Category: Science

  • MIL-OSI Global: As US ramps up fossil fuels, communities will have to adapt to the consequences − yet climate adaptation funding is on the chopping block

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Bethany Bradley, Professor of Biogeography and Spatial Ecology, UMass Amherst

    Salt marshes protect shorelines, but they’re already struggling to survive sea-level rise. John Greim/LightRocket via Getty Images

    It’s no secret that warming temperatures, wildfires and flash floods are increasingly affecting lives across the United States. With the U.S. government now planning to ramp up fossil fuel use, the risks of these events are likely to become even more pronounced.

    That leaves a big question: Is the nation prepared to adapt to the consequences?

    For many years, federally funded scientists have been developing solutions to help reduce the harm climate change is causing in people’s lives and livelihoods. Yet, as with many other science programs, the White House is proposing to eliminate funding for climate adaptation science in the next federal budget, and reports suggest that the firing of federal climate adaptation scientists may be imminent.

    As researchers and directors of regional Climate Adaptation Science Centers, funded by the U.S. Geological Survey since 2011, we have seen firsthand the work these programs do to protect the nation’s natural resources and their successes in helping states and tribes build resilience to climate risks.

    Here are a few examples of the ways federally funded climate adaptation science conducted by university and federal researchers helps the nation weather the effects of climate change.

    Protecting communities against wildfire risk

    Wildfires have increasingly threatened communities and ecosystems across the U.S., exacerbated by worsening heat waves and drought.

    In the Southwest, researchers with the Climate Adaptation Science Centers are developing forecasting models to identify locations at greatest risk of wildfire at different times of year.

    Knowing where and when fire risks are highest allows communities to take steps to protect themselves, whether by carrying out controlled burns to remove dry vegetation, creating fire breaks to protect homes, managing invasive species that can leave forests more prone to devastating fires, or other measures.

    The solutions are created with forest and wildland managers to ensure projects are viable, effective and tailored to each area. The research is then integrated into best practices for managing wildfires. The researchers also help city planners find the most effective methods to reduce fire risks in wildlands near homes.

    Wildland firefighters and communities have limited resources. They need to know where the greatest risks exist to take preventive measures.
    Ethan Swope/Getty Images

    In Hawaii and the other Pacific islands, adaptation researchers have similarly worked to identify how drought, invasive species and land-use changes contribute to fire risk there. They use these results to create maps of high-risk fire zones to help communities take steps to reduce dry and dead undergrowth that could fuel fires and also plan for recovery after fires.

    Protecting shorelines and fisheries

    In the Northeast, salt marshes line large parts of the coast, providing natural buffers against storms by damping powerful ocean waves that would otherwise erode the shoreline. Their shallow, grassy waters also serve as important breeding grounds for valuable fish.

    However, these marshes are at risk of drowning as sea level rises faster than the sediment can build up.

    As greenhouse gases from burning fossil fuels and from other human activities accumulate in the atmosphere, they trap extra heat near Earth’s surface and in the oceans, raising temperatures. The rising temperatures melt glaciers and also cause thermal expansion of the oceans. Together, those processes are raising global sea level by about 1.3 inches per decade.

    Adaptation researchers with the Climate Adaptation Science Centers have been developing local flood projections for the regions’ unique oceanographic and geophysical conditions to help protect them. Those projections are essential to help natural resource managers and municipalities plan effectively for the future.

    Researchers are also collaborating with local and regional organizations on salt marsh restoration, including assessing how sediment builds up each marsh and creating procedures for restoring and monitoring the marshes.

    Saving salmon in Alaska and the Northwest

    In the Northwest and Alaska, salmon are struggling as temperatures rise in the streams they return to for spawning each year. Warm water can make them sluggish, putting them at greater risk from predators. When temperatures get too high, they can’t survive. Even in large rivers such as the Columbia, salmon are becoming heat stressed more often.

    Adaptation researchers in both regions have been evaluating the effectiveness of fish rescues – temporarily moving salmon into captivity as seasonal streams overheat or dry up due to drought.

    In Alaska, adaptation scientists have built broad partnerships with tribes, nonprofit organizations and government agencies to improve temperature measurements of remote streams, creating an early warning system for fisheries so managers can take steps to help salmon survive.

    Managing invasive species

    Rising temperatures can also expand the range of invasive species, which cost the U.S. economy billions of dollars each year in crop and forest losses and threaten native plants and animals.

    Researchers in the Northeast and Southeast Climate Adaptation Science Centers have been working to identify and prioritize the risks from invasive species that are expanding their ranges. That helps state managers eradicate these emerging threats before they become a problem. These regional invasive species networks have become the go-to source of climate-related scientific information for thousands of invasive species managers.

    The rise in the number of invasive species projected by 2050 is substantial in the Northeast and upper Midwest. Federally funded scientists develop these risk maps and work with local communities to head off invasive species damage.
    Regional Invasive Species and Climate Change Network

    The Northeast is a hot spot for invasive species, particularly for plants that can outcompete native wetland and grassland species and host pathogens that can harm native species.

    Without proactive assessments, invasive species management becomes more difficult. Once the damage has begun, managing invasive species becomes more expensive and less effective.

    Losing the nation’s ability to adapt wisely

    A key part of these projects is the strong working relationships built between scientists and the natural resource managers in state, community, tribal and government agencies who can put this knowledge into practice.

    With climate extremes likely to increase in the coming years, losing adaptation science will leave the United States even more vulnerable to future climate hazards.

    Bethany Bradley receives funding from the US Geological Survey as the University Director of the Northeast Climate Adaptation Science Center.

    Jia Hu has receives funding from the US Geological Survey as the University Director of the Southwest Climate Adaptation Science Center.

    Meade Krosby receives funding from the US Geological Survey as the University Director of the Northwest Climate Adaptation Science Center.

    ref. As US ramps up fossil fuels, communities will have to adapt to the consequences − yet climate adaptation funding is on the chopping block – https://theconversation.com/as-us-ramps-up-fossil-fuels-communities-will-have-to-adapt-to-the-consequences-yet-climate-adaptation-funding-is-on-the-chopping-block-256307

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI China: Full Text: President Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Full Text: President Xi’s keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    BEIJING, May 13 — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum.

    The following is the full text of the speech:

    Writing a New Chapter in Building

    A China-LAC Community with a Shared Future

    Keynote Address by H.E. Xi Jinping

    President of the People’s Republic of China

    At the Opening Ceremony

    Of the Fourth Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum

    Beijing, May 13, 2025

    Your Excellency President Gustavo Petro,

    Your Excellency President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,

    Your Excellency President Gabriel Boric,

    Your Excellency President Dilma Rousseff,

    Delegates of CELAC Member States,

    Ladies and Gentlemen,

    Friends,

    It gives me great pleasure to meet so many old and new friends from Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries in Beijing. On behalf of the Chinese government and people, I extend a warm welcome to you all.

    In 2015, LAC delegates and I attended the opening ceremony of the First Ministerial Meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, which marked the launch of the China-CELAC Forum. Ten years on, with dedicated nurturing of both sides, the Forum has grown from a tender sapling into a towering tree. This fills me with deep pride and satisfaction.

    Although China and the LAC region are geographically distant, the bonds of our friendship stretch back through centuries. As early as in the 16th century, Nao de China, or “Ships of China,” laden with friendship, shuttled across the Pacific, marking the dawn of interactions and exchanges between China and the LAC region. From the 1960s onward, as New China established diplomatic ties with some LAC countries, exchanges and cooperation between the two sides became closer and closer. Since the turn of the century and in particular in recent years, China and LAC countries have ushered in a historic era of building a shared future.

    We stand shoulder to shoulder and support each other. China appreciates the long-standing commitment of LAC countries that have diplomatic ties with China to the one-China principle. China firmly supports LAC countries in pursuing development paths suited to their national conditions, safeguarding sovereignty and independence, and opposing external interference. In the 1960s, mass rallies and demonstrations took place across China in support of the Panamanian people’s rightful claim to sovereignty over the Panama Canal. In the 1970s, during the Latin American campaign for 200-nautical-mile maritime rights, China voiced its resolute and unequivocal support for the legitimate demands of developing countries. For 32 consecutive times since 1992, China has consistently voted for the United Nations (U.N.) General Assembly resolutions calling for an end to the U.S. embargo against Cuba.

    We ride the tide of progress together to pursue win-win cooperation. Embracing the trend of economic globalization, China and LAC countries have deepened cooperation in trade, investment, finance, science and technology, infrastructure, and many other fields. Under the framework of high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, the two sides have implemented more than 200 infrastructure projects, creating over a million jobs. The China-LAC satellite cooperation program has set a model for high-tech South-South cooperation. The inauguration of Chancay Port in Peru has established a new land-and-sea connectivity link between Asia and Latin America. China has signed free trade agreements with Chile, Peru, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Nicaragua. Last year, trade between China and LAC countries exceeded US$500 billion for the first time, an increase of over 40 times from the beginning of this century.

    We unite in tough times to conquer challenges through mutual support. China and LAC countries have collaborated on disaster prevention, mitigation and relief and on joint response to hurricanes, earthquakes and other natural disasters. Since 1993, China has dispatched 38 medical teams to the Caribbean. When the pandemic of the century struck, China was among the first to offer assistance to LAC countries, providing over 300 million doses of vaccines and nearly 40 million units of medical supplies and equipment, and sending multiple teams of medical experts. All this helped protect the lives of hundreds of millions across the region.

    We uphold solidarity and coordination and rise to global challenges with resolve. Together, China and LAC countries champion true multilateralism, uphold international fairness and justice, advance global governance reform, and promote multipolarization of the world and greater democracy in international relations. We have worked together to address global challenges like climate change, and advance progress in global biodiversity governance. China and Brazil jointly issued a six-point common understanding on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, which has been endorsed by more than 110 countries, contributing our wisdom and strength to resolving international hotspot issues.

    Facts have shown that China and LAC countries are advancing hand in hand as a community with a shared future. This community of ours is founded upon equality, powered by mutual benefit and win-win, invigorated by openness and inclusiveness, and dedicated to the people’s well-being. It exhibits enduring vitality and holds immense promise.

    Distinguished Delegates,

    Friends,

    The century-defining transformation is accelerating across the globe, with multiple risks compounding one another. Such developments make unity and cooperation among nations indispensable for safeguarding global peace and stability and for promoting global development and prosperity. There are no winners in tariff wars or trade wars. Bullying or hegemonism only leads to self-isolation. China and LAC countries are important members of the Global South. Independence and autonomy are our glorious tradition. Development and revitalization are our inherent right. And fairness and justice are our common pursuit. In the face of seething undercurrents of geopolitical and bloc confrontation and the surging tide of unilateralism and protectionism, China stands ready to join hands with our LAC partners to launch five programs that advance our shared development and revitalization, and contribute to a China-LAC community with a shared future.

    The first is Solidarity Program. China will work with LAC countries to support each other on issues bearing on our respective core interests and major concerns. We must enhance exchanges in all fields, and strengthen communication and coordination on major international and regional issues. In the next three years, to facilitate our exchanges on national governance best practices, China will invite 300 members from political parties of CELAC member states every year to visit China. China supports the efforts by LAC countries in increasing their influence on the multilateral stage. We will work with LAC countries to firmly safeguard the international system with the U.N. at its core and the international order underpinned by international law, and to speak with one voice in international and regional affairs.

    The second is Development Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Development Initiative. We will resolutely uphold the multilateral trading system, ensure stable, unimpeded global industrial and supply chains, and promote an international environment of openness and cooperation. We should foster greater synergy between our development strategies, expand high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, and bolster cooperation in traditional areas such as infrastructure, agriculture and food, and energy and minerals. We should expand cooperation in emerging areas such as clean energy, 5G telecommunications, the digital economy and artificial intelligence, and carry out the China-LAC Science and Technology Partnership. China will increase imports of quality products from LAC countries, and encourage its enterprises to expand investment in the LAC region. We will provide a RMB66 billion yuan credit line to support LAC countries’ development.

    The third is Civilization Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Civilization Initiative. We should uphold the vision of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness between civilizations, and champion humanity’s common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom. We should enhance China-LAC civilizational exchanges and mutual learning, including through a conference on China-LAC inter-civilizational dialogue. We should deepen cultural and artistic exchanges and cooperation, and hold the Latin American and Caribbean Arts Season. We should strengthen exchanges and cooperation in cultural heritage fields such as joint archaeological projects, conservation and restoration of ancient and historic sites, and museum exhibitions. We should also carry out collaborative studies of ancient civilizations and enhance cooperation to combat illicit trafficking of cultural property.

    The fourth is Peace Program. China will work with LAC countries to implement the Global Security Initiative. China supports the Proclamation of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace and the Declaration of Member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. The two sides should cooperate more closely in disaster governance, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, narcotics control and combating transnational organized crime so as to safeguard security and stability in the region. China will organize law enforcement training programs tailored to the needs of CELAC member states, and do our best to provide equipment assistance.

    The fifth is People-to-People Connectivity Program. In the next three years, China will provide CELAC member states with 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 International Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals, and 1,000 funded placements through the Chinese Bridge program. We will initiate 300 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects, actively promote vocational education cooperation programs such as Luban Workshop, and support CELAC member states in developing Chinese language education. We will also launch an exhibition of Chinese films and TV programs under The Bond, and work with LAC countries to translate and introduce 10 premium TV dramas and audiovisual programs annually to each other. China will host the China-LAC tourism dialogue with LAC countries. To facilitate friendly exchanges, China has decided to implement a visa exemption for five LAC countries as the first step, and will expand this policy coverage at proper times.

    Distinguished Delegates,

    Friends,

    As an 11th-century Chinese poet wrote, “Life’s greatest joy comes from finding kindred spirits.” Latin America has a similar proverb which goes, “The one who has a friend has a treasure.” No matter how the world changes, China will always stand by LAC countries as a good friend and a good partner. Let us march forward together on our paths toward modernization, working together to write a new chapter in building a China-LAC community with a shared future.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi unveils roadmap for deepening cooperation with LAC countries

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    BEIJING, May 13 — Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday announced the launch of five programs to advance shared development and revitalization with Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries.

    The five programs, ranging from solidarity, development and civilization to peace and people-to-people connectivity, were announced by Xi when delivering a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing.

    In 2015, Xi and LAC delegates attended the opening ceremony of the first ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, which marked the launch of the forum.

    On Solidarity Program, Xi said China is willing to strengthen solidarity with LAC countries and continue to support each other on issues concerning their core interests and major concerns, to firmly safeguard the international system with the U.N. at its core and the international order underpinned by international law, and to speak with one voice in international and regional affairs.

    In the next three years, China will invite 300 members from political parties of CELAC member states every year to visit China to facilitate exchanges on national governance best practices, Xi said.

    On Development Program, China is willing to work with LAC countries to implement the Global Development Initiative, resolutely uphold the multilateral trading system, ensure stable, unimpeded global industrial and supply chains, and promote an international environment of openness and cooperation, Xi said.

    Noting that the two sides should foster greater synergy between their development strategies and expand high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, Xi said China will import more quality products from LAC countries and encourage Chinese enterprises to expand their investment in the region.

    On Civilization Program, Xi called for joint implementation of the Global Civilization Initiative. He said both sides should uphold the vision of equality, mutual learning, dialogue, and inclusiveness between civilizations, champion humanity’s common values of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy and freedom, and enhance China-LAC civilizational exchanges and mutual learning, including through a conference on China-LAC inter-civilizational dialogue.

    On Peace Program, Xi called for joint implementation of the Global Security Initiative. He said both sides should cooperate more closely in disaster governance, cybersecurity, counterterrorism, anti-corruption, narcotics control and combating transnational organized crime so as to safeguard security and stability in the region.

    On People-to-People Connectivity Program, Xi said in the next three years, China will provide CELAC member states with 3,500 government scholarships, 10,000 training opportunities in China, 500 International Chinese Language Teachers Scholarships, 300 training opportunities for poverty reduction professionals, and 1,000 funded placements through the Chinese Bridge program, initiate 300 “small and beautiful” livelihood projects, and support CELAC member states in developing Chinese language education.

    China has decided to offer a visa-free policy to five LAC countries, and will expand the policy to cover more regional countries in due course, Xi said.

    Gustavo Petro, president of Colombia, the CELAC rotating chair, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Chilean President Gabriel Boric, and Dilma Rousseff, president of the New Development Bank and former Brazilian president, addressed the event respectively.

    Special representative of Yamandu Orsi, president of Uruguay, the incoming CELAC rotating chair, read out the president’s congratulatory letter.

    Faced with a world full of uncertainties, LAC countries and China should work together to promote continuous new progress in building a community with a shared future, they said.

    Both sides should respect each other and firmly support each other in safeguarding sovereignty and choosing their own development path, they said, calling for strengthening the synergy between the development strategies of LAC countries and the Belt and Road Initiative, and promoting cooperation in trade, investment, infrastructure, agriculture, science and technology, new energy and education.

    The two sides should also promote exchanges and dialogues among civilizations, safeguard the authority of the U.N., support multilateralism and free trade, and oppose unilateralism, protectionism, power politics and bullying to safeguard the common interests of the Global South, they added.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping poses for a group photo with guests attending the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi attended the opening ceremony of the meeting and delivered a keynote speech. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum and delivers a keynote speech at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping and guests attend the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the meeting. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chinese President Xi Jinping and guests attend the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum at the China National Convention Center in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the meeting. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Colombian President Gustavo Petro, also rotating president of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Chilean President Gabriel Boric delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Dilma Rousseff, president of the New Development Bank and former Brazilian president, delivers a speech at the opening ceremony of the fourth ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum in Beijing, capital of China, May 13, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Bold science reforms to fuel economic growth

    Source: NZ Music Month takes to the streets

    The Government is moving swiftly to implement the most significant science reforms in three decades, with three new public research organisations to be formed by 1 July, Science, Innovation and Technology Minister Dr Shane Reti announced today.
    “These reforms are about unlocking the full potential of science to deliver stronger economic growth and greater resilience for New Zealand. We’re not wasting a moment,” says Dr Reti. 
    “Earlier this year, the Prime Minister unveiled a major overhaul of the science system, including the move from seven Crown Research Institutes to three new, future-focused entities. These new organisations will concentrate on key areas of national importance.”
    The new institutes will be:

    New Zealand Institute for Bioeconomy Science – advancing innovation in agriculture, aquaculture, forestry, biotechnology and manufacturing; protecting ecosystems from biosecurity threats and climate risks; and developing new bio-based technologies and products.
    New Zealand Institute for Earth Science – supporting energy security and sustainability; developing land, marine and mineral resources; and improving resilience to natural hazards and climate-related risks.
    New Zealand Institute for Public Health and Forensic Science – strengthening public health through disease detection and response; and supporting public safety through forensic science services.

    “These institutes will ensure our world-class researchers are focused on delivering science that drives innovation, supports our industries, and improves the lives of everyday New Zealanders,” says Dr Reti.
    “Critically, the new research organisations will have a strong commercial focus, with a mandate to translate science into real-world outcomes and commercial success. 

    “It’s not enough to have great science — we need that science to power start-ups, lift productivity, and create jobs. This is about turning research into results for New Zealand’s economy.”
    To lead this transformation, Dr Reti today announced the appointment of Barry Harris as Chair of the Bioeconomy Science Institute, and David Smol as Chair of the Earth Science Institute.
    “Both Mr Harris and Mr Smol bring outstanding leadership and deep sector experience. They are well placed to guide these new organisations as they take shape and begin delivering on our vision for a stronger, more productive science system,” says Dr Reti.
    The Institute of Environmental Science and Research (ESR) will retain its current governance as it transitions to become the New Zealand Institute for Public Health and Forensic Sciences.
    “These changes are about focus, outcomes, and value. We are investing in science that delivers for New Zealand — science that strengthens our economy, supports our environment, and builds resilience for the future,” Dr Reti says.
    “I’m confident these new leaders will help us deliver a science system that is more connected, more commercially focused, and better aligned with the needs of our nation.”

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Markey, Clark, Pressley Condemn Termination of Federal Grants to Harvard University

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Massachusetts Ed Markey
    Washington (May 13, 2025) – Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), a member of the Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, along with Democratic Whip Katherine Clark (MA-05) and Representative Ayanna Pressley (MA-07), today condemned the Trump Administration’s cancelation of $450 million in federal grants to Harvard University, including all grants from the National Science Foundation. In fiscal year 2024, Harvard University received $56 million in National Science Foundation grants. This announcement is the next in a series of illegal and authoritarian Trump administration attacks on Harvard, including freezing $2.2 billion of federal funding and blocking all future research grants to Harvard.
    “Yet again, the Trump administration is flouting the Constitution and laws passed by Congress in an authoritarian attempt to intimidate Harvard University into complying with its political demands. The Trump administration is demonstrating astonishing disregard for not only the students, faculty, and staff that these cuts impact, but also for the general public who benefit from scientific breakthroughs and the global standing of the United States. This is a blatant and condemnable strike against freedom, and we stand by Harvard University in their fight against authoritarian overreach by Trump.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: New generation of skin substitutes give hope to severe burns patients

    Source:

    14 May 2025

    A dermal matrix – one of the latest advancements to regenerate skin after severe burns.

    Severe burns remain one of the most challenging injuries to treat, causing high disease and death rates worldwide, but Australian researchers have flagged some promising new approaches that could save lives and dramatically improve patient recovery.

    In a comprehensive review published in Advanced Therapeutics, researchers from the University of South Australia (UniSA), University of Adelaide and Royal Adelaide Hospital (RAH) explore the latest advancements in dermal substitutes – biochemicals used to replace damaged skin – with a particular focus on combating infection and enhancing tissue regeneration following catastrophic burns.

    The researchers say that despite decades of progress, traditional treatments such as skin grafting often fail to provide adequate healing and infection control, leading to prolonged hospital stays and soaring healthcare costs.

    According to the lead authors Dr Zlatko Kopecki and Dr Bronwyn Dearman, the urgency to develop safer, more effective solutions has never been greater.

    “Infections are a major cause of complications and mortality in burn patients,” says Dr Kopecki, a Research Fellow at UniSA’s Future Industries Institute.

    “We must innovate beyond conventional methods and develop therapies that regenerate tissue while actively preventing infections.”

    Each year, approximately 2423 Australians are admitted to hospital with burn-related injuries, 74% of whom require surgery, including a skin graft. Globally, 180,000 people die from burns each year, and approximately 10 million are hospitalised, costing healthcare systems $112 billion worldwide.

    The review highlights that while many commercial skin substitutes exist, very few offer integrated antimicrobial protection – a critical factor given the vulnerability of burn wounds to bacterial invasion and sepsis.

    The paper discusses emerging technologies such as Kerecis, a novel fish skin graft with inherent antimicrobial properties, and NovoSorb BTM, a synthetic biodegradable matrix that resists bacterial colonisation without relying on antibiotics.

    Both products represent a new generation of dermal substitutes with enhanced potential to protect and heal complex burns.

    Kerecis comes from wild Atlantic cod, caught from a sustainable fish stock in pristine Icelandic waters and processed using renewable energy. It stands out for retaining natural omega-3 fatty acids, which have strong antimicrobial effects and promote wound healing.

    Meanwhile, NovoSorb BTM’s unique polyurethane matrix offers structural resilience even in infected wounds, providing a vital scaffold for tissue regeneration.

    “These materials demonstrate a shift towards multifunctional therapies that combine structural support with infection resistance,” says Dr Dearman, Principal Medical Scientist for the Skin Engineering Laboratory at the RAH and an Adjunct Lecturer at the University of Adelaide.

    “Such innovations are crucial, particularly as antibiotic-resistant infections continue to rise globally,” she says.

    The review calls for the next wave of research to integrate active antimicrobial agents directly into 3D dermal scaffolds that support cell growth, reducing the reliance on antibiotics and temporary dressings.

    Beyond infection control, the research points to scarless healing as the future frontier of burn care.

    By combining smart biomaterials with cell-based therapies, scientists aim to regenerate skin that restores its full function – an outcome that could revolutionise the recovery for millions of burn survivors worldwide.

    The research team includes experts from the Future Industries Institute at UniSA, the Adult Burn Service at the Royal Adelaide Hospital, and the Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences at the University of Adelaide.

    …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………

    Contact for interview: Dr Zlatko Kopecki E: zlatko.kopecki@unisa.edu.au
    Media contact: Candy Gibson M: +61 434 605 142 E: candy.gibson@unisa.edu.au

    Other articles you may be interested in

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Honoring the Lives of Victims in Tops Shooting

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul, City of Buffalo Mayor Christopher P. Scanlon and members of the 5/14 Memorial Commission announced a major milestone for the permanent and living memorial to honor the lives taken and those impacted by the racially motivated mass shooting at Tops on Jefferson Avenue on May 14, 2022. The 5/14 Memorial Commission identified 18 city-owned and privately-owned lots required for the construction of a permanent memorial. The City’s discussions with private property owners have successfully concluded, with three owners willing to donate or sell the remaining four parcels needed for the memorial. As a result, all 18 lots required for the memorial have now been designated for a unified site, and the acquisition of all parcels marks a critical step forward for the 5/14 Memorial Foundation Inc. to enter detailed phases of design, engineering, permitting, and fundraising.

    “The 5/14 Memorial will stand not only as a tribute to the lives lost and forever changed on May 14, 2022, but also as a powerful symbol of resilience, remembrance, and justice,” Governor Hochul said. “Today marks a profound and pivotal moment in our shared journey toward healing the pain caused on that tragic day and ensuring the legacy of those lost endures for generations to come.”

    Buffalo Mayor Christopher P. Scanlon said, “As we approach three years since the horrific racially motivated attack on May 14th, today’s announcement isn’t just about transferring property — it’s about the next step creating a permanent and living space that reflects the strength of the East Side community and ensures that the lives we lost are never forgotten. I want to thank Governor Hochul, the 5/14 Memorial Foundation Inc., the Buffalo Common Council, and all stakeholders for coming together to make this possible.”

    5/14 Memorial Foundation Inc. Chairman Rev. Mark Blue said, “This moment represents a significant milestone in our collective journey to push forward as a community and honor the lives taken from us on May 14th, 2022. We are deeply grateful to Governor Hochul, Mayor Scanlon, the Common Council, and the members of this community who have worked in partnership with us to achieve site control. This brings us one step closer to creating a permanent space for healing, reflection, and education.”

    Buffalo Common Council Majority Leader, Ellicott District Councilmember Leah M. Halton-Pope said, “This moment represents more than a transfer of land — it is a transfer of purpose, of collective will, and of deep resolve to remember those we lost on May 14th and the community that continues to rise in their honor. The establishment of a permanent and living memorial affirms that Black lives matter, that the East Side of Buffalo matters, and that the legacy of those ten beautiful souls will forever be etched not only in stone, but in our city’s conscience. I’m proud to stand with my colleagues, Governor Hochul, Mayor Scanlon, and the 5/14 Memorial Commission as we take this next step forward — grounded in remembrance and committed to healing.”

    Today, the Common Council approved the sale of 14 city-owned parcels at the designated memorial site to the 5/14 Memorial Foundation. The City of Buffalo submitted a Designated Developer Agreement, which was approved by the Buffalo Common Council, to establish site control at the corner of Jefferson Avenue and Best Street, the future site for the 5/14 permanent and living memorial. The agreement outlines the sale of city-owned parcels to the 5/14 Memorial Foundation Inc. and sets forth land use conditions and long-term responsibilities for the Foundation to develop and maintain the site as a public memorial space.

    About the 5/14 Memorial

    The 5/14 Memorial Commission, established in October 2022 by Governor Kathy Hochul and then-Mayor Byron W. Brown, unveiled the final design for the memorial, titled “Seeing Us,” on May 13, 2024. Designed by Jin Young Song and Douglass Alligood, the memorial features ten interconnected stone pillars inscribed with the names of the lives taken and survivors, each with a unique arc and height. A sweeping support building will serve as a central hub for education, exhibitions, community activities, and events, with an elevated Memorial Walk on its roof. The design was selected through a comprehensive public engagement process, including community meetings and surveys.

    The estimated cost for the memorial is approximately $15 million. To date, New York State has committed $5 million, and the City of Buffalo has pledged $1 million toward the project. The 5/14 Memorial Commission has designated the newly created 5/14 Memorial Foundation to initiate a yearlong fundraising campaign to secure the remaining funds necessary to commence construction.

    Representative Tim Kennedy said, “Our community was permanently scarred by the events of May 14, 2022. While that pain will never go away, the new permanent site for this memorial will create a place of comfort and healing where Western New Yorkers can come together in love and unity. I thank the members of the 5/14 Memorial Commission, Mayor Scanlon, and the Common Council for their collaborative work to identify and secure this site. The City of Good Neighbors will respond to hatred and violence with hope and unity.”

    Assembly Majority Leader Crystal Peoples-Stokes said, “The acquisition of land is another positive step towards creating a lasting memorial honoring the lives lost, the lives forever changed, and the community that stood together in the face of anti-Black racism. We have more hills to climb and we will climb them. I want to thank Governor Kathy Hochul, City of Buffalo Mayor Christopher Scanlon, the City of Buffalo Common Council, community leaders and the 5/14 Memorial Foundation, Inc for helping to bring the memorial one step closer to reality.”

    State Senator April N.M. Baskin said, “May 14, 2022, is a tragic day that will live in infamy throughout Buffalo, Western New York, and beyond. We lovingly remember our 10 neighbors who were senselessly murdered that day as well as the individuals injured and those who face irreversible trauma from the attack on our community. As we work on many initiatives to improve the societal conditions that made East Buffalo a vulnerable target on 5/14, I am pleased that we are making strides to establish a tangible Memorial that will stand as a timeless symbol of that fateful day.”

    State Senator Sean Ryan said, “Three years after the racist attack on 5/14, the memories of that horrible day are still fresh in all of our minds. The anger, sorrow, and grief we felt that day are still inside, but we have begun to build our lives around them. This memorial will be a solemn tribute to the friends, loved ones, and neighbors lost that day, celebrating them and memorializing them for all time. It will also serve as a reminder of our community’s resilience in the wake of tragedy. Thank you to Governor Hochul and our partners in government who have worked together to make this tribute possible.”

    Buffalo Common Council President Bryan Bollman said, “The land transfer for the 5/14 Memorial marks a vital step forward in honoring the 10 lives lost, the families forever changed, and the community that continues to heal. We will never forget the pain of that day, but we move forward with purpose, committed to remembrance, justice, and unity. I commend Governor Hochul, Mayor Scanlon, former Mayor Brown, and the 5/14 Memorial Commission for their leadership in ensuring this sacred space will stand as a permanent reminder that love will always triumph over hate.”

    Masten District Council Woman and 5/14 Commission Member Zeneta B. Everhart said, “It has been an honor to serve on the 5/14 Memorial Commission and Foundation for nearly three years. As we approach the 3rd memorial anniversary I am reminded of the 10 lives stolen from us, the survivors including my son Zaire Goodman, and the dozens of residents impacted by the hate fueled massacre on 5/14/2022. I want to thank the Mayor and my colleagues on the Council for making the process for acquiring these properties seamless so that we can begin building an honor space in remembrance of 5/14. I would also like to thank the donors who selflessly gave their properties and those who were so willing to sell their properties so that we could make this memorial a reality. This memorial will be a living breathing entity that will not only teach the community about the horrific events of 5/14, but it will be a space that teaches the history of African Americans for generations to come.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – 2023 and 2024 reports on Türkiye – P10_TA(2025)0092 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 17 and 18 April 2024, 30 June 2023, 23 June 2022, 24 June 2021 and 12 December 2019, and to all relevant previous Council and European Council conclusions,

    –  having regard to Türkiye’s membership of the Council of Europe and NATO,

    –  having regard to the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the readmission of persons residing without authorisation(1) (EU-Turkey Readmission Agreement),

    –  having regard to the statement of the members of the European Council of 25 March 2021 on Türkiye,

    –  having regard to the ‘EU-Turkey statements’ of 18 March 2016 and 29 November 2015,

    –  having regard to the ‘Turkey Negotiating Framework’ of 3 October 2005,

    –  having regard to the declaration issued by the European Community and its Member States on 21 September 2005 following the declaration made by Turkey upon its signature of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement on 29 July 2005,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions of December 2006 and March 2020, and to the Presidency Conclusions of the European Council in Copenhagen of 21-22 June 1993, also known as the Copenhagen Criteria,

    –  having regard to the Council conclusions on Enlargement of 17 December 2024 and of 12 December 2023,

    –  having regard to the International Law of the Sea and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2024)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2024 Report (SWD(2024)0696),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 on EU enlargement policy (COM(2023)0690) and to the accompanying Türkiye 2023 Report (SWD(2023)0696),

    –  having regard to Special report 06/2024 of the European Court of Auditors of 24 April 2024 entitled ‘The Facility for Refugees in Turkey – Beneficial for refugees and host communities, but impact and sustainability not yet ensured’,

    –  having regard to the joint communications from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the European Council of 29 November 2023 (JOIN(2023)0050) and of 22 March 2021 (JOIN(2021)0008) on the state of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations,

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 December 2024 entitled ‘Eighth Annual Report of the Facility for Refugees in Türkiye’ (COM(2024)0593),

    –  having regard to the fundamental principles of international law and to the Charter of the United Nations, the 1977 and the 1979 High-Level Agreements between the leaders of the two communities, and the relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council on Cyprus, including Resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, which reaffirms the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, Resolution 550 (1984) of 11 May 1984 on secessionist actions in Cyprus, Resolution 789 (1992) of 25 November 1992, and Resolution 2537 (2020) on the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP),

    –  having regard to Article 46 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which states that the contracting parties undertake to abide by the final judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in any case to which they are parties, and to the ensuing obligation of Türkiye to implement all judgments of the ECtHR,

    –  having regard to the relevant resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe,

    –  having regard to the 2025 Freedom in the World report published by Freedom House,

    –  having regard to the 2024 World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders,

    –  having regard to the January 2025 prison statistics report published by the Civil Society in the Penal System Association (CISST) and to the 2024 country profile for Türkiye published by Prison Insider,

    –  having regard to the Global Gender Gap Report 2024 published by the World Economic Forum,

    –  having regard to recent reports of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu),

    –  having regard to the UNESCO statement on Hagia Sophia of 10 July 2020, and to the relevant UNESCO World Heritage Committee decisions 44 COM 7B.58 (2021) and 45 COM 7B.58 (2023), adopted in its 44th and 45th sessions respectively,

    –  having regard to its previous resolutions on Türkiye, in particular those of 13 September 2023 on the 2022 Commission Report on Türkiye(2), of 7 June 2022 on the 2021 Commission Report on Turkey(3), and of 26 November 2020 on escalating tensions in Varosha following the illegal actions by Türkiye and the urgent need for the resumption of talks(4),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 29 February 2024 on deepening EU integration in view of future enlargement(5),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 April 2015 on the centenary of the Armenian Genocide(6),

    –  having regard to its resolutions of 5 May 2022 on the case of Osman Kavala in Turkey(7), of 10 October 2024 on the case of Bülent Mumay in Türkiye(8) and of 13 February 2025 on recent dismissals and arrests of mayors in Türkiye(9),

    –  having regard to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s visit to Ankara in December 2024,

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0067/2025),

    A.  whereas Türkiye remains a candidate for EU accession, and EU membership remains the repeatedly declared political goal of the Turkish Government, although the gap with the values and interests of the EU is growing; whereas EU accession negotiations have effectively been at a standstill since 2018, owing to the deterioration of the rule of law and democracy in Türkiye;

    B.  whereas any accession country is expected to respect democratic values, the rule of law and human rights, and to abide by EU law; whereas Türkiye needs to credibly demonstrate its commitment to closer relations and alignment with the European Union in order to reinvigorate its European perspective; whereas being a candidate country presumes a willingness to progressively approach and align with the EU in all aspects, including values, interests, standards and policies, inter alia with its common foreign and security policy, to respect and uphold the Copenhagen criteria, and to pursue and maintain good neighbourly relations with the EU and all of its Member States without discrimination; whereas the tensions between the EU and Türkiye in relation to the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean have de-escalated but not ceased; whereas Türkiye has repeatedly been asked to refrain from all actions which violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of all EU Member States and are in breach of international and EU law;

    C.  whereas the 2023 Commission progress report on Türkiye painted a picture of continued backsliding, while its latest progress report of 2024 appears to present a slightly more positive overall picture of progress on enlargement-related reforms in Türkiye, such as in the area of economic and monetary policies; whereas this cannot, however, be applied to the core matters related to democracy and fundamental rights, which have deteriorated even further since the release of the Commission’s latest report; whereas the gap between Türkiye and the EU’s values and normative framework has therefore remained unaddressed during the recent period with the persistent use of laws and measures aimed at curtailing the rule of law and human rights, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties;

    D.  whereas the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023 struck a more positive note, putting forward a set of recommendations on cooperating in areas of joint interest in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner and based on the established conditionalities; whereas only a few concrete steps in line with the commitments therein have been taken so far; whereas the April 2024 European Council mandated Coreper to advance in the implementation of this joint communication; whereas nevertheless this joint communication has not yet received a clear political endorsement by the Council;

    E.  whereas Türkiye is a member of the Council of Europe and is therefore bound by the judgments of the ECtHR; whereas owing to its failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings, Türkiye is currently facing historical infringement proceedings; whereas Türkiye consistently ranks among the countries most frequently found in violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the European Convention on Human Rights; whereas as of late November 2024, Türkiye had the highest number of pending cases before the ECtHR, with 22 450 applications, representing 36,7 % of the Court’s total caseload of 61 250 applications;

    F.  whereas Türkiye is classified as ‘not free’ by Freedom House and has experienced one of the worst declines in the level of freedom in the world in the past 10 years; whereas Türkiye ranks 158th out of 180 countries in the 2024 World Press Freedom Index; whereas the Turkish Government has closed dozens of media outlets, routinely blocks online articles, is reported to control 85 % of national media and uses its state agency Anadolu as an organ of propaganda;

    G.  whereas the Turkish constitution provides for sufficient protection of fundamental rights, but the practice of the institutions and the critical state of the judiciary, including the lack of respect for Constitutional Court rulings, are the main reasons for the dire situation of the rule of law and human rights in the country, issues repeatedly described in the reports of the EU, the Council of Europe and international organisations;

    H.  whereas Türkiye has the highest incarceration rate and the largest prison population of all Council of Europe Member States, with an overcrowded prison population that has grown by 439 % between 2005 and 2023 and currently represents more than a third of all inmates of Council of Europe countries;

    I.  whereas Türkiye is ranked 127th out of 146 countries in the 2024 Global Gender Gap Index, underscoring severe gender inequality and systemic failures in protecting women’s rights; whereas according to the 2024 report of the We Will Stop Femicide Platform (Kadın Cinayetlerini Durduracağız Platformu), 394 women were murdered by men and 259 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances in Türkiye in 2024, the highest number recorded since the civil society group started collecting data in 2010; whereas in its 2023 report, the platform noted that 315 women were killed by men, and 248 women were found dead in suspicious circumstances;

    J.  whereas in recent months, Türkiye has taken steps towards the resumption of a process for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish question; whereas on 27 February 2025 jailed militant leader Abdullah Öcalan called on his Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband, providing a historic opportunity to end the Turkish-Kurdish conflict; whereas these efforts have been accompanied by increasing repression and the curtailment of the powers of democratic local governments, including the dismissal of elected Kurdish and other opposition mayors;

    K.  whereas, alongside being a candidate for EU accession, Türkiye is a NATO ally and a key partner in the areas of trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration; whereas Türkiye continues to play a key role in the region, acts as a bridge between Europe and Asia, and remains a key partner for the stability of the wider East Mediterranean region; whereas Türkiye continues to play a significant role in the Syrian conflict and maintains a military presence in northern Syria;

    L.  whereas Türkiye has not aligned with EU sanctions against Russia; whereas trade between Türkiye and Russia has nearly doubled since the EU’s imposition of sanctions against Russia; whereas despite some steps taken, Türkiye has not prevented its territory from being used to circumvent EU sanctions against Russia;

    M.  whereas the 2024 Commission progress report on Türkiye states that, as at 30 September 2024, the country maintained a very low alignment rate of 5 % with relevant statements of the High Representative on behalf of the EU and with relevant Council decisions, compared to 9 % in 2023;

    N.  whereas Türkiye is the EU’s fifth largest trade partner, and the EU is Türkiye’s largest trading partner by far, as well as its primary source of foreign direct investment;

    O.  whereas in the past year, the level of engagement between the EU and Türkiye has increased in terms of both technical and high-level meetings in sectoral areas;

    P.  whereas Türkiye has applied for membership of BRICS+ and shown interest in joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO);

    Q.  whereas following a period of unorthodox economic policy, Türkiye has implemented a tighter monetary policy over the past year leading to a reduction in external imbalances and a moderation of inflationary pressures;

    R.  whereas in March 2025 the Turkish Government spent at least USD 10 billion of its currency reserves to counteract the collapse of its financial markets and the devaluation of the lira caused by its decision to arrest and detain Mayor of Istanbul and prominent opposition politician Ekrem İmamoğlu; whereas the Turkish Government’s undermining of Turkish democracy and the rule of law creates an unfavourable environment for foreign direct investment and hence weakens the Turkish economy, with grave consequences for the socio-economic situation of Turkish citizens;

    S.  whereas Türkiye hosts the largest refugee population in the world, with around 3,1 million registered refugees, mainly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; whereas since 2011 the EU has directed more than EUR 10 billion to assisting refugees and host communities in Türkiye; whereas according to a credible investigative report by Lighthouse Reports and eight media partners, the EU is funding removal centres in Türkiye implicated in the detention, abuse and forced deportations of refugees under the guise of voluntary return;

    T.  whereas in addition to the emergency assistance coordinated via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, with an estimated financial value of EUR 38 million, the EU provided EUR 78,2 million in humanitarian aid for the earthquake response in 2023, and EUR 26 million in humanitarian aid in 2024; whereas the EU signed an additional EUR 400 million in assistance under the EU Solidarity Fund to finance recovery operations following the devastating earthquake;

    U.  whereas Türkiye has systematically misused counterterrorism laws to target elected officials, opposition politicians, journalists and human rights defenders, among others;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1.  Recognises the long-standing aspirations of Turkish civil society regarding accession to the European Union; welcomes the Turkish Government’s recent statements reiterating its commitment to EU membership as a strategic goal amid an effort to revitalise EU-Türkiye relations in line with relevant European Council conclusions in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner; recognises the EU’s commitment to fostering this engagement through enhanced dialogue and cooperation but encourages it to review its expectations for engagement in the foreseeable future, in light of the deterioration of democratic standards that has been pushing the country towards an authoritarian model over the past decade, accelerating recently with the politically motivated arrest of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s main political opponent, Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Ekrem İmamoğlu;

    2.  Stresses that EU membership is contingent on fulfilling the accession (Copenhagen) criteria, which require stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and the protection of minorities, good neighbourly relations, respect for international law and alignment with the EU CFSP; further notes that these are absolute criteria, not issues subject to transactional strategic considerations and negotiations; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process;

    3.  Regrets, in this regard, that the aforementioned positive statements have not been accompanied by any concrete actions by the Turkish authorities to close the persistent and vast gap between Türkiye and the EU on values and standards, particularly with regard to the fundamentals of the accession process; reiterates its previously adopted conclusion that the Turkish Government continues to show, as it has done for the past few years, a clear lack of political will to carry out the necessary reforms to reactivate the accession process and continues to pursue a deeply entrenched authoritarian understanding of the presidential system;

    4.  Acknowledges the strategic and geopolitical importance of Türkiye, and its increasing presence and influence in areas critical to international security, such as the Black Sea region, including Ukraine, and the Middle East; reiterates that Türkiye is a strategic partner and NATO ally, and a country with which the EU has close relations in the areas of security, trade, economy and migration; welcomes closer cooperation between Türkiye and the EU, to which the Turkish Government has made frequent reference, but stresses that this cannot in any way be a substitute for the necessary real progress which Türkiye, as a candidate country, needs to make with regard to meeting the fundamental requirements for accession; highlights, in this regard, that there are no shortcuts in the accession process and that no argument can be put forward to avoid discussing the democratic principles which are at the core of the accession process;

    5.  Notes that the Commission’s Türkiye report 2024 paints a more positive picture of reform implementation in the context of Türkiye’s accession process than the Türkiye report 2023, shifting from further deterioration to ‘no progress’ with regard to the rule of law and human rights issues; is of the opinion, however, that at least in key areas such as democracy, rule of law and fundamental rights, this is due to the fact that a very low point had already been reached and this situation has remained unchanged;

    6.  Further takes note of a nuanced shift in focus of the Türkiye report 2024, by contrast with the 2023 report, away from the accession process towards a strategic partnership between the European Union und Türkiye; is of the opinion that the critical state of the accession process is driving the Commission and the Council to focus merely on the partnership dimension of the EU’s relations with Türkiye, as is also reflected in the joint communication on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations of 29 November 2023, and of 22 March 2021; highlights the increasing shift towards a different framework for the relationship, which might come at the expense of the accession process;

    The core of the accession process: democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights

    7.  Considers that, in terms of human rights and the rule of law, Parliament’s recent resolutions on the matter remain valid in light of the continued dire human rights situation and democratic backsliding in Türkiye over the last year; fully endorses the latest resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the related report by its Monitoring Committee, as well as the resolutions adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which depict in detail the wide range of serious shortfalls in human rights constantly reported by locally and internationally renowned human rights organisations;

    8.  Notes the Turkish Government’s stated commitment to judicial reform and the introduction of measures of an organisational nature; highlights, however, the need to introduce structural measures ensuring judicial independence; deeply regrets that, despite a reform strategy with nine judicial reform packages, the state of independence of the judiciary in Türkiye remains desolate following systematic government interference in and political instrumentalisation of the judicial system; deplores, in this regard, the weakening of remaining constitutional review mechanisms, particularly individual applications, and the frequent violations of due process;

    9.  Is dismayed by the persecution of legal professionals, including most recently the lawsuit filed by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office that resulted in the removal of the leadership of the Istanbul Bar Association on charges of ‘making propaganda for a terrorist organization’ and ‘publicly disseminating misleading information’ for having asked for an investigation into the murders of two Kurdish journalists in Syria, and in the imprisonment of one of the members of the Istanbul Bar Association’s executive board following his trip to Strasbourg to hold meetings with Council of Europe institutions;

    10.  Is alarmed by the blatant lack of implementation of decisions by the Constitutional Court, including in the case of MP Can Atalay, which has turned into a serious judicial crisis, with the Court of Cassation filing a criminal complaint against nine judges of the Constitutional Court; is worried by the recent decision of the Court of Cassation to overturn the sentences of and release the terrorists involved in the ISIS attack at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport, which claimed 45 lives in 2016;

    11.  Calls on Türkiye to strengthen its commitment to democratic governance, especially through reforms that ensure an independent judiciary; takes notes of the recent announcement of the Fourth Judicial Reform Strategy, spanning 2025-2029; calls on the Turkish Government to move from the superficial changes made so far through the recurrent reform packages and action plans to a profound and long overdue reform that will address, through real political will, the serious and structural shortcomings of Türkiye’s judiciary; stresses that putting an end to political interference in the judiciary requires no strategy or reform package but merely the political will to do so;

    12.  Remains deeply concerned by the continued deterioration of democratic standards and relentless crackdown by the Turkish authorities on any critical voices by means of a growing battery of repressive laws, the regular misuse of counterterrorism laws, including their application in relation to minors (as in the ‘Kız Çocukları Davası’ trial), the disproportionate use of the crime of insulting a public official, the extensive use of secret witnesses and dormant cases in flawed judicial proceedings, and the recurrent practice of exaggerated night arrests and home raids to portray targeted persons as extremely dangerous;

    13.  Welcomes the withdrawal in November 2024 of the draft amendment to Türkiye’s espionage laws, known as the ‘agent of influence’ law; urges the Turkish authorities to refrain from reintroducing a similar overly broad and vague law in the future, given the serious risk that it would be used as a tool to further criminalise the legitimate activities of civil society organisations within the country; calls on the Turkish authorities to ensure that the recently approved cybersecurity bill will serve its legitimate purpose of protecting data privacy and national security without giving way to potential infringements of fundamental rights or becoming another tool for further repression; stresses that the judicial apparatus remains heavily restrictive, with a complex web of legislation serving as a tool to systematically control and silence any critical voice, such as the 2020 social media law, the 2021 anti-money laundering law and the 2022 disinformation law;

    14.  Is concerned by the recent approval of legal provisions granting extraordinary powers to the State Supervisory Council (DDK) and the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF), including the possibility for the former to dismiss public officials of all types and levels and appoint trustees, which could be used in an arbitrary manner;

    15.  Urges the Turkish authorities to put an end to the current serious restrictions on fundamental freedoms, in particular of expression, of assembly and of association, and to the constant attacks on the fundamental rights of members of the opposition, human rights defenders, lawyers, trade unionists, members of minorities, journalists, academics, artists and civil society activists, among others; strongly condemns the recent waves of mass arrest and imprisonment on politically motivated charges, and on the grounds of suspected terror links, affecting political figures, academics and journalists, including the arrests of Elif Akgül, independent journalist, Yıldız Tar, editor in chief of LGBT+ news site Kaos GL, Ender İmrek, columnist of Evrensel daily, and Joakim Medin, Swedish journalist for ETC, all well known for their work on human rights issues;

    16.  Strongly condemns the recent arrest and detention of the Swedish journalist Joakim Medin; reiterates that freedom of the press is a fundamental right and core EU value; strongly condemns the accusations made against Joakim Medin, which are solely based on his journalistic work and therefore demands his immediate and unconditional release and that of other journalists imprisoned for exercising their freedom of speech;

    17.  Deplores the continued prosecution, censorship and harassment of journalists and independent media, denying them the freedom to carry out their professional duties and inform the public, which is essential to a functioning democratic society; calls on the Turkish authorities to refrain from further attacks on independent media and to uphold fundamental rights and civil liberties such as freedom of speech and of the press; remains deeply concerned by the existing legislation that prevents an open and free internet, with lengthy prison sentences imposed for social media posts, scores of access blocks and content removal orders, and by the continued use of the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) to crack down on media criticism and even on outlets deemed to spread ‘pessimism’ instead of positive news;

    18.  Acknowledges the positive developments in relation to the partial lifting by the minister of the interior of restrictions on the weekly vigils of the Saturday Mothers, Cumartesi Anneleri, in Istanbul’s Galatasaray Square, and the recent acquittal of all 46 people prosecuted for more than 6 years in the case surrounding the organisation’s 700th gathering in August 2018; calls for the complete removal of all restrictions on their peaceful protest, in full compliance with the relevant Constitutional Court ruling, and for an end to the ongoing judicial case against several of its members and sympathisers; is concerned by the ongoing trial against prominent human rights defender Nimet Tanrıkulu, who was released on 4 March 2025 after spending 94 days in pre-trial detention; urges the Turkish authorities to ensure the immediate release of all individuals detained for exercising their fundamental freedoms;

    19.  Continues to be appalled by the Turkish authorities’, in particular the Turkish judiciary’s, continuous disregard for and failure to apply landmark ECtHR rulings; reiterates its condemnation of Türkiye’s blatant misuse of the judicial system and the refusal to release from detention human rights defender Osman Kavala and opposition politicians Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ,for which Türkiye is facing historical infringement proceedings in the Council of Europe, with long-awaited consequences yet to be determined; is appalled by the recent filing and acceptance of a new indictment against Selahattin Demirtaş in which the Diyarbakır Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office asks for up to 15 years of imprisonment and a ban on his political activities on the basis of several speeches he made in 2016; calls on Türkiye to fully comply with the ECtHR judgements related to missing persons and properties (inter alia in the Fokas case) in Cyprus; deplores the politically motivated nature of these prosecutions, which form part of a broader pattern of judicial harassment; calls on Türkiye to fully implement all judgments of the ECtHR in line with Article 46 of the ECHR and in line with the unconditional obligations derived from Article 90 of the Turkish constitution; calls on the European Commission and Member States to use all diplomatic channels to urge Türkiye to implement relevant ECtHR rulings and consider implementing relevant funding conditionality in relation to compliance with ECtHR rulings;

    20.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the European Court of Human Rights decision of 24 January 2008, which found Türkiye guilty of breaching Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, due to its failure to locate and prosecute those responsible in the case of the murders of Tassos Isaak and Solomos Solomou, which were committed in Cyprus in 1996; calls on the Turkish authorities to enforce the international arrest warrants against the murder suspects, and hand them over to the Republic of Cyprus;

    21.  Expresses its deep concern about the dire situation in Turkish prisons owing to severe overcrowding and poor living conditions, with reports, including by the Council of Europe, of torture and ill-treatment being widespread, and access to basic needs such as hygiene and information being severely limited; is particularly worried by the conditions of imprisonment of elderly and seriously ill prisoners, such as the case of Soydan Akay, who is being unjustly kept imprisoned; calls for his immediate release on humanitarian and health grounds; is concerned by the continued use of humiliating strip searches in prisons and other places of detention and by the persisting harassment of MP Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu, who is currently facing six proceedings for the removal of his parliamentary seat and immunity, among other reasons for his having denounced this very practice;

    22.  Strongly condemns the Turkish Government’s decision to dismiss, following the March 2024 local elections, the democratically elected mayors of at least 13 municipalities and districts (Hakkari, Mardin, Batman, Halfeti, Tunceli, Bahçesaray, Akdeniz, Siirt, Van and Kağızman, won by the DEM Party; and Esenyurt Ovacık and Şişli, won by CHP Party) and to replace them with government trustees appointed by the interior ministry; regards this long-standing practice of appointing trustees as a blatant attack on the most basic principles of local democracy; urges the Turkish authorities to immediately cease and reverse repression of political opposition and to respect the rights of voters to elect their chosen representatives in line with the recommendations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe and the Venice Commission; reiterates its call on the VP/HR to consider restrictive measures under the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime against Turkish officials assuming the role of trustee and those appointing them; denounces the severe repression of protests against the removal of elected mayors, including the arbitrary arrest of hundreds of protesters, some of whom were minors; regards the decision of the Turkish Government to return to this practice after the last local elections of March 2024 as a clear sign of its lack of commitment to addressing the democratic shortcomings within the country and in clear contradiction to the declared willingness to revitalise the accession process, as such actions undermine the prospects for a stronger, more comprehensive partnership with the EU and are detrimental to long-term progress towards closer cooperation;

    23.  Deplores the permanent targeting of political parties and members of the opposition, who continue to suffer increasing pressure; condemns in the strongest terms the recent arrest and removal from office of the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality CHP Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, along with the mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, in the framework of two separate investigations on alleged corruption and terrorist-related charges involving a total of 106 suspects; highlights that these last cases, which are part of a long list of 42 administrative and 51 judicial investigations since İmamoğlu’s election in 2019, were launched just a few days before the internal party election to nominate him presidential candidate and the day after the controverted decision by Istanbul University to revoke his diploma, a requisite for his eligibility to be President; is appalled by the decision to temporarily ban all demonstrations in Istanbul and other provinces across the country, and the slowdown on social media; condemns the Turkish authorities’ harsh crackdown on the peaceful mass protests, including the detention of nearly 2000 people, many of them students, and the prosecution of hundreds of them through hasty mass trials with a lack of any evidence of criminal wrongdoing; expresses its deep concern over the unlawful arrest of Esila Ayık, a Ghent-based photography student detained on 8 April 2025 during protests in Istanbul, particularly owing to her untreated heart and kidney conditions; calls for the immediate release of all those still in detention and the acquittal of all those prosecuted for exercising their fundamental rights; deplores the arrests, detentions and deportations of local and international journalists covering the protests, in violation of the freedom of the press; urges the Turkish authorities to promptly and effectively investigate all allegations of harassment and excessive use of force against protesters and to uphold the freedom of assembly and protest; considers that the attacks against İmamoğlu constitute a politically motivated move aimed at preventing a legitimate challenger from standing in the upcoming elections and that with these actions the current Turkish authorities are further pushing the country towards a fully authoritarian model; regrets the EU’s lack of a strong, unified response to these alarming developments;

    24.  Further expresses its concern about the recent separate cases against Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district CHP Mayor Rıza Akpolat, Istanbul’s Beykoz district CHP Mayor Alaattin Köseler, CHP Youth Branch Chair Cem Aydın, and Zafer Party Chair Ümit Özdag; is appalled by the brutal and relentless crackdown on any kind of criticism to which all sectors of Turkish society have recently been subjected by the Turkish authorities, as illustrated, among others, by the case of Ayşe Barım, a well-known talent manager imprisoned since 27 January 2025 for alleged involvement in the Gezi Park protest 12 years ago, the investigation launched against Orhan Turan and Ömer Aras, the president and an executive of TÜSIAD, the country’s main business group, and the indictment, with the aim of imposing hefty prison sentences, of Halk TV Editor-in-Chief Suat Toktaş and journalists Seda Selek, Barış Pehlivan, Serhan Asker and Kürşad Oğuz, who have been provisionally acquitted; is concerned by the involvement in these and other cases of recently appointed Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor Akın Gürlek, who has a long record of involvement, in different positions, in high-profile cases against political figures, and which may give grounds for considering the application of restrictive measures under the EU Human Rights sanction regime; is also concerned by the growing financial pressure on opposition municipalities and controversial announcements, such as that made in relation to day-care centres run by opposition municipalities;

    25.  Expresses its deep concern at the deterioration in women’s rights, at gender-based violence and at the increase in the incidence of femicide in Türkiye in 2024, which has been the highest since 2010, the year before the signing of the Istanbul Convention; reiterates its strong condemnation of Türkiye’s withdrawal, by presidential decree, from this international agreement and reiterates its call to reverse this decision; urges the Turkish authorities to improve the legislative framework and its implementation, including by fully applying Protection Law no. 6284, in order to effectively tackle all forms of violence against women and the practice of so-called ‘honour killings’, end the persistent policy of impunity by holding abusers to account, and advance towards gender equality, particularly with regard to the participation of women in decision-making and policymaking processes; warns against further encroachments on women’s rights, as exemplified by Türkiye’s recent ban on elective caesarean sections at private medical centres without medical justification, which constitutes an unacceptable infringement on women’s bodily autonomy;

    26.  Strongly condemns the ongoing violations and lack of protection of the fundamental rights of LGBTI+ persons in Türkiye, including the increased incidence of hate speech, hate crimes and discriminatory rhetoric, as well as continued media stereotyping based on sexual orientation and gender identity; deplores the fact that this continued discrimination is often sanctioned by the authorities, as evidenced by the mass arrests made during the Pride March in 2023 and the banning of the march in 2024, while anti-LGBTI+ marches were permitted; urges the Turkish authorities to stop banning activities against homophobia, including Pride marches, with immediate effect;

    27.  Welcomes the increased dialogue with Christian minorities, but stresses that no significant progress has been registered with regard to the protection of the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, in particular as regards their legal personality, including those of the Greek Orthodox population of the islands of Gökçeada (Imvros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos); calls for Türkiye to implement the Venice Commission recommendations and all relevant ECtHR rulings in this regard; notes with concern that representatives of different confessions, including non-Muslim and Alevi communities, continue to face bureaucratic obstacles when attempting to register places of worship; highlights that this is a violation of the right to freedom of religion and belief; calls on Türkiye to adopt the long-awaited regulation on the election of board members in non-Muslim minority foundations controlling community hospitals; reiterates its call on Türkiye to respect the role of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for Orthodox Christians all over the world and to recognise its legal personality and the public use of the ecclesiastical title of Ecumenical Patriarch; calls on Türkiye to fully respect and protect the outstanding universal value of Hagia Sophia and the Chora museum, which are inscribed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List; notes with concern that Türkiye has still not implemented two decisions of the UNESCO World Heritage Committee of 2021 and 2023 regarding its obligations to undertake special measures to protect these monuments; deplores the lack of protection of Panagia Soumela Monastery, which has been put forward for inclusion in the UNESCO World Heritage Monuments list; stresses the need to eliminate restrictions on the training, appointment and succession of clergy; welcomes the envisaged reopening of the Halki Seminary and calls for the lifting of all obstacles to its proper functioning; calls on the Turkish authorities to effectively investigate and prosecute people responsible for any hate crimes, including hate speech, committed against minorities; condemns the antisemitic statements made in the media and by high-level officials following the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on 7 October 2023; notes that all of these practices against any religious minority are incompatible with EU values;

    28.  Welcomes Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call on the PKK to lay down arms and dissolve, and to engage in a peace process, as a historic and long-awaited step that could help end a period of 40 years of violence that has caused more than 40 000 deaths; praises the efforts made by all stakeholders involved to facilitate these developments, including the constructive approach of different political leaders that was started by MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, the visits to Imrali prison granted to a delegation of the DEM Party, and the broad consultations that this party has led with other political parties; underlines that this represents a significant opportunity and must be followed by an inclusive political process, with a prominent role for the Turkish Parliament, aimed at the peaceful and sustainable resolution of the Kurdish issue in its political, social, democratic and security-related aspects; stresses the need to uphold human rights, political pluralism, and civil rights for all citizens, including Kurds; regrets the continued political repression, judicial harassment and restrictions on cultural and linguistic rights faced by Kurdish citizens, which undermine democratic principles and social cohesion;

    Regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    29.  Continues to commend Türkiye for hosting around 3,1 million refugees, including 2,9 million Syrians under temporary protection in 2024, down from 3,2 million in 2023; reiterates the importance of Türkiye’s collaboration for the effective and orderly management of migration flows; further welcomes the fact that since 2011 the EU has contributed close to EUR 10 billion to assist Türkiye in hosting refugees; notes that some EU funding has been allocated to strengthening Turkish border control and containment capabilities; welcomes the EU’s decision to allocate an additional EUR 1 billion in December 2024 to further support the healthcare, education, and integration of refugees in Türkiye since the fall of the Assad regime; at the same time, notes that these funds had already been pledged in May 2024, and therefore do not constitute new funds; calls on the Commission to ensure utmost transparency and accuracy in the allocation of funds and that EU-funded projects, particularly those related to removal centres and border control, comply with all relevant human rights standards; is alarmed by credible reports uncovering grave human rights violations at EU-funded removal centres in Türkiye and calls on the Commission to launch a transparent and independent review into the matter; notes with concern that a continuing increase in asylum applications has been registered in the Republic of Cyprus over recent years; recalls Türkiye’s obligation to take all necessary measures to halt the existing illegal migration routes and prevent the creation of new sea or land routes for illegal migration from Türkiye to the EU, particularly to Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; points out the risks related to any possible instrumentalisation of migrants by the Turkish Government; underlines the need to ensure the protection of all refugees’ and migrants’ rights and freedoms; calls on Türkiye to ensure the full and non-discriminatory implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 and the EU-Türkiye Readmission Agreement vis-à-vis all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; expresses cautious hope that developments in Syria will gradually allow an increasing number of refugees to return home; reiterates that returns should only be carried out on a voluntary basis and under conditions of safety and dignity; condemns repeated violent attacks against refugees and migrants fuelled by xenophobic rhetoric among politicians and host communities; calls on the European Commission and the EU Member States to increase their efforts to preserve humanitarian and protection space for Syrian refugees in Türkiye and to uphold the principle of non-refoulement as a cornerstone of EU policies;

    30.  Reiterates its strong interest in stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean; welcomes the continued de-escalation and positive momentum in the region and the recent climate of re-engagement between Türkiye and Greece, albeit that unresolved issues continue to affect bilateral relations; deplores the fact that Türkiye continues to violate the sovereignty and sovereign rights of EU Member States, such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, including through the promotion of the Blue Homeland doctrine; underlines that, although Turkish violations of Greek airspace have drastically decreased, violations of Greek territorial waters have risen compared to 2023, and systematic illegal fishing activities have been conducted by Turkish vessels within Greek territorial waters; expresses its deep concern that Türkiye continues to uphold a formal threat of war against Greece (casus belli), should the latter exercise its lawful right to extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles into the Aegean Sea, in accordance with Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; calls on Türkiye to fully respect the sovereignty of all EU Member States over their territorial sea and airspace, and their other sovereign rights, including the right to explore and exploit natural resources in accordance with EU and international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is part of the EU acquis; reiterates its view that the memorandum of understanding between Türkiye and Libya on delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean infringes upon the sovereign rights of third States, does not comply with the Law of the Sea and cannot produce any legal consequences for third States;

    31.  Regrets the fact that the Cyprus problem remains unresolved, and calls for serious reengagement and the political will of all parties involved to bring about peaceful UN-led negotiations, with a view to achieving real progress in the Cyprus settlement talks; welcomes the resumption of informal talks under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General on 18 and 19 March 2025, which were held in a constructive atmosphere in which both sides showed a clear commitment to making progress and continuing dialogue; welcomes the agreement between both sides on opening four crossing points, demining, establishing a youth affairs committee and launching environmental and solar energy projects, as part of a new set of confidence-building measures; encourages all sides to use this momentum to move towards the resumption of negotiations;

    32.  Strongly reaffirms its view that the only solution to the Cyprus problem is a fair, comprehensive, viable and democratic settlement, including of its external aspects, within the agreed UN framework, on the basis of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with a single international legal personality, single sovereignty, single citizenship and political equality, as set out in the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, the agreed areas of convergence and the Framework of the UN Secretary General, as well as in accordance with international law and the principles and values on which the Union is founded; strongly condemns Türkiye’s attempts to upgrade the secessionist entity’s status in occupied Cyprus, including via the Organisation of Turkic States, and calls on all states to respect Cyprus’ sovereignty according to UNSC resolutions; calls, as a matter of urgency, for the resumption of negotiations on the reunification of Cyprus under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General as soon as possible, from the point at which they were interrupted in Crans-Montana in 2017; calls on Türkiye to abandon the unacceptable proposal for a two-state solution in Cyprus and to return to the agreed basis for a solution and the UN framework; further calls on Türkiye to withdraw its troops from Cyprus and refrain from any unilateral action which would entrench the permanent division of the island and from action altering the demographic balance;

    33.  Calls on Türkiye to respect the status of the buffer zone and the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); reiterates its call for cooperation among the Republic of Cyprus, Türkiye, the United Kingdom and the UN to implement concrete measures for a demilitarisation of the buffer zone, and to improve security on the island; urges Türkiye and the Turkish Cypriot leadership to reverse all unilateral actions and violations within and in the vicinity of the buffer zone and refrain from any further such actions and provocations; condemns the ongoing ‘opening’ of Varosha by Türkiye, as this negatively alters the situation on the ground, undermines mutual trust and negatively impacts the prospects for the resumption of direct talks on the comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem; calls on Türkiye to reverse its illegal actions in violation of UN Security Council resolutions 550(1984) and 789(1992) on Varosha, which call on Türkiye to transfer the area of Varosha to its lawful inhabitants under the temporary administration of the UN, and to withdraw from Strovilia and facilitate the full implementation of the Pyla Understanding;

    34.  Reiterates its deep concern regarding all unilateral actions which aim at entrenching on the ground the permanent division of Cyprus as opposed to its reunification; condemns, in this context, the recent illegal visit of President Erdoğan to the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus, as well as his provocative statements, which jeopardise the efforts of the UN, the EU, the international community at large and other parties involved for the resumption of substantial negotiations in the agreed framework; regrets that such unilateral actions are tantamount to a direct illegitimate intervention against the interests of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities;

    35.  Reiterates its call on Türkiye to give the Turkish Cypriot community the necessary space to act in accordance with its role as a legitimate community of the island, which is a right guaranteed by the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; reiterates its call on the Commission to step up its efforts to engage with the Turkish Cypriot community, with a view to facilitating the resolution of the Cyprus problem and recalling that its place is in the European Union; calls for all parties involved to demonstrate a more courageous approach to bringing the communities together; stresses the need for the EU body of law to be implemented across the entire island following a comprehensive resolution of the Cyprus problem;

    36.  Takes note of the significant work of the Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus (CMP) and calls for improved access to occupied military zones by the Turkish army, access to its military archives and information as to the relocation of remains from former to subsequent burial sites; remains deeply concerned about the education and religious restrictions and impediments faced by the enclaved Greek Cypriots; calls on Türkiye to step up its cooperation with the Council of Europe and its relevant bodies and institutions, to address their key recommendations, to fully implement the European Convention of Human Rights with regard to respecting the freedom of religion and the freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to access and enjoy cultural heritage, and to stop the deliberate destruction of cultural and religious heritage; condemns the repeated attempts by Türkiye to intimidate and silence Turkish Cypriot journalists, trade unionists, human rights defenders and progressive citizens in the Turkish Cypriot community, thus violating their right to freedom of opinion and expression; calls on Türkiye to halt its proclaimed aggressive policy of the sale and exploitation of Greek Cypriot properties, a policy designed to create irreversible effects on the ground and which completely disregards the European Code of Human Rights ruling on this issue;

    37.  Regrets Türkiye’s continuing refusal to comply with aviation law and establish a channel of communication between air traffic control centres in Türkiye and the Republic of Cyprus, the absence of which entails real safety risks and dangers as identified by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the International Federation of Air Line Pilots’ Associations; regrets, too, its denial of access to vessels under the flag of one Member State to the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles; takes the view that these could be areas where Türkiye can prove its commitment to confidence building measures and calls on Türkiye to collaborate by fully implementing EU aviation law; regrets that Türkiye has continued its attempts to impede the implementation of the Great Sea Interconnector, an EU project of common interest, and has persisted in its plans for an illegal electricity interconnector with the occupied area of Cyprus;

    38.  Regrets that for 20 years Türkiye has refused to implement the obligations assumed towards the EU, including those in relation to Cyprus, as per the Negotiating Framework of October 2005; stresses that recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process; reiterates its call on Türkiye to fulfil its obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement in relation to all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus; further calls on Türkiye to ensure that the human and political rights of all Cypriots are fully respected and that compliance with the fundamental principles of the European Union and the European acquis is guaranteed;

    39.  Affirms its support for a free, secure and stable future for Syria and its citizens and highlights the need for an inclusive and peaceful political transition process that is Syrian-led and Syrian- owned, including the protection and inclusion of religious and ethnic communities; expresses its commitment to constructive cooperation between the EU and Türkiye to that end, on humanitarian aid, promoting a sustainable political solution in Syria, and the fight against DAESH, given that Türkiye has a key role in promoting stability in the region; recalls that Syria’s sovereignty must be restored; acknowledges the importance of rebuilding Syria’s economy as a pillar of long-term stability and prosperity for the region; calls on Türkiye to respect Syria’s territorial integrity and sovereignty and immediately cease all attacks and incursions on and occupation of Syrian territory in full compliance with international law; condemns the attacks carried out in recent weeks, taking advantage of the collapse of the Assad regime, by Turkish-backed militias against Syrian Kurdish forces in the north of Syria; expresses deep concern, as these attacks increase the number of internally displaced persons but also threaten the efficiency and continuity of the fight against Daesh; notes that its ongoing presence risks further destabilising and undermining efforts towards a sustainable political resolution in Syria; further notes that, citing security concerns, Türkiye also illegally occupies areas in Iraq; reiterates that civilian populations should never be the victim of military self-defence; calls for the necessary investigation into the cases in which there have been civilian casualties and to stop the crackdown on journalists working in the area; calls on Türkiye to support the process of implementing the agreement between the Syrian transitional government and the Kurdish-led SDF and refrain from any interference in Syria’s internal processes;

    40.  Supports the normalisation of relations between Armenia and Türkiye in the interests of reconciliation, good neighbourly relations, regional stability and security and socio-economic development, and welcomes the progress achieved so far; welcomes the continued efforts to restore links between the two countries; urges Türkiye to ensure the speedy implementation of agreements reached by the Turkish and Armenian Governments’ special representatives, such as the opening of the airspace and the border between the two countries for the third country nationals, and, subsequently, for holders of diplomatic passports; welcomes the temporary opening of the Margara-Alican border crossing between Armenia and Türkiye to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid to Syria; expresses the hope that these developments may give impetus to the normalisation of relations in the South Caucasus region, also in terms of security and socio-economic development, and stresses the EU’s interest in supporting this process; encourages Türkiye to play a constructive role in promoting regional stability by facilitating the swift conclusion of the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, inter alia by exerting its influence on Azerbaijan and by deterring Azerbaijan from any further military action against Armenian sovereignty; encourages Türkiye once again to acknowledge the Armenian genocide in order to pave the way for genuine reconciliation between the Turkish and Armenian peoples and to fully respect its obligations to protect Armenian cultural heritage;

    41.  Notes that Türkiye’s stance in relation to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine continues to affect EU-Türkiye relations, as Türkiye attempts to maintain ties with both the West and Russia simultaneously; notes Türkiye’s diplomatic attempts to mediate between Russia and Ukraine, particularly regarding the Black Sea Grain Initiative, as well as its continued support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, including its vote in favour of UN General Assembly resolutions condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine; regrets that, on the other hand, trade between Türkiye and Russia has risen sharply since the start of the war in Ukraine, making Türkiye Russia’s second largest trading partner despite EU sanctions against Russia, and that Türkiye is the only NATO member state not having imposed any sanctions on Russia; further notes that the European Union’s anti-fraud office, OLAF, has initiated an investigation into a loophole that enables countries like Türkiye to rebrand sanctioned Russian oil and export it to the EU; welcomes, however, positive steps such as Türkiye’s blocking of exports to Russia for certain dual use goods, as well as products originating in the United States and the United Kingdom that are of benefit to Russian military action; reiterates its call on the Turkish Government to halt its plans for the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, which will be built, operated and owned by Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom; expresses concern at Türkiye’s ongoing discussions with Russia to establish a gas-trading hub in Istanbul, scheduled to begin operations in 2025;

    42.  Welcomes Türkiye’s participation in various crisis management missions and operations (within the framework of the common security and defence policy); regrets, however, the further deterioration in the level of alignment on common foreign and security policy positions, including on sanctions and countering the circumvention of sanctions, which has fallen to a historically low rate of 5 %, the lowest rate for any accession country; recalls that EU candidate countries are required to progressively align with the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and comply with international law; regrets that Türkiye has not undertaken any steps in this regard, notably by failing to align with EU sanctions against Russia, and that in many areas of mutual interest the foreign policies of the EU and Türkiye are worryingly divergent; urges Türkiye to align with and fully implement the EU sanctions against Russia, including on anti-circumvention measures and to cooperate closely with the EU’s Sanctions Envoy;

    43.  Stresses the importance of reinforcing EU-Türkiye cooperation in global security matters, particularly in light of the changing geopolitical landscape and potential shifts in US foreign policy; expresses cautious hope that recent informal engagement, such as the participation of the Turkish Foreign Minister in the informal meeting of EU foreign affairs ministers in 2024, may provide an impetus towards better relations; acknowledges Türkiye’s key role as an ally in NATO and welcomes the Turkish Parliament’s decision to ratify Sweden’s NATO accession in January 2024; recalls, in this regard, that Türkiye has a key responsibility to foster stability at both regional and global levels and is expected to act in line with its NATO obligations, especially given the current geopolitical upheavals; encourages constructive engagement in a more structured and frequent political dialogue on foreign, security and defence policy to seek collaboration on convergent interests while working to reduce divergences, particularly with regard to removing persistent obstacles to the enhancement of a genuine relationship between the EU and NATO, including the acquisition from Russia of the S-400 air defence system; remains duly concerned that Türkiye continues to exclude a Member State from cooperation with NATO;

    44.  Welcomes Türkiye’s long-standing position in favour of a two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, its calls for a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war, and its ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid to Gaza throughout the conflict; deeply regrets, at the same time, the Turkish authorities’, including the President’s, active support for the EU-listed terror group Hamas and their stance on the attack against Israel on 7 October 2023, which the Turkish Government failed to condemn; points out that Türkiye’s open support for Hamas and its refusal to designate it a terrorist organisation is not compatible with the EU’s foreign and security policy; calls, therefore, for a revision of this position;

    45.  Notes with concern that Türkiye has asked to be a member of BRICS+ and been offered ‘partner country’ status, and is considering the same for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where it holds the status of a dialogue partner; expresses serious concern over Türkiye’s increasing interest in an alternative partnership framework, which is fundamentally incompatible with the EU accession process; insists that Türkiye’s new status as a BRICS partner country must not affect Türkiye’s responsibilities within NATO; notes that Türkiye has been cultivating cooperation formats, partnerships and regional alliances beyond the EU; is concerned by Türkiye’s tendency to use this multi-vector approach to advance its interests without committing to a full-fledged cooperation with any of these alliances;

    46.  Remains concerned by the Turkish Government’s use of the Turkish diaspora as an instrument for occasional meddling in EU Member States’ domestic policies;

    Socio-economic and sustainability reforms

    47.  Welcomes Türkiye’s return to a more conventional economic and monetary policy, while maintaining robust growth and a moderate budget deficit; regrets, however, that the cost of this is yet again being borne by citizens in the form of higher interest rates; highlights that social vulnerabilities have increased, particularly among children and older people, primarily due to the absence of a comprehensive poverty reduction strategy and income inequalities; underlines the necessity for the Turkish authorities to implement comprehensive social protection measures, strengthen collective bargaining rights and ensure that economic reforms prioritise reducing inequality and creating decent work opportunities;

    48.  Regrets the fact that despite the progress observed in economic and monetary policies, other actions by the Turkish Government affecting the rule of law continue to undermine basic principles such as legal certainty, which impacts negatively on Türkiye’s potential capacity to receive investments; welcomes the removal of Türkiye from the grey list of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in June 2024, following significant progress in improving its anti-money laundering regime and combating the financing of terrorism;

    49.  Welcomes Türkiye’s increased investment activity in the green energy sector and calls on Türkiye to continue improving the compatibility of its energy policy with the EU acquis, exploiting Türkiye’s enormous potential in renewable energy; expresses concern about the lack of any significant progress on climate action, in particular owing to the absence of a comprehensive climate law, a domestic emissions trading system, and a long-term low-emission development strategy, which undermines its 2053 climate neutrality target; highlights the need for a robust legal framework and stricter enforcement mechanisms to safeguard environmental and natural resources; urges Türkiye to align its environmental policies with the EU acquis, including respecting natural habitats when conducting mining projects, and underlines the importance of Türkiye’s adherence to the Aarhus Convention; commends the work of environmental rights defenders in Türkiye and warns against the dire environmental impact of extensive government projects, such as the expansion of its copper mining activities in Mount Ida (Kaz Daglari);

    50.  Highlights the fact that Türkiye has taken steps to diversify energy supplies and increase its renewable energy share; notes that the country is the seventh largest LNG market and highlights its potential as a regional energy hub; takes note that Türkiye has subscribed to the global goals on energy efficiency and renewable energy capacity by 2030; calls on the Commission to take into account Türkiye’s potential as a regional energy hub in initiatives to increase the installed renewable capacity in the Mediterranean region and in the development of the New Pact for the Mediterranean, and calls for energy cooperation to be part of the common agenda;

    51.  Observes some improvements in labour market conditions and points out a number of pending critical challenges, such as informal employment, the gender gap, and income inequality; is worried about the low coverage of collective bargaining and the lack of recognition of trade union rights for certain public sector employees; believes that more efforts are needed to enhance social dialogue mechanisms and address emerging occupational safety challenges; recalls that trade union freedom and social dialogue are crucial to the development and prosperity of a pluralistic society; deplores, in this regard, the recent detentions of trade unionists including Remzi Çalişkan, vice-president of the DISK confederation, and president of Genel-Iş, who was released after a month in prison, Kemal Göksoy, President of the Mersin Branch of Genel-İş, who remains in prison, and Mehmet Türkmen, chair of the textile sector union BİRTEK SEN, who was detained on 14 February 2025;

    Wider EU-Türkiye relations

    52.  Reiterates its firm conviction that, beyond the currently frozen accession process, Türkiye is a country of strategic relevance, a key partner for the stability of the wider region and plays an important role in addressing security challenges, migration management, counterterrorism, and energy security; stresses the importance of maintaining constructive dialogue and deepening cooperation in areas of mutual strategic interest; points towards a number of policy areas for future engagement, whether it be the green transition, trade, energy, a modernised customs union and visa liberalisation, among others; recalls, however, that democratic backsliding and non-alignment with the CFSP are not conducive to significant progress being made in that regard; reaffirms that the EU is committed to pursuing the best possible relations with Türkiye, based on dialogue, respect and mutual trust, in line with international law and good neighbourly relations;

    53.  Stresses the importance of encouraging deeper partnership in all economic sectors, to the benefit of the EU and all of its Member States and Türkiye; notes in particular the importance of cooperation in the fields of energy, innovation, artificial intelligence, health, security and migration management, among others; in this regard, notes that various high-level dialogues (HLDs) were held recently, including the HLD on trade and the HLD on economy, as steps towards pragmatic forms of cooperation in areas of mutual importance; calls again for the resumption of all relevant HLDs and for the establishment of structured HLDs on sectoral cooperation, to address common challenges and explore opportunities, on the condition that such cooperation must go hand-in-hand with clear and consistent conditionality grounded in respect for democratic principles, the rule of law and fundamental rights, as previously underlined in this resolution;

    54.  Stands ready to support an upgraded customs union with a broader, mutually beneficial scope, which could encompass a wide range of areas of common interest, including digitalisation, Green Deal alignment for green energy policies, public procurement, sustainable development commitments, and due diligence, contributing to the economic security of both sides; supports accompanying this upgraded customs union with an efficient and effective dispute settlement mechanism; underlines the fact that for Parliament to give its consent at the end of the process, such a modernisation would need to be based on strong conditionality related to human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for international law and good neighbourly relations, including Türkiye’s full implementation of the Additional Protocol on extending the Ankara Agreement to all Member States without exception and in a non-discriminatory fashion;

    55.  Notes with deep regret that no progress has been made by Türkiye towards meeting the required benchmarks for visa liberalisation; reiterates its willingness to start the visa liberalisation process as soon as the Turkish authorities fully fulfil the six clearly outstanding benchmarks in a non-discriminatory manner vis-à-vis all EU Member states while aligning with EU visa policy; regrets that Turkish citizens are facing problems with visa requests/applications to EU Member States owing to a marked increase in demand and fears of abuse of the system; recognises, however, the political commitment to improving access to visas and calls for intensified efforts on both sides to address the remaining technical and administrative barriers; calls on the EU Member States to increase the resources allocated to this matter; supports measures on visa facilitation, particularly with regard to business activities and Erasmus students; deeply regrets the constant attempts by the Turkish authorities to blame the EU for not making progress on this dossier, while not taking any necessary steps to comply with the remaining benchmarks; reminds Türkiye that the lack of tangible and cumulative progress on the pending conditions has a direct impact on business activities and Erasmus students; appreciates the invaluable contribution of Erasmus+ exchanges in providing rich cross-cultural educational opportunities; regrets, however, the poor oversight on the part of the Commission, exemplified by the Erasmus partnership with Gaziantep Islam Science and Technology University, whose leadership publicly expressed support for terrorist acts; calls on the Commission to ensure that partner universities respect the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights by conducting ex ante verifications and regular controls;

    The way forward for EU-Türkiye relations

    56.  Considers, in view of the above, that the Turkish Government has failed to take the necessary steps to address the existing fundamental democratic shortcomings within the country and therefore reiterates its view that Türkiye’s EU accession process cannot be resumed in the current circumstances, despite the democratic and pro-European aspirations of a large part of Turkish society; recalls that, as in the case of any other candidate, the accession process is contingent on full compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and on the normalisation of relations with all EU Member States;

    57.  Urges the Turkish Government and the EU institutions and Member States to continue working, beyond the currently frozen accession process, on the basis of the relevant Council and European Council conclusions and the established conditionality, towards a closer, more dynamic and strategic partnership with particular emphasis on climate action, energy security, counter-terrorism cooperation and regional stability; insists on the need to begin a process of reflection on how this new constructive and progressive framework for EU-Türkiye relations can encompass the interests of all parties involved, for example by modernising and enhancing the current Association Agreement; underlines that such a positive process must be based on and matched by tangible progress in Türkiye as regards CFSP alignment, democracy, the rule of law and respect for fundamental values;

    58.  Considers the joint communication of 29 November 2023 on the state of play of EU-Türkiye relations a good basis on which to move forward in the overall relations between the EU and Türkiye; regrets the lack of a clear political endorsement of this joint communication so far by the Council; reiterates that recognition of all EU Member States is a necessary component of any agreement between the EU and Türkiye; stresses that Türkiye’s constructive engagement, including in relation to the Cyprus problem, remains key to advancing closer cooperation between the EU and Türkiye;

    59.  Warns, nevertheless, that a further drift towards authoritarianism by the Turkish authorities, such as we have been witnessing recently, will ultimately have a severe impact on all dimensions of EU-Türkiye relations, including trade and security cooperation, as it prevents the trust and reliability needed between partners and antagonises both sides in the current geopolitical scene;

    60.  Continues to acknowledge and commend the democratic and pro-European aspirations of the majority of Turkish society (particularly among Turkish youth), whom the EU will not forsake; regards these aspirations as a major reason for keeping Türkiye’s accession process alive; calls therefore on the Commission to uphold and increase its political and financial support to the vibrant and pro-democratic civil society in Türkiye, whose efforts can contribute to generating the political will necessary for deepening EU-Türkiye relations; highlights, nevertheless, that the resumption of the accession process depends on the unwavering political will of Türkiye’s authorities and society to become a full-fledged democracy, which cannot be forced upon it by the EU;

    61.  Reiterates its call to strengthen and deepen mutual knowledge and understanding between our societies, promoting cultural growth, socio-cultural exchanges and combating all manifestations of social, religious, ethnic or cultural prejudice; encourages Türkiye and the EU to promote shared values, particularly by supporting young people; reiterates its utmost commitment to sustaining and increasing support for Türkiye’s independent civil society;

    o
    o   o

    62.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the President of the European Council, the Council and the Commission; asks that this resolution be translated into Turkish and forwarded to the President, Government and Parliament of the Republic of Türkiye.

    (1) OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, p. 3, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_internation/2014/252/oj.
    (2) OJ C, C/2024/1760, 22.3.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/1760/oj.
    (3) OJ C 493, 27.12.2022, p. 2.
    (4) OJ C 425, 20.10.2021, p. 143.
    (5) OJ C, C/2024/6746, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6746/oj.
    (6) OJ C 328, 6.9.2016, p. 2.
    (7) OJ C 465, 6.12.2022, p. 112.
    (8) OJ C, C/2025/206, 14.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/206/oj.
    (9) Texts adopted, P10_TA(2025)0016.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-Evening Report: From GPS to weather forecasts: the hidden ways Australia relies on foreign satellites

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Cassandra Steer, Chair, Australian Centre for Space Governance, Australian National University

    Japan Meteorological Agency via Wikimedia

    You have probably used space at least 20 times today. Satellites let you buy a coffee with your phone, book a rideshare, navigate your way to meet someone, and check the weather.

    Satellites are also essential for monitoring floods, cyclones and bushfires, and supporting the people they affect. Farmers depend on satellite data, too, as does everyone trying to understand and tackle climate change, not to mention our military.

    Yet Australia’s access to space services depends almost entirely on satellites owned and run by foreign governments and companies. In an increasingly uncertain world, having our own sovereign space technology is becoming even more important for security.

    But what exactly do we need to secure? And how can space help us do it? My colleagues and I at the Australian Centre for Space Governance have thought through these questions and presented them in a policy paper series – and we have some recommendations for the government.

    Space services are essential

    Since 2022, the Australian government has considered space technology to be “critical infrastructure”. In other words, if the space-based services we use were destroyed or disrupted, it “would have a debilitating impact on Australia’s defence and national security, a destabilising effect on the population, and cause significant damage to the economy”.

    However, Australia is entirely dependent on foreign partners for space-based services such as communications and Earth observation.

    Another crucial kind of satellite-powered service is “position, navigation and timing” – things like GPS, which is owned and operated by the US government. Even a temporary loss of these services could pose significant risks to Australia’s telecommunications and energy systems, as well as disaster response.

    According to Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy, space capabilities are “equally as important as the maritime, land and air domains”. But we are in many respects simply users of space infrastructure that belongs to partner countries for our military needs. There are opportunities to increase our role in these partnerships if we place more emphasis on how Australia can be a contributor.

    An uncertain world

    Almost all the satellite data that supports our agriculture, banking, transport, climate monitoring, bushfire and flood response – and connects rural, remote and regional Australians – comes from the US, Europe and Japan. This dependency poses significant risks.

    If any of those countries have to prioritise their own national needs in a natural disaster – such as the Sea of Japan earthquake in January last year – we might lose access. Even temporary loss of service can be disruptive, such as the temporary outage in 2023 of a UK satellite that impacted farmers in Australia and New Zealand.

    The same might happen if any of those countries stopped providing data for political or national security reasons.

    These risks are only increasing as our dependency on satellite services grows, and our relationship with the United States may become less certain.

    What do we want from space?

    Many of Australia’s international partners are also questioning their dependence on the US, and prioritising their domestic needs. Many have national space policies, or at least a clear idea of what sovereign space capabilities they want to invest in. This is what Australia needs, too.

    Greater cooperation on new space technologies could help our shared interests with our neighbours. Obvious areas include regional security, climate response, supporting agriculture, and internet connectivity needs.

    One obstacle, as we discovered when we ran a national public opinion survey last year, is that Australia doesn’t have a clear vision of what it wants from space.

    In government, too, there is little shared understanding of how satellites and related infrastructure feed in to our national priorities and needs.

    At present, thinking about space is usually the domain of specialists in government. But a better option would be “mainstreaming” space – making it part of the everyday, business-as-usual thinking of policymakers across government.

    Sovereign satellites

    Our country already excels at what’s called the “ground segment” for space – things like satellite dishes and data management. One example is the satellite dish operated by Geoscience Australia in Alice Springs, on land leased from the Indigenous-owned business, the Centre for Appropriate Technology. But we don’t have any sovereign satellites.

    In 2023, the government scrapped a billion-dollar project including four Earth-observation satellites, citing budget constraints. In 2024, a planned military-grade satellite communications system worth $7 billion was also cancelled due to lack of cash.

    But in 2025, it’s a new term of government. New minister for industry and science Tim Ayres may revisit these decisions. It certainly aligns with his support for a “Future Made in Australia”.

    This time around, the space industry and researchers will need to do a better job at communicating why satellites matter so much to our national well-being and security.

    Cassandra Steer has received funding in the past from the Department of Defence, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Geoscience Australia and Home Affairs. She is Chair and founder of the Australian Centre for Space Governance.

    ref. From GPS to weather forecasts: the hidden ways Australia relies on foreign satellites – https://theconversation.com/from-gps-to-weather-forecasts-the-hidden-ways-australia-relies-on-foreign-satellites-256440

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI USA: PHOTO: Cornyn Meets with UT San Antonio President

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) met yesterday with University of Texas at San Antonio (UTSA) President Taylor Eighmy and other system leaders to discuss their leading academic programs, merger with UT Health Science Center at San Antonio, and their research efforts in hypersonics. See photo below.

    This image is in the public domain, but those wishing to do so may credit the Office of U.S. Senator John Cornyn.
    Senator John Cornyn, a Republican from Texas, is a member of the Senate Finance, Judiciary, Intelligence, Foreign Relations, and Budget Committees.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn Introduces Mission to MARS Act

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) today introduced the Mission to Modernize Astronautic Resources for Space (MARS) Act, which would improve and modernize Johnson Space Center’s (JSC) infrastructure to prepare National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for human missions to the moon and Mars:
    “Throughout history, America has pioneered human space exploration and boldly charted the path into the great unknown,” said Sen. Cornyn. “I am proud to lead this legislation to not only send humans back to the moon, but to the next frontier of Mars, where technological advancements and untold scientific discoveries await.”
    Background:
    The Mission to MARS Act would bolster Johnson Space Center’s human spaceflight infrastructure by:
    Preparing the Neutral Buoyancy Lab for commercial space station training, lunar-suited operations, and collaborations with the Department of Defense;
    Upgrading and repairing the Astromaterials Curation and Research facility for samples from the moon and Mars;
    Modernizing the Mission Control Center to prepare for crewed missions beyond low-Earth orbit;
    Improving Ellington Field astronaut flight training facilities;
    Constructing the space food systems laboratory;
    And refurbishing astronaut training aircraft.
    This legislation aligns with Governor Greg Abbott’s Texas Space Commission’s efforts to further cement Texas as a leader in space exploration, and it supports President Trump’s call during his Joint Address to Congress to “conquer the vast frontiers of science” and “lead humanity into space and plant the American flag on the planet Mars and even far beyond.” As the space race with China accelerates, we must take steps to strengthen our national security and ensure American ingenuity is not weaponized against us. By staying one step ahead of this adversary in our missions to the moon and Mars, this legislation would help reinforce America’s standing as the preeminent global power in space.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Giving Students Access to Healthy Local Food at School

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul today announced that $10 million has been awarded to two projects through round two of New York’s Regional School Food Infrastructure Grant Program. Projects on Long Island and in Central New York were awarded $5 million each to improve meal preparation and distribution for Kindergarten through Grade 12 students using local agricultural products. First announced in the Governor’s 2023 State of the State, the program will provide a total $50 million over five years to eligible applicants in all ten regions of New York State to facilitate the on-site processing and preparation of fresh, nutritious meals; increase the use of more healthy, local New York food products; and provide a boost to New York farmers.

    “Every New Yorker deserves access to fresh, locally grown, nutritious foods to eat,” Governor Hochul said. “This program is a great example of how we’re working together to connect the dots within our food systems, reduce food insecurity and support our producers. I congratulate the awardees and look forward to seeing these projects come to fruition.”

    Administered by the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets, the Regional School Food Infrastructure Grant Program is providing critical funding for schools to aggregate, store, process and prepare farm products, making it possible to cook fresh, nutritious, scratch made meals for school children. The program also encourages workforce development by providing training to schools, communities and students for culinary arts, food processing, safe food handling and storage, logistics, delivery and more based on community need.

    The projects awarded in round two are:

    • East End Food Institute (Long Island) is being awarded $5 million to continue work on their Food Hub, which is positioned to serve as a centralized hub for food aggregation, processing and distribution in the Long Island Region. The project will focus on addressing logistical challenges that schools and institutions face in sourcing local food, such as constraints around bidding, pricing and distribution. East End Food Institute will incorporate workforce development training into the project by providing staff with training focused on food preparation and production. This project will support the following districts, Southampton Union Free School District, Westhampton Beach School District, Riverhead Central School District (CSD), Copiague School District, North Shore School District, and Half Hollow Hills School District.
    • Onondaga County Health Department (Central NY) is being awarded $5 million to develop a food business venture space to increase school access to New York State grown products across the Central New York region. To increase farm-to-school opportunities, this project will support the development of an expanded warehouse and distribution center to be rented and operated by Russo Produce, and a processing facility to be rented and operated by Upstate New York Growers & Packers. The facility will provide significant community-level benefits, including opportunity for strengthening the farm network in the region and beyond by providing meeting and office spaces. This project will support the following districts: Syracuse City School District, Auburn City School District, Baldwinsville CSD, Cazenovia CSD, Fayetteville-Manlius CSD, Lafayette CSD, Liverpool CSD, Marcellus CSD, Sandy Creek CSD, Southern Cayuga CSD, Syracuse Academy of Sciences, and West Genesee CSD.

    State Agriculture Commissioner Richard A. Ball said, “Ensuring our schools have the equipment they need to cook from scratch and use ingredients made by our farmers and producers is a crucial component of getting New York food directly into our communities. The Regional School Food Infrastructure program provides an opportunity to collaborate with our partners across the state to strengthen our food system and provide delicious, healthy and locally sourced meals to our students while supporting our farmers. I congratulate the awardees and thank Governor Hochul for her support of this program, which will have a lasting impact on our Long Island and Central New York communities.”

    In each of the five rounds of the program, two regions will be awarded $5 million each, until all regions are awarded. Funding from the first round of the program was awarded to projects in the North Country and in Western New York.

    State Education Commissioner Betty A. Rosa said, “The New York State Education Department is committed to ensuring that every student has access to the nutritious meals they need to grow, thrive, and reach their full academic and personal potential. Through the Regional School Food Infrastructure Grant Program—and in partnership with our colleagues at the Department of Agriculture and Markets—we’re helping to make certain that New York’s students receive the nutritious meals they need to be successful academically and meet the demands of a rigorous school day.”

    East End Food Executive Director Marci Moreau said, “East End Food extends our deepest thanks to Governor Hochul and the New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets. Their investment is transformational—for our schools, our farmers, and most importantly, our children. With this support, we can break down the barriers that have kept fresh, local food out of school cafeterias for too long. We’re building a regional food system that nourishes every student with dignity and health, while uplifting the producers who feed us. This is what the power of food looks like when community, equity, and sustainability come first. We are truly elated and honored to be part of this movement!”

    State Senator Michelle Hinchey said, “Every student in New York deserves access to healthy school meals made with local ingredients from New York farms. Farm-to-school programs help make that possible, but only if schools have the infrastructure to cook, store, and serve fresh food. This grant program delivers the capital needed to build those systems, helping our farmers gain reliable, in-state markets and making sure our kids are eating nutritious, high-quality food. Congratulations to the school districts on Long Island and in Central New York that will benefit from these critical investments.”

    Assemblymember Donna Lupardo said, “The Regional School Food Infrastructure Grant Program supports schools and other institutions in their efforts to incorporate fresh, local produce into the meals they serve. The program promotes healthy eating and supports hardworking farmers all while strengthening local food systems, making it especially impactful. These critical infrastructure investments will benefit multiple schools districts across two regions, paying dividends for years to come.”

    Onondaga County Executive Ryan McMahon said, “Onondaga County and Central New York is blessed with a rich and diverse agricultural economy and my administration has worked diligently to support and grow access to our abundance of fresh locally grown products. Thanks this important grant from our partners at New York Ag & Markets, we will be able to expand our efforts exponentially while also investing in our historic Regional Market.”

    Riverhead Town Supervisor Hubbard said, “We are extremely grateful for Governor Hochul’s awarding of the New York’s Regional School Infrastructure Grant Program. We have a very diverse community here in Riverhead and always face economic challenges. This will help ensure our students in grades K-12 have good nutritious food prepared for them while at school. This program not only helps provide local jobs but promotes the use of local agricultural products. Its a big win for our community. Thank you Governor Hochul!”

    Easthampton Supervisor Burke-Gonzalez said, “Farming is at the heart of East Hampton’s heritage, and economy. With this investment in the East End Food Institute’s hub, our local farmers will have new opportunities to get their fresh, homegrown food onto the plates of students across the East End, including right here in our own schools. We thank Governor Hochul and the Department of Agriculture and Markets for supporting our farmers and investing in the health and well-being of our students.”

    The Regional School Food Infrastructure program builds on New York’s many programs that prioritize local foods in schools, including tools to help school districts procure and purchase farm products from local producers, ensuring that New York remains New York’s first and best customer.

    The successful Farm-to-School program connects schools with local farms and food producers to strengthen local agriculture, improve student health and promote regional food systems awareness. Through the program, the Department of Agriculture and Markets provides financial, technical and promotional assistance to schools, farms, distributors and other supporting organizations to bring more local, nutritious, seasonally varied meals to New York students.

    The 30 Percent New York State Initiative further facilitates the provision of healthy New York sourced food products to children as part of their lunch meal in school. The initiative increases the reimbursement schools receive for lunches by 19 cents per meal for any district that ensures their school lunches are made up of at least 30 percent eligible New York produced and processed products. The Department of Agriculture and Markets took over administration of the program as part of Governor Hochul’s 2022 State of the State commitment to better connect farms and schools across New York. Since then, the program has seen increased participation from school food authorities, with a total of 73 school food authorities approved to receive enhanced reimbursement during this school year, up from 59 approved for reimbursement last year. In total, more than $9.7 million was spent on New York agricultural products during the 2023-2024 school year by schools applying for the incentive.

    Building on the work of these programs, Governor Hochul’s 2025 State of the State laid out a plan that will continue to support farmers, strengthen New York’s agricultural industry, and build a more resilient food supply in New York State.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Wyden, Merkley Co-Sponsor Legislation to Ban Conversion Therapy

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Ron Wyden (D-Ore)
    May 13, 2025
    Washington, D.C. — U.S. Senators Ron Wyden and Jeff Merkley (both D-Ore) today announced they are co-sponsoring legislation that would ban so-called “conversion therapy,” a practice fraudulently claiming to change a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity. 
    “Forcing Americans into sham therapy for a non-existent illness is medieval quackery, not modern science,” Wyden said. “This legislation protects the LGBTQ+ community from forced treatment for something that doesn’t need fixing.” 
    “So-called ‘conversion therapy’ has been discredited by every mainstream medical association and is not legitimate medical care,” said Merkley. “It’s dangerous and ineffective, yet too many LGBTQ+ people are still being harmed by it. The Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act will protect LGBTQ+ Americans from this fraudulent and damaging practice.”
    The Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act would ban a practice that has been recognized by the national community of professionals in health, education, social work, and counseling as both dangerous and ineffective.
    In addition to Wyden and Merkley, the Therapeutic Fraud Prevention Act was co-sponsored by U.S. Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-Wis.), Michael Bennet (D-Colo.), Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), Chris Coons (D-Del.), Catherine Cortez-Masto (D-Nev.), Tammy Duckworth (D-Ill.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), John Fetterman (D-Pa.), Kristen Gillibrand (D-N.Y.), Maggie Hassan (D-N.H.), Martin Heinrich (D-N.M.), John Hickenlooper (D-Colo.), Mazie Hirono (D-Hawaii), Tim Kaine (D-Va.), Mark Kelly (D-Ariz.), Andy Kim (D-N.J.), Angus King (D-Maine), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.),Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Alex Padilla (D-Calif.), Jack Reed (D-R.I.), Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.), Bernie Sanders (I-Vt), Adam Schiff (D-Calif.), Jeanne Shaheen (D-N.H.), Elissa Slotkin (D-Mich.), Tina Smith (D-Minn.), Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), Peter Welch (D-Vt.) and Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), and led by Senators Patty Murray (D-Wash.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.).
    Full text of the bill is here. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: “Just Follow the Science,” King Gains Agreement from Army Corps of Engineers Nominee in Discussion of Climate Resiliency

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Angus King
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, in a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), U.S. Senator Angus King questioned an administration nominee on his willingness to follow the science in the face of increasingly occurring and violent weather events. In his questioning of Mr. Adam Telle to be Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, King asked about the importance of Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA) in responding to natural disasters and how, if confirmed, he would lead the Army Corps of Engineers to work with FEMA.
    Senator King began, “Does FEMA play an important role in disaster response in this country, particularly for major disasters that affect more than one state?
    “Senator King, thank you for the question. And FEMA certainly has played a role in disaster response,” Telle responded. “The US Army Corps of Engineers under the National Response Framework, is of course, charged with leading on debris removal, and that relationship between our emergency managers and the Corps of Engineers is important as we respond to disasters like those that occurred recently, recently in North Carolina and Tennessee and surrounding areas with Hurricane Helene.”
    Senator King said, “I just don’t see how we’re going to be able to turn disaster response entirely over to the States, given the fact that disasters don’t respect state borders. Resiliency planning. That has to be part of the responsibility when the Corps is doing projects wherever they are. Do you agree?”
    “Yes, Senator, resiliency is critically important,” Telle affirmed.
    Senator King continued, “And do you agree that we are facing more and greater and more devastating storms than we have in the in the past?”
    “Senator King, we’ve certainly faced devastating natural disasters throughout our nation’s history,” Telle said. “It’s been a long-standing issue that we’ve dealt with. I don’t have the specific data about the intensity of those disasters, but they’re still happening. They’ve been happening throughout our nation’s history, and we have to stay vigilant to make sure we’re up to date with the latest data.”
    Senator King continued asking Mr. Telle, if confirmed, he would follow the science in his role leading the Army Division of Civil Works.
    “Well, I hope that regardless of the position of the administration on climate change, that the corps will take advantage of the science, which I think you’ve committed to, and particularly in resiliency planning. The worst thing we could do would be to build to 100-year-old standards instead of 100 years from now standards. Do you agree?” Senator King asked.
    Telle responded, “Senator, I do agree, and the Corps of Engineers currently, and it’s my understanding, we’ll continue to use the latest hydrological trend data that we can measure to make decisions about investments and the design of flood control infrastructure.”
    Senator King followed up, “Just follow the science, correct?”
    “Senator, we should follow the science,” Telle concluded.
    Because Maine faces increasingly extreme weather and storms, modernizing energy infrastructure through clean solar energy and new storage technologies can help ensure public buildings are able to maintain access to energy during destructive weather events. Last year, Senator King secured $2.5 million through the bipartisan Fiscal Year 2024 Congressionally-Directed Spending appropriations package for the Maine Governor’s Office of Policy Innovation and the Future to support an energy resiliency pilot program. The pilot program is helping to fund climate resiliency initiatives in Caribou, Carthage, Dover-Foxcroft, Fairfield, Jonesport, Limestone, Lubec, Machias, Millinocket, and Rockland.
    Senator King is also a longtime supporter of working waterfronts and small businesses. He previously introduced the bipartisan Providing Resources for Emergency Preparedness and Resilient Enterprises (PREPARE) Act to reauthorize the Small Business Administration’s (SBA) Pre-Disaster Mitigation Pilot Program, which would give small businesses the opportunity to take out low-interest loans for the purpose of proactively implementing mitigation measures that protect their property from future disaster-related damage. He also led a bipartisan bill to provide working waterfronts with a 30 percent tax credit on up to $1 million in mitigation expenses, adjusted for inflation annually.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Luján, Markey Urge FCC to Operate Transparently with Paramount-SkyDance Merger

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-New Mexico)

    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.), Ranking Member of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Telecommunications and Media Subcommittee, and U.S. Senator Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.), a member of the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee, wrote to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Brendan Carr, urging the FCC to take a full Commission vote on the merger between Paramount Global and Skydance Media. Given the reports that Paramount is considering settling a frivolous lawsuit brought by President Donald Trump against CBS, a Paramount subsidiary, the senators stated that the FCC should only approve the merger with an affirmative vote by the full Commission.

    In the letter the lawmakers write, “In late October, then-candidate Trump sued CBS for $10 billion — later raising this outrageous amount to $20 billion — for supposedly deceptively editing an interview of then-Vice President Kamala Harris on its programs 60 Minutes and Face the Nation. As the transcript of the interview showed, the excerpts that CBS aired were a quintessential example of editorial decision-making. Trump’s claim that such conduct constituted ‘voter interference’ and violated Texas’s consumer protection law is both false and a clear attempt to intimidate the news media. CBS has rightfully moved to dismiss the case.”

    The lawmakers continue, “Despite the obviously frivolous nature of the lawsuit, Paramount is reportedly considering settling the case to ‘increase the odds that the Trump administration does not block or delay’ its merger with Skydance. In fact, Paramount executives and directors are reportedly concerned that such a settlement could open them up to accusations of bribery. Paramount would not be the first to settle a lawsuit brought by the President in the past few months. In the weeks following the inauguration, ABC ($16 million), Meta ($25 million), and X ($10 million) all settled cases brought by Trump. With Paramount on the hook to pay Skydance a $400 million breakup fee if the FCC blocks the deal, the company has strong financial incentives to facilitate FCC approval of the merger.”

    The lawmakers conclude, “For those reasons, this transaction has signs of a deal between a company eager for approval of a multi-billion dollar merger and a President willing to exploit his position to intimidate the media and secure a multi-million dollar payout. The unique position of this merger necessitates the utmost transparency at the FCC. A matter of this significance deserves the scrutiny of the entire Commission. We urge you to only approve this merger through a full Commission vote.”

    As Ranking Member of the Commerce, Science, and Transportation Telecommunications and Media Subcommittee, Senator Luján has pushed back against attacks on news organizations. In February, Senators Luján, Markey, and Peters wrote to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Brendan Carr and Commissioner Nathan Simington condemning actions taken by the FCC under the Trump administration demonstrating that the FCC is weaponizing its authority over broadcasters and public media for political purposes. In March, Senators Luján, Markey, and Rosen introduced the Broadcast Freedom and Independence Act, legislation that would prohibit the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from revoking broadcast licenses or taking action against broadcasters based on the viewpoints they broadcast.

    The text of the letter is here and below:

    Dear Chairman Carr,

    With the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) currently reviewing the proposed merger between Paramount Global and Skydance Media, we urge you to approve the transaction only with an affirmative vote by the full Commission. Although the Commission has delegated authority for its Media Bureau to decide certain matters without a full Commission vote, this transaction is unique from other mergers that have come before the Commission. In particular, Paramount is reportedly considering settling a frivolous, unrelated lawsuit filed by President Donald Trump against CBS, a Paramount subsidiary. Given the high profile of this deal and, at the very least, the appearance of impropriety, we strongly urge you to approve the merger only with a vote by the full Commission.

    The unique position of this case stems from President Trump’s ongoing, frivolous litigation against CBS. In late October, then-candidate Trump sued CBS for $10 billion — later raising this outrageous amount to $20 billion — for supposedly deceptively editing an interview of then-Vice President Kamala Harris on its programs 60 Minutes and Face the Nation. As the transcript of the interview showed, the excerpts that CBS aired were a quintessential example of editorial decision-making. Trump’s claim that such conduct constituted “voter interference” and violated Texas’s consumer protection law is both false and a clear attempt to intimidate the news media. CBS has rightfully moved to dismiss the case.

    Despite the obviously frivolous nature of the lawsuit, Paramount is reportedly considering settling the case to “increase the odds that the Trump administration does not block or delay” its merger with Skydance. In fact, Paramount executives and directors are reportedly concerned that such a settlement could open them up to accusations of bribery. Paramount would not be the first to settle a lawsuit brought by the President in the past few months. In the weeks following the inauguration, ABC ($16 million), Meta ($25 million), and X ($10 million) all settled cases brought by Trump. With Paramount on the hook to pay Skydance a $400 million breakup fee if the FCC blocks the deal, the company has strong financial incentives to facilitate FCC approval of the merger.

    For those reasons, this transaction has signs of a deal between a company eager for approval of a multi-billion dollar merger and a President willing to exploit his position to intimidate the media and secure a multi-million dollar payout. The unique position of this merger necessitates the utmost transparency at the FCC. A matter of this significance deserves the scrutiny of the entire Commission. We urge you to only approve this merger through a full Commission vote.

    Thank you for your attention to this important matter.

    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Xi Jinping Holds Talks with Brazilian President

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, May 13 (Xinhua) — Chinese President Xi Jinping held talks in Beijing on Tuesday with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who is on a state visit to China.

    Xi Jinping recalled that last year, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Brazil, the two sides jointly announced the upgrading of bilateral ties to a China-Brazil community of shared future for a fairer world and a more sustainable planet.

    The Chinese President called on both sides to vigorously advance the building of a China-Brazil community with a shared future, consistently strengthen the alignment of development strategies, and jointly promote solidarity and cooperation among countries in the Global South.

    Xi Jinping stressed that China and Brazil should maintain strategic mutual trust, support each other on issues related to the two sides’ core interests and major concerns, and strengthen exchanges at all levels and in all areas.

    The Chinese leader called on the two countries to expand cooperation, deepen the effective alignment of the Belt and Road Initiative with Brazil’s development strategy, make full use of various cooperation mechanisms between the two countries, strengthen cooperation in traditional areas such as infrastructure, agriculture and energy, and explore new areas of cooperation including energy transition, digital economy, artificial intelligence, aviation and space.

    China and Brazil, Xi Jinping continued, should expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges, provide more facilities for people-to-people exchanges, and step up cooperation in culture, education, tourism, media, and at the local level.

    The two sides should maintain active interaction in multilateral forums, the Chinese leader noted, adding that as the largest developing countries in the Eastern and Western hemispheres respectively, China and Brazil should strengthen coordination and cooperation in multilateral mechanisms, uphold multilateralism, improve global governance, safeguard the international trade and economic order, and firmly oppose unilateralism, protectionism and bullying.

    L. I. Lula da Silva, for his part, stated that Brazil expects to deepen strategic cooperation with China and promote the construction of a Brazilian-Chinese community with a shared destiny.

    Brazil is willing to align its development strategy with the Belt and Road Initiative and expand cooperation between the two countries in areas such as trade, infrastructure, space and finance, the president said. He also called on the two countries to expand youth and cultural exchanges and strengthen ties and friendship between the two peoples.

    As L.I. Lula da Silva pointed out, protectionism and abuse of tariffs cannot promote development and prosperity, but instead lead to chaos. He stressed that China’s resolute stance in confronting global challenges gives strength and confidence to all countries. According to him, Brazil is ready to strengthen strategic cooperation with China in international affairs, cooperate to protect the common interests of the Global South, and uphold international fairness and justice.

    At the Great Hall of the People, the heads of the two states attended the signing of 20 documents on cooperation in such areas as the alignment of development strategies, science and technology, agriculture, digital economy, finance, customs control and quarantine supervision, and the media.

    The heads of the two states also met with the press together.

    China and Brazil on Tuesday issued a joint statement on strengthening the joint construction of a China-Brazil community of shared future for a fairer world and a more sustainable planet and jointly safeguarding multilateralism, as well as a joint statement on the Ukraine crisis.

    Before the talks, Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan held a welcoming ceremony for Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and his wife Rosangela Lula da Silva. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Challenges for European fisheries and aquaculture – E-001824/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001824/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Emmanouil Fragkos (ECR), Nora Junco García (ECR)

    The European fisheries and aquaculture sector faces challenges concerning generational renewal, energy transition, fleet ageing, digitalisation, climate change and competition for maritime space.

    While the common fisheries policy (CFP) has made progress on environmental goals (e.g. fish-stock sustainability), it has underperformed in socio-economic terms.

    The CFP should prioritise science-based policies to enhance food-security, reduce bureaucracy and promote socio-economic development. With 70 % of EU seafood being imported, there is growing concern about food autonomy.

    With the right support, our fisheries can continue to advance without compromising productivity. The EU’s fishing fleet, constrained by outdated policies limiting capacity and vessel upgrades, struggles to modernise and transition to low-emission technologies.

    Investments are urgently needed to update the fleet and related infrastructure.

    Imports from non-EU countries with lower standards and costs exacerbate the sector’s challenges. Despite support efforts, EU aquaculture production has stagnated, growing only marginally between 2008 and 2020. Addressing these issues requires a coordinated EU approach focused on competitiveness, sustainability and fair market conditions.

    What actions does the Commission intend to take in order to ensure a level playing field with non-EU countries in relation to:

    • 1.capture fisheries, such as monitoring compliance with obligations (e.g. regarding the reduction of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing) both generally and particularly within EU waters?
    • 2.aquaculture, mainly with regard to imports from third parties (e.g. concerning the abolition of various forms of State aid that artificially reduce production costs)?

    Submitted: 6.5.2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: The main stage of the Unified State Exam will begin on May 23 in all 89 regions of Russia and 55 foreign countries

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    A meeting was held under the chairmanship of Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko on the issue of readiness to conduct the state final certification (SFC) for basic general and secondary general education programs in 2025.

    Its participants discussed the readiness of the subjects of the Russian Federation, including border territories and reunited regions, to conduct the Unified State Exam, Basic State Exam, and State Final Exam.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko noted that, on the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, changes were made to the federal basic general education programs. They will come into force on September 1, 2025. The main and unified state exams are synchronized with the programs.

    “Based on many years of accumulated experience, we see that competent organization of the exam at the local level is an important condition for good results. Over the past two years, according to the results of monitoring, Novosibirsk, Belgorod, Tambov and Leningrad regions, the Altai Republic, the Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, the Republic of Tatarstan, the federal cities of Sevastopol and Moscow have demonstrated a stable exemplary level of conducting the examination campaign. The heads of the regions must take personal control of key issues related to the conduct of the state final certification,” the Deputy Prime Minister said.

    At the request of the Belgorod Region, in connection with the current situation, two additional days for exams were added to the Unified State Exam schedule: in mathematics – May 26, in Russian language – May 29. Graduates from the DPR, LPR, Kherson and Zaporizhia regions, individual schools in border regions, as well as children who moved from these regions, can take the final assessment in the form of an interim assessment.

    “We believe that the early period of the Unified State Exam was held in the normal mode. On May 23, the main stage of the Unified State Exam will begin in all 89 regions of Russia and 55 foreign countries. Traditionally, the exam procedure itself requires special control. For this purpose, over 300 thousand specialized specialists, more than 6 thousand medical workers and about 40 thousand public observers will be involved in the examination centers. Since 2024, on the instructions of President Vladimir Putin, graduates have the right to retake the Unified State Exam in one subject. This year, such retakes will take place on July 3 and 4,” said Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    All results of the State Final Attestation are necessarily entered into the federal information system.

    In conclusion, the Deputy Prime Minister paid special attention to the need to establish prompt interdepartmental cooperation with education authorities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Energy, the Russian National Guard and the media for the smooth conduct of examination and admissions campaigns.

    “Our system is generally ready to conduct both the Unified State Exam and the Main State Exam. The main period of the OGE starts on May 21, and the main period of the USE starts on May 23. It is important that the order of the President of Russia on synchronizing programs and exam assignments has been fulfilled, they do not go beyond the educational program, and calendar-thematic planning has been included in the programs,” said Minister of Education Sergey Kravtsov.

    The head of the Ministry of Education noted that in 2025, an experiment to expand the availability of secondary vocational education will be conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg and the Lipetsk region. By the end of May, the ministry will develop regulations for taking into account the results of control procedures (USE, OGE, VPR, diagnostic work) in the educational process. In June, the document will be sent to the subjects.

    The Minister of Education added that the share of those choosing the Unified State Exam in mathematical and natural science subjects will be 35% by 2030, with the planned figure for 2025 being 32%.

    Head of Rosobrnadzor Anzor Muzaev said that this year over 712 thousand people have registered to participate in the Unified State Exam, of which over 637 thousand are this year’s graduates. He focused the special attention of regional executive authorities on monitoring the technical readiness of all examination points, the readiness of the organizers, as well as ensuring the safety of all exam participants and those involved in their conduct.

    The head of Rosobrnadzor separately focused on this year’s changes. “This year, work was carried out to synchronize control measurement materials with federal state educational standards and federal educational programs. This is the President’s order, and it has been fulfilled,” said Anzor Muzaev.

    Rosobrnadzor also took into account a number of comments from members of the public and the deputy corps regarding the procedure for conducting the Unified State Exam. “We held a broad discussion and implemented these proposals in 2025. Rosobrnadzor’s methodological recommendations include detailed instructions for persons involved in admitting exam participants to exam points, as well as instructions for setting up stationary and portable metal detectors. We proposed actively involving parents of students, including representatives of parent committees, to monitor compliance with the rights of graduates during their admission and presence at exam points,” said Anzor Muzaev.

    Another innovation of the 2025 examination campaign is the ability to promptly report information about any violations in the Unified State Exam directly to Rosobrnadzor via the feedback platform on the public services portal. Each examination point has posters with a QR code, which can be used to send this information directly to a Rosobrnadzor employee so that any problems that arise are resolved as quickly as possible.

    Representatives of the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian National Guard and all regions of Russia also took part in the meeting. Representatives of border regions separately reported on their readiness to conduct the state final certification: Deputy Governor of the Belgorod Region – Minister of Education of the Belgorod Region Andrey Milekhin, Acting Deputy Chairman of the Government of the Kursk Region Oksana Krutko, Acting Deputy Governor of the Bryansk Region Denis Amelichev.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: News 05/13/2025 Blackburn, Luján Introduce Bill to Ensure U.S. Remains the World Leader in Quantum

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn)
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Marsha Blackburn (R-Tenn.) and Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) introduced the Quantum Leadership in Emerging Applications and Policy (LEAP) Act which will ensure the United States remains the world leader in quantum by establishing a legislative commission to tackle the issues facing American ingenuity:
    “The United States cannot afford to fall behind to adversaries like Communist China when it comes to quantum information science and technology as global competition accelerates,” said Senator Blackburn. “The Quantum LEAP Act would establish a much-needed, expert-driven commission to equip Congress with the insights necessary to protect our national interests by keeping the United States the world leader in quantum technology. We can’t let the Chinese Communist Party take the lead.”
    “I am proud to introduce bipartisan legislation to help ensure the U.S. stays competitive in quantum science and engineering, which is crucial for national security and technological advancements,” said Senator Luján. “This legislation would create a commission to analyze and offer policy recommendations on emerging quantum sciences and technologies to Congress. New Mexico is a leader in U.S. quantum research, and this legislation will help drive innovation and economic growth in our state.”
    BACKGROUND
    Quantum information science and technology represent a technological frontier that has the potential to revolutionize computing, cybersecurity, materials science, and communications.
    U.S. leadership in quantum is more important than ever as global competition accelerates from adversaries like China. 
    The U.S. faces numerous challenges to win the quantum race, including fragmented efforts across agencies, a lack of cohesive policy direction, underdeveloped commercial pathways, and a shortage of skilled workforce. 
    Earlier this year, Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Ted Cruz (R-Texas) recognized Senator Blackburn for her leadership on advancing a reauthorization of quantum computing research programs to drive innovation, protect the nation, and create new industries.
    QUANTUM LEAP ACT
    The Quantum LEAP Act would:
    Establish a bipartisan legislative commission composed of 12 members, including both Congressional and private sector experts;
    Require an evaluation of quantum information science development needs across national security, economic competitiveness, supply chains, public-private partnerships, workforce development, and commercialization;
    Require collaboration with federal agencies such as the Departments of Commerce, Energy, Defense, National Institute of Standards and Technology, National Science Foundation, and the National Quantum Coordination Office; and
    Mandate a report to Congress within two years on legislative recommendations.
    ENDORSEMENTS
    This legislation is supported by EPB of Chattanooga, Quantinuum, IBM Quantum, the Quantum Industry Coalition, D-Wave, and the Hudson Institute Quantum Alliance Initiative.
    “EPB of Chattanooga strongly supports the creation of the Commission on American Quantum Information Science. In a city that’s already laying the groundwork for the emergence of the quantum industry by utilizing our fiber optic infrastructure to support collaborative efforts to commercialize quantum technology, we see this Commission as a vital step in aligning national policy with the rapid pace of technological development. A legislative voice will complement the work of the Quantum Advisory Council and help ensure that communities like ours will have a seat at the table as the U.S. charts its quantum future,” said David Wade, CEO of EPB of Chattanooga.
    “Quantinuum strongly supports the bipartisan Quantum LEAP Act. This landmark legislation affirms the strategic importance of quantum technologies to our national and economic security. We commend Senators Blackburn and Luján for their leadership in establishing a Commission that will unite experts across sectors to ensure U.S. leadership in this critical frontier,” said Dr. Rajeeb Hazra, President & CEO of Quantinuum.
    “The Commission on American Quantum Information Science will give Congress expert, nonpartisan guidance on this critical technology. Complementing the Executive Branch’s advisory efforts will strengthen our national approach to quantum innovation, workforce development, and international collaboration, ensuring U.S. leadership and security while developing quantum technology. We commend Senators Blackburn and Luján for their leadership in introducing this important legislation,” said Jay Gambetta, Vice President of IBM Quantum.
    “Quantum information science has profound potential for the national security and economy of the United States and requires a strategic approach.  The Quantum Industry Coalition commends Sen. Blackburn and Sen. Lujan for addressing this issue and looks forward to working with them to advance this important legislation this year,” said Paul Stimers, Executive Director of the Quantum Industry Coalition.
    RELATED
    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: InCHIP Supports Principal Investigators Amid Uncertainty in Federal Research Funding

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    On Friday, May 30, UConn’s Institute for Collaboration on Health, Intervention, and Policy (InCHIP) will hold a virtual coffee break for faculty to receive updates on the evolving federal research funding landscape and guidance for writing competitive grant applications in the current climate.

    The event will feature a panel of InCHIP principal investigators (PIs) who have submitted a federal funding proposal this year. In addition, leaders from InCHIP and the Office of the Vice President for Research will share advice from program officers at the National Institutes of Health and answer questions about the impact of federal funding on the university.

    Information for the upcoming coffee hour can be found on InCHIP’s website, chip.uconn.edu.

    This event is part of InCHIP’s recurring coffee hours, which provide faculty a space to informally discuss their experiences with federal funding changes and create a network of support.

    Caitlin Caspi, Director of Food Security Initiatives at the UConn Rudd Center for Food Policy and Health, and Associate Professor of Allied Health Sciences

    “These events are important for us to get an idea of how changes in federal funding are affecting faculty and how InCHIP can support PIs and their research,” says Caitlin Caspi, associate director of InCHIP and director of Food Security Initiatives at the UConn Rudd Center for Food Policy and Health.

    Faculty from UConn Storrs, UConn Health, regional campuses, and various schools and colleges have participated, highlighting strong interest and demand for these events.

    Caspi spearheaded the coffee hours in response to unprecedented funding cuts at the National Institutes of Health (NIH). According to the Association of American Medical Colleges (AAMC), about $1.9 billion in research and career development funding to U.S. institutions has been terminated. AAMC data shows that Connecticut has lost more than $12 million in NIH funding.

    Scientific research is a core component in the economic engine of Connecticut and the United States. Government-funded research also fuels cures for debilitating diseases and innovation.

    A 2019 study published in Science by researchers at the University of California, Berkely, the University of Connecticut, Boston University, and Harvard University quantified the impact of federal research dollars on patents. The authors found that nearly one-third of U.S. patents rely on federal research dollars and established that corporations have become more reliant on government investment.

    In addition to the impacts on innovation, the cuts have socioeconomic implications. As the largest public funder of biomedical research, the NIH provided key support for research that improves public health and well-being, especially for historically understudied populations and fields.

    Grant terminations have most heavily impacted research areas like HIV/AIDS, sexual and gender minorities, COVID-19, and climate science – many of which are InCHIP priorities. In response, leadership is working to expand support for investigators beyond the coffee hours.

    First, InCHIP continues to offer seed grant funding to support innovative pilot research that will serve as the foundation for future external funding proposals.

    Tricia Leahey of the Department of Allied Health Sciences (AHS) in the College of Agriculture, Health and Natural Resources (CAHNR), and director of the UConn Institute for Collaboration on Health, Intervention, and Policy (InCHIP)

    “InCHIP seed grants support innovative pilot research in emerging areas and PI career growth. In unstable financial times, these internal funding opportunities can act as lifelines to keep research moving forward,” says Tricia Leahey, director of InCHIP.

    For the Spring 2025 semester, InCHIP offered internal funds for projects that aim to address health challenges and concerns affecting understudied populations in Connecticut and the United States.

    Specifically, InCHIP has partnered with the UConn Gladstein Family Human Rights Institute to fund projects that explore the areas of health equity, human rights, and social justice. InCHIP expects to fund 2 projects under this opportunity.

    InCHIP also offered seed grants in environment and health, community-engaged research, and women’s health, along with core funding for career development, and team formation, bridge funding, and project completion.

    The spring application cycle has closed, but investigators are encouraged to check InCHIP’s website during the fall semester.

    InCHIP is also supporting PIs who received award termination from the NIH, from navigating logistics to providing financial support. In addition, InCHIP is helping PIs navigate the changing funding landscape through grant writing workshops and identifying non-federal funding sources.

    Next semester, InCHIP will offer a grant writing workshop focused on foundation opportunities. The goal of the workshop is to help PIs learn best practices for crafting competitive proposals. Modeled after InCHIP’s Spring 2025 NIH grant writing bootcamp, the workshop builds on this semester’s successful bootcamp and follow-up seminar, which is providing researchers hands-on experience and in-depth feedback on their grant proposals.

    Details about the foundation grants workshop will be announced on InCHIP’s website.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA‐UAB) – Autonomous University of Barcelona

    Source: UNISDR Disaster Risk Reduction

    Mission

    The Institute of Environmental Science and Technology (ICTA-UAB) is a multidisciplinary centre that promotes academic research and postgraduate education in the environmental sciences.

    It aims to improve our understanding of global environmental change, and the nature and causes of environmental problems. In addition, it studies policies, strategies and technologies to foster a transition to a sustainable economy.

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Improving Drinking Water, Protecting Public Health

    Source: US State of New York

    overnor Kathy Hochul today announced the start of construction of a critical project to replace nearly 2,500 lead service lines in the City of Albany, improving drinking water, protecting public health, and enhancing quality of life. It’s the first project to get underway with the Governor’s new Lead Infrastructure Forgiveness and Transformation Grants – a $100 million statewide initiative to help local governments get the lead out. This funding is a key component of the governor’s comprehensive strategy to rid New York’s water systems of dangerous lead pipes while protecting the pockets of local ratepayers.

    “Removing lead from our water systems is not just a matter of public health, it’s a matter of equity, safety, and affordability for all communities,” Governor Hochul said. “I’ll keep fighting to ensure local governments can fund essential upgrades to their water systems without taking on crippling debt and overburdening New York families who deserve safe, clean water at rates they can afford.”

    The $12.9 million project spans all 15 city wards, focused on streets containing water mains installed prior to 1975. The project will provide full lead service line replacement to entire street segments at no cost to homeowners or renters.

    Albany was one of 12 municipalities awarded this state grant to fully cover the cost of their lead service line replacement. This $3.9 million state grant for Albany will reimburse costs that were not fully covered by the $9 million federal grant, so at completion of the project, the city will not need to pay back the $3.9 million in EFC financing. The initiative delivers on Governor Hochul’s affordability and safety agenda, helping to ensure local ratepayers in these communities will not bear the financial burden of these vital water quality projects.

    Representative Paul Tonko said, “Science tells us that there is no safe level of lead exposure. Yet millions of lead service lines remain in operation across the country, putting the health and safety of American families at risk. This initiative will bring us closer to a lead-free future by replacing nearly 2,500 lead service lines in the City of Albany, ensuring safe drinking water and improved quality of life for residents across the city. The replacement of lead service lines is one of the best investments we can make in the future of our communities, and I applaud Governor Hochul for recognizing and acting on this critical issue. Going forward, I remain committed to securing additional federal funding to realize our mission to get the lead out of our drinking water and ensure that every New Yorker and every American knows the water from their tap is clean and safe.”

    Albany Mayor Kathy Sheehan said, “Thank you Governor Hochul, President Coleman, and Dr. McDonald for your support in transforming Albany’s water infrastructure. I also want to applaud the Albany Water Department and Commissioner Joseph Coffey for taking the initiative to work toward creating a lead-free water system for our City. Across the country, millions of homes still receive drinking water through privately-owned lead services lines, and it is estimated 40% of the homes in Albany fall into this category. As we know, this issue has disproportionately impacted Albany’s historically underserved neighborhoods, making this initiative vital to ensuring every resident in our city has clean, safe drinking water. Since taking office, my administration has invested more than $150 million in water and sewer infrastructure improvements – a larger investment over the past 12 years than the 20 previous years combined – and this program is yet another example of my administration’s commitment to equitably investing in our City’s infrastructure.”

    Lead is harmful to human health and can enter drinking water when plumbing materials that contain lead corrode, especially where the water has high acidity or low mineral content that corrodes pipes and fixtures. The most common sources of lead in drinking water are lead pipes, faucets, and fixtures. In homes with lead pipes that connect the home to the water main, also known as lead services lines, these pipes are typically the most significant source of lead in the water. Lead pipes are more likely to be found in older cities and homes built before 1986.

    This funding is part of a $340 million statewide initiative that combines state resources with federal grants to remove lead pipes from water systems across New York. Coupling state and federal funding takes the fiscal pressure off communities, allowing them to replace more lead service lines without incurring additional costs. The State’s strategic approach continues to provide communities with the resources they need to improve their water infrastructure without putting undue financial strain on ratepayers.

    New York State Health Commissioner Dr. James McDonald said, “The $100 million Lead Infrastructure Forgiveness and Transformation program represents Governor Hochul’s continued commitment to safeguarding our drinking water by eliminating lead from plumbing and protecting the health of our communities. We thank the Environmental Facilities Corporation and our federal partners for their collaborative leadership and investments in ensuring the water delivered to consumers here in Albany and throughout New York State meets the highest standards.”

    New York State Environmental Facilities Corporation President and CEO Maureen A. Coleman said, “Governor Hochul’s landmark $100 million initiative is helping to ensure that New Yorkers – no matter where they live – have access to clean, safe, and affordable drinking water. EFC is pleased to work with the Department of Health and local governments to get these dollars out the door quickly so communities can get shovels in the ground for their projects. I commend Mayor Sheehan and her administration for their extraordinary work in undertaking these life-saving system improvements for the people of Albany.”

    State Senator Patricia Fahy said, ““There are more than 13,000 lead pipes in the City of Albany alone. When we turn on the tap, we expect our water to be clean, lead-free, and drinkable. Today’s investment represents one of the first bold steps towards ensuring that every child in our Capital Region has access to clean, fresh water. I look forward to working with my colleagues in the State Senate to continue funding lead pipe replacement and clean water infrastructure in every community across the 46th District: rural, suburban, and urban.”

    Assemblymember John T. McDonald III, RPh said “As both a legislator and a former mayor, I know firsthand how vital it is to invest in infrastructure that protects public health without placing an undue burden on our communities. This lead service line replacement project represents exactly the kind of forward-thinking investment we need. Thank you to Governor Hochul, the Environmental Facilities Corporation, and the Department of Health for their leadership and commitment to getting the lead out and delivering cleaner, safer drinking water for all. Today’s groundbreaking in Albany is an example of what we can achieve when state and local governments work together to prioritize the health and safety of our residents.”

    Assemblymember Gabriella Romero said, “Safe, clean drinking water should be a fundamental right. The Lead Infrastructure Forgiveness and Transformation Grants are a critical initiative to not only remove lead from our service lines, but also make sure that cost doesn’t fall on Albany families and local governments. This investment from Governor Hochul is a huge win for Albany to make sure our state and local government can work together to ensure city residents have safe drinking water without footing the bill.

    Albany County Executive Daniel P. McCoy said, “Every community deserves safe drinking water, and this $100 million investment is a major step toward delivering that. This project is about more than pipes and pavement, it’s about laying a foundation for a more resilient and equitable city for generations to come. I thank Governor Hochul for her continued commitment to the health and safety of our residents.”

    Albany Water Commissioner Joseph Coffey said, “In 2019, the Albany Water Department and Albany Water Board included in our strategic plan an initiative to remove all lead water services by 2034. Since 2019, we have replaced over 1700 lead water services. The Water Board created a grant reimbursement program in 2021 to assist homeowners in replacing lead water services and to date, over 780 grants have been awarded totaling over $1.2 million. Now, with the support of Governor Hochul, the Environmental Facilities Corporation, and the NYS State Health Department, this funding will be a catalyst to advance our goal of removing all lead water services in the city.”

    New York’s Commitment to Water Quality
    New York State continues to increase its nation-leading investments in water infrastructure, including more than $2.2 billion in financial assistance from EFC for local water infrastructure projects in State Fiscal Year 2024 alone. With $500 million allocated for clean water infrastructure in the FY25 Executive Budget announced by Governor Hochul, New York will have invested a record $6 billion in water infrastructure since 2017. New Yorkers can track projects benefiting from EFC’s investments using the interactive project impact dashboard.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Rep. Aguilar Announces $300,000 to Strengthen CSUSB Artificial Intelligence Cybersecurity Research

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Representative Pete Aguilar (31 CD Ca)

    Today, Rep. Pete Aguilar announced a $300,000 grant for California State University, San Bernardino (CSUSB) to enhance its research into the effects of artificial intelligence (AI) on the cybersecurity workforce. Continuing Rep. Aguilar’s focus on strengthening the cybersecurity program at CSUSB, this grant will enable educators at the university to adapt their curriculum as AI technology rapidly evolves.
    “As artificial intelligence technology develops, it is crucial that the cybersecurity workforce in the Inland Empire is equipped with the skills and knowledge necessary to ensure we can keep up,” said Rep. Pete Aguilar. “This grant funding is an investment in the future success of the CSUSB students entering the cyber workforce and ensuring that the Inland Empire stays at the forefront of cybersecurity.”
    “The grant supports our effort to forecast all the ways AI will impact the cyber workforce and to provide guidance for educators to adjust in real time to the changes with an information website, a series of workshops throughout the next two years,” said Vincent Nestler, Associate Professor, CSUSB School of Cyber and Decision Sciences.
    The funding comes as part of the U.S. National Science Foundation’s (NSF) Office of Advanced Cyberinfrastructure’s (OAC) National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource (NAIRR) pilot award program. The project, entitled “EAGER: NAIRR Pilot Expansion: FA1: AI Horizon: Forecasting Cybersecurity Workforce Evolution and Adaptive Skill Development,” will support efforts to integrate AI technology into cybersecurity by supporting research and educational needs at universities across the country. The grant funding will support the training of approximately 1,000 faculty members and 1,000 students across 470 higher education institutions across the country.
    Rep. Aguilar has made strengthening the cybersecurity program at California State University, San Bernardino, a top priority. During his time in Congress, Rep. Aguilar has secured more than $130 million in federal resources for CSUSB’s cybersecurity program as part of his commitment to help connect students to national security jobs and strengthen the Inland Empire’s cybersecurity.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA Enables Construction Technology for Moon and Mars Exploration

    Source: NASA

    One of the keys to a sustainable human presence on distant worlds is using local, or in-situ, resources which includes building materials for infrastructure such as habitats, radiation shielding, roads, and rocket launch and landing pads. NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate is leveraging its portfolio of programs and industry opportunities to develop in-situ, resource capabilities to help future Moon and Mars explorers build what they need. These technologies have made exciting progress for space applications as well as some impacts right here on Earth. 
    The Moon to Mars Planetary Autonomous Construction Technology (MMPACT) project, funded by NASA’s Game Changing Development program and managed at the agency’s Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, is exploring applications of large-scale, robotic 3D printing technology for construction on other planets. It sounds like the stuff of science fiction, but demonstrations using simulated lunar and Martian surface material, known as regolith, show the concept could become reality. 

    With its partners in industry and academic institutions, MMPACT is developing processing technologies for lunar and Martian construction materials. The binders for these materials, including water, could be extracted from the local regolith to reduce launch mass. The regolith itself is used as the aggregate, or granular material, for these concretes. NASA has evaluated these materials for decades, initially working with large-scale 3D printing pioneer, Dr. Behrokh Khoshnevis, a professor of civil, environmental and astronautical engineering at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles.  
    Khoshnevis developed techniques for large-scale extraterrestrial 3D printing under the NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts (NIAC) program. One of these processes is Contour Crafting, in which molten regolith and a binding agent are extruded from a nozzle to create infrastructure layer by layer. The process can be used to autonomously build monolithic structures like radiation shielding and rocket landing pads. 
    Continuing to work with the NIAC program, Khoshnevis also developed a 3D printing method called selective separation sintering, in which heat and pressure are applied to layers of powder to produce metallic, ceramic, or composite objects which could produce small-scale, more-precise hardware. This energy-efficient technique can be used on planetary surfaces as well as in microgravity environments like space stations to produce items including interlocking tiles and replacement parts. 
    While NASA’s efforts are ultimately aimed at developing technologies capable of building a sustainable human presence on other worlds, Khoshnevis is also setting his sights closer to home. He has created a company called Contour Crafting Corporation that will use 3D printing techniques advanced with NIAC funding to fabricate housing and other infrastructure here on Earth.  
    Another one of NASA’s partners in additive manufacturing, ICON of Austin, Texas, is doing the same, using 3D printing techniques for home construction on Earth, with robotics, software, and advanced material.  

    [embedded content]
    Construction is complete on a 3D-printed, 1,700-square-foot habitat that will simulate the challenges of a mission to Mars at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. The habitat will be home to four intrepid crew members for a one-year Crew Health and Performance Analog, or CHAPEA, mission. The first of three missions begins in the summer of 2023.

    The ICON company was among the participants in NASA’s 3D-Printed Habitat Challenge, which aimed to advance the technology needed to build housing in extraterrestrial environments. In 2021, ICON used its large-scale 3D printing system to build a 1,700 square-foot simulated Martian habitat that includes crew quarters, workstations and common lounge and food preparation areas. This habitat prototype, called Mars Dune Alpha, is part of NASA’s ongoing Crew Health and Performance Exploration Analog, a series of Mars surface mission simulations scheduled through 2026 at NASA’s Johnson Space Center in Houston.  
    With support from NASA’s Small Business Innovation Research program, ICON is also developing an Olympus construction system, which is designed to use local resources on the Moon and Mars as building materials. 
    The ICON company uses a robotic 3D printing technique called Laser Vitreous Multi-material Transformation, in which high-powered lasers melt local surface materials, or regolith, that then solidify to form strong, ceramic-like structures. Regolith can similarly be transformed to create infrastructure capable of withstanding environmental hazards like corrosive lunar dust, as well as radiation and temperature extremes.  
    The company is also characterizing the gravity-dependent properties of simulated lunar regolith in an experiment called Duneflow, which flew aboard a Blue Origin reusable suborbital rocket system through NASA’s Flight Opportunities program in February 2025. During that flight test, the vehicle simulated lunar gravity for approximately two minutes, enabling ICON and researchers from NASA to compare the behavior of simulant against real regolith obtained from the Moon during an Apollo mission.    
    Learn more: https://www.nasa.gov/space-technology-mission-directorate/  

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Aubrie Henspeter: Leading Commercial Lunar Missions 

    Source: NASA

    As NASA partners with American industry to deliver science and technology payloads to the Moon, a dedicated team behind the scenes ensures every mission is grounded in strategy, compliance, and innovation. Leading that effort is Aubrie Henspeter, who advises all aspects of procurement for NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) initiative—one of the cornerstone projects supporting the Artemis campaign. 

    With 20 years at NASA, Henspeter brings multifaceted experience to her role as CLPS procurement team lead in the Lunar & Planetary Exploration Procurement Office at Johnson Space Center in Houston. Her job is equal parts problem-solving, mentoring, and strategizing—all focused on enabling commercial partners to deliver NASA payloads to the lunar surface faster, more affordably, and more efficient than ever before. 
    “It’s been a great experience to see the full lifecycle of a project—from soliciting requirements to launching to the Moon,” said Henspeter. “We work to continuously adjust as the lunar industry grows and improve procurement terms and conditions by incorporating lessons learned.” 
    Henspeter leads a team of six contracting officers and contract specialists, managing workload priorities and supporting the continuity of seven commercial missions currently on contract. She also helps shape upcoming contract opportunities for future lunar deliveries, constantly seeking creative procurement strategies within a commercial firm-fixed-price framework. 
    NASA launched the CLPS initiative in 2018 to create a faster, more flexible way to partner with commercial companies for lunar deliveries. Thirteen vendors are participating as part of a multi-award contract, each eligible to compete for individual task orders to deliver NASA science and technology payloads to the Moon. These deliveries support Artemis goals by enabling new discoveries, testing key technologies, and preparing for long-term human exploration on the lunar surface. 

    In May 2023, Henspeter received the NASA Exceptional Service Medal for her leadership on CLPS from 2018–2023. For her, the recognition reflects the team’s spirit and collaboration. 
    “I genuinely enjoy working on this project because of its lean, adaptable approach and the amazing team involved,” she said. “When all of us across NASA work together we are the most successful and can achieve our mission.” 
    That sense of collaboration and adaptability has shaped many of the insights Henspeter has gained throughout her career—lessons she now applies daily to help the team stay aligned and prepared. 
    One of those key lessons: always keep the contract current. 
    “It’s all good until it isn’t, and then everyone asks—what does the contract say?” she said. “Open communication and up-to-date documentation, no matter how minor the change, are essential.” 
    Over the course of her career, Henspeter has learned to prioritize preparation, adaptability, and strong working relationships. 
    “Preparation in procurement is conducting thorough market research, understanding the regulations, finding the gray areas, and developing a strategy that best meets the customer’s needs,” she said. “Adaptability means staying committed to the goal while remaining open and flexible on how to get there.” 
    That philosophy has helped her navigate everything from yearlong international contract negotiations with foreign partners to pivoting a customer from a sole-source request to a competitive procurement that ultimately saved costs and expanded opportunity. 
    “NASA is full of brilliant people, and it can be challenging to present alternatives. But through clear communication and data-driven recommendations, we find solutions that work,” Henspeter said. 

    As she looks to the Artemis Generation, Henspeter hopes to pass along a deep respect for teamwork and shared purpose. 
    “Every contribution matters. Whether it seems big or small, it makes a difference in achieving our mission,” she said. “I take pride in my role and in being part of the NASA team.” 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump moves to gut low-income energy assistance as summer heat descends and electricity prices rise

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Conor Harrison, Associate Professor of Economic Geography, University of South Carolina

    Cities like Houston get high humidity in addition to the heat, making summer almost unbearable without cooling. Brandon Bell/Getty Images

    The U.S. is headed into what forecasters expect to be one of the hottest summers on record, and millions of people across the country will struggle to pay their power bills as temperatures and energy costs rise.

    A 2023 national survey found that nearly 1 in 4 Americans were unable to pay their full energy bill for at least one month, and nearly 1 in 4 reported that they kept their homes at unsafe temperatures to save money. By 2025, updated polling indicated nearly 3 in 4 Americans are worried about rising energy costs.

    Conservative estimates suggest that utilities shut off power to over 3 million U.S. households each year because the residents cannot pay their bills.

    This problem of high energy prices isn’t lost on the Trump administration.

    On the first day of his second term in 2025, President Donald Trump declared a national energy emergency by executive order, saying that “high energy prices … devastate Americans, particularly those living on low- and fixed incomes.”

    Secretary of Energy Christopher Wright raised concerns about utility disconnections and outlined a mission to “shrink that number, with the target of zero.”

    Yet, the administration’s 2026 budget proposal zeros out funding for the Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program, or LIHEAP, the federal program that administers funding to help low-income households pay their utility bills. And on April 1, 2025, the administration laid off the entire staff of the LIHEAP office.

    During the hottest periods, even nighttime temperatures might not drop below 90 in Phoenix. Without air conditioning, homes can become dangerously hot.
    Patrick T. Fallon/AFP via Getty Images

    Many people already struggle to cobble together enough help from various sources to pay their power bills. As researchers who study energy insecurity, we believe gutting the federal office responsible for administering energy bill assistance will make it even harder for Americans to make ends meet.

    The high stakes of energy affordability

    We work with communities in South Carolina and Tennessee where many residents struggle to heat and cool their homes.

    We see how high energy prices force people to make dangerous trade-offs. Low-income households often find themselves choosing whether to buy necessities, pay for child care or pay their utility bills.

    One elderly person we spoke with for our research, Sarah, explained that she routinely forgoes buying medications in order to pay her utility bill. Another research participant who connects low-income families to energy bill assistance in Tennessee said: “I’ve gone into these homes, and it’s so hot. Your eyes roll in the back of your head. It’s like you can’t breathe. How do you sit in here? It’s just unreal.”

    Unfortunately, these stories are increasingly common, especially in low-income communities and communities of color.

    Electricity prices are predicted to rise with worsening climate change: More frequent heat waves and extreme weather events drive up demand and put pressure on the grid. Furthermore, rising energy demand from data centers – supercharged by the increasing energy use by artificial intelligence – is accelerating price increases.

    Shrinking resources for assistance

    LIHEAP, created in 1981, provides funding to states as block grants to help low-income families pay their utility bills. In fiscal year 2023, the program distributed US$6.1 billion in energy assistance, helping some 5.9 million households avoid losing power connections.

    The program’s small staff played critical roles in disbursing this money, providing implementation guidelines, monitoring state-level fund management and tracking and evaluating program effectiveness.

    A long line of utility customers wait to apply for help from the Low-Income Energy Assistance Program in Trenton, N.J., in 2011. In 2023, around 6 million households benefited from LIHEAP.
    AP Photo/Mel Evans

    LIHEAP has historically prioritized heating assistance in cold-weather states over cooling assistance in warmer states. However, recent research shows a need to revisit the allocation formula to address the increasing need for air conditioning. The layoffs removed staff who could direct this work.

    It is unlikely that other sources of funding can fill in the gaps if states do not receive LIHEAP funds from the federal government. The program’s funding has never been high enough to meet the need. In 2020, LIHEAP provided assistance to just 16% of eligible households.

    Our research has found that, in practice, many households rely on a range of local nonprofits, faith-based organizations and informal networks of family and friends to help them pay their bills and keep the power on.

    For example, a research participant named Deborah reported that when faced with a utility shut-off, she “drove from church to church to church” in search of assistance. United Way in South Carolina received over 16,000 calls from people seeking help to pay their utility bills in 2023.

    These charitable services are an important lifeline for many, especially in the communities we study in the South. However, research has shown that faith-based programs do not have the reach of public programs.

    Without LIHEAP, the limited funds provided by nonprofits and the personal connections that people patch together will be stretched even thinner, especially as other charitable services, such as food banks, also face funding cuts.

    What’s ahead

    The $4.1 billion that Congress allocated to LIHEAP for the 2025 fiscal year, which ends Sept. 30, has already been disbursed. Going forward, however, cuts to LIHEAP staff affect its ability to respond to growing need. Congress now has to decide if it will kill the program’s future funding as well.

    Maricopa County in Arizona, home to Phoenix, illustrates what’s at stake. Annual heat-related deaths have risen 1,000% there in the past decade, from 61 to 602. Hundreds of these deaths occurred indoors.

    Cooling becomes essential during Arizona’s extreme summers. Maricopa County, home to Phoenix, reported more than 600 heat-related deaths in 2024.
    AP Photo/Ross D. Franklin

    We believe gutting LIHEAP puts the goal of energy affordability for all Americans – and Americans’ lives – in jeopardy. Until more affordable energy sources, such as solar and wind power, can be scaled up, an expansion of federal assistance programs is needed, not a contraction.

    Increasing the reach and funding of LIHEAP is one option. Making home weatherization programs more effective is another.

    Governments could also require utilities to forgive past-due bills and end utility shut-offs during the hottest and coldest months. About two dozen states currently have rules to prevent shut-offs during the worst summer heat.

    For now, the cuts mean more pressure on nonprofits, faith-based organizations and informal networks. Looking ahead to another exceptionally hot summer, we can only hope that cuts to LIHEAP staff don’t foreshadow a growing yet preventable death toll.

    Etienne Toussaint, a law professor at the University of South Carolina, and Ann Eisenberg, a law professor at West Virginia University, contributed to this article.

    Conor Harrison receives funding from the National Science Foundation and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

    Elena Louder receives funding from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

    Nikki Luke receives funding from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. She previously worked at the U.S. Department of Energy.

    Shelley Welton receives funding from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation.

    ref. Trump moves to gut low-income energy assistance as summer heat descends and electricity prices rise – https://theconversation.com/trump-moves-to-gut-low-income-energy-assistance-as-summer-heat-descends-and-electricity-prices-rise-256194

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How redefining just one word could strip the Endangered Species Act’s ability to protect vital habitat

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Mariah Meek, Associate Professor of Integrative Biology, Michigan State University

    Green sea turtles, like this hatchling in Florida, are endangered due in part to habitat destruction and fishing nets. Keenan Adams/USFWS

    It wouldn’t make much sense to prohibit people from shooting a threatened woodpecker while allowing its forest to be cut down, or to bar killing endangered salmon while allowing a dam to dry out their habitat.

    But that’s exactly what the Trump administration is proposing to do by changing how one word in the Endangered Species Act is interpreted.

    For 50 years, the U.S. government has interpreted the Endangered Species Act as protecting threatened and endangered species from actions that either directly kill them or eliminate their habitat.

    Most species on the brink of extinction are on the list because there is almost no place left for them to live. Their habitats have been paved over, burned or transformed. Habitat protection is essential for their survival.

    The golden-cheeked warbler breeds only in Texas, primarily in Texas Hill Country. It has been losing habitat as development expands in the region.
    Steve Maslowski/USFWS, CC BY

    As an ecologist and a law professor, we have spent our entire careers working to understand the law and science of helping imperiled species thrive. We recognize that the rule change the Trump administration quietly proposed could green-light the destruction of protected species’ habitats, making it nearly impossible to protect those endangered species.

    The public, which has long supported the Endangered Species Act, has until May 19, 2025, to comment on the proposal.

    The legal gambit

    The Endangered Species Act, passed in 1973, bans the “take” of “any endangered species of fish or wildlife,” which includes harming protected species.

    Since 1975, regulations have defined “harm” to include habitat destruction that kills or injures wildlife. Developers and logging interests challenged that definition in 1995 in a Supreme Court case, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon. However, the court ruled that the definition was reasonable and allowed federal agencies to continue using it.

    In short, the law says “take” includes harm, and under the existing regulatory definition, harm includes indirect harm through habitat destruction.

    Critical habitat throughout the U.S., including many coastlines and mountain areas. Note: Alaska is not to scale.
    U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service

    The Trump administration is seeking to change that definition of “harm” in a way that leaves out habitat modification.

    This narrowed definition would undo the most significant protections granted by the Endangered Species Act.

    Why habitat protection matters

    Habitat protection is the single most important factor in the recovery of endangered species in the United States – far more consequential than curbing direct killing alone.

    A 2019 study examining the reasons species were listed as endangered between 1975 and 2017 found that only 17% were primarily threatened by direct killing, such as hunting or poaching. That 17% includes iconic species such as the red wolf, American crocodile, Florida panther and grizzly bear.

    In contrast, a staggering 81% were listed because of habitat loss and degradation. The Chinook salmon, island fox, southwestern willow flycatcher, desert tortoise and likely extinct ivory-billed woodpecker are just a few examples. Globally, a 2022 study found that habitat loss threatened more species than all other causes combined.

    As natural landscapes are converted to agriculture or taken over by urban sprawl, logging operations and oil and gas exploration, ecosystems become fragmented and the space that species need to survive and reproduce disappears. Currently, more than 107 million acres of land in the U.S. are designated as critical habitat for Endangered Species Act-listed species. Industries and developers have called for changes to the rules for years, arguing it has been weaponized to stop development. However, research shows species worldwide are facing an unprecedented threat from human activities that destroy natural habitat.

    Under the proposed change, development could be accelerated in endangered species’ habitats.

    Gutting the Endangered Species Act

    The definition change is a quiet way to gut the Endangered Species Act.

    It is also fundamentally incompatible with the purpose Congress wrote into the act: “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species.” It contradicts the Supreme Court precedent, and it would destroy the act’s habitat protections.

    Northern spotted owls, like these fledglings, living in old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest are listed as threatened species because of habitat loss.
    Tom Kogut/USFS, CC BY

    Secretary of the Interior Doug Burgum has argued that the recent “de-extinction” of dire wolves by changing 14 genes in the gray wolf genome means that America need not worry about species protection because technology “can help forge a future where populations are never at risk.”

    But altering an existing species to look like an extinct one is both wildly expensive and a paltry substitute for protecting existing species.

    The Catalina Island fox is endemic to Catalina Island. Habitat loss, diseases introduced by domestic dogs, and predators have diminished the population of these small foxes to threatened status.
    Catalina Island Conservancy/Wikimedia Commons, CC BY-SA

    The administration has also refused to conduct the required analysis of the environmental impact that changing the definition could have. That means the American people won’t even know the significance of this change to threatened and endangered species until it’s too late, though if approved it will certainly end up in court.

    The ESA is saving species

    Surveys have found the Endangered Species Act is popular with the public, including Republicans. The Center for Biological Diversity estimates that the Endangered Species Act has saved 99% of protected species from extinction since it was created, not just from bullets but also from bulldozers. This regulatory rollback seeks to undermine the law’s greatest strength: protecting the habitats species need to survive.

    Congress knew the importance of habitat when it passed the law, and it wrote a definition of “take” that allows the agencies to protect it.

    Mariah Meek has received funding from the National Science Foundation, the US Fish and Wildlife Service, and several state agencies. In addition to being a professor, she is also the Director of Research for The Wilderness Society.

    Karrigan Börk receives grant funding from the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and several California state agencies. He is on the Advisory Board of Water Audit California, an organization that works to protect California’s public trust resources.

    ref. How redefining just one word could strip the Endangered Species Act’s ability to protect vital habitat – https://theconversation.com/how-redefining-just-one-word-could-strip-the-endangered-species-acts-ability-to-protect-vital-habitat-256424

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Preparing science educators to use and teach AI in the classroom

    Source: US Government research organizations

    Researchers use fossil shark teeth to excite middle school teachers and students about artificial intelligence

    An interdisciplinary team of researchers funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation has created a teacher-driven curriculum called Shark AI. This optional online program introduces Florida middle school teachers and students to artificial intelligence through the science of paleontology. With Shark AI, science teachers learn how to incorporate AI and machine learning concepts into their classrooms to help their students build essential skills and prepare for 21st-century STEM careers.

    “Most K-12 AI learning occurs with computer science standards and learning goals,” said Bruce MacFadden, University of Florida (UF) distinguished professor and principal investigator (PI) on the project. Shark AI takes a novel approach by using AI to teach concepts that are connected to biology, paleontology and the nature of science, while at the same time connecting to computer science education goals as well,” he said.

    Image showing the Google Teachable Machine model built to identify fossils. Students use this free, online machine learning tool to create their own models to classify fossil shark teeth.

    Developed with and for teachers, Shark AI is a free, optional online curriculum with five flexible modules — all aligned with middle school science standards — that teachers can choose to integrate into their instruction plans. The lessons aim to demystify AI by teaching students about data collection and object classification using fossil shark teeth, showing students how to train and evaluate machine learning models while recognizing a model’s limitations, and supporting students as they create unique AI models.

    But to best prepare students to use AI, teachers must also know how to use the technology. One critical component to using Shark AI is having access to real fossils.

    Credit: Christine Wusylko, University of Florida

    Students measuring real shark teeth fossils.

    “With Shark AI, students have access to high-quality, real fossils that they can touch and feel,” MacFadden said. “The kids love having that, and so do the teachers.”

    The other key piece is the support provided through professional development for Florida middle school educators who are voluntarily implementing Shark AI in their classrooms.

    “If teachers aren’t given opportunities to learn, they can never bring that knowledge back to their schools,” said Seema Naik, an engineer-turned-sixth and eighth grade educator, and this year’s Career Technical Education Rookie Teacher of the Year for her school in Broward County. “I never imagined that you could actually make a connection between fossils and AI, that you can train a model and do this. That was quite fascinating,” she said.

    The Shark AI team hosts a weeklong summer workshop to support teacher cohorts. The educators learn from various experts, including other middle school ‘teacher leaders,’ who use the curriculum.

    Credit: Erika Nortemann/Florida Museum

    Shark AI teacher professional development session showing educators looking at fossil shark teeth.

    “One thing the teacher cohorts enjoy most about the professional development is working with other teachers — their peers — who facilitate a lot of these AI learning experiences,” said Pavlo “Pasha” Antonenko, UF professor of educational technology and co-PI on the project. “From this project, we have learned that teachers can use AI. Teachers are using AI. We just need to help them do it more effectively,” Antonenko said.

    Importantly, this peer-to-peer engagement helped teachers like Naik unpack some of the common misconceptions she and others held about AI.

    “I had several questions and concerns about the technology before I went through the training, but now I am comfortable using AI in my class,” she said. “Learning how AI could be used positively, that was pretty powerful.”

    Credit: UF College of Education, University of Florida

    Shark AI teacher professional development session, where teachers are learning how to use Google Teachable Machine.

    The community teachers develop while participating in the Shark AI training is also key as they navigate the new curriculum. For example, Naik mentioned that some Florida schools use Microsoft applications while others use Google. This caused a few technical hurdles for some of the Shark AI teachers, but they worked together to troubleshoot and ultimately share their best practices.

    And to help teachers make clear connections for their students between the science classroom and the STEM workforce, the project offers “role model visits,” where a research team member visits science classes to engage directly with the students using Shark AI.

    “Going to a class and saying: ‘I am a real scientist, and if you want, you can be too. You are classifying fossils using machine learning tools, and that is exactly what I do as a scientist.’ That is very powerful for teachers, not only for the content support, but also for the science identity that the students might come away with,” MacFadden said.

    Shark AI role model visits, seen here, allow students to learn directly from Shark AI research team members. Starting with 180 students in 2022, Shark AI’s reach has grown exponentially to engage 1,350 total students over three years. And that number is a testament to the research team and the participating teachers.

    For Naik, Shark AI has not only given her a better understanding and confidence to use AI in her science classes, but she recognizes how the curriculum is giving her students “ownership of their learning,” something she says is key as they move into high school and become more self-sufficient.

    “This project really champions teachers,” emphasized Christine Wusylko, UF postdoctoral researcher on the team. “Shark AI teachers feel special, and they feel part of a club. The curriculum is flexible, and it’s led by teachers. And as a former science teacher myself, that is invaluable.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Discharge 2023: EU general budget – Commission, executive agencies and European Development Funds – P10_TA(2025)0077 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to its decision on discharge in respect of the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2023, Section III – Commission,

    –  having regard to its decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the budgets of the executive agencies for the financial year 2023,

    –  having regard to Rule 101 of and Annex V to its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgetary Control (A10-0074/2025),

    A.  whereas the eleventh EDF has reached its final stage as its sunset clause came into effect on 31 December 2020; whereas, however, specific contracts for existing financing agreements were signed until 31 December 2023, and the implementation of the ongoing projects funded by the EDF will continue until their final completion;

    B.  whereas the ninth, tenth and eleventh(1) EDFs were not incorporated into the Union general budget and continue to be implemented and reported on separately until their closure;

    C.  whereas, for the 2021-2027 MFF, development cooperation aid to ACP countries is integrated in the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (‘NDICI-Global Europe’) as part of the EU general budget, and development cooperation aid to OCTs, including Greenland, has been incorporated into the Decision on the Overseas Association;

    D.  whereas the EDFs are managed almost entirely by the Commission’s DG INTPA with a small proportion (7 %) of the 2023 EDF expenditure being managed by DG NEAR;

    Political priorities

    1.  Underlines its strong commitment to the Union’s fundamental values and principles which are enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); in the framework of the discharge process, stresses especially the principles of sound financial management as set out in Article 317 TFEU and the combatting of fraud and protection of the financial interests of the Union as set out in Article 325 TFEU;

    2.  Underlines the importance of the principle of separation of powers in the Union and recalls that according to the Treaty, the institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation; believes that under no circumstances the actions of one Union institution should affect the independence of another institution; urges all other institutions to respect the role of the Parliament as the sole Union institution directly elected by the citizens and to refrain from any undue, direct or indirect interference in its legislative processes, thereby ensuring that Parliament’s decision making-process remains free and independent from other Union institutions or any other entities;

    3.  Highlights the importance of the Union budget for achieving the Union’s political priorities, as well as its role in assisting Member States in unforeseen situations such as international conflicts or crises and their consequences; points out in this regard the continuing relevance of investments and support from the Union budget for reducing disparities between Member States and regions, for promoting economic growth and employment, for combating poverty and social exclusion, and thus for improving the daily life of European citizens;

    4.  Notes that the Court of Auditors (the Court) for the financial year 2023 has issued a clean opinion concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, regrets that the Court has had to issue for the 5th consecutive year an adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of Union budget expenditure and a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of expenditure under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF);

    5.  Expresses its deep concerns that the overall error rate estimated by the Court has been on a rising trend since the financial year 2020 and has reached 5,6 % for the financial year 2023; notes that there are significant differences in the error rates between headings which range from spending areas with error rates below the materiality threshold of 2 % up to an error rate of 9,3 % in the case of cohesion policy; further notes that discharge is a political process where all issues related to a specific financial year may be taken into consideration and that the decision on whether to grant or refuse discharge should remain factual and anchored in the Union acquis, and that it is taken for the budget as a whole; urges the Commission, finally, to take into account the Court’s recommendations and to reduce the overall error rate over the coming years; further asks the Commission to present an Action Plan within the four months on reducing the error rate;

    6.  Is concerned that the Commission and the Court have different interpretations of what the “error rate” represents, thus generating confusion; expresses its support for a common audit approach and methodology and strongly calls on both institutions to find a solution to the divergent approaches before the 2024 discharge; is concerned that the Commission is systematically underestimating the existing error level and that this could lead to an ineffective protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    7.  Expresses again its deep its concern that the accumulated outstanding commitments (RAL – reste à liquider) have reached a record level of EUR 543 billion, equivalent to 3,2 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023 and representing more than double the Union annual budget for 2023; underlines that such a record high level of outstanding commitments risks creating challenges for the future smooth implementation of extraordinary high levels of payments and/or leading to significant decommitments to the detriment of the implementation of Union policy objectives;

    8.  Further expresses its concern that the outstanding debt from borrowing has reached EUR 458,5 billion, equivalent to 2,7 % of the total GDP of the Union at the end of 2023; notes that the increase in outstanding debt during 2023, equivalent to EUR 110,5 billion, has made the Union one of the largest debt issuers in Europe; further notes that the amount of outstanding debt is projected to increase further during the coming years, especially due to increased borrowing linked to the RRF and financial assistance to a number of countries including Ukraine which is the victim of a war of aggression by Russia; reiterates its deep concerns that the increase in debt makes the Union budget more vulnerable to increases in interest rates since a part of the debt will have to be serviced and repaid by the Union budget;

    9.  Recalls the importance of a strict application of the financial rules of the Union in all programmes and on all beneficiaries, in order to avoid all forms of fraud, conflicts of interest, corruption, double funding and money laundering;

    10.  Underlines the importance of the rule of law as one of the fundamental values of the Union and stresses that the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism is crucial in order to ensure that Member States continue to respect the principles of the rule of law; reiterates its deep concerns about the deteriorating rule of law situation in certain Member States including attacks or restrictions to the activities of civil society organisations, which not only poses a significant threat to democratic values but also leads to an increased risk of financial losses for the Union budget; calls for the provision of adequate support to civil society organisations active in the field; acknowledges the emergence of new forms of rule of law violations by national governments and calls on the Commission to address these evolving challenges; calls on the Commission to ensure strict and fast implementation of all elements of the mechanism when Member States breach the principles of the rule of law where such breaches affect, or risk affecting, the financial interests of the Union; at the same time, underlines the need for complete and timely information on decisions related to the implementation of the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism; encourages the Commission to explicitly assess when shortcomings in the rule of law are of a systemic nature; calls for a stronger emphasis on the implementation of country-specific recommendations, coupled with effective follow-up mechanisms and measurable benchmarks; proposes the establishment of a comprehensive rule of law monitoring framework involving all Union institutions, Member States, and candidate countries, aimed at ensuring coherence and uniformity across the Union, while at the same time ensuring a fair and impartial application; calls on the Commission to propose measures to ensure the protection of final beneficiaries in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without undermining the application and effectiveness of the regulation;

    11.  Takes note of the innovative nature of the RRF and its contribution to supporting Member States in recovering from the economic and social consequences of the pandemic and creating a more resilient European economy; is of the opinion that any shift to a performance-based approach based on the RRF as a model requires addressing the many issues identified in its implementation, as well as assessing data on its full impact, before using such a model; recalls the many problems identified in the implementation of the RRF which would need to be addressed, including, but not limited to: the lack of adequate consultation of the regional and local authorities and other relevant stakeholders, such as social partners and civil society organisations and the lack of their involvement in the implementation; the weak cross border dimension, which may hint to a reduced EU added value in that respect; the lack of a clear definition of the milestones and targets and their satisfactorily fulfilment; the insufficient flexibility; the common debt with long-term debt payment as a consequence; the serious transparency, audit and control problems of the program which make it impossible for the citizens to be informed about the final beneficiaries of actions funded by the Union and pushes Member States to use RRF funds to cover projects very similar to those financed by Cohesion funds but with a much more limited capacity of control; reiterates the concern about the interpretation of the Commission and Member States on what a “final recipient” of RRF funding represents, which is not in line with the agreement of the REPowerEU negotiations and maintains that ministries, public authorities or other contracting authorities cannot be listed as final recipients of RRF funding; further expresses concern about the findings of the Court in relation to the risk of double funding and financing of recurring budgetary expenditure which are not in line with the RRF legal basis;

    12.  Notes that the set-up of the NGEU mechanism implies that the repayment of NGEU loans must start before the end of 2027 and be completed by 2058 at the latest; is concerned that the increase in interest rates over the last years has increased the borrowing costs under the NGEU significantly compared with original estimates; reiterates the need to fully respect the timeline of the legally binding roadmap for the introduction of new own resources and underlines that swift progress on new own resources is essential to repay NGEU and safeguard the current and future MFFs;

    13.  Stresses the urgent need for significant de-bureaucratisation, streamlining and simplification of all Union policies and their funding in line with the recommendations in the Draghi report(2) in order to ease the burdens for European businesses and increase European competitiveness, while ensuring the protection of the financial interests of the Union; underlines that simplification will also have a positive effect on error rates in the implementation of policies because many errors happen because of overcomplicated rules which are difficult to navigate, especially for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), new applicants, spin-offs and start-ups;

    14.  Reiterates the need to balance the further simplification of rules and procedures with much more systematic use of digitalised reporting, better and more robust controls and adequate ex post checks on the most repeated areas of irregular spending that do not add excessive bureaucratic complexity for beneficiaries, develop training sessions and practical information for applicants, in particular new applicants, and improve the assistance and guidelines for SMEs, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies and all other relevant stakeholders; reminds that a robust control system under the responsibility of the Commission is particularly needed for the RRF;

    15.  Stresses the need and highlights the importance of the NDICI programme for the support to global challenges, the promotion of human rights, freedoms and democracy; underlines the importance of reinforcing the Eastern Neighbourhood line in order to support political, economic and social reforms in this challenged region;

    16.  Underlines that it is imperative for the credibility of the Union that the Commission ensures that no Union funds are allocated to individuals or organisations linked to any kind of terrorist movements or any other movement expressing extremist views, inciting violence and/or hatred, that are directly in opposition to the European Union’s fundamental values, including Islamist anti-Semitic, anti-Christian and anti-Islamic movements; in this context, recalls that there have been allegations that 19 of 13 000 UNRWA employees in Gaza were involved in the despicable terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israel on 7 October; recalls that in 9 cases their employment was formally terminated in the interests of UNRWA; takes note of the results of the investigation launched by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS); underlines that the Commission should also establish better controls ensuring that no such funding happens indirectly through third parties and organise better traceability of Union funds to final beneficiaries;

    17.  Reiterates deep concerns about the increase in the exploitation of Union funds against Union principles and values, especially when the use of funds and transfers to other organisations are not entirely traceable; warns of the danger of Union funds ultimately being used within corrupt circles and being subject to fraud and irregularities, foreign interference or entrism; emphasises the importance of ‘final beneficiary transparency’ for Union funds;

    18.  Emphasises the importance of maintaining institutional integrity and preventing potential foreign interference; condemns any improper attempt to influence the legislative activities of the European Parliament; insists on the responsibility of OLAF to conduct all necessary in-depth investigations; stresses the importance of the work carried out by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in protecting the European Union’s financial interests; insists to provide to the EPPO adequate financial and human resources; recalls the Agreement establishing an interinstitutional body for ethical standards for members of institutions and advisory bodies referred to in Article 13 of the Treaty on European Union, and insist on its swift implementation in all EU institutions;

    19.  Recalls the crucial role of civil society organisations (CSOs), including NGOs, in upholding democratic values to support a vibrant and lively democratic society, ensuring a sound basis for broad coverage of all relevant views in different debates and highlights that CSOs may receive support from Union funds to exercise these functions, as provided in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union;

    20.  Notes that there have been allegations from some Members of the Budgetary Control committee that grant agreements, concluded by the Commission included detailed lobbying activities which could be interpreted as potentially interfering with internal decision making in the Union Institutions; notes that the Commission took a series of measures to address the allegations by adopting guidance on funding for activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy, stating that while such grant agreements did not breach the EU legal framework, they could potentially entail a reputational risk for the Union; notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’; notes that such a disclaimer was further added in the 2024 call for proposals for operation grants;

    21.  Notes that a screening of grant agreements in all portfolios to verify their alignment with the new guidance is ongoing and that, so far, the Commission has not communicated to the Parliament the full results of the screening nor other measures that the Commission might take, if necessary; calls the Commission to keep the discharge authority informed at all times; emphasises that transparency in stakeholder meetings is fundamental to democratic integrity and should apply equally to all entities engaging with Union institutions; stresses that clear documentation and disclosure of such interactions strengthens public trust and democratic accountability;

    22.  Recalls that EU funding requires stringent accountability and transparency standards; in line with the ECA recommendations in the Special Report 05/2024(3) and the recent special Report 11/2025(4), urges the Commission to ensure that the information disclosed in the Financial Transparency System is frequently updated, reliable, comparable and useful; stresses the need to allocate additional resources to the EUTR Secretariat to enable a systematic and thorough monitoring of the Transparency Register; this should include allocating resources towards AI implementation to develop an AI based search mechanism; recalls the need to proactively check that all entities beneficiaries of EU funds respect EU values;

    23.  Welcomes the reply of Commissioner Serafin to the written question(5), once again confirming EU funding was granted and used by NGOs in full respect of EU Treaties and LIFE Regulation(6); takes further note of the recent ECA Special Report on transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs(7), which, while stating that the use of EU funding for NGO advocacy is legal, also confirms it is in line with EU’s legal transparency requirements as laid down in the EU Financial Regulation; at the same time ECA SR 11/2025 points to the fact that more should be done to improve transparency of EU funding received by all beneficiaries; calls in this regard on the Commission to implement ECA recommendations regarding screening of self-declarations in the EU’s Financial Transparency System, as well as proactive monitoring of the respect to EU fundamental values and principles by the beneficiaries;

    24.  Welcomes the entry into force of the recast of the Financial Regulation; welcomes, in particular, the enhancements related to tracking Union funds through digital tools and interoperability that will bolster the protection of the Union Financial Interests, the targeted extension of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management following MFF 2027, the reference to the Rule of Law conditionality mechanism and the introduction of a conditionality based on Union values as enshrined in Article 2 TEU, as well as the opportunity to streamline SMEs and individual applicants with the introduction of very low-value grants;

    CHAPTER 1 – Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF)

    The European Court of Auditors’ statement of assurance and budgetary and financial management

    Reliability of the accounts

    25.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023(8), that the consolidated accounts of the European Union for that year are reliable; notes that the Court has issued a clean opinion on the reliability of the accounts every year since 2007;

    26.  Notes that on 31 December 2023, total liabilities amounted to EUR 679,9 billion, and total assets amounted to EUR 467,7 billion; notes that the difference of EUR 212,2 billion represents the negative net assets, comprising debt and the portion of expenses already incurred by the Union up to 31 December 2023 that must be funded by future budgets;

    27.  Notes that at the end of 2023, the estimated value of incurred but not yet claimed eligible expenses due to beneficiaries, recorded as accrued expenses, was EUR 155,2 billion (2021: EUR 148,7 billion), of which EUR 7,4 billion is related to accrued RRF expenditure;

    28.  Welcomes the Court’s conclusion that the assets, liabilities, revenue and expenses, including those related to NextGenerationEU (NGEU), the estimate related to the UK’s withdrawal process, and the impact of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, are presented fairly in the consolidated annual accounts;

    Legality and regularity of Union revenue

    29.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the Union’s revenue is free from material error and that the managing systems examined by the Court were generally effective;

    Legality and regularity of Union expenditure

    30.  Strongly regrets the adverse opinion on the legality and regularity of the Union budget expenditure issued by the Court for the fifth year in a row; considers this increasingly problematic, as the Commission seems unable, or unwilling, to identify the cause and address the underlying issues; regrets the Commission is not accepting some recommendations of the Court of Auditors; notes in particular the importance of reinforcement of financial management of the Commission and Member States, that is considered as not reliable by the Court and therefore compromises the reliability of the Annual Management and Performance Report; calls on the Commission to present a clear action plan on reducing the error rate within the following four months; stresses that Parliament shall duly scrutinise such an action plan;

    31.  Is seriously concerned by the Court’s estimation of the error level of 5,6 % in 2023 expenditure; notes that this is an accelerated deterioration compared to the previous two years (4,2 % in 2022 and 3.0 % in 2021); notes with concern that the Court continues to detect substantial issues in reimbursement-based expenditure where the estimated level of error is 7,9 %; notes that the effect of the errors found by the Court is estimated to be both material and pervasive; calls for the Commission’s financial management to be tightened up, in accordance with the recommendations made by the Court in its Annual Reports and Special Reports, in order to resolutely tackle the high error rate over the next few years; underlines the Court’s warning that the increasing European debt is placing growing pressure on the Union budget;

    32.  Notes that the Commission in its Annual Management and Performance Report categorises the expenditure into higher, medium and lower risk categories, in order to focus action on high-risk areas; while the Court uses only two risk categories in order to produce an opinion on the legality and regularity of the expenditures; is worried that the Court’s work revealed limitations in the Commission’s ex-post work, which, taken together, affect the robustness of the Commission’s risk assessment; notes with concern that one of the areas most impacted was ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’, where the Court assessed the majority of the spending to be high risk, while the Commission classified only a minority in this way;

    33.  Reiterates the concerns about the Court observation that the Commission’s risk assessment is likely to underestimate the level of risk in several areas; is also worried by recurrent weaknesses identified by the Court in Member States’ management and control systems, which are still not still preventing or detecting irregularities in heading 2, thus limiting the reliance that can be placed on their work, while the Commission’s error rates do still rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively;

    34.  Notes that the increase is primarily caused by the estimated level of error under MFF heading 2 – cohesion, resilience and values, where the Court found 9,3 % of expenditure to be in breach of Union rules and regulations; recalls the underlying issues that are reported by the Court and that have been known for several years;

    35.  Underlines that the estimated level of error in the Union’s expenditure, as presented in the Court’s statement of assurance, is an estimate of the money that should not have been paid out because it was not used in accordance with the applicable rules and regulations; considers that, though not an indicator of fraud or corruption, the estimated level of error represents expenditure where corrective actions are necessary, and thus shows a wasteful use of resources; regrets that, while being a problem in itself, this will also give a negative impression to citizens, and may even call into question the Commission’s ability to effectively protect the Union’s financial interests;

    36.  Notes with concern that the Commission´s own estimate of the risk at payment is only 1,9 % for 2023 and has been at that level since 2020; notes that the Commission estimates its capacity to correct and recover irregular expenditure during implementation of the associated programmes at 1,0 %, resulting in a risk at closure of 0,9 %; is concerned that again for this year the Commission’s risk at payment is not only below the Court estimated level of error of 5,6 % but also below the Court range, which is between 4,4 % and 6,8 %; highlights that the divergence between the Court’s overall error rate and the Commission’s risk at payment is also evident in some of the specific spending areas, in particular in heading 2, even more than in the past; welcomes the Court’s estimate of the level of error as an important indicator for the existing risks;

    37.  Notes the multi-annual perspective of the Commission’s risk at closure, as corrections and recoveries after year-end are not reflected in the Court’s estimate of the level of error; regrets, however, the confusion caused by the Commission’s presentation of the risk at payment;

    38.  Recalls the positions expressed in the 2022 discharge resolution and the exchanges of views in the discharge hearings for the financial year 2023 on the diverging methodologies and estimates between the Court and the Commission of errors made in Union expenditure; notes in particular that the Court’s error rate is based on a statistical sample, whereas the Commission’s risk at payment is to a large extent compiled from the error rates reported by national auditing authorities in Member States and calculated only after corrections and repayments; reminds that the Court’s error rate includes the errors that remained undetected by the Member States and the Commission, which demonstrates that the Commission’s error rates are an underestimation; notes with concern an even wider gap between the Court’s and Commission’s estimates; further notes that the Commission and the Court are organising joint workshops on this issue; notes that the Court recently aligned its methodology on procurement in the decentralised agencies with the methodology of the Commission; reiterates its support for the independent audit approach and methodology of the Court and invites the Commission to cooperate with the Court with a view to increasing harmonisation and providing for more comparable estimates of the level of error;

    39.  Recalls that the discharge authority needs a statement of assurance, provided by the Court, on the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the underlying transactions at year-end for its decision on discharge for that year; notes that Union spending programmes are multiannual and that their management and control systems cover multiple years, allowing for corrections and recoveries after year-end;

    40.  Recalls that the Commission is responsible for preventing and detecting fraud; notes that the Court, in the exercise of its mandate, is obliged to report any cases of irregularity; notes that the Court forwards to the EPPO suspicions of criminal offences falling under its competences and to OLAF suspicions of fraud, corruption or other illegal activity affecting the Union’s financial interests; notes that, in 2023, the Court reported 20 cases of suspected fraud to OLAF, and in parallel reported 12 of these cases to the EPPO, resulting so far in four OLAF investigations and nine EPPO investigations; commends the Court for its reporting of cases of irregularity to OLAF and the EPPO, as information resulting from audit engagements usually has a high degree of reliability; reminds in this framework of the key role played by the whole Union’s anti-fraud architecture and expresses some concerns about the refusal of some Member States to cooperate with one of its elements, the EPPO;

    Budgetary and financial management

    41.  Notes that in 2023, 98,9 % of the available commitment appropriations were used (EUR 184,4 billion out of EUR 186,5 billion); notes that the available appropriations were higher than the MFF ceiling of EUR 182,7 billion due to the use of special instruments for new or unforeseen events; notes that 90,0 % of payment appropriations were used (EUR 162,0 billion of EUR 165,2 billion available);

    42.  Notes with concern that the total outstanding commitments, which represent future debts if not decommitted, reached an all-time high of EUR 543 billion (2022: EUR 450 billion); notes that the Commission foresees a decrease from 2025 to 2029 when committed amounts for both NGEU and the 2021-2027 programming period should be paid out; notes however that the actual amounts for 2023 (EUR 543 billion) are much higher than the forecasted amount (EUR 490 billion), calling the Commission’s estimates into question;

    43.  Recalls that the time available for implementing shared management funds under the 2021-2027 MFF is shorter than under previous MFFs because of the n+2 for the last year, which, coupled with the high RAL, will raise the risk of decommitments; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission has increased its forecasted amount of decommitments from EUR 7,6 billion for 2023-2027, to EUR 8,1 billion for 2024-2027 to EUR 8,8 billion for 2025-2027, a 15 % increase in 2 years; underlines with concern that the Commission has underestimated its projections for the RAL in the last two years, and that the Commission therefore likely underestimates the amount of decommitments that will be made until 2027; notes the introduction of the “cascade mechanism” following the mid-term review of the MFF 2021-2027 and the incentive to use decommitted amounts to cover increased interest costs for amounts borrowed by the Commission for NGEU;

    44.   Notes that the latest long-term payment forecast produced by the Commission foresees substantial decommitments as of 2027 unless Member States undertake additional efforts and implement at a much faster pace than in the period 2014-2020; notes that for the CF, ERDF, and ESF+ cohesion policy funds, the Commission forecast total decommitments for 2024-2027 at EUR 2,2 billion, more than five times its 2022 forecast of EUR 0,4 billion; warns that for the Just Transition Fund (JTF), the low implementation in 2023 puts important amounts at risk from 2025 onwards; calls on the Commission and on the Member States to use all of the available possibilities to avoid decommitments;

    45.  Notes with concern that Union debt increased from EUR 344,3 billion in 2022 to EUR 458,5 billion in 2023, 60 % of which is related to NGEU; notes that only for the debt issued for NGEU, associated interest costs need to be paid directly from the Union Budget and that, due to increased interest rates, these costs for the current MFF (until the end of 2027) are estimated to be between EUR 17 billion and EUR 27 billion higher than the initially forecasted EUR 14,9 billion;

    46.  Notes with concern that the total exposure of the Union budget because of guarantees and contingent liabilities for loans rose to EUR 298,0 billion; notes that assumptions on capital-market interest should be made conservatively, both for existing debt and new debt and that for both categories a viable plan for its repayment is necessary; notes that the Court received information from the Commission that indicates that the exposure will steadily increase in the coming years, putting additional pressure on the headroom of the budget and further reducing the flexibility of the Union budget; supports the Court recommendations to the Commission to act more proactively to ensure that its mitigating tools (such as the Common Provisioning Fund) have sufficient capacity as well as to provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure, making its estimate public;

    47.  Notes with concern that the Court in its Special Report 07/2024(9) observed that a significant share of recovery orders issued between 2014 and 2022 were still outstanding at the time of their audit; further notes that the Commission, in its replies to the Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control’s (CONT Committee) written questions for the 2023 discharge, mentioned that there are 1 357 overdue recovery orders for a total outstanding amount of approximately EUR 335 million for the period 2014-2023; calls on the Commission to prioritise collecting monies under overdue recovery orders and to keep the Committee on Budgetary Control informed about progress made;

    48.  Highlights that equality is a founding value of the Union and is enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; recalls the commitment of the Union to gender mainstreaming in its policy-making and implementation of Union funds, including gender budgeting; encourages the Commission to continue the efforts made in gender budgeting and in tracking the impact of the Union budget to foster gender equality; recalls the obligation of the Commission to accompany all legislative proposals with an impact assessment when they are projected to have a significant economic, social, and environmental impact in order to guarantee, among other things, fair distribution of funds;

    49.  Notes that the review of the Interinstitutional Agreement on the Transparency Register is due by July 2025; calls on the Commission to ensure that the process is as open as possible, to align financial reporting requirements across all categories of registrants (including funding sources and lobbying budgets), addressing also the risk identified in the Court’s Special Report on the EU Transparency Register (SR 05/2024) regarding self-declarations on the category of interest representation; believes that, in order to address the recommendations of the Court, the resources of the secretariat of the Transparency Register should be increased;

    50.  Recalls the following findings of the Court of Auditors’ Special Report 11/2025: (i) that the identification and registration of entities as NGOs are not always consistent and reliable; (ii) that despite a more streamlined granting process, issues with the completeness and accuracy of data remain; (iii) that the lack of a reliable overview of Union spending on NGOs hampers useful analysis; (iv) that the calls for proposals in the Court’s sample were transparent; (v) that respect for Union values is not pro-actively verified; and (vi) that transparency practices vary widely in the Court’s sample, with larger NGOs performing better. calls on the Commission to fully implement the recommendations in the Court’s Special Report;

    Recommendations

    51.  Strongly supports the recommendations of the Court in its annual report on the implementation of the budget for the financial year 2023 (annual report for the 2023 financial year)(10) as well as in related special reports; calls on the Commission to implement them without delay and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    52.  Calls on the Court to look for ways, together with the Commission, to align their methodologies for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;

    53.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) continue to engage with the Court in order to increase understanding, convergence and comparability of the two approaches to the diverging estimates of errors in Union expenditure;
       (ii) qualify the impact of corrective measures on the overall level of error;
       (iii) look for ways, together with the Court, to align their methodologies as regards the evaluation of procurement errors, and the estimation of the level of error for the general budget, as in the case of procurement for the decentralised agencies, while respecting the different roles;
       (iv) present the discharge authority with a strategy to strengthen the use of funds for their intended purpose, increase absorption and prevent decommitments in order to maximise the EU-added value of the Union Budget;
       (v) increase the reliability of the forecast of the outstanding commitments with a more realistic estimate of the absorption of Union funds to give the discharge authority a better forecast of the development of the RAL over the years and better protect the Union budget;
       (vi) report on, and provide sufficient measures to, protecting the Union budget from the different risks identified beyond the RAL, such as decommitments in cohesion policy, the increasing debt, increased budget exposure and the impact of increasing inflation;
       (vii) provide more transparent reporting on total annual budget exposure by presenting, in the Annual Management and Performance Report, a multi-annual outlook on the exposure of the Union Budget to budgetary guarantees;
       (viii) substantially simplify rules and procedures and improve the assistance to, and ensure consistent and user-friendly guidelines for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, administration and payment agencies, CSOs and all other relevant stakeholders, without compromising the quality of the controls;
       (ix) make sure that the mitigation tools in place have sufficient capacity to effectively face the exposure risks of the Union budget;
       (x) boost efforts to improve transparency in the use of funds, including as regards information on final beneficiaries, including on the funds that are allocated for the preparation of policy and legislative proposals;
       (xi) put in place all necessary means for ensuring that all interest representatives that approach Union institutions are registered in the Transparency Register; further asks the Commission to set up an effective mechanism to ensure that entities funded by the Union in the Transparency Register are aligned with Union values and demand full transparency on their financing, providing a deeper insight into the financing of all entities registered and which should be the condition to approach all Union institutions, bodies and agencies;
       (xii) together with Parliament and Council, guarantee adequate resources for the secretariat of the Transparency Register in order to ensure that the entries on the lobbying activities of all interest representatives can be checked for accuracy and that lobbying become more transparent as requested in the Court in Special Report 05/2024 on the EU Transparency Register; calls on the Commission to allocate adequate resources to identify irregularities to guarantee a wide range of search capabilities;
       (xiii) require interest representatives in the Transparency Register to list their financial supporters by self-declaring that they are only representing their interests or the collective interests of their members and to propose an amendment to Annex II to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 20 May 2021 to require them to list their financial supporters in the EU Transparency Register, even if they state in that register that they are only representing the interests of their own members; urges entities already registered that have not listed their financial resources by self-declaration to declare them voluntarily before the interinstitutional agreement is amended;
       (xiv) continue to support Member States in improving both the quality and the quantity of checks and to share best practices in the fight against fraud and corruption;
       (xv) address the situation regarding late recovery orders and to take all necessary measures to recover the majority of the amount outstanding for the period 2014-2023, including implementation of corporate escalation mechanisms, and keep the discharge authority informed on the progress made in recovering the sums;
       (xvi) reinforce the capacity of the Anti-fraud Architecture of the Union, including the provision of sufficient financial and human resources, and facilitate the cooperation between them;

    Revenue

    54.  Welcomes that for 2023, the Court is also able to issue a clean opinion on the legality and regularity of revenue; at the same time, stresses that the problems with customs duties not being declared or being incorrectly declared (a customs gap) leading to a shortfall in collected import duties has been a persistent problem for many years and could potentially entail a loss of traditional own resources for the Union and for the Member States;

    55.  Notes with serious concern that the Court has examined the implementation of the Commission’s Customs Action Plan, which has the potential to lead to a significant reduction of the customs gap, and has again identified insufficient progress in the implementation of some actions from this plan; notes that the Commission, as part of this plan, proposed a customs reform in May 2023(11), including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub;

    56.  Recalls that the Court has highlighted the risks to the EU’s financial interests from inadequate or ineffective customs controls of imported goods; commends the efforts made by OLAF on the fight against Fraud linked to customs duties and VAT; underlines the rise of the ecommerce and the online platforms risks due to potential security and safety threats and risk of non-compliance with EU taxation and customs rules, product standards, intellectual property rights, prohibitions and restrictions;

    57.  Notes with concern that the Court revealed that the Commission did not charge late interest payments for six cases related to late corrections to GNI data by Member States where the Commission has expressed reservations; agrees with the Court that the Commission, as a matter of principle, ought to charge late interest payments in such cases in order to create an incentive for Member States to address the reservations within the deadlines;

    58.  Notes with satisfaction that the new own resource based on non-recycled plastic packaging waste generated by Member States in 2023 amounted to EUR 7,2 billion, equivalent to 4,0 % of the EU’s total revenue; further notes that the Court identified(12) some problems related to the reliability and comparability of data; stresses that it provides an excellent example of a new own resource, as it creates positive incentives for Member States to reduce the volume of non-recycled plastic packaging while at the same time generating a new revenue stream for the Union;

    59.  Stresses that the Commission’s proposals concerning new own resources from 2021 comprising three elements, the first based on revenues from emissions trading (ETS), the second drawing on the resources generated by the Union’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, and the third based on the share of residual profits from multinationals that will be re-allocated to Member States under the OECD/G20 agreement on a re-allocation of taxing rights (“Pillar One”) are obvious candidates for such new resources; at the same time, points out that other sources might also be considered if they should prove to be easier for Member States to approve; welcomes other initiatives that may lead to new own resources for the Union budget;

    60.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) increase focus and pressure on the implementation of the Customs Action Plan and not least the proposal for a significant customs reform from May 2023, including the establishment of the EU Customs Authority and EU Customs Data Hub; ensure that Member States implement effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-compliance with reporting obligations; initiate infringement proceedings in those cases where there is sufficient evidence that Member States are implementing a manifestly inadequate penalty system for breaches of the Directive on Administrative Cooperation 6(13) (DAC 6);
       (ii) insist on the importance of intensifying and diversifying the International customs cooperation with trade partners and stresses the need to strengthen the fight against cross-border tax and customs fraud in the context of the expansion of e-commerce;
       (iii) create incentives for Member States to address reservations related to corrections of GNI data by Member States within the deadlines by charging late interest payments;
       (iv) continue work towards the introduction of additional new own resources;

    Single market, Innovation and Digital

    61.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 1 ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ was EUR 25,3 billion (13,2 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: EUR 15,3 billion (60,5 %) for Research, EUR 4,1 billion (16,1 %) for Transport, Energy and Digital, EUR 2,3 billion (9,1 %) for the InvestEU Programme, EUR 2,2 billion (8,7 %) for Space, and EUR 1,4 billion (5,6 %) for other areas;

    62.  Notes that the Court has examined 127 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading, notably the Horizon 2020 programme (90 transactions), Horizon Europe (7 transactions), the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), space programmes and financial instruments, and also that it has reviewed the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA) ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors and the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG RTD) and the European Health and Digital Executive Agency (HaDEA);

    63.  Notes that the Court estimates that the level of error in spending on ‘Single Market, Innovation and Digital’ in 2023 was material at 3,3 %; notes the Court’s observation that research and innovation expenditure is most affected by error, particularly in the area of personnel costs; further notes that the Commission estimates the risk at payment as 1,4 % for this heading, which is in the lower half of the range of the Court’s estimate; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that the Commission’s risk at payment for this heading remains an underestimate, because of weaknesses identified by the Court in the Commission’s ex post audits in this area since the financial year 2019(14);

    64.  Notes with concern that 39 (31 %) of the 127 transactions that the Court examined contained errors; is deeply concerned that for seven cases of quantifiable errors made by beneficiaries, the Commission (or the auditors contracted by the beneficiaries) had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure, and thus, had the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1,4 percentage points lower; highlights that this points to weaknesses in the Commission’s controls;

    Research and innovation

    65.  Highlights the importance of Union research and innovation (R&I) funding programmes for the scientific, societal, economic and technological development of the Union, reducing inequalities, achieving the green and digital transitions and decreasing the Union’s energy dependency on Russia; recalls that Horizon Europe is the most significant research and innovation programme in Europe, with a total budget of EUR 95,5 billion for 2021-2027, including EUR 5,4 billion from the NGEU instrument; notes that the RRF has allocated around EUR 48 billion in investments to R&I; underlines that in order to enhance the Union’s competitiveness and close the innovation gap, additional funding for R&I is needed, taking into account the Draghi report’s pertinent recommendations; highlights, in particular, the need to increase defence-related R&I spending due to the current geopolitical conditions, which could serve as an important component of the innovation policy strategy;

    66.  Notes that its predecessor, Horizon 2020, with a budget of EUR 75,6 billion funded more than 35 000 projects between 2014 and 2020 and its calls attracted over a million individual applications from 177 countries; further notes that in her hearing for the 2023 discharge, Commissioner Ivanova underlined the EU added value of EU R&I funding programmes, explaining that the final evaluation of Horizon 2020 estimated that, for each euro of costs linked to the programme five euros worth of benefits would be generated for society by 2040; deeply regrets that 74 % of proposals assessed as high quality by independent experts could not be funded due to budget constraints; notes that an additional EUR 159 billion would have been needed to fund all high-quality proposals; stresses the importance of ensuring sufficient funding for Union research and innovation, not the least to increase the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity, in line with the Union’s strategic agenda for 2024-2029;

    67.  Notes the late adoption of the Horizon Europe legal bases in 2021 and welcomes that the Commission managed to reach close to 100 % budget implementation in 2023; notes that the number of grant agreements signed by the end of 2023 was 10 674 and a further two framework agreements were signed;

    68.  Notes with concern that the Court found errors relating to ineligible costs in 30 of the 97 research and innovation transactions in its sample, and that these errors represent 71 % of the Court’s estimated level of error for this heading in 2023; reiterates its concern that after 9 years of implementation of the Horizon 2020 programme, the calculation of personnel costs remains a major source of errors, as 22 of the 30 research transactions with quantifiable errors in the Court’s sample (around 73 %) are affected by the incorrect application of the methodology for calculating personnel costs; acknowledges both the Commission’s and the Court’s continued efforts to remedy this situation; welcomes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendations to enhance beneficiaries’ compliance with the daily-rate rules and to ensure clarity concerning daily-rate rules in Horizon Europe documents;

    69.  Underlines the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures governing Union R&I funding; notes that in 2023 the Commission has continued the roll out of simplified cost options such as lump sums and unit costs in Horizon Europe; further notes the remarks made by the Director-General for Research and Innovation in the exchange of views with the CONT Committee that the Commission intends to increase the disbursement of Horizon Europe funds through lump sums to 50 % by 2027; welcomes that the Commission, taking the Court’s recommendations issued in its annual reports for 2022 into account, will further specify the requirements defining the proper implementation of lump sum grants, including the elements of each work package triggering payment, and will also provide detailed guidance to those involved in assessing the implementation of projects; further notes that, as described in the Commission’s assessment of Lump Sum Funding in Horizon 2020 and Horizon Europe 2018-2024, beneficiaries would welcome more clarity on how lump sum grants would be audited; is concerned that the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe is not yet developed;

    70.  Stresses the crucial role of the private sector in addressing the innovation gap in the Union and improving the Union’s competitiveness and prosperity; believes, in particular, that it is imperative to continue to promote and facilitate as much as possible the participation of SMEs in Union R&I funding programmes; notes the Court’s conclusion that SMEs and newcomers are more prone to making errors than other beneficiaries since they lack the experience and resources to administer the funds; welcomes the efforts made by the Commission to support SMEs specifically, for example through information campaigns, contacts with the system of National Contact Points and the dedicated helpdesk of the Research Enquiry Service; considers that the simplification of rules and procedures is the major driver for increased participation of SMEs;

    Energy, Transport and Digital

    71.  Highlights the importance of Union investments in the development of high performing, sustainable and efficiently interconnected trans-European networks in the fields of transport, energy and digital services and notes that the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), with EUR 4,1 billion of expenditure in 2023, is a key Union instrument in delivering these objectives;

    72.  Draws attention to the need to simplify the application procedures under the Connecting Europe Facility for Transport (CEF-T) in order to enable greater participation of smaller entities and local initiatives in the development of European transport infrastructure; regrets that the CEF-T budget does not cover all the needs for sustainable transport investments and that most of the CEF-T budget has already been allocated, leaving a funding gap until 2027;

    73.  Recalls that the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the resulting sanctions imposed on Russia continued to adversely impact the Union’s transport sector in 2023, leading to traffic shortages, supply chain bottlenecks, and the necessity to bypass traditional routes, thereby extending journey times and increasing costs; points out that the Eastern border regions, especially in the Baltic states, Finland, Poland, and Romania, have been particularly affected by economic losses and a halt of cross-border mobility as a consequence of the Russian aggression; calls on the Commission to introduce targeted measures, including in the next MFF, to facilitate recovery of the affected regions;

    74.  Calls on the Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of the funding allocated to the cross-border and multi-country infrastructure projects, facing significant implementation challenges, financial difficulties, or delays, such as Rail Baltica; points out that this review should address inefficiencies in planning and management as well as escalating construction costs that threaten project timelines and objectives; reiterates that greater transparency in the management of public funds increases citizens’ trust in the Union institutions;

    75.  Notes with concern that the Court found two errors in CEF projects in its 2023 sample, and that one of these relates to a serious breach of the Union’s public procurement rules, and has led to the contract being awarded to a consortium that did not fulfil the selection criteria and that this error contributed 28 % to the estimated error rate for heading 1;

    76.  Is deeply concerned by the Court’s findings in relation to the European Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency’s (CINEA)ex ante control system for CEF grants in the transport and energy sectors, in particular the Court’s conclusion that while the strategies for both CEF1 (2014-2020) and CEF2 (2021-2027) are based on a sound analysis of risks and past irregularities, the guidelines for ex-ante checks on procurement were not detailed enough; fully supports the Court’s recommendation that the Commission should further develop these guidelines;

    Recommendations

    77.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) secure the provision of adequate resources to support high-quality research and innovation project proposals with an EU added value in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next Multiannual Financial Framework;
       (ii) continue to simplify rules and procedures in line with the new financial regulation, to support training sessions and user-friendly, consistent and practical information for applicants in Member States, in particular for SMEs, new applicants, spin-offs, start-ups, CSOs or local action groups and to encourage applications from beneficiaries in Member States with more limited participation, as well as from smaller entities;
       (iii) continue to apply simplified rules and procedures, digitalisation measures and simplified cost options (SCOs) while addressing, in particular, the risk of irregularities and fraud and the costs of controls, and finalising the ex post audit strategy for Horizon Europe as soon as possible;
       (iv) further specify the requirements for defining proper implementation of lump sum grants, taking into account the Court’s pertinent recommendations from its 2022 Annual Report, and verify the actual implementation of projects using lump sums;
       (v) undertake a thorough analysis of procurement errors found and further develop the guidelines describing the extent of the checks to be performed for ex ante controls on procurement for CEF projects, as recommended by the Court;

    Cohesion, Resilience and Values

    78.  Stresses the importance of Union cohesion policy for economic and territorial convergence and development in the regions of the Union, as well as for supporting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 2 ‘Cohesion, resilience and values’ was EUR 73,3 billion (38,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 47,8 % for the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and other regional operations, 18,9 % for the European Social Fund (ESF), 9,8 % for the Cohesion Fund (CF), 3,8 % for Erasmus+, 2,1 % for CEF Transport, and 3,8 % for other areas;

    79.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 238 transactions covering the full range of spending under MFF Heading 2; notes with concern that the Court’s estimated overall level of error in expenditure under this heading in 2023 increased to 9,3 %, which is significantly above the materiality threshold; draws attention to the marked increase in the overall level of error estimated by the Court in 2023 compared to previous years (6,4 % in 2022, 3,6 % in 2021);

    80.  Is concerned about the Court’s observation that the significant additional resources made available under the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe (REACT-EU), the approaching end of the eligibility period for 2014-2020 programmes (31 December 2023), and parallel implementation of the NGEU programme have put additional pressure on Member State’s administrations, increasing the risk of errors; is in particular concerned by the practice of reducing Member States’ co-funding, as is the case under REACT-EU, the Coronavirus Investment Initiative (CRII) and CRII+, which reduces the ownership and associated incentives for properly overseeing expenditure; notes from the Commission replies the acknowledgement that some authorities may have carried out less effective controls and verifications due to the heavy overload and increasing pressure of parallel implementation of 2014-2020 programmes and of additional funding under NGEU;

    81.  Notes the Court’s analysis of transactions with additional funding through REACT-EU and flexibility through CRII+ and Cohesion’s Action for Refugees (CARE) and their contribution to the estimated levels of error; notes in particular the conclusion that errors found in 100 % EU-funded priorities contributed 5,0 % to the total estimated level of error of 9,3 %; is concerned that increasing flexibilities, without either decreasing requirements or increasing preventive checks and controls at the same time, contributed to the high error rate;

    82.  Notes the Court’s Review 03/2024 “An overview of the assurance framework and the key factors contributing to errors in 2014-2020 cohesion spending” that provides a multi-annual overview covering six years of audit results, including an assessment of management and control issues, aiming to strengthen the assurance model; is concerned by the Court’s conclusion that, although the assurance framework for cohesion policy has helped to reduce the level of error, it has not been effective in bringing the overall level of error below the materiality threshold of 2 %; is worried that the Commission can rely only to a limited degree on the work of the national audit authorities, because of the systematic weaknesses; supports the Court’s recommendation to the Commission to strengthen the implementation of the assurance framework for the 2021-2027 cohesion spending; reminds the Commission of the discharge authority’s call to work closely with the Member States to improve the management and control system for Union expenditure to reduce the high error rate to below the 2 % materiality threshold;

    83.  Notes the Court’s observation in its review on the reliability of the work of key actors in the control system for cohesion policy; is concerned by the Court’s finding that during a 6-year period managing authorities, the first line of defence for detection and prevention of errors, are not sufficiently effective in mitigating the inherent high risk of error in cohesion policy; considers it even more worrying that the Court found that the second line of defence, the Member States’ audit authorities, are not able to determine the correct error rate for the packages of expenditure they audit and provide assurance on, since the Court detected additional errors in at least 39 % of these packages; notes that these errors have been detected and reported by the Court annually for more than 6 years and that there is therefore a systemic issue;

    84.  Notes the Court’s categorisation of errors found in cohesion expenditure, with ineligible projects accounting for 29 %, ineligible costs for 26 % and serious non-compliance in public procurement procedures accounting for 21 % of errors and ERDF and CF related expenditure accounting for the largest share of errors (80 %); notes that expenditure under the ESF+, YEI and FEAD are proportionally less affected by error, as they together account for 16 % of errors, while they together account for around 20 % of the budget under this heading;

    85.  Notes the study commissioned by the Committee on Budgetary Control on ‘Lessons learned from the implementation of crisis response tools’ that shows that absorption of uncommitted cohesion resources was supported by the flexibilities introduced under CRII and CRII+; is concerned by the finding of the researchers that quality of fast-tracked projects might not have reached the same level as investments before the pandemic; is further concerned by the researchers’ observation that the risk of low-quality projects is entirely borne by the Union Budget, because of 100 % EU-funding in CRII, CRII+ and REACT-EU; considers that 100 % EU-funding might help absorption, but that absorption is not a goal in itself;

    86.  Stresses that, in its most recent discharge opinions, the Committee on Regional Development called for additional advisory support from the Commission to national, local and regional authorities to avoid a situation of administrative overload; recognises the Commission’s efforts but, observes that, regrettably, these have not been sufficient to mitigate the risk of error; warns that a similar administrative overload might occur at the end of the RRF eligibility period and the final years of the MFF; underlines the need to address the insufficient administrative capacity of national, local and regional authorities as a matter of urgency; calls on the Commission, in this regard, to provide them with clear guidance, and to increase its support for administrative capacity building, including through staff training, best practice sharing, peer-to-peer reviews and technical assistance to ensure effective fund management;

    87.  Notes the public discussions on the post-2027 multiannual financial framework that may indicate a shift towards a performance-based model, coupling investments and reforms, and a desire to simplify rules and procedures; calls on the Commission to prioritise the financial responses to the current threats resulting from the geopolitical situation; warns that any decision on the future design of spending programmes must not be to the detriment of oversight and control of Union expenditure in terms of transparency and information at Union level about non-compliance with rules and regulations; considers that the errors identified by the Court and the way the Commission handles those errors are also an indication of a properly functioning management and control system and notes that both institutions stated their commitment to improve the system and bring down the error rate;

    88.  Notes, as in previous years, the Court’s observation that the Commission’s desk reviews, to review and assess the work of audit authorities, are aimed at checking only consistency of regularity information, and that they are therefore too limited to confirm the residual error rate reported by the national authorities in their assurance packages; notes the Commission’s reply that it complements its desk review with on-the-spot audit work covering the programmes and assurance packages, which enables it to establish a reasonable and fair estimate of the error rates for each programme; considers that the Court’s observation is about the scope of the desk reviews and the fact that they are only aimed at consistency and therefore too limited to provide the Commission with information that is sufficiently reliable;

    89.  Is concerned about the persistent shortcomings observed by the Court in the work of national audit authorities as visible in the weaknesses identified in the assurance packages, with a residual error rate above the materiality threshold for more than 60 % of the value of assurance packages audited in 2023; stresses with concern that managing authorities consistently do not effectively succeed in preventing or detecting irregularities in expenditure declared by beneficiaries and that this reduces the extent to which the Commission can rely on their work;

    90.  Reminds that in shared management, it is the Commission’s responsibility to make sure that Member States set up management and control systems that function effectively during the implementation of programmes; is worried that both the Commission and the Court have identified that not all Member States’ management and control systems function effectively, thus negatively effecting the reliability of the Commission error rates, as they rely on these national systems, which do not work effectively; calls into question the possibility for the Commission to continue to rely on national systems;

    91.  Considers that for the single audit approach to work well, and in order to achieve reduced administrative burden for beneficiaries and managing authorities, adherence to audit standards at all levels of control and audit is of essential importance; is therefore worried by the Court’s finding in its annual report that essential supporting documents about compliance with eligibility conditions were not presented by programme authorities and beneficiaries, and also by the finding by the Court presented in its review that insufficient documentation of audit work from audit authorities limits the reliance that can be placed on audit work of national audit authorities;

    92.  Recalls that following Article 15 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council(15) (CPR) for the programming period 2021-2027, Member States need to comply with horizontal and thematic enabling conditions, which need to remain fulfilled and respected throughout the implementation period of the funds; recalls that when enabling conditions are not fulfilled at the time of submission of a payment application to the Commission for the specific objective concerned, the related expenditure will not be reimbursed from the Union budget until the Commission is satisfied that the enabling condition has been fulfilled; recalls the strong regrets of the discharge authority in relation to the Commission decision of 13 December 2023(16) considering that Hungary fulfilled the horizontal enabling condition related to judicial independence that enabled the Hungarian authorities to submit reimbursement claims of up to EUR 10,2 billion; notes with concern that since the release of these funds, the Hungarian government has not taken steps to reinstate the independence of the judiciary but on the contrary; reiterates its worries about the lack of adequate control mechanisms or unreliable public procurement procedures to guarantee sound financial management and the protection of the Union budget; believes that this decision politically contradicts the prolongation of the measures adopted under Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092(17) (the ‘Conditionality Regulation’);

    93.  Expresses deep concern over the findings in the 2023 Rule of Law Report regarding the rule of law situation in Hungary, particularly the persistent and systemic challenges in the judiciary and the media sectors; notes with alarm the increasing pressure on judicial independence, including concerns over the selection and promotion of judges, and recent reports of intimidation and interference in judicial decisions, as exemplified by the resignations of judges in protest against political influence; notes with concern in the same vein that the head of the Hungarian Integrity Authority, a key institution established as a condition set by the Commission for the release of Union funds under the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, is facing increasing pressure from the Hungarian government; calls on the Commission to ensure a coordinated and holistic approach across all relevant Union funds and legislative tools, emphasizing that Union funds must not be allocated to activities undermining democracy or reinforcing authoritarianism;

    94.  Recalls that the Conditionality Regulation establishes a mechanism and measures to protect the Union Budget from breaches of the rule of law when other procedures set out in Union legislation would not protect the budget more efficiently; recalls that this mechanism was activated on 15 December 2022 in the case of Hungary over concerns related to its system of public procurement, resulting in a temporary suspension of 55 % of budgetary commitments for three cohesion policy programmes; recalls that the same regulation, in line with Article 6 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093(18) (the ‘MFF Regulation’), stipulates that suspended commitments of 2022 (year n), may not be re-entered into the budget beyond 2024 (year n+2) and that therefore 55 % of commitments from 2022, around EUR 1 billion, were decommitted in December 2024; notes that no other procedures under the Conditionality Regulation are ongoing;

    95.  Notes that the Commission allocated an equivalent of five full-time staff members to the implementation of the Conditionality Regulation and reiterates the European Court of Auditor’s concerns raised in its Special Report 03/2024 that current staff numbers appear to be insufficient to ensure a strict and coherent application of the Regulation;

    96.  Reiterates the need to treat as a single, integral package all the measures required for the release of Union funding under the Conditionality Regulation, the CPR and Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council(19) (the ‘RRF Regulation’); stresses the importance of the protection of the Union financial interests also for disbursement of pre-financing;

    97.  Notes that some investments which would have been eligible for financing under cohesion are included in the National Recovery and Resilience Plans; recalls that the general objective of the RRF enshrined in Article 4 of the RRF Regulation is to promote the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion, and that one of its six pillars is specifically dedicated to this purpose; acknowledges that the wide scope of the RRF results in limited overlap with other Union funding programmes, as intended by the co-legislators when establishing the Article 9 of the RRF Regulation, which establishes additionality and complementarity funding as key principles; draws attention, however, to the risks of double funding emerging from such situations;

    98.  Expresses its preoccupation about the visible delays in implementation of cohesion policy in Member States and the lack of capacity of national administrations to deal in parallel with different spending programmes (e.g. cohesion programmes and RRF programmes) covering complementary or even similar objectives; calls on the Commission to ensure that sufficient technical assistance is provided to Member States facing difficulties in order to address existing delays in the implementation of cohesion programmes;

    99.  Recognises the disproportionate impact of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine on eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus; draws attention to the costs borne by these regions and Member States as a result of their shared border with hostile neighbouring countries, notably their need to increasingly direct public funding into security, defence and preparedness, while facing dramatically reduced resources due to a disruption in economic activities, cross-border trade and other exchanges, and in cohesion programmes, particularly Interreg programmes; notes the measures taken by the European Commission to support these regions, notably through flexibilities provided under cohesion policy; welcomes that providing support to eastern border regions most affected by Russia’s aggression is included in the mission letter of the Executive Vice President for Cohesion and Reforms; calls on the Commission to ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression, both in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;

    100.  Stresses the importance of ESF+ which aims to achieve high employment, fair social protection, a skilled and resilient workforce, and inclusive/cohesive societies as key in eradicating poverty; expresses the need to provide it with the continued financial and political support of the Union, national and regional institutions in the delivery of its objectives and targets in the years to come; underlines the importance of closely involving regional actors, in particular civil society organisations and social partners working on the ground in the implementation of ESF+ funded activities;

    101.  Welcomes the frontloading of EUR 100 million from the 2027 budget of Erasmus+ to the 2023 budget of Erasmus+, which enabled continued support to pupils, students, teachers and qualified staff fleeing from Ukraine, and the extra EUR 20 million awarded to Erasmus+ in 2023 as a result of Parliament’s insistence; stresses that frontloading must remain an exception to rapid response to unforeseen acute crisis situations; underlines that any frontloading of Erasmus+ cannot result in cuts for the programme at the end of current MFF; emphasises that every effort must be made to respond to such situations preferentially with additional funding;

    102.  Emphasises the need for strict oversight of the allocation of funds to prevent misuse within the Erasmus programme; asks the Commission to gather evidence to investigate any case of fraudulent or suspicious recipients, in accordance with its duties outlined in the Financial Regulation and Erasmus+ grant agreements; calls for adequate safeguarding of the programme from abuse by organizations whose activities are not aligned with the fundamental values of the Union (human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, rule of law, human rights); recalls that the Commission is legally bound to ensure that programme beneficiaries commit to and ensure the respect of these values and do not commit professional misconduct;

    103.  Notes that in 2023, the budget of the EU4Health programme, the main financial instrument to support Union health initiatives, was EUR 735 million, mainly managed by Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety and the Health Emergency Preparedness and Response Authority (HERA) and implemented through the European Health and Digital Executive Agency; acknowledges the progress of initiatives funded under this programme, notably in the areas of health emergency preparedness, the Beating Cancer Plan, the Pharmaceutical Strategy for Europe and in the implementation of Union health legislation;

    Recommendations

    104.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) re-consider the practice of 100 % Union funding in Union crisis response instruments, where increasing pre-financing might provide faster availability of funds, while maintaining a shared financial budgetary control responsibility in implementation of the funds by maintaining financial involvement from both national and Union level;
       (ii) ensure selection of qualitatively good projects with cohesion policy funds by favouring long-term investments, and duly justifying 100 % Union funding while limiting its application;
       (iii) address the systemic issue of non-detection of errors at Member State level in cohesion policy spending with an action plan, aimed at reporting an accurate error rate in assurance packages, and detection of errors at the first lines of defence by making available more, and/or better targeting existing resources and increase detection capacity at Member State and Commission level;
       (iv) calculate and report to the discharge authority the cost of control for all expenditure handled by national authorities concerning cohesion policy funds, and NGEU, and compare these figures with the cost of control when only Cohesion policy funds were handled by the same authorities;
       (v) address the recurrent issue of insufficient documentation at beneficiary, programme authority and audit authority level, not only through checks, awareness raising and information on requirements, but also through increased digitalisation and where possible, through financial incentives to penalise non-respect of the requirements for sound financial management;
       (vi) expand the scope of its desk review of assurance packages to review more quality criteria in addition to consistency to make a reliable estimate of the residual error rate for the assurance package under review, as well as of the risk at payment as a whole;
       (vii) step up its monitoring of the horizontal and thematic enabling conditions in all Member States to identify potential threats for the protection of the Union Budget and ensure enhanced transparency and stakeholder participation in the application of this tool;
       (viii) closely align the rule of law report with the Conditionality Regulation and report in more detail on the breaches of the principles of the rule of law that can be used as input to trigger the Conditionality Regulation;
       (ix) continuously monitor the implementation by the Hungarian Government of measures foreseen in Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022; assess to what extent the situation has improved or worsened, including in relation to the challenges faced by the Hungarian Integrity Authority, and take all necessary actions in accordance with the Conditionality Regulation;
       (x) provide Member States with increased technical assistance in order to address delays in the implementation of national programmes in order to increase the absorption rate;
       (xi) closely monitor and mitigate the increasing risk of double funding between Cohesion programmes and RRF funding and address any such occurrences without delay;
       (xii) further enhance simplification in the implementation of cohesion programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xiii) take all necessary measures to bring down the error rate in close cooperation with the Court of Auditors;
       (xiv) ensure the provision of adequate support for eastern regions of the Union bordering Russia and Belarus to cope with the disproportionate consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, both in the short-term and in the medium-term;

    Natural resources

    105.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 3 ‘Natural resources’ was EUR 59,5 billion (31,1 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 65,0 % for direct payments under the European Agricultural Guarantee fund (EAGF), 27,6 % for the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD), 4,2 % for market-related expenditure under the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF), 1,9 % for Maritime and Fisheries, 0,9 % for Environment and Climate (LIFE), and 0,4 % for other areas;

    106.  Notes that the Court has examined a sample of 218 transactions covering the full range of spending under this MFF heading; notes that the Court also examined the regularity information given in the annual activity reports of the Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA), as well as selected systems in 20 Member States and the United Kingdom; notes that the Court estimates the level of error for ‘Natural Resources’ to be 2,2 % (2,2 % in 2022) and that the majority of the errors found affected rural development transactions;

    107.  Points out, however, that this is partly due to the complexity of environmental schemes in rural development programmes and the recognized negative issue of “gold plating” at national level;

    108.  Notes, in this context, the lower-than-expected implementation rate of EAFRD funding for the period 2023-2027, with an absorption rate of only 1 % at the end of 2023, with payments amounting to EUR 0,7 billion, and expects the absorption rate to increase significantly in the course of the next reporting period;

    109.  Notes that the Court found 16 quantifiable errors in rural development, 15 in direct payments, three in expenditure related to market measures, and three in non-CAP expenditure; is reassured by the Commission’s assessment that most errors concern clerical mistakes and by the actions taken by the Commission to prevent errors in the future;

    110.  Notes the categorisation of errors by the Court, with ineligible claims accounting for 35 % of the errors, and administrative errors and inaccurate information on areas or animals for 21 % and 20 % respectively; notes with concern, that as in previous years, that the Court found in several cases that the Member State authorities and the Commission had sufficient information to prevent, or to detect and correct the error before accepting the expenditure and that, had the Member State authorities and the Commission made proper use of all the information at their disposal, the estimated level of error for this chapter would have been 1.0 percentage point lower;

    111.  Notes that 2023 was the first year of the CAP 2023-2027 new delivery model, which integrates performance elements, agreed with the Member States in Strategic Plans, as basis for payments; notes that 2023 was a modest start of the new delivery model, EUR 63,65 million declared on the basis of generated outputs and therefore subject to a ‘performance clearance’ by DG AGRI out of EUR 215,52 million declared under the CAP Strategic plans under sectoral interventions and rural development; notes that in 2024 payments under the new delivery model will have increased substantially; notes the Court’s observations as regards processing performance data for the Annual Performance Reports where Member States are in the process of setting-up systems and procedures and at times manually aggregate data, with associated risks for the reliability of data;

    112.  Recalls the farmers’ protests across Europe towards the end of 2023 and early 2024 and the Commission’s response aimed at simplification, in particular for small farmers, and increasing discretionary powers for Member States; stresses that simplification should go hand in hand with sound financial management and take into account the Union’s climate commitments; welcomes the Commission’s targeted approach, especially concerning the distinction between farm size in terms of agricultural land and number of farms; cautions that discretion given to Member States should also be accompanied by thorough oversight by the Commission;

    113.  Recalls that both the Commission and Member States are responsible for addressing fraud in CAP spending; welcomes in that regard the work done in terms of anti-fraud risk assessments and the update of its anti-fraud strategy by DG AGRI;

    114.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 07/2024 on the Commission’s systems for recovering irregular expenditure, and the Commission’s reply; notes the Court’s observation that recoveries concerning agricultural expenditure have been relatively successful, attributed in part to the so-called 50-50 rule that incentivised Member States to recover funds; notes that this rule has not been retained in the 2023-2027 CAP and the Court’s warning that this might lead to a deterioration of the rate of recovery for agricultural expenditure;

    115.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 20/2024 on Common Agriculture Policy Plans and the Commission’s reply; stresses the importance of ensuring that all key elements for assessing performance are provided; considers that plans need to account for specific situations in specific Member States and that therefore a certain level of divergence is even desirable, is however worried that divergence in ambitions may mean that there is no level playing field for farmers across Member States; is further disappointed by the Court’s finding that although the new monitoring framework has been simplified, the CAP objectives lack clarity and indicators focus on outputs rather than results, and that important result indicators are missing; notes that the Court recommends the Commission to promote exchange of best practices in the plans and strengthening the future CAP monitoring framework;

    116.  Notes the Court’s Special Report 19/2024 on Organic farming in the EU, and the Commission’s reply; is once more worried by the Court’s finding that a weak strategic framework and data constraints prevent the measurement of the impact of the policy; considers that the increased focus on performance and definition of targets and indicators, and the related monitoring of results across Union policies needs to be supported by an equal increase of the Commission’s capacity to define performance frameworks and monitor performance;

    117.  Welcomes the increased competitiveness achieved through market measures in the wine sector and encourages the Commission and Member States to persevere in their efforts to replicate this success in other sectors;

    118.  Recalls that democracy and pluralism are fundamental values of the Union enshrined in Article 2 TEU; further recalls that, in line with Article 11 TEU, Union institutions shall give citizens and representative associations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange their views in all areas of Union action in order to maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue; underlines that separation of powers between the institutions as laid down in Article 13 TEU must always be respected and that Union institutions shall practice mutual sincere cooperation;

    119.  Recognises the importance of the LIFE programme; recalls the provisions of the LIFE+ Regulation, including those related to operating grants, the eligibility conditions, the award criteria, the overall allocation for 2021-2027 and the distribution of funds within the programme;

    120.  Notes that some members of the Budgetary Control committee requested access to a series of grant agreements under the LIFE programme, as well as other Union funding programmes, and after scrutinising them expressed concerns on the content of several of the programmes in February 2024; notes that the Commission, including the Internal Audit Service (IAS), was initially not aware of any issue, but adopted a series of measures with the aim of addressing the concerns; recalls the discharge written questions and hearings with the Secretary-General of the Commission on 5 November 2024, the responsible Commissioners for MFF Heading 3 on 12 November, and the Commissioner responsible for Budget and administration on 9 December 2024 where the concerns and the Commission’s response were discussed;

    121.  Notes the concerns expressed by some members of the Budgetary Control Committee that certain grant agreements between the European Union Climate, Infrastructure and Environment Executive Agency (CINEA) and beneficiaries, such as CSOs and private companies, under the LIFE Programme include ‘work plans’ containing detailed advocacy actions towards Union institutions or their representatives, as well as other actions directed towards certain trade agreements which the Union was negotiating, or litigation measures to be pursued by the respective entities; acknowledges that this could be potentially interpreted as interfering with internal decision making in Union institutions; notes that the Commission has performed a legal analysis of the grant agreements that raised concerns of some Members of the CONT Committee, which concluded that there was no evidence that the entities concerned had breached their contractual or code of conduct obligations, yet the Commission asked some beneficiaries to make amendments to the grant agreements that contained the specific provisions that potentially entailed a reputational risk; further notes that all grant agreements include a disclaimer stating that ‘views of the beneficiary do not in any way represent views of the EU and that granting authority cannot be held responsible for them’;

    122.  Underlines that Union financing should not contribute to undermining the rule of law, nor the values on which the Union is founded; recalls the provisions of Article 163 of the Financial Regulation; considers it crucial that there should be no funding without traceability of funds;

    123.  Notes the actions taken by the Commission to address the allegations which included the issuance of guidance for Commission services on funding activities related to the development, implementation, monitoring and enforcement of Union legislation and policy and screening of their contract portfolios to determine which agreements were not in line with the guidance; takes note of the measures adopted so far by the Commission while awaiting the results of the screening of the grant agreements with all the beneficiaries, which was requested by the Commission’s Corporate Management Board;

    124.  Notes the decision-making structure, including the evaluation board within CINEA, for deciding on contracts between the Commission and beneficiaries; urges the Commission to ensure that the decision-making structure of CINEA for deciding on contracts to be awarded features clear accountability, clear responsibilities and a practical structure;

    125.  Notes that the executive agency conducts annual bottom-up risk management exercises and that these bottom-up risk management exercises did not identify any critical risks; notes that irrespective of the financing programme, evaluation procedures should be constantly reviewed and adapted if needed;

    126.  Notes reports in the media that the President of the Commission hired a paid special adviser to deliver a report on the “Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture” who received a salary equal to a Director-General in the Commission; is concerned by the remuneration of all the special advisers and the discretion the Commission has in deciding their remuneration, which creates arbitrary inequalities;

    Recommendations

    127.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) closely monitor the Member States’ progress as regards the processing of performance data and the aggregation of data for the annual performance report and keep the discharge authority informed about issues with reliability of performance data, in particular where it concerns manually aggregated data;
       (ii) inform the discharge authority why the Court concludes that for several years several errors could have been prevented, had the Commission and Member States used all information at their disposal and why the Commission and Member States do not manage to address this issue appropriately;
       (iii) apply the lessons learned as regards the reduction of the administrative burden from its response to the farmers’ protests in future policy initiatives, while taking due account of the risk of abuse of funds where control measures are reduced, or risk of too much divergence between Member States when discretionary powers are used without proper oversight;
       (iv) keep the discharge authority informed about the recovery rates of agricultural expenditure, in particular if the rate deteriorates in comparison to the recovery rate under the previous CAP and swiftly mitigate the causes for the deterioration, including considering the introduction of new incentives for Member State authorities to recover funds;
       (v) assess the differences in ambition of strategic plans and inform the discharge authority whether there is divergence between Member States, threatening the level-playing field for farmers, and assess how the Commission addresses those differences;
       (vi) make better use of its capacity for setting-up performance frameworks, for defining objectives and indicators and holding those contributing to the achievements, be they Member States or beneficiaries, accountable for their contributions;
       (vii) update the Commission’s anti-fraud strategy to devote attention to advocating for and upholding a clear separation of executive and legislative power in the Union;
       (viii) have a clear and comprehensive strategy at Commission level as to how to better protect the financial interests of the Union and ensure that Union funds are spent for their intended purposes and diligently apply the Financial Regulation provisions, including by ensuring that grant agreements can be suspended or terminated when beneficiaries violate the Union’s legislation;
       (ix) ensure a fair distribution of Union funds to CSOs to contribute to a pluralistic and vibrant society;
       (x) ensure that the Commission’s guidance adopted in 2024 is applied by all authorising officers and, if necessary, further develop guidance to fully align grant agreements with Treaty provisions and existing legislation;
       (xi) make the results of the screening of grant agreements available to the discharge authority in order to allow an assessment of the extent to which the Commission may be exposed to a reputational risk;
       (xii) adequately address issues such as revolving doors, transparency in financing and donations, the fight against money laundering, limiting foreign interference, independence from political and economic influence, whistleblowing and transparent governance structures, in respect of all entities receiving Union funds;
       (xiii) review the template for MoUs between the Commission and executive agencies to ensure clearer division of responsibilities;
       (xiv) instruct the audit structure to review contracts with beneficiaries and to flag in case they identify contracts that are not in line with applicable financial rules;
       (xv) have the IAS review contracts between the Commission and grantees, specifically to search for content that is not in line with applicable financial rules within work packages;
       (xvi) evaluate the decision-making structure in the areas of the awarding of contracts and instruct Commission services and executive agencies to perform better checks on the content of contracts at all stages, including by ensuring that work packages and key performance indicators as listed by applicants align with the objectives of respective funding programmes;
       (xvii) adopt more precise categorisation of entities listed in the Financial Transparency System;
       (xviii) review its rules for special advisers to remove the arbitrary selection and remuneration;
       (xix) further enhance simplification in the implementation of programmes and work closely with Member States to identify best practices regarding the digitalisation of practices and procedures;
       (xx) improve the quality of dialogue with farmers from all Member States;
       (xxi) react more quickly when serious concerns of the discharge authority are flagged to the Commission;
       (xxii) perform adequate checks of entities listed in the Transparency Register, in order to ensure that they comprehensively list their activities in the Register;
       (xxiii) draw clearer lines of responsibility when implementing collaborative platforms;
       (xxiv) instruct the Corporate Management Board to submit consolidated information on the list of critical risks to the internal audit service and ensure executive agencies address potential risks and ensure a transparent selection of independent evaluators to prevent conflict of interest and guarantee their independence;
       (xxv) instruct all DGs and executive agencies to review the distribution of funds dedicated to auditing in order to ensure sufficient resources;
       (xxvi) ensure that proposals for Multiannual Work Programmes of any Union funding instrument have clear guidelines on the activities eligible for funding, clearer rules on screening of applications and on admissible content as well as clearer requirements for transparency and traceability of the use of Union funds, including in relation to the disclosure requirements under the EU Transparency Register;
       (xxvii) ensure that all grant agreements respect the necessary requirements related to transparency, traceability and visibility of funds;

    Migration and Border management

    128.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 4 ‘Migration and Border Management’ was EUR 2,7 billion (1,4 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 1,2 billion (46,5 %) for three decentralised agencies, the European Boarder Coast Agency (FRONTEX), the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) and the European Union Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (EU- LISA); 1 billion (38,6 %) for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), and 0,4 billion (14,9 %) for the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF);

    129.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 4 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 18 % of AMIF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    130.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 23 transactions, which is not large enough to be representative of the spending under MFF headings 4 and 5 and, thus, it cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for these headings; further notes that the Court’s audit results show that the expenditure under MFF headings 4 and 5 is affected by eligibility and procurement issues and that it is a high-risk area (7 out of 23 transactions audited, i.e. 30,4 %, were affected by errors); is concerned that the Court detected four quantifiable errors which had a financial impact on the amounts charged to the Union budget and that it also found further ten cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions (which had no direct financial impact on the Union budget); therefore, invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for heading 4; notes that the Commission concludes that the risk at payment in 2023 is 1,1 % for the expenditure on migration and border management;

    131.  Notes that the Commission has accepted the Court’s recommendation made in its annual report for 2023 to provide further guidance on applicable rules to the Member State authorities responsible for implementing DG HOME funding via shared management; regrets that the Commission has not yet fully implemented the Court’s previous recommendations that were due to be addressed by the end of 2023; notes that DG HOME is undertaking a reassessment of its ex-ante methodology to ensure the respect of the rules applicable to post-2021 generation of grants, and that this reassessment will also address the Court’s relevant recommendations and those of the IAS audit on the preparedness for closing actions and programmes funded under the Internal Security Fund (ISF) and the AMIF 2014-2020 through direct and shared management;

    132.  Notes with concern that two reservations on the declaration of assurance were issued in DG HOME’s Annual Activity Report for 2023 and that one reservation concerns the implementation of AMIF and ISF 2014-2020 in several Member States and the other reservation concerns the implementation of Border Management and Visa Instrument (BMVI) 2021-2027 in one Member State; welcomes the Commission’s commitment to take remedial measures for the underlying issues that necessitated the reservations;

    133.  Welcomes the progress identified by the Court in its review of the preparatory work done by five member state audit authorities in managing the transition of the AMIF, BMVI and ISF funds to the CPR of the 2021-2027 MFF; observes that these audit authorities reported to the Court that the support and guidance DG HOME provided to them was satisfactory; notes with concern that at the time of the Court’s audit four out of five Member State audit authorities had not finalised their audit strategies;

    134.  Takes note of the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; welcomes that the mid-term revision of the MFF 2021-2027 allocated an additional EUR 2 billion to migration and border management for 2024-2027 to address the growing challenges in migration and border management resulting from the current geopolitical context; notes, however, that additional funds might be needed with a view to ensuring the full implementation of the Pact; calls for the quick implementation of the Pact in the Member States;

    135.  Stresses that securing the Union’s external borders is a pillar of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum; notes with concern that the Commission reported that the number of irregular border crossings in the Union increased in 2023 to 380 000, compared to 330 000 in 2022; observes that the BMVI can support frontline Member States to ensure they have the resources for infrastructure, facilities and installations necessary to secure the external borders of the Union, including electronic border security enhancements and other tools for border surveillance as provided for in annex III of the BMVI regulation; notes the European Council conclusions of 9 February 2023 that the Union will step up its action to prevent irregular departures and loss of life, to reduce pressure on the borders of the Union and on reception capacities, to fight against smugglers and to increase returns; underlines the need to better protect vulnerable people from smuggling and trafficking networks and address the negative effects of the instrumentalisation of migrants as part of hybrid attacks, notably by pro-Russian forces, as well as by the Belarusian regime;

    136.  Recalls that, according to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States and the Commission must ensure respect for fundamental rights and compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in the implementation of Union funds;

    137.  Notes the Court’s conclusion that the AMIF 2014-2020 was performing below expectations in terms of facilitating returns of migrants: also takes note of the fact that the Court and the Commission agree that progress in this area was particularly affected by COVID-19-related travel restrictions; further notes that in 2023 return measures were supported with EUR 29,8 million from the AMIF; considers that the Commission must provide stronger efforts to assist Member States in addressing irregular border crossing and in successfully implementing returns of third-country nationals, as well as the integration of legal migrants; looks forward to receiving consolidated information in 2025 on progress in this regard through the ex-post evaluation AMIF 2014-2020; highlights that the Commission should continue to take action on migration and asylum within the framework of external action, including the ‘Team Europe’ approach while also increasing the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries and safeguarding the role of the Parliament;

    Recommendations

    138.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) address the Court’s recommendations in a thorough and timely manner and share DG HOME’s revised ex-ante methodology, once completed, with the discharge authority;
       (ii) continue to support the Member State managing and audit authorities in the timely finalisation of their audit strategies for MFF 2021-2027 funds, paying particular attention to eligibility and procurement issues, as well as all other recurrent findings of the Court;
       (iii) take action to improve the performance of actions funded by the Union in terms of effective returns and combatting irregular migration, while ensuring the full respect of Union legislation and the fundamental values of the Union;
       (iv) take action to increase the efficiency of Union spending on the protection and management of the European Union’s external borders;
       (v) monitor, assist in and scrutinise the timely progress of the administrative, operational and legal steps required by Member States and Union agencies for the full implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum by 2026;
       (vi) increase the transparency of the programming and implementation of the Union home affairs funds in third countries, while safeguarding the role of Parliament in ensuring the democratic scrutiny of Union spending;
       (vii) continuously assess, in the implementation of the Union Budget, compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Union values enshrined in Article 2 TEU, in accordance with Article 6 of the Financial Regulation;

    Security and Defence

    139.  Notes that in 2023 the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ was EUR 1,4 billion (0,7 % of the Union budget spending) distributed as follows: 500 million (38,4 %) for the European Defence Fund (EDF), 300 million (19 %) for military mobility, 200 million (17,1 %) for decentralised agencies, namely the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), Europol and European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL), 200 million (13,1 %) for the ISF, and 200 million (12,4 %) for nuclear safety, decommissioning and other areas;

    140.  Notes that in 2023 a significant portion of the spending under MFF heading 5 still concerned the completion of projects remaining from the 2014-2020 MFF; notes that 25 % of ISF national programmes for 2014-2020 remained undeclared at the end of 2023 and that the last annual accounts and the request for payment of the final balance for these funds will be provided by the Member States as part of the closure package by 31 December 2024 at the latest;

    141.  Notes with concern that, for the reasons explained in the section on migration and border management, the Court cannot provide a separate estimate of the error rate for MFF heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ and that, based on its audit results, the Court considers expenditure from this heading to be high-risk; therefore, invites the Court to provide an estimate of the error rate for this heading as well; notes that the Commission concludes that in 2023 the risk at payment was 0,5 % for the expenditure on security and defence;

    142.  Observes that the Commission has not accepted the Court’s recommendation to carefully check and document the technical aspects of military mobility grant applications to the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) during the grant award procedure and that the Commission considers that its current processes already ensure a check on whether dual-use infrastructure projects meet the eligibility conditions;

    143.  Recalls the highly unstable geopolitical situation in the Union’s neighbourhood giving rise to greater security and defence challenges, including hybrid threats, and thereby to greater investment needs in security, defence and preparedness, since the beginning of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; draws attention to the fact that MFF heading 5, dedicated to security and defence, is the smallest of all MFF headings and regrets that the Union’s current budget for ensuring the security and defence of its citizens is not equal to the challenges to be met either in the short or the long term; notes that in 2023 Union funding in support of the defence industry came exclusively from the EDF; recalls the role played by the EDF in supporting European technological expertise in emerging and disruptive technologies; welcomes that submissions to the 2023 EDF calls increased by 72 % compared to the previous year, demonstrating the strong and constantly growing interest of European defence industry actors and research organisations in the EDF and the high demand for funding in this sector; notes that under the 2023 calls, the Union committed EUR 1,15 billion for 61 defence R&D projects, benefiting 581 legal entities from 26 Member States and Norway; notes that on average 17 entities from eight different Member States and Norway participate in each project; underlines the importance of a level playing field in supporting cross-border defence R&D cooperation;

    144.  Welcomes the Commission’s actions to enhance support for SMEs in the defence sector, in particular appreciates that the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), which provides a diverse range of instruments tailored to support SMEs within the defence ecosystem, became fully operational in 2023, with EUR 224 million allocated to it from the EDF budget; appreciates, further, the role of the SME bonus under the EDF in facilitating the access of smaller actors and innovators in defence supply chains; notes that in the 2023 EDF calls, 42 % of the entities selected for funding were SMEs, an increased share compared to 2022 (38,2 %), and that 18 % of the total funding available through the EDF calls is allocated to SMEs;

    145.  Recalls that the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) was a precursor programme of the EDF with a budget of EUR 90 million that funded 18 research projects selected following calls for proposals in the years 2017 to 2019; further recalls that the Court, in its Special Report 10/2023 ‘The Preparatory action on defence research’, has observed that the Union still lacked a long-term strategy for the projects under the EDF, particularly in terms of impact, additional research, development, manufacturing and procurement; welcomes that the Commission has accepted all of the Court’s recommendations and has confirmed that their implementation is ongoing; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s adoption of a European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and legislative proposal establishing the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) as well as its commitment to build up the EDF; nevertheless, in view of the geopolitical realities the Union faces, is concerned that the full implementation of the Court’s recommendations is expected only in 2026;

    146.  Recalls the Court’s observations in its Special Report 10/2023 regarding the limited availability of human resources at the Commission and the subsequent risk for the EDF; notes that the growing number of proposals to evaluate and projects to manage puts considerable pressure on human resources; further notes the large share of seconded national experts (17 %) among DG DEFIS staff in 2023 and DG DEFIS’s intention to reinforce staff by the selection of officials through specialised EPSO competitions in the field of space and defence, for which the reserve lists were finalised in November 2023;

    147.  Notes that the implementation of ‘Action Plan on Military Mobility 2.0’ is ongoing, with EUR 1,74 billion allocated for dual-use transport infrastructure projects under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) between 2021-2027; notes that so far the Union has co-funded 95 military mobility projects in 21 Member States and that 94 of these projects are still ongoing and most of them are expected to be finalised between 2026 and 2027; notes with concern that following three calls for proposals organised in 2021, 2022 and 2023, the entirety of the military mobility envelope under the CEF for the current programming period has thereby already been exhausted; considers that although making the budget quickly available by frontloading amounts into the 2022 and 2023 calls responded to the need to take into account the evolution of the security situation in Europe following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, it simultaneously led to Union funding being unstable and unpredictable by leaving a gap of more than four years with no more Union funds available for military mobility calls to finance dual-use infrastructure projects until the post-2027 MFF; recalls the Court’s conclusions in its Special Report 04/2025 that the Action Plan was not built on sufficiently solid foundations and that progress towards its objective, namely ensuring swift and seamless movement of personnel, materiel and assets at short notice and on a large scale, has been variable due to design weaknesses and remaining obstacles to implementation; notes that the Commission considers that more action is needed to strengthen dual-use transport infrastructure corridors, including on regulatory issues such as cross-border movement permission procedures; notes the Court’s observation that the Commission had not carried out a robust assessment of the overall funding required to make its objectives and targets achievable; regrets that only EUR 300 million was spent on military mobility in 2023 and is concerned that calls for proposals under the military mobility envelope faced a four-time oversubscription rate, demonstrating the increased interest among Member States and project beneficiaries;

    148.  Expresses deep concern over the Commission’s decision to proceed with the adoption of the “Rearm EU” initiative without prior consultation of the European Parliament; regrets that such a decision bypasses the principle of institutional balance and undermines Parliament’s role as co-legislator in shaping strategic and budgetary priorities; urges the Commission to refrain from initiating substantial policy instruments that impact the Union’s financial and strategic architecture without ensuring full respect for the prerogatives of the Parliament;

    149.  Notes that the European Parliament has called on the Union and its Member States to put in place a legal framework enabling Russia to be classified as a State sponsor of terrorism;

    Recommendations

    150.  Calls on the Commission to:

       (i) develop a longer-term strategy for the EDF, building on the experience with Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) and the Court’s recommendations, as soon as possible;
       (ii) secure the provision of adequate resources to enhance Union defence cooperation, in the short-term through the 2026 draft budget and the timely recruitment of expert staff, and in the medium-term through the Commission’s proposal for the next MFF;
       (iii) further strengthen military mobility in the Union by substantially increasing the funding available to improve dual-use transport infrastructure corridors and by taking action to eliminate administrative, procedural and regulatory barriers to cross-border military movements, while prioritising Union funding to projects that best respond to the current European threat landscape; taking into account the Court’s findings and recommendations in special report 04/2025;
       (iv) take action to ensure due diligence in relation to project criteria for dual-use military mobility infrastructure projects, in line with the Court’s recommendation;

    Neighbourhood and the world

    151.  Notes that the budget for the programmes under MFF heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ was EUR 15,2 billion (7,4 % of the Union budget) distributed as follows: 63,4 % for the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe), 16,4 % for Humanitarian Aid (HUMA), 16 % for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA III) and 4.2 % for other actions and programmes; notes that in total, payments for ‘Neighbourhood and the world’ reached 15,2 billion in 2023, representing approximatively 8 % of the overall Union expenditure excluding RRF;

    152.  Notes that the Court examined a sample of 72 transactions, which is not adequately representative of the spending under this MFF heading and, therefore, cannot provide an estimate of the error rate; considering that the Court’s audit results show that this is a high-risk area (of 37 out of 72 transactions audited, i.e. 51.4 %, were affected by errors), invites the Court to provide a clear estimate of the error rate for this chapter; notes that the Court found 31 errors that had a financial impact on the Union budget, relating to ineligible beneficiaries, ineligible costs, expenditure not incurred, and breaches of public procurement rules, areas that could point to risks of unreliable functioning of control mechanisms;

    153.  Notes, additionally, that the Court detected 19 cases of non-compliance with legal and financial provisions, none of which had direct financial impact on the Union budget, and which included issues such as ambiguous cost allocations, non-compliance with visibility rules, and inadequate documentation;

    154.  Is concerned that the Court found a significant non-compliance with visibility rules in an EU-funded project under indirect management by DG NEAR, which concerned a contribution agreement worth EUR 21,2 million signed with an international organisation in a project where the aim was to support Eastern partnership countries in tackling COVID-19; notes that the Court found that most donation certificates it checked did not contain any acknowledgment that the medical equipment donated was funded by the Union; recalls that beneficiaries of Union funds are required to clearly publicise the fact that the Union has financed or co-financed the action they are implementing; notes the Commission’s replies that it is discussing new communication and visibility guidelines with the United Nations to reduce the risks of errors on compliance with visibility rules;

    155.  Expresses concern that the Court, in its IT audit on the information system OPSYS’ component for managing user access and rights, found three shortcomings including (i) that the Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) had not formalised a procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users; (ii) four cases in which standard users had more access rights than they needed for their jobs, which is not in line with the Commission’s IT standards; and that (iii) DG INTPA did not manage all administrator accounts belonging to staff of other directorates-general; is concerned that these weaknesses increase the risks of both inappropriate access to the system and non-compliance with the rules and procedures for implementing external action projects, and also undermine the integrity of system processes and data;

    156.  Notes that the Commission intensified communication with international organisations in order to raise awareness of the need to ensure that the Court’s auditors obtain full access to documents when auditing projects funded by the Union, and that the Commission has supported initiatives to find permanent solutions to the issues of access to and retention of documents; notes, however, the Commission’s acknowledgment that despite efforts, some constraints regarding access to documents persist due to the existing legal frameworks of the implementing partners, which are not expected to change in the near future;

    157.  Urges the Commission to enhance the rule of law conditionality-based approach of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) III funding in order for the instrument to serve its purpose of effectively preparing accession countries to fulfil the conditions of becoming Member States of the Union; reiterates its calls on the Commission to implement the recommendations of the Court’s Special Report 01/2022 in order to ensure an effective impact of Union financial assistance in support for the rule of law in the Western Balkans, in particular by developing guidelines on the application of the provisions on modulation and conditionality under IPA III;

    158.  Stresses that Union aid should under no circumstances – directly or indirectly – be financing terrorism, hence it should not support any entity connected to Hamas or any other terrorist or extremist organisation; notes to this end, it is legitimate and necessary to be able to clearly know and identify all the final beneficiaries of European aid in third countries; emphasises the need for strict control over the distribution and use of aid to ensure no misuse of funds;

    159.  Notes with regret that the European Commission financed the Gaziantep Islamic Science and Technology University, which has proven ties to terrorist organisation of Hamas; calls on the Commission to cancel all ties to this university and other universities with ties to terrorist organisations;

    160.  Urges the Commission, in the context of delivering enhanced support and humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population, to also make full use of trusted partners, such as the WHO, WFP UNICEF or different Red Crescent organisations; recalls the importance for the Commission to guarantee independent controls of UNRWA by external experts, the Court and experienced international partners;

    161.  Notes that the Commission has been working in the last months with UNRWA, to enhance the neutrality processes and control systems in the Agency, in line with findings of the investigations by the UN OIOS on the allegations of involvement of 19 of its staff in the 7th October 2023 attack, and to monitor the application of the action plan presented by UNRWA on the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent Review Group led by former French Minister of Foreign Affairs Colonna to strengthen control and oversight; notes that the Commission has reassessed the Union’s 2024 funding decision for UNRWA and that, through an exchange of letters between Commissioner Várhelyi and UNRWA Commissioner General Lazzarini in April 2024, the Union reached an agreement about the Union’s conditional assistance for UNRWA, linked to a number of milestones in relation to three work streams, including the screening of UNRWA staff, an audit by the Union, as well as the reinforcement of the Department of Internal Investigations and Ethics office; notes that Union assistance was resumed;

    162.  Recalls the necessity for the Palestinian Authority to remove all educational materials and content that fail to adhere to UNESCO standards by the next school year, in particular those that contain antisemitism as defined by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance classification endorsed by the Union, incitement to violence, hate speech, and glorification of terrorism; recalls the provisions of previous discharge resolutions; stresses that financial support from the Union for the Palestinian Authority in the area of education should be provided on the condition that textbook content is aligned with UNESCO standards, that all anti-Semitic references are deleted, and that examples which incite to hatred and violence are removed, as repeatedly requested in the resolutions accompanying the discharge decisions; recalls the findings of the Georg Eckert Institute’s report funded by the Union, which revealed a complex picture on the textbooks; notes that the Union does not fund the Palestinian textbooks, and that neither are they the responsibility of UNRWA, which nevertheless reviews all issued textbooks to address any problematic content;); notes that the Commission will carry out close scrutiny to ensure that no Union funds are allocated, directly or indirectly, to the drafting, teaching, or exposure of such educational materials to Palestinian children, including those provided by UN organisations;

    163.  Notes DG NEAR’s acknowledgement in its AAR 2023 that projects in Kyiv received regular visits but security constraints limited on-site monitoring and project visits in other Ukrainian regions; further notes that the constraints on adequately monitoring projects in Ukraine led to a renewed reservation in the 2023 AAR of DG NEAR and that corrective actions are being implemented, such as monitoring progress on project implementation through desk reviews, remote solutions and using a service provider;

    164.  Welcomes that OLAF provides targeted anti-fraud assistance to authorities and supports the accession of Ukraine to the Union Anti-Fraud Programme; notes that the Framework Agreement for the Ukraine Facility, which entered into force in June 2024, provides for legally binding arrangements for the management, control, supervision, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and audit of funds under the Facility, as well as measures to prevent, investigate and correct irregularities, fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest, and provisions on the roles of OLAF and EPPO; welcomes, in addition, that, pursuant to article 36 of the Ukraine Facility Regulation, the Commission established in June 2024 an Audit Board, with the mission of assisting the Commission in assessing the effectiveness of Ukraine’s management and control systems regarding the funds provided under the Facility and in fighting mismanagement of Union funding under the Ukraine Facility; calls on the Commission to keep the European Parliament regularly informed about the activities and findings of the Audit Board in order to ensure proper parliamentary oversight;

    165.  Notes with concern the recent reports on the findings of a draft audit report paid for by the Commission on the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) Secretariat which allege to suspected fraud, unpaid salaries and further liabilities; notes that as reported the Commission has contributed EUR 3,7 million to the Secretariat in 2023 and is trying to recover EUR 3,6 million as of March 2024; asks the Commission to ensure full transparency and accountability, grant access to the audit report and inform the members of Parliament on the concrete steps taken;

    166.  Calls on the Commission in line with the Court’s recommendations in its opinion 03/2024 to integrate into the new MFF legislative proposal the recommendations of the External Action Guarantee complementing the Commission’s evaluation, including increased use of blending (grants) in LDCs, fragile or conflict-affected countries and engaged coordination with stakeholders such as civil society;

    167.  Is concerned about the allocation of EFSD+ under the new flexible ‘Support to Investments’ envelope in favour of benefiting countries where the Global Gateway investments are easier to implement at the expense of prioritising LDCs, and fragile and conflict-affected countries; calls for reporting on the volume of EFSD+ amounts allocated and contractualised in these countries and for transparency on how the quota of allocations to LDCs within country MIPs is respected within allocations of the regional MIPs;

    168.  While recognising the Global Gateway strategy as a concerted Union response to global challenges, reiterates that actions bringing together public and private investment must always be guided by the legal framework as provided by the NDICI Regulation, the Agenda 2030, and the needs of partner countries, as communicated by way of an honest dialogue at eye level; is concerned about inconsistencies surrounding Global Gateway programmes; calls, therefore, for improved transparency, democratic accountability, robust monitoring and evaluation mechanisms in Global Gateway and Team Europe initiatives; calls for a centralised, publicly accessible platform, regularly updated, to detail Global Gateway projects, including their objectives, funding sources, implementing partners, and expected outcomes;

    European Development Fund (EDF)

    169.  Notes that to audit the regularity of transactions, the Court examined a sample of 140 transactions, representing the full range of spending from the EDFs; notes, furthermore, that this comprised 31 transactions related to the European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, 87 transactions authorised by 14 EU delegations(20) and 19 payments approved by Commission headquarters;

    170.  Notes with concern that, out of the 140 transactions examined, 62 (44,3 %) contained errors, compared to 57 (40,7 %) in 2022 for the same number of transactions; stresses, moreover, that the Court quantified 52 errors (48 in 2022), on the basis of which it estimated the level of error for the financial year 2023 to be 8,9 % (7,1 % in 2022);

    171.  Highlights with concern that the three most common types of errors in the financial year 2023 related to expenditure not incurred at 45 % (51 % in 2022), to absence of essential supporting documents at 31 % (7 % in 2022) and to ineligible expenditure at 23 % (24 % in 2022);

    172.  Notes the Commission’s replies to written questions to Commissioners Jutta Urpilainen and Oliver Varhelyi that in 2023 approximately 45 % of the total errors are due to excess clearing, a practice where expenditure not incurred is included in the accounts as expenditure incurred, and that therefore such errors are temporary, since they will no longer exist after the final clearings; notes furthermore that, to reduce these temporary errors, the Commission has requested its partners to review their reporting templates to allow for easier identification of incurred expenditure, and that DG INTPA launched a special working group to screen the compliance of relevant organisations through a risk management framework; also notes that DG INTPA is currently reviewing its control strategy, which aims also to identify how ex-ante controls can be strengthened and to improve the reporting of the pillar-assessed organisations to the Commission; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the effects of these actions;

    173.  Notes that the expected outcomes of DG INTPA’s ongoing review of its control strategy include the reinforcement of guidance on financial reporting and also on enhanced ex-ante controls so as to prevent errors including on excess clearing; calls on the Commission to report to the discharge authority on the remedial measures taken upon finalisation of this review;

    174.  Is concerned that, as in previous years, some international organisations provided only limited access to documents (e.g., in read-only format), which hindered the planning, execution and quality control of the Court’s audit and led to delays; notes that audit and control issues were discussed with UN entities on several occasions, including in the context of joint technical reference group meetings and the relevant EU-UN Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) working group; notes furthermore that the Commission is working with the International Organisations concerned and has intensified communication with them on the Court’s access to documents; encourages, as in previous years, the Commission to increase these efforts;

    175.  Stresses that, according to Court’s assessment, the Residual Error Rate (RER) study does not constitute an assurance engagement or an audit and is based on the RER methodology and manual provided by DG INTPA; notes that DG INTPA clarifies that the RER study is meant to be a key indicator for the estimated financial impact of residual errors, i.e., it measures the proper functioning of the internal control system and thus, demonstrates the Commission’s corrective capacity; stresses that, as in previous years, the Court has found limitations in the study; notes, furthermore, the Court’s opinion, as in previous years, that the RER methodology allows the contractor to rely entirely on the results of DG INTPA´s controls, and that relying on the work of other auditors is contrary to the purpose of an RER study; highlights the Court’s finding that in cases where these previous checks were carried out under the FAFA between the European Commission and the United Nations, the contractor is not always able to carry out additional substantive testing as the FAFA limits the Commission’s verification rights; highlights the Commission’s reply which recognised the limitations in terms of controls set in the FAFA; urges the Commission to look for workable solutions to resolve this issue;

    176.  Recalls that two EUTFs were created under the EDFs; recalls that EUTF for Africa has mobilised over EUR 5 billion, with 88 % of contributions (EUR 4,4 billion) coming from the EDF and the Union budget; deplores that, despite several requests from Parliament, the process of managing and allocating these funds still lacks transparency; is concerned by the Court’s findings in its Special report 17/2024 “The EU trust fund for Africa Despite new approaches, support remained unfocused; notes that, despite an innovative approach to identifying human rights risks in a difficult environment, these risks were not comprehensively addressed and that the Court found that the assessment of potential risks to human rights was not comprehensive; recalls that the Commission is unable to identify and report on the most efficient and effective approaches to reducing irregular migration and forced displacements in Africa according to the Court; regrets that the new monitoring system aggregates information from all EUTF projects, but suffers from issues of data accuracy; notes that the Union’s Africa trust fund is set to be phased out in 2025;

    Recommendations

    177.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations:

       (i) as regards the OPSYS application system, formalise and enhance the procedure for granting and removing access rights for system administrators and to standard users, enhance the quality of the new software, and allocate resources needed to enhance its maturity and robustness;
       (ii) strengthen guidance and controls to ensure that organisations implementing contracts under indirect management, including international organisations, international financial institutions and state agencies, comply with visibility rules;
       (iii) continue to intensify its communication with international organisations in order to provide the Court with complete, unlimited and timely access to documents necessary to carry out its task in accordance with the TFEU, and not just in read-only format;
       (iv) put in place adequate ex ante and ex post control measures in unstable or conflict zones to ensure the proper control of spending of Union funds and ways to recover the Union funds;
       (v) take measures to improve controls systems for the clearing of pre-financing paid to international organisations;
       (vi) strengthen ex ante controls before accepting expenditure;

    178.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) strictly monitor through all available mechanisms and work with UNRWA to ensure the implementation of all agreed actions to guarantee that UNRWA works in full compliance with humanitarian principles and neutrality, including in the forthcoming EU-UNRWA joint declaration and the upcoming financing decisions for conditional Union assistance;
       (ii) ensure that all contracts involving Union funds fully respect applicable Union legislation, including accountability, transparency, and sound financial management, and that this includes verifying that there are no subcontractors, natural persons, participants in workshops and/or trainings or recipients of financial support made to third parties subject to Union restrictive measures or involved in the financing of terrorism or acts of terrorism as well as other acts of hatred and incitement to hatred;
       (iii) increase evidence-based targeting of geographical areas and beneficiaries, and improve the accuracy of reported achievements of future development action, including through the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe;

    European public Administration

    179.  Notes that the Commission is directly responsible for the implementation of 59,1 % of the overall administrative budget of the Union, equivalent to EUR 7,2 billion; further notes that 70 % of the administrative expenditure relates to human resources including pensions while the remaining primarily covers expenditure related to buildings, equipment, energy, communications and IT; notes with satisfaction that also for 2023 the Court concludes that the spending area is low risk;

    180.  Notes that during 2023, 2152 civil servants left the Commission primarily due to retirement, resignation or the end of their contracts; notes that this represents a relatively high turnover, which should give the Commission ample possibilities to address persistent imbalances in geographical representation throughout the services;

    181.  Encourages the Commission together with EPSO to ensure that necessary technical systems are put in place as quickly as possible and that processes are accelerated in order for the Commission and other Union institutions to be able to rely on EPSO for the selection of highly qualified and motivated candidates for all types of jobs in the institutions;

    182.  Appreciates that female representation in management positions increased from 46,1 % in December 2022 to 47,8 % in December 2023; encourages the Commission to continue to focus on ensuring and maintaining gender balance on all levels of management;

    183.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission has implemented policies to enhance work-life balance and staff well-being, including the right to disconnect; at the same time commends that a new decision on the prevention and fight against harassment was adopted which establishes the position of a Chief Confidential Counsellor as key figure in the fight against harassment; stresses the need to provide this position with the appropriate resources to effectively carry out multiple challenging tasks;

    184.  Acknowledges the progress of the Commission with regard to the internalisation of crèche staff;

    185.  Notes with satisfaction that the Commission issued updated versions of the guidelines on ethical standards for participation of the Members of the European Commission in the election campaign to the European Parliament and guidelines for the participation of Members of the Commission in election campaigns at Member State level; further commends that in March 2023, the Commission adopted much needed strengthened rules on missions and costs paid by third parties;

    186.  Stresses the need to ensure that all the Union Institutions in Luxembourg can attract staff to all types of jobs and careers; notes that especially for servants in lower pay grades Luxembourg can be a less attractive option due to the costs of living; notes that with the agreement on the budget for 2025 the first step has been taken by establishing a special housing allowance for staff in lower grades working in Union institutions in Luxembourg;

    187.  Notes that the Commission has an ambitious goal of reducing the overall office space of the Commission by 25 % and the number of buildings by 50 % by 2030 compared to 2020; notes that the total reduction in overall space reached a little over 83 000 m2 in 2023, equal to a reduction of 11 %; welcomes that this goal is an important element in the Commission achieving carbon neutrality and reducing administrative costs; stresses that it is important that the reduction in the number of building and office space and the resulting roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;

    188.  Is concerned about the severe delays, including delays of up to 6 months, faced by civil servants across the institutions when receiving the reimbursements of healthcare costs under the institutions’ sickness insurance scheme; is also concerned about the inadequate treatment of civil servants and MEPs with autoimmune diseases, neurological disorders, COPD (obstructive pulmonary disease), long COVID, undiagnosed and rare diseases by the sickness insurance scheme of the institutions; notes that patients with these symptoms are often not reimbursed for their diagnostic tests;

    189.  Notes that, in 2023, the Ombudsman launched 398 inquiries concerning the Commission; further notes that during 2023 the Commission received 187 closing decisions without remarks and 17 decisions of maladministration; notes with concern that the Ombudsman receives many citizens’ complaints about extreme delays in gaining access to requested documents from the Commission and encourages the Commission to strive to speed up the processing of such requests and further reduce the number of decisions of maladministration and establish clear rules concerning access to all types of written texts whether on paper, email, text messages or any other form of communication, which is part of an administrative process related to Commission policies or decisions; notes that out of the nine investigations related to the Commission concluded by OLAF in 2023, seven were closed with recommendations; calls on the Commission to ensure transparency and accountability in the follow-up to these cases;

    190.  Expresses deep concern that there has been allegations of corruption linked to the Commission; at the same time deplores that there has been allegations about officials from the Commission that allegedly accepted gifts from a country that the Union was negotiating an agreement with; stresses the need for a clear and systematic approach to ensure that all OLAF cases involving relevant potential criminal offences are promptly referred to the EPPO and the competent national authorities; calls on the Commission to reinforce relevant rules and procedures in order to ensure that all cases are handled in a strict, correct and efficient way;

    191.  Notes that only very few cases of psychological and sexual harassment have been recognised as such in the past years and expresses concern that this may point to institutional blind spots in the Commission, given the significant number of employees of the institution;

    192.  Expresses deep concern regarding reports of an ongoing investigation involving the former Commissioner for Justice, who is alleged to have been engaged, during his time in office, in money laundering activities involving funds of unknown origin; calls on the Commission to fully cooperate with the Belgian authorities and to urgently clarify whether these activities were in any way connected to his official duties within the Commission;

    193.  Calls on the Commission to prioritise permanent staff over external consultants and contractual staff, in order to guarantee high quality working conditions and to prevent knowledge and experience from being lost; calls for flexibility for DGs with a high proportion of seconded national experts (SNE) in the establishment plan to convert SNE posts into temporary agent posts with the aim of ensuring better expertise retention, operational functionality and business continuity; further insists on avoiding the externalisation of tasks to consultancies when available know-how can be found in-house;

    194.  Notes that, in recent years, the Commission has increasingly outsourced impact assessments to external companies, raising concerns about potential conflicts of interest; calls on the Commission to strengthen provisions to prevent possible conflicts of interest and to provide better guidance to staff handling public procurement procedures for policy-related service contracts;

    195.  Regrets the alleged espionage organised by the Hungarian Government against OLAF staff during an investigative mission; calls for the swift establishment of robust protection measures to safeguard Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and to prevent any violations;

    196.  Welcomes the entry into force of Regulation (EU) 2023/2841(21); takes note of cybersecurity investments, including EUR 30 million allocated to enhancing digital security in the Commission; calls on the Commission to spare no effort in further developing a cybersecurity culture, promoting training and awareness within the Union institution; stresses the importance of continued adequate investments in cybersecurity towards the longer term indicative target in the order of at least 10 % of total IT spending;

    197.  Reiterates its concern that the significant risks to the security and protection of the registry and operating mechanism of the Union system for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading against cyberattacks have still not been adequately addressed; points out that this issue has been highlighted in the Annual Activity Reports (AARs) since 2010, with reservations raised in each report; notes that this concern is once again emphasised in the Directorate-General for Climate Action’s 2023 AAR, further underscoring the persistent failure to prioritise the security of the system;

    European Schools

    198.  Notes that the European Schools’ overall budget for 2023 was EUR 417,5 million primarily funded by the Commission, other Union institutions, Member States and fees from parents; further notes that almost 80 % of the budget was spent on staff costs;

    199.  Notes with satisfaction that the Court is able to conclude that nothing has come to their attention that causes them to believe that the consolidated accounts for 2023 are not prepared, in all material respects, in accordance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards;

    200.  Observes that the Court found some systematic or recurrent weaknesses in payments and related human resources (HR) and procurement procedures including insufficient verification of supporting evidence affecting the regularity of some HR procedures and payments;

    201.  Calls on the Commission, in particular, to:

       (i) ensure that Union Institutions can rely on EPSO to efficiently organise and complete selection procedures and other staff related procedures in order to provide Union Institutions with sufficient highly qualified and motivated candidates for open positions;
       (ii) explore all possibilities to correct significant geographical and gender imbalances in different categories of the staff;
       (iii) continue work on measures that will ensure that Union Institutions based in Luxembourg can continue to attract highly qualified staff for all types of job profiles;
       (iv) ensure that the roll-out of collaborative work spaces and other significant administrative changes happens in close cooperation with staff;
       (v) make more staff available for processing of reimbursement requests for the sickness insurance scheme, to improve staff training and to have better IT software available to process requests more quickly;
       (vi) act as a role model, particularly for diseases that do not fall into classical fields and rare diseases; urges the Commission to expand their technical knowledge and handling of these cases; urges the Commission to expand the catalogue of tests eligible for reimbursement to include a wider bandwidth for laboratory tests and other diagnostic procedures and exams as well as treatments; urges the Commission to do this promptly;
       (vii) ensure the rapid introduction of strong protective mechanisms for Union institutional staff on mission in Member States and third countries, safeguarding their rights;
       (viii) support the European Schools in their implementation, as soon as possible, of recommendations by the Court from previous years and the recommendation from the report concerning the financial year 2023 which asks the schools to perform systematic checks of supporting evidence on allowances paid to seconded staff;
       (ix) prepare a report analysing the reasons why the vast majority of harassment complaints (requests for assistance) in the Commission are dismissed, most of them without even opening an administrative inquiry, and recommending how such dysfunctionality of the formal procedure can be addressed;
       (x) ensure that as of 2025, requests for assistance in harassment cases are followed up with a proper administrative inquiry by the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) or OLAF so as to ensure that harassers are held accountable and sanctioned proportionately to their wrongdoing;

    CHAPTER II – Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF)

    General remarks

    202.  Notes that in 2023, 27 recovery and resilience plans (RRPs) were revised, and that these revisions had an impact on the pace of implementation of the existing plans, causing delays; notes at the same time that the political priorities in Member States can change; notes that increased energy prices, high inflation and supply chain disruptions caused by Russia’s unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, and, in some cases, natural disasters, contributed to the revision of the RRPs; underlines that the delays caused by the revisions of the RRPs came in addition to existing ones, as shown by the significant differences between the foreseen calendar of payments requests and the actual transmission of these requests by the Member States to the Commission; remains concerned by the risk of under-implementation and of failure to reach the milestones and targets (M&Ts) as agreed in the RRPs; emphasises the need for enhanced monitoring mechanisms to ensure that delays do not disproportionately impact key projects;

    203.  Notes that there should be a clear thematic link between reforms and investments and that there may be, in certain cases, a long delay between the creation of the national recovery plans and the completion of milestones and targets; regrets that the RRF design does not allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to emerging crises in a prompt manner;

    204.  Draws attention with utmost concern to the statement of the President of the Court, arguing that approximately half of the RRF disbursements had not reached the real economy, and questions if the other half may have been used either to substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or generate profit to Member States from the increased interest rates;

    205.  Recalls that the RRF is a temporary recovery instrument based on performance, i.e. that payments are linked to the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts related to reforms and investments included in the national RRPs; stresses that the effectiveness of the RRF must be assessed, not only in terms of disbursement, but also in terms of its ability to generate tangible, long-term improvements of the consequences of the pandemic; recalls that there is no definition in the RRF Regulation of the “satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts”; recalls that each national plan should effectively address all or a significant subset of challenges identified in the European Semester, particularly the country- specific recommendations (CSRs) adopted by the Council; notes the fact that, thanks to the RRF, the percentage of CSRs with progress has increased by 17 % between 2021 and 2023;

    206.  Notes that in 2023, the Commission disbursed a total of EUR 75 billion, and additional pre-financing payments of EUR 7,1 billion, which brought the total disbursements by the end of 2023 to EUR 220,8 billion, divided into EUR 141,6 billion in grants (40 % of the total EUR 357 billion for grants under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) envelope) and EUR 79,2 billion in loans (27 % of the total EUR 291 billion for loans under the RRF envelope); mandates detailed reporting requirements on how Member States allocate funds, preventing substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures, and ensuring funds reach intended beneficiaries;

    Court’s observations

    207.  Notes that the Court issued a qualified opinion on the legality and regularity of the RRF expenditure in 2023; is concerned that the Court concluded that seven out of 23 RRF payments made in 2023 were affected by quantitative findings and that six of these payments were affected by material error; notes that in the Court’s opinion, except for those matters, the RRF expenditure accepted in the accounts for the year 2023 is legal and regular in all material respects; notes that the nature of the RRF spending model relies on the assessments of milestones and targets (M&Ts) to be made by the Commission; notes that in 2023, the Court checked 452 M&Ts included in 23 grant payments and that it does not provide an error rate due to the nature of the RRF’s spending model but estimates the minimum financial impact of its findings to be above the materiality threshold; is convinced that Member States should also bear responsibility for errors detected in post-disbursement;

    208.  Expresses deep concern that the Court was unable to verify the actual financial impact of erroneous or ineligible RRF payments due to the inherent limitations of the milestone and target-based assessment model; calls on the Commission to develop a more transparent error-tracking methodology to prevent misallocation and inefficiency;

    209.  Notes that the Court audited 325 out of 542 milestones and 127 out of 135 targets included in 2023 payment requests for grants; regrets that the Court considers that 16 of them were affected by regularity issues (2.4 % of the total); is concerned by the fact that the Court considers that the requirements had not been satisfactorily fulfilled for seven M&Ts in six payments and that the Commission had still made the corresponding payments; notes that the Court’s conclusions are based on extensive audit work and regrets that the Commission contests some of the Court’s conclusions; notes that all of the RRF payments must be assessed against the framework communicated and applied by the Commission, which must take into consideration for each payment the opinion of the Economic and Financial Committee and the scrutiny by Member State experts under the comitology procedure; requests the Commission to ensure that all disputed payments related to unsatisfactorily fulfilled M&Ts undergo independent external review to strengthen public trust in the process; recommends an introduction of real-time tracking systems for disbursements and expenditures to prevent misallocations under the RRF and the MFF;

    210.  Notes with particular concern that the Court has identified nine potential cases of ineligible M&Ts linked to the continuation of a pre-existing project that either started before the eligibility period, or that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure; regrets the lack of clarity in the RRF Regulation, and does not share the Commission’s interpretation that the eligibility period concerns only the date of start of works on a specific project rather than the beginning of the preparatory or projection phase; regrets that such a view led to measures which were planned before the RRF eligibility period being included in the RRPs, and acknowledges that any measure must respect the scope, objectives and eligibility conditions set by the RRF Regulation; calls on the Commission to implement stricter verification mechanisms to prevent the inclusion of pre-existing projects that do not provide added value under the RRF framework;

    211.  Recalls that RRF funds shall not be used to replace recurring budgetary expenditure, unless in duly justified case; and is preoccupied by the Court’s findings that some M&Ts that were a substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure were not adequately justified in the RRPs;

    212.  Notes with concern the Court’s finding that NGEU borrowing may more than double by 2026 while the bulk of repayment is deferred to future MFFs; recalls that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must start before the end of 2027, if unused appropriations remain available in the budget line to cover NGEU financing costs, and be completed by 2058 at the latest; notes that the Union budget exposure at the end of 2023 is expected to rise in 2024 and 2025, mainly due to RRF loans; is concerned that potential changes in market conditions might result in higher borrowing costs which, for the NGEU debt relating to grants, will have to be borne by the Union budget; is concerned that there is to date still no repayment plan for the NGEU common debt, and that the Union’s debt continues to rise, with a large share of this increase attributed to the temporary recovery instrument, NGEU; is concerned that the increased debt and the associated higher interest costs will have long-term consequences for the Union’s fiscal stability, potentially leading to greater financial strain and a reduced capacity to respond to future challenges or invest in key strategic areas;

    213.  Notes the Court’s finding that payments from RRF were lower than expected in 2023; emphasises that the Court has criticised the slow disbursement and absorption of RRF funds; is concerned by the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that absorption of RRF funds has progressed with some delays, that Member States may not be able to complete all measures at the end of the RRF’s implementation period for which a significant proportion of funds have already been paid out, and that the second half of the RRF’s implementation period is more challenging with an increase in number of M&Ts, a shift from reforms to investments and more advanced stage of implementation, and a high proportion of measures to be completed in the last year;

    214.  Notes, conversely, that according to the Commission the achievement of M&Ts is broadly on track, as by 31 August 2024, over 40 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed to Member States, with the disbursement of grants reaching 48 % and loans slightly exceeding 30 %; notes that the pace of payment requests has also accelerated since the second half of 2023 with the revision of the RRPs linked to the introduction of the REPowerEU chapters was finalised in 2023;

    215.  Notes the Court’s findings in Special Report 13/2024 that additional reasons for slow absorption included measures not being suited to the RRF’s timeframe and underestimation of the time needed to implement them (due to public procurement and state aid rules); as well as uncertainties on implementing rules and how they should be applied including lacking guidance on the ‘do no significant harm’ principle (DNSH) and how to ascribe to it;

    216.  Expresses strong concerns about the Court’s observation that point to persistent weaknesses in the implementation of Member States control systems as this poses a risk to the availability of complete and accurate data underlying payment requests, access to those requests for control purposes, and the effective functioning of Member State control systems to protect the Union’s financial interests; recalls that, according to the RRF Regulation, Member State control systems have a key role to play in ensuring that the financial interests of the Union are protected effectively; urges the Commission to take decisive and swift action whenever necessary, including imposing financial corrections, and to make full use of the provisions of the RRF Regulation if deficiencies persist in the control systems of Member States;

    217.  Expresses concern about the Court’s findings in Special Report N°22/2024 on ‘Double funding from the EU budget: Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to cost’; highlights that Member States can propose so-called ‘zero cost measures’, i.e. measures estimated to have no costs to be financed by the RRF, and for which there is no check at all for double-funding, as the Commission considers that measures which receive no RRF funds are free of risk from that perspective; also notes with concern the Court’s findings that from Member States’ perspective, the many layers of governance involved including national, regional or municipality level, make coordination and oversight very challenging; is concerned that when checks are performed, (i) they suffer from a very complicated environment with different IT tools used often not interoperable and data recorded in an often non-standardised way, leaving manual cross-checks across databases as the only possible tool to check for double funding, and (ii) Member States’ control systems rely to a large extent on self-declarations by recipients of Union funds; notes, however, that the Court did not find any case of double funding;

    218.  Notes the Commission’s observation that, according to the RRF Regulation, double funding is explicitly linked to budgetary costs and thus, there can be no double funding if the Member State has not submitted any cost estimate linked to a specific measure as part of its national plan; notes that the Commission underlines that no-cost reforms do not increase the financial envelope but are nevertheless essential criteria for the Commission’s positive assessment of RRPs, as well as their full implementation for the relevant payments; points out that the Commission, shortly after the Court audit field work, acknowledged it had identified the first two potential cases of double funding;

    219.  Recalls that Article 9 of the RRF Regulation establishes additionality and complementarity between Union programmes and instruments funding as key principles; believes that, to respect these principles but avoid the risk of double financing, the same measures already included in other national plans benefiting from Union funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should either not be included in RRPs or more thoroughly described, even if they do not incur any costs, in order to avoid double funding; underlines that due to the different model of implementation, double funding between RRF and other Union financing instruments might be more difficult to identify, and urges the Commission to remain vigilant and pro-active in identifying any potential situation of double funding;

    220.  Regrets the lack of adequate safeguards to prevent double funding of projects under both the RRF and other Union financial instruments; calls for an automated cross-checking system between RRF and cohesion Funds, the Common Agricultural Policy, and other Union funding programmes to detect and eliminate duplicate claims;

    221.  Expresses concern about the Court’s finding in its Review 01/2023: ‘EU financing through cohesion policy and the RRF: A comparative analysis’ that reporting of fraud involving RRF expenditure still lacks a standardised approach with strong coordination and cooperation between Member States, which are obliged to report on cases of suspected fraud not in an integrated IT system, but in the management declaration accompanying every payment request, although Member States have also reported cases outside of the management declarations; regrets that there are no clear guidelines about exactly when a case of suspected fraud should be reported, whether there is a reporting threshold, and what standard information should be reported for each case and about the remedial measures taken; furthermore supports the request made by the Court to the Commission in the same review 01/2023 to obtain sufficient assurance from the Member States on the effectiveness of national systems to prevent, detect and correct fraud, corruption and conflicts of interest;

    222.  Expresses concerns that in 2023 the Commission had to introduce 10 additional control milestones for seven Members States to address the weaknesses identified in their control systems; reminds and supports the Court’s evaluation that the fact control milestones were introduced, which means that Member states systems were not fully functional when the plans started to be implemented, posing a serious risk to the regularity of the of the RRF expenditure and to the protection of financial interests;

    223.  Regrets the findings of the Court’s Special Report No 26/2023 that several policy areas in the RRF’s pillar containing health policies lack a corresponding common indicator to measure progress; is concerned that this impedes the proper monitoring and understanding of progress made towards achieving milestones and targets linked to health policies;

    224.  Welcomes that, in 2023, the Commission made progress in eliminating any possibility of misinterpretation of figures of the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard and that the Scoreboard further addressed the related recommendation of the Court to improve the presentation of data displayed on the Scoreboard and to improve explanations with regard to its limitations, in particular by better explaining the underlying methodologies and explicitly stating, where applicable, that the data is estimated;

    Audit and control

    225.  Welcomes that, based on the Court’s recommendations and the experience gained, the Commission, in 2023, published three methodological notes to clarify the application of the RRF Regulation, including its framework for (i) assessing the satisfactory fulfilment of M&Ts, upon conducting an assessment, and (ii) the application of the provisions related to the reversal of M&Ts, as well as a methodology to determine the amount to be suspended if a milestone or target is not satisfactorily fulfilled; takes note of the updated Guidance on RRPs, adopted on 19 July 2024, which provides additional guidance to ensure the continued adequacy of controls to identify and avoid any risk of double funding as well as the methodology for reductions and recoveries under the RRF in accordance with Article 24(8) of the RRF Regulation;

    226.  Calls on the Commission to increase the number of ex-post audits and on-the-ground inspections for RRF-funded projects, particularly in high-risk sectors such as digital infrastructure, energy where previous Union funding programmes have identified significant irregularities;

    227.  Warns that the inclusion of pre-existing projects and the substitution of recurring budgetary expenditures within the RRF framework undermines the additionality principle, effectively converting the instrument into a backdoor financing mechanism for Member States’ regular budgets, rather than fostering genuine post-crisis recovery and resilience; calls for an urgent review to prevent further dilution of the RRF’s purpose;

    228.  Advocates more decisiveness on the part of both the Commission and Member States in order to detect irregularities in the spending of RRF funds and to recover undue payments;

    229.  Is concerned with the Court’s counter-reply to the Commission’s replies on the existence of an assurance gap at Union level regarding compliance with Union and national rules on public procurement and State aid; notes that the Commission argues that the assurance provided by DG ECFIN covers the effectiveness of Member States’ controls on compliance with public procurement and state aid rules. however, stresses that while DG ECFIN’s AAR refers to Commission assessments of the existence and effectiveness of Member States’ controls, there is no conclusion regarding their effectiveness; expresses concern that, according to the Court, this represents an important limitation of the scope of the Commission’s declaration of assurance, meaning that the Commission still does not provide full assurance as to whether RRF expenditure – which the Commission manages directly – complies with the rules;

    230.  Stresses that delays in disbursement and absorption of RRF funds not only slow down economic recovery but also create substantial risks of last-minute, low-quality spending towards the end of the RRF period; calls on the Commission to introduce stricter interim evaluations to prevent a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ rush that could lead to waste and misallocation;

    231.  Notes with serious concern that Member States may strategically forego their final payment requests to avoid fulfilling politically sensitive milestones and targets, thereby evading necessary but unpopular reforms; calls on the Commission to introduce financial penalties for incomplete RRF implementation to prevent manipulation of the payment structure;

    232.  Notes that the Commission’s replies that it extended the scope of its audit work beyond that required by the RRF Regulation to verify that the control procedures put in place in the Member States give the necessary assurance that Member States regularly and effectively verify compliance with public procurement and State aid rules and eligibility for RRF measures, but disagrees with the Commission’s opinion that the conclusions of DG ECFIN’s Annual activity report cover this;

    233.  Notes with concern that, as stated by the Commission in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, a majority of Member States consider that the payment suspension methodology remains unclear when it comes to reforms because of the discretion given to the Commission in applying the methodology; urges the Commission to revise this methodology in order to avoid any double standards in its application;

    234.  Notes that the Commission’s IAS, in its audit on ex-ante controls of the RRF payment requests carried out in 2023, identified a very important issue according to which DG ECFIN, in cooperation with the Recovery and Resilience Task Force, should further develop and formalise the existing guidance for the cases where DG ECFIN requests that Member States make additional commitments concerning action stemming from audit and control milestones, in particular that the guidance should define (i) how DG ECFIN should follow up the fulfilment of the formal confirmation on the Member State’s commitment, (ii) the criteria for determining the deadlines for the Member States to fulfil the commitments, and (iii) the relations between the ‘commitment framework’, the ‘framework for assessing M&Ts under the RRF Regulation’ and the ‘Reversal of M&Ts under the Facility’;

    235.  Notes that the Commission checks during its “Protection of the Financial Interest of the Union” audits that Member States have a clear and codified process for transmitting cases of fraud, corruption, conflict of interest and double funding to all competent authorities, including the EPPO where relevant;

    236.  Is concerned by the Court reporting in its annual reports that by the end of 2023, the EPPO had 206 active investigations related to funds used to implement RRF measures and estimated potential damages of over EUR 1,8 billion (concerning both national and Union funding); notes that the 206 open investigations concern ten Member States, with around 75 % of these cases coming from one country; is worried that at the end of 2023 the Member States’ management declarations had not reported a single case of detected suspected fraud, meaning that none of the EPPO open cases were reported by Member States themselves, casting doubts on Member States’ ability to detect and fight frauds; stresses that, while no investigation has yet been completed, the figures presented by the EPPO confirm that the risk of fraud is present in the RRF, and that they call into question the reliability of Member State management declarations in terms of reporting detected fraud and the remedial measures taken; calls for urgent reinforcement of fraud detection mechanisms, including a mandatory fraud risk assessment for all large-scale RRF projects; calls on the Commission to ensure that the EPPO has adequate resources to investigate cases of fraud related to RRF expenditure, given the increasing number of investigations and high estimated damages;

    237.  Warns that Member States’ self-reported fraud cases under RRF remain significantly underreported, creating a misleading picture of financial integrity;

    238.  Strongly regrets the lack of transparency in reporting fraud linked to RRF funds and insists that all Member States comply with standardised reporting obligations and use the Irregularity Management System (IMS);

    239.  Recalls that the Financial Regulation recast in force since 30 September 2024 (‘FR recast’) provides for the extension of its scope of the Early Detection and Exclusion System (EDES) to shared management and direct management in cases where the budget is implemented with Member States, for programmes adopted or financed as from 1 January 2028; calls on the Commission to act on the most serious grounds for exclusion in order to better protect the financial interests of the Union;

    240.  Notes that, with a view to reducing the margin between the Commission and the Court, for different interpretations of M&Ts, the Commission has published its approach to the concepts of the start date of a measure and the concept of ‘substitution of recurring national budgetary expenditure’ as Annex II and Annex III of its 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the RRF; re-iterate its calls on the Commission to keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;

    Implementation and impact

    241.  Urges the Commission to minimise risks that Member States might chose not to receive parts or the entire amounts of the last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last M&Ts and jeopardising the overall implementation of the RRPs; is extremely concerned about the additional risks of measures being reversed after the RRF lifetime, and urges the Commission, when making the final payments, to ensure that such situations will not occur;

    242.  Emphasises that, according to the Commission’s mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024, Member States highlighted the need to mobilise more resources than initially planned to revise the RRPs, and that the efficiency of the performance-based approach is reduced by the ‘excessively complex procedures’ for the plan modifications, which do not distinguish between major or minor amendments and require Council approval for any modification;

    243.  Stresses that for control and audits in the RRF, Member States should put in place arrangements to prevent, detect and correct corruption, fraud and conflicts of interests, and that the Commission performs ex-post and system audits on M&Ts; stresses that some confusion persists with respect to the role of the Court, which has developed a strategy (2021-2025 Strategy) for carrying out its responsibilities for the NGEU programme and the RRF, which some Member States perceive as an unnecessary overlap and administrative burden; is concerned that the Commission, both in its mid-term evaluation of the RRF of 21 February 2024 and its RRF Annual Report of 10 October 2024, acknowledged that Member States’ authorities at all levels found the audit and control procedures to be too complex, and that Member States complained about overlapping audits by national authorities, the Commission and the Court; fully supports the Court work on the RRF; welcomes that the Commission has admitted and accepted that the Court has a full audit mandate on RRF, which is one of the foundation for the Parliament discharge on the RRF funds; recommends to the Member States to cooperate with the European Court of Auditors;

    244.  Is concerned that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation highlighted the entry costs for Member States’ administrations, with room for further simplification; notes, according to this Commission’s Annual Report, that concerning the design of the instrument, in the mid-term evaluation Member States referred to the combined obligations linked to (i) the evidence needed to prove fulfilment of M&Ts, (ii) demanding reporting requirements, for example the common indicators and the bi-annual data; and (iii) the audit and control framework; recalls that Member States see room for simplifying control and audit procedures, ensuring better coordination among the actors involved and avoiding multiple checks; also notes, again according to the Commission RRF Annual Report 2024, that some national authorities also pointed to inflexibility in the Commission’s assessment of milestones and targets and the rigid and resource-intensive procedures to revise RRPs;

    245.  Notes that one of the objectives of the RRF is to help Member States to implement ambitious reforms and investments that make their economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and prepared for the green and digital transitions; highlights with concerns the finding of the Court in its Special Report 15/2024 underlining the lack of relevance, quality and comparability of data submitted by the Member States, with data insufficient to evaluate progress on climate adaptation in the Member States, and thus paving the way for possible greenwashing; expresses concern that the RRF could become a financial vehicle for superficial rebranding of conventional expenditures as ‘green’; encourages the Commission to introduce a mechanism within the RRF framework to track the environmental impact of investments and ensure alignment with the Union’s climate objectives;

    246.  Highlights the RRF impact on the Union business and SMEs; notes that RRF has provided EUR 78 billion in direct support to SMEs, representing 12 % of total RRF expenditure, and that broader measures benefiting businesses amount to EUR 152 billion (23 % of total RRF spending); notes that EUR 2,75 million SMEs, approximately 11 % of all active SMEs in the Union, have received support through the RRF; underlines that nearly 600 000 businesses have benefited from digitalisation initiatives, while EUR 5,2 billion have been allocated to green transition projects, including renewable energy and hydrogen;

    247.  Highlights with concern that the facilitation of cross-border projects has not worked out; deplores that, despite the inclusion in the RRPs of several measures linked to Important Projects of Common Interest (‘IPCEIs’) and cross-border measures in the REPowerEU chapters, the national governance of the Facility has not sufficiently promoted cross-border cooperation; strongly insists that Union financing should be better linked with the achievement of common Union objectives and should generate EU added value;

    248.  Emphasises that the Commission Annual Report of 10 October 2024 on the RRF implementation acknowledged the insufficient involvement of Member States of regional and local authorities, civil society organisations, social partners, and other relevant stakeholders in the preparation and the implementation of the national RRPs; calls for their close involvement in the implementation of the national RRPs on the ground;

    249.  Urges the Commission not to approve any revision of RRPs, which may lead to a re-packaging of planned reforms or investments into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation; notes that any revision should always aim to create added value and increase synergies;

    Transparency

    250.  Recalls that, while Member States are not required to publish all data on final recipients, Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council(22) amending the RRF Regulation requires Member States to publish information on the 100 final recipients receiving the highest amount of funding under the RRF; welcomes that on 10 October 2024, the Commission published, as part of the RRF Annual Report 2024, a dedicated Annex to provide further clarity on the concept of final recipients under the RRF Regulation and the scope of the publication of data on the largest 100 final recipients; expresses deep concern over the interpretation of the Commission of the concept of “final recipient” under the RRF, as often they are listed only at the ministry level, and that the descriptions are vague, with many examples available in almost all lists provided by Member States; reiterates its demand that the list of 100 largest final recipients provides the factual natural person or entity that is the last in a chain of money transfers to be made available in a publicly accessible database to enhance accountability and enable independent oversight, while respecting the legal framework of Union data protection; is concerned that otherwise it will be problematic to measure the impact and guarantee visibility of the RRF funds to the citizens, although also takes into account the RRF Scoreboard and the project map; stresses that, should the Commission continue to refuse to ensure full transparency, Parliament must consider all available measures to enforce compliance, to prevent a similar interpretation from being applied to the transparency provisions in other financial regulations;

    251.  Reminds the Commission that the letter and spirit of the RRF Regulation must be strictly followed, and that the adoption of guidelines or other internal documents must be fully in line with the results of the negotiations between the co-legislators; is convinced that this has not been the case when the Commission adopted the provisions related to the interpretation of what a “final recipient” is in its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU;

    252.  Notes that not being able to ascertain final recipients of RRF funding poses a severe risk to the transparency and traceability of Union funds and thus to the protection of the financial interests of the Union;

    253.  Recalls that a robust IT infrastructure is essential for data collection, programme monitoring and evaluation, and that managing authorities and beneficiaries are critical of the level of information required and duplication with other domestic systems; notes that, in contrast to the Cohesion Policy, the Court under the RRF pointed to the different structures and approaches used by national monitoring authorities, which could be perceived as less reliable by providing non-homogeneous information and leaving room for a potentially high number of errors; stresses that, in this respect, centralised interoperable systems facilitate efficient data collection and reporting, while fragmented systems underscore the need for streamlined approaches;

    254.  Welcomes that the ‘FR recast’ establishes horizontal measures for a centralised website (Financial Transparency System) at Union level, covering all recipients of Union funding, and notes that this website is due to overcome the current fragmentation, enhance transparency, and facilitate public scrutiny of recipients; notes that the Commission, as from the next MFF (i.e. post 2027) will be required to use the relevant data stored in the data mining and risk-scoring tool, Arachne, to feed the centralised website for transparency purposes, and that, in line with data protection rules, the website will include only public data, e.g. relevant data on recipients, contractors, subcontractors, and beneficiaries; further stresses that all Member States will have an obligation to provide the Commission with access to this data, to be fed into Arachne by automated means; regrets that the use of Arachne by Member States is not compulsory;

    255.  Notes that the final M&T of the national RRPs must be completed by 31 August 2026 according to Articles 18(4) and 20(5) of the Regulation; recalls the need for the Commission to work closely with every Member State to speed up implementation on the ground including through providing regular guidance and, upon request, technical assistance to help the implementation of the plans; re-iterates its concerns about the possibility of the reversal of M&Ts after the lifetime of the RRF, and urges the Commission to prevent such situations;

    256.  Calls on the Commission to reject any request of revision of RRPs which would lower the overall ambition of the plan or would eliminate important structural reforms from the RRPs, and to prioritise the completion of measures related to CSRs in RRPs; further calls on the Commission to step up its technical assistance to Member States lagging behind in the RRF implementation;

    Recommendations

    257.  Calls on the Commission to act on the Court’s recommendations from its Annual Report as well as those of its related special reports, and welcomes that the Commission accepts the vast majority of them; calls on the Commission to implement them and to keep the discharge authority informed on the progress of the implementation;

    258.  Calls on the Commission to grant full access to the Court to the new reporting tool on the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), FENIX as soon as possible;

    259.  Furthermore, calls on the Commission to:

       (i) carefully balance auditing and control requirements with the administrative burden imposed on Member States and beneficiaries of future performance-based instruments, while maintaining a sufficient level of control and audit that would grant a solid protection of the Union financial interests;
       (ii) closely monitor the continued fulfilment of M&Ts, in particular those related to audit, monitoring and control and ensure an adequate monitoring of any potential reversal of previously completed M&Ts;
       (iii) use the results of its checks on Member States control systems to express a clear conclusion on their effectiveness and take all appropriate measures;
       (iv) establish one single contact point for Member States on the Statement of Assurance at the Commission to which the Court can have access without further burdening Member States with requests for additional proofs;
       (v) record and monitor systematically all irregularities and all frauds affecting RRF funds;
       (vi) consistently and accurately apply the provisions related to the “final recipients”, of the RRF Regulation, by revising its Guidance on RRPs in the context of REPowerEU, and to communicate with Member States on the correct application of the definition of “final recipients”; calls on the Commission to come forward with proposals requiring Member States to publish details of all final recipients;
       (vii) streamline its control on the M&Ts through the implementation of a Single Audit approach, which would allow reduction of the administrative burden, the consolidation of audit responsibilities between the Commission and the Court, the coordination of audit timelines and requirements to avoid duplication and overlapping controls and audits, but at the same time ensuring the full protection of the Union financial interests;
       (viii) support Member States in making IT systems truly interoperable, so as to facilitate efficient data collection, reporting and exchange between various government departments and agencies to allow the minimisation of the risks of double funding, actively cross-check between relevant databases, and communicate with Member States about their administrative capacities to ensure double funding does not occur; notes in this regard, the positive examples provided at the Court Conference on Transparency and Traceability of EU Recovery and Resilience Funding in October 2024;
       (ix) work closely with Member States to ensure that M&Ts, in particular those of a structural nature or linked with CSRs, are fully and diligently implemented, and that no revision of RRPs will be approved in cases where ambition has been lowered or important measures have been weakened; avoid, to the extent possible, the revision of plans that would represent a “re-packaging” of planned measures into the RRPs if they don’t respect the conditions of the RRF Regulation;
       (x) strictly apply the provisions of the RRF Regulation, including those regarding suspension of payments or recoveries of amounts, in particular if the protection of the financial interests of the Union is not ensured;
       (xi) apply very strictly the methodology on partial payments, including as regards structural measures and measures linked to the implementation of CSRs;
       (xii) develop a methodology based on quality and comparability of data to evaluate progress on green and digital transitions, as well as the tangible benefits, in the Member States;
       (xiii) ensure that Member States diligently apply the visibility provisions of the RRF, making sure that measures implemented through the Facility are adequately flagged as funded by the Union;
       (xiv) provide technical assistance, administrative support and advice to Member States to strengthen their administrative capacity, including through the organisation of regular meetings of the Informal Expert Group on the implementation of the RRF to discuss technical aspects and encourage the exchange of good practices amongst national authorities;
       (xv) perform, whenever a revision of the RRPs is proposed, a comprehensive analysis of new and existing measures and whether they would substitute recurring budgetary expenditure or would be in breach of other eligibility conditions of the RRPs;
       (xvi) provide training and support to Member States to increase administrative capacities including training on specialised skills, knowledge and providing examples of best practices;
       (xvii) keep working with the Court in order to bring the interpretation of M&Ts as close together as possible;
       (xviii) use the recommendations of the Court from its work on the RRF and the experience gained in the implementation for the design of the next multiannual financial framework architecture including the implementation of future Union performance-based instruments;
       (xix) strengthen the design of future performance-based instruments by ensuring a closer link between disbursements and progress in implementation;
       (xx) ensure that any future revision, as well as the overall implementation, of RRPs is done in close cooperation with and consultation of local and regional authorities, and other relevant stakeholders in order to maximise the RRP’s impact;
       (xxi) analyse the weaknesses present in performance-based instruments, and address these weaknesses when designing new programmes in the future;
       (xxii) build, in the next MFF, on a high-level of interoperability and data exchange between various government departments and agencies to facilitate efficient data sharing and real-time updates across multiple platforms in order to allow to track overlapping projects, minimising the risks of double counting and double funding.
    (1) The 11th EDF covers the 2021-2027 MFF.
    (2) ‘The future of European competitiveness’, 9 September 2024.
    (3) Special report 05/2024: EU Transparency Register – provides useful but limited information on lobbying activities.
    (4) Special Report 11/2025 Transparency of EU funding granted to NGOs – despite progress, the overview is still not reliable.
    (5) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (6) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021R0783.
    (7) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/P-10-2025-000595-ASW_EN.pdf.
    (8) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (9) ECA Special Report 07/2024: The Commission’s systems for recovering irregular EU expenditure – Potential to recover more and faster.
    (10) OJ C, C/2024/5882, 9.10.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/5882/oj.
    (11) COM(2023) 258.
    (12) ECA Special Report 16/2024: EU revenue based on non‑recycled plastic packaging waste – A challenging start hindered by data that is not sufficiently comparable or reliable.
    (13) Council Directive (EU) 2018/822 of 25 May 2018 amending Directive 2011/16/EU as regards mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field of taxation in relation to reportable cross-border arrangements (OJ L 139, 5.6.2018, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/822/oj).
    (14) ECA 2023 Annual Report para 1.35.
    (15) Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj).
    (16) Commission Decision of 13.12.2023 on the reassessment, on the Commission’s initiative, of the fulfilment of the conditions under Article 4 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 following Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 regarding Hungary, C(2023)8999.
    (17) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj).
    (18) Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 (OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj).
    (19) Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility (OJ L 57, 18.2.2021, p. 17; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/241/oj).
    (20) Angola, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, The Gambia, Togo and Uganda.
    (21) Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/2841 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2023 laying down measures for a high common level of cybersecurity at the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union (OJ L, 2023/2841, 18.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/2841/oj).
    (22) Regulation (EU) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC (OJ L 63, 28.2.2023, p. 1; ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/435/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Chinese troops participating in Russia’s Victory Day parade in Red Square, Moscow, on May 9 is a clear indication that President Xi Jinping is fully committed to his “no-limits” partnership with his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin.

    Xi’s own attendance of the parade, which came as part of a state visit to Russia, underlines that China is not only supporting Russia. It signified that Beijing wants this support to be understood clearly in Kyiv, Washington and European capitals.

    Travelling to Moscow and having his troops goose-step down Red Square was not a last-minute decision by Xi. Nor was the multitude of agreements signed by the two leaders and their joint declaration anything but part of a well established pattern of deepening relations between Russia and China.

    This trend has accelerated since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But the breadth and depth of China’s commitment to Russia at this particular moment is undoubtedly related to the broader upheaval in the international order that has been worsened since Donald Trump’s return to the White House.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    The Trump administration, possibly spooked by market wobbles, has taken steps to restore stability. China and the US have agreed a deal to slash the import tariffs they have imposed on each other. But uncertainty remains – above all about how the complex relationships in the triangle of Washington, Beijing and Moscow will work out and where this will leave the rest of the world.




    Read more:
    Trump, Xi and Putin: a dysfunctional love triangle with stakes of global significance


    On May 8, in the wake of Xi and Putin’s meetings in Moscow, Russia and China released a joint statement. It stressed the intention of the two leaders to “enhance the coordination of their approaches and to deepen the practical cooperation on maintaining and strengthening global strategic stability, as well as to jointly address common challenges and threats in this sphere”.

    They reiterated this determination in their press statements afterwards. Putin emphasised that he and Xi “personally control all aspects of [the] Russia-China partnership and do all we can to expand the cooperation on bilateral issues and the international agenda alike”.

    A Chinese read-out from the talks was similarly clear on the alignment between the countries. Xi reportedly said that “in the face of unilateralist countercurrents, bullying and acts of power politics, China is working with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major countries and permanent members of the UN Security Council”.

    This unequivocal display of how close Moscow and Beijing are – as well as Putin and Xi personally – is important for both nations. For Russia, it remains important to demonstrate that western attempts at international isolation have not succeeded.

    For China, the very public consolidation of ties with Russia is above all a signal to the US. China is keen to stress that Trump’s efforts to engineer a split between Moscow and Beijing, which the American president described as necessary to “un-unite” the two nations during an interview with US talk show host Tucker Carlson in November 2024, have largely failed.

    However, beyond the glossy surface of the celebrations in Moscow, all is not as well for Russia as Putin is trying to make out. For all the public displays of friendship between Xi and Putin, the relationship between the two countries remains highly asymmetrical.

    Russia would not be able to continue to wage its war against Ukraine without Chinese support. Trade between Russia and China is critical to propping up the Russian war economy, reaching a record high of nearly US$250 billion (£190 billion) in 2024. Their trade has increased by more than 60% since 2021, yet it is only marginally up since 2023.

    China’s diplomatic clout is also helpful for Russia. If Beijing had taken an unequivocal stance opposing Moscow’s aggression, fewer leaders in the developing world would have sided with Putin.

    In this case, Russia would probably have lost organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Brics group of emerging economies as platforms to further its broader agenda of restoring its erstwhile status as a great power.

    In that agenda, Putin has been moderately successful. But with South Africa and India’s leaders absent from Russia’s Victory Day commemorations, the list of attendees was shorter than at the Brics summit in Kazan, Russia, in October 2024.

    A doubled-edged sword

    Notably absent from the celebrations in Moscow was high-level representation from North Korea and Iran. These are two key allies of Russia with whom Moscow signed strategic partnership agreements in June 2024 and January 2025, respectively.

    Tehran simply sent its ambassador to Moscow to attend. However, it may have compensated Putin in a different and materially more significant way.

    According to reports, Iran is readying a delivery of launchers to enable Russia to use the short-range ballistic missiles already delivered last year. This would further add to Russia’s reliance on Iranian hardware in Ukraine, which has so far been most visible in the use of Iranian-made Shahed drones.

    North Korea dispatched a military delegation led by three-star general Kim Yong-bok. Kim is widely considered the commander of North Korean forces fighting alongside Russian troops in the Kursk region of western Russia, where Ukrainian forces seized territory in August 2024 as a possible bargaining chip in future negotiations with Russia.

    Putin officially acknowledged the participation of North Korean troops in this operation in a statement on April 28. This acknowledgment came two days after he had announced the defeat of Ukrainian forces there in a highly choreographed and televised meeting with his chief of general staff, Valery Gerasimov.

    The demonstration of Russia’s close relationships with its three core allies – China, Iran and North Korea – is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it clearly indicates that Putin is far from isolated on the international stage.

    But it also signals that Russia has become a lot more dependent on these relationships than would befit Putin’s dreams of restoring Russia’s great-power status. Neither can be much comfort to Ukraine and its allies, unfortunately.

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    ref. Russia-China ties on full display on Victory Day – but all is not as well as Putin is making out – https://theconversation.com/russia-china-ties-on-full-display-on-victory-day-but-all-is-not-as-well-as-putin-is-making-out-256385

    MIL OSI – Global Reports