Category: Scandinavia

MIL-OSI United Nations: General Assembly Debates Russian Federation’s Security Council Veto of European Amendments Seeking ‘Just’ Peace in Ukraine Based on United Nations Charter

Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

The General Assembly today addressed what many delegations decried as “misuse” of the Security Council veto by the Russian Federation on 24 February — the third anniversary of its aggression against Ukraine.

On that day, Moscow vetoed two of the three European proposals seeking to align the United States-authored draft resolution with the Charter of the United Nations. The two amendments — one inserting a reference to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and another adding a reference to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in line with the UN Charter — garnered 9 and 11 votes in favour, respectively, but were not adopted due to the negative votes cast by the Russian Federation. The other amendment seeking to insert a reference to Moscow’s “full-scale invasion” of Ukraine failed to obtain enough votes to pass. In the end, the text tabled by the United States was adopted as resolution 2774 (2025) by a vote of 10 in favour to none against, with 5 abstentions (Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, United Kingdom), without any amendments.

Opening today’s plenary, Philémon Yang (Cameroon), President of the General Assembly, expressed regret over another meeting pursuant to A/RES/76/262 following the casting of the veto by a permanent member of the Council — noting that the frequency of vetoes has continued to rise since 2022. Affirming that Council and Assembly efforts must be complementary, he noted that, while the Veto initiative demonstrates improvement in the United Nations’ capacity to address matters of international security, “we could do more”. Calling for the Assembly to reflect on how the outcomes of deliberations on the Veto initiative can be more binding.

He recalled that, at the eleventh Emergency Special Session on 24 February, the Assembly adopted two resolutions: “Advancing a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine” and “The Path to Peace”, reaffirming its unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

In the ensuing debate, the Russian Federation’s representative recalled the Security Council meeting on 24 February and welcomed the adoption of the United States’ text “as a step in the right direction”. The change of approach in Washington, D.C., following President Donald J. Trump’s inauguration, caught “European pseudo-peacekeepers off guard”. Allies of the Kyiv regime have been consistently putting forward anti-Russian Federation draft resolutions with no bearing on reality. Member States should not just choose Charter principles that are more to their taste, he said, as it is not a “restaurant menu”. The Kyiv regimes’ non-compliance with the Charter caused the Ukraine conflict, he stated.

However, Ukraine’s delegate stressed that the Russian Federation’s behaviour in the Council following its aggression against her country “is the most vivid example of how detrimental the misuse of the veto could be”. The Russian Federation vetoed all draft resolutions that the Council attempted to adopt in response to its aggression against Ukraine since 2014. Amendments would have reaffirmed the commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, while the resolution lacks classification of the war as an act of aggression by one Member State against another. Use of the veto should be restricted when a permanent member is directly involved in the conflict under consideration and therefore cannot be expected to exercise its voting rights and privileges in an impartial manner. “Nobody wants peace more than Ukrainians, but peace must be real, not just a word,” she stressed.

Throughout the debate, the Assembly heard a chorus of European voices condemning Russian Federation’s actions in the Council. “Let it be clear, Russia is abusing its veto power to block references to the principle of territorial integrity,” said a representative of the European Union, in its capacity as observer, also citing a second veto obstructing a call for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in line with the UN Charter. The Russian Federation has bombed Ukraine cities daily as part of its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression. “Russia is undermining the core principles of our multilateral system,” she stated, adding: “We cannot accept an equivalence between the aggressor and the victim of aggression.”

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MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: With Yemen Poised for Renewed Conflict, Insufficient Aid and Environmental Crisis, Security Council Hears Political Process, Humanitarian Funding Urgently Needed

Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

“Numbers in My Next Briefings Will Be Worse,” Says Emergency Relief Coordinator

Fear of Yemen plunging back into widespread conflict is “palpable”, the United Nations’ top official in that country told the Security Council today, calling on the parties to refrain from military posturing and instead agree on a nationwide ceasefire.

“I see and hear the deep frustration of the Yemeni people who continue to bear the heavy burden of a decade of war” and whose grinding hardship “only deepens”, said Hans Grundberg, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. He added that gross domestic product (GDP) per capita has more than halved, the Yemeni rial in Government-controlled areas has fallen by 50 per cent in the last year and poverty has surged across the country.

Even though large-scale ground operations have not resumed since the UN-mediated truce was implemented in April 2022, he reported that military activity continues. On that, he voiced concern over recent reports of shelling, drone attacks, infiltration attempts and mobilization campaigns recently witnessed in Ma’rib, Al Jawf, Shabwa and Ta’iz. Relatedly, he warned against a rise in rhetoric from the parties, who are pre-positioning themselves publicly for military confrontation. Words, intent and signals matter, and “escalatory discourse can have real consequences”, he added.

Stressing that his team remains “undeterred” amid enormous challenges, he highlighted its recent, relentless engagement with both Yemeni and international stakeholders. To settle the conflict, the parties must agree on a nationwide ceasefire and a mechanism to implement it. Furthermore, he underlined the need for a political process that includes “a broad spectrum of Yemenis that will allow this conflict to settle once and for all”.

While welcoming the continued cessation of attacks by Ansar Allah on vessels in the Red Sea and targets in Israel during the last month, he emphasized that “enabling environments for peace can be fragile and fleeting” and “positive developments must be put on a more-permanent footing”. Reiterating his determination to convene the parties at any opportunity to end this decade-long conflict, he stated: “We owe it to the millions of Yemenis not to waver or falter in our determination on this.”

“I am not here to defend programmes, spreadsheets and institutions, but people,” said Tom Fletcher, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. Severe funding cuts are a “body blow”, he stressed. Humanitarian coordinators are analysing where to make dramatic cuts, as well as “the implications of the tough choices we are making on which lives not to save”, he added. On the United States’ designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, he said that it is vital to ensure civilians in Yemen have access to essential food and medicine — whether through commercial or humanitarian channels.

Continuing, he observed that 9.6 million women and girls in Yemen are in severe need of life-saving humanitarian assistance, while 1.5 million girls remain out of school — preventing them from breaking cycles of discrimination. “As your funding for Yemen evaporates, the numbers in my next briefings will be worse,” he warned, adding that more women will die and more will be forced into survival sex, begging, coerced prostitution, human trafficking and selling their children. And yet, he noted, women remain on the frontlines of survival and recovery — 40 per cent of the Yemen Humanitarian Fund goes to women-led organizations, most of which are local.

Also briefing the Council today was Nesmah M. Ali, civil-society representative from the Peace Track Initiative, who said that Yemen’s myriad crises have weakened State institutions, collapsed social protection systems and created multidimensional insecurities. Recalling that she was forced to leave her hometown in 2020, she stated: “I am a migrant of conflict and climate change.” The war has devastated Yemen’s environment, she said, adding that attacks on oil refineries and ports, landmines in fields and coastal areas and destruction of power stations and water systems have left that country in ruins.

And climate change is deepening Yemen’s crisis, she stressed, as floods displace landmines, complicate demining actions and exacerbate pre-war intertribal conflicts over scarce resources. While women are disproportionately affected by climate change and more vulnerable to natural disasters, their stories of determination — “amid vanishing fish, ruined crops and deferred dreams” — highlight their unwavering strength, and she urged the Council to prioritize the impact of climate change and conflict on gender equality.

Council Members Condemn Detentions

In the ensuing discussion, many Council members condemned the ongoing detention by the Houthis — officially known as Ansar Allah — of UN personnel and the tragic death of a World Food Programme (WFP) staff member in their captivity.

Among them was Panama’s delegate, who called for the immediate and unconditional release of all humanitarian and diplomatic personnel, as well as respect for their fundamental human rights. The representative of France urged the Houthis to end all threats and disinformation campaigns against humanitarian actors. Picking up that thread, the United Kingdom’s delegate expressed support for the UN’s decision to pause humanitarian operations in Saada, describing this pause as “a direct consequence” of the Houthi threat undermining the security and safety of aid workers.

United States Designates Houthis as Terrorist Organization, Others Urge Dialogue

The representative of the United States said that her country is taking concrete steps to eliminate the Houthis’ capabilities by designating them as a foreign terrorist organization and using targeted sanctions to deprive them of illicit revenues. “Our sanctions seek to preserve space for legitimate activities that support Yemenis living in Houthi-controlled territory who bear no responsibility for the Houthis’ malign actions,” she stressed. Washington, D.C., will also take steps to stop Iran’s support for Houthi terrorism, and she added: “We will take action against the Houthis should they resume their reckless attacks in the Red Sea and surrounding waterways and on Israel.”

However, her counterpart from the Russian Federation called on the United States Government to reconsider its decision to designate Ansar Allah as a terrorist organization, stressing that “openly antagonising one of the key sides to the conflict will do no good”. The voices of all political forces must be considered, and the ineffective logic of maximum pressure abandoned, he stressed, drawing attention to Moscow’s proposal to create a framework for collective security in the Persian Gulf.

Pakistan’s delegate also emphasized the critical role of dialogue, highlighting regional initiatives led by Saudi Arabia and Oman. He also noted that there have been no new attacks on commercial shipping since the onset of the ceasefire in Gaza. “While we unequivocally condemn such attacks,” he added that it is crucial to acknowledge that “the absence of the attacks coincides with the maintenance of the ceasefire in Gaza”.

While also welcoming the pause in attacks in the Red Sea and on Israel, the representative of the Republic of Korea voiced concern over the Houthis’ “repeatedly declared” readiness to resume such attacks if the hard-won ceasefire and hostage deal in Gaza breaks down. “This is simply unacceptable,” he asserted.

Speakers Underline Nexus between Conflict and Environment

On the fragile situation on the ground, the speaker for Greece said that “the risk of military escalation has not eclipsed”. As a historic seafaring nation, Greece supports the freedom of navigation and is committed to safeguarding maritime security in the region. Highlighting the interconnectedness of climate, peace and security, he said that the FSO Safer and the Greek-flagged MV Sounion cases demonstrated the conflict’s environmental and humanitarian consequences.

The convergence of prolonged conflict, environmental degradation and climate change has created a perfect storm of crises in Yemen, echoed Denmark’s delegate, Council President for March, speaking in her national capacity. As the world’s third-most vulnerable country to climate change, Yemen is highly affected by climate-induced disasters, she observed, urging the Council to ensure that climate considerations are integrated into peacebuilding strategies, local mediation efforts and a future peace settlement process.

Also highlighting the impact of climate change and conflict on food and water insecurity, the representative of Slovenia — whose country is a founding member of the Global Alliance to Spare Water from Armed Conflicts — called for the protection and development of water resources and infrastructure in Yemen. “We strongly believe that water issues can be an entry point for grassroots dialogue and mutual understanding between parties, as well as empowering women,” he added.

Painting a grim picture of the dire humanitarian situation in Yemen, Sierra Leone’s delegate — who also spoke for Algeria, Guyana and Somalia — called for increased support for the 2025 Humanitarian Response Plan. “Despite shrinking aid budgets, we recognize the tireless efforts of humanitarian organizations and their personnel to meet the urgent needs of the Yemeni people,” he said. China’s representative also urged States to increase humanitarian assistance and prioritize food security, emphasizing that “a political solution is a fundamental way out of the Yemeni issue”.

Yemen’s Speaker Urges Aid Organizations Relocate to Aden

As the conflict enters its eleventh year, the Yemeni people aspire to peace, said that country’s representative. However, these aspirations could not materialize due to the destructive approach of Iran-backed Houthi militias who rejected all efforts to that end, he said, welcoming the United States’ designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization. He underscored the importance of strategic partnerships to support the Government’s efforts to end the coup, restore State institutions and extend State authority over all Yemeni soil.

He further stressed that, despite the economic, humanitarian, social and institutional challenges caused by the war, the Government is making “tremendous efforts” to address currency depreciation and unemployment. Condemning the ongoing detention of international personnel, he cautioned that the militias “will not stop their blackmailing of the international community”. Accordingly, he urged the UN and other international organizations to transfer their headquarters to Aden, the temporary capital.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0146/2025

Source: European Parliament

Rasa Juknevičienė, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Riho Terras, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Andrzej Halicki
on behalf of the PPE Group

B10‑0146/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

– having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

– having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted on 11 March 2022 at the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

– having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

– having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)[1],

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility [2],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union [3],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092 [4],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[5],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[6],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020 [7],

– having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security (JOIN(2025)0009),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [8],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008),

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

– having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

– having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, published on 18 July 2024,

– having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, published in April 2024, and in particular the section thereof entitled ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and in particular Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and to the NATO Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

– having regard to the joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,

– having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,

– having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

– having regard to the speeches and statements made at the Munich Security Conference on 14-16 February 2025,

– having regard to the statements made at the Leaders Meeting on Ukraine, held in London on 2 March 2025,

– having regard to the temporary halt of all United States military aid to Ukraine,

– having regard to the statement by the President of the Commission of 4 March 2025 on the defence package, the ReArm Europe Plan,

– having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the security situation in Europe has seen an unprecedented deterioration over the past years; whereas there is a common understanding that Europe needs to be able to effectively address European security challenges and achieve a state of defence readiness;

B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and on the global order as a whole;

C. whereas despite previous signs and warnings, many countries have not taken the necessary defence measures; whereas the goal of committing 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) to defence spending agreed by NATO members in 2014 is still not being met by all NATO members in the EU; whereas the gap between the 2 % goal and the actual defence spending by EU Member States amounts to EUR 1 770 billion over the 2006-2022 period [9]; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies were expected to exceed NATO’s 2 % defence investment guideline, compared to only nine in 2023;

D. whereas as a result of these investment gaps, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

E. whereas the Draghi report highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade and highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB; whereas the lending policy of the European Investment Bank (EIB) excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

F. whereas the Niinistö report underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating environment outside of the EU; whereas it insists that this preparedness is necessary for the EU and its Member States to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the EU lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security;

G. whereas Russia’s continued armament efforts and its cooperation with other authoritarian powers on armaments, vastly surpassing European stocks and production capacities, pose the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties in particular with the autocratic leaderships of China, Iran and North Korea in order to achieve its objectives;

H. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberattacks, attacks against underwater infrastructure, economic pressures, food and energy blackmailing, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence; whereas the EU should take these kind of threats seriously in its defence and security policies;

I. whereas the recent actions and statements by the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe;

J. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in eastern Europe, but also in countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood partnership and beyond;

K. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to the EU’s security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management and mitigation of illegal migration;

L. whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter the challenges and protect its strategic interests;

M. whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and, alongside the Baltic Sea, has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while at the same time facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

O. whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests; whereas China has promoted an alternative narrative for many years, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

P. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, and replenish depleted stocks;

Q. whereas in 2024, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) and a European defence industry programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the improvement of EU defence capabilities and the governance, security of supply and integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) into its EU counterpart, the EDTIB;

R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

S. whereas in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with drafting a white paper on the future of European defence, which is due to be published on 19 March 2025;

1. Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence must put forward concrete measures and options to the members of the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and much needed efforts can be made, in the shortest possible time frames, which must address the following pressing needs: to urgently and substantially increase defence capabilities, overcome fragmentation in the European defence industry market, enhance the capacity of the EDTIB, promptly identify and implement pragmatic solutions for the considerable funding needs, deepen EU-NATO cooperation through a robust European pillar in NATO, and ensure an increase in our military support to Ukraine and other neighbouring countries that share our European values;

2. Calls on Council President António Costa to immediately convene the European Council, based on the conclusions of the white paper, so that EU leaders can agree on immediate and far-reaching decisions to implement the European Defence Union as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU and elaborate on the measures identified in the white paper; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

3. Reiterates its previous calls to take seriously the direct and indirect threat of a Russian attack against the EU and to prepare urgently, without any further delay, to do the utmost to improve European military capacities in order to ensure that Europe is ready for the most extreme military contingencies; calls therefore for the threat analysis of the EU’s Strategic Compass to be updated and upgraded to a threat assessment and for the measures within the compass to be adapted accordingly, in order to reflect the threat magnitude in our threat environment;

4. Strongly believes that Europeans must take on greater responsibility within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent, and hence underlines that a strong and robust European pillar in NATO is the best way to foster our transatlantic security and ensure the security of all Europeans; recalls that a true transatlantic partnership means shared responsibility, joint efforts and equal burden-sharing;

5. Stresses the importance of learning from Ukraine’s experience in countering Russian aggression and calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

6. Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European way of life, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; reiterates thus that the EU will support Ukraine for as long as it takes for Ukraine to win this war, as a forced surrender by Ukraine and acceptance of a ‘peace’ treaty on Putin’s terms could accelerate the timeline for Russia to shift its aggression toward the EU or NATO; urges the EU, accordingly, to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for the support of Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine in order to ramp up local production and enhance cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defence companies; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine;

7. Emphasises the need for a holistic approach to European security, ensuring that all EU policies incorporate defence and security dimensions, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments;

8. Believes that the EU should develop economic cooperation contingency plans to prepare for mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and should deepen economic and defence industrial dialogues in relation to early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyberthreats, in order to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime and underwater safety, and other forms of deeper defence industrial cooperation; calls, in cooperation with NATO, for an enhanced response to Russia’s hybrid war that aims at destabilising not only Ukraine but the whole European continent;

Addressing capability gaps

9. Underlines the need to urgently address the gaps in military equipment and ammunition by building on the success of the EDIRPA and ASAP programmes and to swiftly finalise EDIP so that, through common procurement, our common European and Ukrainian capabilities are increased and our stocks of crucial defence equipment and ammunition are replenished; welcomes EDIP’s potential to improve the defence capabilities of the EU and its Member States, to strengthen security of supply and to improve the effectiveness and coherence of EU efforts through new governance structures; stresses that EDIP’s financial envelope will fall well short of meeting the ambitions laid out in EDIP and calls, therefore, for additional funding sources to be identified immediately and to include exploring the possibility of reallocations within the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), notably with regard to European defence projects of common interest and to the Ukraine support instrument that currently lacks any funding; stresses, with regard to the threat assessment of a possible Russian attack on EU and NATO territory within the next few years, the urgent need for EDIP to be implemented swiftly and for additional and substantial funding to be provided for joint European defence efforts before the next MFF;

10. Calls for the need for a significant increase in availability of strategic enablers in the air, maritime, underwater, space and cyber domains to be addressed without delay;

11. Suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the lines of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; calls for the closure of PESCO projects that do not deliver results and/or do not provide added value in the closing of capability gaps and/or European defence readiness; stresses, in the light of the limited financial envelope of the EDF, that duplicated efforts, especially in crucial capability areas such as the hypersonic interceptor or future main battle tank systems, waste EU tax payers’ money, will prolong development efforts and thus increase the probability of procurement of such capabilities from the US, thus undermining the ambition laid out in EDIS;

12. Calls for the architecture of the EU Defence Industrial Toolbox to be rationalised, as more financial resources alone will not ensure success, since it is even more important that these resources are spent in a more efficient and effective manner;

13. Underlines the need to ensure coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the NATO capability targets, without delay, to foster complementarity and to prevent dysfunctional duplications; calls for a concrete action plan to be drawn up, including a clear timeline for each priority in line with both the CDP and the NATO Defence Planning Process;

14. Welcomes the proposal for European defence projects of common interest on the development of common capabilities which go beyond the financial means of an individual Member State, such as a European air shield, autonomous space access and space surveillance, transport and communication capabilities, sovereign digital infrastructures, sovereign cloud infrastructure, long-range precision strike capabilities and integrated air defence, as well as complex maritime and underwater protective assets; stresses that the EU’s efforts in missile defence need to be aligned and integrated with NATO support for the European Sky Shield Initiative, driven by EU Member States; stresses the need to ensure adequate funding, to be established well before 2028, in order to deliver results with regard to the threat analyses of a possible Russian attack against EU and NATO territory within the next few years;

15. Calls for the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection operating in alignment with NATO while maintaining EU autonomy; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

16. Calls for the EU to further accelerate the implementation of military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from ‘mobility’ to ‘military logistics’; stresses the need for significant investment in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, fuel infrastructure through depots, ports, air, sea and rail transport platforms, railway lines, waterways, roads, bridges and logistic hubs; stresses that this must be done in cooperation with NATO by drafting a strategic plan for developing mobility;

17. Underlines the need to quickly agree on additional common European military forces, given that the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) designed as a crisis management instrument provides only a limited European capability to react and support NATO efforts in the event of Russian aggression against EU and NATO territory; recommends, therefore, that the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 be revived and that the RDC be gradually extended to ultimately establish a European corps of 60 000 troops, which should be part of a permanent EU structure while being integrated into NATO’s force model;

18. Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened;

Fostering the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)

19. Calls for a significant increase in common procurement by EU Member States of required European defence equipment and capabilities; calls on the Member States to aggregate demand by procuring defence equipment jointly, with the possibility of granting the Commission a mandate to procure on their behalf, ideally ensuring a long-term planning horizon for the EDTIB, thus improving the EDTIB’s production capacities and the interoperability of the European armed forces, and making efficient use of taxpayers’ money through economies of scale;

20. Underlines the outstanding success of the EU’s first joint procurement instrument, EDIRPA, by incentivising joint procurement by Member States; believes that there is a need to continue mechanisms similar to EDIRPA and ASAP while increasing the share of funding for joint procurements compared to support measures for research and development;

21. Believes that the development of the EU’s joint capability should be based on risk analysis provided in threat assessments and on the impact of projects on mitigating the EU’s joint security risks;

22. Believes that it is necessary to conduct systematic analyses of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine from a technology usage perspective, and analyses of the necessity of EU and NATO standards in comparison to how they affect the cost of technology and products compared to their usage effectiveness;

23. Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises and new market entrants through simplified access to funding, reduced regulatory barriers, and dedicated support mechanisms for scaling up operations; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production;

24. Highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by involving companies throughout the EU in the production of defence equipment and by distributing production facilities throughout the EU in order to improve security of supply, increase attractiveness of EU defence cooperation and, above all, enhance the resilience of the supply network, thus reducing our vulnerability in the event of an armed attack;

25. Calls for the review and adaptation of current and future legislation with regard to negative effects on the EDTIB, especially concerning production capacities and security of supply; calls for an extended mapping, in cooperation with the EDTIB, to identify all horizontal hindrances in the current legislation; calls for a detailed action plan to be developed to resolve the issues as soon as possible; underlines the need to review, simplify and harmonise the current framework for export licences and intra-EU transfer licences, as well as for cross-certification of equipment, as one of the priorities to foster better cooperation within the market and among Member States;

26. Strongly underlines the need to significantly increase our investment in emerging and disruptive technologies and structures in defence, taking care not to disperse our resources across too many projects, including cyber defence, outer space, complex underwater protective assets, novel materials and manufacturing, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and sovereign cloud infrastructure, high-performance computing, the internet of things, robotics, biotechnology and nanotechnology;

27. Calls on the Commission to leverage the full dual-use potential of space technologies, considering space as both a new operating domain and a critical enabler of multi-domain operations; underlines that the EU currently has a substantial gap in space capabilities compared to its main competitors and stresses that, in order to address this gap in space technologies, already existing flagship projects (i.e. Copernicus and Galileo) should be enhanced for defence applications; suggests, furthermore, that the EU should urgently pursue the development of its IRIS2 constellation, together with the development of further EU common projects, for example, for space domain awareness and space-based missile early-warning applications;

28. Recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyberthreats in real time;

29. Highlights the importance of the involvement of other industrial actors that do not undertake defence-related activities as potential partners in scaling up production when necessary;

30. Calls for the EU to foster stronger collaboration between our armed forces, academia, industries and investors;

Ensuring pragmatic sources of finance

31. Calls on the Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal containing a binding commitment for Member States to reach a minimum threshold of 3 % of their GDP on defence expenditure by 2026, with the need to further increase it to 4 % by 2028 and to commit at least 0.5 % of their GDP to EU common defence; stresses that, in the light of three decades of underinvestment, the current threat to the EU requires much higher defence investment, while underlining that the EU budget can only complement but can never replace the efforts of the Member States in that regard; emphasises that national defence investment by Member States will continue to serve as the backbone of defence readiness, while EU funding and its role in harmonising and streamlining the processes may have an important impact in enhancing and multiplying these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to work and agree on specific ways and means to achieve a short- to long-term substantial increase in public and private investment in defence and security on the national and European levels;

32. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement on the ReArm Europe Plan;

33. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to activate the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact;

34. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a new instrument providing EUR 150 billion in loans to Member States for joint defence investment;

35. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to direct more funds towards defence-related investment, including making it possible for cohesion policy programmes to be used;

36. Calls for a system of European defence bonds to be explored for financing large-scale military investments up front, ensuring urgent capability development; calls for clear allocation criteria prioritising joint capability development, research and innovation, and military mobility infrastructure; calls, along the same lines, for the use of unused ‘coronabonds’ for defence instruments to be explored;

37. Underlines the role of public-private partnerships which are essential to finance defence investment; proposes, therefore, a dedicated EU instrument incentivising private investment in defence following the example of InvestEU;

38. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to take action to mobilise private capital through an acceleration of the Savings and Investment Union and through the EIB; calls for an urgent revision of the EIB’s lending policy and immediate flexibility to remove current restrictions on financing ammunition, weapons and equipment or infrastructure dedicated to military use; stresses that this fundamental reform is necessary to unlock significant investment potential for the European defence sector, and to foster risk-sharing instruments to facilitate commercial bank lending to the sector; urges the EIB to take the necessary steps to facilitate private investment in defence, ensuring that the financial landscape supports the growing needs of the industry;

39. Demands a review of past and new legislation and taxonomy to ensure that they are best suited to advance our European defence industry;

40. Believes that environmental, social and governance criteria and taxonomy rules and their interpretation by rating agencies are an obstacle to ensuring increased public finance for defence and hence calls on the Commission to address this issue by, among other things, adapting the regulation on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector [10] with a view to explicitly ruling out a classification of the defence industry as sustainably or socially harmful;

Supporting innovation

41. Calls for the establishment of an EU agency, inspired by the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as part of the European Defence Agency, which should be solely responsible for supporting research in emerging and disruptive technologies, equipped with an adequate amount of venture capital; emphasises the need for expanded research and development funding to ensure participation by all Member States through the creation of specialised ‘hubs’;

42. Believes in the need to increase the funding for academic research programmes to cooperate with the defence industry to ensure long-term in-depth research in defence;

Finalising the common market for defence

43. Urges Member States to stop invoking Article 346 TFEU as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive [11], thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to close this loophole by immediately launching a review of this directive, as well as of the Intra-Community Transfer Directive [12], which is scheduled for the second half of 2025, and to recast both regulations as soon as possible with a view to strengthening the common market for defence, as well as to introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like those we are currently facing;

44. Calls for the transformation of NATO standards into EU legislation in order to facilitate the interoperability of European armed forces while strengthening our capacity to negotiate these standards within NATO and to enforce the consistent implementation of these standard in practice;

45. Presses for a common European certification scheme for weapons systems and a move beyond the current system of national certification in order to speed up the introduction of weapons systems into the armed forces of Member States;

Fostering effective governance

46. Deplores the lack of cohesion and effectiveness of EU defence structures and instruments resulting from the loose institutional connection between the Council and the Commission, which not only significantly limits the added value and the effectiveness of cooperation in the EU framework but also results in the ineffective use of taxpayers’ money;

47. Calls for the creation of a permanent Council of EU defence ministers;

48. Suggests that the Commissioner for Defence and Space should become the head of the European Defence Agency and should also be nominated as the coordinator for PESCO projects by recasting the respective Council decisions;

49. Encourages the creation of a ‘defence readiness board’ as proposed in EDIP, led by the Defence Commissioner, which should meet frequently in different configurations, for example, EU defence ministers, national procurement directors and industry representatives;

50. Believes that the Defence Commissioner should exercise supervision over the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and military operations;

51. Suggests that the funding for PESCO and the European Defence Agency be transferred into the common EU budget;

52. Highlights the need for enhanced and effective parliamentary scrutiny in the area of defence, given its importance and the effects on other areas of increasing investment in defence; calls, therefore, for the establishment of an interinstitutional agreement ensuring Parliament’s access to classified information and the provision of physical infrastructure to that end, allowing for committee meetings to be conducted under the classification of EU restricted, or an even higher security classification;

Fostering EU-NATO complementarity

53. Calls for a true strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of cooperation, as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and underlines that only together can we ensure our security and long-term prosperity;

54. Underlines the need for an agreement on the exchange of classified information between the EU and NATO;

55. Calls for the establishment of a regular joint armament conference between the EU and NATO in order to coordinate and align efforts with regard to capability development;

56. Recalls the need to ensure frequent EU-NATO meetings and summits on political and experts levels, in an inclusive, non-discriminatory and reciprocal manner;

57. Calls for the EU to reinforce the Structured Dialogue with NATO on the defence industry in order to enhance cooperation in key areas such as interoperability and standardisation;

Fostering cooperation with non-EU partners

58. Recalls that there is no alternative to strong and sustainable transatlantic cooperation and thus believes that every effort must be made to foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sectors, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop our sovereignty;

59. Underlines the need to enhance our partnership with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for an EU-UK broad security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

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60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the parliaments and governments of the EU Member States and NATO member countries.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0150/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0150/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood, and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action;

B. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are expected to present a white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025, which should serve as a roadmap for such action;

1. Urges the EU to act immediately to ensure its ability to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful defender of the rules-based international order and the principles of the European security architecture; urges the EU and its Member States to define a coherent, comprehensive and actionable strategy to achieve this; expects the Commission to present a proposal for such a strategy in its white paper on the future of European defence;

2. Is firmly convinced that a united EU can overcome all the challenges it faces and become a global power for peace, security, human rights and sustainable development, but that this requires a strong EU budget or additional European financial instruments, a reliable and sovereign industrial basis, a full spectrum of European military capabilities, including strategic enablers, and an integrated command allowing all national forces to act under a unified structure at the service of the EU, alone or in complementarity with other allied forces;

3. Believes that the strategy must include a renewed threat assessment, reflecting the recent unprecedented changes in the EU’s geopolitical context, a plan for supporting Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression, as a key action to defend the EU’s values and protect its citizens and territory, a roadmap to close the capability gap, restore deterrence and enable autonomous EU action, and a plan to finance such vital transformations in the EU’s capacity to act;

4. Stresses its firm commitment to continued close cooperation with NATO to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls nonetheless for the development of a fully-capable European Pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary;

Assessing our threats and challenges

5. Is convinced that the EU needs to define its foreign policy goals and strategic defence doctrine, identifying the most pressing challenges, systemic threats and rival actors, and to shape its defence strategy accordingly;

6. Strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the Second World War; believes that Russia and its allies are currently the most significant threat to our security and that of EU candidate countries and partners, and reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, that the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power, the increased aggressiveness of some middle powers and the behaviour of the Trump administration, which appears ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same, must also be fully taken into consideration;

7. Highlights the fact that on assessments by several European intelligence services, Russia will be ready to attack EU territory within 3 to 10 years, particularly if there is a ceasefire in its aggression against Ukraine that does not lead to a just and lasting peace; notes with deep concern that the Russian armed forces have grown in size and gained valuable battlefield experience, unlike any European forces with the exception of those of Ukraine, aims to have a 1.5 million-strong military by 2026 and has significantly ramped up its armaments production, making it an extremely worrisome threat for the EU’s security and for peace in Europe and globally;

8. Strongly condemns Russia’s escalating hybrid warfare tactics within the EU and its neighbourhood, which encompass both non-physical and physical actions, including attacks on critical infrastructure and disruption of elections; highlights that Russia’s strategic doctrine includes significant conventional conflict in its conception and execution of hybrid war and conceives hybrid wars as the main line of future military development, rather than a temporary phenomenon; calls for the EU to immediately and significantly step up its ability to defend, attribute and punish hybrid warfare waged within its territory and that of candidate countries;

9. Condemns all countries that are providing military equipment, financial support or any other form of assistance to Russia, thereby enabling and intensifying its ongoing aggression; warns of the very serious risks resulting from a widening of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned that the involvement of Iran and North Korea will provide them with important lessons to modernise their military capabilities, and may accelerate their paths towards nuclearisation;

10. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses serious concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns China’s supplying of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry;

11. Notes with concern the increase in both intra and inter-state conflicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, in part driven by the hegemonic ambitions of several middle powers, the presence of aggressive non-state actors and by the fragility of several states; also notes that this leads to clear threats to the EU’s security, namely by fostering terrorism and increasing the destabilisation of populations, often forcing their displacement;

12. Is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the Trump administration, which distance it from the values that have been at the core of its relationship with the EU, namely democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and support for the rules-based international order; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression, as well as the unilateral decision to end Russia’s international isolation and to propose a normalisation of relations between them; strongly condemns any attempt to blame Ukraine, the victim, for the actions of the aggressor, Russia; urges the US Government to maintain maximum pressure on Russia until the latter agrees to a just and lasting peace for Ukraine; rejects any attempt by the US Government to impose a new security architecture on the EU and its Member States, and reiterates that any negotiation of such a security architecture must take place with the EU at the table; is deeply concerned by the actions of the US Government towards NATO and the doubts raised regarding the United States’ commitment to the security of the European continent; supports the peace process for Ukraine launched by European leaders, together with Ukraine, on 2 March 2025 in London, which seeks a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and crime of aggression, Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and credible security guarantees for Ukraine;

13. Concurs with the assessment of the Strategic Compass that the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts, but notes that in the meantime the situation has changed dramatically; believes that, altogether, these developments produce an encirclement of Europe that reduces its scope for the pursuit of democratically defined and autonomous interests and values, and that this requires an immediate response; recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and therefore calls for the EU to conduct more frequent threat assessments, as they are the precondition for a realistic and successful planning of capabilities and operations;

Supporting Ukraine

14. Urges the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, to immediately increase their military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against the Russian war of aggression according to Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets in order to maintain and step up the EU’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

15. Urges the Member States to immediately engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities, in particular ammunition for air defence and artillery, as well as any capabilities in which US assistance has played a key role thus far; further urges them to plan in advance for a possible sudden stop in US military assistance;

16. Welcomes the continued support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has already trained more than 60 000 Ukrainian troops, and calls on the mission to continue training as many troops as possible; stresses the importance of specific training modules aimed at developing the capacities of existing and future officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; emphasises that the mission should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices that would ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including training operations in Ukrainian territory;

17. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for speedier integration of the Ukrainian defence industry; recalls the importance of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to that effect, and highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIP’s Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; calls on the Commission to include Ukraine and its defence industry in all its defence industrial programmes;

18. Praises the ‘Danish Model’ for support to Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics as well as greater ease of training and maintenance;

19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

Closing the capabilities gap and restoring deterrence

20. Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, while making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO;

21. Calls on the Commission to come up with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are all done through a European lens, and that all EU funds are used as a stimulus to joint EU action, instead of perpetuating the present state of market fragmentation, divergent and incompatible capabilities, and superfluous and wasteful investments; considers EDIP to be a good step forward and as such calls for its swift adoption;

22. Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of the current capabilities and capability gap; calls on the Commission, with the support of the European Defence Agency and in cooperation with NATO, to identify critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU, in particular for strategic enablers, where the Member States have fallen behind and become dependent on non-European allies; furthermore, calls on the Commission to transform the capability gaps into clear industrial targets that can be the object of planning and programming and benefit from an industrial policy;

23. Declares the EDTIB to be a strategic asset of the EU, and as such considers that the Commission should be tasked with its mapping and monitoring, so as to safeguard the EU’s strengths, reduce its vulnerabilities, avoid crises, and provide it with an effective and efficient industrial policy; calls on the Commission to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise in the definition of defence industries’ priorities and the formulation of defence initiatives in order to ensure alignment between industrial capabilities and military needs; recalls the importance of ensuring that the EDTIB is present in all Member States, distributing the burden and the benefits equitably, and preventing its disruption by a targeted attack on a particular area;

24. Strongly believes that EU support for the production and procurement of defence products should focus on stimulating the EDTIB, increasing production volumes and ensuring the development of native European solutions for key capabilities, in particular for domains of action where we have so far relied on support from allies, and thus be oriented towards EU-based companies; rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, whether for production of capabilities or their deployment; notes with concern that the vast majority of EU defence investment is diverted to defence industry players outside the EU; highlights that our investments should also contribute to bringing our European allies closer together, first and foremost Ukraine, but also Norway and the UK, finding synergies between complementary industrial strengths and bolstering the interoperability of our fighting forces; states, however, that joining common projects in defence and security requires a steadfast commitment to the EU’s values and norms and demands that any industrial partnerships with non-EU allies include strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority, ensuring that we do not face restrictions on the use of the capabilities acquired; highlights that EU funds will provide opportunities for the defence industry, but also require a commitment to give priority to orders linked to ensuring European security and defence, in particular in times of crisis;

25. Urges the Member States to radically change the way they procure defence products, choosing common procurement by default, and to consider tasking the Commission with undertaking joint procurement on their behalf; considers that all products procured in the EU, particularly those supported by EU funds, must respect strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority;

26. Welcomes all measures that allow a faster and more effective ramp-up of production of defence products in Europe, in particular those that are most needed for a land war; calls for a change in paradigm from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with stock piles of materiel ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in developing wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and to deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners;

27. Highlights that the EDTIB cannot thrive without a true single market for defence; emphasises, in this regard, the need for an effective regulatory framework aimed at encouraging innovation and cross-border cooperation in production, procurement and investment; insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU and calls on the Commission to act upon the results of the reviews of the Directives on the transfer of defence-related products [1] and defence procurement [2], considering the obstacles and costs imposed by the current fragmented framework for certification of defence products; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation for common rules on the certification of defence products and the creation of a European defence certification authority; underlines at the same time the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different undertakings in the single market for defence; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation on the standardisation of defence products with binding industrial standards, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the implementation of NATO defence standards;

28. Stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European levels on arms exports; points out the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, while acknowledging their competences in their defence acquisition policies;

29. Underlines the importance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; reiterates its regret that Member States continue to not make full use of the PESCO framework; reiterates its call on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, and with the involvement of the Commission, to assess projects and their potential regularly and comprehensively with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects; believes that priority projects must focus on reducing our dependencies regarding strategic enablers, such as battlefield command and control (C2), aerial and satellite intelligence, surveillance and recognition, satellite communication, air defence and suppression of enemy air defences, military mobility, strategic and tactical air transport and aerial refuelling, missile and deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, combat engineering and wet-gap crossing, and airborne electronic attack; believes that these could be European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); regrets that Parliament is not in a position to properly scrutinise PESCO projects and calls for a change of paradigm for the governance of EDPCIs, such that Parliament is adequately involved; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year;

30. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should learn from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drones and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

31. Calls on the Commission to step up the ambition of the European Defence Fund, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to better align its work programme with the capability planning exercises; recalls that the EU’s investment in defence research and innovation is much lower than that of its industrial competitors; considers that part of the investment from the European Defence Fund (EDF) should be designed to foster partnerships between academia, ministries of defence and the defence industry, and to the creation of dedicated research centres for defence; highlights the importance of promoting the participation of the most innovative high-tech companies from the civilian sector in the EDF;

32. Recalls that the EDTIB is currently facing a shortage of skilled workers, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a strategy to train, upskill and reskill workers; considers that funding from defence programmes must be paired with requirements regarding benefits for workers and communities where the investments are located, making the European defence industry a source of high-quality jobs and earning the EDTIB broad support from the population;

33. Calls for the EU and its Member States to quickly improve the state of military mobility and logistics, removing all unnecessary obstacles that slow down the speed at which the EU can react to threats and deploy its forces;

34. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive set of instruments to detect, prevent and react to hybrid attacks and threats and protect the Union’s citizens and assets, including critical infrastructure, but also democratic institutions and processes; reiterates its call on the Member States, the European External Action Service and the Commission to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats against the EU as a whole to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI;

35. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among the Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness and to be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), particularly in the area of crisis management; calls on the Member States to use the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) as an effective intelligence-sharing body to share intelligence securely, formulate a common strategic culture and provide strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU military staff, the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability;

36. Welcomes the Niinistö report and its recommendations for strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and resilience; supports the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of the EU institutions, the Member States, civil society and individual citizens in strengthening the Union’s security framework; urges the EU to increase the alignment of existing EU instruments and policies, as well as that between EU and national policies, pioneering a ‘preparedness in all policies’ approach to security and defence, ensuring they do not generate contradictory obligations or jeopardise overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis; expects the upcoming EU strategy on preparedness to offer details of the implementation of the report;

Enabling autonomous EU action

37. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU and its Member States with a framework for strengthening the EU’s security and defence and for advancing towards a common forward-looking strategic culture; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with the corresponding political will, adequate financial contributions and openness to cooperation where necessary; calls for the Member States to take all the necessary steps and decisions and fully implement the Strategic Compass; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU-s MPCC, establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity; insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops; calls on the Member States to urgently pursue a more ambitious pace and scale of command integration and joint operational capability, with the goal of enabling the EU to conduct large-scale operations independently, without reliance on non-EU countries for any capability, including strategic enablers; stresses that the EU and its Member States cannot develop consistent foreign and defence policies without strong support for democratic and agile structures and decision-making processes; underlines that further institutional discussions on removing the unanimity requirement to enhance cooperation should be explored;

38. Underlines that in the current geopolitical context, the need for continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether or not they are NATO members, is of utmost importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to present concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU;

39. Notes that EU candidate countries are frequently the target of destabilisation campaigns, and thus calls for the EU to ensure them greater support, in order to preserve stability and security and increase defence cooperation, especially in the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; is concerned that otherwise it will act as an invitation to Russia to invade them before they finally join the EU;

40. Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence, such that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and exchange of best practices; highlights that all EU-NATO cooperation must be mutually beneficial and inclusive and respect the EU’s capacity to act autonomously; remains concerned, in this respect, that Türkiye, a NATO member and EU candidate country, excludes Cyprus from cooperation with NATO, hampering an enhanced relationship between the EU and NATO;

41. Underlines the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, able to act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO, turning the transatlantic alliance into a more equal partnership, and granting the necessary security guarantees to the EU, its Member States and whoever else they deem it necessary to extend them to;

42. Considers it essential to formalise a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, FIMI and in jointly addressing shared threats;

43. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all instruments of external action, including development aid and cooperation, are aligned with the EU’s security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights; emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy and development cooperation play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-term international security; underscores that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but requires comprehensive strategies that address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change;

Financing our security and defence

44. Considers that, in order to be able to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful actor in the defence of a rules-based international order, the EU requires an immediate, substantial and sustained investment in security and defence, in particular at EU level, using a mix of public and private funds and incentivising better spending and better collective action; calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently agree on concrete financial solutions to finance security and defence-related investments; welcomes the ReArmEU initiative by the Commission as an important first step towards swift action;

45. Recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine; notes higher estimates, such as a Bruegel study referring to EUR 250 billion annually in the event that the United States withdraws its military presence from Europe; highlights that the cost of isolated action is much higher than the cost of joint action, and that the EU and its Member states can also increase their preparedness by making current investment more efficient and coordinated; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness and the consequent loss of autonomy and potential military defeat is much higher than the cost of acting decisively now;

46. Strongly supports increased investments in our security and defence to ensure that the EU and its Member States are able to face all types of threats, from hybrid to conventional, and establish strong deterrence, while reducing dependences; notes that insecurity, social exclusion and poverty are persistently weaponised by our enemies, as they make large swaths of people more vulnerable to hostile propaganda and anti-democratic narratives; demands therefore that the increased investments in our security and defence come on top of the important investments in social cohesion and welfare, and not instead of them; calls instead for a comprehensive EU investment strategy, based on a permanent fiscal capacity that addresses both vulnerabilities in military capabilities and in the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence; underlines that this pressing investment requires raising public financial resources quickly and in substantial volumes and that this should be based on the principle of social solidarity and a fair redistribution of wealth within our European societies; calls therefore on the Commission to propose new own resources and taxes on the stakeholders benefiting from the current economic and security situation, notably through windfall profits, in order to ensure a fair and sustainable contribution to our collective resilience; recalls that investing in security and defence brings many additional benefits for European society besides greater security and autonomy, and contributes to the desire to make the EU’s economy more competitive;

47. Warns that simply increasing national defence spending without addressing coordination issues, redundant efforts, and misaligned strategies could be counterproductive as it may exacerbate force integration challenges and drive up procurement costs for all Member States by intensifying competition between them; is therefore concerned by the Commission’s proposals in ReArmEU to activate the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments, which would change the fiscal rules without creating more fiscal space and without accompanying it with proposals for increased coordinated or joint spending; recalls that any exemption should take into account the need to avoid moral hazard and avoid rewarding countries with long-standing inadequacies in their security and defence spending; demands that the Commission and the Member States design any exemptions for defence spending ramp-up in a way that incentivises coordinated spending and ensures the definition of such investments takes into account all threats, including hybrid, and the need to improve military mobility, resilience and security of communications and the availability of skilled workers;

48. Calls therefore for the bulk of the effort to serve EU-level action; regrets that the Commission’s ReArmEU initiative is mostly based on national expenditure; furthermore calls for the EU and its Member States to give prominent coordination roles to the Commission and the European Defence Agency in new financing instruments, which should be coupled with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, development, procurement and management of capabilities is done together, in groupings of significant numbers of Member States, and often with the Commission and the European Defence Agency acting on their behalf;

49. Recognises that the present multiannual financial framework (MFF) is unable to provide sufficient resources for security and defence, and rejects any increases in security and defence spending in the present and future MFFs at the expense of cohesion policy funds, as proposed by the Commission in its ReArmEU initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adapt the cohesion policy funds to a new geopolitical reality, shifting from a reactive, crisis-response stance to a more proactive policy focused on resilience; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the defence spending gap, but has an important role to play; calls for additional EU-wide and European solutions to bridge the gap until the next MFF; highlights the importance of future MFFs in transforming the current immediate increases in security and defence into structural and sustainable EU-level efforts to ensure the EU’s security and defence;

50. Notes the proposals to make use of readily available sources of capital to finance security and defence, namely the unspent funds of NextGenerationEU and potential financial lines from the European Stability Mechanism, similar to the programme put together during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic; believes that these options could be explored, but would fall short of the needs estimated by the Commission;

51. Calls therefore on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crises situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect the EU’s citizens, restore deterrence and support our allies, first and foremost Ukraine; notes additional ideas to create a rearmament bank or a special purpose vehicle with pooled national guarantees to ensure Member States have easier access to markets; underlines that the meaningful involvement of Parliament as one arm of the budgetary authority in the governance of future EU defence spending is a sine qua non; reiterates that the governance of whatever instrument is used should be such that it gives rise to a European defence programme that uses the funds to solve coordination problems in planning, developing, procuring, maintaining and deploying capabilities, reduces dependencies from non-European countries, supports the EDTIB and ultimately enables the EU and its close allies to act autonomously and in a coordinated manner;

52. Recognises the importance of mobilising private capital into security and defence; recalls, however, that, as governments remain the sole procurers of military capabilities, private capital will not replace public capital in the security and defence sector; calls on the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to consider an investment guarantee programme, similar to InvestEU, to assist in this effort; calls on the EIB to re-evaluate the list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate earmarked debt issuance for funding security and defence projects; calls for more consistent support for companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and simplifying procedures, in particular by increasing information-sharing between public authorities, upholding the once-only principle and making full use of digital technologies; calls for the EU to start preparing emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

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53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0147/2025

Source: European Parliament

Reinier Van Lanschot, Mārtiņš Staķis, Ville Niinistö, Damian Boeselager, Hannah Neumann, Maria Ohisalo, Sergey Lagodinsky, Virginijus Sinkevičius
on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

B10‑0147/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

– having regard its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine [1],

– having regard to the UN Charter,

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence;

B. whereas Parliament and experts have called for a white paper on defence for more than a decade;

C. whereas the Strategic Compass was mainly drafted and negotiated before 24 February 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass is a very broad strategy that provides little guidance with regards to the urgent need to accomplish defence readiness and provide deterrence and defence capabilities to prepare for the most urgent military contingency;

D. whereas there is an urgent need to strengthen parliamentary oversight of European defence in order to guarantee a sound democratic basis for this crucial policy area;

E. whereas the European defence industrial actors not only face challenges but have also been able to profit from a much higher demand for defence products since February 2022, which has led to record profits, especially among prime contractors;

F. whereas innovative defence and dual-use start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have not, in a comparable manner, been able to profit from relevant EU funds or orders from and funding by national governments compared to prime contractors;

G. whereas the combined military spending efforts of EU Member States already exceed that of Russia but suffer from a lack of economies of scale and focus, highlighting the need for more efficiency and the streamlining of military expenses, in addition to the need for fresh investment;

H. whereas the many concrete recommendations contained in the Niinistö report should guide the work on the white paper also because the report presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects; whereas the report underlines that the EU does not have a plan on what to do in the event of an armed attack against a Member State and that the EU currently lacks the comprehensive capacity to bring all necessary EU resources together in a coordinated manner across institutional and operational silos;

I. whereas hybrid threats are designed to operate in the grey zone between peace and war, combining conventional and unconventional methods such as sabotage, espionage and political infiltration to undermine the EU’s stability and resilience; whereas cyberattacks have become a central element of these campaigns, exploiting the increasing digitalisation of critical sectors such as healthcare, finance and energy, causing cascading disruptions with potentially severe economic and societal consequences; whereas foreign information manipulation and interference complements these operations through the spreading of disinformation and propaganda to erode trust in democratic institutions and polarise public opinion; whereas the growing complexity, frequency and intensity of these threats underscore the pressing need to identify and implement effective solutions for safeguarding the EU’s security and resilience;

J. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a wake-up call for the EU, presenting an immediate threat to the European and global security order and to the security of the EU and its Member States; whereas this conflict shows the urgent need for the Member States to define a common perception of threats and demonstrate genuine solidarity with the frontline Member States;

K. whereas the EU’s ability to take decisive action in response to external threats has been repeatedly hampered by the requirement for unanimity, with certain Member States blocking or delaying critical military aid to Ukraine and hence undermining European security;

L. whereas the Trump administration is proposing a normalisation of ties with Russia, and has threatened to withdraw the US military from the European continent; whereas it appears that the US administration has ceased to be a reliable ally within NATO, which has negative repercussions for the collective territorial defence of its members;

1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, also within the West, new and renewed imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry between great powers, nationalist unilateralism, the primary and growing use of force, and violence by certain states and non-state actors in order to promote their political and economic interests or to resolve disputes;

2. Recalls that the EU is a peace project and should strive towards peace and stability while condemning aggression; underlines that, in order to achieve peace and stability, we must support Ukraine and become more resilient ourselves;

3. Believes that the war of aggression against Ukraine was part of Putin’s plan to reshape the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and that this plan has been thwarted thanks to the Ukrainian people’s heroic defence;

4. Underlines that Russian acts of sabotage against critical European infrastructure, and Russia’s manipulation of and interference in EU and NATO countries, have significantly increased; stresses that experts believe that Russia might further escalate its aggressive acts and also attack EU Member States with conventional armed forces during the coming years;

5. Deplores the fact that the President of the United States has suggested that the US may attempt to annex Greenland, which would be in breach of international law, create considerable instability for the Greenland Government and people and the whole region, further exacerbating the deterioration of relations within the Atlantic Alliance;

6. Calls, therefore, for the EU to increase its efforts to shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and set the conditions for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace on Ukraine’s terms; underlines that defeating Russia in Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s future success are the most effective and cost-efficient investments in European security for the short and medium term;

7. Urges the Member States to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine, in as large quantities and as quickly as possible, to enable Ukraine to liberate its territory and deter further Russian attacks;

8. Calls for making a fast and significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine a key and structural component of the white paper; calls on the Member States to scale up direct investments in the capacity of the Ukrainian defence industry to mass-produce essential defence products (Danish model), specifically drones, air defence systems, artillery and long-range strike capabilities; proposes the allocation of a specific multibillion euro budget to the European Defence Industry Programme’s (EDIP) Ukraine Support Instrument reserved exactly for this purpose; stresses the need to explore legal avenues for fully seizing the frozen assets of sanctioned Russian individuals and the Russian Central Bank for use as grants for Ukraine’s expenditure on its defence and resilience needs and its reconstruction, in accordance with international law; condemns the veto imposed by the Hungarian Government on the European Peace Facility (EPF), which blocks more than EUR 6 billion and renders the EPF almost useless; stresses, further, the urgent need also to consider the option of creating an alternative ad hoc arrangement for those European countries that wish to support Ukraine militarily and finance that aid jointly;

9. Demands the inclusion of a plan in the white paper that describes how the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) can be operationalised in the fastest and most efficient manner; recalls the urgency to properly finance EDIP’s Ukraine instrument; further proposes the provision of war insurance for critical EDTIB projects inside Ukraine; proposes the regular inclusion of Ukrainian Defence Ministry officials with observer status at meetings of relevant Council configurations;

10. Expects the white paper on EU defence to define a new framework and the extent to which the EU must accomplish defence readiness and preparedness, in view of the most severe military contingencies, deter potential aggressors and defend itself also to assist NATO allies that are also EU Member States to become a credible European pillar in NATO;

11. Stresses that the time has come to use the white paper process to clearly define what is meant by a true European defence union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was only a starting point, but that its implementation remains necessary and requires an update to reflect the goals of deterrence and defence readiness;

12. Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to addressing deep structural challenges of the European defence industrial landscape and the lack of ambition as regards cooperation between their armed forces at EU level; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a quantum leap towards a very ambitious and comprehensive framework on defence;

13. Welcomes in principle the announcements made by the President of the Commission on 4 March 2025 regarding a ‘re-arm Europe’ initiative; stresses, however, that the planned investments should address the lack of cooperation and coordination between Member States, including measures guaranteeing full interoperability and making joint procurement the rule;

14. Urges the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Member States to use the white paper process for outlining a comprehensive framework that is composed of at least the following key components:

(a) a precise description of scenarios in which the EU and its Member States would use security and military instruments that include the latest risk and threat assessments and range from the most extreme military contingencies to crisis management abroad,

(b) elements of a military doctrine which describe in detail the military tasks related to the different scenarios, including cooperation with NATO, in particular through a more precise operationalisation and routine exercises for scenarios under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

(c) revised and adapted military headline goals, closely coordinated with the NATO Defence Planning Process, and a precise description of the necessary quantity and quality of military personnel, including training requirements and key military capabilities that are fully synchronised with the new NATO Force Model as regards EU NATO countries, such as strategic enablers, but also ammunition stocks, in order to fulfil current force generation targets,

(d) proposals regarding armed forces cooperation structures that go beyond ad hoc arrangements, such as EU Battlegroups, including a strengthened Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), multinationally crewed strategic enablers (based on the Airborne Warning and Control System – AWACS – model) at EU level and additional permanent multinational military units with sufficient capabilities to provide deterrence and defence,

(e) a description of the key parameters necessary for the establishment of an efficient and competitive single market for defence that would help Member States to reach the capability headline goals necessary for full defence readiness and equip our closest allies, such as Ukraine;

15. Underlines that the EU must adopt a holistic and horizontal approach to security and defence by taking into account the many societal and systemic challenges it faces, such as climate change; emphasises the need for an impact assessment of current and future EU policies in order to find out how they can better support EU security and defence, including through other strategic objectives of the Union, especially the transition to a green, digital and just economy;

16. States that major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale wars in our neighbourhood, have threatened and keep threatening the security of the EU and its citizens, that ‘business as usual’ is not an option, and that, to face the threats, the EU and its Member States must make EU-level cooperation of their armed forces and their defence industry the rule in order to create a capabilities-based EU defence union which can overcome threats and attacks against EU security;

17. Strongly believes that more substantial progress needs to be made in operationalising Article 42(7) TEU and that a plan is needed on how to operationalise this solidarity policy in the white paper with respect to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States;

18. Insists on the need to ensure better cooperation and coordination by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK to become closer security partners; calls strongly for the creation of a European security council to coordinate actions between like-minded countries willing to form a vanguard in European defence cooperation and integration; calls for this European security council to serve as the foundation for a new European defence union, bringing together like-minded Member States and strategic partners that share a common security vision and mutual trust;

19. Considers that current strategic documents, legislative proposals and studies such as the Strategic Compass, the European defence industrial strategy and the Niinistö report should finally inspire a concrete and comprehensive vision for the future of European defence, including specific goals, targets and roadmaps, which the white paper should constitute;

20. Calls for the EU to better link common security and defence policy (CSDP) instruments with internal security tools and to strengthen dual-use and civil-military cooperation at EU level;

21. Strongly supports the many good recommendations put forward by the Niinistö report; fully supports the report’s aim, which is ‘not to limit our level of preparedness to what is politically convenient’ but to address what is needed in order to cope with the most severe scenarios; insists on the importance of the upcoming preparedness Union strategy to put the EU on track for comprehensive preparedness, including a definition of EU-level vital societal and governmental functions, the development of EU-level preparedness baseline requirements for these functions, and ensuring the coherence of sectoral crisis plans at EU level; recommends, in particular, the Niinistö report recommendations aimed at empowering citizens to make societal resilience work, inspired by the Finnish concept of total defence;

22. Calls for the EU to develop an EU risk assessment to identify cross-sectoral threats and the risks facing the EU as a whole, and supports the embedding of the ‘preparedness by design’ principle across the EU; insists on the need to develop a mandatory ‘security and preparedness check’ for future impact assessments and ‘stress-tests’ for current legislation as proposed by Niinistö; believes that there is a need to assess whether there are specific challenges that undermine the timely completion of projects identified as critical for effective military deterrence and the rapid arrival of capabilities to the eastern flank for military contingency;

23. Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act to align EU and national efforts when possible;

24. Calls for the EU and the Member States to set up and conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to test high-level decision-making and operational coordination;

25. Calls for the CSDP to be guided by a human security approach and committed to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; underlines the importance of other multilateral frameworks that strive to build a peaceful and stable future;

26. Calls on the Member States to push for the deletion of the unanimity rule in foreign and security policy in the Council; asks for an amendment to Article 46(6) TEU to allow for qualified majority voting instead of unanimity in the management of permanent structured cooperation, with the exception of decisions leading to the creation of military missions or operations with an executive mandate under the CSDP, which must remain under unanimity;

27. Proposes the strengthening of Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role in line with the EU expanding its role in defence, including via delegated acts for the work programmes of the current and future defence industrial programmes and instruments that would allow for their implementation to be scrutinised, in particular the priorities set by the Commission concerning projects on priority capabilities; calls for a Parliament representative to be appointed to the new defence industrial readiness board proposed in EDIP, where currently none is provided for;

28. Believes that the EU must acquire a clear understanding of what the actual gap is between the capability targets and defence capabilities of the Member States; stresses the need to ramp up defence industry production, as well as to have ever-ready production units to respond to foreign attacks or specific needs of its strategic partners;

29. Considers regular threat analyses to be an absolute necessity and proposes synchronising their planning cycle with similar regular threat analyses within NATO and by key non-NATO partners;

30. Reiterates its call to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation in order to build a more European NATO, particularly by fully aligning the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s strategic concept, the EU’s Capability Development Plan and NATO’s Defence Planning Process capability targets, except for areas where there are clear special interests for the EU only; proposes the appointment of a permanent EU representative to NATO, including to the military committee on information exchange and the respective military operations;

31. Calls for the EU to address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls and focus efforts on specific projects of common European interest that are too expensive for a single Member State to procure, in particular strategic enablers, but also large stockpiles of critical equipment, in order to provide genuine EU added value, which could most efficiently be jointly procured and managed by an EU framework through a special off-budget instrument; proposes, in particular, the establishment of the following capabilities:

(a) integrated air defence and long-range strike systems, optimally by coordinating the ongoing development of the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) with the European Long Range Strike Approach (ELSA),

(b) suppression of enemy air defences,

(c) multi-type drone force,

(d) electronic warfare,

(e) defensive and offensive cyber systems,

(f) AWACS, aerial refuelling and long-range transport,

(g) Command, control, communications and computers (C4) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and space assets critical for early warning, navigation, observation and communication,

(h) Main Ground Combat System (MGCS),

(i) Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS);

32. Urges the EU and the Member States to move from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with mandatory targets for critical defence equipment; points to the need to ensure the socially and environmentally sustainable provision of relevant raw materials and to implement policies to close gaps in production and the labour market; stresses the urgent need to make defence production and stocking of ammunition and other products more security-relevant by developing plans on how to have a more decentralised and resilient network and joint stocks building on ‘readiness pools’ in regions facing a higher threat level and the possibility of large-scale conventional warfare;

33. Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to move much faster when faced with wars or other large-scale crises; stresses that this can be done by designing and putting in place binding rules, which can be triggered in emergency situations to accelerate administrative and legal procedures, and taking measures in the input side of the supply chain, for the quick production and delivery of military goods, or the construction of infrastructure projects for European mobility, identified as critical for defence;

34. Urges the EU to take immediate action to pool resources and expertise in the field of cybersecurity, recognising that individual Member States face limited capabilities in this domain; strongly advocates for the development of a unified European approach to cyber forces; further insists on the swift creation of joint European cyber capabilities to effectively address the common challenges faced by all Member States in the rapidly evolving threat landscape, thereby strengthening the EU’s collective resilience and strategic autonomy in the digital realm;

35. Calls for the EU to use the white paper to describe a plan that helps to remove unnecessary national regulatory obstacles that slow down military mobility without undermining public security; considers that the definition of military mobility should apply to dual-use infrastructures that cover all logistical aspects of mobility, and that for dual-use projects, adequate criteria should be properly applied in terms of funding provisions, in particular at EU level; stresses the need for significant investments in military mobility infrastructures to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, depots, ports, air, sea and rail platforms, railway lines, railroad terminals, waterways, roads and bridges;

36. Reiterates its full support for the RDC to achieve full operational capability at the latest by mid-2025, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or temporary reinforcement of missions; proposes upgrading the RDC by transforming it into a permanent multinational force with its own strategic enablers and command and control, learning from the failed experience of the ad hoc EU Battlegroups;

37. Calls on the VP/HR to launch a discussion with Member States in order to create additional permanent multinational units to respond to the changed threat landscape for the EU since the decision to create the RDC, especially in the light of Trump’s recent rapprochement towards Putin and comments regarding Greenland, which have increased the need for effective European deterrence and defence in line with the most extreme military contingencies;

38. Proposes strengthening the current Eurocorps and making it a multinational corps with its own strategic enablers and command and control to which national brigades can be permanently attached with standardised, jointly procured equipment; stresses that such a multinational European corps can enable smaller Member States to fulfil their current force-generation targets, provide industry with aggregate demand through standardised, large-scale equipment orders and provide the EU with its own capability focused on deterrence and defence, including for candidate countries;

39. Proposes the joint creation of crewed and owned strategic enablers at EU level, based on the model of NATO’s AWACS, which are too expensive for individual Member States and important for the security of the EU as a whole;

40. Calls for the European Air Transport Command to be transformed into an ‘EU crisis-response air fleet’ comprising military transport aircraft held at European level and made available to Member States for deployments of equipment or troops, emergency evacuations or civil security missions;

41. Reiterates its call for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to benefit from adequate premises, staff, enhanced planning, command and control, and effective communication and information systems;

42. Calls for a more ambitious concept for military training and relevant planning, command and control elements at EU level to be part of the white paper action plan, such as a fully equipped and well-staffed MPCC; believes that the EU must expand the training of Ukrainian forces in line with Ukrainian needs to enable a higher level of operational coordination between units, allow for the most effective force generation possible, and create conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons from them;

43. Urges the EU Member States to decide on a united and clear medium- and long-term vision for the European defence industry aimed at helping to meet the capability headline goals;

44. Stresses the urgent need to change the way defence industrial programmes are implemented across the EU; believes that it is of crucial importance to synchronise their work programmes with the revised headline goals in order to be able to focus on the most urgent and militarily important capability gaps; underlines the importance of overcoming a very broad distribution of scarce financial resources and the need to prevent any further ‘dual sourcing’ or similar duplications at EU level that would add to a high amount of duplications in Europe and to the low efficiency rate of the defence industrial base, which is still characterised by fragmentation;

45. Stresses that capabilities and resources must be increased, and that the fragmentation of the defence market must be overcome via the creation of a single market for defence, where binding common rules apply guaranteeing fair competition and full interoperability of defence products; shares the view contained in Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness that the EU must urgently boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers (inspired by best practice, such as that of Airbus), and more competition between traditionally nationally entrenched defence firms, and decide on incentives directed towards the EU defence industry for sufficiently large public and private investments in security and defence;

46. Believes that the white paper should build on the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS), in particular EDIP, and also develop a concept for a wartime economic cooperation contingency plan to prepare for mutual support in case of large-scale security crises, and deepen wartime economic communication to provide early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyber threats;

47. Stresses that a single European defence market is a priority, as fragmentation and a lack of competitiveness hamper the capacity of the EU to assume more responsibility as a security provider; deplores the fact that neither the EU defence industrial programmes nor the increasing national defence budgets have led to a surge in EU-level defence industrial cooperation that would have allowed Member States to reach their own 2007 cooperation targets as set in the European Defence Agency (EDA) framework; recalls the persistent low levels of European collaboration since 24 February 2022, which, for research and development (R&D), were 14 % in 2022 and 6 % in 2023, and for joint procurement 18 % in 2023, while the EDA was unable to provide data for 2023 (but stressed that there was ‘a temporary slowdown’); stresses the urgent need to analyse the reasons for the unwillingness of Member States to use EU-level cooperation and see it as the main tool for defence investment;

48. Strongly supports the idea to make EU-level cooperation the rule in the European defence industrial sector and commit to concrete numerical targets for cooperation as presented in EDIS, which focus in particular on joint procurement (at least 40 % by 2030), intra-EU trade (at least 35 % by 2030), and procurement of EU-made defence products (at least 50 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035);

49. Urges the Commission and the Council to address the dual challenge of joint military equipment production and its effective utilisation across Member States; calls for a comprehensive strategy to guarantee increased interoperability through the promotion of agreed civil and military standards, such as NATO standardisation agreements, within EU defence industrial programmes; demands a commitment to tying the funding of current and future instruments to the standardisation of and convergence on certification by NATO allies and to make current standards more precise; calls on the Commission to present concrete plans to overcome interoperability obstacles and ensure the efficient utilisation of jointly produced equipment by all participating Member States;

50. Insists on the importance of European defence projects of common interest as presented in EDIP, which are critical to European defence readiness and preparedness; believes that these should support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin common capability priorities and that cannot be implemented alone, such as strategic enablers; proposes that, based on the capabilities’ headline goals, the Commissioner for Defence create a clear ‘output plan’ listing relevant quantified targets not just for strategic enablers but also for the most critical large-scale equipment needs, such as MGCS, FCAS and ESSI and ELSA, which would then be jointly procured and maintained throughout the life cycle of the product in order to achieve economies of scale and interoperability in the most effective and fastest way;

51. Believes that a competitive and resilient European defence industry will also lead to a restructuring of the industrial landscape, including through mergers, which would also reduce the number of parallel programmes that waste financial resources, as well as a better regional distribution of production sites; considers that our defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence, also according to the criteria of decentralisation, security and resilience; stresses the need to massively boost start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs in the sector as a priority and as a structural element of the section of the white paper pertaining to the single market for defence; stresses that for well-established or systemic actors in the defence sector, public investment should be accompanied by additional safeguards to ensure that public money is reinvested and not used for the purpose of generating profits for their shareholders, such as by windfall profit taxes;

52. Proposes to create European regional EDTIB clusters uniting research, development, production and maintenance facilities to create regional economies of scale and focus areas of technological specialisation; calls for these clusters to be strategically spread throughout the EU to allow for continued manufacturing in times of crisis and to more evenly distribute the economic opportunities for SMEs and Member States with relatively small defence industries; calls for these clusters to be aligned with EDIP’s proposal for the Structure for European Armament Programme;

53. Calls for more coherence in support of companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access for small- and mid-cap companies within the defence sector;

54. Calls for a comprehensive strategy to leverage current instruments such as the Defence Equity Facility and new initiatives such as EDIP’s Fund to Accelerate Defence Supply Chain Transformation; demands concrete commitments to increase the amount of funding per SME while ensuring transparency and accountability; requests the implementation of robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds drive innovation and competitiveness among SMEs without distorting the market; demands, further, regular reporting on the impact and effectiveness of these financial instruments in supporting start-ups and SMEs in the defence industry and dual-use sector;

55. Calls on the Commission to design a successor to the European Defence Fund (EDF) that supports common research and innovation all along the supply chain and lay the conditions to address technological challenges and provide European solutions to key capabilities gaps; calls for the establishment of a Commission agency with a specific focus on R&D with dual-use potential, taking inspiration from the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; stresses the need to put a strong emphasis on EU-level support for the most disruptive and innovative technology via the creation of an accelerator hub for researching, developing and testing new breakthrough defence technologies, which would also contribute to economic competitiveness, bringing together industry, governments and the expert community; underlines that this organisation should nurture a risk-taking culture and be highly flexible by design; proposes, as a first step, that funding allocation should focus on a limited number of critical projects, including decarbonised defence and novel deterrence capabilities;

56. Calls for the strengthening of energy resilience and the climate and environmental transition dimension under the successor to the EDF, and for the climate-proofing and decarbonisation (covering both adaptation and mitigation) of EU defence by design and across the five dimensions: operational, capability planning and development, multi-stakeholder engagement, governance, and R&D, for the benefit of the performance of military capabilities, the resilience of armed forces, and thus the competitiveness of the EDTIB;

57. Is deeply convinced that the EU-level instruments should prioritise and massively increase support for SMEs and start-ups in the dual-use and defence sector; stresses the need to support SMEs and start-ups in bringing successfully tested prototypes to the market, including the scaling up of production; underlines the need to bridge the current funding gap as regards these important steps that would strengthen the EDTIB, including in close cooperation with the Ukrainian technological and defence industrial base;

58. Insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU by reviewing the directives on the transfer of defence-related products and defence procurement; calls on the Commission to propose actions for better market access, smoother cross-border cooperation and increased security of supply, including by harmonising national export policies;

59. Stresses the need to develop an effective EU-level armaments policy that includes the establishment of a functioning and effective external trade dimension that aims to support partners that face threats from aggressive authoritarian regimes and prevents arms deliveries to undemocratic aggressive regimes and regimes that make illegal use of them as assessed under the relevant international human rights and humanitarian law, in line with the current eight criteria under the Council Common Position on arms exports [2]; stresses the need to overcome the very narrow and national interpretation of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in this respect;

60. Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority-ordering mechanism for defence production which builds on security and defence capability mapping to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations;

61. Strongly believes that a European preference must be the cornerstone of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European know-how; underlines that the European preference principle must be reflected in EU defence regulations in clear and unambiguous eligibility criteria; underlines, however, that exceptions for emergency military contingencies and projects critical for ensuring defence readiness should be built into these criteria;

62. Calls for a crisis response instrument for securing European sovereignty based on the model of the US Defense Production Act, so that the EU has a tool which can be activated to react quickly to emergency wartime or crisis needs; calls for such a tool to include the following key components:

(a) joint procurement of specific defence products,

(b) prioritising the provision of critical materials, and prioritising orders, for specific supply chains, such as artillery munitions,

(c) fast-tracking administrative and legal procedures for moving military equipment and troops, and where possible the construction of (infrastructure) projects critical for military mobility or other military readiness priority areas, while avoiding the circumvention of environmental protection provisions and building in necessary safeguards;

63. Deplores the lack of willingness by Member States to invest in EU-level cooperation and urges them to reach the EU objectives on security and defence; highlights the fact that the cost of non-preparedness for the most extreme military contingencies would be higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; recalls that aggregate EU defence spending is insufficient and that very little national defence spending is coordinated or even pooled with other Member States or invested in European collaborative projects; calls for the EU and the Member States to work and agree on concrete measures and means for short- to long-term public and private investment;

64. Notes that, according to the Commission President, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade, but that, if the EU needs to develop its own military capabilities, experts estimate that this amount will have to rise significantly; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play;

65. Underlines that increases in defence investment should not compete with other public investment priorities, including social expenditure, territorial cohesion and climate transition, which are all relevant to our European security; reiterates that the most effective way to maintain such priorities is to release fresh investment for defence rather than repurpose already earmarked funding; further recalls that financing orientations should be anchored in a whole-of-society approach to resilience and therefore need to be broadly supported by European citizens, and that this support needs to be sustainable in the long term;

66. Opposes any proposal aimed at repurposing cohesion policy funds from their long-term objectives and recalls that only strengthening Europe’s social and economic fabric and reducing territorial disparities will contribute to the balanced development and stability of all EU regions, and will ultimately reinforce the EU’s ability to defend itself against disinformation and foreign influence;

67. Supports the Commission President’s announcement to create a new EU financial instrument to assist Member States in increasing their defence spending through loans backed by the EU budget; takes note of the intention to establish such a new instrument under Article 122 TFEU; recalls that while the EU Recovery Instrument, which allocated borrowed funds to various EU programmes, was established by a Council regulation under Article 122 TFEU, various EU programmes to which the resources were allocated, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility, were adopted through ‘codecision’, relying on Article 175 TFEU; calls on the Commission to adopt a similar legal structure, respecting the ordinary legislative procedure and ensuring the democratic legitimacy of any new EU financing instrument for defence;

68. Welcomes the further extension of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group’s eligibility criteria to dual-use goods; welcomes the EIB Group’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology; stresses that EIB investments should focus on innovative projects, but not expendable products such as ammunition; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; calls on the EIB Group to review the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy and insists that any further extension of lending in the sector should only take place if it has no negative impact on the overall financing costs of the bank or its investment pipeline, or on the contribution to financing the investment needed for enabling the EU to reach its climate goals;

69. Considers that, complementing joint debt, further defence lending should be dealt with in a separate bank, as investment in defence cannot in principle be considered an environmental, social and governance investment; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to establish, as a matter of urgency, a new defence bank modelled on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development that could address the global perspective of securing defence lending, while protecting other investment and allowing for allies to join;

70. Takes note of the Commission President’s announcement on ‘activating the escape clause for defence investments’; underlines that, in view of other pressing policy priorities, the escape clause must be applied in a way that ensures that increases in defence expenditure do not lead to cuts in other areas and is conditional on being spent on developing common EU projects, including dual-use infrastructure such as railways, satellite systems and resilient power grids;

71. Stresses that the current political context demonstrates that the recently adopted EU economic governance framework deprives governments of the financial resources needed to respond to current and new challenges; underlines that prioritising one policy area over another exacerbates rather than mitigates the multiple crises the EU is facing; calls for a review of the EU fiscal rules framework that would provide the long-term funding certainty required for investment in promoting the just transition, expanding European defence production capabilities and developing dual-use infrastructure, thereby underpinning a truly coordinated EU approach to investment policy;

72. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework (MMF); believes that, as long as Member States refuse to allocate more resources to a higher overall EU budget, including the creation of new own resources, and given the unanimity requirement to change both the MMF Regulation [3] and the Council’s Own-Resources Decision [4], and given the urgency, solutions for alternative funding must be considered without delay, including:

(a) the urgent launch of a discussion with a view to establishing another off-budget financial facility [5] which would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative R&D and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget EPF, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; stresses therefore the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current EPF governance model,

(b) the issuance of EU risk guarantees by the Commission to lower interest rates for participants in EU-level projects identified as critical for defence readiness,

(c) a new EU debt programme along the lines of the NextGenerationEU backed by genuine own resources to repay the borrowed funds,

(d) the creation of new genuine EU own resources to create additional revenue flows to finance security- and defence-related investments at EU level,

(e) greater mobilisation of equity and private capital; reiterates therefore its call for more private investment in EU defence,

(f) the creation of specific financial products so that private banks invest more in the defence sector,

(g) the development of emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

73. Believes that the next MFF should have a greater allocation of funds for common security and be more flexible in order to react to unforeseen crises and emergencies;

74. Welcomes the proposals made in the recent Niinistö report as regards the financing of European defence; supports the setting up of a defending Europe facility and a securing Europe facility; equally welcomes and supports the proposal to establish an investment guarantee programme based on the model of InvestEU with open architecture to trigger private sector investment and to issue a ‘European preparedness bond standard’;

75. Insists that robust mechanisms be implemented to ensure the efficient use of scarce EU budget resources and prevent any duplication of efforts in defence projects; requests a comprehensive review of current oversight procedures and the development of a transparent framework for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of EU-funded defence initiatives;

76. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commissioner for Defence and Space, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0145/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0145/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to Articles 24(1), 42, 43 and 45 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

– having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[1],

– having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[2],

– having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

– having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States [3],

– having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

– having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

– having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

– having regard to Special Report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility: Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

– having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

– having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

– having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius,

– having regard to the opening remarks made by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting of 12 February 2025,

– having regard to the talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 18 February 2025 between US and Russian negotiators,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas the Commission announced the release of a white paper on the future of European defence, co-authored by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, by 19 March 2025; whereas this document will be the first of its kind produced by the EU and emulates similar documents published by Member States;

B. whereas the white paper must respect the limits set by the TEU in terms of foreign policy and defence and it must take note of the international context and the strategic environment in order to provide a perspective and proposals that will enable the strengthening of Europe’s security;

C. whereas the white paper on the future of European defence will provide the framework for future defence projects and regulations and will be a key point of reference for incoming negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework;

D. whereas the international order is profoundly destabilised and is restructuring; whereas the international rules and organisations that emerged from the Second World War and then from the end of the Cold War are in crisis; whereas international relations are increasingly characterised by uncertainty, and the tendency to resort to armed force to resolve international disagreements is growing;

E. whereas Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly destabilised the security order in Europe; whereas this unilateral aggression has accelerated the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO; whereas this war has considerably deteriorated relations and exchanges between Russia and the countries of Europe;

F. whereas the war in Ukraine has highlighted the chronic underinvestment by Member States in their armed forces; whereas the stocks of arms and ammunition in Europe are largely insufficient; whereas certain critical military capabilities are not possessed by any European military; whereas the infrastructure that is essential for the security and proper functioning of European societies and economies is vulnerable; whereas some Member States have encountered significant difficulties in deploying and transporting military resources within the EU itself;

G. whereas the relations between the United States and China will structure, to a large extent, the future of international relations in the 21st century; whereas the United States no longer has the will to maintain the same level of military involvement in Europe; whereas the US Secretary of Defence has expressly spoken of a ‘division of labour’ between allies, with the Americans prioritising the Pacific region, while emphasising that Europeans must be responsible for the defence of Europe and must increase their capabilities accordingly;

H. whereas the European Union is composed of 27 sovereign states, with each having the sovereign right to determine its own foreign and defence policy;

I. whereas it is in the interest of the Member States to adopt a common policy on matters of common interest to them; whereas enhanced cooperation on defence matters is mutually beneficial if it improves the security of the Member States against any direct aggression or if it increases their capacity to respond to any threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty or prosperity;

J. whereas the European defence market is too fragmented; whereas for a single armament type, there can be several or even dozens of different varieties of equipment in the EU, representing a collective loss of resources because of duplication, and preventing economies of scale;

K. whereas Article 24(1) TEU stipulates that decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy are taken unanimously by the Council; whereas Article 24(1) TEU also stipulates that the EU cannot adopt legislative acts on foreign affairs and defence; whereas Article 36 TEU stipulates that Parliament has a consultative role;

L. whereas, on 30 January 2025, 19 EU countries sent a letter to the European Investment Bank calling for it ‘to play an even stronger role in providing investment funding and leveraging private funding for the security and defence sector’;

1. Stresses that diplomatic and defence policy issues are primarily the prerogative of the Member States, which remain the most relevant and the only legitimate political units in the international order; respects the right of every Member State to determine its own foreign and security policy; insists on the importance of maintaining the principle of unanimity in the Council for all decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy;

2. Underlines that strengthening the Member States’ militaries, based on threats, is necessary to compensate for the security deficit caused by decades of underinvestment and the gradual disengagement of the United States; emphasises that this rearmament policy led by the Member States must not aim to escalate tensions in Europe, but rather aim to reach a level that will deter any hostile actions, establish a continental balance and maintain peace;

3. Notes that the United States remains the EU’s main military ally and is an essential member of NATO; insists that, irrespective of the political orientation of the White House, US foreign policy will continue to make the Asia-Pacific region a geostrategic priority and to perceive Europe as a secondary theatre; stresses that Member States must no longer subcontract their security and defence to other powers;

4. Underlines that NATO is a crucial partner in the collective defence architecture in Europe; takes note of the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO; considers that a greater contribution from European states within the alliance must, for the sake of consistency, result in a more balanced distribution of command posts in favour of European military personnel; stresses that stepping up the defence capabilities of European states can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation with due respect for the neutrality of the EU Member States that are not part of the NATO alliance;

5. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products through greater cooperation between Member States and to collectively work on the interoperability of military capabilities; calls on the Member States to encourage cross-border defence procurement in order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve the objective of European strategic autonomy;

6. Stresses that greater cooperation in the defence sector must actively involve defence SMEs, not only large defence actors, and serve as a platform for SME development, providing greater opportunities for them to contribute to the EU’s technological base and enhance European strategic autonomy;

7. Notes, however, that the strengthening of the European defence industry must not result in the attribution of new competences to the Commission, which would be in breach of the Treaties and would undermine the sovereignty of Member States without increasing efficacy; reiterates, therefore, that decision-making regarding military requirements, the prioritisation of capability development and the purchase of defence products should remain within the remit of Member States; underlines that, despite the need for increased cooperation in the field of defence, such as on joint procurement and joint production, the Member States must retain full sovereignty over their arms export policies;

8. Calls for the co-legislators to establish the principle of a European preference in future European defence regulations, including in the European defence industrial plan, so that European funds benefit European companies on European soil, which will enhance our industrial defence capabilities and will reduce our dependences on non-EU countries; recalls that this regulation must in no way restrict the freedom of the Member States to determine their own arms procurement and import/export policy;

9. Calls on the NATO-affiliated Member States to cooperate in order to identify and fill critical capability gaps by building on and complementing NATO’s Defence Planning Process targets, which are required for sustained full-spectrum operations, including space systems and launchers, long-range missiles, integrated air and missile defence systems, ammunition production, artificial intelligence (AI), maritime drone capability, command and control capability, electronic warfare systems and air-to-air refuelling capacity;

10. Calls on non-neutral Member States to adequately invest in their infrastructure to guarantee optimal military mobility across Europe in line with their respective military agreements and alliances;

11. Emphasises the importance for European states to have the capacity and a framework to act independently within the NATO framework where possible and outside of the NATO framework if necessary; points out that the Rapid Deployment Capacity, an inter-state initiative under the control of the Member States, only comprised of 5 000 troops, does not allow for the possibility of engagement in a context of intense combat; reaffirms that it is in the Member States’ interest to strengthen their ability to fight together by conducting joint training and exercises that enhance the interoperability of the various national instruments;

12. Expresses the need to consider European defence in all its dimensions, including land, air, naval, space and cybernetic; notes that contemporary strategic issues have a growing naval dimension and that the powers challenging the international order are deploying naval capabilities at regional level; stresses the importance of European cooperation at sea and welcomes the current progress of Operation Aspides, the lessons from which must be put to good use; stresses that European strategic autonomy has a maritime and naval dimension, and that European navies should cooperate more closely to ensure the protection of their maritime areas, as well as their underwater or surface infrastructure; stresses that the principle of freedom of navigation must be protected and calls, therefore, for an increase in surveillance and the ability to react quickly in the event of threats arising in European seas;

13. Notes that space will increasingly become a key aspect of power and sovereignty; underlines that the Member States must maintain and guarantee their independent access to space; welcomes the launch of Ariane 6, but is concerned by the accumulated delays; draws attention to the need for the space sector to be industrialised to increase the number of rockets launched to put European satellites into orbit; welcomes the launch of the European satellite constellation IRIS², which should enable secure communications solutions for sovereign and military issues by 2030; emphasises the need for the future EU space law not to hamper the competitiveness of European companies and to apply constraints on non-EU players; notes the importance of Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system;

14. Underlines that, unlike the United States (Buy America Act) and China (Government Procurement Law), the European space industry is not shielded from international competition and does not benefit from a European preference; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement a European preference in space industry procurement and promote innovation, research and development; stresses that the European Space Agency’s principle of geographical return hampers innovative European SMEs and start-ups from receiving adequate funding and contributes to the fragmentation of the European space industry; calls on the European Space Agency to abolish the principle of geographical return and adopt an innovative and efficiency-based approach to space procurement rather than a geographically driven one;

15. Underlines that the strengthening of European defence capabilities will require significant financing; calls on banks, pension funds, insurance companies and other actors in the Member States to simplify and significantly increase the financing of projects and companies operating in the field of defence; insists that in the context of the urgent need to increase defence spending, financial institutions should not consider investments in the field of defence to be damaging for their reputation; rejects, however, the idea of issuing joint debt, such as defence Eurobonds, to support defence spending;

16. Notes the growing importance of AI in warfare, particularly in the development of drones and autonomous weapons; recognises the indigenous AI advances in warfare made by Ukraine and Israel, demonstrating that the Member States are equally capable of developing similar capabilities; highlights that recent breakthroughs, such as the one made by the Chinese AI computing start-up DeepSeek, demonstrate the feasibility of cost-competitive AI systems; calls on the Member States to accelerate the development of AI capabilities; underlines that the AI Act [4], set to be implemented in 2025, creates uncertainty regarding the production and development of dual-use AI systems, an ambiguity that could hinder the development of essential defence industry products; calls for this issue to be clarified to ensure that the European defence industry is not disadvantaged compared to its American and Chinese counterparts;

17. Stresses that a strong civilian manufacturing industry, particularly in the steelmaking, automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, is essential for deterrence and for maintaining long-term military and industrial capabilities in the event of conflict; notes the decline of these industries since the 1990s, especially in western Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to safeguard the manufacturing industries that are vital to national security, including through the use of tariffs; urges the Commission to revise the Green Deal and revoke the net-neutrality goal, since it destroys manufacturing competitiveness and is responsible for the deindustrialisation of key industries in the Member States; stresses that the relocation of essential manufacturing industries to non-EU countries is counterproductive both in terms of global environmental impact and national security;

18. Expresses concern over the growing dependence of the European defence industry on foreign components, particularly rare earths and semiconductors, which are essential for advanced military technologies; calls on the Member States to intensify efforts to develop domestic rare earth mining and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to safeguard the autonomy of the European defence industry in the event of conflicts or severe supply chain disruptions;

19. Welcomes the Dutch Government’s decision to tighten export control rules on advanced lithography systems, which are essential for semiconductor production; stresses that EU technological transfers to non-EU countries have significantly contributed to the rise of foreign competition and the deindustrialisation of Europe; encourages the Member States to impose stricter export controls on critical dual-use technologies and manufacturing products;

20. Notes that 80 % of EU data is stored and managed in the United States and other non-EU countries, where it may be subject to extraterritorial intervention under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CLOUD Act, or China’s Data Security Law; stresses that protecting critical industrial and government data is essential to ensuring national security; welcomes the Swiss Government Cloud programme as a step toward cloud sovereignty and encourages the Member States to implement similar initiatives; encourages the Member States to strengthen regulations on telecommunications service providers, which are predominantly based outside Europe, creating a significant dependence on external actors;

21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the Commission, the European Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

Source: European Parliament

B10‑0144/2025

European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

(2025/2565(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

– having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

– having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

– having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

– having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

– having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

– having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

Towards a European collective security architecture

1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

Defence expenditure

27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

Defence industry

36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

Reprioritising public services and social spending

50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

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54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

MIL OSI Europe News –

March 7, 2025

MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 06.03.2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Nokia Corporation
Stock Exchange Release
6 March 2025 at 22:30 EET

Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 06.03.2025

Espoo, Finland – On 6 March 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

Trading venue (MIC Code)	Number of shares	Weighted average price / share, EUR*
XHEL	2,755,402	4.84
CEUX	826,754	4.84
BATE	–	–
AQEU	142,080	4.84
TQEX	129,929	4.83
Total	3,854,165	4.84

* Rounded to two decimals

On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.

Total cost of transactions executed on 6 March 2025 was EUR 18,653,002. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 149,315,265 treasury shares.

Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

On behalf of Nokia Corporation

BofA Securities Europe SA

About Nokia
At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

Inquiries:

Nokia Communications
Phone: +358 10 448 4900
Email: press.services@nokia.com
Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

Nokia Investor Relations
Phone: +358 931 580 507
Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

Attachment

Daily Report 2025-03-06

The MIL Network –

March 7, 2025

MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: India’s AI Revolution
Source: Government of India (2)

India’s AI Revolution

A Roadmap to Viksit Bharat

Posted On: 06 MAR 2025 4:09PM by PIB Delhi

Introduction

India is undergoing a remarkable transformation in Artificial Intelligence, driven by the visionary leadership of PM Modi. For the first time in India’s history, the government is actively shaping an AI ecosystem where computing power, GPUs, and research opportunities are accessible at an affordable cost.

Unlike in the past, AI in India is no longer confined to a privileged few or dominated by global tech giants. Through forward-looking policies, the Modi government is empowering students, startups, and innovators with world-class AI infrastructure, fostering a truly level playing field. Initiatives such as the IndiaAI Mission and the establishment of Centres of Excellence for AI are strengthening the country’s AI ecosystem, paving the way for innovation and self-reliance in this critical sector.

These efforts align with the vision of Viksit Bharat by 2047, where India aspires to become a global AI powerhouse, leveraging cutting-edge technology for economic growth, governance, and societal progress.

AI Compute and Semiconductor Infrastructure

India is rapidly building a strong AI computing and semiconductor infrastructure to support its growing digital economy. With the approval of the IndiaAI Mission in 2024, the government allocated ₹10,300 crore over five years to strengthen AI capabilities. A key focus of this mission is the development of a high-end common computing facility equipped with 18,693 Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), making it one of the most extensive AI compute infrastructures globally. This capacity is nearly nine times that of the open-source AI model DeepSeek and about two-thirds of what ChatGPT operates on.

Here are the key developments:
- Scaling AI Compute Infrastructure: The initial phase of the mission has already made 10,000 GPUs available, with the remaining units to be added soon. This will enable the creation of indigenous AI solutions tailored to Indian languages and contexts.
- Opening Access to High-Performance Computing: India has also pioneered the launch of an open GPU marketplace, making high-performance computing accessible to startups, researchers, and students. Unlike many countries where AI infrastructure is controlled by large corporations, this initiative ensures that small players have an opportunity to innovate.
- Robust GPU Supply Chain: The government has selected 10 companies to supply the GPUs, ensuring a robust and diversified supply chain.
- Indigenous GPU Capabilities: To further strengthen domestic capabilities, India aims to develop its own GPU within the next three to five years, reducing reliance on imported technology.
- Affordable Compute Access: A new common compute facility will soon be launched, allowing researchers and startups to access GPU power at a highly subsidised rate of ₹100 per hour, compared to the global cost of $2.5 to $3 per hour.
- Strengthening Semiconductor Manufacturing: In parallel, India is advancing semiconductor manufacturing, with five semiconductor plants under construction. These developments will not only support AI innovation but also reinforce India’s position in the global electronics sector.
Advancing AI with Open Data and Centres of Excellence (CoE)

Recognising the importance of data in AI development, the Modi government has launched the IndiaAI Dataset Platform to provide seamless access to high-quality, non-personal datasets. This platform will house the largest collection of anonymised data, empowering Indian startups and researchers to develop advanced AI applications. By ensuring diverse and abundant datasets, this initiative will drive AI-driven solutions across key sectors, enhancing innovation and accuracy.
- IndiaAI Dataset Platform for Open Data Access: The platform will enable Indian startups and researchers to access a unified repository of high-quality, anonymised datasets, reducing barriers to AI innovation.
- Boosting AI Model Accuracy with Diverse Data: By providing large-scale, non-personal datasets, the initiative will help reduce biases and improve the reliability of AI applications across domains such as agriculture, weather forecasting, and traffic management.
- Centres of Excellence: The government has established three AI Centres of Excellence (CoE) in Healthcare, Agriculture, and Sustainable Cities in New Delhi. The Budget 2025 further announced a new CoE for AI in education with an outlay of ₹500 crore, making it the fourth such centre.
- Skilling for AI-Driven Industries: Plans are in place for five National Centres of Excellence for Skilling, which will equip youth with industry-relevant expertise. These centres will be set up in collaboration with global partners to support the ‘Make for India, Make for the World’ vision in manufacturing and AI innovation.
India’s AI Models & Language Technologies

The government is facilitating the development of India’s own foundational models, including Large Language Models (LLMs) and problem-specific AI solutions tailored to Indian needs. To foster AI research, multiple Centres of Excellence have also been set up.
- India’s Foundational Large Language Models: IndiaAI has launched an initiative to develop indigenous foundational AI models, including LLMs and Small Language Models (SLMs), through a call for proposals.
- Digital India BHASHINI: An AI-led language translation platform designed to enable easy access to the internet and digital services in Indian languages, including voice-based access, and support content creation in Indian languages.
- BharatGen: The world’s first government-funded multimodal LLM initiative, BharatGen was launched in 2024 in Delhi. It aims to enhance public service delivery and citizen engagement through foundational models in language, speech, and computer vision. BharatGen involves a consortium of AI researchers from premier academic institutions in India.
- Sarvam-1 AI Model: A large language model optimised for Indian languages, Sarvam-1 has 2 billion parameters and supports ten major Indian languages. It is designed for applications such as language translation, text summarisation, and content generation.
- Chitralekha: An open-source video transcreation platform developed by AI4Bhārat, Chitralekha enables users to generate and edit audio transcripts in various Indic languages.
- Hanooman’s Everest 1.0: A multilingual AI system developed by SML, Everest 1.0 supports 35 Indian languages, with plans to expand to 90.
AI Integration with Digital Public Infrastructure

India’s Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) has redefined digital innovation by combining public funding with private sector-led innovation. Platforms like Aadhaar, UPI, and DigiLocker serve as the foundation, while private entities build application-specific solutions on top of them. This model is now being enhanced with AI, integrating intelligent solutions into financial and governance platforms. The global appeal of India’s DPI was evident at the G20 Summit, where several countries expressed interest in adopting similar frameworks. Japan’s patent grant to India’s UPI payment system further underscores its scalability.

For Mahakumbh 2025, AI-driven DPI solutions played a crucial role in managing the world’s largest human gathering. AI-powered tools monitored real-time railway passenger movement to optimise crowd dispersal in Prayagraj. The Bhashini-powered Kumbh Sah’AI’yak Chatbot enabled voice-based lost-and-found services, real-time translation, and multilingual assistance. Its integration with Indian Railways and UP Police streamlined communication, ensuring swift issue resolution. By leveraging AI with DPI, Mahakumbh 2025 set a global benchmark for tech-enabled, inclusive, and efficient event management.

AI Talent & Workforce Development

India’s workforce is at the heart of its digital revolution. The country is adding one Global Capability Center (GCC) every week, reinforcing its status as a preferred destination for global R&D and technological development. However, sustaining this growth will require continuous investment in education and skill development. The government is addressing this challenge by revamping university curricula to include AI, 5G, and semiconductor design, aligning with the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020. This ensures that graduates acquire job-ready skills, reducing the transition time between education and employment.
- AI Talent Pipeline & AI Education: Under the IndiaAI Future Skills initiative, AI education is being expanded across undergraduate, postgraduate, and Ph.D. programs. Fellowships are being provided to full-time Ph.D. scholars researching AI in the top 50 NIRF-ranked institutes. To enhance accessibility, Data and AI Labs are being established in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, with a model IndiaAI Data Lab already set up at NIELIT Delhi.
- India Ranks 1st in Global AI Skill Penetration: According to the Stanford AI Index 2024, India ranks first globally in AI skill penetration with a score of 2.8, ahead of the US (2.2) and Germany (1.9). AI talent concentration in India has grown by 263% since 2016, positioning the country as a major AI hub. India also leads in AI Skill Penetration for Women, with a score of 1.7, surpassing the US (1.2) and Israel (0.9).
- AI Innovation: India has emerged as the fastest-growing developer population globally and ranks second in public generative AI projects on GitHub. The country is home to 16% of the world’s AI talent, showcasing its growing influence in AI innovation and adoption.
- AI Talent Hubs: The India Skills Report 2024 by Wheebox forecasts that India’s AI industry will reach USD 28.8 billion by 2025, with a CAGR of 45%. The AI-skilled workforce has seen a 14-fold increase from 2016 to 2023, making India one of the top five fastest-growing AI talent hubs, alongside Singapore, Finland, Ireland, and Canada. The demand for AI professionals in India is projected to reach 1 million by 2026.
AI Adoption & Industry Growth

India’s Generative AI (GenAI) ecosystem has seen remarkable growth, even amid a global downturn. The country’s AI landscape is evolving from experimental use cases to scalable, production-ready solutions, reflecting its growing maturity.
- Businesses Prioritising AI Investments: According to BCG, 80% of Indian companies consider AI a core strategic priority, surpassing the global average of 75%. Additionally, 69% plan to increase their tech investments in 2025, with one-third allocating over USD 25 million to AI initiatives.
- GenAI Startup Funding: According to a November 2024 report by National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM), Indian GenAI startup funding surged over six times quarter-on-quarter, reaching USD 51 million in Q2FY2025, driven by B2B and agentic AI startups.
- AI Transforming Workplaces: The Randstad AI & Equity Report 2024 states that seven in 10 Indian employees used AI at work in 2024, up from five in 10 a year earlier, showcasing AI’s rapid integration into workplaces.
- AI Empowering Small & Medium Businesses (SMBs): AI-driven technologies, such as autonomous agents, are helping SMBs scale efficiently, personalise customer experiences, and optimise operations. According to Salesforce, 78% of Indian SMBs using AI reported revenue growth, while 93% stated AI has contributed to increased revenues.
- Rapid Expansion of India’s AI Economy: As per the BCG-NASSCOM Report 2024, India’s AI market is projected to grow at a CAGR of 25-35%, reinforcing its potential for innovation and job creation. While AI automates routine tasks, it is simultaneously generating new opportunities in data science, machine learning, and AI-driven applications.
- AI Startup Support Ecosystem: India hosts 520+ tech incubators and accelerators, ranking third globally in active programs. 42% of these were established in the past five years, catering to the evolving needs of Indian startups. AI-focused accelerators like T-Hub MATH provide crucial mentorship in product development, business strategy, and scaling. In early 2024, MATH supported over 60 startups, with five actively discussing funding, highlighting India’s growing AI startup landscape.
A Pragmatic AI Regulation Approach

India’s pragmatic AI regulation balances innovation and accountability, steering clear of overregulation that could stifle growth and unchecked market-driven governance that may create monopolies. Instead of relying solely on legislation, India is investing in AI-driven safeguards, funding top universities and IITs to develop solutions for deep fakes, privacy risks, and cybersecurity threats. This techno-legal approach ensures AI remains a force for inclusive growth, fostering an ecosystem where innovation thrives while ethical concerns are proactively addressed.

Conclusion

India’s rapid advancements in artificial intelligence, underpinned by strategic government initiatives, have positioned the country as a global AI powerhouse. By expanding AI compute infrastructure, fostering indigenous AI models, enhancing digital public infrastructure, and investing in talent development, India is creating an inclusive and innovation-driven ecosystem. The emphasis on open data, affordable access to high-performance computing, and AI-driven solutions tailored to local needs ensures that the benefits of AI reach businesses, researchers, and citizens alike. As AI adoption accelerates across industries, India’s proactive approach is not only strengthening its digital economy but also paving the way for self-reliance in critical technologies. With a clear vision for the future, India is set to become a leader in AI innovation, shaping the global AI landscape in the years to come.

Source: Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology

Click to see in PDF

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Santosh Kumar/ Ritu Kataria/ Saurabh Kalia

(Release ID: 2108810) Visitor Counter : 108

MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: London ETO greets Year of Snake in Norway (with photos)

Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

London ETO greets Year of Snake in Norway (with photos)
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The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, London (London ETO) and the Norway-Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce hosted a Year of the Snake reception in Oslo, Norway, on March 5 (Oslo time). The Director-General of the London ETO, Mr Gilford Law, delivered a virtual welcome speech at the reception. He highlighted that Hong Kong is an unparalleled destination for businesses and investors, thanks to its free and open investment environment, as well as its simple and low tax system. Mr Law said, “The number of companies in Hong Kong with overseas or Mainland parent companies rose to 9 960 in 2024, while the number of start-ups in Hong Kong increased to 4 694, both reaching record highs. These figures demonstrate that Hong Kong is becoming increasingly attractive to businesses and remains an ideal place for Mainland and overseas enterprises to set up or expand their operations. ” Mr Law added, “On top of attracting businesses, Hong Kong is also attracting tourists with its dynamic calendar of world-class events. In 2024, Hong Kong welcomed close to 45 million international visitors, a 31 per cent increase from 2023. Stepping into 2025, Hong Kong, as the ‘Events Capital of Asia’, is set to host an array of high-profile business, sports, arts, and cultural events.” The reception was well attended by over 80 guests in Norway from the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the business, academic and cultural sectors. The London ETO will continue to celebrate the Year of the Snake among the countries under its purview.

Ends/Thursday, March 6, 2025Issued at HKT 23:33

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MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Video: Pledge to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen – Security Council Media Stakeout | United Nations

Source: United Nations (Video News)

Joint statement of the Security Council members signatories of the Joint Pledges related to Climate, Peace and Security on Yemen read by Ambassador Christina Markus Lassen, PR of Denmark. Other participants – Slovenia, Guyana, Republic of Korea, Panama, Greece, United Kingdom, Sierra Leone, France.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mt_A-7c0wnM

MIL OSI Video –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Assembly President calls for just and lasting peace in Ukraine

Source: United Nations 4

6 March 2025 Peace and Security

The President of the General Assembly on Thursday renewed his call for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Ukraine and Russia, in line with the UN Charter and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.

The meeting, held under the Assembly’s veto initiative, followed Russia’s use of its Security Council veto on 24 February to block amendments to a United States-led draft resolution on the conflict in Ukraine.

The two amendments were proposed by the Council’s European members – France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, and Slovenia. A third amendment introduced by Russia also failed to pass having failed to garner enough support.

As a result, the US-led resolution passed in its original form, marking the first Security Council resolution since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ten Council members voted in favour, while the five European sponsors of the amendments abstained.

Earlier that day, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions – one introduced by Ukraine and the other by the United States, mirroring the text later submitted in the Security Council.

The US-led resolution only passed after EU-led amendments were added, prompting the US to abstain on its own motion and vote on the same side as Russia, Belarus and the DPR Korea, more commonly known as North Korea.

Promote peaceful and inclusive dialogue

Opening the General Assembly debate on Thursday, President Philémon Yang underscored that the body must remain “steadfast in promoting peaceful solutions and inclusive dialogue.”

He recalled the two resolutions adopted on 24 February, when the Assembly met in an emergency session on the situation in Ukraine.

“In both, the General Assembly reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders,” Mr. Yang said.

“Moreover, the Assembly was unequivocal in its call for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation – a peace that aligns with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity,” he added.

Mutually reinforcing

President Yang emphasised that the General Assembly and Security Council must work together in the pursuit of peace.

“While the Security Council bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly plays a crucial role in responding to conflicts and crises,” he said.

However, he expressed regret over the growing use of Security Council vetoes.

“It is regrettable that we must convene under these circumstances, as the frequency of vetoes has continued to rise since 2022,” he added, urging Member States to reflect on how to make deliberations on the veto initiative more binding.

Broadcast of the General Assembly meeting.

Russia upheld its responsibility: Ambassador

Taking the floor as the first speaker, Russia’s First Deputy Permanent Representative, Dmitry Polyanskiy, said that his country’s votes against the draft amendments were to “disrupt” the plans of Western Countries that would have undermined the mandate of the Security Council.

“We highly value the US initiative, and we see the text that was ultimately adopted as a step in the right direction and grounds for further efforts for a peaceful solution to the Ukraine crisis,” he said.

He noted that the change in tack in Washington following President Trump’s inauguration in January “caught European pseudo peacekeepers off guard.”

“The American draft resolution is particularly in sharp contrast with the [General Assembly] draft put forward by Ukraine and the European backers, which promoted a new, more polished form of the futile elements of the infamous Zelensky formula,” he added.

Ambassador Polyanskiy stated that his country takes a responsible attitude towards the use of veto and its actions on 24 February were to give peace a chance, rather than push it away.

“Let us not delude ourselves, the hawks that call for continuing an armed conflict in Ukraine and in European countries are capitalizing on war and the suffering of civilians, and they do not plan on dropping their intention to interfere with peace between Russia and Ukraine.”

No equivalence between aggressor and victim: EU

Hedda Samson, Deputy Head of Delegation of the European Union (EU) to the UN, said Russia’s vetoes blocked the reference to the Security Council’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as the call for a just and lasting peace in line with the UN Charter.

The two proposals by Council’s European members received nine and 11 positive votes respectively, she said.

“Let it be clear, Russia is abusing its veto power to block references to the principle of territorial integrity and to peace in line with the UN Charter,” she added, stating that Russia is undermining the core principles of the multilateral system.

“Aggression is aggression wherever it occurs We cannot accept an equivalence between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. We cannot accept a world where might is right, where the power of law is replaced by the power of guns,” she noted.

She stated that her delegation believes in a world based on rules, adding, “the time for peace is now. The EU supports all meaningful efforts to bring an end to Russia’s war of aggression.”

US committed to ending Russia-Ukraine war: Ambassador

Speaking for the United States, Acting Representative Dorothy Shea said her country is committed to ending the Russia-Ukraine war, which it demonstrated in the Security Council on 24 February.

“Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians have died. The longer the war continues, the greater the suffering for both nations. The war must end now, and the peace must be durable and lasting,” she said.

With the adoption of resolution 2774, she continued, the Security Council showed that the United Nations can still live up to the purposes and principles of its charter, mainly to maintain international peace and security, including through the peaceful settlement of disputes.

“We reminded the world that there is common ground that we can all agree on. All UN Member States can agree that the war is a tragedy and that it must end. Security Council resolution 2774 does not end the war, but it has put us on a path to peace,” she added.

Russia is abusing its veto: Ukraine

Ukrainian Chargé d’affaires Khrystyna Hayovyshyn said that Russia’s behaviour in the Security Council following its aggression against her country is the “most vivid example” of how detrimental the misuse of the veto could be for the Council’s ability to respond effectively.

“All draft resolutions that the UN Security Council attempted to adopt in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 to 2024 were vetoed by the Russian Federation,” she said.

She noted that the amendments proposed by Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and UK would have contributed to bringing Council resolution 2774 in line with the UN Charter and reaffirming the commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

The adopted resolution, Ms. Hayovyshyn continued, lacked essential elements, especially those regarding the classification of the war as an act of aggression and failing to reflect the principles of the UN Charter.

“The Russian Federation abuses its veto rights either to block the Security Council decision designed to address its aggression or, as we have seen recently, block those proposals that contribute to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine in line with the UN Charter,” she added.

MIL OSI United Nations News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI: KingsRock Advisors and BC Partners Credit Announce $500 million Co-Investment Strategic Alliance

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Strengthens KingsRock’s growing corporate finance advisory and capital raising business; Increases robust pipeline of investment opportunities for BC Partners Credit

Collaboration aims to capitalize on the rapidly growing $2.0 trillion private credit industry

NEW YORK and LONDON and STOCKHOLM and DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — KingsRock Advisors, LLC, the independent global advisory firm, and BC Partners Credit, the $8 billion credit arm of international investment firm BC Partners, today announced a non-exclusive strategic alliance, wherein BC Partners Credit will have the ability to co-invest up to $500 million in a robust pipeline of credit and special opportunity transactions originated and structured by KingsRock. Likewise, KingsRock will benefit from BC Partners’ deep expertise, resources and broad international network.

This collaboration aims to leverage their combined expertise to originate, structure, execute and invest in credit and hybrid capital opportunities. BC Partners offers KingsRock greater ability to lead, underwrite and co-invest in mandated private capital markets transactions, thus providing issuer clients an enhanced level of financing certainty and its wide investor base with stronger alignment of interest by co-investments.

“The private credit sector has seen tremendous growth and it will not slow down any time soon. By combining KingsRock’s global origination expertise and broad client mix with BC Partners’ strong capital base and extensive distribution networks, both firms are even better positioned to execute complex financing transactions with greater efficiency and volume. We look forward to partnering together on attractive credit and special situation opportunities” said Ted Goldthorpe, Head of BC Partners Credit.

“We are thrilled to announce our strategic alliance with BC Partners Credit,” said Håkan Wohlin, Founder & Managing Partner, and Louis Jaffe, Co-Founder & Managing Partner of KingsRock Advisors. “Having successfully collaborated on multiple high-profile projects across industries, we are building on a strong foundation. This will allow us to support our clients’ capital raising efforts, and wherever applicable take a lead in transactions with other investor partners, by also utilizing access to BC Partners Credit’s significant capital base and distribution reach. We look forward to working together to capitalize on new transaction opportunities.”

About BC Partners Credit

BC Partners is a leading international investment firm in private equity, private debt, and real estate strategies. BC Partners Credit was launched in February 2017, with a focus on identifying attractive credit opportunities in any market environment, often in complex market segments. The platform leverages the broader firm’s deep industry and operating resources to provide flexible financing solutions to middle-market companies across Business Services, Industrials, Healthcare and other select sectors. For further information, visit www.bcpartners.com/credit-strategy.

About KingsRock:

KingsRock Advisors LLC headquartered at 900 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022, is an independent global advisory firm, with securities offered by KingsRock Securities LLC, a FINRA member firm and SIPC, as well as KingsRock Advisors UK Ltd and KingsRock Advisors Europe AB, both wholly owned subsidiaries of KingsRock Advisors LLC.

Founded in 2020, KingsRock comprises a team of approximately 30 professionals who advise on a wide range of private capital markets transactions including debt, hybrid, equity and M&A covering structures from vanilla to highly structured. The team collectively has worked on thousands of transactions across various industry sectors worldwide. Clients include private equity and private credit firms, corporations, financial institutions, government-related entities, and institutional investors.

KingsRock Advisors offers the experience and global reach of a large firm, combined with the structural agility and creativity of a boutique. An independent advisory firm with a global network that provides objective strategic and financial advisory services, along with innovative capital solutions and special situations. The firms’ bankers excel in complex transactions and deliver swift results often where large banks and traditional sources of financing do not have the ability to engage. KingsRock Advisors operates across all major industry sectors and is supported by a global network of 115 independent Senior Advisors across 45 countries, who bring decades of deal making experience.

Disclaimer:

Securities offered by KingsRock Securities LLC, a FINRA, member firm and a member of SIPC, a wholly owned subsidiary of KingsRock Advisors LLC , 900 Third Avenue, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

KingsRock Advisors UK Ltd is a private limited company registered in England and Wales with registration number 15240371. KingsRock Advisors UK Ltd (FRN 1006329) is an Appointed Representative under Bluegrove Capital Management Ltd (FRN: 960363), which is authorized and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority.

KingsRock Advisors Europe AB is incorporated in Sweden (EU), with registered office at Grev Turegatan 14, 114 46 Stockholm, Sweden, and is a tied agent of Svensk Värdepappersservice i Stockholm AB, a Swedish investment firm authorized and regulated by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Sw. Finansinspektionen) under the Swedish Securities Market Act (Sw. lag (2007:528) om värdepappersmarknaden).

This message is provided for information purposes and does not constitute an invitation, solicitation or offer to buy or sell any securities or investment. Neither KingsRock Securities LLC nor its affiliates provide accounting, tax or legal advice; such matters should be discussed with your advisors and/or counsel.

Press Inquiries

For KingsRock
Info@kingsrock.com

For BC Partners
Daniel Yunger / James Hartwell
Kekst CNC
bcpartnersus@kekstcnc.com

The MIL Network –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Countries unite to identify illegal fishing vessel via INTERPOL

Source: Interpol (news and events)

LYON, France – A joint effort by New Zealand, Australia and Norway to find a vessel suspected of illegal fishing has led to the publication of an INTERPOL Purple Notice to assist in identifying its location.

An INTERPOL Purple Notice has been issued to find a vessel suspected of illegal fishing. Pictured is ‘Thunder’ as Wuhan N 4 in Singapore, October 2012.

Thunder as Wuhan N 4 – bow view – Singapore October 2012

Circulated to all 190 INTERPOL member countries the Notice, requested by New Zealand supported by the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA) and the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, also seeks information about the individuals and networks which own, operate and profit from the suspected illegal activities of the vessel, currently believed to be called ‘Thunder’.

During the past two years, the vessel has operated under at least three different names and under several flags, in order to avoid detection of illegal fishing activities.

In July 2012, Mongolian registration papers for a vessel called ‘Wuhan 4’ were issued; however in August 2012 the vessel was sighted in the North Indian Ocean under the name ‘Kuko’. In October 2012, the vessel was spotted at a Singapore shipyard under the name ‘Wuhan N 4’ and under a Mongolian flag.

In April 2013, the same vessel requested access to a port in Malaysia under the name ‘Wuhan 4’ but when inspected a few days later in Indonesia, it was using the name ‘Thunder’ and with the Nigerian flag.

“Thunder has been operating under a number of names and flags over several years and we believe this is being done to avoid been caught violating international laws and conventions,” said Gary Orr, Manager, Operational Coordination with New Zealand’s Ministry for Primary Industries.

“Fisheries crime is not constrained by borders and is commonly carried out by transnational organized networks. Norway is deeply concerned about its global effects. We need an international, coordinated response to effectively tackle these networks, and I welcome the good cooperation we have established with Australia and New Zealand via INTERPOL,” said Norway’s Minister of Fisheries, Elisabeth Aspaker.

AFMA’s Fisheries Operations General Manager Peter Venslovas said illegal fishing activities seriously undermine the sustainability of fisheries: “Ongoing cooperation between countries across the globe to combat illegal fishing is having a real impact and making it harder for these operators to make a profit.”

It is possible that the owners of ‘Thunder’ have earned more than USD 60 million from its illegal fishing activities since it was blacklisted by the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in February 2006.

The vessel is currently believed to be operating in the Southern Ocean around Antarctica where it may be fishing illegally for Patagonian toothfish, also known as Chilean Sea Bass, a highly sought after protected species.

This is the third INTERPOL Purple Notice issued in connection with illegal fishing activities, with the first published in September this year at the request of Norwegian authorities for a vessel named ‘Snake’.

INTERPOL’s Purple Notices are used to seek or provide information on modi operandi, objects, devices and concealment methods used by criminals.

MIL Security OSI –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

Six days after the infamous shouting match between the US president and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president is scrambling to try and repair what looked initially like a near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine.

Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump. The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to congress on March 5, saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.

But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.

Neither of these two moves will have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.

So far, so bad for Zelensky. Yet Trump’s manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine. It has also had a profound impact on the relationship between the US and Europe. On Sunday March 2, in the aftermath of the White House debacle, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London with a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau.

This “coalition of the willing”“ has been in the making for some time now. Its members straddle the boundaries of the EU and Nato, including – apart from the UK – non-EU members Norway and Turkey. Since the relatively disappointing first-ever EU meeting solely focused on defence on February 3 – which was more notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent’s role and place in the Trumpian world order – Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.

The UK was first out of the blocks. Ahead of Starmer’s visit to Washington, the UK government announced on February 25 an increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. This was then followed on March 2 with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion.

Europe responds

In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the “Rearm Europe” plan on March 4. It is projected to mobilise around €800 billion (£670 million) for European defence.

This includes a “national escape clause” for EU members, exempting national defence expenditures from the EU’s deficit rules. It also offers a new loan instrument worth up to €150 billion, allows for the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defence projects, and proposes partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.

Perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government announced a major shift in the country’s fiscal policy on March 5, which will allow any defence spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country’s strict borrowing rules.

This marks an important point of departure for Germany. Apart from what it means in fiscal terms, it also sends an important political signal that Germany – the continent’s largest economy – will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.

Read more:
Europe will need thousands more tanks and troops to mount a credible military defence without the US

Donald Trump reads a letter from Volodymyr Zelensky during his speech to Congress, March 4.

These are all important steps. Taken together, and provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are likely to accelerate Europe’s awakening to a world in which US security guarantees as no longer absolute.

The challenges that Europe faces on the way to becoming strategically independent from the US are enormous. But they are not insurmountable.

The conventional military threat posed by an aggressive and revanchist Russia is more easily manageable with the planned boost to conventional forces and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will also add critical war-fighting experience which can boost the deterrent effect.

Europe for now, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear capabilities, especially if deprived of the US nuclear umbrella and faced with Russia’s regular threats to use its nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest nuclear power by warhead stockpiles.

But here, too, new strategic thinking is emerging. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has indicated his willingness to discuss a more integrated European nuclear capability. And in Germany, a country with an otherwise very complex relationship with nuclear weapons, such a European approach has been debated, increasingly positively, for some time, starting during Trump’s first term in office between 2017 and 2021.

Read more:
French nuclear deterrence for Europe: how effective could it be against Russia?

Tectonic shift

A stronger, and strategically more independent Europe, even if it will take time to emerge, is also crucial for the war in Ukraine. Increased European defence spending, including aid for Ukraine, will help Kyiv in the short term to make up for at least some of the gaps left by the suspension – and possible complete cessation – of US military support.

In the long term, however, EU accession would possibly open up the route to a security guarantee for Ukraine under article 47.2 of the Lisbon treaty on European Union.

This so-called mutual defence clause has been derided in the past for lacking any meaningful European defence capabilities. But if the current European momentum towards beefing up the continent’s defences is sustained, it would acquire more teeth than it currently has.

With the benefit of hindsight, Zelensky may have walked away less empty handed from his clash with Trump last week than it seemed initially. If nothing else, Europeans have since then demonstrated not just in words but also in deeds that they are no longer in denial about just how dangerous Trump is and how much they are now on their own.

Threatened by both Moscow and Washington, Europe is now on the cusp of a second zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” that the then German chancellor Olaf Scholz acknowledged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They may finally even have found an answer to the question he posed at the time: “How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multi-polar world?”

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin – https://theconversation.com/europe-nato-coalition-of-the-willing-scrambles-for-collective-response-to-hostility-from-trump-and-threat-from-putin-251332

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI: Alma íbúðafélag hf.: Útboð á víxlum 11. mars 2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Alma íbúðafélag hf. heldur lokað útboð á þriggja mánaða óverðtryggðum víxlum (AL 25 0615) og sex mánaða óverðtryggðum víxlum (AL 25 0915) þriðjudaginn 11. mars nk. Víxlarnir eru óveðtryggðir.

Arctica Finance hf. hefur umsjón með útboðinu og kynningu þess fyrir hugsanlegum fjárfestum.

Útboðið verður með hollenskri aðferð, þ.e. öll samþykkt tilboð bjóðast fjárfestum á hæstu samþykktu flötu vöxtum. Víxlarnir eru gefnir út í 20 m.kr. nafnverðseiningum og verða teknir til viðskipta á Aðalmarkaði Nasdaq Iceland.

Alma íbúðafélag hf. áskilur sér rétt til þess að taka hvaða tilboði sem er eða hafna þeim öllum. Niðurstöður útboðsins verða birtar opinberlega eigi síðar en næsta virka dag eftir útboð.

Skila skal inn tilboðum á netfangið m@arctica.is fyrir klukkan 17:00 þriðjudaginn 11. mars 2025. Uppgjör viðskipta fer fram 17. mars 2025.

Útboðið er undanþegið gerð lýsingar á grundvelli c- og d-liðar 4. mgr. 1. gr. reglugerðar Evrópusambandsins og ráðsins (ESB) nr. 2017/1129 um lýsingu sem birta skal þegar verðbréf eru boðin í almennu útboði eða tekin til viðskipta á skipulegum markaði og 1. mgr. 3. gr. laga nr. 14/2020 um sama efni.

Tilkynning þessi er eingöngu sett fram í upplýsingaskyni og felur ekki í sér né er hún hluti af útboðinu eða boð um kaup eða áskrift á verðbréfum félagsins. Grunnlýsing, endanlegir skilmálar og önnur skjöl er varða útgáfu framangreinds flokks skuldaskjals eru birt á vefsíðu félagsins: http://www.al.is/company/investors/bond-issuance/.

Nánari upplýsingar veitir:

Ingólfur Árni Gunnarsson, framkvæmdastjóri
ingolfur@al.is

The MIL Network –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI: Municipality Finance Plc Amends the Terms and Conditions of Medium Term Notes

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Municipality Finance Plc
Stock exchange release
6 March 2025 at 4:00 pm (EET)

Municipality Finance Plc Amends the Terms and Conditions of Medium Term Notes

Municipality Finance Plc amends the terms and conditions pertaining to EUR 10 million medium term notes issued on 11 February 2025 (ISIN: XS2999632172). With the amendments, the notes are in new global note form and accordingly are intended to be held in a manner which would allow Eurosystem eligibility in other respects, the terms and conditions of the notes remain unchanged. The amended and restated final terms are available in English on the company’s website at https://www.kuntarahoitus.fi/en/for-investors.

Holders of the notes have approved the amendments. The notes have been admitted to trading on the Helsinki Stock Exchange maintained by Nasdaq Helsinki.

MUNICIPALITY FINANCE PLC

Further information:

Joakim Holmström
Executive Vice President, Capital Markets and Sustainability
tel. +358 50 444 3638

MuniFin (Municipality Finance Plc) is one of Finland’s largest credit institutions. The owners of the company include Finnish municipalities, the public sector pension fund Keva and the State of Finland. The Group’s balance sheet is over EUR 53 billion.

MuniFin builds a better and more sustainable future with its customers. Our customers include municipalities, joint municipal authorities, wellbeing services counties, joint county authorities, corporate entities under the control of the above-mentioned organisations, and affordable social housing. Lending is used for environmentally and socially responsible investment targets such as public transportation, sustainable buildings, hospitals and healthcare centres, schools and day care centres, and homes for people with special needs.

MuniFin’s customers are domestic but the company operates in a completely global business environment. The company is an active Finnish bond issuer in international capital markets and the first Finnish green and social bond issuer. The funding is exclusively guaranteed by the Municipal Guarantee Board.

Read more: www.munifin.fi

Important Information

The information contained herein is not for release, publication or distribution, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, in or into any such country or jurisdiction or otherwise in such circumstances in which the release, publication or distribution would be unlawful. The information contained herein does not constitute an offer to sell or the solicitation of an offer to buy, nor shall there be any sale of, any securities or other financial instruments in any jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration, exemption from registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction.

This communication does not constitute an offer of securities for sale in the United States. The notes have not been and will not be registered under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”) or under the applicable securities laws of any state of the United States and may not be offered or sold, directly or indirectly, within the United States or to, or for the account or benefit of, U.S. persons except pursuant to an applicable exemption from, or in a transaction not subject to, the registration requirements of the Securities Act.

The MIL Network –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI: Notice to Aktia Bank Plc’s Annual General Meeting 2025
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Aktia Bank Plc
Stock Exchange Release
6 March 2025 at 1.00 p.m.

Notice to Aktia Bank Plc’s Annual General Meeting 2025

Notice is hereby given to Aktia Bank Plc shareholders that the Annual General Meeting will be held on Thursday, 3 April 2025 at 4.00 p.m. at Pikku-Finlandia, address Karamzininranta 4, Helsinki. Persons who have registered for the meeting will be welcomed and voting sheets will be distributed from 3.00 p.m. onwards.

Shareholders of Aktia Bank Plc can also exercise their voting rights by voting in advance. Instructions for advance voting are set out in section C of this notice to the Annual General Meeting.

It is possible to follow the Annual General Meeting via webcast. Instructions on how to follow the webcast are available on the company’s website www.aktia.com/en/investors/corporate-governance/annual-general-meeting. It is not possible to ask questions, make counterproposals, make other interventions, or vote via webcast. Following the meeting via webcast shall not be considered as participation in the Annual General Meeting or as the exercise of shareholders’ rights.

A. Matters to be discussed at the Annual General Meeting

The agenda of the Annual General Meeting will be as follows:

1.   Opening of the meeting

2.   Calling the meeting to order

3.   Election of persons to scrutinise the minutes and to supervise the counting of votes

4.   Recording the legality of the meeting

5.   Recording the attendance at the meeting and adoption of the list of votes

6.   Presentation of the financial statements, consolidated financial statements, report by the Board of Directors and Auditor’s report for 2024

CEO’s presentation.

The company’s financial statements and Annual Report, including the report by the Board of Directors, sustainability report, the Auditor’s report and the assurance report on sustainability reporting, will be published no later than 13 March 2025, after which they are available on the company’s website at www.aktia.com.

7.   Adoption of the financial statements and the consolidated financial statements

The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting adopts the financial statements. The company’s auditor has recommended adopting the financial statements.

8.   Resolution on the use of the profit shown in the balance sheet and the payment of dividend

The Board of Directors proposes that a dividend of EUR 0.82 per share shall be paid for the financial year 2024.

Shareholders registered in the register of shareholders of the company maintained by Euroclear Finland Ltd on the record date for the dividend payment 7 April 2025 are entitled to the dividend. The Board of Directors proposes that the dividend shall be paid out on 14 April 2025 in accordance with the rules of Euroclear Finland Ltd.

9.   Resolution on the discharge from liability of the members of the Board of Directors, the CEO and his deputy

10.   Handling of the Remuneration Report of the governing bodies

The Board of Directors proposes to the Annual General Meeting that the Remuneration Report for the company’s governing bodies be confirmed.

The 2024 Remuneration Report of the company’s governing bodies will be published no later than 13 March 2025, after which it is available on the company’s website at www.aktia.com.

11.   Resolution on remuneration for the members of the Board

The Nomination Board proposes that the remuneration for the Board of Directors for the term be unchanged and determined as follows:
- Chair, EUR 75,000 (2024: EUR 75,000)
- Deputy Chair, EUR 50,000 (2024: EUR 50,000)
- member, EUR 40,000 (2024: EUR 40,000)
Annual remunerations for the Chairs of each Committee as well as meeting remunerations are proposed to be unchanged, meaning that it is proposed that the Chair of each Committee will further receive an annual remuneration of EUR 8,000. The proposed meeting remuneration for Board and Committee meetings is EUR 700 per attended meeting for each person (EUR 700 per attended meeting for each person in 2024). If participation in a board meeting requires travelling outside the board member’s country of residence, the remuneration for board meeting is EUR 1,400 per attended meeting for each person (EUR 1,400 per attended meeting for each person in 2024). The remuneration of the members of the Board is not treated as income forming basis for earnings-related pension. Compensation for travel and accommodation expenses as well as a daily allowance is paid in line with the Finnish Tax Administration’s guidelines and the travel instructions of the company.

The Nomination Board proposes that approximately 40% of the annual remuneration (gross amount) shall be paid to the members in the form of Aktia shares. The company will on account of the Board members acquire Aktia shares on the market to the price that is formed through public trading or it will transfer the company’s own shares to the Board members and the rest of the annual remuneration payable is paid in cash. The shares are acquired or transferred during a two-week time period from the day following the company’s interim report for 1 January 2025–31 March 2025 is disclosed or as soon as possible in accordance with applicable legislation. If the remuneration can’t be paid in shares, it can be paid in cash entirely. The company will be responsible for all expenses and the possible transfer tax for acquiring or transferring the shares.

12.   Resolution on the number of members of the Board of Directors

The Shareholders’ Nomination Board proposes that the number of members of the Board of Directors be decreased from nine (9) to seven (7) members. However, should any of the candidates proposed under section 13 below not be able to attend the Board, the proposed number of Board members shall be decreased accordingly.

13.   Election of members of the Board of Directors

The Shareholders’ Nomination Board proposes that of the present members of the Board of Directors Joakim Frimodig, Carl Haglund, Maria Jerhamre Engström, Harri Lauslahti and Matts Rosenberg, based on their consent, shall be re-elected for a term continuing until the next Annual General Meeting has concluded. For more information on the members of the Board of Directors proposed to be re-elected, please see the company’s website at www.aktia.com. The Board members of Aktia Bank Ann Grevelius, Sari Pohjonen, Johannes Schulman and Lasse Svens have informed that they will not be available for re-election.

The Shareholders’ Nomination Board also proposes that Hanne Katrama and Sari Somerkallio are elected as new members of the Board of Directors for the same term, based on their consent. Further information on the new Board members proposed to be elected have been attached to this notice and can be found on the company’s website at www.aktia.com closer to the company’s Annual General Meeting.

Should any of the candidates presented above not be able to attend the Board, the available candidates are proposed to be elected accordingly.

All the proposed persons are independent in relation to the company according to the definition of the Corporate Governance Code. Only Matts Rosenberg is not independent of a significant shareholder since he is the Chair of the board of RG Partners Oy, the largest shareholder (10.13%) of Aktia Bank. In addition, Rosenberg is the CEO of Rettig Oy Ab, which is the largest owner of RG Partners Oy.

All the proposed persons have informed that they intend, if they are elected, to re-elect Matts Rosenberg amongst them as Chair of the Board of Directors and to elect Joakim Frimodig as Deputy Chair.

14.   Resolution on the auditor’s and sustainability reporting assurance provider’s remuneration

The Board of Directors proposes, based on the recommendation of the Board of Directors’ Audit Committee, that remuneration shall be paid to the auditor against the auditor’s reasonable invoice. The Board of Directors also proposes that remuneration shall be paid to the sustainability reporting assurance provider against a reasonable invoice for measures related to the assurance of sustainability reporting.

15.   Determination of the number of auditors and sustainability reporting assurance providers

The Board of Directors proposes, based on the recommendation of the Board of Directors’ Audit Committee, that the number of auditors and sustainability reporting assurance providers shall be one (1).

16.   Election of the auditor and the sustainability reporting assurance provider

The Board of Directors proposes, based on the recommendation of the Board of Directors’ Audit Committee, that KPMG Oy Ab, a firm of authorised public accountants, shall be elected as auditor, with Tiia Kataja, APA, as auditor-in-charge. The Board of Directors also proposes, based on the recommendation of the Board of Directors’ Audit Committee, that KPMG Oy Ab, an Authorised Sustainability Audit Firm, shall be elected as sustainability reporting assurance provider, with Tiia Kataja, Authorised Sustainability Auditor (ASA), as sustainability reporting assurance provider-in-charge. The auditor and the sustainability reporting assurance provider shall be elected for a term of office beginning when the Annual General Meeting 2025 has ended and continuing up until the Annual General Meeting 2026 has ended.

17.   Authorising the Board of Directors to decide on one or more issues of shares or special rights entitling to shares referred to in Chapter 10 of the Finnish Companies Act

The Board of Directors proposes that the General Meeting authorises the Board of Directors to issue shares, or special rights entitling to shares referred to in Chapter 10 of the Companies Act, as follows:

A maximum amount of 7,316,000 shares can be issued based on this authorisation, which corresponds to approximately 10% of all shares in the company.

The Board of Directors is authorised to decide on all terms for issues of shares and of special rights entitling to shares. The authorisation concerns the issuance of new shares. Issues of shares or of special rights entitling to shares can be carried out in deviation from the shareholders’ pre-emptive subscription right to the company’s shares (directed share issue).

The Board of Directors has the right to use this authorisation, among other things, to strengthen the company’s capital base, for the company’s share-based incentive scheme, acquisitions and/or other corporate transactions.

The authorisation is effective for 18 months from the resolution by the General Meeting and revokes the issue authorisation given by the Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024.

18.   Authorising the Board of Directors to decide on the acquisition of the company’s own shares

The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting authorises the Board of Directors to decide on the acquisition of 500,000 shares at a maximum, corresponding to approximately 0.7% of the total number of shares in the company.

The company’s own shares may be acquired in one or several tranches using the unrestricted equity of the company.

The company’s own shares may be acquired at a price formed in public trading on the date of the acquisition, or at a price otherwise prevailing on the market. The company’s own shares may be acquired in a proportion other than that of the shares held by the shareholders (directed acquisition).

The company’s own shares may be acquired to be used in the company’s share-based incentive schemes and/or for the remuneration of the members of the Board of Directors, for further transfer, retention, or cancellation.

The Board of Directors is authorised to decide on all additional terms concerning the acquisition of the company’s own shares.

The authorisation is effective for 18 months from the resolution by the General Meeting and revokes the authorisation to purchase the company’s own shares given by the Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024.

19.   Authorising the Board of Directors to decide to divest the company’s own shares

The Board of Directors proposes that the Annual General Meeting authorises the Board of Directors to decide on divesting own shares held by the company, as follows.

Based on the authorisation, a maximum of 500,000 shares may be divested.

Board of Directors is authorised to decide on all additional terms concerning the divestment of the company’s own shares. The divestment of the company’s own shares can be carried out in deviation from the shareholders’ pre-emptive subscription rights to shares in the company (directed share issue), e.g., for implementing the company’s incentive programs and for remuneration, including divesting the company’s own shares to board members for payment of board remuneration.

The authorisation is effective for 18 months from the resolution by the General Meeting and revokes the authorisation to divest the company’s own shares given by the Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024.

20.   Closing of the meeting

B. Documents of the Annual General Meeting

The proposals for the decisions on the matters on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting as well as this notice are available on Aktia Bank Plc’s website www.aktia.com. Aktia Bank Plc’s Annual Report including the company’s financial statements, the report by the Board of Directors (including the sustainability report), the Auditor’s report and the assurance report on sustainability reporting, and the 2024 Remuneration Report of the governing bodies, will be available on the above-mentioned website on 13 March 2025, at the latest. The minutes of the Annual General Meeting will be available on the above-mentioned website on 17 April 2025, at the latest.

C. Instructions for the participants in the Annual General Meeting

1. Shareholders registered in the shareholders’ register

Each shareholder, who is registered in the company’s register of shareholders maintained by Euroclear Finland Ltd as at 24 March 2025, has the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting. A shareholder whose shares are registered in their personal Finnish book-entry account is registered in the company’s register of shareholders. Any changes in the ownership of shares that have occurred after the record date of the Annual General Meeting do not affect the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting nor the number of votes of the shareholder.

Registration for the Annual General Meeting starts on 7 March 2025 at 10.00 a.m. Shareholders who are registered in the company’s register of shareholders and who wish to participate in the Annual General Meeting must register for the General Meeting by 4.00 p.m. on 27 March 2025, at the latest. Participants can register for the Annual General Meeting:

a) through the company’s website www.aktia.com/en/investors/corporate-governance/annual-general-meeting. Electronic registration requires strong identification of the shareholder or his/her legal representative or proxy with a Finnish, Swedish or Danish bank ID or mobile certificate;

b) by e-mail to Innovatics Ltd at agm@innovatics.fi. A shareholder registering by e-mail shall include in the message the registration form available on the company’s website www.aktia.com/en/investors/corporate-governance/annual-general-meeting and a possible advance voting form or equivalent information; or

c) by mail to Innovatics Ltd, Annual General Meeting / Aktia Bank Plc, Ratamestarinkatu 13 A, FI-00520 Helsinki. A shareholder registering by mail shall include in the message the registration form available on the company’s website www.aktia.com/en/investors/corporate-governance/annual-general-meeting and a possible advance voting form or equivalent information.

When registering, please provide the necessary information, such as the shareholder’s name, date of birth or business ID, contact details, the name of any assistant or proxy representative and the proxy’s date of birth. The personal data provided by shareholders to Aktia Bank Plc or Innovatics Ltd will only be used in connection with the Annual General Meeting and the processing of the necessary registrations related thereto.

The shareholder, his/her representative or proxy must be able to prove his/her identity and/or right of representation at the meeting. Further information on the use of proxy and power of attorney are described below in section C 3.

Further information on registration and advance voting is available by telephone during the registration period of the Annual General Meeting by calling at +358 10 2818 909 on weekdays from 9.00 a.m. to 12.00 p.m. and from 1.00 p.m. to 4.00 p.m.

2. Owners of nominee registered shares

A holder of nominee registered shares has the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting by virtue of such shares, based on which he/she on the record date of the Annual General Meeting 24 March 2025 would be entitled to be registered in the company’s register of shareholders maintained by Euroclear Finland Ltd. Participation also requires that the shareholder has been entered into the company’s temporary register of shareholders, maintained by Euroclear Finland Ltd, on the basis of such shares by 31 March 2025 at 10.00 a.m. at the latest. In the case of nominee-registered shares, this is considered registration for the Annual General Meeting. Changes in the shareholding after the record date of the Annual General Meeting do not affect the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting or the shareholder’s voting rights.

The holder of nominee-registered shares is advised to request well in advance the necessary instructions from his/her custodian bank regarding temporary registration in the register of shareholders, the issuing of proxy documents and voting instructions, registration, and attendance at the Annual General Meeting and, if necessary, advance voting. The account manager of the custodian bank shall register the holder of nominee-registered shares attending the Annual General Meeting in the temporary register of shareholders of the company by the aforementioned date and time at the latest and, if necessary, arrange for advance voting on behalf of the holder of nominee-registered shares before the end of the registration period for holders of nominee-registered shares.

3. Proxy representatives and powers of attorney

A shareholder may attend the Annual General Meeting and exercise his/her rights there through a proxy representative. A shareholder’s proxy may also elect to vote in advance as described in this notice if he/she so wishes. The proxy representative shall authenticate to the electronic registration service and advance voting personally with strong authentication, after which he/she will be able to register and vote in advance on behalf of the shareholder that he/she represents. The shareholder’s proxy must present dated proxy documents, or otherwise in a reliable manner prove that he/she is entitled to represent the shareholder at the Annual General Meeting. You can prove your right to representation by using the Suomi.fi e-Authorisations service available in the electronic registration service.

Model proxy documents and voting instructions are available on the company’s website www.aktia.com/en/investors/corporate-governance/annual-general-meeting. If a shareholder participates in the Annual General Meeting through several proxies representing the shareholder with shares held in different securities accounts, the shares on the basis of which each proxy represents the shareholder shall be identified in connection with the registration.

Proxy documents are requested to be submitted preferably as an attachment with the electronic registration or alternatively by mail to Innovatics Ltd, Annual General Meeting / Aktia Bank Plc, Ratamestarinkatu 13 A, FI-00520 Helsinki or by e-mail to agm@innovatics.fi before the end of the registration period. In addition to submitting the proxy documents, the shareholder or his/her proxy shall register for the Annual General Meeting in the manner described above in this notice.

4. Advance voting

A shareholder whose shares in the company are registered in his/her personal Finnish book-entry account may vote in advance between 7 March 2025 and 27 March 2025 on certain items on the agenda of the Annual General Meeting

a) via the company’s website at www.aktia.com/en/investors/corporate-governance/annual-general-meeting. Login to the service is done in the same way as for registration in section C.1 of this notice;

b) by mail by submitting the advance voting form available on the company’s website or equivalent information to Innovatics Ltd at Innovatics Ltd, Annual General Meeting / Aktia Bank Plc, Ratamestarinkatu 13 A, FI-00520 Helsinki, Finland; or

c) by e-mail by submitting the advance voting form available on the company’s website or equivalent information to Innovatics Ltd by e-mail at agm@innovatics.fi.

Advance votes must be received by the time the advance voting ends. The submission of votes by mail or e-mail before the end of the registration and advance voting period shall be considered registration for the Annual General Meeting, provided that it contains the abovementioned information required for registration.

A shareholder who has voted in advance cannot exercise the right to ask questions or demand a vote under the Finnish Companies Act unless he/she attends the Annual General Meeting in person or by proxy at the meeting venue.

With respect to nominee registered shareholders, the advance voting is carried out by the account manager. The account manager may vote in advance on behalf of the holders of nominee-registered shares whom he/she represents in accordance with the voting instructions given by them during the registration period set for the nominee-registered shareholders.

Proposals for resolution that are subject to advance voting are deemed to have been made at the Annual General Meeting without any changes.

5. Further instructions for attendees of the Annual General Meeting

The official language of the meeting is Swedish, but the meeting will be partly conducted also in Finnish. Shareholders may address the meeting and present questions in both Swedish and Finnish. There is no simultaneous interpretation at the meeting.

Shareholders present at the Annual General Meeting have the right to present questions about the matters discussed at the meeting in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 25 of the Finnish Companies Act.

Changes in the shareholding after the record date of the Annual General Meeting do not affect the right to participate in the Annual General Meeting or the shareholder’s voting rights.

Shareholders are welcome to participate in coffee service arranged after the meeting.

On the date of this notice to the Annual General Meeting the total number of shares in Aktia Bank Plc is 73,161,696 shares, representing 73,161,696 votes. The company holds on the date of this notice a total number of 56,708 of its own shares. The shares held by the company on the record date of the Annual General Meeting do not entitle to vote at the Annual General Meeting.

Helsinki, 6 March 2025

AKTIA BANK PLC
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Appendix 1: information on the proposed new members of the Board of Directors

For more information, please contact:
Lasse Svens, Chair of the Board, tel. +358 500 562 945
Ari Syrjäläinen, General Counsel, tel. +358 10 247 6350

Distribution:
Nasdaq Helsinki Ltd
Central media
www.aktia.com

Aktia is a Finnish asset manager, bank and life insurer that has been creating wealth and wellbeing from one generation to the next for 200 years. We serve our customers in digital channels everywhere and face-to-face in our offices in the Helsinki, Turku, Tampere, Vaasa and Oulu regions. Our award-winning asset management business sells investment funds internationally. We employ approximately 850 people around Finland. Aktia’s assets under management (AuM) on 31 December 2024 amounted to EUR 14.0 billion, and the balance sheet total was EUR 11.9 billion. Aktia’s shares are listed on Nasdaq Helsinki Ltd (AKTIA). aktia.com.

Attachment
- Attachment_Information_on_proposed_new_Board_members_for_Aktia_Bank
The MIL Network –
March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI USA: The Next Full Moon is the Worm Moon

Source: NASA

The next full moon is called the Worm Moon. Also, there will be a total lunar eclipse this full moon. The Moon will be full early Friday morning, March 14, at 2:55 a.m. EDT, but will appear full for about three days around this time, from Wednesday evening into Saturday morning.

As the Moon passes opposite the Sun it will move through the shadow of Earth creating a total eclipse of the Moon. The Moon will begin entering the partial shadow Thursday night at 11:57 p.m. EDT, but the gradual dimming of the Moon will not be noticeable until it starts to enter the full shadow Friday morning at 1:09 a.m. The round shadow of Earth will gradually shift across the face of the Moon (from lower left to upper right) until the Moon is fully shaded beginning at 2:26 a.m. The period of full shadow, or total eclipse, will last about 65 minutes, reaching the greatest eclipse at 2:59 a.m. and ending at 3:31 a.m. Even though it will be in full shadow, the Moon will still be visible. The glow of all of the sunrises and sunsets on Earth will give the Moon a reddish-brown hue, sometimes called a “Blood Moon” — although this name is also used for one of the full moons near the start of fall. From 3:31 a.m. until 4:48 a.m., the Moon will exit the full shadow of Earth, with the round shadow again shifting across the face of the Moon (from upper left to lower right). The Moon will leave the last of the partial shadow at 6 a.m. ending this eclipse.
The Maine Farmers’ Almanac began publishing Native American names for full moons in the 1930s, and these names are now widely known and used. According to this almanac, the tribes of the northeastern U.S. called the full moon in March the Crow, Crust, Sap, Sugar, or Worm Moon. The more northern tribes of the northeastern United States knew this as the Crow Moon, with the cawing of crows signaling the end of winter. Other northern names were the Crust Moon, because the snow cover became crusted from thawing by day and freezing by night, or the Sap (or Sugar) Moon as this was the time for tapping maple trees. The more southern tribes called this the Worm Moon after the earthworm casts that appeared as the ground thawed. It makes sense that only the southern tribes called this the Worm Moon. When glaciers covered the northern part of North America they wiped out the native earthworms. After these glaciers melted about 12,000 years ago the more northern forests grew back without earthworms. Most of the earthworms in these areas are invasive species introduced from Europe and Asia.
Continuing the tradition of naming moons after prominent phenomena tied to the time of year, a few years ago my friend Tom Van Wagner suggested naming this the Pothole Moon. It may be a case of confirmation bias, but whether in my car or on my bicycle I’ve noticed more potholes lately.

As usual, the wearing of suitably celebratory celestial attire is encouraged in honor of the full moon. Enjoy the total lunar eclipse (if you are in a part of the world that can see it), anticipate the coming of spring and watch out for potholes!

Gordon johnston
NASA Program Executive (Retired)

Here are the other celestial events between now and the full moon after next with times and angles based on the location of NASA Headquarters in Washington:
As winter in the Northern Hemisphere ends and spring begins, the daily periods of sunlight continue to lengthen, changing fastest around the vernal (spring) equinox on March 20. On Friday, March 14 (the day of the full moon), morning twilight will begin at 6:23 a.m. EDT, sunrise will be at 7:20 a.m., solar noon will be at 1:17 p.m. when the Sun will reach its maximum altitude of 48.9 degrees, sunset will be at 7:14 p.m., and evening twilight will end at 8:12 p.m. By Saturday, April 12 — the day of the full moon after next — morning twilight will begin at 5:36 a.m., sunrise will be at 6:36 a.m., solar noon will be at 1:09 p.m. when the Sun will reach its maximum altitude of 60.1 degrees, sunset will be at 7:43 p.m., and evening twilight will end at 8:43 p.m.
During this lunar cycle, a backyard telescope should still provide interesting views of Jupiter and Mars high in the evening sky. Venus and Mercury will only be visible near the start at this cycle and will be too low to see easily unless you have access to a location with clear views toward the western horizon. With a telescope, you should be able to see Jupiter’s four bright moons, Ganymede, Callisto, Europa, and Io, noticeably shifting positions in the course of an evening. Jupiter was at its closest and brightest in early December. Mars was at its closest and brightest for the year just a month ago. The planet Uranus will be too dim to see without a telescope when the Moon is in the sky, but later in the lunar cycle, if you are in a very dark area with clear skies and no interference from moonlight, it will still be brighter than the faintest visible stars, making it barely visible. Uranus was at its closest and brightest in mid-November.
Comets and Meteor Shower
No meteor showers are predicted to peak during this lunar cycle, and no comets are expected to be visible without a telescope.
Evening Sky Highlights
On the evening of Thursday, March 13 — the night of the full moon — as twilight ends at 8:11 p.m. EDT, the rising Moon will be 14 degrees above the eastern horizon. The brightest planet in the sky will be Venus at 4 degrees above the west-southwestern horizon, appearing as a thin, 4% illuminated crescent through a telescope. Next in brightness will be Jupiter at 62 degrees above the west-southwestern horizon. Third in brightness will be Mars at 72 degrees above the southeastern horizon. Mercury, to the left of Venus, will also be 4 degrees above the western horizon. Uranus, on the edge of what is visible under extremely clear, moonless, and dark skies, will be 45 degrees above the western horizon. The bright star closest to overhead will be Capella at 75 degrees above the northwestern horizon. Capella is the 6th brightest star in our night sky, and the brightest star in the constellation Auriga (shaped like a charioteer). Although we see Capella as a single star it is actually four stars — two pairs of stars orbiting each other. Capella is about 43 light-years from Earth.
Also high in the sky will be the constellation Orion, easily identifiable because of the three stars that form Orion’s Belt. This time of year, we see many bright stars at evening twilight, with bright stars scattered from the south-southeast toward the northwest. We see more stars in this direction because we are looking toward the Local Arm of our home galaxy (also called the Orion Arm, Orion-Cygnus Arm, or Orion Bridge). This arm is about 3,500 light years across and 10,000 light years long. Some of the bright stars we see from this arm are the three stars of Orion’s Belt, along with Rigel (860 light-years from Earth), Betelgeuse (548 light-years), Polaris (about 400 light-years), and Deneb (about 2,600 light-years).
As this lunar cycle progresses, the background of stars will rotate by about a degree westward each evening around the pole star Polaris. March 16 will be the last evening Venus will be above the horizon, and March 17 will be the last evening Mercury will be above the horizon as twilight ends. On March 30, Mars will pass by the bright star Pollux for the third time in 6 months, having passed by in mid-October 2024, changed direction (called apparent retrograde motion) and passed again in mid-January, then changed directions again for this March 30 pass. The waxing moon will appear near the Pleiades star cluster on April 1, Jupiter on April 2, Mars and Pollux on April 5, and Regulus on April 7 and 8.
By the evening of Saturday, April 12 — the evening of the night of the full moon after next — as twilight ends at 8:43 p.m. EDT, the rising Moon will be 10 degrees above the east-southeastern horizon with the bright star Spica about a half degree to the upper left. The brightest planet in the sky will be Jupiter at 38 degrees above the western horizon. Next in brightness will be Mars at 70 degrees above the southwestern horizon. Uranus, on the edge of what is visible under extremely clear, moonless dark skies, will be 18 degrees above the western horizon. The bright star closest to overhead will be Pollux at 71 degrees above the west-southwestern horizon. Pollux is the 17th brightest star in our night sky and the brighter of the twin stars in the constellation Gemini the twins. It is an orange-tinted star about 34 light-years from Earth. Pollux is not quite twice the mass of our Sun, but is about 9 times the diameter and 33 times the brightness.
Morning Sky Highlights
On the morning of Friday, March 14 — the morning of the full moon — as twilight begins at 6:23 a.m. EDT, the setting full moon will be 12 degrees above the western horizon. No visible planets will appear in the sky. The bright star closest to overhead will be Vega at 68 degrees above the eastern horizon. Vega is the 5th brightest star in our night sky and the brightest star in the constellation Lyra (the lyre). Vega is one of the three bright stars of the “Summer Triangle” along with Deneb and Altair. It is about 25 light-years from Earth, has twice the mass of our Sun, and shines 40 times brighter than our Sun.
As this lunar cycle progresses, the background of stars will rotate westward by about a degree each morning around the pole star Polaris. The waning moon will appear near Spica on March 16 and 17, and Antares on March 20. Bright Venus — now the morning star — will begin to emerge from the glow of dawn around March 21 and will be above the horizon as twilight begins after March 29. Mercury and Saturn will begin emerging from the glow of dawn in early April, rising after morning twilight begins. Initially Saturn will appear brighter than Mercury, but Mercury will brighten each morning as it becomes a fuller crescent, showing more illuminated area to Earth. After about April 8, Mercury will appear brighter than Saturn.
By the morning of Sunday, April 13 — the morning of the night of the full moon after next — as twilight begins at 5:34 a.m. EDT, the setting full moon will be 10 degrees above the west-southwestern horizon with the bright star Spica 4 degrees to the right. The only planet in the sky as twilight begins will be bright Venus as the morning star at 5 degrees above the eastern horizon. However, both Mercury and the fainter Saturn should be visible below Venus after they rise 4 and 7 minutes later (Saturn at 5:37 a.m. and Mercury at 5:40 a.m.). The bright star closest to overhead still will be Vega at 81 degrees above the eastern horizon.

Here for your reference is a day-by-day listing of celestial events between now and the full moon on April 12, 2025. The times and angles are based on the location of NASA Headquarters in Washington, and some of these details may differ for where you are (I use parentheses to indicate times specific to the D.C. area). If your latitude is significantly different than 39 degrees north (and especially for my Southern Hemisphere readers), I recommend using an astronomy app that is set up for your location or a star-watching guide from a local observatory, news outlet, or astronomy club.
March 8 Just after midnight on Saturday morning, March 8, the planet Mercury will reach its greatest angular separation from the Sun as seen from Earth for this apparition (called greatest elongation).
Saturday evening, March 8, Mercury will appear at its highest (6 degrees) above the western horizon as evening twilight ends (at 7:06 p.m. EST). Mercury will set 34 minutes later (at 7:40 p.m.). This will also be the evening Mercury will have dimmed to the brightness of Mars, after which Mars will be the third brightest visible planet again.
March 8 – 9 On Saturday evening into Sunday morning, March 8 to 9, Mars will appear near the waxing gibbous moon with the bright star Pollux (the brighter of the twin stars in the constellation Gemini) nearby. As evening twilight ends at 7:06 p.m. EST, Mars will be 1.5 degrees to the lower right of the Moon and Pollux will be 6 degrees to the lower left. As the Moon reaches its highest for the night more than an hour later at 8:22 p.m., Mars will be 1.5 degrees to the lower right of the Moon and Pollux will be 5.5 degrees to the upper left. By the time Mars sets on the northwestern horizon (at 4:53 a.m.) it will be 4 degrees to the lower left of the Moon and Pollux will be 3 degrees above the Moon.
March 9 Don’t forget to reset your clocks (if they don’t automatically set themselves) as we “spring forward” to Daylight Saving Time! For much of the U.S., 2 to 3 a.m. on March 9, 2025, might be a good hour for magical or fictional events (as it doesn’t actually exist).
March 11 – 12 Tuesday evening into Wednesday morning, March 11 to 12, the bright star Regulus will appear near the nearly full moon. As evening twilight ends at 8:09 p.m. EDT, Regulus will be 4 degrees to the lower right of the Moon. When the Moon reaches its highest for the night at 11:52 p.m., Regulus will be 3 degrees to the lower right. By the time morning twilight begins at 6:26 a.m., Regulus will be about one degree below the Moon.
Wednesday morning, March 12, Saturn will be passing on the far side of the Sun as seen from Earth, called conjunction. Because Saturn orbits outside of the orbit of Earth it will be shifting from the evening sky to the morning sky. Saturn will begin emerging from the glow of dawn on the eastern horizon in early April (depending upon viewing conditions).
Wednesday evening, March 12, will be when Venus and Mercury will appear closest to each other low on the western horizon, 5.5 degrees apart. They will be about 5 degrees above the horizon as evening twilight ends at 8:10 p.m. EDT, and Mercury will set first 27 minutes later at 8:37 p.m.
March 14 As mentioned above, the full moon will be early Friday morning, March 14, at 2:55 a.m. EDT. There will be a total eclipse of the Moon. As the Moon passes opposite the Sun it will move through the shadow of Earth. The Moon will begin entering the partial shadow Thursday night at 11:57 p.m., but the gradual dimming of the Moon will not be noticeable until it starts to enter the full shadow Friday morning at 1:09 a.m. The round shadow of Earth will gradually shift across the face of the Moon (from lower left to upper right) until the Moon is fully shaded beginning at 2:26 a.m. The period of full shadow or total eclipse will last about 65 minutes, reaching the greatest eclipse at 2:59 a.m. and ending at 3:31 a.m. Even though it will be in full shadow, the Moon will still be visible. The glow of all of the sunrises and sunsets on Earth will give the Moon a reddish-brown hue, sometimes called a “Blood Moon” — although this name is also used for one of the full moons near the start of fall. From 3:31 a.m. until 4:48 a.m. the Moon will exit the full shadow of Earth, with the round shadow of Earth again shifting across the face of the Moon (from upper left to lower right). The Moon will leave the last of the partial shadow at 6 a.m., ending this eclipse. This full moon will be on Thursday evening from Pacific Daylight Time and Mountain Standard Time westward to the International Date Line in the mid Pacific. The Moon will appear full for about three days around this time, from Wednesday evening into Saturday morning.
March 16 Sunday morning, March 16, the bright star Spica will appear near the waning gibbous moon. As the Moon reaches its highest at 2:34 a.m. EDT, Spica will be 6.5 degrees to the lower left. As morning twilight begins at 6:20 a.m. Spica will be 5 degrees to the upper left.
During the day on Sunday, March 16, for parts of Eastern Africa, the southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, the Indian Ocean, and the southern tip of Western Australia, the Moon will pass in front of Spica.
Sunday evening, March 16, will be the last evening that Venus will be above the west-northwestern horizon as evening twilight ends at 8:14 p.m. EDT, with Venus setting 1 minute later.
March 16 – 17 Sunday night into Monday morning, March 16 to 17, the waning gibbous moon will have shifted to the other side of the bright star Spica. As the Moon rises on the east-southeastern horizon at 9:49 p.m. EDT, Spica will be 4 degrees above the Moon. By the time the Moon reaches its highest at 3:15 a.m., Spica will be 6.5 degrees to the upper right. As morning twilight begins at 6:18 a.m., Spica will be 7.5 degrees to the right of the Moon.Monday midday, March 17, at 12:27 p.m. EDT, the Moon will be at apogee, its farthest from Earth for this orbit.Monday evening, March 17, will be the last evening that Mercury will be above the western horizon as evening twilight ends at 8:15 p.m. EDT, with Mercury setting 3 minutes later.
March 19 Wednesday evening, March 19, Neptune will be passing on the far side of the Sun as seen from Earth, called conjunction. Because it orbits outside of the orbit of Earth, Neptune will be shifting from the evening sky to the morning sky. Neptune is faint enough that it is only visible with a telescope.
March 20 Thursday morning, March 20, the bright star Antares will appear near the waning gibbous moon. As Antares rises on the southeastern horizon at 1:17 a.m. EDT, it will be 5 degrees to the lower left of the Moon. By the time the Moon reaches its highest for the night at 5:31 a.m., Antares will be 3.5 degrees to the left of the Moon. Morning twilight will begin 42 minutes later at 6:13 a.m. For parts of Australia and New Zealand the Moon will pass in front of Antares.
Thursday morning at 5:01 a.m. EDT will be the vernal equinox, the astronomical end of winter and start of spring.
March 21 Starting around Friday morning, March 21, Venus as the morning star will begin to emerge from the glow of dawn, rising on the east-northeastern horizon more than 30 minutes before sunrise. Interestingly, this is just before inferior conjunction, when Venus passes “between” Earth and the Sun (passing through the same ecliptic longitude as the Sun as seen from Earth).
March 22 Saturday morning, March 22, the waning moon will appear half-full as it reaches its last quarter at 7:29 a.m. EDT.
Saturday night, Venus will be passing through the same ecliptic longitude as the Sun as seen from Earth, called inferior conjunction. Planets that orbit inside of the orbit of Earth can have two types of conjunctions with the Sun, inferior (when passing between Earth and Sun) and superior (when passing on the far side of the Sun as seen from Earth). Venus will be shifting from the evening sky to the morning sky but will be passing far enough away from the Sun that it may have already begun to be visible in the glow of dawn on the east-northeastern horizon (depending upon viewing conditions).
March 24 Monday afternoon, March 24, Mercury will be passing between Earth and Sun as seen from Earth, called inferior conjunction. It also will be shifting from the evening sky to the morning sky and will begin emerging from the glow of dawn on the eastern horizon in early April (depending upon viewing conditions).
March 29 Saturday morning, March 29, will be the first morning that Venus as the morning star will be above the horizon as twilight begins at 5:59 a.m. EDT.
Saturday morning, March 29, at 6:58 a.m. EDT, will be the new moon, when the Moon passes between Earth and the Sun and is usually not visible from Earth. However, for parts of northwestern Africa, northwestern Eurasia, and northeastern North America, part of the silhouette of the Moon will be visible as it passes in front of the Sun in a partial solar eclipse. The viewing from the Washington area will not be very good. As the Sun rises on the eastern horizon at 6:57 a.m., the Moon will be blocking a small sliver of the left side of the Sun, with the eclipse ending 5 minutes later at 7:02 a.m.
March 30 Early Sunday morning, March 30, at 1:19 a.m. EDT, the Moon will be at perigee, its closest to Earth for this orbit.
For the third time since mid-October 2024, Mars will be passing by the bright star Pollux, the brighter of the twin stars in the constellation Gemini (the twins). Planets that orbit farther from the Sun than Earth’s orbit usually appear to shift westward each night, like the stars, but more slowly, so that they shift eastward relative to the stars. This is because the planets all move in the same direction around the Sun. But around the time when an outer planet is closest to Earth it appears to move the other direction, shifting westward relative to the stars, called apparent retrograde motion. This tendency to “wander” relative to the stars is where the word “planet” comes from (based on the Greek word for “wanderer”). In mid-October 2024 Mars passed by Pollux for the first time as it moved eastward relative to the stars. Beginning Dec. 6, 2024, Mars started its retrograde motion. On Jan. 15, 2025, Mars was at its closest and brightest for the year. On January 23 Mars passed by Pollux for the second time, just 2.5 degrees apart, this time shifting westward relative to the stars. Mars ended its retrograde motion on February 23. It is now shifting eastward again relative to the stars and will pass Pollux a third time on March 30, this time 4 degrees apart. Mars and Pollux will be nearly overhead as evening twilight ends at 8:29 p.m. EDT. Mars will set first on the west-northwestern horizon the morning of March 31 at 3:43 a.m.
This also is the first morning that Mercury will be above the eastern horizon 30 minutes before sunrise. Mercury will be relatively dim, as it will only present a narrow crescent toward Earth. It will brighten significantly each morning, but it’s difficult to predict when it will be bright enough to see in the glow of dawn.
April 1 Tuesday morning, April 1, will be the first morning that Saturn will be above the eastern horizon 30 minutes before sunrise, a rough approximation of when it might start being visible in the glow of dawn.
Tuesday evening, the Pleiades star cluster will appear 1.5 degrees below the waxing crescent moon. The Moon will be 36 degrees above the western horizon as evening twilight ends at 8:31 p.m. EDT, and the Pleiades will set first on the west-northwestern horizon 3 hours later at about 11:40 p.m.
April 2 Wednesday evening, April 2, Jupiter will appear 5.5 degrees to the lower left of the waxing crescent moon. The Moon will be 49 degrees above the western horizon as evening twilight ends at 8:32 p.m. EDT. Jupiter will set first on the west-northwestern horizon 4 hours later Thursday morning at 12:43 a.m.
April 4 Friday night, April 4, the Moon will appear half-full as it reaches its first quarter at 10:15 p.m. EDT.
April 5 – 6 Saturday night into Sunday morning, April 5 to 6, the waxing gibbous moon, Mars, and the bright star Pollux will appear to form a triangle. As evening twilight ends at 8:35 p.m. EDT, Mars will be 3 degrees to the lower right and Pollux 5 degrees to the upper right. As the night progresses, Mars and Pollux will appear to rotate clockwise and away from the Moon. As Mars sets first on the west-northwestern horizon 7 hours later at 3:26 a.m. it will be 6 degrees to the lower right, with Pollux 8.5 degrees to the right of the Moon.
April 7 – 8 Monday night into Tuesday morning, April 7 to 8, the bright star Regulus will appear near the waxing gibbous moon. As evening twilight ends at 8:37 p.m. EDT, Regulus will be 7 degrees below the Moon. As the Moon reaches its highest in the sky at 9:51 p.m., Regulus will be 6.5 degrees to the lower left. By the time Regulus and the Moon set together on the west-northwestern horizon at 4:52 a.m., Regulus will be 3.5 degrees to the left of the Moon.
Tuesday morning, April 8, will be when Mercury will become as bright as Saturn in the glow of dawn (with both Mercury and Saturn rising after morning twilight begins). After this, Mercury will continue brightening each morning as more of its sunlit crescent faces Earth.
April 8 – 9 Tuesday night into Wednesday morning, April 8 to 9, the waxing gibbous moon will have shifted to the other side of the bright star Regulus. As evening twilight ends at 8:38 p.m. EDT, Regulus will be 6 degrees to the upper right of the Moon. As the Moon reaches its highest in the sky at 10:34 p.m., Regulus will be 7 degrees to the right. The pair will continue to separate as the night progresses.
April 10 Thursday morning, April 10, the planets Mercury and Saturn will appear nearest each other, 2 degrees apart, in the glow of dawn. Mercury — the brighter of the two — will be on the left and Saturn will be on the right. Saturn will rise last on the eastern horizon at 5:48 a.m. EDT, 9 minutes after morning twilight begins. You will only have about 20 minutes to view the pair, as by 30 minutes before sunrise (i.e., 6:09 a.m.) the sky will become too bright to see them.
April 12 Saturday, April 12, 2025, is the International Day of Human Space Flight as declared by the United Nations to mark the date of the first human space flight.
The full moon after next will be April 12 at 8:22 p.m. EDT. This will be on April 13 in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) and from the Azores, Iceland, Liberia, and Senegal times zones eastward across Africa, Eurasia, and Australia to the International Date Line in the mid-Pacific. Most commercial calendars are based on UTC and will show this full moon on April 13. The Moon will appear full for about three days around this time, from Friday evening into Monday morning, making this a full moon weekend.
Saturday evening into Sunday morning, the bright star Spica will appear close to the full moon. As evening twilight ends at 8:43 p.m., Spica will be less than a degree to the upper left of the Moon. Spica will appear to rotate clockwise and shift away from the Moon as the night progresses.

MIL OSI USA News –

March 7, 2025
MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Wales’s Clean Energy Industry boosted by Minister Nia Griffith’s visit to Copenhagen
Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments
Press release

Wales’s Clean Energy Industry boosted by Minister Nia Griffith’s visit to Copenhagen

English

Cymraeg

Minister highlights Wales’s natural resources, world-class energy sector and skilled workforce on visit to Denmark.
Wales Office Minister Nia Griffith and His Majesty’s Ambassador to Denmark, Joëlle Jenny

Wales at the forefront of the UK’s clean energy mission.

Minister highlights Wales’s natural resources, world-class energy sector and skilled workforce on visit to Denmark.

Expansion of the renewable energy sector in Wales will help kickstart economic growth and make the UK a clean energy superpower.

Wales Office Minister, Dame Nia Griffith highlighted Wales’s pivotal role in the United Kingdom’s ambitious clean energy mission to Danish companies and potential investors on a trade mission to Copenhagen this week.

Dame Nia’s three-day visit to the Danish capital came just one week after a major £600m investment deal in Welsh green energy projects between Copenhagen Infrastructure Partners, Bute Energy and Green GEN Cymru was announced. The development of new onshore windfarms planned across Wales by Bute Energy is planned to create up to 2,000 jobs.

The visit highlighted collaboration between Wales and Denmark in renewable energy projects, including Danish companies already investing in offshore wind off the North Wales coast and in the construction of turbines used in onshore and offshore projects across Wales.

Currently, 50 per cent of electricity in Denmark is supplied by wind and solar power while making Britain a clean energy superpower is one of the UK Government’s key missions.

The UK Government is working with the Welsh Government and industry partners to develop floating offshore wind in the Celtic Sea. This would see wind turbines built on floating platforms to take advantage of the wind direction and would play a crucial role in the UK Government’s mission to make Britian at clean energy superpower.

This technology could support up to 5,300 new jobs and generate up to £1.4bn for the UK economy, helping to kickstart economic growth and raise living standards as set out in the UK Government’s Plan for Change.

During her visit, Minister Griffith held a series of meetings designed to bolster cooperation on clean energy and explore investment opportunities. The itinerary included visits to leading Danish institutions and companies, discussions on renewable energy projects, and participation in events celebrating St. David’s Day with a focus on promoting Wales as a hub for clean energy innovation.

Wales Office Minister Nia Griffith said:

There are tremendous opportunities for partners and investors in Denmark to work with us to boost the clean energy sector in Wales.

I am determined to make sure we achieve our clean energy mission which will bring energy security, drive down energy bills, create good jobs, and help to protect future generations from the cost of climate breakdown.

Tim Morris, Head of Communications for Associated British Ports, said:

Ports in Wales and Denmark share the ambition to play a foundational role in enabling the energy transition.

It was great to sit down with other port operators and key stakeholders from the wider energy sector from both countries to share knowledge and insights. ABP has strong links with Danish organisations such as Orsted and the Port of Esbjerg and we look forward to deepening these relationships.

The visit showcased Wales’s potential as a global leader in renewable energy, particularly in floating offshore wind, and set the stage for future collaborations and investments that will drive economic growth and environmental sustainability.

ENDS

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Published 6 March 2025
MIL OSI United Kingdom –
March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Economics: Current account deficit 95.2 b.kr. in Q4/2024 – net IIP positive by 42.5% of GDP

Source: Central Bank of Iceland

The current account deficit measured 95.2 b.kr. in Q4/2024. This represents a deterioration of 147.4 b.kr. relative to the previous quarter and 77.7 b.kr. relative to Q4/2023. There was a deficit on goods trade in the amount of 104.1 b.kr and a 34.5 b.kr. surplus on services trade. The deficit on primary income was 10.5 b.kr., and the deficit on secondary income was 15.1 b.kr.

MIL OSI Economics –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI: New federal heat pump grant system approves 930 applications in minutes
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Press Release no. 02/2025

New federal heat pump grant system approves 930 applications in minutes

Copenhagen, March 6, 2025

The Danish Energy Agency has successfully launched its new digital grant management approval system for the heat pump subsidy program, delivering fast and efficient results beyond expectations.

“Yesterday, we at the Danish Energy Agency opened the floodgates for the heat pump subsidy scheme – and it has exceeded all expectations”, says a representative at the Danish Energy Agency.

“Applications totaling 26.6 million DKK have been submitted across 1,383 applications. The coolest part is that in just a few minutes, our top-tuned approval system has already automatically granted approval to 930 of the applicants. Now that’s what you call mega-fast digital support that just works.”

The successful launch of this heat pump subsidy system underscores how smart technology can support faster, smarter, and more effective public services, accelerating Denmark’s green transition.

Build and configured using cBrain (NASDAQ: CBRAIN) F2 COTS for government software platform, the new grant management solution supports fully integrated all steps end-to-end, from self-service to case processing, evaluation, and filing.

Due to automated case processing steps, combined with automated integrations into multiple national registers, the grant process has been fully automated for the majority of applications. Now only cases that e.g. need more information and special evaluation require manual interaction.

Best regards

Per Tejs Knudsen, CEO

Inquiries regarding this Press Release may be directed to

Ejvind Jørgensen, CFO & Head of Investor Relations, cBrain A/S, ir@cbrain.com, +45 2594 4973

Attachment
- Press Release no 2025-02 (New federal heat pump grant system shows strong results)
The MIL Network –
March 6, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: Politics with Michelle Grattan: James Curran on Trump, Ukraine, shifting tectonic plates, and a bigger Australian defence bill

Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

The Trump presidency is turning much of the world order on its head. Tne United States president is arm-twisting Ukraine, playing nice with Russia, and using protection as an economic and political weapon.

The Australian government is pessimistic about escaping American tariffs on aluminium and steel when a decision is announced next week. Meanwhile, the message from the US is clear: we need to boost defence spending.

To discuss Trump Mark 2 on the world stage and what that means for Australia, we’re joined by James Curran, professor of modern history at the University of Sydney.

Curran says,

One gets the sense that we are looking at the kind of tectonic plates of world politics shifting before our very eyes.

Trump is about might is right. He does have an expansionary view of American power in the western hemisphere if we are to judge him by his statements on the Panama Canal and Greenland. But I think more broadly, his interpretation of American power is to simply “get out of America’s way”.

In terms of economic implications, [it’s] a confirmation that we are looking at the permanence of protectionism in the United States. This administration, along with the Biden administration and the first Trump administration, have been putting a wrecking ball through the multilateral trading system and the WTO. And that is certainly a not a good thing for free trade and for countries like Australia.

Curran explains what America’s expectation that countries need to spend more on defence would mean for Australia,

This has been the great concern, if you like, over a number of years – that Australia has got defence on the cheap, that it’s put so much of its national wealth into the middle class and welfare and infrastructure and developing the nation that it’s been able to rely on the American blanket of protection while it pursues its prosperity.

So if [defence spending] is to rise to 3% [of GDP], then that’s going to mean, firstly, a concentration on what are the lower cost alternatives to defend this continent? And secondly, where will the trade offs come? What will be sacrificed from the national budget? And what political leader in this country will front the Australian people and squarely and honestly and earnestly have a conversation about these dramatic strategic circumstances and why greater sacrifice is required from Australians to enable a higher defence expenditure.

Is the Trump world the new normal, or will this be over when Trump eventually leaves the White House?

I’m a little bit sceptical about this idea that we grit our teeth and close our eyes and hope that the nightmare is over in four years time. There is a really big question mark over how America can snap back in terms of its institutional robustness. The pressure that the courts, the media and the Congress are under. Does this all just snap back in four years time? Do we really think that either a Republican or a Democrat successor to Trump will ride into Washington, down Pennsylvania Avenue in a glittering chariot of liberal internationalism? To say everyone shouldn’t worry because the liberal international order is back and it’s gleaming and it’s working.

I really think this is up to America’s allies, both in Europe and in East Asia, to continue to protect as many of those rules and those institutions that have worked so well for so many of us, as much as they possibly can.

Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Politics with Michelle Grattan: James Curran on Trump, Ukraine, shifting tectonic plates, and a bigger Australian defence bill – https://theconversation.com/politics-with-michelle-grattan-james-curran-on-trump-ukraine-shifting-tectonic-plates-and-a-bigger-australian-defence-bill-251486

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 6, 2025
MIL-Evening Report: OPINION: Keith Rankin – Germany’s Election 2025: Far Establishment-Right versus Far Non-Establishment-Right?

Opinion/Analysis by Keith Rankin.

Keith Rankin, trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Germany’s important election last week struggled to make the news cycle, even on Germany’s own Deutsche Welle(DW), Germany’s equivalent of Britain’s BBC. Especially (but not only) in the international media, most of the focus was on a single party (AFD, Alliance for Germany) that was never going to have the most votes and was (almost) never going to become part of the resulting government.

Germany is the world’s third largest national economy, and traditionally dominates the politics of the European Union; an important example of this dominance was the Eurozone financial crisis of the first-half of the 2010s; a crisis that was (unsatisfactorily) resolved, thanks to a problematic and controversial program of fiscal austerity.

At present, Germany, like New Zealand, is experiencing an economic recession. (Provisional annual economic growthwas -0.2% in 2024 and -0.3% in 2023.) The cause is similar, too, in both countries: the same ‘balance the Budget’ mentality that gave the world the Great Depression in the 1930s.

Election Result

The ‘winner’ of the German election was the CDU/CSU Alliance (see Wikipedia for a better presentation of the results), which works a bit like the Liberal/National Coalition in Australia. (The Christian Social Union functions in Bavaria much like Australia’s National Party functions in rural Queensland.) CDU/CSU (like National in New Zealand) comfortably prevailed with 28.5 percent of the vote, entitling that alliance to 33 percent of the seats in the Bundestag (Parliament).

The new Chancellor (equivalent to Prime Minister) will be Friedrich Merz; a 69-year-old version of our own Christopher Luxon, as far as I can tell. He is strongly anti-Putin and pro-Israel. He has come to power well and truly under the international media radar; and will be in a strong position to exert near-absolute power, given that he will always be able to turn to the AFD (who got more votes than the Social Democrats; 20.8%) for support in the Bundestag for any measure that is not palatable to Olaf Scholz’s Social Democrats. In the new Parliament, the Greens and the Left merely make up the numbers.

Merz’s Christian Democrats will form a coalition government with the losing SPD (Social Democratic Party, like Labour in New Zealand) who came third with 16.4 percent of the vote; 19 percent of the seats. Together these two parties of the establishment centre hold 52% of the new parliament, despite having less than 45% of the vote. (The outgoing minority government was a centrist coalition of the SPD and the Greens; the election was held early because the ACT-like Liberal Party – the FPD, Free Democrats – withdrew from the coalition. The FPD vote shrunk from 11.4 percent in 2021 to just 4.3 percent of the vote this time.)

The result in Germany proved to be very much like that of the United Kingdom in 2024: a slide in support for the two major parties (‘the establishment centre’), a consolidation of power to the self-same establishment centre, and a shift of that establishment centre to the right. (See my chart in Germany’s stale (and still pale) political mainstream, Evening Report 27 February 2025, for a timeline of decline.) While both countries technically underwent a change of government, in both countries the establishment has entrenched its power, and in both countries the political assumptions of the power centre have shifted to the right.

Clearly this is problematic for democracy, because historically disastrous popular support for the ‘broad church’ parties of the establishment centre has coincided with increased power to those parties, as well as policy convergence between them. Further, based on legislative electoral requirements, neither Germany nor the United Kingdom (nor the United States for that matter) will have a new government until 2029. At a time when a week is a long time in international politics, 208 weeks is an eternity. World War Three, a distinct possibility, may be in its second or third year by then.

Voting System

Germany represents the prototype upon which New Zealand’s MMP voting system is based. There are some differences though, and some recent changes.

Germany calls its all-important ‘party vote’ the ‘second vote’, disguising its importance. It is possible that many German voters do not fully appreciate its significance. The electorate vote is called ‘first vote’, and winners (by a plurality, not necessarily a majority) are elected ‘directly’. The second (party) vote is understood as a top-up vote to ensure proportionality.

Party lists are regional in Germany. And ‘ethnic parties’ may get special privileges.

In one respect the German version is more proportional than the New Zealand version of MMP, in that it no longer allows overhang MPs. (However, the most recent result is not proportional in the important sense that two parties together with less than 45% of the vote have 52% of the seats.) In MMP, one can easily imagine an overhang situation being frequent if the ‘major’ parties, which win most electorates, only get between 16% and 29% of the party vote.

In 2013, Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court decided that overhang seats were too big a threat to proportionality. So, they introduced ‘levelling seats’. In effect, it meant that if one party gets an overhang, then all parties get an overhang. The result was, in 2013, that a parliament that should have had 598 members (Deputies) ended up with 631, an effective overhang of 33. In 2017 that effective overhang grew to 111, and to 137 in 2021.

For 2025, they decided to abandon overhang representation altogether, by not guaranteeing direct election through the first vote. And they fixed the size of the Bundestag to 630 Deputies, up from a base-size of 598.

If the new German system was in place in New Zealand in 2023, then two of the Te Pati Māori electorate seats from 2023 would have been forfeit, going instead to second placed candidates; proportionality in 2023 entitled Te Pati Māori to four seats, not the six which they have. However, we should note that, if New Zealand was using the present German version of MMP, there would be no special Māori electorates, but the Māori Party would be exempt the five percent party threshold. Ethnic-privileged parties in Germany are incentivised to focus on the party vote, not the electorate vote. In Germany there is a Danish ethnic party (South Schleswig Voters’ Association) which is exempt the threshold. Its leader, Stefan Seidler, did not win his electorate. But his party got 0.15% of the nationwide vote, meaning it qualified for 0.15% of the 630 places in the Bundestag; one seat, for him.

New Zealand voters seem to have more tactical and strategic political nous than do German voters. Thus, it has been very rare for a party in New Zealand to miss out qualifying for Parliament because of getting between 4% and 5% of the party votes (noting that both countries operate a 5% disqualification threshold). In Germany, party-vote percentages just below 5% are not uncommon. In New Zealand, voters, conscious that they want to play a role in coalition-building, actively help parties near the threshold to get over the line. (Indeed, I voted New Zealand First in 2023, because I was 99.9% sure that the only post-election coalition options would be National/ACT or National/ACT/NZF; I favoured the three-party alternative, so I used my vote strategically to help block a National/ACT government.)

Indeed the latest German result was a bit like the latest New Zealand result, but with a party resembling New Zealand First (BSW) getting 4.972% of the vote, so getting no seats at all. BSW getting just a few more votes would have meant a substantial erosion of the two-party power result which eventuated. It is extremely difficult for new non-ethnic parties to get elected in Germany.

In 2025, two parties scored just under five percent of the vote. As well as the BSW, the (ACT-like) Free Democrats who had been part of the previous government, and who had indeed precipitated the early election, scored 4.3%. Indeed, fifteen percent of the votes were ‘wasted’ – that is, cast for ultimately unsuccessful parties. In New Zealand the wasted vote is typically around four percent. Indeed, this high wasted vote turns out to be a more serious challenge to proportionality in German than uncompensated overhang seats.

Both Germany and New Zealand have the contentious (in New Zealand) ‘electorate MP’ rule; the rule that’s misleadingly dubbed in New Zealand as the ‘coat-tail’ rule. (Misleading, because most MPs come in on the coat-tails of their party leadership, and always have.) In Germany the rule is stricter than in New Zealand. In order to avoid disqualification by getting less than 5% of the party vote, New Zealand requires that the party get one electorate MP. In Germany the rule (initially the same as New Zealand), since 1957 has been a requirement for three electorate MPs. In Germany in 2021, the Left Party got 4.87% of the vote and three electorate MPs; they just squeezed in, on both criteria!

Overall, United States’ Vice-President JD Vance’s pre-election comments about democracy in Germany were valid. German politics continues to exclude the non-establishment parties of both the right and the left, despite support for these parties having been increasing for a while, and now representing the majority of German voters.

Media Framing

German television electoral coverage, if DW is anything to go by, is superficial; indeed, is quite insensitive to the national and local dramas taking place. I watched the coverage live. In the hour before the Exit Poll results were announced, the discussion barely mentioned the potential dramas taking place, despite both the BSW and FDP parties pre-polling only just under the five percent threshold. The state of the economy was mentioned in a perfunctory way; clearly it was not a big issue for the political class on display.

At 6 o’clock exactly, the exit-poll results were read out, as if they were the election result. As indeed they turned out to be, more-or-less; the same as the pre-election polls. The subsequent uninterested attitude towards the actual counting of the votes was disappointing. There had been a bit of this in the 2024 UK election as well; as if the exit poll was the election result. In the UK case, Labour’s actual result (for the popular vote) was well under the exit poll result, while the Conservatives did significantly better than their exit poll tally; those facts, though, were for the nerds and psephologists.

In my observation, early votes and exit polls favour the parties supported by the political class; election day votes much less so. So, in New Zealand in 2023 it was initially looking like there would be a two-party coalition of the right. But, to the attentive, as the night wore on, the National Party percentage fell from 41% to 38%, meaning that NZF would have to be included in any resulting coalition.

I suspected something quite similar would happen in Germany, and I was only partially wrong. The exit poll results, and the subsequent counts, were presented to just one decimal place; indeed, the presentation of the numbers was very poor throughout. So, it was hard to see to what extent BSW was improving as the votes were counted.

In the exit poll, two parties – FPD and BSW – were shown as being on 4.7%, and the AFD was on 19.5%. So, the two 4.7% parties were largely written out of the subsequent discussion. We did see an early concession by the FPD, who – representing a segment of the political class – understood the polling dynamics rather well. And we did see the AFD’s Alice Weidel being asked if she was disappointed to get under 20%. Ms Weidel put on a brave face, but she did seem disappointed. When the votes were actually counted, her party got 20.8% exactly on Weidel’s prior expectations.

BSW was completely ignored. There was simply no interest in the possibility that they might reach the 5% threshold, even when the vote count had them upto 4.9%. In the end BSW reached 4.972%; so close! Out of sight, out of mind! In the official results the BSW were lumped with ‘Other Parties’. The DW election panel were too unaware to make any comments about the party itself, its philosophies, or how its possible success might influence the process of forming a coalition government. (Of particular importance was that, with just a few more votes, BSW might have given Eastern Germany a voice in a three-way coalition government.)

For DW, their perennial concern is the place of Germany within Europe and the World; they had little time to give the outside world a glimpse into the domestic lives and politics of ordinary Germans. And we heard nothing about the ‘ethnic vote’, the privileged Denmark Party notwithstanding. I suspect that many if not most of the recent immigrants who do much of the work in Germany either could not vote or did not vote. The election was about them, not for them; denizens, not citizens.

However, DW did invite on a gentleman who mildly focussed the attention of the discussants by suggesting that one of the priorities of the new Chancellor – Friedrich Merz – would be to acquire nuclear weapons! I don’t think the rest of the world had any prior insights into that; ordinary Germans were probably equally in the dark.

Who is Friedrich Merz? Who knows? It turns out that he dropped out of politics for a while, to play a leading role in BlackRock, the international acquisitions company which until recently owned New Zealand’s SolarZero (refer Update on SolarZero Liquidation by BlackRock, Scoop, 29 January 2025). Our media told us that the election was all about the “far-right” AFD Party; that is, the far non-establishment-right. We in New Zealand heard nothing about the far establishment-right; the shadowy man (or his party). Some now fear Merz will be an out-and-out warmonger. Even Al Jazeera, which can be relied upon to cover many stories about places New Zealand’s media barely touches (and in a bit more depth), had the portraits of Olaf Scholz and Alice Weidel on the screen, on 22 February, the day before the election, despite the certainty that Merz world become the new Chancellor.

In that vein, I heard a German woman interviewed in Christchurch, on RNZ on 25 February. She, disappointed with the election result, spent her whole edited four minutes railing about the AFD, as if the AFD had won. There was no useful commentary, by her or RNZ, of the actual result of Germany’s election.

Are we so shallow that we don’t care; that some of us with the loudest voices only want to rail against a non-establishment party, and to see the democratic support for alternative parties as being somehow anti-democratic?

East Germany

People of a certain age in New Zealand will remember the former East Germany; the DDR, German ‘Democratic’ Republic. Most people in Germany itself will have had knowledge of it, including the Berlin-based political staff of DW who were mostly in their thirties, forties and fifties. But the ongoing issues of Eastern Germany were barely in their mindframes.

In Eastern Germany – the former DDR – (especially outside of Berlin), support for the AFD was close to 40%, for BSW over 10%, and the Left much higher than in Western Germany. In the former East Berlin (which I visited in 1974), the Left seems to have been the most popular party. Support in the East for the establishment parties combined was between 25% and 30%, and with a lower turnout.

BSW, it turns out, is Left on economic policy and Right on social policy. And, in the German discourse, is categorised by the political class as ‘pro-Putin’. If BSW had got 5% of the vote, Merz could have tried to bring them into his government; or Merz might have turned to the Green Party instead of a ‘pro-Putin’ party. But I cannot see even the German Greens being able to govern as a junior partner to a belligerent establishment-right CDU-led government. BSW’s failure to get 5% of the vote may turn out to be one of the great ‘might-have-beens’ of Germany’s future history.

As JD Vance stated, this Eastern German situation poses a danger for democracy in Germany and in Europe. Eastern Germany is where the German state is at its most vulnerable. The majority of voters there have voted for ‘pro-Putin’ parties; and, significantly, parties prioritising the problems of economic failure over the big-politics of extranational power-plays.

The new German government, it would seem, is set to aggravate (or, at best, ignore) the problems of Germany’s ‘near-East’, while setting out to inflame the problems of Europe’s ‘far-East’.

The Debt Brake

This is Germany’s equivalent of Ruth Richardson’s 1994 ‘Fiscal Responsibility Act’ (now entrenched in New Zealand law and lore). This is the major single reason why New Zealand has had so many infrastructure problems this century, and why so many young men and families emigrated to Australia in the 1990s, with some of these emigrants coming back to New Zealand in recent years as ‘501s’.

The Merkel debt-brake is the self-inflicted single major reason why many European economies are in such a mess today; and Germany in particular. Germany is congenitally deeply committed to all kinds of financial austerity, with government financial austerity being the most ingrained. Rather than circulating as it should, money is concentrating. The debt-brake is “a German constitutional rule introduced [in 2009] during the Global Financial crisis to enforce budget discipline and reduce [public] debt loads in the country” (see Berlin Briefing, below).

Germany still has a parliamentary session under the old Parliament, before the new parliament convenes. Michaela Küfner (see Berlin Briefing, below) suggests the possibility that the old “lame duck” Parliament could remove the debt-brake from the German constitution, because she sees the make-up of the new more right-wing parliament as being less amenable to address this ‘elephant in the room’. Seems democratically dodgy to me, even talking about pushing dramatic constitutional legislation through a ‘lame duck’ parliament; like Robert Muldoon, pushing through a two-year parliamentary term for New Zealand in the week after the 1984 election!

(Two-year parliamentary terms are not unknown, by the way; the United States has a two-year term for its Congress. This is almost never mentioned when we discuss the parliamentary term in New Zealand. In the United States at present, there will be many people for whom the 2026 election cannot come fast enough; an opportunity to reign-in Donald Trump.)

Future German relations with the United States

On 27 February (28 Feb, New Zealand time) – before the fiasco in the White House on 28 February – I watched Berlin Briefing on DW. This programme is a regular panel discussion of the political editorship of Deutsche Welle.

The context here is that Friedrich Merz made an important speech the evening after the election; a speech that had the Berlin beltway – “people behind the scenes here in Berlin” – all agog. Merz said: “For me the absolute priority will be strengthening Germany so much so that we can achieve [defence] independence from the United States.”

The discussion proceeded as follows:

“How important is this anchoring in Nato of the idea of the United States as ‘The Great Protector’?” Nina Haase, DW political correspondent: “I don’t think there’s a word, ‘massive’ is not enough; people behind the scenes here in Berlin … they talk about are we going to part with the United States amicably or are we going to become enemies [my emphasis] … Europe has relied on the US so much since the Second World War is completely new thinking; just to prepare for a scenario with, if you will, would-be enemies on two sides; in the East with Russia launching a hybrid attack and then [an enemy] in the West as well.” They go on to talk about the possible need for conscription in Germany.

The political correspondents were talking like bourgeois brat adult children who had expected that they should be able to enjoy a power-lifestyle underwritten by ‘big daddy’ always there as a financial and security backstop; and just realising that the rug of entitlement might be being pulled from under them. Michaela Küfner (Chief Political Editor of DW) goes on to talk about an “existential threat from the United States”, meaning the withdrawal (and potential enmity) of the great protector. “Like your Rich Uncle from across the ocean turning against you”, she said.

Nina Haase: “Pacifism, the very word, needs to be redefined in Germany … Germans are only now able to understand that you have to have weapons in order not to use them.” She was referring to earlier generations of pacifists (like me) who saw weapons as the problem, not the solution.

Ulrike Franke: “Everything needs to change for everything to stay the same”, basically saying Germany itself may have to pursue domestic Rich Uncle policies to maintain the lifestyles of the (entitled) ten percenters.

Michaela Küfner, towards the end of the discussion: “The AFD is framing [the supporters of] the parties which will make up the coming coalition as the political class who we will challenge”. And she noted, but only at the very end of the long discussion, that the effectively disenfranchised people in Eastern Germany are “a lot more Russia-friendly”.

Maybe Merz has a plan to build employment-rich munitions factories in Eastern Germany, to address both his security concerns and the obvious political discontent arising from unemployment and fast-eroding living standards? But Merz will have to abandon his innate fiscal conservatism before he can even contemplate that; can he do a Hoover to Hitler transition? Rearmament was Hitler’s game; his means to full employment after the Depression.

Implications for Democracy

I sense that Friedrich Merz will become the face of coming German politics, just as Angela Merkel once was, and as Trump and Starmer are very much the faces of government in their countries; becoming – albeit through democratic means – similar to the autocrats that, in Eastern and Middle-Eastern countries, they [maybe not Trump] rail against.

We might note that if we look carefully at World War One and World War Two, the core conflict was Germany versus Russia. Will World War Three be the same? And which side will ‘we’ (or ‘US’) be on? In WW1 and WW2, we were on Russia’s side. (Hopefully, in the future, we can be neutral with respect to other countries’ conflicts.)

Democracy is under strain worldwide. The diminishing establishment-centre – the political and economic elites and the people with secure employment and housing who still vote for familiar major parties – is clinging on to power, and for the time-being remains more powerful than ever in Europe.

In the Europe of the early 1930s, it was the Great Depression as a period of abject political failure that resulted in the suspension of democracy. All the signs are that the same failures of democratic leadership – worldwide from the 1920s – will bring about similar consequences.

For democracies to save themselves, they should bring non-establishment voices to the table. In 2025. Germany will be another important test case, already sowing the seeds of political failure. We should be wary of demonising the far non-establishment-right while lionising the far establishment-right.

*******

Keith Rankin (keith at rankin dot nz), trained as an economic historian, is a retired lecturer in Economics and Statistics. He lives in Auckland, New Zealand.

Ref.

MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Security: Update 279 – IAEA Director General Statement on Situation in Ukraine

Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

The presence of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) at Ukraine’s nuclear power plants (NPPs) remains an “invaluable asset” for the international community and must be preserved, Director General Rafael Mariano Grossi told Member States after the completion of a delayed team rotation at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

“Difficult conditions have in the past month complicated and delayed the latest rotation of experts, which was safely completed in recent days,” Director General Grossi said in his written introductory statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, which is holding its regular March meeting this week.

In December, a drone attack severely damaged an official IAEA vehicle during a rotation, and in February intense military activity forced the cancellation of the most recent planned rotation, which was finally concluded earlier this month. The current team at the ZNPP is the 27th since Director General Grossi established a continued IAEA presence at the site, where nuclear safety and security remains precarious.

Director General Grossi emphasized that “all the IAEA’s activities in Ukraine are being conducted in line with relevant resolutions of the UN General Assembly and of the IAEA policy-making organs”.

At the ZNPP, the IAEA team has continued to hear explosions on most days over the past week, at varying distances.

The IAEA team at the ZNPP was informed that scheduled maintenance of part of the safety system of reactor unit 1 had been completed and returned to service. At the same time, maintenance began at another part of the same reactor’s safety system.

At the Chornobyl site, firefighters have made progress in extinguishing the fire on the roof of the New Safe Confinement (NSC) caused by a drone strike on 14 February. The IAEA team at the site was informed that no smouldering fires had been detected over the past two days. The site continues to use thermal imaging and surveillance drones to monitor the structure.

The Chornobyl site has continued to perform frequent radiation monitoring and report the results to the IAEA team. The IAEA team has also undertaken its own independent monitoring. To date, all monitoring results have shown that there has not been any increase in the normal range of radiation levels measured at the site nor any abnormal readings detected.

The IAEA team at the Chornobyl site also reported multiple air raid alarms during the past week. In addition, the IAEA was informed by the Ukrainian regulator that the site recorded drone flights in the area early on 1 March.

Last week, a team of IAEA experts conducted another round of visits to seven electrical substations identified as critical for nuclear safety and security in Ukraine.

As during the previous visits last year, the team observed the current status of the substations and collected relevant information to assess any potential impacts of attacks in recent months to the safe operation of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and to identify any further technical assistance that could be provided by the IAEA.

The IAEA teams at Ukraine’s operating NPPs – Khmelnytskyy, Rivne and South Ukraine – have continued to monitor the nuclear safety and security situation at these sites. The teams report hearing air raid alarms on most days, with the team at the Khmelnytskyy NPP having to shelter at the site on Monday. One reactor unit at the same plant last weekend began a planned outage for refuelling and maintenance.

Separately, the IAEA has continued with its comprehensive programme of nuclear safety and security assistance to Ukraine, with three new deliveries of equipment bringing the total number since the start of the armed conflict to 111.

The Hydrometeorological Centre and Hydrometeorological Organizations of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine received survey meters, the Centralised Spent Fuel Storage Facility of Energoatom received thermal imaging cameras and the medical unit of the Khmelnytskyy NPP received medical equipment and supplies. The deliveries were supported with funds provided by the European Union, Norway and the United States.

“We are grateful to all 30 donor states and the European Union for their extrabudgetary contributions, and I encourage those who can, to support the delivery of the comprehensive assistance programme, for which EUR 22 million are still necessary,” Director General Grossi told the Board.

MIL Security OSI –

March 6, 2025

MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 05.03.2025

Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

Nokia Corporation
Stock Exchange Release
5 March 2025 at 22:30 EET

Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 05.03.2025

Espoo, Finland – On 5 March 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

Trading venue (MIC Code)	Number of shares	Weighted average price / share, EUR*
XHEL	2,314,879	4.70
CEUX	962,572	4.70
BATE	–	–
AQEU	215,318	4.70
TQEX	150,000	4.70
Total	3,642,769	4.70

* Rounded to two decimals

Total cost of transactions executed on 5 March 2025 was EUR 17,116,279. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 146,047,975 treasury shares.

Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

On behalf of Nokia Corporation

BofA Securities Europe SA

About Nokia
At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

Inquiries:

Nokia Communications
Phone: +358 10 448 4900
Email: press.services@nokia.com
Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

Nokia Investor Relations
Phone: +358 931 580 507
Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

Attachment

Daily Report 2025-03-05

The MIL Network –

March 6, 2025

MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Consistently high levels of corruption in Greece – E-000817/2025
Source: European Parliament
Question for written answer E-000817/2025
to the Commission
Rule 144
Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR)

According to Transparency International, Greece continues to rank 59th out of 180 countries in terms of its corruption perception, with its score stable compared to last year (49 points out of 100), putting it on a par with Namibia and Slovakia. Unfortunately, Greeks feel let down by by rigged public tenders/competitions, monopolies and the sense that, without connections, applications are not processed in a fair manner. The results of the 2024 Eurobarometer survey showed that 54 % of respondents believe that corruption is the reason they were unsuccessful in a public tender/competition. It should be noted that corruption is a key cause of brain drain and Greece is among the highest-ranking countries for anxiety and depression Europe-wide. The states with the lowest corruption perception among citizens are Denmark with 90 points and Finland with 88 points.

In view of the above, can the Commission answer the following:

1.What action plan does it intend to follow in order to put pressure on the Government to improve the fight against corruption, since it does not seem to be a priority?

2.In its structured bilateral dialogue on the rule of law with the Government, will it examine the timeline for and the deployment of the necessary human and financial resources to ensure the proper implementation of the Code of Criminal Procedure?

3.How is it currently monitoring corruption in Greece?

Submitted: 23.2.2025
Last updated: 5 March 2025
MIL OSI Europe News –
March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Growing Trump-Putin detente could spell trouble for the Arctic

Source: The Conversation – UK – By Duncan Depledge, Senior Lecturer in Geopolitics and Security, Loughborough University

vitstudio/Shutterstock

During a wide-ranging 90-minute speech to the US congress of March 4, Donald Trump revisited his determination to “get” Greenland “one way or the other”. Trump said his country needed Greenland “for national security”. While he said he and his government “strongly support your right to determine your own future” he added that “if you choose, we welcome you into the United States of America”.

Trump’s ambitions regarding Greenland and its considerable mineral wealth are just one of a raft of issues in the first six weeks of his second term that have plunged European global politics into disarray.

As the White House ramps up the pressure on Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, to allow the US access to Ukraine’s mineral wealth, the US president is also talking about “cutting a deal” with Russian president Vladimir Putin. That deal would not only mean territorial losses for Kyiv, but would prepare the ground for a potentially far-reaching economic partnership between the White House and the Kremlin.

Currently, Trump and Putin are primarily focused on Ukrainian territory and mineral assets. But discussions have also begun on where else “deals” might be made, including in the Arctic.

A carve up of the Arctic is an attractive proposition for the two countries given the importance both leaders attach to mineral resource wealth. As in the case of Ukraine, such an approach would reflect Trump’s predisposition for transactional geopolitics at the expense of multilateral approaches.

In the Arctic, any deal would effectively end the principle of “circumpolar cooperation”. This has, since the end of the cold war, upheld the regional primacy of the eight Arctic states (A8) that have cooperated to solve common challenges.

Since the Arctic Council was established in 1996, the A8 has worked on issues of environmental protection, sustainable development, human security and scientific collaboration. That harmony has been crucial in an era in which climate change is causing the rapid melting of Arctic ice.

Notably, the Arctic Council played an instrumental role in negotiating several legally binding treaties. These include agreements on search and rescue (2011), marine oil pollution preparedness (2013) and scientific cooperation (2017). It also supported the Central Arctic Ocean fisheries agreement (CAO) signed in 2018 by the Arctic Ocean states with Iceland, the EU, China, Japan and South Korea.

The Arctic Council – and more broadly, circumpolar cooperation – withstood the geopolitical aftershocks of Russia’s seizure of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine between 2014 and 2015. But Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine left trust teetering on the precipice.

Within a month, European and North American members had pressed pause on regular meetings of the Arctic Council and its scientific working groups, isolating Moscow. Some activity eventually resumed at the working group level in virtual formats, but full engagement with Russia has remained conditional on a military withdrawal from Ukraine. Meanwhile, hefty sanctions were imposed by the US and Europe, including targeting Russian Arctic energy projects.

Russia’s response was to enhance its relationships with others. Countries such as Brazil, India, Turkey and Saudi Arabia now work with Russia in the Arctic on commercial and scientific projects. This pivot raised concerns among Nato allies about a stronger and challenging Russia-China presence across the Arctic. But the second Trump administration has changed the calculus. There’s now the threat of a new Arctic order based on the primacy – not of the A8 – but on a reset of US-Russia relations.

Change of focus

Trump’s signing of an executive order on February 4 to determine whether to withdraw support from international institutions may lead the White House to conclude there is no place for the Arctic Council. Its longstanding focus on climate change and environmental protection is anathema to the Trump administration, which has already withdrawn from the Paris agreement and is destroying domestic climate-related science programmes.

Climate change is bringing increased competition for access to valuable resources.
Peter Hermes Furian/Shutterstock

The longstanding commitment of the A8 to circumpolar cooperation, or even a narrow A5 (Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the US) view of the primacy of the Arctic Ocean coastal states, is likely to be dismissed by the White House, which favours the embrace of great power politics. While many have warned that the Arctic Council can’t survive without Russia, losing US interest and support would surely be its death knell.

In this landscape of “America first”, the prospect of Washington and Moscow dividing the Arctic and its resources seems increasingly realistic. In such a situation, the international treaties signed by the A8, and the CAO may also be at risk. Denmark may find itself excluded altogether from Arctic affairs if Trump gets his way over Greenland. At any rate, all the Nordic Arctic states are likely to struggle to make their voices in the region heard.

A key question for European Nato and EU members is whether Trump would worry about Russian dominance in the European Arctic if it brought US-Russia economic cooperation to extract the region’s wealth? Might Trump even be supportive of Russian attempts to revisit the terms of the 1920 Spitsbergen Treaty, which ultimately gave Norway sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago (albeit with some limitations), if that too meant jointly unlocking Svalbard’s mineral resources let alone the wealth of the Arctic seabed?

What room, if any, would a deal leave for Indigenous people to be heard, or for international scientific collaboration on critical challenges related to climate and biodiversity?

If we have learned anything in the tumult of recent weeks, it is that European countries, individually and collectively, struggle to exercise strategic influence over contemporary geopolitical events. If Trump and Putin do begin negotiations over the Arctic, Europe may simply have to accept the end of the Arctic Council and circumpolar cooperation.

Climate science, environmental protection, sustainable development and the ability of Indigenous people to decide their future would all suffer. The UK and Europe meanwhile will be left to consider what, if anything, can be done to defend Arctic interests.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

– ref. Growing Trump-Putin detente could spell trouble for the Arctic – https://theconversation.com/growing-trump-putin-detente-could-spell-trouble-for-the-arctic-251386

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI Global: Academic freedom and democracy under siege: how a Nobel peace prize could help defend them

Source: The Conversation – France – By Stéphanie Balme, Director, CERI (Centre de recherches internationales), Sciences Po

A rally for science drew a big crowd during the American Geophysical Union’s meeting in San Francisco. MarcioJoseSanchez/AP, CC BY

March 7 has been recognized as the “Day of the Stand Up for Science Movement”, launched in 2017 in response to the anti-science actions of the first Trump administration. Under the second, attacks on scientists and scientific inquiry have escalated into a systematic assault–tantamount to a coup d’Etat against science itself.

While Donald Trump is often portrayed as erratic, his policies in this area have followed a consistent trajectory. His new administration has once again declared ‘war’ on evidence-based national policymaking and science diplomacy in foreign affairs as evidenced by several early actions. Immediately after taking office, Donald Trump issued executive orders freezing or canceling tens of billions in research funding. All National Science Foundation projects have been halted pending review, while the National Institutes of Health faces suspensions under Health and Human Services directives. The US has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement and the World Health Organization, alongside a sweeping review of 90% of USAID-funded projects, signaling a major retreat from climate and global health diplomacy. Federal agencies and universities are in turmoil, leaving thousands of research-professors in limbo amid a politically driven funding freeze. The 2025 March simply calls for the restoration of federal research funding and an end to government censorship and political interference in science.

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The US is the world’s undisputed scientific superpower–for now

While the Trump administration is not the sole force undermining academia worldwide, its actions are particularly striking coming from the world’s leading scientific superpower. Moreover, the situation is especially concerning because developments in the United States often have a ripple effect, shaping policies in other regions in the years that follow.

Neither of the world’s top two scientific superpowers–Washington and Beijing–is positioned to champion academic freedom. China, having failed a liberal constitutional tradition and academic independence since the 1920s, restricts academic freedom to the confines of one-party rule. Caught between these rival scientific giants–both partners and competitors–the “old” Europe and like-minded coutries remain the only actors capable of setting new standards for academic freedom.

A Nobel prize for academic freedom

A decisive step toward its legal protection would be formal recognition by the Nobel Committees for Peace and Science of academic freedom’s fundamental role–both in ensuring scientific excellence and as a pillar of free, democratic societies.

For the past decade, the Scholars at Risk association (SAR) has documented a broader global decline in academic freedom in its annual Free to Think Report. The 2024 edition highlights particularly alarming situations in 18 countries and territories (including the United States), which recorded 391 attacks on scholars, students, or institutions across 51 regions in a year. Data from the Academic Freedom Index in Berlin confirm that more than half of the world’s population lives in regions where academic freedom is either entirely or severely restricted. Some of the most concerning conditions are in emerging scientific ecosystems such as Turkey, Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, or Saudi Arabia. The overall trend is deteriorating: only 10 out of 179 countries have improved, while many democratic regimes are increasingly affected.

Academic freedom in the European Union remains relatively high compared to the rest of the world. However, nine EU member states fall below the regional average, and in eight of them, it has declined over the past decade–signaling a gradual erosion of this fundamental value. Hungary ranks the lowest among EU countries, placing in the bottom 20–30% worldwide. Recent laws have further weakened university autonomy across the EU: financial autonomy in Austria, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Slovakia; organizational autonomy in Slovenia, Estonia, and Denmark; staffing autonomy in Croatia and Slovakia; and academic autonomy in Denmark and Estonia. Moreover, the European Parliament’s first report on academic freedom (2023) highlights emerging threats in France–political, educational, and societal–that impact the freedom of research, teaching, and study.

Academic freedom, a professional right granted to a few for the benefit of all

Freedom of expression, a fundamental pillar of academic freedom, has long been established as a human right, overcoming centuries of censorship and authoritarian control. In contrast, academic freedom is a more recent principle, granting scholars–recognized by their peers–the right and responsibility to research and teach freely in pursuit of knowledge. Like press freedom for journalists, it is a right granted to a few for the benefit of all.

Rooted in medieval Europe, academic freedom has evolved from a privilege granted to students in the Quartier Latin to a recognized principle in international rights frameworks. It gained a collective and concrete dimension in the late 18th and early 19th centuries with the rise of the modern university. Wilhelm von Humboldt, founder of the modern public university in Berlin (1810), articulated the concept of ‘freedom of science’ (Wissenschaftsfreiheit), later enshrined in the Weimar Constitution of 1919, which declared that “art, science, and education are free.” The rise of American universities around the same time reshaped the concept, giving rise to “professional academic freedom.” This was formalized in the American Association of University Professors’ 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, which affirmed the scholar’s primary duty to seek and establish truth. Though its roots lie in Germany, academic freedom ultimately became a cornerstone of American academic discourse.

In the United States, academic freedom draws from multiple sources, with its protection varying by state laws, customs, institutional practices, and the status of higher education institutions. However, U.S. Supreme Court rulings have gradually reinforced its constitutional foundation, particularly after the McCarthy era, by invoking the First Amendment. Landmark cases such as Adler v. Board of Education (1952), Wieman v. Updegraff (1952), and Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) helped establish a constitutional doctrine on academic freedom. Finally, Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1967) extended First Amendment protections to academia, ruling that mandatory loyalty oaths violated both academic freedom and freedom of association.

Interestingly, the American interpretation of academic freedom is currently more restrictive than the German model in certain respects. Article 5(3) of the 1989 Basic Law affirms the “right to adopt public organizational measures essential to protect a space of freedom, fostering independent scientific activity”. In contrast, the U.S. places greater emphasis on prohibitions and prioritizing individual rights over institutional autonomy.

The ‘right to be wrong’

Despite local variations, academic freedom is fundamentally tied to a shared vision of the university that upholds freedom of thought, with rationality and pluralism at its core. It includes the genuine “right to be wrong”–the understanding that a scientific opinion may be incorrect or even proven so does not diminish its protection. This stands in stark contrast to the anti-science, scientistic, or techno-nationalist approach, which views knowledge as a tool of power to serve a predetermined truth and objective of dominance. Authoritarian science, driven by power interests, seeks to diminish critical humanities and social sciences while elevating religion. It tends to reject interdisciplinary work, is exclusively mathematized, and is oriented toward a centralized yet deregulated autocratic tech-utopian state model.

Since 1945, we have operated under the illusion that academic freedom is an indispensable condition for scientific excellence. However, we have recently learned that no systematic link exists between academic freedom and breakthrough scientific innovation in our era of new technologies. Given these circumstances, this proposal advocates for a nomination for the Nobel Peace Prize, for the first time in its history, in recognition of academic freedom.

The Nobel Prize Committees for Science and Peace share the responsibility of using their prestigious platforms to uphold fundamental scientific and democratic values. They are uniquely positioned to champion humanist science, reinforcing its importance for scholars, students, and civil societies worldwide. Since the 1950s, around 90% of Nobel Prize laureates in scientific fields have either been US citizens or have studied and worked at Ivy League research institutions.

While some US scientists are contesting actions of the Trump administration in court, academics worldwide should stand in solidarity with their American colleagues in resisting the erosion of science. To strengthen their efforts, they require the support of the Nobel Prize Committees.

Stéphanie Balme ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d’une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n’a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.

– ref. Academic freedom and democracy under siege: how a Nobel peace prize could help defend them – https://theconversation.com/academic-freedom-and-democracy-under-siege-how-a-nobel-peace-prize-could-help-defend-them-251494

MIL OSI – Global Reports –

March 6, 2025
MIL-OSI: Kvika banki hf.: Meeting announcement for Annual General Meeting on 26 March 2025
Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

The Annual General Meeting of Kvika banki hf., Reg. No. 540502-2930 (“Kvika”), will be held on Thursday, 26 March 2025, at 4:00 pm, at Nauthóll, Nauthólsvík, Reykjavík.

The Agenda for the meeting is as follows:
1. Report from the Company’s Board of Directors on its activities during the past operating year.
2. The Company’s annual financial statements for 2024 along with a decision on the treatment of the Company’s profit during the financial year and the allocation of part of the sale price of TM.
The Board of Directors proposes that a dividend of ISK 5 per share will be paid to the Bank’s shareholders.
1. Motion to renew the Company’s authorisation to purchase own shares.
2. Motion for a reduction in share capital by cancelling own shares and a corresponding amendment to the Articles of Association of the Company.
3. Motion to amend the Company’s Articles of Association.
4. Election of the Company’s directors and alternates.
5. Nomination Committee.
1. 1. Motion on that from now on shareholders will confirm the appointment/election of all three members of the Nomination Committee and a corresponding amendment to the Articles of Association.
  2. Motion to amend the Procedural Rules of the Nomination Committee.
  3. Motion on remuneration to members of the Nomination Committee.
  4. Motion on appointment of three committee members in the Nomination Committee.
  - Meeting Announcement for AGM of Kvika banki hf. 2025
  - Skýrsla tilnefningarnefndar Kviku banka hf. 2025
  The MIL Network –
March 6, 2025

Category: Scandinavia

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