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Category: Scandinavia

  • MIL-OSI: ZA Miner Launches Free Cloud Mining Service, Opening Doors to Bitcoin and Dogecoin Mining for All

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ZA FUNDINGS LTD Image

    MIDDLESEX, United Kingdom, April 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — ZA Miner, a leading cloud mining service provider, is proud to announce the launch of its new no-cost cloud mining platform, designed to make cryptocurrency mining more accessible than ever. With no upfront costs, users can now mine Bitcoin (BTC) and Dogecoin (DOGE) directly through the cloud, eliminating the need for expensive hardware, electricity bills, or technical expertise.

    To help users get started, ZA Miner is offering a $100 free mining bonus upon registration, allowing anyone to begin mining immediately without any financial commitment. This groundbreaking initiative is aimed at democratizing cryptocurrency mining, making it simple and free for anyone to participate in the growing digital economy.

    Mining Made Simple – No Hardware, No Fees

    The ZA Miner platform simplifies the process of mining by removing the traditional barriers associated with cryptocurrency mining. Users only need an email address to sign up and can start earning daily payouts through a straightforward and easy-to-use interface. There’s no need to invest in costly mining rigs or worry about maintenance. The platform supports mining for Bitcoin, Dogecoin, and Litecoin, offering a diverse range of options for users.

    “We designed ZA Miner with the goal of creating a solution that eliminates the complexity and costs of cryptocurrency mining,” said a spokesperson for ZA Miner. “Our platform is built to be user-friendly, transparent, and focused on inclusion, enabling everyone, regardless of technical background, to earn passive income through cloud mining.”

    A Global, Sustainable Mining Operation

    ZA Miner operates its mining infrastructure in regions known for their energy efficiency, such as Kazakhstan and Iceland. These strategic locations help the company to minimize energy costs while ensuring that its operations remain environmentally sustainable. By passing on these savings to its users, ZA Miner is able to offer an affordable and eco-conscious mining experience.

    ZA Miner’s mining contracts are tailored to accommodate users of all skill levels.

    Key Features of ZA Miner’s Platform:

    • Free $100 Mining Bonus – Start mining without any initial investment.
    • No Hardware Required – Cloud-based mining ensures you don’t need to buy or maintain any equipment.
    • Daily Earnings – Track your earnings daily and have them paid directly to your wallet.
    • Environmentally Friendly – Powered by sustainable energy sources in energy-efficient locations.
    • Secure & Safe – SSL encryption and anti-DDoS protection ensure a secure mining experience.
    • Referral Rewards – Earn up to 7% commission by inviting others to join the platform.

    How to Get Started:

    1. Visit www.zaminer.com to create your account.
    2. Claim your $100 bonus mining contract.
    3. Start earning daily payouts and track your progress.

    ZA Miner’s free cloud mining model caters to the growing demand for accessible and user-friendly crypto tools. With its reliable performance, global infrastructure, and commitment to environmental sustainability, ZA Miner offers an easy entry point into the world of cryptocurrency mining.

    About ZA Miner:

    ZA Miner is a cloud mining provider based in Middlesex, United Kingdom, specializing in Bitcoin, Dogecoin, and Litecoin mining. The company focuses on providing accessible, cost-effective, and sustainable mining solutions for individuals worldwide. With a user-friendly platform, ZA Miner is helping to shape the future of the digital asset economy. For more information, visit www.zaminer.com.

    Media Contact:
    SHEIKH, Anisah Fatema
    ZA FUNDINGS LTD
    info@zaminer.com
    https://www.zaminer.com/

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at:

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/f49bfc42-5f77-432e-8d1d-a9e0bcbf6359

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/8afa7cc8-f40f-449c-a000-df91a4f91905

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: BW Energy: Invitation to Q1 2025 results presentation in Oslo on 5 May

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Invitation to Q1 2025 results presentation in Oslo on 5 May  

    BW Energy will release its first quarter 2025 results on Monday, 5 May at 07:30 CEST.  

    The Company will hold a presentation followed by Q&A at Hotel Continental in Oslo, Norway, on the same day at 09:30 CEST. The presentation will include an extended review of optimisation and development projects in Brazil. It will be hosted by CEO Carl K. Arnet, CFO Brice Morlot, CSO Thomas Young, CTO Jerome Bertheau and CCO Thomas Kolanski. 

    You can also follow the presentation via webcast with supporting slides, available on: 

    Viewer Registration • Q1 2025 

    For further information, please contact: 

    ir@bwenergy.no  

     
    About BW Energy: 

    BW Energy is a growth E&P company with a differentiated strategy targeting proven offshore oil and gas reservoirs through low risk phased developments. The Company has access to existing production facilities to reduce time to first oil and cashflow with lower investments than traditional offshore developments. The Company’s assets are 73.5% of the producing Dussafu Marine licence offshore Gabon, 100% interest in the Golfinho and Camarupim fields, a 76.5% interest in the BM-ES-23 block, a 95% interest in the Maromba field in Brazil, a 95% interest in the Kudu field in Namibia, all operated by BW Energy. In addition, BW Energy holds approximately 6.6% of the common shares in Reconnaissance Energy Africa Ltd. and a 20% non-operating interest in the onshore Petroleum Exploration License 73 (“PEL 73”) in Namibia. Total net 2P+2C reserves and resources were 599 million barrels of oil equivalent at the start of 2025.  

    This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to section 5-12 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Holds Informal Meeting with States Parties to the Convention

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination today held an informal meeting with States parties to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

    Opening the meeting, Michal Balcerzak, Committee Chair, said this year was the sixtieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Convention.  This was a moment of reflection, not only on past achievements, but also on the current and future viability of the treaty body system. The Committee was facing turbulent times, and many challenges were undermining the realisation of human rights and racial equality.

    Mr. Balcerzak called on States parties to renew commitment to fully respect and effectively implement obligations under international human rights law, including the Convention.  Prompt action was needed to end current conflicts, address the root causes of racial discrimination, and prevent further human rights violations targeting people based on their national or ethnic origin and identity.

    Régine Esseneme, Committee Vice-Chair, said the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969.  It covered all areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms and had been ratified by 182 countries.  For several years, States parties had submitted fewer reports to the Committee, often choosing to combine reports over longer periods. 

    The discussion with States parties addressed topics including the liquidity crisis facing the Committee and the United Nations treaty body system, cooperation with the Committee, commemoration of the Convention’s sixtieth anniversary, the Committee’s simplified reporting and individual communications procedures, hybrid dialogues, and measures to prevent racial discrimination.

    Speaking in the discussion were Mexico, Finland, Belgium, Bolivia, Spain, Brazil, Venezuela, China and Cuba.

    The programme of work and other documents related to the Committee’s one hundred and fifteenth session can be found here.  Summaries of the public meetings of the Committee can be found here, while webcasts of the public meetings can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public on Friday, 25 April at 3 p.m. to hold a half-day general discussion on reparations for the injustices from the transatlantic trade of enslaved Africans, their treatment as chattel, and the ongoing harms to and crimes against people of African descent.

    Opening Statements

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, said this year was the sixtieth anniversary of the entry into force of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.  This was a moment of reflection, not only on past achievements, but also on the current and future viability of the treaty body system. The Committee was facing turbulent times, and many challenges were undermining the realisation of human rights and racial equality.

    In the last 60 years, there had been progress in the fight against racial discrimination.  However, progress had not occurred at the pace and to the extent needed and expected by marginalised groups and victims of racial discrimination, and today, there were serious risks of backsliding.  The Committee called on States parties to renew commitment to fully respect and effectively implement obligations under international human rights law, including the Convention.  Prompt action was needed to end current conflicts, address the root causes of racial discrimination, and prevent further human rights violations targeting people based on their national or ethnic origin and identity.

    The United Nations treaty body system was faced by an unprecedented crisis marked by acute financial and liquidity constraints.  These challenges struck at the very core of the Committee’s ability to carry out its mandate effectively.  The downsizing of resources had already begun to significantly impair the Committee’s work. Under the Convention, the expenses of the Committee were required to be borne by State parties.  The current situation raised serious concerns about the sustainability of this obligation.  The Committee was facing the real risk of reducing its activities, and, in a worst-case scenario, cancelling sessions due to lack of resources.  This year, the second and third sessions of the Committee were not yet confirmed.  Weakening of the Committee would not only weaken international human rights oversight but also send a troubling signal about the collective will to combat racial discrimination globally. 

    In addition, the Committee was increasingly impacted by a drop in timely reporting by States parties – a trend that undermined its ability to plan and hold dialogue sessions, notably for the years 2026 and 2027.  But despite these challenges, the Committee remained steadfast.  On average, it reviewed 18 State party reports per year, consistently worked to refine its methods of work, and continued to engage in meaningful, forward-looking initiatives in line with its mandate.

    This year marked the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which was adopted on 21 December 1965.  To mark this auspicious occasion, the Committee and its Secretariat were working in collaboration with partners on a year-long campaign throughout 2025.  The campaign highlighted the foundational importance of the Convention for the fight against racial discrimination, and focused attention on its continued relevance today.  It would stimulate discussions on effective practices to address structural and emerging challenges in preventing and combatting racial discrimination and aimed to renew the commitment for the effective implementation of the Convention. 

    The Committee encouraged all States parties to the Convention to contribute to the anniversary by taking concrete action to implement the Convention, including jointly with other States and stakeholders, at the local, national, regional or international levels. The Committee would hold a high-level commemorative event, tentatively scheduled to take place on 4 December 2025. The active support of States parties and all stakeholders in the organization of this event was crucial for its success.

    The Committee had adopted general recommendation 37 in 2024 on equality and freedom from racial discrimination in the enjoyment of the right to health.  This general recommendation clarified the obligations undertaken under the Convention regarding the right to health and provided guidance on measures to address concerns in line with the Convention. 

    Currently, the Committee was working with the Committee on Migrant Workers on a joint general recommendation on xenophobia; regional consultations were held last year to inform the drafting. It was also elaborating a general recommendation on reparations, which would provide guidance on the scope and content of the right to reparations under international human rights law, particularly concerning the harms of the forced capture of Africans, the transatlantic transport of those captives, their enslavement as chattel, and the massive and continuing harms suffered by their descendants.

    The Committee called on States parties to provide advice on how to address the unprecedented crisis affecting the treaty body system.

    RÉGINE ESSENEME, Committee Vice-Chair, said the Convention was adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969.  It covered all areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms and had been ratified by 182 countries.  These States parties had committed to engaging in the Committee’s periodic review process, under which each State party was obliged to submit an initial report after one year of ratification and subsequent periodic reports every two years.  For several years however, States parties had submitted fewer reports to the Committee, often choosing to combine reports over longer periods. 

    Most States had submitted to the Committee’s simplified reporting procedure, but given its resource limitations, the Committee prioritised States with reports overdue by more than 10 years for this procedure.  Currently, 78 States parties had significant delays in the submission of reports.  The Committee sought States’ views on this issue and on methods of fostering collaboration with States parties to ensure that they honoured their commitments under the Convention.

    Discussion with States Parties

    In the ensuing discussion, representatives of States parties said, among other things, that the Convention, the first fundamental human rights treaty, was an essential tool for combatting racial discrimination.  Speakers expressed commitment to fulfilling their obligations under the Convention and eliminating racial discrimination, xenophobia and social exclusion, and to cooperating with the Committee.  They thanked the Committee for its work in eliminating racial discrimination. Cooperating with the Committee gave States the ability to ensure the highest possible implementation of the Convention.

    Many speakers said they would join in the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, which offered an opportunity for renewing commitments under the Convention and addressing modern challenges related to racial discrimination, including hate speech, discrimination and xenophobic practices.  They expressed concern about the United Nations’ liquidity crisis, which impacted the Committee’s work.

    Speakers presented measures to prevent racial discrimination and promote racial equality; recognise the status and promote the rights of indigenous peoples, as well as their participation in policy development; and participate in the Committee’s reporting procedure and follow-up on the recommendations of the Committee.

    Some speakers proposed that the Committee held hybrid meetings with States when necessary to promote the participation of civil servants with specific knowledge and civil society in States with limited resources.  One speaker called for the hybrid meeting tools used by the United Nations to guarantee the equal participation of all States.  Some speakers called on the Committee to strengthen its cooperation with regional mechanisms and other international bodies, including the United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect.

    One speaker said that individual communications needed to be handled effectively.  How did the Committee monitor the implementation of its decision on individual communications?

    Some speakers noted that the Committee had decided to extend the simplified reporting procedure to all States parties, but at the same time requested many States to continue using the regular reporting procedure as their reports were not overdue by 10 years. Why had the Committee decided to do this?  The simplified reporting procedure would ease States’ reporting burden.  Without this procedure, future report submissions could be delayed, they said.  Other speakers, however, said that there were disadvantages to the simplified procedure, expressing support for the regular reporting procedure.  One speaker said that efforts to simplify reporting procedures needed to be balanced with efforts to establish a predictable reporting calendar.

    One speaker expressed concern regarding unilateral coercive measures and human rights violations against migrants, including their illegal deportation to other States.  Another speaker raised the issue of trans-Atlantic slavery, expressing support for a new United Nations instrument on the rights of people of African descent.

    Statements and Responses by Committee Experts

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, thanked States for the proposals they had put forward.  He said that the Committee offered the possibility of hybrid dialogues, which were not currently shortened compared to regular dialogues.  The Committee regretted that it did not have the possibility to hold hybrid meetings with other stakeholders.

    The simplified reporting procedure was a crucial issue.  There was a problem with this procedure in that it was not, in fact, simple from the perspective of the Committee and its secretariat.  If the Committee had more capacity to prepare lists of issues prior to reporting, it would have done so.

    The Chair encouraged States parties to engage in events to commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention, information on which was available online.  He also called for further dialogue between the Committee and regional bodies.

    NOUREDDIN AMIR, Committee Expert, said that Committee Experts were elected by States every two years on a rolling basis.  They sought to achieve States’ aspirations to better fulfil their human rights obligations. The Committee was committed to combatting racism and injustice, which was everywhere.  It needed to promote discussions between belligerents in the wars that were currently raging.  Women and children were being killed in Palestine.  States needed to take responsibility for these issues, stop criminals, and seek justice for those whose voices were not heard.  The International Court of Justice needed to be able to condemn States that carried out forbidden acts against international law.

    STAMATIA STAVRINAKI, Committee Expert, said that the Committee’s individual communications procedure had not yet reached its full potential, as around one-third of States parties to the Convention had not accepted the procedure.  Last year, the Committee adopted decisions on 48 complaints and found violations in 27 of them.  The Committee advocated for this procedure, which created an opportunity to remedy harms caused by racial discrimination and to prevent future violations.  States parties could deploy junior professionals to support the Working Group on individual communications.  The Committee invited States to accept the individual communications procedure, which would reenforce their efforts to combat racial discrimination effectively.

    FAITH DIKELEDI PANSY TLAKULA, Committee Expert, said that the Committee had strengthened its relationship with regional human rights mechanisms, contacting relevant regional bodies regarding their assessment of follow-up efforts to the Committee’s concluding observations.  The concluding observations contained recommendations for improving the implementation of the Convention, which were to be implemented within one year. States parties were required to submit follow-up reports on the implementation of these recommendations, but only one-third of States parties submitted reports, which often did not demonstrate sufficient implementation of the recommendations.  The Committee called on all States to submit these reports.

    VERENE ALBERTHA SHEPHERD, Committee Vice-Chair, expressed pleasure that several States parties from the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean region were attending the meeting. She was the only Expert on the Committee from this region.  She called on these States to promote the appointment of more Experts from the region. It was regrettable that some countries had difficulty in using hybrid tools offered for participation in dialogue, and that some non-governmental organizations could not attend meetings with the Committee.  The Committee would address these issues.

    Ms. Shepherd said that a second International Decade for People of African Descent had been established by the General Assembly.  She called on all States to participate in commemorations of the Decade.  The Committee used an intersectional lens when addressing racial discrimination to address issues such as gender.  In closing, she called on States to financially support the Committee to address its liquidity crisis.

    GAY MCDOUGALL, Committee Vice-Chair, said that the Committee had issued general recommendation 25 on gender, in which it committed to taking an intersectional approach to gender.  The Committee was also committed to assessing the relationship between racial discrimination and economic marginalisation. It was assessing opportunities for decent work for ethnic minorities, as well as access to education and other social services.

    The Committee was concerned by its shrinking resources and capacity to do its work.  It was in the worst situation of any treaty body in terms of resources.  Although it had one of the most ratified treaties, the Committee received among the lowest number of reports.  Why was this?

    RÉGINE ESSENEME, Committee Vice-Chair, said the legal basis for the presentation of reports was article nine, paragraph one of the Convention.  The purpose of the simplified reporting procedure was to encourage States to submit reports.  However, it had not led to an increase in the number of reports that the Committee received. The Committee was affected by a lack of human and financial resources.  The simplified reporting procedure was not simple for the Committee; it was thus the exception and not the rule.  States needed to respect their reporting obligations under the Convention.

    CHINSUNG CHUNG, Committee Expert, said the Committee and all nine treaty bodies had inter-State communications procedures.  The Committee had received and considered three inter-State communications, and amicable solutions to two of these complaints had been found.  A third communication had been received from the State of Palestine against Israel in 2018.  The Committee had issued six recommendations in relation to this communication.  What steps could the Committee take to ensure that its recommendations would be implemented? Ms. Chung encouraged States to cooperate with the inter-State communications procedure.

    IBRAHIMA GUISSE, Committee Expert, said that the Committee had set up an early warning mechanism to prevent existing issues from becoming conflicts.  The mechanism could intervene if there was a lack of legislation or mechanisms to prevent racial discrimination, or to react to discriminatory statements or actions.  The Committee had recently adopted decisions under this procedure related to Sudan and the State of Palestine, which had been cited by the International Court of Justice.  Most conflicts in the world stemmed from racial or religious issues.  The Committee could be a major force to prevent such crises, but it needed the support of States in this regard.

    BAKARI SIDIKI DIABY, Committee Expert, commended the efforts of States parties to engage in dialogue with the Committee.  Some States had not come before the Committee for more than 20 years.  The simplified procedure was set up to assist such States. The Committee also had the power to examine States parties in the absence of a report if necessary and it had done so in the past.  It called on all States to help victims protected by the Convention and to engage in dialogue with the Committee.  States also needed to cooperate with civil society in preparation for dialogues. Some members of civil society who had cooperated with the Committee had been subjected to reprisals; the United Nations had no tolerance for this.

    PELA BOKER-WILSON, Committee Expert, said that reviews of some States parties showed a lack of collection of disaggregated data that allowed for a comparison of population groups. This entailed moving away from traditional data collection practices.  States parties were encouraged to collect data on sex, age, ethnicity, migration status, disability, religion and other distinctions.

    GÜN KUT, Committee Expert, thanked representatives of States parties for engaging with the Committee and expressing support for the Committee’s work.  The Committee was sensitive to States’ questions, demands and criticisms.  The success of the Committee depended on States parties’ will and contributions. The Committee needed regularity in the submission of reports and sufficient follow-up to the Committee’s recommendations, including through follow-up and periodic reports.  The Committee sought to improve its work, but this depended on securing sufficient meeting time and support for the Committee’s secretariat.  States needed to commit to sending reports on time and supporting the financial situation of treaty bodies.

    MAZALO TEBIE, Committee Expert, called on States to support the functioning of the Committee.

    YEUNG KAM JOHN YEUNG SIK YUEN, Committee Expert, said many States parties had not taken steps to criminalise hate speech.  Was this done deliberately to protect politicians?  When the Committee issued a decision on an individual communication, it left it to States parties involved to implement it.  The Committee took up implementation of these decisions in dialogues with States parties.

    Closing Remarks

    MICHAL BALCERZAK, Committee Chair, thanked States parties for attending the meeting.  The Committee would do its best to address the issues raised in the dialogue.  It would work efficiently with States and ensure that it did not disappoint victims of racial discrimination.  The Chair called on States to encourage the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Convention across the world.  The Committee looked forward to further engagement with States in future.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

    CERD25.003E

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI Security: Ashland Man Charged with Transportation of Child Pornography

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    BOSTON – An Ashland man has been arrested and charged with transportation of child sexual abuse material (CSAM).

    Brent Vreeland, 36, was arrested and charged yesterday with one count of transportation of child pornography. Following an initial appearance in federal court in Boston, Vreeland was ordered detained pending a hearing scheduled for this afternoon.

    According to the charging documents, Vreeland was flagged for secondary screening at Boston’s Logan Airport upon arrival from Reykjavik, Iceland in October 2024. It is alleged that during a review of Vreeland’s cell phone, images and videos depicting CSAM were found in his Telegram Messenger app. A subsequent forensic examination of the device allegedly revealed approximately 30 media files depicting CSAM in direct messages with other unknown Telegram users. It is further alleged that Vreeland received and distributed three such videos in October 2021, depicting the abuse of minor victims between the ages of four and 10 years old. In one exchange, Vreeland allegedly asked another user to trade CSAM files for “the youngest [they] hve [sic].”

    The charge of transportation of child pornography provides for a sentence of at least five years and up to 20 years in prison, at least five years and up to a lifetime of supervised release and a fine of up to $250,000. Sentences are imposed by a federal district court judge based upon the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and statutes which govern the determination of a sentence in a criminal case.

    United States Attorney Leah B. Foley and Michael J. Krol, Special Agent in Charge of Homeland Security Investigations in New England made the announcement today. Valuable assistance was provided by Customs and Border Patrol, Boston Division. Assistant U.S. Attorney Allegra Flamm of the Major Crimes Unit is prosecuting the case.

    The details contained in the charging documents are allegations. The defendant is presumed innocent unless and until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.
     

    MIL Security OSI –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The Commission’s strategy to end energy imports from Russia – P-000949/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Following the Russian military aggression against Ukraine as of 2022, the EU has acted firmly to cut its reliance on Russian energy. REPowerEU[1], adopted in May 2022, aiming to fast forward the clean transition, diversify supplies, and enhance EU energy resilience.

    The EU adopted sanctions to phase out Russian coal imports. Sanctions on Russian oil have also reduced imports from almost a third to 3% of total EU imports.

    In terms of gas, the EU reduced its Russian gas imports from over 45% in 2021, to 19% in 2024, replacing it with alternatives like liquefied natural gas or pipeline gas from Norway.

    With the end of Russian gas transit via Ukraine, beginning of 2025, the share could fall to 13% this year. However, Russian fuels, particularly gas, remain in the EU energy mix.

    To address this, the Commission is working on a Roadmap to end Russian energy imports by fully implementing REPowerEU. The Roadmap is in the Commission Work Programme 2025.

    • [1] Source: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/key-documents-repowereu_en
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Prison capacity shortage – E-001008/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Detention issues, including the management of detention capacity and arrangements between EU countries in this regard, are a Member State competence.

    In the past, Norway and Belgium have rented detention spaces in the Netherlands to address overcrowding in their prisons. The experiment had mixed results[1] and ultimately neither Norway nor Belgium extended their contracts with the Netherlands[2].

    The Commission adopted a recommendation[3] that provides guidance to Member States on how to ensure, among other things, that detainees’ fundamental rights are respected and that they are treated with dignity.

    • [1] See ‘Where Two “Exceptional” Prison Cultures Meet: Negotiating Order in a Transnational Prison’
      Alison Liebling, Berit Johnsen, Bethany E Schmidt, Tore Rokkan, Kristel Beyens, Miranda Boone, Mieke Kox, An-Sofie Vanhouche, The British Journal of Criminology, Volume 61, Issue 1, January 2021, Pages 41-60. https://academic.oup.com/bjc/article/61/1/41/5892706
    • [2] https://prisonreformtrust.org.uk/blog-renting-foreign-prison-places-the-unanswered-question. The Norwegian scheme ran for three years from 2015 to 2018 and the arrangements in Belgium for seven years from 2009 to 2016.
    • [3] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32023H0681
    Last updated: 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: PM remarks at the IEA Future of Energy Security summit: 24 April 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    PM remarks at the IEA Future of Energy Security summit: 24 April 2025

    Prime Minister’s remarks from the IEA Future of Energy Security summit.

    Good afternoon, everyone – it’s really fantastic to see so many people here, in London, welcome to London, I’m so pleased we have got so many representatives from so many places and in a sense we’re here today for one simple reason:

    Because the world has changed.

    From defence and national security on the one hand, much discussed in recent months…

    To the economy and trade…

    Old assumptions have fallen away.

    We are living through an era of global instability…

    Which is felt by working people as an age of local insecurity.

    Factory workers, builders, carers, nurses, teachers… 

    Working harder and harder for the pound in their pocket…

    But feeling at the same time that they have less control of their lives.

    *

    And energy security is right at the heart of this.

    Every family and business across the UK…

    Has paid the price for Russia weaponizing energy. And it has.

    But it’s not just that.

    *

    Let’s be frank.

    When it comes to energy…

    We’re also paying the price for our over-exposure…

    Over many years…

    To the rollercoaster of international fossil fuel markets.

    Leaving the economy – and therefore people’s household budgets…

    Vulnerable to the whims of dictators like Putin…

    To price spikes…

    And to volatility that is beyond our control. 

    Since the 1970s, half of the UK’s recessions have been caused by fossil fuel shocks. 

    That’s true for many of the other nations represented here this afternoon.

    So what’s different today is not the information we have.

    It’s not our awareness of the problem.

    No.

    What’s different now… 

    Is our determination…

    In a more uncertain world…

    To fix it.

    It’s our determination that working people…

    Should not be exposed like this anymore.

    *

    So, to the British people, I say:

    This government will not sit back…

    We will step up.

    We will make energy a source…

    Not of vulnerability, but of strength.

    We will protect our critical infrastructure, energy networks and supply chains…

    And do whatever it takes…

    To protect the security of our people.

    Because this is the crucial point – 

    Energy security is national security…

    And it is therefore a fundamental duty of government.

    And I’m very clear – 

    We can’t deliver that by defending the status quo…

    Or trying to turn the clock back…

    To a world that no longer exists.

    *

    Of course, fossil fuels will be part of our energy mix for decades to come.

    But winning the fight for energy security depends on renewal –

    It depends on change…

    It depends on cooperation with others.

    And that’s why we’re all here today – so many countries, so many communities represented.

    *

    The IEA was founded in 1974,

    In the midst of an energy crisis,

    To help us work together to secure energy supplies…

    And reduce future energy shocks.

    Well, that has taken on a new urgency today. 

    So our task is clear – 

    To act – together… 

    To seize the opportunity of the clean energy transition. 

    Because homegrown clean energy…

    Is the only way…

    To take back control of our energy system… 

    Deliver energy security…

    And bring down bills for the long term.

    *

    And I want to tell you –  

    That is in the DNA of my government.

    When we came into office last year… 

    We knew there was no time to waste.

    So in our first 100 days…

    We launched Great British Energy –

    As a national champion to drive investment and transform clean power.

    We scrapped the ban on onshore wind…

    And became the first G7 economy to phase out coal power.

    While we won’t turn off the taps…

    We’re going all out –  

    Through our Plan for Change…

    To make Britain a clean energy superpower… 

    To secure home grown energy…

    And set a path to achieving clean power by 2030.

    *

    Now, I know, some in the UK don’t agree with that.

    They think energy security can wait.

    They think tackling climate change can wait.

    But do they also think that billpayers can wait too?

    Do they think economic growth can wait?

    Do they think we can win the race for green jobs and investment by going slow?

    That would serve no one. 

    Instead, this government is acting now…

    With a muscular industrial policy –

    To seize these opportunities…

    To boost investment…

    Build new industries…

    Drive UK competitiveness…

    And unlock export opportunities –

    In wind, nuclear, hydrogen, carbon capture, heat pumps and so much more.

    That is the change we need.

    We won’t wait – 

    We’ll accelerate.

    *

    Because we’re already seeing the benefits.

    The UK’s net zero sectors are growing three times faster than the economy as a whole.

    They have attracted £43 billion of private investment since last July. 

    And now they support around 600,000 jobs across the UK.

    That means more opportunities…

    And more money in people’s pockets.

    And we’re going further.

    We’ve stripped out unnecessary red tape…

    To put Britain back in the global race for nuclear energy…

    And allow for Small Modular Reactors for the first time.

    We’re speeding up planning for clean energy projects –

    Including onshore wind…

    To power millions of homes and unlock further investment of £40 billion each year.

    *

    It’s really clear to me – 

    That investors want policy certainty.

    They want ambition.

    That is what we’re providing.

    And now we are raising our ambition even further.

    I am really pleased to announce today…

    That we’re creating a new Supply Chains Investment Fund –

    As part of Great British Energy.

    It will be backed by an initial £300 million of new funding… 

    For domestic offshore wind…

    Leveraging billions of new private investment…

    Supporting tens of thousands of jobs…

    And driving economic growth.

    When companies are looking to invest in clean energy…

    When partners are looking to build new turbines, blades or cables…

    Our message is simple:

    Build it in Britain.

    I am determined to seize this opportunity –

    To win our share of this trillion-dollar market…

    And secure the next generation of great jobs.

    I’ve met apprentices at the docks in Grimsby – fantastic individuals…

    I’ve been to Holyhead in Wales…

    And the National Nuclear Laboratory in Preston…

    And I’ve seen the brilliant clean power infrastructure that we are building in this country.

    But more than that…

    I’ve seen the pride that these jobs bring.

    This is skilled, well-paid work…

    Meaningful work –

    A chance to reignite our industrial heartlands…

    To rekindle the sense of community pride and purpose…

    That comes from being part of something that is bigger than yourself.

    And so I’m pleased to tell you…

    That I can share some more good news this afternoon.

    Earlier today, we finalised a deal with ENI.

    It will see them award £2 billion in supply chain contracts…

    For the Hynet Carbon Capture and Storage project…

    Creating 2,000 jobs, across North Wales and the North West.

    I want to thank all those here today who are part of this success story.

    Because it is all built on stability, yes…

    But our ruthless focus on delivery…

    But it is also built on partnership.

    *

    So let me say –

    It is a real pleasure today to welcome my friend –

    President von der Leyen.

    Ursula – it is so good to have you with us this afternoon. Last time we were in this building, Ursula and I stood together with other colleagues here at Lancaster House, that was just last month, six weeks ago…

    Standing shoulder-to-shoulder with President Zelenskyy…

    Working together for European security.

    Today we stand, again together with Fatih and others and the IEA…

    United behind European energy security.

    Europe must never again be in a position where Russia thinks they can blackmail us on energy.

    And until Russia comes to the table and agrees a full and unconditional ceasefire…

    We must continue to crack down on their energy revenues which are still fuelling Putin’s war chest.

    This is the moment to act. 

    And it is the moment to build a partnership with the EU that meets the needs of our time –

    Facing up to the global shocks of recent years…

    And working together to minimise the impact on hard-working people.

    So we’re doing more with the EU to improve our interconnections…

    And make the most of our shared energy systems…

    As well as building on the fantastic partnerships that we already have…

    With countries like the Netherlands, Germany, Norway and so many others.

    We have a common and important resource in the North Sea…

    Which can help us meet common challenges –

    To me, this is just common sense.

    So let’s seize this potential…

    To drive down bills…

    And drive up investment, growth and energy security.

    I was elected with a mandate to deliver change.

    So I make no apologies for pursuing every avenue…

    To deliver in the national interest and secure Britain’s future.

    That is always my priority. 

    And of course this has to be a global effort as well.

    We need to see a wider coalition…

    That unites the north and south…

    In a global drive for clean power.

    That’s why I launched the Global Clean Power Alliance at the G20 last year…

    Working alongside the EU’s Global Energy Transitions Forum.

    And that’s why we’re joining forces to take this forward.

    We want to tackle the barriers and bottlenecks that are holding countries back.

    So I am pleased to announce today…

    That, under the Global Clean Power Alliance…

    We are establishing a first-of-its-kind global initiative…

    To unblock and diversify clean energy supply chains.

    We are harnessing the political leadership needed to make this happen.

    Because, ultimately…

    That is what this is about:

    Leadership.

    In this moment of instability and uncertainty…

    Where we are buffeted by global forces…

    We are taking control.

    We are working together with partners from around the world…

    With the IEA and all of you here today…

    To accelerate this vital global transition.

    And in the UK…

    We are stepping up now…

    To make energy a source…

    Not of vulnerability, and worry…

    Which it is at the moment and it has been for so long…

    But a source of strength, of security and pride.

    With British energy, powering British homes, creating British jobs –  

    A collective effort, to boost our collective security…

    For generations to come.

    Thank you very much.

    *

    And now it is my very great pleasure and privilege to introduce…

    President von der Leyen, my friend Ursula, thank you very much for being here. Ursula, the stage is yours.

    Updates to this page

    Published 24 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Jeffing: how this run-walk method could help you train for a marathon

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By James Thie, Senior Lecturer Sport Coaching and Performance, Cardiff Metropolitan University

    Jeff Galloway originally developed his run training method in 1974. Valery Zotev/Shutterstock

    Even if you’re a runner, you may not have heard the term “Jeffing” before. It’s a method of alternating between running and walking and it’s become a popular way to train for long-distance races.

    It’s particularly timely, as we appear to be in the middle of a second running boom, the first having taken off in the 1970s and 80s. You can see it in the popularity of parkrun, the rise in mass participation events, and the seemingly endless market for running shoes, watches and other gear.

    But despite all this enthusiasm, the idea of running can still be off-putting for many people. Some believe that unless they can run continuously at a certain pace or distance, they aren’t a “real runner”, especially when they find themselves comparing their progress with others.

    That’s where Jeffing comes in. This walk-run technique allows people to keep moving forward at their own pace. It balances effort and recovery in a way that makes endurance running more accessible to a wider range of people and abilities.

    But where did Jeffing come from?

    Jeff Galloway pictured in 2015.
    Lance Cpl. Timothy Turner/Wikimedia

    The concept was invented by American Olympian and coach, Jeff Galloway in the 1970s. It’s a strategic way of combining walking and running, sometimes with jogging too.

    Galloway describes it as a revolutionary approach that reduces fatigue, prevents injuries and makes running more enjoyable. “By alternating between running and walking runners can go farther, recover faster, and feel stronger during and after their workouts,” he says.

    In this sense, Jeffing shares some similarities with “fartlek”, which is Swedish for “speed play”. Fartlek is a training method that was developed in 1930s Sweden by cross-country runners looking to improve their performance. It also involves alternating bursts of fast and slow running.

    Research shows that there were significant improvements in cardiovascular and speed endurance in just 12 weeks of fartlek training.

    The difference is that Jeffing operates at a lower intensity, and the walking breaks allow the body to recover more fully.

    What are the benefits of Jeffing?

    One of the biggest advantages of Jeffing is that it can help you go further. Because the body’s energy stores aren’t being depleted all at once, many runners find they can cover longer distances than they may have managed with continuous running. Studies show that this may have more benefits than shorter and more intense exercise.

    It also lowers the risk of injury because the reduced intensity puts less stress on joints and muscles. This makes Jeffing a popular option for people returning from injury or illness, or anyone keen to stay injury-free while training.

    Recovery tends to be quicker, too. Since the body is under less strain, runners often report feeling less fatigued afterwards. This may make it easier to stick to a training plan without burning out.

    Jeffing is especially welcoming for beginners. Galloway originally developed the method in 1974 while coaching a group of new runners. After ten weeks of following the walk-run approach, every one of them completed either a 5k or 10k race. The technique is still used by runners of all abilities, including those tackling full marathons.

    Jeffing also helps shift the focus away from pace and distance and onto how your own body feels. Galloway’s advice in the early years included the “huff and puff” rule: if you can hear yourself breathing hard, take more frequent walk breaks.

    On the other hand, for people who prefer structure, the method can be done with a stopwatch. A run can be chopped up into manageable segments, such as 30 seconds running and 30 seconds walking, as Galloway explains:

    By going to a 30 second run / 30 second walk … they run faster without any extra effort because they are only walking for 30 seconds. If that feels good, use it for a while then start creeping up the amount of running while keeping the walking at 30 seconds. After several weeks, you may settle in on something like 45 seconds run/30 seconds walk, or you may just run faster during your 30 seconds of running.

    Runners in the 2024 London Marathon.
    mikecphoto/Shutterstock

    Is Jeffing for you?

    Although popular, this approach to running won’t appeal to everyone. Some runners may feel that breaking up a continuous run with walk breaks interrupts their rhythm or makes them feel like they’re not really running. But from my perspective as a runner and athletics coach, anything that helps more people participate in exercise should be welcomed.

    Many marathon runners will be using Jeffing as a way to prepare for their next event. They may use the technique in a structured way or just instinctively walking when they need to, to help them reach the finish line.

    So whether you increase the running time or just stick with short bursts, Jeffing may let you run in a way that suits your body – and that’s what really counts.

    James Thie does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Jeffing: how this run-walk method could help you train for a marathon – https://theconversation.com/jeffing-how-this-run-walk-method-could-help-you-train-for-a-marathon-254837

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: Smackover Lithium’s South West Arkansas Project Receives Unanimous Vote of Approval to Establish the Phase I Brine Production Unit from the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LEWISVILLE, Ark., April 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Smackover Lithium, a Joint Venture (“JV”) between Standard Lithium Ltd. (“Standard Lithium” or the “Company”) (TSXV:SLI) (NYSE:A:SLI) and Equinor, is pleased to announce that the brine production unit, now formally named the Reynolds Unit, for Phase I of its South West Arkansas (“SWA”) Project has been unanimously approved by the Arkansas Oil and Gas Commission (“AOGC”) with no objections or opposition in a hearing that was open to all stakeholders from the community.

    “We thank the AOGC for their due diligence in reviewing our application and for their swift approval,” said Standard Lithium’s President and COO, Dr. Andy Robinson, who provided testimony at the hearing. “The establishment of the Reynolds brine unit is another key milestone our team has now successfully completed as we march towards a final investment decision for the SWA Project, and also a necessary statutory requirement as we look to set a royalty for the unit in late May.”

    “Gaining regulatory approval for our first brine unit is an important step in our project timeline. We look forward to working with the AOGC and community stakeholders to establish a competitive royalty rate for this unit and continue momentum with the SWA Project,” said Allison Kennedy Thurmond, VP of US Lithium at Equinor.

    The Reynolds unit is 20,854 acres in size and is planned to produce 22,500 tonnes per year of battery-quality lithium carbonate once in full commercial production, expected in 2028. For more information about the SWA Project and Smackover Lithium, please visit www.smackoverlithium.com

    About Standard Lithium Ltd.

    Standard Lithium is a leading near-commercial lithium development company focused on the sustainable development of a portfolio of large, high-grade lithium-brine properties in the United States. The Company prioritizes projects characterized by the highest quality resources, robust infrastructure, skilled labor, and streamlined permitting. Standard Lithium aims to achieve sustainable, commercial-scale lithium production via the application of a scalable and fully integrated Direct Lithium Extraction (“DLE”) and purification process. The Company’s flagship projects are located in the Smackover Formation, a world-class lithium brine asset, focused in Arkansas and Texas. In partnership with global energy leader Equinor, Standard Lithium is advancing the South West Arkansas project, a greenfield project located in southern Arkansas, and actively exploring promising lithium brine prospects in East Texas. Standard Lithium also holds an interest in certain mineral leases in the Mojave Desert in San Bernardino County, California.

    Standard Lithium trades on both the TSX Venture Exchange and the NYSE American under the symbol “SLI”. Please visit the Company’s website at www.standardlithium.com.

    About Equinor

    Equinor is an international energy company committed to long-term value creation in a low-carbon future. Equinor’s portfolio of projects encompasses oil and gas, renewables and low-carbon solutions, with an ambition of becoming a net-zero energy company by 2050. Headquartered in Norway, Equinor is the leading operator on the Norwegian continental shelf and is present in around 30 countries worldwide. Our partnership with Standard Lithium to mature DLE projects builds on our broad US energy portfolio of oil and gas, offshore wind, low carbon solutions and battery storage projects.

    For more information on Equinor in the US, please visit: Equinor in the US – Equinor

    Investor and Media Inquiries

    Chris Lang
    Standard Lithium Ltd.
    +1 604 409 8154
    investors@standardlithium.com

    Neither the TSX Venture Exchange nor its Regulation Services Provider (as that term is defined in policies of the TSX Venture Exchange) accepts responsibility for the adequacy or accuracy of this release. This news release may contain certain “Forward-Looking Statements” within the meaning of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and applicable Canadian securities laws. When used in this news release, the words “anticipate”, “believe”, “estimate”, “expect”, “target”, “plan”, “forecast”, “may”, “schedule” and other similar words or expressions identify forward-looking statements or information. These forward-looking statements or information may relate to intended development timelines, future prices of commodities, accuracy of mineral or resource exploration activity, reserves or resources, regulatory or government requirements or approvals, the reliability of third party information, continued access to mineral properties or infrastructure, fluctuations in the market for lithium and its derivatives, changes in exploration costs and government regulation in Canada and the United States, and other factors or information. Such statements represent the Company’s current views with respect to future events and are necessarily based upon a number of assumptions and estimates that, while considered reasonable by the Company, are inherently subject to significant business, economic, competitive, political and social risks, contingencies and uncertainties. Many factors, both known and unknown, could cause results, performance or achievements to be materially different from the results, performance or achievements that are or may be expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. The Company does not intend, and does not assume any obligation, to update these forward-looking statements or information to reflect changes in assumptions or changes in circumstances or any other events affecting such statements and information other than as required by applicable laws, rules and regulations.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Nasdaq and AWS Unlock New Era of Growth for Global Capital Markets with Next Generation Infrastructure Solutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nasdaq and AWS announce modernization blueprint to drive the benefits of cloud into local market infrastructures through flexible deployment while maintaining data sovereignty and resilience

    As part of the modernization blueprint, Nasdaq is introducing a new brand for its complete suite of next generation marketplace technology solutions, Nasdaq Eqlipse, delivering cloud-ready capabilities and data intelligence across the full trade lifecycle

    Nasdaq’s Nordic markets first to adopt the blueprint alongside expanded modernization partnerships with Johannesburg Stock Exchange and Mexico’s Grupo BMV

    NEW YORK, SEATTLE, STOCKHOLM, JOHANNESBURG, and MEXICO CITY, April 24, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Nasdaq and Amazon Web Services, Inc. (AWS), an Amazon.com, Inc. company, today announced an advancement in their shared mission to modernize markets globally. Drawing on their deep experience and expertise in powering capital markets, the companies are introducing a new suite of solutions that empower market operators to enhance liquidity, facilitate capital flows, and drive growth, while upholding the highest level of performance, security and resilience.

    Today, market operators navigate unique complexities, including emerging technology acceleration, highly competitive environments, regulatory standards, and constantly evolving client needs. Yet, their ability to innovate and modernize at pace requires ever greater expertise and advanced technological capabilities. To address these challenges, Nasdaq and AWS are delivering infrastructure, software, data management and services to enable market operators to overcome modernization barriers cost effectively without compromising resiliency or control.

    The new blueprint, proven through Nasdaq’s successful market modernization with AWS, drives industry standards, dynamic and sustainable operations while promoting a more resilient financial ecosystem. In the long term, the blueprint can enhance investor confidence and connect capital, previously confined locally due to technological complexity, to global investment opportunities.

    “Local economies flourish when capital markets are robust, and global investors can confidently channel capital across borders. Conversely, a strong global economy is reliant on local markets that are highly dynamic, where innovators can scale, and capital can seamlessly connect. Powering both creates a virtuous cycle of value creation, driving economic growth and wealth generation,” said Adena Friedman, Chair and Chief Executive Officer, Nasdaq. “The unique combination of Nasdaq’s technology expertise and AWS’s advanced infrastructure enables us to solve the industry’s most complex challenges that have hampered the growth and scalability of markets around the world. By reducing complicatedness, friction, and fragmentation we are fortifying the financial system with greater connectivity and resilience and enabling a new era of economic growth and prosperity.”

    “Building on our 15-year partnership, Nasdaq and AWS are furthering our shared vision to develop technology that simplifies and streamlines capital markets,” said Matt Garman, CEO at AWS. “Together, we are helping market operators provide seamless connectivity for markets and investors anywhere in the world, with a blueprint for modernization and innovation, and the ability to unlock new opportunities for innovation and growth in capital markets.”

    A blueprint for the next generation of markets with resilience and optionality

    The blueprint empowers market operators to execute their modernization strategies by optimizing their resource investments while focusing on operational excellence, enhancing competitive differentiation, satisfying their regulatory obligations, and driving innovation within their markets. The first three key components of the blueprint include:

    • Bringing together AWS, exchange, and trading participant infrastructure in close proximity to power global capital markets: Building on AWS’s high-performing, scalable infrastructure, as well as its deep expertise in operating cloud infrastructure, Nasdaq and AWS are offering a new solution for market operators that addresses resilience, security, proximity and latency demands by positioning AWS services, exchange and trading participant systems in a common location. For the first time, global market participants will have access to industry-leading compute services from AWS in close proximity to the core exchange complex and their own co-located trading systems. In addition, AWS will provide connectivity between this infrastructure and AWS’s Global Regions via the AWS Direct Connect service and the AWS global network, to provide low-latency, high bandwidth connectivity for global applications; all while enabling operators to retain overall control of their data.
    • Nasdaq Eqlipse, a next generation marketplace technology platform: Nasdaq Eqlipse seamlessly integrates client community feedback and Nasdaq’s development investments, including platform capabilities, application architecture, APIs and product integration. The solutions feature cloud-ready applications and globally standardized APIs with proven interoperability across the full trade lifecycle. Nasdaq’s marketplace technology solutions are already used by over 135 market infrastructure providers around the world for multi-asset trading, clearing, central securities depository and surveillance. Nasdaq Eqlipse will also include a new solution – Nasdaq Eqlipse Intelligence – designed to unlock the full potential of market operators’ data with modern, cloud-based data management, analytics and reporting capabilities that are specific to market operators’ workflows. These capabilities address the industry-wide opportunity to deploy AI at greater scale, recognizing its potential to transform how marketplaces operate.
    • A services deployment model: The modernization blueprint brings together the expertise and experience of Nasdaq and AWS through a new services deployment model. This provides market operators with access to both companies’ deep capital markets expertise to help reduce operational heavy lifting. Ultimately the services deployment model powered by AWS is designed to help market operators reduce transformation risks, allowing them to focus technology resources toward a growth-driven capital allocation strategy. Market operators will be able to augment and accelerate their path to modernization, while improving time-to-market for new releases and enhancing overall resilience.

    The blueprint delivers key benefits to market operators so that they can drive innovation; specifically:

    • Accelerate and de-risk modernization strategies for market operators by delivering an agile technology stack and globally standardized services and workflows that empower the market operators to focus on attracting liquidity from global investors.
    • Provide greater flexibility for both innovation and monetization for market operators by leveraging modern technology infrastructure to capitalize on the potential of AI, enhance their data and insight-based services, and develop new products and functionality to the benefit of all market participants.
    • Promote transparency, enhance liquidity and protect market integrity by strengthening trading, clearing, and settlement operations and reducing barriers for local, regional and global investors with secure access.

    The blueprint plans to use AWS’s global network and low-latency traffic routing to support frictionless, high-speed connections for markets and investors around the world. This connectivity will allow market participants to interact seamlessly and transparently across global exchanges with minimal latency, fostering globally inter-connected markets built on a common data lake architecture.

    Johannesburg Stock Exchange, Grupo BMV and Nasdaq’s Nordic markets modernize their ecosystems

    Nasdaq has expanded its modernization partnership with both Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) and Mexico’s Grupo BMV. Additionally, Nasdaq’s Nordic markets have today announced their intention to modernize their infrastructure in line with the blueprint.

    The JSE is collaborating with Nasdaq around the development of services for colocation, data intelligence and insights, and client interactions. The blueprint service deployment model will support the South African bourse’s technology enablement journey to modernize its technology, leverage edge computing infrastructure, explore AI to deliver innovative market solutions and drive operational efficiencies.

    Leila Fourie, Group CEO of the JSE, said: “This strategic collaboration is an extension of the long-standing relationship the JSE has with Nasdaq. The market infrastructure developed in partnership with Nasdaq and AWS will open the door to greater global market interconnectivity with minimal latency, which will support increased liquidity and capital flows between the US and South African capital markets. We will be setting new standards for the industry through innovation and technology that creates value for market participants.”

    Building on the market modernization efforts with Nasdaq, Grupo BMV is analyzing how it can build on its existing technology partnership across its clearing and central securities depository platforms by leveraging the services deployment model. They are also evaluating the long-term potential for cloud infrastructure in Mexico and its ability to create a robust, high-integrity ecosystem that reduces barriers to market participation, enhances operational efficiency, and accelerates the adoption of emerging technologies across the Mexican financial landscape.

    Jorge Alegría, Chief Executive Officer, Grupo BMV, said: “Our post-trade technology infrastructure is undergoing a transformative evolution, with Nasdaq playing a pivotal role as our enabling partner, as we look toward the next decade. We are committed to driving innovation, enhancing operational efficiency and proactively addressing the evolving needs of our local and international customers.”

    In line with the blueprint, Nasdaq plans to incorporate the managed infrastructure model within its Nordic markets. Starting with the Nordic derivatives market, Nasdaq will be able to provide additional services to clients, powered by AWS infrastructure which allows Nasdaq’s clients to rapidly scale their GPU usage within Nasdaq’s own data center in Väsby, Sweden and harness cloud services to innovate faster.

    Roland Chai, President of European Market Services, Nasdaq, said: “The success of Nasdaq’s Nordic markets has demonstrated the extraordinary power of modern market infrastructure to attract international sources of capital. Incorporating AWS’s advanced cloud infrastructure is expected to elevate our markets on the global stage and help to power the next generation of growth across Europe.”

    These advancements will be made in close consultation with the respective regulatory authorities and are subject to relevant approvals.

    About Nasdaq

    Nasdaq (Nasdaq: NDAQ) is a leading global technology company serving corporate clients, investment managers, banks, brokers, and exchange operators as they navigate and interact with the global capital markets and the broader financial system. We aspire to deliver world-leading platforms that improve the liquidity, transparency, and integrity of the global economy. Our diverse offering of data, analytics, software, exchange capabilities, and client-centric services enables clients to optimize and execute their business vision with confidence. To learn more about the company, technology solutions, and career opportunities, visit us on LinkedIn, on X @Nasdaq, or at www.nasdaq.com.

    About Amazon Web Services

    Since 2006, Amazon Web Services has been the world’s most comprehensive and broadly adopted cloud. AWS has been continually expanding its services to support virtually any workload, and it now has more than 240 fully featured services for compute, storage, databases, networking, analytics, machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), mobile, security, hybrid, media, and application development, deployment, and management from 114 Availability Zones within 36 geographic regions, with announced plans for 12 more Availability Zones and four more AWS Regions in New Zealand, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and the AWS European Sovereign Cloud. Millions of customers—including the fastest-growing startups, largest enterprises, and leading government agencies—trust AWS to power their infrastructure, become more agile, and lower costs. To learn more about AWS, visit aws.amazon.com.

    About Amazon

    Amazon is guided by four principles: customer obsession rather than competitor focus, passion for invention, commitment to operational excellence, and long-term thinking. Amazon strives to be Earth’s Most Customer-Centric Company, Earth’s Best Employer, and Earth’s Safest Place to Work. Customer reviews, 1-Click shopping, personalized recommendations, Prime, Fulfillment by Amazon, AWS, Kindle Direct Publishing, Kindle, Career Choice, Fire tablets, Fire TV, Amazon Echo, Alexa, Just Walk Out technology, Amazon Studios, and The Climate Pledge are some of the things pioneered by Amazon. For more information, visit amazon.com/about and follow @AmazonNews.

    About the Johannesburg Stock Exchange

    The Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) has a well-established history of operating as a marketplace for trading financial products. It is a pioneering, globally connected exchange group that enables inclusive economic growth through trusted, world-class, socially responsible products, and services for the investor of the future. It offers secure and efficient primary and secondary capital markets across a diverse range of securities, spanning equities, derivatives, and debt markets. It prides itself on being the market of choice for local and international investors looking to gain exposure to leading capital markets on the African continent.

    The JSE is currently ranked in the Top 20 largest stock exchanges in the world by market capitalization, and is the largest stock exchange in Africa, having been in operation for 137 years. As a leading global exchange, the JSE co-creates unlocks value & makes real connections happen. www.jse.co.za

    About Grupo BMV

    The Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV: BOLSAA) is a fully integrated group with more than 130 years of experience, enabling Mexico’s securities and derivatives markets. It consists of a network of leading companies providing services in capital markets, derivatives, debt, post-trade solutions, data and analytics, as well as a range of value-added services. For more details, visit www.bmv.com.mx.

    Media Contacts

    Nasdaq: Emily Pan; Emily.Pan@nasdaq.com; +1 646 637 3964
    AWS: Naomi Little; njlittle@amazon.com; +1 771 233 2089
    JSE: Pheliswa Mayekiso; pheliswam@jse.co.za; +27 84 4860502
    Grupo BMV: Alberto Maya; amaya@grupobmv.com.mx; +52-55-5342-9000

    Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements:

    Information set forth in this press release contains forward-looking statements that involve a number of risks and uncertainties. Nasdaq cautions readers that any forward-looking information is not a guarantee of future performance and that actual results could differ materially from those contained in the forward-looking information. Forward-looking statements can be identified by words such as “will” and “can” and other words and terms of similar meaning. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements related to the benefits of products and services delivered in line with the modernization blueprint, application and availability of products and services in regulated environments, and Nasdaq’s partnership with AWS. Forward-looking statements involve a number of risks, uncertainties or other factors beyond Nasdaq’s control. These risks and uncertainties are detailed in Nasdaq’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including its annual reports on Form 10-K and quarterly reports on Form 10-Q which are available on Nasdaq’s investor relations website at http://ir.nasdaq.com and the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. Nasdaq undertakes no obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statement, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    – NDAQF-

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Thales reports its order intake and sales for the first quarter of 2025

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: Thales reports its order intake and sales for the first quarter of 2025

    • Order intake: €3.8 billion, down -25% (-27% on an organic basis1)
    • Sales: €5.0 billion, up +12.2% (+9.9% on an organic basis)
    • All 2025 financial objectives confirmed2

    Thales (Euronext Paris: HO) today announced its order intake and sales for the first quarter of 2025.

     

    “In the first quarter of 2025, Thales recorded organic sales growth of nearly 10%, demonstrating the strong momentum of our Defence and Avionics activities, as well as the excellent visibility the Group enjoys.
    ​Order intake in the first quarter of 2025 was solid, and showed growth compared to the same periods in 2022 and 2023. The decline observed compared to the first quarter of 2024 is explained by a particularly high comparison basis.
    ​Thanks to the commitment of our teams, we confirm all our annual financial targets for 2025, including a book-to-bill ratio over 1 for the year 2025.    ” ​
    ​Patrice Caine, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer

    Order intake

    Order intake for the first quarter of 2025 amounted to €3,778 million, down -27% at constant scope and exchange rates compared to the first three months of 2024 (-25% on a reported basis) due to a very high comparison base, particularly in the Defence segment. In the first quarter of 2024, Thales had recorded, among other contracts, two contracts with a unit value exceeding €500 million each: the third phase of the contract signed by Indonesia for the acquisition of Rafale aircraft (18 out of a total of 42), as well as an order for an air surveillance system for a military customer in the Middle East. However, the Group is benefiting from a robust commercial momentum in all its activities for this first quarter of 2025, particularly in the Aerospace segment. For reference, order intake amounted to €3,422 million in Q1 2023 and €3,033 million in Q1 2022.

    During the first quarter of 2025, Thales recorded five large orders worth over €100 million each, for a total of €707 million:

    • Order from Space Norway, Northern Europe’s leading satellite operator, for the supply of a telecommunications satellite, THOR 8;
    • Order from SKY Perfect JSAT to Thales Alenia Space for JSAT-32, a geostationary telecommunications satellite;
    • Signing of a contract between Thales and the European Space Agency (ESA) to develop Argonaut, a future autonomous and versatile lunar lander designed to deliver cargo and scientific instruments to the Moon;
    • Order from the Dutch Ministry of Defence for the modernisation and support of vehicle tactical simulators;
    • Order from the French Defence Procurement Agency (DGA) for the development, production, and maintenance of vetronics equipment for various Army vehicles as part of the SCORPION programme.

    At €3,071 million, order intake with a unit value of less than €100 million was down -10% compared to the first three months of 2024; meanwhile, those with a unit value of less than €10 million were slightly up in the first quarter of 2025.

    Geographically4, order intake in mature markets amounted to €2,914 million, similar to the first quarter of 2024 (+2% on a reported basis and a decrease of -1% at constant scope and exchange rates). Order intake in emerging markets amounted to €864 million (-61% as of March 31, 2025, in organic terms), affected by a very high comparison basis in these markets from the first quarter of 2024 (contracts for the Rafale in Indonesia and for an air surveillance system for a military customer in the Middle East mentioned previously).

    Order intake in the Aerospace segment totaled €1,530 million, compared to €1,003 million in the first three months of 2024 (+45% at constant scope and exchange rates). The Avionics market continued to benefit from strong demand across its various businesses and recorded one large order with a unit value exceeding €100 million in its Training and Simulation business. In addition, Space benefited in the first quarter from favorable phasing of expected 2025 order intake, with the notification of three large orders with a unit value greater than €100 million, two related to the telecommunications business and one to the exploration business.

    At €1,302 million (compared to €3,122 million in the first three months of 2024, representing an organic change of -59%), order intake in the Defence segment compared to a very high base in Q1 2024. One large order with a unit value over €100 million was recorded in the first quarter of 2025 compared to four in the same period in 2024. The Group reaffirms its objective of a book-to-bill ratio greater than 1 for the Defence segment in 2025.

    At €922 million, order intake in the Cyber & Digital segment was structurally very close to sales as most business lines in this segment operate on short sales cycles. The order book is therefore not significant.

    Sales

    Sales for the first quarter of 2025 reached €4,960 million, compared to €4,421 million in the first quarter of 2024, up 9.9%5 at constant scope and exchange rates (up 12.2% on a reported basis).

    Geographically6, sales recorded solid growth in both mature markets (+9.7% in organic terms), notably in the United Kingdom (+14.9%) and emerging markets with organic growth of +10.5% during the period.

    Sales in the Aerospace segment amounted to €1,342 million, up 13.5% compared to the first quarter of 2024 (+8.4% at constant scope and exchange rates). This growth reflects ongoing robust demand in the Avionics market, leading the business to grow double-digit and achieve a solid performance across all activities as well as in both civil and military domains. Sales in the Space business continue to be impacted by the weak demand observed over the past two years in telecommunications satellites.

    Sales in the Defence segment totaled €2,685 million, up +16.5% compared to the first quarter of 2024 (+15.0% at constant scope and exchange rates). This growth is observed across all businesses in the Defence segment, notably in land and air systems, which benefitted from production capacity expansion projects being deployed, especially for radars’ production.

    Sales in the Cyber & Digital segment stood at €903 million, down -1.5% compared to the first three months of 2024 (-2.1% at constant scope and exchange rates), reflecting contrasting trends:

    • Cyber businesses were stable in the first quarter of 2025 (+0.2% at constant scope and exchange rates):
      • The Cyber Security Products business is recording growth, leveraging Imperva’s complementary offer. The beginning of 2025 is moreover marked by the merger of the Imperva and Thales’ sales teams, a key step in the integration process that will unlock the full potential of the business, though its execution may generate some short-term disturbances;
      • The Cyber Premium Services business was impacted by a soft market demand start this first 2025 quarter, notably in Australia, and reported a decline in sales compared to the first quarter of 2024. For this business, which represents approximately 20% of total Cyber activity, the Group’s priority is to standardise operations to improve margins and focus the sales strategy on selective profitable growth segments.
    • In Digital businesses (down -3.6% at constant scope and exchange rates):
      • Sales from Payment Services returned to positive growth in the first quarter of 2025, after five consecutive quarters of decline;
      • Sales in Identity and Biometrics solutions declined. This business faced revenues downturn due to COVID in 2020. Post pandemic, an important catch-up effect occurred through to 2024, in the travel documents segment. As a consequence, the comparison effect is not favourable as this business is now normalising to a more usual run rate.

    Outlook

    Thales continues to benefit from a strong visibility in the vast majority of its businesses and enjoys a robust medium to long-term outlook.

    The Group has initiated preliminary work to assess the impacts of the increase in tariffs, as they are stand today. Such analysis takes into account the affected flows on the one hand, and the cases of exemption from tariffs on the other hand (such as in defence activities), along with certain protective contractual conditions in our export contracts (incoterms). Furthermore, Thales is working on mitigation plans in response to these new regulations: use of specific customs programmes such as duty drawback or temporary Importations under Bonds, the redirection of certain production flows, transfer pricing, supply chain adjustments (alternate sourcing), customer surcharging…

    These estimates are based on the latest available information on announced tariffs increases and exemptions as known on April 24, 2025, and Thales’ estimates to date. At this stage, the Group estimates that the net direct impact from those elements is contained. The potential indirect impact is not known at this stage.

    As a result, assuming no new disruptions of the macroeconomic geopolitical context and the evolution of new tariffs, Thales confirms all of its 2025 financial objectives, as listed below:

    • A book-to-bill ratio above 1;
    • Organic sales growth of between +5% and +6%, corresponding to annual sales in the range of €21.7 billion to €21.9 billion7;
    • An Adjusted EBIT margin between 12.2% and 12.4%.

    ****

    This press release contains certain forward-looking statements. Although Thales believes that its expectations are based on reasonable assumptions, actual results may differ significantly from the forward-looking statements due to various risks and uncertainties, as described in the Company’s Universal Registration Document, which has been filed with the French financial markets authority (Autorité des marchés financiers – AMF).

     

    1In this press release, “organic” means “at constant scope and exchange rates”.

    2Assuming no new disruptions of the macroeconomic geopolitical context or evolution of new tariffs.

    3Mature markets: Europe, North America, Australia, New Zealand. Emerging markets: all other countries.

    4See table on page 6.

    5Taking into account a currency effect of €17 million and a net scope effect of €84 million.

    6See table on page 6.

    7 Based on April 2025 scope and year to date average foreign exchange rates as of April 2025.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Russia’s missile attacks against Ukrainian civilians over Easter demonstrate its attitude towards peace: UK statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Government Statements

    Speech

    Russia’s missile attacks against Ukrainian civilians over Easter demonstrate its attitude towards peace: UK statement to the OSCE

    Ambassador Holland condemns Russia’s missile attacks against civilians in Sumy and Kharkiv over Easter and President Putin’s transparently cynical attempts to portray Russia as the party of peace.

    Thank you, Mister Chair.  The United Kingdom is grateful to Finland for convening this Special Permanent Council.  It was only 16 days ago that you were last compelled to call an extraordinary meeting of the Council after a Russian missile killed 20 people, including nine children, in Kryvyi Rih.  It was the largest number of children killed in a single strike since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion, according to the UN.

    Last week was one of major religious festivals where communities around the globe came together in the spirit of peace and goodwill. But while Christians around the world were marking the beginning of Holy Week, a Russian ballistic missile struck the centre of Sumy.  34 people were killed, including two children.  A further 117 were injured.  Some of the victims were heading to church for a Palm Sunday service.

    On Good Friday another Russian ballistic missile struck Kharkiv using a cluster munition.  One person was killed and at least 60 were injured.  On the same day, a drone attack on Sumy killed another civilian and destroyed a bakery preparing traditional Easter ‘paska’ bread.

    Mister Chair, our thoughts are with all the victims and their loved ones at this tragic time.

    Russia’s response to the widespread condemnation in this Council – and at the UN – following their attack on Sumy was to resort to their familiar playbook of disinformation and distortion in an attempt to justify the unjustifiable.  We can expect to see a similar tactic on this occasion.

    Through these barbaric attacks, Russia has shown that its cruelty knows no bounds and that it is not serious about peace. President Putin’s so-called “Easter truce” was a stunt, violated repeatedly by his own forces.  A day later – Easter Monday – a further five civilians reportedly lost their lives following Russian attacks, laying bare the Kremlin’s transparently cynical attempt to portray themselves as the party of peace.  Similar attacks have continued since, including yesterday against Kyiv, in which nine civilians were reportedly killed, and 70 more injured.

    If Russia was serious about peace, it would agree to an immediate, full and unconditional ceasefire, just as Ukraine did, more than 40 days ago.  If it was serious about peace, it would stop these senseless attacks on civilians.  If it was serious about peace, it would honour the commitments it has made.

    Russia’s continued attacks against Ukraine are another stark reminder that President Putin has not abandoned his goal of subjugating Ukraine.  For this reason, the UK, alongside our partners and allies, will continue to provide Ukraine with the military support it needs to defend its citizens. And we stand ready to apply further pressure on Russia to hinder its ability to wage this war of aggression.

    Thank you, Mister Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 24 April 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Loss of empathy is a key problem in people with frontotemporal dementia — our research shows what’s happening in the brain

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Alexander F Santillo, Associate Professor of Psychiatry, Consultant Psychiatrist, Lund University

    Bruce Willis’s family announced in February 2023 that the actor had been diagnosed with frontotemporal dementia. Denis Makarenko/Shutterstock

    Frontotemporal dementia has gained significant attention in recent years after the family of actor Bruce Willis announced in 2023 that he had been diagnosed with the condition. A year later, it was revealed that US chat show host Wendy Williams had also been diagnosed with the condition.

    Yet despite all this recent attention, there’s still much we don’t know about frontotemporal dementia – including what mechanisms cause certain symptoms, and how we can better spot signs of the disease earlier on. But our research has uncovered the brain processes that underlie one of the disease’s earliest symptoms. This finding brings us one step closer to better diagnosing and treating the condition.

    Frontotemporal dementia accounts for approximately 5% of dementia cases. Symptoms typically begin in a person’s late sixties or seventies. The disease primarily affects behaviour, personality and language abilities.

    A hallmark symptom of frontotemporal dementia, which sets it apart from other forms of dementia (such as Alzheimer’s disease), is early loss of empathy. This often manifests as diminished warmth and concern for loved ones. This symptom can be profoundly unsettling for family members and loved ones close with the patient. They may feel as though the patient’s personality has transformed – and that their efforts to help and support are met with indifference.

    While loss of empathy has been the focus of much research from the scientific community, the precise brain mechanisms underlying the loss of empathy in frontotemporal dementia remain unclear.

    Alongside colleagues from Karolinska Institute, Lund University and Umeå University in Sweden, we conducted a study which sought to understand how empathy diminishes in frontotemporal dementia. We looked at 28 patients with frontotemporal dementia and compared them against 28 healthy people.

    To conduct our study, we used a type of brain scan called functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). While in the fMRI scanner, participants viewed images of hands being pricked by needles. These images were contrasted with those of hand being touched by a q-tip. This is a well-established neuroscience test that is designed to evoke feelings of concern and distress as witnessing another person in pain. We analysed the brain activity of the patients with frontotemporal dementia as they viewed the images.

    In healthy volunteers, the anterior insula, anteria cingulate and thalamus are the brain regions responsible for monitoring internal bodily signals (such as pain). These brain systems became active when they observed the images of a person in pain.

    But in the patients with frontotemporal dementia, activity in these crucial brain regions was significantly reduced. These reductions were strikingly related to the degree of empathy patients exhibited in their daily lives, as judged by questionnaires filled out by family members.

    Empathy and brain function

    Empathy is typically thought to be comprised of two dimensions. Emotional empathy is the ability to react to others’ feelings (such as their distress and concern). Cognitive empathy is the capacity to understand the intention of others.

    Although the two are closely related, they’re not quite the same thing. It’s also possible for a person to possess one facet of empathy but not the other. The difference between the two facets of empathy can actually be exemplified by two psychiatric conditions, antisocial personality disorder and autism.

    People diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder are typically good at understanding the intentions and motivations of other people (cognitive empathy), but cannot empathise emotionally. This can lead to a disregard for other people. On the other hand, a person with autism typically has emotional empathy skills but might not have the ability to infer other peoples’ intentions (cognitive empathy).

    Our study revealed reduced activity in parts of the brain associated with the brain’s monitoring of bodily states, which are typically used when emotionally empathising with another person. These findings underscore the critical link between this brain system and our capacity to take others into consideration.

    In light of these findings, the next step with our research is to explore if and how the in-flow of the bodily signals necessary for the brain to create an inner self is altered in frontotemporal dementia – and how this relates to empathy.

    Apart from about 30% of cases being genetic, the causes of frontotemporal dementia remains unclear. Despite intense efforts from the community, there’s currently no cure. But thanks to courageous sufferers and their families coming forward, awareness is increasing. This is a crucial thrust forward.

    We hope that understanding how the brain processes empathy in frontotemporal dementia may not only help improve diagnosis but may, in the future, pave the way for potential treatments which mitigate some of the devastating effects of this disease.

    Alexander F Santillo is primarily funded by the Swedish federal government, The Åke Wiberg Foundation, The Schörling Foundation and The Bundy Academy.

    Olof Lindberg receives funding from the Schörling foundation and the Olle Engkvists Foundation.

    – ref. Loss of empathy is a key problem in people with frontotemporal dementia — our research shows what’s happening in the brain – https://theconversation.com/loss-of-empathy-is-a-key-problem-in-people-with-frontotemporal-dementia-our-research-shows-whats-happening-in-the-brain-247402

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Back to the fuel guzzlers? Coalition plans to end EV tax breaks would hobble the clean transport transition

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Anna Mortimore, Lecturer, Griffith Business School, Griffith University

    wedmoment.stock/Shutterstock

    If elected, the Coalition has pledged to end Labor’s substantial tax break for new zero- or low-emissions vehicles.

    This, combined with an earlier promise to roll back new fuel efficiency standards, would successfully slow the transition to hybrid and battery electric vehicles (EVs).

    The Albanese government pitched these tax breaks as a way to make EVs cheaper to buy and more competitive with internal combustion engine cars. Since the tax break came in, EV popularity has surged. Almost 100,000 people have taken out a novated lease on an EV between mid-2022, when the scheme began, and February 2025.

    The Coalition has been consistently critical of the tax breaks on cost grounds. The scheme has been far more popular than government forecasts envisaged, leading to concerns about a cost blowout. Rather than the A$55 million forecast for 2024-25, the scheme has cost ten times that – $560 million. EV buyers are much more likely to be wealthy, meaning the tax break has been snapped up by people who need it less. The policy is, however, encouraging car suppliers to import more affordable EVs.

    These concerns don’t mean Labor’s policy is bad. Far from it – this tax break is currently the only policy working to drive down transport emissions, now the second-largest source of emissions in Australia. The Coalition has given no indication it would replace the EV tax break with other ways to cut transport emissions.

    Electric vehicles still cost more than their internal combustion engine counterparts.
    meowKa/Shutterstock

    What is this tax break – and did it work?

    In mid-2022, the Albanese government introduced a tax break to encourage uptake of electric vehicles. The measure initially covered hydrogen fuel-cell, battery-electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles, but plug-in hybrids are no longer eligible as of April 1.

    The tax break works by giving EV buyers who are current employees a fringe benefits tax exemption for low- or zero-emissions vehicles both held and used for private use. The fringe benefits tax is a flat tax of 47% levied on the car benefit provided by the employer. For the exemption to apply, the retail price of the car has to be under the threshold for the luxury car tax of $91,387.

    People in high incomes brackets often like to negotiate with their employer to have a car included as part of their salary package so they can reduce their taxable income. The fringe benefits tax is levied on these types of benefits.

    The scheme works by exempting purchasers of new EVs from fringe benefits tax. A battery electric Hyundai Kona retailed for around $60,000 last year – 32% more in price than its internal combustion engine equivalent. The fringe benefits tax of around $11,700 annually ends up being larger because of the EV’s high sale price. Without this exemption, the tax acts as a major disincentive for the uptake of EVs.
    By and large, electric vehicles cost significantly more than their traditional counterparts. This price gap is dropping as new manufacturers enter the market, but it’s still there. While EVs have lower fuel costs, the higher upfront cost has put off many prospective buyers. This is the issue Labor’s tax exemption was intended to fix.

    Has the scheme worked? Overall, yes. In 2022, EVs accounted for just 3.3% of all new cars sold in Australia. By 2023, almost two-thirds of battery electric, vehicles were sold to private buyers, a 145% increase. And in 2024, the figure had almost tripled to 9.6%. Without this tax incentive, Australia’s uptake of EVs would most likely be much lower.

    If a future Coalition government ended the tax break, Australia would return to the pre-2022 era, where fringe benefits tax acted as a significant disincentive for EVs.

    The tax break isn’t perfect – but it’s better than nothing

    Australia’s main power grid now runs on an average of 40% clean energy. As a result, emissions have been tracking downward in these sectors. But transport emissions are still rising. Transport is now Australia’s second-largest source of emissions – almost 100 million tonnes (Mt) out of our total emissions of 434 Mt. By 2030, transport is projected to be the largest source of domestic emissions.

    Under the 2015 Paris Agreement, nations agreed at least 20% of light vehicles on their roads would be low- or zero-emissions by 2030. But Australia is lagging well behind the pack on the shift to cleaner transport.

    At present, just 1% of Australia’s car fleet is electric. Even EVs make up close to 10% of new sales, changing the makeup of the entire fleet (16.8 million) will take years.

    By contrast, almost 90% of new cars sold in Norway are electric, according to a 2024 report from the International Energy Agency. In China it’s just under 60%, Sweden it’s 60%, Netherlands 30%, the UK 25% and the United States 10%.

    These countries have used a combination of tax incentives and fuel efficiency regulations to drive rapid uptake. While Labor has moved to introduce both of these, progress hasn’t been as fast.

    Back to the fuel guzzlers?

    Australians rely heavily on cars. But the long lack of fuel efficiency standards mean many models sold here emit much more than in other OECD countries – 150 grams per kilometre versus 107 across 29 European Union nations as of 2023. Put another way, a new car in Australia uses 40% more fuel than its equivalent in the EU. Many drivers prefer big cars, such as the top-selling Ford Ranger.

    If the Coalition ends the tax break and pulls the teeth of new emissions standards, it would bring recent modest progress to a halt.

    The Coalition has rightly pointed out the inequity of the tax break as it stands. My research has shown this could be fixed. Throwing the scheme out without proposing another way to cut transport emissions is disheartening.

    Anna Mortimore receives funding from Reliable Affordable Clean Energy Cooperative Research Centre for 2030 (RACE for 2030).

    – ref. Back to the fuel guzzlers? Coalition plans to end EV tax breaks would hobble the clean transport transition – https://theconversation.com/back-to-the-fuel-guzzlers-coalition-plans-to-end-ev-tax-breaks-would-hobble-the-clean-transport-transition-255211

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation Interim Report for Q1 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation

    Interim report
    24 April 2025 at 08:00 EEST

    Nokia Corporation Interim Report for Q1 2025

    Network Infrastructure delivers strong net sales growth to start 2025

    • Infinera acquisition completed during Q1, increasing Nokia’s scale in Optical Networks and with hyperscalers. Integration underway with many portfolio decisions already taken. Positive momentum with customers, with Q1 seeing strong order intake for Infinera driven by growth in hyperscalers.
    • Q1 net sales declined 3% y-o-y on a constant currency and portfolio basis (-1% reported) due to a challenging prior year comparison in Nokia Technologies. Network Infrastructure grew 11% on a constant currency and portfolio basis while Cloud and Network Services grew 8%. Mobile Networks grew 2%.
    • Comparable gross margin in Q1 decreased 820bps y-o-y to 42.3% (reported decreased 820bps to 41.5%), half of which is related to lower net sales in Nokia Technologies. It was also impacted by a contract settlement charge with net impact of EUR 120 million in Mobile Networks.
    • Q1 comparable operating margin decreased 990bps y-o-y to 3.6% (reported up 1 020bps to -1.1%), mainly due to lower gross margin and increased operating expenses resulting from targeted investments for long-term growth.
    • Q1 comparable diluted EPS for the period of EUR 0.03; reported diluted EPS for the period of EUR -0.01.
    • Q1 free cash flow of EUR 0.7 billion, net cash balance of EUR 3.0 billion.
    • Full year 2025 outlook unchanged with comparable operating profit of between EUR 1.9 billion and 2.4 billion and free cash flow conversion from comparable operating profit of between 50% and 80%.

    This is a summary of the Nokia Corporation Interim Report for Q1 2025 published today. Nokia only publishes a summary of its financial reports in stock exchange releases. The summary focuses on Nokia Group’s financial information as well as on Nokia’s outlook. The detailed, segment-level discussion will be available in the complete financial report hosted at www.nokia.com/financials. A video interview summarizing the key points of our Q1 results will also be published on the website. Investors should not solely rely on summaries of Nokia’s financial reports and should also review the complete reports with tables.

    JUSTIN HOTARD, PRESIDENT AND CEO, ON Q1 2025 RESULTS

    In the following quote, net sales growth rates are on a constant currency and portfolio basis.
    Since joining Nokia as President and CEO three weeks ago, I’ve had great engagements with some of our customers, partners and employees. I see great potential for Nokia, and my early focus is on capital allocation to ensure we both drive efficiency and invest sufficiently in the right growth segments for long-term value creation. I am impressed with our core technology base across our portfolio including in RAN and core as well as in IP, Optical and Fiber technologies. In speaking with customers, it is clear we play a critical role as a trusted partner operating their mobile and fixed networks and have the potential to expand our presence in hyperscale, enterprise and defense markets. Spending the time with our employees I’ve been excited by their innovative spirit, energy and drive to unlock Nokia’s full potential.

    Our first quarter financial performance saw a net sales decline of 3%. However, excluding the catch-up element of licensing deals signed in the prior year, sales grew 7%. Our operating margin declined year-on-year due to the challenging prior year comparison in Nokia Technologies and a one-time charge in Mobile Networks, while profitability improved in both Network Infrastructure and Cloud and Network Services.

    Network Infrastructure net sales grew 11% with all units contributing to growth and its backlog increased. The highlight of the first quarter was the completion of the Infinera acquisition. Our expanded Optical Networks business had a strong first quarter with 15% net sales growth along with several important design wins, particularly with hyperscalers. We have initiated the integration of Infinera and made many important roadmap decisions which we communicated to customers in early April. We are on track to deliver our synergy targets and I believe this acquisition has significant value creation potential for Nokia.

    In Mobile Networks we continue to see positive signs of stabilization with further wins in addition to those we discussed last quarter. Today we have announced an important contract extension with T-Mobile US. Regarding our financial performance, net sales grew 2% but profitability was impacted by an unexpected one-time contract settlement with a net impact of EUR 120 million. The settlement related to a project for a single customer that started shipping in 2019 and the settlement fully resolves the situation.

    Cloud and Network Services delivered net sales growth of 8% and we continue to see strong demand in the market for our 5G Core offers with additional footprint won at AT&T, Boost Mobile, Ooredoo Qatar and Telefónica. Nokia Technologies continued its execution with further deals signed in the quarter that increased the contracted annual net sales run-rate to approximately EUR 1.4 billion.

    Looking forward, we are not immune to the rapidly evolving global trade landscape however based on early customer feedback, I believe our markets should prove to be relatively resilient. In 2025, we continue to expect strong net sales growth in Network Infrastructure, growth in Cloud and Network Services and largely stable net sales for Mobile Networks. In Nokia Technologies we expect approximately EUR 1.1 billion of operating profit.

    Regarding the tariff situation, there could be some short-term disruption. We will continue to utilize the flexibility of our global manufacturing network to minimize impact of the evolving tariff landscape. Based on what we see today, we currently expect a EUR 20 to 30 million impact to our comparable operating profit in the second quarter from the current tariffs. Given the lack of visibility, we have not taken an assumption related to tariffs in the second half of 2025.

    In terms of our outlook for the financial year 2025, we will continue to focus on investing in future growth opportunities and we now have an unexpected charge impacting Mobile Networks. Considering these factors, while achieving the top-end of the range will now be more challenging, our comparable operating profit guidance remains between EUR 1.9 and 2.4 billion. Our free cash flow guidance remains between 50% and 80% of comparable operating profit.

    In the coming months I will continue to listen and learn from customers, employees, shareholders and other stakeholders. I will provide an update with our Q2 results and I look forward to presenting our complete value creation vision for Nokia at our capital markets day which we now expect to hold in November.

    Justin Hotard
    President and CEO

    FINANCIAL RESULTS

    EUR million (except for EPS in EUR) Q1’25 Q1’24 YoY change
    Reported results      
    Net sales 4 390 4 444 (1)%
    Gross margin % 41.5% 49.7% (820)bps
    Research and development expenses (1 145) (1 125) 2%
    Selling, general and administrative expenses (728) (693) 5%
    Operating (loss)/profit (48) 405 (112)%
    Operating margin % (1.1)% 9.1% (1 020)bps
    (Loss)/profit from continuing operations (60) 451  
    Profit/(loss) from discontinued operations — (13)  
    (Loss)/profit for the period (60) 438  
    EPS for the period, diluted (0.01) 0.08  
    Net cash and interest-bearing financial investments 2 988 5 137 (42)%
    Comparable results      
    Net sales 4 390 4 444 (1)%
    Constant currency and portfolio YoY change(1)             (3%)
    Gross margin % 42.3% 50.5% (820)bps
    Research and development expenses (1 115) (1 076) 4%
    Selling, general and administrative expenses (587) (584) 1%
    Operating profit 156 600 (74)%
    Operating margin % 3.6% 13.5% (990)bps
    Profit for the period 153 512 (70)%
    EPS for the period, diluted 0.03 0.09 (67)%
    Business group results Network
    Infrastructure    		 Mobile
    Networks    		 Cloud and Network Services Nokia
    Technologies    		 Group Common and Other
    EUR million Q1’25 Q1’24 Q1’25 Q1’24 Q1’25 Q1’24 Q1’25 Q1’24 Q1’25 Q1’24
    Net sales 1 722 1 439 1 729 1 682 567 546 369 757 4 23
    YoY change 20%   3%   4%   (51)%   (83)%  
    Constant currency and portfolio YoY change(1) 11%   2%   8%   (52)%   (83)%  
    Gross margin % 40.6% 40.8% 30.9% 40.9% 45.9% 39.4% 100.0% 100.0%    
    Operating profit/(loss) 135 85 (152) (32) 14 (37) 259 658 (99) (75)
    Operating margin % 7.8% 5.9% (8.8)% (1.9)% 2.5% (6.8)% 70.2% 86.9%    

    (1) This metric provides additional information on the growth of the business and adjusts for both currency impacts and portfolio changes. The full definition is provided in the Alternative performance measures section in Nokia Corporation Interim Report for Q1 2025.

    SHAREHOLDER DISTRIBUTION

    Dividend

    The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting 2025 to be held on 29 April 2025 authorizes the Board to resolve on the distribution of an aggregate maximum of EUR 0.14 per share to be paid in respect of the financial year 2024. The authorization would be used to distribute dividend and/or assets from the reserve for invested unrestricted equity in four installments during the authorization period unless the Board decides otherwise for a justified reason. Subject to approval by the Annual General Meeting, the Board is expected to resolve on the amount and timing of each distribution so that the preliminary record and payment dates will be as set out in the Board’s proposal to the Annual General Meeting. Accordingly, the first expected record date would be 5 May 2025 and the expected payment date would be 12 May 2025. The actual dividend payment date outside Finland will be determined by the practices of the intermediary banks transferring the dividend payments.

    Share buyback program

    On 27 June 2024, Nokia announced its intention to acquire Infinera in a transaction that valued Infinera at US$1.7 billion equity value with up to 30% of the consideration to be paid in Nokia American depositary shares, depending on the elections of Infinera shareholders. To offset the dilution from the transaction to Nokia shareholders, on 22 November 2024 Nokia announced a share buyback program targeting to repurchase 150 million shares. This share buyback program was completed on 2 April 2025. Under this program, Nokia repurchased 150 million of its own shares at an average price per share of approximately EUR 4.69. The repurchases reduced the company’s unrestricted equity by approximately EUR 703 million and the repurchased shares were cancelled on 23 April 2025.

    OUTLOOK

    The outlook provided below reflects the acquisition of Infinera.

      Full Year 2025
    Comparable operating profit(1) EUR 1.9 billion to EUR 2.4 billion
    Free cash flow(1) 50% to 80% conversion from comparable operating profit

    1Please refer to Alternative performance measures section in Nokia Corporation Interim Report for Q1 2025 for a full explanation of how these terms are defined.

    The outlook and all of the underlying outlook assumptions described below are forward-looking statements subject to a number of risks and uncertainties as described or referred to in the Risk Factors section later in this report.

    Along with Nokia’s official outlook targets provided above, Nokia provides the below additional assumptions that support the group level financial outlook.

      Full year 2025 Comment
    Group Common and Other operating expenses approximately EUR 400 million  
    Comparable financial income and expenses Positive EUR 50 to 150 million  
    Comparable income tax rate ~25%  
    Cash outflows related to income taxes EUR 500 million (update) Mainly reflecting evolving regional mix and the inclusion of Infinera
    Capital Expenditures EUR 650 million (update) Reflecting the inclusion of Infinera
    Recurring gross cost savings EUR 400 million Related to ongoing cost savings program and not including Infinera-related synergies
    Restructuring and associated charges related to cost savings programs EUR 250 million Related to ongoing cost savings program and not including Infinera-related synergies
    Restructuring and associated cash outflows EUR 400 million Related to ongoing cost savings program and not including Infinera-related synergies

    ADDITIONAL TOPICS

    Completion of Infinera acquisition

    On 28 February 2025, Nokia announced the completion of the acquisition of Infinera Corporation, pursuant to the definitive agreement announced on 27 June 2024. Infinera, the San Jose based global supplier of innovative open optical networking solutions and advanced optical semiconductors, has become part of the Nokia group effective as of the closing with Nokia holding 100% of its equity and voting rights. The total purchase consideration was EUR 2.5 billion, consisting of cash proceeds, Nokia shares in the form of American Depositary Shares, the fair value of the portion of Infinera’s performance and restricted shares attributable to pre-combination services that were replaced with Nokia’s share-based payment awards and the fair value of Infinera’s convertible senior notes in line with relevant bond indentures. For more information regarding the acquisition, refer to Note 3. Acquisitions in Nokia Corporation Interim Report for Q1 2025.

    “Constant currency and portfolio net sales growth” alternative performance metric

    In Q1 2025, Nokia has introduced a new alternative performance metric (APM), “constant currency and portfolio net sales growth”. Constant currency and portfolio net sales growth is presented on a constant currency basis and also assumes certain specific acquisitions had already been owned during both periods and as if disposals had already occurred in both comparison periods. This has been added to mainly consider the acquisition of Infinera and is an evolution of the constant currency APM that had been previously used.

    RISK FACTORS

    Nokia and its businesses are exposed to a number of risks and uncertainties which include but are not limited to:

    • Competitive intensity, which is expected to continue at a high level as some competitors seek to take share;
    • Changes in customer network investments related to their ability to monetize the network;
    • Our ability to ensure competitiveness of our product roadmaps and costs through additional R&D investments;
    • Our ability to procure certain standard components and the costs thereof, such as semiconductors;
    • Disturbance in the global supply chain;
    • Impact of inflation, increased global macro-uncertainty, major currency fluctuations, changes in tariffs and higher interest rates;
    • Potential economic impact and disruption of global pandemics;
    • War or other geopolitical conflicts, disruptions and potential costs thereof;
    • Other macroeconomic, industry and competitive developments;
    • Timing and value of new, renewed and existing patent licensing agreements with licensees;
    • Results in brand and technology licensing; costs to protect and enforce our intellectual property rights; on-going litigation with respect to licensing and regulatory landscape for patent licensing;
    • The outcomes of on-going and potential disputes and litigation;
    • Our ability to execute, complete, successfully integrate and realize the expected benefits from transactions;
    • Timing of completions and acceptances of certain projects;
    • Our product and regional mix;
    • Uncertainty in forecasting income tax expenses and cash outflows, over the long-term, as they are also subject to possible changes due to business mix, the timing of patent licensing cash flow and changes in tax legislation, including potential tax reforms in various countries and OECD initiatives;
    • Our ability to utilize our Finnish deferred tax assets and their recognition on our balance sheet;
    • Our ability to meet our sustainability and other ESG targets, including our targets relating to greenhouse gas emissions;

    as well the risk factors specified under Forward-looking statements of this release, and our 2024 annual report on Form 20-F published on 13 March 2025 under Operating and financial review and prospects-Risk factors.

    FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS

    Certain statements herein that are not historical facts are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements reflect Nokia’s current expectations and views of future developments and include statements regarding: A) expectations, plans, benefits or outlook related to our strategies, projects, programs, product launches, growth management, licenses, sustainability and other ESG targets, operational key performance indicators and decisions on market exits; B) expectations, plans or benefits related to future performance of our businesses (including the expected impact, timing and duration of potential global pandemics, geopolitical conflicts and the general or regional macroeconomic conditions on our businesses, our supply chain, the timing of market changes or turning points in demand and our customers’ businesses) and any future dividends and other distributions of profit; C) expectations and targets regarding financial performance and results of operations, including market share, prices, net sales, income, margins, cash flows, cost savings, the timing of receivables, operating expenses, provisions, impairments, tariffs, taxes, currency exchange rates, hedging, investment funds, inflation, product cost reductions, competitiveness, value creation, revenue generation in any specific region, and licensing income and payments; D) ability to execute, expectations, plans or benefits related to transactions, investments and changes in organizational structure and operating model; E) impact on revenue with respect to litigation/renewal discussions; and F) any statements preceded by or including “anticipate”, “continue”, “believe”, “envisage”, “expect”, “aim”, “will”, “target”, “may”, “would”, “could“, “see”, “plan”, “ensure” or similar expressions. These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond our control, which could cause our actual results to differ materially from such statements. These statements are based on management’s best assumptions and beliefs in light of the information currently available to them. These forward-looking statements are only predictions based upon our current expectations and views of future events and developments and are subject to risks and uncertainties that are difficult to predict because they relate to events and depend on circumstances that will occur in the future. Factors, including risks and uncertainties that could cause these differences, include those risks and uncertainties identified in the Risk Factors above.

    ANALYST WEBCAST

    • Nokia’s webcast will begin on 24 April 2025 at 11.30 a.m. Finnish time (EEST). The webcast will last approximately 60 minutes.
    • The webcast will be a presentation followed by a Q&A session. Presentation slides will be available for download at www.nokia.com/financials.
    • A link to the webcast will be available at www.nokia.com/financials.
    • Media representatives can listen in via the link, or alternatively call +1-412-317-5619.

    FINANCIAL CALENDAR

    • Nokia’s Annual General Meeting 2025 is planned to be held on 29 April 2025.
    • Nokia plans to publish its second quarter and half year 2025 results on 24 July 2025.
    • Nokia plans to publish its third quarter and January-September 2025 results on 23 October 2025.

    About Nokia

    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs, which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia
    Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia

    Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 931 580 507
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Sp Mortgage Bank Plc & Savings Banks Group: Half-Year Reports for January–June 2025 will be published on 13 August 2025 

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Stock Exchange Release 
    24th of April 2025 at 8 am (CET +1) 

    Sp Mortgage Bank Plc & Savings Banks Group: Half-Year Reports for 1st of January–30th of June 2024 will be published on 13th of August 2025 as a stock exchange release and can be also found at www.saastopankki.fi.

    Sp Mortgage Bank Plc & Savings Banks Group 

    Further information: 

    Kai Koskela 
    Managing Director, Savings Banks Union Coop 
    kai.koskela@sastopankki.fi
    +358 40 549 0430  

    Sp Mortgage Bank Plc is part of the Savings Banks Group and the Savings Banks Amalgamation. The role of Sp Mortgage Bank is, together with Central Bank of Savings Banks Finland Plc, to be responsible for obtaining funding for the Savings Banks Group from money and capital markets. Sp Mortgage Bank is responsible for the Savings Banks Group’s mortgage-secured funding by issuing covered bonds. 

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Central Bank of Savings Banks Finland Plc & Savings Banks Group: Half-Year Reports January–June 2025 will be published on 13 August 2025 

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Stock Exchange Release 
    24th of April 2025 at 8 am (CET +1) 

    Central Bank of Savings Banks Finland Plc & Savings Banks Group: Half year Reports for 1st of January–30th of June 2025 will be published on 13th of August 2025 as a stock exchange release and can be also found at www.saastopankki.fi. 

    Central Bank of Savings Banks Finland Plc & Savings Banks Group 

    Further information: 

    Kai Koskela 
    Managing Director, Savings Banks Union Coop 
    kai.koskela@sastopankki.fi
    +358 40 549 0430  

    Central Bank of Savings Banks Finland Plc is part of the Savings Banks Amalgamation and Savings Banks Group and operates as Group’s central credit institution. Central Bank of Savings Banks’ role is to ensure liquidity and wholesale funding of the Savings Banks Group via operating in the money and capital markets, issue payment cards, and provide payment transfer and account operator services.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia lands strategic 5G RAN deal with T-Mobile US to enhance nationwide connectivity

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press Release
    Nokia lands strategic 5G RAN deal with T-Mobile US to enhance nationwide connectivity

    • Nokia boosts T-Mobile US’s award-winning 5G network with network footprint expansion and site modernization.
    • Partnership brings enhanced 5G connectivity to additional T-Mobile subscribers across the country.
    • Nokia to supply equipment from industry-leading AirScale portfolio.

    24 April 2025
    Espoo, Finland – Nokia today announced a significant multi-year extension of its strategic partnership with T-Mobile US, further expanding and enhancing the Un-carrier’s industry-leading nationwide 5G network coverage and capacity. The agreement will advance T-Mobile’s network by deploying next-generation baseband and radio technologies. T-Mobile’s network already reaches more than 98 percent of the U.S. population. This collaboration demonstrates its commitment to further extending its high-performance 5G capabilities.

    Under the agreement, Nokia will supply its industry-leading AirScale Radio Access Network (RAN) portfolio – including its latest generation Habrok Massive MIMO and Levante Ultra-Performance baseband solutions. These are powered by its energy-efficient ReefShark System-on-Chip technology and will boost T-Mobile’s 5G network for maximum performance, efficiency and reliability. Nokia will also deploy its AI-powered MantaRay SON and AutoPilot, a self-organizing network solution for optimization and automation. The deal includes hardware, software, maintenance, and support services.

    This collaboration will also advance T-Mobile’s network evolution by leveraging next-generation RAN architectures that enhance agility, scalability, and operational efficiency. Nokia will continue to support T-Mobile’s groundbreaking AI-RAN initiatives, including the ongoing technology partnership at T-Mobile’s AI-RAN Innovation Center launched last year. The center is dedicated to integrating AI into RAN to revolutionize network experiences and deliver stronger business outcomes.

    Ulf Ewaldsson, President of Technology, T-Mobile, commented, “T-Mobile’s nationwide standalone 5G network has solidified our global leadership by delivering tangible benefits to our customers. This new agreement with Nokia will further enhance our current network capabilities as we strengthen our journey supercharged with 5G Advanced, laying a robust foundation for future innovation.”

    Justin Hotard, President and CEO of Nokia, said: “This new agreement strengthens our deep partnership with T-Mobile US, and extends their leadership in delivering next-generation connectivity across the U.S. By implementing Nokia’s latest AirScale RAN innovations, along with advanced virtualized and AI-RAN-based solutions, T-Mobile will unlock premium 5G performance for their customers. I’m excited to continue our partnership to shape the next chapter of mobile connectivity in the U.S.”

    Nokia is T-Mobile US’s long-standing partner in RAN. The combination of Nokia’s advanced solutions and T-Mobile’s “Challenger to Champion” strategic initiatives have helped T-Mobile to become America’s largest, fastest, and most awarded 5G network, covering more than 332 million people across two million square miles.

    Multimedia, technical information and related news
    Product Page: Nokia Cloud RAN
    Product Page: Nokia anyRAN
    Product Page: Nokia AirScale Baseband
    Product Page: MantaRay NM

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs, which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Media inquiries
    Nokia Press Office
    Email: Press.Services@nokia.com

    Follow us on social media
    LinkedIn X Instagram Facebook YouTube

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Environmentalists warn city residents against planting box elder maple in their summer cottages

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    In anticipation of the summer season, specialists Department of Nature Management and Environmental Protection reminds that box elder is an invasive (alien) tree species. It actively spreads and grows quickly.

    Box elder is a dominant tree species that poses a threat to biodiversity by disrupting the ecological balance. This tree was brought from North America in the 17th century. A few decades ago, it was used for landscaping Moscow. However, over time, it became clear that box elder is displacing local tree species such as birch, alder and other plants that cannot fully develop in conditions of insufficient light. Only a few survive in its shade. Thus, the balance of the ecosystem is disrupted and biological diversity is reduced.

    Moreover, the fast-growing plant poses a threat to human life and property. The fact is that due to its shallow root system, it is unstable in soft and wet soil. It is the box elder that most often falls during heavy rains, hurricanes and other adverse weather conditions.

    Environmentalists advise avoiding buying box elder seedlings for summer cottages. Although the box elder has a large crown that provides shelter from the heat, you should choose seedlings that are compatible with the local flora and less aggressive in development. The planting material market offers a huge selection of beautiful plants for garden plots that can be both beautiful and useful.

    To create a comfortable recreation area or a hedge on a summer cottage or house plot, specialists from the capital’s Department of Nature Management and Environmental Protection recommend considering alternative options, such as ginnal and Norway maple, hawthorn, ornamental apple trees, thuja and other trees, and from shrubs – elderberry, cotoneaster, as well as dogwood and mock orange.

    In addition, it is advisable to promptly remove self-seeding and shoots of box elder in the first year of their appearance. This will avoid dense plantings with an asymmetrical crown in the future, which, together with the superficial root system, reduces the stability of the tree.

    Quickly find out the main news of the capital in official telegram channelthe city of Moscow.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/153044073/

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI: United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Meeting in Geneva Concludes with Key Recommendations on AI Governance and Launches HUMAN-AI-T: A Global Initiative to Integrate Humanity into Artificial Intelligence

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    United Nations Alliance of Civilizations Meeting in Geneva Concludes with Key Recommendations on AI Governance and Launches HUMAN-AI-T: A Global Initiative to Integrate Humanity into Artificial Intelligence
    UNAOC AI for #OneHumanity: Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence

    Geneva, Switzerland – April 23, 2025 –WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”) (SIX: WIHN, NASDAQ: WKEY), a leading global cybersecurity, blockchain, and IoT company, today announces that United Nations Alliance of Civilizations meeting in Geneva concludes with key recommendations on AI Governance and launches HUMAN-AI-T.

    Staying true to its founding motto “Many cultures, one humanity,” the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), established in 2005 by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, continues to promote cultural diversity, interfaith dialogue, and mutual respect. Today, these foundational principles are essential to shaping the future of artificial intelligence.

    At a high-level meeting held at the United Nations Office in Geneva, UNAOC and its public and private sector partners launched HUMAN-AI-T, a transformative global initiative designed to align the evolution of artificial intelligence with universal ethical values, cultural heritage, and human dignity.

    Building on the momentum of its two previous editions, the third “AI for #OneHumanity” summit gathered a diverse group of global actors—governments, international organizations, business leaders, innovators, academics, media, and civil society—to explore pathways toward inclusive and responsible AI development in the service of the common good.

    Organized by UNAOC in collaboration with the Onuart Foundation, the two-day forum featured thematic sessions on the role of AI in intercultural dialogue, sustainable development, and collective human progress, while addressing critical issues such as cultural bias, AI governance, and equitable access.

    Notable participants from Spain included:

    • José Manuel Albares, Minister of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation of Spain;
    • Miguel Ángel Moratinos, former Foreign Minister and current High Representative of UNAOC;
    • José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, former Prime Minister of Spain and President of the Advisory Board of the Onuart Foundation.

    Key Points:

    1. Ethical AI Governance:
      Minister Albares emphasized the urgent need for ethical AI development rooted in human rights. He announced Spain’s intention to propose a national Artificial Intelligence Governance Law, aimed at ensuring AI applications respect fundamental rights and prioritize dignity, inclusion, and human-centered innovation through multilateral frameworks.
    2. Global Cooperation and Risks:
      Albares warned of the growing dangers of misinformation and the irresponsible use of autonomous military technologies. He called for greater UN involvement to ensure no one is left behind and to maintain a fair and balanced multilateral system in AI development and regulation.
    3. Moratinos’ Concerns:
      Miguel Ángel Moratinos highlighted the risk of AI deepening global inequality or undermining shared values. He stressed that AI is no longer a future issue—it is already at the heart of our communications, economies, and daily lives, and urgently requires global oversight guided by human dignity.
    4. Zapatero’s Message:
      In a video message, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero expressed optimism about AI’s potential to address humanity’s most urgent needs: peace, democracy, and the eradication of poverty. “We are at a turning point,” he said. “Artificial intelligence must be a tool for peace and social justice. It must help us end hunger, combat inequality, and strengthen democratic values. Let’s ensure that AI, like every great human creation, serves to elevate the human spirit.”

    The opening session, titled “Towards One Humanity: Human-Centered Development Supported by AI,” featured remarks by Moratinos, Dr. José Luis Bonet Ferrer (President of the Onuart Foundation), and Rima Al-Chikh (UNOG), followed by opening addresses from Minister Albares, H.E. Burak Akçapar, Permanent Representative of Türkiye, and former President Zapatero.

    A main session on ethical and equitable AI included insights from David Carmona (VP & CTO of Microsoft), Carlos Moreira (CEO of WISeKey), Francisco Hortigüela (President of Ametic), Moulaye Bouamatou (President of Banque de Mauritanie), and Julian Isla (President of Fundación29), moderated by Fernando Zallo from the Onuart Foundation.

    Other panels focused on the inclusive future of AI, with contributions from Bilel Jamoussi (ITU), Jon Hernández, Enrique Arribas, Alberto Díez, Loida Peral, Matthew Griffin, Danilo McGarry, and Yujun Pian, moderated by Julie Ladanan of UNAOC.

    The session “Artificial Intelligence: Transforming Human Identity and Behavior in the Digital Age” featured video contributions from Dr. Rafael Yuste, Director of Columbia University’s NeuroTechnology Center and President of the NeuroRights Foundation, and Jared Genser, General Counsel of the same foundation. The session was moderated by Juan Carlos Gutiérrez of the Onuart Foundation.

    A complementary session on “AI and Media in the Information Age” addressed challenges such as disinformation and hate speech, with contributions from Catherine Bokonga-Fiankan (President of the Association of UN Correspondents in Geneva), Yfat Barak-Cheney (World Jewish Congress), Eduardo Solana (University of Geneva), Axel Hörger (former CEO of UBS Germany), Lluis Vilella (CEO of K-BOX), Sixtine Crutchfield (Art Director at WiseArt), filmmaker Devy Man, and music writer Soren Sorensen (aka Dorian Gray), moderated by Nihal Saad, Director of UNAOC.

    The HUMAN-AI-T initiative was presented as a secure and globally accessible digital platform to preserve humanity’s ethical, philosophical, and cultural legacy. Inspired by the Svalbard Global Seed Vault, it will function as an ethical digital vault, housing verified content—from religious texts and philosophical works to legal codes, international treaties, and indigenous knowledge—digitally signed and protected by post-quantum cryptographic technologies to ensure long-term trust, traceability, and integrity.

    As general artificial intelligence (AGI) and quantum computing advance, HUMAN-AI-T responds to the increasing ethical risks posed by superintelligent systems by anchoring AI development in shared human values and global moral frameworks. The initiative aligns with the UN General Assembly resolution on safe and trustworthy AI, aiming to make AI a platform for inclusion, cooperation, and ethical progress.

    “At the heart of AI must be the heart of humanity,” emphasized Miguel Ángel Moratinos. “This is not just a technological issue—it is a civilizational imperative. We must develop AI to serve people, not the other way around. That requires an inclusive model centered on dignity.”

    Dr. Bonet Ferrer added: “For AI to truly contribute to human progress, we must incorporate the spirit of One Humanity into its design and governance. Technology must unite us, honor our diversity, and strengthen our shared destiny.”

    Jared Genser also highlighted: “As neurotechnologies and AI converge, we must update human rights frameworks to protect mental sovereignty. HUMAN-AI-T is an urgent ethical safeguard anchoring these tools in principles from the outset.”

    Carlos Moreira, founder and CEO of WISeKey, concluded: “We are approaching a threshold where machines may surpass human intelligence. If we do not act now, we risk losing control over the values embedded in these systems. HUMAN-AI-T is our response: to ensure that the intelligence we build remains deeply human—now and for future generations.”

    Finally, Che Fu, founder and president of the World Public Economic Organization (WPEO) and president of the East-West Cultural Exchange Promotion Agency of Sichuan, remarked: “Artificial intelligence has a unique power to build bridges between civilizations. It is a new language of humanity—one that must be shaped with ethics and cultural understanding. We must come together, East and West, to ensure this technology connects us. I warmly invite the UN Alliance of Civilizations to hold the 4th AI for #OneHumanity Conference in China on January 20, 2026, where we can continue this global dialogue and strengthen our shared commitment to a human-centered digital future.”

    The event concluded with closing reflections from H.E. Mr. Moratinos and Dr. Bonet Ferrer, marking the beginning of a new chapter in the evolution of AI—one guided not only by algorithms and code, but by consciousness, cooperation, and compassion.

    #HUMANAIT #QuantumRisks #AGI #AIForGood #OneHumanity #TrustworthyAI #EthicalAI #China2026

    About WISeKey

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”, SIX: WIHN; Nasdaq: WKEY) is a global leader in cybersecurity, digital identity, and IoT solutions platform. It operates as a Swiss-based holding company through several operational subsidiaries, each dedicated to specific aspects of its technology portfolio. The subsidiaries include (i) SEALSQ Corp (Nasdaq: LAES), which focuses on semiconductors, PKI, and post-quantum technology products, (ii) WISeKey SA which specializes in RoT and PKI solutions for secure authentication and identification in IoT, Blockchain, and AI, (iii) WISeSat AG which focuses on space technology for secure satellite communication, specifically for IoT applications, (iv) WISe.ART Corp which focuses on trusted blockchain NFTs and operates the WISe.ART marketplace for secure NFT transactions, and (v) SEALCOIN AG which focuses on decentralized physical internet with DePIN technology and house the development of the SEALCOIN platform.

    Each subsidiary contributes to WISeKey’s mission of securing the internet while focusing on their respective areas of research and expertise. Their technologies seamlessly integrate into the comprehensive WISeKey platform. WISeKey secures digital identity ecosystems for individuals and objects using Blockchain, AI, and IoT technologies. With over 1.6 billion microchips deployed across various IoT sectors, WISeKey plays a vital role in securing the Internet of Everything. The company’s semiconductors generate valuable Big Data that, when analyzed with AI, enable predictive equipment failure prevention. Trusted by the OISTE/WISeKey cryptographic Root of Trust, WISeKey provides secure authentication and identification for IoT, Blockchain, and AI applications. The WISeKey Root of Trust ensures the integrity of online transactions between objects and people. For more information on WISeKey’s strategic direction and its subsidiary companies, please visit www.wisekey.com.

    Disclaimer
    This communication expressly or implicitly contains certain forward-looking statements concerning WISeKey International Holding Ltd and its business. Such statements involve certain known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which could cause the actual results, financial condition, performance or achievements of WISeKey International Holding Ltd to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. WISeKey International Holding Ltd is providing this communication as of this date and does not undertake to update any forward-looking statements contained herein as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities, and it does not constitute an offering prospectus within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (“FinSA”), the FinSa’s predecessor legislation or advertising within the meaning of the FinSA. Investors must rely on their own evaluation of WISeKey and its securities, including the merits and risks involved. Nothing contained herein is, or shall be relied on as, a promise or representation as to the future performance of WISeKey.

    Press and Investor Contacts

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd
    Company Contact: Carlos Moreira
    Chairman & CEO
    Tel: +41 22 594 3000
    info@wisekey.com     		 WISeKey Investor Relations (US) 
    The Equity Group Inc.
    Lena Cati
    Tel: +1 212 836-9611
    lcati@equityny.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023 – A10-0051/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    2. PROPOSAL FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DECISION

    on the closure of the accounts of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2029(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the final annual accounts of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to the Court of Auditors’ annual report on EU agencies for the financial year 2023, together with the agencies’ replies[7],

    – having regard to the statement of assurance[8] as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions provided by the Court of Auditors for the financial year 2023, pursuant to Article 287 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to the Council’s recommendation of 17 February 2025 on discharge to be given to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (05754/2025 – C10-0023/2025),

    – having regard to Article 319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 July 2018 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union, amending Regulations (EU) No 1296/2013, (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 1304/2013, (EU) No 1309/2013, (EU) No 1316/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) No 283/2014, and Decision No 541/2014/EU and repealing Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012[9], and in particular Article 70 thereof,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[10], and in particular Articles 70 thereof,

    – having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)[11], and in particular Article 94 thereof,

    – having regard to Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2019/715 of 18 December 2018 on the framework financial regulation for the bodies set up under the TFEU and Euratom Treaty and referred to in Article 70 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2018/1046 of the European Parliament and of the Council[12], and in particular Article 105 thereof,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0051/2025),

    1. Approves the closure of the accounts of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023;

    2. Instructs its President to forward this decision to the Administrative Director of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, the European Council, the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors, and to arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (L series).

     

    3. MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023

    (2024/2029(DEC))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budget of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office for the financial year 2023,

    – having regard to Rule 102 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0051/2025),

    A. whereas the EPPO is the independent public prosecution office of the Union, responsible for investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union, for significantly enhancing the Union’s capacity to safeguard taxpayer funds, and for bringing to judgment the perpetrators of, and accomplices to, criminal offences provided for in Directive (EU) 2017/1371[13] and indicated by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939[14];

    B. whereas the competence of the EPPO encompasses several types of fraud, and includes cross-border VAT fraud with a total damage of at least EUR 10 million, money laundering, corruption, organised crime and other offences for which the EPPO performs prosecutorial functions before the competent courts of the participating Member States;

    C. whereas the EPPO is one of the component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and, as such, its actions are coordinated with and complementary to those of the other components of the architecture, to achieve streamlined, efficient coordination that enhances the overall effectiveness of the architecture;

    D. whereas the EPPO intervenes when national authorities could investigate and prosecute crimes but where the prerogatives of national authorities stop at the borders of their country, and other organisations like Eurojust, OLAF and Europol do not have the necessary powers to carry out the relevant criminal investigations and prosecutions;

    E. whereas the procedural acts of the EPPO are subject to judicial review by the national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (the ‘Court of Justice’) has, by way of preliminary rulings or judicial reviews of those acts, residual power to ensure a consistent application of Union law;

    F. whereas the EPPO is composed of a central level, with its headquarters in Luxembourg, consisting of the European Chief Prosecutor, 22 European Prosecutors (one per participating Member State), the Administrative Director, and a decentralised, national- level consisting of the European delegated prosecutors (EDPs) in the 22 participating Member States;

    G. whereas at the central level the European Chief Prosecutor and the 22 European Prosecutors compose the College of the EPPO (the ‘College’) and supervise the investigations and prosecutions carried out by the EDPs at the national level, who operate with complete independence from their national authorities;

    H. whereas, under Article 93 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the EPPO Administrative Director, acting as the authorising officer of the EPPO, is to implement its budget under its own responsibility and within the limits authorised in the budget and shall send each year to the budgetary authority all information relevant to the findings of any evaluation procedures;

    I. whereas, in accordance with Article 50(2) of the EPPO’s Financial Rules, the Accounting Officer of the Commission is also to act as Accounting Officer of the EPPO and is responsible for the preparation of the annual accounts, which are consolidated with those of the Union;

    J. whereas, under the current framework, the final annual accounts are scrutinised by the Court of Auditors (the ‘Court’) and it is with the Council to recommend and to the European Parliament to decide whether to grant discharge to EPPO’s Administrative Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for a given financial year;

    K. whereas the scrutiny over the management of the EPPO resources and related expenditure cannot ignore the examination of operational activities, their consequences and impact and the methods of their execution;

    L. whereas the EPPO has been operating autonomously in the implementation of its budget only since 24 June 2021 and it has started its operational activities, necessitating continuous evaluation to ensure resources align with operational effectiveness, on 1 June 2021, which is also the dies a quo for the five-year term indicated in Article 119 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 upon reaching which the Commission will have to submit to the European Parliament and to the Council and to national parliaments an evaluation report on the implementation and impact of such Regulation, and on the effectiveness and efficiency of the EPPO and its working practices, together with its conclusions;

    M. whereas, in accordance with Article 119(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, the Commission is to submit legislative proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council if it concludes that it is necessary to have additional or more detailed rules on the setting up of the EPPO, its functions or the procedure applicable to its activities, including its cross-border investigations;

    1. Welcomes the positive opinion of the Court on the reliability of the EPPO’s accounts for the year ended 31 December 2023 and on the legality and regularity of the underlying revenue and payments;

    2. Recalls the Parliament’s strong support for the establishment of the EPPO; acknowledges the EPPO as an independent Union body; stresses the EPPO’s important role in the protection of the Union’s financial interests and as an essential component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture and of a wider Union system based on integrity, accountability, transparency and the sound financial management of resources; commends the EPPO for its work in investigating, prosecuting, and ensuring justice for crimes affecting the Union budget, such as fraud, corruption, and cross-border VAT fraud;

    3. Notes that it is possible to compare only the two most recent budgetary and operational performances of the EPPO, for the period 2022 to 2023, following the EPPO’s financial autonomy in June 2021; observes that, in that context, the budgetary increases related to the EPPO’s activities remain very difficult to estimate because of the EPPO’s recent establishment, the unique characteristics of the EPPO and its main activities, the unpredictable level of fraud detection, the wide variety of its cases, its lack of discretion with regard to pursuing prosecutions coupled with its reliance on the resources and procedural constraints of national judicial systems, the lack of a fixed correlation between the number and the costs of investigations, and the magnitude of the Union’s financial interests that are to be protected; also observes that it is difficult to estimate the expenditure for the caseload related to the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) because of its unprecedented manner of implementation and high volume of resources;

    Budgetary and financial management

    4. Notes that the overall final budget allocated to the EPPO for 2023 was EUR 65,9 million, substantially increased (by 14,7 %) from the EUR 51,2 million that was allocated in 2022, while the 2021 budget (EUR 26,2 million) related to a period prior to the EPPO’s financial autonomy; observes that the EPPO’s budget includes the reinforcement, granted by the budgetary authority at the request of the EPPO in June 2023, by EUR 500 000 (the request also included human resources related to the essential enhancement of the EPPO’s security capacity, leading to the grant of eight additional establishment plan posts); appreciates that no budget was returned in 2023, compared to 10 % (EUR 5,9 million) of the initial budget in 2022 and 21 % (EUR 9,5 million) in 2021; re-iterates the need for the EPPO to be provided with sufficient resources to adequately fulfil its mandate;

    5. Welcomes the increasing level of budget implementation, which was 99,6 % in 2023 (compared to 98,1 % in 2022 and 97,4 % in 2021); appreciates that the overall execution rate for payments progressed in 2023 reaching 85,3 % (compared to 76,6 % and 71 % in 2022 and 2021) and the average payment time decreased to 17 days compared to 23,8 in 2022 and 21,0 in 2021); observes that the electronic invoicing module (e-invoicing) was rolled out in June 2023 and it will contribute to further reducing administrative burdens, time-to-payment and the overall processing costs; encourages a further refinement of operational processes to maximise efficiency;

    6. Understands that, because the budget endowment requests were only partially met, the EPPO focused its financial resources on the intake of additional EDPs, which has an impact on the EPPO’s capacity to lead the increasing number of investigations and prosecutions, on the need to improve the security standing of the organisation and on the maintenance of its case-management System (CMS), which could have negatively affected the management of cross-border investigations; underlines the importance of additional funding and strengthening its staffing to enable the EPPO to effectively combat organised crime, protect the Union’s financial interests, and uphold the rule of law, which are key Union priorities; calls for a dedicated increase in funding within the next Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to ensure it can continue to meet its objectives and obligations;

    7. Is aware that, following the achievement of its financial autonomy, in June 2021, the EPPO prioritised the operational expenditure related to investigation, prosecution and security measures, and that this has resulted in limiting the non-operational expenditure to essential level support services; remarks that, in this context, a total of EUR 28 312 075 was allocated on operational expenditure lines (Title 3), representing 43 % of the EPPO’s final budget 2023 (compared to EUR 21 047 346, which was 41 % in 2022); observes that the main cost drivers for these activities were the EDPs’ remuneration (51 % of the operational activities compared to 42% in 2022), followed by operational ICT activities like maintenance and development of the EPPO’s CMS (19 % compared to 28 % in 2022), and the linguistic services (translation and interpretation related activities) (14 %, the same as in 2022);

    8. Notes that the remuneration of the EDPs reached EUR 14,5 (compared to EUR 8,7 million in 2022), which represents the main operational expenditure because of the increased number of EDPs in place over 2023; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO, which was announced in 2024; notes that it did not affect the 2023 expenditure and concerns the 2024 budget only marginally, due to the late and gradual intake of two European Prosecutors and a number of EDPs; understands that a more solid cost estimation will not be possible until 2025; welcomes the inclusion in the programme of the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government, as the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay;

    9. Observes that costs for missions and operational meetings increased further in 2023 (mission costs were EUR 1 175 000 in 2023 and EUR 980 000 in 2022; operational meeting in 2023 were EUR 659 752 compared to EUR 170 000 in 2022), in line with the increasing level of intensity of investigations;

    10. Is aware that the costs for translation services are expected to further increase, in line with the EPPO’s increasing caseload, and recognises the need for additional resources for translation; welcomes both the internal guidance developed on the use of translation services, with a view to reinforcing control over costs and including the recommendation to use machine translation services whenever possible, and the use of national service providers of the limit allowed by the current Regulation to address the problem; observes, in that regard, that while Article 107 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 provides for translation services required for the administrative functioning of the EPPO at the central level to be provided by the Union’s Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union, it also provides for different handling of operational and urgent matters and empowers EDPs to decide on the arrangements for translations for the purpose of investigations in accordance with applicable national law;

    11. Notes that in 2023 the EPPO signed 234 specific contracts under existing framework contracts, for a total of more than EUR 11 million, with a significant increase in the use of EPPO framework contracts (82 specific contracts for a value of more than EUR 6,5 million) due, to a great extent, to the use of the EPPO’s framework contract for the Provision of Services in the Field of Information Systems; observes that only one contract, concerning the EPPO’s CMS, was awarded via a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice for reasons of extreme urgency;

    12. Observes that carry-over of appropriations from the previous exercise in 2022 amounted to EUR 10 969 680 (24,4 % of the EPPO’s 2022 final budget), of which 84,8 % was consumed (EUR 9 307 392) and 15,2 % was cancelled (compared to 21,4 % in 2022) and notes that forecasts indicate another carry-over in 2024, pending completion of the deliverables, for payment appropriations (the carry-over from 2023 to 2024 amounted to EUR 9 392 989); understands that partial cancellation is a consequence of the progressive establishment of the EPPO’s administrative practices following the financial autonomy it achieved in 2021; notes that carry-over appropriations cancelled for approved budgets of 2022 and 2023 could be neither used with existing or new contracts nor synchronised with the principle of annuality, while the planning of the corresponding expenses, mainly related to translation, meetings, missions and external contractors, could not be accurate due to a lack of any historical data and figures and the rapid evolving of the organisation; appreciates that the continuous strengthening of the EPPO’s administrative capacity is progressively addressing those issues and that, while a fully estimation cannot be made in advance because of the nature of the EPPO’s operational activity, the expected level of cancelled appropriations will diminish in 2024;

    13. Notes that in 2023 two budget transfers were adopted by the European Chief Prosecutor, on a proposal drawn up by the Administrative Director, and that they were notified to the College for information, for a total transferred between titles of EUR 1,2 million;

    14. Acknowledges the need for adequate budget flexibility, to address unexpected operational needs such as, in 2023, the war in Ukraine, inflationary pressures, or other global challenges and understands that the EPPO made use of its Financial Rules by timely reallocation of appropriations via budget amendments (one in June and one in November) and via budget transfers (one in September and one in December);

    15. Reiterates its observation on the obsolete 2017 Legislative Financial Statement which is deemed to be no longer fit-for-purpose due to a significantly underestimated workload; recalls its previous resolution, underlining that the absence of a mid-term budgetary review obliges the EPPO to wait until the very end of the budgetary adoption process to have clarity on what resource level it can implement in the subsequent year, and it limits the EPPO’s capacity to anticipate budget implementation preparatory activities as well as the options that should be made available to achieve maximum flexibility in the development of an organisational infrastructure for a project as innovative as the EPPO; notes that this, in particular, affects the early launch of recruitment, delaying the progress towards full occupancy among others and the overall absorption capacity of the EPPO;

    16. Maintains that the budgetary and human resources allocated to the EPPO are expected to be adequate to allow the efficient and successful carrying out of its mandate and the normal handling of the related administrative procedures; reiterates its call on the Commission to review the EPPO budgetary framework in close cooperation with the EPPO to find adequate ways to support it in its work; calls on the Commission to allocate additional resources, justified by the growing number of complex cases, and emphasises that these should not be dependent on the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 or of the EPPO mandate, but rather on the importance of the fight against organised crime and the protection of the Union’s financial interests in the next MFF;

    17. Emphasises that the activities of the EPPO contribute to the protection of the Union’s financial interests and are also expected to recover amounts from the Union’s budget that were not used for its intended purpose due to criminal activities; believes that the amounts resulting from seizing and confiscating measures adopted by the EDPs in the Member States could, after the deduction of costs incurred by the Member States’ authorities to implement those measures, flow back into the Union Budget in accordance with Article 38 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939; considers that the potential revenue resulting from seizing and confiscating measures should be accounted for in the Union Budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow those amounts to enter into the Union Budget;

    18. Acknowledges that the EPPO clearly contributes to European added value in terms of coordination and cooperation with the Member States in investigating and prosecuting crimes against the financial interests of the Union and that the EPPO has been achieving the goals set out in Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 in that regard; expects Member States to comply with legal obligations and to report all relevant cases to the EPPO; notes with concern that in several instances Member States have been declaring criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union as national cases, which are within the competence of the EPPO; notes that questions of competence between the national authorities and the EDPs have come up in several cases across several countries; is aware that, according to Article 25(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, cases of disagreement about the EPPO’s competences are to be decided by the same national judicial authority who is responsible for determining the competent body for prosecution at national level; regrets that in many participating Member States the procedures in force and the national authorities entrusted with the decisions on such cases regarding conflicts of competence are not set in compliance with Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, stresses that in cases of conflicts of competence between the EPPO and a national prosecution authority, the national authority competent to decide on the attribution of competence could come to a conclusion without requesting a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice and could, instead adopt a decision that is binding on the EPPO and points out that this is against the spirit of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, which provides that, in accordance with Article 267 TFEU, the Court of Justice has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the provision on conflicts of competence between the EPPO and national authorities; believes that the current situation lacks legal clarity; encourages all Member States to work more closely with the EPPO; emphasises that the competence of the EPPO is clearly outlined in Article 22(1) and (2), and in Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, and that all Member States are to comply with that Regulation; notes that when Member States have doubts about the competence of the EPPO in a particular case, there is the possibility of submitting a preliminary question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU and Article 42(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 ; urges the Commission, where there is a breach of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to submit the case to the Court of Justice; notes with concern that the question of competence can cause a halt to the investigation; is concerned about potential loss of evidence when cases are paused; calls on the Commission to collect information regarding cases regarding conflicts of competence for the evaluation report that will be submitted in 2026;

    19. Reiterates that Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 is to be implemented properly and underlines that the peculiar characteristics of prosecution and investigation expenditure, including the exceptional cases of the EPPO’s operational expenditure governed by that provision, have to be taken into account; understands that, in 2023, a first financing agreement was signed in the framework of a pilot for the reimbursement of claims made under Article 91(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939, to cover exceptionally costly investigation measures carried out at national level on behalf of the EPPO; appreciates that the corresponding payment was audited by the Court during the 2023 audit and was deemed legal and regular;

    Internal management, performance and internal control

    20. Welcomes that, during 2023, the College met 22 times and adopted 73 decisions, among which are the anti-fraud strategy 2023-2025, the anti-harassment policy for staff and for members of the College or the EDPs;

    21. Acknowledges that the EPPO continued its efforts to set in place a system to monitor efficiency gains and cost savings, and notes that in 2023 it launched a review of the budget and activities’ strategic and operational planning and monitoring processes and of the recruitment processes, to make gains in speed and acquired competences; points out that, overall, the internal control systems in force are effective;

    22. Notes that, to further develop the EPPO’s assurance framework, the internal auditor of the EPPO for non-operational matters (IAS) initiated, in 2023, a limited review of the EPPO’s building blocks of assurance; believes that this engagement, scheduled to be finalised during the course of 2024, will provide recommendations to build a stronger capacity for the Authorising Officer to issue a credible declaration of assurance;

    23. Welcomes the benchmarking exercise carried out by the Internal Audit Capability (IAC) by comparing the deployed human resources of the EPPO with a set of other Union entities and national prosecution offices, against a standardised set of pillars which includes administrative support and operational activities; observes that, in 2023, the IAC tested the internal oversight environment and ran the first internal audit as an analysis of the working environment and internal controls of the EPPO’s decentralised office in Sofia, Bulgaria;

    24. Reiterates its view that the IAS and the IAC should coordinate their actions with a view to advising and assisting the EPPO in the establishment of its main core processes and the achievement of its objectives;

    25. Notes that the EPPO has developed its own purchase capacity, resulting from its own specifically run procurement processes launched in 2023, and manages its own specific contracts and order forms with regard to the implementation of existing framework contracts that were signed in 2023; observes that the EPPO continues, in parallel, to operate its purchase capacity through service level agreements with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, and by joining inter-institutional contracts with various market operators;

    26. Is aware that in 2023 the Administrative Director established the minimum standards (assessment criteria) for each of the 17 internal control principles based on the COSO 2013 Control-Integrated Framework and established by the EPPO Internal Control Framework (ICF) as building blocks of the EPPO internal control system; observes that out of 72 compliance criteria, 51 are observed as fulfilled, 20 have some elements in place but further development is desirable and only in the case of one criterion has no significant implementation has been noted; appreciates that, since its adoption by the College on March 2021, 71 % of the adopted ICF assessment have been successfully implemented whereas additional effort needs to be made for the full implementation of the remaining 29 %;

    27. Welcomes that, on 1 March 2023, an updated version of the EPPO Anti-fraud Strategy 2023- 2025 was adopted setting the objectives to counter fraud at all levels of the organisation in connection with a dedicated action plan which is part of the EPPO internal control environment and is monitored on a regular basis; appreciates the annual review of the Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan by the EPPO Internal Control Officer, reporting the results of that review to the Administrative Director;

    28. Is aware that, in line with the EPPO’s financial rules, the EPPO ensures an adequate level of financial transactions and procurement procedures via ex post controls on financial transactions (payments, commitments and recovery orders) and on procurement procedures for the period 1 January to 31 December 2023;

    29. Observes the increase in crime reports submitted to the EPPO (4 187 in 2023 compared to 3 318 in 2022 and 2 832 in 2021) and, as a result, the increase in open investigations (1 371 in 2023 compared to 865 in 2022 and 567 in 2021) and in the estimation of damage (EUR 19,27 billion in 2023 compared to 14,1 billion in 2022 and 5,4 billion in 2021); remarks that reports from private parties (2 494, which is 29 % more than in 2022) and from national authorities (1 562, which is 24 % more than in 2022) represent the biggest share of operational input received, while regrets that reports from other Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies remained very low (108), suggesting that no significant improvement in terms of detection and reporting was achieved from their side; notes that the number of indictments (139 in 2023 compared to 87 in 2022 and 5 in 2021) together with the freezing orders obtained by the EPPO (EUR 1,5 billion compared to EUR 359,1 million in 2022 and EUR 147 million in 2021) are indicative of the growing performance level of the EPPO;

    30. Notes that, compared with 2022, the caseload of the EPPO almost doubled in 2023, reaching up to 1 927 active investigations; commends the fruitful activities of the EPPO in 2023, which included 139 indictments, 339 VAT-related cases and over 200 investigations on the implementation of NextGenerationEU; further notes that the EPPO started to bring more perpetrators of Union fraud to justice in front of national courts;

    31. Notes that, in 2023, 48 cases concluded with a court conviction (compared to 20 cases in 2022) and that EUR 60 million was the amount confiscated (compared to EUR 2 million in 2021); underlines the importance of a systematic reporting on the follow-up to these cases in terms of the financial measures adopted (confiscation and recovery) to get a clearer understanding of the impact of the EPPO’s actions; welcomes the actions undertaken by the EPPO and the Commission to streamline their communications and make them adequate in relation to the needs of possible administrative procedures for the adoption of measures to restore the Union’s budget affected by financial crimes; reiterates its call on the Commission to assist the EPPO in monitoring and follow-up activities, in such a way that the EPPO’s limited resources are not diverted from their investigative and prosecutorial tasks; encourages the EPPO, where possible and appropriate, to engage in better cooperation with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust and Europol, or using – via OLAF- the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services established in the Member States to monitor the results of its investigations;

    32. Underlines the essential role of asset recovery in the creation of a credible deterrent to organised crime; welcomes the EPPO’s participation in international networks to advance its asset recovery operations further; stresses the need for the Commission to invite the EPPO to participate in the newly created cooperation network on asset recovery and confiscation; notes that the timely and effective investigation and prosecution of fraud-related crimes can generate significant savings for the budget of the Union and the budgets of the Member States;

    33. Is concerned about the increasing number of EPPO investigations regarding the implementation of Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) (there were 233 investigations at the end of 2023, compared to 15 investigations at the end of 2022) and their relevant estimated financial damage (EUR 1,86 billion); is particularly concerned that, despite the high number of investigations, there is currently no obligation on Member States to report RRF cases to the Commission through the Irregularity Management System (IMS); recalls the obligation to report all the cases of fraud affecting RRF to the EPPO and stresses that such cases are also relevant for EDES-related measures; stresses that the EPPO’s workload, initially underestimated, has significantly increased and is expected to continue growing particularly due to the rising number of RRF-related cases and that relevant analyses suggest a possible exponential grow in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years; calls on the EPPO to systematically analyse and identify fraud patterns in Member States where multiple RRF cases have been detected, and to communicate these patterns to Member States, the Commission and the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the objective of enhancing preventative measures to mitigate the risk of fraud; calls on the EPPO, the Commission and OLAF to cooperate closely with the aim of minimising, as much as possible, the impact of such fraudulent misbehaviours on the Union’s budget and safeguarding the achievements of the RRF’s goals; recalls the call on the Commission to provide adequate guidance to the EPPO on how to support and foster the adoption of the remedial measures which follow the EPPO’s independent investigation and prosecution of fraud affecting the RRF and to keep the budgetary authority informed regarding the available options;

    34. Understands that the EPPO reacted to Parliament’s call for a better monitoring system and enhanced follow-up of investigations and prosecutions by launching a project on digital statistical tools which would allow better use of the data that it processes, and the development of a strategic analysis capacity to identify the patterns of fraud; shares the EPPO’s view that the success of those efforts are directly linked to the available resources and calls on the Commission to take these activities and the related costs into consideration for the future proposals on Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and on budgetary endowments;

    35. Appreciates the EPPO’s efforts in the setting up key performance indicators (KPIs) for both operational and administrative activities with specific targets due to its peculiar business model; maintains its remark on the need for operational activities to include reference to the amounts seized, confiscated and eventually recovered to the Union’s budget, the safeguard of which is ultimately the raison d’être of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture of which the EPPO is an important component; understands that monitoring and follow-up action, including reporting on the recovery results, are not in the EPPO’s remit and require resources and specific prerogatives that are not part of the EPPO’s mission; asks the Commission to support the EPPO in identifying indicators linked to the achievement of that essential task, stressing that a better monitoring system, and more data of good granularity and aggregated in cluster per typology of misconduct, sector of interest or geographical area, could allow making more tangible the impact of the EPPO’s investigations and allow the identification of patterns of fraud;

    Human resources, equality and staff well-being

    36. Observes the upward trend in the number of staff, increasing from 58 in 2020, to 122 in 2021, 217 by the end of 2022 and 238 by the end of 2023; is aware that, for 2023, the EPPO requested from the budgetary authority the suppression of 20 contract agent posts and the creation of 20 temporary agent posts, which was granted and implemented by the EPPO in the same year, resulting in the total number of staff remaining unchanged (248, out of with 171 TAs, 48 CAs and 29 SNEs), with a different allocation of posts (191 TAs, 28 CAs and 29 SNEs); points out, however, that following certain security weaknesses identified, the EPPO requested in May 2023 an amending budget and additional posts to enhance the physical, information and cyber security at central and decentralised levels and that out of 21 security posts identified, only eight posts (1 AD 9, 4 AD 6 and 3 AST 3) were granted in November 2023 for further security implementations which was finalised in 2024;

    37. Points out that, in 2023, the occupancy rate at the central office was 92,97 %, of which 238 were members of staff compared to 256 budgeted posts; notes that out of 140 posts for the EDPs, 130 were on the post at the end of 2023 and another 10 started at the beginning of 2024, reaching 100 % of occupancy rate; observes that the EPPO reinforced its capacity to run timely and transparent recruitment procedures by concluding 24 selection procedures in 2023, on-boarding 45 statutory staff members and 8 new European Prosecutors while 35 new EDPs were appointed;

    38. Notes that, by December 2023, staff turnover (TAs and CAs) was at 4,62 %[15], recording a total of 11 resignations throughout the year, mainly justified by leaving to another institution (four cases) and for more senior positions offered in other Union institutions (seven cases); observes that the main underlying cause for this turnover is the specificity of the Luxembourg labour market, which has a very limited talent pool and small offer of specialised skills;

    39. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to satisfy the EPPO’s requests for additional posts; believes that the workload perspectives indicates that further resources are needed, especially considering the backlog and additional RRF-related cases and far-reaching VAT fraud and also considering that the administrative and central support functions are expected to grow, in line with the larger operational population; points out the risk of underestimating needs and capacities; remarks that the cost of interim staff and external service providers working intra-muros in 2023 reached EUR 4 235 242; encourages the Commission and the EPPO to find a sustainable long-term solution which allows for continuity, preserves confidentiality and retains built-in competences; appreciates that the EPPO’s additional operational needs are exhaustively integrated in the EPPO Single Programming Document 2024-2026 and in EPPO budget requests;

    40. Notes with concern that the Luxembourg labour market is very competitive, that the financial conditions offered by the Union administration are not attractive compared to the local market (subject to diverse salary indexations throughout the year), and do not take due account of the high cost of living in Luxembourg, which has become even more difficult because of the inflation rate and the increased cost of housing; notes that the EPPO cannot offer a career path for its members of staff to become Union Officials and that its posts are therefore even less attractive than those in the four other Union institutions operating from Luxembourg; emphasises that this results either in a very limited number of applications for vacant posts or in the rejection by the selected candidates of the employment offer once received, due to the high cost of living; calls on the EPPO and the Commission to implement measures that enhance the EPPO’s attractiveness for highly skilled professionals with international experience, such as the housing allowance for lower-grade staff approved by the budgetary authority for 2025, as recommended by the High-Level Interinstitutional Group; notes the overrepresentation of certain nationalities among staff;

    41.  Notes that, at the end of 2023, geographical and gender balance was adequately pursued overall across the 238 members of staff (with 137 men and 101 women); maintains that the nationality breakdown of the EPPO population is constantly monitored by those hiring new members of staff, in seeking to ensure balance, especially, in light of the uneven distribution of applicants, and with Italy (34), Romania (33), Greece (26) and Belgium (24) being more represented across the 26 different nationalities; encourages the EPPO to adopt proactive measures to ensure a balanced representation of nationalities among its staff, reflecting the diversity of the participating Member States; expresses concerns over the gender distribution among senior management positions (four men to one woman) and calls for this issue to be addressed in the framework of the overall diversity strategy; calls for the publication of an annual report, disaggregated by gender, nationality, and employment category, including concrete measures to close gaps in recruitment and career advancement and to monitor and address imbalances;

    42. Is aware that the decision to implement a strategy on Diversity and Inclusion was made in 2023, with the development of the strategy to be executed in the course of 2024; encourages the EPPO to progress with its adoption and to periodically launch surveys among its staff, by promoting peer-review with other components of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, such as Eurojust, OLAF and Europol; understands that the EPPO’s policy on Diversity & Inclusion will be based on the EU Agencies Network Charter on Diversity & Inclusion, adopted in March 2023, and believes that it will in general encourage diversity to make the workplace more attractive to candidates with specific needs; reiterates its request to the EPPO to adopt its Charter on Diversity and Inclusion without delay, in light of the increase in staff during 2023;

    43. Remarks that, including TAs, CAs, SNEs and EDPs, 341 out of 396 staff (compared to 275 out of 332 in 2022) were deployed in investigative activities by the end of 2023 (that is 86,10 % compared to 82,83 % in 2022 and 86 % in 2021) while 55 members of staff (compared to 57 in 2022) were engaged in administrative support and control functions;

    44. Welcomes the appointment of 8 new European Prosecutors and 35 new EDP’s to the EPPO in 2023; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence, which flows from a merit-based and objective appointment procedure; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard;

    45. Maintains that the appointment of EDPs is a shared responsibility of the EPPO and the Member States; stresses that the appointment procedure must always comply with Article 17 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and the principle of national procedural autonomy;

    46. Underlines the need for greater career development opportunities for EDPs to attract and retain experienced professionals; calls for improved employment conditions, including a clear career progression path and the standardisation of social security and pension arrangements across participating Member States, ensuring that national salary discrepancies do not deter qualified candidates from applying;

    47. Appreciates that, in the course of 2023 and beginning 2024, the number of EDPs reached the initially foreseen number of 140; welcomes the decision to align the remuneration of EDPs with that of EU Officials of equivalent level of responsibility, rather than 80 % of the salary of EU Officials, as originally provided for; takes the view that this decision increases the attractiveness of the EDP’s function, paving the way to the recruitment of more experienced national prosecutors whose national salary was higher than the remuneration offered by the EPPO, and in the meantime reduces the administrative burden on the EPPO for the implementation of Article 16(1) of the Conditions of Employment of the EDPs, which provides that, in the case of total net remuneration lower than the national salary, a top-up amount is provided to ensure that the remuneration matches the previous level;

    48. Underlines that the selection process for European Prosecutors and EDPs is not managed autonomously by the EPPO, because European Prosecutors are nominated by the Member States and then appointed by the European Council, whereas EDPs are nominated by the Member States and appointed by the College; maintains that the application of qualified candidates to the EDP positions could increase and the process could become more selective by adopting a clear career perspective and more favourable administrative discipline on social security and health insurance coverage; reiterates that the creation of a specific status for EDPs would be consistent with the nature of their judicial function and contribute on making those posts more appealing; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the event of amending Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    49. Understands that each Member State is obliged (under Article 96(6) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939) to put in place arrangements of legislative or administrative nature to maintain the affiliation and coverage of the EDPs, including any contributions to the relevant national social security, pension and insurance schemes, but a number of Member States have not yet fully complied with this obligation; therefore calls on the Commission to propose an effective solution to the social security and health insurance coverage gap of the EDPs at the revision of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    50. Notes that five complaints about the appointment of EDPs were introduced before the Court of Justice until 2023, of which three were closed (either dismissed or withdrawn) and one was dismissed, but an appeal is currently pending before the Court of Justice, and the last action for annulment of the decision of the College rejecting the nomination as EDP of a person nominated by a Member State was admitted in July 2024 on the grounds of a lack of sufficient reasoning in the College’s decision and an analysis is on-going on the manner in which the annulment is to be implemented; observes that there are no new complaints before the General Court concerning appointments to the EPPO;

    51. Notes that the EPPO’s learning and development strategy was launched in 2023, aiming to promote a culture of continuous learning and facilitate the continuous assessment and adaptation of the staff’s evolving learning needs, together with the pilot learning needs analysis;

    52. Notes, as regards measures and policies in place to safeguard the physical and mental well-being of staff, that in 2023 all measures were subject to revision and consultation by all involved stakeholders (the staff committee, members of staff in general, and management), seeking to find a balance between expectations and reality of the EPPO as a growing and rapidly changing organisation; observes that there the EPPO operates a flexitime scheme and a work-from-home standard scheme, which provides for one day of telework per week as a basis and a maximum of three days per week, plus extensions accepted in light of serious health or family constraints; remarks that current framework also includes 10 days’ work from outside the place of employment in a given year, to be used without link to other days of leave; believes that the EPPO’s current working conditions allow staff to take advantage of digital solutions by integrating a good level of autonomy in the management of working patterns, facilitating the conciliation of private and work life and promoting team morale and spirit; welcomes the on-going development of a policy on well-being which shall contain a section on well-being for staff benefiting from telework;

    53. Highlights that, as suggested by Parliament, in the second semester of 2023 an open consultation on flexible working arrangements took place, and the decisions adopted in 2021 and 2022 underwent an ex post revision; notes that in consideration of the input of all stakeholders, on December 2023 the Administrative Director incorporated updates to the provisions; notes that changes included the enlargement of the notion of ‘place of telework’ (from 2 to 2,5 hours’ time/distance radius around the EPPO’s central office), and the introduction of hybrid working arrangements for interim agency staff; observes that no further change was adopted by College decisions, taking into account that the Administrative Director decisions had already enacted the conclusions of the staff consultations;

    54. Notes that, following Parliament’s calls, a staff satisfaction (engagement) survey is planned in the first quarter of 2025; understands that the EPPO’s staff committee has also run a staff priorities survey, and encourages a more intensive dialogue to enhance the work-life conditions;

    55. Welcomes that no case of burnout or harassment have been reported and that the number of long-term sick leave is very limited; welcomes the EPPO’s awareness of its duty to ensure promotion and preservation of health and wellbeing across staff, as well as the monitoring practices to earn such understanding which take into account untaken annual leave, the carry-over of annual leave and absences, the number of staff on long-term sick leave and the length of the absences; recalls the importance of establishing a clear and structured procedure for reporting cases of harassment by the European Chief Prosecutor and by the European Prosecutors, as well as its divulgation to all the staff;

    56. Observes that, in early 2023, the EPPO’s central office carried out a traineeship pilot and the EPPO legal service sector hosted two trainees followed by two more in March and September 2023 for remunerated, in-person, five-month traineeships; notes that, based on the positive conclusions of the pilot, a traineeship policy was drafted and has been approved in 2024, followed by a first cycle of effective trainees the same year; welcomes the initiative to launch an experimental relationship-building with the local university and if successful, calls for its expansion to additional universities across the EU, which could offer interesting perspectives to further develop the early talent programmes for diversity; stresses that the high cost of living in Luxembourg poses a considerable obstacle for potential trainees; emphasizes that traineeships should be remunerated in compliance with the European Parliament’s resolution of 14 June 2023 with recommendations to the Commission on quality traineeships in the Union (2020/2005(INL), which calls for all internships in the Union to be paid;

    57. Welcomes the intense activity of the staff committee, the final adoption of its internal rules of procedure, the launch of the first staff committee open day, the launch of the first EPPO-wide staff survey, the participation of its representatives in the selection procedures, the retroactive revision of all general implementing provisions adopted by the EPPO before the establishment of the staff committee, the submission of input on internal reorganisation, working time and hybrid working, implementing rules and the improvement of working conditions;

    58. Understands that the EPPO is progressing towards the finalisation of a business continuity plan, which is included in the Union’s administration management standards, and urges the EPPO to adopt it without further delay;

    Ethical framework and transparency

    59. Understands that the EPPO’s ethical framework is being gradually built up; observes that the core values of that ethical framework are clearly set out in codes of conduct, which outline the standards of behaviour expected of employees at all levels; also observes that the ethical framework depends on the EPPO’s code of good administrative behaviour, its anti-fraud strategy and a training programme on ethics, which encompasses harassment, whistleblowing, the prevention of conflicts of interest and other ethical issues; regrets that members of staff of the EPPO are not required to attend that training programme, which would ensure a consistent understanding and application of the EPPO’s codes of conduct; calls on the EPPO to remedy the situation;

    60. Notes the EPPO’s engagement in awareness-raising actions among staff about ethical framework and related matters; encourages the EPPO to make mandatory the attendance of such sessions by European Prosecutors and EDPs at their taking over of duties; believes that internal dialogue needs to be intensified;

    61. Notes that no effective cases of conflict of interest were detected in 2023; is aware that dedicated conflict of interest declaration forms have been established and conflict of interest rules are in force for the members of College, the EDPs, the members of staff of the operational units, and other sensitive posts; welcomes the ongoing development of a structured conflict of interest policy and calls on the EPPO to finalise its adoption; calls for the implementation of a mandatory annual refreshment of an ethics and integrity training course for all EPPO personnel;

    62. Urges the EPPO to enhance its internal integrity framework by mandating public disclosure of all financial interests and external activities of senior officials, including members of the College; calls for a periodic audit of these disclosures to identify and mitigate potential risks of undue influence;

    63. Understands that the EPPO seeks to prevent revolving doors in particular by endorsing the strict application of the provisions of the Staff Regulations, which are set out in all contracts of the EPPO, including ad hoc exit forms that indicate the obligations that apply after termination of engagement; welcomes in this regard the adoption, in 2023, of the Guidelines for the EPPO Staff on Outside Activities and Assignments, which apply to activities that are not considered to relate to hobbies of leisure activities outside the remit of the EPPO;

    64. Calls for the introduction of a more robust revolving door policy, including an extended cooling-off period of at least two years for senior EPPO officials before they can engage in private-sector employment related to EPPO investigations; requests that the EPPO conducts an annual review of compliance with these post-employment restrictions;

    65. Calls the EPPO to adopt a dedicated whistleblowing and anti-retaliation procedure to integrate the implementing rules to the Staff Regulations adopted by the College (College Decision 2021/077 laying down guidelines on whistleblowing applicable within the EPPO) and to accompany Article 45.12 of the EPPO Financial Rules (establishing the actions to be undertaken in the circumstances) in order to ensure a safe and protected workplace; welcomes the initiative of intensifying internal communication on the first network of confidential counsellors and on the anti-harassment provisions and to all National European Delegated Prosecutors’ Assistants (NEDPAs) on whistleblowing mechanism for breaches against the EPPO mandate;

    Digitalisation, Cybersecurity and data protection

    66. Deplores the situation of the EPPO in the area of its IT autonomy, which is adversely affected by the decision of the Commission’s Directorate-General for Digital Services (‘DG Digital Services’, formerly DIGIT) to discontinue the provision of digital workplace services; points out that EPPO IT autonomy requires additional human and financial resources which so far have not been granted because of the limitation imposed by the overall available budgetary resources in the concerned lines; regrets that, on grounds of the risks to its operational activities, the EPPO had to establish its own digital service capacity to accommodate the additional human resources that it was granted in light of the participation of Poland and Sweden;

    67. Notes that the EPPO’s initial approach was to prioritise resources on the setting and working of essential digital services linked to its operational activities, such as its case-management system, while acknowledging that the EPPO’s digital services, which, at least in part, diverge from those of the Commission, would have needed, in the mid-term, a tailored approach; observes that the interruption of service by the Commission occurs in the crucial phase of the consolidation of the EPPO’s establishment;

    68. Understands that, in 2023, the EPPO’s IT, Security and Corporate Services unit continued the implementation of two major programmes: the IT Autonomy Programme, to offer a complete catalogue of administrative IT services fully managed internally, and the EPPO’s CMS programme, to further develop the digitalisation of the organisation in its core business area; acknowledges that in 2023 the EPPO continued to prepare to gradually transition from a digital workplace provided by DG Digital Services  to an EPPO-owned and operated solution; is aware that the resources needed to implement this change, although were included in the EPPO’s budget request for 2023, were not granted by the budgetary authority; notes that following DG Digital Service’s announcement, the EPPO started negotiation to seek a solution which has not yet been achieved;

    69. Appreciates that Commission has temporarily extended the provision of IT services until June 2025 but maintains that the outsourcing of those services is a suboptimal solution in the current situation; understands that not only security and confidentiality-related arguments, but also purely financial aspects, suggest to reconsider the decision, because the outsourcing would appear much more costly than the in-house solution, and the adoption of the latter, after DG Digital Services cease providing their services, would be managed by the EPPO; stresses that, to implement the preferable in-house solution, the complex administrative aspects, the EPPO lack of experience and the de-centralised configuration of the EPPO with EDPs and NEDPAs in several locations across the Union, will require a more relevant budget and a lengthy transition period;

    70. Reiterates its call on DG Digital Services to not interrupt its support to the EPPO until such a time as the EPPO has its own reliable IT system; deems it to be essential to avoid loss of data and to keep the EPPO fully operational in the transition between IT services providers; maintains that clear communication and operational coordination on the transition is to be ensured involving the highest decision-making levels of the Commission and the EPPO; asks the Commission and the EPPO to agree upon a gradual passage of competences for a smooth and continuous transition in the period after the extension, which could be extended beyond June 2025;

    71. Observes that EPPO’s requests for permanent additional posts to fill the gap stemming from the discontinuation of DG Digital Services were refused, in January 2023, when EPPO requested 45 establishment plan, and at the end of February 2024, when a request for an amending budget 2024 for EUR 2,98 million and 37 established plan posts was also rejected; notes that the solution of recruiting intra-muros contractors could be a part of an interim solution to address DG Digital Service’s discontinuation, but while that approach would offer immediate operational continuity, it should not be conceived as a definitive solution for the EPPO, taking into account the extremely sensitive nature of its activities and the need to ensure continuity and reliability of its digital services, as well as the highest level of security of its IT infrastructure, systems and equipment; shares the view that the rejection of the EPPO’s budgetary requests is indicative of differences in the assessment of the problem, which has an adverse impact on the EPPO’s operational activities and represents a potential reputational risk for the Union in the case it results in weakening the EPPO’s operational capacity;

    72. Understands that each EDP has to use any national and the EPPO’s CMS, which are different data bases governed by different access rights; believes that this situation increases the daily complexity in the data management; is also aware that to make it possible the processing and exchange of information between the central services of the EDPs and the EPPO, all the casefiles need to be digitalised by the EDPs using national digital tools and in compliance with national law; appreciates, in this regard, the formal creation of the NEDPA status in the official organisation chart which allows granting access to NEDPAs (staff of the national office) directly to the EPPO’s CMS, like that unburdening the EDPs of administrative tasks and creating the basis for more accuracy and consistency of case data between the two case-management systems; takes the view that the way towards integration between the EPPO’s CMS and national case-management systems would be facilitated by appropriate revision of regulation and that these steps would increase the effectiveness of EPPO investigations; notes, however, that such integration could be primarily a matter of compatible technological solutions used in the different Member States and linked to the actual level of digitalisation of judiciary proceedings in those Member States; observes that the burden of the inherent costs is currently shared, with the national budget covering the costs of the equipment needed for interaction with the national case-management systems, and the EPPO budget covering hardware and the setting of a digital working environment that is secured to the same standard as EPPO central office staff and which is considered part of the operational communication costs provided for by Regulation (EU) 2017/1939;

    73. Understands that interoperability is material to achieving efficient data exchange and cooperation and that in order to adopt minimum common data exchange agreements and the implementation of judicial interoperability tools, an e-CODEX EPPO Use Case Project, initiated in 2023, involved several workshops with the e-CODEX Consortium to align on technical and functional requirements; regrets that, after several workshops with e-CODEX Consortium, the project was paused to allow the transition to the new e-CODEX programme manager, eu-LISA, and due to lack of EPPO resources with expertise in this area; calls on the Commission to act as a facilitator for further progressing in the project and to factor also those actions in the EPPO’s budgetary needs estimate;

    74. Is aware of the increased threat to the EPPO’s IT structural integrity stemming from the aggressiveness of organised crime, combatted by the EPPO, and resulting in the need to step up physical and digital security; notes that in 2023 the EPPO focused on enhancing its security governance; appreciates the EPPO decision to create a dedicated unit to address cyber and physical security; observes that the EPPO prepared a framework including new processes, roles and responsibilities and policies to increase the security of the digital systems used for the handling of operational and administrative data; understands that several risk assessments were carried out to assess the security framework of the digital systems which suggested the implementation of additional technical and governance measures to enhance the EPPO’s security environment; remarks that the policy framework was improved in the circumstance, with a security strategy and global information security policy proposed in 2023 and formally approved and adopted in 2024;

    75. Observes that the EPPO completed, in 2023, the set-up of security contact points in all participating Member States to enhance cooperation on security matters for staff and EPPO offices located in those Member States; welcomes the service level agreement is in place with CERT-EU that provides support and monitoring for specific services for incident response-related matters; underlines that the deployed system to assess risk and to report incidents is well structured and training is provided effectively; appreciates the external assessment performed for physical security whose findings translated in a roadmap for improvement by the host country;

    76. Praises the significant progress made in 2023 towards the implementation of a backup data centre and the deployment of an associated disaster recovery scenario; appreciates, in that regard, the EPPO’s development of its own case-management ecosystem the components of which are all hosted in the EPPO data centre and managed by the EPPO’s staff, guaranteeing the EPPO control, retention and ownership of systems and data processed;

    77. Acknowledges the EPPO’s need for up-to-date equipment and IT systems to deal with increasingly complicated crimes frequently involving digital elements and digital methodologies; stresses as well the urgency of developing a strong cybersecurity framework, given the growing risks posed by highly tech-savvy criminal networks and potential foreign interferences, through cyberattacks; supports the EPPO in its request for resources to be allocated to protecting its cybersecurity and calls for the swift implementation of a robust cybersecurity strategy to safeguard EPPO’s operations and data integrity;

    78. Stresses that the nature of the EPPO’s activities entails the need for specific oversight and dedicated attention to the protection of personal data; takes the view that the EPPO and the EDPS should engage in continuous dialogue to ensure the usability of the data for the investigation and prosecution and, at the same time, ensure respect for the protection of personal data; understands that the requirements relating to data protection handling stems from Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 and from Regulation (EU) 2018/1725[16] and that those requirements are complemented and implemented by College decisions, adopted after consulting the EDPS; appreciates the decision to provide mandatory training for all members of staff, including dedicated data protection training essential to the access to the EPPO’s CMS;

    Buildings and security

    79. Observes that, thanks to the lease agreement by which Luxembourg authorities provide the building currently hosting the EPPO’s headquarters (the TOB building) on a rent-free basis, the costs are limited to a service charge fee of EUR 716 724 per year; notes that, in 2023, EUR 248 103 was paid to the same Luxembourg authorities for security installations in the two additional floors (9 and 10) delivered to the EPPO in Q1 2023;

    80. Welcomes, having regard to physical security, the allocation – with amending budget 2023 and the budget 2024 – of the resources needed to have a proportionate capacity to deliver enhanced security services (21 additional posts to enhance its security capability) and the EPPO’s efforts towards the continuous improvement and efficiency alignment of the physical security processes; maintains the proper functioning of the EPPO implies that prosecutors and staff have to be protected to be able to pursue their mission to its full extent, without threats, influence or pressure;

    Environment and sustainability

    81. Believes that the Luxembourg authorities providing the EPPO’s headquarters should consider their sustainability and energetic performance; calls on the EPPO to engage in discussions with the Luxembourg authorities to explore specific actions for improving the environmental footprint of its premises, including the installation of renewable energy sources such as solar panels, the introduction of CO2 offsetting measures and implementation of the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme to evaluate, report, enhance organisations’ environmental performance and to save energy; calls on the Commission to facilitate dialogue between the EPPO and the local host authorities to ensure the optimal use of resources and the alignment of EPPO’s operations with the Union’s sustainability;

    82. Notes that the EPPO’s central office is integrated in the Luxembourg network of free public transport making it easily reachable through low environmental impact means, at no cost for staff and visitors and that the central office underground car park provides a dedicated zone for bike parking; understands that exchanges are ongoing concerning the installation of charging stations for e-vehicles in the same underground car park;

    Interinstitutional cooperation

    83. Maintains that the EPPO’s role as a major operational component of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture can be effectively pursued only with intense cooperation with and support from its partners and stakeholders; reiterates that the EPPO can fulfil its role only if it enjoys full judicial independence; encourages Member States to contribute to the full independence of the EPPO in that regard and encourages the EPPO to continue its communication and coordination efforts with the several partners whose action has been designed to be reciprocal and complementary;

    84. Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify and streamline their operational cooperation and share knowledge amongst the involved actors; appreciates the first international conference allowing exchange of views between EPPO prosecutors and OLAF investigators, hosted by Parliament in 2024; emphasises that the revision of the regulatory frameworks of OLAF and EPPO provides the opportunity to reconsider many aspects of their working together in the light of the experiences earned in those first years of EPPO operational activity, having specific regard to the opening of complementary OLAF investigations and administrative investigations in support of the EPPO, as well as OLAF’s increased role in detecting and reporting fraud to the EPPO in support of the recovery of the damage to the Union budget; believes that the dialogue and cooperation within the antifraud architecture could be made more effective by the setting of a regular inter-institutional forum with a view to optimising the efficiency and efficacy of the available resources in action;

    85. Welcomes the initiatives launched by OLAF and the EPPO to intensify operational dialogue and improve coordination; underlines the importance of full and effective data-sharing between the EPPO, OLAF, Eurojust, and Europol to ensure seamless cooperation in the fight against cross-border fraud; calls for the establishment of a joint working group to oversee data integration and case management efficiency among these bodies;

    86. Encourages continued and enhanced cooperation between the EPPO and OLAF, in line with their respective regulations, and the obligation on OLAF to report, without undue delay, suspicions of criminal contact to the EPPO, in order to enable it to tackle fraud, corruption and financial crime affecting the Union’s financial interests; supports the further development of joint initiatives, information sharing and coordinated actions between the EPPO and OLAF, as such cooperation is vital in strengthening the protection of the Union’s financial interests and the Union’s fight against financial crime and to ensuring the effective and efficient use of Union resources.

    87. Commends the close cooperation in 2023 between the EPPO and the Court of Auditors, resulting in the timely transmission of information on suspicions of criminal offences falling within the EPPO’s competences;

    88. Expects that the working group established with the Commission, and the meetings on the implementation of the Commission-EPPO Working Arrangement, will ensure that EPPO notifications for the purpose of administrative recovery, as provided for by Article 103(2), point (c), of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 will duly and effectively enable the Commission to maximise recovery to the Union budget, while complying with the confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigative actions; stresses that, in this specific regard, no feedback has been yet provided by either party, preventing the legislators from earning a comprehensive understanding of the underlying issues, including the specific amounts recovered annually by the Commission from Member States in cases of damage to the Union budget; highlights that the recovery of funds by national authorities remains under the Commission’s responsibility, as mentioned in the Mission Letter to the Commissioner for Budget, Anti-Fraud and Public Administration, while the EPPO does not hold a mandate to follow up on the recovery process; calls on the Member States to strengthen cooperation and inform both the Commission and the EPPO of final confiscations; urges a revision of the relevant Regulations to clarify the EPPO’s role in the recovery process; and urges the EPPO and the Commission to adopt an agreed upon form of reporting to Parliament; understands that this could require appropriate development of the EPPO’s CMS, and asks the Commission to prioritise the allocation of resources to the EPPO to meet that need;

    89. Welcomes the strengthened cooperation with Europol; observes that the ODIN (Operational Digital Infrastructure Network) programme would enable the full exploitation of the amount of data collected by the EPPO in its investigations (more than 1000 terabytes and growing); notes that, in that framework, the EPPO has identified possible crimes outside its competences, including organised crime, drug trafficking, illicit cigarette production, investment fraud, illegal gambling and prostitution (non-PIF offences), and others which have resulted in the transmission of several files as key evidence to ongoing national investigations and that 28 new cases have been initiated by national prosecution offices to further investigate those non-PIF offences, which are outside the EPPO’s remit; understands that for this and other analyses, however, cooperation with Europol suffers from limitations stemming from national procedural criminal law and accessibility of the EPPO data owned; underlines that the EPPO’s existing competence to investigate organised crime and money laundering linked to fraud affecting the Union’s financial interests should be supported through adequate resources and efficient cooperation with Europol; considers that while cooperation with Europol needs to be even further enhanced, it cannot fully substitute the development of the EPPO’s internal analytical platform, which remains vital to a fast interpretation of the data collected during its investigations and the setting of operational strategies in cross-border cases requiring access to the EPPO’s entire CMS; recalls that, in its upcoming evaluation report, the Commission should carefully analyse to which categories of crimes the EPPO’s mandate needs to be extended, in order to take full advantage of its potential; welcomes the EPPO’s call for enhanced cooperation with Union institutions;

    90. Is concerned about the increasing number of cases concerning the RRF; appreciates the timely information provided to the Commission and to the relevant Parliament Committees on this matter; believes that the large number of active cases involving RRF funds justifies an intensification of the exchanges held with, in particular, the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, with the aim of identifying possible oversight or control gaps or fraud patterns and to allow the Commission to keep up to date its performance monitoring mechanisms and to enforce the reduction and recovery measures recently designed; reiterates that RRF funds are Union and not national funds and are under the jurisdiction of the EPPO and encourages the Commission and other Union’s bodies and authorities to increase the detection efforts and report to the EPPO every relevant situation;

    91. Welcomes that the EPPO signed Working Arrangement with Parliament in November 2024, establishing clear modalities of cooperation for the purpose of protecting the Union’s financial interests;

    92. Notes that, in 2023, the EPPO continued to rely on inter-institutional contracts and bilateral agreements (SLAs) to purchase goods and services at a lower cost; observes that, at the end of 2023, the EPPO had 80 active membership in inter-institutional framework contracts and 22 service-level agreement or other bilateral agreements with other Union’s entities with the aim of maximising budgetary savings from the contractual instruments in place, in line with the principles of sound financial management;

    93. Strongly welcomes the participation of Poland and Sweden in the EPPO; is aware that this will have an impact on the EPPO’s budgetary needs, and supports the EPPO’s request which aims to equip the EPPO with the necessary resources to take advantage of the participation of Poland and Sweden to its operational activities; notes that while Ireland and Denmark continue to exercise their opt-out from the EPPO under Protocols No 21 and 22 TFEU, Hungary is the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO; calls on the Hungarian government to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

    94. Observes that, in 2023, no major improvement towards participation into the EPPO has occurred with the Irish authorities; reminds that their refusal to cooperate with the EPPO in executing several requests for mutual legal assistance sent by the EDPs had resulted in the EPPO reporting the situation to the Commission in accordance with Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092[17]; appreciated the following decision of the Irish authorities to amend their domestic legislation providing the legal framework for mutual legal assistance to the EPPO and underlines that from 1 November 2023 it provides mutual legal assistance to the EPPO based on this unilateral recognition; notes that no exchanges occurred with the Irish inter-agency working group established to examine Ireland’s potential future participation in the EPPO; urges the Commission, the EPPO and the Irish authorities to engage in a constructive dialogue to find an effective way of cooperation;

    95. Maintains that any lack of cooperation with the EPPO by any of the Member States, whether they are participating in the enhanced cooperation that established the EPPO, creates niches of immunity and privilege that make the defence of the financial interests of the Union uneven and inefficient at best; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Member States concerned to make any possible effort to integrate the current scenario with the few but still very important missing components, promoting the extension of the participation in the EPPO by the other still non-participating Member States in such a way that strengthens the effectiveness of the protection of the Union and national budgets; calls on the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO and urges the Commission to initiate infringement proceedings against any Member State that systematically obstructs EPPO-led investigations; takes the view that membership of the EPPO should be a precondition for receiving Union funds;

    96. Condemns the recently reported systematic espionage organized by the Hungarian government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission into the potential misuse of Union funds by ELIOS, a company linked to the Hungarian Prime Minister’s son-in-law; emphasizes that OLAF and the EPPO, as cornerstone institutions of the Union’s anti-fraud architecture, are regrettably exposed to such threats not only from third countries but also within EU Member States; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of Union institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union’s institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent such unacceptable violations in the future;

    Communication

    97. Observes that the EPPO engages in continuous efforts to enhance internal and external communication; appreciates the actions carried out via social network platforms and encourages the EPPO to maintain its proactive and transparent approach;

    98. Believes that explanations about the EPPO’s interventions and operations and about their background, when reported in the media and posted on social networks, would contribute to reinforcing the reputation of the institutions amongst citizens and raise awareness in taxpayers about the complexity of the protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    99. Maintains that proper and accurate communication from the EPPO would also increase the involvement of civil society and increase submission of potential investigative input; understands that the EPPO asks to have the reporting option included in every standard presentation for external audiences or at conferences and seminars, when possible and appropriate; notes that, in 2023, the EPPO’s corporate website underwent a complete redesign, with the primary focus on enhancing accessibility and user-friendliness, and that the option to report a crime is now prominently displayed at the top of every webpage together with a banner highlighting this feature in the homepage;

    100. Observes that the level of the EPPO’s resources that are devoted to communication are limited, and that, in view of the need to establish the EPPO’s digital autonomy, management of the EPPO website will have to be brought in-house, requiring additional resources, after DG Digital Services cease providing that service; underlines that the increasing volume and the sensitivity of EPPO investigations calls for attention in exchanges with the media, journalists, citizens and academia; reiterates its call on the EPPO to clearly strike the best possible balance between transparency and public interest on the one hand and confidentiality and proper conduct of the investigation on the other, and to ensure the neutrality of its communications about its activities;

    101. Recalls the importance of transparency in the EPPO’s interactions with external actors; calls for the establishment of a mandatory public register of all meetings between EPPO officials and representatives of third parties, including lobbyists and national government representatives, in order to prevent undue influence and reinforce public trust in the EPPO’s independence;

    Effect of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

    102. Believes that the working arrangements with the Ukrainian competent authorities could effectively enhance the level of protection of the Union’s financial interests following the relevant commitments undertaken to support Ukraine and its population; is aware that transmission of evidence has occurred in execution of mutual legal assistance requests and welcomes the perspective of activating a joint task force with the Ukrainian authorities to coordinate investigations; reminds the Commission and other Union institutions bodies, offices and agencies of the importance of detection and timely submission of investigative input to the EPPO.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: International Conference “Shaping the Energy Future: Challenges and Opportunities” (SEFCO-2025) inaugurated at CSIR-Indian Institute of Petroleum, Dehradun

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 23 APR 2025 6:21PM by PIB Delhi

    CSIR-Indian Institute of Petroleum, Dehradun is organising an International Conference “Shaping the Energy Future: Challenges and Opportunities” (SEFCO-2025) from April 23 to 25, 2025. SEFCO conference is annually organized by students and young scientists at CSIR-IIP, Dehradun which is a platform to facilitate discussions on innovative solutions, explore collaborative opportunities in energy & chemical sector.

    1stedition of “SEFCO” Conference was organized in 2017. The present 7thedition is an international conference with a theme of “Catalysing a Sustainable Future with Affordable Energy and Chemicals.”

     

    The inauguration ceremony of SEFCO held on 23 April 2025 was graced by Chief Guest Prof. K.K. Pant, Director, IIT Roorkee and Guest of Honour Sh Alok Sharma, Director (R&D), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Dr. Manoj Srivastava, Secretary, SEFCO 2025 in his opening remarks gave an overview of genesis and relevance of SEFCO and its journey since inception. Dr. Harender Singh Bisht, Director, CSIR-IIP and Chief Patron of the conference, after paying homage to his holiness Pope Francis, welcomed distinguished guests and delegates and highlighted work done at CSIR-IIP and shared his vision on the way forward.

     

     

    Sh Alok Sharma in his guest of honour address highlighted the approaches and measures adopted by Indian refineries towards achieving GoI’snet-zero goal by 2070.

    In his keynote address, Chief guest Prof. K K Pant emphasized various pathways of producing green and sustainable energy and chemicals. He also mentioned that new challenges emerge when the technologies are scale-up from lab to commercial level. He inspired young researchers to think out of box to overcome these challenges.

    This 3-day conference will feature talks from various national and international experts, young scientists and research students from universities, research institutes and industries. Notable International speakers include Prof. Paul A. Webley from Monash University, Australia; Dr. Richard Blom from SINTEF, Norway; Prof. Samira Siahrostami, Simon Fraser University, Canada; Prof. Keiichi Tomishige, Tohoku University, Japan, and Prof. Eric van Steen, SARChI Reaction Engineering, University of Cape Town, South Africa.

    More than 300 delegates from various national and international organizations are attending the conference. An exhibition showcasing CSIR-IIP’s technological achievements is part of this conference. SEFCO-2025 is supported by ONGC, EIL, BPCL, CRISTOL,IOCL, GAIL, AIRBUS, NRL, CPCL & R L Solutions.

    ***

    NKR/PSM

    (Release ID: 2123894) Visitor Counter : 64

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Compliance with the directive on the welfare of pigs – E-001516/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001516/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Sebastian Everding (The Left), Anja Hazekamp (The Left), Tilly Metz (Verts/ALE), Thomas Waitz (Verts/ALE), Günther Sidl (S&D), David Cormand (Verts/ALE), Cristina Guarda (Verts/ALE), Anthony Smith (The Left), Maria Noichl (S&D), Niels Fuglsang (S&D), Sigrid Friis (Renew), Elisabeth Grossmann (S&D), Friedrich Pürner (NI), Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy (Renew)

    The routine tail-docking of pigs has been prohibited in the EU since 1994. The Commission recognised in 2021 that the ‘tail-docking of pigs is a routine practice in 26 out of 28 Member States and approximately 150 million pigs annually are subject to this practice. With the exception of a few Member States, such as Finland and Sweden, most EU Member States did not comply with the ban or with providing adequate enrichment materials’[1]. The Commission has previously asked the Member States to establish national action plans for the prevention of the routine tail-docking of pigs and provide quantifiable data to measure the progress made in this area.

    • 1.What effective steps does the Commission plan to take to ensure that Member States secure compliance with the ban on routine tail-docking?
    • 2.Will the Commission publish the assessments it has made of each Member State’s action plan?
    • 3.Is the Commission now prepared to launch infringement proceedings against Member States that are making no serious attempt to enforce this legislation?

    Submitted: 13.4.2025

    • [1] Commission Staff Working Document of 31 March 2021 entitled ‘Evaluation of the European Union Strategy for the Protection and Welfare of Animals 2012-2015’ (SWD(2021)0076).
    Last updated: 23 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye – A10-0067/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Türkiye

    (2025/2023(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

    – having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

    – having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation[1] (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

    – having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

    – having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

    – having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

    – having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

    – having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

    – having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

     

    – having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

    – having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’ (COM(2024)0593),

    – having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

    – having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

    – having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

    – having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

    – having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

    – having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

    – having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

    – having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

    – having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

    – having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye[2], of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey[3], and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks[4],

    – having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement[5],

    – having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide[6],

    – having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey[7], of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye[8] and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye[9],

    – having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A. whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B. whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C. whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D. whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E. whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36.7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F. whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G. whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H. whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I. whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J. whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K. whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L. whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M. whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N. whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O. whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P. whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q. whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R. whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3.1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10  billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    S. whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78.2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    T. whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation;

    2. Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3. Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4. Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5. Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6. Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7. Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8. Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9. Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10. Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11. Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12. Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13. Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14. Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15. Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, and Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16. Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    17. Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    18. Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    19. Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    20. Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    21. Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; is extremely concerned by the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that theses last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, the slowdown on social media, the detention of journalists and the crackdown on peaceful protesters; considers that this is a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model;

    22. Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    23. Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes;

    24. Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    25. Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    26. Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    27. Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3.1 million refugees, including 2.9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3.2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    28. Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; deeply regrets that Türkiye also continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli) at 12 nautical miles; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranen infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    29. Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    30. Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    31. Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    32. Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    33. Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    34. Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    35. Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye  to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    36. Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    37. Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    38. Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for  the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    39. Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    40. Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    41. Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    42. Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    43. Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    44. Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    45. Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    46. Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    47. Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    48. Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    49. Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points to a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    50. Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, welcomes various high-level dialogues (HLDs) held recently, including the HLD on trade, and the plans for an HLD on economy, as positive steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities for joint initiatives in fields such as security, climate change, research and innovation; stresses that trade between the EU and Türkiye hit a record high last year and that the EU remains Türkiye’s largest trade and investment partner; calls for the removal of all existing trade barriers and irritants;

    51. Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    52. Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member states to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    53. Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    54. Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement;

    55. Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    56. Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    57. Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    58. Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    °

    ° °

    59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023 – A10-0049/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2023

    (2024/2083(INI))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to Articles 310(6) and 325(5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    – having regard to the Commission report of 25 July 2024 entitled ‘35th Annual Report on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests and the fight against fraud – 2023’ (COM(2024)0318) (2023 PIF Report),

    – having regard to the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 2023 annual report[1] and the Activity report of the Supervisory Committee of OLAF – 2023[2],

    – having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2023 Annual Report published on 1 March 2024,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (the Conditionality Regulation),

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law [4] (the Whistleblower Directive) and to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on its implementation and application (COM(2024)0269),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 5 July 2023 entitled ‘2023 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2023)0800), and to the European Parliament resolution of 28 February2024 entitled ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’[5],

    – having regard to the Commission’s decision of 16 December 2024 not to lift the measure imposed in application of Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary,

    – having regard to the judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 16 February 2022 in Cases C-156/21[6] and C-157/21[7] and to Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, all of which refer to the Conditionality Regulation,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[8] (the Financial Regulation),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1624[9], Regulation (EU) 2024/1620[10] and Directive (EU) 2024/1640[11], all of the European Parliament and of the Council, all adopted on 31 May 2024 and all concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, including through the establishment of the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism,

    – having regard to Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law[12] (the PIF Directive),

    – having regard to the Commission report of 16 September 2022 entitled ‘Second report on the implementation of Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law’ (COM(2022)0466),

    – having regard to the Commission report of 3 July 2024 on the implementation and application of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2019 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law (COM(2024)0269),

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy[13] (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    – having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800),

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against organised crime: Assessing the legislative framework’, published in December 2022[14],

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘Strengthening the fight against corruption: assessing the legislative and policy framework’, published in January 2023[15],

    – having regard to the study entitled ‘Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’)’ and its extension, both published in December 2023[16],

    – having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 3 May 2023 on the fight against corruption (JOIN(2023)0012) and to the Commission proposal of 3 May 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating corruption, replacing Council Framework Decision 2003/568/JHA and the Convention on the fight against corruption involving officials of the European Communities or officials of Member States of the European Union and amending Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council (COM(2023)0234),

    – having regard to the joint Europol-OLAF report of 6 June 2023 entitled ‘Assessing the Threats to the NextGenerationEU (NGEU) Fund’,

    – having regard to the European Ombudsman’s closing note of 12 September 2023 on the Strategic Initiative concerning the transparency and accountability of the Recovery and Resilience Facility in relation to Case SI/6/2021/PVV, opened on 24 February 2022,

    – having regard to the European Court of Auditors (ECA) report entitled ‘Our activities in 2023’, published on 9 October 2024,

    – having regard to ECA Review 04/2023 of 6 July 2023 entitled ‘Digitalising the management of EU funds’,

    – having regard to Special Eurobarometer 534 entitled ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’[17],

    – having regard to ECA special report 06/2023 of 13 March 2023 entitled ‘Conflict of interest in EU cohesion and agricultural spending – Framework in place but gaps in transparency and detection measures’,

    – having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 250/2014[18],

    – having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the protection of the European Union’s financial interests – combating fraud – annual report 2022[19],

    – having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    – having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0049/2025),

    A. whereas, in line with the obligation laid down in Article 325(5) TFEU, each year, the Commission submits to the European Parliament and to the Council a report drafted in cooperation with the Member States on the measures taken for the implementation of this article (known as PIF reports);

    B. whereas PIF reports are based mainly on information provided by the Member States, including data on irregularities and fraud detected, via the Irregularity Management System (IMS), and on data extracted from the Commission’s accounting system (ABAC);

    C. whereas effective measures to protect the EU’s financial interests at EU level have to be implemented on the basis of data-based knowledge of the specific situation in each Member State, particularly in cases involving complex criminal activity;

    D. whereas the number of irregularities detected and reported demonstrates the results of Member States’ efforts to counter illegal activities in this area and is not to be interpreted, by itself, as an indication of the level of mismanagement or fraud in the Member States;

    E. whereas the links between irregularities’ occurrence, their detection and the reporting level require a wider overall assessment;

    F. whereas sound management of public resources and protecting the EU’s financial interests across all EU policies should be key to increasing citizens’ confidence by ensuring the proper and effective use of taxpayers’ money;

    G. whereas protecting the EU budget involves multiple actors at various levels who can only achieve their mandate through a structured network of relationships and coordination within the anti-fraud architecture (AFA)[20];

    H. whereas the diversity of legal and administrative systems in the Member States and their varying levels of digitalisation need to be adequately addressed with the creation of more unified, interoperable and comparable administrative and reporting systems in the EU in order to effectively prevent and counter fraud, corruption, irregularities and other infringements;

    I. whereas solid cooperation between authorities conducting administrative investigations and those conducting criminal investigations at both EU and Member State levels should be encouraged;

    J. whereas the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) and ARACHNE are effective tools to protect the EU budget from risks of insolvency, negligence, fraud or irregularity committed by private actors, in the case of the EDES, and via a data-mining and risk-scoring approach, in the case of ARACHNE;

    K. whereas criminal networks operating in the EU are fully embracing the entire range of cutting-edge information technology, including artificial intelligence (AI), to facilitate their criminal activities, posing an even more complex threat to the EU budget and a new challenge for law enforcement and requiring the AFA to fast-track its exploration of AI use in the fight against fraud;

    L. whereas respect for the values on which the EU is founded and for fundamental rights, as well as compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, are prerequisites for accessing EU funding;

    M. whereas the rule of law conditionality mechanism applies across the entire EU budget as a prerequisite for accessing all EU funds and allows measures to be taken in cases of breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or seriously risk affecting the sound financial management of the EU budget or the EU’s financial interests;

    N. whereas Article 22 of Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[21] (the RRF Regulation) contains provisions concerning the protection of the EU’s financial interests;

    General remarks on PIF reporting and on major threats

    1. Welcomes the 2023 PIF Report and its analyses on the relevant findings, and endorses its recommendations;

    2. Shares the view that effective protection of the Union’s financial interests requires the acceleration of the digitalisation that facilitates knowledge sharing, data accessibility and data processing and that would enhance the governance of the overall AFA; maintains that both the EU and national authorities should intensify the use of digital tools with a view to facilitating cooperation;

    3. Reiterates that a more measurable and results-oriented governance of the activities of the AFA’s many components is key both to effectively protecting the Union’s financial interests and to assessing the AFA’s efficiency;

    4. Recalls that solid cooperation between the administrative and judicial authorities conducting investigations at both EU and Member State levels is essential; reiterates its concerns over the still suboptimal situation, in particular as regards the detection and reporting of suspected fraud and irregularities and their follow-up, in which there are marked differences between Member States; encourages the Member States, therefore, to take a proactive approach to protecting the Union’s financial interests and to enhance the exchange of information between their national authorities and with EU bodies and agencies, including in order to identify and address emerging risks and fraud trends in a timely manner; underlines the fact that the fight against fraud requires a holistic and comprehensive approach, covering all stages of the anti-fraud cycle and reflecting the multiple, interconnected and interdependent actors and processes in place for the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    5. Notes that the overall number of cases of fraud and irregularities reported by the competent EU and national authorities increased significantly, by 9 %, in 2023 (13 563) compared to 2022 (12 455); regrets the fact that this is an all-time high and is the continuation of a growing trend over the last five years; observes, further, that the overall financing concerned in relation to these cases in 2023 (EUR 1.90 billion) was markedly higher than in 2022 (EUR 1.77 billion), having increased by 7.3 %; acknowledges that the multiannual cycle of implementation of numerous programmes makes comparisons based on a five-year average more appropriate than year-to-year comparisons for identifying real-time situations and obtaining reliable analysis of trends and patterns; appreciates, accordingly, that the 2023 PIF Report refers to the results of the 2019-2023 period; observes that the rise in the number of irregularities and in funding that achieves no positive results highlights the need to correlate budgets with the performance indicators of the competent institutions;

    6. Is concerned by the overall scenario depicted by the multiannual analysis in the 2023 PIF Report; emphasises that the current situation justifies the efforts made to ensure more effective deployment of adequate resources and their more efficient use, which requires better governance and cooperation; underlines that fraud, corruption and violations of democracy, justice and the rule of law are deeply interconnected and cannot be tackled in isolation; calls on the Commissioners on budget, fraud and public administration and on democracy, justice and the rule of law to work closely and immediately on launching initiatives to make the actions and the results of the AFA measurable and more tangible and to present them to Parliament, in line with the commitment made at the confirmation hearings; suggests that stronger synergies be created between the Commission’s Directorate-General for Budget and other Commission directorates-general working on the rule of law and the protection of other EU values, particularly the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion and the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, to ensure that all the departments work together, rather than in silos, to address these systemic challenges more effectively;

    7. Reiterates the call for a holistic approach in PIF reports, which are also considered an AFA governance tool, in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the synergies between all the relevant actors, identify best practices and address shortcomings; is aware that, as emphasised in the 2023 PIF Report, the operational protection of the Union’s financial interests from fraud, irregularities and other illicit activities is entrusted to national authorities, OLAF and the EPPO, and welcomes the integration of OLAF and EPPO findings in the 2023 PIF Report; asks for a deeper analysis of the interaction between the AFA components, and for the introduction of measures to increase the efficiency of the competent institutions with a view to reducing fraud and irregularities; calls for the further improvement of this holistic approach to provide a clearer, more complete and more concrete picture of the overall state of play of the protection of the Union’s financial interests, encompassing the entirety of anti-fraud action at both national and EU levels;

    8. Welcomes OLAF’s investigative performance, in particular the increased number of recommendations issued (309 compared to 275 in 2022) and the overall amount recommended for financial recovery (EUR 1 043.8 million compared to EUR 426.8 million in 2022) against a stable number of cases opened (190 in 2023 and 192 in 2022) and concluded (265 in 2023 and 256 in 2022); points out, in particular, that over the 2019-2023 period, more than 88 % of the irregularities identified as potentially fraudulent and related to expenditure disbursed under direct management were detected following OLAF investigations; regrets that the long duration of the investigations can have a negative impact regarding the consequential late launching of remedial measures; reiterates its request to receive comprehensive and adequately detailed figures on the amounts effectively recovered by the Commission on the grounds of the financial recommendations issued by OLAF; calls on the Commission also to integrate in the next PIF reports ad hoc sections on OLAF in order to develop a more granular analysis and reporting of its activities and of the financial recoveries carried out;

    9. Welcomes the way in which the EPPO, operationally active since June 2021, has developed and increased its activities, which is well-reflected in the numbers of opened investigations (1 371 compared to 865 in 2022), of overall currently active investigations (1 927 compared to 1 117 in 2022) and of indictments (139 compared to 87 in 2022); appreciates the level of detail in EPPO reporting, which offers relevant information on many trends and on the situation in the participating Member States; calls for greater EPPO efficiency, with this being reflected in the amounts recovered and not just in the number of investigations;

    10. Stresses the added value that EU bodies bring to the protection of the financial interests of the Union and the fight against fraud, especially when it comes to cross-border crime, as shown by the operational results of the EPPO and OLAF in 2023 too; reiterates its call for all relevant EU actors involved in the fight against fraud to be guaranteed adequate resources and, in this regard, reminds the Commission and the Council that every euro spent on investigation and anti-fraud action returns to the EU budget;

    11. Is concerned that the substantial financial loss of value added tax (VAT) fraud reported by the EPPO is having a detrimental effect on the national budgets of the Member States while simultaneously threatening fair taxation and fair competition between businesses in the single market; underlines the fact that VAT is an important resource for the Union’s budget too; deems it appropriate to take into account the complexity of the underlying provisions on the system of own resources of the Union when quantifying the financial impact of the EPPO’s activities[22]; points out the concerning number of investigations into the recovery and resilience programmes (233) and the estimated financial loss (EUR 1.86 billion); calls, therefore, for adequate measures to be taken at both national and EU levels;

    12. Calls on the Commission to develop and implement solutions allowing a follow-up to OLAF recommendations and EPPO prosecutions, their analysis and the measurability of the actual impact of their actions on the protection of the Union’s budget in terms of recovery of both mismanaged funds and of uncollected resources, with a view to providing additional justification for results-oriented policymaking; calls on the Commission to notify Parliament of the outcomes of EPPO prosecutions;

    13. States that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; underlines the central role played by the media and investigative journalism in the fight against fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of public funds; considers that it is essential to safeguard the media from political pressure and influence to protect its independence and its role as a watchdog of democracy and the sound management of public funds;

    14. Underlines that transparency plays an important role in the management of public funds; encourages the Commission and the Member States to maximise transparency in the use of funds, including with regard to information about final beneficiaries;

    15. Underlines the importance of the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture with regard to fraud and states that communication and transparency are essential to address fraud and corruption; emphasises the importance of engaging civil society, the private sector, the media and investigative journalism to enhance awareness; encourages the Commission to provide support to these relevant actors in the form of training programmes, funding and any other measures required to ensure their independence from external influence and from unlawful state surveillance, intimidation and attempts to undermine their legitimacy, in line with EU fundamental rights and the rule of law; invites the Commission to launch an EU-wide public awareness campaign on the risks of fake news, misinformation and deepfake content in fraud cases affecting EU-funded projects;

    16. Is concerned about the EPPO’s and Europol’s clear warning on the increasing presence of groups of organised criminals behind the most relevant cases of cross-border fraud; notes that the EPPO’s annual report indicates 209 investigated offences concerning PIF-focused criminal organisations in its active investigations up to the end of 2023; understands that organised crime affects Union resources substantially and that the scale of fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union, in particular on the revenue side of the budget, can only be explained by the heavy involvement of serious organised criminal groups; is aware that the current analysis and reporting tools do not allow its quantification in a way that is satisfactory for evaluating the effectiveness or the shortcomings of the measures and policies in place; calls on the Commission to swiftly launch all necessary actions to address the analysis and reporting issue;

    17. Maintains that the fact that the relevant EU legislation has not been transposed efficiently into the national legislation of many Member States and the fact that the Member States’ national laws are not harmonised give organised criminal groups opportunities to conduct a number of illegal cross-border activities in areas affecting the Union’s financial interests; reiterates, therefore, its previous calls for the revision of Council Framework Decision 2008/841/JHA on the fight against organised crime[23] and for the introduction of a new common definition of organised crime, taking into account, in particular, the use of corruption, violence, threat or intimidation to obtain control of economic activities or procurement;

    18. Points out the results of the 2023 Eurobarometer survey on ‘Citizens’ attitudes towards corruption in the EU in 2023’, showing that corruption is a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses in the EU; maintains that high-level corruption, including in EU institutions, not only affects the Union’s financial interests and the EU economy as a whole, but also undermines citizens’ trust in democratic institutions, both in the EU and in the Member States; underlines that organised criminal groups are increasingly using corruption to infiltrate public administrations and gain economic advantages;

    19. Points out that, in relation to corruption cases, the EPPO reported 131 investigated offences up to the end of 2023 (there were 87 cases in 2022) and that, over the years 2019-2023, 65 cases were reported to the Commission via IMS[24] by 11 countries, and that the reported irregular amounts linked to such cases come to about EUR 50.5 million; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO inform Parliament of how much of that EUR 50.5 million has been recovered;

    20. Acknowledges that anti-corruption strategies are in place in the Member States; calls for an evaluation and a periodical revision of these strategies; emphasises the importance of taking into account and fully addressing country-specific recommendations relating to the fight against corruption;

    21. Acknowledges the Commission’s efforts to prevent and address cases of conflict of interest in the management of the Union’s financial resources; observes that, in the 2019-2023 period, 419 cases were reported via the IMS related to conflict of interest (there were 375 in 2018-2022), involving in total about EUR 112 million; stresses that the ECA has indicated in its audit work[25] that the main source of information on conflict of interest is the IMS and that the quantity and quality of the data recorded in the IMS varies between Member States; underlines that where Member States consider a conflict of interest to be a minor component in a wider fraud case, they do not report such cases as relating to conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to adopt initiatives necessary to ensure consistent and adequately detailed reporting in the IMS of the above situations; calls for the provisions on conflicts of interest to be applied in a way that ensures legal certainty, be based on a clear and proportionate assessment of the risks and allow practical application by the competent authorities;

    Revenue

    22. Observes that, in 2023, the overall number of fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities related to traditional own resources (TOR) (5 118 compared to 4 661 in 2022) was 10 % higher than the five-year average (2019-2023), but that the amount involved decreased by 12 % to EUR 478 million (compared to EUR 783 million bat the end of2022); regrets that while the data show improved recovery for non-fraudulent cases (82 %), the recovery rate for fraudulent cases remains unchanged at 25 %, which is still low and is distributed unevenly across the Member States;

    23. Points out that, in 2023, the Commission considered that in only five of the new write-off reports submitted to it by the Member States had it been satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to the Member States in question and that the latter were not financially responsible for the loss; notes, by contrast, that in 81 cases, amounting to almost EUR 69 million, the Commission considered that the Member States had not satisfactorily demonstrated that TOR had been lost for reasons not imputable to them and that they were therefore financially responsible for the loss; concludes, therefore, that there is actionable room for improvement in the collection of TOR by the Member States;

    24  Underlines that it is essential for Member States to live up to their responsibility to collect TOR in order to ensure that the burden of financing EU expenditure is shared fairly among the Member States and maintain a level playing field for economic actors in the single market; calls on the Member States to step up their efforts to improve the effectiveness of their national administrations’ activity in the field of recovery, following the detection of irregularities and fraud relating to VAT, in order to increase the amount of TOR made available to the EU budget; acknowledges that the VAT compliance gap relates to more than just fraud and evasion, but also covers VAT lost as a result of insolvencies, bankruptcies, administrative errors and legal tax optimisation; believes, however, that VAT fraud, such as missing trader intra-Community fraud, contributes meaningfully to VAT non-compliance and reiterates its call for the issue to be addressed through digital means, the fraud-proofing of VAT rules and stronger cooperation between national tax authorities and the competent EU investigative bodies;

    25. Acknowledges the current legal framework relating to cooperation with OLAF, the EPPO and Eurofisc; calls on the Commission to speed up the process of revising the current legal framework to provide a clear legal basis for direct cooperation between Eurofisc and the EPPO; encourages OLAF to maximise the possibilities offered by mutual administrative assistance practices to detect and identify customs fraud and related VAT fraud, as well as to report such cases to the EPPO without delay; stresses that, in 2023, the EPPO identified VAT fraud in about 20 % of its active cases (873 cases), making this the second most frequent type of crime after non-procurement expenditure fraud (1 586 cases); is concerned by the increasing participation of groups of organised criminals in VAT fraud operations and by the identified connections between this kind of fraud and other kinds of very serious crimes, such as money laundering;

    26. Reiterates its call on the Commission to reconsider the threshold of EUR 10 million set in the PIF Directive, which has a major impact on the EPPO’s activities in VAT fraud cases; maintains that different interpretations of the methodologies for calculating this threshold make the situation unclear; emphasises that the current threshold limits deterrence and allows perpetrators to seek out the weakest jurisdiction to elude the EPPO’s intervention; believes that the revision of the PIF Directive should either remove the threshold or substantially lower it; calls on the Commission, in the meantime, to provide adequate guidance on the calculation method for cases prior to the amendment of the PIF Directive;

    27. Stresses the importance of effective and efficient cooperation between OLAF and the EPPO in this specific revenue sector and maintains that adequate detection and data transmission by OLAF to the EPPO could increase the collection of VAT and customs revenue for the EU budget, and would help avoid any overlap between the activities of the two offices;

    Expenditure

    28. Is concerned by the high levels of fraud and irregularities detected, both in 2023 and in 2022, under the common agricultural policy, both in rural development and in support for agriculture; remarks that the data confirm patterns and risks identified in previous years; observes that, during the 2019-2023 period, fraudulent irregularities reported for rural development increased, mainly owing to a rising number of irregularities detected for the 2014-2020 programming period; notes that during the 2019-2023 period, the number of non-fraudulent rural development irregularities continuously increased in line with the implementation of the programmes;

    29. Observes that in cohesion policy the number and financial amounts of non-fraudulent irregularities reported for the 2014-2020 programming period are much lower than those reported during the first 10 years of implementation of the 2007-2013 programming period; points out that the fraud detection rate[26] (0.53 %) for the 2014-2020 programming period is similar to the rate for the 2007-2013 programming period, while the irregularity detection rate (0.67 %) is much lower than the rate recorded for the 2007-2013 programming period (2.5 %); notes that individual irregularities involving large financial amounts have a substantial impact on the fraud detection rate; calls for further clarification of the correlation between the fraud detection rate and the occurrence of fraud;

    30. Welcomes OLAF’s analytical report entitled ‘Fraud and irregularities by areas of the cohesion policy – comparing risks’, which refers to information from Member States for the 2014-2020 programming period up until December 2023 and identifies areas particularly exposed to fraud risk (such as investments for the environment, climate change and the transition to a low carbon economy, research, development and innovation); remarks that the largest financial amounts in fraud cases were in environmental protection and research, technology development and innovation;

    31. Reiterates its concern over the lengthy administrative procedures for dealing with the fraudulent cases reported; points out that, on average, during the 2019-2023 period, under the common agricultural policy, nearly four years were required from the start of an irregularity to arrive at a suspicion of fraudulent activity, and nearly three more years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; highlights that, for cohesion, on average and during the 2014-2020 period, it took about a year and a half to arrive at a suspicion that a fraudulent irregularity had been committed and more than two years to close the case after its being reported to the Commission; asks the Commission to intensify dialogue with, and provide advice to, the Member State authorities to reduce the length of administrative procedures;

    32. Observes that, for direct management between 2019 and 2023, OLAF was mentioned as the source of detection of fraudulent irregularities for 88.4 % of recovery items, corresponding to 92.1 % of total recovery amounts; asks the Commission to provide clear information on the data and on the actions taken to enhance swift recovery, including data on overall recovery levels for fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities;

    33. Emphasises that when, despite preventive measures, fraudulent or non-fraudulent irregularities are detected, recovery is the measure that protects the Union’s financial interests, allowing for the correct implementation of EU policies and for the refunding of disbursed expenditure that is non-compliant with the funding requirements; stresses the findings of ECA special report 7/2024[27] when referring to the 2014-2020 period, for which the reported irregular expenditure was EUR 14 billion, which is to be refunded via recovery; stresses the need to speed up the recovery process by establishing clear deadlines and imposing penalties for delays, so that funds are returned to the EU budget as quickly as possible; calls on the Commission to propose adequate measures to provide complete information on irregular expenditure and the associated corrective measures taken;

    34. Stresses the importance of follow-up measures after the necessary corrective actions have been taken, with a view to learning from cases of fraud and improving procedures to prevent similar cases from occurring in the future; considers it important, in this regard, that the Member States thoroughly follow up on cases by analysing the enabling factors behind fraud and assessing the need to revise their management and control systems accordingly;

    35. Understands that, following a lack of support in the Council for its initiatives in 2004 and 2014, the Commission is not willing to put forward another legislative proposal for mutual administrative assistance in the areas of EU spending that do not currently provide for this practice; encourages the Commission to take advantage of the revision of the OLAF Regulation[28], which already provides OLAF with an enhanced mandate for the coordination of Member States’ actions in order to further develop the current provisions with a view to filling this gap;

    36. Notes that civil society organisations are an essential component of a vibrant democratic society, ensuring the broad coverage of diverse views in public debates; recognises that these organisations may receive Union funds to support their work in contributing to democratic dialogue and public engagement; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with EU institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability; stresses that lobbying should be transparent, with full disclosure of all parties involved; takes notes of the allegations that the Commission subsidises NGOs to influence Members of the European Parliament; stresses that, if their existence is confirmed, such practices could distort policy discussions and contravene the principle of separation of powers and should therefore be ended; calls on the ECA to audit the programmes concerned and give its recommendations; expects the future ECA report to bring clarity on these issues; recalls that the ECA asked, in special report 05/2024[29], for more efforts to be made to improve checks on the ground; notes with concern the ECA’s observation that lobbyists can choose to which category they belong, regardless of their legal form, to avoid disclosing financial information; notes that the EU is one of the largest global funders of civil society organisations; underlines the need for the EU Transparency Register Secretariat to enhance its systematic checks of the self-declarations of entities declaring themselves to be ‘NGOs, platforms, networks and similar’; observes that such systematic checks could be based on a set of criteria, including non-profit status, objectives relating to public benefit, and independence, to strengthen the trust in all entities registered in the EU Transparency Register, and should be supported by robust requirements for accountability and transparency;

    37. Considers that when assessing delivery models for EU expenditure, the susceptibility of the various options to fraud and other misuse should be taken into account; calls on the Commission to ensure that the lessons learnt from the design and implementation of the RRF, including the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA and Parliament, are taken into account in future EU funding instruments, notably the post-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF); underlines that the shortcomings identified in the implementation of the RRF, including risks of fraud, double funding, and lack of transparency, must serve as a lesson for future EU financial frameworks; opposes any replication of the RRF model in its current form and stresses that any future performance-based funding must be accompanied by significantly stronger safeguards, transparency requirements and fraud prevention mechanisms to ensure the sound management of EU funds;

    NextGenerationEU (NGEU) and the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    38. Appreciates the efforts made by the Commission in the revision of the 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) to adjust to the energy market disruptions following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine; notes that the integration into the RRPs of REPowerEU is expected to contribute to reducing dependence on Russian fossil fuels and increasing European self-sufficiency;

    39. Recalls, nevertheless, that delays can be observed in the implementation of the RRF and calls on the Commission to remain vigilant, in particular towards the end of the RRF life cycle, in order to ensure that Member States adequately protect the financial interests of the EU and that EU taxpayers’ money is spent appropriately;

    40. Underlines the importance of robust management and control systems in preventing fraud as they have the effect of deterring criminals from attempting to defraud public authorities; expresses concerns about the ECA’s repeated observations pointing to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member State control systems, as this poses risks to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the EU’s financial interests; regrets that in several Member States, the control systems were not fully functional when the national RRPs started to be implemented, and underlines that such issues pose risks to the regularity of RRF payments and to the protection of the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to ensure that the Member States remedy the inadequacies identified in their control frameworks without delay, including by implementing the recommendations addressed to it by the ECA;

    41. Observes that the Commission’s control framework for the RRF relies primarily on the responsibility of the Member States to protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission to maintain a high level of attention to the fulfilment by the Member States of the specific audit and control milestones added to those RRPs which had lacked robustness and to continue efforts to close accountability gaps; takes notes of the actions launched by the Commission following the ECA’s recommendations on the identifiable weaknesses of some Member States’ control and reporting systems; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    42. Notes with grave concern that ECA special report 14/2024 found that the climate impact of green spending under the RRF could have been overestimated by up to EUR 34.5 billion, with some projects having minimal impact on the energy transition or even causing environmental harm while also increasing the risk of fraud;

    43. Calls for the establishment of clear, measurable criteria for green investments under the EU budget and the RRF to ensure that only projects with significant and proven environmental and economic benefits receive funding, thereby enhancing accountability and long-term sustainability while reducing the risk of fraud;

    44. Observes that, for the RRF in 2023, the 2023 PIF Report indicates the number of cases of suspected fraud reported by the Commission (15) and the number of audits (13, compared with 16 carried out in 2022), but it does not include the concerningly high number of EPPO investigations (233 investigations referred to recovery and resilience programmes, with an estimated financial loss of EUR 1.86 billion); is concerned by a possible increase in the number of cases of fraud, corruption, double funding and conflicts of interest in the coming years and urges the Commission and the Member States to act swiftly in order to ensure the sound management and fair distribution of RRF funds;

    45. Calls on the Commission to introduce mandatory fraud reporting via the IMS for all RRF-related cases, ensuring that irregularities and fraud affecting RRF funds are systematically recorded and monitored; notes with concern the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations;

    46. Asks OLAF to continue its risk analysis, which, in 2023, was made available to Member States along with an updated version of the ‘RRF risk framework’, and with the training and seminars for Member State authorities; endorses the use of the IMS for reporting RRF irregularities; reiterates its call on the Commission, on the specialised EU agencies and bodies, as well as on Member States, to actively cooperate and interact to ensure the protection of the EU’s financial interests when implementing the NGEU;

    47. Observes that, as part of the Guidance on RRPs, the Commission has adopted[30] Annex IV on the framework for reduction and recoveries under the RRF; understands that the reduction of a payment is feasible when there are still payments to be effected; recalls that the RRF ends in 2026; points out that recovery is only to be launched whenever no further instalments remain; is concerned by the fact that this recovery procedure, borrowed from the model for implementing cohesion funds, has proved to be extremely ineffective and was abandoned in the current MFF; strongly regrets the fact that by the end of 2023 there were no recovery orders in ABAC concerning the RRF, and that there is still no obligation for Member States to report irregularities related to the RRF via the IMS;

    48. Reiterates that transparency plays a vital role in exposing fraudulent schemes and discouraging fraudsters; reiterates its dissatisfaction with the interpretation endorsed by the Commission of the concept of ‘final recipient’ under the RRF; rejects the Commission’s incomplete and misleading interpretation[31]; remarks that, even according to the Commission guidelines[32], the ‘final recipient’ is the ‘last entity’ that receives funds for an RRF measure, and that any initial or intermediary recipient of funding, such as ministries or agencies operating merely as distributors of the funds, should not be considered to be the ‘last entity’; asks the Commission again to request that the Member States provide information on the ‘final recipient’ or ‘last entity’ and not to accept from Member States any information on ‘second-level recipients’ that is not in line with the agreement between the co-legislators; calls on the Commission to review its guidance by providing cases and examples that can clarify the provision and be a solid term of reference for the national authorities, in such a way as to endorse an adequate transparency level and a homogeneous interpretation across all the Member States; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance;

    49. Is concerned by the ECA’s opinion[33] on the increasing risk of EU funds being spent twice on the same measure and handed out twice for the same action; understands that corresponding measures in similar areas, such as transport and energy infrastructure, are financed from both the EU budget and the RRF, because the EU’s pandemic recovery fund finances actions similar to those covered by standard EU programmes; acknowledges that complementarity between the RRF and other EU instruments is allowed, but observes that this could result in delivering milestones that are fully financed by funds other than the RRF, because the RRF is not linked to the reimbursement of costs effectively incurred, but rather rewards the fulfilment of milestones and targets; emphasises that the several layers of governance, the fragmented IT landscape and the limited exchanges of data or use of data-mining tools such as ARACHNE, prevent the detection of double funding, and therefore the control mechanisms in place may be insufficient to properly mitigate this increased risk; maintains that the absence of direct access to the full list of RRF final recipients limits the Commission’s capacity to detect potential cases of double funding; believes that the precaution adopted by some Member States of avoiding combining the RRF with other EU instruments contributes to mitigating the risk of double funding; calls on the Commission to increase its controls in this regard;

    50. Observes that Member States may include measures in their RRPs with no estimated costs or estimated costs of zero[34]; points out also that these ‘cost-free’ milestones are the main term of reference for assessing the correct use of RRF resources for their intended purposes; understands that the payments for these ‘cost-free’ or ‘zero-cost’ milestones are released following the milestones’ achievement, irrespective of the cost sustained, in line with the ‘financing not linked to cost’ approach under the RRF; observes, however, that such milestones make it impossible to verify the sound management of paid RRF resources, because such resources are disbursed in connection with a milestone for which they have not been deployed; calls on the Commission to reconsider its assumption that a ‘zero-cost’ measure cannot induce double funding, irrespective of whether other EU funds are used to implement it; strongly calls on the Commission to strengthen controls on ‘zero-cost’ measures and to give guidance to the Member States on how to address the financial design of the measures concerned in order to prevent such risk;

    51. Reiterates its calls on the Commission to maintain adequate ex post audit procedures and to pay close attention to the risk of reversal after payment for the achievement of targets previously audited and assessed as satisfactorily fulfilled;

    52. Follows up on the Ombudsman’s strategic initiative, launched in February 2022 and closed in September 2023, conducted on the transparency and accountability of the RRF, whose results it fully endorses; welcomes the ongoing dialogue between the Commission and the Ombudsman to address the suboptimal situations detected, in particular concerning the scoreboard and the proactive publication of documents related to the RRF;

    Digitalisation and transparency to enhance the fight against fraud

    53. Welcomes the political agreement reached on the proposed recast text of the Financial Regulation; believes that extending the scope of EDES to include shared management, and the adoption of a legal basis to use ARACHNE as a model for an EU-wide data-mining and risk-scoring tool, will strengthen the protection of the EU’s financial interests; recalls the calls made in previous reports to ensure that all Member States make use of data-mining tools, especially ARACHNE, to ensure timely and diligent reporting standards;

    54. Shares the view that the IMS, the system through which Member States report to the Commission on irregularities and fraud affecting the EU budget, has potential for greater interoperability with other corporate tools of the Commission, such as ARACHNE and EDES, and with digital tools in Member States; asks to be informed, following the recast of the Financial Regulation, on the progress of the EDES-IMS interface and about the possible use of IMS data within the data-mining and risk-scoring tool (ARACHNE);

    55. Reiterates its call for increased interoperability between data systems and for the harmonisation of reporting, monitoring and auditing in the Union; is aware of the crosscutting nature of interoperability and appreciates the adoption of the Interoperable Europe Act[35];

    56. Underlines the findings of ECA Review 4/2023 of 6 July 2023 on digitalising the management of EU funds; recalls the positive effects of digitalisation on prevention and detection of fraud and irregularities, as well as on the management, control and auditing of EU funds, by allowing easier and quicker access to data and remote cross-checks, thereby limiting costs by reducing the need for controls and on-the-spot checks;

    57. Recognises that taking advantage of a real-time and data-driven economy has significant benefits for the protection of the Union’s financial interests, while reducing the administrative burden on public authorities and businesses operating and trading across borders within the EU; calls for the EU and the Member States to improve the effectiveness of data sharing by creating a digital ecosystem allowing for the seamless, real-time and secure movement of standardised, structured and machine-readable data between businesses and public authorities, in particular national tax administrations, with a view to limiting possibilities for committing fraud and tax evasion;

    58. Shares the view that digitalisation should be at the core of every anti-fraud strategy, and in particular that it should be integrated into national anti-fraud strategies to allow coordination between its constituent parts and for the threats posed by new technologies to be factored in;

    59. Believes that digitalisation offers opportunities for tangible improvements to the governance of the anti-fraud network and that by facilitating communication and accessibility it helps to improve reporting, thereby allowing for a better understanding of the obstacles that persist and a more timely and comprehensive response by decision-makers and co-legislators; welcomes the fact that over half of the Member States have taken steps to identify and address skills gaps in digitalisation, in particular a lack of information and access to data on digitalisation; encourages the Member States and actors in the AFA to continue addressing skills gaps through measures involving, inter alia, knowledge sharing, training and the broadening of know-how and skills in the field of digitalisation;

    60. Welcomes the efforts of many components of the AFA in assessing and further developing the options offered by AI and machine learning in identifying and detecting irregularities and pursuing efficiency gains in both analysis and classic administrative tasks; reiterates that human assessment must remain the pivotal characteristic of every process; adds that AI has the potential to be a game changer in the fight against fraud, allowing the rapid analysis of large data sets, as well as enhancing fraud detection and identification of fraud patterns; recalls that the successful use of AI relies on effective collaboration between all stakeholders and on the availability of high quality data, underpinned by the effective use of ARACHNE; urges the Commission to work towards developing AI in Europe so as to uphold data sovereignty and ensure robust data protection, aligning with the principles outlined in the AI Act[36] and the General Data Protection Regulation[37] (GDPR); calls on all anti-fraud actors to strengthen their cooperation to leverage the use of AI effectively and responsibly in the fight against fraud;

    61. Recognises the growing risk of AI-generated content being used to manipulate procurement processes, financial transactions and evidence in fraud investigations; calls on the Commission to prioritise research and policy measures to combat fraudulent activities enabled by artificial intelligence, including deepfake technology and AI-driven disinformation campaigns that could compromise financial and anti-fraud mechanisms; calls on the Commission to propose stricter legal provisions and penalties for entities found to be using AI to commit or facilitate financial fraud, including AI-driven money laundering schemes, falsification of contracts, and digital identity theft in procurement processes;

    62.  Acknowledges the importance of the use of AI to make improvements in the quality and completeness of data exchanged with Member States; welcomes, in this regard, OLAF’s actions, including recommendations in the annual PIF reports, structured bilateral dialogues with Member States, the revision of the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy action plan, and interinstitutional exchanges focusing on these matters;

    63. Further calls for a dedicated EU-wide initiative to develop AI-driven fraud detection mechanisms within OLAF, the EPPO, and Europol, to increase efficiency in tracking and preventing financial crimes against the EU budget; recommends the establishment of an EU-wide task force composed of representatives from OLAF, the EPPO, Europol and national anti-fraud units, with a dedicated focus on digital fraud threats, including deepfake technology, AI-generated fake documents and synthetic identity fraud; underlines that this task force should develop and share best practices with the Member States;

    64. Stresses the need for increased cross-border cooperation and data-sharing mechanisms between Member States to combat AI-enabled fraud, particularly in high-risk areas such as VAT, customs and financial aid distribution; encourages the creation of a joint EU intelligence hub to track fraudulent AI activity in real time; calls on the Commission and the Member States to integrate AI and data analytics into fraud detection systems, ensuring interoperability between national and EU-level databases while maintaining strong data protection safeguards;

    65. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement strict transparency and audit measures in AI-based fraud detection tools to prevent bias, algorithmic manipulation and misuse in financial oversight systems; urges the development of AI ethics guidelines for anti-fraud institutions to ensure accountability;

    66. Calls for a mandatory forensic verification process for all digital evidence submitted in financial fraud cases, ensuring the authenticity of documents and audio and video material used in investigations;

    The internal layer of the EU’s AFA – 2023 key measures at EU level

    67. Underlines the fact that the EU’s AFA is a composite institutional architecture designed to detect, prevent and combat fraud and other forms of misconduct affecting the EU’s financial interests, built on a multi-layered network of cooperation in which the first layer (OLAF, the EPPO, Europol, Eurojust, AMLA, the Commission, the ECA and the European Investment Bank (EIB)) is grounded on horizontal cooperation between the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, while the other layers are based on vertical relationships between EU and national authorities, and between EU authorities and international organisations; points out that the AFA has evolved over the years through a series of separate decisions that have led to an innovative network of entities; underlines that their coordinated activities in recent years have generated valuable experience that should be considered in the future revision of the relevant regulations; stresses that with the creation of the EPPO, the first European prosecutorial authority was established, enabling prompt and direct criminal law investigations and prosecutions, and that the lessons learnt in the first years of its operational activity need to be adequately integrated in the legislative framework to be able to take full advantage of the available tools and resources; stresses the importance of clear mandates between the various EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies in order to minimise the risk of overlaps and duplication and thereby ensure the efficiency of the functioning of the AFA;

    68. Appreciates the integration in the 2023 PIF Report of the main administrative and judicial results achieved by OLAF and the EPPO, respectively, which follows the many calls from Parliament for more comprehensive reporting of the actions carried out by the components of the AFA; considers, however, that the differences in nature, scope and granularity between the two reports should be addressed and that the areas of cooperation should be indicated clearly; deems the differences in the figures provided by OLAF, the EPPO and the 2023 PIF Report to be justified in the current circumstances; highlights that reporting bodies in the Member States may report on criminal investigations only when the relevant judicial authorities grant the authorisation for them to do so, and this implies that while the EPPO and OLAF report data on active investigations, the reporting bodies are often unable to enter these details in the IMS database because of the need to protect confidentiality and ensure the proper conduct of investigations; understands that these cases result in a divergence in the data (‘delta’) that can only be eliminated when the investigations are completed and the relevant data are included in the reporting to the Commission so they can be included in a future PIF Report;

    69. Welcomes the adoption by the Commission, in May 2023, of a package of anti-corruption measures which encompasses a proposal for a directive on combating corruption; believes that prevention and prosecution of corruption need to be stepped up and calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of the enforcement of measures in the Member States;

    70. Welcomes the establishment of a network against corruption, which met for the first time on 20 September 2023, believes that the mapping of areas at a high-risk of corruption could contribute effectively to the further development of the EU anti-corruption strategy;

    71. Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the rule of law conditionality mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect rule of law principles; reiterates its deep concern regarding the situation concerning the rule of law in certain Member States, which is deeply worrying in its own right and can lead to serious losses for the Union budget; calls on the Commission to ensure the strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach rule of law principles and when this affects, or risks affecting, EU financial interests; further insists on the need for coherence across various instruments when assessing the rule of law situation in Member States;

    72. Notes that the fourth Commission Report 2023 on the rule of law, adopted in February 2024, provides a follow-up to the recommendations issued in the previous year’s Rule of Law Report; acknowledges that, in the fight against corruption, various Member States have updated or launched a revision of their national strategies and/or action plans, while others have reformed criminal law to strengthen the fight against corruption; observes that for many Member States the main obstacle to the fight against corruption is the limited resources of prosecution services; calls on the Commission to continue encouraging and supporting the efforts of Member States to reform and improve the efficacy of criminal proceedings and addressing the other challenges identified in the report; reminds the Commission of the effective tools at its disposal to safeguard the rule of law, such as infringement procedures, funding conditionality and the Article 7 TEU procedures, and expects it to make full use of them all; highlights, in this regard, that the new Financial Regulation introduces conditionality linked to the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU and calls on the Commission to start applying it, particularly in cases where infringement procedures have already been launched against a Member State for violations of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as this constitutes a clear recognition of an ongoing breach that could also impact the sound financial management of the Union budget;

    73. Takes note of the Commission’s decision not to lift the measure under Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary[38]; expects the Commission and the Council to lift the adopted measures only where evidence is collected that the remedial measures adopted by the Hungarian Government have proven effective in practice and, in particular, that no regression has been detected on already adopted measures; condemns the threats, such as espionage, to which EU institution staff are exposed, such as OLAF staff during their investigative missions in Hungary; stresses that such actions gravely undermine the rule of law and the integrity of the EU institutions; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard EU institution staff on missions; calls on the Hungarian authorities to take immediate and concrete steps to safeguard judicial independence, uphold media freedom and fully implement the recommendations of the Commission’s Rule of Law Report to restore democratic checks and balances; urges the Council to continue the Article 7 TEU procedure against the Hungarian Government;

    74. Emphasises that respect for the rule of law, including the fight against corruption, is a key determinant of the single market environment that fosters investment, growth, jobs and innovation, and protects small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and economic operators operating across borders; stresses that the Commission is accountable for rigorous verification, as a condition for disbursing funding, of the fulfilment of the rule of law-related milestones integrated in the various Member State RRPs; recalls that the Commissioner for democracy, justice and rule of law, working in close coordination with the recently appointed Commissioner on budget, anti-fraud and public administration, holds primary responsibility for the full application of the general regime of conditionality; calls on the Commission not to use ‘dialogue’ with Member States or the ‘pilot’ procedure as an open-ended means to avoid launching actual infringement procedures; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to prioritise horizontally infringements affecting the EU’s financial interests, in particular regarding the PIF Directive and the EPPO Regulation[39]; welcomes the statement in the Commission Political Guidelines on the importance of the rule of law for EU funds and the commitment by the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration to introduce strong safeguards on the rule of law in the next MFF;

    75. Considers that the protection of the common EU values enshrined in Article 2 TEU currently included in the Common Provisions Regulation needs to be further strengthened; calls on the Commission to explore how a mechanism equivalent to the horizontal enabling conditions could be developed as a general feature in all areas of the EU budget, with a view to linking a wider range of policies to all the values set out in Article 2 TEU; calls on the Commission to explore means of linking funding to rule of law conditions and the completion of necessary reforms in order to ensure a comprehensive approach, applied horizontally to all EU funds; calls on the Commission to pursue a comprehensive approach and to put forward proposals for further strengthening the Union’s rule of law toolbox as a priority, including strengthened rule of law conditionality for funds deployed in the current programming period;

    76. Maintains that corruption is intrinsically linked to money laundering, and that money laundering is one of the most important enablers of illegal activities by organised criminals, as it allows them to transfer the proceeds of their crime into the legal economy; recognises that the heterogeneous national legal systems and fragmented application of the Union’s anti-money laundering framework have made it difficult to prevent, detect and counter money laundering; welcomes, in this regard, the adoption of the ambitious legislative package on anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism, which will unify national rules and thus enhance the collective fight against money laundering across the Union; welcomes the establishment of the new Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA); considers that the new agency will play a central role in the new anti-money laundering framework through its coordinating and supervisory responsibilities; recalls that money laundering and terrorist financing are intrinsically linked and calls for the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA to have a stronger role in countering these phenomena;

    77. Shares the view that the protection of the EU’s financial interests has been strengthened by the recast Financial Regulation; points out that the scope of EDES has been extended to encompass shared and direct management and provide new grounds for exclusion; welcomes the introduction of a legal basis for a risk-scoring and data-mining tool to be used by all Member States and in all management modes; regrets that both these measures will enter into force only in 2028 and only from the next MFF, resulting in several more years without comprehensive transparency regarding the final recipients of EU funds and missing a crucial opportunity to use these data to strengthen safeguards against corruption and fraud;

    78. Appreciates the adoption of an updated action plan[40] for the 2019 Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy; notes that it includes 44 actions distributed over seven themes covering, in particular, digitalisation, cooperation, the RRF, customs fraud, and awareness-raising in ethical and anti-fraud culture matters;

    79. Points out that the EU’s anti-fraud programme (UAFP) is the only spending programme specifically dedicated to fighting fraud affecting the EU’s financial interests and that it provides relevant support to all Member States’ authorities as components of the external layer of the AFA, in order to strengthen the fight against fraud; observes that the UAFP has the flexibility needed to adapt to the constantly changing anti-fraud landscape and is aligned with the seven-year period (2021-2027) of the current MFF; notes that, so far, 55 % of the total implementation of the UAFP has contributed to the digital transition;

    80. Calls on the Commission to build on the success of the UAFP and encourages the Commissioner on budget and anti-fraud to consider the UAFP as a model to be extended in the next MFF, in line with the task, indicated in the mission letter, of securing support for Member States’ efforts to protect the Union’s financial interests;

    81. Welcomes the first UAFP association request received in 2023 from a non-EU country, namely Ukraine, with which an association agreement covering its participation in the programme has been negotiated and was adopted in March 2024;

    82. Expresses concern that the Commission’s latest interim evaluation of Hercule III found aspects that may have hampered the programme’s effectiveness, notably that certain Member States’ administrations lacked the resources to enable them to cope with the programme’s administrative requirements;

    83. Takes note of the reiterated calls from the EPPO to bolster the detection capacity of the relevant components of the AFA, and recalls that, in line with the Commission Anti-Fraud Strategy, emphasis is to be given to data analysis as a tool for detecting fraud; highlights, in this regard, the importance of harmonising definitions in order to obtain comparable data across the EU; encourages the Commission to strengthen the use of the IMS as a tool to support auditors’ risk analysis when preparing audit activities; invites OLAF to increase its training offer to Commission staff, including auditors and relevant actors in the financial flow circuit;

    84. Is aware that the decentralised structure of the EPPO entails an interplay between national law and EU law and between national authorities and the EPPO; understands that the EPPO operates based on the directly applicable EU regulations but that it also requires adequate implementing measures to be adopted via national legislation transposing the PIF Directive and other relevant Union acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that national legislation is fully in line with the EPPO Regulation and the PIF Directive, launch infringement proceedings and propose the revision of these legal acts in order to make the EPPO more effective in the exercise of its mandate;

    85. Notes the results of the Compliance assessment of measures adopted by the Member States to adapt their systems to the EPPO Regulation[41], which was presented in September 2023; regrets that many situations are still suboptimal and need to be addressed because they weaken the effectiveness of the protection of the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal investigations; refers, in particular, to the attribution of competence between national prosecution services and the EPPO; stresses also that the EPPO Regulation stipulates the reporting of possible EPPO cases directly and without undue delay; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor Member States’ full compliance with the EPPO Regulation and their prompt reporting of suspicions of fraud in areas within the EPPO’s competence directly to it;

    86. Is concerned that in many Member States the designated national authority deciding on disagreements between the EPPO and national authorities on the competence for prosecuting a case is not a ‘court’ or a ‘tribunal’; calls on the Commission to verify and monitor whether Member States are fully complying with Article 25(6) and Article 42(2)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, which requires the possibility of an appeal to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) against a decision by a national authority on the attribution of competence;

    87. Stresses that the current control by national authorities over the ‘necessary’ resources and equipment of the European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) and the need to refer to the national authorities’ provisions for ‘adequate arrangements’ on social security, pensions and insurance coverage could constrain the autonomy and independence of the EPPO’s actions; calls on the Commission to propose adequate solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation;

    88. Points out that the transposition of the PIF Directive differs between Member States, which, in some cases, affects the cross-border exercise of EPPO competences; calls on the Commission to ensure proper implementation of the PIF Directive and to propose its revision, based on the experience gathered;

    89. Underlines that Article 25(3) of the EPPO Regulation, which elaborates on the exercise of the EPPO’s competence in the event of non-PIF offences inextricably linked to PIF offences, raises legal and practical questions and requires further streamlining in order to make effective use of the EPPO’s legal framework; calls on the Commission to propose suitable solutions in the forthcoming revision of the EPPO Regulation in order to reinforce the EPPO’s ability to investigate cross-border organised crime;

    90. Reiterates[42] that the EPPO has an important role in safeguarding the rule of law and in combating corruption in the Union, and encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO in the rule of law reports; welcomes the accession of Poland and Sweden to the EPPO; notes with approval Ireland’s recent announcement of its intention to participate; calls on the Government of Hungary, the sole remaining Member State that has not yet joined the EPPO, despite the absence of any legal or constitutional impediment, to join the EPPO without further delay; recalls that broad public support for Hungary’s accession has been demonstrated by the collection of 680 000 signatures in favour of joining the EPPO, underscoring a strong societal demand for enhanced legal safeguards against fraud and corruption affecting the Union’s financial interests;

    91. Reiterates its call for the launch of an exchange of views on the possible clarification of the competence of the EPPO within its mandate, as defined in the Treaty, as regards protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    92. Notes that in 2023, cooperation between the relevant actors increased, with the EPPO and Eurojust cooperating on 26 ongoing cases at the end of 2023; observes that also in 2023 the EPPO and Europol cooperated efficiently on various operational matters, and understands that this cooperation almost doubled in 2023, with Europol providing support on 47 cases upon the EPPO’s request; calls on the Commission to request that the EPPO and Eurojust specify the efficiency criteria on the basis of which they conduct their activities;

    93. Welcomes the efforts by OLAF and the EPPO to strengthen their cooperation; understands that information is being exchanged between the two offices in order to avoid parallel investigations into the same matters, and that, in 2023, 22 complementary investigations were opened by OLAF and four supporting investigations were requested by the EPPO; is aware that the synergies resulting from the use of complementary investigations (ex Article 12(f) of the OLAF Regulation) and investigations in support (ex Article 12(e) of the OLAF Regulation) are suboptimal; calls on the Commission to address the legal and operational causes of this when reviewing its regulations;

    94. Is concerned about the lack of analysis and accurate information on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union’s budget that should follow both OLAF and EPPO investigations; is aware that the impact of the AFA on the security of citizens and on the enforcement of the rule of law in the Union goes beyond the quantification of financial recoveries alone; stresses, however, that the results of the efforts made to create the AFA should tend towards measurability and be tangible at least as regards the budgetary aspects; emphasises that the impact of the activities implemented for the protection of the Union’s financial interests should be assessed and taken into consideration in the allocation of resources and definition of mandates;

    95. Understands that the Commission has yet to provide data on the recoveries to the benefit of the Union budget following the EPPO activities reported to the Commission, as provided by Article 103(2) of the EPPO Regulation, and that this matter is included in the mission letter of the Commissioner for budget, anti-fraud and public administration; observes that the freezing of assets is essential to combat crime affecting the EU budget and that a certain amount of time is needed for freezing to be converted into actual confiscations and recoveries; highlights that the amount confiscated is not expected to return by default to the Union’s budget; notes that, in line with Article 38 of the EPPO Regulation, the potential revenue resulting from seizure and confiscation measures taken by EDPs in Member States should flow back into the EU budget and could be accounted for in the EU budget as non-assigned revenue; calls on the Commission to make the necessary arrangements with the relevant national authorities to allow these sums to enter the EU budget;

    96. Points out that data on effective recoveries following OLAF financial recommendations are not published in the OLAF Annual Report or in any other official report from the Commission; regrets that only aggregated data are made available and they refer to 2 299 financial recommendations issued by OLAF between 2012 and 2023 for an overall amount of about EUR 9 billion; remarks that the analysis of the available figures suggests considerable room for improvement; observes that a large gap exists between the amounts recommended for recovery by OLAF, the amount established as recoverable by the Commission’s services and the amount eventually effectively recovered; is concerned by the low recovery rates for undue expenditure (for activities implemented under shared and indirect management modes the rate is 34 % and 11 %, respectively, and for recovery under direct management only 22 %); calls on the Commission to provide data with adequate granularity on recovery and to assess the reasons behind the recovery gap; stresses the need for OLAF and the Commission to agree upon, and apply consistently, common evaluation criteria that ensure greater convergence and clarity, thereby improving the efficiency and effectiveness of financial recovery assessment; emphasises that recovery following an OLAF recommendation and the EPPO’s investigations is an important measurement of the efficiency of the AFA and calls for more transparency in this regard;

    The external layer of the EU’s AFA – key measures at national level in 2023

    97. Understands that the overall level of implementation by the Member States of the Commission’s recommendations issued in the 2022 PIF Report is considered satisfactory; highlights, however, that significant differences between Member States persist; is concerned, in particular, by the cases of inadequate reporting of irregularities by some Member States via the IMS; recalls that reporting is mandatory under the current regulations and encourages OLAF to strengthen its oversight and monitoring actions with a view to achieving uniform reporting across the Union;

    98. Calls on the Commission to monitor the comprehensiveness of the reporting in IMS by countries benefiting from pre-accession assistance and welcomes the initiatives of the Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations to enforce candidate countries’ obligations to report irregularities in the IMS on a regular basis;

    99. Encourages the Member States to report in the IMS the irregularities related to the RRF, in line with the ECA recommendations; calls on the Commission to facilitate such use of the IMS by the Member States by providing support in the form of training, seminars and exchange of best practices;

    100. Welcomes the participation of Sweden and Poland in the EPPO, decided on in 2024, as well as the objective of the new Irish Government to join the EPPO; insists that Member States that are not yet participating must do so without delay and calls on the Commission to incentivise participation in the EPPO through positive measures;

    101. Reiterates that Member States’ ineffective, untimely or lack of cooperation with the EPPO and OLAF constitute grounds for action under the Conditionality Regulation; calls on the Commission to take into due consideration all information from the EPPO and OLAF on situations where Member States fail to comply with their obligations;

    102. Maintains that National Anti-Fraud Strategies (NAFS) are the most effective tool for coordination between the various national, regional and sectoral authorities and the many local entities entrusted with the tasks into which the anti-fraud cycle is organised; notes that, in 2023, 21 out of 27 Member States reported having an anti-fraud strategy; observes that out of 21, only 10 Member States had a full national anti-fraud strategy[43] while 11 Member States had only sectoral rather than national anti-fraud strategies in place; recognises that the approach taken by Member States in their anti-fraud strategies today varies widely; regrets that six Member States do not have any anti-fraud strategy at all; strongly regrets this highly unsatisfactory situation, which compromises the integrity of EU spending and undermines citizens’ trust in EU institutions;

    103. Maintains that Member States would benefit from a periodic evaluation of their anti-fraud frameworks; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to run independent or peer reviews of their anti-fraud frameworks to enhance consistency and pursue high standards;

    104. Encourages the Commission to propose enforceable initiatives to clarify the relationship and consider establishing a link between the adoption of NAFS by the Member States and the level of financial support they receive;

    105. Asks the Commission to launch, in preparation for the revision of the OLAF Regulation, a monitoring exercise on the state of play of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Services (AFCOS) established in the Member States; encourages the Commission to plan for the update and redesign of their structure, role, responsibilities and mandate; regrets the suboptimal staffing level across the majority of the AFCOS in the Member States; underlines the need to ensure sufficient levels of expertise among staff in national anti-fraud coordinating structures; calls on the Commission to encourage and support Member States in addressing these issues as a matter of priority, including in the context of the European Semester cycle;

    106. Underlines the role played by public authorities in fostering a zero-tolerance culture against fraud and stresses, in particular, the importance of fraud prevention to ensure that fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and other misuse of funds do not occur in the first place; recalls that the correct transposition of the PIF Directive, adopted on 5 July 2017, is crucial for the protection of the Union budget, for the implementation of all the EU policies for which EU money is used, including in the context of RRF deployment, and for establishing the scope of investigations and prosecutions by the EPPO, whose competence is established by reference to the PIF Directive, as implemented by national law; expects national authorities, including governments, in all Member States unequivocally to condemn fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and any other misuse of public funds, taking a proactive approach in protecting the financial interests of the Union through effective measures in areas including risk assessment, communication and information sharing, and training of staff; calls on the Commission to intervene in a timely manner through infringement procedures to ensure the consistent transposition of the PIF Directive and the effective liability of – and sanctions for – legal and natural persons;

    107. Reiterates that whistleblowers play a key role in boosting fraud detection, investigation and prosecution; understands that, by the end of 2023, 24 Member States had adopted national legislation to transpose the Whistleblower Directive and declared their transposition complete; regrets, however, that in March 2023, after analysis of the national measures adopted, the Commission was obliged to refer six Member States to the CJEU for their failure to transpose the Directive and failure to notify transposition measures, asking the Court to impose financial sanctions; is concerned by the further infringement proceedings[44] ongoing against six other Member States; calls on the Commission to intensify the monitoring of national transposition measures and report to Parliament accordingly; stresses that Parliament itself must also urgently ensure the proper transposition of the Directive, as confirmed by the CJEU ruling of 11 September 2024, which found that Parliament’s current framework fails to provide balanced and effective protection against retaliation; calls for Parliament to immediately adopt robust rules in line with the Directive to safeguard its own whistleblowers;

    108. Notes that the Investigative Division of the European Investment Bank (EIB IG/IN) had made 10 referrals to the EPPO and 17 to OLAF by the end of 2023; is aware that entities which have been found by EIB IG/IN to engage in prohibited practices may be excluded, in other words declared ineligible, for a stated period, from being awarded any contracts or entering into any relationship with the EIB; observes that, in 2023, these exclusion proceedings resulted in the exclusion of five economic operators for a minimum duration of three years, while five other companies reached settlement agreements applying conditionality to their eligibility;

    External dimension of the protection of the EU’s financial interests

    109. Welcomes the Commission’s reaction to its call to increase the monitoring of, and control over, the funds under the Global Europe, Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for assistance to non-EU countries, as well as via the joint communication with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy[45]; appreciates the Commission’s continuous efforts to ensure that anti-corruption measures are mainstreamed into EU external action instruments; reiterates its recommendation to suspend budgetary support and de-commit funds to non-EU countries, including candidate countries, where the authorities clearly fail to take genuine action against widespread corruption, without compromising support for the civil population; emphasises that respect for and commitment to promoting EU values is an essential precondition for all partners aspiring to join the Union; reiterates that accession to the EU is a merit-based process whereby each applicant is assessed on its own merits and its fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria; considers that when applying the revised enlargement methodology there should be a particular focus on fundamental reforms, and that fair and rigorous conditionality should be applied as well as reversibility where setbacks occur; considers that appropriate tools must be used to ensure that candidate countries show concrete and sustainable compliance with the rule of law, democratic principles and fundamental rights, both before and after joining the Union;

    110. Observes that in the context of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, Ukraine will continue to require substantial support in the current and next MFF and, in the perspective of a fair and sustainable peace agreement, Ukraine will need support for post-war reconstruction, including for central government services and reforms;

    111. Considers that the three pillars of the Ukraine Facility could be reshaped accordingly and that reconstruction should align with pre-accession requirements; emphasises the importance of close coordination and cooperation with the Ukraine coordination mechanism established by the G7; calls for the EU and all Member States to increase their support for Ukraine, while putting appropriate measures in place to protect the financial interests of the EU through the prevention, detection and correction of fraud, corruption, conflicts of interest and irregularities in the use of Union funds, including by performing more thorough checks, in order to ensure that EU funds sent to Ukraine and to its neighbouring countries are adequately monitored and controlled and end up benefiting those most in need;

    112. Stresses that the unprecedented volume of financial support received by Ukraine from the EU in recent years, and deployed in the extremely adverse conditions imposed by the ongoing war, imply the adoption of appropriate measures to ensure that such resources are employed as intended, in particular where they are aimed at benefiting infrastructure and people in need;

    113. Appreciates the work carried out by OLAF and the EPPO in protecting the financial interests of the Union by providing training to increase administrative capacity and autonomy, carrying out investigations in Ukraine and agreeing on the working arrangement with the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine to facilitate cooperation in the investigation of corruption; invites the competent EU offices to continue their cooperation with and support for the Ukrainian authorities;

    114. Acknowledges, in this regard, the progress made by Ukraine in advancing reforms related to judicial independence, accountability, anti-corruption and anti-money laundering, despite the difficult conditions caused by Russia’s ongoing war of aggression; encourages Ukraine to continue on the path of reform, including with regard to the influence of oligarchs in politics;

    115. Welcomes the enhanced sanctions adopted by the EU against Russia so far, encompassing the banning of Russian nationals and entities from participating in public procurement contracts in the EU and restrictions on EU funding for Russian publicly owned or controlled entities; recognises, however, that despite the current measures, individuals and entities subject to the sanctions against Russia can still find ways to circumvent the sanctions and calls, therefore, for the EU and the Member States to maintain, reinforce and extend the scope and effectiveness of the sanctions policy against Russia and Belarus;

    116. Recognises that the Member States and their relevant competent authorities are responsible for the effective implementation and enforcement of EU sanctions, as well as for identifying breaches and imposing appropriate penalties; underlines the role played by customs authorities and the importance of their close cooperation in strengthening the uniform enforcement of sanctions; welcomes, in this regard, the Baltic Customs Initiative;

    117. Underlines that the EU is the biggest provider of external assistance to Palestinian refugees; stresses that the Union budget must continue to provide support to build peace and stability in the Middle East region, combat terrorism, hate, fundamentalism and disinformation, as well as promote human rights, fight impunity and strengthen adherence to the rule of law; emphasises, accordingly, that EU budgets must not support, under any circumstances, activities that go against these objectives; notes that, following the heinous terror attacks of 7 October 2023 by Hamas and allegations of misuse of EU funds for terrorism, a funding review has been conducted by the Commission, which, although concluding that no evidence has been found, to date, that money had been diverted for unintended purposes (including for support for incarcerated terrorists) and reporting that the safeguards in place worked well, still called for certain additional measures that were deemed necessary; recalls that all hostages taken by Hamas have to be released; emphasises the importance of ensuring that EU funds are effectively allocated and managed in order to achieve their intended goals, even via scrutiny by the EPPO, OLAF and the ECA where appropriate; recalls the ongoing issue of the destruction of EU-funded projects in Gaza and the West Bank and calls for greater accountability and safeguards in this context;

    118. Stresses that suspension of budgetary support in non-EU countries, including candidate countries, is an appropriate measure in the event of failure to take genuine action against widespread corruption; expects priority to be given to the fight against corruption in pre-accession negotiations, with capacity building via the establishment of specialised anti-corruption bodies; asks the Commission to ensure, also in cases where funding is suspended, assistance for civil populations, where possible through alternative channels;

    119. Underlines the importance of cooperation with international organisations in combating fraud; regrets the lack of cooperation by some international organisations in providing the ECA with complete, unlimited and timely access to the documents necessary to carry out its tasks; notes that the Commission has stepped up communication with international organisations and calls on it to further intensify efforts to ensure access to all requested documentation;

     

    °

    ° °

    120. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Forgotten futures? Canada urgently needs a national discussion about young people’s futures

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By J-C Couture, Adjunct faculty and Associate Lecturer, Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta

    This federal election cycle has seen laudable efforts to raise awareness around neglected issues.

    We’ve heard more about the need for greater co-operation between provincial and territorial governments to respond to chaos triggered by United States President Donald Trump’s policies. In the same time frame, municipal politicans have been calling for climate change action through co-ordinated sustainable infrastructure development.

    For policy experts and pundits alike, a growing consensus is emerging that Canada has for too long ignored deeper economic and political structural problems.

    Some political analysts, (like pundit Andrew Coyne), have framed these issues as being part of Canada’s growth crisis, underscoring problems like a lack of a coherent industrial policy, flat or declining productivity and weak competitiveness.

    Others, including provincial, municipal and First Nations leaders, note Canada also lacks a coherent approach to infrastructure that addresses decades of neglect in cities, towns and Indigenouscommunities alike.

    As researchers committed to advancing more intentional conversations concerning the future of public education, we also see a huge gap in terms of co-ordinated, pan-Canadian federal efforts to support young people’s futures through education.

    Need to knit vision together

    For example, we have a national early learning and child-care strategy, (which could be imperilled, depending on who wins the election). It’s often shorthanded as being about “child care,” which diminishes the long-term significance of paying attention to how we invest in young people and families, and the quality of early education.

    A recent open letter by the chair of the Toronto District School Board called on the leaders of Canada’s federal party leaders to address the growing diversity and complexity of the city’s student population.



    Read more:
    ‘Child care’ or education? Words matter in how we envision living well with children

    We don’t have a federal department for education. While the Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC) serves as a forum to discuss policy issues, as education scholar Jennifer Wallner notes, “effective creativity and co-ordination” is needed.

    In the early 2000s, the Canadian Council on Learning was making ground-breaking contributions towards helping Canada develop comprehensive and coherent approaches to lifelong learning. But the council’s work was hobbled in 2011 when it was defunded by Stephen Harper’s Conservative government.

    Sen. Rosemary Moodie’s introducton of Bill S-282, a “National Strategy for Children and Youth Act,” in November 2023 is one example of a positive effort to develop a pan-Canadian youth development framework.

    There are solid pieces of a puzzle that can contribute to nurturing hopeful young people and a socially healthy and empowered society. But these sorely need to be knit together, as they have in places like like Iceland and Finland
    to name a few.

    Refraining from taking democracy for granted

    The question of what public education actually means is much more than a semantic exercise; it’s a practical and foundational exercise in building a civil society and nation.

    Three decades ago, American cultural and media critic Neil Postman invoked the truism that “public education creates a public” — a reminder that the vibrancy of our communities and democracy can’t be taken for granted. As we look at the U.S. and the rise of neo-liberalism and authoritarian populism, Canadians need to remember Postman.

    Our colleague, David King, former minister of education in Alberta from 1979 to 1986, observes that of all institutions citizens have created, “public school education is the only such institution that remains where we can share common stories, and conventions and imagination.”

    What we should value about public education

    Yet the role of public education in contributing to Canada’s democratic traditions is often taken for granted. A shared sense of what we should value about public education remains elusive — and is played out amid debate about structural and political reforms, around matters like who controls schools.

    Meanwhile, researchers highlight how families continue moving to private schooling. Consider Australians, who see public education as a universal right, yet 35 per cent of students attend private schools..

    In Canada, a network of university researchers and advocacy groups — the Public Education Exchange (PEX) research network —has documented growing privatization and commercialization of public education. Sue Winton, PEX project director and education professor, describes how the privatization of public education in Canada continues to undermine equality and democracy.

    Sue Winton discusses her book ‘Unequal Benefits: Privatization and Public Education in Canada.’

    Across Canada, processes towards privatization involve policies and practices that shift responsibilities from governments to private bodies, with corresponding shifts in lower investment in per-student public school learning.

    Shifts towards privatization go beyond funding private and charter schools. They include underfunding school facilities and movements that promote sloganeering around “parent rights” and “parental choice.”



    Read more:
    ‘School choice’ policies are associated with increased separation of students by social class

    Post-secondary investment declines

    In higher education, privatization has also accelerated. Students, particularly international students, have provided an increasing portion of funding. In Ontario, according to Higher Education Strategy Associates, international students contributed approximately 76 per cent of all tuition fee revenue in the college sector in 2023-24. In the university sector, it’s more than 50 per cent. Other provinces saw similar shifts.

    A decline in per capita public investment has encouraged the growth of the private college and university sector and investments in AI-enabled learning through corporate learning systems. Technology-related fields have developed corporate partnerships that shape what is taught and how.

    The precarity of public higher education in Canada threatens our social and economic future.

    Making futures possible for young people

    Whether it’s through local community schools, a university or college campus or larger community initiatives, we can’t drop the promise of universal access to an inclusive and broad education.

    Keeping this promise is even more pressing given generational inequity. As discusssed by Paul Kershaw, policy professor and founder of “Gen Squeeze” think tank, and Kareem Kudus, research analyst, “generationally unfair policies … have contributed to today’s housing, affordability, medical care and climate crises.”



    Read more:
    Wildfires in Alberta spark urgent school discussions about terrors of global climate futures

    Initiatives established in the 1970s focused on building connections between different regions: Open House Canada was a high-school student exchange program, and Katimavik, a youth service program founded by the visionary author Jacques Hébert, who would later become a senator and champion for intercutural and global travel experiences for our young people.

    Programs like these have presented significant and rich opportunities for building relationships across difference, and an equitable and inclusive sense of social cohesion. But governments at all levels have failed to sustain and expand such programs, or connect them with school learning.

    Broader discussions on what we care about

    The current existential threat to Canada fuelled by Trump’s presidency should mobilize not just an “elbows up” approach, but also “heads up” when it comes to the need for a pan-Canadian a youth policy framework that bolsters public education. As many Americans are also realizing, we need public education to help address current challenges, but it’s under attack.

    As American organizational behaviour expert and writer Margaret J. Wheatley reminds us: “There is nothing more powerful than a community discovering what it cares about.”

    In the aftermath of the federal election, we’d love to see much more dialogue surrounding the “publicness” of public education — to go further in at least deciding on what we really care about as a country.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Forgotten futures? Canada urgently needs a national discussion about young people’s futures – https://theconversation.com/forgotten-futures-canada-urgently-needs-a-national-discussion-about-young-peoples-futures-254883

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI: PFM CRYPTO Introduces One-Click Asset Management, Popularizing Crypto Earnings for 9.2 Million Users

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LOS ANGELES, April 23, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — As Bitcoin’s price fluctuates between $80,000 and $90,000, investors are asking a critical question: Can crypto assets still reliably generate profits? PFM CRYPTO, a leading global crypto asset management service with data centers across 20 countries, including the UK, the United States, and Iceland, has announced its latest quarterly performance report. The findings reveal how the company is helping millions of users achieve stable returns through a simple, one-click crypto asset management solution.

    Survivorship bias in the crypto market: 
    As of the first quarter of 2025, about 69% of global cryptocurrency investors have achieved profitability. ​This data comes from the “2025 Cryptocurrency Adoption and Consumer Sentiment Report” released by Security. Although this data is exciting, among the profitable groups, more than 80% are long-term investors with a holding period of more than 2 years, while the loss rate of short-term traders who chase ups and downs is as high as 67%.

    Although the crypto market continues to fluctuate, PFM CRYPTO still achieved positive results in the first quarter:
    – Florida data center officially put into use (there are 20 data centers in the world).
    – Iceland data center alone has achieved 565 BTC, 1436 ETH, and other crypto assets output.
    – Created $410 million in crypto asset appreciation for millions of users.

    “We are pleased to announce a series of very positive results. Our impressive cost optimization structure has achieved results even in the face of price fluctuations in the cryptocurrency market.” PFM CRYPTO’s Chief Operating Officer said: “Our goal is to provide users with crypto asset services with zero technical barriers. By optimizing the distributed computing power architecture and green energy layout, users can still enjoy transparent and stable returns even during market fluctuations.”

    What is PFM CRYPTO’s crypto asset upgrade package?
    – No expensive equipment or professional skills are required. With just one click of hosting, PFM CRYPTO’s remote computing power can start serving you.
    – All packages will generate electronic contracts, and users can easily understand the benefits of each package.
    – Only a few platforms can achieve true 0 handling fees, and PFM CRYPTO has done it. All deposits and withdrawals are free of charge.

     
    PFMcrypto Offers $10 Bitcoin Bonus for New Users. 
    Nothing is more important than asset security, and PFM CRYPTO knows this. Key safeguards include:

    • Multi-layer cold storage
    • Two-factor authentication
    • Smart contract-driven operations
    • KYC compliance in multiple regions

    PFM CRYPTO’s approach has earned it a 4.7/5 user satisfaction score, with over 1.4 million verified reviews and the top spot in Blockchain Analytics Group’s April 2025 rankings.

    How to start PFM CRYPTO?
    – Register an account, which usually takes only one minute. Register now to get a $10 new user bonus.
    – Contract plans include 1 day, 2 days, 5 days, 10 days, etc. Choose the plan that suits you.
    – Start with one click, and the income will be credited to your account on time every day.

    PFM CRYPTO has been independently rated as the top free platform for earning Bitcoin, thanks to its user-first features, verified returns, and global accessibility. Here’s what sets it apart:

    • Free $10 Bitcoin Bonus: New users receive $10 in BTC upon registration—no deposit or wallet connection required.
    • Flexible Earning Plans: Choose short-term contracts of 1, 3, or 5 days, ideal for testing and scaling.
    • Fast, Fee-Free Withdrawals: All payouts are processed within 1–5 minutes, with no withdrawal or maintenance fees.
    • Advanced Security Protocols: The platform uses cold wallet storage, 2FA, and blockchain-based electronic contracts to ensure safety and transparency.

    The Future of Free Bitcoin Earnings Starts Now
    As more people seek alternative income sources, PFM CRYPTO positions itself as the best free crypto asset management platform in 2025. Whether new to crypto or expanding the portfolio, PFM CRYPTO provides a low-risk, high-potential entry point into Bitcoin.
    Start earning today—register now at pfmcrypto.net and claim a $10 bonus.

    Media Contact:

    Amelia Elspeth
    PFM CRYPTO
    info@pfmcrypto.net
    https://pfmcrypto.net/

    Photos accompanying this announcement are available at: 

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/9980ebd0-dea1-4aa7-88a1-4443b0251f7c

    https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/fa150a23-a784-405e-99ef-31afeae0541e

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: The arbitral tribunal has confirmed Onni Bidco Oy’s redemption right over the minority shares in Innofactor Plc, and trading in the Innofactor Plc shares has been suspended

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Innofactor Plc | Stock Exchange Release | April 23, 2025 at 18:00 EEST

    The arbitral tribunal has confirmed Onni Bidco Oy’s redemption right over the minority shares in Innofactor Plc, and trading in the Innofactor Plc shares has been suspended

    The arbitral tribunal appointed by the Redemption Board of the Finland Chamber of Commerce in connection with the redemption proceedings concerning the minority shares in Innofactor Plc (“Innofactor”) has in its interim decision issued today confirmed that Onni Bidco Oy (“Onni Bidco”) has the right to redeem the minority shares in Innofactor, and that Onni Bidco has the right to obtain title to the minority shares by posting a security approved by the arbitral tribunal for the payment of the redemption price and the interest accruing thereon.

    Innofactor announced on March 31, 2025 that the Board of Directors of Innofactor has resolved to apply for the termination of public trading in the shares of Innofactor and for the delisting of its shares from the official list of Nasdaq Helsinki Ltd (“Nasdaq Helsinki”) so that the delisting in respect of the Innofactor shares admitted to trading on the official list of Nasdaq Helsinki would become effective as soon as possible upon Onni Bidco having gained title to all the shares in Innofactor in the pending redemption proceedings under Chapter 18 of the Finnish Companies Act.

    Following the confirmation of Onni Bidco’s redemption right, Nasdaq Helsinki has suspended trading in the Innofactor shares today on April 23, 2025 at 17:16 (EEST). The possible posting of the security and the delisting of the Innofactor shares will be announced separately.

    Investor and media enquiries:

    Veera Vitie (Innofactor), ir@innofactor.com, +358 44 331 0207
    Lasse Lautsuo (Innofactor), ir@innofactor.com, +358 50 480 1597

    Distribution:
    NASDAQ Helsinki
    Main media

    ABOUT INNOFACTOR

    Innofactor is the leading promoter of the modern digital organization in the Nordic countries for its approximately 1,000 customers in the commercial and public sectors. Innofactor has the widest solution offering and leading know-how in the Microsoft ecosystem in the Nordics. Innofactor’s offering includes planning services for business-critical IT solutions, project deliveries, implementation support and maintenance services, as well as own software and services. Innofactor employs nearly 600 experts in Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Innofactor’s shares are listed on Nasdaq Helsinki with the ticker symbol IFA1V.

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    Source: Government of Canada regional news (2)

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  • MIL-OSI: TGS Webcast Details for Q1 2025 Presentation

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Oslo, Norway (23 April 2025) – TGS, a leading global provider of energy data and intelligence will release its Q1 2025 results at approximately 07:00 a.m. CEST on 9 May 2025. CEO Kristian Johansen and CFO Sven Børre Larsen will present the results at 09:00 a.m. CEST at House of Oslo, Ruseløkkveien 34 in Oslo, Norway.

    The presentation is open to the public and will be webcasted live.

    Access and registration for webcast attendees are available by copying and pasting the link below into your browser, or use the link on the front page of www.tgs.com:
    https://channel.royalcast.com/landingpage/hegnarmedia/20250509_2/

    The Q1 2025 earnings release and presentation will be available on www.newsweb.no and www.tgs.com.

    For more information, visit TGS.com (http://www.tgs.com) or contact:

    Bård Stenberg, VP IR & Communication
    Mobile: +47 992 45 235
    E-mail: investor@tgs.com

    About TGS
    TGS provides advanced data and intelligence to companies active in the energy sector. With leading-edge technology and solutions spanning the entire energy value chain, TGS offers a comprehensive range of insights to help clients make better decisions. Our broad range of products and advanced data technologies, coupled with a global, extensive and diverse energy data library, make TGS a trusted partner in supporting the exploration and production of energy resources worldwide. For further information, please visit www.tgs.com (https://www.tgs.com/).

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