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Category: Science

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Montenegro – P10_TA(2025)0130 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Montenegro, of the other part(1), which entered into force on 1 May 2010,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union of 15 December 2008,

    –  having regard to the Commission opinion of 9 November 2010 on Montenegro’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2010)0670), the European Council’s decision of 16-17 December 2010 to grant Montenegro candidate status and the European Council’s decision of 29 June 2012 to open EU accession negotiations with Montenegro,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans(3),

    –  having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19-20 June 2003,

    –  having regard to the Sofia Declaration of the EU-Western Balkans summit of 17 May 2018 and the Sofia Priority Agenda annexed thereto,

    –  having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 13 December 2023 in Brussels, and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

    –  having regard to the Berlin Process launched on 28 August 2014,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report’ (COM(2024)0800), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union: Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Montenegro’ (SWD(2024)0829),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Montenegro 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0694),

    –  having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the economic reform programme of Montenegro, and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans and Türkiye adopted by the Council on 16 May 2023 and to the joint conclusions of the Economic and Financial Dialogue between the EU and the Western Balkans Partners, Türkiye, Georgia, Republic of Moldova and Ukraine adopted by the Council on 14 May 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU-Montenegro Intergovernmental Accession Conferences of 22 June 2021, 13 December 2021, 29 January 2024, 26 June 2024 and 16 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the 11th EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Council on 14 July 2022,

    –  having regard to the declaration and recommendations adopted at the 22nd meeting of the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 31 October and 1 November 2024,

    –  having regard to Montenegro’s accession to NATO on 5 June 2017,

    –  having regard to Special Report 01/2022 of the European Court of Auditors of 10 January 2022 entitled ‘EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans: despite efforts, fundamental problems persist’,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence (the Istanbul Convention), ratified by Montenegro in 2013, and to the recommendations of the Commission on gender equality and combating gender-based violence,

    –  having regard to the World Press Freedom Index report published annually by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) data on the Ukraine Refugee Situation as of April 2025,

    –  having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement(4),

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Montenegro,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0093/2025),

    A.  whereas enlargement is a key EU foreign policy tool and a strategic geopolitical investment in peace, stability, security and prosperity;

    B.  whereas the new enlargement momentum, sparked by the changing geopolitical reality and the EU membership applications by several Eastern Partnership countries, has prompted the EU to accelerate its efforts towards delivering on its long-overdue commitments to the Western Balkans; whereas the future of the Western Balkan countries lies within the EU;

    C.  whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law, good governance, fundamental EU values and alignment with EU foreign and security policy; whereas the implementation of necessary reforms in the area of ‘fundamentals’ determines the timetable and progress in the accession process;

    D.  whereas Montenegro has gone furthest in the accession process, with all 33 chapters of the EU acquis open and six provisionally closed, and has significant public support therefor;

    E.  whereas the EU is Montenegro’s largest trading partner, investor and provider of financial assistance;

    F.  whereas Montenegro is exposed to malign foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and other forms of influence, including election meddling, hybrid warfare strategies and unfavourable investments from non-EU actors, particularly Russia and China, which are trying to influence Montenegro’s political, economic and strategic trajectory and threaten democratic processes and media integrity, jeopardising the country’s prospects for EU accession;

    G.  whereas on 8 June 2024, an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ took place in Belgrade with the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians under the slogan ‘One people, one Assembly’;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises Montenegro’s firm commitment to EU accession and reaffirms its full support for the country’s future EU membership; welcomes Montenegro’s leading regional position in the EU accession process as well as the overwhelming support of Montenegro’s citizens and the majority of political actors for joining the EU in 2028;

    2.  Welcomes Montenegro’s positive progress in enacting EU-related reforms and measures, underpinned by an ambitious timeline and calls for collective efforts of political actors, civil society and citizens; commends Montenegro for meeting the interim benchmarks for Chapters 23 and 24, which continue to determine the overall pace of negotiations, and for receiving a positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report; welcomes the closure of three more negotiating chapters, bringing the total to six;

    3.  Encourages all political actors to stay focused on EU integration and the required reforms; stresses the need for political stability, commitment and constructive engagement in consensus building across party lines in order to move swiftly and more effectively towards closing additional chapters in 2025, so as to achieve the country’s ambitious timeline; stresses that the reforms adopted must be implemented effectively and consistently to ensure genuine progress and full alignment with EU legislation; calls for a strengthening of the functioning of, and coordination between, state institutions in order to achieve political stability and advance the country’s substantial progress in implementing key EU-related reforms, in particular electoral and judicial reforms and the fight against organised crime and corruption;

    4.  Underlines that the credibility of the EU, including its enlargement policy as a whole, would be affected if tangible progress achieved by certain Western Balkan countries does not translate into clear advancements on the EU accession path;

    5.  Welcomes Montenegro’s sustained full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP), including EU restrictive measures, inter alia, those related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and those targeted against cyberattacks, as well as its support for the international rules-based order at UN level; encourages Montenegro to strengthen the enforcement of restrictive measures and avoid their circumvention and to seize the assets of those sanctioned; calls on all government representatives to respect and promote CFSP alignment and EU values and refrain from any activities that may threaten Montenegro’s strategic path towards EU membership and its sovereignty; is highly concerned, in this context, by public high officials’ statements in support of the President of the Republika Srpska entity, Milorad Dodik, who is undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina; regrets the participation of high-ranking parliamentarians from Montenegro in the ‘All-Serbian Assembly’ in Belgrade as well as their support for the declaration adopted on that occasion undermining the sovereignty of Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo;

    6.  Underlines the strategic importance of Montenegro’s NATO membership and welcomes its active involvement in EU common security and defence policy missions and operations, such as EU Naval Force Operation Atalanta, and in NATO and other international and multilateral missions; welcomes the decision of Montenegro’s Council for Defence and Security to approve the participation of its armed forces in the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine and NATO’s Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine and calls on the Montenegrin Parliament to adopt these decisions, thereby reinforcing the country’s commitment to collective security;

    7.  Commends Montenegro for its humanitarian and material support to Ukraine and for extending the temporary protection mechanism that grants persons fleeing Ukraine the right to stay in Montenegro for one year; recalls that Montenegro is among the Western Balkan countries hosting the largest number of Ukrainian refugees, with over 18 800 refugees from Ukraine registered in Montenegro as of 31 January 2025, according to UNHCR statistics;

    8.  Remains seriously concerned by malign foreign interference, destabilisation efforts, cyberattacks, hybrid threats and disinformation campaigns, including attempts to influence political processes and public opinion, by third-country actors, which discredit the EU and undermine Montenegro’s progress on its accession path; urges Montenegro to adopt countermeasures in stronger cooperation with the EU and NATO and through increased regional cooperation among the Western Balkan countries; notes that religious institutions can be used as a tool for external influence and condemns any undue interference by the Serbian Orthodox Church in this regard; reiterates the importance of building resilience capacity against foreign information manipulation and interference, including through greater oversight of the media landscape, public awareness campaigns and media literacy programmes; recommends that Montenegro establish a dedicated hybrid threat task force;

    9.  Urges the Commission, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the Delegation of the EU to Montenegro and the Montenegrin authorities to boost strategic communication to Montenegrin citizens on the benefits of the enlargement process and EU membership, as well as on the concrete accession criteria that Montenegro still needs to fulfil to align with EU requirements; urges them, furthermore, to improve the EU’s visibility in the country, including as regards EU-funded projects; calls for StratCom monitoring to be expanded in order to concentrate on cross-border disinformation threats in the Western Balkan countries and their neighbours; calls on the Commission to further support the efforts of the EEAS and the Western Balkans Task Force so as to expand outreach activities by increasing visibility in local media, fact-checking reports and partnering with civil society organisations to counter false narratives more effectively;

    10.  Welcomes the Montenegrin Parliament’s renewed engagement in the Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    11.  Recognises the Montenegrin Parliament’s key role in the accession process, notably as regards passing accession-related legislation, and underlines the importance of parliamentary cooperation in this regard; reiterates the European Parliament’s readiness to use its political and technical resources to advance the EU-related reform agenda, including through democracy support activities; notes, with concern, the re-emerging tensions and ethnic polarisation, which are slowing the reform process; calls for constructive dialogue and consensus building across the political spectrum, prioritising legislative quality, and strongly urges that solutions be found through parliamentary dialogue; calls for preventing identity politics from diverting attention from the EU agenda or straining relations with its neighbours, ensuring that Montenegro remains firmly on the EU path; welcomes the agreement between the Montenegrin Prime Minister and opposition leaders to request an opinion from the Venice Commission regarding the termination of the mandate of Constitutional Court judge Dragana Đuranović and for the opposition to return to the parliament;

    12.  Expresses its concern about attempts to amend the law on Montenegrin citizenship in the Montenegrin Parliament, which could have serious and long-term implications for the country’s decision-making processes and identity, while emphasising that any discussions on identity politics must be handled with the utmost sensitivity to avoid further polarisation and should aim for broad societal consensus; encourages the Montenegrin authorities to consult and coordinate with the EU on any possible changes to the law on citizenship and stresses the importance of achieving consensus on any matters relating to this subject of crucial importance for the identity and independence of Montenegro;

    13.  Strongly encourages the Montenegrin Parliament to hold inclusive and transparent public consultations and regular and meaningful engagement with civil society in decision-making from an early stage in the legislative process, notably for key legislation in the EU reform process; encourages a more active role for the Montenegrin Parliamentary Women’s Club;

    14.  Calls on Montenegro to fully align its electoral legal framework with EU standards, notably as regards harmonising electoral legislation, voting and candidacy rights restrictions, transparency, dispute resolution mechanisms, campaign and media oversight, and political party and election campaign financing, and to implement the recommendations of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights(6); urges Montenegro to increase transparency and control of political party spending and prevent the abuse of state resources by bringing the relevant legislation into line with EU standards, as well as enhancing the enforcement of third-party financing rules and strengthening sanctions for violations; highlights the role of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption (APC) in this regard, and calls for increased cooperation between the APC and financial intelligence authorities to detect and prevent foreign influence in political campaigns; calls, furthermore, on Montenegro to implement the recommendations of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) on gender parity on electoral lists;

    15.  Reiterates its call on the Montenegrin authorities to establish a single nationwide municipal election day, as provided for in the Law on Local Self-Government, in order to enhance governance efficiency, reduce political tensions and strengthen the stability and effectiveness of municipal and state institutions; recalls that future disbursement of funds under the Reform and Growth Facility is contingent on the fulfilment of this reform, in line with Montenegro’s commitments in its reform agenda, and should be pursued as a matter of priority; welcomes the fact that, in 2022, elections in 14 municipalities were held on the same day; calls for a robust legislative framework in this regard; is concerned by the misconduct of the electoral process in the municipality of Šavnik;

    16.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to adopt the Law on Government that should enable an improved governance framework and the optimisation of public administration;

    17.  Underlines the importance of a professional, merit-based, transparent and depoliticised civil service; calls on Montenegro to amend and implement the relevant legislation to provide a framework for the professionalisation, optimisation and rationalisation of state administration, including procedural safeguards against politically motivated decisions on appointments and dismissals, as well as high standards for managerial positions; regrets the lack of significant progress in adopting and effectively implementing such legislation and highlights that this allows for public service recruitment to remain subject to political influence;

    18.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; notes, with concern, the identified deficiencies, including judicial appointments and the independence of the prosecutor’s office;

    19.  Welcomes the progress made in implementing key judicial reforms, adopting a new strategic framework and completing long-outstanding judicial appointments; calls on Montenegro to fill the remaining high-level judicial positions;

    20.  Urges Montenegro to further align its legal framework, including the constitution, in particular on the composition and decision-making process of the Judicial Council, with EU laws and standards on the independence, accountability, impartiality, integrity and professionalism of the judiciary, and to further depoliticise appointments to bolster independence, implement outstanding international recommendations, and determine criteria for the retirement of judges and prosecutors in line with European standards and in full compliance with the Constitution; regrets the pending case backlog and calls on Montenegro to take measures to reduce the duration of legal proceedings, particularly for serious and organised crime cases, notably on money laundering; recommends that Montenegro adopt the amendments to the Constitution in the final stage of the country’s EU accession negotiations;

    21.  Notes the steps taken in the fight against corruption, including new laws and provisions on the protection of whistleblowers, the creation of a new National Council for the fight against corruption and a new anti-corruption strategy for 2024-2028; encourages Montenegro to further align with the EU acquis and EU standards and address recommendations by the Commission, the Venice Commission and the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); encourages the Montenegrin authorities to continue addressing existing deficiencies in the handling of organised crime cases and the seizure and confiscation of criminal assets;

    22.  Urges Montenegro to step up its criminal justice response to high-level corruption, including by strengthening the effective enforcement of existing criminal legislation and imposing effective and deterrent penalties, and to create conditions for judicial institutions and independent bodies dealing with corruption to function effectively, free from political influence;

    23.  Notes the work of the Agency for Prevention of Corruption and calls for it to be provided with sufficient funding and for it to be depoliticised; expects the Agency to deliver tangible results and act non-selectively to strengthen its integrity and enhance its authority in carrying out its competences effectively; calls for a stronger corruption prevention framework;

    24.  Urges Montenegro to align its weapons legislation with EU law and international standards, particularly as regards technical standards for firearm markings, deactivation procedures and regulations for alarm and signal weapons, as well as to establish a standardised and effective data collection and reporting system for firearms; is appalled by the tragic mass shooting in Cetinje and expresses its condolences to the victims’ families; expresses its concern over the exploitation of this tragedy for disinformation and ethnic polarisation; urges Montenegro to strengthen its crisis communication to counter disinformation and ensure responsible media reporting in the aftermath of violent incidents; calls for systematic actions in the areas of security, mental well-being and institutional transparency, as well as in civic education and public awareness, outreach and educational initiatives, on the dangers and risks of firearms, in line with citizens’ expectations and societal needs;

    25.  Calls on Montenegro to urgently fully align its visa policy with that of the EU, especially as regards countries posing irregular migration or security risks to the EU; expresses its concern that, contrary to expectations, two additional countries have been added to the visa-free regime and that Russian and Belarusian passport holders continue to benefit from a visa-free regime; notes that the harmonisation of the visa policy is also provided for in Montenegro’s reform agenda under the Reform and Growth Facility;

    26.  Welcomes the ongoing cooperation between Montenegro and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), Europol, Eurojust and the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), and notes the importance of this cooperation in tackling cross-border crime, including the trafficking of weapons, drugs and human beings, and in combating terrorism and extremism; welcomes the entry into force of the upgraded agreement on operational cooperation in border management with Frontex on 1 July 2023 and encourages further cooperation between Montenegro and Frontex to strengthen border management, support asylum procedures, fight smuggling and enhance readmission;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    27.  Regrets that the most vulnerable groups in society still face discrimination; calls on Montenegro to adopt a new anti-discrimination law and relevant strategies, through an inclusive, transparent and meaningful process that actively involves those most affected, to improve vulnerable groups’ access to rights; underlines that respect for the rights of all national minorities is an integral part of the EU acquis; calls for stronger implementation to ensure equal treatment of all ethnic, religious, national and social groups so that they are guaranteed equal rights and opportunities and can fully participate in social, political and economic life;

    28.  Welcomes Montenegro’s multi-ethnic identity and calls for the further promotion of and respect for the languages, cultural heritage and traditions of local communities and national minorities, as this is closely intertwined with Montenegro’s European perspective;

    29.  Underlines the multi-ethnic identity of the Bay of Kotor; stresses that Montenegro’s European perspective is closely intertwined with the protection of minorities and their cultural heritage; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to nurture the multi-ethnic nature of the state, including the traditions and cultural heritage of the Croatian community in the Bay of Kotor;

    30.  Expresses its grave concern over the endangered heritage sites in Montenegro such as the Bay of Kotor and Sveti Stefan; stresses that Sveti Stefan, along with Miločer Park, was listed among the ‘7 Most Endangered heritage sites in Europe’ for 2023;

    31.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the difficult living conditions of Roma people in Montenegro and the discrimination they face, and calls for more measures to promote intercultural understanding in schools; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to also take measures to improve the climate of societal inclusion for LGBTI persons;

    32.  Welcomes that Montenegro has aligned its legislative and institutional framework with the EU acquis and international human rights standards regarding compliance with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols; urges the authorities to address shortcomings in implementation, namely related to accountability and monitoring;

    33.  Calls for the effective implementation of strategies to uphold the rights of persons with disabilities across all sectors and policies;

    34.  Condemns all hate speech, including online and gender-based hate speech, and hate crimes; welcomes the criminalisation of racism and hate speech;

    35.  Emphasises the need to strengthen institutional mechanisms for gender quality and calls on the Montenegrin authorities to address the gender pay gap, to improve women’s participation in decision-making – in both the public domain, particularly public administration, and judicial and security sectors, and in business – to ensure the increased political participation of women, to introduce gender responsive budgeting, and to combat gender stereotypes and strengthen efforts to combat discrimination against women, particularly in rural areas; welcomes recent efforts aimed at boosting women’s representation in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) and encourages further efforts in technology sectors;

    36.  Is deeply concerned by the high rates of gender-based violence, including domestic violence and femicide; calls on Montenegro to fully align its definitions of gender-based violence and domestic violence with the Istanbul Convention, and with recommendations of international bodies, and to set up effective protection and prevention mechanisms and support centres, and ensure effective judicial follow-up for victims of domestic and sexual violence as well as a more robust penal policy towards perpetrators; calls for the collection of disaggregated data on gender-based violence and gender disparities to improve policy responses;

    37.  Regrets that the draft law on legal gender recognition was not adopted in 2024, despite it being a measure under Montenegro’s EU accession programme; urges Montenegro to adopt the law without delay;

    38.  Welcomes Montenegro’s new media laws and its strategy for media policy aimed at strengthening the legal framework to effectively protect journalists and other media workers; insists on a zero-tolerance policy with regard to pressure on, harassment of, or violence against journalists, particularly by public figures; underlines the need for effective investigations, the prosecution of all instances of hate speech, smear campaigns and strategic lawsuits against journalists, and follow-up of past cases; stresses the need to ensure journalists’ rights to access information and maintain a critical stance; notes a significant improvement in Montenegro’s press freedom, demonstrated by its progress on the World Press Freedom Index;

    39.  Expresses its concern over cases where journalists, academics and civil society organisations have faced pressure for exercising free speech, including instances where the police have initiated misdemeanour proceedings against them; is concerned by the use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) to target journalists;

    40.  Regrets the prevailing high level of polarisation in the media and its vulnerability to political interests and foreign influence as well as foreign and domestic disinformation campaigns that spread narratives that negatively impact democratic processes in the country and endanger Montenegro’s European perspective; calls on Montenegro to further develop improved media literacy programmes and include them as a core subject in education; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to ensure the editorial, institutional and financial independence of the public service broadcaster RTCG, as well as the legality of the appointment of its management and full respect for court rulings concerning RTCG; recalls that it needs to comply with the law and the highest standards of accountability and integrity; regrets that the independence of public media is being weakened and undermined; calls on all media entities to comply with legal requirements on public funding transparency;

    41.  Welcomes the publication of the 2023 population census results; calls on the authorities to avoid any politicisation of the process; encourages stakeholders to use these results in a non-discriminatory manner;

    42.  Welcomes Montenegro’s vibrant and constructive civil society and underlines its importance in fostering democracy and pluralism and in promoting good governance and social progress; expresses its concern over the shrinking space for civil society organisations with a critical stance, and condemns all smear campaigns, intimidation and attacks against civil society organisations, notably by political figures in the context of proposals for a ‘foreign agent law’; notes that such laws have the potential to undermine fundamental freedoms and the functioning of civil society and are inconsistent with EU values and standards; calls for a supportive legal framework and clear and fair selection criteria in relation to public funding; calls for the Council for Cooperation between the Government and non-governmental organisations to resume work; underlines the importance of building collaborative relationships and genuinely consulting civil society on draft legislation from an early stage onwards;

    Reconciliation, good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation

    43.  Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the enlargement process; commends Montenegro’s active involvement in regional cooperation initiatives; recalls that good neighbourly relations are key for advancing in the accession process;

    44.  Regrets that Chapter 31 could not be closed in December 2024; calls on all engaged parties to find solutions to outstanding bilateral issues in a constructive and neighbourly manner and prioritise the future interests of citizens in the Western Balkans; recalls that using unresolved bilateral and regional disputes to block candidate countries’ accession processes should be avoided; welcomes bilateral consultations between the Republic of Croatia and Montenegro on the status of unresolved bilateral issues; encourages the authorities to continue pursuing confidence-building measures;

    45.  Notes Montenegro’s amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code to address legal and practical obstacles to the effective investigation, prosecution, trial and punishment of war crimes in line with relevant recommendations; calls on Montenegro to apply a proactive approach to handling war crimes cases, in line with international law and standards, to identify, prosecute and punish the perpetrators and the glorification of war crimes and ensure access to, and delivery of justice, redress and reparations for victims, and clarify the fate of missing persons; calls on Montenegro to allocate sufficient resources to specialised prosecutors and courts and proactively investigate all war crime allegations and raise issues of command responsibility, as well as to review past cases that were not prosecuted in line with international or domestic law; calls for regional cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of individuals indicted for war crimes; recognises that addressing these issues and safeguarding court-based facts are an important foundation for trust, democratic values, reconciliation and strengthening bilateral relations with neighbouring countries, and encourages Montenegro to step up these efforts;

    46.  Warns against the dangers of political revisionism, which distorts historical facts for political purposes, undermines accountability and deepens societal divisions; strongly condemns the glorification of war criminals and widespread public denial of international verdicts for war crimes, including by the Montenegrin authorities; considers that President Jakov Milatović’s statement expressing regret over the participation of Montenegrin forces in the bombardment of the city of Dubrovnik was a valuable contribution to regional peace and reconciliation;

    47.  Reiterates its support for the initiative to establish the Regional Commission for the establishment of facts about war crimes and other gross human rights violations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (RECOM);

    48.  Reiterates its call for the archives that concern the former republics of Yugoslavia to be opened and for access to be granted to the files of the former Yugoslav Secret Service and the Yugoslav People’s Army Secret Service in order to thoroughly research and address communist-era crimes;

    Socio-economic reforms

    49.  Welcomes Montenegro’s inclusion in SEPA payment schemes, lowering costs for citizens and businesses; underlines that this opens up opportunities for business expansion, increased competitiveness, innovation and improved access to foreign direct investments;

    50.  Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which aims to integrate the region into the EU’s single market, promote regional economic cooperation and deepen EU-related reforms, and which includes the EUR 6 billion Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans; welcomes Montenegro’s adoption of a reform agenda and encourages its full implementation; notes that the implementation of the defined reform measures under Montenegro’s reform agenda for the Growth Plan would provide access to over EUR 380 million in grants and favourable loans, subject to successful implementation; stresses the importance of inclusive stakeholder consultations, including local and regional authorities, social partners and civil society, in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation phases;

    51.  Encourages Montenegro to make best use of all EU funding available under the Pre-accession Assistance Instrument (IPA III), the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the IPARD programme and the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, to accelerate socio-economic convergence with the EU and further align its legislation with the EU on fraud prevention; recalls the conditionality of EU funding, which may be modulated or suspended in the event of significant regression or persistent lack of progress on fundamentals;

    52.  Calls for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation between the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and the accession countries in order to facilitate close cooperation and the prosecution of the misuse of EU funds, including through the secondment of national liaison officers to the EPPO; encourages Montenegro to fully implement working arrangements with the EPPO; calls for the EU to make the necessary legal and political arrangements to extend the jurisdiction of the EPPO to EU funds devoted to Montenegro as a candidate country;

    53.  Positively notes Montenegro’s economic growth; calls for more steps to reduce the budget deficit and public debt, and to further remove indirect tax exemptions that do not align with the EU acquis; welcomes the efforts to reduce these fiscal vulnerabilities; reiterates the need for increased public investment in the education system for sustainable social and economic development;

    54.  Notes Montenegro’s public debt to foreign financial institutions and companies that can be used as a tool to influence its policy decisions, in particular those related to China and Russia; welcomes the efforts to reduce these vulnerabilities and calls on the authorities to further reduce economic dependence on China and to continue making use of the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, the EU Global Gateway initiative and the Reform and Growth Facility, with a view to finding greener and more transparent alternatives for financing infrastructure projects; calls on Montenegro to increase transparency in future infrastructure projects, ensure competitive bidding and avoid excessive debt dependence on foreign creditors;

    55.  Calls on the Montenegrin authorities to take measures to counter depopulation and emigration, in particular through investments in education and healthcare, especially in the north of the country, as well as through decentralisation by investing in medium-sized cities;

    56.  Encourages the Montenegrin authorities to boost the digital transformation and pursue evidence-based labour market policies to address the persistently high unemployment rate, in particular among women and young people, while bolstering institutional capacity and enhancing the underlying digital policy framework, and to effectively implement the Youth Guarantee and the new Youth Strategy; urges the authorities to address brain drain as a matter of urgency; encourages the development of targeted preventive measures and incentives to legalise informal businesses and employees, as a large informal sector continues to hinder economic and social development in Montenegro;

    57.  Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkan countries into the EU’s digital single market before actual EU membership, which would crucially enable the creation of a digitally safe environment;

    58.  Calls for more transparency in public procurement, notably for procedures via intergovernmental agreements, and for full compliance with EU rules and principles; calls on Montenegro to reduce the number of public procurement procedures without notices; expresses its concern over the financial burden and lack of transparency surrounding the construction of the Bar-Boljare motorway financed by a Chinese loan; stresses that the secrecy surrounding loan agreements and construction contracts raises accountability concerns;

    59.  Expresses its concern over any agreements or projects that circumvent public procurement rules, transparency obligations and public consultation requirements, as set out in national legislation and EU standards; calls on the Government of Montenegro to ensure full respect for the principles of transparency, accountability, inclusive decision-making and the rule of law in all public infrastructure and development initiatives;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity and connectivity

    60.  Urges Montenegro to advance the green transition, with the support of EU funding, improve its institutional and regulatory framework and enhance energy resilience by finally adopting and implementing the long-overdue National Energy and Climate Plan, adopting energy efficiency laws and integrating further with EU energy markets; calls for all new green transition projects to be implemented in line with EU standards on the environment, State aid and concessions;

    61.  Regrets the lack of progress on key sector reforms in the area of transport policy; calls on the Montenegrin authorities to align the country’s transport development with the Sustainable and Smart Mobility Strategy for the Western Balkans, focusing on railways, multimodality and reducing CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, and to further implement its Transport Development Strategy and strengthen administrative capacities for the implementation of trans-European transport networks;

    62.  Welcomes the reduction of data roaming charges between the EU and the Western Balkan countries and calls on the authorities, private actors and all stakeholders to take all necessary steps towards the goal of bringing data roaming prices close to domestic prices by 2028; welcomes the entry into force of the first phase of the implementation of the roadmap for roaming between the Western Balkans and the EU;

    63.  Encourages the adoption of sectoral strategies for waste management, air and water quality, nature protection and climate change, ensuring strategic planning for investments; notes the lack of progress and associated rising costs in building essential waste water treatment plants to prevent sewage pollution in rivers and the sea in seven municipalities;

    o
    o   o

    64.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commissioner for Enlargement, the Commissioner for the Mediterranean, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, and to the President, Government and Parliament of Montenegro, and to have it translated and published in Montenegrin.

    (1) OJ L 108, 29.4.2010, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2010/224/oj.
    (2) OJ L 330, 20.9.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1529/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/1449, 24.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1449/oj.
    (4) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 105.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/montenegro.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law report – P10_TA(2025)0129 – Wednesday, 18 June 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Articles 2, 3(1), 3(3), second subparagraph, 4(3), 5, 6, 7, 11, 19 and 49 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular to the articles thereof relating to respect for and the protection and promotion of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in the Union, including Articles 70, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265 and 267,

    –  having regard to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter),

    –  having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 July 2024 entitled ‘2024 Rule of Law Report – The rule of law situation in the European Union’ (COM(2024)0800), and the annex thereto containing recommendations for the Member States,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and its accompanying staff working documents (the Enlargement Package),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(1) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(2) (the Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union(3) (the Financial Regulation), in particular Article 6(3) thereof,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/692 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 April 2021 establishing the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1381/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014(4),

    –  having regard to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

    –  having regard to the UN instruments on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRDP), the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the Recommendations of the UN Forum on Minority Issues, and to the recommendations and reports of the UN Universal Periodic Review, as well as the case-law of the UN treaty bodies and the special procedures of the Human Rights Council,

    –  having regard to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Social Charter, the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the European Committee of Social Rights, and the conventions, recommendations, resolutions, opinions and reports of the Parliamentary Assembly, the Committee of Ministers, the Commissioner for Human Rights, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Steering Committee on Anti-Discrimination, Diversity and Inclusion, the Venice Commission and other bodies of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the Council of Europe Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,

    –  having regard to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the memorandum of understanding between the Council of Europe and the European Union of 23 May 2007 and the Council conclusions of 17 December 2024 on EU priorities for cooperation with the Council of Europe 2025-2026,

    –  having regard to the Commission’s reasoned proposal of 20 December 2017 for a Council decision on the determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law (COM(2017)0835), issued in accordance with Article 7(1) TEU,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 October 2016 with recommendations to the Commission on the establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 February 2018 on protection and non-discrimination with regard to minorities in the EU Member States(6);

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 March 2018 on the Commission’s decision to activate Article 7(1) TEU as regards the situation in Poland(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 April 2018 on the need to establish a European Values Instrument to support civil society organisations which promote fundamental values within the European Union at local and national level(8),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 12 September 2018 on a proposal calling on the Council to determine, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(9),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2018 on minimum standards for minorities in the EU(10),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2018 on the need for a comprehensive EU mechanism for the protection of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(11),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 7 October 2020 on the establishment of an EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights(12),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 13 November 2020 on the impact of COVID-19 measures on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights(13),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 June 2021 on the rule of law situation in the European Union and the application of the Conditionality Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(15),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 June 2021 on the Commission’s 2020 Rule of Law Report(16),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 July 2021 on the creation of guidelines for the application of the general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(17),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 16 September 2021 with recommendations to the Commission on identifying gender-based violence as a new area of crime listed in Article 83(1) TFEU(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 November 2021 on strengthening democracy and media freedom and pluralism in the EU: the undue use of actions under civil and criminal law to silence journalists, NGOs and civil society(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2021 on the evaluation of preventive measures for avoiding corruption, irregular spending and misuse of EU and national funds in case of emergency funds and crisis-related spending areas(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 March 2022 on the shrinking space for civil society in Europe(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 March 2022 on the rule of law and the consequences of the ECJ ruling(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 May 2022 on the Commission’s 2021 Rule of Law Report(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 9 June 2022 on the rule of law and the potential approval of the Polish national recovery plan (RRF)(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2020 and 2021(25),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on the proposal for a Council decision determining, pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the existence of a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded(26),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on the rule of law in Malta, five years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia(27),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 October 2022 on growing hate crimes against LGBTIQ+ people across Europe in light of the recent homophobic murder in Slovakia(28),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 November 2022 on racial justice, non-discrimination and anti-racism in the EU(29),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 November 2022 on the assessment of Hungary’s compliance with the rule of law conditions under the Conditionality Regulation and state of play of the Hungarian RRP(30),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 30 March 2023 on the 2022 Rule of Law Report – the rule of law situation in the European Union(31),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 April 2023 on the institutional relations between the EU and the Council of Europe(32),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 February 2024 ‘Report on the Commission’s 2023 Rule of Law report’(33),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(34),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 1 June 2023 on the breaches of the Rule of Law and fundamental rights in Hungary and frozen EU funds(35),

    –  having regard to the report of its Committee of Inquiry to investigate the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware (PEGA) and to its recommendation of 15 June 2023 to the Council and the Commission following the investigation of alleged contraventions and maladministration in the application of Union law in relation to the use of Pegasus and equivalent surveillance spyware(36),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 11 July 2023 on the electoral law, the investigative committee and the rule of law in Poland(37),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 October 2023 on the rule of law in Malta: six years after the assassination of Daphne Caruana Galizia, and the need to protect journalists(38),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 6 December 2023 entitled ‘No place for hate: a Europe united against hatred’ (JOIN(2023)0051),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union – annual report 2022 and 2023(39),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on extending the list of EU crimes to hate speech and hate crime(40),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 24 April 2024 on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) TEU regarding Hungary to strengthen the rule of law and its budgetary implications(41),

    –  having regard to the conclusion of the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Poland, as announced by the Commission on 29 May 2024, following steps taken by Poland to restore compliance with EU rule of law standards;

    –  having regard to Resolution 2262 (2019) of 24 January 2019 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on promoting the rights of persons belonging to national minorities,

    –  having regard to the recommendations and reports of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Representative on Freedom of the Media and other bodies of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), to the cooperation between the EU and the OSCE on democratisation, institution-building and human rights and to the annual OSCE hate crime report, in which participating states have committed themselves to passing legislation that provides for penalties that take into account the gravity of hate crime, to taking action to address under-reporting and to introducing or further developing capacity-building activities for law enforcement, prosecution and judicial officials to prevent, investigate and prosecute hate crimes,

    –  having regard to the special reports of the European Court of Auditors of 17 December 2024 on Enforcing EU Law (28/2024), of 22 February 2024 on the Rule of Law in the EU (03/2024), and of 10 January 2022 on EU support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans (01/2022), and to its review of 28 February 2024 on the Commission’s rule of law reporting (02/2024), and to their respective recommendations,

    –  having regard to the Political Guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029, presented to Parliament on 18 July 2024 by Ursula von der Leyen, candidate for President of the Commission,

    –  having regard to the 2024 Eurobarometer surveys on corruption, which show that corruption remains a serious concern for citizens and businesses in the EU,

    –  having regard to the feedback reports, mission reports, written questions and answers of its Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Monitoring Group (DRFMG)(42),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Legal Affairs,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (A10-0100/2025),

    A.  whereas the Union is founded on the common values enshrined in Article 2 TEU of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities – values that are common to the EU Member States and are reflected in the Charter and embedded in international human rights treaties; whereas the Charter is part of EU primary law; whereas democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights are mutually reinforcing values which, when undermined, pose a systemic threat to the rights and freedoms of the people living in the EU;

    B.  whereas it is apparent from Article 49 TEU, which provides the possibility for any European state to apply to become a member of the European Union, that the Union is composed of states which have freely and voluntarily committed themselves to the common values referred to in Article 2 TEU, which respect those values and which undertake to promote them; whereas EU law is thus based on the fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, and recognises that those Member States share with it, those same values; whereas that premise implies and justifies the existence of mutual trust between the Member States that those values will be recognised and, therefore, that the law of the EU that implements them will be respected(43),(44); whereas the Member State are required to ensure that any regression in the protection of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU is prevented;

    C.  whereas civil society organisations (CSOs), the legal community, associations, independent media and grassroots movements remain a cornerstone of the rule of law by promoting transparency, accountability and citizen participation in democratic processes; whereas these actors have been instrumental in safeguarding judicial independence, freedom of expression and other constitutional values, often operating under increasing political and legal constraints;

    D.  whereas the principle of sincere cooperation in Article 4(3) TEU places an obligation on the Union and the Member States to assist each other in carrying out obligations that arise from the Treaties in full mutual respect, and on Member States to take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising from the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union; whereas Member States should refrain from any measures which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives;

    E.  whereas in a recent Eurobarometer survey, 74 % of respondents thought that the EU plays an important role in upholding the rule of law and 89 % believed that it is important for all Member States to respect the EU’s core values; whereas, in the current global economic and political context, bolstering citizens’ trust in the rule of law and the resilience of democracies at EU level is a crucial factor;

    F.  whereas accession to the EU must always be a merit-based procedure in which there is an assessment of whether an applicant fulfils the Copenhagen criteria, in particular those guaranteeing full respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, in order to ensure that EU enlargement strengthens rather than weakens the EU and its single market; whereas the fundamental role of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance as a Union instrument is to support the rule of law, democracy and human rights in candidate and potential candidate countries, including the strengthening of democratic institutions and CSOs, as well as progress on good governance and the fight against corruption, the promotion and protection of non-discrimination and gender equality and the strengthening of capacities for conflict prevention and resolution;

    Independence of the judiciary

    1.  Underlines that fair and accessible justice is a basic rule of law principle that requires an independent judiciary; reiterates that access to justice is essential for citizens to exercise rights, challenge discrimination and hold decision makers accountable;

    2.  Recalls that robust national legal systems are indispensable in Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries, given that the Commission relies on national judicial authorities to enforce EU law, and that they are fundamental to judicial cooperation across the EU and to fostering mutual trust; notes with concern that while some judicial systems may appear robust on paper, this does not always align with reality;

    3.  Stresses the need for the impartiality of judges; recalls that the appointment and promotion of judges must be determined solely by their qualifications and not be influenced by political or personal considerations, as the judges essential for safeguarding judicial independence; recalls that the criteria for nominations and appointments to high-level judicial positions must be fully transparent;

    4.  Underlines the important role of the national councils of the judiciary in safeguarding judicial independence; considers it necessary to evaluate the reforms that are in the process of being adopted in different Member States and encourages the adaptation of the composition and functioning of these bodies to the standards established by the Commission and the Council of Europe, and which have been endorsed by the CJEU; calls on the Commission in its future rule of law reports to place a particular focus on the roles, structures and functioning of Member States’ national judicial councils as part of its assessment of judicial independence;

    5.  Points out that the prosecution service is a key element in the capacity of a Member State to fight crime and corruption; regrets any governmental or political interference in corruption investigations and recalls that no one is above the law; condemns the misuse of the judicial system for political purposes, including the persecution of political opponents and interference in corruption investigations; stresses that both politically motivated prosecutions and amnesty laws and pardon procedures driven by political interests undermine public trust in constitutional principles and EU standards; highlights the importance of guaranteeing the autonomy and independence of the prosecution service, thereby preventing any political interference in its work, especially from the government; highlights the role of transparent appointment processes for prosecutors as a key factor in maintaining public confidence in criminal justice; highlights its concern about repeated attacks on judges and prosecutors who are conducting high-profile political investigations linked to cases of corruption and abuse of power perpetrated against political opponents;

    6.  Calls for disciplinary procedures for judges and prosecutors to be handled by independent bodies free from political influence and, where necessary, for the system of disciplinary procedures to be reformed to preclude their use by political authorities to control the judiciary;

    7.  Calls on the Commission to maintain constant oversight, ensuring that judges and prosecutors remain independent of the authorities responsible for appointing or reappointing them; calls on the Commission to proactively monitor and swiftly react to risks of rule of law backsliding in areas of judicial independence and access to justice, in line with the principle of non-regression as clarified in recent CJEU case-law;

    8.  Notes that the Commission has found that there are structural challenges with regard to improving the efficiency, accessibility and quality of the judiciary of some Member States(45) and of candidate and potential candidate countries; notes that the Commission has found that several Member States have allocated additional resources to strengthening the resilience of justice systems to ensure the timely resolution of cases and reduce backlogs, while in other Member States levels of remuneration continue to pose challenges, often leading to shortages and vacancies; notes that underfunding and understaffing can undermine the accessibility and effectiveness of judicial systems, thus eroding trust in the rule of law; emphasises that adequate remuneration is essential to attract and retain qualified judicial personnel; strongly believes that training is a key element that guarantees the independence of judges, as well as the quality and efficiency of the judicial system; states that an important element of the state of the rule of law and fair proceedings are judicial procedures conducted in a reasonable time frame; notes, in that context, that the justice scoreboard indicates significant discrepancies across the EU legal area;

    9.  Encourages the Member States to ensure training opportunities for judges; strongly believes that training should be multidisciplinary, with a particular focus on gender equality; reiterates that adequate resources, including funding, infrastructure and qualified personnel, are crucial for the efficiency and accessibility of the justice system; recognises the role of court staff, including notaries, in numerous Member States; calls on all Member States to follow up on corruption cases within a reasonable time limit so as to not foster a feeling of impunity among their citizens; invites Member States to take advantage of the opportunities offered by digitalisation to simplify procedures and processes, improve efficiency and accessibility, save time and reduce storage costs;

    10.  Stresses the importance of independent judicial systems and access to free legal aid in ensuring equal access to justice; reiterates that adequate resources, including infrastructure and personnel, are crucial to improving justice systems; recommends that Member States take concrete steps to improve access to justice for marginalised and vulnerable groups, including adequately funded, enhanced legal aid systems and measures to address language barriers and digital divides;

    11.  Recalls that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report states that serious concerns persist regarding judicial independence in Hungary and that political influence on the prosecution service remains, with the risk of undue interference in individual cases, and that the freedom of expression of judges remains under pressure and smear campaigns against judges continue in the media;

    12.  Welcomes the pivotal role of the CJEU in upholding the rule of law across the EU; endorses further initiatives to enhance the resources and the capabilities of the CJEU to effectively address further challenges to the rule of law; reiterates that, in accordance with Article 19 TEU and Article 267 TFEU, national courts cannot be hindered from using the possibility of a referral for preliminary ruling to the CJEU; calls on the Commission to carry out a systematic check in this regard as part of its annual rule of law report, and to start infringement proceedings in cases where national judges face obstacles in this regard;

    13.  Regrets the trend whereby some Member States are selectively applying, delaying or failing to implement CJEU and ECtHR judgments and calls for their timely and effective implementation; emphasises that Member States and EU institutions must systematically integrate and implement the latest CJEU case-law to uphold the rule of law and ensure the uniform application of EU law; calls for the swift adaptation of national legislation and institutional frameworks to comply with court rulings;

    14.  Reiterates its strong support for the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court (ICC) as essential, independent and impartial jurisdictional institutions at a particularly challenging time for international justice; recalls the need to fully implement the orders of the International Court of Justice, which are legally binding; calls for the Union, its Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to continue to support the ICC;

    15.  Urges the Commission, as the guardian of the Treaties, to meet its responsibility for the enforcement of the Union’s basic values, including those laid down in Article 2 TEU and in the EU’s primary law, and not to rely only on citizens going to court themselves to ensure the application of EU law; stresses that the non-implementation of domestic and international judgments is violating the rule of law and risks leaving people without remedy and can create a perception among the public that judgments can be disregarded, undermining general trust in fair adjudication; underlines the fundamental role of the CJEU and the ECtHR in ensuring respect for the law and guaranteeing uniformity in its application; proposes establishing clear deadlines for the implementation of court rulings, as well as a detailed monitoring plan for the implementation of pending judgments; urges the Commission to launch infringement procedures if needed, together with motions for interim measures; calls on the Member States to implement pending judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR promptly and suggests the establishment of a monitoring unit to monitor the implementation of CJEU and ECtHR rulings relating to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in EU countries, and to fully integrate the monitoring unit’s findings into the annual rule of law report; recommends that the Commission, in particular, take action regarding failures to implement CJEU judgments under Article 260(2) TFEU and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in cases of non-compliance with CJEU and ECtHR judgments where the breach identified affects or seriously risks affecting the Union budget or financial interests; stresses that systematic non-compliance with EU law must entail tangible financial penalties to ensure genuine deterrence; calls on the Commission to assess whether delays or non-compliance with such rulings warrant proceedings for failure to act under Article 258 TFEU; calls on the Commission to systematically analyse data on non-compliance with country-specific views of UN Treaty Bodies;

    16.  Welcomes the revision of the Victims’ Rights Directive(46) to close legal gaps, ensuring that victims can access justice and receive support; calls on the Council to include as much as possible from Parliament’s mandate, including provisions ensuring victims’ right to review decisions in criminal proceedings, on access to legal remedies and fair compensation, and on comprehensive support services, particularly for those in vulnerable situations; stresses the importance of effective data collection, of enhancing resource allocation for victim assistance and of safeguarding victims’ privacy and personal data to prevent secondary victimisation and ensure that victims, including undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, can safely report crimes; expects co-legislators to adopt solutions that are victim-centred;

    17.  Recognises the essential role of law enforcement in upholding the rule of law and protecting fundamental rights; calls on the Member States to ensure adequate funding, training and resources for the police and law enforcement agencies; calls on the Member States to take into account the Council of Europe’s Code of Police Ethics in this regard; emphasises that any use of force must be strictly necessary, proportionate and subject to clear safeguards; calls on the Member States to introduce guidelines for the transparent, independent and consistent selection, testing and trialling of weapons used by law enforcement agents, based on UN standards, recommendations and guiding principles; notes that this assessment should determine that such weapons are compliant with international human rights law and standards prior to their selection and deployment; calls on the Member States to thoroughly investigate any cases of excessive use of force and discriminatory treatment by law enforcement agencies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to include, as a rule of law concern, the conditions in prisons in future rule of law reports, given the serious and growing concerns across Europe regarding overcrowding, inadequate living conditions and the alarming rates of suicide within prisons;

    19.  Calls on the Commission to pay special attention to analysing procedural justice with a view to identifying strengths, gaps, discrepancies and best practice in ensuring transparency, efficiency and fair treatment in strengthening administrative justice across the EU, as a means of ensuring the accountability of public authorities;

    Anti-corruption framework

    20.  Stresses that the rule of law requires that persons holding public office cannot act arbitrarily or abuse their power for personal gain; underlines that governments should adopt laws in the interest of the general public and not in the interest of specific individuals;

    21.  Reiterates that corruption is a serious threat to democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law in Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries; underlines that corruption erodes citizens’ trust in public institutions; deplores the fact that the 2024 Eurobarometer on corruption shows that corruption remains a serious concern for EU citizens and businesses, with 68 % of Europeans considering corruption to be widespread in their country, 65 % believing that high-level corruption cases are not pursued sufficiently and 41 % believing that the level of corruption has increased; considers this a call for the EU to step up its efforts to combat corruption;

    22.  Reiterates its call on the Commission to immediately finalise negotiations on the EU’s membership of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO); notes that such membership will ensure greater transparency, accountability and efficiency in the management of EU funds, the legislative process and the work of the EU institutions, and demands that the annual rule of law report cover EU institutions;

    23.  Reiterates its call on all Member States to adopt a code of conduct for judges following the GRECO recommendations, and taking into account the codes applicable at the ECtHR and the CJEU; calls on Member States to create independent mechanisms to investigate alleged violations of the code of conduct and other laws, to improve disclosure and transparency with regard to conflicts of interest and gifts received by the judiciary, and to address the issue of revolving doors;

    24.  Calls on the Member States, candidate countries and potential candidate countries, and the EU institutions to enhance transparency and accountability in public institutions by strengthening anti-corruption and conflict of competence legal frameworks and reporting processes to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of corruption cases, including high-level corruption cases (inter alia those linked to public procurement procedures and those relating to high-risk areas such as ports or land borders), reinforcing oversight mechanisms and bodies and the independence and proper functioning of existing agencies, fostering protection for whistle-blowers, improving integrity frameworks and lobbying for legislation; regrets the lack of relevant progress made and stresses that final convictions and deterrent penalties are necessary to demonstrate genuine commitment to tackling corruption; calls on Member States to ensure the transparency and accountability of lobbying activities, including the establishment or improvement of mandatory lobbying registers and ‘legislative footprint’ mechanisms for tracking the influence of lobbying activities on lawmaking processes;

    25.  Acknowledges the important role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in safeguarding the rule of law and combating corruption within the EU; encourages the Commission to closely monitor Member States’ level of cooperation with the EPPO; endorses the reinforcement of the monitoring and coordinative powers of the EPPO with a view to strengthening its ability to combat corruption in Member States; calls on the Commission to propose, under Article 86(4) TFEU, an expansion of the mandate of the EPPO to avoid circumvention of EU restrictive measures and cross-border environmental crimes, and to accelerate the revision of the EPPO Regulation(47) and the Directive on the fight against fraud to the EU’s financial interests by means of criminal law(48) in order to safeguard and clarify the primary competence of the EPPO with regard to corruption offences affecting the EU’s financial interests or committed by EU officials;

    26.  Urges all Member States that have not yet done so to join the EPPO in order to enhance the effectiveness of the fight against corruption, particularly in relation to the protection of EU funds; calls on all candidate and potential candidate countries to establish a framework for effective cooperation with the EPPO;

    27.  Calls on European bodies such as Europol, Eurojust, the European Court of Auditors, the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) to improve their cooperation in the fight against corruption and fraud affecting EU finances;

    28.  Calls on the Commission to enhance transparency and accountability in all of its communications, visits and meetings, especially with high-level national actors;

    29.  Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a directive on combating corruption which harmonises the definition of corruption offences in the public and private sector and the corresponding penalties; welcomes the inclusion of preventive measures, including on illicit political financing and training, in the directive on combating corruption, such as effective rules for the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information and effective rules regulating the interaction between the private and the public sector; calls on the Member States to also put in place effective rules to address revolving doors, establish codes of conduct for public officials, establish a public legislative footprint, and ensure transparency in the funding of candidatures for elected public officials and political parties; appreciates that almost all Member States now have anti-corruption strategies in place; regrets, at the same time, that implementation and effectiveness vary; calls on the Member States that have not yet done so to develop and implement robust and effective anti-corruption strategies with the involvement of civil society; underlines the importance of the identification, notification, representation and coordination of victims of corruption; calls on the Member States to protect victims of corruption and enable them to have their views and concerns presented and considered at appropriate stages during criminal proceedings; calls on the Member States to ensure that victims of corruption have the right to adequate and proportionate compensation;

    30.  Calls on all the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies to strengthen their anti-corruption measures with regard to the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest, open access to information, rules regulating the interaction of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies with the private sector, revolving doors and the code of conduct for public officials; considers that during their term of office, Members of the European Parliament should not engage in paid side activities with for-profit organisations or businesses seeking to influence EU policymaking

    31.  Recognises the crucial role that whistle-blowers play in exposing corruption and promoting transparency across both the public and private sectors; stresses the need to protect whistle-blowers from retaliation and harassment; calls for independent and autonomous whistle-blower protection authorities to be further strengthened and further integrated into broader national anti-corruption frameworks, ensuring a unified and robust approach to combating corruption throughout all Member States;

    Media pluralism and freedom

    32.  Welcomes initiatives to promote free, independent and pluralistic media and a safe and enabling environment for journalists such as the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA)(49) and calls for its swift implementation; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to improve transparency in the allocation of state advertising online and offline and to follow the recommendations contained in Commission Recommendation (EU) 2021/1534 of 16 September 2021 on ensuring the protection, safety and empowerment of journalists and other media professionals in the European Union; calls on the Commission to provide the Member States with the necessary assistance in transposing the EMFA into national law, and to monitor its implementation, especially in certain Member States that rank poorly in freedom indices; underlines that the EMFA is a crucial milestone in safeguarding the independence, pluralism and integrity of the media landscape across the Union;

    33.  Expresses deep concern over the increasing attacks on journalists and publishers, with a disproportionate impact on women; calls on the Commission and the Member States and on candidate and potential candidate countries to ensure the safety and protection of journalists, including investigative journalists and fact checkers who are particularly exposed; highlights the fact that the most common forms of threat include verbal attacks, online harassment, intimidation through social media and email, and legal threats, including cases covered by the Anti-SLAPP (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) Directive(50), as well as instances of stalking and personal harassment;

    34.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement the Anti-SLAPP Directive and Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 of 27 April 2022 on protecting journalists and human rights defenders who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded or abusive court proceedings(51), and to adopt comprehensive domestic anti-SLAPP measures to protect journalists and provide support for those facing intimidation, defamation and limitations on the ability to exercise their profession; recommends that, when transposing the directive, Member States extend its application to also include national cases, since the majority of SLAPP cases occur at the national level; calls on the Commission to put forward proposals to address SLAPP cases not covered under the current Directive;

    35.  Calls for the introduction of specific aggravating circumstances in criminal law for offences committed against journalists when such acts are motivated by or connected to their professional activities;

    36.  Urges the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to protect and promote media freedom and pluralism, ensure transparent allocation of public funds, prevent the concentration of media ownership, protect editorial independence and combat disinformation, particularly through robust laws, including specific provisions on media ownership transparency, and independent regulators; underlines the important role of public service media; welcomes initiatives at national level to create a media registry containing public information about ownership and advertising investment in order to ensure transparency, impartiality and verifiability; further calls on Member States to ensure adequate, sustainable and predictable funding and budgetary stability based on transparent and objective criteria for public service media; recommends the creation of a dedicated EU media freedom fund supporting independent journalism and local media outlets;

    37.  Condemns the spread of hate speech, including in mainstream and social media, as it poses a serious threat to democracy and the rule of law; calls for stronger enforcement of media regulations to combat hate speech and safeguard a diverse and inclusive media landscape, in accordance with its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union; underlines the fact that prominent public figures and politicians have to lead by example and need to ensure a respectful debate; recalls that freedom of expression is a fundamental value of democratic societies and should not be unjustifiably restricted; further recalls that any legislation on hate speech and hate crime should be grounded in the principles of necessity and proportionality; underlines that freedom of expression must be exercised within the law and in line with Article 11 of the Charter and should not be exploited as a shield for hate speech and hate crimes;

    38.  Acknowledges that citizens perceive signs of an erosion of democracy fuelled by misinformation and disinformation, and that the spread of false information through social media could lead to the erosion of general respect for the rule of law; calls on digital platforms to take immediate action by ensuring compliance with their own community standards and European laws, including the Digital Services Act(52) (DSA) and competition rules; calls on the Commission to assess such compliance regularly and take measures where necessary; recommends that Member States, candidate and potential candidate countries develop comprehensive strategies to combat disinformation and foreign interference in democratic processes, while safeguarding freedom of expression and media pluralism;

    39.  Strongly condemns state control and political interference in media operations; highlights the fact that media regulators must be adequately protected by legal safeguards to ensure their independence and freedom from political pressure, with sufficient budgetary resources at their disposal; underlines the democratic importance of independent media regulators;

    40.  Expresses deep concern over the abuse of spyware and the lack of sufficient safeguards against illegal surveillance of journalists; calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of Parliament’s PEGA Inquiry Committee on banning politically motivated surveillance;

    41.  Urges Member States to ensure that the transposition of Directive (EU) 2016/343(53) on the presumption of innocence does not introduce restrictions on the right to report on and inform the public of matters of public interest, including judicial investigations, that are not provided for by the Directive; calls on Member States to review and, if necessary, modify existing national provisions that could limit journalistic freedoms;

    42.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that the national coordinators established under the DSA are fully empowered to perform their role in facilitating information exchange and cooperation at the European level;

    Civil society organisations (CSOs)

    43.  Agrees with the Commission’s assessment that CSOs, including those advocating for the rule of law and democracy, the protection of marginalised groups, environmental protection and social justice, and human rights defenders (HRDs) are essential for the checks and balances and for the protection of fundamental values and Union law that are a cornerstone of the EU; appreciates that CSOs and professional associations representing groups such as judges, prosecutors or journalists support the rule of law; underlines, in particular, the importance of local, vibrant civil societies in candidate and potential candidate countries, which play a constructive role in the EU accession processes; recognises their role as watchdogs against rule of law violations and their contribution to promoting and safeguarding democratic principles; recalls the need for a safe, supportive and enabling environment for their work;

    44.  Highlights the role of civil society and independent oversight bodies in monitoring, verifying and supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the 2024 Rule of Law Report; calls for a structured civil dialogue framework to integrate civil society contributions into the annual rule of law cycle, as recommended by the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)(54) and civil society networks(55); reiterates the importance of broad consultation when drafting the report; supports the Commission’s plan to draft a strategy on space for and the protection of civil society and HRDs; recommends that the EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders be fully implemented; calls on the Commission to conduct visits to Member States on-site whenever possible, rather than virtually, as on-site visits could paint a fuller and more contextual picture of the local situation;

    45.  Is concerned by the growing trend of CSOs and HRDs facing further legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and attacks, which undermine freedom of association, freedom of assembly and freedom of expression; notes with concern that several Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries have imposed disproportionate measures, including the excessive use of force and the detention of protesters to prevent people from participating in protests in some Member States, as well as pre-emptive bans on public gatherings on the vague grounds of security; stresses that courts have overturned such bans in multiple cases; strongly condemns the use of ‘foreign agent laws’, which stifle dissent, harass CSOs and restrict their operations, creating a chilling effect on civil society and HRDs; regrets the fact that restrictions on freedom of assembly, expression and association and the use of excessive force often disproportionately affect specific causes or groups(56);

    46.  Stresses that peaceful assembly, freedom of association and expression, and freedom of the arts and sciences are fundamental rights protected by international law and are essential for democracy; condemns the increased pressure on these rights, where proven, and notes the trend of restricting them; condemns also, in this context, episodes of violence against police forces; calls on the Commission to reflect these freedoms in the annual report;

    47.  Expresses deep concern about the shrinking civic space and increasing persecution of CSOs and HRDs in the EU, particularly those working on anti-racism, climate justice, LGBTIQ rights, women’s rights and migrant supports; notes that these groups face a range of threats including legal and financial restrictions, funding suspensions, smear campaigns, intimidation and criminalisation; condemns, in particular, the growing repression of climate activism in several Member States, including the misuse of anti-terrorism and organised crime laws and the classification of peaceful climate activists as members of ‘criminal organisations’; calls on the Member States to refrain from disproportionate legal action against such activists; urges the Commission to systematically monitor the situation of these organisations in its rule of law reports and to expand dedicated EU funding for civil society actors combating racism and working on other fundamental rights;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to address such breaches in a dedicated pillar of the annual rule of law reports; calls on the Commission to strengthen the protection of CSOs and HRDs, by establishing early warning mechanisms, increasing the transparency of funding for all actors in the scope of the EU Transparency Register and expanding funding to support CSOs to enable them to operate freely and independently;

    49.  Urges the Member States to create an enabling environment for CSOs and HRDs, adopt the Anti-SLAPP Directive, and implement Commission Recommendation (EU) 2022/758 to protect CSOs from legal harassment; calls for strengthened independence of national oversight bodies, with adequate resources and safeguards against political interference; encourages support for CSOs in developing and disseminating educational initiatives to ensure broad outreach and accessibility;

    50.  Considers that the Commission and the Member States should improve funding mechanisms for CSOs and initiatives that strengthen the judiciary and uphold court independence, namely through the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values programme and the Justice programme; welcomes the fact that the Commission plans to draft a strategy for protecting civil society, recalls, at the same time, that there should be a special focus on HRDs; calls on the Commission to include a rapid response mechanism to support threatened CSOs and HRDs within the Union, drawing on the model of the EU-funded ‘Protect Defenders’ mechanism, which currently has a non-EU focus only; emphasises that this mechanism could provide resources for advocacy, legal aid and awareness campaigns, while ensuring that these organisations can operate without undue restrictions or harassment; calls for the full and consistent application of the Union guidelines on HRDs in candidate and potential candidate countries; is concerned, however, by the growing trend in some Member States of CSOs and HRDs facing challenges, with new legal restrictions, a lack of funding, and physical or verbal attacks, and by the deplorable acceptance of such practices and the chilling effect thereof, including on their freedom of speech within the Member States(57) and the EU institutions; considers that CSOs and HRDs play an essential supportive role in monitoring Member States’ compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU;

    Equality and non-discrimination before the law

    51.  Recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in judicial proceedings; stresses that the rule of law and fundamental rights are interlinked and that violations of the rule of law have an immediate impact on fundamental rights and disproportionately affect women, minorities and vulnerable groups; calls on the Commission to monitor the effect of any violations of the rule of law on fundamental rights and to ensure that equality and non-discrimination before the law for all people are protected through the use of all relevant instruments, including infringement procedures, where appropriate;

    52.  Stresses the need to fight against all types of discrimination before the law; expresses its concern over the lack of progress in and implementation of equality and anti-discrimination laws in some Member States; regrets the fact that, despite existing EU legislation such as Directive 2000/78/EC(58) on equal treatment, gaps in the legal framework and in implementation persist, leaving victims without adequate legal recourse; recalls that Member States’ legal frameworks must enshrine equal legal treatment and promote equality and the right of individuals not to be discriminated against in legal remedy; calls on the Commission to act in cases of non-compliance with these principles; deplores the intention of the Commission to withdraw the proposal for a horizontal equal treatment directive(59) and urges the Council to adopt the directive without further delay;

    53.  Is concerned that the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report noted that some Member States fail to effectively prosecute hate crimes or provide sufficient support to victims of hate crimes, undermining trust in judicial systems and perpetuating inequality before the law; calls on the Council to extend the current list of ‘EU crimes’ in Article 83(1) TFEU to include hate crimes and hate speech and calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal on hate crime and hate speech; asks the Commission to focus on hate crimes in its rule of law reports and, in this regard, to closely monitor and record hate crimes;

    54.  Underlines that gender-based violence, online and offline, is a major and pervasive offence, as well as a radical violation of fundamental rights, and it violates the principle of equality before the law; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take action against gender-based violence, both online and offline, including violence committed through the use of digital platforms; calls for gender-based violence to be added to the list of EU crimes and for an EU legislative proposal on combating rape based on the lack of consent, also in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    55.  Recalls the need for access to sexual and reproductive rights and health and calls for access to safe, legal abortion to be enshrined in the Charter;

    56.  Calls on all Member States to protect LGBTIQ rights in compliance with Union law, the Charter, and CJEU and ECtHR case-law, recalls that legal barriers to recognising same-sex partnerships or parenthood across borders persist in several Member States; warns that such practices not only hinder the free movement of LGBTIQ families within the EU, but also violate the rule of law principle of non-discrimination before the law, highlighting the lack of uniform protection for LGBTIQ individuals across Member States; calls on the Member States who have not yet done so to introduce legal recognition of same-sex partnerships; calls on the Commission to recast Directive 2004/38/EC(60) in order to include an explicit cross-border recognition of private and family life rights, including parenthood for same-sex parents, in the light of the latest rulings(61) of the CJEU; stresses that all children are equal before the law and that Member States must act in the best interests of the child, increase legal certainty and reduce discrimination against the children of same-sex parents; recalls Parliament’s position supporting the recognition of parenthood across the EU, irrespective of how a child is conceived or born, or the type of family they have; urges the Commission to present a renewed LGBTIQ strategy that fully addresses the challenges throughout Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to make LGBTIQ rights a cross-cutting priority across all policy fields; calls on the Commission to put forward appropriate legislative measures to ensure respect for these principles, as well as to rely on infringement procedures against Member States; urges the Commission to present legislative proposals to combat hate crimes and hate speech on grounds of gender identity, sex characteristics and sexual orientation;

    57.  Is deeply concerned about the discriminatory measures introduced in some Member States under the pretext of fighting ‘LGBTIQ propaganda’ and ‘gender ideology’ which are contributing to an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals in several Member States and have a negative impact on children, families and workers; welcomes the CJEU’s opinion of 5 June 2025 stating that it considers Hungary to be in violation of EU law in prohibiting or restricting access to LGBTIQ+ content; highlights the negative impact of such measures on the freedom of expression and assembly for LGBTIQ groups and beyond; emphasises that these actions encourage discrimination against LGBTIQ individuals and contravene EU law; urges the Commission to present a proposal for a binding EU ban on conversion practices in all Member States; notes that in 2024, both the Commission and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) noted an alarming increase in hate crimes and hate speech targeting LGBTIQ individuals and other minorities in several Member States, stresses the importance of the right to self-determination of LGBTIQ persons and reminds Member States that, in accordance with case-law, the right to self-determination is a fundamental right; therefore urges all Member States who have not done so yet to make sure that LGBTIQ individuals have access to legal gender recognition;

    58.  Is deeply concerned by and strongly condemns the rising levels of anti-Semitism across the EU; is also deeply concerned and strongly condemns the rising levels of Islamophobia and all other forms of discrimination across the EU, including acts of violence, intimidation, hate speech and the display of hate symbols in public spaces; calls on the Member States and candidate and potential candidate countries to make sure that members of all minorities are equal before the law; calls on the Member States to review laws and policies to ensure that they do not discriminate against minorities, directly or indirectly, and to review any discriminatory legal provisions and regulations; calls for sustained efforts at both EU and national levels to monitor, prevent and prosecute related hate crimes and to protect Jewish and Muslim communities from harassment and violence;

    59.  Emphasises that a lack of accountability disproportionately affects minorities’ communities, fair political representation, and economic opportunities; calls for increased transparency in public decision-making processes to ensure inclusive and equitable governance;

    60.  Calls on the Member States to fully implement Directive 2024/1500(62) and Directive 2024/1499(63), which establish minimum standards for equality bodies; calls for concrete measures to guarantee their independence and ensure their effectiveness in promoting equality;

    61.  Underlines that third-country nationals legally residing in the EU, regardless of their nationality or place of birth, must be treated in a non-discriminatory manner and enjoy fair and equal treatment in the areas specified by existing legislation; points out that third-country nationals, regardless of their nationality, place of birth or residence status, have the right to apply for international protection in compliance with international and EU law, of which the non-refoulement principle is an integral part; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in upholding the rule of law and fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter and in implementing the legislation adopted by the co-legislators; stresses the binding nature of the judgments of the CJEU and the ECtHR;

    62.  Urges the Commission to ensure that the free movement of persons within the EU, the right to reside freely, and family reunification are fully respected in the EU territory and that every citizen can enjoy equal rights and fully exercise their rights;

    63.  Urges the Commission to strengthen the focus in the annual rule of law report on strengthening the fight against all forms of discrimination in access to justice; calls on the Commission and the Member States to combat discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin, religion or belief, nationality, political opinion, language, disability, age, gender, including gender identity and gender expression, and sexual orientation; urges the Council to reach an agreement on Directive 2008/0140(CNS)(64); urges the Commission to introduce new pillars in the annual rule of law report focusing on combating all forms of hatred and discrimination as enshrined in Article 21 of the Charter, namely regarding crimes that target minority groups and members of national, ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, as well as the conditions of civil society in Member States; calls on the Commission to require Member States to collect comparable and robust disaggregated equality data to fully assess the impact of structural discrimination on the rule of law; calls on the Commission to reconsider its position on the Minority SafePack Initiative and to put forward legislative initiatives to safeguard the promotion of minority rights and language rights; reiterates its call for the EU to accede to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages; calls for closer ties between the EU and the Council of Europe on minority rights, including in view of the enlargement process;

    64.  Emphasises the need for Member States to address the gender gap in the judiciary and other key democratic institutions; recommends implementing targeted measures to increase women’s representation in senior judicial and public administration positions;

    65.  Calls on the Member States to establish national human rights institutions, in accordance with the UN Paris Principles, to guarantee their independence and to ensure that they have the capacity to carry out their tasks effectively;

    Single market and the rule of law

    66.  Highlights the importance of the rule of law in ensuring the smooth and efficient functioning of the single market and reaffirms that well-functioning, independent judicial systems, effective anti-corruption frameworks and strong protection of media freedom are crucial for maintaining fair competition, upholding legal certainty and fostering trust among economic operators; underlines that non-compliance and circumvention of European regulations lead to enormous distortions of competition in the internal market; emphasises that reliable and stable rule of law structures are key pillars for investment and trade, which are essential for competitiveness and, therefore, for the capacity of the welfare system and the labour market in the EU;

    67.  Stresses that the proper functioning of the single market depends on the effective application of the principle of mutual trust and recognition in both judicial and administrative cooperation; recalls that such trust can only be sustained where the rule of law – as also recommended by the Venice Commission in its rule of law checklist – is fully upheld; indicates that the principle of mutual recognition should be suspended in cases of systemic breaches;

    68.  Underlines the negative economic impact that corruption and weak judiciary systems have on investor confidence and cross-border cooperation; is concerned that national governments and institutions which fail to uphold the rule of law may allow anti-competitive behaviour to flourish, or may even actively encourage it for political or economic gain, thereby potentially damaging the EU’s economy and undermining the fairness of its internal market;

    69.  Recalls that, within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on the grounds of nationality is prohibited in accordance with the Charter, and that freedom of establishment, service provision and movement of capital are fundamental to the single market; underlines that the rules regarding equality of treatment forbid overt and covert discrimination by reason of nationality or, in the case of a company, its seat; recalls its condemnation of the reported systemic discriminatory, non-transparent and unfair practices against companies in some Member States;

    70.  Condemns systemic discriminatory practices in Hungary, including the misuse of EU funds to benefit political allies, violations of EU competition rules, and the concentration of businesses in the hands of oligarchs with ties to the government; deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government;

    71.  Highlights the importance of addressing economic inequality and social exclusion as threats to democratic participation and the rule of law;

    72.  Calls on the Commission to integrate the single market dimension of the rule of law more explicitly into its monitoring mechanisms, with a stronger focus on the uniform and rapid application, implementation and enforcement of existing legislation, ensuring that Member States’ adherence to rule of law principles is assessed not only from a democratic and judicial standpoint but also in terms of its economic impact on the single market and financial stability; requests that the Commission include in its 2025 rule of law report a dedicated chapter on the single market dimension; urges the Commission to use all available legal tools to address rule of law deficiencies, including launching infringement procedures and competition law enforcement powers when necessary, to preserve the functioning of the internal market;

    Rule of law toolbox

    73.  Stresses the importance of embedding rule of law milestones in funding instruments such as the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF); deplores the release of EU funds to the Hungarian Government despite ongoing deficiencies in judicial independence and anti-corruption frameworks; recommends suspending disbursements until all rule of law benchmarks are met; urges the Commission to ensure that EU funds reach the Hungarian population, including through direct and indirect funding mechanisms for beneficiaries independent of the Hungarian Government, while maintaining the full impact of the measures taken;

    74.  Criticises the Council’s inaction in advancing ongoing Article 7 TEU proceedings, which weakens the EU’s credibility in upholding the rule of law; urges the Council to unblock the next steps in the Article 7 TEU procedure in relation to Hungary, given persistent violations on judicial independence, media freedom and civil society, which necessitate immediate and decisive action; recommends that the Council ensure that hearings take place at least once per presidency during ongoing Article 7 procedures and also that new developments affecting the rule of law, democracy and fundamental rights are addressed; emphasises that there is no need for unanimity in the Council in order to identify a clear risk of a serious breach of Union values under Article 7(1) TEU, or to address concrete recommendations to the Member States in question and provide deadlines for the implementation of those recommendations; reiterates its call on the Council to do so, underlining that any further delaying of such action would amount to a breach of the rule of law principle by the Council itself; insists that Parliament should have a more active role in Article 7 TEU proceedings, including the ability to present reasoned proposals to the Council, attend Council hearings and be fully informed at every stage of the procedure;

    75.  Welcomes the preventive tools in the rule of law toolbox, such as the annual rule of law cycle, the EU justice scoreboard, the European Semester, EU funds to support civil society, judicial networks and media freedom and the rule of law milestones in the RRF; insists that a closer link between the findings of the 2024 Rule of Law Report and the allocation of financial support under the Union budget is introduced, in terms of milestones, ensuring that EU funds are tied to the achievement of necessary reforms; calls on the Commission to further develop a direct link between preventive and reactive instruments and hence, on the basis of the findings in the annual rule of law reports, to promptly and in a coordinated manner launch infringement procedures, set further steps in applying the Article 7 TEU procedure, and apply the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and the horizontal enabling conditions related to the Charter, as well as provisions from the Financial Regulation and Common Provisions Regulation; calls on the Commission to assess and report on the potential risks to the Union budget posed by weaknesses in rule of law regimes in the annual rule of law reports starting with the 2025 report; underlines that both the triggering of the reactive instruments and the closure of relevant procedures must be based on the objective criterion of compliance with the rule of law and with EU and international law as interpreted by international courts;

    76.  Calls on the Commission to systemically resort to expedited procedures and applications for interim measures before the CJEU in infringement cases; calls on the Commission to revise its policy, outlined in its 2022 communication on enforcing EU law(65), not to use infringement actions for ‘individual’ redress, as this policy has led to serious deprivation of rights for citizens across the EU, especially where their own governments are refusing to comply with EU law or CJEU judgments, also because most of these cases are not merely individual but address strategic and fundamental issues; asks the Commission to report annually on the application and effectiveness of the tools used against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Underlines the need for an ever more comprehensive toolbox ensuring compliance, beyond its budgetary dimension, with EU values across all Union law, including financial instruments, to prevent backsliding; urges the Commission to identify the gaps and present relevant proposals broadening the scope of this toolbox; supports stronger application of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, with cross-cutting conditionality in EU funding programmes; maintains its position that frozen EU funds should only be released once meaningful reforms have been fully implemented and rule of law compliance has been verifiably achieved in practice; emphasises the need for consistency and transparency in applying the toolbox to protect Union values, without political considerations and using objective criteria to trigger reactive instruments; highlights the fact that conditionality should equally apply to candidate and potential candidate countries; insists on the importance of Parliament’s role in overseeing the use of those tools; urges the Commission to conduct systematic audits of the distribution of EU funds to prevent conflicts of interest, political instrumentalisation or opacity in fund allocation at the national level;

    78.  Insists on the introduction of a performance-based instrument in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) to strengthen the alignment between EU funds and the respect for Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU such as democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law; requests that the future MFF include robust rule of law safeguards applicable to all EU funds;

    79.  Expresses concern that the suspension of EU funds could be misused as a political weapon against civil society and local authorities; recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation ensures that final recipients should not lose access to EU funds if sanctions are applied to their government; calls for ‘smart conditionality’ that would enable national governments undermining the rule of law to be bypassed by allocating decommitted EU funds directly to local and regional authorities and to non-governmental organisations and businesses that comply with EU law, as well as by simplifying the reallocation of funds intended for the benefit of the Member State in question to other EU programmes; proposes the establishment of a transparent system for local authorities to request EU funds when national governments block or misuse EU funds; stresses the importance of strictly applying the conditionality mechanisms as enshrined in the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance and in the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans in a transparent manner;

    Checks and balances

    80.  Underlines the importance of safeguarding the separation of powers and a stable institutional framework in every Member State; calls on the Member States to ensure that any constitutional or legislative reforms affecting the separation of powers fully comply with EU fundamental values and legal principles;

    81.  Calls on the Member States to refrain from excessively using accelerated procedures that bypass stakeholder and civil society consultation, including parliamentary scrutiny or emergency powers, as these negatively impact the stability and the quality of lawmaking and democracy; calls on the Member States to set up transparent lawmaking processes following systematic and public consultation with various stakeholders and advisory bodies;

    82.  Encourages national governments and parliaments to publish publicly accessible impact assessments and consultation findings for every major legislative proposal;

    83.  Underlines the recommendation of the Venice Commission that complaints and appeals in the case of electoral irregularities, in particular with regard to vote buying, ballot-box stuffing and incorrect vote counting, be followed up effectively; recalls the importance of the EU legislation adopted in this regard, namely the DSA, the Digital Markets Act(66), the AI Act(67), Regulation (EU) 2024/900 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising(68) and the EMFA; calls on the Commission and the Member States to fully implement these acts and provide adequate public resources for the measures under them;

    84.  Calls on the Member States to strengthen the independence of national oversight bodies in order to ensure resources and freedom from political interference; stresses the importance of civil society and HRDs in promoting accountability and protecting fundamental rights;

    85.  Expresses deep concern about the rise of extremism and its corrosive effect on democratic norms and the rule of law in several Member States; notes with concern that extremist groups actively target minorities and contribute to a climate of fear, discrimination and polarisation; calls on the Commission to explicitly identify such groups as a threat to democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, including academic and media independence, in its annual rule of law report; urges the Member States to take decisive action to counter their influence through robust legal frameworks, education promoting democratic values, and support for CSOs countering extremism; calls for coordinated EU action to counter this threat, including through education, social inclusion programmes and, where necessary, legal measures;

    86.  Expresses concern about the reported cases of the use of surveillance technologies by Member State governments against journalists, activists, opposition figures and staff of the EU institutions; recalls that the use of spyware must be strictly proportionate and necessary and urges the Commission to present a plan of measures to prevent its abuse without undue delay, making full use of all available legislative means provided by the Treaties, as recommended by the PEGA Committee;

    87.  Notes with concern the increasing use of artificial intelligence for national security and law enforcement purposes across the EU, stressing the risks to fundamental rights and freedoms(69); recalls the need to ensure robust data protection safeguards when Member States or national authorities employ surveillance software; calls for strengthened EU legislation to prevent mass surveillance and discrimination;

    88.  Is concerned about foreign interference in the Member States and in candidate and potential candidate countries, including social media manipulation and disinformation by forces both inside and outside the Union to manipulate public opinion and distort democratic debate; stresses the importance of transparency in platform algorithms, independent audits and robust fact-checking mechanisms to combat disinformation and safeguard democracy; calls on major digital platforms to cooperate with national law enforcement authorities to support investigations into illegal online activities; calls on the Commission and the Member States to monitor this and to apply the DSA and the Digital Markets Act swiftly, particularly regarding very large online platforms; calls on the Commission to include greater scrutiny of online platform disinformation in Pillar 3 (Pluralism and Media Freedom) of its rule of law report;

    89.  Stresses the importance of academic freedom as an integral aspect of the rule of law and urges the Member States to protect universities from political interference and ensure institutional autonomy; encourages the Member States to foster a culture of the rule of law through awareness campaigns, outreach initiatives and action promoting democratic values and principles;

    90.  Invites the Commission and the Member States to consider engaging in a process focused on improving administrative procedures and practices that have an impact on the functioning of key democratic processes and the exercise of checks and balances in line with the EU’s established, shared principles;

    Horizontal recommendations

    91.  Recognises the Commission’s rule of law report as a key preventive tool for monitoring the state of the rule of law across the EU, facilitating dialogue between Member States, and guiding reforms in areas such as judicial independence, anti-corruption, media freedom and other checks and balances;

    92.  Acknowledges that the Commission’s rule of law report has become more comprehensive since its inception in 2020; deplores, however, the fact that essential elements from Parliament’s 2016 resolution have not yet been implemented and that the Commission has not fully addressed the recommendations made by Parliament in its previous resolutions; considers that these recommendations remain valid and reiterates them; calls for the inclusion in the annual report of important missing elements of the Venice Commission’s rule of law checklist, such as prevention of the abuse of powers, equality before the law and non-discrimination; reiterates its position that the report should cover the full scope of the values of Article 2 TEU, as these cannot be seen in isolation; asks the Commission to explore the potential release, at around the same time, of all reports related to the rule of law or fundamental rights, such as the annual reports on compliance with the Charter or the report by the FRA, in order to enable a simultaneous global debate on these issues; regrets, however, that despite the growing threats of disinformation, propaganda and information manipulation targeting European democracy, a similar peer review practice among the Member States, in support of the efforts of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, has not yet been considered;

    93.  Calls on the Commission to expand the scope of the report next year; insists that the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report cover the entire scope of Article 2 TEU and include broader indicators, such as media independence, the role of civil society, fundamental rights, academic and artistic freedom, gender equality, the protection of minorities and vulnerable groups, respect for international law, free and fair elections and the functioning of democratic institutions, in order to provide a fuller picture of rule of law standards across the EU, and in candidate and potential candidate countries;

    94.  Calls on the Commission to publish the criteria it uses to select information from civil society, international bodies, national authorities and other stakeholders in the process of their rule of law reporting; repeats its call on the Commission to invite the FRA to provide methodological advice and conduct comparative research in order to add detail in key areas of the annual report, given the intrinsic links between fundamental rights and the rule of law;

    95.  Encourages the Commission to use clearer language and transparent assessment rules to evaluate compliance with the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU; reiterates its call to the Commission to differentiate clearly between systemic and isolated breaches of the rule of law in Member States, to avoid the risk of trivialising the most serious breaches of the rule of law, and to make clear that when the values of Article 2 TEU are systematically, deliberately and gravely violated over a period of time, Member States could fail to meet all criteria that define a democracy; indicates that the recommendations should better reflect negative findings in the report and be more detailed; believes that the assessment of the fulfilment of previous recommendations should be more precise and qualitative, not relying only on legislative changes but also on real and independent evidence of their implementation in practice; invites the Commission to conduct field visits and provide assessments based on concrete and independent evidence of implementation in practice;

    96.  Warns that failing to link monitoring to real consequences risks diminishing the report’s relevance in the Member States; calls for a greater focus on implementing country-specific recommendations, with timelines and measurable benchmarks, including, where relevant, reference to existing opinions of international bodies (e.g. the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, UN Special Rapporteurs) or relevant court rulings (including from the ECtHR); calls on the Commission to detail the possible consequences in the event of non-compliance, including by referring to specific instruments from the toolbox, which includes budgetary tools and funding conditionality; believes that certain breaches of the values deserve immediate enforcement action and other breaches require recommendations to be implemented urgently; urges the Member States to implement the recommendations outlined in previous reports and commends those Member States that have not only implemented the recommendations but have also exceeded the established standards;

    97.  Notes that the release date of the annual rule of law report in July is not conducive to generating sufficient visibility and is contrary to the report’s intended purpose of generating a genuine public debate about its findings; urges the Commission to reconsider the publication date and undertake additional efforts to make its findings widely known in all Member States;

    98.  Recalls that decisions taken or not taken by the EU institutions often influence the rule of law situation in the Member States; criticises the fact that the rule of law status at the EU institutions remains outside the scope of the Commission’s 2024 Rule of Law Report; requests that a chapter on the EU’s adherence to rule of law standards, based on an independent review mechanism, be included in the Commission’s 2025 rule of law report;

    99.  Proposes a comprehensive interinstitutional mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights covering all the values set out in Article 2 TEU and involving all EU institutions, Member States and candidate countries in order to foster uniformity; emphasises the need to ensure full independence and objectivity in the composition and functioning of this body, while adapting its mandate specifically to address rule of law challenges;

    100.  Believes that EU-level interinstitutional dialogue and cooperation on the rule of law should be strengthened; regrets the fact that the Commission and the Council have so far rejected its offer to enter into an interinstitutional agreement on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights; reaffirms its willingness to resume talks on this agreement; calls on the other institutions, in the meantime, to at least explore further cooperation in the context of the proposed interinstitutional pilot on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, which would help build trust between the institutions in a practical way, in particular by sharing monitoring, dialogue and meeting practices; calls on the Council to make its rule of law dialogue more inclusive by inviting other institutions, such as the Venice Commission, the Human Rights Commissioner and representatives of Parliament, to its sessions; believes that the Council’s rule of law dialogue should become more interactive, with systematic provision of feedback; calls on the Member States to invest in proper preparation for this dialogue; emphasises that increased transparency would enhance the rule of law dialogue within the Union and therefore invites the Council to provide detailed public conclusions; urges the Council to engage with national parliaments to enhance democratic oversight of Member States’ compliance with EU rule of law standards; stresses that the rule of law report should be evidence-based and objective, addressing the Member States and EU institutions, and should include preventive and corrective measures;

    101.  Calls on the Member States to ensure that emergency measures adopted in response to crises (such as pandemics or security threats) are subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny and judicial review, and are strictly time-limited and proportionate;

    102.  Considers that cooperation between the EU and international organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the UN in promoting and defending democracy, the rule of law, fundamental freedoms and human rights, including the rights of minorities, should be further strengthened;

    103.  Encourages the Member States to develop and implement comprehensive civic education programmes that foster understanding of democratic institutions, the rule of law and fundamental rights among citizens of all ages;

    104.  Deplores the fact that the Commission has not incorporated many of Parliament’s repeated requests regarding the Commission’s rule of law reports; demands that the Commission issue a communication by 31 December 2025 detailing which of the requests adopted by Parliament in relation to the Commission’s rule of law reports since 2021 the Commission will implement, which it will not, and why;

    105.  Welcomes the extension of the Commission’s rule of law report to cover candidate countries, namely Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia, reinforcing the fact that the EU’s fundamental values must be respected not only by current Member States but also by future members during the accession processes; encourages a close evaluation of the rule of law in all countries in an accession process; encourages the Commission to provide concrete recommendations to accession countries on the state of the rule of law, and to ensure alignment with the enlargement report; expects the Commission to include all candidate countries in its 2025 rule of law report;

    o
    o   o

    106.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, the Council of Europe and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 433, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (3) OJ L, 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (4) OJ L 156, 5.5.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/692/oj.
    (5) OJ C 215, 19.6.2018, p. 162.
    (6) OJ C 463, 21.12.2018, p. 21.
    (7) OJ C 129, 5.4.2019, p. 13.
    (8) OJ C 390, 18.11.2019, p. 117.
    (9) OJ C 433, 23.12.2019, p. 66.
    (10) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 13.
    (11) OJ C 363, 28.10.2020, p. 45.
    (12) OJ C 395, 29.9.2021, p. 2.
    (13) OJ C 415, 13.10.2021, p. 36.
    (14) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 70.
    (15) OJ C 67, 8.2.2022, p. 86.
    (16) OJ C 81, 18.2.2022, p. 27.
    (17) OJ C 99, 1.3.2022, p. 146.
    (18) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 88.
    (19) OJ C 205, 20.5.2022, p. 2.
    (20) OJ C 251, 30.6.2022, p. 48.
    (21) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 2.
    (22) OJ C 347, 9.9.2022, p. 168.
    (23) OJ C 479, 16.12.2022, p. 18.
    (24) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 108.
    (25) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 80.
    (26) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 463.
    (27) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 15.
    (28) OJ C 149, 28.4.2023, p. 22.
    (29) OJ C 161, 5.5.2023, p. 10.
    (30) OJ C 167, 11.5.2023, p. 74.
    (31) OJ C 341, 27.9.2023, p. 2.
    (32) OJ C, C/2023/442, 1.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/442/oj.
    (33) OJ C, C/2024/6743, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6743/oj.
    (34) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (35) OJ C, C/2023/1223, 21.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1223/oj.
    (36) OJ C, C/2024/494, 23.1.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/494/oj.
    (37) OJ C, C/2024/3995, 17.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/3995/oj.
    (38) OJ C, C/2024/2656, 29.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/2656/oj.
    (39) OJ C, C/2024/5739, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5739/oj.
    (40) OJ C, C/2024/5733, 17.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5733/oj.
    (41) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0367.
    (42) For all DRFMG monitoring activities, see: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/libe-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundament/product-details/20190103CDT02662.
    (43) Opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 168.
    (44) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 24 June 2019, European Commission v Republic of Poland, C-619/18, ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 42.
    (45) COM(2024)0800, Annex with recommendations, pp. 1, 9, 11, 19 and 24.
    (46) Directive 2012/29/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA (OJ L 315, 14.11.2012, p. 57, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2012/29/oj).
    (47) Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) (OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/1939/oj).
    (48) Directive (EU) 2017/1371 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2017 on the fight against fraud to the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (OJ L 198, 28.7.2017, p. 29, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2017/1371/oj).
    (49) Regulation (EU) 2024/1083 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a common framework for media services in the internal market and amending Directive 2010/13/EU (European Media Freedom Act) (OJ L, 2024/1083, 17.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1083/oj).
    (50) Directive (EU) 2024/1069 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on protecting persons who engage in public participation from manifestly unfounded claims or abusive court proceedings (‘Strategic lawsuits against public participation’) (OJ L, 2024/1069, 16.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1069/oj).
    (51) OJ L 138, 17.5.2022, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reco/2022/758/oj.
    (52) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (53) Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings (OJ L 65, 11.3.2016, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/343/oj).
    (54) EESC opinion of 14 February 2024 entitled ‘Strengthening civil dialogue and participatory democracy in the EU: a path forward’.
    (55) Civil Society Europe, ‘Joint Civil Society Contribution on Civic Space to the 2024 Annual Rule of Law Report’, June 2024.
    (56) European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Addressing racism in policing, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (57) Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Drozd v. Poland, 15158/19 of 6 April 2023, and Mándli and Others v Hungary, 63164/16 of 26 May 2020.
    (58) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation (OJ L 303, 2.12.2000, p. 16, http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/78/oj).
    (59) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (60) Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC (OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p. 77, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2004/38/oj).
    (61) Judgment of the Court of Justice of 5 June 2018, Relu Adrian Coman and Others v Inspectoratul General pentru Imigrări and Ministerul Afacerilor Interne, C‑673/16, ECLI:EU:C:2018:385.
    (62) Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and amending Directives 2006/54/EC and 2010/41/EU (OJ L, 2024/1500, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1500/oj).
    (63) Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 of 7 May 2024 on standards for equality bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in matters of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services, and amending Directives 2000/43/EC and 2004/113/EC (OJ L, 2024/1499, 29.5.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1499/oj).
    (64) Proposal for a Council Directive on implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (COM(2008)0426).
    (65) Commission communication of 13 October 2022 entitled ‘Enforcing EU law for a Europe that delivers’ (COM(2022)0518).
    (66) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).
    (67) Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (OJ L, 2024/1689, 12.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1689/oj).
    (68) Regulation (EU) 2024/900 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 March 2024 on the transparency and targeting of political advertising (OJ L, 2024/900, 20.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/900/oj).
    (69) Europol, ‘AI and policing – The benefits and challenges of artificial intelligence for law enforcement’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: REP TED LIEU AND SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN LEAD 23 SENATORS AND 49 MEMBERS IN INTRODUCING RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING WORLD REFUGEE DAY

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Ted Lieu (33 District of California)

    WASHINGTON—Today, Congressman Ted Lieu (D-Los Angeles County) and Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, introduced a resolution to honor World Refugee Day and the United States’ commitment to supporting refugees and forcibly displaced persons worldwide. The World Refugee Day Resolution was cosponsored by 23 Senators and 49 Members of Congress.

    “There used to be more consensus among Democrats and Republicans that the world’s wealthiest nation has an obligation to help those seeking refuge from violence, persecution, human rights abuses, and other dangers,” said Representative Lieu. “A strong U.S. foreign aid program was once considered both morally correct policy, and a smart return on investment that engendered good will and protected our national security. Now, Trump has turned his back on the world’s most vulnerable people by banning refugees and pulling funding for foreign aid programs. This is a terrible abdication of our duty to help those who need it the most. On World Refugee Day, those of us who want the world to be a more peaceful, prosperous place for everyone reiterate our call to help refugees who are fleeing unimaginable circumstances. Everyone deserves to live freely and safely.”

    “Conflict, persecution and violence continue to force millions of people from their homes – with more than 123 million people forcibly displaced at the end of 2024, including Afghans, Burmese Rohingya and Sudanese,” said Ranking Member Shaheen. “The United States has long been a leader in supporting refugees overseas and welcoming the most vulnerable, promoting stability around the world and boosting the U.S. economy through refugees’ contributions. Yet the Trump Administration is turning its back on this bipartisan legacy of support, slashing U.S. foreign aid programs that help refugees and host communities and indefinitely suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. On this World Refugee Day, our resolution honors the resilient spirit of forcibly displaced persons globally and calls on the Trump Administration to recommit to supporting refugees and displaced persons.”

     This bill as the support of:

    “With an ongoing refugee ban leaving so many with no path to protection – it is imperative we take this opportunity to stand in solidarity with all those forced to flee their homes around the world,” said Erol Kekic, Chief Strategy Officer at Church World Service. “CWS thanks Senator Shaheen and Representative Lieu for honoring refugees and leading this year’s congressional World Refugee Day resolution. From 80 years of walking alongside newcomers, CWS knows that refugees and immigrants enrich our communities – culturally, artistically, religiously, and economically. They are our neighbors and friends. They are mothers and fathers working to build better futures for their children.” 

    “Today, more than 123 million people around the world have been forcibly displaced from their homes—the highest number in recorded history,” said Myal Greene, President and CEO of World Relief. “On World Refugee Day, we remember that behind every statistic is a person made in the image of God, longing for safety, stability, and hope. This crisis should stir the conscience of lawmakers and citizens alike–particularly those, like me, motivated by the Christian faith. We urge Congress to champion policies that protect the persecuted, restore dignity, and uphold America’s long legacy of welcoming those fleeing violence and oppression.” 

    “On World Refugee Day, we are reminded that the right to seek safety is both a legal commitment and a moral imperative,” said Sharif Aly, President of the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP). “The United States has the capacity, and the obligation, to uphold its commitments to refugees and asylum seekers. Yet today, tens of thousands of people who were promised protection under the U.S. resettlement program remain stranded due to unlawful and discriminatory policies. We commend this resolution for reaffirming the values enshrined in our Constitution and refugee laws and urge our leaders to restore U.S. leadership in protecting the rights and dignity of those forced to flee.” 

    “There has never been a more urgent moment for Congress to reaffirm America’s support for refugees, both at home and abroad,” said Jeremy Konyndyk, President of Refugees International. “On World Refugee Day, we must renew our pledge to advance refugee protection, including by ensuring refugees have a role in shaping policy; to uphold the right to seek asylum; and to generously welcome those who seek safety and the chance to rebuild their lives with dignity and opportunity.” 

    “RCUSA reminds the Trump administration of the incredible contributions that refugees have made in the 45-year history of the refugee resettlement program,” said John Slocum, Executive Director of Refugee Council USA. “We stand in solidarity with those forced to flee their homes due to violence and persecution – families and individuals continue to seek safety, dignity, freedom, and opportunity in the face of unimaginable hardship. As global displacement reaches historic highs, the United States must lead with compassion and courage. That means rejecting fear-based policies and recommitting to a system that upholds the rights of all people to seek safety. Congress must invest in our nation’s capacity to welcome refugees and asylum seekers — and safeguard the use of public resources in good faith. RCUSA calls on all people of conscience to stand with refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants, not only today but every day. Our work is far from over.”  

    The resolution is supported by the following organizations: Church World Service, Center for Gender and Refugee Studies, Center for Human Rights and Constitutional Law, Center for Victims of Torture, Climate Refugees, Dorothy Day Catholic Worker, Florence Immigrant & Refugee Rights Project, Franciscan Action Network, Friends Committee on National Legislation, HIAS, International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), Just Neighbors, National Partnership for New Americans, Presidents’ Alliance on Higher Education and Immigration, Refugee Advocacy Lab, Refugee Council USA, Refugee Congress, Refugees International, Unitarian Universalists for Social Justice, United Church of Christ, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), World Relief and Women’s Refugee Commission. 

    The House resolution is cosponsored by Representatives Gabe Amo (D-RI), Yassmin Ansari (D-AZ), Becca Balint (D-VT), Joyce Beatty (D-OH), Sheila Cherfilus-McCormick (D-FL), Judy Chu (D-CA), Gil Cisneros (D-CA), Steve Cohen (D-TN), Danny Davis (D-IL), Diana Degette (D-CO), Suzan DelBene (D-WA), Mark DeSaulnier (D-CA), Adriano Espaillat (D-NY), Chuy Garcia (D-IL), Robert Garcia (D-CA), Sylvia Garcia (D-TX), Jonathan L. Jackson (D-IL), Pramila Jayapal (D-WA), Hank Johnson (D-GA), Ro Khanna (D-CA), Troy A. Carter, Sr. (D-LA), Summer Lee (D-PA), Teresa Leger Fernandez (D-NM), Stephen Lynch (D-MA), Jennifer McClellan (D-VA), Betty McCollum (D-MN), Jim McGovern (D-MA), Robert Menendez (D-NJ), Gwen Moore (D-WI), Seth Moulton (D-MA), Kevin Mullin (D-CA), Jerrold Nadler (D-NY), Eleanor Norton (D-DC), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-MN), Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Delia Ramirez (D-IL), Jan Schakowsky (D-IL), Darren Soto (D-FL), Shri Thanedar (D-MI), Dina Titus (D-NV), Rashida Tlaib (D-MI), Jill Tokuda (D-HI), Paul Tonko (D-NY), Derek Tran (D-CA), Nydia Velazquez (D-NY), Bonnie Watson Coleman (D-NJ), Nikema Williams (D-GA).

    The Senate resolution is cosponsored by Senators Michael Bennet (D-CO), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Angus King (I-ME), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Patty Murray (D-WA), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Peter Welch (D-VT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) and Ron Wyden (D-OR).  

    ### 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Urges Trump to Finally Bring TikTok Under U.S. Ownership: “We Are Allowing This National Security Issue to Fester”

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

    06.20.25

    Cantwell Urges Trump to Finally Bring TikTok Under U.S. Ownership: “We Are Allowing This National Security Issue to Fester”

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – This week, U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA), ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and a senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, delivered a speech on the Senate floor urging President Donald Trump to follow the law as passed by Congress and ensure TikTok is sold to a U.S. company so that America’s enemies will no longer be able to weaponize TikTok to spread their propaganda and turn the world against the United States. In her remarks, Sen. Cantwell cited studies that revealed an alarming rise in anti-Semitic content on TikTok.  

    Yesterday, President Trump announced that he would extend a June 19 deadline for ByteDance, the Chinese-owned company that owns TikTok, to sell the app. His extension – the third of its kind – would push the divestment date to mid-September.  Earlier today, he signed an Executive Order to extend the deadline until September 17, 2025  

    “I rise to express my concerns about reports that President Trump is going to again extend the deadline for getting TikTok out of the control of ByteDance and the Chinese government. Concern because that means that again, we are going to allow this national security issue to fester and to continue on, maybe for several more months,” she said.

    “I’m concerned that these extensions of the TikTok deal are illegal. Note that Congress passed this law, and the president extending the deadline to allow them to continue to operate in the United States under the control of ByteDance and the Chinese government is not what Congress intended,” Sen. Cantwell continued.

    “Simply put, we cannot continue to allow foreign adversaries to control technology that can fuel domestic and political polarization and civil unrest. We need the president to follow the law that Congress passed — bring TikTok under U.S. ownership.”

    Video of her floor speech is HERE; a transcript is HERE.

    In January 2025, following the Supreme Court’s 9-0 decision to uphold the law requiring the sale of TikTok, Sen. Cantwell issued a statement urging the administration to “find a solution to shut the Chinese government backdoor, improve the platform, and help content creators earn more revenue for their work.”

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Preparing students for their future job

    [. To help meet this demand and better prepare students for the future, Alberta’s government is expanding collegiate schools across the province. Budget 2025 invests $27.5 million to support this expansion, which includes $6 million for operational costs and $21.5 million for school improvements.

    Collegiate schools connect classroom learning with real-world careers by offering students hands-on experience and direct pathways to post-secondary education and employment. These specialized schools equip students with practical skills, industry experience and a strong foundation for future careers, helping young Albertans succeed and thrive in a fast-paced and evolving job market.

    “Collegiate schools help students connect what they learn in the classroom to real-world careers. By expanding this model, we are ensuring young Albertans can access specialized training, explore in-demand careers and graduate with a clear path to further education and meaningful employment.”

    Demetrios Nicolaides, Minister of Education and Childcare

    Expanding access to collegiate schools is a key part of the province’s goal to improve career pathways in schools and help students transition into post-secondary education or careers after graduation.

    “Fusion turned my passion for aviation into a real path. They helped me explore my options and confidently choose a career direction. From ground school to career connections, they’ve supported me every step of the way. Thanks to this grant, more students will see the cockpit not just as a dream – but as their future. Fusion is an incredible transition from high school to what comes next.”

    Brock Foster, student, Fusion Collegiate

    New collegiate schools

    In the 2025/26 school year, 16 new collegiate schools will offer specialized programming in science, aviation, technology, engineering, agriculture, business, information communications and the trades. These collegiate programs are designed with industry and post-secondary institutions to help students gain hands-on experience, explore career pathways and prepare for future success.

    The new collegiate schools include:

    Collegiate school

    School authority/location

    Human Services Collegiate

    The Buffalo Trail School Division (Central East)

    St. Eligius Catholic Collegiate 

    Edmonton Catholic Separate School Division (Edmonton)

    GHSD Collegiate of Digital Arts & Esports

    The Golden Hills School Division (Strathmore)

    Heartland Collegiate

    The Elk Island School Division (Fort Saskatchewan)

    HPSD Pathways School

    The High Prairie School Division (High Prairie)

    Monsignor McCoy First Responders 

    The Medicine Hat Roman Catholic Separate School Division (Medicine Hat)

    Northeastern Alberta Collegiate Institute (NACI)

    The Northern Lights School Division (Northeast Alberta)

    Northland Collegiate School 

    The Northland School Division (Northwest Alberta)

    Prairie Land Collegiate

    The Prairie Land School Division (Hanna, Cessford, Altario, Youngstown, Virtual)

    Prairie Sky Collegiate

    The Medicine Hat School Division

    PSD Collegiate

    The Parkland School Division (Stony Plain)

    Skilled Trades and Technology Collegiate

    The Edmonton School Division (Edmonton)

    St. Albert Collegiate Pathways

    The St. Albert School Division (St. Albert)

    STAR Catholic Collegiate

    The St. Thomas Aquinas Roman Catholic Separate School Division (Drayton Valley, Ponoka, Leduc)

    Sturgeon Collegiate

    The Sturgeon School Division (Sturgeon County)

    The Canadian Rockies Collegiate Institute

    The Canadian Rockies School Division (Banff)

    “Fusion Collegiate is proud to help lead this innovative approach to collegiate high school programming. With the support of this grant, Fusion is launching a new Aviation Program in partnership with SAIT and AVmax. This investment enables hands-on, career-focused learning that meets student interest and industry demand. We thank the Ministry of Education and Childcare for its vision in supporting programs that equip students with real-world skills and clear pathways into high-opportunity careers.”

    Chris Meaden, superintendent, Fusion Collegiate

    Expanding collegiate schools

    In addition to the 16 new collegiate schools, four existing collegiate schools will receive funding to improve and expand their facilities. Funding will support the development of specialized learning spaces, such as film and media studios, skilled trades labs and more.

    The four collegiate schools receiving enhancement funding include Calgary Trades & Technologies Collegiate, Fusion Collegiate Aviation, South Alberta School of Agriculture and The Central Alberta Collegiate Institute.

    “As the aviation industry continues to grow in Alberta, SAIT is ready to train the talent needed to fulfill workforce demands. Through continued support from the Government of Alberta and by expanding our relationship with collegiate partners, we’re connecting with young people as they begin to explore options for the future and open their eyes to the potential of a career in aviation.”

    Lynda Holden, dean, School of Transportation and School of Manufacturing and Automation, SAIT

    Quick facts

    • Currently, there are 12 collegiate schools in operation across Alberta:
      • Five opened in the 2023/24 school year.
      • Seven opened in the 2024/25 school year.
    • Each collegiate school is eligible for:
      • up to $150,000 in base funding and $500 per student in their first year for administrative support and operational start-up costs
      • up to $100,000 per lab or learning space and $2,500 per student for furniture and equipment and space modifications

    Related information

    • Collegiate schools

    Related news

    • More money for hands-on learning (March 28, 2025)

    Multimedia

    • Watch the news conference

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Banking: Our 2025 Responsible AI Report: How we’re growing and supporting customers

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Our 2025 Responsible AI Report: How we’re growing and supporting customers

    In May 2024, we released our inaugural Responsible AI Transparency Report. We’re grateful for the feedback we received from our stakeholders around the world. Their insights have informed this second annual Responsible AI Transparency Report, which underscores our continued commitment to building AI technologies that people trust. Our report highlights new developments related to how we build and deploy AI systems responsibly, how we support our customers and the broader ecosystem, and how we learn and evolve. 

    The past year has seen a wave of AI adoption by organizations of all sizes, prompting a renewed focus on effective AI governance in practice. Our customers and partners are eager to learn about how we have scaled our program at Microsoft and developed tools and practices that operationalize high-level norms. 

    Like us, they have found that building trustworthy AI is good for business, and that good governance unlocks AI opportunities. According to IDC’s Microsoft Responsible AI Survey that gathered insights on organizational attitudes and the state of responsible AI, over 30% of the respondents note the lack of governance and risk management solutions as the top barrier to adopting and scaling AI. Conversely, more than 75% of the respondents who use responsible AI tools for risk management say that they have helped with data privacy, customer experience, confident business decisions, brand reputation, and trust.

    We’ve also seen new regulatory efforts and laws emerge over the past year. Because we’ve invested in operationalizing responsible AI practices at Microsoft for close to a decade, we’re well prepared to comply with these regulations and to empower our customers to do the same. Our work here is not done, however. As we detail in the report, efficient and effective regulation and implementation practices that support the adoption of AI technology across borders are still being defined. We remain focused on contributing our practical insights to standard- and norm-setting efforts around the world. 

    Across all these facets of governance, it’s important to remain nimble in our approach, applying learnings from our real-world deployments, updating our practices to reflect advances in the state-of-the-art, and ensuring that we are responsive to feedback from our stakeholders. Learnings from our principled and iterative approach are reflected in the pages of this report. As our governance practices continue to evolve, we’ll proactively share our fresh insights with our stakeholders, both in future annual transparency reports and other public settings.

    Key takeaways from our 2025 Transparency Report 

    In 2024, we made key investments in our responsible AI tools, policies, and practices to move at the speed of AI innovation.

    1. We improved our responsible AI tooling to provide expanded risk measurement and mitigation coverage for modalities beyond text—like images, audio, and video—and additional support for agentic systems, semi-autonomous systems that we anticipate will represent a significant area of AI investment and innovation in 2025 and beyond. 
    2. We took a proactive, layered approach to compliance with new regulatory requirements, including the European Union’s AI Act, and provided our customers with resources and materials that empower them to innovate in line with relevant regulations. Our early investments in building a comprehensive and industry-leading responsible AI program positioned us well to shift our AI regulatory readiness efforts into high gear in 2024. 
    3. We continued to apply a consistent risk management approach across releases through our pre-deployment review and red teaming efforts. This included oversight and review of high-impact and higher-risk uses of AI and generative AI releases, including every flagship model added to the Azure OpenAI Service and every Phi model release. To further support responsible AI documentation as part of these reviews, we launched an internal workflow tool designed to centralize the various responsible AI requirements outlined in the Responsible AI Standard. 
    4. We continued to provide hands-on counseling for high-impact and higher-risk uses of AI through our Sensitive Uses and Emerging Technologies team. Generative AI applications, especially in fields like healthcare and the sciences, were notable growth areas in 2024. By gleaning insights across cases and engaging researchers, the team provided early guidance for novel risks and emerging AI capabilities, enabling innovation and incubating new internal policies and guidelines. 
    5. We continued to lean on insights from research to inform our understanding of sociotechnical issues related to the latest advancements in AI. We established the AI Frontiers Lab to invest in the core technologies that push the frontier of what AI systems can do in terms of capability, efficiency, and safety.  
    6. We worked with stakeholders around the world to make progress towards building coherent governance approaches to help accelerate adoption and allow organizations of all kinds to innovate and use AI across borders. This included publishing a book exploring governance across various domains and helping advance cohesive standards for testing AI systems.

    Looking ahead to the second half of 2025 and beyond 

    As AI innovation and adoption continue to advance, our core objective remains the same: earning the trust that we see as foundational to fostering broad and beneficial AI adoption around the world. As we continue that journey over the next year, we will focus on three areas to progress our steadfast commitment to AI governance while ensuring that our efforts are responsive to an ever-evolving landscape: 

    1. Developing more flexible and agile risk management tools and practices, while fostering skills development to anticipate and adapt to advances in AI. To ensure people and organizations around the world can leverage the transformative potential of AI, our ability to anticipate and manage the risks of AI must keep pace with AI innovation. This requires us to build tools and practices that can quickly adapt to advances in AI capabilities and the growing diversity of deployment scenarios that each have unique risk profiles. To do this, we will make greater investments in our systems of risk management to provide tools and practices for the most common risks across deployment scenarios, and also enable the sharing of test sets, mitigations, and other best practices across teams at Microsoft.
    2. Supporting effective governance across the AI supply chain. Building, earning, and keeping trust in AI is a collaborative endeavor that requires model developers, app builders, and system users to each contribute to trustworthy design, development, and operations. AI regulations, including the EU AI Act, reflect this need for information to flow across supply chain actors. While we embrace this concept of shared responsibility at Microsoft, we also recognize that pinning down how responsibilities fit together is complex, especially in a fast-changing AI ecosystem. To help advance shared understanding of how this can work in practice, we’re deepening our work internally and externally to clarify roles and expectations.
    3. Advancing a vibrant ecosystem through shared norms and effective tools, particularly for AI risk measurement and evaluation. The science of AI risk measurement and evaluation is a growing but still nascent field. We are committed to supporting the maturation of this field by continuing to make investments within Microsoft, including in research that pushes the frontiers of AI risk measurement and evaluation and the tooling to operationalize it at scale. We remain committed to sharing our latest advancements in tooling and best practices with the broader ecosystem to support the advancement of shared norms and standards for AI risk measurement and evaluation.

    We look forward to hearing your feedback on the progress we have made and opportunities to collaborate on all that is still left to do. Together, we can advance AI governance efficiently and effectively, fostering trust in AI systems at a pace that matches the opportunities ahead. 
    Explore the 2025 Responsible AI Transparency Report.  

    Tags: AI, AI for Good Lab, artificial intelligence

    MIL OSI Global Banks –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: USGS Releases Report on Oil and Gas Potential Beneath U.S. Public Lands

    Source: US Geological Survey

    If produced, that would be enough oil to supply all of the nation’s needs for 4 years at the current rate of consumption, and enough natural gas to meet the nation’s needs for nearly 12 years.  

    The onshore public lands of the U.S. included in the report are those administered by the Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Energy and Interior and the Tennessee Valley Authority. 

    The undiscovered oil and gas resource estimates are both significant increases from the most recent USGS estimates in 1998.These increases are due not to any change in the subsurface but to the revolution in energy production since the previous USGS estimates of undiscovered oil and gas resources on public lands in 1998, when the USGS estimated 7.86 billion barrels of oil and 201.1 trillion cubic feet of gas.  Those estimates focused on conventional oil and gas accumulations and did not include all unconventional resources such as shale oil, tight oil and tight gas (oil and gas trapped in impermeable rock), and coal-bed gas, which are routinely produced using fracking and are now part of USGS oil and gas assessments. 

    “The USGS assesses the potential for energy resources where science tells us there may be a resource that hasn’t been discovered yet,” said Sarah Ryker, acting director of the USGS. “In this report, we leveraged our extensive existing data to estimate oil and gas resources on federally managed public lands.  We expect these estimates to be useful for state and national land management, energy futures analysis, and economic development planning.”  

    The estimates were produced by compiling previously published reports that included 579 assessment units, subdivisions of the nation’s 69 geologic provinces that the USGS assesses for undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and gas. Resources were then allocated to public lands proportionally based on the percentage of public land in each defined assessment unit. 

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Canada: Canadian Coast Guard begins 2025 Arctic Summer Season

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    June 20, 2025

    Yellowknife, Northwest Territories – The Canadian Coast Guard’s annual Arctic summer operational season is underway. Through its new Arctic Strategy, the Canadian Coast Guard is working with Inuit, First Nation, and Métis partners to deliver services and programs in the North, by the North, for the North.

    In total, seven Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers are scheduled to deploy from June into November to enable the annual northern community resupply, search and rescue operations, marine pollution incidents, Canadian Arctic security, and other operational and program commitments.

    • June 11 – CCGS Pierre Radisson departed Quebec City, QC, for icebreaking, Arctic science support, Marine Environmental and Hazards Response (MEHR) vessel reconnaissance and assessment, buoy tending operations, and refueling Killiniq’s remote communication station.
    • June 26 – CCGS Henry Larsen departs St. John’s, NL, for icebreaking, Arctic science support, and Operation Pacer Goose – to support the annual resupply of U.S. Pituffik Space Base in Greenland.
    • June 27 – CCGS Amundsen departs Quebec City, QC, for the 2025 Amundsen Science mission.
    • July 1 – CCGS Des Groseilliers departs Quebec City, QC, for icebreaking, Arctic science support, MEHR vessel reconnaissance and assessment, and refueling the weather station in Eureka, NU.
    • July 9 – CCGS Jean Goodwill departs Dartmouth, NS, for icebreaking in Southern and Central Arctic, as well as the High Arctic, if required.
    • July 17 – CCGS Sir Wilfrid Laurier departs Nome, Alaska (following its deployment in Operation North Pacific Guard), for icebreaking, Arctic science support, MEHR vessel reconnaissance and assessment, and buoy tending operations in the Western Arctic.
    • September 18 – CCGS Louis S. St-Laurent departs Cambridge Bay, NU, to assist the Joint Ocean Ice Study in the Beaufort Sea, and provide icebreaking support in the High and Low Arctic. It will be the last vessel operating in the Arctic, until the end of November 2025.

    Through presence, assistance, and operations, the Canadian Coast Guard continues to demonstrate and reinforce Canada’s long-standing, well-established sovereignty in the North.

    MIL OSI Canada News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Russia: HSE at SPIEF: Investments in Electric Power, the Role of Women in the Economy, and the “Russian Engineer”

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    © Roman Kitashov / Roscongress Foundation

    Should we increase electricity generation and what should be the role of the state here? What economic effect does involving women in the economy provide? How can we train personnel to ensure technological leadership? HSE representatives, together with other experts, sought answers to these and other questions at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. In addition, HSE signed a number of cooperation agreements.

    Blood for the economy

    Investments in the electric power industry have a significant multiplier effect on the economy, they contribute to the development of regions and related industries, believes Ilya Dolmatov, Director Institute of Economics and Regulation of Infrastructure Industries HSE. However, against the backdrop of increased availability of electricity, the volume of investment in this area has decreased, he noted, speaking at the session “Investments in the Electric Power Industry on the Horizon up to 2050.”

    Meanwhile, today the economy is transforming, many industries are digitalizing and, in fact, deeper electrification is taking place. “In this sense, we can definitely say that if we do not provide investments for the growth of new capacities, we will face the fact that the economy will not grow. We already see that we have to introduce certain restrictions on electricity consumption, connecting new consumers,” says Ilya Dolmatov. At the same time, in the current macroeconomic realities, the expert believes, it is impossible to do without state support, especially in infrastructure. “The state must determine priority projects and, accordingly, measures to support them,” he believes.

    “Russia is currently one of the top four countries in terms of electricity consumption,” said Deputy Minister of Energy of the Russian Federation Petr Konyushenko. The department expects electricity consumption to grow by about a third of the current level by 2050. To cover the projected growth, it is planned to increase generating capacity, and a number of large construction projects in the electric grid economy will be launched in the near future. These are global federal projects to connect the East with Siberia, to build a direct current line that will connect the Novovoronezh nuclear power plant with Moscow, and a power transmission line from Krasnoyarsk Krai to Buryatia.

    The tasks of industry, in turn, are to help power engineers solve their problems, noted Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Mikhail Ivanov. Over the course of 10 years, demand for power engineering has grown threefold, and the capabilities of our production have grown fourfold, he shared the figures. But it is still necessary to correctly “balance the capabilities of engineering with the modernization of electric power facilities.”

    The head of Yakutia, Aisen Nikolaev, noted that “everyone needs energy, it is like lifeblood for the economy.” But, according to him, companies all unanimously say that without state support, it is simply impossible to implement energy investment projects as desired. “We also need support from development institutions, which are much talked about. This is preferential lending first and foremost, especially in our conditions. These are direct government investments, these are tax breaks, which have already been discussed today. Well, and balanced tariff regulation,” the speaker noted.

    The session was also attended by Pavel Snikkars, CEO of PJSC T Plus, Alexandra Panina, member of the board of PJSC Inter RAO, Kirill Komarov, First Deputy CEO, Director of the Development and International Business Block of Rosatom, Alexey Molsky, member of the board, Deputy CEO for Investments and Capital Construction of PJSC Rosseti, Eldar Muslimov, First Deputy CEO of MKOOO EN HOLDING, and bank representatives.

    Ilya Dolmatov signed an agreement between the HSE and Rosvodokanal at the SPIEF. The parties agreed to develop cooperation in the field of training and retraining of personnel, research and development, and technology implementation activities. On behalf of Rosvodokanal, the signature was made by the company’s CEO Sergey Krzhanovsky.

    International Women’s Cooperation

    Victoria Panova, Vice-Rector of the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Head of BRICS Expert Council – Russia, Russia’s Sherpa in the Women’s Twenty, took part in the session of the Eurasian Women’s Forum “International Cooperation of Women in the Interests of Economic Development” within the framework of the SPIEF.

    According to Victoria Panova, scientific research has shown that more active involvement of women in employment can add about 7 trillion dollars to the global GDP in the coming decades. More active participation of women in the economy and development of female education will also contribute to the growth of labor productivity by 35%. “Women are more likely to reinvest income from entrepreneurial activity in health care, food security and education, which increases the sustainability of the country’s development and ensures stability and overall prosperity,” said Victoria Panova.

    The Vice-Rector also stressed the importance of strengthening expert and scientific interaction among women researchers. She proposed creating a regularly updated depository of measures to expand the legal and economic opportunities of women in the association countries in BRICS.

    Priority is technological leadership

    HSE Vice-Rector Dmitry Zemtsov moderated the session “Training Personnel to Ensure Russia’s Technological Sovereignty” at the Ministry of Education and Science stand.

    Deputy Minister of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation, graduate of the Master’s program “Management in Higher Education» Olga Petrova of the Higher School of Economics spoke about synchronizing personnel training with business demands and solving the problem of achieving technological leadership. One of the key projects was the Advanced Engineering Schools project. “The project has become a powerful tool for synchronizing efforts so that the very “Russian engineer” in the broad sense emerges from the walls of the university,” said Olga Petrova. According to her, another flagship program for personnel training, Priority 2030, of which the HSE is a participant, has been reconfigured for technological leadership.

    The session featured the following speakers: Rector of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University Andrey Rudskoy, Rector of MEPhI Vladimir Shevchenko and other speakers.

    The topic of what specialists will be in demand on the global market was also discussed at the session “Preparing Personnel for the International Market of the Future.” Its moderator was Irina Karelina, Vice President of the National Research University Higher School of Economics.

    The Russian Ministry of Education and Science stand also hosted a session entitled “The Rights of Young Scientists to Their Developments: How Not to Drown in Bureaucracy?” The director of the Institute for Enterprise and Market Analysis HSE University Anton Kazun. In particular, he spoke about the experience of transforming the results of fundamental research into applied projects (using the example of the recommendation system for selecting lawyers “Zastupnik”) and the possibilities of developing a model of technology transfer centers in various universities of the Russian Federation (based on the experience of HSE University), including regular exchange of experience between universities (for example, within the framework of the “Priority-2030” program). Anton Kazun also took part in the discussion of the proposal to legislatively enshrine the exemption from VAT when implementing the rights to use all types of RIAs, exclusive rights to which are held by universities.

    Dmitry Zemtsov also signed a number of agreements concluded by the HSE within the framework of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.

    An agreement was reached with the Russian State University for the Humanities on joint scientific research related to historical and cultural identity, traditional values, preservation of cultural heritage, as well as on holding scientific events and student expeditions within the framework of the project “Rediscovering Russia”. In addition, the plans include formulating proposals for socio-economic development that will be included in youth policy programs in Russia. The documents were signed by Rector of the Russian State University for the Humanities Andrey Loginov and Dmitry Zemtsov.

    Cooperation agreements were also signed between the ANO “University of Entrepreneurs” and universities participating in the program, including the National Research University Higher School of Economics. The parties agreed to create and develop entrepreneurial workshops, where more than 350 senior students will begin developing at least 50 business projects as early as 2025.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: NIH to Fund Long-Term Health Studies for East Palestine After Train Disaster

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services – 2

    Friday, June 19, 2026

    Today, at the urging of Vice President JD Vance, under the leadership of U.S. Health and Human Services Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., the National Institutes of Health (NIH) launched a five-year, $10 million research initiative to assess and address the long-term health outcomes stemming from the 2023 train derailment in East Palestine, Ohio.
    “Vice President Vance, thank you for your persistence on this issue,” Secretary Kennedy said. “You helped drive the first large-scale, coordinated, multi-year federal study dedicated to the long-term health effects of the East Palestine, Ohio disaster. The people of East Palestine have a right to clear, science-backed answers about the impact on their health.”
    “As a senator, it was incredibly frustrating watching the Biden administration refuse to examine the potentially dangerous health impacts on the people of East Palestine following the train derailment,” Vice President Vance said. “I’m proud that we finally have a new president that takes the concerns of everyday, working-class people seriously. This historic research initiative will finally result in answers that this community deserves, and I’m grateful for the work of Secretary Kennedy and Director Bhattacharya on these efforts.”
    On Feb. 3, 2023, a Norfolk Southern freight train derailment involving 38 cars carrying hazardous chemicals—including vinyl chloride, butyl acrylate, ethylene glycol, and benzene residue—resulted in prolonged fires and controlled burns in East Palestine. Following the derailment, several railcars burned for more than two days, and emergency responders conducted controlled burns which raised concerns about the airborne release of hydrogen chloride and phosgene.
    Community members experienced and reported a range of initial health symptoms—including headaches as well as respiratory, skin, and eye irritations—prompting concern about broader long-term impacts on maternal and child health as well as psychological, immunological, respiratory, and cardiovascular effects.
    “NIH is working to ensure that the people of East Palestine and the surrounding communities are listened to, cared for, and get the answers they deserve,” NIH Director Jay Bhattacharya said. “This multi-disciplinary research program will focus on public health tracking and surveillance of the community’s health conditions to support health care decisions and preventive measures.”
    The multi-disciplinary, community-focused series of studies that will focus on:

    Longitudinal epidemiological research to understand the health impacts of exposures on short- and long-term health outcomes including relevant biological markers of risk.
    Public health tracking and surveillance of the community’s health conditions to support health care decisions and preventive measures.
    Extensive, well-coordinated, communications among researchers, study participants, community stakeholders, health care providers, government officials, and others to establish a comprehensive approach to address the affected communities’ health concerns.

    Technical details, application information, and other background material to the public were released today. It is expected that a series of grants will be issued to analyze various types of studies and community activities. The deadline to submit research proposals is July 21. Research projects to start this fall. Learn more here.
    “The announcement today of the funding for long-term health studies for the people of East Palestine is great news for the community,” Governor Mike DeWine said. “This funding will enable the people of East Palestine to have the peace of mind that comes from knowing that any potential for long-term health effects will be studied by the scientists at the National Institutes of Health. I thank President Trump, Vice President Vance, and Secretary Kennedy for their commitment now and into the future.”
    “Let’s be clear, Joe Biden abandoned East Palestine and left a community of working Americans behind when they needed him most,” Senator Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio) said. “I’m beyond grateful that President Trump, Vice President Vance, and Secretary Kennedy are moving quickly to make the community whole again and help these Ohioans in need. This is a huge step toward finally getting justice for East Palestine.”
    “On its path to full recovery, East Palestine deserves the reassurance that comes with transparency, and, thanks to the Trump Administration, that’s what they’re getting,” Senator Jon Husted (R-Ohio) said. “My commitment to East Palestine means making sure that we have the facts necessary to respond effectively and compassionately—now and into the future. I’m thankful for the leadership of President Trump and Vice President Vance, as well as Secretary Kennedy and Director Bhattacharya, in fighting for East Palestine and ensuring all impacted get the support they need and deserve.”
    “Once again, this administration is showing the American people what true leadership looks like—putting Americans first,” Rep. Mike Rulli (OH-06) said. “Unlike the Biden Administration, which tried to sweep under the rug the catastrophic negligence and long-term health consequences of the East Palestine disaster, President Trump, Secretary Kennedy, and Director Bhattacharya are stepping up and putting Ohioans’ health first. I couldn’t be more pleased with this announcement and the meaningful support this administration is delivering to my constituents.”
    “I applaud the Trump/Vance Administration for not leaving the people of East Palestine behind,” Rep. Dave Joyce (OH-14) said. “Programs like these, in coordination with other federal, state, and local partners, are critical to ensuring the impacted communities can move forward with the essential tools and knowledge to safeguard their long-term well-being. I look forward to continuing to work with the Administration and my colleagues in Congress to enact my bill, the East Palestine Health Impact Monitoring Act, and similar programs that advocate for the long-term recovery of the region.”
    About the National Institutes of Health (NIH): NIH, the nation’s medical research agency, includes 27 Institutes and Centers and is a component of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. NIH is the primary federal agency conducting and supporting basic, clinical, and translational medical research, and is investigating the causes, treatments, and cures for both common and rare diseases. For more information about NIH and its programs, visit www.nih.gov.
    NIH…Turning Discovery Into Health®

    Institute/Center

    National Institutes of Health (NIH)

    Contact

    NIH Office of Communications
    301-496-5787

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Who is Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sahar Maranlou, Lecturer in Law and Socio-legal Studies, Royal Holloway University of London

    Ali Khamenei was born in Mashhad, Iran, in 1939, as the second son of a local religious leader, Javad Khamenei, and he grew up in relative poverty.

    He learned to read the Qur’an in early childhood before attending a theological seminary school in Mashhad. At 18, he travelled to Najaf in central Iraq to study Shia jurisprudence, but was later asked by his father to return. He was a student of Ayatollah Hossein Borujerdi and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

    There is not much known about Khamenei’s family life, except that he is married and has six children. Khamenei’s interest in poetry is a well-known part of his public persona. He often cites poems in his speeches and hosts poetry gatherings where pro-government poets gather to read their poems to receive his comments. Khamenei’s interest in literature is quite rare among religious clerics. The same goes for his interest in gardening.


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    In the 1960s and 1970s Khamenei was involved in protests against the US-backed monarchy (the shah), and was an ardent supporter of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, then living in exile, and against the “westernisation” of Iran. This led to his arrest by the shah’s secret police and intelligence operation, the Organisation of National Security and Information (Savak), which suppressed opposition to the shah.

    Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the monarch who ruled Iran until 1979, was backed by western powers including the US and the UK. After a decade of economic growth in Iran, mainly based on oil revenues, did not lead to an improvement in the standard of living for ordinary Iranians, a combination of students, intellectuals and clerics created combined support for a revolution.

    After the shah was overthrown in the 1979 revolution, Iran became an Islamic republic. Khamenei was appointed as a member of the Islamic Revolutionary Council, which was put in place to manage the revolution, and served as deputy defence minister and led Friday prayers in Tehran, which was considered highly prestigious.

    The new republic adopted an anti-western “imperialist” foreign policy. This is known as “global arrogance” (Estekbar Jahani) in Iranian post-revolutionary discourse.

    In 1982, he was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran, winning 95% of the vote, after the previous president, Mohammad Ali Rajai, was killed in a bomb attack in Tehran. Khamenei had been the target of an assassination attempt two months earlier, leaving him with serious injuries and paralysis in his right arm.

    Iran’s supreme leaders reacts to air strikes by Israel and US rhetoric.

    Iran’s war with neighbouring Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, lasted from 1980 to 1988 and is known in Iran as the “sacred defence”. The war began after an invasion by Iraqi troops on Iranian territory and resulted in around one million deaths across both countries.

    This was another significant period in Khamenei’s career. He was active in managing Iran’s defence as the chairman of the supreme council of war support during this period. The council was formed to make sure the country was as prepared as possible during the war and to take measures to mobilise forces and to meet the needs of the war at the battlefront.




    Read more:
    Why Israel’s air strikes signal a shifting relationship with the US and a weakening Iran


    He also commanded the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an elite part of the Iranian armed forces, from 1981. At the end of the war, Khamenei claimed Iran had won a “luminous victory”.

    He praised Khomeini for his tactics in the war and said that the supreme leader had realised from the very beginning that it was not an ordinary conflict between two neighbours. “He recognised the enemy and realised that the main enemy is not present in the war, and he recognised that Saddam is just a tool.”

    He went on to suggest that this was a war about US regional power and that Saddam Hussein would continue to receive US support.

    Rising to supreme leadership

    Khamenei became supreme leader in 1989 after the death of Khomeini. He was designated as the new leader by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member body of Islamic clerics. He ruled in the same style, and with the same type of foreign policy, as his predecessor; looking for allies to offset US power in the region.

    The duties designated for the rahbar (supreme leader) are listed in Article 101 of the constitution and range from determining the political direction of the government (in consultation with an advisory committee) to commanding the armed forces to declaring war, peace, and the mobilisation of armed forces to pardoning or commuting sentences upon recommendation of the head of the judiciary.

    Khomeini’s conception of Islamic government was centred on the doctrine of the guardianship of “the jurist”, known as velayat-e faqih, and this continued at the heart of the government that followed under Khamenei. This gives the supreme leader extensive powers, including control over the military, judiciary and media.

    This doctrine plays a vital role in legitimising theocratic power in Iran, linking religious authority with the state. Discussion about velayat-e faqih continues within Iranian society as part of an ongoing dialogue between traditional religious authority and civil society.




    Read more:
    Trump’s unpredictable approach to Iran could seriously backfire


    The question of who might come to power after Khamenei was raised during the grassroots uprising and pro-democracy protests around Iran in 2022 and 2023. It was expected that any transition would take a considerable amount of time, especially if the aim was for a more democratic form of government.

    The current war might suggest a different outcome. Even though the Israeli attacks on Iran have again sparked discussion of a possible change of leader, the public is focused now on their own safety, and defending Iran, not on political change.

    Any external war or threats coming from outside Iran has historically united Iranians against aggressors. This means that the path to democratic change is not likely to be created, or helped, by Israeli air strikes or US threats.

    Sahar Maranlou does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Who is Iran’s leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei? – https://theconversation.com/who-is-irans-leader-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-259424

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: Trump’s first term lies at the heart of escalation between Iran and Israel

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Christian Emery, Associate Professor in International Politics, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies, UCL

    The US president, Donald Trump, is weighing up whether to join Israel in attacking Iran. The fact he is even contemplating such a move is, in my opinion, a direct consequence of his 2018 decision to tear up the agreement negotiated during Barack Obama’s presidency that limited Iran’s nuclear capabilities in return for sanctions relief.

    Trump not only squandered the opportunity to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions severely. He also shut the door on showing Iran that diplomacy and economic development could offer a more promising path than proxy warfare.

    The Obama administration’s core strategic rationale behind the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, or joint comprehensive plan of action (JCPOA), was that amid several devastating regional wars and an American public weary of costly military interventions, a war with Iran would be disastrous. This was especially true given the growing US desire to pivot toward containing China.


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    Obama challenged opponents of the deal to propose a credible alternative. And Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, addressed US Congress to make the case against the JCPOA. He argued that it would not prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.

    But Obama ultimately succeeded in persuading the American public that the only real alternative to a negotiated agreement with Iran was yet another war in the Middle East.

    Trump believed that exiting the JCPOA and crushing the Iranian economy would either force the regime to accept major restrictions on its nuclear programme and moderate its regional behaviour, or cause the entire theocratic system to collapse.

    What followed instead was a sharp escalation of tensions in the Persian Gulf. Iran exercised greater reliance on its regional proxy network, with attacks on US personnel increasing. It simultaneously increased its stockpile of highly enriched uranium.

    When Trump took office in 2017, the JCPOA had already eliminated 98% of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. It also capped enrichment at 3.7%, well below the level required for a nuclear bomb.

    The situation has changed since Trump’s withdrawal. Israel’s central justification for launching its attack against Iran on June 15 was the International Atomic Energy Agency’s determination that Iran had now amassed over 408kg of uranium enriched up to 60%. Netanyahu claimed that Iran could be “within a few months” of producing a nuclear weapon.

    However, even with these serious violations, US intelligence has consistently stated that Iran is not actively pursuing such a weapon. It recently assessed that, even if Iran decided to do so, it was up to three years away from being able to produce a nuclear weapon that it could deliver to a target of its choosing.

    Netanyahu may have wanted to attack Iran anyway. He has repeatedly claimed over the past 15 years that immediate military action was needed to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear bomb.

    But it would have been harder to justify an attack on Iran if it possessed no highly enriched uranium and was verifiably complying with the JCPOA. Iran had stuck to the JCPOA for four years, including one year after the US withdrew, and there is no evidence to suggest it wouldn’t have kept to a deal that Iran clearly saw as being in its interests.

    Maximum pressure campaign

    Iran’s developing nuclear programme may be the immediate pretext for the current escalation. But Iran’s proxy warfare strategy, using regional militant groups to fight Israel and serve as pressure points it can activate when threatened, forms the other essential backdrop.

    This strategy pre-dates the Trump administration. But Trump’s so-called “maximum pressure” campaign clearly escalated tensions in the Middle East, making direct confrontation between Israel and Iran more likely.

    When Trump enacted sanctions aiming to eliminate Iran’s oil and gas exports, Tehran retaliated by using its strategic position in the Strait of Hormuz to harass Gulf shipping. In September 2019, an Iranian drone attack on a Saudi oil processing facility temporarily took out 50% of Saudi oil production.

    Iran would normally have zero interest in disrupting Gulf shipping. This is because its own gas and oil must travel through the Strait of Hormuz. But its strategy was to deter Trump’s economic warfare by showing that it would not be the only one to suffer.

    Tehran unsurprisingly viewed Trump’s policy as an attempt to deliver regime change and responded by doubling down on its “forward defence” strategy. Iran increased its military, financial and political backing of proxy groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. And it also continued development of its ballistic missile programme.

    Before 2018, the US estimated that Iran was sending about US$200 million (£148 million) annually to the Lebanese armed group, Hezbollah. By 2020, it was sending US$700 million.

    Trump’s repudiation of the JCPOA also critically damaged more moderate voices in Iran. In 2017, the success of the JCPOA helped propel reformist president Hassan Rouhani to a second term in office. However, in 2021, the regime prevented key moderate figures from standing.

    Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner who had lost against Rouhani in 2017 and was already under US sanctions, was elected as Iran’s president. Raisi and his faction demanded tougher terms for any future nuclear deal – more sanctions relief upfront and binding guarantees against another US withdrawal.

    This frustrated attempts to revive the agreement under Joe Biden’s presidency, as only Congress could offer such guarantees. This was an improbable prospect amid escalating tensions with a more hostile, nuclear-advanced Iran that was increasingly aligning with Russia.

    None of this absolves Iran of its own intransigence, support for terrorism or brutalisation of its own citizens. Nor does it free the Islamic Republic of criticism over its decision to abandon the nuclear limits agreed under the JCPOA – even if it was the US that first broke the deal.

    Ultimately, though, the conditions that led to this war would almost certainly not have arisen without Trump’s mishandling of Iran policy in his first administration. It was a precursor to the abysmal leadership he’s demonstrating in this war.

    Christian Emery does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Trump’s first term lies at the heart of escalation between Iran and Israel – https://theconversation.com/trumps-first-term-lies-at-the-heart-of-escalation-between-iran-and-israel-259199

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: How mice ‘listen’ with their whiskers

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tommi Anttonen, Postdoctoral research associate, University of Oxford

    Bilanol/Shutterstock

    Oh no! You dropped your keys on the ground, and it is too dark to see them. You might have to feel the ground with your hands, but a mouse could use its whiskers to find the keys.

    Mouse whiskers, also known as the vibrissa system, are long facial hairs which are sensitive to touch and allow mice to feel around their environment. As a whisker touches something, the sensory neurons at the hair follicle activate. These neurons send electrical signals to the animal’s central nervous system, which interprets them into information about the features of the environment.

    But a recent study by neuroscience PhD candidate Ben Efron and his colleagues suggested that mice may use their whiskers to explore their surroundings in ways other than the sense of touch.


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    The sensory system of mice is especially useful for nocturnal animals like mice that navigate in lightless burrows and in the dark corners of our houses. Mice can use specialised muscles to move their whiskers in patterns. They can also do this by turning their head. This behaviour is called whisking. Rodents use various whisking patterns depending on whether it is running, turning or examining an object. The faster the mouse runs, the faster the whisker movements are.

    The researchers behind the new study noticed that mouse whiskers make subtle sounds when they touch surfaces. They measured the electrical activity of neurons in the auditory cortex (a brain area that processes sound) of whisking mice and discovered that these sounds induce brain activity.

    This happened even when the nerve connection that conveys touch sensation from the whiskers to the brain was cut, suggesting that mice can detect these sounds as a separate sensory input with their auditory system. The researchers also trained mice to recognise specific surfaces solely based on the sounds that their whiskers produced.

    Scientists generally have believed that whiskers only help mice explore their surrounding via touch. But these results indicate whiskers provide sound information to mice too. Whether other animals with whiskers can do this too remains to be studied.

    Integrating information from several senses in this way may help animals make a more accurate interpretation of the world around them. Like mice with their whiskers, you can acquire multisensory information about the location of your lost keys with your hands. You might not identify them based on how they feel when you tap them but the familiar sound of the keys jingling would tell you that you have found them.

    Every animal perceives the world differently through the unique combination of the senses that they have. There is a secret world of sounds and vibrations around us that we cannot experience.

    The way mice in the recent study identified objects based on sounds resembles, in part, echolocation that some bats and aquatic mammals like dolphins use for navigation. Echolocating bats produce ultrasounds – meaning that they are too high in frequency for humans to hear them – which reflect from surrounding surfaces. Bats can navigate their way in total darkness and detect prey such as moths by listening to these echoes.

    Moths in turn have evolved acoustic defenses against echolocating bats which include the ability to detect ultrasounds, acoustic camouflage (wing scales that reduce ultrasonic echoes), decoy structures (elongated wingtips that misguide the bats to attack away from the body of the moth) and emitting ultrasounds that compromise bat echolocation.

    Lunar moth tails make an acoustic signal that seems to make bats zero in on the tail rather than more vital body parts.
    Jay Ondreicka/Shutterstock

    Elephants make vocalisations known as rumbles that are infrasonic, meaning that they are too low in frequency for humans to hear them. Elephants, however, seem to use rumbles for long distance communication. Rumbles travel through air as sound signals and through the ground as seismic signals which can travel up to 6km.

    It’s not completely clear how elephants detect seismic signals. Detection may happen through vibration-sensitive organs in their feet and/or through bone conduction hearing. During bone conduction hearing, vibrations do not enter the inner ear as airborne sounds but as vibrations of bones and tissues. You can experience this by placing a vibrating tuning fork on the bony part of your head behind your ear or on your tooth. Suddenly, you can hear the tuning fork vibrating loudly.

    Why should we be interested in this secret world that cannot be detected by human senses? First, human-generated environmental change, which includes noise pollution, poses significant threats to many species and ecosystems.

    For example, maritime noise interferes with sound communication of whales and dolphins while human-made noise on land disturbs nesting birds. To protect animals from these harmful effects, we need to understand how their sensory systems are affected.

    Secondly, bio-inspired innovations are waiting to be discovered. So keep in mind next time when parking a car with ultrasound-based parking sensors that echolocating bats have had access to this navigation technique for more than tens of millions of years.

    Tommi Anttonen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. How mice ‘listen’ with their whiskers – https://theconversation.com/how-mice-listen-with-their-whiskers-257650

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Analysis: The light triad: psychology’s answer to our darkest fears about people

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Christian van Nieuwerburgh, Professor of Coaching and Positive Psychology, RCSI University of Medicine and Health Sciences

    Are you losing faith in humanity because of everything that is going on right now? If so, that is no surprise. Our habit of “doomscrolling” convinces us that people are inherently self-centred and uncaring.

    According to the American Psychological Association, many of us are suffering from “headline stress disorder”. We all know from experience that exposure to negative news shapes a darker view of humanity.

    Psychologists have been interested in the darker side of human personality for decades. The so-called dark triad of Machiavellianism, narcissism and sociopathy have attracted intense scrutiny. People high in these darker traits tend to be manipulative, self-centred and lacking in empathy.

    Between our doomscrolling habit and our natural negativity bias, we start to doubt the goodness of human beings.


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    In response to this, American psychologist Scott Barry Kaufman and his colleagues have highlighted positive aspects of humanity with their research into the “light triad”.

    The light triad emphasises the positive aspects of human nature – Kantianism (treating people as inherently valuable rather than as means to an end), humanism and faith in humanity. Those who score high on the light triad see the inherent value in others, believe in human goodness and treat people with dignity and respect.

    In his blog for Scientific American, Kaufman argues that these positive aspects of personality are “just as worthy of research attention and cultivation in a society that sometimes forgets that not only is there goodness in the world, but there is also goodness in each of us”.

    (Anyone curious about where they fall on the light triad scale can find out for free online by completing a questionnaire.)

    By taking a balanced view of personality, we remind ourselves of the breadth of possibility within each of us. Human beings are capable of performing wonderful, heartwarming acts of kindness, just as they are capable of acts of selfishness and cruelty.

    We all have traits from both the dark and light triads. When we’re at our best, we’re sociable, positive, supportive and forgiving. Human nature isn’t black and white. Embracing this complexity can help us to be more compassionate to ourselves and others.

    With all the challenges we face today, it’s easy to feel overwhelmed and lose sight of our shared humanity. But it is especially now that we should avoid that. Let’s remember the potential for kindness, altruism and compassion that exists within all of us. Here are five simple ways to boost our hopefulness.

    Engage in small acts of kindness

    Try simple everyday gestures such as letting someone go ahead of you in line, allowing a car to merge in traffic or simply offering a warm smile. These small acts of kindness can brighten someone’s day, boost your mood and encourage others who witness them.

    Show compassion

    Compassion is crucial. Start by being gentle with yourself. Practise self-compassion by going easy on yourself during tough moments. Extend that same compassion to others. Remember that everyone is always in the middle of something. A bit of patience, a few kind words or a genuine acknowledgement can make a big difference.

    Spread positivity

    Instead of sharing negative news in your WhatsApp groups, make a conscious effort to highlight positive and uplifting stories from within your network or community. Share articles or videos that inspire hope and celebrate human kindness. By spreading positivity, you can play your part in counterbalancing our negativity bias and create a more hopeful narrative about the world we live in.

    Listen intentionally

    In a world full of distractions, offering someone your full, undivided attention can be a powerful act. Take the time to really listen to others, making them feel seen, valued and heard.

    By being present in your conversations and engaging in “radical listening”, you not only strengthen your connection with the other person but also create a more humanising environment.

    Robert Biswas-Diener and I have written a book called Radical Listening: The Art of True Connection. To learn more about the concept, listen to one of the many podcasts out there.

    Radical listening explained.

    Connect through community

    As human beings, we thrive through social connections. Get involved by participating in community events. Join a litter-picking group, offer to volunteer at the local school, get involved in charity fundraisers or even set up a casual coffee morning. These activities will help you feel more connected while reinforcing the idea that we all belong to something bigger and can make a difference together.

    Every positive action and enriching conversation counts. By doing these small things, you will be playing your part in reigniting hope in our shared humanity. It starts with each of us choosing to be compassionate, listening radically and seeing the good in others.

    Christian van Nieuwerburgh does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The light triad: psychology’s answer to our darkest fears about people – https://theconversation.com/the-light-triad-psychologys-answer-to-our-darkest-fears-about-people-258050

    MIL OSI Analysis –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Green Party MPs Back Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

    Source: Green Party of England and Wales

    20 June 2025/ 20 June 2025 by Dominic Johnson

    Today Green MPs backed the continued passage of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill in the House of Commons. All four Green MPs voted yes at the Bill’s third reading.

    Although broad support for assisted dying is Green Party policy, on this issue of conscience there was no party line and every MP voted according to their own personal deliberations.

    Every Green MP worked hard to hear from and understand people with different views on this sensitive issue. This included: meeting both supporters and opponents including constituents directly affected by terminal illness at their MP surgeries, sitting down with local faith leaders, support services and Disabled people’s groups, taking part in briefings and information sessions with medical professionals both for and against the Bill, carefully considering the scores of amendments that were added to the law, and replying to the many hundreds of emails and letters from constituents writing in with questions, personal views and experiences.

    Every MP took this decision they made with the utmost seriousness. Green MPs are fully committed to making sure this new policy proceeds with the utmost care and safety in mind and will also continue to use their voices in Parliament to press for vital improvements to the availability of palliative care.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Why some elite athletes face a higher risk of developing motor neurone disease – and what we’re doing about it

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Johnathan Cooper-Knock, Senior Lecturer in Neurology, School of Medicine and Population Health, University of Sheffield

    Mural of Rob Burrow, former Leeds Rhinos rugby league star by Jonathan Long, CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

    Motor neuron disease (MND) is a devastating condition that causes progressive muscle weakness by damaging the motor neurons, the nerve cells that connect the brain to muscles. These neurons allow us to move, breathe, eat and ultimately, stay alive.

    Unlike many chronic conditions linked to lifestyle, where being “unhealthy” increases risk, MND doesn’t follow the usual rules. In fact, some of the highest profile cases of MND in recent years have involved elite athletes: rugby legends Doddie Weir and Rob Burrow are two well known examples. Previous research from Italy also found an increased incidence of MND in former professional footballers.

    But wait – these are elite sportsmen. The healthiest of the healthy. We’re always told that exercise protects against heart disease, stroke, diabetes, and many forms of cancer. So why would it be associated with something as devastating as MND?

    That’s the question we’re investigating at the Sheffield Institute for Translational Neuroscience (SITraN), part of the University of Sheffield, where we’re exploring how strenuous physical activity might play a role in triggering MND.


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    One of the first questions we asked was whether this link could simply be down to survivorship bias. In other words, do people who exercise more develop MND only because they’re protected from more common causes of death?

    To explore this, we turned to genetics. Specifically, we looked at the connection between MND, exercise, and genetic mutations – changes in DNA that are fixed from birth and unaffected by lifestyle or survival.

    We found that a small proportion of people who are genetically predisposed to engage in high levels of physical activity also carry a genetic risk for MND, but only when it comes to very intense anaerobic exercise. Other forms of exercise, like weightlifting, had no effect. Crucially, this link appeared to be independent of head injury, which has also been suggested as a potential cause of exercise-associated MND.

    How much is too much?

    It’s important to emphasise that most athletes never develop MND. There is no simple one-to-one relationship between intense exercise and the disease.

    What we observed in our genetic study was a dose effect; risk was only apparent in people performing extreme levels of activity, such as more than 12 hours of intense exercise per week. Even then, most did not go on to develop MND. But in this group, the risk of MND was higher than in the general population.

    This echoes findings from a Swedish study involving cross-country skiers who took part in the Vasaloppet, a gruelling 90km race. The fastest skiers, those at the very top of the performance spectrum, were four times more likely to develop MND than the general population. However, skiers who finished in the middle of the pack had a 50% lower risk than average.

    Why? We believe that extreme levels of physical activity may switch off protective mechanisms within motor neurons. These mechanisms act like safety switches, preventing neurons from becoming overexcited and wearing out. Turn them off, and you may improve performance – but at a potential long-term cost. We’re now exploring whether we can reactivate these safety mechanisms to prevent or delay the onset of MND.

    To develop treatments, we first need a reliable model of the disease – and that’s where fruit flies come in. We’ve engineered flies that carry a known genetic risk factor for MND.

    In healthy flies, exercise improves strength and extends lifespan – just like in humans. But in MND-prone flies, exercise does the opposite: it makes them weaker and accelerates motor neuron loss. We’ve seen similar patterns in human studies.

    Now we’re testing interventions that could protect against this damage. Early results suggest the key may lie in tweaking the electrical signals between motor neurons and muscles; potentially allowing us to retain the benefits of exercise while eliminating the risks.

    Should athletes be worried?

    There’s no need for alarm, just awareness. Exercise is overwhelmingly beneficial and should be encouraged for almost everyone. Most professional athletes remain in exceptional health throughout their lives.

    But for a small proportion of people, extreme anaerobic training may carry a hidden risk. By identifying those individuals early and better understanding the underlying biology, we aim to develop targeted strategies for prevention and treatment – without discouraging the countless benefits of an active life.

    The science is still evolving. But the goal is clear: to make sport safer and motor neuron disease rarer.

    Johnathan Cooper-Knock receives funding from TargetALS, the ALS Association, the MND Association and the Lister Institute of Preventive Medicine.

    Pamela J. Shaw has received funding from The Motor Neurone Disease Association, The Medical Research Council, LifeArc, NIHR, My Name’5 Doddie Foundation, European Union and Pharmaceutical partners

    – ref. Why some elite athletes face a higher risk of developing motor neurone disease – and what we’re doing about it – https://theconversation.com/why-some-elite-athletes-face-a-higher-risk-of-developing-motor-neurone-disease-and-what-were-doing-about-it-258452

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What ancient ice sheets can tell us about future sea level rise

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ed Gasson, Royal Society University Research Fellow and Senior Lecturer, Department of Earth and Environmental Sciences, University of Exeter

    When visiting Godrevy beach on the north Cornish coast, most people look out to sea at the lighthouse, surfers and seals rather than the cliffs behind. But these cliffs hold a history of past climate and sea level that is incredibly valuable to scientists like me who are trying to determine how quickly sea level is going to rise in the future.

    Scramble up the slate rocks a few metres and you’ll reach a flat platform cut by waves breaking over 100,000 years ago. On top, there’s a cliff of sand and pebbles, an incredibly clear indicator of where the shoreline used to be, several metres higher than it is today.

    Beaches like this exist all around the Cornish coastline, near Falmouth at Bream Cove and at the furthest western point near Lands End at Porth Nanven.

    Searching for the source of these higher sea levels takes us to the poles. In a climate similar to today, the Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets retreated, raising global sea level. Although exactly where this ice was lost from remains a mystery that continues to frustrate scientists.

    Godrevy lighthouse, Cornwall, UK.
    Vivi_784/Shutterstock


    Local science, global stories.

    This article is part of a series, Secrets of the Sea, exploring how marine scientists are developing climate solutions.

    In collaboration with the BBC, Anna Turns travels around the West Country coastline to meet ocean experts making exciting discoveries beneath the waves.


    When ice gets trapped on land as giant ice sheets, it causes the sea level to change, but it doesn’t change by the same amount all around the planet. Like the moon, the gravity of the ice sheets pulls the ocean towards them, causing sea levels to rise near to the ice sheets.

    The opposite happens when they melt. As the ice on Greenland retreats today, it’s causing the sea level nearby to fall, rather than rise. Only as far as Scotland, some 1,500 miles from Greenland, does this sea level fall switch to a sea level rise.

    The cliffs at Godrevy reveal historic sea level rise.
    Ed Gasson, CC BY-NC-ND

    This gravity effect leaves behind a distinctive fingerprint in past sea level markers, such as raised beaches and fossil coral reefs. By piecing together data from around the world we can work out the source of past high sea levels.

    The raised beaches such as those in north Cornwall are likely caused by the retreat of ice from Antarctica, rather than the ice from Greenland. But direct evidence for ice loss from Antarctica has proven very hard to come by.

    I’m involved with an international drilling project that aims to solve this mystery. Following two challenging seasons of drilling, our team of scientists and engineers will return to Antarctica in late 2025 and attempt to recover sediments from deep underneath the ice, to analyse for signals of past ice retreat.

    If we’re lucky, we’ll recover records from warm climates millions of years ago. This will help us understand how the west Antarctic ice sheet may change in the future as our climate continues to warm.

    Drilling down

    Next winter, this international team is travelling to Scott Base, a New Zealand research station at the edge of the Ross ice shelf in west Antarctica. From there, the journey continues over 500 miles to the other end of the ice shelf, an extremely remote corner of an already remote continent.

    Everything we need is taken across the ice in a convoy of tracked snow vehicles. A hot water drill is used to make a small hole through the 500m ice shelf, providing access to the sediment below. Up to 200m of valuable sediment core will be retrieved with a custom-designed drilling system.

    The geological data contained in these sediments will help us to improve models and refine our predictions of how sea level will rise in the future. As the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increases, it is as if we are rapidly moving backwards through geological time.

    Today, there is as much CO₂ in the atmosphere as during a geological epoch known as the mid-Pliocene, more than 3 million years ago. The average estimate for the mid-Pliocene is a concentration of around 400 parts per million (ppm), a value we reached only 12 years ago.

    We’ll exceed the highest concentrations of the Pliocene this year. The next warmest interval is probably the mid-Miocene, 12 million years earlier.

    Back in Cornwall, some communities are already planning for the effects of sea level rise. In Bude, local people have come together to form a “climate jury”, a panel chosen to give local people a voice as to how to best manage and reduce the impacts of a rising sea.

    This approach could be adopted by other communities at risk from sea level rise, alongside other adaptations. Hopefully, the world can avoid a return to the very high sea levels that formed the raised beaches at Godrevy.


    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 45,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.


    Ed Gasson receives funding from The Royal Society and the Natural Environment Research Council.

    – ref. What ancient ice sheets can tell us about future sea level rise – https://theconversation.com/what-ancient-ice-sheets-can-tell-us-about-future-sea-level-rise-251185

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: In Case You Missed It: PHOTOS: Capito Participates in Ribbon Cutting Ceremony for new Rehabilitation Science and Athletics Center at the University of Charleston

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for West Virginia Shelley Moore Capito

    CHARLESTON, W.Va. – Yesterday, U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), a leader on the Senate Appropriations Committee, participated in the ribbon cutting ceremony for the Rehabilitation Science and Athletics Center at the University of Charleston in Charleston, W.Va.

    The newly renovated center, which is located inside a portion of Gorman Hall, will house UC’s new occupational and physical therapy programs with modern labs, as well as study rooms, meeting spaces, a classroom, offices, visitor locker rooms and weight rooms for student athletes. In September 2023, Senator Capito advocated for and secured a Congressionally Directed Spending award for this project.

    “The Morrison Rehabilitation Science and Athletics Center is a remarkable example of what can be accomplished when federal support, private philanthropy, and strong institutional leadership come together around a shared goal: to invest in the future of our students and in the health and wellness of our communities,” Senator Capito said. “This newly renovated facility will play a vital role in preparing the next generation of healthcare professionals and student athletes. I’m grateful to President Roth, the Board, and all the generous donors who helped bring this vision to life.”

    “This is an exciting moment for the University of Charleston, and we could not have done it without Senator Capito’s support,” UC President Marty Roth said. “The federal funding she secured played a major role in bringing the Morrison Center to life. This facility will have a lasting impact not just for our students but for the future of healthcare in West Virginia, as it is designed to meet the growing demand for occupational and physical therapists across the region and nation. We are incredibly thankful for her commitment to higher education and to the health and well-being of our communities.” 

    Photos from yesterday’s event are below:

    U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) participates in the ribbon cutting ceremony for the Morrison Rehabilitation Science and Athletics Center in Charleston, W.Va. on Thursday, June 19, 2025.

    U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.) participates in the ribbon cutting ceremony for the Morrison Rehabilitation Science and Athletics Center in Charleston, W.Va. on Thursday, June 19, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Boozman Continues Leadership on Senate 4-H Caucus

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Arkansas – John Boozman

    WASHINGTON—U.S. Senator John Boozman (R-AR), Chairman of the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee, will continue championing 4-H as a leader of the bipartisan Senate 4-H Caucus. The senator returns to serve as co-chair of the caucus in the 119th Congress and is joined by Ranking Member Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) to lead efforts to promote the program in the Senate.

    4-H is a youth developmental program of the Cooperative Extension System of land-grant universities and is the largest youth development organization in the country. It provides experiences for nearly six million young people through hands-on projects in health, science, agriculture and civic engagement. In Arkansas, more than 120,000 young people participate in 4-H programs annually.

    “4-H is instrumental in preparing students for the future. I’ve witnessed the benefits and positive impact it has on young people, including my three daughters who were active members and state record book winners. I’m proud to support this organization whose influence in developing the next generation of leaders is undeniable, and I look forward to working with members of this caucus to promote and celebrate 4-H,” said Boozman. 

    This week, Boozman met with Arkansas 4-Hers who are attending the organization’s Citizenship Washington Focus conference.

    Boozman and Arkansas 4-H participants met in his Washington, D.C. office.

    In the House, the bicameral caucus will be led by House Agriculture Committee Chairman Glenn ‘GT’ Thompson (PA-15) and Ranking Member Angie Craig (MN-02) as well as Congressmen Sanford D. Bishop (GA-02) and Andy Harris (MD-01).

    For more on Boozman’s leadership of the Senate Agriculture Committee, click here.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: How Nuclear and Isotopic Techniques Help Countries Combat Soil Salinization

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The IAEA has a long history of helping countries adjust to salinized soils. In 1978, the IAEA helped develop climate smart agricultural practices to reclaim salt-affected soil that transformed saline soils in Pakistan into productive farmlands.

    IAEA support to the country has continued as the changing climate has caused even further soil salinization. In Pakistan, erratic rainfall patterns have pushed farmers to irrigate using groundwater with high levels of salt. With IAEA support, Pakistan’s Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB) has developed and planted salt-tolerant crops and implemented soil nutrient and water management techniques. Today, NIAB is sharing its expertise by training scientists from other countries affected by soil salinization.

    The IAEA is also supporting countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, where scientists are using nuclear techniques to develop salt-tolerant crops, helping farmers grow food in degraded soils.

    Following IAEA regional projects, in which 60 researchers from 10 countries were trained in soil, nutrient and water management to combat soil salinity, the IAEA published an open-access book enabling experts in several countries to successfully grow crops under saline conditions such as millet in Lebanon, barley and safflower in Jordan and Kuwait, okra in Syria and quinoa in the United Arab Emirates. “Thanks to the joint work with the IAEA, our scientists applied the recommended climate-smart agricultural practices to successfully grow crops under saline conditions,” says Nabeel Bani Hani, Director of the National Agricultural Research Center in Jordan.

    “As the world faces increasing pressure to feed a growing population, restoring degraded land is more urgent than ever. The IAEA’s work shows that with the right tools—science, collaboration, and innovation—we can turn salty, barren soils into fertile ground for the future” said Mohammad Zaman, Head of the Soil and Water Management and Crop Nutrition Section of the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Security: How Nuclear and Isotopic Techniques Help Countries Combat Soil Salinization

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    The IAEA has a long history of helping countries adjust to salinized soils. In 1978, the IAEA helped develop climate smart agricultural practices to reclaim salt-affected soil that transformed saline soils in Pakistan into productive farmlands.

    IAEA support to the country has continued as the changing climate has caused even further soil salinization. In Pakistan, erratic rainfall patterns have pushed farmers to irrigate using groundwater with high levels of salt. With IAEA support, Pakistan’s Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB) has developed and planted salt-tolerant crops and implemented soil nutrient and water management techniques. Today, NIAB is sharing its expertise by training scientists from other countries affected by soil salinization.

    The IAEA is also supporting countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, where scientists are using nuclear techniques to develop salt-tolerant crops, helping farmers grow food in degraded soils.

    Following IAEA regional projects, in which 60 researchers from 10 countries were trained in soil, nutrient and water management to combat soil salinity, the IAEA published an open-access book enabling experts in several countries to successfully grow crops under saline conditions such as millet in Lebanon, barley and safflower in Jordan and Kuwait, okra in Syria and quinoa in the United Arab Emirates. “Thanks to the joint work with the IAEA, our scientists applied the recommended climate-smart agricultural practices to successfully grow crops under saline conditions,” says Nabeel Bani Hani, Director of the National Agricultural Research Center in Jordan.

    “As the world faces increasing pressure to feed a growing population, restoring degraded land is more urgent than ever. The IAEA’s work shows that with the right tools—science, collaboration, and innovation—we can turn salty, barren soils into fertile ground for the future” said Mohammad Zaman, Head of the Soil and Water Management and Crop Nutrition Section of the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre.

    MIL Security OSI –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI NGOs: How Nuclear and Isotopic Techniques Help Countries Combat Soil Salinization

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) –

    The IAEA has a long history of helping countries adjust to salinized soils. In 1978, the IAEA helped develop climate smart agricultural practices to reclaim salt-affected soil that transformed saline soils in Pakistan into productive farmlands.

    IAEA support to the country has continued as the changing climate has caused even further soil salinization. In Pakistan, erratic rainfall patterns have pushed farmers to irrigate using groundwater with high levels of salt. With IAEA support, Pakistan’s Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology (NIAB) has developed and planted salt-tolerant crops and implemented soil nutrient and water management techniques. Today, NIAB is sharing its expertise by training scientists from other countries affected by soil salinization.

    The IAEA is also supporting countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, where scientists are using nuclear techniques to develop salt-tolerant crops, helping farmers grow food in degraded soils.

    Following IAEA regional projects, in which 60 researchers from 10 countries were trained in soil, nutrient and water management to combat soil salinity, the IAEA published an open-access book enabling experts in several countries to successfully grow crops under saline conditions such as millet in Lebanon, barley and safflower in Jordan and Kuwait, okra in Syria and quinoa in the United Arab Emirates. “Thanks to the joint work with the IAEA, our scientists applied the recommended climate-smart agricultural practices to successfully grow crops under saline conditions,” says Nabeel Bani Hani, Director of the National Agricultural Research Center in Jordan.

    “As the world faces increasing pressure to feed a growing population, restoring degraded land is more urgent than ever. The IAEA’s work shows that with the right tools—science, collaboration, and innovation—we can turn salty, barren soils into fertile ground for the future” said Mohammad Zaman, Head of the Soil and Water Management and Crop Nutrition Section of the Joint FAO/IAEA Centre.

    MIL OSI NGO –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: Microbes from Brooklyn could help mitigate industrial contamination

    Source: US Government research organizations

    Metagenomic analysis of microbial life in an ultra-contaminated urban habitat reveals dozens of ways to degrade pollutants

    Microorganisms with extreme abilities have laid the groundwork for decades of biotechnologies from the PCR technique that enables amplification of DNA for diagnostics and drug development to the gene editing tool CRISPR, and now researchers supported by the U.S. National Science Foundation have found a trove of these microbes in a somewhat unlikely location — the Gowanus Canal in Brooklyn. The team identified more than 450 species with over 60 different biochemical pathways to deal with pollutants and 1,171 genes that can aid in processing heavy metals, offering potential for bio-based and cheaper methods of industrial clean-up, the costs of which are estimated to be more than $645 billion.

    The Gowanus Canal is a contaminated waterway in Brooklyn that has high concentrations of petrochemicals and heavy metals. The researchers, including Sergios-Orestis Kolokotronis of the SUNY Downstate Health Sciences University, collected soil samples at 14 locations along the 1.8-mile-long canal and deep sediment core samples and analyzed them using genomic sequencing and bioinformatics. Understanding the genetic sequences and metabolic pathways of the organisms identified will allow researchers to develop faster methods of what the microbes can do naturally.

    “We have seen the power of extremophiles used in medicine and industry, and this new analysis expands the biological adaptations we can harness for societal benefit,” said Joanna Shisler, program director in the NSF Directorate for Biological Sciences.

    In addition to the research, investigator Elizabeth Henaff of NYU Tandon School of Engineering created an immersive display as part of an exhibition on water at the BioBAT Art Space to educate the broad public. BioBAT is a partnership between the SUNY Research Foundation, SUNY Downstate Health Sciences University, and the New York City Economic Development Corporation.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: H.R. 1455, ITS Codification Act

    Source: US Congressional Budget Office

    H.R. 1455 would codify the authority for and delineate the responsibilities of the Institute for Telecommunication Sciences (ITS), a research and engineering laboratory within the National Telecommunications and Information Administration. The bill also would require ITS to develop emergency communication and tracking technologies to locate people trapped in confined spaces, such as underground mines. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Economics: ASEAN and India reaffirm commitment to strengthen Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

    Source: ASEAN – Association of SouthEast Asian Nations

    JAKARTA, 20 June 2025 – The Committee of Permanent Representatives to ASEAN held an informal meeting with Secretary (East) of the Ministry of External Affairs of India, P. Kumaran, today at the ASEAN Headquarters/ASEAN Secretariat. The Meeting exchanged views on the progress of ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP).
     
    The Meeting took note of the substantive, meaningful and mutually beneficial ASEAN-India CSP, and highlighted the progress of cooperation across various sectors.  Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening the CSP through various frameworks of cooperation and commended the substantial progress in implementing the Plan of Action to Implement the ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity (POA) 2021-2025 and its Annex. The Meeting looked forward to the adoption of the succeeding POA that will guide both sides in realising the full potential of ASEAN-India CSP over the next five years, with a view to bringing tangible benefits to the people of both sides.
     
    Looking ahead, the Meeting agreed to continue their close engagement and consultations to further advance the ASEAN-India CSP, and looked forward to explore opportunities to further enhance collaboration in areas of mutual interest such as defence; maritime; combatting transnational crimes; cybersecurity, trade and investment; agriculture; science and technology, including space technology; connectivity, including land, air, sea and people-to-people connectivity; digital economy and infrastructure; artificial intelligence; tourism; culture; health; education; youth; sustainable development; renewable energy; climate change; disaster management; capacity-building initiatives; and people-to-people exchanges.
     
    ****
     

    MIL OSI Economics –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: UKAEA welcomes UK-Japan fusion partnership

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    UKAEA welcomes UK-Japan fusion partnership

    UK-Japan partnership to further collaboration in key fusion areas, including R&D, regulation, skills and workforce

    Kerry McCarthy, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State (Minister for Climate) and Hiroshi Masuko, Senior Deputy Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, signing the Memorandum of Cooperation on fusion energy.

    UKAEA welcomes the signing of a Memorandum of Cooperation between UK and Japan, to strengthen our already close bond on developing fusion energy.

    Fusion is a global challenge with global solutions and UKAEA looks forward to working with Japanese scientists and innovators to advance fusion energy.

    More information can be found here.

    Share this page

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    Updates to this page

    Published 20 June 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: PRESS RELEASE: Congresswoman Barragán Holds Tele-Town Hall on the Ongoing ICE Raids and Deployment of the National Guard in Los Angeles County

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Nanette Diaz Barragán (CA-44)

    FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
    June 18, 2025

    Contact: Jin.Choi@mail.house.gov


    Congresswoman Barragán Holds Tele-Town Hall on the Ongoing ICE Raids and Deployment of the National Guard in Los Angeles County

    Long Beach, CA — This evening, Congresswoman Nanette Barragán (CA-44) hosted a Tele-Town Hall to address the ongoing ICE raids and Donald Trump’s deployment of the National Guard and Marines in Los Angeles County. Congresswoman Barragán spoke to nearly 8,000 participants about the Trump administration’s decision to target immigrant families and entire communities —not serious criminals— and how this has sparked fear, anxiety, and protests across the region. She raised concerns about the use of federal troops in neighborhoods where local officials had already confirmed the situation was under control, calling it an unnecessary public show of force and political theater.

    Congresswoman Barragán was joined by representatives from the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (CHIRLA) and Immigrant Defenders Law Center, who helped answer questions and share resources. 

    “Donald Trump and Stephen Miller are terrorizing immigrant families and communities in my district and throughout Los Angeles County,” said Rep. Barragán. “We’re seeing ICE agents gathering near our schools and the recent raids forcing communities to cancel local events because people are too afraid to gather in public spaces. And when our communities spoke up through protest, Trump responded by sending in the National Guard and Marines. This isn’t just about immigration. It’s about democracy. It’s about whether the federal government will protect people’s rights or punish them for speaking out.”

    “This moment demands both clear understanding and united effort,” said Angelica Salas, Executive Director for CHIRLA. “We’ve spent decades creating systems to help immigrants. This work is incredibly pertinent now – immigrants and community members should know they are not alone in this process.”

    “Misinformation is more dangerous now than ever, in light of ICE’s presence in Los Angeles,” said Matthew Toyama, Managing Attorney at CHIRLA. “People are being detained and deported because they don’t know they have options when interacting with immigration officers and attorneys willing to protect their rights. These are times that test the fabric of our Constitution and our consciences.”

    “Fear is spreading through our immigrant communities,” said Kristen Hunsberger, Managing Attorney at Immigrant Defenders Law Center. “Now is an essential time for people to know there are resources and information available to them – and we are here to help with that. Immigrant rights are human rights, and should be defended just as strongly.”

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI USA: NIST Names Shyam Sunder Associate Director for Laboratory Programs

    Source: US Government research organizations

    Dr. Shyam Sunder

    GAITHERSBURG, Md. — The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced that S. Shyam Sunder has been selected as its new Associate Director for Laboratory Programs (ADLP), effective June 1, 2025.

    In this role, Sunder will provide leadership and oversight to NIST’s laboratories, which provide vital measurement and research services that underpin technology innovation in the United States. NIST’s non-regulatory science mission is executed in close partnership with industry through its laboratory programs by supporting new technologies, services and markets, and industry-led, consensus-based standards that help American companies compete around the world. 

    “Shyam’s expertise and practical background, as well as his more than 30 years in leadership roles at NIST, make him an invaluable asset as we continue to push boundaries in critical and emerging technologies,” said Deputy Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Acting NIST Director Craig Burkhardt. “Shyam will play a crucial role in helping NIST accelerate advances at the forefront of measurement science, which is the foundation for unleashing technological innovation and U.S. economic competitiveness.”

    Sunder previously served as director of NIST’s Special Programs Office and Acting Director of the Standards Coordination Office. In these roles, he established and managed the NIST Safety Commission, which issued a comprehensive set of findings and recommendations to improve NIST’s safety culture and the effectiveness of its safety protocols. In response to the CHIPS for America Act, he led NIST’s cross-laboratory team, engaging more than 800 stakeholders to assess and publish seven “grand challenges” to advance the U.S. semiconductor industry. He further led NIST’s efforts to establish a competitively selected Standardization Center of Excellence to accelerate U.S. engagement in international standardization for critical and emerging technologies through a cooperative agreement with the private sector-led U.S. standards system.

    Sunder’s prior positions include founding director of NIST’s Engineering Laboratory, director of its Building and Fire Research Laboratory (BFRL), and chief of BFRL’s Structures and Materials Division. He co-chaired White House National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) panels that set the federal R&D agenda for Net-Zero Energy High-Performance Buildings and Cyber-Physical Systems.

    Before joining NIST in 1994, he served on the Massachusetts Institute of Technology faculty. He received master and doctor of science degrees from MIT, and a bachelor of technology with distinction from the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi.

    Sunder is a recipient of the Presidential Rank Award of Distinguished Executive, and the U.S. Department of Commerce Gold Medal Award, its highest honor, for distinguished leadership of the federal building and fire safety investigation of the World Trade Center disaster after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. He was elected to the National Academy of Construction in 2012.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: Why taking a cold shower on a hot day might be a bad idea

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Adam Taylor, Professor of Anatomy, Lancaster University

    A cold shower might not be the best strategy to cool down. Ollyy/ Shutterstock

    When the weather warms up, many of us use a nice cold shower to help us cool down. But while this might feel like relief, it might actually not be helping the body cool off at all.

    Our body’s optimal temperature is around 37°C. This temperatures ensures our body systems can function properly. But when the core gets too hot the temperature regulating centre of the brain starts sending nervous signals out to the blood vessels and muscles in or near the skin – telling them to start activating their cooling mechanisms.

    If our core stays at high temperature for too long (around 39-40°C), this can lead to organ damage. So to ensure our temperature stays optimal, the body uses multiple techniques to cool itself down.

    For instance, the body radiates heat into the surrounding environment by electromagnetic (thermal) radiation. Approximately 60% of our body heat is lost this way.


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    Sweating is another mechanism the body uses. Around 22% of our body heat is lost this way. But when the air temperature around us exceeds our body temperature, sweating becomes the dominant mechanism for reducing core temperature. Any remaining body heat is then lost through a mixture of convection into the air or liquid the body may be in contact with and conduction into solid objects that the body may be in contact with.

    To support these mechanisms, our blood vessels change diameter. The ones closest to the skin dilate (widen) to allow more blood into them so they can get close to the relatively cooler surface of the skin.

    The body then works to circulate the blood so that heat from inside the body can be moved to the periphery to cool off. Similarly on our skin, the hairs remain flat to allow air next to the body to cool and be replaced, helping to dissipate heat.

    Cold shower?

    Of course, when the weather gets really hot outside, these mechanisms just don’t feel like they cut it.

    Although diving into a cold bath or shower straight after being out in the heat might feel nice on your skin, it isn’t doing what is needed to reduce the core temperature of the body. It might also be risky for some people.

    A cold shower might not actually cool the body down.
    LarsZ/ Shutterstock

    When exposed to cold, the blood vessels near to the skin constrict – reducing the blood flow into these areas.

    So in the context of cooling the body down, jumping into a cold shower does the opposite of what needs to happen, as less blood is now flowing to the surface of the skin. This will hold the heat in and around your organs instead of getting rid of it. Basically, you’re tricking your body that it doesn’t need to cool down, but actually needs to conserve heat.

    And, depending on how cold your water is, sudden exposure could even trigger dangerous consequences for some people.

    Exposure to water that is 15°C can trigger the cold shock response. This causes the blood vessels in the skin (those in contact with the cold water) to constrict rapidly. This increases blood pressure as the heart is now pumping against increased resistance.

    This response can be particularly dangerous in people with underlying heart conditions, such as coronary artery disease. The cold shock response can also lead to an irregular heartbeat and even death when going from very hot to cold.

    Thankfully, these events are rare – and probably won’t happen if you’re just taking a cold shower or bath in your home. But you might want to skip the cold plunge or avoid taking an ice bath on a hot day for this reason.

    Hot showers are also a bad idea on a warm day. Although it’s sometimes said that a hot shower helps the body cool down faster, this unfortunately isn’t true. Water that is warmer than the body is going to transfer energy in the form of heat into the body. This again prevents the body getting rid of heat – potentially increasing its core temperature.

    On a hot day, a tepid or lukewarm bath or shower is the way to go, evidence suggests 26-27°C is most effective. This helps bring blood to the surface to cool, without being cold enough to cause the body to think it needs to conserve its heat.

    Another reason to skip a cold shower on a hot day is that it might not help you get clean.

    When we get hot, we sweat – and this sweat mixes with sebum, another skin product and the bacteria on our skin, which produces body odour. Cold water has been shown to be less effective at removing and breaking down sebum and other detritus on the skin, compared to warmer water, which means body odour will persist.

    Cold water also causes the skin to tighten. This might potentially trap sebum and dirt within the pores. This can lead to blackheads, whiteheads and acne. But warm or lukewarm water can help dissolve and loosen material in the pores.

    As you plan your escape and recovery from the heat this week, a lukewarm or cool shower or bath, rather than a cold shower, is a safer and more effective choice. This will allow your body to dissipate heat away from your core without harm.

    Equally, if you do feel the need to go cooler, do it gradually so you aren’t shocking the body’s automatic temperature regulation system into action. Turning the temperature down gradually if you want to go cold, or slowly placing a limb in at a time can help with this process.

    Adam Taylor does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why taking a cold shower on a hot day might be a bad idea – https://theconversation.com/why-taking-a-cold-shower-on-a-hot-day-might-be-a-bad-idea-259074

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 21, 2025
  • MIL-OSI Global: What the new grooming gangs inquiry must do to put victims before politics

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By William Tantam, Senior Lecturer, Department of Anthropology and Archaeology, University of Bristol

    Kemi Badenoch, Conservative party leader, responds to Home Secretary Yvette Cooper’s statement announcing the new inquiry. House of Commons/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    The independent inquiry into child sexual abuse was the largest inquiry in UK history, running from 2015 to 2022 and investigating institutional failures in preventing child sexual abuse. The inquiry’s final report included 20 recommendations for change. So far, zero have been fully implemented.

    We both worked on the inquiry and know the pervasive harm of this violence, as well as the consequences it leaves with survivors, families and communities. We are also well aware of the importance of clear language to reflect victims’ experiences and of capturing reliable data.

    Louise Casey’s audit of group-based child sexual exploitation and abuse echoes these issues. In particular, it highlights the huge gaps around ethnicity data.

    The report addresses decades of failure to protect vulnerable girls from group-based child sexual abuse (“grooming gangs”). The ethnicity of perpetrators and victims has been a flashpoint in the discussion for years.

    The national narrative has been that gangs of predominantly Asian men have groomed and exploited young white girls, and that this is why victims’ cases were ignored, dismissed or covered up. Political rows around it have been a factor in the government announcing another inquiry. Over 200 pages, Lady Casey’s audit endeavours to lay out the facts.


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    What does the report say about ethnicity?

    Casey’s audit repeatedly emphasises the lack of ethnicity data on a national level. She notes that ethnicity is not recorded for two-thirds of perpetrators, and that the data collected for both victims and perpetrators is “not sufficient to allow any conclusions to be drawn at the national level.”

    But she does note: “There is enough evidence available in local police data in three police force areas … which show disproportionate numbers of men from Asian ethnic backgrounds.” And, “There have been enough convictions across the country of groups of men from Asian ethnic backgrounds to have warranted closer examination. Instead of examination, we have seen obfuscation.”

    Why might this be? Casey notes that the issue of ethnicity was “shied away from” by local services, due to anxieties about being perceived as racist by endorsing an “Asian grooming gang” narrative.

    Her audit points to numerous reviews at different levels, all of which reflect inconsistency in data collection. While some, such as a 2020 Home Office research, found that most offenders of organised exploitation nationwide are white, Casey again notes that the data is not sufficient to conclude this.

    When analysing the testimonies of victims of child sexual abuse in other contexts, such as the 2015 inquiry’s Truth Project, often the ethnicity of the perpetrator remains vague. One reason is that whiteness goes unremarked upon in many areas of life in a majority-white country such as the UK. Another serious issue is the poor levels of reporting of child sexual abuse in general in ethnic minority communities. Overall, we lack a good understanding of both victim and perpetrator characteristics.


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    Casey also raises important questions about perpetrator profiles that go beyond their ethnicity, such as what drives them to commit these crimes. We would add another key question – why are young, working class girls from all backgrounds consistently treated as culpable for the crimes committed against them?

    If coming from a particular community is a risk factor for perpetration of a certain form of child sexual abuse, more accurate data is needed to say this confidently and in a way that can engage communities rather than alienating them. It is our hope that this new inquiry can do that. In the meantime, Casey has asked for the public to “keep calm” over the data.


    House of Commons/Flickr, CC BY-NC-ND

    Putting victims over politics

    The lack of accurate data has allowed politicians and the far right to take control of the narrative, without strong evidence to back up their claims. Elon Musk’s interventions earlier this year made the implications of this clear.

    People can lay claim to “the truth” of child grooming gangs without clear data in support or in opposition. What we can say with conviction – and what Musk was correct in pointing out – was the horrific nature of the crimes perpetrated against victims of sexual violence.

    Politicisation of abuse does a serious disservice to victims. As we found through the 2015 inquiry’s extensive work with diverse communities, narratives about the ethnicity of child sexual abuse perpetrators can lead to defensiveness and secrecy among victims from those communities, who fear betraying their own, risking further abuse.

    This new inquiry is a much needed opportunity to improve the data. The government has accepted all 12 recommendations, including mandatory collection of ethnicity and nationality data for all suspects in child sexual abuse and criminal exploitation cases.

    This is a statutory inquiry, so it has greater powers than past inquiries to compel witnesses to provide evidence. It also means that the inquiry holds some independence from government, hopefully insulating it from some of the politicised rhetoric.

    But the current moment still risks loud political voices talking over the expertise of survivors. While it is encouraging to read that survivors’ voices were included in Casey’s investigation, the audit does not say how many nor in what capacity.

    We hope that the inquiry takes a lesson from the pioneering approach of the 2015 inquiry. Its victims and survivors consultative panel gave a level of “testimonial justice” to those whose voices are often silenced and ignored.

    The new inquiry is a chance to really listen to victims, who have been let down for decades.
    Katty Elizarova/Shutterstock

    Foremost in everyone’s minds is the need to prevent and deter such abuse from happening in the future. This requires fully understanding the reasons behind inaccurate or incomplete data collection, the motivations of perpetrators and institutional contexts that might facilitate them, and barriers to implementing meaningful responses. This inquiry promises to listen to survivors, without filtering the parts that are uncomfortable to hear.

    Amid this, there is another scandal hidden in plain sight. For all the talk about acting on Casey’s findings, there is a huge funding crisis in services that support survivors of child sexual abuse. Our colleagues in the sector report increasing pressure to reduce the amount of care survivors are offered, despite commitments to offer lifelong care for those affected by this deeply damaging crime.

    How can we claim to care about prevention when we do not do enough to support those already affected?

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. What the new grooming gangs inquiry must do to put victims before politics – https://theconversation.com/what-the-new-grooming-gangs-inquiry-must-do-to-put-victims-before-politics-259410

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    June 21, 2025
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