Category: Scandinavia

  • MIL-OSI: No. 10/2025 – Course of the annual general meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nasdaq Copenhagen                                                                                   
    Nikolaj Plads 6
    DK-1067 Copenhagen K   

    Copenhagen, 26 March 2025
    ANNOUNCEMENT no.10/2025

    CEMAT A/S
    Company reg. (CVR) no. 24 93 28 18
    Annual general meeting 2025

    On 26 March 2025 at 1:00 pm the annual general meeting was held in Cemat A/S (the “Company”) at DLA Piper Denmark, Oslo Plads 2, 2100 Copenhagen Ø.

    Pursuant to the Company’s articles of association, the Board of Directors had appointed attorney-at-law Martin Lavesen as chairman of the meeting.

    1. The management’s report on the Company’s activities during the past financial year

    The management’s report for the financial year 2024 was presented by management.

    The annual general meeting took note of the management’s report for the financial year 2024.

    1. Presentation of the audited annual report for adoption

    The annual general report was presented.

    The general meeting approved the annual report for 2024.

    1. The Board of Directors’ proposal for appropriation of profit or covering of loss according to the adopted annual report

    The Board of Director’s proposal for appropriation of profit as stated in the annual report was approved by the general meeting, with the result being carried forward to the next year, and it was decided not to distribute dividends.

    1. Presentation of and indicative vote on remuneration report

    The remuneration report was presented.

    The general meeting approved the remuneration by an indicative vote.

    1. Approval of the remuneration of the Board of Directors’ fees for the current financial year

    The Board of Directors’ proposal regarding directors’ fees for the current financial year 2025 was adopted by the general meeting. The members of the Board of Directors will receive the basic fee of DKK 220,000 for the financial year 2025.

    In accordance with the remuneration report the chairman of the Board of Directors will receive the basic fee multiplied by a factor of 2.5, and the vice-chairman will receive the basic fee multiplied by a factor of 1.75.

    1. Election of members to the Board of Directors

    The Board of Directors proposed re-election of Frede Clausen, Eivind Dam Jensen, Joanna Iwanowska-Nielsen and Brian Winther Almind to the Board of Directors.

    The candidates were re-elected by the general meeting.

    At a subsequent constituent board meeting, the Board of Directors appointed Frede Clausen as Chairman of the board and Eivind Dam Jensen as Deputy Chairman of the board.

    1. Appointment of auditor

    The Board of Directors proposed re-election of BDO Statsautoriseret Revisionsaktieselskab, CVR-nr. 20222670, as auditors of the Company.

    BDO Statsautoriseret Revisionsaktieselskab was re-elected by the general meeting.

    1. Proposals from the Board of Directors or shareholders

    No items on the agenda.

    1. Any other business

    No items discussed.

    The annual general meeting was adjourned at 2:03 pm.

    Any questions concerning this announcement may be directed to info@cemat.dk.

    Cemat A/S

    Frede Clausen
    Chairman of the Board of Directors

    This announcement has been issued in Danish and English. In case of any inconsistencies, the Danish version will prevail.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Politicians’ attacks on immigrants lack solid evidence: New data set the record straight

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Edward Koning, Associate professor, University of Guelph

    Immigration dominated recent election campaigns in countries that include the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the United States.

    The subject sparked particularly fierce debates over welfare. While some politicians called for more support for typically economically vulnerable immigrant populations, others argued that welfare systems are already too generous and accommodating to newcomers.

    Unfortunately, many debates on this subject lack solid evidence. A newly launched data set could change that. The data, which provides systematic information on immigrants’ access to social programs across different countries and different time periods, can help ground some of these discussions in empirical reality.

    The data set reveals key insights. One striking observation is that the countries where politicians most frequently complain that immigrants are treated too generously are among the most exclusionary from a comparative perspective.

    It also shows that although most welfare systems were moving towards greater inclusion up until the 2010s, since then social programs in many countries have become more inclusive in some respects but more exclusive in others.

    A new data set for 22 countries

    The data set, called the Immigrant Exclusion from Social Programs Index (IESPI), measures how much immigrants’ access to pensions, health care, unemployment benefits, housing benefits, social assistance and active labour market programs compares to that of native-born citizens.

    The index uses 32 indicators to measure factors like whether immigrants have to have resided in the country for a certain period of time, held a specific type of residence status, or met standards of successful integration before they can access social programs.

    The data covers the years 1990 to 2023 and includes information for 22 countries.

    Complaints about inclusion

    In the United States, President Donald Trump has voiced concerns about immigrants’ welfare access repeatedly, both during his first term and since taking office again this year.

    In last year’s British election, a staple of Rishi Sunak’s campaign was the insistence that immigrants threaten the sustainability of the welfare state.

    On the other side of the North Sea, the political party that won the Dutch elections made the argument that immigrants are “pampered” a central feature of its election platform.

    Ironically, all three of these countries are among the most exclusionary, according to the most recent IESPI data, as the graph below illustrates. (Note that the IESPI is organized such that a value of 0 is maximally inclusionary and 100 is maximally exclusionary.)

    Inclusionary trends have ended

    A second observation is that the era of social welfare systems becoming more inclusive for immigrants has ended.

    From 1990 until the 2010s, most western welfare systems were removing barriers for immigrant access to social programs. But since then, levels of immigrant welfare exclusion have not changed dramatically over time.

    Closer inspection shows that this picture of stability since the 2010s hides negative trends in different social programs.

    On the one hand, health-care programs and active labour market policies have gradually become more inclusionary. More and more countries have been making health-care services accessible for vulnerable immigrant populations, and rolling out targeted programs to improve newcomers’ chances on the labour market.

    On the other hand, social assistance policies have generally become more exclusionary over time. Many countries have intensified restrictions for recent arrivals, migrants without permanent residence status and migrants who cannot demonstrate successful integration.

    Large differences in historical trajectories

    When we look beyond aggregate trends, we also note very different trajectories in different countries.

    In some countries (Austria, Germany, Finland, Iceland, Malta, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain), social programs have become consistently more inclusionary.

    Other countries (Canada, Luxembourg and Sweden) have also undergone an inclusionary development, although at a more modest pace of change.

    In a third set of countries (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Norway and Switzerland), policies initially became more inclusionary but this trend was halted or reversed around 2010. The social programs of three other countries (the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States), finally, have consistently become more exclusionary over time.

    These comparisons within the IESPI data set hopefully enable us to make sense of the frequently charged nature of discussions about immigrants’ access to social programs.

    Most obviously, they show we should be cautious when listening to some of the politicians who are most critical of immigrant welfare access, like Donald Trump, Rishi Sunak and Geert Wilders.

    If their arguments that exclusionary reforms in their countries are nothing but reasonable adjustments to overly generous approaches ever had any merit, that merit is quickly evaporating.

    Edward Koning received funding from the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada to collect the data for this project.

    ref. Politicians’ attacks on immigrants lack solid evidence: New data set the record straight – https://theconversation.com/politicians-attacks-on-immigrants-lack-solid-evidence-new-data-set-the-record-straight-251853

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: From Greenland to Fort Bragg, America is caught in a name game where place names become political tools

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Seth T. Kannarr, PhD Candidate in Geography, University of Tennessee

    President Donald Trump re-renamed Denali as Mount McKinley in 2025. Tim Rains/National Park Service, CC BY

    Place names are more than just labels on a map. They influence how people learn about the world around them and perceive their place in it.

    Names can send messages and suggest what is and isn’t valued in society. And the way that they are changed over time can signal cultural shifts.

    The United States is in the midst of a place-renaming moment. From the renaming of the Gulf of Mexico to the Gulf of America, to the return of Forts Bragg and Benning and the newly re-renamed Mount McKinley in Alaska’s Denali National Park, we are witnessing a consequential shift in the politics of place naming.

    This sudden rewriting of the nation’s map – done to “restore American greatness,” according to President Donald Trump’s executive order that made some of them official – is part of a name game that recognizes place names as powerful brands and political tools.

    In our research on place naming, we explore how this “name game” is used to assert control over shared symbols and embed subtle and not-so-subtle messages in the landscape.

    As geography teachers and researchers, we also recognize the educational and emotional impact the name game can have on the public.

    Place names can have psychological effects

    Renaming a place is always an act of power.

    People in power have long used place naming to claim control over the identity of the place, bolster their reputations, retaliate against opponents and achieve political goals.

    These moves can have strong psychological effects, particularly when the name evokes something threatening. Changing a place name can fundamentally shift how people view, relate to or feel that they belong within that place.

    In Shenandoah County, Virginia, students at two schools originally named for Confederate generals have been on an emotional roller coaster of name changes in recent years. The schools were renamed Mountain View and Honey Run in 2020 amid the national uproar over the murder of George Floyd, a Black man killed by a police officer in Minneapolis.

    Four years later, the local school board reinstated the original Confederate names after conservatives took control of the board.

    One Black eighth grader at Mountain View High School — now re-renamed Stonewall Jackson High School — testified at a board meeting about how the planned change would affect her:

    “I would have to represent a man that fought for my ancestors to be slaves. If this board decides to restore the names, I would not feel like I was valued and respected,” she said. The board still approved the change, 5-1.

    Even outside of schools, place names operate as a “hidden curriculum.” They provide narratives to the public about how the community or nation sees itself – as well as whose histories and perspectives it considers important or worthy of public attention.

    Place names affect how people perceive, experience and emotionally connect to their surroundings in both conscious and subconscious ways. Psychologists, sociologists and geographers have explored how this sense of place manifests itself into the psyche, creating either attachment or aversion to place, whether it’s a school, mountain or park.

    A tale of two forts

    Renaming places can rally a leader’s supporters through rebranding.

    Trump’s orders to restore the names Fort Bragg and Fort Benning, both originally named for Confederate generals, illustrate this effect. The names were changed to Fort Liberty and Fort Moore in 2023 after Congress passed a law banning the use of Confederate names for federal installations.

    Veterans and other guests posed in 2023 next to a newly unveiled sign for Fort Moore, named for Lt. Gen. Harold ‘Hal’ Moore, who served in Vietnam, and his wife, Julia Moore. In 2025, President Donald Trump reverted the name back to Fort Benning.
    Cheney Orr/AFP via Getty Images

    Trump made a campaign promise to his followers to “bring back the name” of Fort Bragg if reelected.

    To get around the federal ban, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth identified two unrelated decorated Army veterans with the same last names — Bragg and Benning — but without any Confederate connections, to honor instead.

    Call it a sleight of hand or a stroke of genius if you’d like, this tactic allowed the Department of Defense to revive politically charged names without violating the law.

    A soldier walks beside a sign that was unveiled when Fort Liberty was rededicated as Fort Bragg during a ceremony on base on March 7, 2025.
    AP Photo/Chris Seward

    The restoration of the names Bragg and Benning may feel like a symbolic homecoming for those who resisted the original name change or have emotional ties to the names through their memories of living and serving on the base, rather than a connection to the specific namesakes.

    However, the names are still reminders of the military bases’ original association with defenders of slavery.

    The place-renaming game

    A wave of place-name changes during the Obama and Biden administrations focused on removing offensive or derogatory place names and recognizing Indigenous names.

    For example, Clingmans Dome, the highest peak in the Great Smoky Mountains, was renamed to Kuwohi in September 2024, shifting the name from a Confederate general to a Cherokee word meaning “the mulberry place.”

    Under the Trump administration, however, place-name changes are being advanced explicitly to push back against reform efforts, part of a broader assault on what Trump calls “woke culture.”

    The view from a lookout tower on Kuwohi, formerly known as Clingmans Dome, in the Great Smoky Mountains.
    National Park Service



    Read more:
    From Confederate general to Cherokee heritage: Why returning the name Kuwohi to the Great Smoky Mountains matters


    President Barack Obama changed Alaska’s Mount McKinley to Denali in 2015 to acknowledge Indigenous heritage and a long-standing name for the mountain. Officials in Alaska had requested the name change to Denali years earlier and supported the name change in 2015.

    Trump, on his first day in office in January 2025, moved to rename Denali back to Mount McKinley, over the opposition of Republican politicians in Alaska. The state Legislature passed a resolution a few days later asking Trump to reconsider.

    Georgia Rep. Earl “Buddy” Carter made a recent legislative proposal to rename Greenland as “Red, White, and Blueland” in support of Trump’s expansionist desire to purchase the island, which is an autonomous territory of Denmark.

    Danish officials and Greenlanders saw Carter’s absurd proposal as insulting and damaging to diplomatic relations. It is not the first time that place renaming has been used as a form of symbolic insult in international relations.

    Renaming the Gulf of Mexico to Gulf of America might have initially seemed improbable, but it is already reflected in common navigation apps.

    Google Maps displays the name ‘Gulf of America’ instead of Gulf of Mexico in March 2025.
    Google INEGI



    Read more:
    Yes, Trump can rename the Gulf of Mexico – just not for everyone. Here’s how it works


    A better way to choose place names

    When leaders rename a place in an abrupt, unilateral fashion — often for ideological reasons — they risk alienating communities that deeply connect with those names as a form of memory, identity and place attachment.

    A better alternative, in our view, would be to make renaming shared landscapes participatory, with opportunities for meaningful public involvement in the renaming process.

    This approach does not avoid name changes, but it suggests the changes should respond to the social and psychological needs of communities and the evolving cultural identity of places — and not simply be used to score political points.

    Instead, encouraging public participation — such as through landscape impact assessments and critical audits that take the needs of affected communities seriously — can cultivate a sense of shared ownership in the decision that may give those names more staying power.

    The latest place renamings are already affecting the classroom experience. Students are not just memorizing new place labels, but they are also being asked to reevaluate the meaning of those places and their own relationship with the nation and the world.

    As history has shown around the world, one of the major downsides of leaders imposing name changes is that the names can be easily replaced as soon as the next regime takes power. The result can be a never-ending name game.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. From Greenland to Fort Bragg, America is caught in a name game where place names become political tools – https://theconversation.com/from-greenland-to-fort-bragg-america-is-caught-in-a-name-game-where-place-names-become-political-tools-251201

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The day the Red Army reached the USSR border in 1944

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University of Management – Official website of the State –

    On March 26, 1944, on the 1009th day of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops reached the state border of the USSR with Romania.

    This significant event occurred as a result of the actions of the 2nd Ukrainian Front during the Uman-Botoşani offensive operation under the command of the newly-minted Marshal Ivan Konev. Let us recall that Konev received a promotion for the successful Korsun-Shevchenkovsk operation, which ended on February 17, that is, just a month before the Red Army reached the border.

    Border posts were once again installed on the 85-kilometer section of the Soviet border, and this section of the border was taken under the protection of the 24th Border Regiment, the same one that guarded this line in 1941. Regiment veteran Boris Sichan recalls:

    “You can’t imagine the excitement in the regiment when it became clear that we were going to the same section of the border that we had guarded before the war. After we crossed the Dniester at Mogilev-Podolsky, many border guards took off their hats and caps and pulled out of their kit bags the green caps that they had carefully preserved since 1941.”

    Now the Red Army faced the task of liberating a not very friendly Europe from fascism: Romania under the dictatorship of Hitler’s ally John Antonescu, Hungary with the puppet regime of Ferenc Szalasi, Bulgaria, ruled by a pro-German regency council…

    There were still many large-scale operations and fierce battles ahead. In the meantime, Soviet troops were gradually reaching the borders of the Motherland and in other sections of the front: – On July 20, units of the 1st Belorussian Front crossed the border with Poland; – On July 21, troops of the Karelian Front reached the border with Finland; – On August 17, units of the 3rd Belorussian Front entered German territory; – On November 7, the western state border of the USSR was completely restored.

    #Scientific regiment

    Subscribe to the TG channel “Our GUU” Date of publication: 03/26/2025

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – US restrictions on AI chip exports to EU Member States – P-000495/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The United States (US) Interim Final Rule on a Framework on Artificial Intelligence (AI) Diffusion[1] (‘AI Diffusion measures’) restricts the export of advanced AI models and semiconductors. Exemptions to the restrictions depend on the ‘Tier’ or ‘category’ of country.[2]

    The AI Diffusion measures go against the principles of the Single Market: the free movement of goods (advanced AI semiconductors) and services (AI-enabled services).

    The Commission believes that it is also in the US’ economic and security interest that the EU buys advanced AI chips from the US without limitations. The EU cooperates closely, in particular in the field of security, and represents an economic opportunity for the US, not a security risk.

    The Commission shared its concerns about these measures in a statement issued on 13 January 2025[3] immediately after the adoption of the US AI Diffusion measures.

    The Commission is committed to the integrity of the Single Market and ensuring that trade restrictions do not undermine its functioning or the EU’s legitimate technological ambitions in the field of AI.

    The Commission works closely with the Member States to prepare a reply to the US Bureau of Industry and Security within the consultation period until 15 May 2025, and will further engage in discussions with the US administration to find an appropriate solution.

    In its engagement with the US, the Commission advocates for a non-discriminatory approach for EU Member States, which is key to safeguarding the integrity of the EU Single Market and the future of the AI ecosystem.

    At the same time, recognising the strategic importance of building AI chip capabilities in Europe, the Commission already supports initiatives in AI chip design and is committed to driving their manufacturing, as set out in the Competitiveness Compass.

    • [1] https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2025/01/15/2025-00636/framework-for-artificial-intelligence-diffusion
    • [2]  Tier 1: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden.
      Tier 2: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_25_255
    Last updated: 26 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: An autonomous Europe in times of geopolitical tension: the role of the financial system | Guest contribution in the Handelsblatt

    Source: Deutsche Bundesbank in English

    The world has been turned on its head and Germany’s economy is stagnating. But in times of geopolitical tensions, a strong German economy is critically important for an autonomous Europe. Public investment will rise sharply now that the special funds have been adopted. While this will unleash positive growth effects, it won’t be enough to significantly expand the economy over a medium to long-term horizon. The German economy itself needs to get match fit to compete internationally – by becoming more agile, more digitalised and more innovative. To achieve this, it is also going to require a great deal more private investment, and that means mobilising vast swathes of private capital. A strong European financial ecosystem is critically important for an autonomous Europe that can be relied on in turbulent geopolitical times.
    In this context, “autonomous” means a European real economy capable of obtaining funding via the European financial ecosystem and reducing its dependencies on non-European sources of capital. Bearing this in mind, a strong financial centre in Germany and Europe is crucially important, as is a more robust capital market culture.
    Germany’s potential growth – a measure of the country’s trend rate of growth – is languishing at a multi-year low. Compared with an average of 1.4% of gross domestic product (GDP) between 2011 and 2019, it is a mere 0.4% today.
    At the same time, Germany is Europe’s number one location for patent applications, and also ranks among the leading countries worldwide on this score – fifth, to be precise. However, much of Germany’s innovation is playing out in sectors characterised by lower growth potential, one of which is the automotive sector.
    What is more, China has emerged as more than just a strong rival in these middle technology sectors, as they are known. Overcapacities in the Chinese economy, including in the car industry, are also rippling out to the European market, exacerbating the competition and price wars further still.
    Why the United States is a high tech leader
    When it comes to high tech sectors boasting strong potential growth, there’s no getting around the United States. Much of this success is down to the fact that capital (including venture capital, which is all important for funding innovation) is far easier to mobilise in US markets. While 0.8% of GDP gets invested in venture capital in the United States, it is only 0.19% in Germany. Incentives would make sense here. In Italy, pension funds benefit from tax relief if they invest 5% or 10% in venture capital funds. Generally speaking, it is important to make it easier for firms to access financing via capital markets. Fingers crossed, then, that measures like the ones envisaged in Germany under the second Future Financing Act (Zukunftsfinanzierungsgesetz II) will be taken up again. These include, for example, making it easier for firms to go public and improving the general tax rules for investment in growth and innovation capital. 
    There are a great many growth markets offering a wealth of opportunities for German firms, like cleantech, pharmaceuticals, bioscience or artificial intelligence. In this respect, it is very welcome to see businesses, associations and government team up as part of the WIN Initiative (Growth and Innovation Capital for Germany) to channel up to €12 billion into the venture capital ecosystem. 
    Sweden: four times more IPOs than Germany
    But what Germany needs besides more venture capital activity is funded pensions. Sweden is a great example of how important this can be for capital markets. That Nordic country, with a population of roughly ten million, has seen 474 IPOs in total since 2015. Germany, with its much larger population, has had just 115. Sweden ranks first in the EU in the number of SME IPOs.
    This striking capital market culture is due, in part, to the country’s funded pension scheme, introduced back in the 1990s. Since its launch, Sweden’s AP7 pension fund has generated an average return of more than 10%. The Netherlands also has an adequate pension system, which is mainly built around capital-funded occupational pensions.
    There are many more countries I could mention that have taken similarly successful measures. A common feature is that two effects come about. First, as society ages, these models take the pressure off government budgets.
    Second, a country’s economy benefits from the capital market activities of its own population, which smooths the domestic funding of innovation and growth.
    German households were holding €9 trillion in capital at the end of last September – that’s a huge amount of potential investment. At present, though, only 17% of the population aged 14 and over hold shares, equity funds or ETFs.
    A strong capital market would benefit the domestic economy, the general public and government alike. It would enable the economy to be funded by the region, for the region, and add substantially to Europe’s autonomy. The general public would get better provision for their old age, one that is furthermore placed on a broader footing. Also, the pressure on government budgets would be reduced, which will be significant in view of the rising expenditure burden.
    In times of distinct geopolitical uncertainty, it is important for Germany and Europe to be autonomous. The capital market has a key role to play in this regard.

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Sampo plc: Notice of the Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Sampo plc, stock exchange release, 26 March 2024 at 10:25 am EET

    Sampo plc: Notice of the Annual General Meeting

    Notice is given to the shareholders of Sampo plc of the Annual General Meeting to be held on Wednesday, 23 April 2025 at 2.00 pm (EEST) at the Helsinki Exhibition and Convention Centre’s Congress Wing, address Rautatieläisenkatu 3, FI-00520 Helsinki, Finland. The reception of persons who have registered for the meeting and serving of coffee prior to the meeting will start at 12.30 pm (EEST).

    Shareholders have the opportunity to exercise their voting rights also by voting in advance on certain matters on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting. In addition, shareholders may follow the meeting through a live webcast. The webcast begins on 23 April 2025 at 2.00 pm (EEST). Following the meeting through the webcast is not considered as participation in the Annual General Meeting or the exercising of shareholder rights. It is not possible to ask questions, make counterproposals, address the meeting otherwise or vote through the webcast. Shareholders who wish to follow the webcast can exercise their voting rights by voting in advance. To receive the link for the webcast, shareholders are required to register through the registration system. The instructions regarding the advance voting and registering for the webcast are presented in Section C.6-7 herein.

    A. Items on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting

    The information and proposals of agenda items 1 to 5 concerning the formal organisational matters of the Annual General Meeting are included in a separate organisational document published on Sampo’s website at www.sampo.com/agm, which document also constitutes a part of this notice. The document may be supplemented at the meeting with any information that is not available before the Annual General Meeting.

    At the Annual General Meeting, the following items will be considered:

    1. Opening of the meeting

    2. Calling the meeting to order

    3. Election of persons to scrutinise the minutes and to supervise the counting of votes

    4. Recording the legality of the meeting

    5. Recording the attendance at the meeting and adoption of the list of votes

    6. Presentation of the Financial Statements, Report of the Board of Directors, the Auditor’s Report and the Sustainability Reporting Assurance Report for the financial year 2024

    • Review by the Group CEO
    • Auditor’s Report and Sustainability Reporting Assurance Report presented by the Auditor and Sustainability Reporting Assurance Provider

    7. Adoption of the Financial Statements

    8. Resolution on the use of the profit shown on the balance sheet and the payment of dividend

    The Board of Directors proposes to the Annual General Meeting that a total dividend of EUR 0.34 per share be paid to all shares except for the shares held by Sampo plc on the dividend record date of 25 April 2025. The dividend will be paid to the shareholders registered in the Company’s shareholders’ register maintained by Euroclear Finland Oy as at the record date of 25 April 2025. The Board proposes that the dividends be paid on 6 May 2025.

    The issuer of the Swedish depository receipts shall ensure that the dividend is paid to the depository receipt holders registered in the securities depository and settlement register maintained by Euroclear Sweden AB as at the record date of 25 April 2025, which payment shall be made in Swedish Krona. The dividend payment for shares registered in the form of share entitlements book-entered in VP Securities A/S in Denmark as at the record date of 25 April 2025 will be administered by VP Securities A/S subsequent to receipt of the dividend from Euroclear Finland.

    9. Resolution on the discharge of the members of the Board of Directors and the CEO from liability for the financial year 2024

    10. Consideration of the Remuneration Report for Governing Bodies

    The Board of Directors proposes that the Remuneration Report for Governing Bodies for the financial year 2024 be adopted by the Annual General Meeting through an advisory resolution.

    The Remuneration Report for Governing Bodies is available on Sampo plc’s website at www.sampo.com/agm.

    11. Resolution on the remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors

    The Nomination and Remuneration Committee of the Board of Directors proposes to the Annual General Meeting that the following annual fees be paid to the members of the Board of Directors until the close of the next Annual General Meeting:

    • EUR 243,000 for the Chair of the Board (prev. EUR 235,000);
    • EUR 140,000 for the Vice Chair of the Board (prev. EUR 135,000);
    • EUR 108,000 for each member of the Board (prev. EUR 104,000);
    • EUR 30,000 for the Chair of the Audit Committee as an additional annual fee (prev. EUR 29,000); and
    • EUR 6,800 for each member of the Audit Committee as an additional annual fee (prev. EUR 6,600).

    A Board member must acquire Sampo plc A shares at the price paid in public trading with 50 per cent of his/her annual fee after the deduction of taxes, payments and potential statutory social and pension costs. Notwithstanding this, a Board member is not required to purchase any additional Sampo plc A shares if the Board member owns such amount of said shares that their value is equivalent to twice the respective Board member’s gross annual fee. The Company will pay any possible transfer tax related to the acquisition of the shares.

    12. Resolution on the number of members of the Board of Directors

    The Nomination and Remuneration Committee of the Board of Directors proposes to the Annual General Meeting that the number of Board members is decreased by one and that eight members be elected to the Board.

    13. Election of the members of the Board of Directors

    The Nomination and Remuneration Committee of the Board of Directors proposes that the current members of the Board Christian Clausen, Steve Langan, Risto Murto, Antti Mäkinen, Markus Rauramo, Astrid Stange and Annica Witschard be re-elected for a term continuing until the close of the next Annual General Meeting. Of the current members, Georg Ehrnrooth and Jannica Fagerholm are not available for re-election. The Committee proposes that Sara Mella be elected as a new member to the Board.

    All the proposed Board members have been determined to be independent of the Company and its major shareholders under the rules of the Finnish Corporate Governance Code 2025.

    The CVs of all persons proposed as Board members are available at www.sampo.com/agm.

    14. Resolution on the remuneration of the Auditor and the Sustainability Reporting Assurance Provider

    The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors proposes to the Annual General Meeting that compensation be paid to the Company’s Auditor and to the Sustainability Reporting Assurance Provider against invoices approved by the Company.

    15. Election of the Auditor and the Sustainability Reporting Assurance Provider

    The Audit Committee of the Board of Directors proposes to the Annual General Meeting that the Authorised Public Accountant Firm Deloitte Ltd be re-elected as the Company’s Auditor for the financial year 2025. If Deloitte Ltd is elected as Sampo plc’s Auditor, the firm has announced that APA ASA Jukka Vattulainen will continue as the auditor with principal responsibility.

    The Audit Committee also proposes to the Annual General Meeting that Authorised Sustainability Audit Firm Deloitte Ltd be re-elected as the Company’s Sustainability Reporting Assurance Provider for the financial year 2025. If Deloitte Ltd is elected as Sampo plc’s Sustainability Reporting Assurance Provider, the firm has announced that APA ASA Jukka Vattulainen will continue as the principal authorised sustainability auditor.

    16. Authorising the Board of Directors to decide on the repurchase of the Company’s own shares

    The Board of Directors proposes to the Annual General Meeting that the Annual General Meeting authorise the Board to resolve to repurchase, on one or several occasions, a maximum of 250,000,000 Sampo plc A shares. The maximum number of shares represents approximately 9.29 per cent of all outstanding A shares of the Company as of number of shares on the date of the Board’s proposal. The repurchased shares will be cancelled.

    The shares may be repurchased either through an offer to all shareholders on equal terms or through other means and otherwise than in proportion to the existing shareholdings of the Company’s shareholders (directed repurchase) if the Board of Directors deems that there are weighty financial reasons for such directed repurchase. Directed repurchases may be carried out, among others, through open market purchases, participation in accelerated book-building processes or through arranging reversed accelerated book-building processes.

    The purchase price per share shall be no more than:

    (i) the highest price paid for the Company’s shares in public trading on the day of the repurchase or the offer to repurchase the Company’s own shares, or alternatively,

    (ii) the average of the share prices (volume weighted average price on the regulated markets where the Company’s share is admitted to trading) during the five trading days preceding the repurchase or the offer to repurchase the Company’s own shares.

    The lowest purchase price per share shall be the price that is 20 per cent lower than the lowest price paid for the Company’s shares in public trading during the validity of this authorisation until the repurchase or the offer to repurchase the Company’s own shares.

    It is proposed that the authorisation be valid until the close of the next Annual General Meeting, however no longer than 18 months from the Annual General Meeting’s decision.

    17. Closing of the meeting  

    B. Documents of the Annual General Meeting

    The proposals for decisions on the items on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting and this notice are available on Sampo plc’s website at www.sampo.com/agm. The Financial Statements, the Report of the Board of Directors, the Auditor’s Report, the Sustainability Reporting Assurance Report and the Remuneration Report for Governing Bodies for the financial year 2024 are available on Sampo plc’s website at www.sampo.com/year2024. The proposals for decisions and the other above-mentioned documents are also available at the meeting. Copies of these documents and of this notice will be sent to shareholders upon request. The minutes of the meeting will be available at www.sampo.com/agm on 7 May 2025 at the latest.

    C. Instructions for the participants in the Annual General Meeting

    The registration for the Annual General Meeting and the advance voting will commence on 26 March 2025 at 3:00 pm (EET) and end on 14 April 2025 at 4.00 pm (EEST). For holders of Swedish depositary receipts, the registration for the Annual General Meeting will commence on 26 March 2025 at 3.00 pm (EET) and end on 14 April 2025 at 9.00 am (EEST). For Danish shareholders, the registration for the Annual General Meeting and the advance voting will commence on 26 March 2025 at 2:00 pm (CET) and end on 11 April 2025 at 3:00 pm (CEST), Instructions on the registration for the Annual General Meeting for shareholders wishing to participate in the meeting at the meeting venue are set out in Subsections 1, 2 and 3 below. Instructions for holders of nominee-registered shares are set out below under Subsection 4. Information on proxy documents and Suomi.fi authorisations are set out in Subsection 5 below. The instructions for advance voting are set out in Subsection 6 below. Instructions regarding the registration for the live webcast are set out in Subsection 7 below.

    In connection with the registration and advance voting, at least the following information is requested: the shareholder’s name, date of birth (except for shareholders with shares registered with VP Securities A/S in Denmark) or business ID, email address, telephone number and information on a possible authorised representative. Strong electronic identification is required for the registration on the Company’s website of shareholders, their authorised representatives and proxy representatives who are private persons by using Finnish, Swedish or Danish online banking IDs or mobile certificates. For shareholders that are Finnish legal persons, electronic registration requires providing the entity’s business ID and that the relevant authorised person uses strong electronic identification for the registration. For shareholders that are legal persons with shares registered with VP Securities A/S in Denmark, registration requires providing the entity’s business ID, name of the shareholder, name and birthdate of the authorised representative, and an email address, the entity’s address and telephone number as contact information.

    The personal data provided by the shareholders to the Company is only used in connection with the Annual General Meeting and the processing of related registrations.

    More information on registration for the meeting and advance voting is available until 14 April 2025 by phone from Innovatics Ltd at +358 10 2818 909 from Monday to Friday between 9.00 am and 12.00 noon and between 1.00 pm and 4.00 pm (EET/EEST).

    1. Shareholders registered with Euroclear Finland Oy in Finland

    Each shareholder who is on 9 April 2025 registered in the shareholders’ register of Sampo plc held by Euroclear Finland Oy has the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting. A shareholder whose shares are registered on their personal Finnish book-entry account is registered in the shareholders’ register of the Company.

    A shareholder who is registered in the Company’s shareholders’ register and who wishes to participate in the Annual General Meeting shall notify the Company thereof according to the instructions set out below.

    Notification of participation shall be made no later than by 4.00 pm (EEST) on Monday 14 April 2025

    a) On the Company’s website at www.sampo.com/agm

    b) By email to agm@innovatics.fi or regular mail to Innovatics Oy, Yhtiökokous / Sampo Oyj, Ratamestarinkatu 13 A, FI-00520 Helsinki, Finland.

    c) By telephone to Innovatics Ltd at +358 10 2818 909 from Monday to Friday between 9.00 am and 12.00 noon and between 1.00 pm and 4.00 pm (EET/EEST). When registering by phone, a shareholder cannot vote in advance.

    Registration must be received by 4.00 pm (EEST) on Monday 14 April 2025 irrespective of the registration method.

    2. Shareholders registered with VP Securities A/S in Denmark

    Each shareholder who is on 9 April 2025 registered in the shareholders’ register of Sampo plc held by VP Securities A/S (Euronext Securities Copenhagen) has the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting. Such shareholders who wish to participate in the Annual General Meeting shall notify Euronext thereof according to the instructions set out below.

    Notification of participation shall be made no later than by 3.00 pm (CEST) on Friday 11 April 2025

    a) On the Company’s website at www.sampo.com/agm

    b) By email to CPH-investor@euronext.com

    c) By telephone to Euronext at +45 4358 8866 from Monday to Friday between 9.00 am and 4.00 pm (CET/CEST). When registering by phone, a shareholder cannot vote in advance.

    Registration must be received by 3.00 pm (CEST) on Friday 11 April 2025 irrespective of the registration method.

    If you represent a legal entity/person, you must present proof of identification and rights of representation. Such identification may consist of a document that proves your authorisation to sign on behalf of the entity or a document that process you are part of the management of the entity.

    Shareholders whose shares are held in trust in Denmark and who wish to participate in the Annual General Meeting are advised to request their trustee for the necessary instructions regarding the registration and advance voting. The trustee shall register the shareholder according to the instructions above to Euronext Securities Copenhagen no later than 11 April 2025 at 3.00 pm (CEST).

    3. Holders of Swedish depository receipts

    Holders of Swedish depository receipts (SDRs) have the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting by virtue of shares represented by the SDRs based on which they would be entitled to be registered in the shareholders’ register of the Company held by Euroclear Finland Oy on 9 April 2025. In addition, the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting requires that the holder of SDRs has been registered, on the basis of such shares represented by the SDRs, into the temporary shareholders’ register held by Euroclear Finland Oy at the latest by 10.00 am (EEST) on 16 April 2025, and the request regarding such registration must be delivered to the issuer of the SDRs and all necessary actions taken at the latest by 9.00 am (EEST) on 14 April 2025. As regards holders of SDRs, this constitutes a due registration for the Annual General Meeting.

    A holder of SDRs is advised to request without delay necessary instructions regarding the registration in the temporary shareholders’ register of the Company, the issuing of proxy documents and voting instructions from their custodian bank which the holder of the SDRs has appointed to hold the SDRs on their account. Said custodian bank shall take necessary actions to the effect that a holder of SDRs who wants to participate in the Annual General Meeting is registered into the temporary shareholders’ register of the Company at the latest by 10.00 am (EEST) on 16 April 2025 and, if necessary, arrange for advance voting on behalf of the holders of SDRs before the end of the registration period.

    Further information on these matters can also be found on the Company’s website www.sampo.com/agm.

    4. Holders of nominee-registered shares

    Holders of nominee-registered shares have the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting by virtue of shares based on which they would be entitled to be registered in the shareholders’ register of the Company held by Euroclear Finland Oy on 9 April 2025. In addition, the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting requires that the shareholder has been registered on the basis of such shares into the temporary shareholders’ register held by Euroclear Finland Oy at the latest by 10.00 am (EEST) on 16 April 2025. As regards nominee-registered shares, this constitutes a due registration for the Annual General Meeting.

    A holder of nominee-registered shares is advised to request without delay necessary instructions regarding the registration in the temporary shareholders’ register of the Company, the issuing of proxy documents, voting instructions and registration and advance voting for the Annual General Meeting from their custodian bank. The custodian bank shall register a holder of nominee-registered shares who wants to participate in the Annual General Meeting into the temporary shareholders’ register of the Company at the latest by the date stated above and, if necessary, arrange for advance voting on behalf of the holder of nominee-registered shares before the end of the registration period for holders of nominee-registered shares.

    Further information on these matters can also be found on the Company’s website www.sampo.com/agm.

    5. Proxy representative and powers of attorney

    A shareholder may participate in the Annual General Meeting and exercise their rights at the meeting by way of proxy representation. A proxy representative may also vote in advance in accordance with the instructions provided herein. The proxy representative shall authenticate in the electronic registration service and advance voting (if applicable) personally with strong authentication, after which they will be able to register and vote in advance on behalf of the shareholder whom they represent.

    A proxy representative shall produce a dated proxy document or otherwise in a reliable manner demonstrate their right to represent the shareholder at the Annual General Meeting. Providing the right to represent can be done by using the suomi.fi e-authorizations service available in the electronic registration service.

    When a shareholder participates in the Annual General Meeting by means of several proxy representatives representing the shareholder with shares on different securities accounts, the shares by which each proxy representative represents the shareholder shall be identified in connection with the registration for the Annual General Meeting.

    Possible proxy documents shall be delivered primarily as an attachment as part of the electronic registration, or alternatively, through email to agm@innovatics.fi or as originals to the address Innovatics Oy, Yhtiökokous / Sampo Oyj, Ratamestarinkatu 13 A, FI-00520 Helsinki, Finland before the end of the registration period.

    Delivering of a proxy prior to the end of the registration period is considered as registration for the meeting if all required information for registration described above is given.

    Shareholders may also use the electronic Suomi.fi authorisation service instead of a traditional authorisation. In such case, the shareholder authorises a representative in the Suomi.fi service at www.suomi.fi/e-authorizations by using the category “Representation at a general meeting”. The representative shall in connection with the registration to Innovatics’ general meeting service identify oneself through strong electronic identification. After that, the electronic authorisation will be proofed automatically. Online banking credentials or a mobile certificate may be used for strong electronic identification. More information is available at www.suomi.fi/e-authorizations and Sampo plc’s website at www.sampo.com/agm.

    6. Advance voting

    Shareholders may vote in advance on certain items on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting.

    a. Shareholders with shares registered with Euroclear Finland Oy in Finland

    Each shareholder who is registered in the shareholders’ register of the Company maintained by Euroclear Finland Oy as described in Subsection 1 above may vote in advance on certain items on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting between 26 March 2025 at 3.00 pm (EET) and 14 April 2025 at 4.00 pm (EEST):

    a) On the Company’s website at www.sampo.com/agm

    b) By email by submitting the advance voting form available on the Company’s website or equivalent information to agm@innovatics.fi or regular mail to Innovatics Oy, Yhtiökokous / Sampo Oyj, Ratamestarinkatu 13 A, FI-00520 Helsinki, Finland.

    b. Shareholders with shares registered with VP Securities A/S in Denmark

    Each shareholder who is registered in the shareholders’ register of Sampo plc held by VP Securities A/S (Euronext Securities Copenhagen) as described in Subsection 2 above may vote in advance on certain items on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting between 26 March 2025 at 2.00 pm (EET) and 11 April 2025 at 3.00 pm (CEST):

    a) On the Company’s website at www.sampo.com/agm

    b) By email to CPH-investor@euronext.com

    Shareholders whose shares are held in trust in Denmark and who wish to vote in advance are advised to instruct the trustee to vote in advance on behalf of such shareholders by 3.00 pm (CEST) on 11 April 2025 at the latest according to the instructions set out in this notice.

    The advance votes must be received by the end of the advance voting period. The submission of votes by email or by regular mail before the end of the registration and advance voting period shall be regarded as registration for the General Meeting, provided that it contains the above information required for the registration.

    A shareholder who has voted in advance may request information under the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act, request a vote at the Annual General Meeting or vote on a possible counterproposal if they are present or represented at the Annual General Meeting at the meeting venue.

    The agenda items subject to advance voting are deemed to be presented unchanged at the Annual General Meeting. Therefore, under agenda item 13, if any of the members proposed to be elected to the Board of Directors are unavailable for election to the Board of Directors at the Annual General Meeting for any reason, the number of the proposed members unavailable for election will be automatically decreased from the number of the members of the Board of Directors to be elected, and the remaining candidates available for election will be elected in accordance with the proposal of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee.

    Instructions regarding the advance voting, and the terms related to the electronic advance voting are also available on the Company’s website at www.sampo.com/agm.

    7. Webcast

    A shareholder who is entitled to attend the Annual General Meeting may also follow the meeting via live webcast. Following the meeting through the webcast is not considered as participation in the Annual General Meeting or the exercising of shareholder rights. It is not possible to ask questions, make counterproposals, address the meeting otherwise or vote through the webcast. Webcast access to the Annual General Meeting will be provided through Inderes Oyj’s virtual general meeting service on the Videosync platform, which includes video and audio access to the General Meeting. Following the webcast does not require any paid software or downloads. In addition to an internet connection, following the webcast requires a computer, smartphone or tablet with speakers or headphones for sound. One of the following browsers is recommended: Chrome, Firefox, Edge, Safari, or Opera. It is advisable to log in to the meeting system well in advance of the meeting.

    The link and password for following the meeting via the webcast will be sent by e-mail and/or SMS to the e-mail address and/or mobile phone number provided at the time of registration to all those who have registered for the General Meeting no later than the day before the General Meeting.

    For more information on the general meeting service, additional instructions for proxies representing more than one shareholder, contact details of the service provider and instructions in case of possible disruptions can be found here: https://vagm.fi/support. A link to test the compatibility of your computer, smartphone or tablet with the network connection can be found here: https://demo.videosync.fi/agm-compatibility?language=en. It is recommended that you read the detailed instructions before the meeting. More information and instructions can also be found on the Company’s website at www.sampo.com/agm.

    8. Other instructions and information

    Pursuant to Chapter 5, Section 25 of the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act, a shareholder who is present at the Annual General Meeting has the right to request information with respect to the items to be considered at the meeting.

    Any changes in the ownership of shares that have occurred after the record date of the Annual General Meeting do not affect the right to participate in nor the number of votes of the shareholder at the Annual General Meeting.

    On the date of this Notice of the Annual General Meeting the total number of shares in Sampo plc is 2,690,238,860 A shares, representing 2,690,238,860 votes, and 1,000,000 B shares, representing 5,000,000 votes, i.e. a total of 2,691,238,860 shares and 2,695,238,860 votes. At the Annual General Meeting, each A share carries one vote and each B share carries five votes.

    All of Sampo plc’s B shares are owned by a shareholder independent from the Company. Based on Sampo plc’s articles of association, each B share can be converted into an A share at the request of the holder of the B share. Subject to the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act, the general meeting may resolve upon a directed acquisition of own shares, decide on the amendment of the articles of association to the effect that share classes are combined or otherwise reduce share class rights only provided such a proposal is supported by at least two thirds of the votes and shares, per share class, represented at the meeting. Thus, the authority to decide on the combination of Sampo plc’s share classes does not rest with the Company.

    Helsinki, 26 March 2025

    SAMPO PLC
    Board of Directors

    For further information, please contact:

    Sami Taipalus
    Head of Investor Relations
    tel. +358 10 516 0030

    Maria Silander
    Communications Manager, Media Relations
    tel. +358 10 516 0031

    Distribution:
    Nasdaq Helsinki
    Nasdaq Stockholm
    Nasdaq Copenhagen
    London Stock Exchange
    FIN-FSA
    The principal media
    www.sampo.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Ress Life Investments A/S publishes notice for Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

                                                                                                                            Ress Life Investments A/S
                                                                                                                            Nybrogade 12
                                                                                                                            1203 Copenhagen K
                                                                                                                             Denmark
                                                                                                                             CVR nr. 33593163
                                                                                                                             www.resslifeinvestments.com

    To: Nasdaq Copenhagen
    Date: 26 March 2025

    Corporate Announcement 11/2025

    Ress Life Investments A/S publishes notice for Annual General Meeting

    TO THE SHAREHOLDERS OF RESS LIFE INVESTMENTS A/S

    In accordance with Article 9.8 of the Articles of Association, notice is hereby given of the Annual General Meeting of Ress Life Investments A/S (the “Company“) which will take place on Wednesday 16 April 2025 at 10.00 a.m. at Nybrogade 12, 1203 Copenhagen K, Denmark.

    Shareholders in the Company are invited to participate.

    Agenda for the Annual General Meeting:

    1)     Adoption of the annual report
    2)     Appropriation of profit or loss as recorded in the adopted annual report
    3)     Election of members of the Board of Directors
    4)     Approval of the Remuneration Report
    5)     Approval of remuneration for the Board of Directors for the financial year 2025
    6)     Appointment of auditor
    7)     Any other business

    COMPLETE PROPOSALS

    Re. item 1

    The Board of Directors proposes that the annual report be adopted.

    Re. item 2

    The Board of Directors proposes that the profit as recorded in the annual report as adopted by the general meeting should be distributed in accordance with the annual report.

    Re. item 3

    The Board of Directors proposes that Søren Andersen, Jeppe Buskov and Henrik Franck be re-elected to the Board of Directors.

    Mr Søren Andersen has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Company since August 2019. Mr Andersen is the managing director of Nordic I&P DK ApS, S.A. Consulting ApS, FPension A/S and NHMSA ApS. Mr Andersen currently is a board member of FPension A/S.

    Mr Jeppe Buskov has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Company since February 2014. Mr Buskov currently holds the position as chairman of the board of directors of Advokatfirmaet Kromann Reumert International A/S. Mr Buskov is a board member of KR 649 A/S.

    Mr Henrik Franck has been a member of the Board of Directors of the Company since April 2024. Mr Franck has 35 years of experience from the Asset Management Industry including 24 years in CIO positions.

    Re. item 4

    The Board of Directors proposes that the Remuneration Report attached to this notice be approved.

    Re. item 5

    The Board of Directors proposes the following remuneration for the Board of Directors for the financial year 2025:

    • Ordinary members will receive a basic remuneration of DKK 100,000
    • The chairman will receive a basic remuneration of DKK 215,000

    Re. item 6

    The Board of Directors proposes that Deloitte Statsautoriseret Revisionspartnerselskab should be re-elected as auditor. The Board of Directors has not been influenced by any third party and has not been bound by any third-party agreement, restricting the general meeting’s choice of auditor to certain auditors or audit firms.

    REGISTRATION, ADMISSION, PROXY AND POSTAL VOTE

    Registration date

    A shareholder’s right to participate in the general meeting and the number of votes, which the shareholder is entitled to cast, is determined in accordance with the number of shares held by such shareholder on 9 April 2025 (the registration date). The shares held by each shareholder are determined at the registration date on the basis of the shareholdings registered in the share register in accordance with any notices on shareholding received, but not yet registered, by the Company in the share register.

    Deadline for notice of attendance

    A shareholder or its proxy wishing to attend the general meeting must give notice of their participation to the Company no later than 11 April 2025, see Article 11.5 of the Articles of Association. Similarly, the shareholders’ advisor or the shareholders’ proxy’s advisor must give notice of their participation to the Company no later than 11 April 2025. Notice of participation may be given to the Company using the form attached as Appendix 1, which shall be sent, duly completed and signed, to Ress Life Investments A/S, Nybrogade 12, 1203 Copenhagen K, Denmark by letter or by email to RessLifeGroup@citco.com for receipt no later than 11 April 2025, 23:59 p.m.

    Proxy

    If you are prevented from attending the general meeting, you may appoint a proxy, e.g. the Board of Directors, to cast the votes carried by your shares. If you wish to appoint a proxy, please return the instrument of proxy form attached as Appendix 2, duly signed and dated, to Ress Life Investments A/S, Nybrogade 12, 1203 Copenhagen K, Denmark by letter or by email to RessLifeGroup@citco.com for receipt no later than 11 April 2025, 23:59 p.m.

    Postal vote

    You may also submit your votes by post before the date of the meeting. If you wish to vote by post, please fill in and return the postal vote form attached as Appendix 2, duly signed and dated, to Ress Life Investments A/S, Nybrogade 12, 1203 Copenhagen K, Denmark by letter or by email to RessLifeGroup@citco.com for receipt no later than 15 April 2025, 17:00 p.m.

    SHARE CAPITAL AND VOTING RIGHTS

    The Company’s share capital is EUR 87,873,500 divided into shares of EUR 500, cf. Article 3.1 of the Company’s Articles of Association. Pursuant to Article 11.1, each share of EUR 500 carries one (1) vote:

    Number of shares: 175,747
    Number of votes: 175,747

    AGENDA ETC.

    The agenda and the Annual Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2024 will be available for inspection by the shareholders on all business days and within normal business hours at the office of the Company at Nybrogade 12, 1203 Copenhagen K, Denmark no later than 3 weeks before the general meeting.

    The following information will be made available at the Company’s website (http://resslifeinvestments.com/) not later than 3 weeks before the meeting:

    1. Notice convening the meeting.
    2. The total number of shares and voting rights as at the date of the notice.
    3. The documents to be submitted to the general meeting.
    4. The agenda and the full text of the proposals.
    5. The forms to be used for voting by proxy and by post, if relevant

    RIGHT TO INQUIRE

    At the general meeting, the management will answer questions from the shareholders on matters of relevance to the assessment of the Annual Report for the period 1 January – 31 December 2024, the Company’s position, and other questions to be addressed by the meeting.

    Questions related to this announcement can be made to the Company’s CEO Ketil Poul Petersen, email: ketilp.rli@gmail.com or to the Company’s AIF-manager, Resscapital AB, Gustaf Hagerud, email: gustaf.hagerud@resscapital.com.

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EU citizens most concerned with security and unity, survey shows

    Source: European Union 2

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey, released today, highlights historic levels of approval for EU membership linked to peace and security.

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “Two thirds of Europeans want the EU to play a greater role in their protection. This is a clear call for action which we will answer. Europe needs to be stronger so that our citizens feel safer. The European Parliament will ensure that every proposal put forward is bold and ambitious enough to match the serious level of threat Europe faces. Europe must step up today, or it risks being stepped over tomorrow.”

    66% of EU citizens want the EU to take a more important role in protecting them against global crises and security risks. This view is particularly strong amongst younger respondents to the survey. At the national level, results for a stronger role of the EU range from 87% in Sweden to 47% in Romania and 44% in Poland.

    Almost three quarters of EU citizens (74%) believe their country has benefited from being a member of the EU. This is the highest result ever recorded in a Eurobarometer survey for this question since it was first asked in 1983. Fitting the current context, respondents mention the EU’s contribution to maintaining peace and strengthening security (35%) as the main reason why membership is considered beneficial.

    In addition, there is wide agreement among EU citizens that EU Member States should be more united to face current global challenges (89%) and that the European Union needs more means to deal with the challenges ahead (76%).

    Citizens expect the EU to strengthen security and defence and to enhance competitiveness

    In a rapidlychanging geopolitical environment, defence and security (36%) as well as competitiveness, economy and industry (32%) are identified as the areas on which the EU should focus most to reinforce its position in the world. These are also the topics that featured high on last week’s European Council with Parliament’s President calling for faster action and bolder ambition. While the results for defence and security have remained stable compared to February/March 2024, those for competitiveness, economy and industry have increased by five points. These two areas are followed by energy independence (27%), food security and agriculture (25%) and education and research (23%).

    Economic and security issues are also at the forefront when it comes to the topics citizens want the European Parliament to address as a priority. Four in ten Europeans mention inflation, rising prices and the cost of living (43%), followed by the EU’s defence and security (31%), the fight against poverty and social exclusion (31%) and support to the economy and the creation of new jobs (29%). Inflation, rising prices and the cost of living is a main priority across all age groups and with peak results recorded in Portugal (57%), France (56%), Slovakia (56%), Croatia (54%) and Estonia (54%).

    As shown by the EP’s previous survey, inflation and the cost of living had already played a major role as a driving force in the last European elections and the economic situation continues to be a main concern for many Europeans. A third (33%) expect their standard of living to decrease in the next five years, seven points more than in June-July 2024. This is the case for 53% of French respondents (+8 pp) and 47% of Germans (+15 pp).

    Peace and democracy remain EU core values

    Looking at the values Europeans would like the European Parliament to defend, peace (45%), democracy (32%) and the protection of human rights in the EU and worldwide (22%) come first. The results for this question have remained stable, underlining citizens steadfast support for the EU’s founding values and principles.

    Two-thirds of citizens support a stronger role for the EP

    As historic trend lines show, in moments of crisis citizens look to the EU for decisive actions and solutions. When the EU is perceived as coming together and delivering results, support indicators are high – which is currently the case.  50% of respondents have a positive image of the EU. In the last decade, this positive perception was only higher once (at 52%), in spring 2022 in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The positive image of the EP is stable at a high level (41%). A few months into the legislative term, over six in ten (62%) citizens would like to see the European Parliament play a more important role, a six- percentage point increase compared to February-March 2024, a few months before the June 2024 European elections.

    Full results can be found here.

    Background   

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey was carried out between 09 January and 04 February 2025 in all 27 EU Member States. The survey was conducted face-to-face, with video interviews used additionally in Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Netherlands, and Sweden. 26.354 interviews were conducted in total and EU results are weighted according to the size of the population in each country.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Deutsches Forschungsnetz selects Nokia to accelerate scientific research with a high-capacity green IP network 

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press Release
    Deutsches Forschungsnetz selects Nokia to accelerate scientific research with a high-capacity green IP network 

    • IP network upgrade allows Deutsches Forschungsnetz e.V. (DFN) to provide seamless access to critical resources and facilitate faster and more efficient collaboration.
    • Expansion delivers interface speeds up to 800 Gigabits per second to meet future capacity growth
    • Modernized IP core network offers higher bandwidth, increased capacity and up to 75% reduced power consumption

    26 March 2025
    Espoo, Finland – Nokia has renewed and expanded DFN’s, the German National Research and Education Network, IP core router network in Germany. Nokia’s IP router solution will give DFN access to higher bandwidth, increased network capacity and reduce power consumption in its network up to 75%.

    The DFN Association offers a comprehensive suite of services designed to meet the evolving needs of the scientific research community. By providing high-throughput connectivity, DFN ensures that researchers can seamlessly access critical resources, such as supercomputers and large-scale data repositories, enabling faster and more efficient collaboration. This is particularly vital for projects that require extensive data transfers or collaboration with international research institutions.

    The DFN Association operates the national research and education network and develops the communication infrastructure for universities, research institutes and R&D companies across Germany, connecting approximately 850 locations throughout the country. It is considered one of the largest and most powerful non-commercial networks in the world with a total length of 10,250 km of optical fiber in the backbone and a multi-terabit core network spanning 65 core network locations.

    DFN selected Nokia to swap out existing equipment from another vendor and provide IP core network routers to ten locations in Germany. This upgrade will increase connectivity from DFN’s current 100G interfaces to 400G, with runway to further upgrade to 800G as demand warrants. Nokia deployed its scalable 7750 Service Routers which are based on the company’s FP5 routing silicon.

    The deal includes a full suite of professional services, training and technical consultancy throughout the deployment and operation. All existing DFN applications were successfully migrated into Nokia’s service routers ahead of deployment.

    “Nokia’s solution offered the performance and scalability we need for our IP core network in Germany, and the results speak for themselves. With the implemented solution, we are already equipped for 800G and can now further scale and expand our services according to the requirements of our participants in research and higher education in Germany. We are very satisfied with the collaboration with Nokia and the results achieved so far,” said Dr. Stefan Piger, Head of Network and Communication Services at DFN.

    “As the developer and operator of the communications infrastructure linking universities and research institutes in Germany, DFN plays a vital role in fostering growth for the broader scientific community across the country. This collaboration with world class research and education network underscores the value of our IP routing technology in providing a robust, agile and adaptable core network with the headroom to scale efficiently into the future”, added Matthieu Bourguignon, Senior Vice President, Europe, Network Infrastructure at Nokia.

    Multimedia, technical information and related news 
    Product Page: FP5 network processor
    Product Page: 7750 Service Router
    Web Page: Nokia Research and Education Networks

    About Nokia 
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs, which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    About Deutsches Forschungsnetz e.V. – DFN
    The DFN Association is responsible for the operation and expansion of the German research network and related IT services. DFN operates and develops the communication infrastructure for research institutes in Germany. It connects universities, non-university research institutions and research-related commercial enterprises at around 850 locations throughout Germany.

    The science network has a total length of 10,250 km of optical fiber in the backbone and a multi-terabit core network spanning 65 core network locations; it is one of the largest and most powerful non-commercial communication networks in the world.

    DFN operates not only nationally but also connects to European and global scientific networks and the general Internet via high-performance exchange points.

    https://www.dfn.de/netz/

    Media inquiries
    Nokia Press Office
    Email: Press.Services@nokia.com

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: DNO Bags Kjøttkake with a Bang

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Oslo, 26 March 2025 – DNO ASA, the Norwegian oil and gas operator, today announced an important oil and gas discovery in Northern North Sea license PL1182 S in which the Company holds a 40 percent operated interest.   

    The discovery was made in Paleocene injectite sandstones of excellent reservoir quality with preliminary estimates of gross recoverable resources in the range of 39 to 75 million barrels of oil equivalent (MMboe), with a mean of 55 MMboe.

    The Kjøttkake exploration well encountered a 41-meter oil column and a 9-meter gas column. A sidetrack drilled horizontally 1,350 meters westwards along the reservoir in the Sotra Formation confirmed the presence of the oil column throughout the discovery.

    “We are on a hot streak in Norway,” said Executive Chairman Bijan Mossavar-Rahmani. “Our latest and most exciting discovery this year, Kjøttkake, is close to existing infrastructure in the Troll-Gjøa area, and we will be relentless in pursuing its commercialization.”

    Located 27 kilometers northwest of the Troll C platform and 44 kilometers southwest of the Gjøa platform, Kjøttkake is DNO’s tenth discovery since 2021 in the Troll-Gjøa exploration and development hotspot, following Røver Nord, Kveikje, Ofelia, Røver Sør, Heisenberg, Carmen, Kyrre, Cuvette and Ringand.

    The Company has also racked up discoveries in other parts of the Norwegian Continental Shelf, including Norma (2023) and Othello (2024), both play-opening finds and both operated by DNO.  

    Partners in license PL1182 S include Aker BP ASA (30 percent), Concedo AS (15 percent) and Japex Norge AS (15 percent). The wells were drilled using the Deepsea Yantai rig.

    Following its exploration success, the Company has stepped up purchases of producing assets to balance its Norwegian portfolio and help fund coming developments. In early March, DNO announced the transformative acquisition of Sval Energi Group AS, which will increase North Sea 2P reserves from 48 million barrels of oil equivalent (boe) to 189 million boe post-closing and 2C resources from 144 million boe to 246 million boe (pro forma figures as of yearend 2024).

    The acquisition, which is expected to close by mid-year, will turn the North Sea into the biggest contributor to Company’s net production with some 60 percent of the total, with the balance coming predominantly from two operated fields, Tawke and Peshkabir, in the Kurdistan region of Iraq.

    For further information, please contact:
    Media: media@dno.no
    Investors: investor.relations@dno.no

    DNO ASA is a Norwegian oil and gas operator active in the Middle East, the North Sea and West Africa. Founded in 1971 and listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange, the Company holds stakes in onshore and offshore licenses at various stages of exploration, development and production in the Kurdistan region of Iraq, Norway, the United Kingdom, Côte d’Ivoire, Netherlands and Yemen. More information is available at www.dno.no

    This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to section 5-12 of the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI China: Tesla sales halve in EU amid broader EV boom

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Sales of electric vehicles in the European Union (EU) rose in the first two months of 2025, but Tesla saw a sharp drop in new registrations, industry data showed on Tuesday.

    Battery-electric car sales grew by 28.4 percent year-on-year to about 255,489 units, accounting for 15.2 percent of the total EU market, according to the European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association (ACEA).

    Tesla registered around 19,000 new vehicles during the same period, down nearly 49 percent from more than 37,000 a year earlier.

    The decline comes amid strained transatlantic ties, worsened by U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent remarks about “buying” Greenland and tariff hikes on the EU. Tesla, whose CEO Elon Musk has close ties with Trump, has faced growing consumer backlash in parts of Europe. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: A $33 billion vote-grabber or real relief? Examining the Albanese government’s big housing pledge

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ehsan Noroozinejad, Senior Researcher, Urban Transformations Research Centre, Western Sydney University

    Man As Thep/Shutterstock

    The Australian housing market is in crisis: soaring prices, increasing rental stress, declining home ownership rates and a growing number of people experiencing homelessness.

    In response, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has announced a $33 billion housing investment plan as part of his government’s latest budget.




    Read more:
    At a glance: the 2025 federal budget


    This is a central plank of Labor’s re-election pitch, aimed at showing housing commitment by:

    Making it easier to buy, better to rent, and building more homes faster.

    What are the key features of the plan?

    The plan includes two headline measures aimed at boosting housing supply and helping buyers:

    1-Expanding ‘Help to Buy’ for first-home buyers:

    The Help to Buy program provides shared-equity loans to first-time homebuyers so they can purchase properties with smaller deposits. Under this program, the government buys a portion of the property to lower the required mortgage amount for buyers.

    Under the initial terms of the scheme, the Commonwealth offered up to 30% of the price for existing homes and 40% for new constructions, while restricting eligibility to households within specific income and property value ranges.

    Now, the Albanese government has raised cap levels to enable more people to become eligible. The income ceiling for single buyers will increase from $90,000 to $100,000, while the maximum income limit for couples and single parents will rise from $120,000 to $160,000.

    These higher caps mean more than five million Australian properties would fall under the scheme’s scope, significantly expanding buyers’ choice.

    2-Investing in prefabricated and modular homes:

    In November 2024, the Albanese government announced a $900 million productivity fund to reward states and territories that boost housing supply by removing barriers to prefab and modular construction.

    And now, the Albanese government is budgeting another $54 million for the advanced manufacturing of prefab and modular housing industry. This includes $5 million to create a national certification system to streamline approvals and eliminate red tape.

    This aims to speed up home construction through off-site manufacturing technologies, which produce components in factories before assembling them on-site.

    Minister for Industry and Science Ed Husic claims these homes can be finished in half the time of conventional construction. Even a 20–30% time saving would be significant.

    These buildings are also more energy efficient, more resilient and cheaper.

    A crane lifts part of a modular home into place.
    benik.at/Shutterstock

    Can these measures fix the problem?

    The big picture problem is, Australia has simply not been building enough homes for its growing population.

    According to the Urban Development Institute of Australia’s State of the Land Report 2025, the federal government will fail (by 400,000 dwellings) to meet its target of constructing 1.2 million new homes by 2029.

    Prefab building methods make up just 8% of new housing developments in Australia.

    Some countries use it much more: Sweden boasts more than 100 years of prefab construction experience, where more than 80% of homes are produced in factories and then assembled at their destinations.

    Modular housing can be described as a promising step forward. But while they offer potential improvements in speed and cost efficiency, it cannot solve the massive housing deficit on its own without structural policy reforms in the near future.

    What about the Help to Buy scheme?

    Shared-equity loans tackle a different side of the problem: affordability for buyers.

    Experts describe Help to Buy as a “modest” but useful “piece of the puzzle” in solving the housing crisis.

    While its impact on general house prices and universal housing affordability is minimal, policymakers worry that programs like these unintentionally push up prices by boosting demand.

    Federal v state roles

    Housing policy in Australia is a shared responsibility.

    State governments control planning, zoning and most of the levers that determine how quickly homes can be approved and built (such as releasing land for development or approving apartment projects).

    The federal government mainly controls funding and high-level programs, so the success of the Albanese government’s plan will depend a lot on cooperation with the states and territories.

    However, there’s some inherent tension here: Canberra can set targets and provide incentives (funding), but it can’t directly build houses or force local councils to approve projects faster.

    That’s one reason behind the prefab certification idea: it removes one potential regulatory hurdle at a national level.

    Political timing

    The timing of this housing plan announcement is no coincidence.

    Australia will have a federal election by May 2025. Most voters will likely consider housing costs and cost-of-living to be primary issues.

    The expansion of Help to Buy enables Labor to target first-home buyers, which may be important in the election.

    The new housing plan is ambitious in scope and certainly a welcome effort to turn the tide on housing affordability.

    However, renters and prospective buyers are unlikely to experience quick benefits from these housing initiatives, as it will require sustained action and cooperation well beyond the upcoming election cycle.

    The Help to Buy program will begin later in 2025, and the positive effects of investing in prefabricated/modular housing will require a period of time before they become apparent.

    It is unclear whether these measures will effectively persuade voters and produce substantial improvements.

    Dr. Ehsan Noroozinejad has received funding from both national and international organisations to support research addressing housing and climate crises. His most recent funding on integrated housing and climate policy comes from the James Martin Institute for Public Policy.

    ref. A $33 billion vote-grabber or real relief? Examining the Albanese government’s big housing pledge – https://theconversation.com/a-33-billion-vote-grabber-or-real-relief-examining-the-albanese-governments-big-housing-pledge-252915

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-left”>By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered: 

    Section 1.  Purpose and Policy.  Despite pioneering self-government, the United States now fails to enforce basic and necessary election protections employed by modern, developed nations, as well as those still developing.  India and Brazil, for example, are tying voter identification to a biometric database, while the United States largely relies on self-attestation for citizenship.  In tabulating votes, Germany and Canada require use of paper ballots, counted in public by local officials, which substantially reduces the number of disputes as compared to the American patchwork of voting methods that can lead to basic chain-of-custody problems.  Further, while countries like Denmark and Sweden sensibly limit mail-in voting to those unable to vote in person and do not count late-arriving votes regardless of the date of postmark, many American elections now feature mass voting by mail, with many officials accepting ballots without postmarks or those received well after Election Day. 

    Free, fair, and honest elections unmarred by fraud, errors, or suspicion are fundamental to maintaining our constitutional Republic.  The right of American citizens to have their votes properly counted and tabulated, without illegal dilution, is vital to determining the rightful winner of an election.
    Under the Constitution, State governments must safeguard American elections in compliance with Federal laws that protect Americans’ voting rights and guard against dilution by illegal voting, discrimination, fraud, and other forms of malfeasance and error.  Yet the United States has not adequately enforced Federal election requirements that, for example, prohibit States from counting ballots received after Election Day or prohibit non-citizens from registering to vote.

    Federal law establishes a uniform Election Day across the Nation for Federal elections, 2 U.S.C. 7 and 3 U.S.C. 1.  It is the policy of my Administration to enforce those statutes and require that votes be cast and received by the election date established in law.  As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held in Republican National Committee v. Wetzel (2024), those statutes set “the day by which ballots must be both cast by voters and received by state officials.”  Yet numerous States fail to comply with those laws by counting ballots received after Election Day.  This is like allowing persons who arrive 3 days after Election Day, perhaps after a winner has been declared, to vote in person at a former voting precinct, which would be absurd.  

    Several Federal laws, including 18 U.S.C. 1015 and 611, prohibit foreign nationals from registering to vote or voting in Federal elections.  Yet States fail adequately to vet voters’ citizenship, and, in recent years, the Department of Justice has failed to prioritize and devote sufficient resources for enforcement of these provisions.  Even worse, the prior administration actively prevented States from removing aliens from their voter lists.  

    Additionally, Federal laws, such as the National Voter Registration Act (Public Law 103-31) and the Help America Vote Act (Public Law 107-252), require States to maintain an accurate and current Statewide list of every legally registered voter in the State.  And the Department of Homeland Security is required to share database information with States upon request so they can fulfill this duty.  See 8 U.S.C. 1373(c).  Maintaining accurate voter registration lists is a fundamental requirement in protecting voters from having their ballots voided or diluted by fraudulent votes. 
    Federal law, 52 U.S.C. 30121, prohibits foreign nationals from participating in Federal, State, or local elections by making any contributions or expenditures.  But foreign nationals and non-governmental organizations have taken advantage of loopholes in the law’s interpretation, spending millions of dollars through conduit contributions and ballot-initiative-related expenditures.  This type of foreign interference in our election process undermines the franchise and the right of American citizens to govern their Republic.  

    Above all, elections must be honest and worthy of the public trust.  That requires voting methods that produce a voter-verifiable paper record allowing voters to efficiently check their votes to protect against fraud or mistake.  Election-integrity standards must be modified accordingly.
    It is the policy of my Administration to enforce Federal law and to protect the integrity of our election process.

    Sec. 2.  Enforcing the Citizenship Requirement for Federal Elections.  To enforce the Federal prohibition on foreign nationals voting in Federal elections:

    (a)(i) Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Election Assistance Commission shall take appropriate action to require, in its national mail voter registration form issued under 52 U.S.C. 20508:

    (A)  documentary proof of United States citizenship, consistent with 52 U.S.C. 20508(b)(3); and

    (B)  a State or local official to record on the form the type of document that the applicant presented as documentary proof of United States citizenship, including the date of the document’s issuance, the date of the document’s expiration (if any), the office that issued the document, and any unique identification number associated with the document as required by the criteria in 52 U.S.C. 21083(a)(5)(A), while taking appropriate measures to ensure information security.

    (ii)  For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, “documentary proof of United States citizenship” shall include a copy of: 

    (A)  a United States passport; 

    (B)  an identification document compliant with the requirements of the REAL ID Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-13, Div. B) that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States; 

    (C)  an official military identification card that indicates the applicant is a citizen of the United States; or 

    (D)  a valid Federal or State government-issued photo identification if such identification indicates that the applicant is a United States citizen or if such identification is otherwise accompanied by proof of United States citizenship.

    (b)  To identify unqualified voters registered in the States:

    (i)    the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, consistent with applicable law, ensure that State and local officials have, without the requirement of the payment of a fee, access to appropriate systems for verifying the citizenship or immigration status of individuals registering to vote or who are already registered;

    (ii)   the Secretary of State shall take all lawful and appropriate action to make available information from relevant databases to State and local election officials engaged in verifying the citizenship of individuals registering to vote or who are already registered; and 

    (iii)  the Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the DOGE Administrator, shall review each State’s publicly available voter registration list and available records concerning voter list maintenance activities as required by 52 U.S.C. 20507, alongside Federal immigration databases and State records requested, including through subpoena where necessary and authorized by law, for consistency with Federal requirements. 

    (c)  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall, consistent with applicable law, provide to the Attorney General complete information on all foreign nationals who have indicated on any immigration form that they have registered or voted in a Federal, State, or local election, and shall also take all appropriate action to submit to relevant State or local election officials such information.

    (d)  The head of each Federal voter registration executive department or agency (agency) under the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. 20506(a), shall assess citizenship prior to providing a Federal voter registration form to enrollees of public assistance programs.   

    (e)  The Attorney General shall prioritize enforcement of 18 U.S.C. 611 and 1015(f) and similar laws that restrict non-citizens from registering to vote or voting, including through use of:

    (i)    databases or information maintained by the Department of Homeland Security; 

    (ii)   State-issued identification records and driver license databases; and

    (iii)  similar records relating to citizenship.

    (f)  The Attorney General shall, consistent with applicable laws, coordinate with State attorneys general to assist with State-level review and prosecution of aliens unlawfully registered to vote or casting votes.

    Sec. 3.  Providing Other Assistance to States Verifying Eligibility.  To assist States in determining whether individuals are eligible to register and vote:

    (a)  The Commissioner of Social Security shall take all appropriate action to make available the Social Security Number Verification Service, the Death Master File, and any other Federal databases containing relevant information to all State and local election officials engaged in verifying the eligibility of individuals registering to vote or who are already registered.  In determining and taking such action, the Commissioner of Social Security shall ensure compliance with applicable privacy and data security laws and regulations. 

    (b)  The Attorney General shall ensure compliance with the requirements of 52 U.S.C. 20507(g).  

    (c)  The Attorney General shall take appropriate action with respect to States that fail to comply with the list maintenance requirements of the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America     Vote Act contained in 52 U.S.C. 20507 and 52 U.S.C. 21083.

    (d)  The Secretary of Defense shall update the Federal Post Card Application, pursuant to the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. 20301, to require:

    (i)   documentary proof of United States citizenship, as defined by section 2(a)(ii) of this order; and

    (ii)  proof of eligibility to vote in elections in the State in which the voter is attempting to vote.

    Sec. 4.  Improving the Election Assistance Commission.  
    (a)  The Election Assistance Commission shall, pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 21003(b)(3)and 21142(c) and consistent with applicable law, take all appropriate action to cease providing Federal funds to States that do not comply with the Federal laws set forth in 52 U.S.C. 21145, including the requirement in 52 U.S.C. 20505(a)(1) that States accept and use the national mail voter registration form issued pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 20508(a)(1), including any requirement for documentary proof of United States citizenship adopted pursuant to section 2(a)(ii) of this order.

    (b)(i) The Election Assistance Commission shall initiate appropriate action to amend the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 and issue other appropriate guidance establishing standards for voting systems to protect election integrity.  The amended guidelines and other guidance shall provide that voting systems should not use a ballot in which a vote is contained within a barcode or quick-response code in the vote counting process except where necessary to accommodate individuals with disabilities and should provide a voter-verifiable paper record to prevent fraud or mistake. 

    (ii)  Within 180 days of the date of this order, the Election Assistance Commission shall take appropriate action to review and, if appropriate, re-certify voting systems under the new standards established under subsection (b)(i) of this section, and to rescind all previous certifications of voting equipment based on prior standards.  

    (c)  Following an audit of Help America Vote Act fund expenditures conducted pursuant to 52 U.S.C. 21142, the Election Assistance Commission shall report any discrepancies or issues with an audited State’s certifications of compliance with Federal law to the Department of Justice for appropriate enforcement action.

    (d) The Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, consistent with applicable law, shall in considering the provision of funding for State or local election offices or administrators through the Homeland Security Grant Programs, 6 U.S.C. 603 et seq., heavily prioritize compliance with the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 developed by the Election Assistance Commission and completion of testing through the Voting System Test Labs accreditation process.

    Sec. 5.  Prosecuting Election Crimes.  To protect the franchise of American citizens and their right to participate in fair and honest elections:

    (a)  The Attorney General shall take all appropriate action to enter into information-sharing agreements, to the maximum extent possible, with the chief State election official or multi-member agency of each State.  These agreements shall aim to provide the Department of Justice with detailed information on all suspected violations of State and Federal election laws discovered by State officials, including information on individuals who: 

    (i)    registered or voted despite being ineligible or who registered multiple times; 

    (ii)   committed election fraud;

    (iii)  provided false information on voter registration or other election forms;

    (iv)   intimidated or threatened voters or election officials; or 

    (v)    otherwise engaged in unlawful conduct to interfere in the election process.

    (b)  To the extent that any States are unwilling to enter into such an information sharing agreement or refuse to cooperate in investigations and prosecutions of election crimes, the Attorney General shall: 

    (i)   prioritize enforcement of Federal election integrity laws in such States to ensure election integrity given the State’s demonstrated unwillingness to enter into an information-sharing agreement or to cooperate in investigations and prosecutions; and

    (ii)  review for potential withholding of grants and other funds that the Department awards and distributes, in the Department’s discretion, to State and local governments for law enforcement and other purposes, as consistent with applicable law.

    (c)  The Attorney General shall take all appropriate action to align the Department of Justice’s litigation positions with the purpose and policy of this order.

    Sec. 6.  Improving Security of Voting Systems.  To improve the security of all voting equipment and systems used to cast ballots, tabulate votes, and report results:

    (a)  The Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take all appropriate actions to the extent permitted by 42 U.S.C. 5195c and all other applicable law, so long as the Department of Homeland Security maintains the designation of election infrastructure as critical infrastructure, as defined by 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e), to prevent all non-citizens from being involved in the administration of any Federal election, including by accessing election equipment, ballots, or any other relevant materials used in the conduct of any Federal election.

    (b)  The Secretary of Homeland Security shall, in coordination with the Election Assistance Commission and to the maximum extent possible, review and report on the security of all electronic systems used in the voter registration and voting process.  The Secretary of Homeland Security, as the head of the designated Sector Risk Management Agency under 6 U.S.C. 652a, in coordination with the Election Assistance Commission, shall assess the security of all such systems to the extent they are connected to, or integrated into, the Internet and report on the risk of such systems being compromised through malicious software and unauthorized intrusions into the system.  

    Sec. 7.  Compliance with Federal Law Setting the National Election Day.  To achieve full compliance with the Federal laws that set the uniform day for appointing Presidential electors and electing members of Congress:

    (a)  The Attorney General shall take all necessary action to enforce 2 U.S.C. 7 and 3 U.S.C. 1 against States that violate these provisions by including absentee or mail-in ballots received after Election Day in the final tabulation of votes for the appointment of Presidential electors and the election of members of the United States Senate and House of Representatives.

    (b)  Consistent with 52 U.S.C. 21001(b) and other applicable law, the Election Assistance Commission shall condition any available funding to a State on that State’s compliance with the requirement in 52 U.S.C. 21081(a)(6) that each State adopt uniform and nondiscriminatory standards within that State that define what constitutes a vote and what will be counted as a vote, including that, as prescribed in 2 U.S.C. 7 and 3 U.S.C. 1, there be a uniform and nondiscriminatory ballot receipt deadline of Election Day for all methods of voting, excluding ballots cast in accordance with 52 U.S.C. 20301 et seq., after which no additional votes may be cast.  

    Sec. 8.  Preventing Foreign Interference and Unlawful Use of Federal Funds.  The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall prioritize enforcement of 52 U.S.C. 30121 and other appropriate laws to prevent foreign nationals from contributing or donating in United States elections.  The Attorney General shall likewise prioritize enforcement of 31 U.S.C. 1352, which prohibits lobbying by organizations or entities that have received any Federal funds.   

    Sec. 9.  Federal Actions to Address Executive Order 14019.  The heads of all agencies, and the Election Assistance Commission, shall cease all agency actions implementing Executive Order 14019 of March 7, 2021 (Promoting Access to Voting), which was revoked by Executive Order 14148 of on January 20, 2025 (Initial Rescissions of Harmful Executive Orders and Actions), and, within 90 days of the date of this order, submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Domestic Policy, a report describing compliance with this order.

    Sec. 10.  Severability.  If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any agency, person, or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other agencies, persons, or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

    Sec. 11.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

    DONALD J. TRUMP

    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        March 25, 2025. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA News: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Protects the Integrity of American Elections

    Source: The White House

    RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN ELECTIONS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order to protect the integrity of American elections.

    • This Order strengthens voter citizenship verification and bans foreign nationals from interfering in U.S. elections.
      • The Election Assistance Commission will require documentary, government-issued proof of U.S. citizenship on its voter registration forms.
      • Agencies like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Social Security Administration and Department of State must provide states with access to Federal databases to verify eligibility and citizenship of individuals registering to vote.
      • The Attorney General will prioritize prosecuting non-citizen voting and related crimes, including through use of DHS records and coordination with state attorneys general.
    • Federal election-related funds will be conditioned on states complying with the integrity measures set forth by Federal law, including the requirement that states use the national mail voter registration form that will now require proof of citizenship.
    • The Order improves the integrity of elections by directing the updating of the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines 2.0 and security standards for voting equipment and prioritizing federal grant funds accordingly.
      • This includes requiring a voter-verifiable paper ballot record and not using ballots in which the counted vote is contained within a barcode or QR code.
    • It directs the Attorney General to enter into information-sharing agreements with state election officials to identify cases of election fraud or other election law violations.
      • Non-compliant states may face prioritized Federal enforcement of election integrity laws and loss of funding given their unwillingness to police fraud.
    • The Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security shall prevent non-citizens from any involvement in administering elections.
    • The Attorney General will fully enforce the voter-list maintenance requirements of the National Voter Registration Act and the Help America Vote Act.
    • Given clear Federal law setting a single Election Day deadline, the Attorney General shall take appropriate action against states that count ballots received after Election Day in Federal elections. Federal election funding will be conditioned on compliance.
    • The Attorney General will prioritize enforcement of laws prohibiting foreign nationals from contributing to or donating in U.S. elections.
    • All agencies must report on compliance with undoing Biden Executive Order 14019, which turned Federal agencies into Democratic voter turnout centers.

    SAFEGUARDING THE VOTE: President Trump recognizes that free, fair, and honest elections—unmarred by fraud, errors, or suspicion—are essential to our Constitutional Republic.

    • The United States lags behind other nations in enforcing basic and necessary election protections.
      • India and Brazil tie voter identification to a biometric database, while the United States largely relies on self-attestation for citizenship.
      • Germany and Canada require paper ballots when tabulating votes, while the United States has a patchwork of methods that often lack basic chain-of-custody protections.
      • Denmark and Sweden sensibly limit mail-in voting to those unable to vote in person—and late arrivals do not count—while American elections now feature mass voting by mail, even after Election Day.
    • Without proper enforcement of Federal laws, illegal voting, discrimination, fraud, and other forms of malfeasance and error dilute the votes of lawful American citizens.
    • Federal law establishes a uniform Election Day across the nation for Federal elections, but numerous states fail to comply with those laws by counting ballots received after Election Day.
    • The Biden Administration blocked states from removing aliens from voter rolls, while foreign nationals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) exploited loopholes to pour millions into influencing U.S. elections.

    MAKING ELECTIONS SECURE AGAIN: Voters deserve elections they can trust, and that confidence is being restored thanks to President Trump. 

    • President Trump is following through on his promise to secure our elections.
      • President Trump: “We’re going to fix our elections so that our elections are going to be honorable and honest and people leave and they know their vote is counted. We are going to have free and fair elections. And ideally, we go to paper ballots, same-day voting, proof of citizenship, very big, and voter ID, very simple.”
      • President Trump: “We will secure our elections, and they will be secure once and for all.”
    • Unlike the Biden Administration, which prioritized political agendas over fair elections, President Trump is putting the American people back in charge.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Amid Appalling Civilian Death Toll in Syria, Caretaker Authorities Must Signal ‘Era of Impunity’ Is Over, Special Envoy Tells Security Council

    Source: United Nations 4

    Several Speakers Urge Lifting Economic Sanctions on Damascus, Condemn Israel’s Ongoing Violations of Syria’s Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity

    Meeting today — 14 years after the start of the civil war in Syria, four months since the fall of the former regime and weeks removed from harrowing violence along the country’s coast — the Security Council heard of the need for accountability and economic recovery so that the country can move towards credible, inclusive transition.

    “The legacies of 14 years of war and conflict — and five decades of one-man rule — are huge,” said Geir O. Pedersen, the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Syria.  “So are the immediate challenges facing the Syrians today,” he added. While many have rejoiced at their newfound ability to gather in public spaces without fear, many others have faced devastating violence on Syria’s coast.  On that, he said that “armed groups associated with the former regime” attacked and ambushed caretaker authority forces across that region on 6 March. “Serious armed confrontations ensued, resulting in significant numbers of casualties among the warring factions,” he reported.

    “But far more disturbing was the appalling civilian death toll,” he stressed, spotlighting “widespread footage of grave violations of a plainly sectarian and retaliatory nature”.  Detailing the broader context of fomenting insecurity, hate speech, sense of exclusion and pent-up grievance, he said that further investigation is needed to fully determine the perpetrators of the “shocking” violence against civilians.  For their part, the caretaker authorities have announced an independent investigative committee tasked with examining violations by all sides.  He underscored that findings must be made public and those responsible held accountable to clearly signal that “the era of impunity in Syria is in the past”.

    He went on to express concern over recent Israeli statements on the intention to stay in Syria “for the foreseeable future”, as well as demands for the “full demilitarization of southern Syria”, calling on the Council to “hold Israel to its commitment that this is a temporary presence”.  Additionally, he detailed the caretaker authorities’ actions to establish a transitional Government, a permanent Constitution and transitional justice. “Syrians need an economic future,” he added, welcoming humanitarian pledges made at the ninth Brussels Conference on 17 March to support Syria’s recovery.  However, observing that “more resources will be needed”, he also urged “fast and broad sanctions easing”.

    Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, cited progress on that front, with expanded cross-border deliveries from Türkiye, engagement with Member States to ease sanctions, the repair of infrastructure to restore access to water and the clearance of over 1,700 pieces of unexploded ordnance. Nevertheless, he underscored:  “We need more funding.”  The 2024 Humanitarian Appeal for Syria was only 35 per cent funded, and in 2025, almost half of organizations funded by the United States have received full or partial stop orders.

    Stating that $2 billion is needed to reach 8 million of the most vulnerable people through June, he noted that his office has only received $155 million to date — 13 per cent of what is needed.  Yet, 16 million people — nearly three quarters of the Syrian population — lack sufficient food, water, shelter and medicine.  While stating that there are real reasons for hope after 14 years of conflict and devastation, he stressed that “there is no time to spare”.  He therefore urged those present to be “problem-solvers, rather than problem-observers”.

    Next to brief was Joumana Seif, Co-founder of the Syrian Women’s Political Movement and Legal Adviser at the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, who pointed out that Syrians endured “immense” suffering under the rule of Bashar al-Assad.  This led to sanctions, which affected not only the regime, but also ordinary citizens.  “Now that Assad is no longer in power, there is no justification for maintaining these sanctions,” she stressed, adding that “what Syrians need most” is the immediate lifting of these measures alongside investment, reconstruction and economic revitalization.

    Turning to the recent coastal violence, she underscored that this has “caused real concern for us Syrians”.  She stressed:  “We don’t want to build our new country on the back of a new massacre.”  Instead, Syrians must create a transparent and inclusive plan for transitional justice, which requires consultation with victims’ associations and civil society to ensure fair trials, truth commissions, moral and financial compensation for victims and safeguards to prevent future atrocities.  “All of this requires significant financial resources,” she observed.  Additionally, she underscored the need to form an inclusive Government that “truly represents everyone without exclusion”.

    As the floor opened, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Council President for March, spoke in his national capacity to underscore that the interim Government “must protect Syrians from all religious and ethnic backgrounds”.  He also underlined the need for an inclusive political transition. “Syrian society, in all its complexity and diversity, must be represented,” he urged.  And on the issue of sanctions, he noted that the European Union suspended several such measures in February “to send a very clear signal to the Syrian people of our support towards a better future”.

    Also underlining the European Union’s commitment to the Syrian people, the representative of France noted the suspension of certain restrictive measures to facilitate financial and bank transactions for the country’s reconstruction.  Slovenia’s representative added that the bloc will consider a further lifting of sanctions depending on developments on the ground.  The representative of Greece, meanwhile, emphasized that sanctions should be eased in a gradual, conditional and reversible manner to “ensure that our expectations are met” in terms of an inclusive transition and accountability for recent atrocities.

    Many Council members also spotlighted the recent Brussels Conference, during which donors pledged nearly $6.5 billion in aid to support Syria’s recovery.  The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that her country, at that event, promised up to $207 million in critical humanitarian assistance.  In parallel, the United Kingdom has relaxed some of its sanctions on Syria and revoked the asset freezes of 24 entities and institutions in the energy, transport and finance sectors.

    On the topic of assistance, Kang Insun, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, urged stronger international commitment to humanitarian aid and economic recovery in Syria to “overcome the pain and destruction of 14 years of conflict”.  For its part, Seoul has provided nearly $150 million in humanitarian assistance to Syria and its neighbours over the past decade, and will continue to offer its support.  “As [the Republic of] Korea has pledged, 2,400 tons of Korean rice will be delivered to assist food-insecure populations in Syria,” she reported.  She also took “positive note” of recent developments regarding the suspension of certain sanctions.

    Many Council members, echoing warnings of Syria’s dire economic and humanitarian situation, called for the lifting of unilateral sanctions on the country.  Among them were the representatives of Panama and Pakistan — the latter of whom stressed that lifting sanctions is “imperative to facilitating reconstruction and aid efforts”.  Algeria’s representative — also speaking for Guyana, Sierra Leone and Somalia — stressed: “Without rapid economic recovery, it will be difficult to envision a safe and prosperous future for Syrians.” Therefore, the swift lifting of unilateral sanctions is essential.

    Additionally, he — like many other Council members today — expressed concern over “alarming” statements by Israeli officials regarding the “indefinite” presence of their forces in Syrian territory and their intention to establish a “demilitarized area” in the country’s south.  Condemning these “irresponsible” statements — “which will only exacerbate regional instability” — he also joined others in calling for full respect for the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, including its provisions regarding the area of separation.

    Similarly, the representative of the Russian Federation pointed to the “destructive role” played by Israeli air strikes against — and continued occupation of — Syrian territory.  Condemning recent attacks by the Israel Defense Forces, he called on Israel to withdraw its units from areas taken since December 2023.  Additionally, he expressed concern over the issue of foreign terrorist fighters still present in Syria — a point echoed by China’s representative, who urged the interim authorities to fulfil their counter-terrorism obligations and take decisive measures to combat all Council-listed terrorist organizations.

    The representative of the United States also underscored that all foreign fighters “need to be removed from their posts immediately”. She also stressed that the interim authorities must embark on a political process that includes Kurdish, Druze, Alawite and Christian communities — “something they have not meaningfully done to date”.  There must also be expansive representation of Syrian voices in the drafting of a permanent Constitution.  Otherwise, she stressed, Syria will “remain in the sectarian shadow of the Assad regime, increasing the likelihood of a new civil war”.

    For his part, the representative of Syria reported that, in the wake of recent violence, the Syrian leadership “affirmed that the new Syria will be a State of law and that the law will apply to all”.  Further, such authorities have emphasized that shedding “the blood of the innocent will not go unpunished — regardless of the identity of the perpetrators”.  Additionally, he urged the “full lifting of sanctions imposed on the Syrian people”. And pointing to an Israeli attack on the province of Daraa today, he called on the Council to “compel Israel to cease its ongoing aggression”.

    Several of Syria’s neighbours also took the floor, with Iran’s representative condemning Israel’s ongoing violations of Syria’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.  So, too, did the representative of Qatar, who additionally called for the lifting of economic sanctions against Syria as “that raison d’être is no longer there”. Jordan’s representative echoed that call, adding that countries hosting Syrian refugees cannot bear that burden alone. Therefore, the international community must provide financial and technical support in this regard.

    The representative of Türkiye, meanwhile, welcomed a “new era” in Syria as the interim authorities work towards political transition.  However, he voiced concern over provocations in Latakia and surrounding areas, which are aimed at undermining a smooth transition process.  “These attacks should not be mischaracterized as a sectarian conflict between Damascus and the Alawite community,” he stressed, as “the international community must recognize that these were coordinated efforts, supported by certain regional actors, to destabilize Syria”.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 25.03.2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    25 March 2025 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 25.03.2025

    Espoo, Finland – On 25 March 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:                

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 1,803,118 4.96
    CEUX 1,137,165 4.96
    BATE
    AQEU
    TQEX 165,012 4.96
    Total 3,105,295 4.96

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 25 March 2025 was EUR 15,388,910. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 197,228,875 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 931 580 507
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Sen. Warner Speaks at Senate Intelligence Committee Hearing

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Commonwealth of Virginia Mark R Warner

    BROADCAST-QUALITY VIDEO OF SEN. WARNER’S OPENING REMARKS IS AVAILABLE HERE

    WASHINGTON – Today, Vice Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Sen. Mark R. Warner (D-VA) delivered opening remarks at the Intelligence Committee’s annual Worldwide Threats Assessment hearing.

    Sen. Warner’s opening remarks as delivered are below:

    Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, everybody, and I want to thank all the witnesses for being here.

    I got to say, I’ve been on the committee now for 14 years, and this year’s assessment is clearly one of the most complicated and challenging in my tenure on the committee.

    And I want to get into that in a moment, but I want to, first of all, address the recent story that broke in the news.

    Yesterday, we stunningly learned that senior members of this administration and according to reports, two of our witnesses here today, were members of a group chat that discussed highly sensitive and likely classified information that supposedly even included ‘weapons packages, targets and timing,’ and included the name of an active CIA agent.

    Putting aside for a moment that classified information should never be discussed over an unclassified system, it’s also just mind boggling to me that all these senior folks were on this line and nobody bothered to even check, security hygiene 101…

    Who are all the names? Who are they?

    Well, it apparently includes a journalist.

    And no matter how much the Secretary of Defense or others want to disparage him, this journalist had at least the ethics to not report everything he heard.

    The question I raise is: everybody on this committee gets briefed on security protocols. They’re told you don’t make calls outside of SCIFs of this kind of classified nature.

    Director Gabbard is the executive in charge of all keeping our secrets safe. Were these government devices? Or were they personal devices? Have the devices been collected to make sure there’s no malware?

    There’s plenty of declassified information that shows that our adversaries, China and Russia, are trying to break in to encrypted systems like Signal.

    I can just say this. If this was the case of a military officer, or an intelligence officer, and they had this kind of behavior, they would be fired. I think this is one more example of the kind of sloppy, careless, incompetent behavior, particularly towards classified information, that this is not a one off or a first time error.

    Let me take a couple of minutes and review some of the other reckless choices that this administration has made regarding our national security. We all recall it seems like it wasn’t that long ago, but less than two months ago, in the first two weeks, the administration canceled all U.S. foreign assistance.

    Now, some may say, how can that how bad can that be, its foreign assistance?

    Well, U.S. foreign assistance paid for the units in Ukraine to provide air defense to civilian cities being attacked by Russia.

    Foreign assistance paid for guarding camps in Syria, where ISIS fighters are to be detained.

    Foreign assistance paid for programs abroad that ensure that diseases like Ebola don’t come home.

    And until recently, it paid for the construction of a railway in Africa that would have help given the United States much needed access to critical minerals in Congo.

    Now that project… China is going to try to finance it as well.

    In the first two weeks, the administration fired several of our most experienced FBI agents, including the head of the criminal Investigative submission, the head of the intelligence division, the head of the Counterterrorism division, the heads of the New York, Washington and Miami field office, all individuals who were distinctly and directly responsible for helping to keep America safe.

    The irony a little bit, was the recently dismissed head of the counterterrorism division was involved in disrupting the ISIS attacks planned for Oklahoma City and Philadelphia and helped lead the effort to bring to justice the key planner of the Abbey Gate bombing in Afghanistan, who killed 13 U.S. servicemen and 150 civilians.

    That very Abbey Gate effort was actually praised by the president in his state of the Union address.

    The administration’s response to these agents’ good works and years of service was to force these folks out.

    It’s hard to imagine how that makes our country safer.

    Nor can I understand how Americans are made more secure by firing more than 300 staff at the National Nuclear Security Administration, including those responsible for overseeing the security and safety of the nuclear stockpile, or by ousting 130 employees at CSA.

    The agency directly responsible for trying to take on China’s salt typhoon attack again. After Salt Typhoon, I would have thought folks on that group chat might have thought twice.

    Or how are we made safer by sacking a thousand employees at the CDC and NIH. We’re actually directly working on trying to keep our country safe from disease by pushing out hundreds of intelligence officers.

    The amazing thing is our intelligence officers, they’re not interchangeable like a Twitter coder. Our country makes $20,000 to $40,000 of an investment just in getting a security clearance.

    It literally goes into six figures when you take the training involved. Can anyone tell how firing probationary individuals without any consideration for merit or expertise is an efficient use of taxpayer dollars?

    And just to make clear that yesterday’s story in the Atlantic was not this rookie one-off, it’s a pattern.

    I want to acknowledge Director Ratcliffe was not here in his position with this took place.

    But again, earlier in the administration, when a new unclassified network was used, thereby exposing literally hundreds of CIA officers’ identities.

    Those folks can’t go into the field now.

    How does that make our government more efficient?

    You know, again, this pattern of an amazing, cavalier attitude towards classified information is reckless and sloppy.

    And perhaps what troubles me most is the way the administration has decided that we can take on all of our problems by ourselves without any need for friends or allies.

    I agree that we’ve got to put America’s priorities first, but American first cannot mean America alone.

    The intelligence we gather to keep Americans safe depends on a lot of allies around the world who have access to sources that we don’t have.

    That’s sharing of information saves lives. And it’s not hypothetical.

    We all remember (because it was declassified) last year when Austria worked with our community to make sure to expose a plot against Taylor Swift in Vienna that could have killed literally hundreds of individuals.

    However, these relationships are not built in stone. They’re not dictated by law. Things like the Five Eyes are based on trust built on decades, but so often that trust is now breaking literally overnight.

    Yet suddenly, for no reason that I can understand, the United States is starting to act like our adversaries are our friends. Voting in the UN with Russia, Belarus and North Korea. It’s a rogues gallery if ever heard one.

    Treating our allies like adversaries, whether it’s threats to take over Greenland or over the Panama Canal, a destructive trade war with Canada, or literally threatening to kick Canada out of the Five Eyes, I feel our credibility is being enormously undermined with our allies, who I believe, and I think most of us on this committee, regardless of party believes, makes our country safer and stronger.

    But how can our allies ever trust us as the kind of partner we used to be when we, without consultation or notice, for example, stop sharing information to Ukraine in its war for survival against Russia. Or how can our allies not only not trust our government, but potentially not our businesses with such arbitrary political decision?

    Let me give you a few examples. You know, as a result of a lot of work from this committee and others in Congress, we made sure America’s commercial space industry is second to none from space to launch to commercial sensing and communications.

    The United States has taken a lead. Yet overnight, this administration called into question the reliability of American commercial tech industry.

    When maps are and other commercial space companies were directed to stop sharing intelligence with Ukraine.

    I’m going to tell you… I’m a business guy. Can’t say longer than being an elected official, but pretty close. That shockwave across all of commercial space and frankly, not just commercial space. I’ve heard it from some of our hyperscalers, in the tech community, has sent an enormous chill.

    Who’s going to hire an American commercial space company, government or foreign business with the ability to have that taken down so arbitrarily?

    It’s not just in the case of commercial space.

    We’ve seen that Canada, Germany, Portugal have all been saying they’re rethinking buying F-35s.

    I’ve heard from Microsoft and Google directly, and Amazon that they’re having questions about whether they can still sell their services.

    We’ve also seen foreign adversaries and friends take advantage of this RIF in our national security areas, and our scientists.

    Germany has already put out ads trying to attract some of our best scientists who’ve been RIFed and the Chinese intelligence agencies are posting on social media sites in the hopes of luring individuals with that national security clearance who’ve been pushed out, perhaps arbitrarily, to come into their service.

    So, no, the signal fiasco is not a one off. It is, unfortunately, a pattern we’re seeing too often repeated.

    I fear that we feel the erosion of trust from our workplace, from our companies, and from our allies and partners can’t be put back in the bottle overnight. Make no mistake, these actions make America less safe.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Three graphs that show what’s happening with Donald Trump’s popularity

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Paul Whiteley, Professor, Department of Government, University of Essex

    Donald Trump started out with more Americans approving than disapproving of his performance just after inauguration day on January 20 , and this continued into February. By early March, his ratings had turned a little bit negative, but not by much, and it has stayed that way. As of March 20, 48% of Americans approved of his job performance so far, while 49% disapproved.

    The daily average of polls measuring approval/disapproval ratings for the job Trump is doing appears in the chart below. They cover the period from February 20 to March 20.

    Approval and disapproval ratings for Trump’s performance:

    These aggregate ratings are interesting, but they disguise the political divide which is revealed when we drill down into the details. This can be done using an Economist/YouGov poll completed on March 18, for instance.

    This reveals how polarised American public opinion has become when it comes to judging the president. Around 6% of respondents who identified themselves as Democrats approved of his performance, while 93% of them disapproved. Those who identified as Republican were almost the exact opposite, with 90% approving and 7% disapproving.

    One problem in analysing these statistics is that only 29% of the sample interviewed were Republicans, compared with 34% Democrats. The pollsters do their best to get a representative sample of the US electorate and it’s worth noting that there are currently more registered Democrats in the US than there are Republicans.

    Interestingly, the American National Election Study survey conducted just before the presidential election last year showed that only 11.6% of Americans were supporters of the Maga movement. This highly respected study, which has been carried out over the past 75 years as a national resource, would suggest that Maga supporters are noisy, but fewer in number than some people might realise.

    What do independents think?

    Around 37% of those interviewed for the Economist poll described themselves as independents. In their case 37% of them approved of his performance and 54% disapproved. Trump may have a very strong following among Republicans, but they are less than one-third of the electorate.

    A quick calculation looking at support among Democrats, Republicans and independents in proportion to their size in the electorate suggests that 42% of Americans have a favourable view of his performance, while 54% have an unfavourable view.

    If we look at the social backgrounds of respondents in the survey there is not much difference between the young and the old, or different income groups in their attitudes to the president’s performance. But there is a large gender gap with 53% of men, but only 39% of women, approving. Similarly, while 53% of whites approved, only 24% of blacks and 31% of Hispanics did so. Finally, 7% of ideological liberals approved of Trump’s job performance, compared with 81% of conservatives and 44% of moderates. Overall, partisanship and ideology completely dominate the picture when it comes to judging Trump’s record.

    How important is the economy?

    US politics is in turmoil with large federal jobs losses and significant changes, such as tariffs on Canadian goods, being announced by the new administration, so there are a lot of factors at work which can explain attitudes to Trump. In the 2024 presidential election the economy played a key role in explaining how people voted, and it is always an important issue in elections.

    Given that, it is interesting to look at one of the key measures of the voter’s attitudes to the economy, namely consumer confidence. This has been measured by researchers at the University of Michigan for many decades using a series of surveys conducted every month.

    US consumer sentiment scale March 2024 to March 2025:

    The chart shows scores on the Index of Consumer Sentiment from March of last year until March this year. A high score means Americans are confident about the state of their economy and a low score the opposite. Confidence has plunged from a rating of 79.4 a year ago to 57.9 now. It is notable that, as recently as December 2024, it stood at 74.0, but after the inauguration of Trump it started to rapidly decline. Americans are getting increasingly worried about the state of their economy, along with the rest of the world.

    The cause is not hard to discern: the imposition of tariffs, a fall in the stock market, the threat of inflation, the administration’s sympathy towards Vladimir Putin and its threats to allies such as Canada and Greenland over their territorial integrity. These issues are all adding up to a self-imposed economic crisis.

    But what are the implication of this for presidential approval ratings? The chart below shows the relationship between consumer confidence and presidential approval over a period of nearly 50 years. There is a moderately strong relationship between the two series (correlation = 0.40). When consumers are optimistic, they approve of the president’s performance, and when they are pessimistic, they disapprove.

    Presidential approval and consumer confidence 1978-2025:

    Overall, the data suggests that Trump should not be confident of his approval ratings across the US, if you look at people across all political affiliations and who vote. Along with a looming economic crisis, this could lead to a rapid loss of support for the president and the Republicans in the near future.

    Paul Whiteley does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Three graphs that show what’s happening with Donald Trump’s popularity – https://theconversation.com/three-graphs-that-show-whats-happening-with-donald-trumps-popularity-252857

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: Decisions Adopted by eQ Plc’s Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    eQ Plc Stock Exchange Release
    25 March 2025, at 7.30 p.m.

    eQ Plc’s Annual General Meeting, held on Tuesday 25 March 2025 as a hybrid meeting in accordance with chapter 5, section 16, subsection 2 of the Finnish Limited Liability Companies Act (“AGM”), decided upon the following:

    Confirmation of the financial statements

    eQ Plc’s AGM confirmed the financial statement of the company, which included the group financial statements, the report by the Board of Directors and the auditor’s report for the financial year 2024.

    Decision in respect of the result shown on the balance sheet and the payment of dividend

    The AGM confirmed the proposal by the Board of Directors that a dividend of 0.66 euros per share be paid out. The dividend will be paid out in two separate installments. The first installment, EUR 0.33 per share shall be paid to those shareholders who are registered as shareholders in eQ Plc’s shareholder register maintained by Euroclear Finland Ltd on the record date of the dividend payment on 27 March 2025. The first installment of the dividend shall be paid on 3 April 2025. The second installment, EUR 0.33 per share shall be paid in October 2025 to those shareholders who are registered as shareholders in eQ Plc’s shareholder register maintained by Euroclear Finland Ltd on the record date of the divided payment. The Board shall decide the record date and the payment date of the second installment of the divided in its meeting in September 2025. It is contemplated that the record date of the second installment will be 7 October 2025 and that the payment date will be 14 October 2025. 

    Discharge from liability to the Board of Directors and the CEOs

    The AGM decided to grant discharge from liability to the Board of Directors and the CEOs for the financial year 1 January – 31 December 2024.

    Remuneration Report for Governing Bodies and Remuneration Policy for Governing Bodies

    The Annual General Meeting decided to adopt the Remuneration Report for Governing Bodies and the Remuneration Policy for Governing Bodies.

    The remuneration of the members of the Board, the number of Board members and appointment of Board members

    The AGM decided that the members of the Board would receive remuneration as follows: the Chair of the Board will receive 5,000 euros, Vice Chair of the Board of Directors will receive 4,000 euros and the Board members will receive 3,000 euros per month. In addition, a compensation of 750 euros per meeting will be paid for all the Board members for each attended Board meeting and travel and lodging costs will be compensated in accordance with the company’s expense policy.

    According to the decision of the AGM, the Board consists of six members. Päivi Arminen, Nicolas Berner, Georg Ehrnrooth, Janne Larma and Tomas von Rettig were re-elected as members to the Board of Directors and Caroline Bertlin was elected as a new member to the Board. The term of office of the Board members ends at the close of the next Annual General Meeting. The Board appointed Georg Ehrnrooth as Chair of the Board in its meeting held immediately after the AGM.

    Auditor and sustainability auditor and their remuneration

    The AGM decided to elect Authorized Public Accountants KPMG Oy Ab as auditor and as sustainability auditor of the company. The auditor and sustainability auditor with main responsibility, named by KPMG Oy Ab is Tuomas Ilveskoski, APA, Authorized Sustainability Auditor. It was decided to compensate the auditor and the sustainability auditor according to their invoices approved by eQ Plc.

    Establishment of a Shareholders’ Nomination Board

    The AGM decided to establish a Shareholders’ Nomination Board whose task is to prepare proposals concerning the number of members of the Board of Directors and the Board’s composition and remuneration to the General Meeting. The Shareholders’ Nomination Board comprises of four members and four largest shareholders of the Company may each appoint a member.

    The AGM decided to adopt the Charter for the Shareholders’ Nomination Board.

    Authorising the Board of Directors to decide on the issuance of shares as well as the issuance of special rights entitling to shares

    The AGM authorised the Board of Directors to decide on a share issue or share issues and/or the issuance of special rights entitling to shares referred to in Chapter 10 Section 1 of the Companies Act, comprising a maximum total of 3,500,000 new shares. The amount of the authorisation corresponds to approximately 8.45 per cent of all shares in the Company at the date of the notice of the AGM.

    The authorisation is to be used in order to finance or carry out potential acquisitions or other business transactions, to strengthen the balance sheet and the financial position of the Company, to fulfill Company’s incentive schemes or to any other purposes decided by the Board. 50 per cent of the shares or special rights entitling to shares issued on the basis of the authorisation may be used to implement incentive schemes or otherwise for remuneration. Based on the authorisation, the Board decides on all other matters related to the issuance of shares and special rights entitling to shares referred to in Chapter 10 Section 1 of the Companies Act, including the recipients of the shares or the special rights entitling to shares and the amount of the consideration to be paid. Therefore, based on the authorisation, shares or special rights entitling to shares may also be issued directed i.e. in deviation of the shareholders pre-emptive rights as described in the Companies Act. A share issue may also be executed without payment in accordance with the preconditions set out in the Companies Act.
    The authorisation cancels all previous authorisations to decide on the issuance of shares as well as the issuance of special rights entitling to shares and is effective until the next Annual General Meeting, however no more than 18 months.

       
    Helsinki, 25 March 2025

    eQ Plc

    Board of Directors

    Additional information: Juha Surve, Group General Counsel, tel. +358 9 6817 8733

    Distribution: Nasdaq Helsinki, www.eQ.fi

    eQ Group is a Finnish group of companies specialising in asset management and corporate finance business. eQ Asset Management offers a wide range of asset management services (including private equity funds and real estate asset management) for institutions and individuals. The assets managed by the Group total approximately EUR 13.4 billion. Advium Corporate Finance, which is part of the Group, offers services related to mergers and acquisitions, real estate transactions and equity capital markets.

    More information about the Group is available on our website at www.eQ.fi.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting of Jyske Bank A/S

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    This is to give notice of an Extraordinary General Meeting of Jyske Bank A/S, which will be held on Thursday, 24 April 2025, at 3:00 p.m. at Vestergade 8-16, 8600 Silkeborg, Denmark (entrance via Jyske Bank’s visitor entrance situated at Bankpassagen).

    At the Annual General Meeting held on 25 March 2025, the motions to amend the Articles of Association were adopted.
    However, the members in general meeting with a right to vote represented less than 90% of the share capital, wherefore
    the final adoption of the proposed amendments to the Articles of Association is subject to adoption at an extraordinary general meeting.

    The AGENDA for consideration and final adoption:

    a. Motions proposed by the Supervisory Board:
      1 Reduction of Jyske Bank’s nominal share capital by DKK 27,651,180 (corresponding to 2,765,118 shares at a nominal value of DKK 10) from  DKK 642,720,950 to DKK 615,069,770. With reference to S.188(1) of the Danish Companies Act we point out that the capital reduction takes place through cancellation of previously acquired own shares acquired by Jyske Bank in accordance with authorisation from members in general meeting. Hence, the capital reduction is spent on payment of capital owners.
    If the motion is adopted, Jyske Bank’s holding of own shares will be reduced by 2,765,118 shares of a nominal value of DKK 10 These shares have been bought back at a total amount of DKK 1,499,999,584 which implies that, apart from the nominal capital reduction, a total amount of DKK 1,472,348,404 has been paid to the capital owners in connection with the buy-backs. The capital reduction takes place at a share premium since it will be at 542.47 for each share of a nominal amount of DKK 10, corresponding to the average price at which the shares have been bought back.

    In consequence of the above, the following amendment to the Articles of Association is proposed:
    Art. 2 to be amended to the effect that Jyske Bank’s nominal share capital be DKK 615,069,770 distributed on 61,506,977 shares.

      2 Amendments to Art. 3(8), Art. 4(2) and (3), Art. 5(1) and (2) and Art. 24(2): “VP Securities Services” to be changed into “VP Securities A/S”.
      3 To replace the existing authorizations in the Articles of Association, the Supervisory Board is authorized to carry out capital increases with and without pre-emption rights and to raise convertible loans with and without pre-emption rights by amending Art. 4(2), (3) and (5), Art. 5(1), (2), (3) and (4) of the Articles of Association. The amendments are considered together and are proposed to be changed to the following wording:
        Art. 4(2): As specified by the Supervisory Board in respect of time and terms and conditions, the share capital can be increased through the subscription of new shares without preferential subscription rights for existing shareholders. The increase may be in one or several issues by not more than a nominal amount of DKK 60m (6 million shares of a face value of DKK 10). The increase may be effected through cash payment or through acquisition of existing businesses or specific assets. The increase must in every case be effected not below the market price. The increase cannot be effected through part payment. The authorisation will be effective until 1 March 2030.

    The new shares shall when issued and transferred be registered in the names of their holders at VP Securities A/S and in the Bank’s register of shareholders. The new shares are negotiable instruments, and there are no restrictions in their negotiability except for the provisions laid down in Art. 3 of the Articles of Association. Shareholders shall be under no obligation to have their shares redeemed in full or in part.

        Art. 4(3): As specified by the Supervisory Board in respect of time and terms and conditions, the share capital can be increased through the subscription of new shares with preferential subscription rights for existing shareholders. The increase may be in one or several issues by not more than a nominal amount of DKK 120m (12 million shares of a face value of DKK 10). The increase may be effected through cash payment or in any other manner. The increase may be offered at a favourable price. The increase cannot be effected through part payment. The authorisation will be effective until 1 March 2030.

    The new shares shall when issued and transferred be registered in the names of their holders at VP Securities A/S and in the Bank’s register of shareholders. The new shares are negotiable instruments, and there are no restrictions in their negotiability except for the provisions laid down in Art. 3 of the Articles of Association. Shareholders shall be under no obligation to have their shares redeemed in full or in part.

        Art. 4(5): To be deleted.
        Art. 5(1): The Bank may, following resolution by the Supervisory Board, up to 1 March 2030, on one or more occasions raise loans against bonds or other instruments of debt which bonds or instruments of debt shall entitle the lender to convert his claim into shares (convertible loans) and the Supervisory Board is authorised to carry out the related capital increase. Convertible loans may be raised with a conversion right to a maximum number of shares with a total nominal value corresponding to the maximum nominal amount at the time of raising the convertible loans by which the share capital may be increased using the remaining authorization in Art. 4(3), calculated in relation to the conversion price determined at the time of raising the convertible loans. Exercising the authorisation to increase the share capital in Art. 4(3), will hence reduce the authorisation to raise convertible loans in accordance with this provision. The Bank’s shareholders shall have a preferential subscription right to convertible loans. Where the Supervisory Board decides to raise convertible loans, when exercising the authorization in this provision, the authorisation to increase the share capital, cf. Art. 4(3), shall be considered to be utilised by an amount corresponding to the maximum conversion right. The term allowed for conversion may be fixed at a period exceeding five years after the raising of the convertible loan. For shares which shall be issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision, the Supervisory Board shall decide – with due regard to the time of subscription or utilisation of the conversion right – the time from when such new shares shall carry a right to receive dividend and other terms and conditions of the share issue. Shares issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision cannot be paid in by partial payment, are registered shares and are registered in the name of the holder in VP Securities A/S and the Bank’s register of shareholders upon issuance and transfer. The new shares are negotiable instruments and the same rules as apply to the existing shares in respect of rights and duties, redeemability and transferability shall apply.
        Art. 5(2): The Bank may, following resolution by the Supervisory Board, up to 1 March 2030, on one or more occasions raise loans against bonds or other instruments of debt which bonds or instruments of debt shall entitle the lender to convert his claim into shares (convertible loans) and the Supervisory Board is authorised to carry out the related capital increase. Convertible loans may be raised with a conversion right to a maximum number of shares with a total nominal value corresponding to the maximum nominal amount at the time of raising the convertible loans by which the share capital may be increased using the remaining authorization in Art. 4(2), calculated in relation to the conversion price determined at the time of raising the convertible loans. Exercising the authorisation to increase the share capital in Art. 4(2), will hence reduce the authorisation to raise convertible loans in accordance with this provision. The Bank’s shareholders shall not have a preferential subscription right to convertible loans which are offered at a subscription price and a conversion price to the effect that the right of conversion corresponds to the market price of the shares at the time the resolution to raise convertible loans by using the authorisation of this provision was passed by the Supervisory Board. The convertible bonds or other instruments of debt may be issued as payment upon the Bank’s acquisition of existing businesses or specific assets corresponding to the value of the convertible bonds or other instruments of debt. Where the Supervisory Board decides to raise convertible loans, when exercising the authorization in this provision, the authorisation to increase the share capital, cf. Art. 4(2), shall be considered to be utilised by an amount corresponding to the maximum conversion right. The term allowed for conversion may be fixed at a period exceeding five years after the raising of the convertible loan. For shares which shall be issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision, the Supervisory Board shall decide – with due regard to the time of subscription or utilisation of the conversion right – the time from when such new shares shall carry a right to receive dividend and other terms and conditions of the share issue. Shares issued on the basis of the convertible loans mentioned in this provision cannot be paid in by partial payment, are registered shares and are registered in the name of the holder in VP Securities A/S and the Bank’s register of shareholders upon issuance and transfer. The new shares are negotiable instruments and the same rules as apply to the existing shares in respect of rights and duties, redeemability and transferability shall apply.
        Art. 5(3): To be deleted.
        Art. 5(4): To be deleted.
    b. Authorisation to the Supervisory Board to make such amendments as may be required by the Danish Business Authority in connection with registration of the Articles of Association.
    c. Any other business.

    Reference to Jyske Bank’s website for further information
    Where in this notice of a General Meeting, reference is made to Jyske Bank’s website for further information, this link can be used: https://www.jyskebank.dk/ir/generalforsamlinger.

    Adoption of motions – requirements
    The motion to amend Jyske Bank’s Articles of Association (items a.1-a.3 of the agenda) at extraordinary general meetings shall only be finally adopted where adopted by three fourth of the votes cast as well as by three fourth of the voting share capital represented at the general meeting, cf. Art. 12(2) of the Articles of Association.

    Size of the share capital, voting rights of the shareholders and registration date
    Jyske Bank’s share capital is DKK 642,720,950, comprising shares at a face value of 10. Any share amount of DKK 10 shall carry one vote, provided always that 4,000 votes are the highest number of votes any one shareholder may cast on his own behalf. Voting rights can only be exercised by shareholders or their proxies. For the voting right of a share to be exercised, the share shall be registered in the name of the holder in the Bank’s register of shareholders not later than on the day of registration, which is 17 April 2025, or the title to such share shall be notified and documented to the Bank within that same time limit.

    Proxy and postal vote
    Shareholders may as from Friday, 28 March up to and including Wednesday, 16 April 2025 give voting instructions, appoint Jyske Bank’s Supervisory Board or a third party as proxy either electronically or by means of the Power of Attorney form.

    Shareholders may attend the General Meeting by proxy and cast their votes by proxy.

    In addition, shareholders may as from Friday, 28 March up to and including Wednesday, 23 April 2025 at 10.00 a.m. cast postal votes either electronically or by means of a form.

    Proxies may be appointed or postal votes may be cast electronically at the Investor Portal via Jyske Bank’s website. A form for the appointment of proxies or for casting postal votes is available at one of Jyske Bank’s branches or can be downloaded from Jyske Bank’s website. Where the form is used, please forward the completed and signed form either by post to Euronext Securities (VP Securities A/S) at the address Nicolai Eigtveds Gade 8, 1402 Copenhagen K or by email to CPH-investor@euronext.com. The form must reach Euronext Securities (VP Securitas A/S) by the above-mentioned deadlines, and proxies must have been appointed or postal votes must have been cast electronically by the same deadlines.

    Custodian bank
    Jyske Bank’s shareholders may choose Jyske Bank A/S as their custodian bank in order to exercise their financial rights through Jyske Bank A/S.

    Questions from shareholders
    Shareholders are recommended to ask questions in writing before the general meeting about the items of the agenda or Jyske Bank’s financial position. Please send questions to Jyske Bank A/S, Juridisk Afdeling, Vestergade 8-16, DK-8600 Silkeborg or by email to Juridisk@jyskebank.dk. Questions and answers will be presented at the general meeting, and shareholders who have asked questions will receive replies directly from Jyske Bank. At the General Meeting, the management will also answer questions from the shareholders about matters of importance for the financial situation of Jyske Bank and questions for consideration at the General Meeting.

    Additional information
    The following documents and information can be downloaded from Jyske Bank’s website from Friday, 28 March 2025:
    1. Notice of Extraordinary General Meeting
    2. The total number of shares and voting rights at the date of the notice
    3. Agenda and full wording of motions.
    3. The forms to be used when voting by proxy or by postal vote

    Notification of participation
    Shareholders who wish to attend the General Meeting and cast their votes must notify their participation at the Investor Portal via Jyske Bank’s website as from Friday, 28 March 2025 up to and including Wednesday, 16 April 2025.
    Confirmation of registration and QR code for the General Meeting Portal will be submitted by email (also in case of powers of attorney to third parties), and therefore it is important that you register your email address at the Investor Portal.
    At the entrance to the general meeting, you press the submitted QR code in the email to register your attendance which is why you must bring your smart phone or your tablet. Any votes will also take place via the General Meeting Portal. Additional guidelines for using the General Meeting Portal will be available at the entrance to the general meeting.
    If you are unable to receive confirmation of registration to the general meeting by email, you may register for the general meeting by means of the sign-up form available at Jyske Bank’s website or
    by contacting one of Jyske Bank’s branches. If so, you must contact and confirm your attendance at the entrance to the general meeting which requires that you produce valid identification.

    Silkeborg, 25 March 2025
    The Supervisory Board

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Olli Rehn: Eurozone outlook and European Central Bank monetary policy

    Source: Bank for International Settlements

    Presentation accompanying the speech

    Let me first thank MNI for inviting me to speak at this conference. To kick off, I will briefly discussthe economic outlook in the eurozone and the current lines of thought in the ECB’s monetary policy.

    In presenting my remarks here, I will focus particularly on how the significant shifts in world politics of recent weeks will, in my view, affect the euro area economy and the European Central Bank’s monetary policy.

    Slide 2: Geopolitics dominates economic outlook

    Geopolitics currently dominates and weighs on the outlook for the global economy, and does so with exceptional force. 

    Russia’s illegal, brutal war of aggression in Ukraine has been going on for more than three years. It has shaken the European security order, and more recent events since the Munich Security Conference a month ago have marked a major disruption in the world order – in a way that is dangerous for Europe. This has forced the European Union to seek to strengthen its common defences.

    It is clear that the United States is undergoing a fundamental change of direction both in its foreign and security policy and in its domestic political development. This is not necessarily just a temporary phenomenon, but may be a more permanent turn in US politics. And US foreign policy is now operating under a very different kind of rationality than it used to.

    “America first” trade policy in the US is profoundly protectionist but highly unpredictable. There will be no winners in a trade war. Tariffs and the related uncertainty will hit investment and slow down growth everywhere. The latest indicators on the US economy point to weaker than expected growth, which would also affect growth prospects in Europe.

    As a result of the turmoil in world politics in recent weeks, Europe has woken up to the necessity of strengthening common defence. The situation is acute, and many EU countries, led by Germany, have announced significant decisions to increase defence spending. Europe is now taking action and responding to the challenge of forming and financing a common, strong defence.

    These defence investments will have to be made in a situation where the public deficits of EU Member States are already large. However, the investments required for defence are of such a magnitude that they cannot be financed simply by increasing taxation or cutting other public sector expenditure. It is therefore, in my view, justified, in the short term, to utilize the flexibility elements included in the EU’s new fiscal rules, provided that longer-term debt sustainability is not compromised. 

    This is why we also need common European financing solutions, implemented in a way that strengthens our common security and accelerates joint procurement and production – I am thinking of air defence and drone production, for example.

    Slide 3: Bank of Finland’s scenario calculation: A trade war would weaken growth worldwide

    Recent statements from the United States about imposing import tariffs have raised the threat of a trade war in the global economy. An analysis published a week ago by the Bank of Finland illustrates the significant risks that a trade war would pose to economic growth.

    The study assumes that the United States would impose a 25% tariff increase on all imports from the euro area and a 20% increase on all imports from China. It also assumes that the euro area and China would impose equivalent tariffs on the United States. Moreover, the calculations take into account the potential economic effects of increased uncertainty affecting economic policy.

    The scenario demonstrates that there are no winners in a trade war. As a result, world GDP would decline by more than 0.5% per year. The effects on the euro area and China would be even greater. A key aspect of a trade war is the rise in uncertainty, which we are already witnessing and which could lead to a reduced willingness to investment among businesses.

    Efforts should, in any case, be made to prevent the threat of a trade war through a fair negotiated solution to mitigate the negative effects on growth. To support a negotiated solution, Europe should be prepared to respond to the imposition of tariffs with potential countermeasures.

    It must also be said that when a brutal war is being fought on European soil, a trade war is the last thing we need right now – especially among allies.

    Slide 4: Growth in the euro area economy picking up gradually

    US tariffs and increased uncertainty are already having adverse effects on economic growth outlook in the euro area in the immediate and near term.

    Europe’s response to the deterioration of the security situation will have its own effects on European economies, which are very difficult to quantify at this stage.

    The growth outlook for the euro area remains subdued. According to the ECB’s March forecast, growth in the euro area is gradually picking up, but at a slower pace than expected, and growth risks are on the downside.

    In addition to cyclical factors, the euro area economy is also experiencing structural problems. In the ECB’s new forecast, productivity growth is slower than before. The weakness appears to be more structural than previously. But it would be wrong to say that it is entirely structural.

    One – if not the only – reason for Europe’s slow productivity growth is precisely the weak development of investment in recent years. The background is a great deal of uncertainty fuelled by geopolitics, but there were also tight financial conditions for a long time.

    Let me reveal that I don’t belong to those who makes a crystal-clear distinction between structural and cyclical factors – it would be against my macroeconomic training. Rather, I see the distinction as a line drawn in water. Here, I feel like applying a giant of economics: “In the long run, we will all retire. But in the meantime, we need more productive investment.”

    In other words: although the euro area’s longer-term challenges of growth and competitiveness cannot be solved by monetary policy, the fall in interest rates brings welcome room for manoeuvre for households and companies. Rate cuts have been supportive of the investments that are required to improve productivity. Of course, in the long term, the level and growth of investments is determined by their expected real returns.

    Although there is little to be positive about in the security situation in Europe, the expected increases in defence spending and investment are at least likely to support GDP growth over the medium-term.

    Slide 5: Euro area inflation stabilising at the 2% target

    Inflation in the euro area is stabilising at the ECB’s 2% target. The path of disinflation has been pretty much in line with forecasts. Wage inflation has largely decelerated, and forward-looking wage indicators point to a clear slowdown in wage growth. Most measures of core inflation − which excludes energy and food prices − also point to a sustained convergence of inflation around the 2% target over the medium term.

    Risks to the inflation outlook are two-sided. Protectionism in world trade dampens growth and increases uncertainty about the inflation outlook. Geopolitical tensions pose a wide range of risks to the energy market, consumer confidence and corporate investment.

    Slide 6: ECB’s decision to ease monetary policy spurred by inflation stabilising and growth weakening

    The ECB’s latest decision to ease monetary policy leaned on the fact that inflation is stabilising and growth weakening. Thus, the Governing Council decided to cut the key policy rate by 25 basis points.

    The rate cut was the sixth since we started easing monetary policy. Since last June, the deposit facility rate has been lowered by a total of 1.5 percentage points, from 4% to 2.5%. Monetary policy is thus becoming meaningfully less restrictive.

    The decision was based, as usual, on three elements: the inflation outlook, the dynamics of underlying inflation and the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    We are not pre-committed to any interest rate path. Policy rates are set at each meeting based on the latest information and our comprehensive assessment, next time on 17 April. The Governing Council retains full freedom of action in times of pervasive uncertainty.

    Slide 7: Europe is under challenge from the world of geopolitics – investment is needed now in security and productivity

    Let me now conclude. The world is now experiencing a transition of potentially similar magnitude as 30 years ago, when the Berlin Wall fell, the Cold War ended and Europe united. At that time, the evolution of humanity took a step forward and security rooted in cooperation was strengthened.

    Today the world only is in reverse gear: power politics has returned in a brutal way with Russia’s invasion, the United States is standing by Russia and playing sphere-of-influence politics, and China is challenging the entire international order. 

    But we must be able to navigate even in this geopolitically difficult terrain. With the Munich Security Conference, Europe has received yet another wake-up call.

    At the same time, we must focus on our own economic problems. Europe needs investments in productivity growth – in human capital and in research and innovation. Protectionism highlights the need to complete the single market and expand the EU’s network of free trade agreements.

    The stabilisation of inflation and the weakening of the growth outlook have supported monetary policy easing since last summer. The ECB’s monetary policy has been reasonably successful in bringing inflation down without inflicting unnecessary pain to the real economy.

    The past few weeks have shown that Europe must urgently get its act together and stand united in the face of external security threats. In the coming weeks and months, Europe will have to demonstrate that it is taking action and meeting the challenge of strengthening its defence. There is no time to waste.

    Thank you very much. I am happy to take any questions you have.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Webcast: Statement of the Financial Stability Committee and publication of Financial Stability 26 March 2025

    Source: Central Bank of Iceland

    A statement of the Financial Stability Committee will be published at 8:30 tomorrow, Wednesday 26 March. The bank‘s Financial Stability Report will be published at 8:35. At 9:30, a press conference on the statement and the contents of the Financial Stability Report begins.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia to showcase latest optical innovations to network the cloud for the AI era at OFC50

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press Release
    Nokia to showcase latest optical innovations to network the cloud for the AI era at OFC50

    • New optical networking powerhouse to demonstrate bolstered product portfolio and pioneering innovations.
    • Nokia offers solutions and industry firsts to help network operators more efficiently address capacity demands driven by rapid growth in data center builds and AI workloads.
    • Nokia to hold executive briefing at OFC50 to provide optical insights in the era of AI.

    25 March 2025
    Espoo, Finland – Nokia announced today that it will be showcasing its comprehensive set of networking solutions designed to help operators network the cloud and meet the connectivity challenges of the artificial intelligence (AI) era at the OFC50 conference in San Francisco to be held March 30 to April 3, 2025.

    The increasing prevalence of cloud-based services and applications, notably AI workloads, is driving significant increases in data center capacity. New AI services delivered by cloud service providers, including hyperscale and webscale operators, internet exchange and colocation providers, and CSPs who are building dedicated managed optical fiber networks and data centers in support of AI initiatives, all require optimized solutions that can enable simple network scaling while minimizing power consumption.

    “The solution to challenges posed by AI and cloud-based connectivity demands starts with scale, but it certainly doesn’t end there. Nokia’s expanded portfolio of optical network solutions and technology capabilities delivers tangible network value that supports our customers’ long-term business success. At OFC50, it’s our pleasure to show these off publicly for the first time. Visitors to this iconic show will find Nokia occupying two booths; because there’s simply too much innovation to fit into just one,” said James Watt, Senior Vice President and General Manager of Optical Networks at Nokia.

    The Nokia solutions portfolio, which includes several new pioneering innovations, will help network operators more efficiently address capacity demands driven by rapid growth in data center builds and AI workloads, while driving down power per bit, simplifying network architectures, and increasing automation and security.

    Nokia will showcase its latest optical networking innovations and industry-firsts at this year’s OFC, including:

    • New Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) Optical Line System: optimized for high-capacity data center interconnection (DCI). A new highly integrated C+L and feature rich WDM optical line system with enhanced optical client optical management facilitating seamless support of a wide variety of input wavelengths including lower power coherent pluggables – ideal for providing maximum scalability for DCI with cost-effective, and operationally efficient connectivity.
    • Pluggable Optimized Muxponder and Transponder (X-Ponder) Line Cards: A new series of line cards for Nokia’s compact modular transport platforms utilizing high-performance 400Gb/s and 800Gb/s pluggable coherent optics supporting efficient transponder and muxponder aggregation capabilities.
    • Multi-Haul 800Gb/s Coherent Pluggables: Live demonstration of the industry’s first multi-vendor interoperable multi-haul 800Gb/s pluggable coherent optics in industry standard form-factors including QSFP-DD800 and OSFP. Supporting a wide variety of deployment configurations including transponders and coherent routing, these solutions offer network operators a low-cost and power efficient solution for applications up to 2000km.
    • Intra-Data Center Connectivity Solutions: Live demonstration of Nokia’s ultra-low power 1.6Tb/s intra-datacenter optical connectivity solutions that can drive down the power required for high-speed connectivity by as much as 70%. This innovative technology can be seamlessly integrated into fully retimed, half-retimed, and linear drive pluggable solutions to support any intra-data center connectivity requirements.

    In addition, Nokia will demonstrate its comprehensive multi-layer networking solutions, featuring industry-leading solutions, including:

    • Embedded Optical Solutions: The industry’s leading and record-setting 1.2Tb/s embedded coherent optics operating over C+L line systems, enabling operators to scale fiber capacity up to 76.8Tb/s in the C+L bands.
    • Enhanced Network Security Solutions: Innovative Quantum-Safe Networking solutions for optical and IP networks, to provide the highest level of network protection against existing and future hacking threats.
    • AI Powered Network Automation: Enabling automated management, coordination and service activation with unified network visualization across IP, optical and cross-domain layers to simplify network operations, increase resiliency, and monetize networks with new and faster service deployment.
      • Routing & Switching: High-performance data center switching and flexible Coherent Routing interconnectivity solutions delivering automated operations with un-matched reliability, scalability, and flexibility.
        • Broadband Fiber Access Solutions: For 25G and 50G passive optical networks (PON) and coherent solution overlays for PON networks to deliver 100G business services.

    Nokia will hold an executive investor, analyst and media briefing at OFC50 on April 2 from 8:30 – 9:30am PDT in the Moscone Center, Level 3, Room #314. The Optical leadership team will be on stage to discuss evolving industry trends and how Nokia’s expanded portfolio of optimized optical networking solutions is solving critical network operator challenges in the era of AI and hyperscale cloud-based connectivity. The event will be publicly available via live webcast and replay on the Investor Relations section of Nokia’s website, under Events.

    For more information on Nokia’s participation at OFC, visit us at OFC50 | Nokia.com.

    Multimedia, technical information and related news 
    Web Page: Optical Network Solutions
    Web Page: Nokia at OFC50

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs, which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Media inquiries
    Nokia Press Office
    Email: Press.Services@nokia.com

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: CoinShares announces issue of options under the Employee Incentive Plan

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    25 March 2025 | SAINT HELIER, Jersey | CoinShares International Limited (“CoinShares” or the “Company“) (Nasdaq Stockholm Market: CS; US OTCQX: CNSRF), a global investment firm specializing in digital assets, has granted 345,038 options (the “Options”) over ordinary shares of £0.000495 par value each (“Ordinary Shares”). The Options have been granted under the Company’s Employee Incentive Plan (“EIP”) as part of the staff remuneration for the financial year ended 31 December 2024, as approved by the Board on 24 March 2025.

    The 345,038 Options granted represent 0.52% of the issued share capital of the Company, bringing the total number of shares currently under option in issue to 3,511,303 (5.00% of the issued share capital of the Company).  

    The vesting date of the Options granted shall be 24 March 2028, being three years from the date of grant. The exercise price of the Options is SEK 72.8 per Ordinary Share.

    Options granted under the EIP to persons discharging managerial responsibilities for the Company have been included in the table below, which sets out the total shareholding and interests of each individual in the Company:

    Individual Role Number of Shares  % of issued capital New Options Total Options
    Richard Nash CFO 900 0.00% 220,038 424,461
    Benoit Pellevoizin Head of Marketing and Communications 0 0.00% 30,000 70,000
    Lewis Fellas Head of Hedge Fund Solutions 300 0.00% 30,000 30,000
        1,200 0.00% 280,038 524,461

    About CoinShares

    CoinShares is a leading global investment company specialising in digital assets, that delivers a broad range of financial services across investment management, trading and securities to a wide array of clients that includes corporations, financial institutions and individuals. Focusing on crypto since 2013, the firm is headquartered in Jersey, with offices in France, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. CoinShares is regulated in Jersey by the Jersey Financial Services Commission, in France by the Autorité des marchés financiers, and in the US by the Securities and Exchange Commission, National Futures Association and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority. CoinShares is publicly listed on the Nasdaq Stockholm under the ticker CS and the OTCQX under the ticker CNSRF.

    For more information on CoinShares, please visit: https://coinshares.com
    Company | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com
    Investor Relations | +44 (0)1534 513 100 | enquiries@coinshares.com

    This information is information that CoinShares International Limited is obliged to make public pursuant to the EU Market Abuse Regulation (596/2014). The information in this press release has been published through the agency of the contact persons set out above, at 13:00 GMT on Tuesday, 25 March 2025.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission – A10-0042/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Article 314 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Article 106a of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027[1] and to the joint declaration agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context[2] and the related unilateral declarations[3],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2022/2496 of 15 December 2022 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4],

     having regard to the Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[5] (MFF Revision),

     having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 3 October 2023 on the proposal for a mid-term revision of the multiannual financial framework 2021-2027[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[9],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom[10],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 22 December 2021 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2021)0570) and its position of 23 November 2022 on the proposal[11],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)[12] (the Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (‘European Climate Law’)[13],

     having regard to the EU’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and its commitments under the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework,

     having regard to the EU gender equality strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on the impact on the 2024 EU budget of increasing European Union Recovery Instrument borrowing costs[14],

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[15],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16],

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights[17] of 13 December 2017,

     having regard to the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2025[18] and the joint statements agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission annexed hereto,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report entitled ‘Much more than a market’, presented in the European Parliament on 21 October 2024,

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, presented in the European Parliament on 17 September 2024,

     having regard to Sauli Niinistö’s report entitled ‘Safer together – Strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’, presented in the European Parliament on 14 November 2024,

     having regard to the presentation of the EU Competitiveness Compass by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on 29 January 2025,

     having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 for European Defence Readiness providing a framework for the ReArm Europe plan (JOIN(2025)0120),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the proposal of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to the Council conclusions of 18 February 2025 on the budget guidelines for 2026,

     having regard to Rule 95 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development and the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

     having regard to the letters from the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Culture and Education and the Committee on Constitutional Affairs,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0042/2025),

    Budget 2026: building a resilient, sustainable and prosperous future for Europe

    1. Highlights the anticipated economic growth projected for 2025 and 2026 within the EU[19], accompanied by an easing of inflation; notes nonetheless the uncertainties stemming from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, which directly threatens the security of the EU, and the worsening effects of climate change and the biodiversity crisis, also manifested in the increasing frequency and intensity of natural disasters, which are compounded by new significant geopolitical changes and a deteriorating international rules-based order, heightened security threats and a rise in global protectionism; emphasises that, in such an increasingly volatile landscape, it is imperative for the EU to enhance its defence and security capabilities, social, economic and territorial cohesion and political and strategic autonomy, decrease its dependence, increase its competitiveness and ensure a prosperous future for the continent and its people, who are currently facing an increasingly high cost of living;

    2. Is determined to ensure that the 2026 budget, by focusing on strategic preparedness and security, economic competitiveness and resilience, sustainability, climate, as well as strengthening the single market, provides the people in the EU with a robust ecosystem and delivers on their priorities, thus reinforcing a socially just and prosperous Europe; underlines the need for additional investment in security and defence, research, innovation, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), health, energy, migration, as well as land and maritime border protection, inclusive digital and green transitions, job creation, and the provision of opportunities for young people; insists that this be accompanied by administrative simplification, as indicated in the Competitiveness Compass; insists that the EU budget is the largest investment instrument with leverage effect, complementing national budgets and therefore enabling the EU to navigate the complexities of a rapidly changing world while ensuring prosperity, social cohesion and stability for its people; is strongly of the opinion that the EU should use this leverage effect to the maximum degree to boost the Union’s objectives and policymaking, as well as private investment;

    Investing in a solid, sustainable and resilient economy

    3. Is adamant that sound economic resilience and sustainability can be achieved in the EU by boosting public and private investment, increasing innovation and supporting competitiveness, including by addressing the skills gap and fostering more industrial production in Europe as a source for robust economic growth and quality jobs, and thereby guaranteeing the Union’s strategic autonomy, ensuring that the EU remains agile and self-reliant in the face of global challenges, disruptions and volatility; highlights the need to promote innovation, prioritise education, reduce costs and the administrative burden, and strengthen the single market, particularly as regards services;

    4. Reaffirms, in this regard, that research and innovation remain crucial for the EU’s success in cutting-edge industries and new clean and sustainable technologies; recalls the long-standing goal of increasing research and innovation investment to 3 % of gross domestic product (GDP); calls, therefore, for increased funding to be provided under Horizon Europe to fund at least 50 % of all excellent proposals in all scientific disciplines, enable researchers as well as companies, especially SMEs, to bring new developments to the market, and to scale up, ensure solid economic growth and boost the Union’s competitiveness in the global economy, thereby preventing actors from leaving for competing regions while also ensuring that Europe has the knowledge base it needs to pursue the Green Deal commitments;

    5. Highlights the importance of targeted support in encouraging public-private partnerships and accessible and increased financing to support SMEs as the backbone of the European economy and a vector for pioneering innovation, emphasising the role of the European Innovation Council, InvestEU and the SME component of the single market programme in empowering start-ups and scale-ups of innovative companies, supporting them in their growth and contributing to a greater role for the EU economy on the global stage; expresses its concern that, according to the interim evaluation of InvestEU, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; takes note of the Commission proposal in this regard; underlines, furthermore, the importance of the single market programme to leverage the full potential of the EU’s cross-border dimension;

    6. Stresses that the modernisation of the economy will require blending public and private investment; emphasises, in this regard, the necessity of private investments to maximise the leverage effect of public spending; recalls that these efforts should lead to simplification and reduce the financial burden for the EU’s SMEs while maintaining EU standards;

    7. Underscores the urgency of further accelerating the digital and green transitions as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy that remains attractive for innovative businesses and that is based on market-driven investments providing quality jobs and leaving no one behind; advocates substantial investment in forward-looking digital infrastructure, underpinned by well-regulated, human-centred and trustworthy artificial intelligence and cybersecurity; stresses the need to improve citizens’ basic digital skills to match the needs of companies and to equip citizens to counter disinformation; stresses, further, the need to increase the resilience of the Union’s democracy in fighting malign foreign interference;

    8. Recognises the strategic value of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) and the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) for contributing to the economic, social and climate goals of the EU’s cross-border transport infrastructure; calls for network extensions, particularly towards candidate countries and the EU’s strategic partners, as regards the EU’s sustainable and smart mobility strategy and the complementarities between the TEN-T and the Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E);

    A better-prepared Union, capable of effectively responding to crises

    9. Underlines the need to enhance EU security and defence capabilities to create a genuine defence union and to better prepare for and respond to unprecedented geopolitical challenges and new hybrid security threats; stresses the essential role of common investment, research, production and procurement mechanisms, including in new disruptive technologies supporting an independent EU defence industry; considers that there is an EU added value in security and defence cooperation that not only makes Europe and its people safer but also leads to greater efficiency, potential savings, quality job creation and enhanced strategic autonomy; calls therefore for immediate upscaling and much better coordination of defence spending by Member States; stresses in particular the need to provide adequate resources to innovate and enhance Member States’ military capabilities, as well as their interoperability; takes note, in line with the Commission’s ‘ReArm Europe’ plan, of its call for the European Investment Bank (EIB) and other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry while safeguarding their operations and financing capacity; recalls the importance of investing in and developing dual-use equipment and, particularly, of strengthening EU military mobility as regards funding dual-use transport infrastructure along priority axes; calls on the Commission to assess the possibility of using calls for this purpose under the CEF transport programme, in the light of the military mobility funding gap; underlines the urgent need to strengthen the EU’s cybersecurity capabilities to fight hybrid warfare;

    10. Recalls the role of the EU’s space programme in enhancing the strategic security of the Union through a variety of civil and military applications; underlines that a strong European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, the protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions, and therefore requires sufficient resources;

    11. Highlights, in the face of new challenges in internal and external security, the importance of ensuring proper implementation of the Asylum and Migration Pact, in full compliance with international human rights law, and of respecting the principles of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility; stresses that effective management and protection of the EU’s external borders, both land and maritime, are essential for maintaining the freedoms of the Schengen area and crucial for the security of the EU and its citizens; emphasises the need to better protect people from trafficking and enhance support to strengthen cross-border cooperation between the Member States and the Union in combating criminal networks, particularly those involved in migrant smuggling and human trafficking, so as to reinforce law enforcement and the judicial response to these criminal networks, as well as to support Member States facing hybrid threats, in particular the instrumentalisation of migrants as defined in the Crisis Regulation[20];

    12. Recalls the vital role that the Integrated Border Management Fund, the Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) and the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund play in protecting external borders; calls, in addition, for appropriate funding for border protection capabilities, including physical infrastructure, buildings, equipment, systems and services required at border crossing points, as provided for in Annex III to the BMVI Regulation[21], and for the requirements to be met in terms of reception conditions, integration, return and readmission procedure; reaffirms that cooperation agreements with non-EU countries in full respect of international law can help to prevent irregular migration and strengthen border security;

    13. Acknowledges the common agricultural policy (CAP) as a key strategic European policy for food security and greater EU autonomy in affordable and high-quality food production; stresses the crucial role of the CAP in ensuring a decent income for EU farmers as well as a productive, competitive and sustainable European agriculture; regrets that direct payments have significantly decreased in real terms due to inflation, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; urges the Commission to reduce the administrative burden while maintaining high production standards and the requirement to implement EU legislation; calls for adequate resources and for direct payments to be protected to help farmers cope with the impact of inflation, fuel costs, changes in the global food and trade market and adverse climate events, affecting agricultural production and threatening food security, including in the outermost regions; highlights, in this regard, the role of the agricultural reserve; emphasises the need to help small and medium-sized farms and new and young farmers by supporting generational renewal and ensuring continued support for the promotion of EU agricultural products; underlines the need for appropriate support for research and innovation to make the agricultural sector more sustainable, including water management, in particular through the Horizon Europe programme, without reducing European agricultural production and while preventing European farmers from facing unfair competition from imported products that do not meet our standards; welcomes the Commission’s preparation of a second simplification package; underscores that food security is an essential component for geopolitical stability;

    14. Stresses the strategic role of fisheries and aquaculture and the need for them to be adequately supported financially; acknowledges that the common fisheries policy ensures a stable income and long-term future for fishers by contributing to protecting sustainable marine ecosystems, which are key to the sector’s competitiveness; insists that special attention must be devoted to the EU’s fishing fleet in order to improve safety and security, including by combating illegal fishery actions and improving working conditions, energy efficiency and sustainability, as well as by renewing the fleet; reaffirms that the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund should support a human resources policy capable of addressing future challenges, in order to promote an inclusive, diversified and sustainable blue economy; expresses its concern about the effect of the end of the Brexit transition period in June 2026 on the fishing and aquaculture sectors;

    15. Stresses that enhancing energy security and independence remains fundamental for the EU; highlights the EU’s role in ensuring security of energy supply, assisting households, farmers and businesses in mitigating price volatility and managing price gaps in comparison to the rest of the world; calls, therefore, for additional investment in critical infrastructure and connectivity, including large-scale cross-border electricity grids and hydrogen infrastructure for hard-to-abate sectors, which are an essential prerequisite to the decarbonisation of European industry, in low-carbon and renewable energy sources and connectivity, in particular by properly funding the CEF, as well as in energy efficiency; highlights the need to adapt European infrastructure to meet future energy demands as part of the transition to a clean and modern economy; underlines the importance of investing in new, expanding and modernising interconnector capacity for electricity trading, in particular cross-border capacity, for a fully integrated EU energy market that enhances Europe’s diversified supply security and resilience to energy market disruptions, reducing external dependencies and ultimately ensuring affordable and sustainable energy for EU citizens and businesses; stresses, in this regard, the need to strengthen cooperation with Africa;

    16. Recalls, in this context, the current housing crisis in Europe, including the lack of decent and affordable housing; calls, therefore, for swift additional investments through a combination of funding sources, including the EIB and national promotional banks, in areas with a positive impact on reducing the cost of living for households, improving the energy efficiency of buildings and deploying renewable energy sources; calls for a coordinated approach at EU level that respects the principle of subsidiarity, encourages best practices and effectively uses all relevant funding mechanisms in addressing this pressing challenge;

    17. Is highly concerned by the strong impacts of climate change and the biodiversity crisis both in Europe and globally and by the fact that the year 2024 was assessed to be the planet’s warmest year on record; calls for sufficient funding for the LIFE programme to finance climate and environment-related projects, including in the area of climate change mitigation and adaptation, and for increased budgetary flexibility to adequately respond to natural disasters in the EU; regrets that increasing numbers of natural disasters have led to a high number of victims, as well as to long-term devastating effects on citizens, farmers and businesses based and working in the regions concerned, as well as in the ecosystems impacted; calls for increased funding for the EU Solidarity Fund, RESTORE (Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction) and the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, including for increasing rescEU capacities, which allow for more cost-efficient capacity building, in order to support Member States quickly and effectively in overwhelming crisis situations; recognises the EU’s role as a hub for coordinating and improving Member States’ preparedness and capacities to respond immediately to large-scale, high-impact emergencies, and its added value both for Member States and citizens; stresses, in this regard, that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism is a tangible expression of European solidarity, reinforcing the EU’s role as a crisis responder; acknowledges that the European Union Solidarity Fund or any other fund alone cannot fully compensate for the extreme weather events of increased frequency and severity caused by climate change today and in the future; stresses the need to invest in and prioritise preparedness, prevention, and adaptation measures, prioritising nature-based solutions; stresses that it is crucial to ensure that Union spending contributes to climate mitigation, adaptation efforts and water resilience infrastructure; emphasises that these investments are far lower than the cost of climate inaction;

    Enhancing citizens’ opportunities in a vibrant society

    18. Insists that continued investment in EU4Health and Cluster Health in Horizon Europe are key to improving health and preparedness for future health crises, thereby improving the health status of EU citizens; stresses the need for health investments for maximum impact; highlights its support for a holistic regulatory and funding approach to Europe’s life sciences and biotech ecosystem, including the creation of cutting-edge European clusters of excellence, as a central pillar of a stronger European health union, to which a European plan for cardiovascular diseases and lifestyles should be added, focusing on primary and secondary prevention as key objectives to increase life expectancy in the EU; highlights the need to create a more supportive care system to respond to demographic challenges and the ageing population; reiterates its support for Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan, as well as the importance of European investment in tackling childhood diseases, rare diseases and antimicrobial resistance; reiterates the importance of the gender aspect of health, including sexual and reproductive health and access to services; is highly concerned by the current mental health crisis in Europe, affecting in particular the young generation, exacerbated by recent global events, which requires immediate action to be taken; underlines the need to prevent shortages of critical medicines, medical countermeasures and healthcare workers faced by some Member States; calls, in this respect, for better coordination at EU level and joint procurement of medicines in order to reduce costs;

    19. Stresses the importance of investing in young generations and their skills, as major agents of change and progress, by ensuring access to quality education; considers it essential that all students, without discrimination and in every EU Member State, should have full access to the Erasmus+ programme and underlines the essential role of Erasmus+ in facilitating cultural exchange, strengthening European identity and promoting peace through mutual understanding and cooperation, making it a cornerstone of European integration and unity; recalls the need to tackle the skills deficit, the brain drain and the correlation between market needs and skills; considers that for the EU workforce to remain competitive in the future, establishing key areas for training and reskilling is needed; stresses that further investment is required in modernising the Union’s education systems, by equipping them for the digital and green transitions, creating talent booster schemes and incentivising young entrepreneurs; points, in this respect, to the relevance of sufficient financial resources for EU programmes such as the European Social Fund Plus, Erasmus+ and the EU Solidarity Corps, which have proven highly effective in helping to achieve high employment levels and fair social protection, in broadening education and training across the Union, as well as in promoting new job opportunities and fostering skills, youth participation and equal opportunities for all; calls on the Commission to do its utmost so that all university students remain eligible to participate in the Erasmus+ programme, including in Hungary;

    20. Recalls the role of the EU budget in contributing to the objectives of the European Pillar of Social Rights; highlights the role of the EU budget in contributing to initiatives that reinforce social dialogue and facilitate labour mobility, including in the form of training, networking and capacity building;

    21. Highlights the ever-increasing threats and dangers of organised and targeted disinformation campaigns against the EU by foreign stakeholders undermining European democracy; calls for the mobilisation of all relevant Union programmes, including Creative Europe, to fund actions in 2026 that promote inclusive digital and media literacy, in particular for young people, combating disinformation, countering online hate speech and extremist content, while encouraging the active participation of citizens in democratic processes and safeguarding media freedom and pluralism for good cultural resilience, all of which are fundamental to a thriving democracy;

    22. Calls on the Commission to increase EU funding for protecting citizens, religious communities and public spaces against terrorist threats, combating radicalisation and terrorist content online, as well as countering hate speech and rising antisemitism, anti-Muslim hatred and racism;

    23. Calls on the Commission to ensure the swift, full and proper implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act[22], the Digital Market Act[23] and the Artificial Intelligence Act[24], also by allocating sufficient human resources; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability and the integrity of the digital public space;

    24. Underlines the added value of funding programmes in the areas of democracy, rights and values; recalls the important role that the EU budget plays in the promotion of the European values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and in supporting the key principles of democracy, the rule of law, solidarity, inclusiveness, justice, non-discrimination and equality, including gender equality; reaffirms, furthermore, the essential role of the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme in promoting European values and citizens’ rights, in particular its Union Values strand, as well as gender equality, thereby sustaining and further developing an open, rights-based, democratic, equal and inclusive society based on the rule of law; stresses the need for targeted measures to address gender disparities and promote equal opportunities through EU funding allocations; stresses that supporting investigative journalism with sufficient resources is a strategic investment in democracy, transparency and social justice; reiterates the importance of the Daphne and Equality and Rights programmes, and stresses that necessary resources should be devoted to combating discrimination in all its forms, as well as tackling forms of violence;

    25. Emphasises the valuable work carried out under the Union Values strand, which provides, among other things, direct funding to civil society organisations as key actors in vibrant democracies; stresses that citizens and civil society organisations, promoting the will and interest of citizens, represent the core of European democracy; underlines, in this regard, the importance of all EU programmes and increased funding in supporting the genuine engagement of civil society, particularly in the context of the impact of reduced funding for civil society by the EU’s international partners;

    26. Considers it essential for the Union’s stability and progress and its citizens’ trust to ensure the proper use of Union funds and to take all steps towards protecting the Union’s financial interests, in particular by applying the rule of law conditionality; underscores the undeniable connection between respect for the rule of law and efficient implementation of the Union’s budget in accordance with the principles of sound financial management under the Financial Regulation; reiterates that under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation[25], the imposition of appropriate measures must not affect the obligations of governments to implement the programme or fund affected by the measure, and in particular the obligations they have towards final recipients; insists, therefore, that in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments, the Commission should explore alternative ways to implement the budget, including by assessing the possibility of diverting sources to directly and indirectly managed programmes, in order to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding, without weakening the application of the regulation; highlights the role of the European Court of Auditors and its constant activity in defence of transparency, accountability and strict compliance with the regulations on all of the funds and programmes;

    A strong Union in a changing world

    27. Observes that the need for the EU to maintain and augment its presence on the global stage is increasingly crucial amid escalating global conflicts, geopolitical shifts and foreign influence efforts worldwide, particularly considering developments with other major global providers of aid; stresses that in order to achieve this, the Union requires sufficient funding and resources to act, including to respond to major crises in its neighbourhood and throughout the world, in particular in the light of the sudden decrease in international funding; stresses the importance of the humanitarian aid programme and regrets that resources are not increasing in line with record-high needs; underscores the need to strengthen the EU’s role as a leading humanitarian actor while effectively addressing emerging crises, particularly in regions facing protracted conflict, displacement, food insecurity and natural disasters; emphasises that the Union also requires sufficient resources for long-term investments in building global partnerships, and points out the importance of the participation of non-EU countries in Union programmes, where appropriate;

    28. Underlines that the EU’s security environment has changed dramatically following Russia’s illegal, unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine and unpredictable changes in the policies of its main allies; recalls the importance of enhancing citizens’ safety and of achieving efficiency in the area of defence and strategic autonomy, through a comprehensive approach to security that covers military and civilian capabilities, external relations and internal security; stresses the importance of the Internal Security Fund to ensure funding to tackle increased levels of serious organised crime with a cross-border dimension and cybercrime; recognises the pressure which increased defence spending represents for Member Sates’ national budgets; stresses the importance of Member States stepping up their efforts and increasing funding for their defence capabilities, in a consistent and complementary manner in line with the NATO guideline;

    29. Stresses that, beyond the enormous sacrifices of the people of Ukraine in withstanding Russia’s war of aggression for our common European security, this war has also had substantial economic and social consequences for people throughout Europe; recalls that certain Member States, in particular those with a land border with Russia and/or Belarus in the Baltic region, and frontline Member States, as well as vulnerable sectors of the economy, remain particularly exposed to the consequences of the war and deserve support in areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and military mobility, in the spirit of EU solidarity;

    30. Firmly reiterates its unconditional and full support for Ukraine in its fight for its freedom and democracy against Russian aggression, as the war on its soil has passed the three-year mark; underlines the ongoing need for high levels of funding, including in humanitarian aid and for repairs to critical infrastructure, and for improved capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes; welcomes the renewed and reinforced intention of the Commission and Member States to work in a united way to address Ukraine’s pressing defence needs and to further support the Ukrainian economy by providing regular and predictable financial support and facilitating investment opportunities; welcomes the agreement with the Council on macro-financial assistance for Ukraine of up to EUR 35 billion, making use of the proceeds of frozen Russian assets through the new Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, in order to support Ukraine’s recovery, reconstruction and modernisation, as well as to foster Ukraine’s progress on its path to EU accession; stresses the importance of ensuring accountability regarding core international crimes;

    31. Insists on the benefits of pre-accession funds, both for the enlargement countries and for the EU itself, as the funding creates more stability in the region; welcomes the implementation of the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans to further support the economic convergence of Western Balkan countries with the EU’s single market through investment and growth in the region; insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support Moldova’s accession process, in line with the EU’s commitment to enlargement and regional stability; underlines the role of the Reform and Growth Facility for the Republic of Moldova and highlights the necessity of securing sufficient financial resources for its full implementation; underlines the importance of sustained support for candidate countries in implementing the necessary accession-related reforms, in particular regarding the rule of law, anti-corruption and democracy and in enhancing their resilience and preventing and countering hybrid threats; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society, independent media organisations and journalists;

    32. Underlines, furthermore, that EU neighbourhood policy, namely its Eastern and Southern Partnerships, contributes to the overall goal of increasing the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU’s neighbours and thereby of increasing the security of our continent; stresses, therefore, the importance of reinforcing the Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood budget lines in order to support political, economic and social reforms in the regions, facilitate peace processes and reconstruction and provide assistance to refugees, in particular through continuous, reinforced and predictable funding and continuous implementation on the ground; recalls that the EU must continue to alleviate other crises and assist the most vulnerable populations around the world through its humanitarian aid programme, as well as by maintaining its global positioning with the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument for supporting global challenges and promoting human rights, freedoms and democracy, as well as for the capacity building of civil society organisations and for delivering on the Union’s international climate and biodiversity commitments, within a comprehensive monitoring and control system;

    Cross-cutting issues in the 2026 budget

    33. Underlines that the repayment of the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) borrowing costs is a legal obligation for the EU and therefore non-discretionary; notes that borrowing costs depend on the pace of disbursements under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) as well as on market fluctuations in bond yields and are therefore inherently partly unpredictable and volatile; insists, therefore, on the need for the Commission to provide reliable, timely and accurate information on NextGenerationEU (NGEU) borrowing costs and on expected RRF disbursements throughout the budgetary procedure as well as on available decommitments; expects the Commission to update the decommitments forecast when it presents the draft budget; recalls that the three institutions agreed that expenditures covering the financing costs of NGEU must aim at not reducing EU programmes and funds;

    34. Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposals for the introduction of new own resources; is highly concerned by the complete lack of progress on the new own resources in the Council, in particular in view of increasing investment and unforeseen needs; considers that the introduction of new own resources, in line with the roadmap in the interinstitutional agreement of 2020, is essential to cover NGEU borrowing costs while shielding the margins and flexibility mechanisms necessary to cater for these needs;

    35. Highlights again Parliament’s full support for the cohesion policy and its key role in delivering on the EU’s policy priorities and its general growth; reiterates that the cohesion policy’s optimal added value for citizens depends on its effective and timely implementation; in the same vein, urges the Member States and the Commission to accelerate the implementation of operational programmes under shared management funds as well as of the recovery and resilience plans so as to ensure swift budgetary execution and to avoid accumulated payment backlogs in the two last years of the MFF period, in particular through additional capacity building and technical assistance for Member States; reaffirms the imperative of a robust and transparent mechanism for accurately monitoring disbursements to beneficiaries;

    36. Notes that particular attention must be paid to rural and remote areas, areas affected by industrial transition and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, such as islands and outermost, cross-border and mountain regions and all those affected by natural disasters; stresses that these regions should benefit from adequate funding to offset the special characteristics and constraints of their structural social and economic situation, as referred to in Article 349 TFEU; stresses the vital importance of the POSEI programme for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions and bringing food to local markets; calls for the programme budget to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in these regions; notes that there has been no such increase since 2013, despite the fact that farmers in these regions face higher production costs due to inflation and climate change; stresses also that the Overseas Countries and Territories associated with the EU, as referred to in Articles 198-204 TFEU, should benefit from adequate funding for their sustainable economic and social development, in the light of their geopolitical importance for global maritime trade routes and key partnerships such as those on sustainable raw materials value chains;

    37. Reiterates that EU programmes, policies and activities, where relevant, should be implemented in such a way that promotes gender equality in the delivery of their objectives; welcomes the Commission’s work on developing gender mainstreaming in order to meaningfully measure the gender impact of Union spending, as set out in the interinstitutional agreement;

    38. Takes note that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be met by 33.5 % in 2025, while the biodiversity target will be below 8.5 % in 2025, and unless dedicated action is undertaken the 10 % target will not be met in 2026; stresses the need for continuous efforts towards the achievement of the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets laid down in the interinstitutional agreement in the Union budget and the EURI expenditures;

    39. Stresses that the 2026 Union budget should be aligned with the Union’s ambitions of making the Union climate neutral by 2050 at the latest, as well as the Union’s international commitments, in particular under the Paris Agreement and the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, and should significantly contribute to the implementation of the European Green Deal and the 2030 biodiversity strategy;

    40. Recalls that effective programme implementation is achievable only with the backing of a committed administration; emphasises the essential work carried out by bodies and decentralised agencies and asserts that they must be properly staffed and sufficiently resourced, while taking into account inflation, so that they can fulfil their responsibilities effectively and contribute to the achievement of the Union political priorities, also when given new tasks and mandates;

    41. Recalls that, in accordance with the Financial Regulation, when implementing the budget, Member States and the Commission must ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and respect the Union’s values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; underlines in particular Articles 137, 138 and 158 of the Financial Regulation and recalls the Commission and the Member States’ obligation to exclude from Union funds any persons or entities found guilty by a final judgment of terrorist offences, as well as by final judgments of terrorist activities, inciting, aiding, abetting or attempting to commit such offences, and corruption or other serious offences; highlights the need to leverage efforts in tackling fraud both at Union and Member State level and to this end ensure appropriate financial and human resources covering the Union’s full anti-fraud architecture; recalls the importance of providing the Union Anti-Fraud Programme with sufficient financial resources;

    42. Underlines the importance of effective communication and the visibility of EU policies and programmes in raising awareness of the added value that the EU brings to citizens, businesses and partners;

    °

    ° °

    43. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the Court of Auditors.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (20.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Michael Gahler

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Foreign Affairs calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Welcomes the fact that the multiannual financial framework (MFF) revision in 2024 provided for additional funding under Heading 6 and for the EUR 50 billion Ukraine Facility; deplores, however, the fact that the MFF revision fell short of the needs identified by Parliament; reiterates the urgent need to increase funding, particularly in crisis-affected regions where the needs are greatest, and to address the various challenges in the neighbourhood, invest in partnerships and strengthen the geopolitical position of the EU; underlines in particular the need for continued efforts to finance Ukraine’s immediate funding needs; emphasises that the EU should without any delay intensify its efforts to enable frozen and immobilised Russian assets to be used for Ukraine’s reconstruction, reparations and budgetary needs, in full compliance with EU and international law; underlines that the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe) and the Global Gateway are crucial instruments within the Union’s external action toolbox; stresses the importance of the EU’s humanitarian aid policies and instruments; calls in general for a more strategic and impactful approach to EU funding abroad while advancing open strategic autonomy;

    2. Reiterates that an increased level of funding should be allocated for the Southern Neighbourhood in 2025 to support political, economic and social reforms in the region; highlights in particular the pressing need to contribute significantly to the reconstruction of Gaza and to provide additional humanitarian aid in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria; recalls that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNWRA) has up to now been the principal humanitarian assistance structure in Gaza and the West Bank as well as an essential service provider in the region; recalls the need to continue supporting key regional partners such as Jordan in order to foster peace in the region;

    3. Welcomes the new Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans and the proposed Facility for Moldova, as well as the role of the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) III in financing actions in the region; underlines that the Reform Agendas, which beneficiaries need to develop, are a promising instrument to speed up transformation and compliance with EU norms; calls on the Commission, in the interests of a successful accession process, to strictly apply the conditionalities enshrined in the two facilities; calls furthermore on the Commission to accompany all 10 enlargement countries on their path to European integration and to provide tailored assistance to address their respective challenges; calls on the Commission to allocate additional funding to support civil society and independent media organisations and journalists; calls on the Commission to ensure that it retains the possibility to withhold funds, either temporarily or indefinitely, if those funds would contribute to the budgets of governments – whether at the national or sub-national level – whose actions are significantly undermining the stability of the country or its neighbours, or the country’s progress towards European integration, particularly regarding democracy, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to present a proposal for an instrument for pre-accession assistance for the next MFF that incorporates the facilities to avoid overlaps and covers all 10 enlargement countries and which should ensure strong institutional and economic preparedness for EU membership; calls also on the Commission to speed up the integration of all candidate countries in the EU roaming area;

    4. Highlights the importance of the EU’s ensuring that EU funds do not go towards financing educational literature that romanticises martyrdom, violence or terrorism;

    5. Underlines the need for the Directorate-General for Enlargement and the Eastern Neighbourhood (DG ENEST), the Directorate-General for the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf (DG MENA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to be provided with sufficient financial and human resources to promote peace, prosperity, security and EU values and interests in both the European neighbourhood and across the globe; underlines the need to provide adequate resources to both the EEAS and the Commission for strategic communication and to counter disinformation; highlights the need to maintain the current structure of the network of EU delegations around the world and to provide financing that is commensurate with the role that the Union expects all delegations to play on the ground; notes, furthermore, that the EEAS, with 145 delegations around the globe, cannot be measured according to the same logic as that applied to European institutions in Brussels and Luxembourg; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Council not to apply the 2 % logic to the EEAS; insists on a budgetary increase for common foreign and security policy (CFSP) actions and common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions, as well as other appropriate peace, conflict and crisis response instruments; stresses the need to improve IT and security protocols within EEAS headquarters, EU Delegations and in Commission directorates-general with responsibilities in EU External Action; stresses the importance of investing in European security and defence by bolstering the Union’s strategic autonomy and collective defence capabilities;

    6. Welcomes the establishment of the EU Partnership Mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova); highlights the essential role of the EUPM Moldova and calls on the EU and its Member States to extend the mission’s mandate beyond May 2025, while increasing resources to enhance its effectiveness;

    7. Reiterates the EU’s commitment to promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women globally, as enshrined in the EU Gender Action Plan III (2021–2025); calls for increased resources to support women’s rights, including efforts to eliminate gender-based violence, strengthen women’s participation in decision-making processes and promote economic empowerment; emphasises the importance of gender mainstreaming across all budgetary and policy initiatives to ensure equal opportunities and inclusivity; stresses that gender equality is not only a fundamental right but also a crucial driver of social and economic development;

    8. Calls on the Commission to collaborate with the EPLO office in Washington, D.C., and the EU delegation in the United States to identify, fund and implement initiatives aimed at strengthening the transatlantic relationship, including exchange programmes for professionals working in public institutions in both the EU and the United States;

    9. Underlines that any disbursements from the European budget must depend on the beneficiary country’s respect for the rule of law, human rights and compliance with international obligations, and with respect for international agreements;

    10. Considers that more EU funds need to be allocated to joint cyber defence in order to counter the digital threats from Russia, the People’s Republic of China and others; considers that the Commission needs to secure the necessary funding for a future cyber army that can help EU institutions and Member States to defend themselves against cyberattacks from hostile states;

    11. Stresses the need for the visibility and communication of EU aid, particularly in candidate countries, but also in other partner countries;

    12. Stresses the urgent need for the EU to invest in research and development concerning low-cost drones, not only in order to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend itself against Russia, but also to strengthen European defence; considers that the EU should cooperate with Ukraine on the development of a drone system following their successful use of drones.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    40

    13

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Wouter Beke, Robert Biedroń, Ľuboš Blaha, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Marc Botenga, Helmut Brandstätter, Sebastião Bugalho, Tobias Cremer, Danilo Della Valle, Loucas Fourlas, Alberico Gambino, Giorgos Georgiou, Christophe Gomart, Rima Hassan, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Rihards Kols, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, Marion Maréchal, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Sven Mikser, Francisco José Millán Mon, Hannah Neumann, Urmas Paet, Kostas Papadakis, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Mounir Satouri, Andreas Schieder, Alexander Sell, Villy Søvndal, Davor Ivo Stier, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Cristian Terheş, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Reinier Van Lanschot, Nicola Zingaretti, Željana Zovko

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Krzysztof Brejza, Jaroslav Bžoch, Engin Eroglu, Tomasz Froelich, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Ana Catarina Mendes, Alessandra Moretti, Ana Miguel Pedro, Chloé Ridel, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Marco Tarquinio

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Mélissa Camara, Alexander Jungbluth, Erik Marquardt, Leire Pajín, Kristian Vigenin

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    40

    +

    ECR

    Cristian Terheş

    PPE

    Mika Aaltola, Wouter Beke, Ioan-Rareş Bogdan, Krzysztof Brejza, Sebastião Bugalho, Loucas Fourlas, Rasa Juknevičienė, Sandra Kalniete, Łukasz Kohut, Ondřej Kolář, Andrey Kovatchev, Reinhold Lopatka, Antonio López-Istúriz White, David McAllister, Vangelis Meimarakis, Francisco José Millán Mon, Davor Ivo Stier, Riho Terras, Željana Zovko

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Engin Eroglu, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Urmas Paet, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

    S&D

    Robert Biedroń, Tobias Cremer, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Alessandra Moretti, Tonino Picula, Thijs Reuten, Chloé Ridel, Nacho Sánchez Amor, Andreas Schieder, Marco Tarquinio, Kristian Vigenin, Nicola Zingaretti

     

    13

    ECR

    Rihards Kols, Marion Maréchal

    ESN

    Tomasz Froelich, Alexander Jungbluth, Alexander Sell

    NI

    Ľuboš Blaha, Kostas Papadakis

    PfE

    Jaroslav Bžoch, Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Danilo Della Valle, Giorgos Georgiou, Rima Hassan

     

    8

    0

    ECR

    Alberico Gambino, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza

    Verts/ALE

    Mélissa Camara, Erik Marquardt, Hannah Neumann, Mounir Satouri, Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORT AND TOURISM (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget, Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gheorghe Falcă

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Transport and Tourism calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) has been a highly successful EU instrument for strategic investment in the development of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T), aimed at transforming the EU’s roads, railways, ports, inland waterways and airways into a connected, safe, efficient, sustainable and competitive transport system; whereas the completion deadlines of 2030 for the core network, 2040 for the extended core network and 2050 for the comprehensive network are binding on the Member States and often require massive and sustained infrastructure investments; whereas the CEF-T should remain an important transport funding instrument in the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    B. whereas modern, interconnected and multimodal transport infrastructure within a single European transport area is central to creating growth and jobs in the EU, completing the European single market and ensuring territorial cohesion, including for the benefit of peripheral, rural, mountainous, island and outermost regions and other geographically disadvantaged areas; whereas the Draghi and Letta reports call on the EU to step up its efforts to develop a competitive industrial strategy in the face of global competition; whereas successful decarbonisation that safeguards the global competitiveness of European industries requires significant investment in renewable-energy-based transport networks and alternative fuel infrastructure for sustainable transport; whereas digitalisation across all transport sectors can yield significant efficiency gains, which often have the potential to exceed the initial investments; whereas sufficient investment is required to achieve this and other technological solutions to enhance interoperability between digital, energy and transport networks and to maximise network benefits; whereas increased investment in road safety is necessary to achieve the goals of the EU’s Vision Zero strategy and ensure the safety of roads and road users; whereas the transport sector faces labour and skills shortages, combined with sometimes poor working conditions;

    C. whereas the efficient use of EU funds is paramount to achieving strategic objectives within limited financial envelopes, particularly in the light of inflationary pressures that have led to significant increases in construction, energy and raw material costs, threatening the financial feasibility of key infrastructure projects of common European interest; whereas resilient and coordinated EU funding mechanisms are vital for maintaining project momentum despite economic volatility; whereas the imperative of maximising the impact of EU spending requires inflation-adjusted budgetary provisions, the reallocation of underutilised funds, as well as clear monitoring and improved reporting frameworks;

    D. whereas delays in planning, permitting and procurement processes also hinder the timely implementation of transport and infrastructure projects, jeopardising EU transport and infrastructure development; whereas establishing optimised approval procedures is crucial to accelerating project timelines and ensuring budget absorption;

    E. whereas, as envisaged under the Omnibus simplification package outlined by the Commission in its Competitiveness Compass, reducing regulatory and administrative burdens and simplifying implementation are key to ensuring equal access to funding for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), regional authorities and disadvantaged regions; whereas the simplification of EU regulatory and administrative processes at all levels, coupled with streamlined access to funding, are essential for achieving the timely and efficient implementation of projects under CEF-T and tourism programmes, particularly for SMEs and regional authorities;

    F. whereas the action plan on military mobility 2.0 outlines ambitious EU-level initiatives; whereas, however, inadequate funding remains a significant obstacle to their effective implementation;

    G. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, like the COVID-19 pandemic, has underscored the vulnerability of the EU’s transport and tourism sectors to external shocks; whereas it is more necessary now than ever before to strengthen transport connections with Ukraine and Moldova; whereas the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, which facilitates road freight transport and transit by setting up solidarity corridors, has been extended until 30 June 2025, with the possibility of tacit renewal for a further six months; whereas the European transport network is critical infrastructure facing increasing digital and/or physical security risks and needs to be protected from external threats to maintain the societal functions for which it is vital;

    H. whereas tourism, a major economic activity accounting for almost 10 % of the EU’s GDP and identified in the Commission’s 2021 industrial strategy as a critical ecosystem for the EU’s economy and for employment, continues to face economic, environmental, employment-related and digital challenges;

    1. Calls for a significant increase in the CEF-T budget to secure adequate funding for ongoing and planned TEN-T projects, focusing on cross-border infrastructure with the highest added value for the EU and on the elimination of bottlenecks and missing links, including within Member States, in order to enhance passenger and freight flow throughout Europe; underlines, furthermore, the value of smaller-scale projects in improving cross-border connectivity and their eligibility for EU funding;

    2. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop an EU industrial action plan for the automotive sector, as proposed in the Draghi report, and calls for swift progress in the ongoing strategic dialogue;

    3. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement that it will develop a new maritime industrial strategy to enhance the competitiveness, sustainability and resilience of the European maritime manufacturing sector; appreciates the Commission’s announcement that it would present a European port strategy to limit the risks of economic dependence, espionage and sabotage linked to the economic presence and operational involvement of entities from non-EU countries in EU ports;

    4. Calls, further, for a strategic action plan for the EU aviation sector to identify potential reductions in administrative burdens and to assess financial needs for maintaining the sector’s competitiveness in the face of decarbonisation pressures and the associated risks, including an uneven playing field and carbon leakage, and geopolitical challenges, and with regard to a cross-country analysis of working conditions as a determinant in attracting and retaining skilled workers and boosting productivity;

    5. Welcomes the commitment to put forward a plan to develop an ambitious European high-speed rail network to help connect EU capitals, including through night trains, and to accelerate rail freight, as well as to set up a single digital ticketing and booking system for railways as soon as possible, as already outlined in the revised TEN-T guidelines; underlines the need for ambitious support for the deployment of the European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS);

    6. Advocates a comprehensive strategy on hyperloop, with clear timelines, detailed investment frameworks and support for research, development and deployment;

    7. Welcomes, in this respect, the Commission’s announcement under the Competitiveness Compass presenting a sustainable transport investment plan and calls on the Commission to define financing measures for the above-mentioned strategies and action plans, including by de-risking the investment needed to swiftly ramp up charging infrastructure as well as for the production and distribution of renewable and low-carbon transport fuels, without jeopardising existing market choices;

    8. Underlines again the role of the Social Climate Fund in supporting investment for an inclusive transition towards more sustainable mobility and calls on the Member States to address transport poverty with specific policies and financing measures in their national Social Climate Plans;

    9. Highlights the need to address the shortage of qualified labour, women’s employment and an ageing workforce in the transport sector; calls, in this regard, for sufficient support for the safety and good working conditions of transport workers as well as for the funding of safe and secure truck parking areas across the EU;

    10. Calls for the digitalisation of transport through intelligent solutions and digital booking platforms to facilitate seamless cross-border travel; calls for the systematic reduction of EU regulatory burdens across all transport modes to free up resources, including EU budgetary means, for increased investment in transport infrastructure; underlines the strong need for prior impact assessments of all new legislative initiatives with respect to their budgetary implications but also the regulatory or administrative burdens that the proposals would create or resolve;

    11. Calls on the Commission to address inflationary pressures and resource scarcity by incorporating inflation adjustments into the budget; notes that the inclusion of realistic price adjustments is essential to safeguarding the viability of transport and infrastructure projects against the impact of inflation-induced cost increases; supports the reallocation of unused funds to strategic clusters, such as transport infrastructure, sustainable transport solutions and innovation; calls strongly for the integration of inflation-resilient frameworks and adaptive budget mechanisms within the MFF to avoid financing challenges in upcoming cycles;

    12. Emphasises the importance of bolstering co-financing mechanisms, particularly for large-scale projects such as the Clean Aviation, Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) and Europe’s Rail Joint Undertakings, to ensure their timely implementation despite economic constraints; insists on the leveraging of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to mobilise additional resources;

    13. Advocates innovative financing models, in particular the facilitation of PPPs by providing guarantees or implementing risk-sharing mechanisms, in order to attract private investment in transport and tourism infrastructure, including for a faster transition to alternative fuels; stresses that these PPPs can also contribute to knowledge-sharing, innovation and support for SMEs and start-ups;

    14. Stresses the need to reinforce the budgets of transport agencies, in particular the EU Aviation Safety Agency, the European Maritime Safety Agency, and the EU Agency for Railways, so that they can fulfil the additional tasks assigned to them by the co-legislators in recently adopted EU legislation, as well as in order to support critical safety, sustainability, interoperability, competitiveness, innovation and modernisation initiatives;

    15. Calls resolutely for the streamlining of application and reporting procedures in relation to EU funds in line with Directive 2021/1187[26]; insists on transparent and fair allocation of EU transport funding using digital platforms in order to simplify access for SMEs and regional stakeholders; calls for the establishment of expedited review processes for critical transport and infrastructure projects in order to reduce delays; proposes the implementation of the ‘once-only’ principle for administrative processes, allowing applicants to provide information once and reuse it across EU programmes, thus reducing redundancy and delays, including for the increased blending of EU funds;

    16. Insists on the restoration of the military mobility budget to the originally proposed EUR 6.5 billion over seven years; reiterates that the drastic cut of 75 % to military mobility funding within the transport pillar considerably weakens this policy; highlights the critical role of that funding in adapting parts of the TEN-T infrastructure for dual use along priority axes, in order to facilitate the short-notice, large-scale movement of military equipment and humanitarian aid across the continent, enabling a joint response to military threats to the EU Member States and their allied nations; calls for military mobility to be included in the white paper on the future of European defence;

    17. Reiterates that, to help Ukraine withstand Russia’s war of aggression and to accelerate its post-war recovery and integration into the EU market, alongside the upcoming decisions on the renewal of the EU-Ukraine road transport agreement, it is imperative to pursue projects to improve the capacity along the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, encompassing railway upgrades, improved border crossings and the crucial step of integrating relevant lines of Ukraine’s rail system into the EU’s standard gauge to facilitate the uninterrupted movement of goods and services; considers that the 2026 budget should also help alleviate the economic and social hardship faced by the people of the EU’s eastern border regions, especially the Baltic states, Finland, Poland and Romania, who have been particularly affected by economic losses and the suspension of cross-border mobility as a consequence of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; calls for the financing of further EU measures against the Russian shadow fleet;

    18. Reiterates its repeated request to create a specific EU programme and a dedicated budget line for tourism in the current MFF and beyond, increasing the sector’s resistance to economic shocks and contributing to further growth and jobs across the value chain, bringing significant benefits and long-term well-being to local people and their businesses; highlights the need to reduce administrative burdens for SMEs operating in the tourism sector by simplifying rules, minimising data collection requirements, where appropriate, and providing tailored financial support; notes that the tourism sector stands to benefit greatly from digital innovations, such as smart tourism platforms and integrated digital ticketing systems for attractions and services, which enhance visitor experiences while driving significant economic growth for local communities; stresses that the further development of sustainable tourism, including through the promotion of regional products to strengthen local value chains or the management of tourist flows, could foster economic growth in less popular, more remote and peripheral areas, improve urban-rural connectivity and bolster the climate resilience of EU territories.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    36

    6

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Daniel Attard, Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Benoit Cassart, Carlo Ciccioli, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Valérie Devaux, Siegbert Frank Droese, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, François Kalfon, Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Milan Mazurek, Alexandra Mehnert, Ştefan Muşoiu, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Philippe Olivier, Matteo Ricci, Arash Saeidi, Marjan Šarec, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi, Kosma Złotowski

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Arno Bausemer, Ondřej Krutílek, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Beata Szydło, Flavio Tosi, Kathleen Van Brempt

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Marie Dauchy, Elisabeth Grossmann

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    36

    +

    ECR

    Carlo Ciccioli, Ondřej Krutílek, Beata Szydło, Kosma Złotowski

    PPE

    Tom Berendsen, Nina Carberry, Gheorghe Falcă, Jens Gieseke, Sérgio Humberto, Elżbieta Katarzyna Łukacijewska, Alexandra Mehnert, Elena Nevado del Campo, Luděk Niedermayer, Andrey Novakov, Flavio Tosi, Elissavet Vozemberg-Vrionidi

    Renew

    Oihane Agirregoitia Martínez, Benoit Cassart, Valérie Devaux, Jan-Christoph Oetjen, Marjan Šarec

    S&D

    Daniel Attard, Vivien Costanzo, Johan Danielsson, Elisabeth Grossmann, François Kalfon, Ştefan Muşoiu, Matteo Ricci, Rosa Serrano Sierra, Kathleen Van Brempt

    The Left

    Elena Kountoura, Merja Kyllönen, Arash Saeidi

    Verts/ALE

    Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Virginijus Sinkevičius, Kai Tegethoff

     

    6

    ESN

    Arno Bausemer, Siegbert Frank Droese, Milan Mazurek

    NI

    Luis-Vicențiu Lazarus

    PfE

    Marie Dauchy, Philippe Olivier

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2026 budget – Section III – Commission

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Gabriella Gerzsenyi

     

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Regional Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    A. whereas pursuant to Article 174 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), ‘in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least-favoured regions’;

    B. whereas cohesion policy is a key instrument for reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various regions within the Union and for addressing the fact that the least-favoured regions lag behind, playing a vital role in promoting sustainable development and also addressing environmental challenges, complementing national budgets and enhancing the EU’s ability to navigate global complexities;

    C. whereas among the regions concerned, particular attention must be paid to rural areas, areas affected by the industrial and automotive transitions, less-developed areas inside the so-called developed regions, eastern EU regions bordering on Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, as well as outermost regions, islands and Mediterranean regions facing environmental and economic vulnerabilities;

    D. whereas the absorption rate of cohesion policy funds remains very low partly owing to delays to the start of programmes and the high level of bureaucracy and complexity required in cohesion-funded projects, which can lead to unforced errors;

    E. whereas among the beneficiaries concerned, particular attention should be paid to vulnerable people, such as persons with disabilities;

    1. Considers that, as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument, cohesion policy is based on solidarity, creates sustainable growth and jobs across the Union and contributes to key Union objectives and priorities, including its climate, energy and biodiversity targets, competitiveness, as well as sustainable and socially inclusive economic growth, to tackle demographic challenges and ensure equitable access to affordable housing;

    2. Recalls that cohesion policy has proven to be a helpful tool in tackling challenges in various crises, such as the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its effects on the energy supply, the high cost of living, inflation, and the needs of refugees and displaced persons, as well as natural disasters; underlines, however, that the resulting legislative amendments to cohesion policy have repeatedly brought unexpected changes to its objectives and resources, while cohesion policy should, when needed, complement rather than replace other financial instruments designed for emergency response;

    3. Reiterates the need for coordination at budgetary level between all the financial instruments supporting cohesion policy; believes that, to make the most of NextGenerationEU funds, these should support and complement cohesion policy measures;

    4. Emphasises the need to ensure that the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle is observed across the EU budget; stresses, in this regard, that cohesion policy should not undergo any fundamental changes which could jeopardise the structural and investment funds’ ability to deliver on their goals; stresses that the setting of new priorities should entail new resources and underlines that the long-term investment objectives of cohesion policy are to reduce regional disparities and enhance competitiveness;

    5. Is concerned about the state of implementation of cohesion policy programmes for 2021-2027; urges the Commission to step up monitoring efforts, ensuring respect for the rule of law, a transparent, fair and responsible use of EU resources, as well as their sound financial management; urges the Commission to strengthen its cooperation with the Member State authorities at all levels in order to reduce bureaucracy to make cohesion funds more accessible to local and regional authorities, among others, and to avoid decommitments, unfinished projects and any political manipulation of fund allocation; stresses, therefore, the need to introduce a ‘smart conditionality’ mechanism;

    6. Notes that the Just Transition Fund needs adequate financial resources and a long-term perspective to ensure its effectiveness in supporting regions’ transition towards climate neutrality, while ensuring that the most vulnerable regions are properly supported in the transition process; emphasises the need for a realistic and balanced approach to the just transition, ensuring economic, social and environmental sustainability, with the meaningful participation of local and regional authorities, as well as economic and social partners;

    7. Calls for further simplification of cohesion policy to reduce the growing administrative burden, enhance fund accessibility and ensure investments tailored to the specific needs of regions while enabling the effective management of funds in line with the needs of final beneficiaries; highlights, in this context, the importance of the newly-created EU Councillors network, which is jointly run by the European Committee of the Regions and the European Commission, as a key tool for strengthening the ability to gather evidence of how the Union operates at local level;

    8. Underlines that rural areas are a core part of Europe’s identity and economic potential; welcomes cohesion policy measures that recognise the contribution of more prosperous and resilient rural areas to Europe’s overall resilience; calls for adequate funding to enhance their role in environmental protection, food production, tourism and ensuring ‘the right to stay’; calls for increased public investment to tackle demographic challenges and support young people by improving services and infrastructure, expanding access to digital education, technologies and innovations, so as to raise living standards, increase the stock of affordable housing and foster equal access for citizens and families to culture and high quality education, essential social services and other public services, while making more efficient use of resources, reducing the impact on the environment and creating new opportunities for rural SMEs;

    9. Notes that the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund support investments in sustainable urban development, underlining its importance as a key component of integrated territorial development, with at least 8 % of ERDF resources at the national level being allocated to urban areas through the relevant mechanisms; further notes that this should include special attention to the sustainable development of functional urban and metropolitan areas, facilitating the digital, green and industrial transitions;

    10. Calls for increased investment in digitalisation and innovation to enhance the competitiveness of SMEs in less-developed regions, including rural and peripheral areas, in order to bridge the digital divide and foster inclusive economic growth;

    11. Underlines that sustainable development is directly linked to having a highly skilled work force; insists, therefore, on the need for increased efforts to ensure an adequate degree of upskilling and reskilling of all relevant working age individuals, as well as initiatives to increase citizens’ acceptance of the economic, industrial and energy transitions;

    12. Recalls the importance of mechanisms and strategies adapted to the diversity of the EU’s territories, and therefore calls for a full use of Article 349 TFEU to adapt cohesion policy to the specificities of the outermost regions; reiterates that the outermost regions should receive specific additional allocations to offset the extra costs incurred as a result of permanent constraints on their development; calls for an Islands Pact to be considered by the EU institutions with the participation of the principal stakeholders, along the lines of the Urban Pact and the future Rural Pact;

    13. Reaffirms the need for close cooperation between national, regional, local and other authorities as well as their dialogue with civil society organisations and all relevant stakeholders, including economic and social partners, universities and innovation centres; recognises the importance of research and innovation policy in driving economic growth and enhancing competitiveness in order to fulfil cohesion policy objectives; highlights the need to support the commercialisation and scaling up of interregional innovation projects, underlining the importance of developing value chains, particularly in less-developed regions;

    14. Reiterates the need to strengthen the administrative capabilities and capacity of local, regional and national authorities, which are key components in the effective planning and implementation of initiatives and projects at the local level; highlights the importance of stronger ownership, responsibility, partnership and decentralisation; strongly considers that increased financial resources dedicated to technical assistance are key to effective project implementation;

    15. Emphasises that the implementation of cohesion policy must respect horizontal principles, including its place-based nature, multilevel governance, sustainability, the partnership principle, gender equality and non-discrimination, ensuring that all projects contribute to a more equitable and inclusive Union;

    16. Stresses the need to strengthen awareness-raising among European citizens about cohesion policy achievements and calls for further information measures promoting it such as accessible data platforms, as cohesion policy is a particularly effective means of promoting strong and balanced European regions.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under her exclusive responsibility that she did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    29

    0

    1

    Members present for the final vote

    Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Gordan Bosanac, Irmhild Boßdorf, Daniel Buda, Klára Dobrev, Klara Dostalova, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Valentina Palmisano, Vladimir Prebilič, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere, André Rougé, Antonella Sberna, Mārtiņš Staķis, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Rody Tolassy, Francesco Ventola, Marta Wcisło

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Dan Barna, Sofie Eriksson, Denis Nesci, Jacek Protas

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Francisco Assis

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    29

    +

    ECR

    Denis Nesci, Antonella Sberna, Şerban Dimitrie Sturdza, Francesco Ventola

    PPE

    Daniel Buda, Gabriella Gerzsenyi, Krzysztof Hetman, Isabelle Le Callennec, Elena Nevado del Campo, Andrey Novakov, Jacek Protas, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Klara Dostalova, André Rougé, Rody Tolassy

    Renew

    Dan Barna, Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle, Ľubica Karvašová, Elsi Katainen

    S&D

    Francisco Assis, Adrian-Dragoş Benea, Klára Dobrev, Sofie Eriksson, Sabrina Repp, Marcos Ros Sempere

    The Left

    Valentina Palmisano

    Verts/ALE

    Gordan Bosanac, Vladimir Prebilič, Mārtiņš Staķis

     

     

    1

    0

    ESN

    Irmhild Boßdorf

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT (19.2.2025)

    for the Committee on Budgets

    on guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III

    (2024/2110(BUI))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Dario Nardella

     

    OPINION

    The Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following into its motion for a resolution:

    1. Highlights the crucial role of agricultural and rural development policies, particularly the common agricultural policy (CAP), in achieving the Union’s objectives under Article 39 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union; highlights the fact that these policies are tools for farmers to provide safe, healthy, affordable and sustainable food of high quality, while ensuring fair and viable incomes for all farmers, in particular active, small-scale and young farmers, including targeting to prevent land abandonment and promoting short food supply chains; underlines that these policies aim to foster sustainable food systems and secure the long-term viability, profitability, sustainability and safety of EU agricultural production, the development of rural areas and the Union’s food sovereignty, while taking into consideration animal welfare standards, climate protection, mitigation and biodiversity measures; recalls, in this regard, that the strong and simplified EU financial support for a competitive and sustainable farming sector should be increased in the 2026 CAP budget allocation to better reflect the growing challenges in rural areas, including depopulation, and keep rural areas alive; underlines that, according to the latest Eurobarometer survey, support for the CAP has reached an all-time high, with over 70 % of respondents agreeing that the CAP fulfils its role in providing safe, healthy and sustainable food of high quality;

    2. Notes that spending under the CAP significantly exceeds the climate and biodiversity mainstreaming targets and requests that this surplus be used to allocate funds that directly contribute to achieving the primary objectives of the CAP;

    3. Calls on the Commission to secure additional funding for further nature objectives rather than relying on the CAP, which must above all remain a fund that ensures food security and a viable income for our farmers;

    4. Upholds the promotion of EU agricultural products as a cornerstone of agricultural policy, with the aim of strengthening the competitiveness and relevance of all production sectors, especially that of wine and high-quality products, which need to have better access to both internal and external markets so as to promote diversification and internationalisation; recalls the success achieved by such promotion programmes in the opening up and consolidation of new markets; stresses the need to ensure an adequate promotion-policy budget in the coming financial years;

    5. Stresses the need for a stronger, better equipped, flexible and more reactive agricultural reserve, with adequate funding to cope with market imbalances or unpredictable external factors, such as extreme and recurring weather events, animal diseases, water stress or an evolving geopolitical context, which are having an increasing impact on agricultural production and markets, farmers’ incomes, farm continuity and food security; calls on the Commission to make use of the crisis reserve in the most efficient, expeditious and transparent way; stresses the need to simplify administrative procedures in order to guarantee the swift disbursement of that aid; points out that an increase in the agricultural reserve must not affect direct payments; calls on the Commission to develop a comprehensive crisis management strategy for each major agricultural sector, ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of the crisis reserve, while considering the establishment of new crisis and risk management instruments; acknowledges though that the agricultural reserve alone cannot fully compensate for the increasing frequency and severity of extreme weather events caused by climate change; stresses the need to fund preventive mitigation and adaptation measures that enhance the resilience, including climate resilience, of rural areas and food production systems;

    6. Strongly opposes any proposals to reduce the level of pre-allocated funds from the CAP in the future budget; points out that those funds should be increased by at least the equivalent of cumulative inflation since the start of the current budget period in order to avoid hidden reductions in CAP funding; stresses that farmers need the continuity and predictability of the CAP and that emerging new priorities cannot lead to cuts to the CAP budget; advocates for transparency and accountability in the allocation of CAP funds and encourages Member States and the Commission to enhance cooperation and strengthen anti-fraud measures; stresses the need for a fair distribution of CAP support between and within Member States; calls on the Commission to mobilise funds outside the CAP, given the challenges facing EU agriculture and to simplify the administrative procedures for farmers who receive aid; insists that any revenue accruing to the Union budget from assigned revenue or repayments of irregularities relating to agriculture should remain under the agriculture component of Heading 3 of the multiannual financial framework (MFF);

    7. Underlines that CAP simplification measures adopted in 2024 must be the starting point for the next CAP reform;

    8. Recalls that innovation can play a key role in enhancing the productivity, competitiveness, resilience and adaptability of agriculture; underlines, in this regard, the importance of increasing funding for research, thereby avoiding additional bureaucracy, both in the future budget allocations in the framework of the Horizon Europe research programme, as well as in the CAP, while creating funding mechanisms that ensure the continuity of existing and successful agri-food projects, established and funded through the NextGenerationEU instrument; calls therefore for adequate funding for climate change mitigation, precision agriculture, circular economy projects, renewable energy production in rural areas, development and technology-neutral innovation, including for projects promoting animal and plant health and the efficient use of resources, such as water, in agriculture; notes that production efficiency may also be an aim in itself, and that such funding should, in addition to improving the competitiveness of the agricultural sector, increase its resilience to challenges such as climate change and the spread of animal diseases; stresses the importance of ensuring adequate resources for training and knowledge exchange through European instruments, such as the Agricultural Knowledge and Innovation Systems;

    9. Highlights the fact that digitalisation is a crucial tool in the development and enhancement of the value of rural areas, including inner areas, and plays a key role in addressing depopulation and attracting young people to these areas; welcomes the digital transformation in agriculture and rural areas, including its use in irrigation, to improve the efficiency, environmental, social and economic sustainability, traceability and precision of agricultural systems, ensuring more effective use of the EU’s budgetary resources and promoting entrepreneurship in rural areas, thus making them more attractive to people and businesses; calls on the Commission and the Member States, in this context, to strengthen the technological and communications infrastructure in rural areas, including broadband internet coverage, and encourages them to leverage technologies to enhance access to critical information and digitalise administrative processes for CAP support so as to reduce the bureaucratic burden and enable more efficient access to support and services; recalls that the uptake of innovative digital technologies requires sufficient funding, as well as targeted training, education and support programmes for farmers, particularly for small-scale and older farmers, to ensure equitable and affordable access to digital tools;

    10. Notes with concern the continuing loss of farms and farmers, which has a significant socio-economic impact on rural areas; urges, therefore, the EU institutions and Member States to address labour and skills shortages by stepping up their efforts to promote generational renewal in the agricultural sector and rural areas, including in outermost regions and inner areas; highlights the importance of improving the profitability of the agricultural sector by enhancing fiscal and support measures that make farming activities more attractive and by improving access to land, financing and insurance, particularly for women, families involved in small-scale farming, marginalised groups and first-time farmers, such as young people; underlines that young farmers have the potential to be a driving force in sustainable and climate-friendly farming and highlights the need to empower them, including through the use of Union funds and adapted advisory and training tools; underlines that building and modernising rural infrastructure improves the quality of life in rural areas, which is essential for generational renewal; proposes, in this context, the inclusion of a specific indicator in future policies to monitor the rate of generational renewal and the level of services and infrastructure in rural areas;

    11. Calls for EU programmes to prioritise projects that safeguard existing jobs in the agricultural sector and promote the creation of quality employment; stresses that all jobs in the agricultural sector must respect workers’ rights, provide stable and regulated pay, and ensure good working conditions; emphasises the importance of effectively combating poverty and social exclusion in rural areas;

    12. Recalls the challenges that the agri-food sector has faced and is facing, such as the COVID-19 crisis, the harmful effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, natural disasters and rising input costs; regrets that direct payments and CAP subsidies have decreased significantly in real terms due to inflation, resulting in difficulties in implementing rural development measures, while the administrative burden on farmers has increased due to the accumulation of bureaucracy; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to help farmers cope with those inflationary effects, including fuel costs, and underscores that the 2 % deflator of the current MFF does not compensate for the loss of value resulting from inflation; asks the Commission to provide a more flexible deflator in the next MFF and, furthermore, to work closely with the Member States to implement best practices at national and European levels to help farmers cope with inflation and record costs;

    13. Requests that, following the repeated economic crises and extreme weather events caused by climate change that have affected agricultural companies, the unspent resources of the 2014-2022 rural development plans be spent by 31 December 2026 as a derogation from the N+3 rules laid down in Article 38 of Regulation (EU) No 1306/2013[27];

    14. Welcomes the decision of the European Investment Bank to identify agriculture and the bio-economy as key priorities in its 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap;

    15. Expresses its concern about the adverse effects on the European agri-food sector of political instability in certain Member States and at global level, as well as of geopolitical tensions related to trade or international crises; underlines that the signing of the Mercosur Agreement in December 2024 will have implications for Union farmers and producers; invites the Commission to improve trade agreements to protect EU farmers, to ensure fair competition and a level playing field, and to allocate sufficient funds to mitigate the negative effects of trade agreements on the agricultural sector; recalls that European farmers may face unfair competition from third country producers who do not meet the same production standards as those in the EU and calls therefore for a proper level of reciprocity; reiterates the negative cascade effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine on global food security and farmers’ livelihoods; highlights the need to make sure that the reform of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine provides stability and protection for EU farmers; highlights the need to start better preparation for an enlargement of the Union, taking account of European farmers’ interests, especially with regard to the adoption of balanced and enhanced measures to safeguard the European agricultural sector, while also ensuring support for Ukraine;

    16. Calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to revise their national strategic plans, including the rapid use of funds from the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and to provide funding to strengthen the relative negotiating positions of farmers in value chains, and for the Commission to swiftly approve these modifications;

    17. Stresses the vital importance of the programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI) for maintaining agricultural activity in the outermost regions of Europe, for the provision of food and agricultural products there and for the food sovereignty of the EU as a whole; calls for the budget of the scheme, which has not been increased since 2013, to be increased to reflect the real needs of farmers in the outermost regions, as farmers in those areas are facing higher production costs; calls therefore on the Commission to apply without delay a 2 % deflator to the POSEI financial envelopes in order to mitigate the substantial losses for producers in real terms and ensure fairer support for all farmers;

    18. Urges the Commission to ensure adequate resources for the implementation of an EU water management strategy and to continue developing water collection, storage and distribution activities, while preserving the status of water bodies, in order to render the use of water reserves more efficient in agriculture, both in crop irrigation and livestock farming, given that droughts are becoming increasingly severe across the Union.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Date adopted

    18.2.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    34

    2

    8

    Members present for the final vote

    Sergio Berlato, Stefano Bonaccini, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Daniel Buda, Waldemar Buda, Gheorghe Cârciu, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Ivan David, Valérie Deloge, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Carlo Fidanza, Luke Ming Flanagan, Maria Grapini, Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Elsi Katainen, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, Gilles Pennelle, André Rodrigues, Katarína Roth Neveďalová, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Eric Sargiacomo, Christine Singer, Raffaele Stancanelli, Anna Strolenberg, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Veronika Vrecionová, Thomas Waitz, Maria Walsh

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Peter Agius, Benoit Cassart, Ton Diepeveen, Elisabetta Gualmini, Esther Herranz García

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    34

    +

    ECR

    Sergio Berlato, Waldemar Buda, Carlo Fidanza, Bert-Jan Ruissen, Veronika Vrecionová

    NI

    Katarína Roth Neveďalová

    PPE

    Peter Agius, Daniel Buda, Carmen Crespo Díaz, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Herbert Dorfmann, Esther Herranz García, Krzysztof Hetman, Céline Imart, Stefan Köhler, Norbert Lins, Pekka Toveri, Jessika Van Leeuwen, Maria Walsh

    PfE

    Raffaele Stancanelli

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Asger Christensen, Barry Cowen, Elsi Katainen, Christine Singer

    S&D

    Stefano Bonaccini, Gheorghe Cârciu, Maria Grapini, Elisabetta Gualmini, Cristina Maestre, Dario Nardella, Maria Noichl, André Rodrigues, Eric Sargiacomo

     

    2

    PfE

    Ton Diepeveen

    The Left

    Luke Ming Flanagan

     

    8

    0

    ESN

    Ivan David

    PfE

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Valérie Deloge, Gilles Pennelle

    Verts/ALE

    Cristina Guarda, Martin Häusling, Anna Strolenberg, Thomas Waitz

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETARY CONTROL (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Budgetary Control has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 18 February 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    Yours sincerely,

    Niclas Herbst

     

    CONT Chair

    Rapporteur for the Commission Discharge

    OPINION

    1. Recalls its strong commitment to the fundamental principles and values enshrined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU);

    2. Stresses the fundamental importance of respect for the rule of law to protect the financial interests of the Union in the implementation of EU funds; recalls the improvements needed in the application of the Rule of law Conditionality Regulation and a swifter follow-up by the Commission on breaches of the rule of law principles that affect or risk affecting the EU financial interests, including the Single Market dimension, as for example procurement and state aid;

    3. Stresses that the sound and timely implementation of the budget contributes to addressing more efficiently and effectively the needs and challenges faced by the Union and its citizens in different policy areas; warns that the implementation of the budget under time pressure may lead to an increase in errors and irregularities;

    4. Recalls that for the last years all available flexibility measures in the EU Budget were used; reiterates the need for flexibility in the EU Budget to address potential new circumstances where EU action is necessary; notes that increasingly the headroom in the EU Budget is used to provide funding to respond to crises; notes in addition, that exposure of the EU Budget to guarantees and contingent liabilities is projected to rise in the coming years, putting additional strain on the headroom in the Budget which further limits the flexibility of the EU Budget, as are the increased interest payments for NGEU related borrowing; urges the Commission to work on a more stringent risk assessment framework to define the exposure more accurately to prevent over-burdening of the EU Budget;

    5. Stresses the need to protect the EU Budget from any misuse, particularly fraud and corruption, and calls on the Commission to continue to be vigilant and proactive in the current and future cases when the lack of respect for Union values and the Rule of Law affect or threaten to affect the Union’s financial interests;

    6. Stresses the importance of the EU anti-fraud architecture and the need to provide increased resources and to strengthen the role of the European anti-fraud office (OLAF), the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust) and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) in the fight against fraud and corruption; stresses the need for a comprehensive cooperation between all these institutions;

    7. Notes that while the digital transformation is indispensable to increase the efficiency, control and transparency of the EU Budget, this shift has also heightened its exposure to cyber fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient funds to strengthen EU digital infrastructure, research and development while ensuring that investments in cybersecurity are impactful and contribute to the overall protection of the Union’s financial interests;

    8. Is concerned that total outstanding commitments are reaching record levels for several years now; notes that the Commission projects outstanding commitments to decrease after 2024, when NGEU draws to a close; considers that until the projected decrease of the RAL, the risk of decommitments, and a related reduction of EU added value for the EU Budget, remains high; calls on the Commission to enact a more strategic, transparent, and proactive approach to managing decommitments, also considering the use of decommitments in the cascade mechanism;

    9. Is concerned that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences on the EU’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas; encourages the Commission to explore options to reduce the overall debt burden, such as optimising the timing and structure of debt issuance, and consider alternative financing mechanisms that could reduce reliance on high-interest debt; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden for past debts;

    10. Expresses regret that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been increasing since the 2020 financial year, reaching 5,6 % for the 2023 financial year; notes significant variations in error rates across different budget headings, with some areas reporting error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 %, while cohesion policy has an error rate as high as 9,3 %; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities without at the same time either decreasing requirements or increasing ex ante checks and controls contributed to the high error rate; calls on the Commission to take careful consideration of the lessons learned from the implementation of EU crisis response tools, such as increased flexibility;

    11. Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; expresses concern that the Court found 7 out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were impacted by quantitative issues, with 6 of these payments being affected by material errors; notes in addition that absorption of RRF funds was delayed in 2023, and that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period; notes further that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period (post 2023) is more challenging with an increase in number of milestones and targets to be implemented, a shift from reforms to investments, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year; calls on the Commission to support the Member States’ authorities in the implementation of funds, in particular where additional administrative capacity is needed, to stimulate absorption and reduce the occurrence of errors; calls on the Commission to transparently inform the Parliament about the progress of implementation and absorption of funds and to timely propose solutions where bottlenecks in the implementation are observed;

    12. Recalls the importance of protecting the Union’s own resources from any fraudulent irregularity and, to that end, stimulate the cooperation between anti-fraud services and customs agencies to detect, prevent and correct fraud affecting Union revenue; recalls its position on the amended Commission proposals endorsing the introduction of new own resources.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR OPINION HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE ENVIRONMENT, CLIMATE AND FOOD SAFETY (18.2.2025)

     

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

     

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    The Coordinators of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) decided on 16 December 2024 that ENVI would provide an opinion on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI)) in the form of a letter. Therefore, as both ENVI Chair and Standing Rapporteur for the Budget, let me provide you with ENVI’s contribution in the form of resolution paragraphs, which was adopted by ENVI at its meeting[28] of 18 February 2025 and which I kindly request will be taken into account by your committee:

    1. Highlights that the current serious geopolitical context requires the Union to allocate sufficient resources for accelerating the green transition to transform the EU into a modern, resource-efficient and competitive economy; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure the full execution of the REPowerEU Plan to accelerate the deployment of renewable energy sources and of energy efficiency technologies to speed up the green transition and end dependency on fossil fuels

    2. Stresses the importance of the Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping the global average temperature increase below 1,5°C compared to pre-industrial times; recalls the Union’s obligations to deliver the financial commitments made for international climate financing; considers that the Union should continue leading the efforts towards decarbonisation at global level;

    3. Stresses that the Union’s budget for 2026 should be aligned with the realisation of the European Union’s objectives to reduce pollution and enhance biodiversity, as well as the long-term vision for a prosperous, modern, competitive and climate-neutral economy, the legally enshrined objective to reach climate neutrality by 2050 and the Union’s intermediate climate targets for 2030 and 2040, as laid down in the European Climate Law;

    4. Points out that the European Green Deal is a growth strategy, whose effective implementation with adequate funding  is fundamentally connected to the Union’s strength and competitiveness; believes that the future Clean Industrial Deal and Circular Economy Act should further increase the Union’s competitiveness capacity and sustainability and resource-efficiency to achieve the European Green Deal objectives and ensure a just and inclusive transition;

    5. Reminds that the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027, together with NextGenerationEU, is aimed at implementing the EU’s long-term priorities in various areas, including climate and the environment; emphasizes, specifically, that 30 % of total EU expenditures under the MFF have to be allocated to climate-related projects, including clean-tech and innovation projects; stresses that the future Multi-Financial Framework post-2027 should maintain the level of ambition on climate and environment protection;

    6. Considers it unacceptable that the Union did not reach its objective of allocating at least 7.5 % of annual expenditure to biodiversity in 2024;  calls on the Member States and Commission to take the necessary measures to ensure that the 10 % objective will be reached in both 2026 and 2027 in order to achieve concrete outcomes, including the objectives set in the Kunming-Montreal Agreement, whilst ensuring cost-effectiveness and long-term sustainability; notes the importance of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) to reach biodiversity objectives;

    7. Emphasises the need to allocate sufficient funding for each individual budget line that contributes to the achievement of the green transition, with a particular focus on sustainability, climate change, innovation, competitiveness, resource-efficiency and biodiversity conservation, such as attention to bees and pollinators’ protection and their role as indicators for healthy ecosystems; emphasizes the importance of the Social Climate Fund (SCF), established to support vulnerable groups in the Union’s green transition;

    8. Highlights the importance of improving disaster prevention and preparedness by implementing climate adaptation measures, allowing the Union to better prevent and respond to emergencies like recent climate change events; emphasizes the ongoing need to ensure sufficient funding for the Union’s civil protection mechanism;

    9. Notes the relevance of the reports adopted by the European Court of Auditors (ECA) in relation to the management of EU funds linked to climate and environment; urges the Commission and the Member States to implement the recommendations of the reports, in particular report 15/2024 on climate adaptation[29] regarding the need to ensure that all relevant EU-funded projects are adapted to the current and future climate conditions; recalls the importance of the ECA recommendations in its special report 14/2024[30], emphasising the need for the Commission to better estimate climate spending under future funding instruments, to ensure their adequate design, and to enhance the performance of green transition measures; 

    10. Emphasises the need for more ambitious funding allocations for programs like LIFE to support climate and environment-related projects, as well as for the Just Transition Fund to assist the most vulnerable carbon-intensive regions in addressing the economic and social impacts of the climate transition to leave no one behind; emphasises that the funding under LIFE is crucial for the protection of nature and biodiversity, the transition towards an energy efficient, circular, climate neutral, competitive and climate resilient economy and for democratic participation in decision-making processes;  notes that efficient and result-driven climate and biodiversity financing should be integrated into programming activities, while remaining flexible enough to address the diverse needs of different regions and sectors;

    11. Reminds that a stronger European Health Union requires adequate funding with health-related expenditure that follows the ‘One Health’ and ‘Health in all policies’ approaches, securing the proper implementation of, inter alia, the European Health Data Space and of the Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan;

    12. Strongly reiterates its regrets over the redeployment from the EU4Health programme of 1 billion EUR over the 2025-2027 period; considers that this funding shortfall threatens the programme’s ability to achieve its critical objectives; renews its call for the Commission, Member States, and other stakeholders to identify practical solutions to offset this cut, ensuring that the programme’s objective of building stronger, more resilient, and more accessible health systems is achieved; calls as well for increased amounts allocated to Cluster Health in Horizon Europe; recognises that stronger health systems directly contribute to economic stability and productivity by reducing health-related workforce disruptions and increasing the resilience of the labour market;

    13. Highlights the importance of effectively allocating sufficient human and financial resources to all relevant DGs for the implementation of the adopted legislation related to climate environment, chemicals and health as well as to the relevant European agencies, including the European Environment Agency (EEA), the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and the European Medicines Agency (EMA);

    14. Highlights the need for a strengthened EU own resources system that can address current challenges while supporting the Union’s environmental, climate and health objectives; stresses the importance of implementing the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism effectively, enabling the Commission to take compensatory measures to address any shortfalls in meeting the EU budget’s overall climate spending target.

    I have sent a similar letter to Mr Andrzej Halicki, general rapporteur for the 2026 budget.

    Yours sincerely,

    Antonio Decaro

     

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair in his capacity as rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND ENERGY (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan VAN OVERTVELDT

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

     

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion in the form of a letter on the Guidelines for the 2026 budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Chair,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. On 19 February 2024, the committee adopted an opinion in the form of letter during its regular meeting.

    The Committee on Industry, Research and Energy calls on the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible, to incorporate the following suggestions into its motion for a resolution.

    Yours sincerely,

    Borys BUDKA  

    ITRE Chair

     

    SUGGESTIONS

    1.  Recalls that the Union Budget for 2026 should concretely reflect the political priorities of the new legislative term, considering also the various pledges made by Commissioners during their confirmation hearings in Parliament in November 2024; insists that the 2026 budget needs to fully implement all programmes agreed under the current Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), as well as set  in motion and finance new strategic EU initiatives, such as the Clean Industrial Deal for competitive industries and quality jobs; underscores that the 2026 budget must be aligned with the Union’s objectives and international commitments;

    2.  Notes that multiple challenges facing Europe require greater investment and coordination at European level, as well as more concrete action by Member States; calls on the Commission to propose a Union Budget for 2026 that reflects the urgent nature of these challenges; among others, the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine and hybrid attacks on Member States and their energy and digital infrastructure; maintains this requires multiple forms of EU and national level investments and preparedness, including improving the resilience of digital and energy infrastructure, direct support for Ukraine, accelerated investment in Europe’s defence industry, and support for the EU’s Eastern border regions most directly impacted by the war and Russian hybrid operations; the need to strengthen Europe’s economic competitiveness and industrial base in a volatile environment where global competitors benefit from extensive state support, leading to unfair competition for European companies; the urgent necessity to improve Europe’s research and innovation capabilities, including greater support for SMEs, start-ups and scale-ups; the digital revolution, including the acceleration of artificial intelligence and growing concerns about cybersecurity; and the need to achieve a just climate transition, as we adapt our economy to the Union’s long-term energy goals and climate neutrality by 2050, by accelerating the decarbonisation in Europe’s energy markets, implementing European Green Deal legislation and achieving a circular economy;

    3.  Notes that EU companies face considerably higher electricity and gas prices compared with the USA, China and other global actors, which presents a significant competitiveness disadvantage, especially but not only for Europe’s energy intensive industries; emphasises the need to  tackle energy poverty and limit the damaging effects of high energy prices on European consumers, many of whom are already struggling with a high cost of living; stresses the importance of reducing EU dependence on fossil-fuels and improving energy efficiency; underlines that security of supply concerns remain paramount and should be addressed in the 2026 budget, given  that energy supplies are easily weaponised by state actors; insists on the need to improve energy interconnections, modernise energy grids, integrate a higher share of renewables while ensuring sufficient clean baseload energy and system flexibilities, therefore calls for significantly increased funding for the Connecting Europe Facility – Energy, which is the flagship EU programme in this field but currently has limited resources to credibly advance Europe towards an interconnected, resilient and decarbonised energy system, able to deliver affordable prices; calls for urgently ending any remaining EU import dependencies on Russia:

    4.   Recalls the need to strengthen the resilience of the EU economy and the competitiveness of Union industries, with ambitious EU industrial policies that can create quality jobs and contribute significantly towards achieving the EU’s social, digital and green objectives, whilst preserving a level playing field in the Single Market; therefore believes that the Union Budget for 2026 should mark the start of the investment boost recommended in the Draghi report by investing strongly in industrial competitiveness, open strategic autonomy and creating pathways towards decarbonisation, while securing EU supply chains for strategic sectors and technologies and improving access to critical raw materials; insists that the 2026 budget must continue strengthening the Union’s competitiveness with increased support for SMEs, midcaps and start-ups, including greater support for scale up to compete globally, in particular through the European Innovation Council;

    5.  Recalls that the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe will be the first after the mid-term review of this strategic EU programme, and therefore needs to offer sufficient investment in fundamental and applied research, foster collaborative research and facilitate the scale-up and commercialisation of research results to ensure Europe can retain and further develop the necessary knowledge base to confront the scientific and economic challenges of the coming decades; regrets that the existing level of Horizon Europe funding is ultimately insufficient to develop the ideas and technologies necessary for the twin green and digital transitions, or to fully deliver on the stated EU goals of sustainable growth and open strategic autonomy; calls for an increase in the 2026 budget for Horizon Europe, including through the reuse of all available decommitments allowing each sub-programme to fund at least 50% of all excellent proposals, given that presently a majority of excellent proposals remain unfunded; calls for maintaining stable and sufficient funding of the ITER project;

    6.  Stresses that significant investments are necessary to address Europe’s connectivity gap and other Digital Decade 2030 targets; recalls that the European Commission estimates that achieving the full gigabit target could exceed €200 billion; calls therefore for adequate resources to be allocated to provide high speed connectivity including gigabit and 5G services, in addition to investments in next generation digital infrastructures and emerging technologies; calls for further investments that foster the development of European digital sovereignty and an EU-based digital sector in order to catch up in crucial areas such as quantum computing and Artificial Intelligence; calls on the Commission to allocate sufficient resources to ensure the full implementation and robust enforcement of the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act; stresses the importance of tackling foreign interference, addressing the dangers of biased algorithms, and safeguarding transparency, accountability, and the integrity of the digital public space.

    7.  Underlines that a strong and sustainable European space sector is fundamental for European security, open strategic autonomy, secure connectivity, protection of critical infrastructure and advancing the twin green and digital transitions; regrets that EU and its Member States funding for space programmes is highly fragmented and only a fraction of the level in the US, while other global actors including China are rapidly increasing investments; calls on the Commission and Member States to ensure sufficient funding for the European space industry, which includes fostering investments from the private sector; calls furthermore for a sufficient level of  EU investments supporting R&I in the field of space;

    8.  Calls for adequate funding and staffing for all agencies and Union bodies in the policy areas of industry, research, energy, space and cybersecurity, in order to cope with increased workload and new regulatory obligations; 

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CULTURE AND EDUCATION (19.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget –Section III 2024/2110(BUI)

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    to above, the Committee on Culture and Education has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 3 December 2024, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It considered the matter at its meeting of 19 February 2025 and adopted the opinion at that meeting[31].

    The Committee on Culture and Education:

    1. Insists that funding for the most successful EU and crucial programmes like Erasmus+, the European Solidarity Corps (ESC), Creative Europe and the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme has to be excluded from debt repayment needs for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI) over the whole remaining MFF period; stresses that the ‘EURI cascade mechanism’ has to be implemented effectively, protecting important programme initiatives that directly benefit citizens;

    2. Welcomes further simplification in line with EP calls, e.g. through the use of lump sums in Erasmus+ , for the programmes that are close to the citizens and need to be accessible also for organisations with limited administrative capacities, and calls for further efforts to achieve that end; underlines that attention should be given to peripheral, mountainous and rural areas that experience more difficulties in accessing EU funds; calls on the Commission to continue to share regularly with Parliament, including the Committee on Culture and Education, updated indicators and statistics on the absorption of funds in these programmes;

    3. Welcomes that mobility grants under Erasmus+ were increased to offset rising living costs, upon Parliament’s insistence on an increase to the programme’s budget, to ensure that the programme remains accessible and inclusive;

    4. Stresses necessary efforts to widen participation and to meet inclusivity targets in order to widen the participation of the most vulnerable youth groups and people with disabilities;

    5. Strongly warns against any cuts, and calls for an increase of the funding for the programme, taking into account the high implementation rates and absorption capacities of the programme; calls in particular to preserve funding to initiatives that support teacher development, such as the European Universities and the Erasmus+ Teacher Academies; highlights the growing number of applicants – e.g. a 94% increase  in school education mobility applications from 2022 to 2023 ; regrets, however, the consequence of  lower success rates, notably for school accreditations, which underscores the need for a substantial funding increase to meet the growing demand;

    6. Insists that all funding initially allocated to the programme will be used for investing in the future of young people;

    7. Emphasises the need to support sport under Erasmus+ to promote its role in improving physical and mental health and social inclusion, and to fight discrimination;

    8. Deplores the additional, unanticipated costs for the media strand of Creative Europe, including the implementation of not only the AVMSD, but also of EMFA, including the secretariat of the European Board for Media Services, an additional expenditure that was not taken into account when the current MFF was set up; insists that new initiatives should always be financed from fresh money;

    9. Stresses that the budget for the Creative Europe programme is insufficient to meet the high demand for projects across all its strands, with alarmingly low success rates (e.g. 17% in 2023 under the culture strand); calls for an increase of its funding and highlights the need for synergies between Creative Europe and other EU funds.

    10. Calls for an increase in funding for the ESC programme, given the modest year-on-year increases of about 2% of its budget under the MFF, which is not sufficient to offset inflation rates, and the fact that it is heavily over-subscribed, resulting in a high rejection rate and, therefore, in many cases, disappointment for the young applicants; welcomes the fact that the number of participants with fewer opportunities in the programme (38%)  is the highest of any EU programme and should be maintained;

    11. Stresses the importance of the CERV programme for building bridges between European citizens from different Member States and promoting their engagement and participation in the democratic life of the Union, while also contributing to preserving social cohesion and helping to prevent democratic backsliding, particularly in the current challenging political situation; insists, therefore, on an increase for its budget;

    12. Points out that pilot projects and preparatory actions (PPs and PAs) serve as testbeds for new policy initiatives and need adequate funding to properly fulfil that function; deplores any attempts to thwart potentially successful proposals for PPs and PAs already at the selection stage and calls for better cooperation between the Commission and the European Parliament on the selection and implementation of PPs and PAs.

    Yours sincerely,

    Nela Riehl

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS (18.2.2025)

    Mr Johan Van Overtveldt

    Chair

    Committee on Budgets

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Guidelines for the 2026 Budget – Section III (2024/2110(BUI))

    Dear Mr Van Overtveldt,

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs has been asked to submit an opinion to your committee. At its meeting of 29 January 2025, the committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter.

    The Committee on Constitutional Affairs considered the matter at its meeting of 18 February 2025. At that meeting[32], it decided to submit the opinion set out below to the Committee on Budgets, as the committee responsible.

    Yours sincerely,

    Sven Simon

     

     

    OPINION

    1. Points out that future substantial EU enlargement cannot be met without a larger EU budget and sufficient new own resources; calls for the necessary budgetary and institutional reforms to be agreed and adopted before substantial enlargement takes place;

    2. Reminds of the need to secure proper financing for the structures within the EU institutions that are responsible for communication with citizens and countering disinformation such as the Commission Representations and European Parliament Liaison Offices, in order to enable them to effectively fulfil their tasks;

    3. Recommends that the Authority for European Political Parties and European Political Foundations receives adequate resources, in particular for staffing purposes in view of the significant enlargement of its tasks as foreseen by the Commission proposal for the recast of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 1141/2014;

    4. Urges the Committee on Budgets to incorporate the above mentioned budget lines augmentations in its position, as they serve the purpose of delivering concrete results and quality communication to citizens.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

     

     

    INFORMATION ON ADOPTION IN COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    27

    8

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Olivier Chastel, Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Thomas Geisel, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Alexander Jungbluth, Fabienne Keller, Ondřej Kovařík, Janusz Lewandowski, Victor Negrescu, Danuše Nerudová, João Oliveira, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Julien Sanchez, Hélder Sousa Silva, Nicolae Ştefănuță, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Stine Bosse, Mohammed Chahim, Rasmus Nordqvist

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Łukasz Kohut, Marit Maij, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Mirosława Nykiel, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    27

    +

    ECR

    Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Isabel Benjumea Benjumea, Andrzej Halicki, Monika Hohlmeier, Łukasz Kohut, Janusz Lewandowski, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Stine Bosse, Olivier Chastel, Fabienne Keller, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Sakis Arnaoutoglou, Mohammed Chahim, Marit Maij, Victor Negrescu, Leire Pajín, Krzysztof Śmiszek, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Rasmus Nordqvist, Nicolae Ştefănuță

     

    8

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tamás Deutsch, Angéline Furet, Ondřej Kovařík, Julien Sanchez, Auke Zijlstra

    The Left

    João Oliveira

     

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Regula Reaches 15,000 ID Templates in Its Industry’s Largest Database, Revealing New Document Trends

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    RESTON, Va., March 25, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Regula, a global developer of forensic devices and identity verification solutions, now has 15,000 templates in its identity document template database, the most comprehensive in the world. This significant update ensures that businesses and government agencies around the globe can verify the latest IDs, including the most advanced biometric documents, with the highest accuracy.

    Regula’s proprietary identity document template database contains detailed descriptions of each document’s security features. Combined with the advanced capabilities of Regula Document Reader SDK, this enables online ID verification with the same level of precision previously achievable only in on-site scenarios. Incorporating ID templates from 251 countries and territories and capable of reading 138 national languages, this database enables the recognition and proper verification of nearly every ID from any corner of the world, even the rarest ones.

    Tracking Global Shifts in Identity Documents

    The latest expansion of Regula’s ID template database reflects the global shift towards more sophisticated identity documents. More and more countries are introducing biometric passports, which are considered the most secure at the moment. For example, among the recent additions to Regula’s database are the first-ever biometric passports issued by India, Sri Lanka, and Guyana.

    Apart from the format, documents’ security features are also becoming more complex and elaborate. First and foremost, ID issuers are switching from paper substrates in favor of polycarbonate pages, which are much harder to counterfeit. For this reason, states like Benin, Burkina Faso, Chile, and Djibouti have recently issued new IDs with polycarbonate data pages.

    Another advanced security feature that has become quite widespread across different identity documents is the Multiple Laser Image (MLI). An MLI embeds two distinct images within a document. Typically, these include the passport holder’s photo and their personal data. Special lenses positioned above the images can visualize either image clearly by tilting the document. Hard to illegally duplicate by design, MLIs significantly enhance document protection. Among the IDs that were added to Regula’s ID template database with the latest update, the US driver’s license from Wisconsin, as well as the ID cards of Jamaica, San Marino, and Yemen contain such security features.

    “The growing complexity of identity documents presents notable challenges for ID verification workflows. Businesses and government agencies must be prepared to properly verify all the document security features so as not to miss any forgery or identity fraud attempts. Furthermore, they have to handle multiple ID versions from the same country simultaneously, as many older documents remain in circulation alongside the new formats. By keeping pace with evolving security features and document standards, we help streamline ID verification workflows, reduce fraud risks, and maintain compliance with global regulations,” says Ihar Kliashchou, Chief Technology Officer at Regula.

    Among the new IDs added to Regula’s database to hit 15,000 templates are the following, issued in 2024-2025:

    Passports:

    • Azerbaijan
    • Benin
    • Burkina Faso
    • Burundi
    • Chile
    • Djibouti
    • Germany
    • Guyana
    • India
    • Kosovo
    • Malawi
    • Myanmar
    • Netherlands
    • Romania
    • Saint Kitts and Nevis
    • Slovakia
    • Sri Lanka
    • Tajikistan

    ID cards:

    • Argentina
    • Bosnia and Herzegovina
    • Chile
    • Guatemala
    • Jamaica
    • Kazakstan
    • Kosovo
    • Netherlands
    • Nigeria
    • Norway
    • Philippines
    • Puerto Rico
    • San Marino
    • Slovakia
    • Somalia
    • Sri Lanka
    • Vietnam
    • Yemen

    Driver’s licenses:

    • Azerbaijan
    • Denmark
    • Honduras
    • Iran
    • Kosovo
    • Mongolia
    • Puerto Rico
    • Slovakia
    • Sweden
    • Venezuela
    • Bolivia
    • US states: Michigan, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wisconsin

    To get the full list of the documents supported by Regula’s software solutions, visit Regula’s official website.

    About Regula

    Regula is a global developer of forensic devices and identity verification solutions. With our 30+ years of experience in forensic research and the most comprehensive library of document templates in the world, we create breakthrough technologies for document and biometric verification. Our hardware and software solutions allow over 1,000 organizations and 80 border control authorities globally to provide top-notch client service without compromising safety, security, or speed. Regula has been repeatedly named a Representative Vendor in the Gartner® Market Guide for Identity Verification.

    Learn more at www.regulaforensics.com.

    Contact:
    Kristina – ks@regulaforensics.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/8a3cd960-c05b-412f-9df8-ce5052474afa.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: New member of Jyske Bank’s Group Executive Board

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Jyske Bank’s Supervisory Board has appointed Ingjerd Blekeli Spiten as Head of Personal Banking and Wealth Management and new member of the Group Executive Board.

    Ingjerd Blekeli Spiten is Master of Business and Economics and was during the period 2018-2024 Group Executive Director of Retail Banking at DNB (Norway). Previously, she held leadership positions with responsibility for sales, development, and implementation at DNB and tech companies such as Ericsson, Microsoft and Telenor.

    Kurt Bligaard Pedersen, Chairman of the Supervisory Board, states:

    Ingjerd Blekeli Spiten brings a unique combination of skills and experience in banking, technology and management of a large customer-oriented organisation. Ingjerd has been instrumental in the development of one of the strongest digital customer solutions in Scandinavia and will play a central role in the execution of Jyske Bank’s group strategy in the Personal Banking and Wealth Management area.

    Ingjerd Blekeli Spiten will take office on 1 June 2025.

    Yours faithfully,
    Jyske Bank

    Contact person: Susanne Faber, Press Manager, tel.: +45 26 29 11 29.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: Amid U.S. threats, Canada’s national security plans must include training in non-violent resistance

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Richard Sandbrook, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, University of Toronto

    Canadians are currently learning tough lessons about national security thanks to United States President Donald Trump’s repeated annexation threats.

    It’s clear that American proclamations of support for universal human rights, national sovereignty and a rules-based international order can vanish with a change of leadership. These ideals, though tarnished by some past U.S. actions, have now been replaced by the predatory dictum known as “might makes right.”

    Although it seems unthinkable that Trump will invade Canada, we live in an increasingly unstable world and Canadians need to be prepared for the worst. In the midst of a federal election campaign, party leaders need to present innovative ideas to fight Trump and potential American aggression.




    Read more:
    An American military invasion of Canada? No longer unthinkable, but highly unlikely


    More than military defence

    Unfortunately, the common assumption is that national security depends wholly on military strength and alliances. But the emergency Canada is now facing demands a rethink.

    Of course, Canada would not dispense with its military. It’s needed, especially to defend Canada’s northern frontier. However, Canada cannot match the U.S. in military power, nor would anything be achieved if it broke its commitments to the United Nations’ Non-Proliferation Treaty — a pact designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons — by acquiring nukes.

    Either of these tactics would be suicidal. Canada’s real strength is its unity and institutions.

    Canadians can paralyze military might through civil, non-violent resistance. Familiarity with these techniques could empower Canadian citizens to preserve a vibrant democracy.

    Non-violent resistance can not only a more effective defence, but also much less devastating in terms of lives lost and property destroyed. Responding to an invasion with military force would only mean widespread casualties and the destruction of Canada’s largest cities.

    Canada should therefore aim to subvert the will of the occupying force, not drive it, through armed defence, to fear, hatred and further violence.

    What is civil defence?

    Non-violent resistance involves using a country’s citizens and institutions to deter an invasion, and if that fails, to defeat and drive out the invaders. It has a long history both as a spiritual practice and a strategic weapon.

    Civil defence, however, only emerged as a strategic concept in the 1980s and 1990s. It is a system of deterrence and defence that relies on a united and resolute citizenry employing only non-violent tactics.

    An early American proponent was the Albert Einstein Institution’s Gene Sharp, an American political scientist. Recent advocates from around the world — Srdja Popovic, Erica Chenoworth and Michael Beer — follow in Sharp’s footsteps.

    Civil defence is not merely a theory. There is a long history of improvised civilian resistance to invasions, most recently in Ukraine.

    Ukrainians undertook many inspirational acts of non-violent resistance following the Russian invasion in 2022. They blocked tanks and convoys, berated or cajoled Russian soldiers to undermine their resolve, gave the wrong directions to Russian convoys, refused to co-operate and mounted spontaneous protests in occupied towns. But then the bloody carnage on both sides overwhelmed civilian defence.

    Countries that include Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, Germany and Lithuania have institutionalized civil defence at various times. In Canada, civil defence was part of the mandate of Public Safety Canada during the Cold War. The idea then faded, being replaced by emergency management.

    Public Safety Canada protected Canadians from both human-made and natural disasters. The agency, now the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of Canada, should be resuscitated. The toll being exacted by climate disasters is reason enough.

    Making Canada ungovernable

    Non-violent resistance involves determined citizens deterring an aggressor by signalling that the targeted country is united in opposition to a takeover.

    A potential aggressor fears contagion from the democratic ethos of these citizens. If invaded, the civilians defeat the invaders by rendering their society ungovernable by the aggressor.

    When the Warsaw Pact army invaded Czechoslovakia to crush the “Prague Spring” in 1968, the commanders soon learned that tanks and heavily armed soldiers were useless against unarmed civilians who refused to comply. The country was unruleable. Soviet troops were also infected with the democratic spirit and had to be rotated out of the country. It took several months and concessions from the Soviet Union before order could be restored.

    The invader cannot consolidate control if citizens and their institutions refuse to comply with its rule. The tactics involve a complete refusal to co-operate with the occupying force along with open defiance.

    That means that governments at all levels in the invaded nation continue to supply only basic services: clean water, electricity and policing, for example. Governments resign and civil servants find ways to subvert every order issued by the invader.

    Crowds fill urban squares in silent or derisory defiance of orders, making it apparent to all — the occupiers, the dictator’s audience back home, less committed citizens and global observers — who are the true purveyors of violence against non-violent people

    Throughout the occupation, citizens and non-governmental organizations focus on subverting the loyalty and morale of the occupying troops and functionaries and rallying international support.

    In Canada’s case, the long history of friendship with Americans would likely mean that the morale of the occupiers would be low. The aim is to encourage defections by soldiers and functionaries, and erode the support base of the dictator. This erosion of support could lead to the overthrow of the leader, or at least to his concoction of a compromise to cover a retreat.

    Attracting international support to Canada’s cause would not be a challenge. Trump has already alienated most of humankind and foreign governments during his first weeks in office.

    Obstacles

    Non-violent resistance is most effective with nation-wide training, organization and leadership. The national government is best equipped to provide the facilities. Training of volunteers could include responding to natural disasters and emergencies, as well as implementing a civil defence strategy.

    Yet partisan divides and apathy make such nationwide training difficult. It would likely be viewed with suspicion by right-wing populist forces in this era of conspiracy theories and misinformation.




    Read more:
    How conspiracy theories polarize society and provoke violence


    Apathy might also be a problem.

    These considerations suggest that top-down, apolitical training in civilian defence may not work. If so, training and organization should be the goal of as many existing civil society associations as possible: churches, synagogues, temples, civil rights groups, unions, Indigenous rights organizations, peace advocates and climate groups, for example.

    The manual authored by Michael Beer, the longtime director of the Nonviolence International non-governmental organization, includes more than 300 tactics. Widespread training and organization can not only deter aggression but ensure countries remain free of tyrants.

    Canada’s leverage

    Amid the ongoing threats against Canadian sovereignty, Canada is an ideal candidate for effective civil defence. Although it might be unlikely Trump will order a military invasion of Canada, a united country capable of non-violent resistance decreases the risk.

    Canada cannot match the U.S. in firepower or economic strength. But it shares with America a language, a history of common struggles, myriad cross-border personal relationships and basic democratic values still considered important by many Americans, if not Trump.

    All of these factors give Canada considerable leverage.

    Richard Sandbrook is Vice-President of Science for Peace, a registered charity.

    ref. Amid U.S. threats, Canada’s national security plans must include training in non-violent resistance – https://theconversation.com/amid-u-s-threats-canadas-national-security-plans-must-include-training-in-non-violent-resistance-252451

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Banking: AGNICO EAGLE PROVIDES NOTICE OF RELEASE OF FIRST QUARTER 2025 RESULTS, CONFERENCE CALL AND ANNUAL MEETING

    Source: Agnico Eagle Mines

    Stock Symbol: AEM (NYSE and TSX)

    TORONTO, March 25, 2025 /CNW/ – Agnico Eagle Mines Limited (NYSE: AEM) (TSX: AEM) (“Agnico Eagle” or the “Company“) today announced that it will release its first quarter 2025 results on Thursday, April 24, 2025, after normal trading hours. Additionally, the Company will host its Annual and Special Meeting of Shareholders (the “AGM”) the following day, Friday, April 25, 2025, in a hybrid format (in Toronto and virtually).

    First Quarter 2025 Results Conference Call and Webcast

    Agnico Eagle’s senior management will host a conference call on Friday, April 25, 2025, at 08:30 AM (E.D.T.) to discuss the Company’s financial and operating results.

    Via Webcast:

    To listen to the live webcast of the conference call, you may register on the Company website at www.agnicoeagle.com, or directly via the link here.

    Via Phone:

    To join the conference call by phone, please dial 416.945.7677 or toll-free 1.888.699.1199 to be entered into the call by an operator. To ensure your participation, please call approximately five minutes prior to the scheduled start of the call.

    To join the conference call without operator assistance, you may register your phone number here 30 minutes prior to the scheduled start of the call to receive an instant automated call back.

    Replay Archive:

    Please dial 289.819.1450 or toll-free 1.888.660.6345, access code 36377 #. The conference call replay will expire on May 25, 2025.

    The webcast, along with presentation slides, will be archived for 180 days on the Company’s website.

    Annual Meeting

    The AGM will begin on Friday, April 25, 2025 at 11:00 AM (E.D.T). During the AGM, management will provide an overview of the Company’s activities.

    Hybrid Format

    The AGM will be held in person at the Arcadian Court, 401 Bay Street, Simpson Tower, 8th Floor, Toronto, Ontario, M5H 2Y4 and online at: https://meetnow.global/M59UWL4

    The Company is conducting a hybrid meeting that will allow registered shareholders and duly appointed proxyholders to participate both online and in person. The Company is providing the virtual format to provide shareholders with an equal opportunity to attend and be heard at the AGM even if they are unable to attend the AGM in person.

    For details explaining how to attend, communicate and vote virtually at the AGM please see the Company’s Management Information Circular dated March 24, 2025, filed under the Company’s profile on SEDAR at www.sedarplus.ca and on EDGAR at www.sec.gov. Shareholders who have questions about voting their shares or attending the AGM may contact Investor Relations by phone at 416.947.1212, by toll-free phone at 1.888.822.6714 or by email at investor.relations@agnicoeagle.com or may contact the Company’s strategic shareholder advisor and proxy solicitation agent, Laurel Hill Advisory Group, by phone at 1.877.452.7184 (toll free in North America), at 1.416.304.0211 (for collect calls outside of North America) or by e-mail at assistance@laurelhill.com.

    Investor Relations

    Agnico Eagle Mines Limited
    145 King Street East, Suite 400
    Toronto, Ontario, M5C 2Y7
    investor.relations@agnicoeagle.com 
    Phone: 416.947.1212
    Fax: 416.367.4681

    About Agnico Eagle

    Agnico Eagle is a Canadian based and led senior gold mining company and the third largest gold producer in the world, producing precious metals from operations in Canada, Australia, Finland and Mexico, with a pipeline of high-quality exploration and development projects. Agnico Eagle is a partner of choice within the mining industry, recognized globally for its leading sustainability practices. Agnico Eagle was founded in 1957 and has consistently created value for its shareholders, declaring a cash dividend every year since 1983.

    View original content to download multimedia:https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/agnico-eagle-provides-notice-of-release-of-first-quarter-2025-results-conference-call-and-annual-meeting-302409463.html

    SOURCE Agnico Eagle Mines Limited

    MIL OSI Global Banks