NewzIntel.com

Category: Russian Federation

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Five people injured in plane crash in US state of New Jersey

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    NEW YORK, July 2 (Xinhua) — A light aircraft crashed near an airport in Williamstown, New Jersey, U.S., on Wednesday, injuring at least five people, local officials said.

    The incident occurred at around 5:30 p.m. local time. Five people were taken to Cooper University Hospital in Camden with injuries. Local authorities described the crash as a “multiple-casualty incident.”

    An investigation into the cause of the crash is underway. U.S. aviation authorities are expected to examine the crash site to determine what led to the incident. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Lightning: Four killed, 23 survived, 38 missing after passenger ship capsized near Indonesian island of Bali – local rescuers

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Xinhua | 03. 07. 2025

    Keywords: Indonesia

    Source: Xinhua

    Lightning: Four people killed, 23 survived, 38 missing after passenger ship capsized near Indonesian island of Bali – local rescuers Lightning: Four people killed, 23 survived, 38 missing after passenger ship capsized near Indonesian island of Bali – local rescuers

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi Jinping champions the cause of Global South

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese President Xi Jinping visits the New Development Bank and meets with Dilma Rousseff, president of the institution, in Shanghai, east China, April 29, 2025. (Xinhua/Huang Jingwen)

    On the banks of the shimmering Huangpu River that cuts through the Chinese metropolis of Shanghai sits the headquarters of the New Development Bank, co-founded by the BRICS countries more than a decade ago to foster the shared development of the world’s emerging economies.

    In his visit to this new landmark in China’s financial center late April, Chinese President Xi Jinping told the bank’s president and former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff this multilateral institution has been a result of “a pioneering initiative for the Global South to seek strength through unity.”

    For the Chinese leader, the BRICS mechanism is a major platform for promoting cooperation among countries in the Global South. In the coming days, this year’s BRICS summit will open in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro under the theme of “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance.”

    Xi’s April visit to the bank demonstrates his long-standing commitment to bolstering the solidarity and common development of the Global South, amplifying the role of over 6 billion people in a world fraught with uncertainty and challenges unseen in a century.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping poses for a group photo with other leaders and representatives attending the “BRICS Plus” Dialogue in Kazan, Russia, Oct. 24, 2024. (Xinhua/Yao Dawei)

    COLLECTIVE RISE

    “The collective rise of the Global South is a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world,” Xi observed when addressing the “BRICS Plus” Dialogue held in Kazan, Russia, in October last year.

    Much more than a pure geographical or economic term, the Global South refers to a community of emerging markets and developing countries that share similar historical experiences, development stages and goals, and political pursuits.

    The concept of “South” was first coined in Antonio Gramsci’s work “The Southern Question” written in 1926, in which the Italian Marxist philosopher highlighted the development gap between northern and southern Italy.

    The rise of the Global South has been decades in the making. Back in 1955, the landmark Bandung Conference convened in Indonesia under the flag of solidarity, friendship and cooperation, marking the awakening of the Global South after centuries of Western colonial rule. In 1964, the Group of 77, a coalition of developing countries, was established in Geneva within the United Nations to promote South-South cooperation and form a new international economic order.

    Through extensive cooperation, the countries of the Global South have emerged as a key driver of global growth. These countries have contributed as much as 80 percent of global growth over the past 20 years, with a share of global GDP increasing from 24 percent four decades ago to more than 40 percent today.

    China, the world’s largest developing country, is a natural member of the Global South. In 2004, the United Nations Development Programme included China in its list of more than 130 Global South countries in a report titled “Forging a Global South.” Some Westerners have challenged China’s position that it is part of the Global South. In response, Xi has provided a clear answer.

    “As a developing country and a member of the Global South, China breathes the same breath with other developing countries and pursues a shared future with them,” Xi once said.

    Historically, China has suffered from Western colonialism and imperialism, much like other developing countries, said Cavince Adhere, a Kenya-based international relations scholar.

    “Even today, despite inordinate success by Beijing to rise from the backwaters of development to be the second-largest economy in the world, as well as the first developing country to eliminate extreme poverty, China still faces common development challenges, and holds similar views regarding the current international order and global governance,” he added. “Because of this, China has emerged as a strong champion for the legitimate rights and interests of many Global South countries.”

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and delivers a keynote speech at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, Sept. 5, 2024. (Xinhua/Liu Bin)

    LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND

    Ahead of Xi’s state visit to Brazil late last year, the Portuguese edition of the book “Up And Out Of Poverty” was officially launched in Rio de Janeiro. The book, first published in 1992, outlines Xi’s perspectives on poverty eradication, local governance, reform and development when he worked in the formerly impoverished prefecture of Ningde in China’s southeastern Fujian province.

    Poverty has long ranked atop among the problems facing the Global South. With Xi’s steadfast commitment and strong leadership, China has eradicated absolute poverty in its rural areas, a feat that no one had accomplished in China for thousands of years.

    At the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro last year, Xi spoke with quiet conviction, recounting his lifelong dedication to poverty alleviation, from his time as a local official to his current role as China’s top leader.

    In his speech, Xi said a weaker bird can start early and fly high. “If China can make it, other developing countries can make it too. This is what China’s battle against poverty says to the world,” he said.

    Xi’s “weaker bird” metaphor originated from his book on poverty. His speech struck a chord with several foreign leaders, who asked the Chinese delegation whether they could share a copy of the speech.

    The Chinese leader has placed great emphasis on development. For him, “development holds the master key to solving all problems,” particularly when the global development gap continues to widen. Over the years, Xi has also been active in rallying global efforts to put development back on the international agenda as a central priority.

    When attending the general debate of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly in 2021 via video, Xi proposed the Global Development Initiative, an international policy framework to promote sustainable development around the world. To date, the initiative has garnered the support and participation of over 100 countries and 20 international organizations.

    Intelligent equipment lifts containers at Chancay Port, Peru, on Nov. 14, 2024. (Xinhua/Li Mengxin)

    To boost common development in the Global South, Xi has been promoting practical cooperation through major infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative. During his foreign visits over the years, Xi would launch or visit major projects, such as the Chancay Port in Peru, the Dushanbe No. 2 power plant in Tajikistan and the Colombo Port City in Sri Lanka. When hosting leaders of the Global South in Beijing, Xi would also discuss with them major projects for cooperation during their talks.

    Xi believes that the Global South should be the main driving force for common development and that “On the path to modernization, no one, and no country, should be left behind.” He also supports countries of the Global South exploring paths of modernization tailored to their distinctive national conditions, rather than following Western development models.

    Also at last year’s G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, Xi outlined eight measures in support of Global South cooperation, ranging from high-quality Belt and Road cooperation to boosting development in Africa. Months earlier, at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing last year, Xi unveiled 10 partnership actions and granted zero-tariff treatment on all product categories to the least developed countries with which it has diplomatic relations.

    An exhibitor (R) introduces African products to visitors during the fourth China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo at Changsha International Convention and Exhibition Center in Changsha, central China’s Hunan Province, June 13, 2025.  (Xinhua/Chen Sihan)

    Gu Qingyang, associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, said, “China can play a positive role in the development of Global South countries,” adding that Chinese technology and expertise in industrial development can support the modernization of the Global South’s various regions.

    EMPOWERING GLOBAL SOUTH IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

    As Xi once observed, in the face of global changes of the century, pursuing modernization and working for a more just and equitable international order are the sacred historic missions of Global South countries.

    Xi described the BRICS countries as “leading members of the Global South,” calling for building BRICS into “a primary channel for strengthening solidarity and cooperation among Global South nations and a vanguard for advancing global governance reform.”

    Since becoming Chinese president in 2013, Xi has always been a steadfast champion of BRICS cooperation. In Xiamen, he advocated for the “BRICS Plus” program at the 2017 BRICS summit, calling for more active participation from other emerging markets and developing nations. He played a crucial role in propelling the BRICS’ historic expansion in 2023, ushering in the era of greater BRICS cooperation.

    Effective coordination between BRICS members and other countries in the Global South has been adding more bricks to the global governance architecture. The New Development Bank exemplifies this effort.

    Xi said the bank serves as “an important emerging force in the international financial system,” which should work to “make the international financial system fairer and more equitable and effectively enhance the representation and say of emerging markets and developing countries.”

    Aerial photo taken on Dec. 17, 2020 shows the headquarters building of BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) in east China’s Shanghai. (Xinhua/Fang Zhe)

    Over the years, China, under Xi’s leadership, has taken concrete steps to advocate for developing countries, help Global South countries enhance their representation and voice in international governance, and promote a more just and equitable international order.

    At the 2022 G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, China took the lead in supporting the African Union (AU)’s membership in the G20. In their meeting on the sidelines of the summit, then Senegalese President Macky Sall, who was also the AU chairperson that year, thanked Xi for being the first to publicly support the AU’s G20 membership.

    The global leadership today remains lopsided, and rebalancing this skewed system is a shared imperative for both the Global North and South, said Paolo Magri, managing director and chair of the advisory board of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, a think tank.

    “Global South countries marching together toward modernization is monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” Xi said at the “BRICS Plus” Dialogue in Kazan, Russia, last year, while acknowledging that “the road to prosperity for the Global South will not be straight.”

    “No matter how the international landscape evolves, we in China will always keep the Global South in our heart, and maintain our roots in the Global South,” Xi pledged.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s Turkey branch granted clearing bank status for yuan settlements

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 3 (Xinhua) — The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China’s branch in Turkey has acquired the status of a clearing bank for yuan settlements, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) said.

    The regulator noted that this decision was made in accordance with the memorandum of understanding signed by the central banks of both countries.

    Earlier, on June 13, the PBOC announced that the two banks had signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a clearing mechanism for yuan settlements in Turkey. Such a mechanism will facilitate the use of national currencies for cross-border settlements between enterprises and financial institutions in both countries, and will also further facilitate bilateral trade and investment procedures.

    On the same day, the PBOC announced the extension of a bilateral currency swap agreement with the Central Bank of Turkey. The total amount of funds in it reached 35 billion yuan (approximately 4.88 billion US dollars), or 189 billion Turkish lira.

    According to official data, China is currently Turkey’s largest trading partner in Asia and the third largest in the world. -0-

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Russia expects 3rd round of talks with Ukraine soon: Kremlin

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The Kremlin expects the dates for a third round of Russia-Ukraine talks to be finalized “in the near future,” spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Wednesday.

    “We expect that it will be agreed upon soon,” Peskov said, reiterating Moscow’s stance that the scheduling of talks requires mutual consent.

    Peskov noted that no specific date has been set and emphasized that the negotiation framework is inherently collaborative.

    “This is a mutual process,” he said.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Creative Australia’s backflip on Venice Biennale representatives exposes deep governance failures

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Samuel Cairnduff, Lecturer in Media and Communications, The University of Melbourne

    The reinstatement of artist Khaled Sabsabi and curator Michael Dagostino as Australia’s representatives for the 2026 Venice Biennale closes a bruising recent cultural episode and exposes the fragility of the systems meant to protect artistic freedom in Australia.

    An independent review released this week confirms this was not simply a communications misstep.

    It was a full-scale institutional failure inside Australia’s peak cultural agency, Creative Australia, marked by poor risk management, inadequate escalation protocols, and a fundamental confusion about how to respond when artistic expression meets political controversy.

    What triggered the collapse

    The crisis began in February, just six days after Sabsabi and Dagostino were announced as Australia’s representatives.

    In a sudden reversal, Creative Australia’s board rescinded their appointment.

    At the centre of the backlash were two of Sabsabi’s earlier works – one referencing Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, the other depicting a view of the Twin Towers on 9/11.

    Coalition senator Claire Chandler raised the issue in Parliament. That evening the board held an emergency meeting. The artists were removed, with Creative Australia citing concerns about “a prolonged and divisive debate” that posed “an unacceptable risk to public support for Australia’s artistic community”.

    The decision triggered resignations, protests and widespread condemnation.

    Mikala Tai, Head of Visual Arts, and program manager Tahmina Maskinyar both resigned. Artist and board member Lindy Lee stepped down. Major donor Simon Mordant withdrew support, calling the move “unprecedented”. More than 4,300 people signed petitions demanding reinstatement.

    In May, chair Robert Morgan resigned from the board, after telling a February senate hearing he would not step down.

    What the review found

    This week’s review, conducted by governance consultancy Blackhall & Pearl, offers a damning but restrained post-mortem.

    It finds no evidence of political interference but reveals Creative Australia lacked basic tools to respond to controversy.

    The agency lacked formal risk assessment processes, a crisis plan, and a clear mechanism for escalating or containing reputational issues.

    More troublingly, the report found the board and staff misunderstood risk itself, believing that identifying risks meant avoiding them.

    In other words, Creative Australia treated controversy as something to flee, not manage. The result was paralysis and ultimately capitulation.

    A fragile funding model

    The episode also exposes the fragility of Australia’s arms-length funding model. As cultural policy expert Jo Caust has noted, this model relies on two key elements: peer review and operational independence from political direction. Both were tested by these events.



    Read more:
    Creative Australia’s decisions should be peer reviewed and at arm’s length. Where did things go wrong?

    Arts Minister Tony Burke’s public expression of “shock” at Sabsabi’s appointment and his suggestion he should have been briefed sent a troubling signal about government oversight.

    In a message released with the review, Creative Australia CEO Adrian Collette acknowledged the damage done:

    The decision the Board took in February has weighed heavily on many people, most particularly the artistic team – and for that we are sorry […] We are also sorry that this has caused concern and uncertainty for many in the broader arts community and we are committed to rebuilding trust in our processes for the commissioning of the Venice Biennale.

    What must change

    The report makes nine recommendations, including clearer governance frameworks, stronger risk protocols and better board training. But the deeper issue is cultural.

    Institutions must find the courage to support artists under pressure, not retreat.

    This means rejecting the false binary between risk management and artistic freedom. Effective risk planning should equip institutions to defend challenging work, not discourage it.

    It also requires cultural leaders to accept that controversy is not a failure to be avoided, but often a by-product of meaningful expression.

    A global warning

    The sector has been here before. The 2015 “Brandis affair”, when then-arts minister George Brandis redirected A$105 million from the Australia Council (predecessor to Creative Australia) into a minister-controlled fund, sparked similar alarm about political influence.

    But this crisis is more revealing. The pressure came not through overt interference but through internal uncertainty and a lack of institutional resolve.

    Globally, cultural institutions face similar strains. Book bans in the United States, museum purges in Hungary, and artistic blacklists in Russia all point to a global narrowing of space for free expression.

    What happened here is not the same, but it warns that institutions can fail without censorship, simply by lacking the will to stand firm.

    A turning point – or not?

    Sabsabi and Dagostino’s reinstatement is not just a symbolic correction. It is a test.

    Can Creative Australia rebuild trust with a community that saw it falter? Will future risk processes be used to support bold programming or suppress it? And will this moment mark the beginning of a stronger, more principled approach to cultural leadership, or a drift into safer, smaller territory?

    As Sabsabi and Dagostino prepare for Venice, they carry more than artistic hopes. They carry a test of whether this moment marks a turning point in Australian cultural governance.

    Their reinstatement is not simply a symbolic reversal. It is a chance to restore trust and demonstrate that institutions can learn from failure.

    Whether this becomes a real shift or missed opportunity depends not only on Creative Australia, but on whether institutions across the country defend artistic integrity and rebuild the leadership culture this moment demands.

    Samuel Cairnduff does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Creative Australia’s backflip on Venice Biennale representatives exposes deep governance failures – https://theconversation.com/creative-australias-backflip-on-venice-biennale-representatives-exposes-deep-governance-failures-260402

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Antarctic research is in decline, and the timing couldn’t be worse

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Elizabeth Leane, Professor of Antarctic Studies, School of Humanities, University of Tasmania

    Oleksandr Matsibura/Shutterstock

    Ice loss in Antarctica and its impact on the planet – sea level rise, changes to ocean currents and disturbance of wildlife and food webs – has been in the news a lot lately. All of these threats were likely on the minds of the delegates to the annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, which finishes up today in Milan, Italy.

    This meeting is where decisions are made about the continent’s future. These decisions rely on evidence from scientific research. Moreover, only countries that produce significant Antarctic research – as well as being parties to the treaty – get to have a final say in these decisions.

    Our new report – published as a preprint through the University of the Arctic – shows the rate of research on the Antarctic and Southern Ocean is falling at exactly the time when it should be increasing. Moreover, research leadership is changing, with China taking the lead for the first time.

    This points to a dangerous disinvestment in Antarctic research just when it is needed, alongside a changing of the guard in national influence. Antarctica and the research done there are key to everyone’s future, so it’s vital to understand what this change might lead to.

    Why is Antarctic research so important?

    With the Antarctic region rapidly warming, its ice shelves destabilising and sea ice shrinking, understanding the South Polar environment is more crucial than ever.

    Ice loss in Antarctica not only contributes to sea level rise, but impacts wildlife habitats and local food chains. It also changes the dynamics of ocean currents, which could interfere with global food webs, including international fisheries that supply a growing amount of food.

    Research to understand these impacts is vital. First, knowing the impact of our actions – particularly carbon emissions – gives us an increased drive to make changes and lobby governments to do so.

    Second, even when changes are already locked in, to prepare ourselves we need to know what these changes will look like.

    And third, we need to understand the threats to the Antarctic and Southern Ocean environment to govern it properly. This is where the treaty comes in.

    What is the Antarctic Treaty?

    The region below 60 degrees south is governed by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, along with subsequent agreements. Together they are known as the Antarctic Treaty System.

    Fifty-eight countries are parties to the treaty, but only 29 of them – called consultative parties – can make binding decisions about the region. They comprise the 12 original signatories from 1959, along with 17 more recent signatory nations that produce substantial scientific research relating to Antarctica.

    This makes research a key part of a nation’s influence over what happens in Antarctica.

    For most of its history, the Antarctic Treaty System has functioned remarkably well. It maintained peace in the region during the Cold War, facilitated scientific cooperation, and put arguments about territorial claims on indefinite hold. It indefinitely forbade mining, and managed fisheries.

    Lately, however, there has been growing dysfunction in the treaty system.

    Environmental protections that might seem obvious – such as marine protected areas and special protections for threatened emperor penguins – have stalled.

    Because decisions are made by consensus, any country can effectively block progress. Russia and China – both long-term actors in the system – have been at the centre of the impasse.



    Read more:
    Antarctic summer sea ice is at record lows. Here’s how it will harm the planet – and us

    What did our report find?

    Tracking the amount of Antarctic research being done tells us whether nations as a whole are investing enough in understanding the region and its global impact.

    It also tells us which nations are investing the most and are therefore likely to have substantial influence.

    Our new report examined the number of papers published on Antarctic and Southern Ocean topics from 2016 to 2024, using the Scopus database. We also looked at other factors, such as the countries affiliated with each paper.

    The results show five significant changes are happening in the world of Antarctic research.

    • The number of Antarctic and Southern Ocean publications peaked in 2021 and then fell slightly yearly through to 2024.
    • While the United States has for decades been the leader in Antarctic research, China overtook them in 2022.
    • If we look only at the high-quality publications (those published in the best 25% of journals) China still took over the US, in 2024.
    • Of the top six countries in overall publications (China, the US, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and Russia) all except China have declined in publication numbers since 2016.
    • Although collaboration in publications is higher for Antarctic research than in non-Antarctic fields, Russia, India and China have anomalously low rates of co-authorship compared with many other signatory countries.

    Why is this research decline a problem?

    A recent parliamentary inquiry in Australia emphasised the need for funding certainty. In the UK, a House of Commons committee report considered it “imperative for the UK to significantly expand its research efforts in Antarctica”, in particular in relation to sea level rise.

    US commentators have pointed to the inadequacy of the country’s icebreaker infrastructure. The Trump administration’s recent cuts to Antarctic funding are only likely to exacerbate the situation. Meanwhile China has built a fifth station in Antarctica and announced plans for a sixth.

    Given the nation’s population and global influence, China’s leadership in Antarctic research is not surprising. If China were to take a lead in Antarctic environmental protection that matched its scientific heft, its move to lead position in the research ranks could be positive. Stronger multi-country collaboration in research could also strengthen overall cooperation.

    But the overall drop in global Antarctic research investment is a problem however you look at it. We ignore it at our peril.

    Elizabeth Leane receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Dutch Research Council, the Council on Australian and Latin American Relations DFAT and HX (Hurtigruten Expeditions). She has received in-kind support from Hurtigruten Expeditions in the recent past. The University of Tasmania is a member of the UArctic, which has provided support for this project.

    Keith Larson is affiliated with the UArctic and European Polar Board. The UArctic paid for the development and publication of this report. The UArctic Thematic Network on Research Analytics and Bibliometrics conducted the analysis and developed the report. The Arctic Centre at Umeå University provided in-kind support for staff time on the report.

    – ref. Antarctic research is in decline, and the timing couldn’t be worse – https://theconversation.com/antarctic-research-is-in-decline-and-the-timing-couldnt-be-worse-260197

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Antarctic research is in decline, and the timing couldn’t be worse

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Elizabeth Leane, Professor of Antarctic Studies, School of Humanities, University of Tasmania

    Oleksandr Matsibura/Shutterstock

    Ice loss in Antarctica and its impact on the planet – sea level rise, changes to ocean currents and disturbance of wildlife and food webs – has been in the news a lot lately. All of these threats were likely on the minds of the delegates to the annual Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, which finishes up today in Milan, Italy.

    This meeting is where decisions are made about the continent’s future. These decisions rely on evidence from scientific research. Moreover, only countries that produce significant Antarctic research – as well as being parties to the treaty – get to have a final say in these decisions.

    Our new report – published as a preprint through the University of the Arctic – shows the rate of research on the Antarctic and Southern Ocean is falling at exactly the time when it should be increasing. Moreover, research leadership is changing, with China taking the lead for the first time.

    This points to a dangerous disinvestment in Antarctic research just when it is needed, alongside a changing of the guard in national influence. Antarctica and the research done there are key to everyone’s future, so it’s vital to understand what this change might lead to.

    Why is Antarctic research so important?

    With the Antarctic region rapidly warming, its ice shelves destabilising and sea ice shrinking, understanding the South Polar environment is more crucial than ever.

    Ice loss in Antarctica not only contributes to sea level rise, but impacts wildlife habitats and local food chains. It also changes the dynamics of ocean currents, which could interfere with global food webs, including international fisheries that supply a growing amount of food.

    Research to understand these impacts is vital. First, knowing the impact of our actions – particularly carbon emissions – gives us an increased drive to make changes and lobby governments to do so.

    Second, even when changes are already locked in, to prepare ourselves we need to know what these changes will look like.

    And third, we need to understand the threats to the Antarctic and Southern Ocean environment to govern it properly. This is where the treaty comes in.

    What is the Antarctic Treaty?

    The region below 60 degrees south is governed by the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, along with subsequent agreements. Together they are known as the Antarctic Treaty System.

    Fifty-eight countries are parties to the treaty, but only 29 of them – called consultative parties – can make binding decisions about the region. They comprise the 12 original signatories from 1959, along with 17 more recent signatory nations that produce substantial scientific research relating to Antarctica.

    This makes research a key part of a nation’s influence over what happens in Antarctica.

    For most of its history, the Antarctic Treaty System has functioned remarkably well. It maintained peace in the region during the Cold War, facilitated scientific cooperation, and put arguments about territorial claims on indefinite hold. It indefinitely forbade mining, and managed fisheries.

    Lately, however, there has been growing dysfunction in the treaty system.

    Environmental protections that might seem obvious – such as marine protected areas and special protections for threatened emperor penguins – have stalled.

    Because decisions are made by consensus, any country can effectively block progress. Russia and China – both long-term actors in the system – have been at the centre of the impasse.



    Read more:
    Antarctic summer sea ice is at record lows. Here’s how it will harm the planet – and us

    What did our report find?

    Tracking the amount of Antarctic research being done tells us whether nations as a whole are investing enough in understanding the region and its global impact.

    It also tells us which nations are investing the most and are therefore likely to have substantial influence.

    Our new report examined the number of papers published on Antarctic and Southern Ocean topics from 2016 to 2024, using the Scopus database. We also looked at other factors, such as the countries affiliated with each paper.

    The results show five significant changes are happening in the world of Antarctic research.

    • The number of Antarctic and Southern Ocean publications peaked in 2021 and then fell slightly yearly through to 2024.
    • While the United States has for decades been the leader in Antarctic research, China overtook them in 2022.
    • If we look only at the high-quality publications (those published in the best 25% of journals) China still took over the US, in 2024.
    • Of the top six countries in overall publications (China, the US, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany and Russia) all except China have declined in publication numbers since 2016.
    • Although collaboration in publications is higher for Antarctic research than in non-Antarctic fields, Russia, India and China have anomalously low rates of co-authorship compared with many other signatory countries.

    Why is this research decline a problem?

    A recent parliamentary inquiry in Australia emphasised the need for funding certainty. In the UK, a House of Commons committee report considered it “imperative for the UK to significantly expand its research efforts in Antarctica”, in particular in relation to sea level rise.

    US commentators have pointed to the inadequacy of the country’s icebreaker infrastructure. The Trump administration’s recent cuts to Antarctic funding are only likely to exacerbate the situation. Meanwhile China has built a fifth station in Antarctica and announced plans for a sixth.

    Given the nation’s population and global influence, China’s leadership in Antarctic research is not surprising. If China were to take a lead in Antarctic environmental protection that matched its scientific heft, its move to lead position in the research ranks could be positive. Stronger multi-country collaboration in research could also strengthen overall cooperation.

    But the overall drop in global Antarctic research investment is a problem however you look at it. We ignore it at our peril.

    Elizabeth Leane receives funding from the Australian Research Council, the Dutch Research Council, the Council on Australian and Latin American Relations DFAT and HX (Hurtigruten Expeditions). She has received in-kind support from Hurtigruten Expeditions in the recent past. The University of Tasmania is a member of the UArctic, which has provided support for this project.

    Keith Larson is affiliated with the UArctic and European Polar Board. The UArctic paid for the development and publication of this report. The UArctic Thematic Network on Research Analytics and Bibliometrics conducted the analysis and developed the report. The Arctic Centre at Umeå University provided in-kind support for staff time on the report.

    – ref. Antarctic research is in decline, and the timing couldn’t be worse – https://theconversation.com/antarctic-research-is-in-decline-and-the-timing-couldnt-be-worse-260197

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    July 2, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board has completed the first review under the Extended Credit Facility arrangement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The decision allows for an immediate disbursement of US$ 261.9 million towards international reserves, to continue building buffers.
    • The DRC’s economy has been resilient in a challenging environment amid the escalation of the armed conflict in the eastern part of the country, which placed significant strains on the budget. The authorities have made good progress on the structural reform’s agenda, but a few quantitative targets were missed.
    • The recent peace agreement signed between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, mediated by the United States, is encouraging for the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and renewed focus on development goals.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the first review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) approved on January 15, 2025 (see PR 25/003). The completion of the first review allowed an immediate disbursement equivalent to 190.4 million SDR (about US$ 261.9 million) to support balance-of-payment needs, bringing the aggregate disbursement to date to 380.5 million SDR (about 523.4 US$ million).  

    The DRC has been facing significant challenges amid the intensification of the armed conflict in its eastern part since end-2024. The escalation of hostilities has claimed thousands of lives and caused severe social and humanitarian damages, including disruptions in access to essential services such as food, water, and electricity. Diplomatic efforts are ongoing to secure a cessation of hostilities and ensure sustainable peace in the region. The signing on June 27, 2025, of a peace agreement between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, under the mediation of the United States, is encouraging for the prospect of a peaceful resolution on the ongoing conflict and renewed focus on addressing development goals.

    Despite the challenging environment, economic activity remained resilient, with robust GDP growth of 6.5 percent in 2024, driven by continued dynamism in the extractive sector.  External stability has strengthened, as the current account deficit narrowed and the accumulation of international reserves continued. Inflationary pressures continue to ease, and year-on-year inflation declined from 23.8 percent at end-2023 to 11.7 percent at end-2024 and [8.5] percent at end-June 2025.

    Performance under the program was mixed, as the intensification of the conflict has placed significant strains on the budget. Despite strong revenue collection, the domestic fiscal deficit reached 0.8 percent of GDP in 2024, exceeding the program target of 0.3 percent, owing to spending overruns linked to the escalation of the conflict, including on exceptional security spending and public investments. The program target on the Central Bank of the Congo (BCC)’s foreign exchange assets held with domestic correspondents was missed as well, due to higher-than-expected tax payments in foreign currency on government accounts. Other quantitative performance criteria of the ECF were met. Most indicative targets were also met, except those related to the floor on social spending and the ceiling on spending executed through emergency procedures—owing to elevated exceptional security spending linked to the conflict intensification. Appropriate corrective measures are being implemented by the authorities.

    In completing the first review, the Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for waivers of nonobservance of the performance criteria on the floor on the domestic fiscal balance at end-December 2024 on the basis of corrective actions, and the continuous ceiling on the levels of foreign currency assets of the BCC held with domestic correspondents on the basis of the temporary nature of the deviation which has since been remedied. Further, the Executive Board completed the financing assurances review under the ECF arrangement. No reform measures under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement, approved in January 2025, were due for review at this time.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Chair stated:

    “The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been confronted with heightened security challenges since late 2024. The escalation of the conflict in the eastern part of the country has caused serious human, social and economic damage and induced the government to increase spending. Despite these difficulties, the macroeconomic environment of the DRC remained broadly stable. Growth has remained robust, due to the resilience of mining production. Inflation continues to decrease, and the external position has strengthened. The economic outlook remains positive, but is fraught with downside risks related to the persistence of the conflict, declining external humanitarian assistance, global economic headwinds, and potential escalation of geopolitical conflicts. The authorities are committed to closely monitor these risks and to respond proactively to evolving challenges.

    “Budget implementation remains challenging in a difficult security context. As a result, the domestic fiscal deficit is projected to be larger than initially projected for 2025, but is expected to return to the path envisaged at program approval starting in 2026, reflecting the authorities’ commitment to carry out measures to enhance domestic revenue mobilization and strengthen the budget implementation process. Additionally, to guard against unforeseen adverse shocks, the authorities have adopted a contingency plan.

    “The Central Bank of the Congo (BCC) has maintained a tight monetary policy stance, thereby helping bring inflation down to single digits for the first time in three years. The accumulation of international reserves has continued, on the back of the narrowing of the current account deficit. Efforts must continue, to strengthen the monetary policy implementation framework, refine the foreign exchange intervention strategy, enhance the governance and safeguards of the BCC and ensure its adequate recapitalization.

    “The authorities have committed to accompany these efforts to preserve macroeconomic stability with an acceleration of structural reforms in key areas, including strengthening the AML/CFT framework, improving the business climate, enhancing transparency and governance, combating corruption and upgrading national statistics. Efforts to lay the groundwork for a timely implementation of the reform measures underpinning the RSF arrangement approved in January should be stepped up.”

    Table 1. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023-26

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    Est.

    CR No. 25/023

    Prel.

    CR No. 25/023

    Proj.

    CR No. 25/023

    Proj.

    (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    GDP and prices

      Real GDP

    8.5

    6.0

    6.5

    5.4

    5.3

    5.1

    5.3

         Extractive GDP

    19.7

    11.6

    12.2

    7.7

    8.2

    5.2

    5.8

         Non-extractive GDP

    3.5

    3.2

    3.5

    4.2

    3.6

    5.0

    5.0

      GDP deflator

    14.4

    17.4

    19.9

    8.8

    8.2

    7.4

    6.7

      Consumer prices, period average

    19.9

    17.7

    17.7

    8.9

    8.8

    7.3

    7.1

      Consumer prices, end of period

    23.8

    12.0

    11.7

    7.8

    7.8

    7.0

    7.0

    (Annual change in percent of beginning-of-period broad money)

    Money and credit

      Net foreign assets

    19.9

    17.4

    23.0

    18.2

    14.5

    23.7

    22.7

      Net domestic assets

    20.3

    4.9

    5.6

    -3.5

    -1.0

    -10.9

    -10.5

         Domestic credit

    34.3

    15.4

    15.2

    9.9

    10.5

    3.7

    4.2

      Broad money

    40.3

    22.4

    28.1

    14.7

    13.8

    12.8

    12.3

    (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    Central government finance

      Revenue and grants

    14.8

    15.6

    15.2

    15.0

    14.8

    14.9

    14.9

      Expenditures

    16.5

    16.8

    16.5

    16.8

    17.0

    16.6

    16.6

      Domestic fiscal balance

    -1.2

    -0.3

    -0.8

    -0.8

    -1.2

    -0.8

    -0.8

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Investment and saving

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

      Gross national saving

    9.5

    9.1

    9.6

    12.2

    11.2

    13.0

    12.5

      Investment

    15.7

    14.2

    13.5

    15.0

    14.4

    15.3

    14.8

         Non-government

    12.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

     

    Balance of payments

      Exports of goods and services

    44.0

             45.1

    47.4

    45.4

    46.1

    45.5

    46.6

      Imports of goods and services

    49.9

    48.9

    50.3

    47.3

    47.5

    46.9

    47.0

      Current account balance, incl. transfer

    -6.2

    -5.1

    -3.9

    -2.8

    -3.2

    -2.4

    -2.4

      Current account balance, excl. transfers

    -7.5

    -5.1

    -5.0

    -2.7

    -3.4

    -2.3

    -2.6

      Gross official reserves (weeks of imports)

    8.2

    10.0

    10.1

    11.5

    11.8

    12.7

    12.8

     

    External debt

      Debt service in percent of government revenue

    7.6

    5.7

    6.1

    6.7

    7.1

    7.0

    7.4

    Sources: Congolese authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.
    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/02/pr-25238-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-imf-completes-the-1st-rev-under-ecf-arrang

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • Normality returns to Wimbledon as Alcaraz and Sabalenka ease through

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Carlos Alcaraz, Aryna Sabalenka and the end of London’s tropical heatwave ensured that a sense of normality returned to the lawns of Wimbledon on Wednesday after two sweat-soaked days of shocks, although Jasmine Paolini’s exit meant the surprises did not end.

    A stream of big names including Coco Gauff, Jessica Pegula, Alexander Zverev and Daniil Medvedev crashed and burned in the oven-like temperatures of the first round.

    So when Alcaraz walked on Centre Court to continue his bid for a third successive Wimbledon title against British qualifier Oliver Tarvet, the thought surely lurked somewhere in his mind that he could be the fall-guy in the event’s greatest upset.

    The 22-year-old second seed was not at his best but after saving three break points in a nervy first service game against a college student ranked 733rd in the world, he asserted his authority to win 6-1 6-4 6-4.

    Earlier on Centre Court, women’s top seed Sabalenka battled to a 7-6(4) 6-4 win against Czech Marie Bouzkova.

    “Honestly, it is sad to see so many upsets in the tournament, in both draws, women’s and men’s,” said Sabalenka, who is bidding for her first Wimbledon title.

    “I’m just trying to focus on myself… I hope there are no more upsets in this tournament.”

    That was not to be, as last year’s runner-up Paolini joined the mass exodus of fancied players when she crashed out 4-6 6-4 6-4 against Russian Kamilla Rakhimova.

    However, Australian Open champion Madison Keys, the sixth seed, made it safely into round three by beating Olga Danilovic 6-4 6-2 while unseeded four-time Grand Slam champion Naomi Osaka eased past Czech doubles specialist Katerina Siniakova 6-3 6-2.

    Lower temperatures did not necessarily mean more comfortable outings as world number 12 Frances Tiafoe became the 14th of the 32 men’s seeds to fall, losing 4-6 6-4 6-3 7-5 against Cameron Norrie, one of seven Britons in singles action on day three.

    The American was joined later on by Czech 23rd seed Jiri Lehecka, last month’s Queen’s Club Championships runner-up, who fell 7-6(4) 6-1 7-5 to Italian Mattia Bellucci.

    HOME CHARGE

    Ashlyn Krueger, the American 31st seed, was then beaten 7-6(4) 6-4 by Russian Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova, ensuring 15 of the 32 women’s seeds also went out of the tournament.

    Sonay Kartal led the home charge by defeating Bulgaria’s Viktoriya Tomova 6-2 6-2 to book her place in the last 32 for the second year in succession while the nation’s big hope Emma Raducanu got past 2023 champion Marketa Vondrousova 6-3 6-3.

    There was disappointment for Britain’s Katie Boulter, who served 14 double faults as she crashed 6-7(9) 6-2 6-1 to 101st-ranked Solana Sierra, the Argentine who lost in qualifying but has seized her lucky loser spot with both hands.

    Alcaraz, bidding to do the French Open-Wimbledon double for the second successive year, needed five sets to get past Italian veteran Fabio Fognini in the opening round and set up an intriguing clash with 21-year-old Tarvet.

    Tarvet, who plays on the U.S. collegiate circuit for the University of San Diego, said he believed he could beat anyone, even Alcaraz, after winning his Grand Slam debut match against fellow qualifier Leandro Riedi of Switzerland on Monday.

    He was clearly not overawed at sharing a court with a five-times major champion and had he taken any of the eight break points he earned in the first set it could have been closer.

    Alcaraz proved a step too far though as he moved through the gears when required to keep an eager Tarvet under control.

    Just as the Spaniard did in his first round when going to the aid of a female spectator suffering in the heat, Alcaraz again endeared himself to the Centre Court crowd.

    “First of all I have to give a big congratulations to Oliver, it’s his second match on the tour. I just loved his game to be honest, the level he played,” Alcaraz said.

    Play on courts without roofs was delayed for two hours by light morning rain but once the clouds rolled away the place to be for fans without showcourt tickets was Court 12 for Brazilian teenager Joao Fonseca’s match against American Jenson Brooksby.

    The 18-year-old is widely tipped as a future challenger to the domination of Alcaraz and Jannik Sinner and he showed why during a 6-2 5-7 6-2 6-4 win that was celebrated by a large contingent of exuberant Brazilians.

    Andrey Rublev, who suffered a bruising loss to Fonseca in the Australian Open first round earlier this year, battled past Lloyd Harris 6-7 6-4 7-6 6-3 before Taylor Fritz closed out the day with a 3-6 6-3 7-6(0) 4-6 6-3 win over Gabriel Diallo.

    -Reuters

  • Normality returns to Wimbledon as Alcaraz and Sabalenka ease through

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Carlos Alcaraz, Aryna Sabalenka and the end of London’s tropical heatwave ensured that a sense of normality returned to the lawns of Wimbledon on Wednesday after two sweat-soaked days of shocks, although Jasmine Paolini’s exit meant the surprises did not end.

    A stream of big names including Coco Gauff, Jessica Pegula, Alexander Zverev and Daniil Medvedev crashed and burned in the oven-like temperatures of the first round.

    So when Alcaraz walked on Centre Court to continue his bid for a third successive Wimbledon title against British qualifier Oliver Tarvet, the thought surely lurked somewhere in his mind that he could be the fall-guy in the event’s greatest upset.

    The 22-year-old second seed was not at his best but after saving three break points in a nervy first service game against a college student ranked 733rd in the world, he asserted his authority to win 6-1 6-4 6-4.

    Earlier on Centre Court, women’s top seed Sabalenka battled to a 7-6(4) 6-4 win against Czech Marie Bouzkova.

    “Honestly, it is sad to see so many upsets in the tournament, in both draws, women’s and men’s,” said Sabalenka, who is bidding for her first Wimbledon title.

    “I’m just trying to focus on myself… I hope there are no more upsets in this tournament.”

    That was not to be, as last year’s runner-up Paolini joined the mass exodus of fancied players when she crashed out 4-6 6-4 6-4 against Russian Kamilla Rakhimova.

    However, Australian Open champion Madison Keys, the sixth seed, made it safely into round three by beating Olga Danilovic 6-4 6-2 while unseeded four-time Grand Slam champion Naomi Osaka eased past Czech doubles specialist Katerina Siniakova 6-3 6-2.

    Lower temperatures did not necessarily mean more comfortable outings as world number 12 Frances Tiafoe became the 14th of the 32 men’s seeds to fall, losing 4-6 6-4 6-3 7-5 against Cameron Norrie, one of seven Britons in singles action on day three.

    The American was joined later on by Czech 23rd seed Jiri Lehecka, last month’s Queen’s Club Championships runner-up, who fell 7-6(4) 6-1 7-5 to Italian Mattia Bellucci.

    HOME CHARGE

    Ashlyn Krueger, the American 31st seed, was then beaten 7-6(4) 6-4 by Russian Anastasia Pavlyuchenkova, ensuring 15 of the 32 women’s seeds also went out of the tournament.

    Sonay Kartal led the home charge by defeating Bulgaria’s Viktoriya Tomova 6-2 6-2 to book her place in the last 32 for the second year in succession while the nation’s big hope Emma Raducanu got past 2023 champion Marketa Vondrousova 6-3 6-3.

    There was disappointment for Britain’s Katie Boulter, who served 14 double faults as she crashed 6-7(9) 6-2 6-1 to 101st-ranked Solana Sierra, the Argentine who lost in qualifying but has seized her lucky loser spot with both hands.

    Alcaraz, bidding to do the French Open-Wimbledon double for the second successive year, needed five sets to get past Italian veteran Fabio Fognini in the opening round and set up an intriguing clash with 21-year-old Tarvet.

    Tarvet, who plays on the U.S. collegiate circuit for the University of San Diego, said he believed he could beat anyone, even Alcaraz, after winning his Grand Slam debut match against fellow qualifier Leandro Riedi of Switzerland on Monday.

    He was clearly not overawed at sharing a court with a five-times major champion and had he taken any of the eight break points he earned in the first set it could have been closer.

    Alcaraz proved a step too far though as he moved through the gears when required to keep an eager Tarvet under control.

    Just as the Spaniard did in his first round when going to the aid of a female spectator suffering in the heat, Alcaraz again endeared himself to the Centre Court crowd.

    “First of all I have to give a big congratulations to Oliver, it’s his second match on the tour. I just loved his game to be honest, the level he played,” Alcaraz said.

    Play on courts without roofs was delayed for two hours by light morning rain but once the clouds rolled away the place to be for fans without showcourt tickets was Court 12 for Brazilian teenager Joao Fonseca’s match against American Jenson Brooksby.

    The 18-year-old is widely tipped as a future challenger to the domination of Alcaraz and Jannik Sinner and he showed why during a 6-2 5-7 6-2 6-4 win that was celebrated by a large contingent of exuberant Brazilians.

    Andrey Rublev, who suffered a bruising loss to Fonseca in the Australian Open first round earlier this year, battled past Lloyd Harris 6-7 6-4 7-6 6-3 before Taylor Fritz closed out the day with a 3-6 6-3 7-6(0) 4-6 6-3 win over Gabriel Diallo.

    -Reuters

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Beijing launches city alliance to strengthen global digital economy ties

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 2 (Xinhua) — A global alliance involving more than 40 cities was formally launched in Beijing on Wednesday as part of efforts to expand multilateral cooperation on the digital economy.

    The Global Alliance of Digital Economy Cities was launched by Beijing together with partner cities from Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Latin America at the 2025 Global Conference on the Digital Economy, which opened on the same day.

    The Alliance aims to institutionalise multilateral cooperation beyond bilateral projects and will focus on key areas such as digital infrastructure, governance of cross-border data flows, the ethics of artificial intelligence and the application of smart cities.

    Earlier in 2023, Beijing launched the Digital Economy Partnership City Cooperation Initiative, and in 2024, the Chinese capital and partner cities adopted six action plans to implement the initiative. The current alliance was created with the support of international organizations including the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International Trade Centre.

    The 2025 Global Conference on Digital Economy will run until July 5, featuring an opening ceremony, six key forums, and a series of thematic sessions, with more than 1,000 participants. The event is jointly organized by the Beijing Municipal People’s Government, the National Internet Information Office of China, the National Data Administration of China, the Xinhua News Agency, and the United Nations Development Programme. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Belarus and Libya Sign Package of Cooperation Documents

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    MINSK, July 2 /Xinhua/ – Belarus and Libya signed a package of documents on cooperation on Wednesday following the visit of the Libyan government delegation to Minsk, BelTA reported.

    Among the signed documents is an agreement of intent between the ministries of industry of the two countries. The Ministry of Agriculture and Food of Belarus and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock of the Government of National Stability of Libya signed a memorandum of understanding on the development of cooperation in the field of agriculture. A protocol of intent was also signed between the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of Belarus and the National Development Agency of Libya.

    In addition, the parties signed a memorandum of intent on cooperation between the Ministry of Education of Belarus and the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research of the Government of National Stability of Libya, a protocol of intent on the creation of an emergency prevention and response system in Benghazi, and an action plan for the development of cooperation in the field of healthcare.

    At the end of the signing ceremony of the package of documents, Prime Minister of Belarus Alexander Turchin particularly noted that the parties had summed up an important result of the next stage of bilateral work. “I am simply confident that this event will give a serious impetus to further interaction between Belarus and Libya. I am grateful to all my colleagues who worked intensively to ensure that our cooperation continues at such a high level,” said the Prime Minister of Belarus. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Georgia’s External Debt Reaches $25.5 Billion

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Tbilisi, July 2 (Xinhua) — Georgia’s total external debt as of March 31, 2025 reached $25.5 billion, accounting for 74.2 percent of GDP over the past four quarters, the National Bank of Georgia (Central Bank) said on Wednesday.

    In the first quarter of 2025, Georgia’s external debt increased by $300.4 million.

    Of the total, $11 billion is the state debt, of which $8.5 billion is the government debt, $822.8 million are the National Bank’s obligations, $449 million and $1.2 billion are the debt of state-owned enterprises on bonds and loans, respectively.

    According to the Central Bank, 88.6 percent of external debt is denominated in foreign currency. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China, EU vow to uphold multilateralism, strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BRUSSELS, July 2 (Xinhua) — Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and European Council President Antonio Costa met in Brussels on Wednesday, vowing to uphold multilateralism and strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation.

    Noting that both the European Union and China are supporters of multilateralism, A. Costa stated the EU’s intention to work together with China to uphold mutual respect, overcome differences, improve mutual understanding and respond to global challenges through joint efforts.

    The EU hopes to work with the Chinese side to ensure the success of the next meeting of EU and Chinese leaders, he said, stressing that the EU will continue to firmly adhere to the one-China policy.

    Wang Yi, also a member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, for his part said that China regards Europe as one of the important poles of the multipolar world, has consistently supported European integration, and is glad to see the EU strengthening its strategic autonomy and playing an increasingly important role in the international arena.

    According to Wang Yi, China intends to strengthen contacts and coordination with the EU and make preparations for the meeting of the leaders of the two sides.

    The more serious and complex the international situation becomes, the more necessary it is for China and the EU to strengthen solidarity and coordination and resolutely act as stabilizing forces in a turbulent world, the Chinese diplomat stressed, adding that the two sides should respect each other’s core interests in practice, strengthen mutual understanding and mutual trust, and promote mutual success.

    The parties also exchanged views on the Ukrainian crisis. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Georgia expelled over 40 foreign citizens for violating migration laws

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Tbilisi, July 2 (Xinhua) — As a result of joint measures carried out by the Migration Department and other units of the Georgian Interior Ministry, 41 foreign citizens were expelled from the country, the press service of the Georgian Interior Ministry reported on Wednesday.

    The expulsion was carried out on the basis of the Georgian Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners and Stateless Persons. Among those deported were citizens of Azerbaijan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, India, Jordan, Iran, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Armenia and Zimbabwe. All of them were banned from re-entering the country.

    According to official data, 525 foreign citizens were deported from Georgia between January and June 2025. This is 280 percent more than the same period last year.

    In late June, the Georgian parliament approved a package of legislative amendments aimed at tightening migration policy. The new rules provide for a simplified deportation procedure. Court proceedings will no longer suspend the expulsion process if a visa or residence permit is refused. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The internal problems of the American economy cannot be treated from the outside – Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Moscow, July 2 /Xinhua/ – The US government accuses China of its economy being overly dependent on exports. Under the pretext of “rebalancing,” the US is introducing unilateral tariffs, forcing the world to pay for the structural problems of the US economy. This was stated by Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui in an opinion piece for AiF.ru, published on Wednesday.

    “The US demands that China import more US goods, interprets the trade deficit with other countries as ‘all countries in the world are benefiting from America’, and under the pretext of ‘rebalancing’ imposes unilateral tariffs and applies protectionism, forcing China and the world to pay for the long-standing structural problems of the US economy,” writes Zhang Hanhui. “In fact, it is the US economy itself that needs ‘rebalancing’. The US’s attempts to cure internal diseases from the outside and its economic bullying are the main source of chaos leading to global imbalances.”

    According to the Chinese diplomat, the US government has recently been promoting a series of false narratives about “rebalancing the Chinese economy,” “rebalancing trade,” and “rebalancing the global economy.” In fact, China’s investment- and export-driven development model has undergone fundamental changes. A new architecture of economic growth driven by domestic demand and innovation is emerging. China’s dependence on foreign trade has declined from over 60 percent at the beginning of the 21st century to just over 30 percent in 2024. China has been the world’s second-largest import market for 16 years now.

    The US accuses China of “unfair trade”. “This is brazen hypocrisy and double standards,” the article points out. It is the US that abuses export controls against China in high-tech areas. Even if there is an imbalance in Sino-American trade, “the reason is that the US does not want to sell, not that China does not want to buy.”

    “The US-initiated trade war and the ‘rebalancing’ narrative it promotes aim to shift the structural problems of the US economy onto others and hold back the transformation and qualitative improvement of China’s industry,” writes Zhang Hanhui.

    The US economic and financial hegemony is an important cause of the development imbalance, the Chinese ambassador said. The US uses economic coercion, deprives other countries of their right to develop through trade, technology and financial wars, abuses unilateral sanctions and keeps developing countries at the bottom of global value chains, deepening the gap between North and South and worsening the global development environment.

    “China calls on the United States to take an honest look at its own problems, rather than focusing on the so-called trade imbalances with other countries, to jointly and openly overcome global challenges, rather than arbitrarily wield the tariff cudgel, to abandon the arrogance of the “America First” position, and to conduct win-win cooperation based on mutual respect to achieve common development,” emphasized the article by Chinese Ambassador to Russia Zhang Hanhui. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Kingdom of the Netherlands – Curaçao: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    July 2, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC.

    Curaçao’s economic activity expanded by 5 percent in 2024, as strong tourism performance trickled into the wider economy. Stayover arrivals, growing at double digits, continued to outperform Caribbean peers and carried over to other sectors, including whole trade, real estate, and construction. Mostly related to holiday homes and hotels, construction was further fueled by strong mortgage growth and complemented by a resumption of public investments under the Road Maintenance Plan. Average headline inflation declined to 2.6 percent in 2024 from 3.5 percent in 2023, in line with global oil prices and lower US inflation. Real wages increased for the first time in five years but job creation continued to be dominated by informal construction and tourism-related sectors while formal employment declined. The primary surplus continued its upward trajectory on the back of increased tax collection on goods and services. The current account deficit widened due to higher merchandise imports, mainly related to construction activity.

    The government is pursuing an ambitious agenda to steer a now tourism-led economy, amidst heightened global uncertainty. Mindful of tourism saturation and a decoupling of local living standards, the authorities strive to improve social conditions while generating sustainable and green growth amid safeguarding solid public finances. The near doubling of the tourism footprint within five years brought profound structural shifts to Curaçao’s economy, including the decline in manufacturing and rise in services, lower overall wages, higher informality, and greater reliance on – more regressive – indirect taxation. Policy responses need to shift accordingly. Priorities are rightly focused on upgrading tourist experiences and diversification, improving skills and labor market conditions, and reforming the tax system in an equitable way while addressing social spending pressures. The administration has delivered on a first round of targeted, one-off pension increases this year, continued reforms to contain health costs, expanded investment in education infrastructure, and came closer to its renewables target with the opening of the latest wind park in 2024. The landspakket, a structural reform package agreed with the Netherlands in 2020, continues to guide structural reforms.

    Outlook and Risks

    Growth is projected to moderate to 4 percent in 2025, balancing domestic impulses and heightened global uncertainty, before gradually converging to 2 percent over the medium term. Further expansion of stayover tourism and construction activity will continue to support growth in 2025, along with fiscal expansion driven by higher public investments. Potential negative effects of slowing global demand and heightened uncertainty would dampen tourism flows towards the end of 2025 and 2026. Growth is expected to moderate to 2 percent over the medium term, given saturation in tourism and slower global demand, while public capital spending would be carried forward, including in road infrastructure and the energy value chain. Headline inflation is projected to stabilize at 2.5 percent in 2025, subject to oil price-related uncertainty. Fiscal accounts would remain in surplus, fully compliant with the fiscal rule, allowing the government to partially settle a large bullet loan in 2025 with own liquid reserves, thereby accelerating the impressive downward trajectory of debt. The current account deficit would decline in the medium term but remain elevated.

    Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. External risks include trade policy and investment shocks, which could induce higher inflation and lower external demand, adversely impacting tourism arrivals. Domestic upside risks include faster-than-expected advances in the green hydrogen value chain project and development of other energy sources. On the downside, lower-than-expected disbursements in public investments and delays in infrastructure improvements could set back the expected increase in potential growth from the expansion of hotel capacities. Continued high growth in mortgage credit fueling rising house prices could lead to financial sector as well as household balance sheet vulnerabilities. Buffers include access to favorable refinancing conditions on the Dutch capital market, subject to compliance with the fiscal rule, which grants the island substantial fiscal space, notably for capital and emergency spending.

    Tailoring Fiscal and Structural Policies to a Tourism-led Economy

    Safeguarding Medium-term Fiscal Sustainability

    Reaching the medium-term debt target and further sustaining growth will require weighing the need to boost investments and address social spending pressures while reforming the tax system in an equitable manner.  

    Advancing healthcare reforms is an urgent priority to restore the sector’s financial sustainability and limit medium-term fiscal risks. Annual deficits of the SVB healthcare fund amounted to around 5 percent of GDP over the past years, excluding central government transfers, with an additional 1 percent of GDP annual deficit by the Curaçao Medical Center. Transfers to the latter were recently increased to better cover operating costs and invest in new medical equipment, but the health system’s overall finances remain unsustainable. Curaçao’s health expenses, around 13 percent of GDP, stand out relative to regional peers and surpass the OECD average. Possible efficiency gains on the spending side would include additional volume and price measures for pharmaceuticals, re-evaluation of laboratory service tariffs, further expansion of primary care to contain hospital visits, and improvements in preventive care, with the latter likely to materialize over the longer horizon. Revenue reform options would include a broadening of the contributor base, e.g., via the inclusion of migrant workers, increasing co-payments for higher-income households, allowing for price differentiation for the privately insured, exploring options to charge for add-on services, with a possible secondary, private insurance market for these services, and expanding the potential in medical tourism. 

    The authorities’ plans to adjust pension benefits for lower-income households in a fiscally responsible manner are welcome and should be accompanied by widening the contribution base. Staff welcomes the intention to reassess benefit levels, given the pausing of indexation and a decline in real per capita benefits by 23 percent between 2016 and 2024. Applying inflation indexation to residents’ pensions only would allow for a broadly balanced budget of the old-age pension scheme (before central government transfers). Considerations to providing a supplement for low-income pensioners, which could cost around ½ percent of GDP per year, should be partially financed by broadening the contributor base. Legalizing predominantly young migrant workers and providing incentives for them and their employers to formalize (see below) would increase revenues by about 0.3 percent of GDP. Ensuring longer-term sustainability of social insurances would likely imply tapping general budget resources, which could be expanded with selected measures while avoiding earmarking (see below). Meanwhile, the current draft law to make second-pillar occupational pension plans mandatory would reduce reliance on old-age pensions and increase private savings, which would also help alleviate the sizable current account deficit.

    The authorities envisage the introduction of a VAT while continuing the modernization of the tax authority and improving revenue collection. Given Curaçao’s already significant tax burden and the recent expansion of direct taxation from a pre-pandemic average of 11 percent of GDP to 14 percent of GDP in 2024, plans to design the envisaged VAT reform in a revenue-neutral and equity-enhancing way are welcome. Expanding property taxation on second homes should be prioritized, as well as the purchase and implementation of digital infrastructure to modernize Curaçao’s tax system. Further considerations to introduce a tourism fee (by 2026), end tax holidays on import duties, and adjust permitting fees would lift revenues and contribute to compensating for potential pension increases.

    Further efforts are needed to boost investments and improve government service delivery. While capacity constraints were successfully addressed in the ramp-up of investments in 2024, including by hiring external project managers, capacity in planning and execution must be strengthened further to administer the needed investment increase of 2-3 percent of GDP in the coming years, including via a centralized investment planning unit. Implementing multi-year project budgeting and establishing a transparent procurement system will be critical to improve execution, ensure the efficient allocation of financing resources, and grant space to a gradual inclusion of adaptation investments against damage from sea level rise. Efforts to render health and pension spending as well as goods and services taxation more equitable hinge on improving means-testing and maintaining a state-of-the-art registry for lower-income households.  

    Labor Market Policies to Address Informality and Improve Education

    Informality could be addressed by strengthening incentives for formal work, improving enforcement and monitoring, and tightening eligibility criteria for receiving benefits. Decomposing changes in the formal workforce over the past decade, the strong decline in formal employment was mostly driven by a drop in registered jobs among men, especially in prime working age. Half of this decline cannot be explained by demographics, migration, or unemployment, and is likely attributed to the transition to informality. Tourism and construction sectors offer relatively more opportunities for informal work, making it harder to design the right incentives for formalization. Incentivizing formality, however, is crucial to maintaining government revenues and ensuring social protection for workers, and could be fostered by: facilitating access to education, increasing formal sector productivity, introducing more in-work benefits for workers with incomes between minimum and median wage, and stricter eligibility criteria for monthly assistance, along with strengthening enforcement and monitoring.

    Skill deterioration compounded by population aging is a key drag on long-term potential growth. The 2023 census showed that education levels of new entrants to the labor force are below the level of the pre-retirement cohort, and young employees tend to work in more precarious positions. Ongoing investments in education, in line with landspakket recommendations, including in schools’ physical as well as digital infrastructure, are very welcome. Recent initiatives to attract graduates back to the island, including with tax incentives, and an expedited labor permitting process for high-skill workers are important steps in the right direction. These could be complemented by vocational training to lift the overall skill level and reduce skill mismatches, in line with government’s proposed stimulation package with incentives for employer-led vocational education. Integrating migrants into the workforce would grant them perspectives to grow and invest in their skills.

    Fostering Competitiveness and Diversification

    Bracing for slower growth and mindful of market saturation and the global context, the authorities’ focus is rightly on tourism value added and diversification of source markets. Roads and transportation are among the key bottlenecks of the island, and more public investments are needed to improve the connectivity within the island for tourists to venture out. Public and private investments should also be directed to maritime infrastructure to attract more yacht tourists and move up the tourism value chain. Increasing the number of taxi licenses is welcome and will improve tourist experiences through better mobility. Efforts to tap markets in South America have proven successful, and new flight routes opened from Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, countries with a large consumer base and rising purchasing power.

    Fostering non-tourism sectors in areas of competitive advantage would help build resilience against global shocks and attract additional investments. Building on recent successful reforms to expedite business permits and promote digitalization, more progress is needed to achieve the authorities’ goals as outlined in the National Export Strategy. Curaçao’s connection to a new submarine cable throughout the Caribbean and Miami from 2027 onwards could help expand the island’s data center industry – conditional on sufficient absorption capacity of the electricity grid and a moderation in electricity prices, which remain among the highest in the region. Planned investments in the grid by Aqualectra would be supported by funding from the Netherlands and provide the basis for lifting renewables electricity production to 70 percent by 2027 from around 50 percent currently. The envisaged floating offshore wind park of 3-10 GW would help cover Curaçao’s entire electricity demand and create new export opportunities, in addition to exploratory investments in other energy sources.

    In the presence of global uncertainty, diversification of trade as well as regional integration are key for mitigating Curaçao’s exposure to external shocks. Curaçao’s imports remain concentrated on advanced markets, providing ample room to expand goods imports from neighboring countries, such as Brazil and Colombia. As a new associate CARICOM member and acknowledging limitation of independent trade policy given Kingdom laws, Curaçao should continue strengthening regional cooperation and trade integration with neighboring states.

    The authorities’ commitment to lower corruption vulnerabilities are welcome. The online gaming law has been approved by parliament in end-2024, an important step towards meeting the landspakket’s rule of law target. Curaçao’s recent accession to the UN Convention Against Corruption and delisting from the EU grey list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, following key legal updates in 2024, is another step in the right direction and opens doors for further international cooperation and bilateral tax treaties, as pursued by the authorities. The mutual evaluations of the AML/CFT frameworks for both Curaçao and Sint Maarten are underway, with results expected to be published in mid-July 2025.

    The Monetary Union of Curaçao and Sint Maarten

    The external balance of the Union is expected to improve, following a mild deterioration in 2024. The Union’s current account deficit widened to around 17 percent of GDP in 2024 driven by higher imports, mainly related to construction on Curaçao, and despite strong growth in tourism receipts. Going forward, stronger travel receipts, moderation in construction-related imports, and an increase in renewables would support a contraction of the Union’s current account deficit towards 10 percent of GDP in the medium term. The deficit will continue to be financed by private investment inflows and decumulation of assets abroad. The stock of international reserves would remain broadly stable and adequate over the medium term. Given still sizable deficits and a sustained real effective exchange rate appreciation, staff’s preliminary assessment suggests that the external position in 2024 was weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies in Curaçao and broadly in line in Sint Maarten, albeit subject to high uncertainty given persistent measurement biases. The assessment for the Union is the same as for Curaçao due to its larger size and current account deficits.

    The monetary policy stance is appropriate and continues to support the peg. Following developments in the US, the CBCS cut its benchmark pledging rate by a cumulative 100 basis points in September and November 2024 to 4.75 percent, and has kept it unchanged since then, in line with the pegged exchange rate regime. Transmission to banking sector interest rates continues to be weak, as deposit rates stayed broadly constant throughout the recent tightening and easing cycles, with a mild uptick in late 2023 driven by time deposits, and Union lending rates declined between 2018 and end 2024. Excess liquidity is the key impediment to the transmission, further exacerbated by the absence of interbank and government securities markets.

    With lending rates declining, credit growth has accelerated, entirely driven by mortgages in Curaçao. Mortgage credit in the union, the second highest in the Caribbean, has been growing by double digits in real terms post pandemic, while real overall credit growth has been negative. Driven by Curaçao, mortgages are expected to remain on an upward trajectory, including financing for the construction of second homes and vacation rental apartments. In Sint Maarten, on the contrary, mortgage credit growth turned negative in 2024, possibly reflecting delays in construction projects and cross-border financing on the French side. With the islands’ financial sectors predominantly financing tourism-related activities, credit to non-tourism sectors is declining in real terms.

    The financial sector is broadly sound and systemic risks are contained, but mortgage growth needs to be monitored closely while a macroprudential toolkit is further developed. Banks are well capitalized, among the highest in the region, but both NPLs and provisioning remain weaker than the CBCS early warning signal – and with respect to peers. Liquidity is abundant and has further increased, but the Union’s banks are somewhat less profitable than the Caribbean median and concentration remains high. Closely monitoring mortgage growth to detect overheating in the real estate sector and possible vulnerabilities in household balance sheets should become a priority, in particular given continued data gaps. Overcoming these gaps and further developing a macroprudential toolkit towards the introduction of CCyBs, and thresholds for the loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios are warranted to detect vulnerabilities and ensure timely response to potential shocks. Caps on mortgage credit growth or mortgage loan exposure could be applied should the positive mortgage credit gap widen further.

    The IMF mission would like to thank the authorities for their cooperation and the candid and constructive discussions that took place during June 18-25.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Reah Sy

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/02/07022025-curacao-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Shanghai Launches Multifunctional Easy Go Platform for Foreign Visitors

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    SHANGHAI, July 2 (Xinhua) — East China’s Shanghai Municipality launched Easy Go, a multi-functional digital service platform for foreign tourists, on Wednesday. The city has recently attracted more overseas visitors thanks to its expanded visa-free regime and instant tax refund policy.

    The platform, developed by the Shanghai People’s Government External Affairs Office and the People’s Bank of China Shanghai Office together with other relevant city departments, relies on the international version of Alipay and integrates consumer services and tourism information, eliminating the need to download multiple apps and eliminating language barriers.

    Overseas users can register with one click and gain access to 30 mini-programs in four key areas: dining, transportation, sightseeing, and shopping. Key features include food delivery, restaurant recommendations, public transportation information, taxi hailing, travel recommendations, ticket booking, luggage storage, and tax refund point information. The platform operates primarily in English and offers real-time translation into multiple languages.

    Easy Go has a “Tax Refund” feature that integrates a map of city tax refund points, and provides updated Shanghai travel guides and travel tips. The platform also features videos from media and bloggers promoting Shanghai and China.

    “Easy Go is a very convenient platform because it brings together different daily services,” said Clarisse Le Guernic from France. “Foreign tourists coming to Shanghai don’t need to download many different apps, they can make a payment, translate a phrase, order food and use a bike rental on one platform.”

    As of June, citizens of 55 countries can enjoy 240-hour visa-free transit in China. In addition, China unilaterally expanded the visa-free entry program, allowing travelers from 47 countries to stay in the country visa-free for up to 30 days. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Chinese brands offer consumers around the world more choice – Chinese Foreign Ministry

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 2 (Xinhua) — Chinese brands are offering consumers around the world more choices by expanding into overseas markets, and China itself welcomes more high-quality foreign brands to enter its market, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said at a regular briefing for reporters on Wednesday.

    Mao Ning made the remarks when asked about the expansion of many Chinese brands globally. Chinese beverage brands such as Mixue Bingcheng and Chagee have recently filed for initial public offerings (IPOs) overseas, attracting increased attention.

    “Indeed, many Chinese brands are winning over more and more overseas consumers due to their scientific content, cultural content, inspiring design and emotional value that unites China and other countries,” Mao Ning said.

    According to her, the transition from “Made in China” to “Chinese brands” is an inevitable result of China’s high-quality development, driven by China’s complete industrial system, fair and open market environment, and long-term innovative development.

    The diplomat also noted that China welcomes more high-quality foreign brands to enter the Chinese market to achieve common prosperity and enable people from all countries to truly benefit from economic globalization. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: D. Trump announces trade deal with Vietnam

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    NEW YORK, July 2 (Xinhua) — U.S. President Donald Trump announced on his social media platform Truth Social that he had just concluded a trade deal with Vietnam after talking with General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam To Lam.

    “This will be a great deal of cooperation between our two countries. The terms stipulate that Vietnam will pay the United States a customs duty of 20 percent on all goods shipped to our territory, without exception, and 40 percent on all transhipments,” the American leader wrote.

    As noted in the publication, in exchange, Vietnam will do something it has never done before, namely, provide the United States with full access to its market for trade.

    The country will “open its market to the United States,” meaning “we will be able to sell our products to Vietnam at zero tariff rates,” D. Trump said. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: General Secretary of the CPV Central Committee welcomes new Vietnam-US trade deal

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    HANOI, July 2 (Xinhua) — General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee To Lam welcomed the new trade agreement between Vietnam and the United States during a phone conversation with U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday, the Vietnam News Agency reported.

    To Lam called on Washington to recognize Vietnam as a market economy as soon as possible and lift restrictions on the export of some high-tech goods.

    The two leaders also discussed the main directions for further strengthening the Vietnam-US comprehensive strategic partnership in the coming years and related measures. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Global Conference on Digital Economy underway in Beijing

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 2 (Xinhua) — High-ranking guests from China and abroad gathered in Beijing for the 2025 Global Conference on Digital Economy, calling for international cooperation to develop the digital economy and build “digital cities” around the world.

    Global industry leaders gathered at the event, which opened in the Chinese capital on Wednesday, to build consensus on digital development through city-level collaboration, technology innovation and adoption, and promoting inclusive and sustainable growth.

    Stressing the key role of digital technology in urban development, Zhuang Rongwen, director of the Office of the Central Cybersecurity and Information Technology Commission, said the internet has unique advantages that promote global cooperation.

    Cities around the world should leverage these advantages to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the fields of digital economy and artificial intelligence, thereby creating a favorable environment and greater opportunities for their development, he said.

    Fu Hua, director general of Xinhua News Agency, noted that Xinhua, as China’s state media, has long been covering China’s digital development and is willing to expand cooperation with all interested parties in promoting the digital economy.

    Fu Hua said the news agency will strive to comprehensively cover China’s progress in developing digital cities and tell vivid stories about the interactions between cities in China and other countries.

    UNDP Resident Representative in China Beate Trankmann praised Beijing’s achievements in digital development. She noted that the Chinese capital has taken many innovative steps that have provided important lessons for the global community, such as using digital technologies to improve urban governance.

    “Beijing, as a pioneer in building a global digital city, has not only integrated the concept of digital adaptation into its urban development strategy, but also set an example for the world by introducing a number of innovative practices,” said Zhang Xiangchen, Deputy Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

    According to him, the transformation in the digital era represents not only technological breakthroughs, but also an evolution of the concept of global cooperation. Zhang Xiangchen promised that the WTO will continue to play its role as a connecting multilateral platform through which technological advances can more effectively contribute to human well-being and global development. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China completes list of key construction projects for 2025 worth 800 billion yuan

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 2 (Xinhua) — Chinese authorities have finalized and released a complete list of key construction projects for this year aimed at implementing major national strategies and enhancing security capabilities in priority areas, the National Development and Reform Commission of the People’s Republic of China said on Wednesday.

    The department noted that after the recent allocation of more than 300 billion yuan for the third / final / group of projects in 2025, the total amount of allocated funds amounted to 800 billion yuan / about 111.8 billion US dollars /.

    The NSC said the funds will support 1,459 projects in priority areas including restoration of the Yangtze River basin ecosystem, major transportation infrastructure projects along the Yangtze River, the new western land-sea corridor, high-standard farmland, major water conservancy projects and urban underground pipelines.

    The department promised to speed up new reform measures in priority areas, including improving the financing models for the Yangtze River railway, establishing and improving the operation mechanisms of underground pipelines, and optimizing the planning of national logistics hubs.

    China is making efforts to expand effective investment and stimulate consumption. In addition to the implementation of the above-mentioned significant projects, support for large-scale equipment renewal programs and trade-in for consumer goods is also being increased.

    In 2025, to support the trade-in program, the Chinese authorities issued ultra-long special treasury bonds totaling 300 billion yuan, with the first two tranches of financing totaling 162 billion yuan allocated in January and April, respectively. The third tranche is scheduled for July.

    China’s gross domestic product grew 5.4 percent year-on-year in the first quarter of 2025. The economic growth target for this year is around 5 percent. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Sobyanin took part in a meeting with members of the Russian Government

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Vladimir Putin held meeting with members of the Government of the Russian Federation via videoconference. Participation in it was taken by Sergei Sobyanin.

    The meeting began with a discussion of measures to support participants in the special military operation (SVO) who were injured and remained in military service. Their social security should remain one of the priority areas of work, the Russian President emphasized.

    The meeting also discussed topics related to the construction of high-speed highways, the first of which will connect Moscow and St. Petersburg. According to Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Savelyev, systematic work is underway to implement this project – all key financial and organizational procedures have already been completed.

    “The construction of a test section of the route, from Zelenograd to Tver, 129 kilometers long, will be critical for the implementation of the high-speed railway project. The section includes the sixth and seventh stages of the project and will be completed in the fourth quarter of 2027. It will become an experimental testing ground for all systems of the domestic high-speed train, developed at the Ural Locomotives plant by the Sinara Group. The delivery of the first two trains is synchronized with the construction of these sections,” said Vitaly Savelyev.

    Once the highway opens, travel time from Moscow to St. Petersburg will be just 2 hours and 15 minutes. Passenger traffic on the route is expected to be at least 23 million people by the end of 2030.

    It is planned that by 2045 the length of the high-speed highway network will exceed 4.5 thousand kilometers.

    Vitaly Savelyev also promised to report next spring on the completion dates and parameters of the remaining high-speed railways that are planned to be built next. These are the roads from Moscow to Yekaterinburg, Adler, Ryazan and Minsk.

    In addition, the meeting discussed issues of developing the country’s backbone airport network. According to Vladimir Putin, this work must be carried out dynamically, without losing momentum.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/mayor/tkhemes/13021050/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements – A10-0117/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

    (COM(2025)0084 – C10‑0036/2025 – 2025/0040(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0084),

    – having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 172 and 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, and Articles 183 and 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0036/2025),

    – having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025[1],

    – after consulting the Committee of the Regions,

    – having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy and of the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0117/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

    AMENDMENTS BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT[*]

    to the Commission proposal

    ———————————————————

     

    2025/0040 (COD)

    Proposal for a

    REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 172 and Article 173, Article 175, third paragraph, Article 182(1), Article 188, second paragraph, Article 183 and Article 194 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

    Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 29 April 2025[2],

    After consulting the Committee of the Regions▌,

    Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

    Whereas:

    (1) The Union faces massive financing needs to deliver on its objectives in the areas of innovation, the green and digital transition, and social investment and skills, while a complex backdrop affecting the Union’s competitiveness and industrial base characterised by changing global dynamics, slow economic growth, accelerated climate change and environmental degradation, technological competition and rising geopolitical tensions needs to be addressed. In that context, enhancing the Union’s autonomy, in particular in the area of energy, by supporting investments that strengthen a renewable-based and clean energy system, is essential to reduce dependencies and safeguard economic and political stability.

    (1a) Additionality and the leveraging effect of the EU guarantee are the foundation of both the EFSI and the InvestEU Programme, enabling especially the scaling up of new and innovative technologies and companies as well as de-risking investment for private investors. It is necessary for the European Parliament to have better oversight over the InvestEU Programme to ensure that the EU guarantee is used in accordance with the programme’s objectives, such as fostering sustainable growth and competitiveness, with genuine additionality compared to private investors.

    (2) The Draghi report assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030, with EUR 450 billion needed for the energy transition alone. This includes a substantial amount for the green and digital transition. Ensuring sufficient public and private investment is critical to boost productivity growth and achieve Union’s goals, leverage private investments with the objective to decarbonise industry, accelerate the production, storage and deployment of clean energy and electrification, strengthen interconnections and grids, advance sustainable and circular business models, foster sustainable building renovation, develop clean tech manufacturing as well as digital technologies and their diffusion across economic sectors.

    (2a) Europe is experiencing an acute housing crisis which consists in two market failures: a shortage of affordable and social housing, and a failure to bridge the energy efficiency gap, with 46 million Europeans living in energy poverty. According to an analysis by the EIB Group, an estimated annual investment of EUR 300 to 400 billion is needed for construction and renovation only. In that regard, the Commission is planning to present a first-ever European Affordable Housing Plan and is partnering with the EIB Group, national promotional banks and international financial institutions to develop a European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing. Increasing the amount available under the social investment and skills policy window would allow greater support from InvestEU for that key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments in relation to housing. This would contribute to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights.

    (2b) In the light of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, increased national and European spending is required to enhance European defence capabilities and to support the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB). On 19 March 2025, the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy presented a White Paper for European Defence –Readiness 2030 containing a plan to significantly step up Europe’s spending on security and defence. InvestEU enables financing and investment operations to develop the Union defence industry and military mobility, including financial support to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mid-caps. Increasing the amount available under the relevant windows would allow greater support from InvestEU for this key priority. In particular, it is necessary for the Commission and implementing partners to enhance the visibility and accessibility of financing instruments for SMEs, mid-caps, and start-ups in the defence supply chain.

    (2c) In 2024, the Commission launched, together with the European Investment Fund, an export credit guarantee facility under InvestEU with a view to encouraging Union SMEs to strengthen economic ties with Ukraine and revitalise trade, thereby contributing to Ukraine’s economic recovery and improving the competitiveness of SMEs. It is important that as many European export credit agencies as possible participate in this facility.

    (2d) The Letta and Draghi reports underline the importance of well-functioning transport networks and services to ensure a transition towards a green economy while strengthening the Union’s competitiveness. In that regard, massive strategic investments are needed to complete missing links and to modernise transport infrastructure, where major gaps exist in public and private financing.

    (3) The InvestEU Fund is the main EU-level tool to leverage public and private funding to support a broad range of Union policy priorities. Through its comprehensive network of implementing partners, including the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Investment Fund (EIF), other international financial institutions and national promotional banks and institutions, the InvestEU Fund is delivering much-needed financing through its risk-sharing capacity. The InvestEU interim evaluation highlighted that budgetary guarantees are inherently efficient for the EU budget and confirmed that the programme is well on track to mobilise investment, with a notable expected impact on the real economy. However, approvals of financing and investment operation under InvestEU were heavily frontloaded, and as a result, if no action is taken to address the issue, new approvals for some financial products may cease after 2025.

    (4) The financial capacity of InvestEU Fund should be increased and used even more efficiently in combination with resources that will become available under the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and other legacy instruments (CEF Debt Instrument and InnovFin Debt Facility) implemented by the EIB Group. These combinations potentially reduce the budget revenues from legacy instruments. However, they would also create the possibility for an increased volume of guarantee cover to be provided for strategic investments in key Union priority areas for an additional investment of around EUR 25 billion that can be expected to be mobilised and by leading to an increased diversification of risks and thus not substantially increasing the risks for the Union budget.

    (5) With the EUR 4,5 billion increase of the EU guarantee underpinned by ▌additional reflows of EUR 1,8 billion, and the efficiency measures implemented by combining the capacities of the legacy instruments with the InvestEU Fund, it is expected that around EUR 70 billion in additional investment could be mobilised. The financial contribution of the EIB Group should be proportionally adjusted to the share of the increased EU guarantee allocated to them. The indicative distribution of the EU guarantee between the four policy windows should be increased proportionally to the increase of the EU guarantee.

    (5a) InvestEU advisory services play an important role in the development of a pipeline of projects. Those advisory services are particularly useful in complex areas, such as affordable social housing and defence. It would therefore be appropriate to use EUR 200 million in reflows to increase the amount made available for such services. Furthermore, it is necessary to enhance the interaction between the various components of the InvestEU Programme, in particular between the InvestEU Advisory Hub and the InvestEU Portal.

    (5b) The Commission estimates the amount of provisioning required to cover future life-time losses from the operations supported under the InvestEU Fund with a 95 % confidence level of the value at risk. Taking into account the positive experience with the InvestEU Programme to date and in order to maximise budgetary efficiency while preserving a suitable level of risk management, it would be appropriate for the Commission to assess whether to reduce that level to 90 %, which would be in line with risk-related methodologies in Union external policies and would enable a high volume of financing and investment operations in support of the Union’s strategic priorities.

    (6) In order to enhance the attractiveness of the Member State compartment under the InvestEU Fund, it should be made possible for Member States to contribute also in a fully funded manner through an InvestEU financial instrument in addition to the existing option of contributing to the EU guarantee. The support from InvestEU financial instrument should, to the extent possible, be implemented following the same principles as those of the EU guarantee. Through the InvestEU financial instrument, non-euro Member States could benefit from the InvestEU programme financially more efficiently in their own currency. The InvestEU financial instrument should also provide a further incentive for responsibly increasing the risk appetite of the implementing partners thereby contributing to the crowding-in of private capital.

    (6a) It is possible to combine amounts allocated to the Member State compartment with resources under the EU compartment in a layered structure to achieve a better risk coverage, in particular with a first loss tranche covered by national resources. Member States should further explore that possibility to mobilise more investments in strategic areas. To ensure coherence with the objectives of the InvestEU Programme, such combinations should respect the principles of EU value-added, fair competition, and the integrity of the internal market, and should support cross-border cooperation where relevant.

    (7) In line with an overall objective of simplification so as to alleviate the administrative burden for final recipients, financial intermediaries and implementing partners, reporting requirements, including those relating to key performance and monitoring indicators, should be reduced, where appropriate, in particular those that affect small businesses and small-size operations. Without prejudice to the definition of an SME for the purposes of other Union acts and any future programmes and funds, the application of the definition of an SME for the purposes of the InvestEU Programme should be adjusted to remove complexities to the extent possible, taking account of the possibility for implementing partners to request information on the ownership structure of SMEs for the purpose of calculating the headcount. In that regard, and as noted in Recital 14 of Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC[3], enterprises should be permitted to use solemn declarations to certify specific characteristics relevant to their SME status, such as the autonomy of their ownership structures. Specific attention should be paid to social economy enterprises and micro finance institutions.

    (7a) It is appropriate for the Commission to take further non-legislative simplification measures in order to complement this amending Regulation, such as reducing the frequency of progress reports to be submitted by implementing partners. However, it is important that such measures do not compromise the effectiveness of auditing and monitoring mechanisms necessary to ensure alignment with the Union’s policy objectives.

    (7b) It is important that State aid procedures applicable to operations supported under the InvestEU Fund be proportionate, predictable, and streamlined. In that context, it is also important that the Commission explore all available means to simplify and accelerate State aid assessments. This could include making greater use of the principle of market conformity. Furthermore, it is necessary that, where appropriate, the Commission provide timely guidance and further clarify and simplify the application of State aid rules to national financial instruments.

    (8) The frequency and scope of reports should also be reduced for the InvestEU programme and its predecessor, the EFSI programme.

    (9) For the Commission’s accounting, implementing partners should provide for combinations audited financial statements in line with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation, clearly delineating the amounts related to the different legal basis.

    (10) Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 should be amended to allow for combinations of support under those Regulations and the EU guarantee under this Regulation.

    (10a) On 18 April 2019, the Commission declared that ‘without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), one-off contributions by Member States, either by a Member State or by national promotional banks classified in the general government sector or acting on behalf of a Member State, into thematic or multi-country investment platforms should in principle qualify as one-off measures within the meaning of Articles 5(1) and 9(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (13) and Article 3(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (14). In addition, without prejudice to the prerogatives of the Council in the implementation of the SGP, the Commission will consider to what extent the same treatment as for the EFSI in the context of the Commission communication on flexibility can be applied to the InvestEU Programme as the successor instrument to the EFSI with regard to one-off contributions provided by Member States in cash to finance an additional amount of the EU guarantee for the purposes of the Member State compartment’. Since then, the economic governance framework has changed. In light of this, Member State contributions should still be considered as one-off measures.

    (11) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address Union-wide and Member State specific market failures and the investment gap within the Union, to accelerate the Union’s green and digital transition, enhance its competitiveness and strengthen its industrial base cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, but can be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary to achieve those objectives.

    (11a) In order to support the European Parliament in exercising its institutional role in overseeing Union funds and ensuring alignment with agreed policy objectives, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should assess the effectiveness and impact of the derogations introduced by this amending Regulation, in particular their role in facilitating access to finance for target groups such as SMEs. It should also consider the overall functioning of the InvestEU Programme in the light of the principles of transparency, accountability and performance monitoring, including an examination of the relevance of financial thresholds applicable to SMEs in the light of economic developments.

    (11b) With a view to reducing administrative complexity and legal uncertainty, the independent final evaluation report on the InvestEU Programme referred to in Article 29(3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/523 should also take into account any regulatory adjustments arising from the projected legislative proposal on a small mid-cap enterprise category. Due attention should be given to the effectiveness of measures aimed at facilitating enterprise development,

     

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

    Article 1

    Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 [InvestEU Regulation]

    Regulation (EU) 2021/523 is amended as follows:

    (1) In Article 1, the first paragraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘This Regulation establishes the InvestEU Fund, which shall provide for an EU guarantee and an InvestEU financial instrument to support financing and investment operations carried out by the implementing partners that contribute to objectives of the Union’s internal policies.’;

    (2) Article 2 is amended as follows:

    (a) points (3), (4) and (5) are replaced by the following:

    ‘(3) ‘policy window’ means a targeted area for support by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument as laid down in Article 8(1);’

    (4) ‘compartment’ means a part of the support provided under the InvestEU Fund defined in terms of the origin of the resources backing it;’

    (5) ‘blending operation’ means, under the EU compartment, an operation supported by the Union budget that combines non-repayable forms of support, repayable forms of support, or both, from the Union budget with repayable forms of support from development or other public finance institutions, or from commercial finance institutions and investors; for the purposes of this definition, Union programmes financed from sources other than the Union budget, such as the EU ETS Innovation Fund, may be assimilated to Union programmes financed by the Union budget;’;

    (b) point (8) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(8) ‘contribution agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and one or more Member States specify the conditions for the implementation of the contribution under the Member State compartment, as laid down in Articles 10 and 10a, respectively;’;

    (c) points (10) and (11) are replaced by the following:

    ‘(10) ‘financing and investment operations’ or ‘financing or investment operations’ means operations to provide finance directly or indirectly to final recipients through financial products:

    (a) in the context of the EU guarantee, carried out by an implementing partner in its own name, provided by the implementing partner in accordance with its internal rules, policies and procedures and accounted for in the implementing partner’s financial statements or, where applicable, disclosed in the notes to those financial statements;

    (b) in the context of the InvestEU financial instrument, carried out by the implementing partner in its own name or in its own name but on behalf of the Commission, as applicable;

    (11) ‘funds under shared management’ means funds that provide for the possibility of allocating a portion of those funds to the provisioning for a budgetary guarantee or to a financial instrument under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council[4], the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council[5] (the ‘ESF+ Regulation for 2021-2027’), the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund (EMFAF) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1139 of the European Parliament and of the Council[6] and the European Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) established by Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council[7] (the ‘CAP Strategic Plans Regulation’);’;

    (d)  point 12 is replaced by the following:

    ‘(12) ‘guarantee agreement’ means a legal instrument whereby the Commission and an implementing partner specify the conditions for proposing financing and investment operations in order for them to be granted the benefit of the EU guarantee and/or of the InvestEU financial instrument, for providing the EU guarantee or support through the InvestEU financial instrument for those operations and for implementing them in accordance with this Regulation;’;

    (e) point 21 is replaced by the following:

    ‘(21) ‘small and medium-sized enterprise’ (‘SME’) means (a) in case of financial products not conferring advantage in State aid terms, an enterprise which, according to its last annual or consolidated accounts, employs an average number of employees during the financial year of less than 250 and which has an annual turnover not exceeding EUR 50 million and where information relating to the autonomy of its ownership structure for the purpose of calculating those thresholds may be made by way of a solemn declaration by the enterprise, or (b) in case of other types of financial products, a micro, small or medium-sized enterprise within the meaning of the Annex to Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC[8] or as otherwise defined in the guarantee agreement;’;

    (f) the following point 24 is added:

    ‘(24) ‘InvestEU financial instrument’ means a measure defined in Article 2, point (30), of the Financial Regulation to be implemented under the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund.’;

    (3) Article 4 is amended as follows:

    (a) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

    (i) in the first subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘The EU guarantee for the purposes of the EU compartment referred to in point (a) of Article 9(1) shall be EUR 30 652 310 073 in current prices.’;

    (ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘An additional amount of the EU guarantee may be provided for the purposes of the Member State compartment referred to in point (b) of Article 9(1) of this Regulation, subject to the allocation by Member States, pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council[9] (the ‘Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027’) and Article 81 of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, of the corresponding amounts.’;

    (b) in paragraph 2, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘An amount of EUR 15 827 310 073 in current prices of the amount referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 of this Article shall be allocated for the objectives referred to in Article 3(2).’;

    (ba) paragraph 3 is replaced by the following:

    ‘3.  The financial envelope for the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII shall be EUR 630 000 000 in current prices.’

    (4) in Article 6(1), the first sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘The EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument shall be implemented in indirect management with the bodies referred to in points (c)(ii), (c)(iii), (c)(v) and (c)(vi) of Article 62(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

    (5) Article 7 is amended as follows:

    (a) The title is replaced by the following:

    ‘Combinations’

    (b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

    ‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be combined to support financial products or portfolios implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

    (c) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

    ‘Support from the EU guarantee under this Regulation, Union support provided through the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 and released from the operations approved under these instruments and Union support provided through the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 and released from operations approved under that EU guarantee may be combined to support financial products or portfolios containing exclusively financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, implemented or to be implemented by the EIB or the EIF under this Regulation.’;

    (d) the following paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are added:

    ‘5. By derogation from Article 212(3), second subparagraph of the Financial Regulation, the released guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020 may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

    6. By derogation from Article 216(4), point (a) of the Financial Regulation, the provisioning corresponding to the released guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017  may not be taken into account for the purpose of operations  referred to in Article 216(4) of the Financial Regulation and may be used for covering financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation for the purpose of the combination referred to in paragraph 4.

    7. The release of the guarantee under the financial instruments established by the programmes in the programming period 2014-2020, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to Common Provisioning Fund and the release of the guarantee under the Union support from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 referred to in paragraph 4 shall take place by an amendment of the relevant agreements signed between the Commission and the EIB or the EIF. 

    The conditions of the use of the released guarantees referred to in the first subparagraph, to cover financing and investment operations eligible under this Regulation, and where relevant, the transfer of corresponding assets from fiduciary accounts to the Common Provisioning Fund, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.

    The terms and conditions of the financial products referred to in paragraphs 1 and 4 of this Article and of the portfolios concerned, including the respective pro rata shares of losses, revenues, repayments and recoveries or the respective non pro rata shares in accordance with the second subparagraph of paragraph 3, shall be set out in the guarantee agreement referred to in Article 17.’;

    (6) In Article 8(8), the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘The Commission, together with implementing partners, shall seek to ensure that the part of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment used for the sustainable infrastructure policy window is distributed with the aim of achieving a balance between the different areas referred to in point (a) of paragraph 1.’;

    (7) In Article 9(1), point (b) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(b) the Member State compartment shall address specific market failures or suboptimal investment situations in one or several regions or Member States to deliver the policy objectives of the contributing funds under shared management or of the additional amount provided by a Member State under  Article 4(1), third subparagraph, or under Article 10a(1), second subparagraph, in particular to strengthen economic, social and territorial cohesion in the Union by addressing imbalances between its regions.’;

    (8) Article 10 is amended as follows:

    (a) the title is replaced by the following:

    ‘Specific provisions applicable to the EU Guarantee implemented under the Member State compartment’;

    (b) in paragraph 2, the fourth subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘The Member State and the Commission shall conclude a contribution agreement or an amendment to it following the Commission Decision approving the Partnership Agreement pursuant to the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or the CAP Strategic Plan under the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation or simultaneously to the Commission Decision amending a programme in accordance with the  Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or a CAP Strategic Plan in accordance with the provisions on the amendment to the CAP Strategic Plan laid down in the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation.’;

    (c) in paragraph 3, point (b) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(b) the Member State strategy, consisting of the type of financing, the target leverage, the geographical coverage, including regional coverage if necessary, types of projects, the investment period and, where applicable, the categories of final recipients and of eligible intermediaries;’;

    (9) The following Article 10a is inserted:

    ‘Article 10a

    Specific provisions applicable to the InvestEU financial instrument implemented under the Member State compartment

    1. A Member State may contribute amounts from the funds under shared management to the Member State compartment of the InvestEU Fund in view of deploying them through the InvestEU financial instrument.

    Member States may also provide additional amounts for the purposes of the InvestEU financial instrument. Such amounts shall constitute an external assigned revenue in accordance with Article 21(5), second sentence of the Financial Regulation.

    Amounts allocated by a Member State on a voluntary basis pursuant to the first and second subparagraph shall be used for supporting financing and investment operations in the Member State concerned. Those amounts shall be used to contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives specified in the Partnership Agreement referred to in Article 11(1)(a) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027, in the programmes or in the CAP Strategic Plan which contribute to the InvestEU Programme, in order to implement relevant measures set out in the recovery and resilience plans in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2021/241 or, in other cases, for the purposes laid down in the contribution agreement, depending on the origin of the amount contributed.

    2.  Contribution to the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the conclusion of a contribution agreement between a Member State and the Commission, which for the contributions from funds under shared management shall be done in accordance with Article 10(2), fourth subparagraph.

    Two or more Member States may conclude a joint contribution agreement with the Commission.

    3. The contribution agreement shall at least contain the amount of the contribution by the Member State and the currency of the financing and investment operations, provisions on the Union remuneration for the InvestEU financial instrument, the elements set out in points (b) to (e) and (g) of Article 10(3) and the treatment of resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument.

    4. The contribution agreements shall be implemented through guarantee agreements concluded in accordance with Article 10(4), first subparagraph.

    Where no guarantee agreement has been concluded within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be terminated or prolonged by mutual agreement. Where the amount of a contribution agreement has not been fully committed under one or more guarantee agreements within 12 months from the conclusion of the contribution agreement, that amount shall be amended accordingly. The unused amount of a contribution from funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of a contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

    Where a guarantee agreement has not been duly implemented within the period specified in Article 14(6) of the Common Provisions Regulation for 2021-2027 or Article 81(6) of the CAP Strategic Plans Regulation, or, in the case of a guarantee agreement related to amounts provided in accordance with paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article, in the relevant contribution agreement, the contribution agreement shall be amended. The unused amounts allocated by Member States pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The unused amount of an InvestEU financial instrument attributable to the contribution by a Member State under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

    Resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument pursuant to the provisions on the use of the funds under shared management delivered through the InvestEU Programme shall be re-used in accordance with the respective Regulations. The resources generated by or attributable to the amounts contributed to the InvestEU financial instrument under paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of this Article shall be paid back to the Member State.

    5. Contracts implementing the InvestEU financial instrument between the implementing partner and the final recipient or the financial intermediary or other entity referred to in Article 16(1), point (a), shall be signed by 31 December 2028.’;

    (9a) In Article 11(1), point (d)(i) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(i) be allocated an amount of up to EUR 450 000 000 from the financial envelope referred to in Article 4(3) for the advisory initiatives referred to in Article 25 and the operational tasks referred to in point (ii) of this point;’;

    (10) the title of Chapter IV is replaced by the following:

    ‘EU guarantee and InvestEU financial instrument’;

    (11) in Article 13(4), the first two sentences are replaced by the following:

    ‘75 % of the EU guarantee under the EU compartment as referred to in the first subparagraph of Article 4(1), amounting to EUR 22 989 232 555, shall be granted to the EIB Group. The EIB Group shall provide an aggregate financial contribution amounting to EUR 5 747 308 139.’;

    (12) Article 16 is amended as follows:

    (a) in paragraph 1, the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘The InvestEU financial instrument may be used to provide funding to the implementing partners for the types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph provided by the implementing partners.

    In order to be covered by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument, the financing referred to in the first and second subparagraph shall be granted, acquired or issued for the benefit of financing and investment operations referred to in Article 14(1), where the financing by the implementing partner was granted in accordance with a financing agreement or transaction signed or entered into by the implementing partner after the signature of the guarantee agreement and that has not expired or been cancelled.’;

    (b) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

    ‘Financing and investment operations through funds or other intermediate structures shall be supported by the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with the provisions laid down in the investment guidelines, as applicable, even if such structures invest a minority of their invested amounts outside the Union and in third countries referred to Article 14(2) or invest a minority of their invested amounts into assets other than those eligible under this Regulation.’;

    (13) Article 17 is amended as follows:

    (a) in paragraph 1, the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘The Commission shall conclude a guarantee agreement with each implementing partner on the granting of the EU guarantee up to an amount to be determined by the Commission or on providing support under the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

    (b) paragraph 2 is amended as follows:

    (i) point (c) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(c)  detailed rules on the provision of the EU guarantee or support under the InvestEU financial instrument in accordance with Article 19, including on the coverage of financing and investment operations or portfolios of specific types of instruments and the respective events that trigger possible calls on the EU guarantee or the use of the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

    (ii) point (f) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(f) the commitment of the implementing partner to accept the decisions by the Commission and the Investment Committee as regards the use of the EU guarantee or of the InvestEU financial instrument for the benefit of a proposed financing or investment operation, without prejudice to the decision-making of the implementing partner in respect of the proposed financing or investment operation without the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument;’;

    (iii) points (h) and (i) are replaced by the following:

    ‘(h)  financial and operational reporting and monitoring of the financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument;

    (i) key performance indicators, in particular as regards the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument, the fulfilment of the objectives and criteria laid down in Articles 3, 8 and 14, and the mobilisation of private capital;’;

    (ba) the following paragraph is added:

    ‘5a. The Commission shall, upon request, provide to the European Parliament and the Council the names of the implementing partners party to the guarantee agreements and the main content of those agreements, having due regard to the legitimate interest of undertakings in the protection of their business secrets.’;

    (14) Article 18 is amended as follows:

    (a) the title is replaced by the following:

    ‘Requirements for the use of the EU guarantee and the InvestEU financial instrument’;

    (b) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

    ‘1.  The granting of the EU guarantee and the support from the InvestEU financial instrument shall be subject to the entry into force of the guarantee agreement with the relevant implementing partner.’;

    (c) paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

    ‘Financing and investment operations shall be covered by the EU guarantee or be supported through the InvestEU financial instrument only where they fulfil the criteria laid down in this Regulation and, if applicable, in the relevant investment guidelines, and where the Investment Committee has concluded that those operations fulfil the requirements for benefiting from the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument. The implementing partners shall remain responsible for ensuring that the financing and investment operations comply with this Regulation and the relevant investment guidelines.’;

    (d) paragraph 3 is amended as follows:

    (i) the first sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘No administrative costs or fees related to the implementation of financing and investment operations under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument shall be due to the implementing partner by the Commission unless the nature of the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented and the affordability for the targeted final recipients or the type of financing provided allow the implementing partner to duly justify to the Commission the need for an exception.’

    (ii) the following second subparagraph is added:

    ‘Notwithstanding the first subparagraph, implementing partners are entitled to appropriate fees in relation to the management of fiduciary accounts relating to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

    (e) paragraph 4 is replaced by the following:

    ‘In addition, the implementing partner may use the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument to meet the relevant share of any recovery costs in accordance with Article 17(4), unless those costs have been deducted from recovery proceeds.’;

    (15) Article 19 is amended as follows:

    (a) the title is replaced by the following:

    ‘Coverage and terms of the EU guarantee and of the InvestEU financial instrument’;

    (b) paragraph 1 is amended as follows:

    (i) the second sentence of the first subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘The remuneration for the EU guarantee or for the InvestEU financial instrument may be reduced in the duly justified cases referred to in Article 13(2).’;

    (ii) the second subparagraph is replaced by the following:

    ‘The implementing partner shall have appropriate exposure at its own risk to financing and investment operations supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument, unless exceptionally the policy objectives targeted by the financial product to be implemented are of such nature that the implementing partner could not reasonably contribute its own risk-bearing capacity to it.’;

    (c) in paragraph 2, first subparagraph, point (a), the introductory sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘for debt products referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):’;

    (d) the following paragraph 2a is inserted:

    ‘2a.  The InvestEU financial instrument shall cover:

    (a)  for debt products consisting of guarantees and counter-guarantees referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1):

    (i) the principal and all interest and amounts due to the implementing partner but not received by it in accordance with the terms of the financing operations prior to the event of default;

    (ii) restructuring losses;

    (iii) losses arising from fluctuations of currencies other than the euro in markets where possibilities for long-term hedging are limited;

    (b)  for other eligible types of financing referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of Article 16(1): the amounts invested or lent by the implementing partner;

    For the purposes of point (a)(i) of the first subparagraph, for subordinated debt a deferral, reduction or required exit shall be considered to be an event of default.

    The Invest EU financial instrument shall cover the entire exposure of the Union with respect to the relevant financing and investment operations.’;

    (16) in Article 22, paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

    ‘A scoreboard of indicators (the ‘Scoreboard’) shall be established to ensure that the Investment Committee is able to carry out an independent, transparent and harmonised assessment of requests for the use of the EU guarantee or, as applicable, the InvestEU financial instrument for financing and investment operations proposed by implementing partners.’;

    (17) in Article 23, paragraph 2 is replaced by the following:

    ‘EIB financing and investment operations that fall within the scope of this Regulation shall not be covered by the EU guarantee or benefit from the InvestEU financial instrument where the Commission delivers an unfavourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute.’;

    (18) Article 24 is amended as follows:

    (a) in paragraph 1, first subparagraph is amended as follows:

    (i) point (a) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(a)  examine the proposals for financing and investment operations submitted by implementing partners for coverage under the EU guarantee or for support from the InvestEU financial instrument that have passed the policy check referred to in Article 23(1) of this Regulation or that have received a favourable opinion within the framework of the procedure provided for in Article 19 of the EIB Statute;’;

    (ii) point (c) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(c)  check whether the financing and investment operations that would benefit from the support under the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument comply with all relevant requirements.’;

    (b) in paragraph 4, second subparagraph, the last sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘Any project assessment conducted by an implementing partner shall not be binding on the Investment Committee for the purposes of granting a financing or investment operation coverage by the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

    (c) paragraph 5 is amended as follows:

    (i) in the second subparagraph, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘Conclusions of the Investment Committee approving the coverage of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation shall be publicly accessible and shall include the rationale for the approval and information on the operation, in particular its description, the identity of the promoters or financial intermediaries, and the objectives of the operation.’;

    (ii) in the fifth subparagraph, the second sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘That submission shall include any decisions rejecting the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument.’;

    (d) in paragraph 6, the first sentence is replaced by the following:

    ‘Where the Investment Committee is requested to approve the use of the EU guarantee or support from the InvestEU financial instrument for a financing or investment operation that is a facility, programme or structure which has underlying sub-projects, that approval shall comprise those underlying sub-projects unless the Investment Committee decides to retain the right to approve them separately.’;

    (19) in Article 25(2), point (c) is replaced by the following:

    ‘(c)  where appropriate, assist project promoters in developing their projects so that they fulfil the objectives set out in Articles 3 and 8 and the eligibility criteria set out in Article 14, and facilitate the development of among others important projects of common European interest and aggregators for small-sized projects, including through investment platforms as referred to in point (f) of this paragraph, provided that such assistance does not prejudge the conclusions of the Investment Committee with respect to the coverage of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument with respect to such projects;’;

    (20) Article 28 is amended as follows:

    (a) in paragraph 2, the following second subparagraph is added:

    ‘Implementing partners shall be exempt from reporting on key performance and monitoring indicators laid down in Annex III, except those in points 1, 2, 3.1, 3.2, 4.1, 5.2, 6.3 and 7.2, as far as financing or investments operations benefiting final recipients receiving financing or investment supported by the EU guarantee or by the InvestEU financial instrument from an implementing partner or a financial intermediary not exceeding EUR 300 000 are concerned.’;

    (b) paragraphs 3 and 4 are replaced by the following:

    ‘3. The Commission shall report on the implementation of the InvestEU Programme in accordance with Articles 241 and 250 of the Financial Regulation. In accordance with Article 41(5) of the Financial Regulation, the annual report shall provide information on the level of implementation of the Programme with respect to its objectives and performance indicators. For that purpose, each implementing partner shall provide on an annual basis the information necessary to allow the Commission to comply with its reporting obligations, including information on the operation of the EU guarantee or the InvestEU financial instrument.’

    4. Once a year, each implementing partner shall submit a report to the Commission on the financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation, broken down by EU compartment and Member State compartment, as appropriate. Each implementing partner shall also submit information on the Member State compartment to the Member State whose compartment it implements. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and the Invest EU financial instrument and with the key performance indicators laid down in Annex III to this Regulation. The report shall also include operational, statistical, financial and accounting data on each financing or investment operation and an estimation of expected cash flows, at the level of compartment, policy window and the InvestEU Fund. The report may also include information on barriers to investment encountered when carrying out financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The reports shall contain the information the implementing partners have to provide under point (a) of Article 158(1) of the Financial Regulation.’;

    (21) Article 35 is amended as follows:

    (a) the title is replaced by the following:

    ‘Transitional and other provisions’;

    (b) paragraphs 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

    ‘1. By way of derogation from Article 212(3), first and fourth subparagraph, of the Financial Regulation, any revenues, repayments and recoveries from financial instruments established by programmes referred to in Annex IV to this Regulation may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

    2. By way of derogation from Article 216(4), point (a), of the Financial Regulation, any surplus of provisions for the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation, taking into account the relevant provisions concerning the budget laid down in the Public Sector Loan Facility Regulation for 2021-2027.

    ▌ By way of derogation from Article 214(4)(d) of the Financial Regulation, any revenues from the EU guarantee established by Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 received in 2027 may be used for the provisioning of the EU guarantee or the implementation of the measures provided for in Chapters VI and VII under this Regulation.’;

    (22) Annex I is replaced by the following:

    ‘ANNEX I

    AMOUNTS OF EU GUARANTEE PER SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

    The indicative distribution referred to in the fourth subparagraph of Article 4(2) towards financial and investment operations shall be as follows:

    (a) up to EUR 11 589 045 902 for objectives referred to in point (a) of Article 3(2);

    (b) up to EUR 7 707 119 112 for objectives referred to in point (b) of Article 3(2);

    (c) up to EUR 8 095 166 498 for objectives referred to in point (c) of Article 3(2);

    (d) up to EUR 3 260 978 561 for objectives referred to in point (d) of Article 3(2).’;

    (23) In Annex III, the following two paragraphs are added in point 1 below point 1.4:

    ‘By way of derogation from Article 2(40) of the Financial Regulation, when determining the leverage and multiplier effect for financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees, the amount of risk coverage shall be assimilated to the amount of reimbursable financing.

    By way of derogation from Article 222(3) of the Financial Regulation, the financing and investment operations providing performance guarantees shall not be required to achieve multiplier effect.’;

    (24) In Annex V, the following paragraph is added:

    ‘This Annex also applies to the InvestEU financial instrument.’

    Article 2

    Amendments to Regulation 2015/1017 [EFSI Regulation]

    Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 is amended as follows:

    (1) Article 11a is amended as follows:

    (a) the title is replaced by the following:

    ‘Combinations’.

    (b) the following second subparagraph is inserted:

    ‘The EU guarantee may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council for the purposes of combinations referred to in Article 7(4) of that Regulation and it may cover losses in relation to financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

    (2) Article 16 is amended as follows:

    (a) paragraph 1 is replaced by the following:

    ‘1. The EIB, in cooperation with the EIF where appropriate, shall submit once a year a report to the Commission on EIB financing and investment operations covered by this Regulation. The report shall include an assessment of compliance with the requirements on the use of the EU guarantee and with the key performance indicators referred to in Article 4(2), point (f)(iv). The report shall also include statistical, financial and accounting data on each EIB financing and investment operation and on an aggregated basis.’;

    (b) paragraph 2 is deleted;

    (c) in paragraph 3, the following subparagraph is added:

    ‘In relation to the combinations referred to in Article 11a, the EIB and the EIF, respectively, shall provide the Commission annually with the financial statements in accordance with Article 212(4) of the Financial Regulation. Such financial statements shall include accounting data about the support provided by the EU guarantee under this Regulation clearly delineated from the support provided by the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council.’;

    (3) in Article 22(1), the fifth subparagraph is deleted.

    Article 3

    Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/1153 [CEF]

    In Article 29 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1153, the following paragraph is added:

    ‘5. The guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB through the CEF Debt Instrument established under Regulation (EU) 1316/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination  referred to in Article 7 of that Regulation and may cover losses in relation to the  financing and investment operations covered by the combined support.’;

     

    (*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

    Article 4

    Amendments to Regulation (EU) 2021/695 [Horizon Europe]

    In Article 57 of Regulation (EU) 2021/695, the following paragraph is added:

    ‘3. The  guarantee supported by the Union budget and provided by the EIB  through the InnovFin Debt Facility established under Regulations (EU) 1290/2013 and 1291/2013 may be granted to cover financing and investment operations eligible under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council(*) for the purpose of combination  referred to in Article 7 and may cover losses of the financial product containing the  financing and investment operations and covered by the combined support.’:

     

    (*) Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017 (OJ L 107, 26.3.2021, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/523/oj)’.

    Article 5

    Entry into force

    This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President The President

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Latvia, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Welcome Law Granting Latvian Citizenship to Stateless Children, Raise Questions on Hate Crimes and Access to Elections for Minorities and Non-Citizens

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the fourth periodic report of Latvia on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Committee Experts welcomed the adoption of the 2020 Latvian citizenship law, which granted Latvian citizenship to children who would otherwise be stateless, while raising questions on hate crimes against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons and access to elections for minorities and non-citizens.

    One Committee Expert welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State, and the recent reduction in the number of non-citizens.

    Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes, and on changes in the criminal law addressing motivations for such crimes, including sexual orientation and gender identity.  How were these changes publicised?  Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognise and support victims?

    A Committee Expert said the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections. How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections? Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections?

    Osams Abu Meri, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, introducing the report, said the fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia, which had invaded parts of Georgia and launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked.  According to article 89 of the Constitution, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. Domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the general comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.

    The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victims’ rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework.  The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community.   As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue.

    The delegation also said that if someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship.  A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution.  The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional.

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Abu Meri expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue.  Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance.  Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, in concluding remarks, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue.  The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues.

    The delegation of Latvia was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Health; the Ministry of Welfare; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the Ministry of Education and Science; the Ministry of Justice; the Ministry of Culture; the Ministry of the Interior; the Ministry for Culture on Cooperation with Non-governmental Organisations; the Ministry of Defence; the Prosecutor General’s Office; the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs; the Internal Security Bureau; the State Police; the State Border Guard; the Cadet Force Centre; and the Permanent Mission of Latvia to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m., Wednesday 2 July to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of Spain (CCPR/C/ESP/7).

    Report 

     

    The Committee has before it the fourth periodic report of Latvia (CCPR/C/LVA/4). 

    Presentation of the Report

    HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, presenting the report, said the situation in Europe had changed significantly since Latvia had last reported to the Committee.  The fact that Latvia was a neighbouring country of Russia which, starting from 2008, had invaded parts of Georgia and acquired military and political control over parts of Ukraine, and on 24 February 2022 launched a full-scale military aggression against Ukraine, must not be overlooked. Because of these events, Latvia increasingly had legitimate reasons to fear for its security, territorial integrity, and democratic order.  These events, along with information and hybrid warfare operations directed against Latvia, had strengthened efforts to defend democracy, national security, and effectively implement the rights and freedoms protected by the Covenant. 

      

    According to Article 89 of the Constitution of Latvia, the international human rights obligations binding upon Latvia formed an integral part of the domestic legal system. To illustrate, domestic courts in Latvia had referred to the General Comments and opinions issued by the Committee in numerous cases.  

      

    The financial resources allocated to domestic courts had steadily and consistently increased.  Moreover, in 2024, the Academy of Justice, a new institution for the professional development of judges, prosecutors, prosecutor assistants, and investigators, was established. The Ombudsperson’s Office of Latvia had consistently received the highest “A” status of accreditation, and continued to operate in accordance with the highest international standards concerning respect for human rights and good governance. In 2022, Latvia ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  The Ombudsperson had been entrusted with the function of the national preventive mechanism, and, as of October 2024, had a new Department on the Prevention of Discrimination.  

      

    Latvia had continued to support the naturalisation of non-citizens; these were not stateless persons, as they enjoyed the right to reside in Latvia, along with a set of rights and obligations that extended beyond those prescribed by the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons.  In recent years, Latvia had seen a gradual and steady decline in the number of non-citizens residing in the country.  A significant achievement in reducing the number of non-citizens in Latvia was the enactment of the law on the discontinuation of the non-citizen status for children, which had contributed to a substantial decrease in the number of non-citizens among younger age groups. Since 2020, all children born in non-citizen families had been granted citizenship at birth. 

      

    Between 2024 and 2027, Latvia had identified three priority areas for gender equality: increasing equal rights and opportunities in the labour market and education; reducing negative gender stereotypes; and integrating the principle of gender equality into policy planning.

     

    In respect to combating gender-based violence, Latvia had significantly strengthened legal protections, expanded victim support services, and increased awareness-raising campaigns to challenge societal norms that perpetuate violence. Between 2022 and 2024, the authorities, together with non-governmental organisations, held workshops and discussions for young people on how to build non-violent relationships, based on the principle of gender equality.  

      

    In 2024, Latvia took a significant step forward in recognising diverse family forms by introducing civil partnership legislation.  This legal framework allowed both same-sex and opposite-sex couples to register their partnership, granting them a range of rights and protections previously reserved for married couples.  In 2021, the Latvian Parliament enacted amendments to the Criminal Law adding to the list of aggravating circumstances motivation based on “social hatred”, which covered hatred based on sexual orientation.  Additionally, awareness-raising measures were continuously implemented, and investigators, prosecutors, and judges regularly attended trainings on the investigation and prosecution of hate crimes.  

     

    Questions by Committee Experts

     

    A Committee Expert noted the various positive developments linked to civil and political rights, asking for additional information on the legal status of the Committee’s views in the national legal framework.  What steps had Latvia taken to inform the public, including persons who did not read Latvian or English, about their rights under the Covenant and the possibility of submitting cases to the Committee under the Optional Protocol?

    The Committee appreciated the rating of the Ombudsman and the increasing material and financial resources allocated to it, and the Expert asked for information on proposals to amend the Ombudsman’s enabling law.  Regarding the implementation of the Corruption Prevention and Combating Action Plan, what mechanisms were in place to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures?  Regarding judicial integrity, were there plans to adopt additional safeguards to prevent undue political influence in the judiciary?

    Another Expert commended the State party for the establishment of a special unit to investigate hate crimes and on changes in the criminal law, adding “social enmity” and “any other characteristic” to cover sexual orientation and gender identity, and asked how these changes were publicised.  Incidents of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons remained underreported, the Expert noted; how was law enforcement trained to facilitate reporting and to recognize and support victims? 

    Could the State party be more specific about the risks to national security posed by individuals with ties to the Russian Federation?  How could fluency in the Latvian language prevent such risks?  The Expert also asked for the number of persons deported so far, their background and to which countries they were deported.  Had there been a state of emergency in parts of the country, in particular the Belarussian border from August 2021 to August 2023, and could the delegation confirm that Latvia did not derogate from its obligations under the Covenant during that period? 

    Regarding the equality of women, and efforts towards narrowing the gender pay gap, another Committee Expert asked what measures had been helpful so far, and what additional measures the government intended to introduce to narrow it further?  Could the State party provide statistical data on gender-based violence and femicide from the last three years? What measures was the government preparing to improve prevention of the concerning occurrence of online violence against women, including against women journalists and women in politics and other leadership positions? 

     

    Regarding the right to life, a Committee Expert asked for disaggregated data on the high numbers of deaths in all places of detention, including psychiatric facilities. Was the definition of torture in line with that of international treaties, and what measures were in place to protect persons complaining of torture in places of detention? 

    Responses by the Delegation 

    Responding to the issues raised, the delegation said concerning the status of the Covenant and awareness-raising on submitting complaints, the Constitutional Court of Latvia had explained that the views of the Committee did not have the status of a legally binding instrument.  While the Committee’s decisions did carry the weight of authoritative interpretation, they were not formally binding.  The Committee’s views and opinions were soft-ball instruments, but had been taken into account by the courts over the years.  Regarding awareness-raising on the United Nations human rights treaties, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had published informative material on its website in various languages, including guidance on submitting complaints to various treaty bodies, and ensuring accessible and transparent information for applicants.  This was how Latvia ensured that society was informed about the Committee and the possibility of submitting complaints.

    On training in the armed forces, the delegation said there were education programs which included human rights.  The Ombudsman was appointed after approval by the Parliament.  This aimed to strengthen human rights protection and ensure public awareness of the position.  This approach aligned with the spirit of the Constitution and existing practice, whilst supporting the principles of democratic governance.  On the Department of Discrimination, there was an Anti-Discrimination Unit, consisting of five people.  There was a separation of the powers in Latvia, the delegation said, and there was currently a discussion on the procedure of nomination of the Ombudsman.  There was no influence by political parties on the Ombudsman, and the election was entirely transparent.

    Regarding anti-corruption measures, the Anti-Corruption Action Plan was in place since 2023, and the main reason for lack of fulfilment of its tasks was the lack of funding.  The effectiveness of the Plan itself was usually measured by assessing the percentage of accomplished tasks, as well as feedback from institutions involved in its implementation.  In 2025, six persons were fined in cases relating to corruption, and 2024 data showed that corruption was effectively investigated and sent to prosecution.  On the independence of investigations conducted by the Internal Security Bureau, pre-trial detentions were supervised by a prosecutor.  In accordance with the law, the Minister of the Interior could only supervise the legality and justification of the Bureau’s decisions, and could revoke them if necessary. On transparency of lobbying, work continued on effective implementation of legislation in this regard, and there was no Transparency Register yet.

    The delegation said work had been done to raise the awareness of those individuals in charge of prosecuting hate crimes, addressing victim’s rights from a broader, human rights-focused framework.  A specific hate speech conference event had been held in October 2024, with twenty-two participants who worked on such violations. A training session was also held for judges, prosecutors and investigators, focusing on a victim-centred approach to the justice system.  For the general public, there were two specific web platforms with information about hate speech, hate crime, and related issues, and these were supported by the Ministries of Culture and Education, and the Ombudsman’s Bureau.  The Ministry of Justice had also disseminated a circular on the interpretation of existing legal frameworks on hate crime and targeting the members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community.   As this was a very hot topic for Latvian society, the public broadcaster had also addressed the issue.  The legal framework, which prescribed criminal liability for social, national and ethnic hatred as an aggravating circumstance was sufficient and proportionate to existing needs.  

    Numbers of hate speech and hate crimes were not so large, usually fewer than 10 criminal cases per year, the delegation said, but this did not reflect the priority of the topic, as the Government was working on the issue.  With regard to ethnic tensions, it was important to look at the information space, and how people used and consumed information inside the country.   According to research and statistics, minorities, as well as the general population, found news and entertainment important, and consumed it at the same rates, showing that society was living in the same space.  There were differences of opinion in society, as should be the case in any healthy society.  Latvian society had gone through traumas, and was dealing with them, including by taking care of minorities, legally, but also practically, including through an annual festival celebrating cultural minorities.

    Latvia saw its society as one which facilitated civic participation, and was working to strengthen this.  Even Roma representatives and organisations were finally putting their projects forward, and they were being supported.  Work was also being done on media literacy, as the current greatest threat to human rights was the great mass of information that was available, meaning critical thinking was a critical tool for building a cohesive society.  Latvia had acquired a large number of refugees, including those fleeing from Ukraine, and was providing measures and support for their language acquisition and cultural and societal integration.

    Latvia was working with the Roma strategy at the European Union level and had its own strategic plan for Roma integration.  Unfortunately, the community was one of the most stigmatised, as it was across Europe.  It was important for this stigmatisation to be approached and that communities were approached, with Roma mediators involved in the efforts to end the stigma.  Hate speech had increased in the digital environment, and a plan was being put together to address it.

    The delegation said the issue of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was not an ethnic issue: it was an issue of international law, colonialism, and history.  This was how society and the government had treated it.  The government had been very clear that this was an issue that had to unite everybody within the country, no matter the language and ethnicity of the individual.  Research showed that there was an increase of differences of opinion on the issue within the country, but these were not aligned with ethnicity.  The Russian minority was very vocal in its lack of support for the actions of Russia.  On the declaration of a State emergency at the border, there had been a deliberate attempt by Belarus to destabilise European countries, including Latvia, in response to the imposition of sanctions on the Belarus regime.  Actions to protect the external borders must be interpreted in the light of the broader geo-political context and the will to protect the system against abuse, including the instrumentalisation of migrants and refugees.

    The gender pay gap had reduced further in Latvia, the delegation said, and female employment rates were relatively high, but the government needed to look into employment equality further, including encouraging women’s participation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics.  Latvia was one of the rare countries that admitted to having problems in its prisons, and the government had approved an action plan to implement the Committee’s recommendations in this regard, showing its determination to tackle the issue.  Prison staff were instructed and trained on sensitive periods in the life of a prisoner, aiming to limit incidents of self-harm and suicide.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    In follow-up questions, Experts asked for figures on deaths in prisons, and the reconciliation between self-administration prisons and the official system, and whether the former was to the detriment of detainees.  Did psychiatric facilities offer education and therapeutic facilities, and was there sufficient staff?  Another Expert asked for clarification on training in hate crimes and hate speech, asking whether it was mandatory and country-wide, or whether people could opt out.  How was disaggregated data and statistics gathered on hate speech and hate crimes?  There appeared to be a tension between language groups, and the Expert wondered how promoting a culture of human rights education and speech could be of help in resolving these matters.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Ministry of Justice had prepared a general policy planning document to combat and reduce the effects of informal prison hierarchies in Latvian prisons.  This included building a new prison, and the education of prison guards and administration, including a new education centre, among others.  One of the biggest problems in Latvian prisons was the outdated prison infrastructures, and the construction of the new prison to remedy this would be concluded in September 2025, with prisoners to be relocated in 2026.

    There were 26,132 persons with mental disabilities in the country in 2019, and the situation was roughly the same now.  It was very important today for persons with mental disabilities to have access to independent living, and Latvia had 12 social service homes, with between 50 and 150 places to which persons could be admitted voluntarily and could leave freely.  There was only one long-term facility, with approximately 200 beds, meant for persons with severe mental disorders, and this hospital was also only for voluntary treatment.  Regarding treatment and rehabilitation, nowadays in all treatment centres there were muti-professional teams, and staff workers ensuring integrated healthcare.  Great efforts were made to ensure there were recreational facilities at all hospitals.

    There was no mandatory training for judges, except on children’s rights, and training on hate speech and hate crimes were mostly linked to the specialisation of judges.  In Latvia, the media enjoyed independence, and investigative journalism thrived, holding the government and the judiciary to account.  The most common form of corruption involved the use of administrative resources, the delegation said.

    The delegation said amendments had been made to the Criminal Code in 2024, establishing accountability for acts of violence against immediate family or in partner relationships. The amendments introduced the punishment of imprisonment for up to three years if the perpetrator committed a violent act against a family member, spouse or former spouse.  Cases of spousal rape were considered rape under the Criminal Code, and sanctions were higher if there were aggravating circumstances. It was ensured that these crimes were reviewed by the courts in a timely manner.  More than 13 trainings had been conducted for judges, investigators, prosecutors and those who worked on family violence cases.  Every year, at least 20 women were killed by their partner in Latvia. The State believed that, in many instances, these deaths were preventable.  From 1 July, electronic monitoring of offenders could be applied in criminal proceedings, providing an opportunity to prevent both femicides and homicides.

    The ratification of the Istanbul Convention was a significant step in Latvia and was a cornerstone policy for the country.  Changing societal attitudes towards women and violence and shifting deeply ingrained cultural norms and stereotypes required public awareness campaigns, which took time to yield results.  Real-life stories of survivors had been made accessible to the public to raise awareness of the issue and encourage others to come forward.  Services were accessible and no proof was required to receive help.

    In December 2023, preventive visits had been carried out to two prisons, to assess potential risks of violent behaviour.  Conferences had been held in cooperation with the Ombudsman’s office and non-governmental organizations dedicated to the prevention of violent conduct, attended by representatives of the prison administration.  There had been an increase in crimes committed by prison administration officials in 2025, but this was due to the mandate to increasingly investigate these kinds of crimes.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked why Latvia did not systematically collect and publish data on the length and frequency of pretrial detention.  What steps would be taken to address this gap?  Could data be provided on the use of non-custodial alternatives to detention?  How was it ensued that all detainees were fully informed of their rights and access to a lawyer from the outset of detention?  Would the State implement mandatory audiovisual recording of all police interviews with detained persons?  How was it ensured that detainees received timely and effective assistance from qualified lawyers, including during the initial critical hours of detention?

    What specific safeguards existed to prevent undue political influence in the appointment of Supreme Court judges?  How did the State party address reports of politicisation and corruption in the judicial system?  What measures were taken to improve trust in the justice system?  What was the current operational status of the academy of justice? What specific training programmes had been implemented for judges and prosecutors since it opened?  What steps had been taken to ensure timely issuance of judgements?  Could information be provided on the types and lengths of sentences provided to minors? How was it ensured the detention of minors was used only as a last resort and for the shortest possible time?

    Another Committee Expert said the overall national referral mechanism had not yet been established; why was this?  How would the State implement the relevant European Parliament directive in time? How did the conflict in Ukraine impact trafficking in Latvia and different categories of victims, including victims of sexual exploitation and child trafficking?  Were training activities organised for law enforcement in this regard?  How did Latvia’s transition from a country of origin to country of transit and destination impact Government prevention efforts?  What measures were being taken to promptly investigate, prosecute and punish all cases of trafficking?  What remedies were provided to victims?  How many cases had been raised against persons involved in human trafficking?

    In mid-2024, the Ministry of Culture launched a study to ensure the safety of journalists in Latvia. What was its progress thus far? How were its recommendations being implemented?  The Government informed the Committee that the criminal proceedings concerning serious bodily injuries inflicted to the journalist and publisher Leonids Jākobsons were terminated on 19 February 2025, as the authorities were unable to find the perpetrators.  How often were similar cases involving infliction of serious bodily injuries terminated because of lack of success in finding perpetrators?  How would the State ensure that similar incidents did not repeat, and that there was no impunity for perpetrators?

    Could the delegation elaborate on the legal basis for the drastic revocation of TV Rain’s broadcasting licence on 6 December 2022, that was challenged before the Administrative Regional Court?  The National Security Concept of 28 September 2023 served to prohibit the production of public television and radio content in Russian. What was the legal basis for this policy, and had there been any legal and administrative actions taken to implement it thus far?

    Another Committee Expert said that in June 2023, Latvia established an enhanced border regime with restrictive measures, which had been extended to the end of 2025. Could the delegation confirm this? How did the State party justify prolonging these restrictions long after the formal state of emergency had ended? Credible reports indicated that from 2021 to 2025, the State border guard had engaged in 28,000 pushbacks to Belarus and other countries, without assessing the risks individuals would face. How did these pushbacks comply with the principle of non-refoulment?  Refugees at the border were reportedly subjected to violence and abuse and left without water and food.  What concrete actions had the State party taken to monitor the State border guard?  How were the border guards trained to prevent ill-treatment of migrants?

    How many official border crossing points were operating today?  What steps were being taken to facilitate applications for persons seeking protection?  What percentage of asylum seekers were detained and for how long?  The Committee was concerned about the detention of children who sought asylum; would Latvia consider a policy of never detaining children for immigration reasons?  The State had a good practice of providing free legal aid to refugees challenging asylum decisions, however reports stated it was not respected in practice.  How did the State party uphold this commitment in practice?

    The Committee welcomed the adoption of a 2020 law which automatically granted Latvian citizenship to children of non-citizens who were not nationals of another State.  The Committee also welcomed the reduction in the number of non-citizens.  Would the State party consider amending its citizenship law to grant nationality to all children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless?  Was the State party considering extending political rights to non-citizens?

    The Committee appreciated the measures adopted to safeguard the rights of conscientious objectors following the re-introduction of compulsory military service for men under Law 75 on the State Defence Service.  The Committee also noted that the term of Alternative Civil Service was equal in length to military service, which was an improvement.  Would the State consider allowing the Conscription Control Commission to operate independently of the miliary?  Were conscientious objectors assigned responsibilities in alternative civil services, as opposed to non-combat roles within the military? How would the State party respect the rights of conscientious objectors during emergencies and armed conflicts?

    A Committee Expert said the Committee understood that the Pre-Election Campaign Law prohibited pre-election campaign materials in any language other than Latvian, except for European Parliament elections.  How did the State party ensure that this prohibition did not unduly restrict accessibility and the participation of minorities in elections?

    Could the State party explain why non-citizen residents, including long-term residents, were excluded from elections?  Would the State party be willing to permit their participation in elections?  Where did the State party see the most need for further improvement regarding accessibility for persons with disabilities in elections?  What measures had the State party taken to follow up on treaty body recommendations, including those calling on political parties to introduce quotas to promote women’s representation in political life?

    The Committee had questions regarding the transition to Latvian as the exclusive language of instruction, eliminating Russian as a second language in schools and preschools. While this transition was envisaged a long time ago, its implementation had been rushed.  How does the State party ensure that schools were ready within the limited timeframe, especially schools where many teachers lacked sufficient proficiency in Latvian?  There were serious concerns about the lack of meaningful minority community consultation and participation during the law’s adoption.  How many stakeholders were involved and how was active participation and meaningful dialogue ensured?   The Committee was informed that national minority pupils at pre-school and primary education levels had a right to request education programmes on their language and cultural history.  Did communities have to fund these programmes themselves?  How were people made aware of these programmes and how easy was it to apply for them?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that while not all police interviews were recorded, this did not affect police investigations.  All interviews with children were recorded.  All interviews were documented in written form.

    Legal aid was provided by the court administration.  There had been just one case where a higher court judge had not been appointed by the parliament.  Reports of corruption in the court system were legally investigated.  The parliament adopted a law establishing a new judicial academy in 2024.  In January this year, the newly established institution officially commenced its operations.  The academy had been admitted as a member of the European Judicial Network.  During this year, 106 events and trainings had already been held at the academy.

    Latvia remained susceptible to labour exploitation, sham marriages, forced begging, as well as sexual exploitation.  This year, just one criminal investigation had been launched so far in this regard. At the beginning of the Ukrainian refugee crisis, a programme was established that strengthened the capacity of State border guards to identify possible victims of human trafficking. All unaccompanied minors had been given legal assistance.  Since 2022, there had been one case of sexual exploitation of a Ukrainian woman.

    Regarding the case of the grievous bodily harm reflected on the journalist Leonids Jākobsons, despite its best efforts, the State had been unable to identify the perpetrator, and the proceedings had been closed.  However, should new information emerge, the criminal proceedings could be reopened, and investigations could resume.  In a 2019 case involving a journalist who had been persecuted and harassed for over a year, the perpetrator was identified and sentenced to prison for two years.  This emphasised that the State recognised the importance of journalists and were committed to ensuring their safety and security. 

    A study had been launched which looked at updating the legal definition of “the media”. Seminars were provided for journalists that helped them to protect themselves.  Meetings were held with the police once a year, to help them support journalists.  Materials were envisaged for judges to help them on cases involving journalists.

    Latvia was a democratic State that promoted the right to a fair trial and access to justice.  A case was ongoing regarding Russian propaganda channels spreading hate speech in Latvia.  The Government could not assess the outcome of the case at this point.

    No languages had been prohibited in Latvia.  Statistics showed that only 54 per cent of Latvian youth knew Russian language.  The official State language was the Latvian language.

    Around 47 to 50 per cent of television programmes and 35 percent of radio programmes were available in Russian language, and 13 per cent of the printed press was in Russian language.   A law was in place which obligated the public broadcaster to broadcast in minority languages.  The public broadcaster independently decided on media content and in which languages it should be broadcast.  Work was being done to promote the inclusion of more minorities.

    The state of emergency situation at the border with Belarus had been ended, but a new “enhanced border protection regime” had been introduced and would be in force until the end of the year.  During legislative amendments, the State had assessed a proportional and law-based solution, considering European Union court rulings in this field.  A lot of work had been done to comply with international obligations and the principle of non-refoulment.  A document had been developed to instruct personnel at the border on how to deal with these cases.

    Significant training had been provided to border staff, with more than 1,000 border guards trained in 2024 on asylum rights.  The State did not have information on 20 deaths registered at the border with Belarus.  There had been a case in 2024 in which a dead body was found on the Latvian border. This year, there had been 63 applications for asylum so far.  As a rule, asylum seekers were not detained in Latvia and were accommodated in open space centres.  However, due to several circumstances, the law on asylum permitted the detention of asylum seekers, such as in the case of security threats.  Each case was individually and thoroughly assessed. Minors under 14 years old were not detained; they were placed in different facilities.  Efforts were taken to accommodate minors with their families when possible.  State-provided legal assistance could be accessed once an asylum decision had been appealed.

    Regarding conscientious objection, no one from the Ministry of Defence had interfered with the Conscription Control Commission, and changes were not considered.  The State defence service law set basic criteria for alternative service.  So far, just three applications had been received, including for religious and health reasons.  Military service was for a fixed period and a solider could choose whether to extend their contract or not.  International regulations set a two-month resignation notice for military service, which the State believed was a reasonable amount of time.  A reserve solider who could not perform military service due to their beliefs could be enrolled in the national armed force reserves. The State was not considering amending paragraph five of the military law.

    Latvia did not consider “non-citizens” to be stateless persons.  All non-citizens had the right to naturalise.  The number of Latvian non-citizens had decreased by around 77 per cent in recent years.  After a change in regulations in 2020, more than 500 children had been automatically registered after birth.  Several campaigns had been carried out on the possibility of acquiring Latvian citizenship.

    If someone wanted to be elected or vote in Latvia, they needed to obtain citizenship.  A Constitutional Court decision issued at the beginning of the year stated that the contested legal provisions did not impose a complete ban on the use of foreign languages, and only applied to individual campaigning with voters, hence they were in conformity with the Constitution.  The Court decided that restrictions on fundamental rights were proportional. Russian language was still widespread in Latvia, justifying the need to strengthen the use of Latvian as the official State language.  The Constitutional Court had taken article 27 of the Covenant into account, which recognised the obligation to ensure minority groups could use their mother tongue. It found amendments in the law complied with article 27.

    The naturalisation procedure was fairly easy.  The path for non-citizens was wide, short and easy to walk. 

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    The Committee asked follow-up questions regarding actions taken to implement the national security policy before the Constitutional Court; the permanence of the enhanced border regime; ill-treatment of migrants crossing the Belarus/Latvia border between 2021 and 2022; granting citizenship to children born in Latvia who would otherwise be stateless; providing for honourable discharges from military service; the exclusion of non-citizens from all elections; alternative programmes for minority languages in schools; and measures in place to ensure detention of minors was only implemented as a measure of last resort.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the public broadcaster was bound by media laws.  Currently Belarussian authorities at the border were refusing to cooperate with Latvian authorities.  These non-cooperation issues had brought about an increase in criminal activities across the border, including organised crime.  This year, there had been 186 irregular migration cases across the border.  An investigation had been launched in 2021 and 2022 regarding individuals who had attempted to cross the Belarussian border, which had analysed a significant amount of information.  During the investigation, it was determined that injuries to migrants were not caused by the actions of border officials, but were likely obtained during the journey to cross the border.

    Reasons for terminating a military contract prior to its conclusion were not specified in national laws.  An agreement simply needed to be reached. 

    Only persons with Latvian citizenship had the right to vote.  Using languages other than Latvian during political campaigning in the election period was not prohibited.  The provision about using just the official language applied only to the pre-election period.  Non-citizens who chose to keep their status still had the right to receive healthcare and work in the country.

    Teachers were instructed on teaching methodologies in a linguistically diverse environment, and on how to teach students whose native language was not Latvian.  There were targeted grants supporting minority languages and cultures. 

    As of 25 June this year, there were 27 inmates who were children.  Four of these children were detained, with the rest serving their sentences on probation.  This illustrated that incarceration of children in Latvia was a last resort.

    Closing Statements

    HOSAMS ABU MERI, Minister for Health of the Republic of Latvia, expressed gratitude for the open and constructive dialogue.  A wide range of topics had been addressed, including efforts to combat hate crimes, gender equality, and matters of national security.  Latvia’s experience during these challenging times, as its neighbours Russia and Belarus deployed the full arsenal of hybrid warfare, had a broader relevance.  Latvia would not only withstand these threats but remain steadfast in the rule of law, the principles of human rights and a rule-based law and order.  These circumstances reaffirmed Latvia’s commitment to uphold the rights enshrined in the Covenant.  Latvia appreciated the engagement and interest of the Committee.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed gratitude to all who had contributed to the dialogue.  The Committee commended the State party for progress in several areas, including access to justice and gender equality, however remained concerned about the treatment of asylum seekers and non-residents, among other issues.  Mr. Soh thanked all involved in the dialogue for their engagement and commitment. 

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CCPR25.013E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Is the European defence industry represented by an American lobbyist? – E-001156/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Member States remain in the driving seat for defence whilst benefitting from the added value offered by the EU programmes and instruments supporting cooperation between European defence industrial players and between Member States, and incentivising investment in defence capacities.

    In that respect, the Commission is particularly vigilant in ensuring the respect of the allocation of competences, as enshrined in the Treaties.

    The Commission is fully aware of the responsibilities of the individual mentioned in the parliamentary question within RTX Corporation, as both the organisation and the individual are registered in the Transparency Register[1].

    However, the Commission respects the freedom of every professional organisation to be represented by whomever it considers fit for this purpose.

    As regards their relation with external stakeholders, Commission Members and staff members are bound by stringent rules and internal control standards, included in particular in the treaties, the Staff Regulations[2] and the Conditions of employment of other servants of the EU, as well as the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour[3].

    These rules aim, in particular, at ensuring the independence, impartiality, objectivity and loyalty of Commission Members and staff members in the exercise of their duties. This includes the protection of any sensitive or classified information.

    Finally, the issue of foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is very high on the agenda of the Commission, especially in the context of recent Russian attempts to undermine the EU and its Member States’ democratic processes.

    FIMI is one of the key aspects of the recently adopted European Preparedness Union Strategy[4] and will be addressed in the upcoming European Democracy Shield.

    • [1] https://transparency-register.europa.eu/searchregister-or-update/organisation-detail_en?id=87564644126-75.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/1962/31(1)/2014-05-01/eng.
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/about/service-standards-and-principles/ethics-and-good-administration/good-administration/code-good-administrative-behaviour-and-complaints_en.
    • [4] JOIN/2025/130 final, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025JC0130.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Eligible spending under ReArm Europe – E-001294/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The classification of the functions of government (COFOG) is a classification of transactions designed to apply to general government and its subsectors.

    In the current version of the COFOG classification, which is used both globally and in Europe, there are 10 divisions, including division 02 Defence.

    The classification is centred on primary purpose of government expenditure. Thus, division 02 Defence captures all government expenditure with primary purpose of supporting and developing defence capabilities, but it excludes expenditure and investment that has other primary purposes, like climate change.

    The activation of the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence[1] was justified by the exceptional circumstances created by Russia’s aggression of Ukraine and its major impact on Member States’ public finances.

    The activation is framed in scope, size, and time to cater for a quick transition to a higher defence spending regime while preserving fiscal sustainability.

    Member States should use the financial assistance provided under the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Regulation[2] to carry out common procurements. Eligible defence common procurement should relate to the list of priority areas identified by Article 1 of SAFE Regulation.

    In addition, Article 16 sets out eligibility conditions applying to contractors, subcontractors and products participating in common procurement supported by SAFE.

    Therefore, to be supported under the SAFE instrument, investments also contributing to tackling climate change need to fall into one of the areas identified in Article 1 of SAFE Regulation and be channelled through common procurement, which complies with the eligibility conditions set out in the regulation.

    • [1] https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a57304ce-1a98-4a2c-aed5-36485884f1a0_en?filename=Communication-on-the-national-escape-clause.pdf.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2025/1106/oj/eng.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war, and the continued bombing of civilians – B10-0304/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Sergey Lagodinsky, Markéta Gregorová, Ville Niinistö, Jutta Paulus, Mārtiņš Staķis
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    B10‑0304/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the human cost of Russia’s war against Ukraine and the urgent need to end Russian aggression: the situation of illegally detained civilians and prisoners of war and the continued bombing of civilians

    (2025/2710(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Ukraine and Russia,

    – having regard to the UN Charter, the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Conventions and the additional protocols thereto, and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas three years ago, on 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation launched an unprovoked, unjustified and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, in gross violation of the UN Charter and its own international commitments, including the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances and the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation; whereas the Russian aggression against Ukraine started in 2014 with the occupation of parts of the Donbas region and the occupation and annexation of Ukraine’s Autonomous Republic of Crimea;

    B. whereas since then, Russian forces have continued to carry out and escalate indiscriminate attacks against residential areas and civilian infrastructure; whereas heavy and intense bombardments, combined with ground fighting, have continued throughout 2025; whereas the UN has confirmed that more than 12 500 civilians, including hundreds of children, have been murdered since February 2022; whereas the actual civilian death toll is estimated to be in the tens of thousands; whereas many more civilians have been injured, tortured, forcibly ‘re-educated’, harassed, raped, kidnapped or forcibly displaced;

    C. whereas while their exact numbers are unknown, thousands of Ukrainians, both military personnel and civilians, are likely to be held in captivity currently, in Russia and occupied Ukraine;

    D. whereas the vast majority of Ukrainian prisoners, both civilian and military personnel, held by the Russian Federation are deprived of any recognised legal status or procedural safeguards, leaving them without rights, legal representation or the ability to contact their families; whereas in 90 % of cases, relatives do not know whether their loved ones are alive;

    E. whereas there is documented evidence of repeated extrajudicial executions of prisoners of war (POWs) and civilians by members of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, as well as other grave violations of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions and other international humanitarian law instruments;

    F. whereas the Russian authorities have launched thousands of politically motivated criminal prosecutions against Ukrainian POWs and civilian detainees, often based on confessions extracted under torture and without credible evidence; whereas these fabricated charges commonly include terrorism, espionage and treason, with the charges of treason frequently following the forced imposition of Russian citizenship in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine;

    G. whereas families of Ukrainian detainees face institutional barriers to accessing legal recourse or filing official inquiries, as the Russian state requires the use of domestic digital identification platforms that are not accessible to non-citizens; whereas in some cases, relatives advocating publicly for detainees have seen their loved ones punished with extended sentences or re-arrested on additional charges;

    H. whereas the death of Ukrainian journalist Viktoriia Roshchyna in Russian captivity highlights the grave and growing dangers faced by Ukrainian journalists held by Russian forces; whereas others, including Iryna Danylovych, Dmytro Khyliuk and Iryna and Heorhiy Levchenko, remain in detention under life-threatening conditions;

    I. whereas the Russian authorities consistently deny POWs access to international organisations in an effort to hide the atrocities taking place, leaving POWs even more vulnerable to violations of international law; whereas the Geneva Conventions guarantee POWs the right to regular correspondence, access to medical care, and visits from international organisations; whereas Russia’s treatment of Ukrainian POWs amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity;

    J. whereas the Russian authorities have detained large numbers of civilians in all temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine; whereas they target, among others, local authorities, civil servants and journalists; whereas the scale at which Russia is conducting these enforced disappearances against civilians is clearly in compliance with a coordinated state policy;

    K. whereas in all temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine, Russian-installed proxy paramilitary structures and de facto authorities have played a key role in implementing Russia’s policy of repression and terror against the Ukrainian population by systematically engaging in intimidation, arbitrary detentions, torture and enforced disappearances of civilians under the guise of administrative or security procedures;

    L. whereas many victims of enforced disappearances are transferred either to local detention facilities or deported to Russia; whereas various forms of torture are reportedly commonplace in these detention facilities; whereas civilians regularly go missing for months if not years, with some dying in detention; whereas these acts also amount to crimes against humanity;

    M. whereas since the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Russian Federation has systematically targeted Crimean Tatars with politically motivated prosecutions, enforced disappearances, intimidation and harassment; whereas Crimean Tatar leaders, journalists, civil society activists and religious figures have faced disproportionate repression, including under the guise of anti-extremism and antiterrorism charges; whereas these actions amount to violations of international human rights and humanitarian law and aim to erase the identity and presence of the indigenous Crimean Tatar people;

    N. whereas cases of punitive psychiatry, including forced institutionalisation, drugging and involuntary treatment of both children and adults, have been documented in at least 42 psychiatric institutions and psycho-neurological boarding schools located in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine; whereas Russian occupying authorities have revived Soviet-style psychiatric abuse as a tool of repression, targeting individuals for their perceived pro-Ukrainian views or their refusal to accept Russian citizenship; whereas such acts represent a serious breach of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities;

    O. whereas the families are left traumatised as their loved ones are held incommunicado and the Russian authorities, in full violation of international law, refuse to provide information about people’s whereabouts;

    P. whereas the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine confirmed, in its latest report of March 2025, that the enforced disappearances committed by the Russian authorities in a widespread and systematic manner against the civilian population, in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, amount to crimes against humanity; whereas the same body documented countless cases proving that Russia’s use of sexual violence, including rape, as a form of torture is systemic in detention facilities and that this practice is clearly a deliberate policy, thus stressing that the Russian authorities committed the war crimes of rape and sexual violence as a form of torture;

    Q. whereas the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab, whose Ukraine Conflict Observatory has been documenting Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children using biometric and satellite data and supported six International Criminal Court (ICC) indictments, has had its funding cut by the Trump administration; whereas the observatory has ceased all its work collecting data crucial for achieving accountability as of 1 July 2025; whereas the observatory’s database contains records on more than 30 000 Ukrainian children allegedly abducted by Russia from over 100 locations;

    1. Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, Russia’s continued war of aggression against Ukraine and demands that Russia immediately terminate all military activities in Ukraine, unconditionally withdraw all forces and military equipment from the entire internationally recognised territory of Ukraine and compensate Ukraine for the damage caused to its people, land and infrastructure;

    2. Expresses its undivided solidarity with the people of Ukraine, fully supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and underlines that this war constitutes a serious violation of international law;

    3. Decries Russia’s policy of widespread and systematic use of enforced disappearance, incommunicado detention, torture and other forms of ill treatment against Ukrainian civilian detainees and POWs; demands that Russia notify the Ukrainian Government of the status of all POWs and allow international humanitarian organisations unhindered access; stresses that, under international law, Russia must provide adequate medical care to all Ukrainians in captivity and directly repatriate seriously sick and wounded POWs; urges Russia to release all unlawfully detained civilians without delay;

    4. Demands the immediate release of all Ukrainian civilians held in Russian captivity who do not fall under any category for lawful detention under international humanitarian law, with particular attention to women, children and elderly individuals; underlines that their continued detention places them at imminent risk and constitutes a grave violation of the Geneva Conventions;

    5. Condemns the ongoing persecution of Crimean Tatars in illegally occupied Crimea, including politically motivated detentions, torture, enforced disappearances and restrictions on freedom of religion, expression and association; calls for the immediate release of all Crimean Tatars imprisoned on political grounds and urges the EU and international organisations to enhance monitoring and advocacy on behalf of the indigenous people of Crimea;

    6. Calls for the EU, its Member States and international partners to launch an urgent international campaign aimed at documenting and publicising evidence concerning the imprisonment of Ukrainian minors and elderly civilians in Russian detention, including the use of documented case studies compiled by civil society organisations; stresses the importance of visibility for accountability and rescue operations;

    7. Demands immediate and unhindered access for international humanitarian organisations, including the International Committee of the Red Cross, to all known and suspected sites where Ukrainian civilians are held, with particular attention to women, children and elderly people;

    8. Insists on the immediate release of all Ukrainian journalists held in Russian captivity; calls for the international community to take urgent diplomatic and legal steps to secure their safety and freedom, and to ensure accountability for crimes committed against media professionals in the context of the war;

    9. Strongly condemns the use of punitive psychiatry by the Russian occupying authorities in Ukraine, including the forced institutionalisation of civilians, especially children and individuals with pro-Ukrainian views, in psychiatric hospitals under inhumane and degrading conditions; calls for urgent international monitoring of psychiatric institutions in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and the immediate release of all individuals detained on politically motivated psychiatric grounds;

    10. Insists that all perpetrators, in particular commanders and others within the Russian occupying forces ordering, soliciting or inducing the commission of crimes under international law, are held accountable in accordance with international standards;

    11. Calls for the EU and the broader international community to use all possible judicial and non-judicial accountability mechanisms, including universal jurisdiction, to pressure Russia to immediately cease its campaign of enforced disappearances and torture;

    12. Calls for the EU and the Member States to step up support for Ukraine to enable it to address the widespread mental health and psychosocial needs resulting from the armed conflict, by ensuring access to the relevant services for those returning from captivity, allocating resources to those services and enhancing their institutional coordination, legal regulation, monitoring and evaluation;

    13. Regrets the decision by the Trump administration to cut the funding of the Yale Humanitarian Research Lab and is concerned about the consequent major gap in accountability efforts; welcomes the transfer of the lab’s data to Europol and calls for the EU and the Member States, in cooperation with like-minded partners, to ensure the continuation of the observatory’s work;

    14. Commends the work of the ICC on its ongoing investigation into the situation in Ukraine from 21 November 2013 onwards, encompassing any past and present allegations of war crimes, crimes against humanity or genocide committed on any part of the territory of Ukraine by any person; expresses concern about the worsening attacks on the ICC by the United States, and the impact this will have on the ICC’s ability to continue conducting its investigations; calls on the Commission to urgently activate the blocking statute and on the EU Member States to increase their diplomatic efforts in order to protect and safeguard the ICC as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system;

    15. Stresses Europe’s responsibility to curb Russia’s aggression, both in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and also for the sake of Europe’s own security; calls therefore for the EU and its like-minded partners to increase their efforts to shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and set the conditions for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace; urges the Member States and like-minded partners, therefore, to provide Ukraine with more arms and ammunition to enable Ukraine to liberate its territory and deter further Russian attacks; notes, in this context, that a number of Member States are militarily neutral and urges them to increase their non-military support for Ukraine in line with their constitutions;

    16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the President, Government and Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, and the President, Government and Parliament of the Russian Federation.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –