Category: Scandinavia

  • MIL-OSI: Resolutions by the Annual General Meeting of Municipality Finance Plc held on 25 March 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Municipality Finance Plc
    Stock exchange release
    25 March 2025 at 1:00 pm (EET)

    Resolutions by the Annual General Meeting of Municipality Finance Plc held on 25 March 2025

    The Annual General Meeting (hereinafter the AGM) of Municipality Finance Plc (MuniFin) held on 25 March 2025 adopted the company’s financial statements and discharged the members of the Board of Directors (the Board), the CEO, and the Deputy to the CEO from liability for the financial year 2024.

    Use of Profit Shown on the Balance Sheet and the Distribution of Dividend
    The Annual General Meeting decided that a dividend of EUR 1.86 per share, totaling 72,658,664.28 EUR shall be paid out. Dividends will be paid on 3 April 2025 or as soon as possible thereafter to each shareholder who is registered in the company’s shareholder register maintained by Euroclear Finland Ltd on the record date of dividend payment on 27 March 2025.

    Remuneration and Composition of the Board
    The AGM decided on the remuneration for the members of the Board for the term from the closing of the 2025 AGM to the closing of the next AGM (the Term 2025–2026) as follows:

    • annual fixed remuneration of the Chair of the Board EUR 51,000;
    • annual fixed remuneration of the Vice Chair of the Board EUR 33,000;
    • annual fixed remuneration of the Chair of the Risk or Audit Committee EUR 36,000;
    • annual fixed remuneration of a Board member EUR 28,000 and
    • for each Board and committee meeting as well as for each meeting required by the authorities, for the members and Vice Chair of the Board, a fee of EUR 600 per meeting attended and for the chairs, EUR 950 per meeting attended.

    The annual remuneration of the Chair of the Board was increased by EUR 6,000, the annual remuneration of the Vice Chair of the Board was increased by EUR 4,000, the annual remuneration of the Chairs of the Risk and Audit Committees was increased by EUR 5,000 and the annual remuneration of a Board member was increased by EUR 3,000. No amendments were made to the meeting fees.

    The AGM decided to elect nine members to the Board for the Term 2025–2026 and to re-elect the following current members: Ms. Maaria Eriksson, Mr. Kari Laukkanen, Mr. Tuomo Mäkinen, Ms. Elina Stråhlman, Ms. Leena Vainiomäki and Mr. Arto Vuojolainen. In addition, the AGM decided to elect Ms. Liisa Harju, Mr. Juho Malmberg and Mr. Henrik Rainio as new board members.

    The CEO’s Review

    Esa Kallio, the President and CEO of MuniFin, discussed the company’s development in 2024. There are currently many uncertainties in the world, and therefore it is important that MuniFin can provide stability and ensure the security of supply for the Finnish society through its operations. The year 2024 was a record year for MuniFin’s sustainable finance: the company issued a record number of sustainable bonds, and the demand for green finance grew significantly.

    Election and Remuneration of the Auditor

    PricewaterhouseCoopers Oy was elected as the company’s auditor with Jukka Paunonen, Authorized Public Accountant, as the principal auditor. The auditor’s fees will be paid against the invoices approved by the company.

    Election and Remuneration of the Sustainability Reporting Assurer

    PricewaterhouseCoopers Oy was selected as the sustainability reporting assurer, with Tiina Puukkoniemi as the responsible sustainability reporting auditor. The assurer’s fees will be paid against the invoices approved by the company.

    Constitutive Meeting of the Board
    At its constitutive meeting, the Board appointed Kari Laukkanen as the Chair and Maaria Eriksson as the Vice Chair of the Board. The following persons were appointed to the Remuneration Committee: Kari Laukkanen as the Chair, and Leena Vainiomäki, Maaria Eriksson and Tuomo Mäkinen as members. The following persons were appointed to the Audit Committee: Elina Stråhlman as the Chair, and Liisa Harjula, Kari Laukkanen and Henrik Rainio as members. The following persons were appointed to the Risk Committee: Leena Vainiomäki as the Chair, and Maaria Eriksson, Juho Malmberg and Arto Vuojolainen as members.

    Additional information on the company’s operations in 2024 is available in the company’s Annual Report, which is available for downloading in PDF format at the company website www.munifin.fi.

    MUNICIPALITY FINANCE PLC

    Esa Kallio
    President and CEO
    tel. +358 50 337 7953

    MuniFin (Municipality Finance Plc) is one of Finland’s largest credit institutions. The owners of the company include Finnish municipalities, the public sector pension fund Keva and the State of Finland. The Group’s balance sheet is over EUR 53 billion.

    MuniFin’s customers include municipalities, joint municipal authorities, wellbeing services counties, joint county authorities, corporate entities under the control of the above-mentioned organisations, and affordable social housing. Lending is used for environmentally and socially responsible investment targets such as public transportation, sustainable buildings, hospitals and healthcare centres, schools and day care centres, and homes for people with special needs.

    MuniFin’s customers are domestic, but the company operates in a completely global business environment. The company is an active Finnish bond issuer in international capital markets and the first Finnish green and social bond issuer. The funding is exclusively guaranteed by the Municipal Guarantee Board.

    Read more: www.munifin.fi

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: PARLIAMENT QUESTION: PROVIDING TAP WATER CONNECTION UNDER JJM

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 25 MAR 2025 2:14PM by PIB Delhi

    Government of India is committed to the provision of safe & potable tap water supply in adequate quantity, of prescribed quality and on a regular & long-term basis to all rural households in the country. Towards this end, the Government of India launched the Jal Jeevan Mission (JJM), to be implemented in partnership with States/ UTs, in August 2019. The Government of India supports the states by providing technical and financial assistance.

    Significant progress has been made in the country since the launch of JJM, towards enhancing access to tap water for rural households. At the start of JJM in August 2019, only 3.23 Crore (16.71%) rural households were reported to have tap water connections. So far, as reported by State/UTs as on 20.03.2025, around 12.30 Crore additional rural households have been provided with tap water connections under JJM. Thus, as on 20.03.2025, out of 19.36 Crore rural households in the country, approximately 15.53 Crore (80.22%) households are reported to have tap water supply. The year-wise and State-wise including the Kushinagar district of Uttar Pradesh details of the progress made under the JJM in providing tap water connections since its inception are available on JJM IMIS Dashboard at https://ejalshakti.gov.in/jjmreport/JJMIndia.aspx.

    The government of India is building strategic international partnerships to enhance international cooperation in specific areas of water supply, water distribution, wastewater and solid waste treatment, sewerage systems, re-use of treated wastewater, water management, and energy optimization.

    At present, India and Denmark have entered into a Green Strategic Partnership on 28th September, 2020. Joint Work Plan (2021-2024) has subsequently been formulated between the National Jal Jeevan Mission, Ministry of Jal Shakti, New Delhi and Danish Environment Protection Agency, Ministry of Environment, Denmark (DEPA) to support Government of India’s objective of providing drinking water supply to all rural households. The objective of the work plan is to enhance cooperation in the specific areas of water supply, water distribution, wastewater treatment, sewerage systems, re-use of treated wastewater, water management and energy optimization in the water sector.

    The cooperation is working to support a range of priorities of the JJM and co-create solutions in the fields of policy, planning, regulation and implementation as well as technology, research & development and skilling that combine Danish and Indian expertise.

    As on date, 11 States/ UTs have become ‘Har Ghar Jal’ States/ UT i.e. 100% households are having tap water supply and the remaining States/ UTs are at various stages of achieving the objectives of the mission.

    Government of India has taken a number of steps to ensure coordinated planning between infrastructure development projects, like road construction and water supply system, like pipelines installations which inter alia includes (i) nomination of a nodal officer in the Department for coordinating with Central nodal Ministries/ Departments/ agencies viz. M/o EF&CC, M/o RTH, NHAI, M/o Railways etc. to facilitate the States in obtaining Statutory/ other clearances; (ii) regular review meetings with central agencies and State level officers; (iii) State Programme Management Units (SPMUs) and District Programme Management Units (DPMUs) have been set up to bridge the gap in availability of technical skill sets and of HR for programme management; (iv) A network of Civil Society Organizations working in the water sector, the Rural WASH Partner Forum, has been set up to extend support to states for time bound implementation.

    Under the Jal Jeevan Mission, as per existing guidelines, Bureau of Indian Standards’ BIS:10500 standards are adopted as benchmark for quality of water being supplied through the piped water supply schemes. BIS specifies ‘acceptable limit’ and ‘permissible limit in the absence of alternate source’ for various physio-chemical and bacteriological parameters for drinking water quality.

    This information was provided by THE MINISTER OF STATE FOR JAL SHAKTI SHRI V. SOMANNA in a written reply to a question in Rajya Sabha today.

    ***

    DHANYA SANAL K

     (Rajya Sabha US Q2632)

    (Release ID: 2114775) Visitor Counter : 30

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – Survey confirms Europe’s citizens want the EU to protect them and act in unity

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey, released today, highlights historic levels of approval for EU membership linked to peace and security.

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “Two thirds of Europeans want the EU to play a greater role in their protection. This is a clear call for action which we will answer. Europe needs to be stronger so that our citizens feel safer. The European Parliament will ensure that every proposal put forward is bold and ambitious enough to match the serious level of threat Europe faces. Europe must step up today, or it risks being stepped over tomorrow.”

    66% of EU citizens want the EU to take a more important role in protecting them against global crises and security risks. This view is particularly strong amongst younger respondents to the survey. At the national level, results for a stronger role of the EU range from 87% in Sweden to 47% in Romania and 44% in Poland.

    Almost three quarters of EU citizens (74%) believe their country has benefited from being a member of the EU. This is the highest result ever recorded in a Eurobarometer survey for this question since it was first asked in 1983. Fitting the current context, respondents mention the EU’s contribution to maintaining peace and strengthening security (35%) as the main reason why membership is considered beneficial.

    In addition, there is wide agreement among EU citizens that EU Member States should be more united to face current global challenges (89%) and that the European Union needs more means to deal with the challenges ahead (76%).

    Citizens expect the EU to strengthen security and defence and to enhance competitiveness

    In a rapidlychanging geopolitical environment, defence and security (36%) as well as competitiveness, economy and industry (32%) are identified as the areas on which the EU should focus most to reinforce its position in the world. These are also the topics that featured high on last week’s European Council with Parliament’s President calling for faster action and bolder ambition. While the results for defence and security have remained stable compared to February/March 2024, those for competitiveness, economy and industry have increased by five points. These two areas are followed by energy independence (27%), food security and agriculture (25%) and education and research (23%).

    Economic and security issues are also at the forefront when it comes to the topics citizens want the European Parliament to address as a priority. Four in ten Europeans mention inflation, rising prices and the cost of living (43%), followed by the EU’s defence and security (31%), the fight against poverty and social exclusion (31%) and support to the economy and the creation of new jobs (29%). Inflation, rising prices and the cost of living is a main priority across all age groups and with peak results recorded in Portugal (57%), France (56%), Slovakia (56%), Croatia (54%) and Estonia (54%).

    As shown by the EP’s previous survey, inflation and the cost of living had already played a major role as a driving force in the last European elections and the economic situation continues to be a main concern for many Europeans. A third (33%) expect their standard of living to decrease in the next five years, seven points more than in June-July 2024. This is the case for 53% of French respondents (+8 pp) and 47% of Germans (+15 pp).

    Peace and democracy remain EU core values

    Looking at the values Europeans would like the European Parliament to defend, peace (45%), democracy (32%) and the protection of human rights in the EU and worldwide (22%) come first. The results for this question have remained stable, underlining citizens steadfast support for the EU’s founding values and principles.

    Two-thirds of citizens support a stronger role for the EP

    As historic trend lines show, in moments of crisis citizens look to the EU for decisive actions and solutions. When the EU is perceived as coming together and delivering results, support indicators are high – which is currently the case.  50% of respondents have a positive image of the EU. In the last decade, this positive perception was only higher once (at 52%), in spring 2022 in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The positive image of the EP is stable at a high level (41%). A few months into the legislative term, over six in ten (62%) citizens would like to see the European Parliament play a more important role, a six- percentage point increase compared to February-March 2024, a few months before the June 2024 European elections.

    Full results can be found here.

    Background   

    The European Parliament’s Winter 2025 Eurobarometer survey was carried out between 09 January and 04 February 2025 in all 27 EU Member States. The survey was conducted face-to-face, with video interviews used additionally in Czechia, Denmark, Finland, Malta, Netherlands, and Sweden. 26.354 interviews were conducted in total and EU results are weighted according to the size of the population in each country.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: 36th Annual International Military Chiefs of Chaplains Conference and First Chaplain Africa Forum held in Brussels

    Source: United States AFRICOM

    The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and Belgian Ministry of Defence, in partnership with U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) and U.S. Indo Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) Chaplain Directorates, hosted the world’s largest annual meeting of senior military religious leaders at the 36th Annual NATO & Partner International Military Chiefs of Chaplains Conference (IMCCC) in Brussels, Belgium, January 27-31, 2025.

    Over 200 military chaplains, academic experts, and special guests participated, representing 43 nations and more than 30 religious denominations. This year’s gathering included a special Africa Summit hosted by AFRICOM, highlighting the role of chaplains in fostering regional stability through spiritual and ethical leadership. Delegates divided into working groups to share information, identify training needs and areas cooperation, and update their future engagement plans.

    “This conference has not only strengthened our bonds across nations but has also underscored the indispensable role of chaplains in modern military operations, particularly in fostering resilience and ethical leadership in Africa and beyond.” said Major General Kenneth Ekman, DOD West Africa Coordination Lead, AFRICOM.

     AFRICOM’s Command Chaplain, U.S. Army Chaplain Colonel Karen Meeker said, “Our engagement at the IMCCC and the Africa Forum is crucial for developing a comprehensive approach to chaplaincy that resonates with the unique cultural and spiritual landscapes of Africa, ensuring our chaplains are well-prepared to support our service members and their families.”

    Experts from the United Nations, European Union, NATO, Belgium Armed Forces and other organizations briefed attendees on topics such as conflict resolution, interoperability and the importance of interworld view dialogue for achieving peace. Delegates collaborated to identify areas of cooperation and update their future engagement plans.

    EUCOM Command Chaplain, Colonel Christopher LaPack, shared, “First, I want to sincerely thank EUCOM’s co-hosts for this year’s IMCCC. The Belgian Planning Team, led by Chief Chaplain Hans De Cuester, provided a world-class forum for what turned out to be the biggest-ever IMCCC. I have no doubt that the engagements that took place this week will improve future interoperability amongst our chaplaincies. The change in security environment and NATO’s military posture in response to Russian aggression in the region means that our nations’ warfighters are more integrated than ever before. Military chaplains must be properly trained and ready to respond to the religious and spiritual needs of military personnel serving in multinational formations.”

    The Africa Forum agenda also highlighted the role of chaplains in the DoD State Partnership Program (SPP), which partners National Guard forces from the United States with militaries around the world. Chaplain General Henry Matifeyo, Zambian Ministry of Defence said, “The discussions here, especially the tri-lateral meetings, have opened new avenues for cooperation. We are keen on building a network that not only strengthens our chaplaincy but also addresses critical issues like PTSD and moral injury through a multi-disciplinary lens.”

    The IMCCC began in 1990 when the USEUCOM chaplain’s office convened twelve senior NATO military chaplains in order to provide a forum for dialogue to enhance interoperability among NATO chaplaincies, facilitate mutual support, and ensure professional pastoral care is available to all Allied Forces during combat or crisis circumstances. Over time, its scope has expanded to enhance religious affairs interoperability, strengthen international relations, support warfighter and family resilience, improve spiritual advisement for commanders, and promote religious freedom. The IMCCC 2025 has grown into a forum that includes not just European military religious leaders but also leaders from Africa, Asia and North America to share ideas and practices that support the collective security mission on a global scale. This year’s focus on Africa was a step forward in recognizing and addressing the unique needs of this diverse continent.

    List of national chaplaincies that participated in the 2025 conference: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Eswatini, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Italy, Kenya, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Malawi, , Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Serbia, , Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, , Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Zambia.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Municipality Finance issues a USD 50 million tap under its MTN programme

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Municipality Finance Plc
    Stock exchange release
    25 March 2025 at 11:00 am (EET)

    Municipality Finance issues a USD 50 million tap under its MTN programme

    On 26 March 2025 Municipality Finance Plc issues a new tranche in an amount of USD 50 million to an existing benchmark issued on 22 January 2025. With the new tranche, the aggregate nominal amount of the benchmark is USD 400 million. The maturity date of the benchmark is 2 February 2029. The benchmark bears interest at a floating rate equal to Compounded SOFR plus 100 bps per annum.

    The new tranche is issued under MuniFin’s EUR 50 billion programme for the issuance of debt instruments. The offering circular, the supplemental offering circular and the final terms of the benchmark are available in English on the company’s website at https://www.kuntarahoitus.fi/en/for-investors.

    MuniFin has applied for the benchmark to be admitted to trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange maintained by Nasdaq Helsinki. The public trading is expected to commence on 26 March 2025. The existing notes in the series are admitted to trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange.

    Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited act as the Dealer for the issue of the new tranche.

    MUNICIPALITY FINANCE PLC

    Further information:

    Joakim Holmström
    Executive Vice President, Capital Markets and Sustainability
    tel. +358 50 444 3638

    MuniFin (Municipality Finance Plc) is one of Finland’s largest credit institutions. The owners of the company include Finnish municipalities, the public sector pension fund Keva and the State of Finland. The Group’s balance sheet is over EUR 53 billion.

    MuniFin’s customers include municipalities, joint municipal authorities, wellbeing services counties, joint county authorities, corporate entities under the control of the above-mentioned organisations, and affordable social housing. Lending is used for environmentally and socially responsible investment targets such as public transportation, sustainable buildings, hospitals and healthcare centres, schools and day care centres, and homes for people with special needs.

    MuniFin’s customers are domestic, but the company operates in a completely global business environment. The company is an active Finnish bond issuer in international capital markets and the first Finnish green and social bond issuer. The funding is exclusively guaranteed by the Municipal Guarantee Board.

    Read more: https://www.kuntarahoitus.fi/en/

    Important Information

    The information contained herein is not for release, publication or distribution, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, in or into any such country or jurisdiction or otherwise in such circumstances in which the release, publication or distribution would be unlawful. The information contained herein does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor shall there be any sale of, any securities or other financial instruments in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration, exemption from registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction.

    This communication does not constitute an offer of securities for sale in the United States. The notes have not been and will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) or under the applicable securities laws of any state of the United States and may not be offered or sold, directly or indirectly, within the United States or to, or for the account or benefit of, U.S. persons except pursuant to an applicable exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: African Heritage Conservation in the Age of Development: A Regional Approach to Impact Assessments

    Source: UNESCO World Heritage Centre

    In an era of rapid urbanization, infrastructure development, and tourism growth, World Heritage properties across Africa face unprecedented challenges in protecting and managing their outstanding values. The inherent demand for socio-economic transformation often places immense pressure on these heritage properties, highlighting the urgent need harmonize economic growth and heritage protection for sustainable development.

    In response to these pressing challenges, the Strategy for World Heritage in Africa, aligned with UNESCO’s Global Priority Africa is designed to empower African States Parties to adopt best conservation practices as a catalyst for sustainable development. To advance this goal, and with the support of the Kingdom of Netherlands and the Government of Norway, UNESCO, in collaboration with its Advisory Bodies ICCROM and IUCN, and in close coordination with the State Party of Malawi, organized a training on Heritage Impact Assessments (HIA), from 10 to 21 February 2025, at the Lake Malawi National Park World Heritage site, a property renowned for its rich biodiversity and historical significance. The training aimed to enhance the technical expertise of national and regional stakeholders in international standards for undertaking heritage impact assessments amid pressing development demands.

    © Aaron Khombe/Malawi Department of National Museums and Monuments

    The training brought together 32 participants from across southern Africa, including heritage professionals, government officials, environmental specialists, planning agencies, and local councils alongside regional authorities responsible for water, roads, tourism, and environmental assessments from  Malawi and other member states including, Mosi-oa-Tunya / Victoria Falls, Zambia and Zimbabwe, Okavango Delta, Botswana, and Maloti-Drakensberg Park, Lesotho and South Africa, and the United Republic of Tanzania. It was structured around a dynamic blend of lectures, interactive discussions, field visits, and group exercises, providing participants with a hands-on learning experience, focusing on international best practices, assessment methodologies, and case studies.

    © UNESCO/Esnath Mwaka

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Municipality Finance issues SEK 500 million tap under its MTN programme

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Municipality Finance Plc
    Stock exchange release
    25 March 2025 at 10:00 am (EET)

    Municipality Finance issues SEK 500 million tap under its MTN programme

    On 26 March 2025 Municipality Finance Plc issues a new tranche in an amount of SEK 500 million to an existing series of notes issued on 21 February 2025. With the new tranche, the aggregate nominal amount of the notes is SEK 1.5 billion. The maturity date of the benchmark is 21 February 2028. The notes bear interest at a floating rate equal to 3-month Stibor plus 150 bps per annum.

    The notes are issued under MuniFin’s EUR 50 billion programme for the issuance of debt instruments. The offering circular, the supplemental offering circular and the final terms of the notes are available in English on the company’s website at https://www.kuntarahoitus.fi/en/for-investors.

    MuniFin has applied for the notes to be admitted to trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange maintained by Nasdaq Helsinki. The public trading is expected to commence on 26 March 2025. The existing notes in the series are admitted to trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange.

    Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) act as the Dealer for the issue of the notes.

    MUNICIPALITY FINANCE PLC

    Further information:

    Joakim Holmström
    Executive Vice President, Capital Markets and Sustainability
    tel. +358 50 444 3638

    MuniFin (Municipality Finance Plc) is one of Finland’s largest credit institutions. The owners of the company include Finnish municipalities, the public sector pension fund Keva and the State of Finland. The Group’s balance sheet is over EUR 53 billion.

    MuniFin’s customers include municipalities, joint municipal authorities, wellbeing services counties, joint county authorities, corporate entities under the control of the above-mentioned organisations, and affordable social housing. Lending is used for environmentally and socially responsible investment targets such as public transportation, sustainable buildings, hospitals and healthcare centres, schools and day care centres, and homes for people with special needs.

    MuniFin’s customers are domestic, but the company operates in a completely global business environment. The company is an active Finnish bond issuer in international capital markets and the first Finnish green and social bond issuer. The funding is exclusively guaranteed by the Municipal Guarantee Board.

    Read more: https://www.kuntarahoitus.fi/en/

    Important Information

    The information contained herein is not for release, publication or distribution, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, in or into any such country or jurisdiction or otherwise in such circumstances in which the release, publication or distribution would be unlawful. The information contained herein does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor shall there be any sale of, any securities or other financial instruments in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration, exemption from registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction.

    This communication does not constitute an offer of securities for sale in the United States. The notes have not been and will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) or under the applicable securities laws of any state of the United States and may not be offered or sold, directly or indirectly, within the United States or to, or for the account or benefit of, U.S. persons except pursuant to an applicable exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Prosafe SE: Prosafe enters agreement to sell Safe Scandinavia for recycling

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    25 March 2025 – Prosafe SE, through a wholly owned subsidiary, has entered into an agreement to sell for recycling its 1984 built, anchor moored semi-submersible tender support and accommodation vessel ‘Safe Scandinavia’. The Safe Scandinavia is presently located in Norway and has been in cold layup for over 6 years.

    A condition of the recycling is full compliance with all relevant conventions and regulations, with the vessel expected to be delivered within Q2 2025.

    This information is considered to be inside information pursuant to the EU Market Abuse Regulation and is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act. This stock exchange announcement was published by Line Bliksmark, Marketing and Communications Manager, on March 25(th), 2025, at approx.09:03 CET.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Commission on Limits of Continental Shelf Concludes Sixty-Third Session

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    NEW YORK, 24 March (Office of Legal Affairs) ― The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf held its sixty-third session at United Nations Headquarters from 17 February to 21 March.  The plenary parts of the session were held from 24 to 28 February and from 10 to 14 March.  The remainder of the session was devoted to the technical examination of submissions at the premises of the Division, including geographic information systems laboratories and other technical facilities.

    During the first plenary part of the session, the Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal Counsel, Elinor Hammarskjöld, addressed the Commission for the first time since her appointment.  She acknowledged the crucial contribution of the Commission to the implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and paid tribute to the significant work carried out by the members of the Commission in this regard.  Noting the ongoing liquidity crisis affecting regular budget operations of the United Nations Secretariat, the Under‑Secretary-General reiterated that the Division would continue to do its utmost to deliver high-quality support to the Commission within the available means.

    The Submissions of the following coastal States were considered by the Commission and its subcommissions: Mauritius in respect of the region of Rodrigues Island (partial submission); Palau in respect of the North Area (partial amended submission); Portugal; Spain in respect of the area of Galicia (partial submission); Namibia; Cuba in respect of the eastern polygon in the Gulf of Mexico; Mozambique; and Madagascar; as well as revised submissions made by Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Equatorial Margin (partial revised submission); Cook Islands concerning the Manihiki Plateau (revised submission); Iceland in respect of the western, southern and south-eastern parts of the Reykjanes Ridge (partial revised submission); Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Oriental and Meridional Margin (partial revised submission); and the Russian Federation in the Area of the Gakkel Ridge in the Arctic Ocean (partial revised submission).

    The Commission approved three sets of recommendations, namely in regard to the submissions made by Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Equatorial Margin (partial revised submission); Cuba in respect the eastern polygon in the Gulf of Mexico; and Iceland in respect of the western, southern and south-eastern parts of the Reykjanes Ridge (partial revised submission).

    During its plenary meetings, with regard to the submission made by Guyana, the Commission decided to defer its consideration in view of an objection conveyed by Venezuela.

    The Commission further heard presentations on the submission of Mozambique, which was a repeat presentation made upon the request of the coastal State; the partial revised submission made by Brazil in respect of the Brazilian Oriental and Meridional Margin; and the partial submission made by Viet Nam in respect of the Central Area.

    Underscoring the importance that submitting States attach to the work of the Commission, delegations were represented in the plenary at the high level:  the delegation of Mozambique was headed by the Minister for Mineral Resources and Energy, Estêvão Tomás Rafael Pale; the delegation of Cuba was headed by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carlos Fernández de Cossío Domínguez; and the delegation of the Russian Federation was headed by the Minister for Natural Resources and Environment, Alexander Kozlov.

    In view of the progress in its work, the Commission decided to establish subcommissions to consider the partial submission made by Mexico in respect of the eastern polygon in the Gulf of Mexico; the submission made by the United Republic of Tanzania; and the partial submission made by Denmark in respect of the Southern Continental Shelf of Greenland. With a view to facilitating the efficient consideration of submissions, the Commission decided that subcommissions could actively consider two submissions in parallel, as needed.

    The Commission appointed the new member of the Commission, Ahmed Er Raji (Morocco), to subcommissions.  In view of the resignation of Mr. Brekke due to health reasons and the establishment of new subcommissions, the Commission also adjusted the membership of some existing subcommissions and subsidiary bodies.  The Commission also elected David Cole Mosher (Canada) as Vice-Chair of the Commission for the remainder of the current two-and-a-half-year term — until 15 December.

    With regard to the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 79/144 for the Secretary-General to develop and make available training courses to assist States in relation to the preparation, making and maintenance of submissions, as well as their consideration, the secretariat informed the Commission that no earmarked voluntary trust fund contributions for such activities had been received as of 13 March, and that, if no contributions were received by April, the secretariat would not be in a position to deliver on this mandate in 2025.

    The Commission also continued its consideration of initiatives to enhance efficiency in its work, including the development of technical bulletins and templates for presentations and recommendations.

    Further details on the sixty-third session will be available in the Statement of the Chairperson of the Commission (document CLCS/63/2).

    The background press release on this session is available at https://press.un.org/en/2025/sea2206.doc.htm.

    Background

    Established pursuant to article 2 of annex II to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the Commission makes recommendations to coastal States on matters related to the establishment of the outer limits of their continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured, based on information submitted by those coastal States.  The recommendations are based on the scientific data and other material provided by coastal States in relation to the implementation of article 76 of the Convention and do not prejudice matters relating to the delimitation of boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts or prejudice the position of States that are parties to a land or maritime dispute, or application of other parts of the Convention or any other treaties.  The limits of the continental shelf established by a coastal State on the basis of the recommendations are final and binding. In the case of disagreement by a coastal State with the recommendations of the Commission, the coastal State shall, within a reasonable time, make a revised or new submission to the Commission.

    Under rule 23 of its rules of procedure (Public and private meetings), the meetings of the Commission, its subcommissions and subsidiary bodies are held in private, unless the Commission decides otherwise.

    As required under the rules of procedure of the Commission, the executive summaries of all the submissions, including all charts and coordinates, have been made public by the Secretary‑General through continental shelf notifications circulated to Member States of the United Nations, as well as States Parties to the Convention.  The executive summaries are available on the Division’s website at:  www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/clcs_home.htm.  The summaries of recommendations adopted by the Commission are also available on the above-referenced website.

    The Commission is a body of 21 experts in the field of geology, geophysics or hydrography serving in their personal capacities. Members of the Commission are elected for a term of five years by the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention having due regard to the need to ensure equitable geographical representation. Not fewer than three members shall be elected from each geographical region.

    Currently, two seats on the Commission are vacant as a result of the resignation of Mr. Brekke and the long-standing vacancy resulting from a lack of nominations from the Group of Eastern European States.  A call for nominations has been circulated to States Parties with a view to filling these vacancies at a by-election to be conducted at the thirty-fifth Meeting of States Parties, scheduled to be convened from 23 to 27 June. The nomination period opened on 12 February and will close on 12 May at midnight.

    The Convention provides that the State party which submitted the nomination of a member of the Commission shall defray the expenses of that member while in performance of Commission duties.  A voluntary trust fund for the purpose of defraying the cost of participation of the members of the Commission from developing countries has been established.  It has facilitated the participation of several members of the Commission from developing countries in the sessions of the Commission.

    The convening by the Secretary-General of the sessions of the Commission, with full conference services, including documentation, for the plenary parts of these sessions, is subject to approval by the General Assembly of the United Nations.  The Assembly does so in its annual resolutions on oceans and the law of the sea, which also address other matters relevant to the work of the Commission and the conditions of service of its members.

    For additional information on the work of the Commission see the website of the Division at www.un.org/depts/los/index.htm.  In particular, the most recent Statements by the Chair on the progress in the work of the Commission are available at http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/commission_documents.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 24.03.2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    24 March 2025 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 24.03.2025

    Espoo, Finland – On 24 March 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:                

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 2,408,132 4.93
    CEUX 1,220,634 4.93
    BATE
    AQEU
    TQEX 166,276 4.93
    Total 3,795,042 4.93

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 24 March 2025 was EUR 18,703,105. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 194,123,580 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 931 580 507
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: INVESTOR SUMMIT SPEECH

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Ka nui te mihi kia kotou, kia ora, and good morning everyone. 
    To those of you visiting us from overseas, can I extend a very special welcome to each and every one of you. 
    Welcome to New Zealand, welcome to the best country on planet Earth, and welcome to our stunning Auckland waterfront. 
    And to all those Kiwis I see in the room today, thank you for being here and showcasing some of the extraordinary businesses and talent that exists in our business community. 
    And it was a real pleasure to meet many of you informally last night, and my Ministers and I are really looking forward to spending much more time with you over the next two days. 
    I meant it before when I said this is the best country on planet Earth. 
    Because what makes New Zealand so very special and unique is our Kiwi Spirit which is exemplified in the qualities, character, and attitude of New Zealanders.  
    For us, it‘s about resilience and determination, ingenuity and innovation, adventure and exploration, creativity and practical problem-solving, humility and mateship, fairness, and a deep care for our land and community. 
    It’s no surprise that growing up in New Zealand, our heroes are Kiwi trailblazers and pioneers, people who have dared to push boundaries, challenge the status quo, and leave a lasting mark on the world.
    From our early Māori explorers navigating vast oceans guided by the stars, to modern-day adventurers like Sir Edmund Hillary conquering Everest.   
    To Ernest Rutherford, the father of nuclear physics, who split the atom and revolutionised our understanding of science. To Rocket Lab’s Peter Beck and his groundbreaking developments in rocket technology launching satellites into space. 
    And Kate Shepperd, who secured New Zealand women the right to vote – the very first country in the world to do so. 
    And our phenomenal athletes who show the world what determination and talent can achieve. Or the stunning world of The Lord of the Rings created by one of our most creative storytellers – Peter Jackson.
    We may be a small country, but time and again, we have proven that size is no barrier to greatness. From the peaks of Everest to the frontlines of social progress, from scientific breakthroughs to arts and sporting legends, Kiwis have led the way.
    And we’re living in an age when New Zealand has never been closer to the action – right in the middle of the booming Indo-Pacific with direct connections to Asia and North America. 
    With the weight of global economic activity shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific and digital connections breaking down barriers, New Zealand has never been closer to the world.  
    But for all our spirit and hard work, we also know New Zealand can’t do it alone. 
    We’re a small country of around five million people like Ireland, Singapore, and Denmark. 
    Just as those countries have prospered by tapping into larger markets, building stronger international connections, and fostering trade and investment, New Zealand needs to do the same. 
    If we want our country to thrive, we need to work even harder to compete on the world stage – and, in particular, to unlock the commercial partnerships that will supercharge the next generation of growth in the New Zealand economy. 
    That means the Government will work more with Industry to deliver much of the infrastructure and projects that will be showcased over the next two days. 
    Many of your organisations will have extensive experience delivering outstanding world-class infrastructure to national and regional governments worldwide.
    I want New Zealand to seize every opportunity to partner with the private sector and deliver a fresh generation of infrastructure investment to unleash economic growth.  
    But it’s not just infrastructure. 
    I want to develop closer ties between outstanding New Zealanders and their companies based here, with investors and organisations based offshore.  
    I also want to unlock more partnerships between indigenous Iwi Māori organisations and commercial investors, whether they are based in Auckland or Abu Dhabi, Dunedin or Denver.  
    I want start-ups based in Christchurch and Hamilton fighting for seed capital in San Francisco and London – winning their share of global influence and success. 
    Breaking perceptions about the New Zealand economy is critical to that. 
    Yes, we have globally competitive dairy, film, and tourist industries, but our space industry is also operating at the cutting edge, ranking fourth in the world for launches behind the US, China, and Russia. 
    Over the next two days, you will hear more about our plan to unleash growth and ensure New Zealand reaches its full potential. 
    We want you to join us on that journey, and we will have several opportunities on display. 
    That will include the opportunity to deliver infrastructure in partnership with the Crown – both in the form of immediate opportunities and the pipeline of projects going forward. 
    It will include working with Iwi Māori organisations to grow their businesses as they make a multigenerational investment in their people. 
    It will include opportunities in a range of specific sectors where we believe New Zealand has a unique role to play and where we expect the Government to focus its efforts on growth. 
    In the very short term, we have made good economic progress in our first year in Government, although there’s still a long way to go. 
    New Zealand is now in the early stages of a cyclical economic recovery, with growth beginning to pick up and unemployment expected to peak around its current rate. 
    Inflation has fallen and now sits comfortably anchored within the Reserve Bank’s target band at 2.2%. 
    Annual tourism expenditure was up 23% last year, and services and manufacturing activity have returned to growth after extended periods of contraction. 
    Business confidence is at around its highest level in a decade. As confidence has risen, retail trade has picked up, and growth is expected to rise, hitting 3% in 2026. 
    So, there’s now cause for optimism in the New Zealand economy that the recovery is underway and better days lie ahead. 
    For policymakers here in New Zealand, that poses an opportunity – not just to watch the economic recovery, but to shape it. 
    Step-changing economic productivity, lifting incomes, creating jobs, and unleashing the investment New Zealand needs to become much more prosperous.  
    Which brings us to today. 
    I know the only way we will raise incomes, lift New Zealanders’ standard of living, and fund the quality public services we rely on is by unlocking more investment, more innovation, and more entrepreneurship.
    Having broken inflation last year, our collective focus has now turned to shaping the economic recovery – ensuring we take every possible step to lift New Zealand’s economic performance. 
    That renewed energy and effort forms the backdrop of this Summit. 
    My Government is working around the clock to make New Zealand an outstanding place to do business. 
    But before I highlight some of those reforms and my economic priorities as Prime Minister, I want to make a more fundamental point about New Zealand as an investment destination. 
    New Zealand has been and will continue to be a poster child for social and political stability in a more volatile and challenging world. 
    That reputation is long-standing, but in challenging times, it has come into sharper focus. 
    We stand up for our values and live by them, too. That means respecting civil liberties, private property and private life, and the democratic and social institutions that underpin them. 
    We consistently advocate for a rules-based international order that allows small countries like New Zealand to thrive. Free trade isn’t just an idea in New Zealand; it’s the bedrock of our prosperity. 
    For farmers and growers living in rural New Zealand, it has allowed a modern economic miracle: the opportunity to not just collectively operate one of the most efficient agricultural sectors in the world but to live in some of the most stunning parts of the world while they do it. 
    Finally, we might disagree sometimes – but we’re not disagreeable. Over the next two days, you will hear from various political leaders.
    You will hear from senior Ministers representing each of the three political parties in our Coalition Government, as well as Barbara Edmonds, the Labour Party’s Opposition Finance Spokesperson.  
    It’s pretty normal in New Zealand for political parties to disagree with each other – often loudly, and sometimes even with my own Coalition colleagues. 
    But I believe the broad political representation that is here demonstrates that most New Zealanders share the same motivations – higher incomes and more financial freedom, quality public services, and a long-standing belief that our best days lie ahead of us. 
    When you look at all the tension, volatility, and strife in the world today, I think that makes us pretty special, and a very attractive destination for anyone looking to take shelter from the global storm. 
    Political stability, however, is not an excuse for a lack of ambition. 
    You should be under no illusions about my commitment to the Government’s growth agenda and the reforms we are pushing through to unleash investment in the New Zealand economy. 
    Last month, Minister for Economic Growth Nicola Willis published our Government’s Going for Growth Agenda – we have copies for you here – which outlines a range of actions we are taking to get the New Zealand economy moving and realising its vast potential. 
    Each of those actions fits into one of five pillars we have identified as critical to lifting economic growth and improving New Zealanders’ standard of living:

    Developing talent,
    Encouraging innovation, science, and technology,
    Introducing competitive business settings,
    Promoting global trade and investment,
    And delivering infrastructure for growth. 

    Across each of those pillars, we have Ministers from across the Government working day and night to drive through reform – in transport,  tourism, aquaculture, construction, advanced aviation, mining, energy, agriculture, and horticulture. 
    Over the next two days, you will hear much more about our work programme in those areas that will play a critical role in the next phase of New Zealand’s growth story – with more information on a series of specific investable propositions available in the private sector. 
    Among that reform programme are some significant changes designed to achieve a profound step change in the New Zealand economy that I would like to touch on today. 
    For a start, we are clearing away decades of broken planning law – brick by brick. 
    We have introduced the Fast Track regime, which streamlines the consenting process for projects that are regionally and nationally significant. 
    In short, instead of seeking different permissions under different laws, under Fast Track, it’s all done in one place, with a faster process and fewer hurdles to getting underway. 
    That regime is now up and running, and I know a number of projects have already submitted applications since it became operational last month. 
    In short, if you want to build a wind farm, a highway, a quarry, hundreds of new homes, or any other regionally or nationally significant projects, we are busting down the doors to make it happen faster and cheaper. 
    149 projects have already been listed in legislation, but nothing prevents new projects from applying for referral into the scheme. 
    And it doesn’t stop with Fast Track. 
    Further planning reforms are also on the way, including a total replacement of the Resource Management Act. 
    We are also eliminating the barriers to more significant investment in energy and generation to unleash abundant, affordable energy. 
    The impact of unaffordable and unreliable energy on economic growth has been brought into the spotlight in recent years following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. 
    Industries in Europe that had historically relied on access to low-cost natural gas came under tremendous strain, putting pressure on growth and household incomes. 
    In New Zealand, we are lucky that 85% of electricity generation is already renewable, thanks to decades of investment in hydro, wind, solar, and geothermal.  
    But we can’t risk falling short in the years to come. So, as a Government, we are tearing down the barriers to fresh energy investment. That means introducing more permissive rules for renewables.
    But it also means ending restrictions on offshore oil and gas exploration – and providing certainty for market participants by confidently saying that gas has to be part of New Zealand’s energy mix going forward.  
    At the same time, we are making it easier to invest in New Zealand from offshore.  
    That started last year, with fresh directives to our Overseas Investment Office, which slashed processing times and made applications more predictable. 
    Today, an application for offshore investment is approved within 18 days on average, compared to 28 days prior to those changes.
    And two weeks ago, we announced upcoming changes to legislation designed to further improve the timeliness and reliability of our overseas investment regime. 
    We also announced just last month that, from April 1 this year, individuals who invest at least $5 million in New Zealand will be eligible for an Active Investor Visa, with a pathway to residency after three years. 
    I know that for many of you from offshore in this room, that will be positive news. But as a New Zealander, I have to say it’s an even bigger deal for the sharp, ambitious Kiwis here and all around the country, who are hungry for capital and hungry to grow. 
    We know the impact foreign investment has on local businesses. It’s not just the capital investment; it’s the skills, connections, and linkages into new markets. 
    That translates into higher wages, more jobs, more money in Kiwi wallets, and more resilient businesses that make an even greater contribution in the community. 
    We need more of it, especially for a small country hungry to grow like New Zealand, which is why I have invited many of you here today. 
    I believe New Zealand’s best days are ahead of us—and we can make them happen if we get serious about partnering with commercial expertise to solve some of our biggest economic challenges and seize on the huge economic opportunities ahead of us. 
    Helping to end New Zealand’s infrastructure deficit through private sector partnership.
    Fattening out our capital markets and opening up new sectors for growth.
    Strengthening our connections to the world, enhancing technology, lifting productivity, and opening new markets for our products and services. 
    Over the next two days, you will hear from a range of leaders—cabinet Ministers, business leaders, and Iwi Māori leaders—who I know are committed to responding to our challenges and opportunities. 
    There will also be plenty of time across both days for closer interactions and to discuss the opportunities and challenges that you are confronting in your own businesses. 
    While you’re here, please also enjoy our hospitality and culture. We’re not just here to do business—we’re here to build relationships and make the case for New Zealand as an outstanding country to invest in, to visit, and to establish roots in. 
    So once again, and on behalf of the New Zealand Government and the New Zealand people, welcome to this year’s Summit. 
    I’m excited to get stuck in – and I can’t wait to hear more from you over the next two days about your approach to business and the difference you could make for growth, investment, jobs, and opportunity for us here in New Zealand. 
    Thank you. 

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Security Council Examines Ways to Strengthen United Nations Peacekeeping against New Threats

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Delegates Debate ‘Christmas-Tree’ Add-on Mandates versus Focusing on Core Tasks

    The Security Council today debated ways to adapt United Nations peacekeeping to evolving threats with Member States emphasizing the need to partner with regional organizations and actively involve local communities, particularly women.  They also stressed the importance of aligning mandates with available resources, leveraging intelligence-led strategies and digital tools for data-driven decision-making, and avoiding overly broad “Christmas-tree mandates” that prolong operations and escalate costs.

    “Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond,” United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said during the Council’s day-long open debate focusing on the ability of United Nations peace operations to adjust to new realities on the ground.  These challenges along with more complex and deadly wars, he cautioned, “throw fuel on the fires of conflict”.

    He also highlighted a “persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources”, as well as growing divisions within Council itself.  To address this, he called for a tailored and collective approach to peace operations. Announcing a forthcoming United Nations peace operation review — mandated by Member States in the Pact for the Future, he said that this process will incorporate insights from the New Agenda for Peace and from the first comprehensive study of special political missions in the 80-year history of the United Nations.

    Peace operations, he emphasized, must engage early with host nations and local partners, guided by clear, achievable mandates and viable exit strategies.  “Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process,” Mr. Guterres concluded.

    Cultural Shifts Required

    “The fact that peace operations are effective is one of the most verified findings in international relations literature,” said Jenna Russo, Director of Research at the International Peace Institute and Head of the Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.  “Yet, there is often a dissonance between these findings and the lived experiences of those in conflict settings,” she added.

    Offering four recommendations, she first called for a stronger planning culture within the Secretariat.  Bureaucratic and political barriers have kept this culture of planning from taking root, she said, adding that the Organization should build the capacity to discern emerging trends, anticipate potential shifts and respond proactively.

    Secondly, she said, the Organization must embrace a “risk-tolerant culture around peace operations”, noting that “personnel are structurally disincentivized from trying new things and reporting what doesn’t work for fear that their budgets and jobs may suffer the consequences”.  She highlighted the need for a culture that creates space for trying and even failing, with the aim of learning and improving — “this culture must come from the top”.

    “The Secretariat should tell the Council what it needs to hear, not what it wants to hear,” she underscored as her third recommendation, citing the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.  Instead of the Secretariat pre-emptively lowering the bar on what is politically possible, she said, it should present a wide range of options and leave it to the Council to adjust the bar.

    Modular Approach — Building Blocks

    Her final recommendation was that the Council should consider the advantages and the risks of a modular approach to peace operations.  Mandated sets of activities like electoral support, human rights monitoring or security sector reform can be “treated like building blocks that can be scaled up or down over the lifespan of a mission”, she said.  This approach can promote more tailored responses and align mandates with available resources, but it comes with the risk that broader peacebuilding aspects “could fall by the wayside if the Council or host States view them as optional”, she added.

    In the ensuing open debate, speakers stressed the need to evolve with the times, underscored the importance of regional partnerships and called for a more people-centered approach that involves local communities, and specifically women, in peace efforts.

    Closer Cooperation with Regional Organizations

    “For millions, the blue flag and the blue helmets are symbols of hope,” said Lars Løkke Rasmussen, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark and Council President for March, as he spoke in his national capacity.  However, just as conflicts and needs have evolved, so must the UN’s tools, he stressed, urging closer collaboration with regional and subregional organizations — “especially the African Union” — and the inclusion of women in peace processes.

    Zane Dangor, Director-General of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, said that deployments by regional and subregional organizations, such as the African Union and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), if authorized and supported by the UN, could off-set the limitations of the Organization’s peacekeeping operations.  Calling for the accelerated implementation of Council resolution 2719 (2023), he said the Council can also gain insights from the experiences of African peace operations that are often conducted in difficult conditions and with limited resources.

    Jiří Kozák, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, emphasized that strong coordination with regional partners, such as the African Union and European Union, must be systematic, practical and based on the sharing of resources, information and best practices.  “Improved coordination will ensure stronger political and operational support,” he added.

    Similarly, Guyana’s representative highlighted the need for deeper collaboration with regional organizations and reiterated the calls of previous speakers who stressed that women must be present at all levels — from peacekeeping forces to peace negotiations.

    “Peace should be built from the ground up,” said Javier Martínez-Acha Vásquez, Panama’s Minister for Foreign Affairs.  Conflict-resolution mechanisms “are more likely to last when women are leaders and involved in the peacebuilding process”, he added.  Insun Kang, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, called for a people-centered approach that respects host country priorities and national ownership.  “This approach views local populations as not just beneficiaries of peacekeeping efforts, but active participants,” she said, noting her country’s rice cultivation and vocational training initiatives in South Sudan.

    Noting that the Council has not mandated a new peacekeeping operation in 10 years, Syed Tariq Fatemi, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, warned that the UN’s absence is being filled by “negative actors and soldiers of fortune”.  UN peacekeeping is cost effective, representing only 3 per cent of global military spending.  The Council must ensure it is properly funded and resourced.

    Accountability for Performance

    As the global leader of peacekeeping capacity-building, the United States aims to ensure that its programmes have measurable effects on the ground, said that country’s representative. “Robust accountability measures will enhance the effectiveness and efficiencies of UN peacekeeping missions,” she said, adding that accountability must incentivize positive performance and expedient consequences for performance failures.

    On that, Somalia’s delegate, pointing to Africa’s experience with peacekeeping operations, stressed that “success depends on two interlinked principles — clear strategic planning and operational adaptability”.

    Caution against ‘Christmas-Tree Mandates’

    Several speakers expressed concern about the overbroad mandates of UN peacekeeping missions, noting that these mandates often lead to prolonged missions in host countries, costing billions of dollars.  “The result is missions that are present in countries for decades and cost billions of dollars,” said the representative of the Russian Federation. Rather, she stressed that “the goal we need to be aiming for” is that, after a mandate is implemented, host States assume full responsibility for conflict prevention.

    “We must end the strange phenomenon where every mandate renewal leads to expansion,” said China’s representative, also rejecting the “unchecked growth of Christmas-tree mandates”.  He further underscored that the principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defence “should always be upheld as fundamental guidelines”.

    Similarly, Algeria’s delegate said: “We are witnessing, in some cases, what can be described as ‘Christmas-tree’ mandates, under which UN missions are tasked with an overwhelming number of responsibilities, thus hindering their ability to undertake focused and targeted engagements”.

    Slovenia’s delegate was among the speakers who stressed the need to enhance early warning and rapid response capabilities to address conflicts before they escalate.  “Missions must be proactive rather than reactive,” she said.  Greece’s delegate, echoing many other delegations, condemned attacks on peacekeepers and emphasized the need to ensure their absolute safety.

    Clear, Realistic Mandates, Use of Digital Tools 

    France’s delegate said that “peacekeeping is the heart” of the UN.  Peacekeeping missions “need to be part of a strategy, but in order for them to be successful, the mandate has to be based on clear, realistic and political objectives”, he added.  The representative of the United Kingdom said the UN needs to harness innovation, using data-driven decision-making, intelligence-led approaches and digital tools.  Peacekeepers must be trained on emerging threats, including cyberwarfare, disinformation campaigns and climate-related security risks.

    On the Secretary-General’s efforts to make the united Nations fit for purpose, Beate Meinl-Reisinger, Federal Minister for European and International Affairs of Austria, stated:  “Reform, yes; replace, no.”  Underlining the need for a “flexible toolbox of peace operations”, she stressed the importance of political solutions to the success of such operations.  “They can only keep peace where there is a peace to keep,” she observed.

    Over the past eight decades, the UN has deployed more than 120 peace operations in over 50 countries, and to a very large extent, these missions have helped prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, said the representative of Sierra Leone.  When his country was in the throes of a brutal civil war more than 20 years ago, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) assisted in disarming more than 75,000 ex-combatants, restored State authority and oversaw the first post-conflict democratic elections.  “The Mission, at the time, was seen as a prototype for the UN’s new emphasis on peacebuilding and showed how a well-resourced and adaptable UN operation can support a country to rebuild, reconcile and reclaim its future,” he said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal joins Global Maritime Leaders at Singapore Maritime Week (SMW)

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal joins Global Maritime Leaders at Singapore Maritime Week (SMW)

    Meets key Singapore Ministers to strengthen bilateral maritime & trade ties

    Deliberates with ministerial counterparts from France, The Netherlands, Norway & Portugal on navigating Global Maritime Trends at SMW

    Posted On: 24 MAR 2025 6:59PM by PIB Delhi

    The Union Minister of Ports, Shipping & Waterways, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal joined Global Maritime Leaders at the Singapore Maritime Week (SMW) to discuss, deliberate and devise strategies based on the shared vision for a secure, sustainable and prosperous maritime future. The Minister highlighted the challenges and India’s vision to channel growth of the maritime sector around that. Shri Sonowal also argued for strengthening maritime connectivity and supply chains while the need for collective effort towards a green sustainable maritime future.

    On digitalisation and future ready shipping, the Union Minister reiterated how it is the core strategy of India’s maritime policy. India’s  maritime policies like ONOP, NLP (Marine), and MAITRI are streamlining port services, cutting transaction times, and enabling real-time data. India is also partnering with the UAE and Singapore to create Virtual Trade Corridors for seamless cargo movement. 

    Speaking on the occasion, the Union Minister, Sarbananda Sonowal said, “India’s maritime vision, rooted in ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’, promotes collaboration and shared prosperity. As a reliable and responsible partner, India is committed to building a green, secure, and inclusive maritime future. Alongside Singapore and global partners, we aim to drive innovation and collective action for a resilient maritime ecosystem.” 

    Shri Sonowal met Senior Minister and ex PM of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong at the SMW. Union Minister was ushered to the bilateral meeting with Murali Pillai, Minister of State, Ministry of Law and Ministry of Transport, Singapore. The Union Minister also held individual meetings with other senior members of the government including Dr Tan See Leng, Minister for Manpower and Second Minister of Trade and Industry, Singapore; Vivian Balakrishnan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Singapore. Sonowal said at the SMW that India is addressing supply chain vulnerabilities by developing key corridors like IMEEC, the Eastern Maritime Corridor, and the North-South Transport Corridor to secure trade routes. A USD 20 billion investment would enhance logistics, port connectivity, and trade facilitation. India targets a top-five global shipbuilding rank by 2047 through policy reforms and infrastructure upgrades. Ports aim to grow their global cargo share from 6% to 15% by 2047, supported by a Maritime Development Fund for fleet and shipyard expansion. The GIFT City is also rising as a global hub for maritime finance and ship leasing, offering a competitive gateway to global capital, highlighted Shri Sarbananda Sonowal at the SMW Adding further, he said, “The maritime sector faces both challenges and opportunities, from climate change and geopolitics to digital disruption and shifting trade patterns. Guided by PM Narendra Modi’s vision of Viksit Bharat and Atmanirbhar Bharat, India is advancing as a modern, self-reliant, and globally connected economy. The maritime sector is key to driving growth, resilience, and sustainable connectivity. India is expanding port infrastructure, integrating logistics, and boosting ease of doing business—resulting in greater port efficiency, stronger cargo flows, and growing investor confidence.” 

    In his concluding remark, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal said, “Sustainability is central to India’s maritime strategy. We are advancing green port infrastructure, promoting low-emission shipping, and supporting innovation in low-carbon vessels. Three Green Hydrogen Hub Ports— Kandla, Tuticorin, and Paradip—will drive alternative fuel adoption and green hydrogen production. India is also leading the IMO’s Green Voyage 2050 initiative, helping developing nations in their energy transitions. Our commitment, under the leadership of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi ji, extends to developing Green Shipping Corridors, including the proposed India-Singapore Green and Digital Corridor, focused on clean energy and smart logistics. Oceans unite us. Through partnerships, we can turn today’s maritime challenges into shared, sustainable opportunities.”  Sarbananda Sonowal also met Industry Captains including Jeremy Nixon, Global CEO, ONE and Masashi Hamada along with other corporate leaders from the Maritime Sector including APM Terminals, Gateway Terminals. 

    ***

    GDH/HR

    (Release ID: 2114536) Visitor Counter : 48

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Heeding the lessons of COVID-19 in the face of avian influenza

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Matthew S Miller, Executive Director, Global Nexus and M.G. DeGroote Institute for Infectious Disease Research, McMaster University

    If the H5N1 avian flu virus learns to spread efficiently from person to person, it could pose an imminent threat to humanity. (CDC and NIAID), CC BY

    Infectious disease outbreaks have a bad habit of piling on at the worst possible times.

    The 1918 flu pandemic, also known as the Spanish flu, caught the world by surprise just as the First World War was coming to an end. It was responsible for killing three to five per cent of the world’s population (50-100 million people, equivalent to about 400 million today).

    Now, as we reflect on five years since the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic and face economic uncertainty imposed by the United States administration — as well as lingering conflicts in places such as the Middle East and Ukraine — it’s the steady march of avian influenza, or “bird flu,” that poses an imminent threat to humanity.

    Walter Reed hospital flu ward in Washington, D.C. during the flu epidemic of 1918-19, which killed three to five per cent of the world’s population.
    (Shutterstock)

    Bird flu has been causing a flurry of human infections, especially in U.S. cattle workers. If the virus learns to spread effectively from human to human, it could change the course of history. Even though our weary world already feels maxed out, we have to make room to avert yet another crisis.




    Read more:
    Bird flu in cattle: What are the concerns surrounding the newly emerging bovine H5N1 influenza virus?


    The good news is that we know how to minimize risk and mobilize resources quickly, before the virus starts moving from human-to-human.

    Heading off a bird flu pandemic

    Knowing what to do and actually doing it, though, are very different, as we saw all too well five years ago when COVID-19 shut down much of the world, killing more than seven million people worldwide. And it’s not through with us yet.

    The question is whether we will act in time to head off a bird flu pandemic. The Spanish Flu was the first of five influenza pandemics since the end of the First World War.

    A sixth is inevitable without co-ordinated global action. Otherwise, the only questions are when it will it come and how bad it will be.




    Read more:
    Combatting the measles threat means examining the reasons for declining vaccination rates


    Infectious diseases constitute a permanent threat to society, especially as vaccine hesitancy and misinformation grow. Fighting pandemics needs to be a full-time, ongoing priority for governments everywhere.

    After the arrival of COVID-19, there were some impressive investments in infrastructure and science to support pandemic preparedness, but many were essentially one-time projects.

    Canada needs to establish permanent capacity to prevent and respond to health emergencies. Government agencies specifically dedicated to supporting the development of medical countermeasures for pathogens that pose a pandemic risk, like the recently established Health Emergencies Readiness Canada (HERC), are a step in the right direction.

    However, we must also re-prioritize investments in the fundamental research that is the birthplace of new medical and non-medical solutions to pandemic preparedness — where we currently lag far behind essentially all of our G7 counterparts. This has never been more important than in the current global political context.

    The cost of acting to prevent or limit a pandemic is infinitesimal compared to the price of letting one happen, whether one measures the toll in human lives, or in dollars.

    The world needs to adopt a collective mentality that we are “all in” on prevention if we want to maximize our chances of avoiding the next pandemic. We cannot sit on our hands and hope we get lucky. That strategy has failed us in the past and will doom us in the future.

    H5N1 avian flu

    Today, as we stand on the brink of an avian influenza pandemic that could be significantly worse than COVID-19, too much of the world seems unaware, unprepared or largely disengaged.

    Globally, more than 900 humans are known to have been infected by H5N1 avian influenza so far. The death rate associated with these human infections is a staggering one in two, placing it on par with threats such as Ebola.

    Death rates resulting from human infections of the most prevalent currently circulating H5N1 virus in the U.S. (clade 2.3.4.4b) have been much lower — though the very narrow demographic characteristics of the individuals that have been infected leaves many questions regarding the true danger that this virus poses to the population at-large.
    Avian influenza has become more prevalent than ever in our environment. Having adapted to spread efficiently among cattle and other mammals, the virus will follow its biological imperative to adapt and survive.

    No responsible country can ignore the possibility that person-to-person spread could start anywhere and quickly wash over the planet.




    Read more:
    An ounce of prevention: Now is the time to take action on H5N1 avian flu, because the stakes are enormous


    Certainly, Canada is treating the issue seriously, as I know from my work with the Public Health Agency of Canada, the National Advisory Committee on Immunization, the Ontario Immunization Advisory Committee and other bodies.

    But the effort to stop or at least slow avian influenza needs to include all countries and to engage everyday people, especially those who work directly with birds, cattle and other wild and domestic animals.

    Targeted interventions

    The best tactics to stave off a pandemic, at least at this point, are relatively unintrusive, targeted interventions. It’s critical that farm workers, veterinarians and others who work with animals follow careful protocols such as wearing masks and goggles, sanitizing equipment and continuing to cull poultry flocks where exposure is identified.

    We also need to educate hunters about protective measures to lower their risk of exposure.

    Most mitigation measures are entirely non-medical — though offering vaccines to those at high risk of exposure, as Finland has done, would be prudent. It’s much easier to target vaccination programs to high-risk groups than to organize a global vaccine campaign after a pandemic has begun.

    We need to encourage these groups to take every possible action to protect themselves — and therefore the world — and to provide financial supports that enable them to comply without cost.

    If avian flu becomes established among humans, which could happen rapidly and with very little warning, COVID-19 has shown that only a swift, decisive and truly global approach can fend off disaster.

    A significant lesson from COVID-19 is that we have to support pandemic prevention and response efforts for people in every corner of the world, however remote they may be, and that we must reach vulnerable populations within wealthy countries, such as elderly, frail and marginalized people, and those affected by poverty. These are the people always impacted most by infectious diseases.

    A selective distribution of resources among the planet’s wealthiest populations will not provide the protection the world needs and will only enlarge and extend the reach of a new pandemic.

    We must remember what it was like to close down schools, workplaces and public gatherings and to have hospitals overflowing with patients as clinicians risked their lives to care for them.

    We could have saved so many people and so much money by taking the threat more seriously from the outset, including providing better public education about evidence-based measures such as masking and vaccines.

    It’s past time we made pandemic prevention and response a permanent priority, no matter what else is happening in the world.

    Matthew S Miller is co-founder and Chief Scientific Officer of AeroImmune Inc. He has received compensation from Seqirus, Sanofi, GSK, Roche, Grifols, and Aramis Biotechnologies for participating on advisory boards and for supporting educational activities. He has received research funding from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research, the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the Canada Research Chairs Program, the Federal Economic Development Agency for Southern Ontario, Ontario Centre of Innovation, Bay Area Health Trust, Providence Therapeutics, JN Nova Pharma, Lactiga, and Zentek. He is a member of the National Advisory Committee on Immunization COVID-19 Working Group and H5N1 Influenza Working Group. He is also a member of the Ontario Immunization Advisory Committee and the Public Health Agency of Canada Expert Panel on Avian Influenza A(H5Nx).

    ref. Heeding the lessons of COVID-19 in the face of avian influenza – https://theconversation.com/heeding-the-lessons-of-covid-19-in-the-face-of-avian-influenza-252161

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: ‘Peace Operations Face Serious Barriers that Demand New Approaches’, Secretary-General Stresses, at Security Council Open Debate

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    Following are UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ remarks to the Security Council’s open debate titled “Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations — Responding to New Realities”, in New York today:

    I thank the Government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth.

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy, from peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians, from negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground, to electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges; the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly.  They last longer and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics.

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve. Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.  And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.  And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful, what is hindering their effectiveness, and what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep.

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.  We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.  And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an international force established by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.  And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment.

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701 (2006), and our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.  Security Council resolution 2719 (2023) is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.  We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council members to fully support this work.

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges.

    Work is now under way to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN country teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Throughout, we will hold extensive consultations to capture as wide a spectrum of views as possible and to benefit from worldwide expertise.

    From Member States, host States, troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors to regional organizations, civil society and academia, and our own leaders and experts within UN peace operations and the Secretariat.

    And the review will, of course, help inform our efforts through our UN@80 initiative, to find efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.

    Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process.  I urge all Members to support it.  And I call on this Council to continue working to overcome divisions and disagreements around peace operations and build the unified and consistent political support our peace operations — and the women and men who conduct them — need and deserve.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Giorgia Meloni’s government is still supporting Ukraine and backing NATO. Italy’s aerospace and defence sectors help explain why

    Source: The Conversation – France – By Jean-Pierre Darnis, Full professor at the University of Côte d’Azur, director of the master’s programme in “France-Italy Relations”. Associate fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS, Paris) and adjunct professor at LUISS University (Rome), Université Côte d’Azur

    US President Donald Trump’s pivot toward Russia amid its war in Ukraine has collided with the stance of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, which has always shown unwavering support for Kyiv as well as loyalty to Washington. When Trump came to power, Meloni wanted to appear connected to his administration, hoping to play the role of a bridge with Europe while France and Germany were in unfavourable political cycles. Trump’s pivot led to a revival of France’s role in Europe, while Germany emerged from its electoral period with its likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, calling for European defence’s “independence from the USA”.

    Meloni’s position is not only weakening within the European context, where France, Germany and the UK play leading roles, but also in Italian politics, as US policy has created rifts within the three-part governing coalition. Meloni’s party, Fratelli d’Italia, supports Ukraine and Europe, as does Forza Italia. But the leader of Lega, Matteo Salvini, has come to embody Trumpism in Italy, taking an openly pro-Russian position and opposing European rearmament. If a break with Lega were to occur, it could call into question the viability of the government, as it would no longer hold an absolute majority in parliament.

    Anti-French rhetoric

    For her part, Meloni always tends to push back against any “European-only” defence solution proposed by France. This position is a way for Italy to avoid facing the fact that NATO has weakened. It also reactivates an anti-French rhetoric that is a classic refrain among Italian nationalists. Salvini has recently accused French President Emmanuel Macron of being “crazy” and calling for Europe to prepare for nuclear war.

    However, Macron has not made any significant missteps toward Italy. Since the first informal emergency meeting in Paris after Trump’s policy shift toward Ukraine (a gathering that included the UK, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland), the Italian government has always been involved. Moreover, Macron’s policy convergence with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has dulled criticisms, because Rome is traditionally close to London.

    Both Meloni’s government and the opposition have put forward complicated if not unrealistic proposals for the war in Ukraine, such as a UN peacekeeping mission after a ceasefire, and repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to NATO. In terms of public opinion, a poll published in mid-February – two weeks before Trump scolded Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a White House visit – found that 69 percent of Italians “are favourable toward a common European army”.

    There is also a growing debate in Italy on nuclear deterrence. This issue had been taboo until now, with Italy benefitting from an arrangement in which US nuclear bombs are stored in bases on Italian soil. While Germany and Poland have expressed interest in an expansion of the French nuclear umbrella, Italian media and policymakers are also beginning to discuss it. The discussion may reflect doubts about US reliability within NATO, including Washington’s commitment to the alliance treaty’s Article 5, which holds that “an armed attack” on one member “shall be considered an attack against them all”.




    À lire aussi :
    French nuclear deterrence for Europe: how effective could it be against Russia?


    Defence ties to Europe

    There are also significant signals coming from Italian industry. While, in recent months, the Italian government appeared to want to use the telecommunications services of Starlink, the satellite network created by Elon Musk, for its defence needs, a contract no longer seems to be on the agenda. Musk’s fluctuating stance about the Starlink service provided to Kyiv, as well as the US decision that temporarily cut aid to Ukraine, introduced questions about reliability. This explains how, in just a few weeks, the French company Eutelsat, which owns the OneWeb constellation, has seen a resurgence of interest, as many countries assess its services as alternatives to Starlink. Following this turmoil, the Italian company Leonardo recently announced that it is planning to launch a constellation of 18 telecommunications satellites for defence purposes.

    These developments also tie into Italy’s industrial position in aerospace and defence, because Leonardo and Fincantieri, another large, publicly owned company, do not limit their markets to the Italian armed forces. As part of a European strategy, Leonardo concluded an agreement with the German company Rheinmetall in 2024 to jointly produce battle tanks, and recently announced an agreement with the Turkish company Baykar to produce drones. Leonardo is part-owner, along with French defence company Thales, of Telespazio and of Thales Alenia Space, and is also in discussions with Airbus to form a European satellite production group. In the missile sector, Leonardo’s participation in European joint venture MBDA allowed Italy and France to produce the SAMP/T anti-missile system, which could lead to further developments for the European missile-defence network. In shipbuilding, Fincantieri has expressed interest in merging its activities with the German group Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems. And in aircraft, Italy is participating in the Global Air Combat Programme, which includes the UK and Japan in the production of fighter jets. These examples show that Italian aerospace and defence development is intrinsically linked to European collaborations and export markets.

    Both in terms of industrial interests and politics, Italy is firmly anchored in the European camp. The positive stance that the Meloni government took toward Washington does not mean Rome is considering an alternative to EU affiliation. Italy is also facing continuous cyberattacks from Russian groups, which feeds a clear threat perception. The prime minister has stressed her differences with France and the UK during the recent European security summits, but while Italy may be reluctant to deploy peacekeeping troops in Ukraine, it cannot distance itself too much from the future defence architecture of Europe.

    Jean-Pierre Darnis ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

    ref. Giorgia Meloni’s government is still supporting Ukraine and backing NATO. Italy’s aerospace and defence sectors help explain why – https://theconversation.com/giorgia-melonis-government-is-still-supporting-ukraine-and-backing-nato-italys-aerospace-and-defence-sectors-help-explain-why-252683

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council – Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations: responding to new realities [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English and all-French versions]

    Source: United Nations – English

    r. President, Excellencies,
     
    I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth. 

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

    From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

    To electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.  

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly. 

    They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics. 

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

    Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

    And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.  

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  

    We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

    And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    Excellencies,

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

    What is hindering their effectiveness …

    And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep. 

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

    We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

    And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an enhanced international force by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.   

    And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment. 

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

    And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

    Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

    We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

    Excellencies,

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges. 

    Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Excellences,

    Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

    Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

    Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

    Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

    Excellences,

    Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

    J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

    Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

    Je vous remercie.

    ***
    All-English

    Mr. President, Excellencies,
     
    I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth. 

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

    From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

    To electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.  

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly. 

    They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics. 

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

    Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

    And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.  

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  

    We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

    And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    Excellencies,

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

    What is hindering their effectiveness …

    And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep. 

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

    We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

    And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an international force established by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.   

    And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment. 

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

    And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

    Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

    We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

    Excellencies,

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges. 

    Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Excellencies,

    Throughout, we will hold extensive consultations to capture as wide a spectrum of views as possible and to benefit from worldwide expertise.

    From Member States, host States, troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors…

    To regional organizations, civil society and academia, and our own leaders and experts within UN peace operations and the Secretariat.

    And the review will, of course, help inform our efforts through our UN@80 initiative, to find efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.  

    Excellencies,

    Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process.

    I urge all Members to support it.

    And I call on this Council to continue working to overcome divisions and disagreements around peace operations, and build the unified and consistent political support our peace operations — and the women and men who conduct them — need and deserve.

    Thank you.

    ***
    All-French

    Monsieur le Président, Excellences,

    Je remercie le Gouvernement danois d’avoir organisé ce débat de haut niveau.

    Les opérations de paix des Nations unies protègent les personnes et les communautés dans certains des endroits les plus éprouvés de la planète. 

    Ces opérations comprennent à la fois les opérations de maintien de la paix et les missions politiques spéciales.

    Leur travail va de l’alerte rapide à diplomatie préventive…

    Du rétablissement de la paix à la vérification de l’application des accords de paix et de la protection des civils…

    De la négociation de cessez-le-feu au soutien de leur mise en œuvre par les parties sur le terrain…

    Ou encore aux missions d’observation et d’appui électoral.

    Prises ensemble, ces opérations dotent le Conseil d’un outil essentiel pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales dans divers contextes.

    Depuis le déploiement de la première mission politique spéciale et de la première opération de maintien de la paix en 1948, nos opérations de paix se sont développées, adaptées et transformées.

    Elles nous permettent régulièrement d’intervenir de façon ciblée pour sauver des vies, réduire la violence, enrayer l’élargissement et le débordement de conflits meurtriers, et mettre fin à des atrocités.

    Les opérations de paix sont conçues pour démontrer non seulement l’efficacité du multilatéralisme en action mais aussi son intérêt en termes de coûts.

    Dans le meilleur des cas, elles montrent qu’il est possible d’alléger le fardeau qui pèse sur chaque pays individuellement lorsque les Nations Unies se rallient pour agir.

    Toutefois, comme nous le savons tous, les opérations de paix se heurtent à des obstacles de taille, et de nouvelles approches s’imposent.

    Les guerres deviennent plus complexes et plus meurtrières.

    Elles durent plus longtemps et sont davantage imbriquées dans des dynamiques mondiales et régionales.

    Il est plus difficile de parvenir à des règlements négociés.

    Parallèlement, un entrelacs complexe de menaces, dont beaucoup transcendent les frontières nationales, se dresse face aux opérations de paix.

    Les groupes terroristes et extrémistes, la criminalité organisée, la militarisation des nouvelles technologies et les effets des changements climatiques sont autant de phénomènes qui mettent à l’épreuve nos capacités d’intervention.

    Et – je suis navré de le constater – les divisions géopolitiques sapent la paix.

    Les accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux qui, pendant des décennies, avaient permis de maîtriser les tensions et de préserver la stabilité s’érodent.

    Les violations du droit international, des droits humains et de la Charte des Nations Unies sont légion – sans que cela ne porte à conséquence, semble-t-il.

    La confiance se fait rare entre les pays, entre les régions, et à l’intérieur de ceux-ci.

    Tous ces dangers, et bien d’autres encore, attisent la flamme des conflits.

    De notre côté, nos interventions en faveur de la paix sont à la peine.

    Nous constatons une asymétrie persistante entre les mandats confiés et les ressources disponibles.

    Et nous constatons des divergences de vues de plus en plus marquées – y compris au sein même de ce Conseil – sur les modalités de fonctionnement des opérations de paix, les circonstances justifiant leur déploiement, la teneur de leur mandat et leur durée.

    Excellences,

    Le diagnostic peut paraître sombre, mais il correspond à la réalité.

    La bonne nouvelle est que les États Membres se sont engagés dans le Pacte pour l’avenir à adapter les opérations de paix pour l’avenir.

    Voilà une occasion privilégiée de dégager une réponse commune aux questions suivantes : quelles sont les conditions de réussite des opérations de paix ?

    Quels obstacles se dressent sur le chemin ?

    Et quels nouveaux modèles nous pouvons appliquer afin de les rendre plus adaptables, plus souples et plus résilientes – tout en reconnaissant les cas limites où l’on sait qu’il y a peu ou pas de paix à maintenir.

    Les propositions que je vous ai faites récemment dans le contexte d’Haïti en sont une bonne illustration.

    Nous devons continuer d’œuvrer en faveur d’un processus politique – maîtrisé et conduit par le peuple haïtien – qui rétablisse les institutions démocratiques par la voie électorale.

    L’ONU a un rôle clair à jouer pour appuyer la stabilité et la sécurité, tout en s’attaquant aux causes profondes de cette crise effroyable.

    L’ONU est prête à assumer la responsabilité des dépenses logistiques et opérationnelles – y compris le transport, les capacités médicales et le soutien envers la police nationale – qui peuvent appuyer une force internationale renforcée par les États membres, qui soit capable de faire face aux gangs en Haïti et de créer les conditions de la paix.

    Les salaires de la force quant à eux sont couverts par le fonds d’affectation spéciale qui existe déjà.

    Nous avons là un bon exemple de la manière dont nous pouvons concevoir une approche adaptée et collective des opérations de paix dans un environnement extrêmement complexe et dangereux.

    Parmi les autres exemples d’adaptation de nos opérations de paix, citons la FINUL, qui a récemment élaboré un plan d’adaptation pour aider les parties à respecter les obligations que leur fait la résolution 1701.

    On peut également évoquer nos opérations à Abyei, au Soudan, où nous avons reconfiguré nos opérations de paix en une force multinationale.

    Nous prenons également de plus en plus la mesure des avantages considérables que présente le renforcement de la collaboration avec les organisations régionales et sous-régionales.

    La résolution 2719 du Conseil de sécurité revêt une importance certaine à cet égard.

    Cette avancée a porté notre partenariat avec l’Union africaine à un niveau supérieur, alors que nous œuvrons à la mise en place de missions d’imposition de la paix sous la responsabilité de l’Union africaine, avec le soutien des Nations unies.

    Nos deux Secrétariats travaillent désormais activement à concrétiser la vision énoncée dans la résolution, et j’invite les membres du Conseil à y apporter leur plein concours.

    Excellences,

    Il est temps de s’inspirer de ces exemples et de continuer à adapter nos opérations de paix aux défis actuels et futurs. 

    Des travaux sont en cours pour réexaminer toutes les formes d’opérations de paix, comme l’ont demandé les États Membres dans le Pacte pour l’avenir.

    L’objectif est de procéder à un examen critique de ces outils et de proposer des recommandations concrètes afin de les adapter au monde d’aujourd’hui.

    Il s’agira notamment de mener des consultations approfondies avec les États Membres et d’autres parties prenantes afin de nourrir – et d’inspirer – ces recommandations.

    L’étude fera fond sur l’analyse présentée dans le Nouvel Agenda pour la paix.

    Elle prendra pour appui l’étude d’ensemble de l’histoire des missions politiques spéciales, la première effectuée en 80 ans d’existence de l’ONU, qui sera publiée prochainement.

    Elle se fera aussi l’écho de l’appel lancé dans le Pacte pour veiller à ce que les opérations de paix s’engagent le plus tôt possible dans la planification des transitions avec les pays hôtes, l’équipe de pays des Nations Unies et les groupes locaux et régionaux.

    L’étude s’inscrit également dans le sillage de la demande qui est adressée au Conseil dans le Pacte pour que les opérations de paix soient guidées par des mandats clairs et séquencés, réalistes et réalisables, ainsi que des stratégies de sortie et des plans de transition viables.

    Elle s’appuiera enfin sur les discussions qui se tiennent en préparation de la Conférence ministérielle sur le maintien de la paix qui aura lieu à Berlin en mai et qui sera consacrée à l’avenir du maintien de la paix.

    Excellences,

    Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

    Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

    Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

    Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

    Excellences,

    Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

    J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

    Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

    Je vous remercie.
     

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Global: There’s a global tug-of-war for Greenland’s resources – but the new government has its own plans

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Nicolas Jouan, Senior Defence and Security Analyst, RAND Europe

    Greenland’s parliamentary election was held on March 11 against a backdrop of repeated calls from the Trump administration for America to annex the island. The poll delivered a momentous shift in Greenland’s political landscape as the pro-business Demokraatit (Democrats) emerged as the biggest winners overturning the two left-leaning parties which had formed the previous government.

    Securing nearly 30% of the vote and gaining seven seats for a total of ten in the Inatsisartut (parliament), the party now holds the strongest mandate it has ever had. Close behind was the nationalist Naleraq party, which secured 24.5% of the vote and gained four seats, bringing their total to eight.

    While both parties are united in their rejection of Trump’s ambitions and share a vision of Greenlandic independence, their approaches couldn’t be more different. Demokraatit advocates for a gradual, measured process, prioritising economic development. The party considers that economic self-sufficiency and strengthening domestic infrastructure are key preconditions to achieve independence. Naleraq, on the other hand, is pushing for a rapid break from Denmark. Its line is that Greenland will only be able to unleash its potential, economic and otherwise, once independent.

    Independence has long been the dominant theme of Greenlandic politics. Ever since the territory gained home rule in 1979, most political parties across the spectrum have championed the idea of full independence from the kingdom of Denmark. Even the two major challengers – the Inuit Ataqatigiit, which lost five seats at the election to drop to seven, and the once-dominant Siumut, which lost six and now holds just four seats – are pro-independence.

    But while independence remains a defining issue, the real story of this election is Greenland’s economy. The island is sitting on a treasure trove of rare earth elements, uranium, iron and other minerals critical to global industries. Yet despite decades of interest from foreign investors, strict regulations and environmental concerns have often slowed development.

    With Demokraatit’s rise, that could change. The party is pushing for pro-business policies, including tax incentives, streamlined regulations and reduced state intervention in key industries like mining, fisheries and tourism. If successful, these reforms could transform Greenland into a major player in the global supply chain.

    Despite its electoral gains, Demokraatit faces a challenge in implementing its economic vision. The party’s potential coalition partner, Naleraq, is deeply sceptical of foreign investment, at least when it comes from Denmark and Europe. While open to partnerships with the US, Naleraq is adamant that Greenland must retain full control over its resources, resisting any foreign influence that could compromise national sovereignty.

    This ideological divide could create friction within a potential coalition government. Will Demokraatit’s pro-business agenda be tempered by Naleraq’s nationalistic stance? Or will the promise of economic growth push both parties toward compromise?

    Global powers are watching

    Greenland’s election came at a time when it was already the focus of world attention. Its strategic location and vast resources have attracted growing interest from global superpowers – none more so than the US. Trump has repeatedly expressed interest in acquiring Greenland, a move widely considered unrealistic, but indicative of Washington’s strategic priorities.

    American interest in Greenland isn’t new. The island is home to the Pituffik Space Base, formerly Thule Air Base, since the 1950s as a critical part of North American missile defence and whose Arctic position makes it a key player in both American territorial defence and Nato’s security architecture. Pituffik is the only non-Danish military presence in the territory and is the northernmost American military base.

    But the White House’s rhetoric has taken a more insistent tone, raising questions about whether the US might attempt to exert greater influence over Greenland’s economic and political future. The interest in Greenland seems guided by at least two factors: its strategic position at the centre of the North Atlantic security complex and its economic potential with hard-to-access but abundant resources.

    In both cases, the growing involvement of both Russia and China in the Arctic seem to make the US wary of a potentially independent Greenland getting closer to unfriendly great powers.

    Denmark’s central government is walking a diplomatic tightrope when it comes to responding to the US government’s repeated intentions to annex Greenland. Copenhagen has sought to Europeanise the debate, floating the idea of Greenland joining the European Union. Taking this step would provide welcome economic support to the island but could also clash with Greenland’s scepticism toward European interference.

    Greenland now stands at a crossroads. Domestically, negotiations between Demokraatit and Naleraq will likely shape the trajectory of the island’s economic and independence ambitions. Internationally, major powers – including the US, the EU and possibly even China and Russia – are positioning themselves to engage with Greenland’s untapped potential.

    As the world’s focus on Greenland intensifies, one thing is clear: this Arctic nation is no longer a remote outpost. It is fast becoming a key battleground for economic, political and strategic influence in the North Atlantic.

    Nicolas Jouan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. There’s a global tug-of-war for Greenland’s resources – but the new government has its own plans – https://theconversation.com/theres-a-global-tug-of-war-for-greenlands-resources-but-the-new-government-has-its-own-plans-252396

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council – Advancing Adaptability in UN Peace Operations: responding to new realities [bilingual, as delivered; scroll down for all-English and all-French versions]

    Source: United Nations secretary general

    Mr. President, Excellencies,
     
    I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth. 

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

    From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

    To electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.  

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly. 

    They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics. 

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

    Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

    And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.  

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  

    We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

    And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    Excellencies,

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

    What is hindering their effectiveness …

    And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep. 

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

    We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

    And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an enhanced international force by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.   

    And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment. 

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

    And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

    Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

    We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

    Excellencies,

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges. 

    Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Excellences,

    Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

    Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

    Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

    Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

    Excellences,

    Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

    J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

    Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

    Je vous remercie.

    ***
    All-English

    Mr. President, Excellencies,
     
    I thank the government of Denmark for convening this high-level discussion.

    United Nations peace operations safeguard people and communities in some of the most desperate places on earth. 

    These operations comprise both peacekeeping operations and special political missions.

    Their work ranges from early warning to preventive diplomacy…

    From peacemaking to verifying peace agreements to protecting civilians…

    From negotiating ceasefires to helping parties implement them on the ground…

    To electoral support and observer missions.

    Collectively, these operations represent a critical tool at this Council’s disposal to maintain international peace and security in a variety of contexts.

    Since the first special political mission and peacekeeping operation were deployed in 1948, our peace operations have grown, adapted and evolved.

    Time and again, they allow us to mount tailored responses that have saved lives, reduced violence, prevented the expansion and spillover of deadly conflicts, and stopped atrocities.

    Peace operations are designed not only to be an effective example of multilateralism in action — but a cost-effective one.

    At their best, they show how when the UN comes together to address challenges, the burden is diminished on individual countries alone.  

    But as we all know, peace operations face serious barriers that demand new approaches.

    Wars are becoming more complex and more deadly. 

    They last longer, and are more enmeshed in global and regional dynamics. 

    Negotiated settlements have been harder to achieve.

    Meanwhile, our peace operations are confronted with a complex interplay of threats — many of which do not respect national borders.

    Terror and extremist groups, organized crime, the weaponization of new technologies, and the effects of climate change are all testing our capacities to respond.

    And, I regret to say, geopolitical divisions are undermining peace.

    The bilateral and multilateral arrangements that — for decades — have managed tensions and maintained stability are eroding.  

    Violations of international law, human rights and the UN Charter are rampant — seemingly without consequence.

    Trust is in short supply among — and within — countries and regions.

    All of these challenges and more throw fuel on the fires of conflict.

    Meanwhile, our peace responses are struggling.  

    We see a persistent mismatch between mandates and available resources.

    And we see increasing differences of views — including in this Council itself — around how peace operations should work, under what circumstances, with what mandates they should be deployed, and for how long.

    Excellencies,

    This is a grim diagnosis, but we must face facts.

    The good news is that, through the Pact for the Future, Member States committed to working to adapt peace operations for the future.

    This is an important opportunity to gain a shared understanding of what makes peace operations successful …

    What is hindering their effectiveness …

    And what new models we can use to make them more adaptable, flexible and resilient — while recognizing the limitations in situations where there is little or no peace to keep. 

    My recent proposals to you in the context of Haiti are a good example.

    We must keep working for a political process — owned and led by the Haitian people — that restores democratic institutions through elections.

    And the UN has a clear role to play in supporting stability and security, while addressing the root causes of the appalling crisis.

    The UN stands ready to assume the responsibility of the logistical and operational expenditures — including transportation, medical capabilities and support for the national police — that can support an international force established by Member States that is able to confront the gangs in Haiti and create conditions for peace.   

    And the salaries of the force are paid through the trust fund that already exists.

    This is a good example of how we can design a tailored and collective approach to peace operations in an extremely complex and dangerous environment. 

    Other examples of adapting our peace operations include UNIFIL, which recently developed an adaptation plan to support the parties to uphold their obligations under resolution 1701…

    And our operations in Abyei, Sudan, where we reconfigured our peace operations into a multinational force.

    We also increasingly see the enormous benefits of strengthening cooperation with regional and subregional organizations.

    Security Council resolution 2719 is an important example.

    This breakthrough has lifted our partnership with the African Union to a new level as we work to establish peace enforcement missions under the responsibility of the African Union, supported by the United Nations.

    We are now working actively across our two Secretariats to meet the vision of the resolution, and I urge Council Members to fully support this work.

    Excellencies,

    It’s time to build on these examples and continue adapting our peace operations for current and future challenges. 

    Work is now underway to review all forms of peace operations, as requested by Member States in the Pact for the Future.

    The review will aim to critically examine these tools and propose concrete recommendations to make them fit for today.

    This will include extensive consultations with Member States and others to inform — and inspire — recommendations.

    The review will build on the analysis presented in the New Agenda for Peace.

    It will be informed by the first comprehensive study of the history of special political missions in the 80 years of the United Nations, which will be released soon.

    And it will reflect the Pact’s call to ensure that peace operations engage at the earliest possible stage in planning transitions with host countries, UN Country Teams and local and regional groups.

    The review also aligns with the Pact’s call to this Council to ensure that peace operations are guided by clear and sequenced mandates that are realistic and achievable — with viable exit strategies and transition plans.

    And it will draw on the discussions taking place in preparation for the Peacekeeping Ministerial in Berlin in May focusing on the future of peacekeeping.

    Excellencies,

    Throughout, we will hold extensive consultations to capture as wide a spectrum of views as possible and to benefit from worldwide expertise.

    From Member States, host States, troop- and police-contributing countries and financial contributors…

    To regional organizations, civil society and academia, and our own leaders and experts within UN peace operations and the Secretariat.

    And the review will, of course, help inform our efforts through our UN@80 initiative, to find efficiencies and improvements across our work in light of the continued funding challenges we face as an organization.  

    Excellencies,

    Today’s open debate provides a vital opportunity for the Council to share perspectives and ideas to inform the review process.

    I urge all Members to support it.

    And I call on this Council to continue working to overcome divisions and disagreements around peace operations, and build the unified and consistent political support our peace operations — and the women and men who conduct them — need and deserve.

    Thank you.

    ***
    All-French

    Monsieur le Président, Excellences,

    Je remercie le Gouvernement danois d’avoir organisé ce débat de haut niveau.

    Les opérations de paix des Nations unies protègent les personnes et les communautés dans certains des endroits les plus éprouvés de la planète. 

    Ces opérations comprennent à la fois les opérations de maintien de la paix et les missions politiques spéciales.

    Leur travail va de l’alerte rapide à diplomatie préventive…

    Du rétablissement de la paix à la vérification de l’application des accords de paix et de la protection des civils…

    De la négociation de cessez-le-feu au soutien de leur mise en œuvre par les parties sur le terrain…

    Ou encore aux missions d’observation et d’appui électoral.

    Prises ensemble, ces opérations dotent le Conseil d’un outil essentiel pour maintenir la paix et la sécurité internationales dans divers contextes.

    Depuis le déploiement de la première mission politique spéciale et de la première opération de maintien de la paix en 1948, nos opérations de paix se sont développées, adaptées et transformées.

    Elles nous permettent régulièrement d’intervenir de façon ciblée pour sauver des vies, réduire la violence, enrayer l’élargissement et le débordement de conflits meurtriers, et mettre fin à des atrocités.

    Les opérations de paix sont conçues pour démontrer non seulement l’efficacité du multilatéralisme en action mais aussi son intérêt en termes de coûts.

    Dans le meilleur des cas, elles montrent qu’il est possible d’alléger le fardeau qui pèse sur chaque pays individuellement lorsque les Nations Unies se rallient pour agir.

    Toutefois, comme nous le savons tous, les opérations de paix se heurtent à des obstacles de taille, et de nouvelles approches s’imposent.

    Les guerres deviennent plus complexes et plus meurtrières.

    Elles durent plus longtemps et sont davantage imbriquées dans des dynamiques mondiales et régionales.

    Il est plus difficile de parvenir à des règlements négociés.

    Parallèlement, un entrelacs complexe de menaces, dont beaucoup transcendent les frontières nationales, se dresse face aux opérations de paix.

    Les groupes terroristes et extrémistes, la criminalité organisée, la militarisation des nouvelles technologies et les effets des changements climatiques sont autant de phénomènes qui mettent à l’épreuve nos capacités d’intervention.

    Et – je suis navré de le constater – les divisions géopolitiques sapent la paix.

    Les accords bilatéraux et multilatéraux qui, pendant des décennies, avaient permis de maîtriser les tensions et de préserver la stabilité s’érodent.

    Les violations du droit international, des droits humains et de la Charte des Nations Unies sont légion – sans que cela ne porte à conséquence, semble-t-il.

    La confiance se fait rare entre les pays, entre les régions, et à l’intérieur de ceux-ci.

    Tous ces dangers, et bien d’autres encore, attisent la flamme des conflits.

    De notre côté, nos interventions en faveur de la paix sont à la peine.

    Nous constatons une asymétrie persistante entre les mandats confiés et les ressources disponibles.

    Et nous constatons des divergences de vues de plus en plus marquées – y compris au sein même de ce Conseil – sur les modalités de fonctionnement des opérations de paix, les circonstances justifiant leur déploiement, la teneur de leur mandat et leur durée.

    Excellences,

    Le diagnostic peut paraître sombre, mais il correspond à la réalité.

    La bonne nouvelle est que les États Membres se sont engagés dans le Pacte pour l’avenir à adapter les opérations de paix pour l’avenir.

    Voilà une occasion privilégiée de dégager une réponse commune aux questions suivantes : quelles sont les conditions de réussite des opérations de paix ?

    Quels obstacles se dressent sur le chemin ?

    Et quels nouveaux modèles nous pouvons appliquer afin de les rendre plus adaptables, plus souples et plus résilientes – tout en reconnaissant les cas limites où l’on sait qu’il y a peu ou pas de paix à maintenir.

    Les propositions que je vous ai faites récemment dans le contexte d’Haïti en sont une bonne illustration.

    Nous devons continuer d’œuvrer en faveur d’un processus politique – maîtrisé et conduit par le peuple haïtien – qui rétablisse les institutions démocratiques par la voie électorale.

    L’ONU a un rôle clair à jouer pour appuyer la stabilité et la sécurité, tout en s’attaquant aux causes profondes de cette crise effroyable.

    L’ONU est prête à assumer la responsabilité des dépenses logistiques et opérationnelles – y compris le transport, les capacités médicales et le soutien envers la police nationale – qui peuvent appuyer une force internationale renforcée par les États membres, qui soit capable de faire face aux gangs en Haïti et de créer les conditions de la paix.

    Les salaires de la force quant à eux sont couverts par le fonds d’affectation spéciale qui existe déjà.

    Nous avons là un bon exemple de la manière dont nous pouvons concevoir une approche adaptée et collective des opérations de paix dans un environnement extrêmement complexe et dangereux.

    Parmi les autres exemples d’adaptation de nos opérations de paix, citons la FINUL, qui a récemment élaboré un plan d’adaptation pour aider les parties à respecter les obligations que leur fait la résolution 1701.

    On peut également évoquer nos opérations à Abyei, au Soudan, où nous avons reconfiguré nos opérations de paix en une force multinationale.

    Nous prenons également de plus en plus la mesure des avantages considérables que présente le renforcement de la collaboration avec les organisations régionales et sous-régionales.

    La résolution 2719 du Conseil de sécurité revêt une importance certaine à cet égard.

    Cette avancée a porté notre partenariat avec l’Union africaine à un niveau supérieur, alors que nous œuvrons à la mise en place de missions d’imposition de la paix sous la responsabilité de l’Union africaine, avec le soutien des Nations unies.

    Nos deux Secrétariats travaillent désormais activement à concrétiser la vision énoncée dans la résolution, et j’invite les membres du Conseil à y apporter leur plein concours.

    Excellences,

    Il est temps de s’inspirer de ces exemples et de continuer à adapter nos opérations de paix aux défis actuels et futurs. 

    Des travaux sont en cours pour réexaminer toutes les formes d’opérations de paix, comme l’ont demandé les États Membres dans le Pacte pour l’avenir.

    L’objectif est de procéder à un examen critique de ces outils et de proposer des recommandations concrètes afin de les adapter au monde d’aujourd’hui.

    Il s’agira notamment de mener des consultations approfondies avec les États Membres et d’autres parties prenantes afin de nourrir – et d’inspirer – ces recommandations.

    L’étude fera fond sur l’analyse présentée dans le Nouvel Agenda pour la paix.

    Elle prendra pour appui l’étude d’ensemble de l’histoire des missions politiques spéciales, la première effectuée en 80 ans d’existence de l’ONU, qui sera publiée prochainement.

    Elle se fera aussi l’écho de l’appel lancé dans le Pacte pour veiller à ce que les opérations de paix s’engagent le plus tôt possible dans la planification des transitions avec les pays hôtes, l’équipe de pays des Nations Unies et les groupes locaux et régionaux.

    L’étude s’inscrit également dans le sillage de la demande qui est adressée au Conseil dans le Pacte pour que les opérations de paix soient guidées par des mandats clairs et séquencés, réalistes et réalisables, ainsi que des stratégies de sortie et des plans de transition viables.

    Elle s’appuiera enfin sur les discussions qui se tiennent en préparation de la Conférence ministérielle sur le maintien de la paix qui aura lieu à Berlin en mai et qui sera consacrée à l’avenir du maintien de la paix.

    Excellences,

    Tout au long de l’étude, nous mènerons des consultations approfondies afin de recueillir un éventail de vues aussi large que possible et de bénéficier d’une expertise mondiale.

    Celle des États Membres, des pays hôtes, des pays fournisseurs de contingents ou de personnel de police et des contributeurs financiers…

    Celle des organisations régionales, de la société civile et des milieux universitaires, ainsi que de nos propres hauts responsables et experts des opérations de paix des Nations Unies et du Secrétariat.

    Bien entendu, l’étude contribuera à éclairer les efforts que nous déployons dans le cadre de l’initiative ONU80, afin de dégager des gains d’efficacité et des améliorations dans tous nos axes de travail – compte tenu des défis persistants de financement auxquels notre Organisation est confrontée.

    Excellences,

    Le débat public d’aujourd’hui est une occasion précieuse pour le Conseil de partager toute idée et point de vue qui pourrait contribuer à l’étude.

    J’invite tous les États Membres à apporter leur pierre à l’édifice.

    Et j’appelle ce Conseil à continuer à œuvrer pour surmonter les divisions et les désaccords entourant les opérations de paix, et bâtir le soutien politique unifié et cohérent dont nos opérations de paix – et les femmes et les hommes qui les mènent – ont tant besoin.

    Je vous remercie.
     

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Ambassador of Norway to ASEAN

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, today had a meeting with the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Norway to ASEAN, H.E. Kjell Tormod Pettersen, at the ASEAN Headquarters/ASEAN Secretariat. They exchanged views on ways and means to further advance the ASEAN-Norway relations, especially as this year marks the 10th anniversary of ASEAN-Norway Sectoral Dialogue Partnership. Both sides also discussed preparations for SG Dr. Kao’s Working Visit to Norway this year.

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Ambassador of Norway to ASEAN appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI: Aller Media expands Agillic across the Nordics

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Aller Media, the Nordic market leader within magazines and weeklies, rolls out Agillic to Finland, Norway, and Sweden to replicate success from Denmark.

    Founded in 1873, Aller Media is today the Nordic market leader within magazines and weeklies, creating stories and experiences across platforms, publications, and events. With media consumption increasingly digital, Aller Media is on a journey to manage the transformation efficiently and profitably.

    A long standing Agillic client, Aller Media Denmark has generated strong business results, automating customer engagement across titles, increasing advertising revenue, reducing new customer churn, and retaining gifted subscriptions. Experience, Aller Media is now looking to apply across the Nordics.

    Bente Klemetsdal, Group EVP and CCO at Aller Media explains:
    “At Aller Media, we are moving towards an even closer Nordic consolidation, where we want to make it easier for our employees to collaborate. With a shared tool for customer communication, we can strengthen cross-country cooperation and ensure that we leverage our collective knowledge and resources optimally. The experience from Denmark has demonstrated how technology can free up time for original content and unique customer experiences – a commercial foundation that we are now expanding across the Nordics to create even greater impact.”

    Christian Samsø, CEO at Agillic adds: 
    Historically, Agillic has always had a very strong foothold within ‘Media & Entertainment’, and we are excited to see Aller Media Denmark set the bar internally and how their experience can apply across markets and operations. In that sense, Aller Media’s expansion underlines our value for and strategic focus on the Nordics, adding to a growing list of multinational clients benefitting from our platform’s scalability and advanced use cases.” 

    For further information, please contact
    Christian Samsøe, CEO
    +45 24 88 24 24
    christian.samsoe@agillic.com

    About Agillic A/S
    Agillic A/S (Nasdaq First North Growth Market Copenhagen: AGILC) is a Danish software company offering brands a platform through which they can work with data-driven insights and content to create, automate, and send personalised communication to millions. Agillic is headquartered in Copenhagen, Denmark. For further information, please visit agillic.com.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: RECOMMENDATION on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland – A10-0036/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland

    (10005/2024 – C10‑0103/2024 – 2024/0052(NLE))

    (Consent)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision (10005/2024),

     having regard to the draft Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021–April 2028 (10057/2024),

     having regard to the draft Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021–April 2028 (10146/2024),

     having regard to the draft Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway (10149/2024),

      having regard to the draft Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland (10148/2024),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council in accordance with Article 217 and Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10-0103/2024),

     having regard to Rule 107(1) and (4), and Rule 117(7) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the recommendation of the Committee on International Trade (A10-0036/2025),

    1. Gives its consent to the conclusion of the agreements and protocols;

    2. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway.

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement allows Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to participate fully in the single market. As provided for in the Agreement, and since its entry into force in 1994, these three countries have therefore financially contributed to the alleviation of economic and social disparities in the EEA. In addition, Norway has contributed through a separate financial mechanism.

    As the most recent financial mechanisms expired in 2021, the Commission opened negotiations in 2022 with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway on an agreement on their future financial contributions. In parallel, a review of the Protocols to the Agreements between the European Economic Community (EEC) and Iceland and Norway related to imports into the European Union (EU) of certain fish and fishery products, was opened as provided for in the revision clauses of the Free Trade Agreements with these countries. 

    The negotiations were concluded at negotiators’ level, with the initiating in November 2023 of:

     an Agreement between the EU, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028;

     an Agreement between Norway and the EU on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028;

     an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the EEC and Norway; and

     an Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the EEC and Iceland.

    The EEA Financial Mechanism Agreement and the Norway Agreement will together provide a financial contribution to economic and social cohesion in the EEA of EUR 3.268 billion for the period May 2021 – April 2028. The Protocols with Iceland and Norway will provide for new concessions for the period May 2021 – April 2028. Flexibility will be provided concerning the carry-over of unexhausted quotas at the end of the period. Norway will also renew the fish transit arrangement for EU vessels landing catches in its territory.

    The rapporteur raises its concerns regarding the limits and imbalances of the fisheries-related Protocol between the EEC and Norway, but nonetheless gives the consent of the conclusion of the four arrangements as one package.

    The rapporteur calls on the Commission to take the concerns raised seriously and address the imbalances in the EU fishing sector adequately and swiftly.

    On 25 June 2024, the Council adopted the Decision on the signing, on behalf of the EU, and on the provisional application of the Agreements and Protocols.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    Ministry of Regional Development and European Union Funds of Republic of Croatia

    Mission of Norway to the European Union

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Agreement between the European Union, Iceland, the Principality of Liechtenstein and the Kingdom of Norway on an EEA Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on a Norwegian Financial Mechanism for the period May 2021 – April 2028, the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway and the Additional Protocol to the Agreement between the European Economic Community and Iceland

    References

    10005/2024 – C10-0103/2024 – 2024/0052(NLE)

    Date of consultation or request for consent

    18.9.2024

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

    INTA

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    PECH

    7.10.2024

     

     

     

    Not delivering opinions

     Date of decision

    PECH

    19.2.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Željana Zovko

    30.9.2024

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    30.1.2025

    20.2.2025

     

     

    Date adopted

    20.3.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    33

    7

    0

    Members present for the final vote

    Christophe Bay, Brando Benifei, Anna Bryłka, Udo Bullmann, Benoit Cassart, Markéta Gregorová, Bart Groothuis, Céline Imart, Karin Karlsbro, Bernd Lange, Ilia Lazarov, Thierry Mariani, Javier Moreno Sánchez, Ştefan Muşoiu, Daniele Polato, Majdouline Sbai, Lukas Sieper, Dominik Tarczyński, Francesco Torselli, Kathleen Van Brempt, Jörgen Warborn, Iuliu Winkler, Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski, Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Mika Aaltola, Nicolas Bay, Markus Buchheit, João Cotrim De Figueiredo, Danilo Della Valle, Borja Giménez Larraz, Vicent Marzà Ibáñez, Marina Mesure, Martin Schirdewan, Kris Van Dijck

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Hildegard Bentele, Mélanie Disdier, Niels Geuking, Chloé Ridel, Romana Tomc, Matthieu Valet

    Date tabled

    21.3.2025

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 as regards the revision of the suspension mechanism – A10-0035/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 as regards the revision of the suspension mechanism

    (COM(2023)0642 – C9‑0392/2023 – 2023/0371(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2023)0642),

     having regard to Article 294(2) and Article 77(2), point (a), of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C9‑0392/2023),

     having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to Rule 60 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0035/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) Visa-free travel brings significant benefits to the Union and third countries alike. Economic, social and cultural relations with third countries create prosperity and establish the Union as an open and free bloc. The Union’s common visa policy, in that regard, is a cornerstone of its engagement with third countries. At the same time, the evolving geopolitical context has brought new challenges linked to visa-free travel. Abuse of, and security risks resulting from, visa-free travel to the Union require a swift and adequate response. It is imperative that the Union be equipped to deal with those challenges accordingly.

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The mechanism for the temporary suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement for the nationals of a third country listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 (‘the suspension mechanism’) should be strengthened for the Union to have at its disposal a more efficient safeguard aimed at preventing a wider range of irregular migration, public policy and security risks arising from the third countries listed in that Annex II, as well as the abuse of the visa exemption through the operation of investor citizenship schemes by those third countries.

    (2) In order to address the new challenges linked to visa-free travel, the mechanism for the temporary suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement for the nationals of a third country listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 (‘the suspension mechanism’) should be strengthened for the Union to have at its disposal a more efficient safeguard aimed at preventing a wider range of risks arising from the third countries listed in that Annex II, as well as the abuse of the visa exemption through the operation of investor citizenship schemes by those third countries.

    Amendment  3

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) In particular, the use of the suspension mechanism should be facilitated by broadening the possible grounds for suspension, adapting the relevant thresholds and procedures, and strengthening the Commission’s monitoring and reporting obligations.

    (3) In particular, the use of the suspension mechanism should be facilitated by broadening the possible grounds for suspension, making the relevant procedures more precise and strengthening the Commission’s monitoring and reporting obligations. Furthermore, the Commission should assess the overall impact of visa suspensions, including on reciprocity.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) The Union has concluded a number of agreements on the short-stay visa waiver with countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 which may include different grounds for suspension or different procedures than the ones set out in the suspension mechanism, and may conclude further of those agreements in the future. As the Union respects international agreements and, thus, is bound by these agreements, the relevant different provisions set out in those agreements should be applied instead of the relevant provisions of the suspension mechanism.

    (4) The Union has concluded a number of agreements on the short-stay visa waiver with countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 which may include different grounds for suspension or different procedures than the ones set out in the suspension mechanism. It should be possible for the Union to suspend the visa-free regime established by those agreements by means of a generally applicable legal act of the Union. For that reason, the relevant grounds for suspension set out in those agreements should be included in the suspension mechanism. However, the use of the grounds for suspension set out in a short-stay visa waiver agreement should be limited to the scope of application of that agreement.

    Amendment  5

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) In its conclusions of 22 October 2021, the European Council invited the Commission to propose any necessary changes to the Union’s legal framework and concrete measures to ensure an immediate and appropriate response to hybrid threats in line with Union law and international obligations. Therefore, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism in case of risks or threats to the public policy or internal security of the Member States arising from hybrid threats such as situations of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants aimed at destabilising or undermining society and key institutions.

    (5) Due to a need to ensure an immediate and appropriate response to hybrid threats in line with Union law and international obligations, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism in case of risks or threats to the public policy or internal security of the Member States arising from hybrid threats such as situations of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants, as referred to in Regulation (EU) 2024/1359, which aim to destabilise or undermine society and key institutions.

    Amendment  6

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) Investor citizenship schemes operated by third countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 allow visa-free travel to the Union to third-country nationals that would otherwise be visa required. Under an investor citizenship scheme, citizenship is granted in return for pre-determined payments or investments without any genuine link to the third country concerned. While the Union respects the right of sovereign countries to decide on their own naturalisation procedures, visa-free third countries should be deterred from using visa-free access to the Union as a tool for leveraging individual investment in return for their citizenship. To prevent visa-free access to the Union being used for this purpose, it should be possible to suspend the visa exemption for a third country which chooses to operate such investor citizenship schemes, whereby citizenship is granted without any genuine link to the third country concerned.

    (6) Investor citizenship schemes operated by third countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 allow visa-free travel to the Union to third-country nationals that would otherwise be visa required. Under an investor citizenship scheme, citizenship is granted in return for pre-determined payments or investments without any genuine link to the third country concerned. While the Union respects the right of sovereign countries to decide on their own naturalisation procedures, visa-free third countries should be deterred from using visa-free access to the Union as a tool for leveraging individual investment in return for their citizenship. In addition, a lack of comprehensive security checks, vetting procedures and due diligence by such third countries with regard to investor citizenship schemes pose several serious security risks for Union citizens, such as those stemming from money laundering and corruption. To prevent visa-free access to the Union being used for this purpose, it should be possible to suspend the visa exemption for a third country which chooses to operate such investor citizenship schemes, whereby citizenship is granted without any genuine link to the third country concerned.

    Amendment  7

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 7

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (7) Where the visa policy of a third country listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 is not aligned with the visa policy of the Union as regards the list of third countries whose nationals are required to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, this could result in irregular migration to the Union, in particular where the concerned third country is in close geographic proximity to the Union. Therefore, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism where, following an assessment, the Commission concludes that there is a risk of a substantial increase in the number of third-country nationals, other than nationals of that third country, who arrive legally in the territory of that third country and then irregularly enter the territory of the Member States.

    (7) Where the visa policy of a third country listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 is not aligned with the visa policy of the Union as regards the list of third countries whose nationals are required to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States, this could result in irregular migration to the Union, in particular where the concerned third country is in close geographic proximity to the Union. Therefore, it should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism where, following an assessment, the Commission concludes that there is a substantial increase in the number of third-country nationals, other than nationals of that third country, who arrive legally in the territory of that third country and then irregularly enter the territory of the Member States.

    Amendment  8

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 7 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (7a) Refusing or failing to process readmission applications could include cases of a third country failing to assist, in a timely manner, in identifying third country nationals for whom a Member State has submitted readmission applications to that third country or otherwise creating persisting practical obstacles regarding the enforcement of readmission decisions.

    Amendment  9

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) The thresholds to trigger the suspension mechanism in case of a substantial increase in the number of nationals of a third country refused entry or found to be staying in the Member State’s territory without a right to do so, or in the number of asylum applications from the nationals of that third country for which the recognition rate is low, or in the number of serious criminal offences linked to the nationals of that third country, should be subject to a case-by-case assessment by the Commission. In particular, the Commission should be able to assess whether there are specific circumstances, in the cases notified by Member States or under its own analysis, which would justify the application of lower or higher thresholds than those indicated in relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806. The Commission’s assessment should take into account, for example, the number of unauthorised crossings of the external borders of the Member States, unfounded asylum applications or criminal offences in proportion to the number and size of Member States affected and the impact of those numbers on the overall migratory situation, functioning of the asylum systems or internal security of the Member States affected, as well as actions taken by the third country concerned to remedy the situation.

    (8) The thresholds to trigger the suspension mechanism in case of a substantial increase in the number of nationals of a third country refused entry or found to be staying in the Member State’s territory without a right to do so, or in the number of asylum applications from the nationals of that third country for which the recognition rate is low, should be clearly set out in order to avoid diverging interpretations and the risk of inconsistent practices. In particular, the Commission should assess whether there are specific circumstances, in the cases notified by Member States or under its own analysis, which would justify the application of the relevant provisions of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806. Additionally, taking into account the impact that a suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement might have on relations with the third country concerned and on the rights of its nationals, the Commission should thoroughly assess the necessity, proportionality and consequences of such a suspension before adopting the relevant act.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (8a) For the purpose of determining whether a recognition rate of asylum application is low, it is important that the Commission carry out a case-by-case assessment, taking into account the latest available yearly Union-wide average Eurostat data, the way in which relevant Union law on asylum is being implemented, and the specific circumstances of the third country concerned.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (8b) It should be possible to trigger the suspension mechanism in the event of serious breaches by a third country of the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations or in the event of grave violations of the obligations deriving from international human rights law or international humanitarian law, violations of bilateral agreements between the Union and that third country, non-compliance or non-alignment with relevant Union sanctions, or hostile acts towards the Union or Member States which aim to destabilise or undermine society and key institutions for the public policy and internal security of the Member states and the Union. Such hostile acts could result from foreign interference in political processes, economic coercion, cyber operations, economic espionage or the sabotage of critical infrastructure.

    Amendment  12

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8 c (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (8c) Where the Commission considers suspending an exemption from the visa requirement on its own accord or following a notification by a Member State, the Commission should take into account, in its evaluation, the impact of the proposed suspension on the principles of visa reciprocity and non-discrimination and whether the proposed suspension represents an appropriate measure to remedy the situation. Special attention should be given to civil society, in particular where the human rights situation in the third country concerned has deteriorated.

    Amendment  13

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) For the purpose of notifying to the Commission the circumstances that may amount to a ground for suspension, Member States should be able to take into account reference periods longer than two months in order to identify not only sudden changes in the relevant situation, but also longer-term trends that may justify the use of the visa suspension mechanism.

    (9) For the purpose of notifying to the Commission the circumstances that may amount to a ground for suspension, Member States should take into account reference periods between two and twelve months in order to identify sudden changes in the relevant situation that may justify the use of the visa suspension mechanism. The suspension mechanism should only be triggered where the reasons for relying on the relevant ground are sufficient and clear. The Commission should fully and immediately inform the European Parliament and the Council of notifications it receives and decisions it takes as a result.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 10

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (10) Whenever it considers it necessary, or upon request by the European Parliament or by the Council, the Commission should report on the outcome of its systematic monitoring of the visa-free regimes with all the third countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806. The report should focus on those third countries which, according to the Commission’s analysis, present specific problems that, if not addressed, may lead to trigger the suspension mechanism. In particular, the Commission should consider reporting on countries which have been newly listed in Annex II without undergoing a visa liberalisation dialogue, where it considers it necessary and in particular in the first years following the entry into force of the visa exemption for those countries.

    (10) Whenever it considers it necessary, or upon request by the European Parliament or by the Council, the Commission should report on the outcome of its systematic monitoring of the visa-free regimes with all the third countries listed in Annex II to Regulation (EU) 2018/1806. The report should focus on those third countries which, according to the Commission’s analysis, present specific problems that, if not addressed, may lead to trigger the suspension mechanism. In particular, the Commission should report on countries which have been newly listed in Annex II without undergoing a visa liberalisation dialogue, where it considers it necessary and in particular in the first years following the entry into force of the visa exemption for those countries.

    Amendment  15

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 10 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (10a) In light of the far-reaching consequences that the temporary suspension of an exemption from the visa requirement might have on the nationals of the third country concerned, the Commission should favour a targeted approach, applying the suspension first and foremost to selected individuals holding positions of responsibility, such as members of that third country’s official delegations, members of local, regional and national governments, members of parliaments or high-ranking public or military officials, while making every effort to minimise the adverse consequences on the general population of that third country. The Commission should continuously monitor whether the triggering of the suspension mechanism has achieved the intended result and regularly report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council.

    Amendment  16

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 11

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (11) Where a decision to temporarily suspend the visa exemption for a third country has been taken, there should be an adequate timeframe for the enhanced dialogue between the Commission and the concerned third country aimed at remedying the circumstances that led to the suspension. For this purpose, the duration of the temporary suspension decided by a Commission implementing act should be 12 months in a first phase, with a possibility to extend it by a further 24 months with a delegated act in a second phase. Where no solution is found before the end of the period of validity of the delegated act and the Commission presents a legislative proposal to transfer the concerned third country from Annex II to Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806, the Commission should adopt a delegated act extending the temporary suspension until the entry into force of the adopted proposal.

    (11) Where a decision to temporarily suspend the visa exemption for a third country has been taken, there should be an adequate timeframe for the enhanced dialogue between the Commission and the concerned third country aimed at remedying the circumstances that led to the suspension. For this purpose, the duration of the temporary suspension decided by a Commission implementing act should be 12 months in a first phase, with a possibility to extend it by a further 24 months with a delegated act in a second phase. Where no solution is found before the end of the period of validity of the delegated act and the Commission presents a legislative proposal to transfer the concerned third country from Annex II to Annex I of Regulation (EU) 2018/1806, the Commission should adopt a delegated act extending the temporary suspension for a further six months or until the entry into force of the adopted proposal, whichever comes first.

    Amendment  17

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 12

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (12) The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases related to the triggering of the suspension mechanism, imperative grounds of urgency require expedited action, in particular to prevent any abuse of visa-free travel causing a mass influx of third-country nationals arriving irregularly in the territory of the Member States or a serious damage to the public policy or internal security of Member States.

    (12) The Commission should adopt immediately applicable implementing acts where, in duly justified cases related to the triggering of the suspension mechanism, a serious threat to public policy or internal security of a Member State requires immediate action, in particular to prevent any abuse of visa-free travel causing a mass influx of third-country nationals arriving irregularly in the territory of the Member States or a serious damage to the public policy or internal security of Member States.

    Amendment  18

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 13

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (13) The temporary suspension should be lifted at any time where the circumstances that led to the suspension are remedied before the end of the period of the suspension. To this end, the Commission should adopt, respectively, an implementing act before the end of the period of suspension set out in the relevant implementing act, and a delegated act before the end of the period of suspension set out in the relevant delegated act.

    (13) The temporary suspension should be lifted at any time where the circumstances that led to the suspension are remedied before the end of the period of the suspension or where the suspension turns out to be ineffective for the purpose of remedying the situation. To this end, the Commission should adopt, respectively, an implementing act before the end of the period of suspension set out in the relevant implementing act, and a delegated act before the end of the period of suspension set out in the relevant delegated act.

    Amendment  19

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 14

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (14) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points B, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC23.

    (14) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Regulation constitutes a development of the provisions of the Schengen acquis within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the area referred to in Article 1, points B and C, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC23.

    __________________

    __________________

    23 Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31).

    23 Council Decision 1999/437/EC of 17 May 1999 on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the association of those two States with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis (OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31).

    Amendment  20

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point -1 (new)

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 7 – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 – point d

     

    Present text

    Amendment

     

    (-1) In Article 7 point (d) is replaced by the following:

    (d) the Commission shall, when considering further steps in accordance with point (e), (f) or (h), take into account the outcome of the measures taken by the Member State concerned with a view to ensuring visa-free travel with the third country in question, the steps taken in accordance with point (b), and the consequences of the suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement for the external relations of the Union and its Member States with the third country in question;

    “(d) the Commission shall, when considering further steps in accordance with point (e) or (h), take into account the outcome of the measures taken by the Member State concerned with a view to ensuring visa-free travel with the third country in question, the steps taken in accordance with point (b), and the consequences of the suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement for the external relations of the Union and its Member States with the third country in question;”

    Amendment  21

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8 – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. In cases where an agreement on the short-stay visa waiver between the Union and a third country listed in Annex II includes provisions on different grounds or procedures for suspension, those provisions shall be applied instead of Articles 8a, 8e and 8f of this Regulation.

    2. In cases where an agreement on the short-stay visa waiver between the Union and a third country listed in Annex II has been concluded, Articles 8a, 8e and 8f of this Regulation shall apply without prejudice to the relevant provisions on grounds for suspension and procedures set out in the agreement.

    Amendment  22

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 1 – introductory part

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The suspension mechanism may be triggered on the following grounds:

    The suspension mechanism may be triggered by any of the following grounds:

    Amendment  23

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 1 – point d – point i

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (i) a substantial increase in serious criminal offences, linked to the nationals of that third country, substantiated by objective, concrete and relevant information and data provided by the competent authorities;

    (i) a substantial increase in serious criminal offences, linked to the nationals of that third country, substantiated by objective, concrete and relevant information and data provided by the competent authorities; or

    Amendment  24

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 1 – point f

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (f) the non-alignment of the visa policy of a third country listed in Annex II, where, in particular because of the geographic proximity of that third country to the Union, there is a risk of a substantial increase in the number of third-country nationals, other than nationals of that third country, who enter irregularly the territory of the Member States after having stayed on, or transited through, the territory of that third country;

    (f) the non-alignment of the visa policy of a third country listed in Annex II, where, in particular because of the geographic proximity of that third country to the Union, there is a substantial increase in the number of third-country nationals, other than nationals of that third country, who enter irregularly the territory of the Member States after having stayed on, or transited through, the territory of that third country;

    Amendment  25

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 1 – point g a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (ga) a deterioration in the Union’s external relations with a third country listed in Annex II caused by:

     

    (i) serious breaches by that third country of the principles set out in the Charter of the United Nations;

     

    (ii) grave violations by that third country of the obligations deriving from international human rights law or international humanitarian law;

     

    (iii) violations by that third country of bilateral agreements between it and the Union;

     

    (iv) that third country carrying out hostile acts against the Union or Member States with the aim of destabilising or undermining society or institutions which are key for the public policy and internal security of the Union or the Member States;

     

    (v) non-compliance or non-alignment by that third country with relevant Union sanctions.

    Amendment  26

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, points (a), (b) and (d)(i), of this Article a substantial increase shall mean an increase exceeding a threshold of 50%, unless the Commission in accordance with Article 8b(4) or Article 8c(2) concludes that a lower or higher increase is applicable in the particular case.

    2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, points (a), (b) and (d)(i), and paragraph 4 of this Article a substantial increase shall mean an increase exceeding a threshold of 40 %, unless the Commission in accordance with Article 8b(4) or Article 8c(2) concludes that a lower or higher increase is applicable in the particular case. The Commission shall duly justify any such conclusion.

    Amendment  27

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    3. For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (b), of this Article a low recognition rate shall mean a recognition rate of asylum applications of less than 4%, unless the Commission in accordance with Article 8b(4) or Article 8c(2) concludes that a higher recognition rate is applicable in the particular case.

    deleted

    Amendment  28

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    4. For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a decrease in cooperation on readmission with a third country listed in Annex II shall mean a substantial increase, substantiated by adequate data, in the refusal rate of readmission applications submitted by a Member State to that third country for its own nationals or, where a readmission agreement concluded between the Union or that Member State and that third country so provides, for third-country nationals having transited through that third country.

    4. For the purposes of paragraph 1, point (c), a decrease in cooperation on readmission with a third country listed in Annex II shall mean a substantial increase, substantiated by adequate data, in the refusal rate of readmission applications submitted by a Member State to that third country for its own nationals, or, where a readmission agreement concluded between the Union or that Member State and that third country so provides, for third-country nationals having transited through that third country, provided that it can be duly justified that the decrease in cooperation is the result of the action or inaction of that third country and is not attributable to the Member State that submitted the readmission applications.

    Amendment  29

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point a

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (a) refusing or failing to process readmission applications in due time;

    (a) refusing or failing to process readmission applications;

    Amendment  30

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8a – paragraph 5 – point b

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (b) failing to issue travel documents in due time for the purposes of returning within the deadlines set out in the readmission agreement or refusing to accept European travel documents issued following the expiry of the deadlines set out in the readmission agreement;

    (b) failing to issue travel documents to its own nationals or persons recognised by the third country as having a right of residence in its territory for the purposes of returning within the deadlines set out in the readmission agreement or refusing to accept European travel documents issued following the expiry of the deadlines set out in the readmission agreement;

    Amendment  31

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8b – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. A Member State may notify the Commission if it is confronted, over a period of at least two months, compared with either the same period in the preceding year or the last two months prior to the implementation of the exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of a third country listed in Annex II, with one or more of the circumstances amounting to the grounds for suspension referred to in Article 8a(1), points (a), (b), (c), and (d)(i).

    1. A Member State may notify the Commission if it is confronted, over a period between two and twelve months, compared with either the same period in the preceding year or the last two months prior to the implementation of the exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of a third country listed in Annex II, with one or more of the circumstances amounting to the grounds for suspension referred to in Article 8a(1), points (a), (b), (c), and (d)(i).

    Amendment  32

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8b – paragraph 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1a. A Member State may notify the Commission of the existence of any of the grounds for suspension referred to in Article 8a(1), points (d)(ii), (e), (f), (g) and (ga).

    Amendment  33

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8b – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. The notification referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall state the reasons on which it is based and shall include relevant data and statistics as well as a detailed explanation of the preliminary measures that the Member State concerned has taken with a view to remedying the situation. In its notification, the Member State concerned may specify the categories of nationals of the third country concerned which are to be covered by an implementing act under Article 8e(1), specifying the detailed reasons for doing so.

    2. The notification referred to in paragraphs 1 and 1a of this Article shall state the reasons on which it is based. Where relevant, that notification shall include relevant data and statistics as well as a detailed explanation of the preliminary measures that the Member State concerned has taken with a view to remedying the situation. In its notification, the Member State concerned may specify the categories of nationals of the third country concerned which are to be covered by an implementing act under Article 8e(1), specifying the detailed reasons for doing so.

    Amendment  34

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8b – paragraph 4 – introductory part

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    4. The Commission shall examine any notification made pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, taking into account:

    4. The Commission shall examine any notification made pursuant to paragraphs 1 and 1a of this Article, taking into account:

    Amendment  35

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8b – paragraph 4 – point a

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (a) whether any of the circumstances amounting to the grounds referred to in Article 8a(1), points (a), (b), (c), or (d)(i) exist;

    (a) whether any of the circumstances amounting to the grounds referred to in Article 8a(1) exist;

    Amendment  36

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8b – paragraph 4 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    4a. As part of its examination pursuant to paragraph 4, the Commission shall also assess the necessity, proportionality and consequences of a suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement.

    Amendment  37

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8c – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. Where the Commission, taking into account the relevant data, reports and statistics, has concrete and reliable information on the existence of any of the grounds referred to in Article 8a(1) it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of its analysis, and Article 8e and Article 8f shall apply.

    2. Where the Commission, taking into account the relevant data, reports and statistics, including data, reports and statistics from any relevant Union institution, body, office or agency, and after having carried out an assessment as referred to in Article 8b(4a), has concrete and reliable information on the existence of any of the grounds referred to in Article 8a(1) it shall inform the European Parliament and the Council of its analysis, and Article 8e and Article 8f shall apply.

    Amendment  38

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8d – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    1. The Commission shall report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the monitoring conducted in accordance with Article 8c(1) with regard to the third countries which have been listed in Annex II as a result of the successful conclusion of a visa liberalisation dialogue conducted between the Union and that third country, at least once a year and for a period of seven years after the date of entry into force of visa liberalisation for those third countries, and thereafter whenever the Commission considers it to be necessary, or upon request by the European Parliament or by the Council. The report shall focus on the third countries which the Commission considers, based on concrete and reliable information, as no longer complying with certain specific requirements, which are based on Article 1 and which were used to assess the appropriateness of granting visa liberalisation.

    1. The Commission shall periodically report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the monitoring conducted in accordance with Article 8c(1) with regard to the third countries which have been listed in Annex II, ensuring that each of those third countries is reported on at least once within a four-year period.

     

    1a. The Commission shall report on an annual basis for a period of seven years after the date of entry into force of visa liberalisation for those third countries which have been listed as a result of the successful conclusion of a visa liberalisation dialogue conducted between the Union and that third country.

     

    1b. Whenever the Commission considers it necessary, it shall report on the third countries which it considers, based on concrete and reliable information, as no longer complying with certain specific requirements, which are based on Article 1 and which were used to assess the appropriateness of granting visa liberalisation.

    Amendment  39

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8e – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Where, on the basis of the examination referred to in Article 8b(4), or the analysis referred to in Article 8c(2), and taking into account the consequences of a suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement for the overall external relations of the Union and its Member States with the third country concerned, while working in close cooperation with that third country to find alternative long-term solutions, the Commission decides that action is needed, or where a simple majority of Member States have notified the Commission of the existence of circumstances referred to in Article 8a(1), points (a), (b), (c) or (d)(i), the Commission shall adopt an implementing act temporarily suspending the exemption from the visa requirement for the nationals of the third country concerned for a period of 12 months.

    Where, on the basis of the examination referred to in Article 8b(4), or the analysis referred to in Article 8c(2), and taking into account the consequences of a suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement for the overall external relations of the Union and its Member States with the third country concerned, while working in close cooperation with that third country to find alternative long-term solutions, the Commission decides that action is needed, or where a simple majority of Member States have notified the Commission of the existence of circumstances referred to in Article 8a(1), points (a), (b), (c) or (d), the Commission shall adopt an implementing act temporarily suspending the exemption from the visa requirement for the nationals of the third country concerned for a period of 12 months.

    Amendment  40

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8e – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    Notwithstanding Article 6(1), point (a), where the Commission has adopted an implementing act under this paragraph which temporarily suspends the exemption from the visa requirement for nationals of the third country concerned who hold diplomatic passports, service/official passports or special passports, the Member States shall not provide for exceptions therefrom.

    Amendment  41

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8e – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 3 – point c

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (c) receiving the notification from a simple majority of Member States of the existence of grounds referred to in Article 8a(1), points (a), (b), (c) or (d)(i).

    (c) receiving the notification from a simple majority of Member States of the existence of grounds referred to in Article 8a(1), points (a), (b), (c) or (d).

    Amendment  42

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8e – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, the Commission shall adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11(4), temporarily suspending the exemption from the visa requirement for the nationals of the third country concerned for a period of 12 months.

    2. On duly justified imperative grounds of urgency, where a significant risk or imminent threat to public policy or internal security of a Member State as set out in Article 8a(1), point (d), requires immediate action, the Commission may adopt immediately applicable implementing acts in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 11(4), temporarily suspending the exemption from the visa requirement for the nationals of the third country concerned for a maximum period of 12 months.

    Amendment  43

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8e – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    In cases as referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall comprehensively and consistently inform the European Parliament and the Council throughout the procedure.

    Amendment  44

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8e – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    3. During the period of suspension, the Commission shall establish an enhanced dialogue with the third country concerned with a view to remedying the circumstances in question.

    3. During the period of suspension, the Commission shall establish an enhanced dialogue with the third country concerned with a view to remedying the circumstances in question and shall regularly report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the progress and outcome of the dialogue and on the effectiveness of the suspension.

    Amendment  45

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8f – paragraph 1 a new

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1a. The delegated act referred to in paragraph 1 shall be accompanied by a report to the European Parliament and to the Council detailing the outcome of the enhanced dialogue with the third country concerned, the measures adopted by that third country and by the Member States concerned, and the reasons for considering that the circumstances leading to the temporary suspension have not been remedied. 

    Amendment  46

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8f – paragraph 1 b new

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1b. Notwithstanding Article 6(1), point (a), where the Commission has adopted a delegated act under paragraph 1 of this Article the Member States shall not provide for exemptions as regards nationals of the third country concerned who hold diplomatic passports, service/official passports or special passports.

    Amendment  47

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8f – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    2. Without prejudice to the application of Article 6, during the period of suspension, the nationals of the third country concerned shall be required to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States.

    2. Without prejudice to the application of Article 6 and paragraph 1b of this Article, during the period of suspension, the nationals of the third country concerned shall be required to be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the Member States.

    Amendment  48

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8f – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    3. A Member State which, in accordance with Article 6, provides for new exemptions from the visa requirement for a category of nationals of the third country covered by the act suspending the exemption from the visa requirement shall communicate those measures in accordance with Article 12.

    3. A Member State which, in accordance with Article 6(1), points (b) to (f), Article 6(2) or Article 6(3), provides for new exemptions from the visa requirement for a category of nationals of the third country covered by the act suspending the exemption from the visa requirement shall communicate those measures in accordance with Article 12.

    Amendment  49

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8f – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Before the end of the period of validity of the delegated act adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council.

    Before the end of the period of validity of the delegated act adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the temporary application of the visa suspension, on the dialogue between the Commission and the third country concerned and on the measures taken to remedy the circumstances having led to the temporary suspension of the visa exemption.

    Amendment  50

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8f – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The report may be accompanied by a legislative proposal to amend this Regulation in order to transfer the reference to the third country concerned from Annex II to Annex I. In that case, the Commission shall adopt a further delegated act in accordance with Article 10, amending Annex II to extend the period of suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement from the end of the period of validity of the delegated act adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article until the entry into force of the amendment transferring the third country concerned to Annex I. The footnote shall be amended accordingly.

    The report may be accompanied by a legislative proposal to amend this Regulation in order to transfer the reference to the third country concerned from Annex II to Annex I. In that case, the Commission shall adopt a further delegated act in accordance with Article 10, amending Annex II to extend the period of suspension of the exemption from the visa requirement set by the delegated act adopted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article by a period of six months or until the entry into force of the amendment transferring the third country concerned to Annex I, whichever comes first. The footnote shall be amended accordingly.

    Amendment  51

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2018/1806

    Article 8f a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    Article 8fa

     

    Suspension of the possibility to provide for exceptions from the visa requirement as regards countries listed in Annex I

     

    1. In the event of a deterioration in the Union’s external relations of the kind referred to in Article 8a(1), point (ga), of this Regulation with a third country listed in Annex I to this Regulation[, and provided that that deterioration is of a significant and abrupt nature], or following the adoption of an implementing decision pursuant to Article 25a(5) of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, the Commission may adopt an implementing act to suspend any exceptions from the visa requirement provided for by Member States pursuant to Article 6(1) of this Regulation as regards holders of diplomatic passports, service/official passports or special passports.

     

    2. The Commission shall continuously assess whether it is possible to achieve a substantial and sustained improvement in the Union’s external relations with the third country concerned or in the level of cooperation of the third country concerned as regards the readmission of irregular migrants. On the basis of that assessment, the Commission may adopt an implementing act to repeal or amend the implementing act referred to in the first paragraph.

     

    3. The implementing acts referred in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall be adopted in accordance with the examination procedure referred to in Article 11(2).

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    1. Background

     

    One of the basic pillars of the EU visa policy is the Regulation (EU) 2018/1806 of the European Parliament and of the Council listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Member States and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement for stays of no more than 90 days in any 180-day period.

     

    It determines the basic principles for granting visa liberalisation, sets the so-called “positive” or visa exempt third countries and “negative” or visa required third countries lists, and it provides for safeguards when visa free regime could be suspended via two basic mechanisms, namely the reciprocity mechanism and the suspension mechanism, as well as the procedures for their triggering.

     

    Following the calls from both co-legislators on the need to revise the suspension mechanism in order to be more adapt to the emerging challenges, the European Commission presented in October 2023 targeted proposal for the revision of the suspension mechanism with the aim to strengthen and improve several elements of it. The proposed revision concerns the revision of Article 8 and includes several substantive amendments related to the possible grounds for suspension as well as to the procedures.

     

    This suspension mechanism was first introduced in 2013[1] with the main purpose to enable a temporary suspension of the visa exemption in case of a sudden and substantial increase in irregular migration. The mechanism was subsequently revised in 2017[2] by making it easier for Member States to notify circumstances leading to a possible suspension and by enabling the Commission to trigger the suspension mechanism on its own initiative.

     

    2. The proposed amendments to the suspension mechanism

     

    In its latest proposal, the Commission makes several changes to the current mechanism. New suspension ground are proposed related to hybrid threats such as situations of state-sponsored instrumentalisation of migrants aimed at destabilising or undermining society and key institutions, as well as new grounds specifically addressing investor citizenship schemes, which are currently operated by number of visa exempt third countries.

     

    A new suspension ground is also added to cover cases where the lack of visa policy alignment of a third country listed in Annex II with the visa policy of the Union, could lead to situations where third-country nationals, other than nationals of that third country, arrive legally in the territory of that third country and then enter irregularly the territory of the Member States.

     

    Also new with this proposal is the possibility for the Commission to consider different thresholds when deciding whether to suspend a visa exemption in cases of a substantial increase in irregular migration, unfounded asylum applications or serious criminal offences linked to the nationals of that third country, following a case-by-case assessment.

     

    The proposal also makes changes to the procedure and conditions for a Member State’s notification to the Commission when it is confronted by one or more circumstances amounting to a ground for suspension, and the procedure for the Commission’s examination of such a notification. It also modifies the reference period for identifying the existence of the circumstances which may lead to the suspension.

     

    The Commission will also have the obligation to monitor on a regular basis the existence of the grounds for suspension with regard to all third countries listed in Annex II, and the procedure to trigger the suspension mechanism based on the Commission’s own analysis of the existence of such grounds.

     

    This procedure is further amended by increasing the duration of the temporary suspension of the visa exemption from nine months to 12 months (for the first phase) and from 18 months to 24 months (for the second phase), as well as a new urgency procedure is introduced when the situation requires immediate action by the Commission.

     

    3. Position of the Rapporteur

     

    The expansion of the visa-free travel to several new third countries in recent years, as well as constantly new emerging challenges and crisis occurring around the world, the Rapporteur considers that the European Union needs effective and sufficient tools to respond to such challenges, including in the area of visa policy.

     

    The Rapporteur in that respect therefore largely supports the aim of the Commission and the need to strengthen and improve the visa suspension mechanism. It is worth noting that since its introduction in 2013, the suspension mechanism has only been triggered once. Namely in the case of Vanuatu due to EU’s concerns of its operation of investor citizenship schemes, for which a partial suspension has been adopted by the Council in March 2022, following by a full suspension in October of 2022, which is still in place.

     

    Due to ever changing world and evolution of the EU policies as well as the visa free regime, the Rapporteur believes that the revision of the suspension mechanism ought to look at the EU visa policy holistically considering all aspects.

     

    The Rapporteur therefore believes that there is an inherent gap between the conditions for the exemption from EU visa requirements, which are based on a case-by-case assessment of a variety of criteria, and the grounds allowing for the suspension from the said exemption. The Rapporteur considers as well that a discrepancy exists particular in relation to the Union’s external relations with the relevant third countries, including considerations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

     

    In that regard, the Rapporteur is of the opinion that grounds for suspension of visa free regime with a third country must include considerations relating to Union’s or in certain cases Member States’ external relations with the relevant third country.

     

    Those grounds for suspension should include, among others: a) breaches or suspension of bilateral and multilateral agreements between the European Union or the European Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and the relevant third countries, on the other; b) serious breaches of international law and standards, including international humanitarian law, by the relevant third country, including non-compliance with the international court decisions and rulings; c) hostile acts or aggression against one or more Member States or the Union by the relevant third country; d) serious human rights violations, including criminalisation of abortion, LGBTQ+ persons, as well as the introduction or the use of death penalty by the relevant third country; and e) the non-compliance with the relevant EU sanctions.

     

    The Rapporteur also believes that the regular evaluation is needed of the continue fulfilment of the basic grounds for third countries benefiting from visa liberalisation which was not a result of the successful conclusion of a visa liberalisation dialogue. In that respect, the Rapporteur supports the Commission’s proposal as regards the monitoring the existence of the grounds for suspension for all third countries, however their consideration must undoubtedly include considerations relating to Union’s or in certain cases Member States’ external relations with the relevant third country.

     

    Since the current parliamentary term is quickly coming to an end, the Rapporteur wishes to quickly proceed with the adoption of the European Parliament’s negotiating mandate in order to secure a progressive text which should be reflected also in the EU visa policy going forward.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI: Prosafe SE: Operational update – February 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    24 March – Fleet utilisation for February 2025 was 57 per cent.  

    Safe Notos, Safe Zephyrus and Safe Concordia operated at full capacity during this period, achieving 100 per cent utilisation. Safe Eurus achieved a utilisation rate of 98 per cent.

    Safe Caledonia has commenced reactivation activities in Scapa Flow, UK, and will mobilise to the Captain Field, UK, within June 2025. 

    Safe Boreas is in Norway preparing for relocation in Q2 2025 for a contract in Australia commencing between mid-November 2025 and mid-February 2026.  

    The sale of Safe Concordia is completed, and the vessel was transferred to the new owner on March 13, 2025.   

    Safe Scandinavia remains laid up in Norway.  

    Prosafe is a leading owner and operator of semi-submersible accommodation vessels. The company is listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange with ticker code PRS. For more information, please refer to https://www.prosafe.com  

    For further information, please contact:  

    Terje Askvig, CEO 

    Phone: +47 952 03 886 

    Reese McNeel, CFO 
    Phone: +47 415 08 186 
     
    This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act. 

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Sydbank share buyback programme: transactions in week 12

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Company Announcement No 12/2025

    Peberlyk 4
    6200 Aabenraa
    Denmark

    Tel +45 74 37 37 37
    Fax +45 74 37 35 36

    Sydbank A/S
    CVR No DK 12626509, Aabenraa
    sydbank.dk

    24 March 2025  

    Dear Sirs

    Sydbank share buyback programme: transactions in week 12
    On 26 February 2025 Sydbank announced a share buyback programme of DKK 1,350m. The share buyback programme commenced on 3 March 2025 and will be completed by 31 January 2026.

    The purpose of the share buyback programme is to reduce the share capital of Sydbank and the programme is executed in compliance with the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 and Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 of 8 March 2016, collectively referred to as the Safe Harbour rules.

    The following transactions have been made under the share buyback programme:

      Number of shares VWAP Gross value (DKK)
    Accumulated, most recent
    Announcement

    119,000

     

    52,669,390.00

    17 March 2025
    18 March 2025
    19 March 2025
    20 March 2025
    21 March 2025
    8,000
    8,000
    7,000
    7,000
    19,000
    449.74
    450.85
    451.93
    449.01
    425.47
    3,597,920.00
    3,606,800.00
    3,163,510.00
    3,143,070.00
    8,083,930.00
    Total over week 12 49,000   21,595,230.00
    Total accumulated during the
    share buyback programme

    168,000

     

    74,264,620.00

    All transactions were made under ISIN DK 0010311471 and effected by Danske Bank A/S on behalf of Sydbank A/S.

    Further information about the transactions, cf Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council on market abuse and Commission delegated regulation, is available in the attachment.

    Following the above transactions, Sydbank holds a total of 3,552,669 own shares, equal to 6.50% of the Bank’s share capital.

    Yours sincerely
            
    Mark Luscombe        Jørn Adam Møller
    CEO        Deputy Group Chief Executive

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: KALLELSE TILL ÅRSSTÄMMA I SERSTECH AB

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Aktieägarna i Serstech AB (publ) kallas till årsstämma onsdagen den 23 april 2025 klockan 13.00 på bolagets kontor, Åldermansgatan 13 i Lund.

    Anmälan
    Aktieägare som önskar delta i stämman ska dels vara införd i den av Euroclear Sweden AB förda aktieboken avseende förhållandena fredagen den 11 april 2025, dels anmäla sitt deltagande till bolaget senast tisdagen den 15 april 2025.

    Aktieägare som låtit förvaltarregistrera sina aktier måste, förutom att anmäla sig till stämman, genom förvaltarens försorg låta inregistrera sina aktier i eget namn för att ha rätt att delta i årsstämman, så att aktieägaren blir upptagen i framställningen av aktieboken per fredagen den 11 april 2025. Sådan registrering kan vara tillfällig (s.k. rösträttsregistrering) och begärs hos förvaltaren enligt förvaltarens rutiner i sådan tid i förväg som förvaltaren bestämmer. Rösträttsregistrering som har gjorts senast tisdagen den 15 april 2025 kommer att beaktas vid framställningen av aktieboken.

    Anmälan om deltagande i stämman kan ske skriftligen till Serstech AB (publ), att: Thomas Pileby, Åldermansgatan 13, 227 64 Lund, via e-post till tp@serstech.com eller per telefon 0702-072643. Vid anmälan ska anges namn, person- eller organisationsnummer, adress och telefonnummer, antal aktier samt, i förekommande fall, det antal biträden (högst två) som avses medföras vid stämman.

    För aktieägare som företräds av ombud ska fullmakt översändas tillsammans med anmälan. Fullmakt ska vara skriftlig, daterad och underskriven. Fullmakt i original ska medtas till årsstämman. Den som företräder juridisk person ska även bifoga kopia av registreringsbevis eller motsvarande behörighetshandlingar som utvisar behöriga firmatecknare. Fullmaktsformulär finns tillgängligt på www.serstech.com och kan även beställas från bolaget.

    FÖRESLAGEN DAGORDNING

    1. Stämmans öppnande
    2. Val av ordförande vid stämman
    3. Upprättande och godkännande av röstlängd
    4. Godkännande av dagordning
    5. Val av en eller två protokolljusterare
    6. Prövning av om stämman blivit behörigen sammankallad
    7. Framläggande av årsredovisning och revisionsberättelse
    8. Beslut om

    a)    fastställande av resultaträkning och balansräkning
    b)    dispositioner beträffande resultatet enligt den fastställda balansräkningen
    c)    ansvarsfrihet åt styrelseledamöter och verkställande direktör

    1. Fastställande av antalet styrelseledamöter och revisorer
    2. Fastställande av styrelse- och revisorsarvoden
    3. Val av styrelseledamöter och revisorer
    4. Styrelsens förslag till beslut om införande av nytt långsiktigt incitamentsprogram
    5. Stämmans avslutande

    BESLUTSFÖRSLAG

    Resultatdisposition (punkt 8b)

    Styrelsen föreslår att ingen utdelning lämnas samt att bolagets ansamlade medel överförs i ny räkning.

    Valberedningens förslag till styrelse m.m. (punkt 2 och 9 – 11)

    Valberedningen, som består av Bengt Myhrman (ordförande) samt ledamöterna Mathis Nimlin och Jens Munch föreslår följande:

    Antal styrelseledamöter och suppleanter: Sex styrelseledamöter utan suppleanter.
    Antal revisorer och revisorssuppleanter: En revisor utan suppleanter.
    Styrelsearvode: 1.117.200 kronor för tiden intill slutet av nästa årsstämma, med följande fördelning: 4 prisbasbelopp (ett prisbasbleopp för 2025 motsvarar 58.800 kronor) till styrelseordföranden och 3 prisbasbelopp vardera till övriga styrelseledamöter.
    Revisorsarvode: Enligt godkänd räkning inom ramen för offert.
    Styrelse m.m.: Omval av Thomas Pileby (ordförande), Sverker Göranson, Märta Lewander Xu, Arve Nilsson och Christer Kjellkvist, samt nyval av Emelie Agnedal för tiden intill slutet av nästa årsstämma.
    Revisor: Omval av revisionsbolaget Öhrlings PricewaterhouseCoopers AB, med huvudansvarig revisor Cecilia Andrén Dorselius.

    Emelie Agnedal, född 1983, bosatt i Sverige och svensk medborgare, har en Master of Science i Engineering Physics från Uppsala universitet. Emelie är sedan 2024 Global Director of Business Development (affärsutvecklingschef) på MilDef Group AB med fokus på strategiska samarbeten och M&A. Till tidigare roller på MilDef hör Director of Business Development Nordics och Head of Sales på MilDef Sweden (2022 – 2024). Innan MilDef arbetade Emelie under åtta års tid på Försvarets Materielverk (FMV) där hon ledde stora projekt innefattandes upphandling av försvarssystem samt deltagande i internationella arbetsgrupper inom NATO och andra försvarssamarbeten. Innan FMV arbetade Emelie under sex års tid på AFRY som teknisk konsult med analysuppdrag för olika myndigheter såsom FMV, Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap samt Post- och telestyrelsen. Emelie Agnedal äger inga aktier i Serstech.

    Information om de till omval föreslagna styrelseledamöterna finns i bolagets årsredovisning och på bolagets hemsida, www.serstech.com.

    Styrelsens förslag till beslut om införande av nytt långsiktigt incitamentsprogram (punkt 12)

    Styrelsen föreslår att årsstämman beslutar om införande av ett nytt långsiktigt incitamentsprogram för anställda i koncernen genom utgivande av teckningsoptioner samt godkännande av vidareöverlåtelse därav (”Programmet”) i enlighet med nedan. Besluten under den här punkten är villkorade av varandra och föreslås därför antas som ett beslut.

    Utgivande av teckningsoptioner (punkt 12 (a))
    Styrelsen föreslår att årsstämman, med avvikelse från aktieägarnas företrädesrätt, beslutar om utgivande av högst 3.000.000 teckningsoptioner av serie 2025/2028, till följd varav bolagets aktiekapital kan komma att öka med högst cirka 87.083 kronor.

    Rätt att teckna teckningsoptionerna ska, med avvikelse från aktieägarnas företrädesrätt, endast tillkomma bolagets helägda dotterbolag Serstech Förvaltning AB, för vidareöverlåtelse enligt nedan. Teckning av teckningsoptioner ska ske på teckningslista senast den 29 april 2025. Teckningsoptionerna ska ges ut vederlagsfritt till dotterbolaget.

    Varje teckningsoption ger rätt att under perioden 1 – 10 juni 2028 teckna en ny aktie i bolaget till en teckningskurs som ska fastställas till 160 % av den volymvägda genomsnittliga betalkursen för aktier i Serstech AB på Nasdaq First North Growth Market under tiden från och med den 2 maj 2025 till och med den 15 maj 2025, dock lägst kvotvärdet. Den sålunda framräknade teckningskursen ska avrundas till närmaste helt öre, varvid 0,5 öre skall avrundas nedåt. De nya aktierna ska ge rätt till vinstutdelning första gången på den avstämningsdag för utdelning som infaller närmast efter det att de nya aktierna införts i bolagets aktiebok.

    Godkännande om överlåtelse av teckningsoptioner (punkt 12 (b))
    För att möjliggöra bolagets leverans av teckningsoptioner enligt Programmet föreslår styrelsen att årsstämman beslutar att godkänna att teckningsoptionerna som ges ut i enlighet med punkt 12(a) ovan, direkt eller indirekt, får överlåtas av Serstech Förvaltning AB, i enlighet med styrelsens instruktioner, till anställda i koncernen. Sådan överlåtelse ska i Sverige ske mot betalning motsvarande teckningsoptionernas teoretiska marknadsvärde vid överlåtelsetillfället, beräknat enligt Black & Scholes värderingsmodell för optioner, och vid eventuell överlåtelse i utlandet i enlighet med sedvanliga villkor för optionserbjudande till mottagare i respektive land.

    Förtydligande om tilldelning
    Programmet omfattar högst cirka 25 personer. Teckningsoptionerna ska tilldelas enligt nedanstående principer.

    Kategori Maximalt antal optioner per person/kategori
    Verkställande direktör (1 person) 500.000
    Nyckelpersoner A (3 personer) 300.000 / 900.000
    Nyckelpersoner B (3 personer) 200.000 / 600.000
    Övriga anställda (19 personer) 100.000 / 1.000.000
    Totalt 3.000.000

    För det fall anställda önskar förvärva ett större antal teckningsoptioner än det antal som anges ovan, ska tilldelning av teckningsoptioner, som inte förvärvats av annan inom ramen för emissionens högsta belopp, göras i förhållande till antalet teckningsoptioner som relevanta deltagare önskar förvärva.

    Teckningsoptioner som inte överlåts vid det inledande erbjudandet eller som därefter återköps får överlåtas till framtida anställda eller anställda som har befordrats, varvid ovan angivna riktlinjer för tilldelning ska tillämpas. Vid sådan tilldelning ska ny beräkning av teckningsoptionernas marknadsvärde, som ska erläggas av deltagare, ske.

    Beredning av och motiv för förslaget mm.
    Programmet har utarbetats av bolagets styrelse i samråd med externa rådgivare och baseras på de incitamentsprogram i bolaget som tidigare har antagits. Motiven för förslaget och skälen till avvikelsen från aktieägarnas företrädesrätt är att bolaget bedömer att det är positivt för bolagets långsiktiga utveckling att nyanställda i koncernen erbjuds möjlighet till delägande genom ett incitamentsprogram. Styrelsen anser att det ligger i samtliga aktieägares intresse att bolagets anställda har ett långsiktigt intresse av en god värdeutveckling på aktien i bolaget.

    Styrelsen för Serstech ansvarar för den närmare utformningen av villkoren för Programmet, inom ramen för de ovan angivna villkoren. I samband därmed ska styrelsen ha rätt att göra anpassningar för att uppfylla särskilda regler eller marknadsförutsättningar utomlands, inklusive att besluta om kontant- eller annan avräkning för det fall det anses fördelaktigt för bolaget och deltagaren baserat på utländska skatteregler.

    Utspädning
    Vid fullt utnyttjande av teckningsoptionerna på vid beslutstillfället gällande villkor kan antalet aktier och röster i bolaget öka med högst 3.000.000, vilket motsvarar cirka 1,17 procent av antalet aktier och röster i bolaget. Utspädningseffekten har beräknats som antalet tillkommande aktier och röster vid fullt utnyttjande i förhållande till antalet aktier och röster efter fullt utnyttjande. Det finns idag 8.000.000 teckningsoptioner av serie 2023/2026 som löper till 1 – 10 juli 2026. För det fall teckningsoptioner av serie 2023/2026 inluderas i beräkningen uppgår den motsvarande maximala utspädningen till cirka 4,15 procent av antalet aktier och röster.

    Påverkan på nyckeltal och kostnader för bolaget m.m.
    Eftersom Programmet baseras på teckningsoptioner, vilka vid utnyttjandet medför en utspädning av aktiekapitalet, innebär Programmet inte några kostnader för bolaget utöver för eget arbete och externa rådgivare i samband med genomförandet. För det fall styrelsen gör anpassningar av programmet för utländska deltagare, såsom att besluta om kontantavräkning, kommer programmets utfall att påverka bolagets resultat i form av ökade personalkostnader.

    S.k. optionsavtal ska träffas enligt vilka varje optionsinnehavare, under vissa förutsättningar, ska vara förpliktad att erbjuda bolaget eller Serstech Förvaltning AB att förvärva teckningsoptionerna, eller viss del av dessa.

    Enligt en preliminär värdering motsvarar teckningsoptionernas marknadsvärde cirka 0,25 öre per teckningsoption, beräknat enligt Black & Scholes värderingsmodell för optioner.

    Majoritetskrav
    Beslut i enlighet med styrelsens förslag, innefattande även godkännande av Serstech Förvaltning AB:s vidareöverlåtelse av teckningsoptioner till anställda i koncernen enligt ovan, är giltigt endast om det biträds av aktieägare med minst nio tiondelar av såväl de avgivna rösterna som de aktier som är företrädda vid bolagsstämman.

    Övriga incitamentsprogram
    För en beskrivning av Serstechs övriga aktierelaterade incitamentsprogram hänvisas till Serstechs hemsida, www.serstech.com.

    __________________

    Årsredovisning och fullständigt beslutsunderlag kommer att hållas tillgängliga hos bolaget och på bolagets hemsida, www.serstech.com, senast tre veckor före stämman och sänds med post till aktieägare som så begär och uppger sin postadress. Kopior kommer även att delas ut vid stämman.

    Aktieägarna erinras om sin rätt att begära upplysningar enligt 7 kap 32 § aktiebolagslagen.

    Behandling av personuppgifter
    För information om hur dina personuppgifter behandlas hänvisas till den integritetspolicy som finns tillgänglig på Euroclears hemsida www.euroclear.com/dam/ESw/Legal/Integritetspolicy-bolagsstammor-svenska.pdf. Om du har frågor avseende vår personuppgiftsbehandling kan du vända dig till oss via e-post på info@serstech.com. Serstech AB (publ) har organisationsnummer 556713-9893 och säte i Lund.

    Lund i mars 2025
    Styrelsen för Serstech AB (publ)

    För mer information:
    Stefan Sandor, VD Serstech AB
    Telefon: 0739-60 60 67
    E-post: ss@serstech.com
    eller
    Thomas Pileby, Styrelseordförande Serstech AB
    Telefon: 0702-07 26 43
    E-post: tp@serstech.com
    eller besök: www.serstech.com
    Certified advisor åt Serstech är Svensk Kapitalmarknadsgranskning AB (SKMG).
    Om Serstech
    Serstech utvecklare och säljer utrustning för identifiering av farliga kemikalier, såsom narkotika, bomber och kemiska stridsmedel. Bolagets kunder är huvudsakligen rättsvårdande myndigheter och inkluderar FN, Världstullorganisationen (WCO) och tull- och polismyndigheter över hela världen. Serstech har återförsäljare i 63 länder. Bolaget har huvudkontor i Lund och all tillverkning sker i Sverige.
    Serstech är listat på Nasdaq First North Growth Market. Mer information finns på www.serstech.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Choi Yuk-lin bound for Iceland

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Secretary for Education Choi Yuk-lin will lead a delegation of Hong Kong principals and educationalists in attending the International Summit on the Teaching Profession 2025 in Reykjavík, Iceland, from tomorrow.

    After visiting Iceland, Ms Choi and her delegation will visit India. Their itinerary is aimed at promoting Hong Kong’s advantages as an international post-secondary education hub.

    Besides discussing trends in global education with education ministers from around the world at the Reykjavík forum, Ms Choi will also visit local schools and meet Icelandic educationalists.

    The education chief will fly to Delhi on Thursday to attend the Asia-Pacific Association for International Education 2025 Conference & Exhibition.

    She will be accompanied by representatives from the University Grants Committee (UGC) and UGC-funded universities, and will give a speech at the Delhi event about studying in Hong Kong.

    Ms Choi will return to Hong Kong on Friday. During her absence, Under Secretary for Education Sze Chun-fai will be Acting Secretary.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: Tryg A/S – Q1 2025 pre-silent newsletter

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Tryg A/S – Q1 2025 pre-silent newsletter

    Tryg will conduct pre-close analyst calls and meetings during the week commencing on March 24, ahead of the Q1 2025 results, which will be released on April 11. This newsletter aims to inform capital market participants of the key factors influencing the company’s recent financial performance.

    Insurance revenue growth

    Tryg maintains a balanced distribution of insurance revenue across the Scandinavian countries, with approximately 50% of revenue generated in Denmark, 30% in Sweden, and 20% in Norway. In Q1 2024, Tryg reported insurance revenue of DKK 9,531m.

    From 2025 Q1 and onwards the commercial and corporate segments will be reported together in the segment named ‘Commercial’. The commercial segment will experience a smaller spillover effect into 2025 of the derisking of the corporate portfolio carried out in 2024. In general, the group revenue development remains in line with recent development.

    When converting earnings from local currencies to DKK, Tryg’s reporting currency, the expected average value of SEK 100 is DKK 65.6 (66.6 Q1 2024), and NOK 100 is DKK 63.4 (65.6 Q1 2024).

    Claims environment

    Underlying claims development
    Tryg operates a stable business and recent trends in underlying performance should thus be considered reliable indicators for short-term trends. The Group’s underlying claims ratio was 72.3% in Q1 2024. At the capital markets day (CMD) on 4 December 2024, Tryg mentioned that it expects a broadly stable to slightly improving underlying performance in the new strategy period towards 2027.

    Weather claims
    For Q1, normalised weather claims amount to 40% of the annual DKK 800m guidance, equating to DKK 320m. As a reminder, the annual expectation for weather claims is split as follows (in percentages terms): 40% in Q1, 10% in Q2, 20% in Q3 and 30% in Q4.

    In general, a milder than average winter with warmer temperatures has been recorded in Scandinavia. A couple of smaller storms have hit the region (Floriane and  Éowyn). It is important to remember that freezing temperatures always cause bursting pipe claims and more car accidents are reported during the winter due to more difficult weather conditions.

    Large claims
    On an annual basis, Tryg provides guidance for large claims amounting to DKK 800m, evenly distributed across quarters. Occasionally, information about large claims may be available in mass media or local press.

    Interest rates development
    For Q1, we expect an approximate discount rate of 2.3% at the time of writing. The discounting percentage was reported at 2.1% in Q4 2024.

    Run-off expectations towards 2027
    At the 2024 CMD, Tryg stated a long-term run-off expectation of ~2% towards 2027.

    Investment activities

    Tryg has divided its investment activities into a match portfolio (approx. DKK 44bn at Q4 2024) and a free portfolio (approx. DKK 17bn as per Q4 2024). As announced at the 2024 CMD, the free portfolio was derisked during Q4 2024 and is now mainly made up by Scandinavian covered bonds and government bonds (approx. DKK 13bn) and the real estate portfolio (approx. DKK 3bn). As a rule of thumb, the return on bonds can be modelled as 50% NYKRCMB2 and 50% NYKRCMG2 (Bloomberg tickers). For the real estate portfolio, a normalised annual return of 6.5% is assumed. The current buyback program of DKK 2bn started in December will impact the size of the free portfolio accordingly.

    The return of the match portfolio mainly consists of the return on premium provisions, which is expected at DKK 75m per quarter with the current level of interest rates.

    Additionally, the line ‘Other financial income and expenses’ is guided at DKK -90m per quarter and mainly consists of costs related to currency hedges, general balance sheet items and costs related to running the investment operation. As described in the newsletter on inflation hedging dated 17 March 2025, this line now also includes the net result of the inflation hedge. In the medium term, this is expected to average zero, but mismatches may occur in the short term.

    Other income and cost

    Other income and cost are expected between DKK -350m and DKK -370m on a quarterly basis. This is primarily driven by amortisation of intangibles related to the RSA Scandinavia acquisition.

    Number of shares

    At year-end 2024, Tryg reported 613,165k outstanding shares. Tryg announced a DKK 2bn share buyback at the CMD in December 2024, and as at 14 March 2025, 6,010,787 shares have been acquired in the quarter to date. The status of the buyback is announced each Monday at noon CET.

    Outlook statement from annual report 2024

    Tryg reported an insurance service result, adjusted for the more favorable-than-normal large and weather claims outcome, of around DKK 7.2bn in 2024 and it is now targeting its highest ever insurance service result of between DKK 8.0-8.4bn in 2027. The insurance service result is expected to increase gradually throughout the strategy period.

    Tryg will publish the Group’s Q1 results for 2025 on 11 April 2025 at around 7:30 CET.

    Conference call

    Tryg will host a conference call on the day of the release at 10:00 CET. CEO Johan Kirstein Brammer, CFO Allan Kragh Thaysen, CTO Mikael Kärrsten and Head of Financial Reporting Gianandrea Roberti, SVP  will present the results in brief, followed by a Q&A session.

    The conference call will be held in English.

    Date 11 April 2025
    Time 10:00 CET
     

    Dial-in numbers

     Pin code

    +45 (DK) 78 76 84 90

    +44 (UK) 203 769 6819

    +1 (US) 646 787 0157

    560768

    You can sign up for an e-mail reminder on tryg.com. The conference call will also be broadcast on this site. An on-demand version will be available shortly after the conference call has ended.

    All Q1 2025 material can be downloaded on tryg.com shortly after the time of release.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SED to attend International Summit on the Teaching Profession and Asia-Pacific Association for International Education Conference and Exhibition

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    SED to attend International Summit on the Teaching Profession and Asia-Pacific Association for International Education Conference and Exhibition 
         On March 25 (Reykjavík time), Dr Choi will lead a delegation of Hong Kong principals and education experts to attend the International Summit on the Teaching Profession 2025 in Reykjavík, Iceland, to discuss the latest trends in global education development with education ministers from around the world. She will also visit local schools and meet education experts there.
     
         On March 27 (Delhi time), she will depart for Delhi, India, and lead a delegation of representatives of the University Grants Committee (UGC) and UGC-funded universities to attend the Asia-Pacific Association for International Education 2025 Conference and Exhibition, during which she will deliver a speech on “Study in Hong Kong”. The Secretary-General of the UGC, Professor James Tang, will join part of the visit.
     
         Dr Choi will conclude her visit on March 28 (Delhi time) and return to Hong Kong. During her absence, the Under Secretary for Education, Dr Sze Chun-fai, will be the Acting Secretary for Education.
    Issued at HKT 11:00

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI China: Trump’s ‘transactional foreign policy’ hits deadlock

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    In the two months since taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration has been aggressively pursuing its foreign policy agenda under the belief that everything is subject to “deals,” triggering wide backlash in international society.

    The essence of Trump’s foreign policy is “purely transactional,” said an article on the U.S. website The National Interest.

    “All I know, is… deals”

    “My whole life is deals. That’s all I know, is deals,” said Trump following his meeting with French President Emmanuel Macron about a month ago.

    When it comes to the means to facilitate these deals, as Kevin Hassett, director of the White House National Economic Council, put it, “We could do that with carrots, and we can do that with sticks.”

    On the issue of the Ukraine crisis, to facilitate negotiations between the parties, the Trump administration threatened that Russia would face U.S. sanctions if it refused to participate in talks, and that Ukraine would lose U.S. aid if it declined to negotiate.

    The United States has also coveted Ukraine’s resources, initially demanding rare earth elements, followed by oil, natural gas and other mineral resources.

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky strongly opposed these demands at first. His fiery clash with Trump at the White House on Feb. 28 shocked the world, prompting the United States to suspend military aid to Ukraine and cut off intelligence-sharing.

    When they spoke by phone on Wednesday, Trump even suggested to Zelensky that the United States could help run, and possibly own, Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, according to a statement by the U.S. presidential administration.

    On the Palestinian question, Trump demanded that Hamas release detained Israeli hostages, threatening that “or it is OVER for you” on March 5 in a post on Truth Social.

    Trump also proposed to “clean out” Gaza in late January and used the suspension of aid as leverage to pressure Egypt and Jordan to accept Palestinians.

    To address the issues of illegal immigration and fentanyl within the United States, the Trump administration wielded the “tariff stick” against Mexico and Canada. According to the Trump administration’s logic, these two major problems were caused by Canada and Mexico, and if they are not resolved, tariffs will be imposed.

    Trump also set his sights on Greenland, an autonomous territory of Denmark.

    He said that the United States would take control of Greenland “one way or the other,” refusing to rule out economic or military coercion. Trump said he would consider imposing tariffs on Denmark “at a very high level” if it resisted his offer to acquire the territory.

    Referring to Trump’s book where he talks about his experiences as a hotel developer, Sina Toossi, a fellow at the U.S. think tank Center for International Policy, told AFP: “He approaches diplomacy the way he approached real estate in ‘The Art of the Deal:’ — escalate tensions, maximize threats, push the situation to the brink of disaster and then, at the last minute, strike a deal.”

    “Transactional foreign policy” reaches impasse

    “My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier,” Trump declared in his inaugural address on Jan. 20. But how effective is his “transactional foreign policy?”

    After Trump’s phone calls with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Zelensky on Tuesday and Wednesday respectively, U.S. media believe that Russia has in effect rejected the U.S.-proposed 30-day ceasefire plan for Russia and Ukraine.

    The Washington Post reported that the call between the U.S. and Russian leaders highlighted differences more than agreement.

    Meanwhile, Ukraine is also dissatisfied with the proposal to halt attacks on each other’s energy infrastructure within 30 days, hoping to extend the ceasefire to include other civilian infrastructure.

    Zelensky said that Ukraine has no intention of transferring the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, which the Trump administration is interested in.

    As with Ukraine, Trump has pledged to bring “peace” to the Middle East, but his failure to facilitate “deals” through coercion and pressure has led to the rekindling of the flames of war in Gaza and Yemen.

    After “full coordination with the United States,” the Israeli military resumed large-scale airstrikes on the Gaza Strip on Tuesday, signaling the collapse of the Gaza ceasefire agreement.

    Additionally, the U.S. military began large-scale military operations against Yemen’s Houthi group on March 15. In retaliation, the Houthis claimed to have attacked U.S. aircraft carriers multiple times.

    After the Trump administration launched its “tariff war,” many countries implemented countermeasures. On March 12, the Canadian government announced a 25-percent retaliatory tariff on 29.8 billion Canadian dollars’ (20.7 billion U.S. dollars’) worth of U.S. goods.

    On the same day, the European Commission declared that the European Union (EU) would impose retaliatory tariffs on 26 billion euros’ (28.3 billion U.S. dollars’) worth of U.S. goods starting in April, targeting items such as beef, poultry, whiskey and motorcycles.

    Trump’s tariffs “are an act of self-harm,” The Economist said in a recent article.

    Trump’s remarks about Greenland have also increased anti-American sentiment on the island. To protest Trump’s remarks about acquiring the territory, an anti-American rally was held on March 15 in Nuuk, the capital of Greenland, with thousands of demonstrators marching to the U.S. Consulate there.

    Danish and EU officials also voiced their support for Greenland. “I believe that Greenland will remain part of the Danish Commonwealth for quite some time,” Danish Foreign Minister Lars Lokke Rasmussen said recently.

    “To all the people of Greenland and of Denmark as a whole, I want to be very clear that Europe will always stand for sovereignty and territorial integrity,” European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said Tuesday.

    The Japanese daily Yomiuri Shimbun commented Thursday: “Another major offensive has begun in the Middle East, and Russia declined to endorse a full ceasefire in Ukraine. U.S. President Donald Trump’s diplomacy based on deals has apparently stalled.”

    A more dangerous world

    Analysts believe that the root cause of the impasse in “transactional foreign policy” lies in Trump’s sole focus on U.S. interests. He disregards the demands and needs of others, especially those of conflicting parties, and makes no effort to address the underlying issues.

    “For Trump, foreign policy isn’t about carefully negotiated peace deals. It’s about performance, leverage and crafting a narrative that sells,” Toossi said.

    Trump’s ability to create bargaining chips out of thin air and force concessions through coercion and inducement rely on the United States’ military and economic strength, analysts said.

    The essence of his “transactional foreign policy” is nothing more than coercion diplomacy rooted in power, serving the narrow self-interests of the United States. Rather than solving problems at their root, it ignores the concerns of relevant parties and pressures them to accept U.S. terms.

    “Team Trump claims that its dealmaking will bring peace and that, after 80 years of being taken for a ride, America will turn its superpower status into profit,” said The Economist in an article.

    “Instead it will make the world more dangerous, and America weaker and poorer,” it added. 

    MIL OSI China News