risks to the outlook.  These projections are subject to extraordinary uncertainty and the risks to the baseline forecast remain tilted to the downside.  Four key risks stand out.  First, trade tension as a further escalation could dampen global demand, delay in oil production recovery, and tighten financial conditions.  Our analysis shows that persistence spikes in uncertainty triggered by global shocks are associated with large output losses both in MENA and CCA.  The second risk is geopolitical conflict.  The third one is climate shocks.  And the last one is the reduction in official development assistance.  This could further exacerbate food insecurity and humanitarian conditions in low-income and conflict-affected economies.  However, upside risks also exist.  The swift resolution of conflict and accelerated implementation of structural reforms could substantially improve regional growth prospects.  The implications of a potential peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for the CCA region also remain uncertain. 

    Now the question is what are the policies that we recommend for countries and how they should prioritize them.  In the face of extraordinary uncertainty, MENA and CCA economies should respond along two key dimensions, manage short term instability, and use the opportunity to advance structural reforms for long-term growth.  The first priority is adapt to the new environment.  Countries must take steps to shield their economies from the impact of worst-case scenarios and prioritize safeguarding macroeconomic and financial stability.  The appropriate policy response will vary depending on each country’s initial conditions and vulnerability to risk. 

    Turning to more the long-term, countries should transform their economies.  Recent developments underscore the urgent need to accelerate the long-discussed structural reforms agenda across the region.  To reduce vulnerabilities to shocks and seize opportunities arising from the evolving global trade and financial landscape, it is essential to enhance governance, invest in human capital, advance digitalization, and foster a dynamic private sector.  Establishing strategic trade and investment corridors with other regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as well as within the region, including between GCC and Central Asia or GCC and North Africa, can help mitigate exposure to external uncertainty, enable greater risk sharing, and drive sustainable economic development. 

    We will delve into these policy priorities at the launch of our Regional Economic Outlook in Dubai next week and in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, where on May 3 we are organizing jointly with the Uzbek government a GCC-CCA Economic Conference where Ministers of Finance and Governors of Central Banks from both regions, as well as representatives of IFIs and private sectors, will discuss deepening economic ties between these two regions.  We also invite you to join us tomorrow at 2:30 p.m. at the Atrium for a public panel discussion on the economic consequences of the high uncertainty in the MENA and CCA regions. 

    Before I open the floor to questions, I want to underscore the IMF’s deep commitment to supporting countries throughout the region with policy advice, technical assistance, and, in many cases, financial support.  Since early 2020, we have approved almost $50 billion in financing to countries across the MENA region, Pakistan, and the CCA, of which 14.8 have been approved since early 2024. 

    In closing, I want to highlight our engagement to post-conflict economies.  Strengthening economic fundamentals and rebuilding institutions will be essential to successful recovery.  The IMF, in coordination with the World Bank and regional partners, has established an informal coordination group to support recovery in conflict-affected states in the Middle East.  Our focus will be on capacity building, policy guidance, and financial assistance.  We are also working closely with authorities to help stabilize their economies, restore confidence, and lay foundations for sustainable growth. 

    Again, thank you very much for joining us this morning, and now I would like to welcome your questions.               

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad, and now we will take your questions. And let’s start with the gentleman here in the first row, please.

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, Angham and Jihad.  I’m Amir Goumaa from Asharq Bloomberg.  IMF raised the gross forecasting for Egypt dispIte the regional downgrade.  Why is that?  And how can the MENA region turn the country trade disputes into opportunities? 

    MR. AZOUR: Excuse me?

    QUESTIONER: How can the MENA region turn the current trade disputes and tariffs into opportunities?  Like how can they make the best use of it? 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much for your question.

    MS. AL SHAMI: Should we take more questions on Egypt? Perhaps should we take more questions on Egypt. We’ll start with this gentleman and then the gentleman in the back.  This one first. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello everyone.  My name is Ahmad Yaqub.  I’m the managing editor of Al Youm Al-Sabah Egyptian Newspaper.  I have two questions about Egypt.  The first one is about the expected exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the U.S. dollar by the end of 2026, the next year, and the expected inflation rate and the economic growth rate of Egypt.  The second question is the next trench of the program, current program with the Egyptian authorities.  What is the timing of the next trench and the total amount of it?  Thank you so much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: And then the gentleman here.

    QUESTIONER: Ramy Gabr from Al-Qahera News.  The global economic outlook carries good news.  Maybe for Egypt in terms of the economic growth in 2025.  How do you see that and what’s the facts and numbers led to this outlook?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Over to you.

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. Yes, please.

    QUESTIONER: I’m Lauren Holtmeier from S&P Global.  I wanted to ask about the fiscal break-even prices for oil production, specifically for the countries with high fiscal break-even prices like Saudi Arabia and Iraq.  And how will the lowered expectations for oil prices over the next couple of years affect their ability and their economic outlook?  And I recognize that the answer for those two countries might be very different. 

    MR. AZOUR: Thank you very much. I had three sets of questions. One on trade and the impact of the recent trade developments on the region and how those could be turned into an opportunity.  The second set of questions were on Egypt, and the third one was on the GCC and the oil market.  Let me start with the first one. 

    Countries of the region have limited trade dependence on the U.S., and therefore the recent trade and tariff decisions will have limited direct impact on those economies.  Yet it’s important also to highlight that there would be indirect impact.  And also those indirect impact may take different channels.  One impact is the impact that this could have on financial stability and capital flows.  We saw widening of spreads over the last few years, which is an issue that could affect the capacity of emerging economies and middle-income countries who have high levels of debt.  The second potential impact is impact on oil market.  We saw some softening in the oil price, as well as the forwards of oil price are showing a certain extension of those softening over the year.  And the third type of effect is the second-round impact due to trade diversion. 

    I will maybe go into more details about what are the policies that we recommend for countries to address those challenges.  Few countries have more exposure to the U.S. trade like Pakistan or Jordan, and those are specific cases.  I can address those.  Opportunities, of course, in any change there are opportunities, and over the last few years we saw successive shocks and transformation on the geopolitical front and the geoeconomic front, and those have affected the region.  The region stands at the crossroads between East and West, and therefore trade routes, connectivity, as well as also opportunities go through this region.  This would require, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, for countries in the region to seek new opportunities in terms of strengthening their economic relationships and trade ties with regions close to them, as well as also within countries in the region, which will call for new way of increasing connectivity and cooperation in the region. 

    The second set of questions is on Egypt.  Over the last year, growth in Egypt has improved, and we expect growth for the fiscal year 2025 to reach 3.8 percent.  For comparison, in 2024 it was 2.4 percent, and we expect that the growth will keep improving in 2026 and reach 4.3 percent.  Also, inflation went down from 33 percent on average for fiscal year 2024 to 19.7 percent in 2025, and we expect it to reach 12 percent in 2026, despite the various shocks.  Those positive developments reflect the implementation of the reform program that was supported by the IMF and was augmented back in March last year in order also to help Egypt address some of the external shocks, in particular the decline in revenues from the Suez Canal. 

    As you remember, the program is based on four pillars.  One, macroeconomic stability by addressing inflation that constitutes the main issue for economic stability through tightening the monetary policy.  The second is to address the debt issue by improving the primary surplus and also through an active debt management strategy and strengthening debt management organization to reduce gradually the debt and the weight of the debt through the debt service on the economy.  The third important pillar is to preserve the economy from external shocks, and this is the role of the flexibility in the exchange rate.  Flexibility in the exchange rate in a time of high level of uncertainty plays an important way to protect the Egyptian economy from external shocks, and its flexibility has proven to be beneficial to the stability of the Egyptian economy.  The fourth pillar is growing the economy and give a bigger weight to the private sector, and we encourage the authorities to strengthen and accelerate the reinvestment strategy that would allow more investment to come to the Egyptian economy, would give more space to the private sector, and will help the Egyptian economy and the Egyptian people get better opportunities in a time where those international changes would require an acceleration of economic transformation.  The review has been completed in March, and as you know, we had also another facility that was provided to Egypt to help Egypt deal with climate issues, and our engagement with the authorities remain very active.  Shall I move to GCC? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes.

    MR. AZOUR: The next trench will be with the next review. On the GCC, well, of course the direct impact of the trade shock on the region has been limited except that with the prospect of the decline in oil price, it comes at a time where we see a resumption of increase of oil production with the implementation of what has been agreed, though at a slower pace, of the December decision of the OPEC+ agreement.

    As you know, countries of the GCC have different fundamentals and different level of buffers, and therefore there is no one break-even point for all countries.  Our estimates are showing, though, that a decline in oil price of $10 would weaken the fiscal situation by somewhat between 2.3 to 2.7 percent of GDP, and it also, it has similar impact on the external account between 2.5 to 2.7 percent of GDP. 

    I would like to highlight two additional points that some countries have used the opportunity of their diversification strategy to both reduce their dependence on oil as a source of income, but also to diversify fiscally and reduce the impact of oil revenues, which we encourage other countries to follow suit. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. So we’ll take another round of questions from the room, and then we will turn to online. The lady in the first row, please. 

    QUESTIONER: Dr. Jihad, thank you for taking my question.  Nour Amache from Asharq Bloomberg.  I wanted to ask about Lebanon and Syria and to follow up on what my colleagues here asked about Egypt.  They were asking about the next review, if it’s in June, and the next tranche in June, if we can elaborate on that.  Now, regarding Lebanon, today the parliament passed the law of lifting bank secrecy.  Will this make or will this make the program with the IMF faster?  Will this increase the prospects of a program with Lebanon anytime soon, especially since I know the Lebanese authorities represented by the Finance Minister, the Economy Minister, and the Central Bank Governor are all here in Washington, and a lot of meetings have been undergoing?  That’s regarding Lebanon.  And regarding Syria, also a big Syrian delegation is here.  What has been reached so far with the Syrian counterparts?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. One more question. Maybe we’ll go to the gentleman in the front here. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you.  Mohammad Al-Lubani from Jordan Al-Mamlaka TV.  I’d like to ask in Arabic.  In light of our dependence on American exports, [ESQUAH] said that 25 percent of the exports go to the United States.  How would the tariffs affect Jordan, and are there any estimates of these losses by the Fund?  And what are the recommendations of the Fund in order to face these challenges? 

    MR. AZOUR: The discussions are, you know, continuing, and the engagement with the authorities is taking place during the Spring Meetings. As I mentioned earlier, we look forward to the next review to see an acceleration of the divestment strategy that is one of the key priorities because of its critical impact on sustaining growth in Egypt, providing opportunities to the private sector, and also helping in the effort that Egypt is pursuing in reducing the debt. In the context of high interest rate, it’s very important to address debt service issue, and this would be accelerated by reducing the debt.  Therefore, we look forward to see progress on the authorities’ plan in terms of divestment.

    On Lebanon, the Fund has been supportive of Lebanon, and a staff-level agreement has been reached in 2022.  Lebanon staff, Lebanon team, is and remained actively engaged with the authorities, providing technical assistance.  And recently, we had two staff visits to Lebanon and the authorities have engaged with our team in order to reactivate a potential program.  They have expressed their interest for that.  The Lebanese economic and financial situation has been made

    more challenging with the recent implications of the war and the massive destruction that in addition to the need to address the financial and economic situation, Lebanon is also facing the need to deal with the reconstruction. 

    The pillars of the program will remain valid as they were negotiated.  Macroeconomic stability, based on addressing the legacy of the financial sector.  The legacy of debt, address the debt issue.  Second pillar is to deal with the macroeconomic stability through fiscal consolidation.  Third pillar is to strengthen governance by reforming SOEs and also increasing and improving the confidence factor.  And third is to address social issues, especially now with issues related to the reconstructions.  Discussions are taking place and staff is on active dialogue with the Lebanese authorities. 

    We are in discussion and therefore I think the discussions that we are having during the Spring Meetings are giving the opportunity for us to understand what are the reform priorities of the Lebanese government.  As you know, staff had a couple of visits in the last few weeks, and we will keep our active engagement with the Lebanese authorities.

    On Syria.  Of course, Syria has been absent for the last 15 years due to the war, and their engagement with the institution has been fairly limited since 2011.  The last Article IV consultation with Syria took place in 2009.  The international community and the regional community has been actively engaged in order to see how we could help Syria recover from a long period of war. 

    We had a preparatory meeting preparatory meeting in AlUla back in February where regional institutions and the international community have agreed to have another follow-up coordination meeting that took place last Tuesday where representatives from international institutions, bilaterals, have convened in order to assess the needs of Syria and also to develop a framework of coordination.  The Fund is engaged to support the international community in its engagement with Syria.  We have already started our assessment of the macroeconomic situation, the institutional capacity, and we look forward to continue our engagement with the Syrian authorities. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Then you have one more question on Jordan.

    MR. AZOUR: Yes, Jordan. In Arabic?  Okay.  Jordan is one of the countries that have been affected by the tariffs, but this is still limited because of the kind of exports or the relationship between Jordan and the United States.  And Jordan managed to overcome, in the recent years, to overcome several shocks, including shocks related to the variability and volatility and the effect of the Gaza issues on the economy of Jordan.  And the latest reviews emphasized the need for Jordan to keep stability and also, despite the external shocks, to take the needed measures in order to improve the macroeconomic situation and to reinforce the economy.  And there has been discussions about supporting Jordan through a new mechanism, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility, in order to help Jordan in the measures that would help it improve adaptation with the climate change and other shocks and other pandemics.  There is actually progress in this regard.  And there will be a review next month by the Executive Board of the Fund about Jordan. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: We’ll turn to Dania, who’s on Webex online. Dania, please go ahead. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello, can you hear me? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Yes, you can hear you.

    QUESTIONER: Hi.  Hello Dr. Jihad, I just have a follow-up question on the break-even oil prices for the Gulf.  In the October report, countries like Saudi Arabia had a very high break-even price of around 90.  I think it was the second biggest highest in the GCC after Bahrain.  I just wanted to see, this figure is likely to increase given the high expenditures, the lower oil prices.  How will the lower oil prices — you mentioned about the impact on GDP, but the prices, I think, since the beginning of the year have dropped by more than $10.00.  So, the impact has it been considered in the Regional Economic Report?  And especially because I don’t know the report, did it include the impact of the tariffs and the impact of the increase in OPEC production from May, which is accelerated?  And just one clarification, with regards to Saudi break-even, some analysts include the expenditure of the Public Investment Fund.  Is that part of the IMF estimates for the break-even?  What’s included in the break-even?  Thank you very much. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Any additional questions on GCC? Okay, let’s take the gentleman in the middle. 

    QUESTIONER: Hello Mr. Azour, Madame Al Shami, thank you for the opportunity.  Philippe Hage Boutros from L’Orient-Le Jour, Lebanon.  How does the IMF assess the potential impact of declining oil revenues stemming from a possible drop in prices amid the tariff crisis on the capacity and willingness of the Gulf countries to fund international aid, particularly for countries like Lebanon and Syria that urgently need reconstruction financing?  Does it anticipate a significant or relatively limited effect?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we had one more question on Saudi that we received online. In light of the global trade repercussions, what is the effect on the Saudi market, especially on inflation and growth?  This question comes from Mohammed Al Sulami from Al Akhbariyah in Saudi Arabia. 

    MR. AZOUR: Let me start with Dania’s question. Dania, let me start by saying that over the last few years from a fiscal perspective, Saudi has made a significant improvement through various reforms in order to diversify revenues outside oil and also reduce certain expenditures, including on the subsidy side. And this effort to diversify revenues has led to an increase of non-oil revenues in the GDP for Saudi.  Of course, the last couple of years have been beneficial in terms of providing Saudi and other GCC countries with surplus in the fiscal as well as also in the current account, which have led to increase in buffers.  Of course, still the oil sector represent an important source of revenue and it’s still also an important source of foreign currencies. 

    Coming to the fiscal strategy, Saudi has established a medium-term fiscal framework that anchors policies and also help them deal with the volatility in oil price and become less pro cyclicals.  Of course, the increase in oil price, sorry, the decline in oil price will have impact on the fiscal and will lead to a potential additional drop in fiscal situation. 

    As I mentioned earlier, a decline of $10.00 per barrel or a decline of $1 million of production will have an impact on the fiscal between 2 to 3 percent.  The decline in oil price is accompanied with a recovery in oil production and Saudi was one of the largest, I would say, contributor to the voluntary drop in oil export. 

    When it comes to the link between fiscal and the investment strategy, the investment strategy has been also put in the medium-term framework in the context of the Vision 2030 and regularly there are updates, recalibration and also phasing, based on the capacity to implement and the priorities.

    In our projections, although developments were taking place almost at the time when we were releasing our outlook, we took into consideration the new assumptions on the oil price for this year as well as also on the growth projections. 

    The second question related to Saudi.  The impact of the latest developments on the Saudi economy.  Undoubtedly, the trade relations regarding the non-oil sector is limited with the United States and therefore the impact will also be limited on trade related to tariffs, especially as oil and gas are exempt from the increase in tariffs.  But there will be an indirect impact, as we’ve said.  Saudi Arabia also has a dollarized economy, whether on the side of exports or imports, and therefore the impact will be limited. 

    On the other hand, the reduction or the depreciation of the dollar will affect services, especially tourism.  And this is a sector that Saudi Arabia is trying to develop by establishing new expansion for tourism in Saudi Arabia.

    The other related question on support to the reconstruction in the region.  Let me first say two things.  One, ODA has declined over the last few years, and more recently with the decisions to stop some of the international assistance by USAID and others.  This will have an important impact, especially on countries in fragility who depend heavily on aid.  Countries like Somalia, Sudan, countries like Yemen.  And this represents a risk not only on the fiscal side, but also on the humanitarian side on food security.  This is the first point. 

    The second point is the region is, we’re talking here about the Levant, is going through an important prospect of post-conflict recovery.  Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, and hopefully, Yemen, and Sudan.  This would require strong international and financial assistance.  Of course, this also would require to accelerate certain number of reforms that will allow the private sector to provide financing.  Those countries have strong diasporas, and the recovery could also be co-led by international assistance, also by private sector support.  And some of the reforms, be it in Lebanon or in Syria, are very important to regain confidence and will allow private sector to play its key role in recovering those economies. 

    The region has been very supportive.  And when we look at the official assistance and the interest that is being shown by several countries in the region, be it in the recent meeting that took place in Saudi Arabia, in Al Ula, where ministers of finance from the GCC and regional institutions convened in order to explore opportunities to provide more assistance to those countries. 

    Again, I think it’s very important also to highlight that assistance has to accompany reform programs that will lay the ground to strong institutions will provide confidence for both citizens and also international, private and public community, in order to accelerate the recovery. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you, Jihad. We’ll take one more round of questions.  The lady on the second row here, please. 

    QUESTIONER:  Hello, I’m Mariam Ali from Dawn News Pakistan.  My question is how will the global tariff war uniquely impact Pakistan?  Any need of buffers in place to mitigate risks to the country?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. Let’s take maybe one more question. The gentleman here sitting in the front. 

    QUESTIONER: Thank you, , Director Azour.  My question is on Yemen.  Igor Naimushin, RIA News Agency, D.C. Bureau.  So, last week U.S. struck Ras Isa fuel part in Yemen.  I would like to ask you to outline what repercussions this strike will have on energy security and economic situation in Yemen and broadly in region?  And if you could, provide any details how the IMF — what is the IMF view on longer-term risks for the region as U.S. operation on Yemen continues to unfold?  Thank you. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. We’ll take one more question from the gentleman here in the –.

    QUESTIONER: Hi, my name is Magnus Sherman.  I wanted to return to Lebanon.  The new Prime Minister has pledged to not touch the hard currency deposits.  Does the IMF support that position? 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you. And we have an online question from Camille Faris Abu Rafael. How can low- and middle-income countries in MENA balance urgent social needs with long-term fiscal sustainability amid rising debt and global uncertainty and persistently high interest rates?  We’ll take these questions, and we’ll take another round.  Thank you. 

    MR. AZOUR: On Pakistan. Pakistan made significant progress in restoring macroeconomic stability over the last 18 months and the numbers are, for Pakistan, are showing improvement both in terms of growth as well as also in inflation that dropped from 12.6 percent last year in 2024 fiscal year to 6.5 percent this year, expected to stay at this level for next year.  Debt is also stabilizing in the case of Pakistan, and recently Pakistan has been upgraded by rating agencies. 

    Of course, trade tensions will affect relatively Pakistan maybe more than the average in the region.  But I would say the impact on Pakistan directly can be offset by other measures that would allow the Pakistani economy to reposition itself in a world that is in the midst of one of the largest transformation in terms of trade, economic opportunities, and to reposition itself in order to address any risks, but also to potentially benefit from change in the trade routes. 

    The question on Yemen the situation on Yemen is extremely preoccupying at the humanitarian level, both in terms of food security as well as also in terms of human suffering.  And this situation has been inflicting heavy toll on the Yemeni people for a long period of time.  Of course, broadly speaking, instability has been one of the main issues that the region is dealing with.  Instability is one of the key sources of uncertainty for the region.  Addressing this instability is key in providing security for people to improve their living conditions, providing stability for the trade routes, and also provide opportunities for people to rebuild and reconstruct.  The Fund is engaged to (A) keep a very strong contacts with Yemen, provide technical assistance at a time where we cannot provide because of the security situation, financial assistance.  Therefore, we are actively supporting through technical assistance.  And we are also in regular engagement with the authorities. 

    Our next plan is to reengage through Article IV in order to assess the economic situation in Yemen, help the internationally recognized government assess the overall debt situation and the debt liabilities in order, later on, to help Yemen deal with the debt situation, and provide right assessment for the donor community to provide assistance. 

    Political stabilization security is very important to preserve human and social conditions, and the Fund stands ready to help Yemen as well as also other countries facing fragility and conflicts in the region.  And this is something that we are increasing our resources to provide support to those countries. 

    Lebanon.  Lebanon problems are complex in terms of how to address the overall financial challenge.  The solution has to deal through a comprehensive approach with all the financial issues that Lebanon is facing.  A piecemeal approach is not what Lebanon needs today.  A reform package that restores confidence, addresses the legacy of the past, provides opportunities for the economy to recover, by also promoting the capacity of the financial system to finance the recovery, mobilize international assistance to help Lebanon dealing with the reconstruction needs, and also support the reforms are priorities that our team is currently discussing with the Lebanese authorities. 

    The question related to balancing short-term and medium-term.  I think it’s a very important question.  We live currently in a world of high uncertainty and in our outlook this spring we have — and I would encourage you to read it,  it’s very interesting piece — we have tried to assess the impact of uncertainty on the region and the uncertainty is of multiple layers.  A global uncertainty, regional, geopolitical and conflict situation, but also internal or local uncertainties.  Those are important issues for countries to address. 

    In very brief, countries need to in the short term to preserve stability and that would require to increase their buffers.  And for those who have limited buffers to accelerate fiscal consolidations to reduce the risk, address some of their financing issues, especially countries who have high level of debt and for those who have buffers, preserve those and use them when they need.  But I think what is really important, especially given the lasting negative impact of uncertainties on countries, is to address the medium-term issues.  And addressing the medium-term issues will help unlock growth, accelerating structural reforms, improving economic conditions, provide stronger social protection framework by moving from untargeted subsidies to something that is more meaningful in terms of social support would be extremely beneficial for countries in the region. 

    MS. AL SHAMI: Thank you very much, Jihad and I’m afraid we have run out of time. Thank you all for participating with us today and as always, we will be posting the transcript online.  But just a reminder that we will be launching our report next week on May 1 so stay tuned for that.  And as Jihad mentioned, please join us tomorrow at 2:30 for the seminar on how countries can navigate uncertainties.  Jihad, any last words? 

    MR. AZOUR: Only to say thank you. And thanks to our friends here, the journalists. We look forward to provide you with more details in Dubai next week with all the details, as well as also country-specific information on our Regional Economic Outlook.  And two days after that, in Samarkand, in Uzbekistan, on the outlook for Caucasus and Central Asia.  Thank you very much. 

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/24/tr-04242025-mcd-press-briefing-sms-2025

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Joint Statement by Saudi Finance Minister, IMF Managing Director, and World Bank Group President on Syria

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 24, 2025

    Washington, DC: Mohammed AlJadaan, Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia; Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF); and Ajay Banga, President of the World Bank Group (WBG) issued the following statement:

    “On the sidelines of the 2025WBG/IMF Spring Meetings in Washington, we co-hosted a high-level roundtable for Syria, bringing together the Syrian authorities, finance ministers and key stakeholders from multilateral and regional financial institutions, as well as economic and development partners.

    “Building on earlier discussions –including at the Paris Conference on Syria (February 13), the Al Ula roundtable on February 16 (See Press Release), and Brussels IX conference (March 17)— this event provided a platform for the Syrian authorities to present their ongoing efforts to stabilize and rebuild their country, reduce poverty, and achieve long-term economic development.

    “There was broad recognition of the urgent challenges facing the Syrian economy and a collective commitment to support the authorities’ efforts for recovery and development. Priority will be given to efforts to meet the critical needs of the Syrian people, institutional rebuilding, capacity development, policy reforms, and the development of a national economic recovery strategy. The IMF and WBG were called upon to play a key role in providing support in line with their mandates and reflecting shareholders’ support, in close coordination with multilateral and bilateral partners.

    “We welcome the efforts to help Syria reintegrate with the international community and unlock access to resources, to support the authorities’ policy efforts, address early recovery and reconstruction needs, and promote private sector development and job creation. We also support the Syrian authorities’ efforts to strengthen governance and increase transparency as they build effective institutions that deliver for the people of Syria.

    “We extend our gratitude to all participants for their valuable contributions and commitment to support efforts by the Syrian authorities to rebuild Syria and improve the lives of the Syrian people. We look forward to reconvening, by the Annual Meetings of the IMF and WBG in October 2025, to monitor the progress achieved and harmonize global efforts in advancing Syria’s economic-recovery and prosperity.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/24/pr25120-syria-joint-statement-by-saudi-finance-minister-imf-md-wbg-president

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Public invited to line Mall for VE Day 80 procession and fly past

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Press release

    Public invited to line Mall for VE Day 80 procession and fly past

    Members of the public are able to watch the VE Day 80 military procession taking place on Monday 5 May

    • More than 1,300 members of the Armed Forces, uniformed services and young people will march from Parliament Square to Buckingham Palace
    • Procession on Bank Holiday Monday begins with a performance of a Churchill speech and finishes with a flypast including the world-famous Red Arrows
    • Public encouraged to host a street party as part of the Great British Food Festival

    Commemorations to mark 80 years since the end of the Second World War in Europe, known as Victory in Europe (VE) Day, will kick off on Monday 5 May with a military procession featuring 1,300 members of the Armed Forces and thousands of members of the public watching along the Mall.

    The events will pay tribute to the millions of people across the UK and Commonwealth who served in the Second World War, telling the stories of those who fought, the children who were evacuated, and those who stepped into the essential roles on the Home Front.

    The procession will begin in Parliament Square when Big Ben strikes midday, and an actor will recite extracts from the iconic Winston Churchill VE Day speech. A young person will then pass the Commonwealth War Graves Torch for Peace to Alan Kennett, 100, a Second World War veteran who served in the Normandy campaign. The Torch for Peace is an enduring symbol, honouring the contributions made by individuals, which will act as a baton to pass and share stories to future generations.

    The Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment and The King’s Troop, Royal Horse Artillery will then lead the procession from Parliament Square, down Whitehall and past the Cenotaph which will be dressed in Union Flags, through Admiralty Arch and up The Mall through to Buckingham Palace where the procession will finish.

    They will be followed by a tri-service procession group featuring marching members of the Royal Navy, the Royal Marines, the British Army and the Royal Air Force. Cadets from all three services and other uniformed youth groups will also take part in the procession to ensure the message of VE Day is handed down to a new generation.

    The Prime Minister and Second World War veterans supported by the Royal British Legion will watch the procession from a specially built dais on the Queen Victoria Memorial.

    The procession will conclude with the Mall being filled with members of the public and a fly past featuring the Red Arrows and 23 current and historic military aircraft.

    VE Day 80 street parties, picnics and community get togethers are being encouraged to take place across the country as part of the Great British Food Festival, led by the Together Coalition and the Big Lunch in partnership with the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

    Culture Secretary Lisa Nandy said:

    VE Day 80 is a chance for us to come together and celebrate our veterans and ensure their legacy of peace is passed on to future generations. Whether by watching on TV or having a street party with neighbours, everyone can take part. This is one of the last chances we have to say thank you to this generation of heroes and it is right that we do just that.

    Defence Secretary John Healey MP said:

    As we mark 80 years since the end of the Second World War in Europe, I look forward to joining our veterans, serving Armed Forces personnel and young people to remember the remarkable generation who defended the freedoms we enjoy today.

    Our whole nation is invited to join together to reflect on the sacrifices of all those who fought for peace and ensure their legacy is never forgotten.

    Alan Kennett, who travelled to Normandy with the Royal British Legion for D-Day 80, said:

    It is a huge honour to be part of the military procession to start the VE80 commemorations. I remember Battle of Britain pilot Johnnie Johnson bursting in and shouting ‘the war is over’. A big party soon followed, filled with lots of drinking and celebrating the news. The 80th anniversary of VE Day brings back so many memories, and it will be such a privilege to be there with everyone.

    Mark Atkinson, Director General of the Royal British Legion, said:

    The 80th anniversary of VE Day is a special moment for the country and the Royal British Legion is incredibly proud to put Second World War veterans at the heart of the commemorations. It’s important we remember those who went to war, who fought for the freedom of not just Europe but everywhere, and those who risked their lives and never made it back.

    Brendan Cox, co-Founder of the Together Coalition, said:

    VE Day 80 is a moment to celebrate our shared victory and remember the sacrifices it took. Whether it’s hosting a street party, sharing a meal, or writing a message of thanks to a veteran, this is a unique opportunity to thank those who served and to celebrate the values that hold us together. We’re proud to be supporting communities across the UK to mark this occasion in ways that are meaningful, joyful and inclusive. Most importantly, this is a moment for everyone to take part – regardless of background, age or postcode.

    The procession and flypast will be broadcast live on Monday 5 May. On Thursday 8 May, 80 years to the day since the end of the Second World War in Europe, a service will take place at Westminster Abbey followed by a concert in the evening on Horse Guards Parade in which stars of stage and screen will tell the story of the end of the war.

    Armed Forces of Commonwealth nations have been invited to join the procession to celebrate the contribution of people from throughout the Commonwealth to the allied effort during the Second World War. They will be led by The Band of the Irish Guards on parade.

    Military musicians on parade include The Band of the Household Cavalry Mounted Regiment, The Band of HM Royal Marines and a military band from the Royal Corps of Army Music.

    The flypast will include a Voyager transport aircraft, a P8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft, Typhoon and F-35 fighter jets  and will culminate with the iconic red, white, and blue smoke of the Royal Air Force’s Red Arrows.

    Historic Second World War-era aircraft from the Royal Air Force Battle of Britain Memorial Flight will also take part in the flypast.

    ENDS

    Notes to editors:

    Flypast details:

    • P8 Poseidon maritime reconnaissance aircraft has recently flown over the North Sea and North Atlantic to monitor Russian vessels near UK waters.
    • The UK’s fleet of Voyager aircraft has been extensively involved in our support to Ukraine, delivering tonnes of equipment to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and flying thousands of Ukrainian recruits to the UK for military training.
    • Typhoon fast jets are on standby 365 24/7 to protect UK airspace and frequently deploy overseas to help protect our allies from airborne threats as part of NATO Air Policing. Typhoons are currently deployed to Poland.
    • The F-35 Lightning is a fifth-generation fighter jet which deploy on board the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers – HMS Prince of Wales set sail earlier this week on its eight-month deployment to the Indo-Pacific.

    Members of the public can find street parties and events near them on the governments VE Day 80 website at www.ve-vjday80.gov.uk

    The Royal British Legion has been given funding by DCMS to support veteran attendance at government led events in the UK to mark VE Day 80. This includes travel costs and welfare support.

    Read guidance for the public wishing to attend the procession in London

    As announced last week by the Prime Minister, pubs will be able to stay open an additional two hours on Thursday May 8 to celebrate. More information

    Updates to this page

    Published 25 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: On April 25, Mikhail Mishustin will hold talks with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Tajikistan Kokhir Rasulzoda

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    On April 25, in Moscow, Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Mikhail Mishustin will hold talks with Prime Minister of the Republic of Tajikistan Kokhir Rasulzoda.

    The heads of government plan to discuss current issues of Russian-Tajik trade, economic, investment and cultural-humanitarian cooperation. Special attention will be paid to the implementation of major joint projects in the fields of energy, industry, agriculture, education and culture.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Sergey Kiriyenko and Dmitry Chernyshenko held a meeting of the NTO organizing committee and greeted the participants of the Fakel award

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    The National Center “Russia” celebrated the tenth anniversary of the National Technology Olympiad (NTO). On this day, the fifth meeting of the Olympiad organizing committee and the Fakel Prize award ceremony took place – an award for NTO graduates who have achieved significant results in science, engineering, business and mentoring.

    The meeting of the organizing committee was opened by the First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration, co-chairman of the organizing committee of the National Technology Olympiad, Sergei Kiriyenko.

    “Since 2015, NTO has brought together almost 900,000 schoolchildren and students from all over Russia, as well as 77 other countries. The Olympiad, originally conceived as an all-Russian engineering competition, has gradually reached the international level. However, NTO is not only about scale. The main thing here is people. Young, bright, talented guys who are already creating the future today. Some of the winners’ projects can be compared to serious scientific works worthy of the level of candidate dissertations. We are confident that with the launch of the 11th season, the number of participants will exceed a million. But what is more important is not quantity, but quality – young people who really change reality with their ideas and developments,” he said.

    Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko added that next year it is necessary to increase the number of participating countries, and also thanked the NTO partners.

    “I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our leading technology partners – companies such as Sber, Yandex, Roscosmos, 1C and others. Thanks to their support, the Olympiad is held at a truly high level. I am sure that this list will expand. And NTO will become an even more powerful tool for developing talents and strengthening international scientific and technological cooperation,” Dmitry Chernyshenko emphasized.

    During the meeting, the Deputy Prime Minister supported the inclusion of new areas in the NTO for grades 5–7 and the launch of the International Space Games. He also instructed to work out the possibility of adding individual educational events of the NTO to the calendar of the “Movement of the First”.

    Nikita Anisimov, Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics and Deputy Co-Chairs of the Organizing Committee of the NTO, spoke about the development of the Olympiad movement and the results of the decade of the NTO. He noted that the NTO preserves and continues the traditions of the Moscow Mathematical Olympiad: it is a movement that brings together like-minded people and comrades. Nikita Anisimov also emphasized that the NTO has grown over the past years. For example, the first final of the Olympiad brought together about 1.2 thousand participants, and this year there were already about 220 thousand.

    Hero of Russia, participant of the presidential program “Time of Heroes”, Chairman of the Board of the “Movement of the First” Artur Orlov noted that the “Movement of the First” project “First in Science”, implemented within the framework of the national project “Youth and Children”, will become an important platform for interaction on the development of scientific and technical cooperation.

    After the organizing committee, the Fakel Prize was presented. At the ceremony, Sergei Kiriyenko emphasized the importance of holding it at the National Center “Russia”, created on the instructions of Russian President Vladimir Putin.

    “I am sure that not much time will pass and the results of your projects, your discoveries and your dreams that came true will be presented here as a source of pride,” said Sergei Kiriyenko.

    The shortlist of the award included 21 applications. The selection of candidates for the final list of applicants took place in several stages: first, the applications were selected for compliance with all criteria, then a public vote took place. Based on its results, a shortlist was formed, which was then evaluated by an expert jury.

    “It is very symbolic that the first celebration of the winners of the Fakel Prize is taking place in the year of the tenth anniversary of the National Technology Olympiad. As Sergey Vladilenovich decided, and we included this in the protocol, this will now be an annual event. In addition to encouraging the winners, it is important to remember those who prepared them. These are mentors, teachers, parents, and our technology partners who helped create conditions for the implementation of opportunities and talents, as instructed by our President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. So that together we can ensure not just technological sovereignty, but also technological leadership of our country. Thank you very much, congratulations to the winners. Create, dare, try, everything will work out!” Dmitry Chernyshenko addressed the guests of the award.

    In the Startup Leader category, the award was received by Daniil Zaitsev and Anastasia Popova, the authors of the SkyControl system for controlling UAVs using hand tilt and gestures. It involves children and teenagers in the world of robotics and technical sciences.

    The winners in the Social Progressor category were the creators of the Green School project – Polina Sapozhnikova, Anna Budekova and Matvey Karachev. They create green corners with information stands and thematic cubes in schools. This helps to form ecological thinking and eco-habits in the younger generation.

    The title “Professional of the Future” was awarded to German Golod, who, as a student, works as a 1C developer at T-Bank. According to him, participation in the NTO helped him acquire the necessary skills. Dmitry Shpanov, who developed a computer model for selecting the mode of electron-beam processing of alloys or ceramics, was recognized as “Innovation Engineer”.

    The winner in the “Technology Champion” category was Eduard Sukharev, a multiple winner of Russian and international competitions in the operation of unmanned aircraft systems.

    The title of “Best Mentor” was awarded to Arseniy Yarmolinsky, a computer science teacher and teacher of additional education, who trained dozens of finalists and winners of NTO and other engineering competitions.

    The winner in the “Engine of Science” nomination was Maria Tishkova, a junior research fellow at the Institute of Cytology of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

    Let us recall that the Olympiad is being held under the coordination of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation together with the presidential platform “Russia – Country of Opportunities” within the framework of the national project “Youth and Children” with the support of the “Movement of the First”, the Agency for Strategic Initiatives and the ANO “NTI Platform”. The NTO project office is deployed at the HSE with the methodological support of the Association of Participants of Technology Circles (NTI Circle Movement).

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Chikunga leads SA delegation at Brazil BRICS Women Ministerial Meeting

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Minister in the Presidency responsible for Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities, Sindisiwe Chikunga, is leading South Africa’s delegation to the BRICS Women Ministerial Meeting at the Itamaraty Palace in Brasília, Brazil.

    The Ministerial meeting, taking place on Thursday, is one of several high-level engagements under the 2025 BRICS Presidency, led by Brazil, and is themed: “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance”.

    The meeting will bring together Ministers responsible for gender and women’s affairs across BRICS member states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to advance multilateral cooperation on women’s empowerment and gender-responsive governance.

    The BRICS Women Ministerial Meeting was first conceptualised during South Africa’s BRICS Presidency in 2023, when South Africa proposed the institutionalisation of a platform for Ministers responsible for women’s affairs.

    This initiative aimed to integrate gender equality and women’s empowerment more centrally into BRICS multilateralism. Since then, both Russia in 2024, and Brazil in 2025, have continued the momentum, hosting sessions that advance this collaborative agenda.

    The 2025 Ministerial will focus on three priority areas:
    •    Women, Development and Entrepreneurship,
    •    Digital Governance, Misogyny and Disinformation, and
    •    Women’s Empowerment, Climate Action and Sustainable Development.

    The Department of Women, Youth and Persons with Disabilities said Chikunga will participate in all three thematic debates scheduled for the Ministerial Meeting, where she will contribute to discussions on women’s economic empowerment, digital governance, and climate resilience.

    “Her participation underscores South Africa’s commitment to ensuring that gender equality is mainstreamed across all areas of governance, policy, and development within the BRICS framework. These themes reflect shared challenges and ambitions across the BRICS countries, particularly in the context of inclusive economic development, digital rights, and sustainability.

    “The meeting offers a strategic space for exchanging policy approaches, aligning efforts, and strengthening collective commitments to gender justice. South Africa’s participation is consistent with its broader commitment to women development, social inclusion, and multilateral solidarity,” the department said in a statement on Thursday. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: President Ramaphosa calls for comprehensive, unconditional ceasefire

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    By Dikeledi Molobela

    President Cyril Ramaphosa has called on both Ukraine and Russia to commit to a comprehensive and unconditional ceasefire, paving the way for meaningful dialogue and negotiations between the two nations. 

    The President emphasised that South Africa stands ready to continue to support all credible and inclusive multilateral efforts aimed at achieving a just, sustainable and comprehensive peace. 

    “We call upon all parties, both Russia and Ukraine, to ensure that there is a comprehensive ceasefire, an unconditional ceasefire, so that discussions and negotiations can start between the two countries. 

    “President Zelensky, as he himself would say, told me that as Ukraine, they are ready to engage in discussions and negotiations with Russia and they are also ready to have a comprehensive, unconditional ceasefire. This we believe is the best way towards ending the war between Russia and Ukraine,” he said. 

    President Ramaphosa, together with his Ukrainian counterpart, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, addressed a media briefing at the Union Buildings following official talks on Thursday. 

    Zelenskyy, who had to cut his visit short due to an overnight attack in his country, was in South Africa on his first official visit. 

    This engagement follows President Ramaphosa’s visit to Ukraine in June 2023 as part of the African Peace Initiative, which also saw African leaders meeting with both Zelenskyy and Russian President Vladimir Putin to table a 10-point peace proposal. 

    READ | Africa’s peace mission ‘historic’ – President Ramaphosa

    President Ramaphosa emphasised that South Africa’s own journey from apartheid to democracy has taught the nation the value of engaging all parties in a conflict to achieve peaceful, just, and lasting solutions.

    “If there is one thing that our history has taught us, it is that diplomacy and dialogue are more powerful than any weapon that anyone can use. 
     
    “It is this understanding that informed South Africa’s participation in the African Peace Initiative and South Africa’s subsequent participation in the Ukraine Peace Formula,” he said. 

    Answering a question on whether Ukraine may need to cede part of its territory to Russia, President Ramaphosa said he views this as a precondition; however, the focus should be on Ukraine’s commitment to an unconditional ceasefire, which is seen as a positive step for negotiations. 

    “I think what we should focus on is that there is a willingness and a commitment from Ukraine for an unconditional ceasefire. An unconditional ceasefire sets a very good and positive tone for negotiations to commence. It is a confidence-building measure that should be a key ingredient in a negotiation process. So, I see this as great progress,” the President said.

    During the media engagement, President Ramaphosa also said he spoke to United States of America President Donald Trump this morning to discuss the peace process in Ukraine, where they both agreed that the war should end as soon as possible.
     
    “We both agreed that the war should be brought to an end as soon as possible to prevent further death and destruction. President Trump and I also agreed to meet soon to address this, and relations between South Africa and the United States. We both spoke about the need to foster good relations between our two countries,” he said. 
     
    Earlier in the week, President Ramaphosa also had a call with President Vladimir Putin, where they both committed to working together towards a peaceful resolution of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

    In response, President Zelenskyy extended his gratitude to South Africa, adding that the shared understanding that the war needs to end as soon as possible was a key focus during discussions with President Ramaphosa. 

    “When he had been on a visit to Ukraine, I remember him saying these very important words about the need to reach a ceasefire as soon as possible — an unconditional ceasefire. I agreed to it.

    “I said that everything depends on Russia’s intention and desire because it is in Moscow where they have to make a decision on silence, making relevant orders to the Russian army,” he said. 

    President Zelenskyy said Ukraine was ready for a ceasefire but was forced to defend itself in the face of Russian attacks.

    “Unfortunately, after that, Russia renewed its assaults on the front line, the strikes against the civilian infrastructure,” Zelenskyy said.

    Zelenskyy also expressed that his country has been fighting for its freedom in this full-scale war for more than three years now.

    “We have a very fresh Russian attack this day… Unfortunately we have got losses and destruction…I decided to shorten my visit to your beautiful country,” he said. 

    However, Zelenskyy said he leaves behind his Foreign Minister to attend all the meetings that have been planned. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: South Africa and Ukraine solidify biliteral relations

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    By Dikeledi Molobela

    President Cyril Ramaphosa and his Ukrainian counterpart, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, have used the official visit to deepen bilateral relations for the mutual benefit of the two countries.  

    President Ramaphosa hosted President Zelenskyy at the Union Buildings in Pretoria on Thursday, marking the first official visit by a Ukrainian Head of State to South Africa.

    He expressed that it was his distinct honour to receive President Zelenskyy and his delegation at the Union Buildings.
     
    “This is a historic visit. This is the first time the Head of State of Ukraine is visiting South Africa in the 33 years since we established formal diplomatic relations.
     
    “We acknowledge with great appreciation the support we received from Ukraine during our liberation struggle. We recall that a number of exiled South Africans received training and education in Ukraine,” the President said. 
     
    In June 2023, President Ramaphosa had the honour of visiting President Zelenskyy in Kyiv as part of the African Peace Initiative.
     
    Since then, he said they have maintained ongoing dialogue between the two countries and its diplomats.
     
    “We have just concluded successful talks during which we exchanged views on how to consolidate and deepen the bilateral relations between our two countries. We noted a growing interest in expanding relations in peace diplomacy, post-conflict reconstruction and development, and the empowerment of women.
     
    “We also discussed opportunities for cooperation in areas such as agriculture, trade, education, infrastructure and social exchanges,” President Ramaphosa said. 
     
    He expressed satisfaction that Ministers from both countries have held discussions on strengthening trade and investment opportunities, including opportunities in agriculture and agribusiness.
     
    “We acknowledge the significant strides that Ukraine has taken and in particular, the efforts of President Zelenskyy to expand relations with the African continent.
     
    “We note the provision of grain in areas of food stress in West and East Africa, the expansion of agricultural cooperation, and the opening of a grain hub at the Port of Mombasa in Kenya,” he said. 
     
    President Ramaphosa said these are the direct outcomes of the discussions that were held when he and other African Heads of State visited Kyiv in June 2023 as part of the African Peace Initiative. 
     
    “Our engagement today was an opportunity to discuss our shared interest in advancing peace, security, stability and sustainable development on the continent, in Ukraine and across the world.
     
    “We have reinforced our common commitment to respect the rule of law in international relations, multilateralism, the central role of the United Nations in global governance, and the maintenance of global peace and security,” he said. 

    Delivering his remarks, President Zelenskyy noted that South Africa is currently presiding over the Group of 20 (G20) and emphasised that the G20’s role in defending peace could be far more significant, a role he strongly counts on.

    He proposed the creation of a joint mineral hub between Ukraine and South Africa to facilitate the production and transport of fertilisers, supporting the broader Southern African region.

    “Our bilateral agenda is also very important. Ukraine is keenly interested in energy security matters and fertiliser production… We are ready to work with the South Africans to build more modern production facilities in your country for better resilient power sector,” he said. 

    President Zelenskyy also highlighted opportunities for cooperation in the agricultural sector, which could significantly enhance bilateral trade between the two countries.

    “Ukraine offers South Africa to have a joint mineral hub to produce and transport fertilisers to support the whole of your region. There are potential projects in the agricultural sector. This can lead to better bilateral trade results between Ukraine and South Africa,” he said. 

    He added that Ukraine is also ready to work together to develop modern security systems for national parks, urban environments, and other areas requiring advanced technological solutions. 

    President Zelenskyy expressed Ukraine’s willingness to partner with South Africa to boost power generation, ranging from atomic energy to affordable renewables. 

    “We are also ready to work together to drastically increase power generation in your country, from atomic energy to renewable. Affordable energy has always contributed to economic growth, and I’ve already tasked my professional team to look into a joint project between our countries,” he said.

    He also presented President Ramaphosa with a list of 400 Ukrainian children reportedly being held against their will in Russia.

    President Zelenskyy acknowledged South Africa’s role as co-leader of the global coalition to bring Ukrainian children home and expressed hope that President Ramaphosa would assist in securing their return. 

    “I presented President Ramaphosa with a list of 400 Ukrainian children. It’s very important for us to look after them… We need to get them back. I truly hope that President Ramaphosa will help us to bring them home indeed. 

    “I’d like to thank you for this visit, for the opportunity to meet you. We strongly believe that the President, South Africa, all other partners in Africa will help us to… to [get Russia] to engage in the full-scale ceasefire,” Zelenskyy said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI: MidWestOne Financial Group, Inc. Reports Financial Results For the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    IOWA CITY, Iowa, April 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — MidWestOne Financial Group, Inc. (Nasdaq: MOFG) (“we,” “our,” or the “Company”) today reported results for the first quarter of 2025.

    First Quarter 2025 Summary1

    • Net income of $15.1 million, or $0.73 per diluted common share.
      • Net interest margin (tax equivalent) was 3.44%;2 core net interest margin expanded 10 basis points (“bps”) to 3.36%.2
      • Noninterest expenses were $36.3 million; efficiency ratio was 59.38%.2
      • Return on average assets of 1.00%.
    • Criticized loans ratio improved 54 bps to 5.47%; nonperforming assets ratio improved 7 bps to 0.33%.
    • Tangible book value per share of $23.36,2 an increase of 4.4%.
    • Common equity tier 1 (“CET1”) capital ratio improved 24 bps to 10.97%.

    CEO Commentary

    Charles (Chip) Reeves, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, commented, “We are pleased with the continued execution of our strategic plan initiatives despite a more uncertain economic environment. Our return on average assets eclipsed 1% for the second straight quarter driven by disciplined balance sheet management, core net interest margin expansion of 10 bps2 and solid expense control. Loan growth was flat in the quarter, somewhat softer than anticipated, due to pay-offs and latter quarter market volatility. The majority of our asset quality metrics improved significantly, led by reductions in nonperforming assets and criticized loans. Net charge-offs increased to 29 basis points, with the majority of the increase due to a partial charge-off on a previously reserved CRE loan as we prepare for resolution. Driven by earnings and lower accumulated other comprehensive loss, tangible book value per share increased 4.4% to $23.362 and the CET1 ratio grew to 10.97%, edging closer to our target range of 11.0%-11.50%.

    Thank you to our team members who continued to execute well and serve our customers amidst market volatility. We are pleased with the transformation of our company and our solid foundation of increased capital, earnings power, asset quality, and a premium core deposit franchise position us well for uncertain economic times and the remainder of 2025.”

    1 First Quarter Summary compares to the fourth quarter of 2024 (the “linked quarter”) unless noted.
    2 Non-GAAP measure. See the separate Non-GAAP Measures section for a reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

        As of or for the quarter ended
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share amounts and as noted)   March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
        2025       2024       2024  
    Financial Results            
    Revenue   $ 57,575     $ 59,775     $ 44,481  
    Credit loss expense     1,687       1,291       4,689  
    Noninterest expense     36,293       37,372       35,565  
    Net income     15,138       16,330       3,269  
    Adjusted earnings(3)     15,301       16,112       4,504  
    Per Common Share            
    Diluted earnings per share   $ 0.73     $ 0.78     $ 0.21  
    Adjusted earnings per share(3)     0.73       0.77       0.29  
    Book value     27.85       26.94       33.53  
    Tangible book value(3)     23.36       22.37       27.14  
    Balance Sheet & Credit Quality            
    Loans In millions   $ 4,304.2     $ 4,315.6     $ 4,414.6  
    Investment securities In millions     1,305.5       1,328.4       1,862.2  
    Deposits In millions     5,489.1       5,478.0       5,585.2  
    Net loan charge-offs In millions     3.1       0.7       0.2  
    Allowance for credit losses ratio     1.25 %     1.28 %     1.27 %
    Selected Ratios            
    Return on average assets     1.00 %     1.03 %     0.20 %
    Net interest margin, tax equivalent(3)     3.44 %     3.43 %     2.33 %
    Return on average equity     10.74 %     11.53 %     2.49 %
    Return on average tangible equity(3)     13.75 %     14.80 %     4.18 %
    Efficiency ratio(3)     59.38 %     59.06 %     71.28 %
                             

    REVENUE REVIEW

    Revenue               Change   Change
                  1Q25 vs   1Q25 vs
    (Dollars in thousands)   1Q25   4Q24   1Q24   4Q24   1Q24
    Net interest income   $           47,439   $         48,938   $        34,731   (3)%   37 %
    Noninterest income                 10,136               10,837                9,750   (6)%   4 %
    Total revenue, net of interest expense   $           57,575   $         59,775   $        44,481   (4)%   29 %
                                 

    Total revenue for the first quarter of 2025 decreased $2.2 million from the fourth quarter of 2024 due to lower net interest income and noninterest income during the quarter. When compared to the first quarter of 2024, total revenue increased $13.1 million, due to higher net interest income and higher noninterest income.

    Net interest income of $47.4 million for the first quarter of 2025 decreased $1.5 million from the fourth quarter of 2024, due to lower earning asset volumes and yields, partially offset by lower funding volumes and costs. When compared to the first quarter of 2024, net interest income increased $12.7 million, due to higher earning asset yields and lower funding volumes and costs, partially offset by lower earning asset volumes.

    The Company’s tax equivalent net interest margin was 3.44%3 in the first quarter of 2025, compared to 3.43%3 in the fourth quarter of 2024, driven by lower funding costs, partially offset by a decline in earning asset yields. Interest bearing liability costs during the first quarter of 2025 decreased 11 bps to 2.41%, due to reductions of short-term borrowings, interest bearing deposits, and long-term debt costs of 78 bps, 10 bps, and 7 bps, to 3.75%, 2.31%, and 6.41%, respectively, from the fourth quarter of 2024.

    The Company’s tax equivalent net interest margin was 3.44%3 in the first quarter of 2025, compared to 2.33%3 in the first quarter of 2024, driven by higher earning asset yields and lower interest-bearing liability costs. Total earning assets yield increased 79 bps from the first quarter of 2024, primarily due to increases of 192 bps and 20 bps in total investment securities and loan yields, respectively. Interest bearing liability costs decreased 34 bps to 2.41%, due to short-term borrowing costs of 3.75%, long-term debt costs of 6.41%, and interest-bearing deposit costs of 2.31%, which decreased 107 bps, 45 bps, and 14 bps, respectively, from the first quarter of 2024.

    3 Non-GAAP measure. See the separate Non-GAAP Measures section for a reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

    Noninterest Income             Change   Change
                1Q25 vs   1Q25 vs
    (In thousands) 1Q25   4Q24   1Q24   4Q24   1Q24
    Investment services and trust activities $ 3,544     $ 3,779   $ 3,503     (6)%   1 %
    Service charges and fees   2,131       2,159     2,144     (1)%   (1)%
    Card revenue   1,744       1,833     1,943     (5)%   (10)%
    Loan revenue   1,194       1,841     856     (35)%   39 %
    Bank-owned life insurance   1,057       719     660     47 %   60 %
    Investment securities gains, net   33       161     36     (80)%   (8)%
    Other   433       345     608     26 %   (29)%
    Total noninterest income $ 10,136     $ 10,837   $ 9,750     (6)%   4 %
                       
    MSR adjustment (included above in Loan revenue) $ (213 )   $ 164   $ (368 )   (230)%   (42)%
                                 

    Noninterest income for the first quarter of 2025 decreased $0.7 million from the linked quarter, primarily due to declines of $0.6 million and $0.2 million in loan revenue and investment services and trust activities revenue, respectively. The decrease in loan revenue was reflective of an unfavorable change in the fair value of our mortgage servicing rights of $0.4 million, coupled with a decrease in Small Business Administration (“SBA”) gain on sale revenue of $0.3 million. The decrease in investment services and trust activities revenue was driven by a decline in assets under administration due to market volatility. Partially offsetting these decreases was an increase of $0.3 million in bank-owned life insurance revenue, due primarily to $0.4 million of death benefit recognized in the first quarter of 2025.

    Noninterest income for the first quarter of 2025 increased $0.4 million from the first quarter of 2024 due primarily to increases of $0.4 million and $0.3 million in bank-owned life insurance and loan revenue, respectively. The bank-owned life insurance increase was due primarily to the death benefit noted above. The increase in loan revenue was due primarily to the mortgage servicing right valuation adjustment, coupled with higher SBA gain on sale revenue and other loan income. Partially offsetting these increases were decreases of $0.2 million in each of card revenue and other revenue.

    EXPENSE REVIEW

    Noninterest Expense             Change   Change
                1Q25 vs   1Q25 vs
    (In thousands) 1Q25   4Q24   1Q24   4Q24   1Q24
    Compensation and employee benefits $ 21,212   $ 20,684   $ 20,930   3 %   1 %
    Occupancy expense of premises, net   2,588     2,772     2,813   (7)%   (8)%
    Equipment   2,426     2,688     2,600   (10)%   (7)%
    Legal and professional   2,226     2,534     2,059   (12)%   8 %
    Data processing   1,698     1,719     1,360   (1)%   25 %
    Marketing   552     793     598   (30)%   (8)%
    Amortization of intangibles   1,408     1,449     1,637   (3)%   (14)%
    FDIC insurance   917     980     942   (6)%   (3)%
    Communications   159     154     196   3 %   (19)%
    Foreclosed assets, net   74     56     358   32 %   (79)%
    Other   3,033     3,543     2,072   (14)%   46 %
         Total noninterest expense $ 36,293   $ 37,372   $ 35,565   (3)%   2 %
                               
    Merger-related Expenses          
             
    (In thousands) 1Q25   4Q24   1Q24
    Compensation and employee benefits $                 —   $                 —   $               241
    Occupancy expense of premises, net                     —                       —                     152
    Equipment                     —                       21                     149
    Legal and professional                     40                       —                     573
    Data processing                     —                       10                       61
    Marketing                     —                       —                       32
    Communications                     —                       —                         1
    Other                     —                       —                     105
    Total merger-related expenses $                 40   $                 31   $            1,314
                     

    Noninterest expense for the first quarter of 2025 decreased $1.1 million from the linked quarter, primarily due to decreases in other noninterest expense, legal and professional, equipment, and occupancy expense of premises, net, of $0.5 million, $0.3 million, $0.3 million, and $0.2 million, respectively. The primary drivers of the decrease in other noninterest expense were declines in fraud loss expense of $0.3 million and customer deposit costs of $0.1 million. The $0.3 million decrease in legal and professional expense was primarily driven by lower litigation-related legal costs. The decrease in equipment of $0.3 million was primarily driven by fewer small equipment purchases, while the decrease in occupancy expense of premises, net was due primarily to lower property tax expense. Partially offsetting these decreases was an increase of $0.5 million in compensation and employee benefits which reflected an increase in equity compensation and payroll tax expenses.

    Noninterest expense for the first quarter of 2025 increased $0.7 million from the first quarter of 2024 primarily due to increases in other noninterest expense, data processing, and compensation and employee benefits of $1.0 million, $0.3 million and $0.3 million, respectively. The increase in other noninterest expense was due primarily to customer deposit costs while the increase in data processing was driven core banking system costs. The increase in compensation and employee benefits was primarily driven by medical benefits expenses, wages expense, and incentive expense due to improved performance. Partially offsetting these identified increases was a decline of $1.3 million in merger-related expenses.

    The Company’s effective tax rate was 22.7% in the first quarter of 2025 and the linked quarter. The effective income tax rate for the full year 2025 is expected to be 22-23%.

    BALANCE SHEET REVIEW

    Total assets were $6.25 billion at March 31, 2025, compared to $6.24 billion at December 31, 2024 and $6.75 billion at March 31, 2024. The increase from December 31, 2024 was primarily due to higher cash balances, partially offset by lower securities balances. Compared to March 31, 2024, the decrease was primarily driven by the sale of assets associated with our Florida banking operations in the second quarter of 2024 coupled with the pay-off of Bank Term Funding Program (“BTFP”) borrowings with proceeds received from securities sales transactions in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Loans Held for Investment March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024  
    (Dollars in thousands) Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total  
    Commercial and industrial $1,140,138   26.5 % $1,126,813   26.1 % $1,105,718   25.0 %
    Agricultural 131,409   3.1   119,051   2.8   113,029   2.6  
    Commercial real estate                        
    Construction and development 293,280   6.8   324,896   7.5   403,571   9.1  
    Farmland 180,633   4.2   182,460   4.2   184,109   4.2  
    Multifamily 421,204   9.8   423,157   9.8   409,504   9.3  
    Other 1,425,062   33.0   1,414,168   32.7   1,440,645   32.7  
    Total commercial real estate 2,320,179   53.8   2,344,681   54.2   2,437,829   55.3  
    Residential real estate                        
    One-to-four family first liens 471,688   11.0   477,150   11.1   495,408   11.2  
    One-to-four family junior liens 182,346   4.2   179,232   4.2   182,001   4.1  
    Total residential real estate 654,034   15.2   656,382   15.3   677,409   15.3  
    Consumer 58,424   1.4   68,700   1.6   80,661   1.8  
    Loans held for investment, net of unearned income $4,304,184   100.0 % $4,315,627   100.0 % $4,414,646   100.0 %
                             
    Total commitments to extend credit $1,080,300       $1,080,737       $1,230,612      

    Loans held for investment, net of unearned income, decreased $11.4 million, or 0.3%, to $4.30 billion from $4.32 billion at December 31, 2024, primarily due to the reclassification of $11.0 million of credit card receivables to loans held for sale in the first quarter of 2025. Management expects the credit card portfolio sale to close in the fourth quarter of 2025.

    Loans held for investment, net of unearned income, decreased $110.5 million, or 2.5%, to $4.30 billion from $4.41 billion at March 31, 2024. The decrease from the first quarter of 2024 was driven primarily by the sale of loans associated with our Florida banking operations in the second quarter of 2024, partially offset by organic loan growth and higher line of credit usage.

    Investment Securities March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024  
    (Dollars in thousands) Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total  
    Available for sale $1,305,530   100.0 % $1,328,433   100.0 % $797,230   42.8 %
    Held to maturity —   — % —   — % 1,064,939   57.2 %
    Total investment securities $1,305,530       $1,328,433       $1,862,169      

    Investment securities at March 31, 2025 were $1.31 billion, decreasing $22.9 million from December 31, 2024 and decreasing $556.6 million from March 31, 2024. The decrease from the fourth quarter of 2024 was primarily due to principal cash flows received from scheduled payments, calls, and maturities. The decrease from the first quarter of 2024 stemmed primarily from the sale of debt securities in connection with a balance sheet repositioning, as well as principal cash flows received from scheduled payments, calls, and maturities. 

    Deposits March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024  
    (Dollars in thousands) Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total  
    Noninterest bearing deposits $903,714   16.5 % $951,423   17.4 % $920,764   16.5 %
    Interest checking deposits 1,283,328   23.3   1,258,191   22.9   1,349,823   24.2  
    Money market deposits 1,002,066   18.3   1,053,988   19.2   1,122,717   20.1  
    Savings deposits 877,348   16.0   820,549   15.0   728,276   13.0  
    Time deposits of $250 and under 818,012   14.9   826,793   15.1   787,851   14.1  
    Total core deposits 4,884,468   89.0   4,910,944   89.6   4,909,431   87.9  
    Brokered time deposits 200,000   3.6   200,000   3.7   205,000   3.7  
    Time deposits over $250 404,674   7.4   367,038   6.7   470,805   8.4  
    Total deposits $5,489,142   100.0 % $5,477,982   100.0 % $5,585,236   100.0 %

    Total deposits increased $11.2 million, or 0.2%, to $5.49 billion, from $5.48 billion at December 31, 2024. Total deposits decreased $96.1 million, or 1.7%, from $5.59 billion at March 31, 2024, primarily due to the deposits transferred in the sale of our Florida banking operations, partially offset by organic deposit growth in our targeted metropolitan markets.

    Borrowed Funds March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024  
    (Dollars in thousands) Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total   Balance   % of Total  
    Short-term borrowings $1,482   1.3 % $3,186   2.7 % $422,988   77.6 %
    Long-term debt 111,398   98.7 % 113,376   97.3 % 122,066   22.4 %
    Total borrowed funds $112,880       $116,562       $545,054      

    Borrowed funds were $112.9 million at March 31, 2025, a decrease of $3.7 million from December 31, 2024 and a decrease of $432.2 million from March 31, 2024. The decrease compared to the linked quarter was due to lower customer repurchase agreement volumes and scheduled payments on long-term debt. The decrease compared to March 31, 2024 was primarily due to the pay-off of $405.0 million of BTFP borrowings and $13.0 million of a revolving credit facility, as well as scheduled payments on long-term debt.

    Capital March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands) 2025 (1)     2024       2024  
    Total shareholders’ equity $ 579,625     $ 559,696     $ 528,040  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (63,098 )     (72,762 )     (60,804 )
    MidWestOneFinancial Group, Inc. Consolidated          
    Tier 1 leverage to average assets ratio   9.50 %     9.15 %     8.16 %
    Common equity tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio   10.97 %     10.73 %     8.98 %
    Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio   11.84 %     11.59 %     9.75 %
    Total capital to risk-weighted assets ratio   14.34 %     14.07 %     11.97 %
    MidWestOneBank          
    Tier 1 leverage to average assets ratio   10.42 %     10.12 %     9.36 %
    Common equity tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio   13.02 %     12.86 %     11.20 %
    Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets ratio   13.02 %     12.86 %     11.20 %
    Total capital to risk-weighted assets ratio   14.21 %     14.02 %     12.25 %
    (1) Regulatory capital ratios for March 31, 2025 are preliminary          
               

    Total shareholders’ equity at March 31, 2025 increased $19.9 million from December 31, 2024, driven primarily by an increase in retained earnings and a decrease in accumulated other comprehensive loss. Total shareholders’ equity at March 31, 2025 increased $51.6 million from March 31, 2024, primarily due to increases in common stock and additional pain-in-capital stemming from the common equity capital raise in the third quarter of 2024, partially offset by a decrease in retained earnings.

    On April 22, 2025, the Board of Directors of the Company declared a cash dividend of $0.2425 per common share. The dividend is payable June 16, 2025, to shareholders of record at the close of business on June 2, 2025.

    No common shares were repurchased by the Company during the period December 31, 2024 through March 31, 2025 or for the subsequent period through April 24, 2025. The current share repurchase program allows for the repurchase of up to $15.0 million of the Company’s common shares. As of March 31, 2025, $15.0 million remained available under this program.

    CREDIT QUALITY REVIEW

    Credit Quality As of or For the Three Months Ended
    March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands)   2025       2024       2024  
    Credit loss expense related to loans $ 1,787     $ 1,891     $ 4,589  
    Net charge-offs   3,087       691       189  
    Allowance for credit losses   53,900       55,200       55,900  
    Pass $ 4,068,707     $ 4,056,361     $ 4,098,102  
    Special Mention   121,494       148,462       152,604  
    Classified   113,983       110,804       163,940  
    Criticized   235,477       259,266       316,544  
    Loans greater than 30 days past due and accruing $ 6,119     $ 9,378     $ 8,772  
    Nonperforming loans $ 17,470     $ 21,847     $ 29,267  
    Nonperforming assets   20,889       25,184       33,164  
    Net charge-off ratio(1)   0.29 %     0.06 %     0.02 %
    Classified loans ratio(2)   2.65 %     2.57 %     3.71 %
    Criticized loans ratio(3)   5.47 %     6.01 %     7.17 %
    Nonperforming loans ratio(4)   0.41 %     0.51 %     0.66 %
    Nonperforming assets ratio(5)   0.33 %     0.40 %     0.49 %
    Allowance for credit losses ratio(6)   1.25 %     1.28 %     1.27 %
    Allowance for credit losses to nonaccrual loans ratio(7)   309.47 %     254.32 %     197.53 %
    (1) Net charge-off ratio is calculated as annualized net charge-offs divided by the sum of average loans held for investment, net of unearned income and average loans held for sale, during the period.
    (2) Classified loans ratio is calculated as classified loans divided by loans held for investment, net of unearned income, at the end of the period.
    (3) Criticized loans ratio is calculated as criticized loans divided by loans held for investment, net of unearned income, at the end of the period.
    (4) Nonperforming loans ratio is calculated as nonperforming loans divided by loans held for investment, net of unearned income, at the end of the period.
    (5) Nonperforming assets ratio is calculated as nonperforming assets divided by total assets at the end of the period.
    (6) Allowance for credit losses ratio is calculated as allowance for credit losses divided by loans held for investment, net of unearned income, at the end of the period.
    (7) Allowance for credit losses to nonaccrual loans ratio is calculated as allowance for credit losses divided by nonaccrual loans at the end of the period.
     

    Nonperforming loans and nonperforming assets ratios improved 10 bps and 7 bps, to 0.41% and 0.33%, respectively, compared to the linked quarter. In addition, special mention loan balances decreased $27.0 million, or 18%, while classified loan balances remained relatively stable with an increase of $3.2 million, or 3%. When compared to the same period of the prior year, the nonperforming loans and nonperforming asset ratios improved 25 bps and 16 bps, respectively, while the classified loan ratio improved 106 bps. Special mention loan balances decreased $31.1 million, or 20%. The net charge-off ratio increased 23 bps from the linked quarter and 27 bps from the same period in the prior year.

    As of March 31, 2025, the allowance for credit losses was $53.9 million and the allowance for credit losses ratio was 1.25%, compared with $55.2 million and 1.28%, respectively, at December 31, 2024. Credit loss expense of $1.7 million in the first quarter of 2025 primarily reflected additional reserve on pooled loans, offset by a reduction of $0.1 million in the reserve for unfunded loan commitments.

    Nonperforming Loans Roll Forward Nonaccrual   90+ Days Past Due
    & Still Accruing    		   Total
    (Dollars in thousands)    
    Balance at December 31, 2024 $21,705   $142   $21,847
    Loans placed on nonaccrual or 90+ days past due & still accruing 3,121   225   3,346
    Proceeds related to repayment or sale (4,158)   —   (4,158)
    Loans returned to accrual status or no longer past due (336)   (49)   (385)
    Charge-offs (2,774)   (259)   (3,033)
    Transfers to foreclosed assets (141)   —   (141)
    Transfer to nonaccrual —   (6)   (6)
    Balance at March 31, 2025 $17,417   $53   $17,470


    CONFERENCE CALL DETAILS

    The Company will host a conference call for investors at 11:00 a.m. CT on Friday, April 25, 2025. To participate, you may pre-register for this call utilizing the following link: https://www.netroadshow.com/events/login?show=29396e9f&confId=80376. After pre-registering for this event you will receive your access details via email. On the day of the call, you are also able to dial 1-833-470-1428 using an access code of 527448 at least fifteen minutes before the call start time. If you are unable to participate on the call, a replay will be available until July 24, 2025 by calling 1-866-813-9403 and using the replay access code of 162684. A transcript of the call will also be available on the Company’s web site (www.midwestonefinancial.com) within three business days of the call.

    ABOUT MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.

    MidWestOne Financial Group, Inc. is a financial holding company headquartered in Iowa City, Iowa. MidWestOne is the parent company of MidWestOne Bank, which operates banking offices in Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Colorado. MidWestOne provides electronic delivery of financial services through its website, MidWestOne.bank. MidWestOne Financial Group, Inc. trades on the Nasdaq Global Select Market under the symbol “MOFG”.

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains certain “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of such term in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. We and our representatives may, from time to time, make written or oral statements that are “forward-looking” and provide information other than historical information. These statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results to be materially different from any results, levels of activity, performance or achievements expressed or implied by any forward-looking statement. These factors include, among other things, the factors listed below. Forward-looking statements, which may be based upon beliefs, expectations and assumptions of our management and on information currently available to management, are generally identifiable by the use of words such as “believe,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “should,” “could,” “would,” “plans,” “goals,” “intend,” “project,” “estimate,” “forecast,” “may” or similar expressions. These forward-looking statements are subject to certain risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, these statements. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Additionally, we undertake no obligation to update any statement in light of new information or future events, except as required under federal securities law.

    Our ability to predict results or the actual effect of future plans or strategies is inherently uncertain. Factors that could have an impact on our ability to achieve operating results, growth plan goals and future prospects include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) the effects of changes in interest rates, including on our net income and the value of our securities portfolio; (2) fluctuations in the value of our investment securities; (3) effects on the U.S. economy resulting from the implementation of proposed policies and executive orders, including the imposition of tariffs, changes in immigration policy, changes to regulatory or other governmental agencies, changes in foreign policy and tax regulations; (4) volatility of rate-sensitive deposits; (5) asset/liability matching risks and liquidity risks; (6) the ability to successfully manage liquidity risk, which may increase dependence on non-core funding sources such as brokered deposits, and may negatively impact the Company’s cost of funds; (7) the concentration of large deposits from certain clients, including those who have balances above current FDIC insurance limits; (8) credit quality deterioration, pronounced and sustained reduction in real estate market values, or other uncertainties, including the impact of inflationary pressures and future monetary policies of the Federal Reserve in response thereto on economic conditions and our business, resulting in an increase in the allowance for credit losses, an increase in the credit loss expense, and a reduction in net earnings; (9) the sufficiency of the allowance for credit losses to absorb the amount of expected losses inherent in our existing loan portfolio; (10) the failure of assumptions underlying the establishment of allowances for credit losses and estimation of values of collateral and various financial assets and liabilities; (11) credit risks and risks from concentrations (by type of borrower, collateral, geographic area and by industry) within our loan portfolio; (12) changes in the economic environment, competition, or other factors that may affect our ability to acquire loans or influence the anticipated growth rate of loans and deposits and the quality of the loan portfolio and loan and deposit pricing; (13) governmental monetary and fiscal policies; (14) new or revised general economic, political, or industry conditions, nationally, internationally or in the communities in which we conduct business, including the risk of a recession; (15) the imposition of domestic or foreign tariffs or other governmental policies impacting the global supply chain and value of the agricultural or other products of our borrowers; (16) war or terrorist activities, including ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, widespread disease or pandemic, or other adverse external events, which may cause deterioration in the economy or cause instability in credit markets; (17) legislative and regulatory changes, including changes in banking, securities, trade, and tax laws and regulations and their application by our regulators, and including changes in interpretation or prioritization of such laws and regulations; (18) changes in accounting policies and practices, as may be adopted by state and federal regulatory agencies and the Financial Accounting Standards Board; (19) the effects of competition from other commercial banks, thrifts, mortgage banking firms, consumer finance companies, credit unions, securities brokerage firms, insurance companies, money market and other mutual funds, financial technology companies, and other financial institutions operating in our markets or elsewhere or providing similar services; (20) changes in the business and economic conditions generally and in the financial services industry, and the effects of recent developments and events in the financial services industry, including the large-scale deposit withdrawals over a short period of time that resulted in prior bank failures; (21) the occurrence of fraudulent activity, breaches, or failures of our or our third party vendors’ information security controls or cyber-security related incidents, including as a result of sophisticated attacks using artificial intelligence and similar tools or as a result of insider fraud; (22) the ability to attract and retain key executives and employees experienced in banking and financial services; (23) our ability to adapt successfully to technological changes to compete effectively in the marketplace; (24) operational risks, including data processing system failures and fraud; (25) the costs, effects and outcomes of existing or future litigation or other legal proceedings and regulatory actions; (26) the risks of mergers or branch sales (including the sale of our Florida banking operations and the acquisition of Denver Bankshares, Inc.), including, without limitation, the related time and costs of implementing such transactions, integrating operations as part of these transactions and possible failures to achieve expected gains, revenue growth and/or expense savings from such transactions; (27) the economic impacts on the Company and its customers of climate change, natural disasters and exceptional weather occurrences, such as: tornadoes, floods and blizzards; and (28) other risk factors detailed from time to time in Securities and Exchange Commission filings made by the Company.

    MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
    FIVE QUARTER CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS

      March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   June 30,   March 31,
    (In thousands)   2025       2024       2024       2024       2024  
    ASSETS                  
    Cash and due from banks $            68,545     $            71,803     $            72,173     $            66,228     $            68,430  
    Interest earning deposits in banks              182,360                  133,092                  129,695                    35,340                    29,328  
    Federal funds sold                       —                           —                           —                           —                            4  
    Total cash and cash equivalents              250,905                  204,895                  201,868                  101,568                    97,762  
    Debt securities available for sale at fair value           1,305,530               1,328,433               1,623,104                  771,034                  797,230  
    Held to maturity securities at amortized cost                       —                           —                           —               1,053,080               1,064,939  
    Total securities           1,305,530               1,328,433               1,623,104               1,824,114               1,862,169  
    Loans held for sale                13,836                         749                      3,283                      2,850                      2,329  
    Gross loans held for investment           4,315,546               4,328,413               4,344,559               4,304,619               4,433,258  
    Unearned income, net              (11,362 )                (12,786 )                (15,803 )                (17,387 )                (18,612 )
    Loans held for investment, net of unearned income           4,304,184               4,315,627               4,328,756               4,287,232               4,414,646  
    Allowance for credit losses              (53,900 )                (55,200 )                (54,000 )                (53,900 )                (55,900 )
    Total loans held for investment, net           4,250,284               4,260,427               4,274,756               4,233,332               4,358,746  
    Premises and equipment, net                90,031                    90,851                    90,750                    91,793                    95,986  
    Goodwill                69,788                    69,788                    69,788                    69,388                    71,118  
    Other intangible assets, net                23,611                    25,019                    26,469                    27,939                    29,531  
    Foreclosed assets, net                  3,419                      3,337                      3,583                      6,053                      3,897  
    Other assets              246,990                  252,830                  258,881                  224,621                  226,477  
    Total assets $       6,254,394     $       6,236,329     $       6,552,482     $       6,581,658     $       6,748,015  
    LIABILITIES                       
    Noninterest bearing deposits $          903,714     $          951,423     $          917,715     $          882,472     $          920,764  
    Interest bearing deposits           4,585,428               4,526,559               4,451,012               4,529,947               4,664,472  
    Total deposits           5,489,142               5,477,982               5,368,727               5,412,419               5,585,236  
    Short-term borrowings                  1,482                      3,186                  410,630                  414,684                  422,988  
    Long-term debt              111,398                  113,376                  115,051                  114,839                  122,066  
    Other liabilities                72,747                    82,089                    95,836                    96,430                    89,685  
    Total liabilities           5,674,769               5,676,633               5,990,244               6,038,372               6,219,975  
    SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY                       
    Common stock                21,580                    21,580                    21,580                    16,581                    16,581  
    Additional paid-in capital              414,258                  414,987                  414,965                  300,831                  300,845  
    Retained earnings              227,790                  217,776                  206,490                  306,030                  294,066  
    Treasury stock              (20,905 )                (21,885 )                (21,955 )                (22,021 )                (22,648 )
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss              (63,098 )                (72,762 )                (58,842 )                (58,135 )                (60,804 )
    Total shareholders’ equity              579,625                  559,696                  562,238                  543,286                  528,040  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $       6,254,394     $       6,236,329     $       6,552,482     $       6,581,658     $       6,748,015  
                                           

    MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
    FIVE QUARTER CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME

      Three Months Ended
      March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   June 30,   March 31,
    (In thousands, except per share data)   2025     2024     2024       2024     2024
    Interest income                  
    Loans, including fees $            59,462   $            62,458   $            62,521     $            61,643   $            57,947
    Taxable investment securities                13,327                  11,320                   8,779                     9,228                   9,460
    Tax-exempt investment securities                    703                      728                   1,611                     1,663                   1,710
    Other                 1,247                   3,761                      785                        242                      418
    Total interest income                74,739                  78,267                  73,696                    72,776                  69,535
    Interest expense                  
    Deposits                25,484                  27,324                  29,117                    28,942                  27,726
    Short-term borrowings                      25                      115                   5,043                     5,409                   4,975
    Long-term debt                 1,791                   1,890                   2,015                     2,078                   2,103
    Total interest expense                27,300                  29,329                  36,175                    36,429                  34,804
    Net interest income                47,439                  48,938                  37,521                    36,347                  34,731
    Credit loss expense                 1,687                   1,291                   1,535                     1,267                   4,689
    Net interest income after credit loss expense                45,752                  47,647                  35,986                    35,080                  30,042
    Noninterest income                  
    Investment services and trust activities                 3,544                   3,779                   3,410                     3,504                   3,503
    Service charges and fees                 2,131                   2,159                   2,170                     2,156                   2,144
    Card revenue                 1,744                   1,833                   1,935                     1,907                   1,943
    Loan revenue                 1,194                   1,841                      760                     1,525                      856
    Bank-owned life insurance                 1,057                      719                      879                        668                      660
    Investment securities gains (losses), net                      33                      161              (140,182 )                        33                        36
    Other                    433                      345                      640                    11,761                      608
    Total noninterest income (loss)                10,136                  10,837              (130,388 )                  21,554                   9,750
    Noninterest expense                  
    Compensation and employee benefits                21,212                  20,684                  19,943                    20,985                  20,930
    Occupancy expense of premises, net                 2,588                   2,772                   2,443                     2,435                   2,813
    Equipment                 2,426                   2,688                   2,486                     2,530                   2,600
    Legal and professional                 2,226                   2,534                   2,261                     2,253                   2,059
    Data processing                 1,698                   1,719                   1,580                     1,645                   1,360
    Marketing                    552                      793                      619                        636                      598
    Amortization of intangibles                 1,408                   1,449                   1,470                     1,593                   1,637
    FDIC insurance                    917                      980                      923                     1,051                      942
    Communications                    159                      154                      159                        191                      196
    Foreclosed assets, net                      74                        56                      330                        138                      358
    Other                 3,033                   3,543                   3,584                     2,304                   2,072
    Total noninterest expense                36,293                  37,372                  35,798                    35,761                  35,565
    Income (loss) before income tax expense                19,595                  21,112              (130,200 )                  20,873                   4,227
    Income tax expense (benefit)                 4,457                   4,782                (34,493 )                   5,054                      958
    Net income (loss) $            15,138   $            16,330   $          (95,707 )   $            15,819   $             3,269
                       
    Earnings (loss) per common share                  
    Basic $               0.73   $               0.79   $              (6.05 )   $               1.00   $               0.21
    Diluted $               0.73   $               0.78   $              (6.05 )   $               1.00   $               0.21
    Weighted average basic common shares outstanding                20,797                  20,776                  15,829                    15,763                  15,723
    Weighted average diluted common shares outstanding                20,849                  20,851                  15,829                    15,781                  15,774
    Dividends paid per common share $            0.2425   $            0.2425   $            0.2425     $            0.2425   $            0.2425
                                   

    MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
    FINANCIAL STATISTICS

      As of or for the Three Months Ended
      March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share amounts)   2025       2024       2024  
    Earnings:          
    Net interest income $ 47,439     $ 48,938     $ 34,731  
    Noninterest income   10,136       10,837       9,750  
    Total revenue, net of interest expense   57,575       59,775       44,481  
    Credit loss expense   1,687       1,291       4,689  
    Noninterest expense   36,293       37,372       35,565  
    Income before income tax expense   19,595       21,112       4,227  
    Income tax expense   4,457       4,782       958  
    Net income $ 15,138     $ 16,330     $ 3,269  
    Adjusted earnings(1) $ 15,301     $ 16,112     $ 4,504  
    Per Share Data:          
    Diluted earnings $ 0.73     $ 0.78     $ 0.21  
    Adjusted earnings(1)   0.73       0.77       0.29  
    Book value   27.85       26.94       33.53  
    Tangible book value(1)   23.36       22.37       27.14  
    Ending Balance Sheet:          
    Total assets $ 6,254,394     $ 6,236,329     $ 6,748,015  
    Loans held for investment, net of unearned income   4,304,184       4,315,627       4,414,646  
    Total securities   1,305,530       1,328,433       1,862,169  
    Total deposits   5,489,142       5,477,982       5,585,236  
    Short-term borrowings   1,482       3,186       422,988  
    Long-term debt   111,398       113,376       122,066  
    Total shareholders’ equity   579,625       559,696       528,040  
    Average Balance Sheet:          
    Average total assets $ 6,168,546     $ 6,279,975     $ 6,635,379  
    Average total loans   4,290,710       4,307,583       4,298,216  
    Average total deposits   5,398,819       5,464,900       5,481,114  
    Financial Ratios:          
    Return on average assets   1.00 %     1.03 %     0.20 %
    Return on average equity   10.74 %     11.53 %     2.49 %
    Return on average tangible equity(1)   13.75 %     14.80 %     4.18 %
    Efficiency ratio(1)   59.38 %     59.06 %     71.28 %
    Net interest margin, tax equivalent(1)   3.44 %     3.43 %     2.33 %
    Loans to deposits ratio   78.41 %     78.78 %     79.04 %
    CET1 Ratio   10.97 %     10.73 %     8.98 %
    Common equity ratio   9.27 %     8.97 %     7.83 %
    Tangible common equity ratio(1)   7.89 %     7.57 %     6.43 %
    Credit Risk Profile:          
    Total nonperforming loans $ 17,470     $ 21,847     $ 29,267  
    Nonperforming loans ratio   0.41 %     0.51 %     0.66 %
    Total nonperforming assets $ 20,889     $ 25,184     $ 33,164  
    Nonperforming assets ratio   0.33 %     0.40 %     0.49 %
    Net charge-offs $ 3,087     $ 691     $ 189  
    Net charge-off ratio   0.29 %     0.06 %     0.02 %
    Allowance for credit losses $ 53,900     $ 55,200     $ 55,900  
    Allowance for credit losses ratio   1.25 %     1.28 %     1.27 %
    Allowance for credit losses to nonaccrual ratio   309.47 %     254.32 %     197.53 %
               
    (1) Non-GAAP measure. See the Non-GAAP Measures section for a reconciliation to the most directly comparable GAAP measure.
     

    MIDWESTONE FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
    AVERAGE BALANCE SHEET AND YIELD ANALYSIS

      Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025   December 31, 2024   March 31, 2024
    (Dollars in thousands) Average
    Balance    		   Interest
    Income/
    Expense    		   Average
    Yield/
    Cost    		   Average
    Balance    		   Interest
    Income/
    Expense    		   Average
    Yield/
    Cost    		   Average Balance   Interest
    Income/
    Expense    		   Average
    Yield/
    Cost
    ASSETS                                  
    Loans, including fees (1)(2)(3) $4,290,710   $60,443   5.71%   $4,307,583   $63,443   5.86%   $4,298,216   $58,867   5.51%
    Taxable investment securities 1,207,844   13,327   4.47%   1,080,716   11,320   4.17%   1,557,603   9,460   2.44%
    Tax-exempt investment securities (2)(4) 105,563   865   3.32%   109,183   896   3.26%   328,736   2,097   2.57%
    Total securities held for investment(2) 1,313,407   14,192   4.38%   1,189,899   12,216   4.08%   1,886,339   11,557   2.46%
    Other 124,133   1,247   4.07%   309,904   3,761   4.83%   30,605   418   5.49%
    Total interest earning assets(2) $5,728,250   $75,882   5.37%   $5,807,386   $79,420   5.44%   $6,215,160   $70,842   4.58%
    Other assets 440,296           472,589           420,219        
    Total assets $6,168,546           $6,279,975           $6,635,379        
    LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY                                  
    Interest checking deposits $1,240,586   $2,127   0.70%   $1,252,481   $2,205   0.70%   $1,301,470   $2,890   0.89%
    Money market deposits 1,002,743   6,333   2.56%   1,046,571   7,197   2.74%   1,102,543   8,065   2.94%
    Savings deposits 835,731   3,057   1.48%   799,931   3,158   1.57%   694,143   2,047   1.19%
    Time deposits 1,397,595   13,967   4.05%   1,410,542   14,764   4.16%   1,446,981   14,724   4.09%
    Total interest bearing deposits 4,476,655   25,484   2.31%   4,509,525   27,324   2.41%   4,545,137   27,726   2.45%
    Securities sold under agreements to repurchase 2,705   5   0.75%   3,640   8   0.87%   5,330   11   0.83%
    Other short-term borrowings —   20   —%   6,465   107   6.58%   409,525   4,964   4.88%
    Total short-term borrowings 2,705   25   3.75%   10,105   115   4.53%   414,855   4,975   4.82%
    Long-term debt 113,364   1,791   6.41%   116,018   1,890   6.48%   123,266   2,103   6.86%
    Total borrowed funds 116,069   1,816   6.35%   126,123   2,005   6.32%   538,121   7,078   5.29%
    Total interest bearing liabilities $4,592,724   $27,300   2.41%   $4,635,648   $29,329   2.52%   $5,083,258   $34,804   2.75%
    Noninterest bearing deposits 922,164           955,375           935,977        
    Other liabilities 82,280           125,536           88,611        
    Shareholders’ equity 571,378           563,416           527,533        
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $6,168,546           $6,279,975           $6,635,379        
    Net interest income(2)     $48,582           $50,091           $36,038    
    Net interest spread(2)         2.96%           2.92%           1.83%
    Net interest margin(2)         3.44%           3.43%           2.33%
                                       
    Total deposits(5) $5,398,819   $25,484   1.91%   $5,464,900   $27,324   1.99%   $5,481,114   $27,726   2.03%
    Cost of funds(6)         2.01%           2.09%           2.33%
    (1) Average balance includes nonaccrual loans.
    (2) Tax equivalent. The federal statutory tax rate utilized was 21%.
    (3) Interest income includes net loan fees, loan purchase discount accretion and tax equivalent adjustments. Net loan fees were $256 thousand, $456 thousand, and $237 thousand for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. Loan purchase discount accretion was $1.2 million, $2.5 million, and $1.2 million for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. Tax equivalent adjustments were $981 thousand, $985 thousand, and $920 thousand for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. The federal statutory tax rate utilized was 21%.
    (4) Interest income includes tax equivalent adjustments of $162 thousand, $168 thousand, and $387 thousand for the three months ended March 31, 2025, December 31, 2024, and March 31, 2024, respectively. The federal statutory tax rate utilized was 21%.
    (5) Total deposits is the sum of total interest-bearing deposits and noninterest bearing deposits. The cost of total deposits is calculated as annualized interest expense on deposits divided by average total deposits.
    (6) Cost of funds is calculated as annualized total interest expense divided by the sum of average total deposits and borrowed funds.
       

    Non-GAAP Measures

    This earnings release contains non-GAAP measures for tangible common equity, tangible book value per share, tangible common equity ratio, return on average tangible equity, net interest margin (tax equivalent), core net interest margin, loan yield (tax equivalent), core yield on loans, efficiency ratio, adjusted earnings and adjusted earnings per share. Management believes these measures provide investors with useful information regarding the Company’s profitability, financial condition and capital adequacy, consistent with how management evaluates the Company’s financial performance. The following tables provide a reconciliation of each non-GAAP measure to the most comparable GAAP measure.

    Tangible Common Equity/Tangible Book Value                    
    per Share/Tangible Common Equity Ratio   March 31,   December 31,   September 30,   June 30,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)     2025       2024       2024       2024       2024  
    Total shareholders’ equity   $ 579,625     $ 559,696     $ 562,238     $ 543,286     $ 528,040  
    Intangible assets, net     (93,399 )     (94,807 )     (96,257 )     (97,327 )     (100,649 )
    Tangible common equity   $ 486,226     $ 464,889     $ 465,981     $ 445,959     $ 427,391  
                         
    Total assets   $ 6,254,394     $ 6,236,329     $ 6,552,482     $ 6,581,658     $ 6,748,015  
    Intangible assets, net     (93,399 )     (94,807 )     (96,257 )     (97,327 )     (100,649 )
    Tangible assets   $ 6,160,995     $ 6,141,522     $ 6,456,225     $ 6,484,331     $ 6,647,366  
                         
    Book value per share   $ 27.85     $ 26.94     $ 27.06     $ 34.44     $ 33.53  
    Tangible book value per share(1)   $ 23.36     $ 22.37     $ 22.43     $ 28.27     $ 27.14  
    Shares outstanding     20,815,715       20,777,485       20,774,919       15,773,468       15,750,471  
                         
    Common equity ratio     9.27 %     8.97 %     8.58 %     8.25 %     7.83 %
    Tangible common equity ratio(2)     7.89 %     7.57 %     7.22 %     6.88 %     6.43 %
                                             

    (1) Tangible common equity divided by shares outstanding. 
    (2) Tangible common equity divided by tangible assets.  

        Three Months Ended
    Return on Average Tangible Equity   March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands)     2025       2024       2024  
    Net income   $ 15,138     $ 16,330     $ 3,269  
    Intangible amortization, net of tax(1)     1,047       1,075       1,228  
    Tangible net income   $ 16,185     $ 17,405     $ 4,497  
                 
    Average shareholders’ equity   $ 571,378     $ 563,416     $ 527,533  
    Average intangible assets, net     (94,169 )     (95,498 )     (95,296 )
    Average tangible equity   $ 477,209     $ 467,918     $ 432,237  
                 
    Return on average equity     10.74 %     11.53 %     2.49 %
    Return on average tangible equity(2)     13.75 %     14.80 %     4.18 %
                             

    (1) The income tax rate utilized was the blended marginal tax rate.  
    (2) Annualized tangible net income divided by average tangible equity.

    Net Interest Margin, Tax Equivalent/
    Core Net Interest Margin    		   Three Months Ended
      March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands)     2025       2024       2024  
    Net interest income   $ 47,439     $ 48,938     $ 34,731  
    Tax equivalent adjustments:            
    Loans(1)     981       985       920  
    Securities(1)     162       168       387  
    Net interest income, tax equivalent   $ 48,582     $ 50,091     $ 36,038  
    Loan purchase discount accretion     (1,166 )     (2,496 )     (1,152 )
    Core net interest income   $ 47,416     $ 47,595     $ 34,886  
                 
    Net interest margin     3.36 %     3.35 %     2.25 %
    Net interest margin, tax equivalent(2)     3.44 %     3.43 %     2.33 %
    Core net interest margin(3)     3.36 %     3.26 %     2.26 %
    Average interest earning assets   $ 5,728,250     $ 5,807,386     $ 6,215,160  
                             

    (1) The federal statutory tax rate utilized was 21%.  
    (2) Annualized tax equivalent net interest income divided by average interest earning assets.  
    (3) Annualized core net interest income divided by average interest earning assets.   

          Three Months Ended
    Loan Yield, Tax Equivalent / Core Yield on Loans   March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands)     2025       2024       2024  
    Loan interest income, including fees     $ 59,462     $ 62,458     $ 57,947  
    Tax equivalent adjustment(1)       981       985       920  
    Tax equivalent loan interest income     $ 60,443     $ 63,443     $ 58,867  
    Loan purchase discount accretion       (1,166 )     (2,496 )     (1,152 )
    Core loan interest income     $ 59,277     $ 60,947     $ 57,715  
                   
    Yield on loans       5.62 %     5.77 %     5.42 %
    Yield on loans, tax equivalent(2)       5.71 %     5.86 %     5.51 %
    Core yield on loans(3)       5.60 %     5.63 %     5.40 %
    Average loans     $ 4,290,710     $ 4,307,583     $ 4,298,216  
                               

    (1) The federal statutory tax rate utilized was 21%.  
    (2) Annualized tax equivalent loan interest income divided by average loans.  
    (3) Annualized core loan interest income divided by average loans.  

          Three Months Ended
    Efficiency Ratio   March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands)     2025       2024       2024  
    Total noninterest expense     $ 36,293     $ 37,372     $ 35,565  
    Amortization of intangibles       (1,408 )     (1,449 )     (1,637 )
    Merger-related expenses       (40 )     (31 )     (1,314 )
    Noninterest expense used for efficiency ratio     $ 34,845     $ 35,892     $ 32,614  
                   
    Net interest income, tax equivalent(1)     $ 48,582     $ 50,091     $ 36,038  
    Plus: Noninterest income       10,136       10,837       9,750  
    Less: Investment securities gains, net       33       161       36  
    Net revenues used for efficiency ratio     $ 58,685     $ 60,767     $ 45,752  
                   
    Efficiency ratio (2)       59.38 %     59.06 %     71.28 %
                               

    (1) The federal statutory tax rate utilized was 21%.    
    (2) Noninterest expense adjusted for amortization of intangibles and merger-related expenses divided by the sum of tax equivalent net interest income, noninterest income and net investment securities gains.  

          Three Months Ended
    Adjusted Earnings   March 31,   December 31,   March 31,
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)     2025       2024     2024  
    Net income     $         15,138     $         16,330   $           3,269  
    Less: Investment securities gains, net of tax(1)                        25                      119                      27  
    Less: Mortgage servicing rights (loss) gain, net of tax(1)                     (158 )                    122                   (276 )
    Plus: Merger-related expenses, net of tax(1)                        30                        23                    986  
    Adjusted earnings     $         15,301     $         16,112   $           4,504  
                   
    Weighted average diluted common shares outstanding                 20,849                 20,851               15,774  
                   
    Earnings per common share – diluted     $             0.73     $             0.78   $             0.21  
    Adjusted earnings per common share(2)     $             0.73     $             0.77   $             0.29  
                             

    (1) The income tax rate utilized was the blended marginal tax rate.      
    (2) Adjusted earnings divided by weighted average diluted common shares outstanding.  

    Category: Earnings

    This news release may be downloaded from Corporate Profile | MidWestOne Financial Group, Inc.

    Source: MidWestOne Financial Group, Inc.

    Industry: Banks

    Contact:

      Charles N. Reeves Barry S. Ray
      Chief Executive Officer Chief Financial Officer
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    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Commend Ukraine’s Presence Despite the Prevailing Circumstances, Raise Questions on the Treatment of Ukraine’s Indigenous Peoples and the Roma Population

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination today concluded its consideration of the combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of Ukraine.  Committee Experts congratulated the State party for appearing before the Committee despite prevailing circumstances, while raising questions on the treatment of Ukraine’s indigenous peoples and the Roma population. 

    A Committee Expert congratulated the Ukrainian delegation for making a laudable effort to assess the implementation of the Convention in the country, despite prevailing circumstances. Ukraine should be praised for this effort. 

    Chinsung Chung, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee noted that the State party adopted the law on indigenous peoples in 2021.  However, according to information before the Committee, the law only recognised Crimean Tatars, Karaims and Krymchaks as indigenous peoples in Ukraine, while excluding other groups, such as Hutsuls, Lemkos and Gagauz peoples.  Could the delegation provide clarifications on the law on indigenous peoples and how it aligned with international standards? What measures were in place to preserve and promote the identity, language and culture of all indigenous people under the jurisdiction of the State party?

    Ms. Chung also said that according to the representative of the Office of the Ombudsman of Ukraine, around 100,000 Roma became refugees, and around the same number of Ukrainian Roma became internally displaced persons.  Were accurate statistics available?  Did the State party find durable solutions for internally displaced Roma and take measures to ensure that they benefitted from assistance?  What were the State’s plans to include Roma people in recovery and reconstruction programmes?

    The delegation said in 2021, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the law on indigenous peoples in Ukraine, which was developed through extensive consultations with indigenous groups and civil society, and represented the aspirations of these groups.  In addition, a draft law was developed on the status of the Crimean Tartar people which would be registered in Parliament in the near future. 

    Officially, Ukraine recognised three indigenous groups of peoples, including Crimean Tartars, Karaims and Krymchaks.  The Lemkos people were not considered a national minority group, but rather a cultural group.  The public broadcaster of Ukraine produced programmes for national minorities in their national languages, across broadcast, radio and digital formats. 

    Mr. Lossovskyi said in 2021, the Ukrainian Government approved the Roma strategy, and every two years action plans were prepared for its implementation.  The Roma community was a young community, one of the youngest among the national minorities in Ukraine.  It would be beneficial to use their innovation and abilities in the process of renovating Ukraine when the war was over.  The State was working on providing the Roma with more education. There were many grants provided to Roma for studying in universities. 

     

    Introducing the report, Ihor Lossovskyi, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said during the reporting period from 2014 to 2019, fundamental tragic changes took place in Ukraine, in particular the beginning of the Russian aggression.  At the height of the Russian invasion, in April 2022, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, and in June 2022, it received candidate status along with seven relevant recommendations in all spheres of human activity, including recommendation no. 7 on completion of the reform of legislation in the field of national minorities and interethnic relations. 

    To implement these recommendations, Ukraine developed and approved three laws, including the new law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine, as well as 16 subordinate regulatory legal acts (bylaws) approved by the Government.

    In concluding remarks, Ibrahima Guisse, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, thanked the delegation for the dialogue held, particularly given the context.  War was ended through negotiation and diplomacy, not capitulation. It was hoped this would happen with Ukraine.  The fact that Ukraine was here before the Committee was an example of the State’s willingness to cooperate.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Lossovskyi thanked the Committee for their time and interest in the situation in Ukraine.  The Committee’s recommendations were very much appreciated. 

    The delegation of Ukraine consisted of representatives of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience; the Coordination Centre for Legal Aid Provision; the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine; and the Permanent Mission of Ukraine to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee will issue its concluding observations on the report of Ukraine after the conclusion of its one hundred and fifteenth session on 9 May 2025.  The programme of work and other documents related to the session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Friday, 25 April at 3.p.m for a half day general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.

    Report

    The Committee has before it the combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of Ukraine (CERD/C/UKR/24-26).

    Presentation of Report

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said during the reporting period from 2014 to 2019, fundamental tragic changes took place in Ukraine, in particular the beginning of the Russian aggression, Russia’s brazen destruction of international law, the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the occupation by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and terrorist organizations supported by it of certain parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as the financing by the Russian Federation of terrorist organizations of the occupation administrations. 

    Due to these circumstances, collecting information in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine was difficult. As a result of the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by the Russian Federation, and the aggression of the Russian Federation in eastern Ukraine, ensuring the rights of minorities in these areas, especially Crimea, had sharply deteriorated.  Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars, and those who adhered to pro-Ukrainian views, were subject to discrimination in Crimea. 

    During the reporting period, important changes also took place in the religious sphere in Ukraine.  On 15 December 2018, the Unification Council was held, at which representatives of the three Orthodox Churches of Ukraine united into a single church structure, which was called the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine”, and the Metropolitan Epiphany of Kyiv and All Ukraine was elected as its primate.  As of the beginning of 2021, this church jurisdiction had 7,097 religious organizations on the territory of Ukraine, handled by 4,537 clergy. 

    The principles of preventing and combatting discrimination were defined by the 2012 law on the principles of preventing and combatting discrimination in Ukraine.  In May 2014, amendments were made to the law, which improved the legislative definition of discrimination.  In 2019, the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience was established to deal with State policy in the field of national minorities and interethnic relations, freedom of conscience, and freedom of religion. 

    At the height of the Russian invasion, in April 2022, Ukraine applied for membership in the European Union, and in June 2022, it received candidate status along with seven relevant recommendations in all spheres of human activity, including recommendation no. 7 on completion of the reform of legislation in the field of national minorities and interethnic relations.  To implement these recommendations, Ukraine developed and approved three laws, including the new law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine, as well as 16 subordinate regulatory legal acts (bylaws) approved by the Government. 

    The first stages of the negotiation process with the European Commission regarding Ukraine’s membership in the European Union took place, in particular, the screening of Ukrainian legislation for its compliance with European legislation.  The screening was provided under four subsections on judiciary and fundamental rights: freedom of conscience, freedom of religion; racism, xenophobia, hate speech; racial and ethnic discrimination, including Roma; and rights of national minorities. 

    Based on the results, the European Commission prepared a positive report on the state of Ukrainian legislation and its compliance with European legislation in October 2024.  The next stage of the negotiation process was the preparation of strategic documents, including an action plan to ensure the rights of national minorities in Ukraine, which were in the final stage of preparation. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, welcomed that Ukraine had a diverse and high-level delegation.  Ukraine’s presence before the Committee despite the difficult context in the country highlighted the country’s commitment to appear before the treaty bodies. Mr. Guisse then paid tribute to Pope Francis who had been a man of peace. 

    During the period under review, Ukraine had experienced deep upheavals, including the large-scale invasion in 2022, which had given rise to large-scale destruction, human loss and mass displacement. According to information before the Committee, the last census conducted in 2001 showed that the main minority groups included Russians, Belarusians, Moldovans, Crimean Tatars and Bulgarians. Ukraine also has smaller populations of Poles, Romanians, Armenians, Hungarians, Roma and other nationalities.  A subsequent census was supposed to be conducted in 2011, which was postponed until 2020, and had not taken place until now. 

    Other data was also not provided, and the Committee emphasised that the lack of statistics limited the ability to evaluate the enjoyment of different groups of their economic, social and cultural rights.  Were there plans to conduct the census based on the principle of self-identification? What were the measures planned to collect data on the enjoyment of economic and social rights by the different groups under the jurisdiction of the State party? 

    The Committee noted that the legal framework, particularly on principles of preventing and combatting discrimination in Ukraine, did not prohibit discrimination based on all grounds listed in the Convention, particularly national origin and descent.  Were there plans to amend and align the national legislation framework with article 1 of the Convention?  What measures were taken to ensure that the legislative framework prohibited intersecting forms of discrimination? 

    Could the delegation inform the Committee on the implementation of the national human rights strategy for 2015–2020 in 2015 and its action plan?  Was there a timeframe for developing and adopting a strategy on combatting racial discrimination?

    Could the delegation provide information on the mandate and activities of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience?  What were the measures to ensure the consultation and participation of groups vulnerable to racial discrimination in the work of the State Service?  Was the State party planning to establish a central mechanism to coordinate and monitor the implementation of measures designed to combat racial discrimination?

     

    The Committee was concerned that the legislative framework, including the Criminal Code, did not include a definition of all forms of discrimination, or a specific definition of hate speech or sanction for hate speech and crimes.  What measures were being undertaken to review and amend the legislative framework to prohibit all forms of racial discrimination, hate speech and hate crimes in accordance with the Convention? 

    Was the State party planning to amend its Criminal Code, particularly article 161, to remove the requirements and restrictive approach as recommended by the Committee in 2016?  What was the status of the draft law no. 5488 before the Parliament?  How were its provisions in line with the Convention?   

    Could information be provided on the legislative framework on combatting racial discrimination in political discourse, as well as information on complaints received, investigations initiated, and imposed sanctions in this field?  The Committee noted that the law on media included provisions on discrimination and incitement to hatred.  Could clarifications on the law and how its provisions aligned with the Convention be provided?  Could the delegation inform the Committee about measures taken to combat hate speech in the media and over the Internet?  Was there a designated entity to monitor hate speech or avenues to submit complaints by victims? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said unfortunately, the last census of Ukraine had taken place in 2001, which was 24 years ago.  There were several reasons for this, including two Ukrainian political revolutions during this time and the beginning of the war with Russia in 2014. The next census had been planned for 2023, but this had been postponed due to the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation in 2022.  It was impossible in current circumstances to hold another census. 

    Significant work in combatting racial discrimination had been undertaken in the past three to four years.  The State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience was established in 2019 and began its work in 2020. The institute directly dealt with issues of national minorities and ethnic policies and consisted of around 40 people. 

    Over the past couple of years, three laws had been adopted by the parliament, including the new law on national minority communities of Ukraine.  This new law was revolutionary, as it described the ethnic policy for Ukraine and prescribed tasks for the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience. According to the law, all those who considered themselves to be national minorities would be recognised by the State as such.  Ukraine had 130 national minorities, and the State took responsibility for all these communities. 

    There was a lack of strict definitions in Ukrainian laws around hate speech and hate crimes.  Ukrainian institutions were working hard to integrate these into Ukrainian legislation.  There was an interagency working group dealing with issues of discrimination, hate speech and hate crime. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, appreciated the answers given, noting the circumstances within the country.

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked for more details on the interagency working group to be provided?  Could more information on the national human rights institution be provided? 

    A Committee Expert said Ukraine’s non-compliance with article 4 was an ongoing issue.  It was strongly recommended that the State follow up on this. 

    Another Expert asked how effective the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience had been in protecting minority rights in Ukraine?  What was the level of participation of national minorities in consultations on State decisions?  Had there been any improvements based on these discussions? 

    A Committee Expert said the situation in Ukraine was incomprehensible.  What could be done about hate speech?  Did Russian people hate Ukrainian people?  Personally, the Expert did not feel this was the case. How could this explain why not everyone opposed the war which continued to take more lives?  While there was hatred, men would continue to wage war. 

     

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert and Follow-Up Rapporteur, expressed gratitude to the State party for responding to the Committee’s request in the one-year time frame, however, many questions by the Committee were not addressed, nor were they provided in the current State report.  Could the State party provide the Committee with the previously requested information in paragraph 16 of the concluding observations? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said the questions about the war were philosophical.  This was an existential war for the Ukrainian nation. According to the Russian dictator, Ukrainians did not exist and needed to be re-educated.  To stop the war, the Russian dictator should provide a decree to forces to stop the fight and withdraw from the territory of Ukraine. 

    The Commissioner of Human Rights had a special department focusing on discrimination.  After the screening exercise with the European Union, Ukraine understood there were some gaps in its legislation, particularly when it came to definitions.  Many new laws and bylaws had been approved to fill these gaps, and this was a key focus of the State Service for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience. Communication with national minorities was a key step in this regard. 

    Around seven million Ukrainians had left Ukraine as refugees or moved around Ukraine as internally displaced persons. Many people treated the Roma community differently.  The national action plan for the Roma strategy to 2030 was evaluated every two years. Every year, many different roundtables and conferences were organised by the State on the Roma community. 

    Two forums had been organised for the different minorities to discuss any issues they had and how to address them. A forum was organised in Kiev with Polish national minorities, and another one with Greek national minorities. There was a strategy on the development of the Crimea Tartare language.  This year, work had also been finished on the new spelling of the Crimean Tartare language. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked about concrete cases of racially motivated violence and racial profiling, and the measures taken to respond to these cases?  What measures had been taken for increasing public awareness-raising campaigns and other measures to counter incitement to hatred and hate crimes?  The Committee would also like to receive information on measures to prevent discriminatory violence by the police and other law enforcement officers; measures to ensure accountability for incidents of discriminatory violence; and data on these kinds of incidents?

    The Committee was concerned about racist hate speech and discriminatory statements in the public discourse, including by public and political figures and in the media.  How did these victims address their cases, and how effectively were these cases treated?  How many complaints had been received in the last five years, and what was the number of investigations initiated, cases considered before courts, and sanctions imposed on perpetrators?  Could detailed information be provided on complaints registered with the courts, or any other national institution, including the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, concerning acts of racial discrimination, racist hate speech and racist hate crimes?

    According to information before the Committee, there were gaps in the implementation of the legal framework, including the lack of specialisation among law enforcement officials and lack of operational standards to handle, register and investigate complaints of racial discrimination and hate crimes.  What measures were being taken to address these concerns, particularly to enhance the capacity of law enforcement officials in handling and investigating complaints related to racial discrimination and hate speech? 

    Information before the Committee indicated that there was a lack of awareness on the rights of victims of racial discrimination and fear of approaching law enforcement officials on this topic.  What measures were being taken to address these issues?  Could a reason be provided for the low rate of complaints at the National Human Rights Commission?  What measures were being taken to enable victims to make complaints more effectively? 

    The Committee welcomed the adoption of amendments in 2024 on the law on free legal aid to allow victims of hate crimes on specific grounds to benefit from secondary legal aid.  However, the information before the Committee indicated that the victims were only entitled to the legal aid at the secondary stage and not to initiate a complaint.  In addition, the implementation of the amendment was postponed until one year after the martial law was abolished.  Could the delegation provide information on these two concerns? 

    Could disaggregated data be provided on complaints by ethnic origin such as by Roma, Jews, Africans and other minorities, as well as by national origin and gender?  Had the complaints changed during the armed conflict, in terms of quantity, nature and results?  What measures were being taken to promote human rights education, including on racial discrimination, in university programmes and teacher training?

    What measures were being taken to raise awareness of the public, civil servants, and law enforcement officials in order to combat societal prejudice against certain minority groups, including the Roma?

    Could accurate statistics of ethnic minorities, including Roma, be provided?  The Committee remained concerned at the persistence of discrimination, stereotypes and prejudices against Roma, including reports of physical attacks and killings. 

    Recent research also demonstrated that the level of antigypsyism in Ukraine was still very high.  According to the social cohesion study, 35 per cent of the Ukrainian population did not want Roma to be in their community at all. What measures had the Government of Ukraine taken to fight antigypsyism? 

    Could data on the education conditions of Roma be provided?  What measures had been taken for improving the situation of education for Roma children? Were they educated in their mother tongue without discrimination?

    The Committee noted the various measures taken by the State party to improve the situation of Roma, including the strategy for the protection and integration of the Roma national minority to 2020 and its action plan.  Could information on the progress and results of strategies and programmes directed at the Roma be provided, particularly the allocated resources to ensure the effective implementation of the strategy and action plan and monitoring of its implementation?  How were members of the Roma ethnic minorities involved in the implementation and monitoring of these policies?  Had the Government consulted with Roma communities when planning and implementing such integration measures, including at the local level?  How were the low levels of funding for these plans being addressed? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the issues affecting the Roma community were a problem, not just for Ukraine but for all European countries.  Prejudices still existed, however, during the war, many Roma men had served in the Ukrainian armed forces and in some cases sacrificed their lives, which had changed the attitude of Ukrainians towards Roma people.  A unity and diversity programme was implemented last year, which was a Ukrainian national cultural programme, with training for Ukrainian police officers. 

    The lack of documents in Roma communities was an issue but this was being addressed through regular visits to regions where the Roma community lived.  Thousands of Roma people had been provided with new documents.

    In 2023, around 60 consultations were organised with different national minority groups.  Permanent consultations and meetings were held with Roma communities. The consultations included members of all relevant ministries.  The next meeting had been planned for the end of April.  April 8 was International Roma Day and a large event had been organised in Kiev, including a roundtable and an all-day conference with the participation of ambassadors and the diplomatic corps.  On the same day, several regions also organised International Roma Day celebrations with different events. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the implementation of the Committee’s recommendations were lacking.  How were the stakeholders in the consultations selected? The Expert expressed hope that the war would end soon with a fair and sustainable solution.  It was important to remember that the unity towards Roma people should be sustained after the war, and that the stereotypes did not return. 

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert and Follow-Up Rapporteur, said the Committee’s recommendations regarding measures taken to conduct training to raise awareness on the amendments to article 161 of the Criminal Code had not been addressed, and urged the State party to provide this information. 

    Another Expert asked what existing mechanisms were in place to receive complaints from victims of hate crimes? Were they user friendly?

    A Committee Expert asked whether the education system in the State party allowed for the type of education help to prevent hate crimes and racial intolerance for children?  Were there any significant numbers of people of African descent in the State party?  Would Ukraine support the Second Decade for People of African Descent? 

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked if Ukraine’s desire to align itself with the European Union’s legislation on hate speech was to address hate speech, or to bring its legislation into line with that of the European Union? 

    An Expert asked if the outcome of today’s dialogue would be brought to the attention of the media?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said if the Committee approved, Ukraine would provide information to the media about the meeting. Regardless of the ethnicity or culture of any citizen, they could contact the police and make a complaint. There were special school curricula on tolerance and education.  There should be more education in schools, from the youngest level possible. 

    There was an African community in Ukraine; it was not very big but its members were consulted on many issues. The African community had never informed the Government about any issues when dealing with the Ukrainian community. 

    The legal aid system of Ukraine provided several services, including primary and secondary legal aid and access to alternative dispute resolutions.  Regular targeted information campaigns were conducted on the right to legal aid, to provide empowerment for vulnerable groups and build trust in the legal aid system in Ukraine.  There had been only 91 cases of requests for legal aid during the past three years.  There were 500 legal aid centres across Ukraine, as well as an online service. 

    Six months ago, the Government adopted the list of the languages of the national minorities of Ukraine which were under threat of disappearance, and this included the Roma language. Currently, there was a special working group of experts who were familiar with these languages working on initiatives in this regard.

    In a brief comment at the end of the first meeting, MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said the dialogue was public and it was up to Ukraine if it wished to produce information on the discussion. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked if measures were planned to assess and review the law on national minorities (communities) of Ukraine that aimed to eliminate all discriminatory provisions?  What measures had been taken to consult and ensure the participation of all ethnic and national minority groups in the process of developing and drafting the law and its amendments? 

    While noting the measures taken by the State party to protect Crimean Tatars, in particular those who fled Crimea after 2014, the Committee remained concerned about reports that Crimean Tatars in regions under the authority of the State party faced difficulties in accessing employment, social services and education, and did not receive assistance. What mechanisms had been developed to ensure consultations with ethnic minority groups? 

    Did the State party have information concerning the National Council for Interethnic Harmony?  What measures had been taken by the State party to support women belonging to ethnic or national minority groups in exercising their political rights, including participation in public affairs and raising awareness on their rights and the vital impact of their participation?  What measures were being taken to mitigate the impact of the ongoing conflict on the participation of women in politics?   

     

    According to information received, legislative amendments relating to religious organizations entered into force on 23 September 2024, invoking “national security” as a ground for restricting freedom of religion or belief and freedom of religious association. However, this was not considered a permissible grounds for restriction of freedom of religion under the Convention. What were the measures restricting freedom of religion and belief and their impact on the ethno-religious communities concerned?  Information received referred to practices tending to prohibit the activities of religious organizations, specifically the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Could information be provided on the necessity and proportionality of such punitive measures?

    The situation of migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and stateless persons in Ukraine had been significantly impacted by recent legal and practical developments, particularly since the introduction of martial law in February 2022.  The current legal framework and its implementation presented several challenges that were inconsistent with the Convention. 

    The refugee status determination process in Ukraine did not align with international standards, leading to inconsistent application of legal interpretations and time limits for lodging asylum applications.  This often resulted in the rejection of asylum claims.  New practices had restricted access to asylum and statelessness determination procedures, especially for individuals with ties to the Russian Federation and Belarus.  The State Migration Service often issued oral refusals for asylum applications without official decisions, citing martial law as a reason.  This practice had been recognised by courts as illegal, yet it persisted, leaving applicants in legal limbo.

    How would Ukraine address the inconsistencies in the asylum procedures to ensure alignment with international standards and the Convention?  What legal amendments were introduced under martial law and what was their impact on the rights of refugees and stateless persons?  What procedural safeguards were in place to protect individuals from forcible deportation?  What steps were being taken to improve access to the asylum and statelessness determination procedures, particularly for individuals with ties to the Russian Federation and Belarus? 

    How was the Government addressing the challenges posed by the suspension of diplomatic relations with Russia in verifying nationality in statelessness determination procedures?  What plans did the Ukrainian Government have to develop an integration strategy for refugees and improve reception conditions for asylum seekers?  What steps were being taken to address the unlawful practice of issuing verbal refusals for asylum applications and ensure that applicants received official decisions?

    The Government of Ukraine had made significant strides in addressing statelessness since 2020, including the introduction of a statelessness determination procedure. Despite these efforts, several challenges remained, particularly in the implementation of the procedure and the accessibility of necessary documentation for applicants, which was further exacerbated by the conflict. 

    On 22 January 2024, draft law no. 11469, titled “on amendments to certain laws of Ukraine on ensuring the right to acquire and preserve Ukrainian citizenship” was registered in the Ukrainian Parliament.  The draft law, if passed, could result in the loss of Ukrainian citizenship for residents in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories, who often had to obtain Russian passports to access basic services, employment, and social benefits. How did the Ukrainian Government plan to address the potential risk of stripping Ukrainian citizenship from residents of occupied territories who acquired Russian citizenship under duress or due to essential needs, such as access to basic services and employment?

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said Kiev had been under attack the night before and there had been casualties.  This was a serious and sad situation.  The Committee understood the situation and was very concerned about these tragic events. 

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said many members of the delegation had barely slept the night before. Russia had launched missiles from the Black Sea and inside Russia and had bombed Kiev.  Up to now, there were 10 citizens who had been killed and 100 wounded, including children.  Every day, there were peaceful victims of this tragic and bloody war.  The delegation in Ukraine had lost contact with the Committee at the beginning of the session and missed some questions.

    Regarding the law on ethnic minorities, several meetings had been organised with national minorities during the development of the law, predominantly online due to the war.  In December 2022, Parliament adopted the law. At the request of some national minority organizations, the State used the term “communities” instead of minorities. The law encompassed all groups of ethnic peoples, which was around 130 according to the most recent census. 

    Ukraine did not have many new asylum seekers as the situation in the country was not sustainable for a peaceful life. 

    The Ombudsman’s Office was referred to as the Parliamentary Commission of Human Rights.  The independence of this Office was guaranteed, ensuring it could function without undue influence from any external entities.  This enabled the Office to effectively address human rights and issues of non-discrimination.  Its annual report outlined steps taken to combat discrimination. It was a large institution with around 500 employees.  There were branches located across 24 regions of Ukraine.  In 2024, there were 454 complaints received by the Office.  The Office monitored all issues of non-discrimination.  All reports of the Office were public and could be found online.   

    Questions by Committee Experts

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, expressed sorrow at the recent shocking events which had wracked the Ukrainian capital.  What was the impact of martial law on asylum seekers, refugees and stateless persons? 

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked about the situation of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons belonging to minority groups, as well as the situation of elderly people belonging to these groups?  What was the situation of migrant workers, particularly in this situation of armed conflict?

    A Committee Expert asked how far Ukraine had gone in implementing the decision of the European Court of Human Rights on a case versus Ukraine?   

    Another Committee Expert congratulated the Ukrainian delegation for making a laudable effort to assess the implementation of the Convention in Ukraine, despite prevailing circumstances. Ukraine should be praised for this effort.  The Expert was concerned about allegations of racism at the Ukrainian Polish border. Had there been any follow-up on such reports?  How many cases had been brought to court? 

    There had been allegations of racism in sport, including with a Brazilian footballer who was banned for one game after reacting to crowds calling him monkey.  How had this case been handled?  Ukraine should be congratulated for adopting the law on stateless in 2021.  How many individuals had benefitted from the enforcement of that law?  How did the State party plan to provide Roma with national documents? 

    Another Expert said African nationals had been facing discrimination at the borders. 

    What measures were being taken by the State party to ensure the protection, safety and security of all persons living in its jurisdiction? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said Ukrainian legislation underscored equal rights for men and women. Half of the ministers of the Government were women.  Many women in Ukrainian society occupied high-level positions.  Women from Roma communities were among the most vulnerable. The State had organised several events, including roundtables, which assisted Roma women to find their place in society. 

    Due to the war, Ukraine no longer had many migrant workers.  It was hoped that this would change after the war.  The country would need many workers for innovation and to help rebuild Ukraine. It was hoped workers from many countries would come to Ukraine after the war and help rebuild the hundreds of cities which had been destroyed or partially destroyed. 

    Mr. Lossovskyi said he had not heard of cases of discrimination on the border between Ukraine and Poland.  The case of discrimination regarding the Brazilian football player was an awful occurrence which was not typical for Ukraine. There had been a police investigation, but he could not recall the exact outcome. 

    The delegation said the aggression by the Russian federation had led to a huge influx across Ukraine’s borders. The Government took all accounts of discriminatory treatment very seriously.  Despite difficult conditions, the Government had managed to keep all checkpoints on the borders open. 

    Mr. Lossovskyi said in 2022, a pilot project was launched to provide documents to Roma people in a more effective way.  This was organised in a region where the majority of Roma people lived.  Every year, the State continued this work and made several visits to these places. 

    The delegation said the draft law 5488 was being considered before parliament.  It was hoped the law would be adopted during the current session of Parliament.  The draft law provided for the term “intolerance” and addressed issues under this topic.  All law enforcement agencies were currently working together to introduce the necessary amendments to the Criminal Code.  Police officers had completed specialised human rights training.  Outreach activities, including in schools, were carried out to combat negative stereotypes on the Roma population. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, said the Committee believed in the necessity of investigating and documenting all human rights violations and abuses committed in the context of the ongoing armed conflict and invasion initiated by the Russian Federation against the State party on 24 February 2022.  What measures had been taken to ensure prompt and impartial investigations?  Could the delegation provide information on investigations and prosecutions into allegations of human rights violations and abuses during the armed conflict with the Russian Federation?

     

    On 11 October 2018, the Holy and Sacred Synod of the Istanbul-based Ecumenical Patriarchate granted autocephaly to a new church, the “Orthodox Church of Ukraine”.  This led to tensions with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.  The Church was formerly linked to the Russian Orthodox Church under the Patriarch in Moscow, but stated that it severed those ties in May 2022, following the full-scale invasion by the Russian Federation. 

    It was reported that on 23 September 2024 in territory controlled by the Government of Ukraine, new legal provisions regarding religious organizations entered into force, prohibiting the activities of foreign religious organizations based in a State responsible for armed aggression against Ukraine or occupation of its territory, and specifically prohibiting the activities of the Russian Orthodox Church. Could detailed explanations be provided on this and on measures to ensure the respect of the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion?

    According to media reports in January 2025, the State party announced the capturing in Russia of two soldiers from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and indicated that they were detained and provided with medical care.  Could the delegation provide information on the situation of these two prisoners of war? What were the legal measures taken against them?  Were there more prisoners of war captured by the State party from other nationalities, including mercenaries? 

    The Committee noted that the State party adopted the law on indigenous peoples in 2021.  However, according to information before the Committee, the law only recognised Crimean Tatars, Karaims and Krymchaks as indigenous peoples in Ukraine, while excluding other groups, such as Hutsuls, Lemkos and Gagauz peoples.  Could the delegation provide clarifications on the law on indigenous peoples and how it aligned with international standards?

    Were there plans to assess and review the law?  What was the situation of the Hutsuls, Lemkos and Gagauz peoples?  What measures were in place to preserve and promote the identity, language and culture of all indigenous people under the jurisdiction of the State party?  Could information be provided on the situation of internally displaced Crimean Tatars, and measures to ensure their access to education, housing, employment, healthcare services and humanitarian assistance?  Was the State party taking measures in consultation with the Crimean Tatar community to find durable solutions for an appropriate settlement of Crimean Tatars in Ukraine?

    The Committee was concerned that during the war, persons belonging to minorities, such as Roma, had difficulties in registering as internally displaced persons and having access to social assistance.  According to the representative of the Office of the Ombudsman of Ukraine, around 100,000 Roma became refugees, and around the same number of Ukrainian Roma became internally displaced persons.  Were accurate statistics available on the Roma?  Did the State party find durable solutions for internally displaced Roma and take measures to ensure that they benefitted from assistance?  What were the State’s plans to include Roma people in recovery and reconstruction programmes?

    What efforts were being made to restore linkages between displaced children and their families?  What efforts were being made to ensure access to education and basic services for displaced children?

    Ukraine’s inadequate response to hate crimes against migrants, African and Asian students and other foreigners had previously attracted international criticism.  What was the situation of non-citizens, particularly migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, and people of African and/or Asian descent during the armed conflict?  Could the delegation provide clarification on the situation of detained undocumented migrants and non-citizens?  Could the delegation also please provide information on measures to ensure their access to education, housing, employment, healthcare services and humanitarian assistance?

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said Ukraine did not refer to what was going on in Ukraine as conflict. This was a bloody, existential, colonial war with Russia, not simply a conflict.  In 2018, the Ukrainian Church received independence from the Patriarchal Eastern Christianity Church based in Istanbul, Türkiye.  This was a revolutionary decision, as Ukraine was a big country and did not have an orthodox church.  Now there was an independent church of Ukraine, like all other Christian Orthodox countries.  No other activities of other churches were forbidden in Ukraine.  The only restrictions were for the Russian Orthodox Church, which had restricted activity on the territory of Ukraine. This was because it was an accompaniment of the Russian aggression which had destroyed the country and killed hundreds of thousands of people. 

    Ukraine provided the international standard for prisoners of war in their prison facilities, which were regularly visited by the Ukrainian Ombudsman.  In 2021, Ukraine adopted the law on indigenous peoples and consulted with many minorities on this law.  Indigenous peoples were defined as those who lived on the territory of Ukraine and did not have a mother country.  The Lemkos people were not considered a national minority group, but rather a cultural group. 

    In 2021, the Ukrainian Government approved the Roma strategy, and every two years action plans were prepared for its implementation.  The Roma community was a young community, one of the youngest among the national minorities in Ukraine.  It would be beneficial to use their innovation and abilities in the process of renovating Ukraine when the war was over.  The State was working on providing the Roma with more education.  There were many grants provided to Roma for studying in universities. 

    The delegation said in 2021, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the law on indigenous people in Ukraine, which was developed through extensive consultations with indigenous groups and civil society, and represented the aspirations of these groups.  In addition, a draft law was developed on the status of the Crimean Tartar people which would be registered in Parliament in the near future. 

    To ensure prisoners of war were not tortured, relevant legislation and policies had been developed.  Three legislative acts had been produced to regulate these affairs. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, asked if there were representative bodies of minorities inside the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine?  How did the State party ensure consultations with all indigenous peoples under the framework of this law? 

    Another Expert said 10 to 20 per cent of Ukrainian Roma did not have identity documents?  Was there a provision for determining statelessness in the act on statelessness?  Did the Roma community benefit from universal birth registration? 

    A Committee Expert asked how many of the ethnic and national minorities participated in the relevant bodies in the Government?  How many Roma, indigenous, or migrant women had been hired or granted responsibility positions, or were integrated in the responsibility of the work? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, said when the law on indigenous peoples was adopted, several bylaws were prepared for the implementation of the law.  According to one of the bylaws, Crimean Tatars regularly consulted with the Government.  Only during the population census could the Government request information about the ethnic groups.  Sometimes women with high-ranking positions did not disclose their ethnicity.  It was up to people to declare this. 

    The delegation said due to the Russian full-scale invasion, there were problems preparing full statistical information on ethnic minorities.  The legal aid system in Ukraine had provided legal assistance to more than 1,000 Roma people over the past three years.  Most of these related to the processing of identity documents.  Secondary legal aid had been provided for 27,000 internally displaced people over the past three years, due to the full-scale invasion. 

    Officially, Ukraine recognised three indigenous groups of peoples, including Crimean Tartars, Karaims and Krymchaks.  Crimean Tartars were represented by an executive body; the spiritual administration of Ukraine represented the Karaim people; and there was no official information regarding a body for the Krymchaks, although they had the full rights to establish such a body under law. 

    Currently, there was no definition of hate speech under Ukrainian law.  The Government of Ukraine had prepared a draft roadmap covering this issue. In Ukraine, a working group made up of State authorities and public organizations was working on a definition of hate speech and establishing administrative and criminal liability depending on the severity of the crime. 

    The public broadcaster of Ukraine continued to create a single information space for minorities.  The broadcaster produced programmes for national minorities in their national languages, across broadcast, radio and digital formats.  The State bodies would do their best to cover all the information needs of the national minorities in Ukraine. 

    Closing Remarks

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert and Follow-Up Rapporteur, said the Committee would send Ukraine concluding observations after the dialogue, with specific recommendations to be enacted within a period of one year. 

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert and Co-Rapporteur, thanked the delegation for the dialogue held, particularly given the context.  War was ended through negotiation and diplomacy, not capitulation.  It was hoped this would happen with Ukraine. The fact that Ukraine was here before the Committee was an example of the State’s willingness to cooperate. Ukraine was also meeting with the Committee against Torture at the same time, which may have weakened Ukraine’s ability to provide comprehensive answers. 

    IHOR LOSSOVSKYI, Deputy Head of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Affairs and Freedom of Conscience, thanked the Committee members for their time and interest in the situation in Ukraine.  The Committee’s recommendations were very much appreciated. 

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said racial discrimination was about ethnic and national origin.  The Committee was concerned when ethnic minorities were denied their identity.  This led to wars.  It was now the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, and the first composition of the Committee had included an expert of Ukrainian origin.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CERD25.002E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: 🇺🇸 Sec Rubio on President Trump’s Desire to Bring Peace

    Source: United States of America – The White House (video statements)

    Secretary Rubio on President Trump’s desire to bring peace: “Of all the leaders in the world today, no leader is working harder to prevent wars or end them than President Trump is right now. That’s why we’re talking to Iran. That’s why we’re engaged with Ukraine and Russia.”

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-SUHbfXX01I

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Gas supply: MEPs advocate storage refill flexibility to bring down prices

    Source: European Parliament

    The draft law adopted on Thursday seeks to address speculation on the gas market and bring down prices, by introducing greater flexibility in rules on gas storage refilling.

    The Industry, Research and Energy Committee has backed the Commission proposal to extend the EU’s 2022 gas storage scheme until 31 December 2027; it was otherwise set to end in 2025. The provision is designed to ensure security of gas supply ahead of the winter season.

    This legislative proposal also provided MEPs with the opportunity to introduce a number of amendments to the existing regulation. These changes are aimed at easing tensions in the gas market partly generated by market anticipations stemming from the scheme’s compulsory target of a 90% fill rate by 1 November each year.

    To this end, MEPs propose reducing the filling target from 90% to 83% to help balance energy security with market-based principles and bring down gas prices. Member states would be allowed to deviate by up to four percentage points from the filling target in the event of unfavourable market conditions, such as supply disruptions or high demand. The European Commission may further increase this deviation by up to an additional four percentage points if these market conditions persist.

    Member states would however have to ensure that the cumulative effects of flexibilities and derogations do not bring down overall storage filling obligations to below 75%, MEPs agreed.

    Next steps

    The report, drafted by committee chair Borys Budka (EPP, Poland), was adopted by 64 votes in favour and 10 against, with 12 abstentions. The text will be put to a vote during Parliament’s next plenary session, from 5 to 8 May in Strasbourg.

    Background

    The European Union’s energy security has been a critical concern in recent years, not least in light of its dependence on non-EU countries for primary energy supplies. The 2022 energy crisis, exacerbated by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent weaponisation of gas supplies, highlighted the urgent need for additional measures to ensure stable and affordable energy supplies.

    In response, the EU introduced new gas storage rules. However, the global gas market remains tight, with increased competition for liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and persistent price volatility. As the current gas storage provisions are set to expire at the end of 2025, the Commission proposed extending these measures until 31 December 2027 to maintain predictability and transparency in gas storage utilisation across the EU.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – MEPs push for a more ambitious European defence industry programme

    Source: European Parliament

    On Thursday, MEPs backed a draft law designed to strengthen Europe’s defence industry, ramp up defence product manufacturing and provide more support for Ukraine.

    The Committees on Industry, Research and Energy and Security and Defence have adopted their position on the proposed creation of a European defence industry programme (EDIP). More specifically, MEPs backed measures to boost the European defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), to strengthen EU defence and further integrate the EU defence industry. These measures include a significant increase in member states’ financial contributions to the EDIP, more aggregation of orders for the development of defence products, and enhanced use of joint procurement.

    MEPs want the new programme to focus on improving the supply of weapons, ammunition and other crisis-relevant products, boosting manufacturing capacities or ensuring their ramp-up, reducing lead times for production and delivery, and increasing stockpiling.

    Other principles agreed by MEPs to strengthen Europe’s defence capacity include the following:

    • Introducing a “buy European” principle by which the EDIP should only fund products where the cost of components originating in the EU or associated countries represents at least the 70% of the estimated end product value.
    • To be eligible for funds, European defence projects of common interest should involve at least six member states, or at least four that are facing high exposure to the risk of conventional military threats; MEPs want also Ukraine to participate.
    • A European ‘military sales mechanism’ would work as a centralised catalogue of defence products and services to bolster EU-wide demand.
    • A new, voluntary, Structure for European Armament Programme would scale up member states’ cooperation throughout the defence equipment lifecycle.
    • An EU security of supply regime should gradually guarantee continuous access to essential defence products to tackle future supply crises; the regime would be managed by a Defence Industrial Readiness Board.


    Military support for Ukraine

    As part of the new EDIP regulation, MEPs also backed a Ukraine Support Instrument (USI) to ensure the Ukrainian defence industry’s modernisation and integration within the EDTIB. This EU funding would scale up direct investment in Ukraine’s defence industry, facilitate partnerships between EU and Ukrainian defence actors and increase EU procurement of defence capacities produced in Ukraine, including for Ukraine itself.

    Quotes

    “Our position on the EDIP sends a strong message to the Council to finalise its own position in order to start interinstitutional negotiations. The European Parliament will insist on establishing a strong regulation that will incentivise EU member states to boost joint procurement in order to build common European defence capabilities – stronger, strategic, efficient and united,” said Marie‑Agnes Strack-Zimmermann (Renew Europe, Germany), Chair of the Committee on Security and Defence.

    “Today, Parliament has come together with an unprecedented sense of urgency and purpose. In record time, we’ve forged a broad and determined majority in support of strengthening Europe’s defence industrial base – because this is no longer just an option, it’s a strategic imperative. Europe stands at a historic crossroads. Faced with Russia’s threats, we must act with unity, ambition and resolve. Investing together, developing critical military capabilities jointly, and aligning our spending efforts at EU level is the only way forward. It’s time to end our dependence on external actors. A sovereign Europe is a stronger and safer Europe, and this vote on the EDIP is a clear step in that direction”, said Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D, France), co-rapporteur from the Committee on Security and Defence.

    “The adoption of the EDIP report by a large majority today marks a major step for the security of the European continent and the strengthening of our defence industry. With this vote, the European Parliament is setting the bar high for the EU to enhance the sovereignty and resilience of our countries, build an effective governance framework, and design an ambitious and realistic financing solution. Our committees’ work in accelerated procedure means Parliament is ready to tackle the upcoming trilogue stage as soon as the Council has determined its position. This outcome, both in substance and pace, seemed impossible to achieve just a few weeks ago; with this important step, we have shown that our institution is rising to the challenge on this crucial issue for the future of Europe”, said François-Xavier Bellamy (EPP, France), co-rapporteur from the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy.

    Next steps

    The report was adopted by 70 votes to 46 with 8 abstentions. MEPs also decided to open negotiations with the Council to finalise the law, with 90 votes in favour, 20 against and with 5 abstentions. Parliament as a whole will be notified of this decision during the May plenary session.

    Background

    The European Commission put forward a proposal for a European defence industry programme (EDIP) regulation on 5 March 2024. The EDIP – with a proposed budget of €1.5 billion – seeks to achieve defence industrial readiness by bridging the gap between short-term emergency measures, such as the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), that have been implemented since 2023 and will end in 2025, and a more structural, long-term approach.

    The EDTIB comprises a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2,000 small and medium-sized enterprises, with an estimated combined annual turnover of €70 billion.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Statement by President von der Leyen with UK Prime Minister Starmer

    Source: EuroStat – European Statistics

    European Commission Statement London, 24 Apr 2025 Thank you very much, Keir. It is good to meet a friend again and to be here with you We are friends, and we are Europeans, we are very like-minded.

    The President of the European Commission and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom met today and agreed to strengthen the relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union.

    They agreed on the shared challenges facing the European Union and the United Kingdom including the altered strategic context for the wider continent notably resulting from Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. They reiterated their unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty.

    The leaders agreed the UK and European Union would also continue to work closely to address wider global challenges including economic headwinds, geopolitical competition, irregular migration, climate change and energy prices, which pose fundamental challenges to the shared values of the United Kingdom and the European Union and provide the strategic driver for stronger cooperation.

    The leaders reflected on the events in the Middle East overnight and condemned the egregious attack by Iran on Israel. They recognised Israel’s right to self-defence in the face of this unacceptable aggression. De-escalation by all parties in the region was of the upmost importance. They reiterated the need to coordinate the diplomatic response to the situation in the Middle East and called on all sides to show restraint and end the bloodshed. An immediate ceasefire in Lebanon and Gaza was required to create the space to allow for political solutions, the leaders underlined.

    They agreed on the importance of the unique relationship between the European Union and the United Kingdom in addressing such challenges and resolved, in line with our shared values, to strengthen ambitiously their structured strategic cooperation.

    They reaffirmed that the Withdrawal Agreement, including the Windsor Framework, and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement underpin relations between them and underlined their mutual commitment to the full and faithful implementation of those agreements. They reaffirmed their mutual commitment to uphold international law and to the European Convention on Human Rights. They agreed a stable, positive and forward-looking relationship was in their mutual interests and provided the basis for long term cooperation.

    They agreed to take forward this agenda of strengthened cooperation at pace over the coming months, starting with defining together the areas in which strengthened cooperation would be mutually beneficial, such as the economy, energy, security and resilience, in full respect of their internal procedures and institutional prerogatives. They agreed to meet again this autumn.

    They agreed on the importance of holding regular EU-UK Summits at leader-level to oversee the development of the relationship. They agreed that a first Summit should take place ideally in early 2025.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The Commission’s strategy to end energy imports from Russia – P-000949/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Following the Russian military aggression against Ukraine as of 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. REPowerEU[1], adopted in May 2022, aiming to fast forward the clean transition, diversify supplies, and enhance EU energy resilience.

    The EU adopted sanctions to phase out Russian coal imports. Sanctions on Russian oil have also reduced imports from almost a third to 3% of total EU imports.

    In terms of gas, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from over 45% in 2021, to 19% in 2024, replacing it with alternatives like liquefied natural gas or pipeline gas from Norway.

    With the end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, beginning of 2025, the share could fall to 13% this year. However, Russian fuels, particularly gas, remain in the EU energy mix.

    To address this, the Commission is working on a Roadmap to end Russian energy imports by fully implementing REPowerEU. The Roadmap is in the Commission Work Programme 2025.

    • [1] Source: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –