Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Mahakumbh 2025: Over 7 Lakh Pilgrims treated at Prayagraj; Experts from AIIMS and BHU join forces with Specialists from Canada, Germany, Russia

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Mahakumbh 2025: Over 7 Lakh Pilgrims treated at Prayagraj; Experts from AIIMS and BHU join forces with Specialists from Canada, Germany, Russia

    World-Class Treatment with Allopathy and AYUSH Medicine in place; 23 Allopathic and 20 AYUSH Hospitals in Operation

    3,800 Minor and 12 Major Surgeries Completed, 3.71 Lakh Pilgrims underwent Pathology Tests

    Posted On: 10 FEB 2025 7:13PM by PIB Delhi

    The health of pilgrims is being given top priority at the Mahakumbh 2025, and the Mela administration has ensured extensive medical arrangements are in place. From common ailments to specialized treatments, comprehensive healthcare facilities are available. So far, over 7 lakh pilgrims have been treated. To make the healthcare services world-class, specialists from Canada, Germany, Russia, along with doctors from AIIMS Delhi and IMS BHU, are working tirelessly on the ground.

    Dr. Gaurav Dubey, the nodal medical officer of the Kumbh Mela, shared that more than 4.5 lakh pilgrims have been treated at 23 allopathic hospitals, and over 3.71 lakh pilgrims have undergone pathology tests. Additionally, more than 3,800 minor surgeries and 12 major surgeries have been successfully completed.

    Over 2.18 Lakh Pilgrims Treated with AYUSH Medicine

    With the collaboration of the Ministry of AYUSH, Government of India, and Uttar Pradesh AYUSH Society, 20 AYUSH hospitals (10 Ayurveda and 10 Homeopathy) are operating 24/7 in the Kumbh Mela area. To date, over 2.18 lakh pilgrims have benefited from Ayurveda, Homeopathy, and Naturopathy treatments. Specialists from AIIMS Ayurveda, Delhi, including Dr. V.K. Joshi, Dean of BHU, Dr. Thomas from Canada, and many other medical experts from around the world, are treating pilgrims at the Kumbh Mela.

    Pilgrims Benefiting from Yoga, Panchakarma, and Ayurvedic Treatments

    At the Ayurvedic hospitals in the Kumbh Mela, pilgrims are being treated with traditional methods like Panchakarma, herbal-based treatments, yoga therapy, and naturopathy. AYUSH kits, yoga kits, calendars, medicinal plants, and health awareness materials are being distributed to help pilgrims adopt a healthier lifestyle in the future. Yoga sessions are regularly conducted by teams of yoga instructors from New Delhi, and these sessions have gained significant interest, especially from foreign pilgrims.

    Special Ayurvedic ‘Swarnaprashan’ Medicine for Children

    For children aged 1 to 12 years, special Ayurvedic ‘Swarnaprashan’ medicine is being administered, distributed during the Pushya Nakshatra. This medicine is proving beneficial in enhancing children’s concentration, intelligence, immunity, and physical development.

    Multidimensional Medical Facilities Become a Major Attraction for Pilgrims

    The combined arrangement of Allopathy and AYUSH medicine at the Kumbh Mela is proving to be a great relief for pilgrims. High-quality healthcare services are being provided free of charge to sadhus, kalpavasis, and common pilgrims. The integration of Ayurveda, yoga, Panchakarma, and modern medical science has set a new standard for healthcare services at the Kumbh Mela.

    It has been ensured that the Prayagraj Mahakumbh 2025 will not only be a center for spiritual experiences but also an exemplary event in terms of health and well-being. The health services being offered to pilgrims are being appreciated both nationally and internationally, giving global recognition to the Indian medical system.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh exhorts global OEMs to use the opportunities offered by the Indian defence ecosystem to find solutions to today’s challenges

    Source: Government of India

    Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh exhorts global OEMs to use the opportunities offered by the Indian defence ecosystem to find solutions to today’s challenges

    Stresses on the need to adopt & improve solutions constantly amidst the fragile global security situation

    “Govt is taking all steps to equip the Armed Forces & make the nation ‘Aatmanirbhar’ in defence”

    Posted On: 10 FEB 2025 5:30PM by PIB Delhi

    Raksha Mantri Shri Rajnath Singh has invited the global Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) to utilise the opportunities offered by the expanding Indian defence ecosystem and find targeted solutions & counter measures to the challenges emerging due to the volatile geopolitical landscape of today. He was addressing the CEOs Roundtable organised as part of Aero India 2025 in Bengaluru, Karnataka on February 10, 2025. Raksha Mantri stated that amidst the fragile global security situation, where rules-based order is being challenged and technologies are creating new opportunities & vulnerabilities, there is a need to adopt & improve solutions constantly.

    “Today, the nature of communication and data sharing in military operations is getting much more complex. The reliance on space-based navigation systems, communication and surveillance implies that such assets would have to be integrated in our operational plans. The use of drones in recent conflicts indicate that the future would depend on the integrated efforts of manned, unmanned and autonomous warfare systems. Hence, our defence manufacturing has to focus on creating counter measures for these emerging challenges,” said Shri Rajnath Singh.

    Citing great Indian strategist Kautilya, Raksha Mantri said: “We have the moral responsibility to protect our people and territory in a hostile atmosphere. To achieve this, we are taking all necessary steps to equip our Armed Forces and making the country self-reliant in defence manufacturing through the establishment of a strong, efficient, resilient and future-ready defence industrial ecosystem,” he said.

    Shri Rajnath Singh asserted that the Government of India, led by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi, has put in place transparent & industry-friendly regulations, processes and policies. He emphasised that the opportunities provided by the Indian defence ecosystem are driven by the policies of self-reliance in defence production, facilitated by a conducive policy regime.

    Raksha Mantri enumerated the transformative steps taken by the Government to make the domestic defence industry an important component of the national economy in order to facilitate India’s transition from a developing to a developed country by 2047. “We have allowed FDI upto 75% through the Automatic Route for companies seeking new defence license, while upto 100% is also allowed under Government approval route. A total of 46 Joint Ventures and Companies have been given foreign investment approval in the defence sector till date,” he said.

    Shri Rajnath Singh added that more than 250 MoUs have, so far, been signed for the establishment of industrial units in the Defence Industrial Corridors set-up in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. He mentioned about the Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme introduced to provide financial assistance to the Aerospace and Defence sector for setting up 6-8 greenfield Testing and Certification facilities. The Defence Exim Portal has made the export authorisation process seamless. “As a testimony to the emergence of India as a defence export nucleus, India has seen 31 times growth in the export of products in the last 10 years as compared to Financial Year 2013-14,” he said.

    Raksha Mantri described the issuance of Positive Indigenisation Lists as a clear indicator to the Government’s intent to support the industry in its self-reliance pursuit. He added that for innovation projects in the defence sector, over 500 start-ups & MSMEs are presently working under the aegis of Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX). “Our overall ease of doing business environment has improved tremendously. This is showing great results as India has the 3rd largest start-up ecosystem in the world today; this is expected to witness Year on Year growth of 10-12%. We possess a young generation of highly-skilled workforce, which constantly updates itself in the face of the fast-changing ecosystem of the world. You must not miss the opportunity to leverage the advantages of this ecosystem,” he told the over 100 CEOs, both domestic and foreign, present on the occasion.

    Shri Rajnath Singh described the CEOs Roundtable as a platform where the idea of making India self-reliant in defence production would take root, germinate and blossom into full scale reality. It reflects the serious intent of the Government to team with the best organisations around the world in the spirit of cooperation. The essence of this conclave is to explore how to join hands to make India a leading defence manufacturer and service provider at the global scale, he said.

    The theme of the Roundtable was ‘Enabling Defence Cooperation through Global Engagement (EDGE)’. OEMs from 19 countries (USA, France, Russia, South Korea, UK, Japan, Israel & Brazil etc), 35 Indian (Larsen & Toubro, Bharat Forge Ltd, Adani Defence & Aerospace, Mahindra Defence Systems Ltd, BrahMos Aerospace & Ashok Leyland Defence) and 16 Defence DPSUs attended the event.

    Major foreign OEMs including Airbus (France), Ultra Maritime (USA), GNT (South Korea), John Cockerill Defence (UK), Mitsubishi (Japan), Rafael Advanced Defense System (Israel), Safran (France) and Liebherr Aerospace (France) highlighted their future plans, Joint Ventures, collaborations, partnerships with Indian companies for production of spares parts, development of aero-engines, setting up of Maintenance, Repair and Operations facilities and establishment of R&D facilities.

    Raksha Rajya Mantri Shri Sanjay Seth, Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan, Chief of the Army Staff General Upendra Dwivedi, Chief of the Naval Staff Admiral Dinesh K Tripathi, Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal AP Singh, Defence Secretary Shri Rajesh Kumar Singh, Secretary (Defence Production) Shri Sanjeev Kumar, Secretary, Department of Defence R&D and Chairman DRDO Dr Samir V Kamat were among those who attended the CEOs Roundtable.

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: International Co-Operation in Tourism Sector

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 10 FEB 2025 5:19PM by PIB Delhi

    The Government of India works with other countries to promote tourism through bilateral and multilateral arrangements that encourage information sharing, ease of travel, and other areas of cooperation for the promotion and development of tourism. India is also a member of global tourism organizations like the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Group of Twenty (G20), Group of Seven (G7), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), etc. helping shape tourism policies and support sustainable travel. These efforts are to attract more tourists to India and also to strengthen cultural and economic ties with other nations, contributing to India’s vision of sustainable and inclusive tourism initiatives.

    India is promoted as a holistic tourism destination by showcasing its diverse offerings, including heritage, culture, spirituality, wellness, adventure and eco-tourism. To promote tourism, the Ministry undertakes several initiatives in international and domestic markets, including media campaigns, social media promotions, webinars and participation in promotional events. Additionally, Indian Missions abroad conduct various activities to attract global travelers to India’s diverse tourist destinations, contribute to strengthening India’s position as a preferred travel destination on the global map.

    This information was given by Union Minister for Tourism and Culture Shri Gajendra Singh Shekhawat in a written reply in Lok Sabha today.

    ***

    Sunil Kumar Tiwari

    tourism4pib[at]gmail[dot]com

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EIB Group President Calviño in Kyiv on first official visit outside EU to announce new major projects for critical energy infrastructure, basic services for citizens and investment in SMEs across Ukraine

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The EIB President is leading the EIB delegation to Ukraine on her first visit outside the EU since taking up office last year.
    • Calviño stressed the EIB Group’s long-term commitment to Ukraine in talks with the government and business leaders in Kyiv.
    • The projects announced under EU’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility include €420 million in investment for the public sector to restore and protect energy supplies, and for water, heating, housing and other critical infrastructure.
    • The support also includes new loan and guarantees for SMEs, unlocking almost €500 million of new finance.
    • The EU 112 emergency call system will be rolled out in Ukraine with EIB backing.
    • A €16.5 million grant provided by the German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action to an EIB International Climate Initiative Trust Fund has been signed for renewable energy in Ukraine.
    • There are plans for close cooperation to advance social housing in the country.

    On her first official visit outside the European Union since taking up office a year ago, European Investment Bank (EIB) Group President Nadia Calviño is visiting Kyiv today to meet top Ukrainian officials, including President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal. The objective of the visit is to agree on new financing operations for Ukraine and stress Europe’s long-term commitment to the country. President Calviño is leading the delegation that also features EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska and EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová.

    The package – part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility – includes €420 million for new public-sector projects to restore and protect energy supplies, heating systems and other critical infrastructure that has been damaged since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. The EIB and the European Commission are set to finalise the approval of a €2 billion EIB contribution under the Facility.

    The latest round of European funding announced today will also benefit Ukraine’s private sector, with the aim of bolstering thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which form the backbone of the country’s economy. It combines a €100 million loan and guarantees aimed at unlocking around €400 million in lending to SMEs through key Ukrainian banks – including Ukreximbank, ProCredit Bank and Ukrgasbank – with which the EIB has signed agreements today.

    Another element of the package is the planned rollout of the European Union’s common 112 emergency number and call system across Ukraine to enhance public safety. President Calviño visited an operating centre in Kyiv that will run the new system to mark the signing of a €40 million EIB loan for the initiative, which is complemented by a €12 million EU grant and funding from Member States under the EU for Ukraine Fund.

    “This is my first official visit outside the European Union since  taking up office as President of the EIB Group last year. Support for Ukraine is a top priority and that is why I am so pleased to be here to announce new major projects for SMEs, energy, water and other essential services that will help people to continue with their daily lives and support the country’s economic resilience, while also laying the foundation for a stronger Ukraine on its path to EU membership,” said EIB Group President Nadia Calviño.

    “The financing package that we have announced reflects our ongoing and unwavering commitment, since the very first day of this war, to help Ukraine recover, rebuild, and thrive despite the immense challenges it faces. This is a joint effort of Team Europe made possible through close collaboration with the European Commission and EU Member States,” added EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska, who oversees the Bank’s operations in Ukraine.

    “This support package, developed with the EIB, further demonstrates the European Union’s unwavering commitment to Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction. With the Ukraine Facility, we are restoring vital infrastructure and helping businesses grow – crucial projects as Ukraine defends itself against Russian aggression. Together, we will continue to support Ukraine, working on key areas, such as energy, housing, and public safety to build a stronger and more sustainable future,” said EU Ambassador to Ukraine Katarína Mathernová.

    Today, four projects worth €420 million were announced under the EU’s Ukraine Facility. They will help to restore critical infrastructure and services and ensure a stable energy supply. The projects include the €100 million “Ukraine Recovery III”, €100 million “Ukraine Water Recovery”, and the €100 million “Ukraine District Heating”, which will be channelled through Ukreximbank. These initiatives aim to ensure that millions of Ukrainians in more than 100 communities across the country have access to heating, water, hospitals, schools and housing for internally displaced people. The €120 million “Support of Ukrhydroenergo Stability and Recovery” loan to the largest hydropower generating company in Ukraine will help to restore hydropower plants and thus reinforce the Ukrainian energy system.

    Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine — Minister for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine Oleksii Kuleba said: “We deeply value the strong cooperation with the European Investment Bank, in particular under the recovery programmes, which are playing, since 2014 a key role in supporting more than 100 communities across the country. We are grateful for the support to the communities that are de-occupied or close to the front line. The provision of social, medical, logistical, educational and other infrastructure is essential to ensuring our communities remains strong and resilient. Today we sign €100 million of the multi-sector Ukraine Recovery III loan for the restoration and modernization of critical infrastructure, such as heating, hospitals and housing for IDPs and we sign €100 million of Ukraine Water Recovery dedicated to water and wastewater. Our collaboration on social housing is another key component, reflecting our shared commitment to providing essential infrastructure and stability for those in need. The grant for renewable energy, which we also signed today, will play a vital role in ensuring that critical buildings, like hospitals, can continue serving the population amidst power cuts. Together, these initiatives not only accelerate our recovery but also help us build a more resilient and sustainable future for our country.”

    The financing provided for the 112 call system in Ukraine will expand data centres across the country and upgrade their technological capacity, ensuring that critical services are reliable and efficient.

    “Implementing and developing the 112 emergency call system has become a crucial component in enhancing public safety in Ukraine and in aligning our infrastructure to European standards. Thanks to the EIB loan and support from European partners, we will be able to improve cooperation between emergency services, particularly through the automatic detection of the caller’s geolocation. We will strengthen our ability to assist individuals with hearing and speech impairments, as well as foreign citizens. This project is about enhancing the safety of our citizens and providing timely assistance to those in need,” said Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Ihor Klymenko.

    The EIB is also signing a €16.5 million grant from the German government with the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine to promote renewable energy. The grant comes through the EIB’s International Climate Initiative Fund and is part of the Ukraine Energy Rescue Plan announced by the EIB in October 2024.

    The grant will help integrate renewable energy systems into public buildings undergoing renovation works under EIB municipal loans. This will upgrade social infrastructure and make energy more reliable, cleaner and less costly. The grant will also help to decentralise energy generation, ensuring that critical public buildings in towns and villages are less reliant on electricity supplies from large power stations, making them less vulnerable to blackouts in the event of an airstrike.

    Berthold Goeke, Director-General for Climate Action, German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK) said: “Through the Renewable Energy Solutions Programme, the International Climate Initiative (IKI) is helping smaller Ukrainian communities — those most affected by the war and in urgent need — to implement climate-friendly technologies. This support enables Ukraine to reduce energy costs and modernize outdated infrastructure in public buildings, laying the foundation for a stable and renewable energy future. In this way, the German government is addressing two critical challenges in Ukraine’s energy system. First, we are supporting the development of a decentralized and resilient energy supply, particularly for essential public infrastructure such as hospitals, schools, and kindergartens. Given the ongoing Russian aggression and the destruction of central energy infrastructure, this is vital for ensuring stability and security. Second, our initiative contributes to Ukraine’s long-term energy transition by promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency measures, paving the way for a climate-neutral energy system.”

    Social housing is one of the most pressing issues in Ukraine, with 10% of the country’s housing stock damaged as a result of the war. The EIB is supporting the government in drafting a new housing code and exploring the possibility of financing the construction of homes that are publicly owned.

    Background information

    EIB in Ukraine 

    The EIB Group has been supporting Ukraine’s resilience, economy and efforts to rebuild since the very first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion. In 2024, we supported projects aimed at securing Ukraine’s energy supply, repairing critical infrastructure that has been damaged, and ensuring that essential services continue to be delivered across the country. This brings the total amount of aid we have disbursed since the start of the war to over €2.2 billion. This funding has played a crucial role in ensuring that vital services continue to be delivered to people in Ukraine. For example, this year we inaugurated the water supply facility in Bucha that was rebuilt, and which provides clean water to 9 000 residents. We also opened five new schools in Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Ternopil Oblasts, helped build a department for children’s infectious diseases at a hospital in Zhytomyr Oblast, and significantly improved sanitation through the upgraded sewerage collector in Vinnytsia Oblast. Furthermore, our investments have helped modernise street lighting in Dnipro, benefitted the reclamation of the Hrybovychi landfill in Lviv, and helped to upgrade water infrastructure in Mykolaiv. We have also strengthened Ukraine’s transport networks to ensure resilient and sustainable mobility for businesses and residents. With our support, cities such as Lviv, Kyiv, Mykolaiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Odesa, and Sumy have purchased new buses, trolleybuses, and trams. In addition, we have funded the reconstruction of the M01 Kyiv-Chernihiv-Novi Yarylovychi section of road that had been damaged in the war. To enhance Ukraine’s energy resilience, we have launched the Energy Rescue Plan, securing €600 million in EU-backed financing, including €86 million to build anti-drone shelters to protect critical electricity transmission infrastructure. These measures are crucial to maintaining stable power supply across the country amid ongoing challenges. In 2024, we signed over €250 million in new investment for projects to further enhance social infrastructure and support businesses that are the backbone of Ukraine’s economy.

    The EU for Ukraine Fund (EU4U) was established in 2023 as part of a larger EU for Ukraine initiative. The fund aims to accelerate EIB Global’s support for Ukraine’s most urgent infrastructure needs and help sustain its economy. The Fund supports both public and private sector projects to rebuild critical municipal infrastructure and improve access to finance for entrepreneurs.

    The International Climate Initiative (IKI) Fund was established in 2019 in partnership with the government of Germany, with the aim of catalysing investment for ambitious climate change mitigation and adaptation projects in developing and emerging countries. The IKI Fund seeks to do this by providing investment grants, financial instruments and technical assistance to public and private sector beneficiaries, as well as advisory services to central banks and financial institutions.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Agenda – Tuesday, 11 February 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    Agenda
    Strasbourg
    Monday, 10 February 2025 – Thursday, 13 February 2025  
    Tuesday, 11 February 2025 Version: Monday, 10 February 2025, 17:33

    12:00 – 12:30   Formal sitting      
    59   Address by Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada


    09:00 – 11:50   Debates     
    Council (including replies) 20′
    Commission (including replies) 20′
    “Catch the eye”   (2×5′) 10′
    Members 104′
    13:30 – 22:00   Debates (or at the end of the votes)     
    Council (including replies) 50′
    Commission (including replies) 65′
    Author (committee) 5′
    “Catch the eye”   (7×5′) 35′
    Members 239′

    32 Continuing the unwavering EU support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s war of aggression
    17 European Central Bank – annual report 2024
    Anouk Van Brug (A10-0003/2025
        Amendments Wednesday, 5 February 2025, 13:00
    50 Escalation of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo
        Motion for a resolution Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00
        Amendments to motions for resolutions; joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00
        Amendments to joint motions for resolutions Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 20:00
        Requests for “separate”, “split” and “roll-call” votes Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 16:00
    Separate votes – Split votes – Roll-call votes
    Texts put to the vote on Tuesday Friday, 7 February 2025, 12:00
    Texts put to the vote on Wednesday Monday, 10 February 2025, 19:00
    Texts put to the vote on Thursday Tuesday, 11 February 2025, 19:00
    Motions for resolutions concerning debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (Rule 150) Wednesday, 12 February 2025, 19:00

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Russian Government disinformation interference with national governments – E-001958/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The High Representative/Vice-President is aware of the intentions of the Russian government, its modus operandi and have detected and exposed several foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations coming from Russian state or pro-Kremlin actors.

    The European External Action Service coordinates closely with Member States and EU institutions on such FIMI activity in the context of the Rapid Alert System, including regarding Social Design Agency and other entities with links to such operations.

    The exposure and response to Russia’s FIMI operations and restrictive measures are part of the FIMI toolbox[1], endorsed by the European Council in December 2023[2], and developed to reinforce EU situational awareness, resilience and response, as well as international partnerships to tackle this threat to security and democracy.

    The EU’s response to FIMI evolves in close cooperation with the EU Member States and international partners to take account of new operations and malign activity patterns.

    Furthermore, Regulation 2022/2065 (Digital Services Act ‘DSA’)[3] along with the EU Code of Practice on Disinformation[4] provide a number of tools to address the spread of disinformation, while fully upholding fundamental rights including the freedom of expression.

    Political advertising can be a vector of disinformation and foreign interference. Once it fully enters into application in October 2025, Regulation 900/2024 on transparency and targeting of political advertising will ensure that political advertisements are labelled and subject to strict targeting requirements.

    Sponsoring political advertisements by third country actors will be prohibited in the three months before elections or referenda.

    • [1] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/tackling-disinformation-foreign-information-manipulation-interference_en
    • [2] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/68967/europeancouncilconclusions-14-15-12-2023-en.pdf
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market for Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022).
    • [4] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/code-practice-disinformation
    Last updated: 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Extending sanctions packages, procedure for discontinuing sanctions packages and voting arrangements in the Council under the Treaties – E-000427/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000427/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Rada Laykova (ESN)

    EU sanctions, such as those aimed at the Russian Federation and its residents, must be renewed by the Council every six months. Sanctions packages are then extended not individually but in blocks, with extensions requiring a unanimous vote in the Council.

    • 1.What is the exact procedure followed by the Commission and the Union if at least one Member State does not agree to extending a block of sanctions and the extension therefore cannot be adopted?
    • 2.Is it in any way permitted, under the EU Treaties in force, to repeat or cancel such votes in the Council until the result favoured by the majority of Council members can be reached unanimously?

    Submitted: 30.1.2025

    Last updated: 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: Conflict of interest management rules for NPFs

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Central Bank of Russia –

    Non-state pension funds (NPF) will be required to identify and manage conflicts of interest. Funds will be able to allow a conflict to arise only if they have notified their clients about it and their rights are not violated. The corresponding Bank of Russia instructionregistered by the Ministry of Justice of Russia.

    The document defines the rules for identifying conflicts of interest and describes specific situations that may lead to this, for example, if an NPF acquires securities of an affiliated company or makes a transaction with an associated person. Funds will have to keep mandatory records of information on conflicts of interest.

    The requirements imposed on NPFs are similar to the approaches to regulating conflicts of interest of professional participants and management companies and are aimed at strengthening the protection of the rights and legitimate interests of fund clients.

    The directive comes into force on February 21, 2025.

    Preview photo: Thomas Bethge / Shutterstock / Fotodom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //vv. KBR.ru/Press/Event/? ID = 23360

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Support for Ukrainians continues as government extends driving licence and vehicle exemptions

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Ukrainian licence holders will be able to drive on Great Britain’s roads for up to 4.5 years from when they arrive in the UK.

    • rules to allow Ukrainians to drive in the UK using their Ukrainian license extended
    • Ukrainians will also remain exempt from registering and paying vehicle excise duty in the UK on Ukrainian-registered vehicles
    • additional support comes as UK and Ukraine sign historic 100-year partnership to bolster maritime security and deepen trade ties

    Ukrainian nationals who have fled Russia’s illegal invasion will continue being able to drive, as the government extends rules to support them.

    The Future of Roads Minister, Lilian Greenwood, has announced an 18-month extension for Ukrainian licence holders, allowing them to drive mopeds, motorcycles and cars – meaning these motorists will be able to drive on Great Britain’s roads for up to 4.5 years from arriving here in the UK.

    In addition, certain Ukrainians on visa schemes will be exempt for a further 18 months from registering their vehicles or paying vehicle excise duty (VED) for their Ukrainian-registered vehicles in the UK. This reduces financial pressure and avoids unnecessary costs and complications.

    Future of Roads Minister, Lilian Greenwood, said:

    The government stands firmly with the people of Ukraine, and it’s important those in the UK who’ve fled Putin’s illegal invasion are able to get about with ease for work or education.

    This may seem like a small thing, but I’m pleased our country is taking action to help make day-to-day life that little bit easier for those who have endured unimaginable hardship for 3 years now.

    The UK and Ukraine have an unbreakable bond reflected through the recently announced 100 Year Partnership, which ensures closer communities are supported for generations to come.

    These exemptions align with the launch of the Ukraine Permission Extension scheme, which enables certain Ukrainians to stay in the UK for a further 18 months from the end of their current permission. These measures will help avoid obstacles that may make it harder for Ukrainians to return home after the war to support reconstruction efforts.

    The UK is steadfast in its commitment to supporting Ukraine, with £12.8 billion in humanitarian, economic and military support since the invasion started in February 2022. The Prime Minister committed £3 billion a year of military support for Ukraine for as long as it takes.

    Roads media enquiries

    Media enquiries 0300 7777 878

    Switchboard 0300 330 3000

    Updates to this page

    Published 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – President Metsola: “Örebro shooting was a senseless act of violence”

    Source: European Parliament 3

    President Metsola opened the 10-13 February session with a minute’s silence for the victims of last week’s shooting in Örebro – the worst in Sweden’s history.

    Örebro Shooting

    Calling on MEPs to observe a minute’s silence for the victims of the mass shooting at Risbergska school in Örebro on Tuesday 4 February 2025, President Metsola called the tragedy “a senseless act of violence that claimed innocent lives, shattering families, and scarring communities. Europe mourns those who have been lost, and our thoughts are with their loved ones, with all those who have been injured, and with the people of Sweden in this moment of profound sorrow.” She added that “hatred and violence have no place in Europe. The values that unite us – peace, democracy, and the dignity of human life – will always prevail.”

    Three years since Russian invasion of Ukraine

    President Metsola marked the third anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by saying that “Ukraine remains resilient. And this Parliament stands with it.” President Metsola informed MEPs that Parliament will welcome Chairman Ruslan Stefanchuk of the Verkhovna Rada on Tuesday 11 February to mark this sombre anniversary.

    Interruptions during International Holocaust Remembrance Day

    Referring to interruptions that took place during Parliament’s solemn session on 29 January 2025 to honour International Holocaust Remembrance Day, President Metsola extended her deepest apologies for the “disgraceful” incident. “The gravity of such behaviour cannot be overstated. It is a stark reminder of why remembrance is not just a symbolic act, but a fundamental duty that this Parliament – that we all must – uphold,” she said. “The appropriate consequences will be drawn after the relevant procedures are followed. I thank all of you for being present that day.”

    Changes to the agenda

    MONDAY

    Parliament’s statements on the Situation in Sweden in the midst of the recent mass shooting in Örebro, with one round of political group speakers, is added as the first point today.

    TUESDAY

    A formal sitting with an address by Ruslan Stefanchuk, Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is added at 12:00. As a consequence, the voting session will start at 12:30.

    THURSDAY

    The order of debates in the morning is changed as follows:

    • the debate on EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement is taken as the first point on the agenda, whereas
    • the debate on Threats to EU sovereignty through strategic dependencies in communication infrastructure follows as the second point.

    Request by several committees to start negotiations with Council and Commission

    Decisions by committees to enter into inter-institutional negotiations (Rule 71) are published on the plenary website.

    If no request for a vote in Parliament on the decision to enter into negotiations is made by Tuesday at midnight, the committees may start negotiations.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: While the world is distracted by Trump, here’s how Putin and Musk are weakening European democracies

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    In an unprecedented decision on December 6 2024, the Romanian constitutional court annulled the November 25 presidential elections after it received credible intelligence of large-scale external interference rigging the results of the first round in favour of a hardly-known far-right candidate, Calin Georgescu.

    Georgescu’s massive last-minute surge was largely blamed on the creation of thousands of paid-for Russian-controlled bots on TikTok and illegal campaign financing.

    This may seem like last year’s news, but with elections coming up in Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, and possibly even Ukraine, there’s plenty to worry about – apart from a new US president who is disrupting Washington (and the world) with a flurry of executive orders and foreign policy initiatives that feel more like real estate sales pitches.

    Concerns about Russian election interference are nothing new, but so far the picture of Moscow’s success is rather mixed.

    Back in January 2017, the US intelligence community was confident that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential elections to get Donald Trump elected. The following year, similar accusations arose in the context of presidential elections in France. But in France, the Kremlin failed to prevent the victory of Emmanuel Macron.

    More recently, in Georgia, the incumbent government of the Georgian Dream party won the parliamentary elections in October 2024 after alleged Russian interference. This sparked widespread protests and a government crackdown on media and civil society.

    By contrast, despite alleged Russian interference in Moldova, the country’s pro-western president won a second term in November 2024. A referendum on a constitutional commitment to EU membership was supported by a razor-thin majority of voters.




    Read more:
    Maia Sandu’s victory in second round of Moldovan election show’s limits to Moscow’s meddling


    Opinion polls on perceptions of Russia and Vladimir Putin across western democracies also offer some solace. According to a survey by the Pew Research Center in 2024, positive views of Russia and its leader remain very low across EU and Nato member countries. At the same time, approval ratings of the EU and Nato remained high among member countries’ citizens.

    But these relatively comforting headline figures mask important, and somewhat worrying, trends. In Germany, which holds early parliamentary elections on February 23, positive views of Putin more than doubled from 8% in 2023 to 17% in 2024. This is still a far cry from the 76% who approved of Putin in 2003 or even the 36% who did so in 2019, according to the same survey. The German increase is an outlier among the 13 EU members, but in only one of them – Italy – did support for Putin drop, compared with the previous year.




    Read more:
    Why Romania’s election was annulled – and what happens next?


    The same goes for support for the EU and Nato. The median level of support for the EU across nine member states surveyed stands at 63%, with 36% of participants holding unfavourable views. Germany, with 63% favourable views, however, recorded the second consecutive decline, down from 78% in 2022 and 71% in 2023. And Germany is less of an outlier here – favourable views of the EU among member states have generally declined somewhat over the past two years.

    Musk speaks at an AfD rally.

    When it comes to Nato, 63% of survey participants in 13 member countries thought more positively of the alliance, while 33% had more negative views. But again, with the exception of Hungary and Canada (where favourability went up), the share of those with favourable views had declined by between two and eight percentage points since last year.

    Does this mean that Putin is winning? No, at least not yet. Attitude surveys are less important than election results.

    Russia appears to have had some recent success in changing election outcomes, for instance in Romania where Romanian intelligance services discovered evidence of voter manipulation. But the Romanian example (in annulling the election) is also illustrative of how important it is for democracies to fight back – and even more importantly to take preventive action.

    And this is a lesson that seems to have sunk in. On January 30, the foreign ministers of 12 EU member states sent a joint letter to Brussels urging the European Commission to make more aggressive use of its powers under the Digital Services Act to protect the integrity of democratic elections in the bloc. Article 25 of that act, crucially, establishes an obligation on online platforms to design their services free from deception and manipulation and ensure that users can make informed decisions.

    While the commission has yet to demonstrate its resolve under the Digital Services Act, a Berlin court on February 7 2025, ordered that X must hand over data needed to track disinformation to two civil society groups who had requested it.

    Musk and Putin: shared values?

    If Putin is winning, he is not winning on his own. Democracies are not only under threat from Russia. Musk – an unelected billionaire wielding unprecedented influence under Donald Trump – has repeatedly been accused of interfering in European debates and election campaigns. Of his comments on the German election, Musk has argued that as he has significant investments in Germany he has the right to comment on its politics and that the AfD “resonates with many Germans who feel their concerns are ignored by the establishment”.

    What Musk and Putin have in common is their deep dislike of open liberal democracies and a cunning ability to employ technology to further their goals by promoting political parties and movements that share their illiberal views.

    Where they differ is that Musk focuses on the far right – Germany’s AfD or the UK’s Tommy Robinson. But Putin tends to back whoever he sees as serving Russian interests in weakening western unity and influence. This leads to the Kremlin lending support to leaders on both the far right and far left.

    But often Putin’s and Musk’s proteges are the same. In the case of the German AfD, it was no accident that Putin echoed comments from a speech Musk gave at an AfD election rally, saying that Germans should move beyond their war guilt. Both were keen to remove the stain of being too close to Germany’s Nazi past from the AfD and make it not just electable but also respectable enough to bring into a coalition, much like Austria’s far-right Freedom Party which has a long history of friendly relations with Putin.

    And what Musk can do openly on X, Putin tries to achieve with a campaign of his bot army on the platform.

    Perhaps the most significant similarity between Musk and Putin – and others who have been accused of election interference – is that they tap into a growing reservoir of discontent with liberal democracy.

    According to a 2024 survey of 31 democracies worldwide, 54% of participants were dissatisfied with how they saw democracy working. In 12 high-income countries – Canada, US, and 10 EU member states – dissatisfaction was even higher with 64% and has been increasing for the fourth consecutive year.

    Pushing back against the kind of blatant election interference by the likes of Putin and Musk is clearly important. But it will not be enough to reverse persistent trends of decline in the support for democracy and its standard bearers including the EU and Nato. It is right to resist and prosecute election rigging. But it is also crucial to ask why people are dissatisfied with democracy – and to do something about it.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. While the world is distracted by Trump, here’s how Putin and Musk are weakening European democracies – https://theconversation.com/while-the-world-is-distracted-by-trump-heres-how-putin-and-musk-are-weakening-european-democracies-249400

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin Warns Defense Secretary Hegseth Against Politicization Of U.S. Military After Numerous Concerning Actions By Trump Administration

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    February 10, 2025
    “I am deeply alarmed that these actions may not only erode trust in our military as an institution, but also dangerously distract from where our focus ought to be on foreign adversaries and their capabilities,” Durbin wrote in his letter to Secretary Hegseth
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), a member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense (SACD), yesterday sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth to warn him against the politicization of the Department of Defense (DoD).  Durbin’s letter comes after several thinly-veiled political orders by the Trump Administration related to the nation’s military, including removing protection from former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, using the military for immigration enforcement, and impounding congressional approved DoD funding.
    “I write to express my concern that President Trump’s personal agenda is counter to defending against our country’s serious national security threats.  Since the President’s inauguration less than one month ago, the Trump Administration has pursued several dubious executive actions that threaten our military’s long-standing ethos to remain nonpartisan and promote merit, both of which you spoke to the importance of during your hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) prior to your confirmation,” Durbin began his letter.
    “I am deeply alarmed that these actions may not only erode trust in our military as an institution, but also dangerously distract from where our focus ought to be on foreign adversaries and their capabilities,” Durbin wrote.  “With China rapidly building its nuclear and naval forces, Russia fighting a war of aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and North Korea and Iran pursuing nuclear weapons and destabilizing actions, these erratic pursuits distract from the real threats to our nation.”
    Durbin then laid out the troublesome and political actions that the Trump Administration has taken since January 20. 
    Durbin referenced the “targeting [of] military officers such as… former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley… as part of an effort to go after individuals unceremoniously deemed unfit or considered political adversaries.” 
    In January, Secretary Hegseth removed General Milley’s security detail despite ongoing threats related to the 2020 drone strike that killed Iranian General Qusem Soleimani.  DoD also announced that there will be an investigation into General Milley for “undermining the chain of command,” but there has been no clear indication of what conduct would be investigated.  Rather, the investigation and threat of demotingGeneral Milley’s four-star rank appears to be a political reaction to General Milley’s public comments about being photographed at Lafayette Square after President Trump cleared the area of protestors using National Guard troops.  Similarly, Coast Guard Commandant Linda Fagan, the first woman to lead a  military service, was removed from her post on President Trump’s second day in office without warning and ahead of her scheduled departure.  
    Durbin also emphasized that the Trump Administration is “diverting DoD resources and critical warfighting personnel for contentious immigration enforcement, compromising our military assets and distracting from national security threats.” 
    Immediately upon being sworn in, President Trump signed an executive order stating that DoD would deploy troops to the southern border despite federal law prohibiting the use of military for law enforcement.  At the end of January, DoD announced that Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) would use facilities at Buckley Space Force Base in Aurora, Colorado, as a detention center forundocumented immigrants.  Further, military planes typically used for missions such as providing security assistance to Ukraine and Israel or hunting Russian and Chinese submarines have been used to deport immigrants and provide surveillance on our southern border.  In addition, in an unprecedented move, the Trump administration began flying migrants on military aircraft from the U.S. for detention at Naval Station Guantanamo Bay.  
    In addition, Durbin decried the administration’s efforts to freeze congressionally-appropriated funding for programs such as defense medical research, which supports lifesaving treatment and prevention of illnesses for service members, veterans, and the civilian population.  Since Fiscal Year 2015, Durbin has boosted defense medical research funding by more than $1.4 billion or 82 percent through SACD.  
    Durbin also noted that administration efforts to overturn policies that “remove barriers and enhance opportunities for qualified recruits” ultimately “[undermines] force strength and readiness—in the midst of unprecedented recruitment and retention challenges.”  On January 27, President Trump issued an Executive Order effectively banning transgender troops from the military.  And on January 31, the Pentagon eliminated a Biden-era policy that would provide reimbursements for service members who travel out of state to get reproductive health care after the Supreme Court’s overturning of Roe v. Wade. 
    “America’s national security depends on the Department of Defense functioning as a stable institution that supports its personnel rather than being thrown into disarray.  Further, increasing politicization of our military risks diminishing the role of the United States on the international stage, sending a dangerous signal to our allies and adversaries alike,” Durbin said.
    “In the spirit of your promise before SASC to be a faithful partner to Congress, I urge you to defend the principles of the Department of Defense,” Durbin concluded his letter.
    Prior to Secretary Hegseth’s confirmation, Durbin made his concerns about his nomination clear.  In January, Durbin delivered a speech on the Senate floor explaining his objections to Hegseth’s nomination, including his inability to articulate a defense strategy in addressing threats to the U.S., his disparaging comments about women serving in the military, and troubling reports of financial mismanagement, alcohol abuse, and personal misconduct.
    The full text of the letter can be found here and below:
    February 9, 2025
    Dear Secretary Hegseth,
    I write to express my concern that President Trump’s personal agenda is counter to defending against our country’s serious national security threats.  Since the President’s inauguration less than one month ago, the Trump Administration has pursued several dubious executive actions that threaten our military’s long-standing ethos to remain nonpartisan and promote merit, both of which you spoke to the importance of during your hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) prior to your confirmation.  I am deeply alarmed that these actions may not only erode trust in our military as an institution, but also dangerously distract from where our focus ought to be on foreign adversaries and their capabilities.  With China rapidly building its nuclear and naval forces, Russia fighting a war of aggression on the border of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and North Korea and Iran pursuing nuclear weapons and destabilizing actions, these erratic pursuits distract from the real threats to our nation.
    The Trump Administration’s troubling actions have included, but are not limited to:
    Targeting military officers such as Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Linda Fagan and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, as well as civilian federal government employees within the Department of Defense (DoD), such as the Senate-confirmed Inspector General, as part of an effort to go after individuals unceremoniously deemed unfit or considered political adversaries;
    Diverting DoD resources and critical warfighting personnel for contentious immigration enforcement, compromising our military assets and distracting from national security threats;
    Unconstitutionally impounding congressionally approved DoD funding from a myriad of programs that protect and support our service members, including projects that boost defense medical research, reduce civilian casualties, provide infrastructure grants to municipalities near military installations, and promote investments in critical technologies, sowing mass confusion and chaos; and
    Undermining force strength and readiness—in the midst of unprecedented recruitment and retention challenges—by arbitrarily weaponizing programs and policies designed to remove barriers and enhance benefits and opportunities for qualified recruits.
    As you know, DoD is the largest federal government agency in the United States.  Your responsibilities include overseeing a nearly $900 billion budget, more than 3.5 million service members and civilian employees, and 750 military installations around the world.  America’s national security depends on the Department of Defense functioning as a stable institution that supports its personnel rather than being thrown into disarray.  Further, increasing politicization of our military risks diminishing the role of the United States on the international stage, sending a dangerous signal to our allies and adversaries alike.
    In the spirit of your promise before SASC to be a faithful partner to Congress, I urge you to defend the principles of the Department of Defense. 
    Sincerely,
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Baltic states join European continental electricity grid

    Source: European Union 2

    Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have disconnected from Russia’s and Belarus’s electricity systems and fully integrated into the European continental network via Poland. The synchronisation project has been 15 years in the making and will ultimately allow consumers to benefit from lower energy costs.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Smyrna Man Sentenced to 20 Years in Federal Prison on Child Exploitation Charges

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    NASHVILLE – Peter Allen Snyder, 43, of Smyrna, Tennessee, was sentenced last Thursday to 20 years in federal prison after having pled guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of distribution of child pornography, announced Robert E. McGuire, Acting United States Attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee. Snyder also is required to register as a sex offender.

    “One of our office’s highest priorities is the aggressive prosecution of crimes against children,” said Acting United States Attorney Robert E. McGuire. “We will seek to hold these criminals accountable in order to protect the most vulnerable members of our community.”

    According to court records, on November 21, 2019, Snyder created at least nine sexually explicit images of the Minor Victim on his cell phone which depicted her naked from the waist down. Snyder’s hand was visible in one of the images.  Snyder later distributed these photographs through the internet. The creation and distribution of these sexually explicit images came to light in December 2021, when Yahoo submitted a CyberTip to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children regarding the possession and distribution of child sexual abuse material. The CyberTip contained twenty-five images of child sexual abuse material, including nine of the Minor Victim, which had been sent by e-mail from a Russian-based e-mail service, with the subject header reading “Trade.”

    The images of the Minor Victim contained gps data confirming the images were produced at or near the vicinity of Snyder’s residence in Cannon County.  These images also included data about the cell phone used to create the sexually explicit images of the Minor Victim.  When Snyder was questioned about the cell phone following his arrest, he said he had disposed of it at a recycling kiosk.

    After serving his sentence, Snyder will be on supervised release for the remainder of his life.

    This case was investigated by Homeland Security Investigations, the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, and the Woodbury Police Department. Assistant U.S. Attorney Monica R. Morrison prosecuted the case.

    # # # # #

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Completes 2025 Article IV Consultation with Morocco

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 10, 2025

    End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF’s Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    • Economic growth is accelerating thanks to strong domestic demand, amid a new investment cycle in many sectors.
    • Tax reforms have allowed the fiscal deficit in 2024 to be lower than expected while also funding spending measures. Going forward, saving part of the revenue windfall would help strengthen the fiscal buffers. The current monetary policy stance is appropriate and should remain data dependent.
    • Structural reforms should focus on strengthening job creation, including by better targeting active labor market polices, consolidating programs to support small and medium firms, and removing regulatory distortions that hinder firms’ growth.

    Rabat, Morocco: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team led by Roberto Cardarelli conducted discussions with the Moroccan authorities in Rabat on the 2025 Article IV Consultation from January 27 to February 7. At the conclusion of the visit, Mr. Cardarelli issued the following statement:

    “Economic activity is expected to have grown by 3.2 percent in 2024 and to accelerate to 3.9 percent in 2025, as agricultural output rebounds after the recent droughts and the nonagricultural sector continues to expand at a robust pace amid strong domestic demand. Higher growth is expected to increase the current account deficit towards its estimated medium-term norm of around 3 percent, while inflation is expected to stabilize at around 2 percent. The risks to the outlook are broadly balanced, with significant uncertainty regarding the economic impact of geopolitical tensions and changing climate conditions.

    “With inflation expectations anchored around 2 percent and little signs of demand pressures, the current broadly neutral monetary policy stance is appropriate, and staff agrees with Bank Al-Maghrib that future changes of policy rates should remain data dependent. With inflation back to around 2 percent, Bank Al-Maghrib should continue its preparation to adopt an inflation-targeting framework.”

    “Recent reforms to the tax system and tax administration have helped expand the tax base while lowering the tax burden. As a result, tax revenues in 2024 have been greater than expected. With only a small part of the additional tax revenues being saved, the central government’s deficit for the year was 4.1 percent of GDP compared to the 4.3 announced in the 2024 Budget. While the 2025 Budget confirms the gradual pace of fiscal adjustment projected last year, higher-than-expected revenues should be used to accelerate the pace of debt reduction to levels closer to pre-pandemic. In addition, continuing to finance structural reforms may require further efforts to expand the tax base and rationalize spending, including by reducing transfers to state-owned enterprises as part of the ongoing reform of the sector and expanding the use of the Unified Social Registry to all social programs.

    “Staff welcomes the ongoing reform of the Organic Budget Law that should introduce a new fiscal rule based on a medium-term debt anchor. Good progress has been made in the Medium-Term fiscal framework to include an assessment of the risk from climate change. Staff encourages the authorities to build on this progress by adding more information on the impact of new policy measures and a quantification of the risks from the increased reliance on public-private partnership (PPP) projects.

     “Stronger job creation requires a novel approach to active labor market policies, focusing on labor displaced from the agricultural sector due to the sequence of droughts. A special focus should be placed on encouraging the growth of small and medium size enterprises (SME)  and favoring their integration into sectoral value chains. Staff welcomes the progress in the operationalization of the Mohammed VI Investment Fund that should help SMEs access equity financing. Measures that may encourage the development of a more buoyant private sector include strengthening the support for SMEs under the new Charter of Investment, strengthening regional investment centers so they can better help SMEs access the financial and technical resources needed for their growth, and reviewing the labor code, tax system, and regulatory and governance frameworks so as remove the distortion that incentivize firms to remain small or informal. It will also be necessary that the ongoing SOE reform effectively pursues market neutrality between public and private sector firms.

    “The IMF team held discussions with senior officials of the government of Morocco, Bank Al-Maghrib, and representatives of the public and private sectors. The team thanks the Moroccan authorities and other stakeholders for their hospitality and candid and productive discussions.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Angham Al Shami

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/10/pr-2533-morocco-imf-staff-completes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Glawion, Senior research fellow at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg, Germany, University of Freiburg

    Since it became independent in 1960, the Central African Republic has grappled with poverty, instability and governance challenges.

    A decade into former president François Bozizé’s corrupt rule, a rebellion broke out and toppled the president in 2013. What followed was a devastatingly violent civil war with thousands of people killed and a fifth of the populace displaced.

    To halt violence against civilians, numerous international actors intervened, including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and France. From 2014 onward they put thousands of boots on the ground and pushed rebels from most towns, while protecting and supporting the interim administration.

    But by 2016 all actors had retreated, save the United Nations (UN). The mission – Minusca – was not able to contain a resurgence in rebellion, and the newly elected president Faustin-Archange Touadéra turned to Russian paramilitaries to stabilise his rule in 2017.

    These paramilitaries started out only as “trainers” but took on more prominent and direct combat roles as the years passed, making the country a geopolitical playing field. The Russian paramilitaries and national army again pushed the rebels out of most towns and into the countryside.

    I have studied the Central African Republic’s politics for over a decade, conducting research in towns across the country. I wanted to find out why some areas were more affected by violence than others and how people locally lived together. I believed that in such local stories we might find missing links as to why all the actors involved failed to provide the protection from violence and provision of services that people desired.

    To study people’s expectations of peacekeepers, I used a method I call the “qualitative” survey. This type of survey asks open questions, for example “what do you expect of international actors?”. This leaves space for people to say things that researchers might not have expected. It also included more typical closed questions like “how safe do you feel, on a scale from 1 to 5?”.

    With a team of Central African researchers, I conducted these surveys in four places in 2019 and in two places in 2023 and 2024. At this stage respondents had experienced foreign peacekeeping missions and Russian paramilitary presence.

    We found that peacekeeping missions were losing popular support because they were not fulfilling the expectations of people in the Central African Republic.

    People wanted peacekeepers to confront armed actors. When peacekeepers failed to do so, they criticised them, even requested them to leave.

    Russian paramilitaries offered the forceful response that autocratic regimes and many locals wanted. However, they provided a too simplistic answer to people’s demands, based only on the present. People also had future expectations: they wanted armed actors to be kicked out so that people might be treated fairly and witness the return of a caring state in the near future.

    Thus, while peacekeepers frustrated initial expectations and Russian paramilitaries might fulfil them, the Central African state and their Russian paramilitary allies were not building the future people expected.

    Expectations

    The overall results of the survey showed that people had the most confidence in local institutions, while harbouring high expectations for the state (when it returns), and being broadly disappointed by international peacekeepers.

    The results varied strongly according to local experiences with the state and international actors. Most intriguingly, respondents did not necessarily feel safest in those localities that had the fewest violent incidents. I call this the “security paradox” and it has much to do with unmet expectations for which we need to dig into individual responses.

    Take the example of a middle-aged woman in the Central African Republic’s north-eastern and long rebel-held town of Ndélé, who made two points in early 2019. First, the United Nations peacekeeping mission, Minusca, was inactive in the face of aggression. Second, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were doing a good job:

    Partner organisations such as Minusca who reside among our population do not seem to be there to ensure our protection, as we hear on the radio. A person may well be raped, and they do not even react to rescue the person in danger, even if they know about it. On the other hand, the NGOs are doing a very good job, and it is thanks to them that Ndélé is doing well today.

    However, my own analysis showed that, objectively speaking, both peacekeepers and aid organisations were doing a mediocre job. Under the peacekeepers’ watch few violent incidents occurred and the aid organisations were only covering a fraction of local needs, much less than in other studied localities.

    The difference in perception, I argue, stems from the fact that local people have certain expectations for security and different expectations for service provision in the Central African Republic.

    Security in the Central African Republic is marked by an abundance of armed groups threatening people’s livelihoods. Dozens are currently active, of which a handful have been roaming for more than a decade, controlling trade routes and resources, as well as wielding local political power.

    Services like schooling, health and electricity are almost entirely absent in many areas outside the capital; not even the state provides them.

    Thus, in the security sector, people expect confrontation of armed actors by either the UN peacekeeping mission or the Russian paramilitary, whereas in services they want NGOs to substitute for government failings. Or in the words of an Ndélé trader:

    The international actors can help us during these absences of state authority.

    However, Minusca was not ready to forcefully oppose armed actors as they pursued an approach based on negotiating peace agreements and pursuing voluntary integration or disarmament. What my study shows is that doing too little in the eyes of the population can quickly turn the rumour mill, as this woman in Ndélé suggested:

    As for Minusca, we do not see its work in favour of our well-being, and we even want it to leave since we have seen that it is the cause of our current division and suffering.

    But would confrontation have brought more popular support to Minusca? Well, it did to another actor that stepped in, as a national staffer of an aid organisation stated in early 2022 in Bambari:

    Minusca patrols do not have the confidence of the population. Because in front of Minusca forces, the rebels kill the population. For seven years, Minusca was unable to secure the town. Within minutes, the Central African Armed Forces and their Russian allies managed to dislodge them from the town of Bambari, which is now secure.

    Reality

    I did not judge whether people’s expectations of interventions were realistic.

    Given the state’s history in the Central African Republic, it was surprising how many people wanted a state and army to return.

    However, people were hoping for a “benevolent” state return. This has not happened.

    And as for the Russian “allies”, as they are called in the Central African Republic: their confrontational approach has caused heavy collateral damage and has failed to stabilise former rebel areas. Rebellion is again on the rise.

    My study shows how important it is to analyse expectations in-depth, and to take them as a starting point of intervention policy. Not understanding people’s expectations is what caught peacekeepers by surprise when people started demonstrating in front of their bases and even calling for their withdrawal.

    While there might be good reasons not to pursue a forceful approach against rebels, interveners must be aware that they thereby deceive public expectations and should thus proactively listen to and engage the population about their demands.

    The dilemma is that fulfilling people’s initial expectations does not automatically lead to the future they desire. So there must be difficult and open discussions about what is and what is not feasible in peacekeeping.

    Tim Glawion receives funding from the public German Science Foundation (DFG, project number: 437386574).

    ref. Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace – https://theconversation.com/central-african-republic-listening-to-peoples-stories-about-foreign-forces-could-help-bring-peace-247834

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State University

    With France fast losing its influence in west Africa’s Sahel region and an unpredictable US president in power, will China fill the vacuum?

    The Sahel region covers 10 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

    French troops have been expelled from three of these – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – after military coups. Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast have also expelled French troops. The troops were there because of the security threat from extremist groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province.

    Niger also ended an agreement to keep about 1,000 US troops involved in a counter-terrorism mission. Niger’s military government described the US as having a “condescending attitude”.

    While it has been rightly argued that the presence of the western powers did not resolve the security challenges of the region, their withdrawal creates a vacuum.

    I am a political science and international relations researcher who has been studying China-Africa relations for over a decade.

    I argue that Beijing could take advantage of the vacuum in the Sahel in at least three ways: expansion of investments in critical minerals; resolution of the Ecowas crisis (when Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali exited the regional bloc); and increased arms sales.

    This is especially so as China is not new to the Sahel region of west Africa. For instance, China is constructing a US$32 million headquarters for Ecowas in Abuja, Nigeria.

    Three ways China could benefit

    First, China could expand its influence – and the next four years hold enormous opportunities in this regard.

    US president Donald Trump’s likely transactional and unpredictable approach to international relations may force African countries to look to China. For instance, they may need China to help fill the void created by the US decision to dismantle USAID and freeze international development aid.

    Nigeria joined Brics as a partner country a few days before the inauguration of Trump. Brics is a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This decision by the largest economy in the Sahel is an expression of its commitment to China – with potential implications for other Sahelian countries.

    The vacuum offers Beijing the opportunity to strengthen its investment and position as a top beneficiary of the critical minerals, such as gold, copper, lithium and uranium, in the Sahel region.

    In 2024, west African gold production was estimated to be 11.83 million ounces. Ghana, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Guinea and Mali were the major contributors.

    Second, China is in a unique position to push for a resolution of the Ecowas crisis.

    Following military coups, the Ecowas regional economic bloc sanctioned Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Ecowas even threatened Niger with a military invasion. The three countries then decided to leave Ecowas to form the Alliance of Sahel States.

    As a neutral actor whose non-interference policy accommodates both civil and military regimes, Beijing is in a position to bring Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States into negotiation before the final departure date of 29 July 2025.

    If it succeeds, China would look more like a peaceful power, an image that is contested by others.

    Building on its soft power projects like the Confucius Institutes and scholarships, China would look like the “saviour” of Ecowas integration.

    This is what it did in the case of the Tazara railway project, where China supported Tanzania and Zambia to build a railway line together. It supported the African countries when the US and Europe had failed, were reluctant or were not interested.

    Third is Chinese arms sales.

    Chinese arms are already in the Sahel. In 2019, Nigeria signed a US$152 million contract with the China North Industries Corporation Limited (Norinco) to provide some of the weapons needed to fight the Boko Haram terror group. Since then, Chinese drones and other equipment have become a feature in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism response.

    The Chinese arms market could receive a major boost beyond Nigeria with the withdrawal of western countries from the Sahel. Western countries are likely to be reluctant to sell arms to the countries that have evicted their military.

    Sanctions on Russia have also increased the likelihood of Chinese arms in the Sahel.

    For example, a few months after France and the US left the region, some reports suggested that Russian mercenaries in the Sahel region were using Chinese weapons. Norinco – China’s top arms manufacturer and seventh largest arms supplier in the world – has opened sales offices in Nigeria and Senegal.

    In June 2024, Burkina Faso received 100 tanks from China. Three months after, Mali signed an agreement with Norinco to bolster its fight against terrorism.

    Bumpy road ahead

    China’s non-interference can accommodate both civil and military governments in the Sahel. This is an advantage for Beijing in some ways. But it could also have unexpected impacts.

    There are competing local interests in the Sahel and Beijing’s deepening involvement could be (mis)interpreted as supporting one over the other.

    This could make Chinese interests a target in the violence.

    It is also unclear if China is capable or willing to fill the vacuum created by the evicted western powers. But it looks as though China can benefit from the situation in the Sahel in the short term.

    Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi has previously received research funding or travel support from organisations like the KU Leuven, Research Foundation Flanders (FWO), Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Centre of African Studies at the University of Edinburgh, Lagos State University, Chatham House (i.e. Robert Bosch Stiftung), Centre for Population and Environmental Development (CPED), Think Tank Initiative, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Coimbra Group Scholarship Programme, Tertiary Education Trust Fund (TetFund), Global Challenge Research Fund (GCRF), American Council of Learned Societies’ African Humanities Program (ACLS-AHP), Merian Institute of Advanced Studies in Africa (MIASA), Development Studies Association (DSA) UK, Collective for the Renewal of Africa (CORA), Ford Foundation, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), and Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS). However, I must clearly and strongly state that none of these funders have at any time sought to influence or influenced my writings or public engagement. Thus, this article is one of my many expressions of my academic freedom.

    ref. Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits – https://theconversation.com/power-vacuum-in-west-africas-sahel-3-ways-china-could-fill-the-gap-as-west-exits-248353

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Tim Glawion, Senior research fellow at the Arnold Bergstraesser Institut, Freiburg, Germany, University of Freiburg

    Since it became independent in 1960, the Central African Republic has grappled with poverty, instability and governance challenges.

    A decade into former president François Bozizé’s corrupt rule, a rebellion broke out and toppled the president in 2013. What followed was a devastatingly violent civil war with thousands of people killed and a fifth of the populace displaced.

    To halt violence against civilians, numerous international actors intervened, including the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union and France. From 2014 onward they put thousands of boots on the ground and pushed rebels from most towns, while protecting and supporting the interim administration.

    But by 2016 all actors had retreated, save the United Nations (UN). The mission – Minusca – was not able to contain a resurgence in rebellion, and the newly elected president Faustin-Archange Touadéra turned to Russian paramilitaries to stabilise his rule in 2017.

    These paramilitaries started out only as “trainers” but took on more prominent and direct combat roles as the years passed, making the country a geopolitical playing field. The Russian paramilitaries and national army again pushed the rebels out of most towns and into the countryside.

    I have studied the Central African Republic’s politics for over a decade, conducting research in towns across the country. I wanted to find out why some areas were more affected by violence than others and how people locally lived together. I believed that in such local stories we might find missing links as to why all the actors involved failed to provide the protection from violence and provision of services that people desired.

    To study people’s expectations of peacekeepers, I used a method I call the “qualitative” survey. This type of survey asks open questions, for example “what do you expect of international actors?”. This leaves space for people to say things that researchers might not have expected. It also included more typical closed questions like “how safe do you feel, on a scale from 1 to 5?”.

    With a team of Central African researchers, I conducted these surveys in four places in 2019 and in two places in 2023 and 2024. At this stage respondents had experienced foreign peacekeeping missions and Russian paramilitary presence.

    We found that peacekeeping missions were losing popular support because they were not fulfilling the expectations of people in the Central African Republic.

    People wanted peacekeepers to confront armed actors. When peacekeepers failed to do so, they criticised them, even requested them to leave.

    Russian paramilitaries offered the forceful response that autocratic regimes and many locals wanted. However, they provided a too simplistic answer to people’s demands, based only on the present. People also had future expectations: they wanted armed actors to be kicked out so that people might be treated fairly and witness the return of a caring state in the near future.

    Thus, while peacekeepers frustrated initial expectations and Russian paramilitaries might fulfil them, the Central African state and their Russian paramilitary allies were not building the future people expected.

    Expectations

    The overall results of the survey showed that people had the most confidence in local institutions, while harbouring high expectations for the state (when it returns), and being broadly disappointed by international peacekeepers.

    The results varied strongly according to local experiences with the state and international actors. Most intriguingly, respondents did not necessarily feel safest in those localities that had the fewest violent incidents. I call this the “security paradox” and it has much to do with unmet expectations for which we need to dig into individual responses.

    Take the example of a middle-aged woman in the Central African Republic’s north-eastern and long rebel-held town of Ndélé, who made two points in early 2019. First, the United Nations peacekeeping mission, Minusca, was inactive in the face of aggression. Second, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were doing a good job:

    Partner organisations such as Minusca who reside among our population do not seem to be there to ensure our protection, as we hear on the radio. A person may well be raped, and they do not even react to rescue the person in danger, even if they know about it. On the other hand, the NGOs are doing a very good job, and it is thanks to them that Ndélé is doing well today.

    However, my own analysis showed that, objectively speaking, both peacekeepers and aid organisations were doing a mediocre job. Under the peacekeepers’ watch few violent incidents occurred and the aid organisations were only covering a fraction of local needs, much less than in other studied localities.

    The difference in perception, I argue, stems from the fact that local people have certain expectations for security and different expectations for service provision in the Central African Republic.

    Security in the Central African Republic is marked by an abundance of armed groups threatening people’s livelihoods. Dozens are currently active, of which a handful have been roaming for more than a decade, controlling trade routes and resources, as well as wielding local political power.

    Services like schooling, health and electricity are almost entirely absent in many areas outside the capital; not even the state provides them.

    Thus, in the security sector, people expect confrontation of armed actors by either the UN peacekeeping mission or the Russian paramilitary, whereas in services they want NGOs to substitute for government failings. Or in the words of an Ndélé trader:

    The international actors can help us during these absences of state authority.

    However, Minusca was not ready to forcefully oppose armed actors as they pursued an approach based on negotiating peace agreements and pursuing voluntary integration or disarmament. What my study shows is that doing too little in the eyes of the population can quickly turn the rumour mill, as this woman in Ndélé suggested:

    As for Minusca, we do not see its work in favour of our well-being, and we even want it to leave since we have seen that it is the cause of our current division and suffering.

    But would confrontation have brought more popular support to Minusca? Well, it did to another actor that stepped in, as a national staffer of an aid organisation stated in early 2022 in Bambari:

    Minusca patrols do not have the confidence of the population. Because in front of Minusca forces, the rebels kill the population. For seven years, Minusca was unable to secure the town. Within minutes, the Central African Armed Forces and their Russian allies managed to dislodge them from the town of Bambari, which is now secure.

    Reality

    I did not judge whether people’s expectations of interventions were realistic.

    Given the state’s history in the Central African Republic, it was surprising how many people wanted a state and army to return.

    However, people were hoping for a “benevolent” state return. This has not happened.

    And as for the Russian “allies”, as they are called in the Central African Republic: their confrontational approach has caused heavy collateral damage and has failed to stabilise former rebel areas. Rebellion is again on the rise.

    My study shows how important it is to analyse expectations in-depth, and to take them as a starting point of intervention policy. Not understanding people’s expectations is what caught peacekeepers by surprise when people started demonstrating in front of their bases and even calling for their withdrawal.

    While there might be good reasons not to pursue a forceful approach against rebels, interveners must be aware that they thereby deceive public expectations and should thus proactively listen to and engage the population about their demands.

    The dilemma is that fulfilling people’s initial expectations does not automatically lead to the future they desire. So there must be difficult and open discussions about what is and what is not feasible in peacekeeping.

    – Central African Republic: listening to people’s stories about foreign forces could help bring peace
    – https://theconversation.com/central-african-republic-listening-to-peoples-stories-about-foreign-forces-could-help-bring-peace-247834

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Abdul-Gafar Tobi Oshodi, Faculty member, Department of Political Science, Lagos State University

    With France fast losing its influence in west Africa’s Sahel region and an unpredictable US president in power, will China fill the vacuum?

    The Sahel region covers 10 countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, The Gambia, Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

    French troops have been expelled from three of these – Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger – after military coups. Chad, Senegal and Ivory Coast have also expelled French troops. The troops were there because of the security threat from extremist groups like Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province.

    Niger also ended an agreement to keep about 1,000 US troops involved in a counter-terrorism mission. Niger’s military government described the US as having a “condescending attitude”.

    While it has been rightly argued that the presence of the western powers did not resolve the security challenges of the region, their withdrawal creates a vacuum.

    I am a political science and international relations researcher who has been studying China-Africa relations for over a decade.

    I argue that Beijing could take advantage of the vacuum in the Sahel in at least three ways: expansion of investments in critical minerals; resolution of the Ecowas crisis (when Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali exited the regional bloc); and increased arms sales.

    This is especially so as China is not new to the Sahel region of west Africa. For instance, China is constructing a US$32 million headquarters for Ecowas in Abuja, Nigeria.

    Three ways China could benefit

    First, China could expand its influence – and the next four years hold enormous opportunities in this regard.

    US president Donald Trump’s likely transactional and unpredictable approach to international relations may force African countries to look to China. For instance, they may need China to help fill the void created by the US decision to dismantle USAID and freeze international development aid.

    Nigeria joined Brics as a partner country a few days before the inauguration of Trump. Brics is a group of emerging economies determined to act as a counterweight to the west and to whittle down the influence of global institutions. It was established in 2006 and initially composed of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. This decision by the largest economy in the Sahel is an expression of its commitment to China – with potential implications for other Sahelian countries.

    The vacuum offers Beijing the opportunity to strengthen its investment and position as a top beneficiary of the critical minerals, such as gold, copper, lithium and uranium, in the Sahel region.

    In 2024, west African gold production was estimated to be 11.83 million ounces. Ghana, Burkina Faso, the Republic of Guinea and Mali were the major contributors.

    Second, China is in a unique position to push for a resolution of the Ecowas crisis.

    Following military coups, the Ecowas regional economic bloc sanctioned Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Ecowas even threatened Niger with a military invasion. The three countries then decided to leave Ecowas to form the Alliance of Sahel States.

    As a neutral actor whose non-interference policy accommodates both civil and military regimes, Beijing is in a position to bring Ecowas and the Alliance of Sahel States into negotiation before the final departure date of 29 July 2025.

    If it succeeds, China would look more like a peaceful power, an image that is contested by others.

    Building on its soft power projects like the Confucius Institutes and scholarships, China would look like the “saviour” of Ecowas integration.

    This is what it did in the case of the Tazara railway project, where China supported Tanzania and Zambia to build a railway line together. It supported the African countries when the US and Europe had failed, were reluctant or were not interested.

    Third is Chinese arms sales.

    Chinese arms are already in the Sahel. In 2019, Nigeria signed a US$152 million contract with the China North Industries Corporation Limited (Norinco) to provide some of the weapons needed to fight the Boko Haram terror group. Since then, Chinese drones and other equipment have become a feature in Nigeria’s counter-terrorism response.

    The Chinese arms market could receive a major boost beyond Nigeria with the withdrawal of western countries from the Sahel. Western countries are likely to be reluctant to sell arms to the countries that have evicted their military.

    Sanctions on Russia have also increased the likelihood of Chinese arms in the Sahel.

    For example, a few months after France and the US left the region, some reports suggested that Russian mercenaries in the Sahel region were using Chinese weapons. Norinco – China’s top arms manufacturer and seventh largest arms supplier in the world – has opened sales offices in Nigeria and Senegal.

    In June 2024, Burkina Faso received 100 tanks from China. Three months after, Mali signed an agreement with Norinco to bolster its fight against terrorism.

    Bumpy road ahead

    China’s non-interference can accommodate both civil and military governments in the Sahel. This is an advantage for Beijing in some ways. But it could also have unexpected impacts.

    There are competing local interests in the Sahel and Beijing’s deepening involvement could be (mis)interpreted as supporting one over the other.

    This could make Chinese interests a target in the violence.

    It is also unclear if China is capable or willing to fill the vacuum created by the evicted western powers. But it looks as though China can benefit from the situation in the Sahel in the short term.

    – Power vacuum in west Africa’s Sahel: 3 ways China could fill the gap as west exits
    – https://theconversation.com/power-vacuum-in-west-africas-sahel-3-ways-china-could-fill-the-gap-as-west-exits-248353

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia’s shrinking world: The war in Ukraine and Moscow’s global reach

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Ronald H. Linden, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh

    Russia President Vladimir Putin sent a guarded message of congratulations to Donald Trump on inauguration day, but then held a long direct call with his “dear friend,” Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

    From Putin’s perspective, this makes sense. Russia gets billions of dollars from energy sales to China and technology from Beijing, but from Washington, until recently, mostly sanctions and suspicion.

    Moscow is hoping for a more positive relationship with the current White House occupant, who has made his desire for a “deal” to end the Ukraine war well known.

    But talk of exit scenarios from this 3-year-old conflict should not mask the fact that since the invasion began, Putin has overseen one of the worst periods in Russian foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.

    Transatlantic unity

    The war in Ukraine has foreclosed on options and blunted Russian action around the world.

    Unlike the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the 2022 invasion produced an unprecedented level of transatlantic unity, including the expansion of NATO and sanctions on Russian trade and finance. In the past year, both the U.S. and the European Union expanded their sanction packages.

    And for the first time, the EU banned the re-export of Russian liquefied natural gas and ended support for a Russian LNG project in the Arctic.

    EU-Russian trade, including European imports of energy, has dropped to a fraction of what it was before the war.

    The two Nordstrom pipelines, designed to bring Russian gas to Germany without transiting East Europe, lie crippled and unused. Revenues from energy sales are roughly one-half of what they were two years ago.

    At the same time, the West has sent billions in military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, enabling a level of resilience for which Russia was unprepared. Meanwhile, global companies and technical experts and intellectuals have fled Russia in droves.

    While Russia has evaded some restrictions with its “shadow fleet” – an aging group of tankers sailing under various administrative and technical evasions – the country’s main savior is now China. Trade between China and Russia has grown by nearly two-thirds since the end of 2021, and the U.S. cites Beijing as the main source of Russia’s “dual use” and other technologies needed to pursue its war.

    Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Russia has moved from an energy-for-manufactured-goods trade relationship with the West to one of vassalage with China, as one Russia analyst termed it.

    Hosting an October meeting of the BRICS countries – now counting 11 members, including the five original members: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South America – is unlikely to compensate for geopolitical losses elsewhere.

    Russian President Vladimir Putin and China President Xi Jinping toast their friendship in March 2023.
    Pavel Byrkin/AFP via Getty Images

    Problems at home …

    The Russian economy is deeply distorted by increased military spending, which represents 40% of the budget and 25% of all spending. The government now needs the equivalent of US$20 billion annually in order to pay for new recruits.

    Russian leaders must find a way to keep at least some of the population satisfied, but persistent inflation and reserve currency shortages flowing directly from the war have made this task more difficult.

    On the battlefield, the war itself has killed or wounded more than 600,000 Russian soldiers. Operations during 2024 were particularly deadly, producing more than 1,500 Russian casualties a day.

    The leader who expected Kyiv’s capitulation in days now finds Russian territory around Kursk occupied, its naval forces in the Black Sea destroyed and withdrawn, and its own generals assassinated in Moscow.

    But probably the greatest humiliation is that this putative great power with a population of 144 million must resort to importing North Korean troops to help liberate its own land.

    … and in its backyard

    Moscow’s dedication to the war has affected its ability to influence events elsewhere, even in its own neighborhood.

    In the Caucasus, for example, Russia had long sided with Armenia in its running battle with Azerbaijan over boundaries and population after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

    Moscow has brokered ceasefires at various points. But intermittent attacks and territorial gains for Azerbaijan continued despite the presence of some 2,000 Russian peacekeepers sent to protect the remaining Armenian population in parts of the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

    In September 2023, Azerbaijan’s forces abruptly took control of the rest of Nagorno-Karabakh. More than 100,000 Armenians fled in the largest ethnic cleansing episode since the end of the Balkan Wars. The peacekeepers did not intervene and later withdrew. The Russian military, absorbed in the bloody campaigns in Ukraine, could not back up or reinforce them.

    The Azeris’ diplomatic and economic position has gained in recent years, aided by demand for its gas as a substitute for Russia’s and support from NATO member Turkey.

    Feeling betrayed by Russia, the Armenian government has for the first time extended feelers toward the West — which is happy to entertain such overtures.

    Losing influence and friends

    Russia’s loss in the Caucasus has been dwarfed by the damage to its military position and influence in the Middle East. Russia supported the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad against the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 and saved it with direct military intervention beginning in 2015.

    Yet in December 2024, Assad was unexpectedly swept away by a mélange of rebel groups. The refuge extended to Assad by Moscow was the most it could provide with the war in Ukraine having drained Russia’s capacity to do more.

    Russia’s possible withdrawal from the Syrian naval base at Tartus and the airbase at Khmeimim would remove assets that allowed it to cooperate with Iran, its key strategic partner in the region.

    More recently, Russia’s reliability as an ally and reputation as an armory has been damaged by Israeli attacks not only on Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed forces in Lebanon and Syria, but on Iran itself.

    Russia’s position in Africa would also be damaged by the loss of the Syrian bases, which are key launch points for extending Russian power, and by Moscow’s evident inability to make a difference on the ground across the Sahel region in north-central Africa.

    Dirty tricks, diminishing returns

    Stalemate in Ukraine and Russian strategic losses in Syria and elsewhere have prompted Moscow to rely increasingly on a variety of other means to try to gain influence.

    Disinformation, election meddling and varied threats are not new and are part of Russia’s actions in Ukraine. But recent efforts in East Europe have not been very productive. Massive Russian funding and propaganda in Romania, for example, helped produce a narrow victory for an anti-NATO presidential candidate in December 2024, but the Romanian government moved quickly to expose these actions and the election was annulled.

    Nearby Moldova has long been subject to Russian propaganda and threats, especially during recent presidential elections and a referendum on stipulating a “European course” in the constitution. The tiny country moved to reduce its dependency on Russian gas but remains territorially fragmented by the breakaway region of Transnistria that, until recently, provided most of the country’s electricity.

    Despite these factors, the results were not what Moscow wanted. In both votes, a European direction was favored by the electorate. When the Transnistrian legislature in February 2024 appealed to Moscow for protection, none was forthcoming.

    When Moldova thumbs its nose at you, it’s fair to say your power ranking has fallen.

    Wounded but still dangerous

    Not all recent developments have been negative for Moscow. State control of the economy has allowed for rapid rebuilding of a depleted military and support for its technology industry in the short term. With Chinese help and evasion of sanctions, sufficient machinery and energy allow the war in Ukraine to continue.

    And the inauguration of Donald Trump is likely to favor Putin, despite some mixed signals. The U.S. president has threatened tariffs and more sanctions but also disbanded a Biden-era task force aimed a punishing Russian oligarchs who help Russia evade sanctions. In the White House now is someone who has openly admired Putin, expressed skepticism over U.S. support for Ukraine and rushed to bully America’s closest allies in Latin America, Canada and Europe.

    Most importantly, Trump’s eagerness to make good on his pledge to end the war may provide the Russian leader with a deal he can call a “victory.”

    The shrinking of Russia’s world has not necessarily made Russia less dangerous; it could be quite the opposite. Some Kremlin watchers argue that a more economically isolated Russia is less vulnerable to American economic pressure. A retreating Russia and an embattled Putin could also opt for even more reckless threats and actions – for example, on nuclear weapons – especially if reversing course in Ukraine would jeopardize his position. It is, after all, Putin’s war.

    All observers would be wise to note that the famous dictum “Russia is never as strong as she looks … nor as weak as she looks” has been ominously rephrased by Putin himself: “Russia was never so strong as it wants to be and never so weak as it is thought to be.”

    Ronald H. Linden has in the past received funding from Fulbright, DAAD, German Marshall Fund, National Council for Eurasian and East European Research, Woodrow Wilson Center, US Institute of Peace.

    ref. Russia’s shrinking world: The war in Ukraine and Moscow’s global reach – https://theconversation.com/russias-shrinking-world-the-war-in-ukraine-and-moscows-global-reach-247754

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: The deposit auction of the Moscow Small Business Lending Assistance Fund will take place on 10.02.2025

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    Parameters;

    The date of the deposit auction is 10.02.2025. Placement currency is RUB. The maximum amount of funds placed (in the placement currency) is 150,000,000.00. Placement period, days 9. Date of depositing funds is 10.02.2025. Date of return of funds is 19.02.2025. Minimum placement interest rate, % per annum is 19.80. Terms of the conclusion, urgent or special (Urgent). The minimum amount of funds placed for one application (in the placement currency) is 150,000,000.00. The maximum number of applications from one Participant, pcs. 1. Auction form, open or closed (Open). Basis of the Agreement is the General Agreement. Schedule (Moscow time). Applications in preliminary mode from 12:00 to 12:10. Applications in competition mode from 12:10 to 12:15. Setting a cut-off percentage or declaring the auction invalid before 12:25.

    Additional conditions – Placement of funds with the possibility of early withdrawal of the entire deposit amount and payment of interest accrued on the deposit amount at the rate established by the deposit transaction, in the event of non-compliance of the Bank with the requirements established by clause 2.1. of the Regulation “On the procedure for selecting banks for placing funds of the Moscow Small Business Lending Assistance Fund in deposits (deposits) under the GDS” (as amended on the date of the deposit transaction), early withdrawal at the “on demand” rate, payment of interest at the end of the term, without replenishment.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MOEX.K.Mom/N77521

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial News: Recognition of Foreign Credit Rating Agencies in Russia

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Central Bank of Russia –

    The regulator has determined criteria, which a foreign credit rating agency (CRA) must comply with so that its ratings can be used in regulatory acts and other documents of the Bank of Russia. Recognition of foreign ratings will expand opportunities for the free movement of capital and services in the international financial market.

    In order to receive approval from the Russian regulator, a foreign CRA must have at least 5 years of experience in the market and a capital of at least 50 million in ruble equivalent. Its methodology contains quantitative and qualitative assessments of creditworthiness, makes it possible to verify the reliability of credit ratings, including on the basis of historical data. Such an agency also adheres to the principles of corporate governance, complies with the conditions for disclosure of information and does not allow conflicts of interest. In total, the Bank of Russia has defined 19 criteria.

    Ratings of foreign CRAs that meet these criteria may be used by the Bank of Russia in regulation only in relation to foreign objects rated on an international scale.

    Preview photo: Kirill Neiezhmakov / Shutterstock / Fotodom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //vv. KBR.ru/Press/Event/? ID = 23359

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: The creation of a network of advanced schools is a strategic step into the future of our country

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Previous news Next news

    Dmitry Chernyshenko at a meeting of the Coordination Council under the Government for the creation of advanced general education organizations

    A meeting of the Coordination Council under the Government for the creation of advanced general education organizations was held under the chairmanship of Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration Maxim Oreshkin and Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    Maxim Oreshkin recalled that President Vladimir Putin in his Address to the Federal Assembly instructed that no less than 12 advanced schools be created by 2030.

    “The creation of such schools is planned in each federal district under the national project “Youth and Children”. They will help prepare a personnel reserve for knowledge-intensive and high-tech sectors of the economy. This is not just a matter of building 12 more schools, it should be a strategic step into the future of our country. At a meeting of the Coordination Council under the Government of Russia, a decision was made to approve the presented concept of advanced general education organizations. It is important that within its framework, not only the scientific, educational and infrastructural component will be worked out, but also issues of educational work, teacher training and assessment of student success,” noted Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    The implementation of such a large-scale project requires synchronization of efforts of all participants in the process: the state, society, educational institutions and business. The Ministry of Education, together with regions, universities and social partners, is already preparing mechanisms for these changes.

    Education Minister Sergei Kravtsov announced that the first three flagship schools will open in the Novgorod, Ryazan and Pskov regions.

    “The project to create flagship schools is not easy, but it is very important for our country. These will be schools for talented children in all federal districts. We plan to open the first three educational organizations on September 1, 2027. Graduates will develop domestic science and economics, and we set the goal of 100% employment of students in leading companies. These institutions will become methodological centers for schools in all federal districts and will disseminate the best pedagogical practices,” said Sergey Kravtsov.

    Children will study in flagship schools from grades 7 to 11 and undergo annual knowledge assessment, and teachers will undergo qualification testing. Teachers will be provided with decent salaries. The creation of a network of schools involves mutual exchange between students and teachers from different regions.

    First Deputy Minister of Construction and Housing and Communal Services Alexander Lomakin presented information on the progress of construction of advanced general education institutions in the Novgorod, Pskov and Ryazan regions. In addition, advanced schools are planned to be created in the Belgorod, Nizhny Novgorod regions and other regions.

    The acting governor of the Novgorod region, Alexander Dronov, the governor of the Pskov region, Mikhail Vedernikov, and the governor of the Ryazan region, Pavel Malkov, also spoke in detail about the creation of schools.

    The head of the educational foundation “Talent and Success” Elena Shmeleva noted the experience of “Sirius” in developing the federal territory around the educational center “Sirius”.

    The meeting was also attended by Presidential Aide Vladimir Medinsky, Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics Nikita Anisimov, governors of the Belgorod, Omsk, Chelyabinsk, Murmansk regions, Krasnodar Krai, heads of the Republic of Crimea and the Karachay-Cherkess Republic, representatives of the Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Digital Development, and Rosobrnadzor.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Change of His Majesty’s Ambassador to Liberia: Ameer Kotecha

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Mr Ameer Kotecha has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia.

    Mr Ameer Kotecha has been appointed His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Liberia in succession to Mr Neil Bradley who will be transferring to another Diplomatic Service appointment.  Mr Kotecha will take up his appointment during April 2025.

    Curriculum vitae         

    Full name: Ameer Kotecha

    Year Role
    2023 to present  Ekaterinburg, HM Consul General
    2022 to 2023 FCDO, Full time language training (Russian)
    2021 to 2022  FCDO, Head of Engagement and Programmes Team, Counter Daesh Communications Cell
    2020 to 2021 Hong Kong, Vice Consul
    2018 to 2020  FCO, Senior Desk Officer, West Africa Department
    2017 to 2018  New York, Second Secretary Africa and Peacekeeping
    2016 to 2017 FCO, Kidnaps and Incidents Case Manager, Counter Terrorism Department
    2015 to 2016  FCO, Deputy Head Libya Team, North Africa Joint Unit
    2015  Joined FCO
    2013 to 2015 Financial Analyst, AgDevCo

    Media enquiries

    Email newsdesk@fcdo.gov.uk

    Telephone 020 7008 3100

    Contact the FCDO Communication Team via email (monitored 24 hours a day) in the first instance, and we will respond as soon as possible.

    Updates to this page

    Published 10 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: The EU was built for another age – here’s how it must adapt to survive

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesco Grillo, Academic Fellow, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Bocconi University

    Shutterstock/gopixa

    To European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen, Europe is like a Volkswagen Beetle – an iconic car produced by a once-mighty German manufacturer which has been struggling to adapt to a new world.

    “Europe must shift gears,” she urged in a speech to business executives gathered in Davos, Switzerland at the beginning of the year. Yet, her call to arms failed to raise more than an eyebrow. After all, she has repeated the same call many times since she was elected six years ago. So far, there has been little result.

    The US president, Donald Trump, may now even be tempted to finish off the EU (the most developed of the world’s multilateral organisations) by dividing its members over the single market for trade. This arrangement is the cornerstone upon which the union was built, but can it withstand Trump’s attempts to play European nations off against each other in order to get the best deal for himself?

    The problem is that Trump is simply bringing to its most extreme consequences the weakness of a system that was built for stable times which are long gone. We urgently need a new idea, and it cannot be for a “United States of Europe”. That is a dream from the past that could not be more at odds with Europe’s current political climate.

    Mini unions

    Europe is unable to chart a path forward because it needs unanimity among its member states in order to make any major decision. Votes are not even weighted to reflect the different sizes of each of the club’s members.

    This is a weakness that would gradually cause the deterioration of any international organisation. But in the case of the EU, the crisis is more serious because member states have surrendered part of their decision power. As a result, if the EU cannot move quickly, even member states turn out to be paralysed.

    Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary, has often been singled out as the bad guy especially – this has happened every time the EU has tried to approve sanctions against Russia or aid to Ukraine. But examples of free riding abound even among the founding parties.

    For decades, France has resisted any attempt to reorganise the common agricultural policy that sends a third of the EU’s budget to farmers, many of them French. Italy has halted the ratification of the reform of the European stability mechanism that should protect states from financial instability, out of the assumption among part of the Italian electorate that this may compromise further sovereignty.

    Elsewhere, Germany’s constitutional court has derailed the reform of the EU electoral law that divides the election of the European parliament into a dysfunctional system of 27 national contests, because of the resistance of the German political system to any electoral law which is not proportional.

    We need to find a way to change all this. And the solution cannot be the rather abstract idea of a union that proceeds at different speeds, where the older members are supposed to be part of an inner circle. Nor is it feasible to expect the abolition of unanimous voting for the simple reason that to forgo unanimity, you need a unanimous vote.

    Instead, the EU should become the coordinator of multiple unions, each formed by the member states themselves around specific policies. A union might form around defence, for example, among member states which are ready for such a partnership, such as Poland, the Baltics and Finland.

    Another might bring together countries that wish to collaborate on large projects such as a pan-European high-speed train, or a fully integrated energy market that may allow Italy, France and Spain to save billions of euros and decarbonise more quickly.

    This is not entirely new. Arrangements like the euro and the free circulation of people (the Schengen area) follow this principle. Only a subset of EU nations are part of these projects, and offers have even been extended to join beyond the EU’s borders. Monaco is in the euro, for example, while Norway is in Schengen, despite neither being an EU member state.

    The problem with these unions is that they are incomplete. The complement to the monetary union is a recently reformed “stability pact” that leaves so many loopholes that 11 out of its 20 members do not comply. And even within Schengen, there are still no proper common borders. The result is continuous reciprocal accusations of exporting each other’s illegal migrants.

    The solution here is to fully share the levers within a certain policy area on terms which are more flexible and voluntary for the union’s members.

    The possibility of calm divorce

    Resilience is achieved through adaptability. Therefore, these new arrangements must make divorce between union members possible from the outset – and establish the terms of such a rupture in advance.

    And in the event of an extreme case, the other parties should also be able to ask one of the members to leave their union (so as to avoid being systematically held to ransom by a free rider). The current union treaty does contain a provision (article 50) that enables a member to leave, as the UK did – but if Brexit showed anything, it was that this mechanism has limited use at preventing a divorce from descending into chaos.

    People should always be part of these decisions, of course. When states decide to surrender some of their sovereignty to a larger organisation such as the EU, it changes the nature of the pact between the citizens of a country and the people who make decisions on their behalf. This evident truth has been ignored for decades as the EU has gradually been built from the top down.

    The European Union currently resembles the marriages we once had in Europe (until well into the 20th century), before it was acknowledged that they are a civil (not necessarily religious) contract that can be dissolved through divorce – not some divine construct that can never be undone.

    The marriage between EU countries is blighted by cheating and empty rhetoric. This is an issue we can no longer avoid if Europe wants to do more than just “shift gears”. The EU was the most successful political project of the 20th century. If it wants to continue to be so in the 21st, it has to learn to be flexible. Only those who can adapt survive.

    Francesco Grillo is Director of the think tank Vision. Vision is convenor of three global conferences on the future of the EU, climate change and AI .

    ref. The EU was built for another age – here’s how it must adapt to survive – https://theconversation.com/the-eu-was-built-for-another-age-heres-how-it-must-adapt-to-survive-248811

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How the war in Ukraine has made flying worse for the climate

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Viktoriia Ivannikova, Assistant Professor in Aviation Management, Dublin City University

    UladzimirZuyeu/Shutterstock

    Some long-haul flights connecting Europe and Asia are emitting 40% more CO₂ since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, my new study shows. The spike is largely due to airspace closures above conflict zones which are forcing airlines to seek alternative routes, significantly increasing flight times. Longer flights consume more fuel and increase the operating costs for airlines, quite apart from their contribution to climate change.

    The research I led with colleagues highlights how conflicts contribute to climate change in unexpected ways. Understanding this is crucial for tackling aviation’s environmental footprint.

    The war in Ukraine closed the country’s airspace and limited access to the airspace of the Russian Federation and Belarus. This amounts to the biggest closure of airspace since the cold war, spanning 18 million km².

    Airlines that previously flew in Russian or Ukrainian airspace on routes between Europe and Asia, North America and Asia, and North America and the Middle East now take significant detours. For example, Finnair’s flight AY73 from Helsinki to Tokyo now covers an additional 3,131 kilometres, extending flight times by up to 3.5 hours. North American flights to Asia have been rerouted over the Arctic and Central Asia.

    Safety concerns and geopolitical sanctions have forced airlines to carefully navigate around restricted zones.

    The situation is further complicated by restrictions in other conflict regions – including the Middle East, where the airspaces of Syria, Yemen and Iraq are also considered no-fly zones for many airlines. The global aviation map has been redrawn, forcing airlines to adapt quickly to a new and challenging reality.

    Several international flights now skirt war zones.
    Viktoriia Ivannikova

    This has been accompanied by significant costs, both financially and to the climate. We analysed 14 long-haul routes between Europe and Asia that were affected by airspace restrictions and operated by three European airlines: Finnair, LOT Polish and Lufthansa.

    The findings are striking: rerouted flights burn an additional 23 to 28.5 tonnes of fuel per journey, releasing an extra 72 to 90 metric tonnes of CO₂. That’s equivalent to the annual emissions of several cars for a single flight.

    Airlines have also reported significant operating cost increases due to the extra flight hours, including higher fuel consumption, air navigation charges and crew salary increases. Our analysis showed that on certain routes between Europe and Asia, costs have risen by between 19% and 39%, while emissions have increased by between 18% and 40%, depending on the airline.

    On routes from Warsaw to Beijing, Warsaw to Tokyo and Warsaw to Seoul, LOT Polish Airlines has reported an increase of 23% in average aircraft operating costs following flight restrictions. CO₂ emissions on these routes have increased by 24% and ticket prices have also risen.

    Finnair, which historically relied on Russian airspace for efficient Europe-Asia connections, appears to be the most affected carrier. Following flight restrictions, aircraft operating costs on the routes from Helsinki to Shanghai, Helsinki to Tokyo and Helsinki to Seoul have risen by 39%, while average CO₂ emissions on these routes have increased by 40%.

    Our findings shed new light on the massive carbon footprint of war, which is often overlooked in climate policy. Using a forecasting model with specialised software, we found that continued avoidance of the airspaces of Russia and Ukraine could increase all aviation-related CO₂ emissions globally by up to 29% in 2025, compared with 2022.

    Aviation already accounts for 2.5% of global CO₂ emissions, and this figure is expected to grow as air travel expands.

    Aeroplanes seed heat-trapping clouds that amplify their climate impact.
    Peter Gudella/Shutterstock

    Our findings demonstrate that the need to decarbonise transport cannot be separated from broader geopolitical issues. As wars and conflicts reshape airspace availability, they also worsen aviation’s carbon footprint. It’s not just the airline industry that bears these costs – we all do, in the form of rising temperatures and a changing climate.

    What action needs to be taken?

    While the challenges are significant, there are solutions.

    Upgrading airline fleets with more fuel-efficient aircraft, such as the Airbus A350 and Boeing 787, can help to reduce CO₂ emissions by roughly 20%–25% compared with older aircraft models, such as the Boeing 777-200ER or Airbus A330-200.

    Optimising flight paths using advanced air traffic management systems could help too. These systems, allow aircraft to choose the shortest and most efficient paths and can reduce unnecessary detours.

    International agreements to manage airspace collectively during times of conflict can keep essential flight corridors open and ensure airlines avoid inefficient rerouting.

    Airlines are investing in sustainable aviation fuels, which emits less than traditional kerosene – but insufficient supplies, high costs and other challenges make this an expensive and partial solution. With no viable low-carbon alternatives for aircraft, reducing air travel should be the priority.

    As researchers, we see our findings as a call to action. By understanding the environmental consequences of conflict, we can work towards a more sustainable future for aviation and the planet.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 40,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Viktoriia Ivannikova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How the war in Ukraine has made flying worse for the climate – https://theconversation.com/how-the-war-in-ukraine-has-made-flying-worse-for-the-climate-249039

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: A Stronger Engine for Middle East and North Africa’s Growth

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    The Managing Director’s Keynote Speech at the Ninth Arab Fiscal Forum, Dubai, UAE

    February 10, 2025

    Assalamu alaikum, your excellencies. I would like to thank Minister Al Hussaini for the United Arab Emirates’ continued warm hospitality in hosting this important annual event, as well as his excellent leadership of the World Bank’s Development Committee.

    It is a privilege to address you at the ninth Arab Fiscal Forum. Over the years, the IMF and Arab countries have always had a strong and productive partnership. Today, this partnership is more vital than ever as the world and this region undergo significant economic, technological, and geopolitical shifts—a point that I will reflect on later.

    In my remarks, I will explore how Arab countries can leverage fiscal policy to transform their economies for the future, and harness technology and investment opportunities for the benefit of their people.

    Global outlook and transformations

    Let me start with an overview of the global and regional economic outlook.

    Global growth is projected to hold at 3.3 percent this year and the next, and then to slow over the next five years, to just above 3 percent. This is well below the historical average.

    For the Middle East and North Africa, we expect growth to rebound to about 3.6 percent in 2025, driven by a recovery in oil production and an easing of regional conflicts. However, as with the global economy, our medium-term outlook still sees growth weaker than before the pandemic.

    Policymakers have generally succeeded in taming inflation, but not everywhere, with inflation picking up again in some countries. This could lead to a divergence in interest rates across countries and higher borrowing costs for emerging market and developing economies.

    On the fiscal side, the legacy of the multiple shocks from the last years leaves public finances under significant strain in many countries. Global public debt is projected to hit 100 percent of global GDP by 2030. Many countries in this region face similar pressures, with debt levels exceeding 70 percent of GDP. This poses the risk of them becoming trapped in a low-growth, high-debt scenario.

    Governments have the difficult task of containing high debt levels in the face of rising spending needs. This region faces the pressing need to create jobs, enhance social safety nets, build resilience to more frequent natural disasters, and support economic diversification. The demands of national security and post-conflict reconstruction are also substantial.

    This is all happening at a time of significant global transformations, which are creating a more uncertain and challenging environment for policymaking. We know, for instance, that trade is no longer the engine of growth that is used to be—unlike the decades of the 1990s and 2000s when global trade grew much faster than global GDP, the two are now growing at roughly the same rate. Governments around the world are shifting policy priorities: the new US administration has been clear that it intends to take action in the areas of trade, tax and spending, deregulation, and technology/digital assets. And the technology revolution—especially AI—is upon us and is set to transform the way we live and work, perhaps as early as the next five years.

    These rapid transformations mean the recipes of the past may no longer provide the path to prosperity. Economies will need to be agile, adaptable and resilient—these will be the ingredients for future success.

    How can the MENA region find these ingredients for success and avoid a low-growth, high-debt scenario?

    Building adaptable and more resilient economies

    First, focus on structural changes that increase economic resilience, agility, and long-term growth potential. Too often, countries use fiscal stimulus to boost short-term domestic demand. While this “sugar rush” provides temporary growth, it often fuels inflation and financial turbulence. Instead of merely stepping on the gas, we need a stronger engine.

    Productivity growth is essential for stronger growth and driving up economic performance. Our research in the Arab region shows how to do it: accelerate digitalization, reduce the state’s footprint in the economy, foster trade diversification, and encourage the free flow of capital to dynamic firms.

    Countries in the region that are more digitalized have substantially higher productivity than less-digitalization ones. Some countries are among the most developed in the world in this area. Digital innovation, with AI technologies, is expected to raise UAE’s GDP significantly by 2030. More R&D spending will further enhance productivity.

    Reducing the state’s footprint in the economy and strengthening governance can yield significant benefits. For example, Saudi Arabia’s regulatory improvements have fostered private sector investment, especially in the non-oil economy. The UAE’s National Agenda for Entrepreneurship has supported a vibrant startup community, and Morocco’s New Model of Development aims to spur markets by improving public sector governance.

    Encouraging employment is also a key ingredient for stronger growth. With a growing working-age population, the region has to make the most of its demographic advantage. Creating more private jobs, for women and youth in particular, can lead to more vibrant and inclusive economies. This requires more-flexible labor markets, and investment in education and vocational training. We have recently seen impressive developments in this regard in Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain.

    A second priority is economic diversification. Today’s transformations provide an excellent opportunity to stimulate and reallocate resources toward new economic sectors and services. This could become a robust new growth engine, particularly for oil-exporting countries. Many countries are already investing in new technologies, such as batteries for electric cars; in improving connectivity and in green supply chains, for example.

    Third, in a world where patterns of cooperation are shifting, countries need to look for opportunities to cooperate in new ways. In many cases, this means deepening regional cooperation. The GCC is an excellent example of the benefits of regional integration—one that I can imagine can be emulated elsewhere.

    Building fiscal buffers and institutions  

    Let me turn to the fiscal side.

    Prudent fiscal stance is essential for macroeconomic stability — a prerequisite for a vibrant private sector and economic growth. An overarching priority today is to decisively use fiscal policy to build fiscal buffers, which is essentially the capacity to spend when needed – for example, to respond to shocks, manage and mitigate risks, and meet pressing development and climate-related needs.

    Many countries will need to pursue fiscal consolidation. It is crucial to carefully calibrate the size, pace, and composition of fiscal adjustments, to avoid unduly hampering growth. Tailoring budgetary reforms to each country’s circumstances, with a helping hand for those who lose out, is vital to ensure public support.

    In this context, increasing tax revenues remains a priority. Our research finds significant potential in strengthening domestic tax systems. This requires expanding tax bases, especially as economies diversify. For example, as new sectors grow, including through digitalization, they can become an important source of tax revenues. In addition, digitalization and AI can help modernize tax administrations.

    Domestic taxes will remain the primary source of funding government spending. However, private domestic and external financing will be needed to support the spending needs in the region. Addressing the impact of more frequent natural disasters will potentially require a cumulative $1 trillion in investment by 2030. The financial sector must play a larger role, while governments can enable an investment-friendly environment.

    Several countries in the region require special attention, either to resolve ongoing conflicts or to advance post-conflict reconstruction. I pray that peace and stability can be delivered in Sudan and Yemen. I hope that the ceasefire in Gaza, along with political changes in Syria and Lebanon, can mark new beginnings. The international community’s reconstruction efforts provide a unique opportunity to rebuild better and lay the foundations for stronger growth.

    Let me conclude

    In a world of rapid transformations, it is critical for countries to become more agile, adaptable, and resilient. They need to look for new engines of growth, which will also help avoid a low-growth, high-debt trap.

    The private sector has to be in the lead in transforming economies in the region through entrepreneurship, job creation, and innovation.

    The role of governments is to foster the right environment for this private sector-led growth: by strengthening governance, modernizing public institutions, reducing bureaucracy, encouraging youth and female employment, and improving access to capital. And by designing and communicating policies that put people first and increase social support.

    The IMF remains fully committed to supporting the Middle East and North Africa. Since early 2020, we have approved about $33 billion in financing for the region, most recently in 2024 to help mitigate the impact of conflict. We have also recently reformed our surcharge policy, resulting in important savings for some countries. We have also expanded our capacity development and strengthened our regional presence with resident representative offices, technical assistance centers, and the new regional office in Riyadh.

    We are now stepping up our efforts to support the private sector, with the creation of a new IMF Advisory Council on Entrepreneurship and Growth. I can assure you, this region will be represented on it. And we look forward to the upcoming Al-Ula conference with emerging market economies, to discuss key issues affecting your economies. Jobs, innovation, and productivity—combined with a sound fiscal approach—will mean better prospects for citizens in this region and ultimately more peace and stability.

    Let’s get to work, or as you say, “linabda al-âmal”—let’s start the work together!

    I wish you all many insightful discussions and meaningful outcomes today.

    Shukran!

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER:

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/10/sp-021025-md-keynote-speech-ninth-arab-fiscal-forum

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Grigorenko: The first regional services “life situations” have been launched

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Regional services “life situations” have been launched in Russia for the first time. 85 services “life situations” have been launched on the unified portal of state services and regional portals for the provision of services, which include services provided by the subjects of the Russian Federation. With the help of the services “life situations” the time for receiving state services is reduced, as well as the number of visits to departments and documents that need to be provided.

    Life situations services combine services that are needed by people and businesses in certain circumstances, provided comprehensively and in one place.

    At the federal level, the “life situations” services are being implemented since 2023. 34 federal “life situations” services have already been launched. In particular, these are services for large families, replacement and restoration of documents, moving to another region, opening a business.

    To date, more than 1.5 million people have used the federal “life situations” services.

    Within the framework of one regional service, “life situation” has decreased on average:

    – the time to receive services is almost 2 times shorter – up to 25 days;

    – the number of documents that need to be submitted to departments is doubled – up to 4 units;

    – the number of in-person visits to departments has increased fourfold, to one.

    “Citizens are faced with the need to receive government services that are provided both at the federal and regional levels. It is important that a person receives a comfortable service regardless of whether these services are federal or regional. For this purpose, we have launched the “life situations” services, including those that combine regional services. The practice of using the most successful of them will be extended to other regions. That is, some of the “life situations” created in a specific region will become federal,” commented Deputy Prime Minister – Chief of the Government Staff Dmitry Grigorenko.

    For example, in the Republic of Buryatia, the service “life situation” helps in arranging care for an elderly relative at home and in providing the relative with assistance from a social worker. A person interacts with all departments in the “one-stop shop” mode on the page of the service “life situation”.

    The service “life situation” in the Yaroslavl region allows you to learn about the procedure for filing an application to receive the title “Veteran of Labor”. The service informs about the rights arising in connection with the assignment of the status “Veteran of Labor”, about the possibility of receiving regional social support measures, about the conditions for their appointment and provision.

    The service “life situation” in the Ryazan region helps to undergo a medical examination and preventive examination. Thanks to the service, you can sign up for a medical examination, fill out the documents required to visit the clinic, and get information on preparing for diagnostic tests. The results of the tests are sent to the citizen’s personal account on the public services portal.

    The “life situations” services launched in other regions allow one to solve a wide range of social issues, such as entering college or technical school, receiving regional support measures for the birth of children, and others.

    By the end of 2025, another 340 regional “life situations” services are planned to be launched. Thus, it is planned that by the end of 2025, 425 regional “life situations” services will be available.

    Work on the formation and launch of the “life situations” services is being carried out within the framework of the implementation of the federal project “State for People”.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: HSE Launches Advanced Training Course on AI in Education

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    Faculty of Computer Science HSE University is launching a professional development course on artificial intelligence in education. Program is intended for teachers, lecturers, and methodologists planning to integrate AI technologies into the educational process, as well as for management teams of educational institutions interested in improving educational processes through the implementation of AI.

    Teachers from the Faculty of Computer Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics will show how to make artificial intelligence an assistant to a teacher so that it works for the benefit of the educational process. For example, students will be able to use neural networks to develop tests and educational materials, and analyze academic performance.

    The program consists of four blocks. The first is devoted to the effectiveness of AI in educational practice and the ethical issues of its use. The second block will examine AI services in detail: Yandex GPT, GigaChat, Perplexity and others. Teachers will tell how to use them to create programs of academic disciplines, articles, presentations, tests and assignments, and conduct data analysis. Block 3 contains information on how AI is currently used in education, business and media. The last block is a bonus. It is intended for those who want to delve deeper into the structure of large language models and learn about the practice of their application. Upon completion of the training in the Artificial Intelligence in Education program, students will be able to confidently create their own projects for integrating AI into the educational process based on the studied cases and examples.

    The integration of artificial intelligence tools into the educational process is not just a fashionable trend, but a necessity in today’s rapidly changing world, the expert believes Center for Continuous Education of the Faculty of Computer Science of the National Research University Higher School of Economics and the course creator Daria Kasyanenko, who spoke about the course and the importance of using AI tools in education.

    “AI opens up huge opportunities for personalizing learning, automating routine tasks, and increasing the efficiency of the educational process as a whole. Our course is designed to help teachers master these innovative technologies and implement them in their teaching practice,” she emphasized.

    The Higher School of Economics already has successful experience in this area. Last year, as part of the strategic academic leadership program “Priority 2030” More than 50% of HSE full-time employees have completed the course “Artificial Intelligence in Education and Research”.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Polytechnic University and UK KER-Holding: six-year cooperation

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    In the research laboratory “Laser and Additive Technologies” of the Institute of Mechanical Engineering of Materials and Transport of SPbPU, acceptance tests of the laser powder cladding complex were carried out. Specialists of the company “UK KER-Holding” assessed the configuration and capabilities of the manufactured installation.

    Polytechnic University and the management company “Complex Energy Development-Holding” began to cooperate in 2019, when the organization was choosing reliable partners for the repair of gas turbine engines. Over six years, specialists from the Research Laboratory “LiAT” of IMMiT have completed more than 20 projects. Now two projects are being implemented at once: the commissioning of the complex and the repair of the second-stage working blades of the GTE.

    In addition, the Polytechnic University conducted acceptance tests of the laser powder cladding complex. The customer was represented by the chief metallurgist of UK KER-Holding Yuri Dvoeglazov, investment director Zufar Idrisov and chief designer Nikolai Tsyganov.

    Successful completion of acceptance tests under the contract for the supply of the unit is another starting point in cooperation with the company. Our specialists developed technical documentation and manufactured the complex. We demonstrated the surfacing process in real conditions to the receiving party, – said Mikhail Kuznetsov, head of the Research Laboratory “LiAT” of IMMiT.

    Laser powder cladding and direct laser deposition are modern technologies that allow creating materials and products with high precision and quality. They are used in various industries, such as medicine, aviation, space exploration, energy, mechanical engineering and others.

    We can confidently talk about the fruitful work carried out over six years of cooperation. In the Polytech-KER-Holding team, specialists have completed many projects and solved a large number of “starred” problems. Direct evidence of this is the serial repair of working and nozzle blades of gas turbine engines and the creation of a laser powder cladding complex with technology transfer, – shared Yuri Dvoeglazov.

    It is gratifying that the interaction between the Polytechnic University and UK KER-Holding is actively developing. The employees of the Research Laboratory LiAT make a worthy contribution to strengthening the ties. Long-term cooperation in the field of repair of nozzle units using the laser powder cladding method is of great importance for the development of the energy industry, – noted the Director of IMMiT Anatoly Popovich.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News