Category: Statistics

  • MIL-OSI: OnStation Unveils Groundbreaking Alert System to Protect Road Workers and Drivers

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CLEVELAND, Feb. 28, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — OnStation, the leading provider of live digital stationing solutions for the heavy highway industry, announced today a new product that prioritizes jobsite worker safety. Active Worksite™ allows all OnStation App users to notify the traveling public of “workers ahead” using connected navigation apps powered by an integration with iCone. This new technology introduces a never-before-seen alert for drivers and communicates the urgency of slowing down in construction zones where workers are present.

    Available in March 2025, the product sends fully anonymized worker location data to iCone who then relays the information to statewide traffic safety data feeds and popular navigation apps in real time. When Active Worksite™ is toggled on by an OnStation App user who is within 130 feet of a stationed project alignment centerline, drivers will receive an alert within their driving apps like Waze, connected OEM navigation systems and other display dashboards. The OnStation system does not share the user’s location when disabled and is not intended to be used for tracking purposes with other entities on the OnStation system. The user experience for the traveling public is similar to current notifications for speed zones, debris on roadway, and stalled cars. When drivers realize humans are present, they are more likely to slow down and watch for workers.

    Unlike conventional Temporary Traffic Control (TTC) guidelines found in Maintenance of Traffic (MOT) plans, which are meticulously crafted months ahead with fixed construction timelines, OnStation’s approach dynamically adapts to the real-time presence of workers, ensuring seamless and safe operations throughout the project. Because the road worker initiates the action in the OnStation App, essentially creating a live beacon, drivers will see a new, more relevant alert, one that is especially impactful during unexpected hours on nights and weekends. Active Worksite™ can also be activated in cases where the work is impromptu, in the absence of a stationed centerline, such as shoulders where road maintenance crews are removing roadkill or repairing roadway features.

    According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries, more than half of all highway worker fatalities at road construction sites in 2022 involved a worker on foot being struck by a vehicle. Further, 2023 data shows the construction industry accounts for the highest total number of fatal work injuries in the private sector, and the third highest fatality rate per 100,000 workers at 9.6.

    “It’s time for a behavior change,” says Nate Till from Brooks Construction. “The injury and fatality data for roadway construction is daunting. If we can get the average driver to understand there are hard working men and women coming up ahead in the roadway, it humanizes the problem and gets people to change their behavior. We know that speed zone alerts work by getting people to slow down and avoid tickets. Now, with Active Worksite™, we can get people to slow down in construction zones before it’s too late.” Brooks Construction, an existing OnStation customer, has already purchased the product.  

    Active Worksite™ is available for a flat fee in addition to purchases of any OnStation license type. Visit onstationapp.com for more information about OnStation and its solutions.

    About OnStation

    OnStation is a collaborative digital stationing platform that offers location-based project records from bid to close. Specifically designed for the heavy highway industry, OnStation’s mobile app centralizes communication, boosts productivity, enhances worker safety, and improves project quality. Users benefit from live jobsite stationing, milepost, and LRS capabilities. They can overlay design layers on the project map and communicate via a custom chat platform that organizes and records project events at their locations. OnStation is available on both the Apple App Store and Google Play Store and is supported on all desktop systems.

    Contact

    Jessica Kodrich

    Director of Marketing

    jkodrich@onstationapp.com

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/cdaf9db1-faa5-4266-bd11-b5a0c7e53dce

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Costa Rica: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Consultation Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 28, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    San José: An International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff team, led by Mr. Ding Ding, held the 2025 Article IV consultation with the Costa Rican authorities during February 18-28. At the conclusion of the discussions, Mr. Ding issued the following statement:

    Costa Rica is one of the fastest-growing economies in the Western Hemisphere, achieving notable economic success in recent years. GDP growth has averaged above 5 percent since 2021, outpacing regional peers and contributing to lower poverty and unemployment. Over the same period, public debt fell by an impressive 8 percentage points of GDP to below 60 percent of GDP. These successes are fruits of good macroeconomic policies, wide-ranging reforms in the context of becoming a member of the OECD, two successfully completed IMF-supported programs, and a strategic focus on exports and economic diversification. Growth is projected to remain strong at about 4 percent for 2025.

    Inflation is showing encouraging signs of returning towards the inflation target, following decisive monetary policy easing by the BCCR. Having been near zero since mid-2024, headline inflation has begun to rise and is projected to reach the BCCR’s tolerance band in mid-2025 and the 3 percent target within a year. However, core inflation remains subdued and there are downside risks, primarily stemming from low inflation expectations becoming entrenched below the target. Upside risks could arise from possible commodity price increases and/or supply-side disruptions.

    The BCCR’s forward-looking data-dependent approach has proven effective and its inflation targeting regime is working well. At the current monetary policy rate, inflation is expected to be 3 percent by 2026Q1. If the convergence of inflation to the 3 percent target weakens in the coming months, there is room for the BCCR to cut the policy rate further. Credit growth has been strong. If there are signs of excess credit growth especially associated with FX loans, macroprudential measures should be tightened to mitigate potential risks to financial stability.

    It is important to further strengthen the BCCR’s autonomy, governance, and operational framework. This would be achieved by approving legislative proposals to improve BCCR governance, transparency, and accountability, and institutionalize the central bank’s de facto autonomy.

    The exchange rate should be allowed to adjust more flexibly to market conditions. The BCCR accumulated US$ 920 million in international reserves during 2024, and reserve coverage is now comfortable by multiple metrics. A further accumulation of international reserves is unwarranted and would impose unnecessary costs over time. Moreover, frequent foreign exchange intervention can weaken monetary policy transmission and hinder foreign exchange market development. Concerted efforts including legal reforms are needed to deepen FX markets and strengthen the non-financial public sector’s ability to manage currency risks, reducing its reliance on the BCCR as an intermediary for FX transactions. Alongside the planned reform to restructure existing pension funds into generational funds, regulatory limits on foreign investments by local pension funds need to be updated. Adjustments to these limits should be phased in and supported by FX market development.

    There is scope to further capitalize on the significant progress on financial sector oversight. Indicators of financial soundness remain comfortable, notwithstanding the resolution of two small non-bank financial institutions last year. These episodes highlighted the importance of a strong supervisory and resolution framework. The Legislative Assembly should, therefore, pass the proposed amendments to the bank resolution and deposit insurance law that would further strengthen supervisory and resolution powers and enhance the crisis management framework.

    Although public debt fell to below 60 percent of GDP in 2024, the task of rebuilding fiscal space is not yet complete. The debt ratio fell in part due to some drawdown of cash balances and transfers of cash balances by decentralized and autonomous entities to the Treasury Single Account (which lowered financing needs). However, the primary surplus fell in 2024 due to temporary factors and the regrettable reductions of the vehicle property tax (marchamo) and corporate tax base. An unwinding of temporary factors is expected to help the primary balance rise to around 1½ percent of GDP this year. A higher primary balance is essential to bring debt down further, reduce interest costs, and create room for additional spending. While spending should be less than the ceiling permitted by the fiscal rule, the higher primary balance should still allow for some increases in priority areas like infrastructure, child and adult care (which will help boost female labor market participation), and investments in skills training for vulnerable groups (which will help reduce dependency on social assistance).

    Tax reforms could improve the fairness and efficiency of the system while raising resources for both debt reduction and somewhat higher spending. However, revenue-increasing bills presented over the last five years that would also have increased progressivity and bolstered dynamism have not been viewed favorably by legislators. These have included proposals to reduce VAT and income tax exemptions (such as on the salario escolar and for lottery winnings) and to bring income from self-employment, salaries, and pensions under a single threshold while raising the top marginal rate. These bills warrant renewed consideration as higher revenues would allow faster increases in social and capital spending. At the same time, we are worried that various Legislative Assembly bills are reducing revenues.

    Full implementation of the public employment bill and debt management reforms would improve spending quality and reduce interest costs. Legislative proposals aimed at amending the public employment law could significantly undermine progress in containing the public-sector wage bill. Institutions that have not yet fully implemented the public employment law should do so without further delay to ensure its benefits are broadened to beyond the central government. Legal reforms to permit access to international sovereign debt markets and grant the executive branch more flexibility in issuing external debt would also be valuable. There have been welcome improvements in the quality of government finance statistics, which are expected to be used in the setting of fiscal policies.

    A comprehensive solution is needed to resolve the dispute between Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social (CCSS) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) over social security claims. The outstanding claim is due to an unfunded expansion of beneficiaries and CCSS’s unilateral decisions to raise the government’s contribution. Addressing this issue requires urgent improvements in the CCSS’s registry systems so as to allow for an accurate tracking of outlays and beneficiaries. Moreover, the CCSS and the MoF should clarify the scope of healthcare services and pension benefits that are currently covered by the budget while identifying additional funding sources as needed to ensure that the healthcare and pension systems are actuarially sound. Strengthening CCSS governance will be essential to ensure that any future changes to the social security system include a thorough assessment of the fiscal and labor market implications of such changes. There is also scope to enhance the accountability of the CCSS, the transparency of their operations, and the simplicity of the system, in line with international best practice. These reforms will be critical to safeguard the long-run sustainability of the social security system as the population ages.

    Advancing supply-side reforms can help sustain Costa Rica’s impressive economic performance by addressing key bottlenecks to growth. To tackle skill shortages, particularly in high-tech industries, it is essential to accelerate efforts to reduce skills mismatches, align school curricula with industry needs, promote dual education (including apprenticeship programs) and bilingual education, and improve adult secondary education graduation rates. The recent reduction of the minimum contribution base for part-time workers has helped encourage formal employment but there is scope to lower the high tax wedge on labor, substituting for alternative revenue sources. Enhancing infrastructure quality and maintenance would further strengthen potential growth. In this regard, integrating climate considerations into public investment decisions is already making infrastructure more resilient against natural disasters. Given the substantial additional funding needed to upgrade infrastructure, approving and implementing the new legislation on public private partnerships is critical. Additionally, ongoing reforms to facilitate private-sector electricity provision, including diversification into non-hydroelectric renewables, will make electricity more affordable and less vulnerable to fluctuations in rainfall.

    The IMF team is grateful to the Costa Rican authorities and other counterparts for the productive discussions and hospitality during the mission.

    Costa Rica: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Projections

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    Output and Prices

    (Annual percentage change)

    Real GDP

    4.6

    5.1

    4.3

    3.9

    3.8

    3.6

    GDP deflator

    6.3

    -0.1

    0.0

    2.9

    3.2

    3.2

    Consumer prices (period average)

    8.3

    0.5

    -0.4

    2.0

    3.0

    3.0

    Savings and Investment

    (In percent of GDP)

    Gross domestic saving

    14.4

    13.8

    14.3

    14.1

    14.1

    14.3

    Gross domestic investment

    17.7

    15.3

    15.7

    15.7

    15.7

    15.8

    External Sector

    Current account balance

    -3.3

    -1.4

    -1.4

    -1.6

    -1.6

    -1.5

    Trade balance

    -6.7

    -3.7

    -2.7

    -3.0

    -2.8

    -3.1

    Financial account balance

    -2.5

    -0.7

    -0.7

    -1.6

    -1.5

    -1.5

    Foreign direct investment, net

    -4.4

    -4.3

    -4.0

    -5.3

    -5.5

    -5.4

    Gross international reserves (millions of U.S. dollars)

    8,724

    13,261

    14,181

    15,056

    16,077

    16,827

    External debt

    50.7

    43.3

    38.6

    35.5

    33.3

    30.9

    Public Finances

    Central government primary balance

    2.1

    1.6

    1.1

    1.5

    1.6

    1.7

    Central government overall balance

    -2.8

    -3.2

    -3.8

    -3.0

    -2.7

    -2.3

    Central government debt

    63.0

    61.1

    59.8

    59.4

    58.4

    57.1

    Money and Credit

    Credit to the private sector (percent change)

    3.3

    1.9

    6.4

    7.5

    7.0

    7.0

    Monetary base 1/

    8.0

    7.9

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

    Broad money

    47.5

    47.4

    49.4

    50.1

    50.3

    50.9

    Memorandum Items

    Nominal GDP (billions of colones) 2/

    44,810

    47,059

    49,116

    52,531

    56,237

    60,132

    Output gap (as percent of potential GDP)

    -0.3

    1.0

    0.6

    0.5

    0.4

    0.2

    GDP per capita (US$)

    13,240

    16,390

    17,901

    19,013

    20,009

    21,045

    Unemployment rate

    11.7

    7.3

    6.9

    8.0

    8.5

    9.0

    Sources: Central Bank of Costa Rica, and Fund staff estimates.

    1/ Includes currency issued and required reserves.

    2/ National account data reflect the revision of the benchmark year to 2017 for the chained volume measures, published in January 2021.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Meera Louis

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/28/mcs-022825-costa-rica-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-consultation-mission

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Mississauga — CBSA and RCMP joint investigation leads to criminal charges and the seizure of synthetic opioids more potent than fentanyl

    Source: Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) are committed to intercepting and investigating smuggling attempts at our border and disrupting organized crime.

    The CBSA and RCMP announced today that an arrest has been made in Mississauga, Ontario for possession and trafficking of narcotics, including Nitazenes. Nitazenes are a class of synthetic opioid which can be up to 20 times more potent than Fentanyl. They are used to “cut” street drugs in Canada, and their high potency can increase the risk of overdose, particularly when mixed with other substances.

    CBSA border services officers at the international mail and cargo processing facilities in Mississauga, ON, and Vancouver, BC, seized multiple shipments of synthetic opioids arriving from China and destined to an address in Mississauga. Officers also intercepted additional shipments intended for international export. Using various investigative techniques, the CBSA’s Greater Toronto Area Region’s Intelligence section provided the RCMP with the evidence required to obtain a search and arrest warrant.

    On January 3, 2025, the RCMP’s Transnational Serious & Organized Crime seized over 5 kg of narcotics, drug paraphernalia, more than $120,000 CAD in cash and other proceeds of crime—including luxury watches and precious metals—from the accused’s residence in Mississauga.

    As a result, the RCMP arrested Matthew Phan (36 years-old) of Mississauga, and charged him with:

    • Trafficking a Schedule I controlled substance to wit: Etonitazene, its salts, derivatives, isomers and analogues and salts of derivatives, isomers and analogues contrary to Section5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Trafficking a Schedule 4 controlled substance to wit: Fencamfamine, its salts, derivatives, isomers and analogues and salts of derivatives, isomers and analogues contrary to Section5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Possession of a Schedule I controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking to wit: Etonitazene, its salts, derivatives, isomers and analogues and salts of derivatives, isomers and analogues contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Possession of a Schedule I controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking to wit: MDMA, contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Possession of a Schedule I controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking to wit: methamphetamine, contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Possession of a Schedule 4 controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking to wit: Fencamfamine, its salts, derivatives, isomers and analogues and salts of derivatives, isomers and analogues contrary to Section 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Unlawful attempt to export a Schedule 1 controlled substance to wit: Etonitazene, its salts, derivatives, isomers and analogues and salts of derivatives, isomers and analogues contrary to Section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Unlawful attempt to export a Schedule 4 controlled substance to wit: Fencamfamine, its salts, derivatives, isomers and analogues and salts of derivatives, isomers and analogues contrary to Section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.
    • Unlawful possession property obtained by crime, contrary to Section 354(1) of the Criminal Code.

    Phan has not received bail and remains in custody.

    Quotes

    “This opioid seizure is yet another example of the effective partnership between the CBSA and the RCMP in stopping cross-border drug trafficking. Nitazenes pose a significant threat to public health, and these joint investigations and resulting enforcement actions keep our communities safe, both in Canada and abroad.”
    – The Honourable David J. McGuinty, Minister of Public Safety

    “Nitazenes are a lethal substance that pose a significant risk to the safety of Canadians, and the CBSA is committed to securing Canada’s border from drug threats like this one. In collaboration with the RCMP, our officers and investigators work diligently to keep these synthetic opioids off our streets. The CBSA executed over 3,000 narcotic seizures in the Greater Toronto Area in 2024, keeping over 10,000 kg of drugs out of our communities.” – Lisa Janes, Regional Director General, Greater Toronto Area Region, Canada Border Services Agency

    “This collaboration between RCMP Federal Police and the CBSA has resulted in a rapid response to protect the safety of our communities. We are very concerned that synthetic opioids are making their way onto our streets. This extremely toxic substance severely amplifies the risk of accidental overdose for all drug users. The RCMP is committed to battling transnational organized crime at all levels in Ontario, Canada and abroad.”
    – Inspector Nicole Noonan, Officer in charge of Federal Policing – Integrated Response & Organized Crime, Royal Canadian Mounted Police

    Quick facts

    • Canada is investing $1.3 billion to bolster security at the border and strengthen the immigration system, all while keeping Canadians safe. Information available on the Border Plan is available here: The Government of Canada’s Border Plan: significant investments to strengthen border security and our immigration system – Canada.ca
    • As part of Canada’s Border Plan, the CBSA has launched Operation Blizzard, a targeted, cross-country initiative aimed at intercepting illegal contraband arriving and leaving Canada, with a focus on fentanyl and other synthetic narcotics.
    • From December 9, 2024 to January 18, 2025, the Canadian Integrated Response to Organized Crime (CIROC) Committee composed of Federal, Provincial and Municipal law enforcement agencies, conducted a national sprint aimed at disrupting illegal fentanyl production and distribution in Canada.
    • The RCMP and the CBSA work closely in an investigative capacity, along with other domestic and international law enforcement partners, to combat the impact that cross border criminal activity is having on our communities.
    • The CBSA screens goods, including international mail and courier items, coming into Canada and examines more closely those that may pose a threat to the safety of Canadians.
    • The RCMP works with the CBSA to protect Canada from inbound and outbound criminal threats through criminal investigations and prosecutions related to narcotic smuggling.
    • Organized crime affects the daily lives of Canadians in many ways that you may not be aware of. It can affect the taxes you pay (tax revenue losses from contraband tobacco and alcohol); your car insurance premiums (higher auto insurance due to car thefts by organized crime rings); your banking fees (banks recovering fraud costs); even your safety and health (drug-related violence, faulty counterfeit goods and currency). In terms of economic-related crimes (e.g. credit and debit card fraud), it is estimated that organized crime costs Canadians $5 billion every year.
    • For the latest CBSA enforcement statistics, visit Canada Border Services Agency seizures.
    • If you have any information related to smuggling, drug importation, trafficking, or possession, or wish to report other criminality, you can contact:
      • The RCMP Toronto West Detachment at 1-905-876-9500
      • Ontario RCMP at 1-800-387-0020
      • Anonymously through Crime Stoppers at 1-800-222-8477 (TIPS), at any time.
    • To report suspicious cross border activities, you can contact the CBSA by using the confidential Border Watch Line online or toll free at 1888 502 9060

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: “Science is very fluid, very fast. You have to keep up with it.”

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: State University Higher School of Economics – State University Higher School of Economics –

    Vladimir Dimidov studies positive psychology and explores the problem of time perspective. In an interview with the Young Scientists of the Higher School of Economics project, he explained why we should think about the future, how to prevent burnout, and which places on Lake Baikal are worth visiting.

    How I got into science

    At the age of four, I wanted to become an inventor. That’s probably where it all started. I tried myself in different fields – electronics, robotics. Then I realized that something humanitarian was closer to me. I tried to become a writer. Then I entered psychology and already in my second year I met Oksana Vladimirovna Zashchirinskaya, a doctor of psychological sciences and professor at St. Petersburg State University. She was the first person who had no doubts about my successful scientific future. And in my fourth year, having worked indirectly on scientific projects, I began to look for a specific place, a research institute, where I would like to work.

    Where did I end up?

    I work at the International Laboratory of Positive Psychology of Personality and Motivation. Positive psychology is a global trend in personality psychology that deals with the problems of happiness and meaning. My scientific supervisor Dmitry Alekseevich Leontiev is a leading scientist, as well as the grandson of the famous Soviet psychologist Alexei Nikolaevich Leontiev and one of his direct followers.

    There is no other place like this in Russia. On the one hand, it is a hereditary, generational, real scientific school. On the other hand, Dmitry Alekseevich is one of the world-class scientists, and he transmits his knowledge to us. This is probably the most valuable experience that can be gained here.

    What I am researching

    Time perspective. Understanding what time perspective is is a separate theoretical task. On the one hand, it can be understood that a person is not only focused on the present, but also looks to the past and the future. In other approaches, time perspective is precisely the perspective of the future, a cognitive-motivational formation consisting of a person’s goals, aspirations, hopes, and fears.

    I suppose that time perspective plays a certain role in the regulation of behavior. Let’s take spirituality, for example. How does it enter our lives? I think through time perspective. Experiments will show whether this is true. But there is an assumption that higher behavior regulators (for some it is God, for others it is morality) appear in our lives precisely because we have a future, we think about the consequences of our actions.

    Time Perspective Effects

    People who have a time perspective are less susceptible to momentary emotions; their happiness depends less on the peak of experiences here and now, and more on meanings.

    In other words, if a person has a goal in the distant future, he may be more resistant to frustration.

    Such a goal could be, for example, defending a dissertation. What distinguishes science from other areas is the need to plan, including your defense. And people who plan better, build a path to their goal, have a more detailed time perspective.

    The lack of a time perspective can have very serious consequences. Suicide is committed by people who have lost their sense of purpose, and the first sign may be that a person has no purpose in life. Alcoholism is also one of the signs of a lack of meaning. A person’s sense system is simplified. Because of this, he becomes more dependent on momentary desires. His illness or tendency to drink alcohol intensifies. Because this intensifies, his sense system is simplified. All this takes on a pathological character.

    How my research is structured

    One of the specific hypotheses I want to test is that time perspective is a specific phenomenon that separates meaning from happiness. In statistical terms, we can say that there is a moderation effect: the correlation either increases or decreases when we introduce time perspective. In the example of happiness and meaning, their relationship should be lower. Let’s say they correlate at 0.7, but when we introduce time perspective into the model, they start to correlate at 0.4. This means that the relationship is destroyed, reduced.

    The main study looks standard: I recruit a certain sample (about two hundred people) so that the study has sufficient power. This sample must be homogeneous. Then I conduct a set of tests. Most of them I still have to develop or test in Russian.

    And then a certain structural model is built, in which there is happiness and positive emotions, there is meaning and time perspective. Within the framework of the dissertation, there will be a number of other important variables. By analyzing the indicators, we can assume whether time perspective plays a role or not.

    What I am proud of

    By not spreading myself too thin. I can do a lot in science or in the academic environment right now, but I try to concentrate on my dissertation, on distant goals.

    There is one achievement. I opened a student research project group at the Faculty of Social Sciences. We worked for a year and conducted a number of interesting studies. This was my first experience of management. I won’t say that I am proud of it, but overall I consider this enterprise successful.

    We developed the issue of goal setting. We asked people how they think about goals, set goals, why, where it all starts, what difficulties there are in this process. The results are reflected in the article “Subjective experience of goal setting”, which will soon be published in the journal “World of Psychology” by my colleagues who worked with me. This process is described there in sufficient detail. We also created a test on involvement in the goal and conducted a number of tests.

    What We Learned About Goal Setting

    We conducted two studies. They were on maximally similar samples. But at the same time, we gave some people the freedom to write down their goals, and others were asked to choose from aspirations that had been empirically identified over decades of research. And we looked at what role meaning plays.

    It turned out that people who wrote down their goals themselves had one structure of involvement in these goals, but when we gave them the aspirations ourselves, the picture was different.

    In theory, these aspirations are divided into internal and external. Internal ones are, for example, the desire for self-development, external ones are the desire to look attractive. We thought that the structures for internal and external goals would differ. It turned out that the structure in each specific case will be its own.

    Some goals bring inspiration, a person gets energy from this inspiration and gets involved. Some goals do not bring inspiration at all, but motivate a person to work on themselves. And this structure in this case depends on the meaning of the goal. My dissertation will have a higher level of generalization: it is not about specific goals, but in principle about the time perspective.

    For example, does a person consider his future limited, if he feels that he may not have as long to live as he would like, most of his life has been lived. Or, on the contrary, the future is open, a person does not know how much longer he will live, and wants to set goals for a long, long time.

    My dream as a scientist

    I have a distant goal – to found an institute. An institute in the broadest sense – it can be an educational institution or a laboratory.

    I could say that it is a dream. But it is not a dream, it is a goal. And there are also things that can be called fantasies. For example, if we talk about the state of psychology and science in Russia, I have a fantasy that scientists will become a little more immersed in science. So far, this has not happened.

    Science is very fluid, very fast. You have to keep up with it.

    You need to be aware of the current state of science, read articles that are published in your field here and now. For example, in 2024, article in the journal “Neuro”. Neurophysiologists, based on experiments with rats, put forward the initial provisions that the functioning of consciousness can be explained by quantum dualism.

    Ideally, people who study the psychology of consciousness can mobilize and begin research based on this article. But only a few will do it. These same few will be cited. These same few will set trends for other scientists. And other scientists will come to this in years, when quantum dualism may no longer be so relevant.

    Before I came to my topic, I wrote probably a dozen research projects, and each topic was closer and closer to what we have now.

    And I see a certain gap between what we do and what our closest colleagues do – psychologists from all over Russia. They use a methodology that is significantly behind. They write research for the drawer. As a scientist, I dream that in Russia the gap between provincial and metropolitan science would be smaller (although, as my scientific supervisor says, there is most provincial science in Moscow – unfortunately, this is true). I want general competence to grow.

    What areas of science could I study?

    The parts of science are closely integrated into each other. From the topic of time perspective, I can move, for example, to the topic of the temporal aspect of consciousness, to talk about how consciousness here and now, consciousness that unfolds further, provides us with a state in the flow of time, the flow of life. This is close to my topic, but already a different area. And I see this as a topic for tomorrow. Maybe tomorrow I will get a grant on this topic, or maybe no one will need it, and I will turn in another direction.

    First of all, science is a worldview. I began to notice that as I delved into the scientific field, my thinking changed greatly. And this can even lead to conflicts with colleagues who are poorly integrated into science. For example, the question of truth.

    The scientist does not know the truth. He strives for it, but he will never know it. He gradually gains power over certain pieces of reality. And such a shaky one that perhaps a new study will refute it, and he will have to adapt to it. He has to think in changeable categories, to build his worldview on the fact that, in essence, nothing is true. And if it is true, then there must be numbers, there must be statistics – in statistical sciences, and in empirical science there must be an empirical base that confirms this. And even a series of confirmations does not give the scientist the right to think that this is so.

    More reliable data is a refutation of something. If it were shown on mice, humans and dolphins that there is no quantum dualism, we could say with more certainty that consciousness is still something different, but not like that. And we could study it further.

    If I hadn’t become a scientist

    I could become a writer, a cyberneticist, a philosopher, a data scientist. All of this is useful to me even in my work. I can easily immerse myself in philosophical and psychological research. Data Science is how we conduct research. Of course, prose would probably be more difficult for me to write than scientific articles, but I would manage. Perhaps poetry is not my thing, but who knows…

    How I use artificial intelligence

    For data analysis, we can only use artificial intelligence to a limited extent now, because the scientific community is not yet accustomed to it. For example, I can process data using machine learning, but it should be an analogue of an existing statistical method that we can do manually. So that if we publish an article, reviewers understand it.

    Personally, I discuss models with artificial intelligence. For example, we have a task to develop a test of time perspective. I have a certain set of variable characteristics: some were identified in a literature review, others in another study of mine. You can generalize this yourself in one way – theoretically. You can generalize it empirically, conduct a study if there are suitable methods. Or you can discuss it with artificial intelligence, giving it certain instructions.

    For example, in terms of time perspective, I have 15 different characteristics. I can’t measure them all in a dissertation, it would be too much. They are from different theories, some of them intersect, some don’t. Discussing this with artificial intelligence, I can identify a more coherent structure, say, of four components.

    Artificial intelligence is very good at identifying what are called in statistics orthogonal and oblique structures, that is, things that are definitely not correlated, and things that are weakly or strongly correlated.

    Who would I like to meet?

    With positive psychologist Robert Emmons. He is an American fundamental psychologist who studied the problems of personal aspirations, wrote about spirituality and religiosity. At the turn of the 2000s, he studied human goals. This is close to what I do. And recently – for more than ten years – he has been studying the problem of gratitude (whether it is an emotion or religious gratitude to God). I would ask him – why. I consider him a genius, but why he chose this direction, I still do not understand.

    Emmons’s graduate student was Ken Sheldon, who at one time worked as the scientific director of our laboratory. He is still an invisibly present at HSE, as his goal self-concordance model sometimes pops up – a model of the correspondence of goals with the interests, values and needs of the individual.

    How my typical day is structured

    Every day is like a new one, everything is different. The only thing is that every evening I walk the dog, and I periodically start the morning with pancakes that my girlfriend makes. I really love them.

    Do I get burnout?

    As I have noticed, scientists work in cycles. I am also starting to experience this, but I do not have burnout as such. There is simply a deterioration in my general condition, but I know very well how to deal with it. You need to do what you love. If I am currently doing work that is not interesting to me, I can put it aside and spend half an hour doing something that I enjoy.

    Science has helped me even in difficult moments in my life. I could miss the whole day due to various events. Feel tired all evening. Not sleep until 4am. But at 4am I would sit down to do science, and my life would become better.

    What are my hobbies besides science?

    I do sports. In the warm season, I like to go to the horizontal bars. Often with friends. I love my friends very much. Most of them are also connected with science. My best friend, with whom I have been friends since school, is involved in cybersecurity. He is also a graduate student. So in any free moment I try to meet with one of them. Or at least call, if a friend is from another city.

    What does sport give?

    Sport is a great tonic, changes the physiological state of the body. Beneficial hormones and hormones of happiness are produced. Sport stabilizes the nervous system, strengthens certain neural connections in the brain due to muscle innervation. And it improves your mood!

    What I read recently

    Nassim Taleb’s book “The Statistical Consequences of Fat Tails”. It is very critical of statistics in the social sciences. And, frankly, it is impossible not to agree with it.

    When collecting data, we work with a certain set of data as normally distributed indicators. We proceed from the assumption that everything we have received is subject to certain statistical laws.

    When we get a normal distribution, we know what to do with it. But if the distribution deviates from the normal, we don’t know how to work with that yet.

    “Fat tails” are just one of the signs that something deviates from the normal.

    Taleb wrote a book based on several dissertations and a number of articles by statisticians. It says that the distribution will most often be different. Most often it will obey other laws, not those we rely on. But we will work, closing our eyes to this. That’s how I was taught, that’s how everyone is taught now.

    If we admit that the book is telling the truth, we will have to admit that we can’t do anything. Statisticians should teach us (scientists who use applied statistics) to work with other data distributions. And they themselves can’t work with all types of distributions.

    Advice to young scientists

    Among young scientists, especially among my peers, the issue of earning money is acute. If you want to earn money, go into business or management. If you are a person of the heart, then go where your heart leads you. But remember that only the best of the best will earn money doing what you really like.

    Favorite place in Moscow

    I really like the Gorka Park with its sports ground under Maroseyka, not far from the Vyshka. And I like the park on Vorobyovy Gory, there is the Luzhniki sports complex nearby, you can work out on the horizontal bars and then walk along the embankment with friends.

    Favorite place in Irkutsk

    In Irkutsk, where I was born and raised, there are also two wonderful embankments. Not far from Irkutsk is Baikal, if you go to a non-tourist place, everything there is wonderful.

    I like the town of Slyudyanka in the south of Baikal. It is equidistant from the Buryat centers of attraction and Irkutsk. I have relatives there. And Baikal there is exactly the kind that is remembered: nature, beaches, mountains.

    I also love the village of Staraya Angasolka, located on the Circum-Baikal Railway. In 1926, Nikolai Roerich passed through this station, and now there is a museum to him there.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Government launches working group on Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia definition

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Government launches working group on Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia definition

    A new working group has been established to provide government with a working definition of Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia.

    • It is the first duty of government to keep its citizens safe

    • New group set to deliver a definition of Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia within six months as incidents of anti-Muslim hatred reach the highest number on record in 2024 

    • The definition will provide guidance to government and other bodies to support further action on tackling religiously motivated hate, delivering on the Plan for Change safer streets mission

    A new working group has been established to provide government with a definition of Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia, supporting a wider stream of work to tackle the unacceptable incidents of anti-Muslim hatred. 

    It will advise government on how to best understand, quantify and define prejudice, discrimination, and hate crime targeted against Muslims. 

    With incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime at record high in England and Wales, the group’s work will support wider and ongoing government-led efforts to tackle religiously motivated hate crime – delivering on the government’s Plan for Change mission for safer streets. 

    Deputy Prime Minister, Angela Rayner, said:   

    The rise in anti-Muslim hate crime is unacceptable and has no place in our society. 

    That’s why we’ve committed to defining Anti-Muslim Hatred/Islamophobia, as a crucial steps forward in tackling it and creating a society where everyone feels safe and welcome. 

    The group will be chaired by Dominic Grieve KC, bringing his years of legal and government expertise to the role. 

    Dominic Grieve KC said:  

    We know Islamophobia is as challenging to define as its existence is undoubted. We need to balance addressing the lived experience of those who are victims of it and the right of British Muslims to feel heard and protected as equal citizens of our country, with the unwavering requirement to maintain freedom of thought and expression under law for all. 

    I welcome the government’s decision to bring forward this needed work and I am hopeful that this commission will come up with principles in defining Islamophobia which are compatible with those requirements and can thus help support positive change in our country. 

    Alongside drawing on their own expertise, members will engage widely to ensure the definition accounts for the variety of backgrounds and experiences of Muslim communities across the United Kingdom. 

    The group’s proposed definition will be non-statutory and will provide the government and other relevant bodies with an understanding of unacceptable treatment and prejudice against Muslim communities. 

    The group’s proposed definition must be compatible with the unchanging right of British citizens to exercise freedom of speech and expression – which includes the right to criticise, express dislike of, or insult religions and/or the beliefs and practices of adherents.   

    Notes to editors: 

    Updates to this page

    Published 28 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Global: What are conflicts of interest and what can be done about them?

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Archon Fung, Professor of Citizenship and Self-Government, Harvard Kennedy School

    The phrase is often lobbed around, but what does it really mean? Frank Brennan/iStock via Getty Images Plus

    Americans’ trust in government and politicians is at record lows. In a 2022 Pew Research survey, about two-thirds of respondents said that all or most people who run for office want to serve their own personal interests rather than the community’s.

    I have taught political ethics to hundreds of public policy students at the Harvard Kennedy School over the past 25 years. One of the most important concepts we discuss is directly tied to that falling faith in government. It’s a term people love to throw around but can’t always define: conflicts of interest.

    Conflicts of interest pervade public service and jeopardize the quality of government action by degrading officials’ judgments. Controlling such conflicts is essential to the success of democracy because all citizens rely on millions of officials – from the president down to the person analyzing water quality in your city – to do their jobs conscientiously, using their best judgment. Citizens’ safety depends on government action in countless ways: to keep drinking water, food and medicines safe; to protect everyone from dangerous products and from individual and corporate predators; to keep airplanes, cars and trains from colliding; to ensure access to education, health care and pensions.

    But what counts as a conflict of interest? In the public sector, they arise when an official has “secondary,” private interests that may affect their judgment about how best to promote the public good. The more intense these private interests are – such as the promise of great financial gain or the welfare of loved ones – the greater the conflict and risk to public good.

    Not just money

    Secondary interests often stem from financial concerns: future employment prospects, corporate positions, stock holdings, real estate and gifts. But secondary interests can also arise from concern for the well-being of family members and friends.

    A conflict between primary and secondary interests – public vs. private – threatens the public by clouding the good judgment of officials. They may be tempted, even unconsciously, to make decisions that achieve secondary interests at the cost of not doing their best to advance the public interest.

    During his last weeks in office, for example, former President Joe Biden pardoned his son Hunter and, preventively, many members of his family. The Constitution establishes the president’s pardon power as a mechanism to correct miscarriages of justice in the court system. Did Biden’s concern for the welfare of his family – a secondary, private interest – cloud his judgment about how best to use this extraordinary power to pardon for the sake of justice, a primary, public interest? It is impossible to peer inside his mind, but anyone can see that there was a strong conflict of interest.

    Many public officials mistakenly deny that there is a conflict at all. Charlie Wilson, a secretary of defense in the 1950s, was previously president and CEO of General Motors, a defense contractor. “For years I thought what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa,” he said during confirmation hearings. “The difference did not exist. Our company is too big. It goes with the welfare of the country.”

    Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson holds a news conference in 1954.
    Bettmann via Getty Images

    After Trump was elected in 2016, he famously said that “the president can’t have a conflict of interest.” It wasn’t true then, and it’s not true now. Conflict of interest is an ethical principle that applies to everyone acting in a public role. The principal law regulating conflict of interest in the federal government does exempt the president and vice president. However, the emoluments clause of the Constitution prohibits some conflicts of interest.

    The president enters his second term with large private assets in social media platform Truth Social and cryptocurrency $Trump – industries that the United States is figuring out how to regulate.

    When leaders have a conflict of interest, it doesn’t necessarily mean they make bad judgments or act corruptly. Nevertheless, such conflicts can reduce citizens’ confidence about their leaders’ judgment.

    Cost for the country

    Conflicts of interest create three problems for democracy.

    Most important, the public suffers when officials’ judgments are compromised: when they are no longer doing their level best for Americans because they are concerned about various private interests rather than with citizens’ rights and well-being.

    Second, conflicts of interest reduce trust and confidence in government and democracy. Even if officials who have large conflicts of interest resist the pull of secondary interests, members of the public may – especially in this time of cynicism about government – still suspect that their leaders are acting corruptly.

    Third, when officials use their powers to benefit their private interests rather than the public interests, they profit from their offices: This is corrupt and unfair.

    Reducing risk

    Though conflicts of interest are ubiquitous, there are good strategies to mitigate and manage them.

    Federal agencies, as well as many state and local governments, require officials to mitigate their conflicts of interest by divesting from secondary interests, such as shifting from specific stock holdings to general funds and resigning from positions on boards of directors. Most U.S. presidents since Jimmy Carter have put their substantial assets into blind trusts in order to manage their conflicts of interests. In a blind trust, the owner knows the value of the trust but not the particular stocks and other holdings in it.

    Jimmy Carter put his peanut farm into a blind trust before taking office.
    PhotoQuest/Archive Photos via Getty Images

    Transparency and disclosure is another common management tool. When information about officials’ secondary interests is publicly available, citizens can better understand the forces that affect the judgment of those in government. For example, people who have undergone Senate confirmation for high-level positions in the federal government must file extensive disclosures that detail their assets and many of their prior sources of income.

    Biden disclosed 22 years of income tax returns. Other presidents have sometimes released several years of tax returns or parts of their tax records – in particular, how much tax they paid.

    Finally, it is important to create offices and procedures with staff dedicated to monitoring and mitigating conflicts of interest. In the executive branch, the seventy-some staff at the Office of Government Ethics, and many more ethics officers across the federal government, regulate conflicts of interest and other ethical issues. In February 2025, Trump dismissed the office’s director, who had been confirmed by the Senate two months before.

    Many states and cities have ethics commissions that adjudicate conflicts of interest, deciding when officials should recuse themselves from particular decisions in which they are conflicted. In 2002, for example, New York City’s Conflicts of Interest Board issued an advisory opinion about how multibillionaire Michael Bloomberg, the mayor at the time, should manage his conflicts of interest. They advised that he should recuse himself from all matters relating to the Bloomberg company, divest from large stock holdings and transfer those assets into professionally managed mutual funds, among other recommendations.

    Wealth – and hyperwealth

    Many conflict of interest measures are formulated with moderately wealthy individuals in mind. For example, the median wealth of a U.S. senator in 2018 was US$1.75 million. At that level, measures such as blind trusts, divestment and recusal are usually very workable.

    Hyperwealthy multibillionaires, however, raise unprecedented conflict of interest concerns that are far more difficult to mitigate and manage. Because their financial interests are enormous and range across many parts of the economy, standard conflict of interest measures have proven difficult to implement.

    Archon Fung serves on the National Governing Board of Common Cause, whose mission is to “to create open, honest, and accountable government that serves the public interest.” The organization has advocated to control conflicts of interest of many public figures, including Donald Trump and Elon Musk.

    He also consults for Apple and serves on the Board of Advisors for the Boston Review.

    ref. What are conflicts of interest and what can be done about them? – https://theconversation.com/what-are-conflicts-of-interest-and-what-can-be-done-about-them-249983

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Texas records first US measles death in 10 years – a medical epidemiologist explains how to protect yourself and your community from this deadly, preventable disease

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Daniel Pastula, Professor of Neurology, Medicine (Infectious Diseases), and Epidemiology, University of Colorado Anschutz Medical Campus

    Young children are especially vulnerable to measles. Bilanol via Getty Images

    On Feb. 26, 2025, Texas health officials announced the death of a child in a measles outbreak – the first measles death in the United States since 2015. The outbreak was first identified in early February in Gaines County, Texas, where just 82% of kindergartners are vaccinated against measles, compared with 93% on average across the country. As of Feb. 27, there were at least 124 confirmed cases in Texas and nearby towns in New Mexico.

    In an interview with The Conversation U.S. associate health editor Alla Katsnelson, neurologist and medical epidemiologist Daniel Pastula explains why measles is so dangerous and how people and communities can protect themselves from the virus.

    What is measles, and where does it come from?

    Measles is an ancient disease caused by a virus that probably evolved in cattle and jumped into humans around 500 B.C. One of the first written accounts of it comes from a Persian physician named Rhazes in the ninth century C.E., and measles epidemics were described in medieval Europe and western Asia regularly beginning around 1100-1200. The virus got brought over to the Americas in the 1500s, and it wiped out large populations of native people as Europeans colonized the continent.

    By the 1950s in the United States, there were 500,000 reported cases of measles each year – though the true number was probably closer to 4 million . It was so contagious, every kid was thought to have gotten measles by age 15. At that time, measles caused close to 50,000 hospitalizations annually and about 500 deaths, usually in children. It also caused over 1,000 cases of severe brain inflammation every year.

    The first measles vaccine became available in 1963, and scientists improved it over the following decades, causing the number of cases to plummet. In 2000, measles was declared eliminated from the U.S.

    Since then, there have been occasional minor flare-ups, usually brought in by international travelers, but by and large, measles outbreaks have been rare. No one had died of it in the United States in nearly a decade.

    Today, measles infections in the U.S. are almost completely preventable with vaccination.

    For most people, two doses of the MMR vaccine protects against measles for life.
    Sergii Iaremenko/Science Photo Library via Getty Images

    What are the typical symptoms of measles?

    About 10 to 14 days after infection, people suffering from measles experience a very high fever, cold-like symptoms including a runny nose and sneezing, and eye inflammation called conjunctivitis.

    Next, they may develop white spots called Koplik spots inside their mouth and a diffuse, spotty, red rash that starts at the head and neck, then descends across the entire body. This rash is where the disease gets its name – the word “measles” is thought to come from a medieval Dutch word for “little blemishes.”

    Symptoms of measles infection take about three weeks to resolve. People are contagious from about four days before symptoms emerge to four days after the rash starts.

    What are the possible severe outcomes of measles?

    Epidemiologists estimate that 1 in 5 people who are infected with measles get sick enough to be hospitalized. About 1 in 10 develop ear infections, some of which may result in permanent deafness.

    About 1 in 20 people develop severe measles pneumonia, which causes trouble breathing. Reports from west Texas this month suggest that many infected children there have measles pneumonia.

    About 1 in 1,000 people develop severe brain swelling. Both measles pneumonia and brain swelling can be fatal. About 3 in 1,000 people die after contracting measles.

    In about 1 in 10,000 who get sick with measles and recover from it, the virus lies dormant in the brain for about a decade. It then can reactivate, causing a severe, progressive dementia called subacute sclerosing panencephalitis, which is fatal within one to three years. There is no treatment or cure for the disease. I have seen a couple of suspected cases of subacute sclerosing panencephalitis, and none of these patients survived, despite our best efforts.

    Given how contagious measles is and how severe the outcomes can be, physicians and public health experts are gravely concerned right now.

    How does measles spread?

    Measles is one of the most contagious infectious diseases on the planet. The virus is so infectious that if you are in a room with an infected person and you are not vaccinated and have never had measles before, you have a 90% chance of becoming infected.

    The measles virus is transmitted by droplets released into the air by infected people when they cough, sneeze or simply breathe. Virus particles can survive suspended in the air or on indoor surfaces for up to two hours, so people can get infected by touching a surface carrying virus particles and then touching their face.

    Who should get the measles vaccine, and how effective is it?

    The vaccine for measles has historically been called the MMR vaccine because it has been bundled with vaccines for two other diseases – mumps and rubella. Most children in the U.S. receive it as a two-dose regimen, which is 97% effective against measles.

    Children generally get the first dose of the vaccine at 12-15 months old and the second dose when they are 4-6 years old. Infants who haven’t reached their first birthday generally do not receive it since their immune system is not yet fully developed and they do not develop quite as robust of an immune response. In an emergency, though, babies as young as 6 to 9 months old can be vaccinated. If an infant’s mother previously received the MMR vaccine or had been infected herself as a child, her transferred antibodies probably offer some protection, but this wanes in the months after birth.

    People born before 1957 are considered immune without getting the vaccine because measles was so widespread at that time that everyone was presumed to have been infected. However, certain people in this age group, such as some health care workers, may wish to discuss vaccination with their providers. And some people who had the original version of the vaccine in the 1960s may need to get revaccinated, as the original vaccine was not as effective as the later versions.

    In recent years, vaccination rates for measles and other diseases have fallen.

    Based on available evidence, the vaccine is effective for life, so people who received two doses are most likely protected.

    A single dose of the vaccine is 93% effective. Most people vaccinated before 1989 got just one dose. That year, an outbreak in vaccinated children with one dose spurred public health officials to begin recommending two doses.

    People with certain risk factors who received only one dose, and everyone who has never received a dose, should talk to their health care providers about getting vaccinated. Because the vaccine is a live but weakened version of the virus, those who are severely immunocompromised or are currently pregnant cannot get it.

    People who are immunocompromised, which includes those who have chronic conditions such as autoimmune disorders, are undergoing certain cancer treatments or have received an organ transplant, are more susceptible to measles even if they have been vaccinated.

    In the current measles epidemic in Texas, the vast majority of people falling ill are unvaccinated. Public health officials there are urging unvaccinated people in affected areas to get vaccinated.

    What measures can protect communities from measles outbreaks?

    Vaccination is the best way to protect individuals and communities from measles. It’s also the most effective way to curb an ongoing outbreak.

    High rates of vaccination are important because of a phenomenon called herd immunity. When people who are vaccinated do not get infected, it essentially stops the spread of the virus, thereby protecting those who are most susceptible to getting sick. When herd immunity wanes, the risk of infection rises for everyone – and especially for the most vulnerable, such as young children and people who are immunocompromised.

    Because measles is so contagious, estimates suggest that 95% of the population must be vaccinated to achieve herd immunity. Once vaccine coverage falls below that percentage, outbreaks are possible.

    Having robust public health systems also provides protection from outbreaks and limits their spread. Public health workers can detect cases before an outbreak occurs and take preventive steps. During a measles outbreak, they provide updates and information, administer vaccines, track cases and oversee quarantine for people who have been exposed and isolation for people who are contagious.

    Daniel Pastula does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Texas records first US measles death in 10 years – a medical epidemiologist explains how to protect yourself and your community from this deadly, preventable disease – https://theconversation.com/texas-records-first-us-measles-death-in-10-years-a-medical-epidemiologist-explains-how-to-protect-yourself-and-your-community-from-this-deadly-preventable-disease-251004

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: What’s a constitutional crisis? Here’s how Trump’s recent moves are challenging the Constitution’s separation of powers

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Jeffrey Schmitt, Professor of Law, University of Dayton

    President Donald Trump’s various actions that appear to overstep the power of the executive office are creating what many legal scholars call a constitutional crisis. VladSt/DigitalVision Vectors via Getty Images

    In a short few weeks, President Donald Trump has upended many core parts and functions of the U.S. government. He dismantled the U.S. Agency for International Development and fired thousands of government employees. He has also fired several inspectors general and board members of independent agencies.

    Additionally, Trump’s administration has violated court orders to unfreeze federal funding. And Trump has issued an unprecedented number of executive orders, including one that aims to end the practice of birthright citizenship, something that is guaranteed by the plain text of the U.S. Constitution.

    Legal experts have said that all of these actions and more are leading up to, or have already sparked, a constitutional crisis.

    There is not one clear definition of what a constitutional crisis actually is. And, as constitutional law scholar Jeffrey Schmitt explains in an interview with Amy Lieberman, politics and society editor at The Conversation U.S., there is also no comparable historical example for Trump’s exercise of executive power.

    Former USAID employees terminated after the Trump administration dismantled the agency collect their personal belongings at the USAID headquarters on Feb. 27, 2025, in Washington, D.C.
    Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images

    Why are some people calling what is currently underway a constitutional crisis?

    I think legal experts are concerned that Trump is expanding executive power beyond anything we have known in American history. And as executive power continues to expand, we may eventually hit a tipping point that threatens the structure of the government, as laid out in the Constitution.

    If the Constitution has one central feature, it is the separation of powers. The Constitution divides power between the states and the federal government, and federal power is divided between the three branches of government – the executive, judicial and legislative.

    Now, Trump appears to be taking over Congress’ core powers, including taxing and spending. Typically, Congress passes a budget, and the president can sign or veto the bill. Once the budget is passed into law, the president cannot refuse to spend the allocated money.

    There is some history to this. President Richard Nixon refused in the 1970s to spend money Congress had appropriated, and the U.S. Supreme Court then ordered the federal government to spend the money. Federal law now prohibits what’s called “impoundment.”

    How is Trump challenging these laws now?

    Trump is freezing spending on things he does not support politically, like foreign aid. He also is trying to place new conditions on the disbursement of federal funds as a way to control state and private institutions. For example, a recent letter from his administration threatens to withhold federal funding from schools that do not abandon DEI programs.

    Trump has also fired top officials at independent agencies such as a member of the independent National Labor Relations Board, when federal law and Supreme Court precedent indicate that he has no constitutional authority to do so. He has also fired agency watchdogs without following legal requirements to give Congress 30 days notice. When he fired most USAID employees and froze the agency’s foreign aid payments, he shuttered an entire agency established by Congress.

    And his firing of thousands of federal workers isn’t just about who works in government – cuts like this make an agency unable to perform its mission.

    The federal courts are intervening in some cases, but they are blocking only a small fraction of the president’s actions.

    Are there other times in history the country has come close to a constitutional crisis?

    President Abraham Lincoln and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt both led the country during periods of constitutional change, and they both clashed with the Supreme Court.

    Slavery in the federal territories was the constitutional crisis that precipitated the Civil War. This issue dominated politics throughout the 1850s because people thought it would determine the future of slavery as new states were admitted to the Union. When Congress was unable to reach an agreement, the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories in the infamous case of Dred Scott v. Sandford.

    But opposition to the expansion of slavery was the unifying principle of the young Republican Party. So, during the election of 1860, Lincoln argued that Dred Scott was not binding on the country because it was not settled precedent. He acknowledged, though, that the court’s decisions are binding in the case before it.

    When Lincoln campaigned for president in 1860, he promised to appoint judges who would overrule Dred Scott and to work with Congress to ban slavery in the territories. When Lincoln realized that constitutional change was necessary, he worked tirelessly to get the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery, ratified in 1865.

    Franklin Roosevelt also worked within the constitutional system to expand the role of the federal government in the New Deal, a series of domestic public works programs in the 1930s. When the Supreme Court ruled against early New Deal programs, FDR complained that the justices were old and out of touch.

    So Roosevelt in 1937 proposed packing the Supreme Court with new justices in a transparent attempt to push the court into accepting his broad reading of federal power. This proposed change never became law, but the Supreme Court changed its views on federal power at roughly the same time, ending the crisis. The country overwhelmingly supported the New Deal’s expansion of federal power in several national elections.

    President Donald Trump and Speaker of the House Mike Johnson appear at an event in Miami on Jan. 27, 2025.
    Mandel Ngan/AFP via Getty Images

    How does today’s situation involving Trump differ?

    Unlike Lincoln or Roosevelt, Trump is trying to seize the powers of Congress and unilaterally transform the federal government. Roosevelt worked with Congress to pass legislation and eventually convince the Supreme Court to accept his views. And while Lincoln rejected the court’s proslavery reading of the Constitution, Trump may be rejecting its central feature – the structural balance of power.

    Can the country resolve this crisis?

    Aside from Trump deciding to change course, there is not much that can be done. Courts can issue orders, but they do not have a military and cannot easily enforce them.

    Congress has the power to remove the president, via impeachment. As we learned during Trump’s first term, however, impeachment is not easy.

    If the president decides to ignore the courts – and Congress continues to do nothing – the final constitutional check on Trump’s power will be the next federal election.

    Jeffrey Schmitt does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What’s a constitutional crisis? Here’s how Trump’s recent moves are challenging the Constitution’s separation of powers – https://theconversation.com/whats-a-constitutional-crisis-heres-how-trumps-recent-moves-are-challenging-the-constitutions-separation-of-powers-250706

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: How to make a political Oscars speech that doesn’t flop – according to rhetorical theory

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tom F. Wright, Reader in Rhetoric, University of Sussex

    So, it’s happened. You’re on stage, Oscar statue in hand, facing Hollywood’s finest and millions of viewers. You could keep it simple – thank your agent, your co-stars, your dog. Or you could use this moment to say something that matters.

    That’s exactly what Jane Fonda just did at the 2025 Screen Actors Guild Awards, urging the audience “to resist successfully what is coming at us” as Elon Musk’s Doge holds a chainsaw to the US federal government. From the cold war to civil rights to Trump 2.0, award ceremonies have always been stages for activism.

    Some of these political speeches have been electrifying. Some have flopped. Some have been drowned out by the orchestra before they even got started. If you’re going to make a political speech at the Oscars, you’d better do it right.

    Thankfully, Kenneth Burke — one of the 20th century’s most influential rhetorical scholars — offers a road map. His theories on identification, dramatism and symbolic action explain why some speeches resonate while others fall flat.


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    1. Know your two (very different) audiences

    Burke argued in the 1950s that rhetoric isn’t just about persuasion – it’s about identification. A speaker is most persuasive when they convince their audience that they share the same values and concerns. If people feel you’re “one of them”, they’re more likely to listen.

    The Oscars create a unique rhetorical challenge. Inside LA’s Dolby Theatre, you might be surrounded by like-minded pampered progressives. But beyond that room, millions of viewers at home may be far less receptive.

    Michael Moore’s infamous acceptance speech in 2003.

    Director Michael Moore learned this the hard way in 2003 when, after winning best documentary for his film Bowling for Columbine, he stormed the stage and declared: “Shame on you, Mr Bush! Shame on you!” The result? A mix of cheers and boos. And days of being pilloried on cable news. Instead of drawing people in, Moore’s approach alienated half his audience.

    Compare this with Meryl Streep’s speech at the 2017 Golden Globes when collecting her lifetime achievement award. She also criticised her president but framed it differently: “Disrespect invites disrespect. Violence incites violence. When the powerful use their position to bully others, we all lose.”

    She didn’t need to utter Donald Trump’s name. And because she framed her speech as a universal concern, rather than a partisan attack, it resonated beyond the room.

    2. Put yourself in the story

    Burke’s second idea is that all communication is “dramatic” – a performance shaped by setting, characters and conflict. In a political speech, the most compelling “character” is often you, the speaker.

    Audiences don’t just respond to abstract arguments. They connect with people who embody the very struggle they’re speaking about.

    Lily Gladstone accepting the Golden Globe for best actress in 2024.

    Lily Gladstone’s 2024 Golden Globes speech worked this way. When she won best actress for Killers of the Flower Moon, she didn’t start with industry statistics or broad calls for change. Instead, she spoke in Blackfeet, honouring her Indigenous roots: “I just spoke a bit of Blackfeet language, a beautiful community – the nation that raised me.”

    That one sentence transformed her win into a moment of cultural recognition, making her speech as much an act of representation as a speech about representation.

    3. Frame your argument wisely

    If you want your audience to engage, you must frame your message in a way that pulls them in. Whereas a speech that just states a problem can feel like noise, one that connects the issue to a larger story can be powerful.

    This is where Burke’s idea of symbolic action comes in. He defined it as “the making or construction of social reality through symbols that foster identification”. Put another way: words don’t just describe reality, they shape it.

    Oprah Winfrey’s speech from the 2018 Golden Globes.

    Take Oprah Winfrey’s 2018 Golden Globes speech picking up the Cecil B. DeMille award. Instead of simply condemning sexism in Hollywood, she tied it to a broader historical movement, from civil rights to #MeToo: “For too long, women have not been heard or believed if they dared to speak their truth to the power [of] those men. But their time is up. Their time is up!”

    Winfrey wasn’t just talking about change – she was creating it in real time, rallying the room behind a clear, urgent message. That’s the difference between listing a problem and delivering a message that sticks.

    4. Turn your speech into an act of protest

    While framing helps persuade an audience, some moments go further, becoming acts of defiance themselves. This is when a speech moves beyond words into symbolic action.

    Let’s take perhaps the most famous protest in Oscars history. In 1973, Marlon Brando refused to pick up his best actor statue – sending in his place Sacheen Littlefeather, who explained she was there as a protest for Hollywood’s treatment of Native American people.

    Sacheen Littlefeather refuses to accept the best actor Oscar on behalf of Marlon Brando.

    “He very regretfully cannot accept this very generous award,” she told the audience. “And the reasons for this being are the treatment of American Indians today by the film industry … and on television in movie reruns, and also with recent happenings at Wounded Knee.”

    In under a minute, she transformed what could have been a quiet refusal into a national reckoning. The audience’s reaction – some cheering, some booing – only made it clearer. This wasn’t just a speech, it was a moment.

    A speech that merely describes a problem may be forgotten, but one that transforms the moment itself? That’s the stuff of history.

    5. Expect a backlash, and decide if you care

    No matter how well you craft your speech, someone is going to be angry. Burke’s final idea for helping us understand this is the “scapegoat mechanism”, by which one figure is cast as the discordant element that must be removed to restore unity.

    If you make a political speech at the Oscars, it could be you. Vanessa Redgrave learned this in 1978: after winning best supporting actress for her role in Julia, she defended her pro-Palestine activism against attacks from the Jewish Defence League, who she called a “bunch of Zionist hoodlums”. The reaction was instant – cheers mixed with boos.

    Vanessa Redgrave accepts the Oscar for supporting actress in 1978.

    Later that night, screenwriter Paddy Chayefsky publicly rebuked her, saying: “A simple ‘thank you’ would have sufficed.” The backlash hurt Redgrave’s career, but she stood by her words.

    If you’re going to say something political, be prepared to own it. And make sure you beat the orchestra.

    Tom F. Wright does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. How to make a political Oscars speech that doesn’t flop – according to rhetorical theory – https://theconversation.com/how-to-make-a-political-oscars-speech-that-doesnt-flop-according-to-rhetorical-theory-250949

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: The UK’s food system is broken. A green new deal for agriculture could be revolutionary

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Benjamin Selwyn, Professor of International Relations and International Development, Department of International Relations, University of Sussex

    William Edge/Shutterstock

    The UK’s food system was described as broken in a recent parliamentary report – and it’s not hard to see why. High living costs, a health crisis of diet-related chronic disease, farmers’ incomes squeezed and low pay across the agricultural sector all play their parts.

    And these elements are underpinned by an environmentally destructive mode of agricultural production – the longer the livestock-intensive system prevails, the greater the environmental, economic and social costs.

    The opportunity cost of not dealing with the food crisis is severe. The Food, Farming and Countryside Commission found that the price of the UK’s unhealthy food system is around £268 billion a year – almost equivalent to the government’s entire expenditure on health. And farmers are also worried about the sector as they face an unpredictable climate, smaller profits and changes to tax relief policies.

    I have researched how a green new deal for agriculture – namely a food system that complements rather than undermines the environment, while tackling social inequities – could begin to address these problems.

    In 2024 the UK’s farming sector experienced its second-worst harvest on record. Huge levels of rain last winter disrupted farmers’ ability to grow crops and reduced yields.

    The UK’s population faces a significant health crisis, exacerbated by the high cost of living. In 2022, around two-thirds of the population across all four nations were either overweight or obese.

    Retailers, processors and distributors grab an exorbitant share of the final value of many agricultural products. Sometimes farmers make as little as 1p profit for each item they produce. And farm workers’ earnings can sometimes leave them facing absolute poverty.

    What’s more, the UK farming sector is systemically inefficient. Dairy and meat products provide about 32% of calories consumed in the UK, and less than half (48%) of the protein. At the same time, livestock and their feed make up 85% of the UK’s total land use for agriculture.

    To make matters worse, land ownership is highly concentrated – about 25,000 landowners, typically corporations and members of the aristocracy, own about 50% of England, for example.

    What would change look like?

    A green new deal for agriculture would require a significant reorientation of policy, akin to the 1945 Labour government’s establishment of the welfare state. Critics might decry the costs and difficulties – but the longer the government waits, the greater the economic and environmental costs are likely to be.




    Read more:
    Britain’s unearned wealth has ballooned – a modest capital tax could help avoid austerity and boost the economy


    The government could introduce compulsory sale orders to spread land ownership more evenly. These would enable public bodies to obtain land that has been left derelict, vacant or that has been used in environmentally damaging ways. These measures could be supported by the establishment of community land trusts – non-profit, democratic organisations that own and work land for the benefit of local people.

    And a green new deal for agriculture could start with the government using its ecosystems service payments, where farmers and landowners are paid to manage their land in an environmentally beneficial way, to stimulate a transition to more plant-based proteins. This could combat hardship among farmers and agricultural workers, and tackle food poverty and ill health in the population. It would also establish the basis for a more sustainable agricultural system.




    Read more:
    Subsidised community restaurants could help tackle the UK’s broken food system – here’s how


    The UK think tank Green Alliance has mapped a green protein transition. It would entail an increase in “agro-ecologically” farmed land – that is, methods that bring a more ecological approach to farming. At present, this is about 3% of UK land, and it would have to rise to 60% by 2050. Under the plan, by 2030 10% of farmland would become semi-natural habitat, rising to one-third by 2050. This would protect land and facilitate natural restoration, and would also support agro-ecological farming methods.

    In this scenario, Britons would be projected to eat 45% less meat and dairy, replacing them with alternative proteins – plants and synthetic foods such as those made from precision fermentation. This is a revolutionary technology producing proteins that can be used in new alternatives to meat and dairy.

    Many conceptions of the protein transition from animal sources to more plant products ignore the necessity of improving farmers’ and agricultural workers’ incomes. But this will be crucial.

    Ecosystems service payments should be broadened to include a focus on sustainable incomes. Farms can be paid directly by government for sustainable production to combat farmer poverty. And the real living wage of £12.60 an hour should be compulsory for agricultural workers.

    As land use shifts from livestock grazing and feed crop production, more ground could be used for food crops for human consumption. There would then be more scope to change which food crops are produced – from wheat to legumes, for example.

    Flour made from broad beans – which can be grown in the UK – packs a bigger protein punch than traditional wheat flour.
    Narsil/Shutterstock

    Research has shown that flour made from broad beans is higher in key nutrients – protein, iron and fibre – than wheat flour. Bread, pasta, pizza, cakes and biscuits could increasingly be produced using broad bean flour, underpinning a shift towards more nutritious diets.

    A protein transition would also free up land for fruit and vegetable production for domestic consumption, reducing the UK’s heavy import dependence by using polytunnels and environmentally sustainable greenhouses.

    Climate breakdown means that the frequency of poor harvests will increase. And the volatile economic and political global picture means that affordable food imports cannot be taken for granted.

    A green new deal for agriculture could begin to remedy many of the problems the UK faces due to its broken food system. What’s needed is a coalition including courageous political parties, farmers, and workers within and beyond food production. Working together, these groups would be well placed to withstand the economic, political and environmental shocks that are on the horizon.

    Benjamin Selwyn does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The UK’s food system is broken. A green new deal for agriculture could be revolutionary – https://theconversation.com/the-uks-food-system-is-broken-a-green-new-deal-for-agriculture-could-be-revolutionary-250565

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Personal Income and Outlays, January 2025

    Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

    Personal income increased $221.9 billion (0.9 percent at a monthly rate) in January, according to estimates released today by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Disposable personal income (DPI)—personal income less personal current taxes—increased $194.3 billion (0.9 percent) and personal consumption expenditures (PCE) decreased $30.7 billion (0.2 percent).

    Personal outlays—the sum of PCE, personal interest payments, and personal current transfer payments—decreased $52.7 billion in January. Personal saving was $1.01 trillion in January and the personal saving rate—personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—was 4.6 percent.

    The increase in current-dollar personal income in January primarily reflected increases in personal current transfer receipts, compensation, and personal income receipts on assets.

    The $30.7 billion decrease in current-dollar PCE in January reflected a decrease of $76.7 billion in spending for goods and an increase of $46.0 billion in spending for services.

    From the preceding month, the PCE price index for January increased 0.3 percent. Excluding food and energy, the PCE price index increased 0.3 percent.

    From the same month one year ago, the PCE price index January increased 2.5 percent. Excluding food and energy, the PCE price index increased 2.6 percent from one year ago.

    *          *          *

    Next release:  March 28, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. EDT
    Personal Income and Outlays, February 2025

    For definitions, statistical conventions, updates to PIO, and more, visit “Additional Information.”

    Technical Notes

    Changes in Personal Income and Outlays for January

    The increase in personal income in January primarily reflected increases in personal current transfer receipts, compensation, and personal income receipts on assets.

    • The increase in personal current transfer receipts was led by social security benefits, reflecting a January cost-of-living adjustment based on data from the Social Security Administration.
    • The increase in compensation was led by private wages and salaries, based on data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) Current Employment Statistics (CES). Wages and salaries in services-producing industries increased $38.0 billion. Wages and salaries in goods producing industries increased $1.9 billion.
    • Within personal income receipts on assets, the increase was led by personal dividend income, based on data from publicly traded companies.

    Within personal outlays, personal current transfer payments to rest-of-world (net) decreased $26.4 billion, reflecting a settlement from a foreign pharmaceutical company that was paid to U.S. households.

    Revisions to Personal Income

    Estimates have been updated for July through December. The estimates for July through September for compensation, personal taxes, and contributions for government social insurance reflect the incorporation of third-quarter wage and salary data from the BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages program. The estimates for October through December reflect updated BLS CES data.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ASIA/SOUTH KOREA – Fertility rate reverses trend: Church community works to restore hope

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    Foto di sq lim su Unsplash

    Seoul (Agenzia Fides) – The number of newborns and the fertility rate in South Korea are bucking the trend and rising for the first time in nine years of steady decline. According to the 2024 demographic trends, data released by the Korea Institute of Statistics, the number of births last year was 238,300, 8,300 more than the previous year, representing the first increase in the number of births since 2015. The fertility rate, i.e. the number of children a woman has in her lifetime, meanwhile rose to 0.75, an increase of 0.03 compared to the previous year. However, according to the report, Korea’s fertility rate is still well below the average of 1.51 for member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). According to the Institute of Statistics, there are three reasons for the increase in the number of births: an increase in the population in the fertile age group, an increase in marriages that have been delayed by the pandemic, and also the beginning of a “cultural” shift in young people’s values regarding marriage. Joo Hyung-hwan, vice chairman of the government’s Low Birth Rate and Aging Society Committee, which was set up specifically to deal with these phenomena, said, “This year, the number of newborns will increase by 10,000 compared to last year, to about 250,000, and the total fertility rate will be about 0.79,” referring to the number of pregnancy and childbirth registrations received at workplaces. “The positive changes are obvious,” he said, emphasizing “that this is the result of the joint efforts of not only the government, but also companies and local authorities.” To counter the low birth rate, the government plans to expand parental leave for men, increase tax support for companies that excel in balancing work and family life, and require companies to raise awareness among their employees about work-life balance.In 2024, President Yoon Suk Yeol, currently under impeachment, proposed a new ministry to address the “national demographic crisis,” taking a more comprehensive approach that would not only focus on financial support and childcare, but also – as a broad national debate has shown – address the culture so that a balance between work and family can be found. To this end, companies would be encouraged to encourage their employees to become parents. In June 2024, the committee announced a package of “measures to reverse the trend of low birth rates.” A change in social practices and the work system could prove crucial in a country where the birth rate has fallen to the lowest in the world over the past decade.Sociologists have noted that Korean women have prioritized career advancement over marriage or parenthood, and another contributing factor has been the rising cost of housing and living and the cost of raising a child. But now, economists say, the demographic crisis has become the biggest risk to the growth of Asia’s fourth-largest economy and its social security system, as the population of 51 million could halve by the end of the century if the trend is not reversed.Father Oh Seok-jun, head of the Seoul Archdiocese Committee for Life, urged people not to view the low birth rate as “just a matter of numbers,” nor as a phenomenon that can be tackled with reproductive technologies, as some claim. It is necessary to “look at the issue from a spiritual and hopeful point of view”: “A child is a gift of grace granted by the Lord through the perfect union of love between a man and a woman. This is why the Catholic Church, in its pastoral care with young people and couples, invites them to look to the future with hope.” This is an approach that also characterizes the Holy Year under the motto “Pilgrims of Hope.” In this context, the Yeokchon-dong parish of the Archdiocese of Seoul held a “Blessing Ceremony for Families with Three or More Children” on February 23 to sensitize couples to the protection of life and to overcome the serious crisis of the low birth rate in Korea. Yuliana Kim Min-jeong, head of the family department in the parish, said: “It was good for the faithful to see how couples with three children live a life of faith and turn to the Lord in these rough times. We hope that their testimony will have a positive influence and give encouragement and hope to young couples.” At the level of mentality and social trends, a culture that tends towards individualism and questions the couple relationship must also be overcome. According to the census conducted by the Korea Statistics Institute, the percentage of single-person households in Korea exceeded 35 percent in 2023. In 2000, there were 2.2 million single-person households in the country, in 2015 there were over 5 million, and in 2023 there were 7.8 million. The Catholic Church, especially in the context of pastoral care for young adults, plays an active role in supporting those who, after entering the world of work, choose to live alone and create a “single” household: the aim is to propose to them forms of positive socialization that allow them to open up to others and develop interpersonal relationships, looking at their lives from the perspective of self-giving and not only from the perspective of self-interest. (PA) (Agenzia Fides, 28/2/2025)
    Share:

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Monetary Statistics for January 2025

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Monetary Statistics for January 2025
    Monetary Statistics for January 2025
    ************************************

    The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority:     According to statistics published today (February 28) by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, total deposits with authorized institutions increased by 1.4 per cent in January 2025. Among the total, Hong Kong dollar deposits and foreign currency deposits increased by 1.3 per cent and 1.5 per cent respectively in January. Renminbi deposits in Hong Kong increased by 6.5 per cent in January to RMB986.8 billion at the end of January, mainly reflecting fund flows of corporates. The total remittance of renminbi for cross-border trade settlement amounted to RMB1,377.4 billion in January, compared with RMB1,401.6 billion in December. It should be noted that changes in deposits are affected by a wide range of factors, such as interest rate movements and fund-raising activities. It is therefore more appropriate to observe the longer-term trends, and not to over-generalise fluctuations in a single month.     Total loans and advances decreased by 0.2 per cent in January. Among the total, loans for use in Hong Kong (including trade finance) decreased by 0.5 per cent, while loans for use outside Hong Kong increased by 0.6 per cent in January. The Hong Kong dollar loan-to-deposit ratio decreased to 75.7 per cent at the end of January from 77.1 per cent at the end of December, as Hong Kong dollar deposits increased while Hong Kong dollar loans decreased.     Hong Kong dollar M2 and M3 both increased by 1.5 per cent in January, and both increased by 4.5 per cent when compared to a year ago. The seasonally-adjusted Hong Kong dollar M1 decreased by 3.0 per cent in January while increased by 1.8 per cent compared to a year ago, reflecting in part investment-related activities. Total M2 and total M3 both increased by 1.6 per cent in January. Compared to a year earlier, total M2 and total M3 both increased by 9.6 per cent.     As monthly monetary statistics are subject to volatilities due to a wide range of transient factors, such as seasonal and IPO-related funding demand as well as business and investment-related activities, caution is required when interpreting the statistics.

     
    Ends/Friday, February 28, 2025Issued at HKT 16:30

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ECB Consumer Expectations Survey results – January 2025

    Source: European Central Bank

    28 February 2025

    Compared with December 2024:

    • median consumer perceptions of inflation over the previous 12 months decreased, as did median inflation expectations for the next 12 months, while median inflation expectations for three years ahead remained unchanged;
    • expectations for nominal income growth over the next 12 months decreased, while expectations for spending growth over the next 12 months increased;
    • expectations for economic growth over the next 12 months became less negative, while the expected unemployment rate in 12 months’ time decreased;
    • expectations for growth in the price of homes over the next 12 months increased, while expectations for mortgage interest rates 12 months ahead declined.

    Inflation

    The median rate of perceived inflation over the previous 12 months decreased slightly in January to 3.4%, from 3.5% in December. Median expectations for inflation over the next 12 months also decreased, to 2.6% from 2.8%. In both instances, these decreases reversed the increases observed in the December 2024 data. Median expectations for inflation three years ahead were unchanged at 2.4% in January 2025. Inflation expectations at the one-year and three-year horizons thus remained below the perceived past inflation rate. Uncertainty about inflation expectations over the next 12 months remained unchanged, for the sixth month in a row, at its lowest level since February 2022. While the broad evolution of inflation perceptions and expectations remained relatively closely aligned across income groups, expectations for lower income quintiles were slightly above those for higher income quintiles. Younger respondents (aged 18-34) continued to report lower inflation perceptions and expectations than older respondents (those aged 35-54 and 55-70), albeit to a lesser degree than in previous years. (Inflation results)

    Income and consumption

    Consumers’ nominal income growth expectations over the next 12 months decreased to 0.9% in January from 1.1% in December. The drop in income growth expectations was mainly driven by the lowest income quintile, while the income growth expectations of the two highest quintiles remained unchanged. Perceived nominal spending growth over the previous 12 months decreased to 5.1% in January, from 5.2% in December, while expected nominal spending growth over the next 12 months increased to 3.6%, from 3.5% in December. (Income and consumption results)

    Economic growth and labour market

    Economic growth expectations for the next 12 months were less negative, standing at -1.1%, compared with -1.3% in December. Expectations for the unemployment rate 12 months ahead decreased to 10.4%, from 10.5% in December. Consumers continued to expect the future unemployment rate to be only slightly higher than the perceived current unemployment rate (9.9%), implying a broadly stable labour market. Quarterly data showed that unemployed respondents reported a decrease in their expected probability of finding a job over the next three months, which declined to 25.1% in January, from 29.3% in October. Employed respondents, by contrast, reported that their expected probability of job loss over the next three months decreased to 8.6% in January, from 9.0% in October. (Economic growth and labour market results)

    Housing and credit access

    Consumers expected the price of their home to increase by 3.0% over the next 12 months, which was slightly higher compared than in December (2.9%). Households in the lowest income quintile continued to expect higher growth in house prices than those in the highest income quintile (3.4% and 2.8% respectively), although the difference narrowed compared with earlier months. Expectations for mortgage interest rates 12 months ahead declined slightly to 4.5%, their lowest level since July 2022. As in previous months, the lowest income households expected the highest mortgage interest rates 12 months ahead (5.1%), while the highest income households expected the lowest rates (3.9%). The net percentage of households reporting a tightening (relative to those reporting an easing) in access to credit over the previous 12 months increased, as did the net percentage of those expecting a tightening over the next 12 months. The share of consumers who reported having applied for credit during the past three months, which is measured on a quarterly basis, declined to 15.0% in January from 15.9% in October. (Housing and credit access results)

    The release of the Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) results for February is scheduled for 28 March 2025.

    For media queries, please contact: Nicos Keranis, Tel: +49 172 758 7237

    Notes

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: The role of the digital euro in digital payments and finance

    Source: European Central Bank

    Contribution to Bancaria by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, based on remarks at the Crypto Asset Lab Conference on 17 January 2025

    28 February 2025

    Being a key player in digital payments and digital finance should be a priority for Europe.

    As Mario Draghi pointed out in his recent report, the productivity gap between the United States and the European Union is mostly explained by technology and finance.[1] If we take the information and communications technology (ICT) and financial sectors out, the gap disappears.

    If we want to close the productivity gap with the United States, we need to focus on these areas. Digital payments and digital finance stand at the intersection of these two sectors. And they are developing fast, driven by changes in habits and technology. This is both an opportunity and a risk for Europe. It is an opportunity to close the gap by developing innovative and competitive European solutions. But if we do not seize that opportunity, we run the risk of weakening our competitiveness, resilience and strategic autonomy.

    At the European Central Bank (ECB), as guardians of our single currency, the euro, we consider this a matter of crucial importance. Ultimately, it is about the future of our currency. Today, the euro is the second most important currency in the international monetary system. Its share across a range of indicators stands at around 20%, and the euro area accounts for around 12% of global GDP.[2] If we want to prevent the euro from losing importance on the global stage, transacting and investing in euro needs to be seen as safe, easy and efficient, even as digitalisation transforms payments and finance.[3]

    Central bank money – the central pillar of the payments and financial system – has a key role to play in connecting the different parts of the financial system in a safe and risk-free way. This is particularly relevant in Europe, where payments and finance often remain fragmented along national lines, preventing us from fully reaping the benefits of the single European market. This is true for both retail and wholesale transactions.

    For retail transactions – payments made on a daily basis by consumers and businesses – our reliance on non-European solutions weakens our strategic autonomy and is a drag on productivity growth. We should ask, for example, why we don’t have a European VISA or Mastercard. A digital euro – that is, central bank money in digital form for retail transactions – would give us the chance to increase efficiency, competition, innovation and resilience while allowing European private payment solutions to scale up and protect our monetary sovereignty.[4]

    For wholesale transactions – transactions between financial institutions – we need to avoid repeating the mistake we made in the retail sector and ensure that we provide the conditions for European actors to stay ahead of their competitors. New technologies offer us the opportunity to create an integrated European market for digital assets from the outset, in other words a European capital markets union.[5]

    A digital euro for everyday payments

    For firms and households, central bank money is currently only available in the form of cash; there is currently no equivalent in digital form, which is becoming increasingly problematic because the use and acceptance of cash are declining. In the euro area, cash transactions have fallen below card transactions in value.[6] The share of companies reporting that they do not accept cash has tripled over the last three years to 12%.[7] The European Commission has put forward a legislative proposal to ensure the acceptance of cash[8], and the ECB is committed to ensuring that cash remains as widely available and accessible as possible[9]. Still, the trend towards cash being used less for daily transactions is likely to continue owing to the digitalisation of the economy in line with what has been observed in many advanced economies.

    Day-to-day payments in the euro area by payment instrument, in value terms

    (percentage of the value of all non-recurring day-to-day payments)

    Source: ECB (2024), Study on the payment attitudes of consumers in the euro area (SPACE).

    Note: The “Other” category includes bank cheques, credit transfers, direct debit, instant payments, loyalty points, vouchers and gift cards, crypto-assets, buy-now-pay-later services and other payment instruments.

    Current European digital payment solutions, such as cards issued by European payment schemes, mainly cater to national markets and specific use cases. To pay across European countries, consumers have to rely on a few non-European providers. More than two-thirds of card transactions in the euro area were settled through international payment schemes in the second half of 2023.[10] And 13 out of 20 euro area countries rely entirely on non-European solutions in the absence of their own domestic payment scheme. But even those international payment solutions are not accepted everywhere and do not cover all key use cases.

    National card schemes in the euro area

    Source: ECB.

    As a result, one of the key objectives of central bank money – to offer the public a means of payment backed by the sovereign authority that can be used for retail transactions across the entire currency area – is not being fulfilled in the digital space.

    In addition, European payments have become a prime example of the situation that Enrico Letta and Mario Draghi described in their recent reports.[11] The fragmentation of the market along national lines, the lack of European payment solutions available on a European scale and the difficulty faced by European payment service providers in keeping pace with technological advances mean that Europe is not competitive within its own market, let alone on a global scale.

    Moreover, in an unstable geopolitical environment, we are being left to rely on companies based in other countries. In future, this dependency could extend beyond traditional payment service providers. Platforms like Ant Group’s Alipay have shown they know how to bridge geographical gaps: during major events like UEFA EURO 2024 they were able to boost their payment app usage among customers in Europe.

    Merchants – and consumers, who bear the costs – are left to deal with the consequences of the international card schemes’ market dominance. To give just one example, the average net merchant service charges in the EU almost doubled between 2018 and 2022.[12] This increase occurred despite regulatory efforts to contain it. And the cost falls disproportionately on smaller retailers, who face charges that are three to four times higher than those paid by their larger counterparts.[13]

    We must move swiftly to counter the risks stemming from Europe’s current inability to secure the integration and autonomy of its retail payment system. This is one of the key reasons behind the digital euro project: to bring central bank money into the digital age. Doing so would provide firms and households with a digital equivalent to banknotes and would strengthen our monetary sovereignty.

    Benefits for consumers and merchants

    Complementing banknotes, the digital euro would give all European citizens and firms the freedom to make and receive digital payments seamlessly.[14]

    The digital euro would provide a single, easy, secure and universally accepted public solution for digital payments in stores, online and from person to person. It would be available both online and offline, and would be free for basic use.

    For merchants, the digital euro would provide seamless access to all European consumers. Moreover, it would offer an alternative that would increase competition, thereby lowering transaction costs in a more direct way than is possible through regulations and competition authorities.[15]

    Fostering competition and innovation in an integrated payments ecosystem

    The digital euro would strengthen the euro area economy by fostering competition and innovation.

    European payment service providers are finding it increasingly difficult to compete with international card schemes and mobile payment solutions. As the latter grow in popularity, banks risk falling behind not only in terms of interchange fees, but also in terms of client relationships and user data.

    By contrast, the digital euro would ensure that payment service providers would continue to play a central role, thus enabling them to maintain customer relationships and be compensated for their services, as is currently the case.[16] It would also offer an alternative to co-badging with international card schemes for cross-border payments in – and potentially beyond – the euro area, thus promoting competition.

    The digital euro would also expand the opportunities available to payment service providers while reducing the cost of offering their own services on a European scale. In addition, it would foster an environment conducive to the widespread adoption of payment innovations throughout the euro area.

    Currently, several innovations aimed at simplifying payments are emerging within specific national markets or across a few countries, driven by European payment service providers. Although these innovations are highly commendable and would enhance people’s lives, existing structural barriers are hampering their efforts to achieve pan-European scale.

    These solutions are struggling to achieve the scale needed to provide a service to everyone in the euro area. This limits their ability to compete effectively with the large international players who can fully leverage economies of scale, even on a global level.

    The European Commission’s legislative proposal[17] foresees that the digital euro would have legal tender status; this implies that it would be accepted by all merchants who currently accept electronic payments. In reality this would equate to the creation of a pan-European network which could also be used by private solutions, thus overcoming the obstacles limiting their growth.

    This would foster a more integrated European payments market. As private providers expand their geographical reach and diversify their product portfolios, they will benefit from cost efficiencies and be better positioned to compete internationally.

    In essence, the network effects generated by a digital euro would function as a public good, benefiting both public and private initiatives. This approach would be akin to creating a unified European railway network or European energy grid, where various companies could competitively operate their own services and deliver added value to customers.

    Instead of requiring significant investment to expand existing services across the euro area, the open digital euro standards would facilitate cost-effective standardisation, making it possible for private retail payment solution providers to launch new products and functionalities on a broader scale.

    Ultimately, whether through the digital euro or private solutions, this framework would unlock innovation, create new business opportunities and improve consumer access to a diverse range of goods and services.

    Making this vision a shared reality

    The design of the digital euro, as well as the key provision in the regulation proposed by the European Commission, contains all the key elements required to make this vision a reality.

    Over the past years, we have extensively engaged with a multitude of market stakeholders to establish the digital euro’s features. We have collected and discussed the input of representatives of consumers, merchants, banks and payment service providers. Furthermore, we are now looking at how the digital euro could be used to provide services currently not available on the market. To this end, we launched a call for expressions of interest, asking for collaboration from stakeholders, and we received a very strong response. Through this inclusive approach, we want to take everyone’s needs and perspectives into consideration to produce a robust payments solution.

    The role of central bank money in developing a European market for digital assets

    Currently, the ECB and the national central banks of those EU Member States whose currency is the euro (which we collectively refer to as the Eurosystem) offer central bank money in digital form to financial institutions through our TARGET Services: T2 settles more than 90% of the value of large payments between financial institutions, and T2S settles securities transactions. These services have been crucial in increasing the efficiency and integration of post-trade platforms in Europe.

    We are committed to continuing to provide state-of-the-art settlement services in central bank money, even as new technologies emerge.

    The potential of new technologies

    In this respect, we recognise the potential of new technologies, such as distributed ledger technology (DLT), to transform and improve wholesale financial markets by enabling assets to be issued or represented in digital token form.

    DLT allows market participants to handle trading, settlement and custody on the same platform, reducing credit risk, transaction failures and reconciliation needs. It can enhance efficiency by operating on a 24/7, 365 days a year basis and settling transactions instantly, which could potentially reduce annual infrastructure operational costs. A shared DLT platform could lower market entry barriers, enable small and medium-sized enterprises and new players to access capital markets and facilitate the efficient trading of financial instruments currently not covered on regulated markets.

    We have an opportunity to create an integrated European capital market for digital assets from the outset – in other words, a digital capital markets union.[18]

    In fact, we have recently seen an upsurge in DLT initiatives in Europe. Over 60% of EU banks are exploring or using DLT, with 22% already implementing DLT applications. Furthermore, on the securities side, there has been an increasing number of issuances on DLT.

    The role of central bank money and the Eurosystem’s exploratory work

    The ECB is aware that it has a role to play in this work from the very beginning.

    The availability of central bank money to settle transactions using these new technologies is important for two reasons. First, if we don’t use central bank money, other settlement assets – such as stablecoins or tokenised deposits – will be used, which would reintroduce credit risks and fragmentation in the financial system. And second, the possibility to settle in central bank money is seen by the market as a key factor in the adoption of new technologies.

    The Eurosystem has already worked with the market to test settling wholesale transactions in central bank money using DLT. In exploratory work we carried out in 2024, for example, we offered three different solutions to link our TARGET services to market DLT platforms. This allowed industry participants to either settle real transactions in central bank money or conduct experiments with mock transactions.[19]

    This exploratory work stands out at the global level in terms of its scale and scope. Overall, 60 industry participants took part, including incumbents and new entrants. More than 40 experiments and trials covered a wide range of securities and payments use cases, including the first issuance of an EU sovereign bond using DLT. A total value of €1.6 billion was settled via trials over a six-month period, exceeding values settled in comparable initiatives in other jurisdictions.

    Next steps

    In the short term, the Eurosystem will aim to make it possible to settle DLT transactions in central bank money, with a view to enabling the further development of DLT on the market.[20] The technological solution will be based on interoperability between market DLTs and the Eurosystem, but also – and this is crucial – between market platforms, based on strong and enforceable standards.

    Looking further ahead, we will investigate how DLT can be used to create a more integrated financial market. With new technology, there is the opportunity to create a new ecosystem from scratch in a more integrated and harmonised manner. One way to achieve this integrated ecosystem in the longer term would be to move towards a European shared ledger. This would bring together token versions of central bank money, commercial bank money and other digital assets on a shared, programmable platform, on which market participants could provide their services. Another option could be the coordinated development of an ecosystem of fully interoperable technical solutions, which might better serve specific use cases and enable legacy and new solutions to coexist.

    The trade-offs between the benefits of such flexibility and those of bringing everyone together on one platform need further analysis. We will reflect on these trade-offs and refine this long-term vision together with private and public sector stakeholders.

    Conclusion

    In the current fast-moving environment, Europe cannot stand still. If we do not bring central bank money into the digital age, we will hamper Europe’s competitiveness, resilience and strategic autonomy. And we will miss out on the opportunities that digital payments and digital finance offer. Others would reap the benefits instead.

    By ensuring that central bank money keeps pace with digitalisation and new technologies, we would safeguard our monetary sovereignty. We would overcome fragmentation by offering money that can be used for any digital transactions in the euro area. We would foster competition and innovation. And we would strengthen our autonomy and resilience.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: SECOND ADVANCE ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR 2024-25, QUARTERLY ESTIMATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR THE THIRD QUARTER (OCTOBER-DECEMBER) OF 2024-25 AND FIRST REVISED & FINAL ESTIMATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, NATIONAL INCOME, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE, SAVING AND CAPITAL FORMATION FOR 2023-24 & 2022-23 RESPECTIVELY

    Source: Government of India (2)

    SECOND ADVANCE ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR 2024-25, QUARTERLY ESTIMATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR THE THIRD QUARTER (OCTOBER-DECEMBER) OF 2024-25 AND FIRST REVISED & FINAL ESTIMATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, NATIONAL INCOME, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE, SAVING AND CAPITAL FORMATION FOR 2023-24 & 2022-23 RESPECTIVELY

    Real GDP Growth Rate of 9.2% for 2023-24 is the highest in the previous 12 years except for 2021-22

    Growth Rate of Real GDP for 2024-25 is estimated as 6.5%

    Real GDP has observed a Growth Rate of 6.2% in Q3 of FY 2024-25

    Posted On: 28 FEB 2025 4:00PM by PIB Delhi

          The National Statistics Office (NSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) is releasing in this Press Note the Second Advance Estimates (SAE) of Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for Financial Year (FY) 2024-25; Quarterly Estimates of GDP for October-December Quarter (Q3) of FY 2024-25 along with its expenditure components and following Revised Estimates of GDP, National Income, Consumption Expenditure, Saving and Capital Formation:

    a.  First Revised Estimates (FRE) for the Financial year 2023-24;

    b.  Second Revised Estimates or Final Estimates (FE) for the Financial year 2022-23.

         These estimates are released both at Constant (2011-12) and Current Prices, in accordance with the release calendar of National Accounts. Detailed Notes on: (i) Second Advance Estimates (SAE) of Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of FY 2024-25, Quarterly Estimates of GDP for October-December Quarter (Q3) of FY 2024-25 and (ii) Abovementioned Revised Estimates for financial years 2023-24 and 2022-23 are given respectively in Part A and Part B of the Press Note.

    Key Highlights:

    1.    Real GDP has been estimated to grow by 6.5% in FY 2024-25. Nominal GDP is expected to witness a growth rate of 9.9% in FY 2024-25. Both the growth rates are revised upward from their respective First Advance Estimates.

    2.    As per the First Revised Estimates, Real GDP has grown by 9.2% in the financial year 2023-24, which is highest in the previous 12 years except for the financial year 2021-22 (the post-covid year). This growth has been contributed by double-digit growth rates in ‘Manufacturing’ sector (12.3%),Construction’ sector (10.4%) and ‘Financial, Real Estate & Professional Services’ sector (10.3%).

    3.    As per the Final Estimates, Real GDP has observed a growth rate of 7.6% in the financial year 2022-23, mainly contributed by double-digit growth rates in ‘Trade, Hotels, Transport, Communication & Services related to Broadcasting’ sector (12.3%), ‘Financial, Real Estate & Professional Services’ sector (10.8%) and ‘Electricity, Gas, Water Supply & Other Utility Services’ sector (10.8%).

    4.    Real GDP is estimated to grow by 6.2% in Q3 of FY 2024-25. Growth rate in Nominal GDP for Q3 of FY 2024-25 has been estimated at 9.9%.

    5.    The growth rate of Real GDP for Q2 of financial year 2024-25 has been revised upward to 5.6%.

    6.   Construction’ sector is estimated to observe a growth rate of 8.6%, followed by ‘Financial, Real Estate & Professional Services’ sector (7.2%) and ‘Trade, Hotels, Transport, Communication & Services related to Broadcasting’ sector (6.4%) during 2024-25.

    7.    Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) is expected to register a good growth of 7.6% during 2024-25 as compared to 5.6% growth observed during 2023-24.

     

      PART A

    NOTE ON SECOND ADVANCE ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR 2024-25 

    QUARTERLY ESTIMATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT FOR THE THIRD QUARTER (OCT-DEC) OF 2024-25  

             The National Statistics Office (NSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) is releasing in this Press Note, the Second Advance Estimates (SAE) of Annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for the Financial Year (FY) 2024-25 and Quarterly Estimates of GDP for the Third quarter (October-December) of 2024-25 along with its expenditure components both at Constant (2011-12) and Current Prices. Annual, Quarterly as well as April-December estimates of Gross Value Added (GVA) at Basic Prices by kind of economic activity along with year on year percent changes, expenditure components of GDP and annual estimates of Gross/Net National Income and Per Capita Income for the Financial years 2022-23, 2023-24 and 2024-25 at Constant and Current Prices are given in Statements 1A to 12A of Annexure A.

    I.  Annual Estimates and Growth Rates

              Real GDP or GDP at Constant Prices is estimated to attain a level of ₹187.95 lakh crore in the financial year 2024-25, against the First Revised Estimate of GDP for the year 2023-24 of ₹176.51 lakh crore. The growth rate in Real GDP during 2024-25 is estimated at 6.5% as compared to 9.2% in 2023-24. Nominal GDP or GDP at Current Prices is estimated to attain a level of ₹331.03 lakh crore in the year 2024-25, against ₹301.23 lakh crore in 2023-24, showing a growth rate of 9.9%.

               Real GVA is estimated at ₹171.80 lakh crore in the year 2024-25, against the FRE for the year 2023-24 of ₹161.51 lakh crore, registering a growth rate of 6.4% as compared to 8.6% growth rate in 2023-24. Nominal GVA is estimated to attain a level of ₹300.15 lakh crore during FY 2024-25, against ₹274.13 lakh crore in 2023-24, showing a growth rate of 9.5%

     

    Fig. 1: Annual GDP and GVA Estimates along with Y-o-Y Growth Rates at Constant Prices

     

    Fig. 2: Sectoral Composition and Growth Rates of Annual GVA

    Sectoral Composition of Nominal GVA in FY 2024-25

     

    Fig. 3: Composition and Growth Rates of Annual GVA in Broad Sectors

     

    II. Quarterly Estimates and Growth Rates

               Real GDP or GDP at Constant Prices in Q3 of FY 2024-25 is estimated at ₹47.17 lakh crore, against ₹44.44 lakh crore in Q3 of FY 2023-24, showing a growth rate of 6.2%. Nominal GDP or GDP at Current Prices in Q3 of FY 2024-25 is estimated at ₹84.74 lakh crore, against ₹77.10 lakh crore in Q3 of FY 2023-24, showing a growth rate of 9.9%.

                Real GVA in Q3 of FY 2024-25 is estimated at ₹43.13 lakh crore, against ₹40.60 lakh crore in Q3 of FY 2023-24, showing a growth rate of 6.2%. Nominal GVA in Q3 of FY 2024-25 is estimated at ₹77.06 lakh crore, against ₹69.90 lakh crore in Q3 of FY 2023-24, showing a growth rate of 10.2%.

    Fig. 4: Quarterly GDP and GVA Estimates along with Y-o-Y Growth Rates from Q1 FY 2021-22 to Q3 FY 2024-25 at Constant Prices

     

    Fig. 5: Sectoral Composition and Growth Rates of Quarterly GVA

    Sectoral Composition of Nominal GVA in Q3 of FY 2024-25

     

    Fig. 6: Composition and Growth Rates of Quarterly GVA in Broad Sectors

     

    [Primary Sector: Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry & Fishing and Mining & Quarrying 

    Secondary Sector: Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas, Water supply & Other Utility Services and    Construction

    Tertiary Sector: Trade, Hotels, Transport, Communication and Services related to Broadcasting, Financial, Real Estate & Professional Services and Public Administration, Defence & Other Services]

     

    III. Methodology and Major Data Sources:            

               Second Advance Estimates of Annual GDP and Quarterly Estimates GDP are compiled using the Benchmark-indicator method i.e. the estimates available for the previous financial year (2023-24) are extrapolated using the relevant indicators reflecting the performance of sectors. The First Advance Estimates (FAE) of Annual GDP for the financial year 2024-25 were released on 7th January, 2025, which were based on very limited data and used Provisional Estimates of 2023-24 as Benchmark Estimates. For Compilation of SAE, 2024-25, the Provisional Estimates of 2023-24 used at the time of FAE have been replaced by FRE, 2023-24 which have been compiled using industry-wise/institution-wise detailed information. Thus, overall as well as sectoral variations in SAE from FAE is attributed to revision of benchmark estimates and additional or updated data available on various indicators. The quarterly estimates of previous years along with the First and Second quarter estimates of 2024-25 released earlier have also undergone revision in accordance with the revision policy of National Accounts.

                The sector-wise estimates have been compiled using indicators/data sources like (i) Index of Industrial Production (IIP), (ii) Financial performance of Listed Companies based on available quarterly financial results of these companies upto Q3 FY 2024-25, (iii) Estimates of Major Agricultural Crops and Horticultural crops for 2024-25, as provided by Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare (iv) Production Targets and Summer as well as Rainy season production estimates of Major Livestock Products for FY 2024-25; (v) Fish Production, (vi) Production of Coal, Crude Petroleum, Natural Gas, Cement and Consumption of Steel, (vii) Net Tonne Kilometres and Passenger Kilometres for Railways, (viii) Passenger and Cargo traffic handled by Civil Aviation, (ix) Cargo traffic handled at Major and Minor Sea Ports, (x) Sales of Commercial Vehicles, (xi) Bank Deposits and Credits, (xii) Premium related information of Life and Non-Life Insurance companies, (xiii) Data on outward Supplies of Goods and Services available from GSTN upto January, 2025 (xiv) Accounts of Central and State Governments, (xv) Goods and Services Tax collections etc., available for first 9-10 months of the FY 2024-25. Year-on-Year growth rates (%) in the main indicators used in the estimation are given in the Annexure B.

                Total tax revenue used for GDP compilation includes non-GST revenue as well as GST revenue. The Revised Estimates of Tax revenue for 2024-25 as available in the Annual Financial Statement of the Central Government, along with latest available information from the websites of Controller General of Accounts (CGA) and Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) have been used for estimating taxes on products at Current Prices. For compiling taxes on products at Constant Prices, volume extrapolation is done using volume growth of taxed goods and services. The total product subsidies at Current prices were compiled using the latest information on major subsidies viz. Food, Urea, Petroleum and Nutrient based subsidy for Centre as available on CGA website and the expenditure incurred on subsidies by most States up to December 2024 as available on CAG website along with the Centre/State-wise RE and BE provision for FY 2024-25. Information available on Revenue expenditure, Interest payments, Subsidies etc. from Centre and States for FY 2024-25 were used for estimating Government Final Consumption Expenditure (GFCE).

                Improved data coverage and revision in input data made by source agencies would have a bearing on subsequent revisions of these estimates. Estimates are, therefore, likely to undergo revisions for the aforesaid causes in due course, as per the release calendar. Users should take these into consideration while interpreting the figures. The Provisional Estimates of Annual GDP for FY 2024-25 along with Quarterly GDP estimates for the quarter January-March of FY 2024-25 (Q4 2024-25) will be released on 30.05.2025.

     

    ***********

    Annexure A

     

    Annexure B

     

    PART B

    NOTE ON FIRST REVISED & FINAL ESTIMATES OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, NATIONAL INCOME, CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURE, SAVING AND CAPITAL FORMATION FOR 2023-24 & 2022-23 RESPECTIVELY

                In this part of the press note, First Revised Estimates of GDP, National Income, Consumption Expenditure, Saving and Capital Formation for the financial year 2023-24 and Second Revised/ Final Estimates for the financial year 2022-23 are given.

    2.         The First Revised Estimates for the year 2023-24 have been compiled using industry-wise/institution-wise detailed information instead of using the benchmark-indicator method employed at the time of release of Provisional Estimates on 31st May, 2024. The estimates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and other aggregates for the year 2022-23 have also undergone revisions on account of use of latest available datasets on agricultural production; industrial production (final results of Annual Survey of Industries: 2022-23); government data as available in budget documents (replacing Revised Estimates with actuals for the year 2022-23); comprehensive data available from various source agencies like Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA), Reserve Bank of India (RBI), National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) etc. and additional data from State/UT Directorates of Economics and Statistics (DES).

    3.         The salient features of the revised estimates at aggregate level are given in the paras as follows.

    Gross Domestic Product

    4.         Real GDP or GDP at constant (2011-12) prices for the years 2023-24 and 2022-23 stands at ₹176.51 lakh crore and ₹161.65 lakh crore, respectively, showing a growth of 9.2 per cent during 2023-24 as compared to growth of 7.6 per cent during 2022-23.

    5.         Nominal GDP or GDP at current prices for the year 2023-24 is estimated at ₹301.23 lakh crore, against ₹268.90 lakh crore for the year 2022-23, showing a growth of 12.0 per cent during 2023-24 as compared to growth of 14.0 per cent during 2022-23.

    GVA and its Industry-wise Analysis

    6.         At the aggregate level, nominal Gross Value Added (GVA) at basic prices has increased by 11.2 per cent during 2023-24 compared to growth of 13.9 per cent during 2022-23. Real GVA, i.e., GVA at constant (2011-12) prices, has increased by 8.6 per cent in 2023-24, compared to 7.2 per cent growth in 2022-23.

    7.         The shares of broad sectors of the economy in overall GVA during 2011-12 to 2023-24 and the annual growth rates during these periods are mentioned below:

    #: Final Estimates; @: First Revised Estimates

    8.         The growth rates of Primary sector (comprising Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry, Fishing and Mining & Quarrying), Secondary sector (comprising Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas, Water Supply & Other Utility Services, and Construction) and Tertiary sector (Services) have been estimated as 2.7 per cent, 11.4 per cent and 9.0 per cent respectively in 2023-24 as against growth rates of 5.9 per cent, 2.4 per cent and 10.3 per cent respectively in the previous years. The growth in real GVA during 2023-24 is on account of growth in ‘Manufacturing’, ‘Electricity, Gas, Water Supply & Other Utility Services’, ‘Construction’, ‘Trade, repair, Hotels and Restaurants’, ‘Financial Services’, ‘Real Estate, Ownership of Dwelling & Professional Services’ and ‘Other services’ as may be seen from Statement 4.2B. However, ‘Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Fishing’, ‘Mining and Quarrying’ and ‘Public Administration and Defense’ have witnessed modest growth.

    Net National Income

    9.         Net National Income (NNI) at current prices for the year 2023-24 stands at ₹263.50 lakh crore as against ₹233.91 lakh crore in 2022-23, showing a growth of 12.7 per cent during 2023-24 as compared to growth of 13.3 per cent in the previous year.

    Gross National Disposable Income

    10.       Gross National Disposable Income (GNDI) at current prices is estimated at ₹305.94 lakh crore for the year 2023-24, while the estimate for the year 2022-23 stands at ₹273.39 lakh crore, showing a growth of 11.9 per cent for year 2023-24 as compared to growth of 14.3 per cent in the year 2022-23.

    Saving

    11.       Gross Saving during 2023-24 is estimated at ₹92.59 lakh crore against ₹82.44 lakh crore during 2022-23. Share of Non-financial corporations, Financial corporations, General Government and Household sectors in Gross Savings during 2023-24 stands at 36.0%, 8.2%, (-) 3.1% and 59.0% respectively. Rate of Gross Saving to GNDI for 2023-24 is estimated at 30.3 per cent as against 30.2 per cent for 2022-23.

    Capital Formation

    12.       Gross Capital Formation (GCF) at current prices is estimated at ₹94.68 lakh crore for the year 2023-24 as compared to ₹87.72 lakh crore during 2022-23. The rate of GCF to GDP is 31.4 per cent during 2023-24 as against 32.6 per cent in the 2022-23. The rates of capital formation in the years 2011-12 to 2019-20 and 2021-22 to 2023-24 have been higher than the rate of saving because of positive net capital flow from Rest of the World (RoW).

    13.       In terms of the share to the total GFCF (at current prices), the highest contributor is Non-Financial Corporations followed by Household sector, share of which stood at 44.2% and 41.7% respectively in 2023-24.

    14.       The rate of GCF to GDP at constant (2011-12) prices was 35.2 per cent in 2022-23 and 34.6 per cent in 2023-24.

    Consumption Expenditure

    15.       Private Final Consumption Expenditure (PFCE) at current prices is estimated at ₹181.30 lakh crore for the year 2023-24 as against ₹165.28 lakh crore in 2022-23. In relation to GDP, the PFCE to GDP ratio at current prices during 2022-23 and 2023-24 are 61.5 per cent and 60.2 per cent respectively. At constant (2011-12) prices, the PFCE is estimated at ₹93.85 lakh crore and ₹99.07 lakh crore, respectively for the years 2022-23 and 2023-24. The corresponding PFCE to GDP ratio for the years 2022-23 and 2023-24 are 58.1 per cent and 56.1 per cent respectively.

    16.       Government Final Consumption Expenditure (GFCE) at current prices is estimated at ₹31.04 lakh crore for the year 2023-24 as against ₹27.58 lakh crore during 2022-23. At constant (2011-12) prices the estimates of GFCE for the years 2022-23 and 2023-24 stand at ₹15.44 lakh crore and ₹16.70 lakh crore respectively.

    Per Capita Estimates

    17.       Per Capita Income i.e. Per Capita Net National Income at current prices is estimated at ₹1,69,145 and ₹1,88,892 respectively for the years 2022-23 and 2023-24. Per Capita PFCE at current prices, for the years 2022-23 and 2023-24 is estimated at ₹1,19,516 and ₹1,29,967 respectively.

    Summary of Revisions in the GDP Estimates

    Revision in the estimates of the year 2023-24

    18.       The following statement gives the major reasons of variation between the Provisional Estimates (released on 31st May, 2024) and the First Revised Estimates of GVA for 2023-24.

     

    Sector

    GVA growth in 2023-24

    (at 2011-12 Prices)

    Major reasons for variation

    Provisional Estimate (PE),

    May 2024

    First Revised Estimate (FRE),

    Feb 2025

    Primary

    2.1

    2.7

    GVA estimates of Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry and Fishing sectors have undergone revision due to revision in production estimates of crop sector as per Final Estimate of Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers welfare. The revision in other industries in Primary Sector is due to the incorporation of latest revised data.

    Secondary

    9.7

    11.4

    Estimates of secondary sector have undergone revision due to use of data from source agencies along with detailed analysis of Non-departmental Enterprises (NDE) & Private Corporate sectors and budget documents of Government whereas provisional estimates were indicator based.

    Tertiary

    7.6

    9.0

    Data from source agencies along with detailed analysis of Departmental Enterprises (DE), NDE and Private Corporate sectors have been used for compilation of estimates for FRE 2023-24 whereas provisional estimates were indicator based. Furthermore, the revision in Public Administration and Defence sector is due to the use of detailed analysis of Budget documents (Centre and State Governments) and latest information of Local Bodies and Autonomous Bodies. In case of Financial services, FRE is based on analysis of annual reports of Financial Corporations and data released by RBI, NABARD and other financial regulators.

    Total GVA at Basic Prices

    7.2

    8.6

     

    GDP

    8.2

    9.2

     

    [Primary Sector: Agriculture, Livestock, Forestry & Fishing and Mining & Quarrying 

    Secondary Sector: Manufacturing, Electricity, Gas, Water supply & Other Utility Services and    Construction

    Tertiary Sector: Trade, Hotels, Transport, Communication and Services related to Broadcasting, Financial, Real Estate & Professional Services and Public Administration, Defence & Other Services]

     

    Revisions in the estimates of the year 2022-23

    19.       The use of latest available data from various agencies has resulted in changes in both the levels of GVA and growth estimates for the years 2022-23.

    Revisions in Major Aggregates

    20.       The level of revisions in the major aggregates at current and constant (2011-12) prices are given in the following table:

     

    Major National Income Aggregates and their % Changes

                                                                                       (₹ in Lakh Crore)

    Sl. No.

    Item

    2022-23

    1st RE

    Final Estimates

    % change

    At Current Prices

    1

    GVA at basic prices

    246.59  

    246.47

    -0.1

    2

    GDP

    269.50

    268.90

    -0.2

    3

    GNI

    265.79

    265.20

    -0.2

    4

    NNI

    234.39

    233.91

    -0.2

    5

    GNDI

    273.99

    273.39

    -0.2

    At Constant Prices

    1

    GVA at basic prices

    148.05

    148.78

    0.5

    2

    GDP

    160.71

    161.65

    0.6

    3

    GNI

    158.31

    159.39

    0.7

    4

    NNI

    137.47

    138.51

    0.8

     

    Major reasons for revisions in GVA/GDP estimates for FY 2022-23 are as given below:

    • Use of updated production estimates (Final Estimates) of horticulture crops from Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare, increase in area under fodder crop and increase in production of sugarcane.
    • Increase in input value due to use of Cost of Cultivation Survey (CCS) 2022-23 and Electricity tariff for agriculture sector for the year 2022-23.
    • Use of updated information from NDE and updated information on minor minerals from States in case of Mining & Quarrying sector.
    • Use of final results of Annual Survey of Industries (ASI): 2022-23 and augmented data for non-financial private corporate sector.
    • Use of ‘Actuals’ in place of ‘Revised Estimates’ of different items of expenditure and receipts in the Central & State government budgets.
    • Use of updated information on Local Bodies & Autonomous Institutions.
    • Use of latest annual reports of Public Sector Enterprises.
    • Use of latest data received for Cooperative Banks, Post Office Saving Bank (POSB), Non-Banking Financial Institutions (NBFIs), and Financial Auxiliaries.

    Detailed statements

    21.       List of Statements released in part ‘B’ of the press note is given below. More details of the revised estimates, i.e., FRE 2023-24 and FE 2022-23 are available in Statements 1.1B to 9B of Annexure C, which are given in the PDF format of the press note.

    1. Statement 1.1B:          Key Aggregates of National Accounts at Current Prices
    2. Statement 1.2B:          Key Aggregates of National Accounts at Constant (2011-12) Prices
    3. Statement 2B:             Per Capita Income, Product and Final Consumption
    4. Statement 3.1B:          Output by Economic Activity and Capital Formation by Industry of Use at Current Prices
    5. Statement 3.2B:          Output by Economic Activity and Capital Formation by Industry of Use at Constant (2011-12) Prices
    6. Statement 4.1B:          Gross Value Added by Economic Activity at Current Basic Prices
    7. Statement 4.2B:          Gross Value Added by Economic Activity at Constant (2011-12) Basic Prices
    8. Statement 5B:             Finances for Gross Capital Formation
    9. Statement 6.1B:          Gross Capital Formation by Industry of Use at Current Prices
    10. Statement 6.2B:          Gross Capital Formation by Industry of Use at Constant (2011-12) Prices
    11. Statement 7.1B:          Gross Fixed Capital Formation by Asset & Institutional Sector at Current Prices
    12. Statement 7.2B:          Gross Fixed Capital Formation by Asset & Institutional Sector at Constant (2011-12) Prices                   
    13. Statement 8.1B:          Private Final Consumption Expenditure at Current Prices
    14. Statement 8.2B:          Private Final Consumption Expenditure at Constant (2011-12) Prices
    15. Statement 9B:             Institutional Sectors – Key Economic Indicators at Current Prices

    **************

    Annexure C

    FORMULAE

    1. GVA at basic prices (Production Approach) = Output at basic prices – Intermediate Consumption
    2. GVA at basic prices (Income Approach) = CE + OS/MI + CFC + Production taxes less Production subsidies(i)
    3. GDP = ∑ GVA at basic prices + Product taxes less Product subsidies(ii)
    4. NDP/NNI = GDP/GNI – CFC
    5. GNI = GDP + Net primary income from ROW (Receipts less payments)
    6. Primary Incomes = CE + Property and Entrepreneurial Income
    7. NNDI =NNI + other current transfers(iii) from ROW, net (Receipts less payments)
    8. GNDI = NNDI + CFC = GNI + other current transfers(iii) from ROW, net (Receipts less payments)
    9. Gross Capital Formation(iv) (Financing Side) = Gross Savings + Net Capital Inflow from ROW
    10. GCF (Expenditure Side) = GFCF + CIS + Valuables
    11. Gross Disposable Income of Govt. = GFCE + Gross Saving of General Government
    12. Gross Disposable Income (GDI) of Households = GNDI – GDI of Govt. – Gross Savings of All Corporations

     

    REMARKS ON THE FORMULAE

    1. Production taxes or subsidies are paid or received with relation to production and are independent of the volume of actual production. Some examples are:

    Production Taxes – Land Revenues, Stamps & Registration fees and Tax on profession

    Production Subsidies – Subsidies to Railways, Subsidies to village and small industries.

    1. Product taxes or subsidies are paid or received on per unit of product. Some examples are:

    Product Taxes- Goods & Service Tax, Excise duties, Sales tax, Service Tax and Import, Export duties

    Product Subsidies- Food, Petroleum and fertilizer subsidies.

    1. Other Current Transfers refers to current transfers other than the primary incomes.

    Gross Capital Formation (GCF) at the current as well as the constant prices is estimated by two approaches: – (i) through flow of funds, derived as Gross Saving plus net capital flow from Rest of the World (RoW); and (ii) by the commodity flow approach, derived by the type of assets.

    Click here to see Press Note in PDF format

    ********

    Samrat/ Dheeraj/Allen

    (Release ID: 2106921) Visitor Counter : 310

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Import of poultry meat and products from areas in Poland and Sweden suspended

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Import of poultry meat and products from areas in Poland and Sweden suspended
    Import of poultry meat and products from areas in Poland and Sweden suspended
    *****************************************************************************

         ​The Centre for Food Safety (CFS) of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department announced today (February 28) that in view of notifications from the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) about outbreaks of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in Kościan District of Wielkopolskie Region in Poland, and in Municipality of Kristianstad of Skåne County in Sweden, the CFS has instructed the trade to suspend the import of poultry meat and products (including poultry eggs) from the above-mentioned areas with immediate effect to protect public health in Hong Kong.     A CFS spokesman said that according to the Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong imported about 6 600 tonnes of frozen poultry meat from Poland, and about 110 tonnes of frozen poultry meat from Sweden last year.     “The CFS has contacted the Polish and Swedish authorities over the issues and will closely monitor information issued by the WOAH and the relevant authorities on the avian influenza outbreaks. Appropriate action will be taken in response to the development of the situation,” the spokesman said.

     
    Ends/Friday, February 28, 2025Issued at HKT 17:45

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Publication of Wildlife Crime in Scotland 2023

    Source: Scottish Government

    An Official Statistics in Development publication for Scotland

    The latest statistics on wildlife crime in Scotland were published today by the Chief Statistician for Scotland. Recorded wildlife crime offences were down by 23%, from 286 offences in 2021-22 to 220 offences in 2022-23, bringing recorded wildlife crime back close to pre-pandemic levels.

    These statistics also contain data on Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service cases, criminal proceedings and scientific evidence and intelligence. Key results from the report include:

    • Over half of all recorded wildlife crimes were categorised as either offences involving birds (31%) or fish poaching (25%).
    • The Police Scotland divisions with the highest recorded wildlife offences in 2022-23 were the Highlands and Islands (35), the Lothians and Scottish Borders (32) and the North East (31).
    • The Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service received 63 cases in 2022-23 relating to wildlife crime (which may include more than 1 offence per case), with fish poaching being the most common category (30 cases). Of these 63 cases, 37 (59%) received an alternative to prosecution (e.g. fine), 15 (24%) were prosecuted, and 11 (17%) resulted in no action.
    • Criminal proceedings statistics for 2022-23 show that 36 people were proceeded against for wildlife crimes – a substantial increase from 2021-22 (20 people) and 2020-21 (2 people) which had been impacted by court closures and reduced capacities.

    Background

    When a wildlife crime is suspected, the first step is for it to be reported to the police (or detected by the police), and then recorded. Further steps may include investigation to assess whether the recorded crime should be part of a case submitted to the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) and then a decision on whether there is sufficient evidence for the case to be prosecuted. Ultimately a court case may result in a conviction or acquittal. All these stages may be supported by relevant scientific evidence and intelligence.

    This report presents statistics relating to 2022-23 for the various stages described above. Although these sets of statistics are related, direct comparisons between them cannot be made due to differences in data sources, timing and the bases on which statistics were collated. For example, several recorded crimes may be included in one COPFS case (involving multiple sources of scientific evidence), and subsequent criminal proceedings may occur in a different year.

    Official statistics are produced in accordance with the Code of Practice for Statistics

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Russia: A year in RIM: at SPbGASU, estimators discussed the results of work on the resource-index method

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Victoria Vinogradova, Alexander Grimitlin, Valery Uskov, Evgeny Enokaev, Maxim Shibnev, Alexey Belousov, Oleg Razgulyaev, Pavel Goryachkin

    For the second time, SPbGASU held a conference on the application of the resource-index method (RIM) for pricing the estimated cost of construction for government procurement projects.

    RIM is a new method for determining the estimated cost of construction. It involves the use of estimate standards – a list of resources required to carry out the work and their quantity, but without base prices. The cost of each resource is determined in current prices directly at the time of drawing up the estimate. Since the first quarter of 2024, 85 regions of the country have switched to RIM. Let us recall that a year ago, the Consortium of the Construction Industry of the Northwestern Federal District (includes the construction committees of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region, the SRO Association “Association of Builders of St. Petersburg”, SPbGASU, NP “Association of Manufacturers of Building Materials”), the IOO “Union of Estimating Engineers” and the National Association of Surveyors and Designers (NOPRIZ) held the first conference on the use of RIM. Then the professional community discussed the expected effectiveness of the innovation and the problems in construction processes associated with it. This year, the organizers of the conference summed up some of the work.

    “A year ago, the obligation to switch to RIM was an event that took many by surprise. Today, we intend to discuss ways to facilitate and increase the reliability of the work of estimators,” emphasized Oleg Razgulyaev, Vice President of the Association of Construction Materials Manufacturers, moderator of the conference.

    Alexey Belousov, General Director of the Saint Petersburg Builders Association and Coordinator of the Northwestern Federal District Construction Industry Consortium, noted that today prices for construction materials are quite volatile, which requires better work with them, so the conference is of great importance. “RIM allows for more efficient work in the current conditions. In addition, the government has legislatively allowed for price adjustments during construction in the range of up to 30 percent. This is serious support for the industry,” he said.

    Digital aspects

    Alexander Grimitlin

    Vice President of NOPRIZ Alexander Grimitlin recalled that in light of geopolitical events, unprecedented pressure caused certain concerns, since many foreign software products were supplied from unfriendly countries. Risks arose that could have led to tragic consequences, but became less unpleasant and certainly not catastrophic.

    “Until 2022, about 600 software products were used in 49 areas of the domestic construction industry, after the well-known events, almost half left the Russian market. But our activities have not undergone significant transformation. Since the beginning of this year, NOPRIZ has launched a program to stimulate software developers, to increase their own product, including with the help of government measures, because this task is not easy due to the financial situation of the developers themselves. If large companies are able to provide for themselves, then it is more difficult for small ones – they cannot organize the development of the new product they need.

    In addition, I consider the assistance in training personnel within the framework of the TIM championships of SPbGASU to be significant. They also include costing, which is very useful for participants, since at the very beginning of their professional activity it gives them skills in working in the automated calculation system.

    The digital modeling method is very important in science. It allows achieving greater efficiency and solving problems in an unconventional way. The introduction of calculation programs and price instability create serious difficulties for the industry, but you can’t choose your time. Therefore, it is necessary to continue to engage in qualified cost estimates,” says Alexander Grimitlin.

    In the process of implementation

    Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Construction of St. Petersburg Evgeny Uskov noted that his department began analyzing the necessary data and issuing the relevant documentation practically from the moment the decree on the transition to RIM was signed.

    “In 2024, 118 social facilities were built, 37 of which were financed from the city budget and 81 from investors. We managed to obtain permission using the new calculation method for two facilities. For 2025-2027, design survey work is planned for 124 facilities, of which two projects using RIM are undergoing examination and technical specifications have been developed for 19. In 2025, it is planned to commission 112 social facilities, 42 of which are financed from the city budget. A large amount of funding is planned for the development of design documentation. Since December 1, 2024, documentation has been submitted electronically in the information system of the Ministry of Construction of Russia. Digital technologies allow for more efficient and effective management of construction processes. RIM is considered a tool with a number of advantages, including increasing the accuracy and reliability of cost determination. The transition to it is gradual, but accompanied by difficulties,” recalled Evgeny Uskov.

    Among the difficulties, he named the low filling of the Federal State Information System of Pricing in Construction (FSISPC), the decrease in the final cost of construction projects, the lack of standard pilot projects in RIM and the experience of specialists. Many questions also arise regarding the procedure for developing estimates, in particular, the procedure for drawing up estimate documentation and the procedure for determining the cost of resources, the increase in the volume of the estimate itself, the form of which is cumbersome and inconvenient for analyzing interim results. A market analysis of transportation prices and the calculation of the time and cost of delivery is necessary.

    Strategy of the Leningrad Region

    First Deputy Chairman of the Leningrad Region Construction Committee Evgeny Enokaev recalled that, in accordance with the strategy for the development of the regional construction industry, the task of improving the pricing system has been implemented since 2016.

    “The Leningrad Region switched to RIM a little earlier than St. Petersburg – in 2023, due to which we have more facilities built and under construction using the new calculation method. In 2024, 125 positive conclusions were issued using RIM. One facility – the Prosthetics Center in Vsevolozhsk – has already been built, another one – a clinic in Kirovsk – is at the implementation stage.

    We expected an increase in the reliability of cost estimates. Were they more reliable? It is difficult to say yet. But, in any case, the introduction of such innovations is associated with the need to improve them at the implementation stages, so RIM continues to develop: the Ministry of Construction of Russia is working to improve regulatory documents, involving the regions. Issues on improving software are being discussed.

    Our committee interacts with construction organizations and understands the problems of the industry well. For example, there is a discrepancy in the cost of resources in remote areas of the region. We cannot make decisions at the local level based on situations that are contrary to the regulatory documents of the federal government, but we actively participate in the discussion of the pricing system. Thus, in early February, a round table was held in the Federal Assembly with the participation of the Ministry of Construction and representatives of the regions. We made proposals that were included in the recommendations for development and implementation for the relevant ministries,” said Evgeny Enokaev.

    He noted that one of the key elements influencing the formation of a single price and index database in the FGISTSS is the monitoring center, a subordinate body of the executive power of the subjects. In the Leningrad Region, the tasks of monitoring the filling of the FGISTSS, quarterly monitoring of resource prices, and annual calculation of the wages of a first-category worker are assigned to the pricing department in construction. According to him, over the past five years, the growth of industry wages has amounted to about 100 percent. However, today the standard wage is significantly underestimated relative to the actual one. It is expected that this year it will amount to 63,500 rubles and will exceed the figures for the previous year by 38 percent. The next area is providing data for calculating indices based on the current cost of resources in accordance with the nomenclature. Over the past five years, the volume of the nomenclature has increased by 85 percent, and indices are already being issued based on the results of this data.

    “The FGISTS database remains low in volume; it has not been possible to increase its volume to 50 percent in five years. In the first quarter of this year, only 34 percent of 800 legal entities engaged in construction activities in the Leningrad Region submitted data. In our opinion, business entities do not have a strong motivation to provide prices for their products. We also made a proposal to strengthen this motivation in the Federation Council. The Ministry of Construction is considering various proposals to increase the database, including a possible expansion of the list of legal entities in the construction community that provide information for the formation of estimated prices. Self-regulatory organizations may be involved in this. The creation of an aggregated resource based on the Unified Information System for collecting prices in automatic mode is also being considered, on the basis of which data on price offers formed based on the results of procurement procedures, that is, from electronic trading platforms, will be collected,” said Evgeny Enokaev.

    In his opinion, in the conditions of price volatility, the discussed tasks for improving the pricing system may go beyond the RIM. For example, the introduction of a correct calculation of average industry salaries in the construction sector. In early February, the state announced that the methodology for calculating them would be revised, which is now quite strictly regulated so that the region cannot increase salaries, even if it considers it necessary. In addition, the development of a comprehensive forecast index-deflator by types of objects is being discussed, since the current procedure for determining the initial maximum contract price is based on the conditions of a fixed contract price taking into account the forecast inflation of the Ministry of Economic Development of Russia, and there is no mechanism for recalculating prices in the conditions of outstripping inflation. It turns out that the current procedure for determining prices in the terms of the contract does not allow contractors to compensate for the resulting difference. The development of a mechanism for automatic indexation of contract prices is also being discussed, that is, the introduction of a mechanism that provides for the possibility of adjusting the contract price in the event of a deviation of actual inflation from the forecast. Optimization of the processes of compensation of expenses not taken into account in the consolidated estimate calculation, which reasonably arose during the implementation of the contract, is also being discussed. For specific decisions, a long way needs to be made, summarized Evgeny Enokaev.

    Using RIM is cheaper and more reliable

    Pavel Goryachkin

    It is too early to draw conclusions, but there are some observations, and the main one shows that most government procurement projects using RIM are cheaper, and the calculations are more reliable, emphasized Pavel Goryachkin, President of the International Public Organization “Union of Estimating Engineers”, Director of the Department of Pricing and Expert-Analytical Work of the Association of Builders of Russia. He emphasized that it is most correct to tie salary calculation not to the first category, but to the actual statistics of accrual of the minimum wage in the region and industry, taking into account the indexation coefficient. For example, in the Leningrad Region, the average minimum accrued salary for October 2024 was 93 thousand rubles, in St. Petersburg – 90 thousand rubles.

    “The filling of the FGISTSS is not the main task. Over the year, the live price indicator in it for the Leningrad Region and St. Petersburg has doubled. A year ago, at this conference, we talked about about 647 resources with live prices, today there are 1,200–1,300 of them. The situation is the same in other regions. Considering that there are 64–67 thousand resources in the industry, we will be doubling their number with live prices for more than a decade. Therefore, when drawing up estimates in the absence of a live price, we take the 2022 price and multiply it by the index. But an estimate that is too voluminous and requires a lot of analytical work is a problem,” says Pavel Goryachkin.

    He also spoke in detail about the problems of settlements for work performed under the RIM estimate and the changes introduced this year.

    With the right approach, the job will become easier

    Maxim Shibnev, Director of Development at Inter Group of Companies, expressed confidence that with a skillful approach and the ability to use digital tools, it is possible to significantly facilitate the work of estimators, including estimators.

    “There is no shortage of software developers now, but there is a crisis in understanding the subject area, that is, in what a specific specialist who will use the software really needs. For example, it is needed by a designer who must correctly allocate resources. Correctly allocated resources are the basis for correctly allocated production, construction management, material quality assessment, and logistics. During construction, there is a lot of different documentation, and the information system operates with this metadata. Currently, titanic efforts are being made at the state level to collect a large amount of metadata. They are accumulating, but it is not yet clear how they will be used. If automation tools are installed on the basis of this metadata, including estimated cost, then it is possible to significantly facilitate work with routine tasks, while leaving creative expert work to specialists,” said Maxim Shibnev.

    He recalled that currently departments of one enterprise cannot exchange information in the information system due to the lack of uniform requirements and classification, a uniform approach. If the same object in the system is called differently, then nothing can be done automatically, especially if you work separately from designers and testing laboratories. Estimators are now starting to enter the digital circuit, but there are still subcontractors without the appropriate competencies.

    “As long as there are gaps in the overall information system, bureaucracy, expenses, and dissatisfaction with technology will multiply. Now, together with the Digitalization and Robotization of the Construction Industry consortium, we are developing an approach for a single bus of interaction between participants in the construction process, which will be based on the regulatory requirements of SMART standards, developed by the Codex consortium. In addition, colleagues from JSC IndigoSoft CT have their own developments in the Project Technical Committee (PTC) 711 “Smart (SMART) Standards”, which can become a link in this interaction bus. It is necessary to ensure universal circulation, exchange and processing of data, manage knowledge, simplify and reduce the cost of access to automation systems. Without comprehensive solutions, it is difficult for individual companies to solve this problem,” said Maxim Shibnev.

    Successful automation requires quality data

    Vitaly Shchukin, General Director for Development of JSC IndigoSoft CT, believes that RIM is a great idea, it combines the need for material and supplier prices. If this is combined, automation will occur.

    “Our company has invested a lot of resources to automate various processes, including interaction with suppliers. But this does not work, because high-quality data is needed. How can a neural network help an estimator? To quickly select a product with an up-to-date price. Correctly built automation is the basis for training a neural network. The task of automation is to organize data. But there is no single standardization methodology yet, and this is a problem that companies are trying to cope with as best they can: they create working catalogs, describing materials at their own discretion. In this regard, they cannot interact with the market, where these products are described differently,” explained Vitaly Shchukin.

    Problems in product descriptions include incomplete names, missing characteristics, spelling and punctuation errors, noted Vitaly Teplov, product manager at IndigoSoft CT.

    “We offer a standard – a unique record according to a template with a set of pricing characteristics. This allows you to get a specific product at current prices in automatic mode by pressing one button, save time on checks and form a high-quality library of materials. It turns out to be an ideal life cycle: the designer adds this standard at the beginning of the design, the estimator selects what is needed, and the buyer knows exactly what he needs to purchase. The catalog is constantly updated,” Vitaly Teplov said.

    Nikolay Samopal, Deputy General Director for Development at ZAO WizardSOFT, used specific examples to talk about options for automating the receipt of a statement and an estimate based on it, and passing a state examination.

    SPbGASU is ready to provide the necessary personnel

    Victoria Vinogradova

    Vice-Rector of SPbGASU for Continuing Education Victoria Vinogradova noted that the mass transition to RIM is complicated by changes in the regulatory framework, the need to use information modeling and obtain additional professional competencies.

    “Our university trains personnel capable of solving issues related to pricing in the construction industry. The university development program for 2023-2032 meets the specified vectors. It includes, among other things, an ecosystem approach to the implementation of educational activities, digital transformation of curricula, the formation of digital and professional competencies of graduates, an individual educational trajectory, and a flexible learning system. 108 basic educational programs are being implemented in 14 large groups of specialties and areas of training. They have state accreditation, most of them also have professional and public accreditation. Most curricula include the discipline “Estimating in Construction,” the vice-rector said.

    According to Victoria Vinogradova, more than 70 percent of graduates find employment in the industry, and the university aims to eliminate the gap between the requirements of educational programs and the needs of the labor market. The expert council at the educational and methodological council of SPbGASU, which includes both graduates and representatives of the real sector of the economy, helps with this. The vice-rector named the practice of targeted training, project-based training, and the implementation of corporate and network programs, within the framework of which the educational organization combines its resources with the employer, as a good way to interact with employers.

    “We work within the framework of the concept of continuous education, where the industrial partner is considered as the customer, and the educational organization is considered as the performer. Moreover, this is possible already at the initial stages – in career guidance work in schools and colleges. As part of continuous education and taking into account the digital transformation, we are implementing a number of projects related to information modeling technologies. In 13 schools in St. Petersburg and one school in Yekaterinburg, we are implementing TIM classes, holding a TIM elective for colleges. We attract industrial partners to work with students as part of the TIM championship.

    A unique story – complex TIM diploma projects. Students of different specialties, including estimators, jointly complete a diploma project. In addition, the university is conducting scientific research on the formation of a methodology for determining the estimated cost, taking into account the use of digital information models.

    Today, any specialist understands that in the course of their professional activity they need to acquire additional competencies. Therefore, we implement additional education. In the field of economics and management, we currently have six additional retraining programs and several advanced training programs. Among the latter is a program that examines RIM issues.

    I would like to thank all the conference participants. I am sure that our discussion will significantly help in resolving issues related to the transition to this method,” concluded Victoria Vinogradova.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: China, Botswana sign agreement on economic, technical cooperation

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    GABORONE, Feb. 27 — China and Botswana signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation between the two governments on Thursday in Gaborone, the capital of the southern African country.

    Speaking at the signing ceremony, Chinese Ambassador to Botswana Fan Yong said China and Botswana have long enjoyed a strong friendship, yielding fruitful results in practical cooperation. With the implementation of the agreement and other outcomes of the 2024 Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, cooperation between the two countries in various fields will be further deepened.

    For his part, Botswanan Vice President and Minister of Finance Ndaba Gaolathe praised China’s remarkable achievements and expressed gratitude for China’s continuous support to Botswana, saying he hopes cooperation with China will contribute to Botswana’s economic growth and the well-being of its people.

    According to official statistics, in 2023, bilateral trade between China and Botswana reached 710 million U.S. dollars, marking a 15.7 percent year-on-year increase. In the first half of 2024, bilateral trade amounted to 419 million dollars, up 12.5 percent year on year.

    This year marks the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China and Botswana, which were established on Jan. 6, 1975. The two countries’ relations were upgraded to a strategic partnership in September 2024.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australia’s retirement savings are too big to invest at home – here’s why super funds are looking to the US

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Susan Thorp, Professor of Finance, University of Sydney

    Marek Masik/Shutterstock

    You might remember Pesto, the king penguin chick who became a star attraction at Melbourne Aquarium last year. Good food, good genes and a safe home let Pesto grow into a huge ball of brown fluff twice the size of his parents. Pesto became a local and international celebrity.

    While not cute or funny like Pesto, Australia’s financial sector gave birth to its own baby three decades ago that has since rapidly grown into a big adult – superannuation. It, too, has become internationally famous.

    This week, our superannuation sector attracted the attention of US asset managers and government officials, including the new US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, at a summit in Washington DC.

    Super industry leaders joined Treasurer Jim Chalmers and the Australian ambassador to the US, Kevin Rudd, to pitch a strengthening of ties. So, why are Australian super funds so keen to shore up support in the United States?




    Read more:
    Your super fund is invested in private markets. What are they and why has ASIC raised concerns?


    A giant nest egg

    Figures from the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) show the total pool of superannuation assets had grown to about A$4.2 trillion by December 2024. That’s up 11.5% on the year before.

    That’s about 160% of the value of all goods and services produced in Australia – the gross domestic product (GDP) – over the year to June 2024 at $2.6 trillion.

    This scales to a very large pool of investable retirement money – the fifth largest in the world. Australia’s population ranks just 54th in the world.

    Some of the biggest individual funds have significant assets under management. Australian Super and Australian Retirement Trust, for example, both manage more than $300 billion in retirement savings.

    Looking overseas

    This leads us to why the Australian super industry is securing openings in the US. Australian super funds have invested some funds overseas since their inception. But this practice is expanding quickly for two reasons.

    First, the sheer size of the superannuation investment pool has largely outgrown its Australian asset base.

    To illustrate, our $4.2 trillion super pool is significantly larger than the total market capitalisation of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX), about $3.1 trillion.

    Without new places to invest our super, it’s impossible to keep earning a return on it.

    The second – and related – reason is the need for diversification. It makes sense to lower risk by spreading funds across industries, geographies and jurisdictions.

    A scan of the aggregated asset allocation of large Australian super funds shows that around half of the funds invested in equities, property and infrastructure are currently in overseas assets.

    The US accounts for about 45% of aggregate financial assets of all investors worldwide – more than US$90 trillion (A$144 trillion).

    The strategy to diversify investments has paid off. The US stock market has seen some spectacular recent returns, with annual returns of more than 20% in some years. These have far outpaced those of the ASX.

    Compulsory savings

    Australia’s super sector has been fed by compulsory contributions (savings) and investment returns. Super has also been protected by legislation that makes participation compulsory for most workers and preserves savings until retirement.

    Australia has had a system of compulsory employer superannuation contributions for workers since 1992.
    DGLimages/Shutterstock

    Since 1992, employers have made compulsory (superannuation guarantee) contributions on behalf of workers into superannuation accounts. The compulsory contribution has risen significantly from an initial 3% of earnings to 12% of earnings from July this year.

    High coverage (well over 90% of workers), combined with rising contribution rates, has meant the amount of money flowing into superannuation accounts has grown at a remarkable compound annual rate of 14% since 1992.

    Even after the superannuation guarantee rate peaks at 12% this year, growth in labour earnings, fed by workforce and productivity growth, will continue to generate substantial inflows.

    Can’t touch our nest egg early

    Australia’s strict rules preventing withdrawals from super are among the tightest in the world. With some exceptions for extreme hardship, members of super funds can withdraw their savings from age 60 if they retire, and from age 65 even if they have not retired.

    An ageing population will mean more retirees in future decades, speeding up outflows. But so far, Australian retirees are proving to be very cautious with their nest eggs.

    Along with compulsory contributions and rules on withdrawing it, investment returns have grown the super baby, at rates of 7.3% annually over the past 30 years, or about 4.4% annually above inflation.

    The super sector is still smaller than its older sibling, the banking system, where assets of A$6.3 trillion are about 240% of the value of annual GDP. But super is forecast to grow to 200% of annual GDP over the next two decades.

    Riskier investments

    To generate these rates of return, Australian super funds have invested in a wide range of financial assets, and with a substantial exposure to high return (but riskier) assets.

    In Australia, super funds invest around two-thirds
    of funds in equities, property, infrastructure and commodities, and around one-third in safer bonds and cash.

    That contrasts with some other pension systems, such as Japan and the UK, where a majority of funds are invested in safer assets like government bonds.

    Susan Thorp is a member of UniSuper. She receives and has received research funding from the Australian Research Council, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, the TIAA Institute (USA), IFM, and UniSuper and Cbus Superannuation funds via ARC Linkage Grants. Thorp was previously Professor of Finance and Superannuation at UTS, a position that was partly funded by Sydney Financial Forum (Colonial First State Global Asset Management), the NSW Government, the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), the Industry Superannuation Network (ISN), and the Paul Woolley Centre for the Study of Capital Market Dysfunctionality, UTS. She was an Associate Investigator for the ARC Centre of Excellence in Population Ageing Research (CEPAR), and is a member of the OECD-International Network on Financial Education Research Committee, the Steering Committee of the Mercer CFA Global Pensions Index, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) Consultative Committee, the Board of New College (UNSW) and the Research Committee of Super Consumers Australia, a not-for-profit advocacy organisation for Australian pension plan participants.

    ref. Australia’s retirement savings are too big to invest at home – here’s why super funds are looking to the US – https://theconversation.com/australias-retirement-savings-are-too-big-to-invest-at-home-heres-why-super-funds-are-looking-to-the-us-250920

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Stats NZ information release: Employment indicators: January 2025

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Employment indicators: January 2025 28 February 2025 – Employment indicators provide an early indication of changes in the labour market.

    Key facts
    Changes in the seasonally adjusted filled jobs for the January 2025 month (compared with the December 2024 month) were:

    • all industries – up 0.3 percent (7,948 jobs) to 2.36 million filled jobs
    • primary industries – down 0.2 percent (198 jobs)
    • goods-producing industries – down 0.2 percent (1,088 jobs)
    • service industries – up 0.5 percent (8,361 jobs).

    Files:

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Stats NZ information release: Employment indicators: January 2025

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Employment indicators: January 202528 February 2025 – Employment indicators provide an early indication of changes in the labour market.

    Key facts
    Changes in the seasonally adjusted filled jobs for the January 2025 month (compared with the December 2024 month) were:

    • all industries – up 0.3 percent (7,948 jobs) to 2.36 million filled jobs
    • primary industries – down 0.2 percent (198 jobs)
    • goods-producing industries – down 0.2 percent (1,088 jobs)
    • service industries – up 0.5 percent (8,361 jobs).

    Files:

     

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Sunrun Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Cash Generation of $34 million in Q4 after safe harbor equipment purchases, third consecutive quarter of positive Cash Generation

    Paid down $132 million of recourse debt in Q4 with excess cash

    Cash Generation guidance of $200 million to $500 million in 2025

    Cash Generation guidance of $40 to $50 million in Q1

    Net Earning Assets increased to $6.8 billion, including $947 million of Total Cash

    Storage Capacity Installed of 392 Megawatt hours in Q4, exceeding high-end of guidance range and representing 78% year-over-year growth, as storage attachment rates reach 62%

    Solar Energy Capacity Installed of 242 Megawatts in Q4, within the guidance range, reaching 7.5 Gigawatts of Networked Solar Energy Capacity

    SAN FRANCISCO, Feb. 27, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Sunrun (Nasdaq: RUN), the nation’s leading provider of clean energy as a subscription service, today announced financial results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024.

    “We are growing, generating meaningful cash, increasing our book value of deployed systems, and paying down debt. We are poised to further improve our operating and financial results, and deliver a very strong 2025 with meaningful Cash Generation. Our actions to optimize our product mix, prioritize the highest value geographies and routes to market and an intense focus on cost as we grow have resulted in the highest Net Subscriber Values Sunrun has ever reported,” said Mary Powell, Sunrun’s Chief Executive Officer. “We are improving in every dimension we control – focusing on fast, effective execution, delivering strong financial and operating results, gaining share in a disciplined way, while building a long-term foundation of valuable grid resources.”

    “In the fourth quarter, we again set new margin records and delivered the third consecutive quarter of Cash Generation. We continue to execute well in the capital markets, raising more than $4 billion in asset-level debt and tax equity financing during 2024, and more than $800 million in non-recourse debt financing year-to-date. We have extended our runway of tax equity commitments and term sheets, including $1.3 billion added year-to-date,” said Danny Abajian, Sunrun’s Chief Financial Officer. “We have a strong balance sheet with no near-term corporate debt maturities and have paid down recourse parent debt by $186 million since March, including a $132 million paydown using excess cash in Q4. As we increase our Cash Generation, we will continue to further pay down parent recourse debt and are committed to a capital allocation strategy beyond this initial de-leveraging period that drives significant shareholder value.”

    Fourth Quarter Updates

    • Storage Attachment Rates Reach 62%: Customer Additions with storage grew more than 50% during the quarter compared to the prior-year period. Storage attachment rates on installations reached 62% in Q4, up from 45% in the prior-year period, with 392 Megawatt hours installed during the quarter. Sunrun has installed more than 156,000 solar and storage systems, representing over 2.5 Gigawatt hours of stored energy capacity.
    • Continued Strong Capital Markets Execution: In January 2025, Sunrun priced a $629 million securitization of residential solar and battery systems. The securitization is Sunrun’s thirteenth securitization since 2015 and first issuance in 2025. The oversubscribed transaction was structured with three separate classes of A rated notes, only two of which were publicly offered. The weighted average spread of the notes was 197 basis points, which was an improvement of approximately 38 basis points from our prior securitization in September. Similar to prior transactions, Sunrun raised additional capital in a subordinated non-recourse financing, which increased the cumulative advance rate to above 80% as measured against the initial Contracted Subscriber Value of the portfolio.
    • Paying Down Recourse Debt: We continue to pay down parent recourse debt. During the fourth quarter, we repurchased $125.5 million in principal of our 2026 Convertible Notes. As of December 31, 2024 we had only $7.7 million outstanding of these notes, which we may repurchase in 2025. Since March 31, 2024 we have paid down recourse debt by $186 million, by repurchasing our 2026 Convertible Notes and reducing borrowings under our recourse Working Capital Facility. We have also increased our Total Cash balance by $164 million and grown Net Earning Assets by $1.5 billion. We expect to further pay down our recourse debt in 2025 by $100 million or more. Aside from the $7.7 million outstanding of our 2026 Convertible Notes, we have no recourse debt maturities until March 2027. Over time we will explore further capital allocation options to maximize shareholder value, based on market conditions and our long-term outlook.
    • Improving Grid Stability with Virtual Power Plants: During 2024, Sunrun’s virtual power plants (VPPs) successfully supported power grids across the country with a combined instantaneous peak of nearly 80 megawatts—a capacity greater than many traditional fossil-fuel power plants. These innovative programs leveraged Sunrun’s fleet of residential solar and battery systems—the largest in America—empowering customers to generate, store, and share their own solar energy. In 2024, more than 20,000 Sunrun customers participated in 16 virtual power plant programs across nine states and territories. From California and Texas to Puerto Rico and New England, the customers’ batteries supplied on-demand, stored solar energy to augment power resources during hundreds of critical energy events.

    Key Operating Metrics

    In the fourth quarter of 2024, Customer Additions were 32,932 including 30,709 Subscriber Additions. As of December 31, 2024, Sunrun had 1,048,842 Customers, including 889,186 Subscribers. Customers grew 12% in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Annual Recurring Revenue from Subscribers was approximately $1.6 billion as of December 31, 2024. The Average Contract Life Remaining of Subscribers was 17.6 years as of December 31, 2024.

    Subscriber Value was $55,811 in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 11% increase compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Creation Cost was $36,634 in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 1% decrease compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Net Subscriber Value was $19,177 in the fourth quarter of 2024. Total Value Generated was $589 million in the fourth quarter of 2024. On a pro-forma basis assuming a 7.3% discount rate, consistent with capital costs observed in the quarter, Subscriber Value was $50,998 and Net Subscriber Value was $14,364 in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Gross Earning Assets as of December 31, 2024, were $17.8 billion. Net Earning Assets were $6.8 billion, which included $947 million in Total Cash, as of December 31, 2024.

    Cash Generation was $34.2 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, the third consecutive quarter of positive Cash Generation.

    Storage Capacity Installed was 392.0 Megawatt hours in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 78% increase compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Solar Energy Capacity Installed was 242.4 Megawatts in the fourth quarter of 2024, a 7% increase compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Included in this figure is 232.0 Megawatts of Solar Energy Capacity Installed for Subscribers in the fourth quarter of 2024, an 11% increase compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Networked Solar Energy Capacity was 7,531 Megawatts as of December 31, 2024. Included in this figure is 6,436 Megawatts of Networked Solar Energy Capacity for Subscribers as of December 31, 2024.

    Networked Storage Capacity was 2.5 Gigawatt hours as of December 31, 2024.

    The solar energy systems we deployed in Q4 are expected to offset the emission of 4.8 million metric tons of CO2 over the next thirty years. Over the last twelve months ended December 31, 2024, Sunrun’s systems are estimated to have offset 4.0 million metric tons of CO2.

    Outlook

    Cash Generation is expected to be in a range of $40 million to $50 million in the first quarter of 2025.

    For the full-year 2025, Cash Generation is expected to be in a range of $200 million to $500 million.

    Storage Capacity Installed is expected to be in a range of 265 to 275 Megawatt hours in the first quarter of 2025, representing approximately 30% growth year over year at the midpoint.

    Solar Energy Capacity Installed is expected to be in a range of 170 to 180 Megawatts in the first quarter of 2025, representing approximately flat year over year growth at the midpoint.

    For the full-year 2025, the Company expects robust growth in Storage Capacity Installed year over year, and Solar Energy Capacity Installed is expected to be approximately flat year over year.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 GAAP Results

    Total revenue was $518.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, up $1.9 million, or 0%, from the fourth quarter of 2023. Customer agreements and incentives revenue was $388.6 million, an increase of $67.0 million, or 21%, compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. Solar energy systems and product sales revenue was $129.9 million, a decrease of $65.1 million, or 33%, compared to the fourth quarter of 2023. The increasing mix of Subscribers results in less upfront revenue recognition, as revenue is recognized over the life of the Customer Agreement, which is typically 20 or 25 years.

    Total cost of revenue was $421.0 million, a decrease of 13% year-over-year. Total operating expenses were $652.6 million, a decrease of 9% year-over-year, on a pro-forma basis to exclude a non-cash goodwill impairment, which was incurred in the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Net loss attributable to common stockholders was $2,813.7 million, or $12.51 per basic and diluted share for the fourth quarter of 2024. Pro forma to exclude non-cash impairment charges, results in non-GAAP net income of $360.9 million or $1.41 per diluted share for the fourth quarter of 2024.

    Full Year 2024 GAAP Results

    Total revenue was $2,037.7 million in the full year 2024, down $222.1 million, or 10%, from the full year 2023. Customer agreements and incentives revenue was $1,505.2 million, an increase of $318.5 million, or 27%, compared to the full year 2023. Solar energy systems and product sales revenue was $532.5 million, a decrease of $540.6 million, or 50%, compared to the full year 2023.

    Total cost of revenue was $1,709.2 million, a decrease of 18% year-over-year. Total operating expenses were $2,610.8 million, a decrease of 15% year-over year, on a pro-forma basis to exclude non-cash goodwill impairment, which was incurred in both the full year 2023 and full year 2024.

    During the year, Sunrun recorded a non-cash goodwill impairment charge of approximately $3.1 billion. Due to the decline in our stock price, we wrote down our goodwill balance of $3.1 billion in its entirety during the fourth quarter of 2024. The goodwill primarily arose following the stock-for-stock acquisition of Vivint Solar in October 2020, with the majority arising from and determined based on the market capitalizations at the time of the acquisition. The Company recorded a non-cash goodwill impairment charge of $3.1 billion, or $14.05 per basic share, in our Consolidated Statement of Operations for the full year 2024, which was reflected in the Company’s fourth quarter results.

    Net loss attributable to common stockholders was $2,846.2 million, or $12.81 per basic and diluted share for the full year 2024. Pro-forma to exclude non-cash impairment charges, results in non-GAAP net income of $333.7 million or $1.33 per diluted share for the full-year 2024.

    Financing Activities

    As of February 27, 2025, closed transactions and executed term sheets provide us with expected tax equity to fund over 500 Megawatts of Solar Energy Capacity Installed for Subscribers beyond what was deployed through December 31, 2024. Sunrun also has $680 million in unused commitments available in its non-recourse senior revolving warehouse loan after the January securitization, to fund approximately 230 megawatts of projects for Subscribers.

    Conference Call Information

    Sunrun is hosting a conference call for analysts and investors to discuss its fourth quarter and full year 2024 results and business outlook at 1:30 p.m. Pacific Time today, February 27, 2025. A live audio webcast of the conference call along with supplemental financial information will be accessible via the “Investor Relations” section of Sunrun’s website at https://investors.sunrun.com. The conference call can also be accessed live over the phone by dialing (877) 407-5989 (toll free) or (201) 689-8434 (toll). An audio replay will be available following the call on the Sunrun Investor Relations website for approximately one month.

    About Sunrun

    Sunrun Inc. (Nasdaq: RUN) revolutionized the solar industry in 2007 by removing financial barriers and democratizing access to locally-generated, renewable energy. Today, Sunrun is the nation’s leading provider of clean energy as a subscription service, offering residential solar and storage with no upfront costs. Sunrun’s innovative products and solutions can connect homes to the cleanest energy on earth, providing them with energy security, predictability, and peace of mind. Sunrun also manages energy services that benefit communities, utilities, and the electric grid while enhancing customer value. Discover more at www.sunrun.com

    Non-GAAP Information

    This press release includes references to certain non-GAAP financial measures, such as non-GAAP net (loss) income and non-GAAP net (loss) income per share. We believe that these non-GAAP financial measures, when reviewed in conjunction with GAAP financial measures, can provide meaningful supplemental information for investors regarding the performance of our business and facilitate a meaningful evaluation of current period performance on a comparable basis with prior periods. Our management uses these non-GAAP financial measures in order to have comparable financial results to analyze changes in our underlying business from quarter to quarter. These non-GAAP financial measures should be considered as a supplement to, and not as a substitute for or superior to the GAAP financial measures presented in this press release and our financial statements and other publicly filed reports. Non-GAAP measures as presented herein may not be comparable to similarly titled measures used by other companies.

    Non-GAAP net (loss) income is defined as GAAP net (loss) income adjusted by the non-cash goodwill impairment charge, non-cash adjustment to equity investments, and the debt discount amortization. Management believes the exclusion of this non-cash and non-recurring item provides useful supplemental information to investors and facilitates the analysis of its operating results and comparison of operating results across reporting periods.

    Forward Looking Statements

    This communication contains forward-looking statements related to Sunrun (the “Company”) within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements related to: the Company’s financial and operating guidance and expectations; the Company’s business plan, trajectory, expectations, market leadership, competitive advantages, operational and financial results and metrics (and the assumptions related to the calculation of such metrics); the Company’s momentum in its business strategies including expectations regarding market share, total addressable market, growth in certain geographies, customer value proposition, market penetration, growth of certain divisions, financing activities, financing capacity, product mix, and ability to manage cash flow and liquidity; the growth of the solar industry; the Company’s financing activities and expectations to refinance, amend, and/or extend any financing facilities; trends or potential trends within the solar industry, our business, customer base, and market; the Company’s ability to derive value from the anticipated benefits of partnerships, new technologies, and pilot programs, including contract renewal and repowering programs; anticipated demand, market acceptance, and market adoption of the Company’s offerings, including new products, services, and technologies; the Company’s strategy to be a margin-focused, multi-product, customer-oriented company; the ability to increase margins based on a shift in product focus; expectations regarding the growth of home electrification, electric vehicles, virtual power plants, and distributed energy resources; the Company’s ability to manage suppliers, inventory, and workforce; supply chains and regulatory impacts affecting supply chains; the Company’s leadership team and talent development; the legislative and regulatory environment of the solar industry and the potential impacts of proposed, amended, and newly adopted legislation and regulation on the solar industry and our business; the ongoing expectations regarding the Company’s storage and energy services businesses and anticipated emissions reductions due to utilization of the Company’s solar energy systems; and factors outside of the Company’s control such as macroeconomic trends, bank failures, public health emergencies, natural disasters, acts of war, terrorism, geopolitical conflict, or armed conflict / invasion, and the impacts of climate change. These statements are not guarantees of future performance; they reflect the Company’s current views with respect to future events and are based on assumptions and estimates and are subject to known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause actual results, performance or achievements to be materially different from expectations or results projected or implied by forward-looking statements. The risks and uncertainties that could cause the Company’s results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements include: the Company’s continued ability to manage costs and compete effectively; the availability of additional financing on acceptable terms; worldwide economic conditions, including slow or negative growth rates and inflation; volatile or rising interest rates; changes in policies and regulations, including net metering, interconnection limits, and fixed fees, or caps and licensing restrictions and the impact of these changes on the solar industry and our business; the Company’s ability to attract and retain the Company’s business partners; supply chain risks and associated costs; realizing the anticipated benefits of past or future investments, partnerships, strategic transactions, or acquisitions, and integrating those acquisitions; the Company’s leadership team and ability to attract and retain key employees; changes in the retail prices of traditional utility generated electricity; the availability of rebates, tax credits and other incentives; the availability of solar panels, batteries, and other components and raw materials; the Company’s business plan and the Company’s ability to effectively manage the Company’s growth and labor constraints; the Company’s ability to meet the covenants in the Company’s investment funds and debt facilities; factors impacting the home electrification and solar industry generally, and such other risks and uncertainties identified in the reports that we file with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission from time to time. All forward-looking statements used herein are based on information available to us as of the date hereof, and we assume no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements for any reason, except as required by law.

    Citations to industry and market statistics used herein may be found in our Investor Presentation, available via the “Investor Relations” section of Sunrun’s website at https://investors.sunrun.com.

    Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (In Thousands)
        As of December 31,
          2024     2023
    Assets        
    Current assets:        
    Cash   $ 574,956   $ 678,821
    Restricted cash     372,312     308,869
    Accounts receivable, net     170,706     172,001
    Inventories     402,083     459,746
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets     202,579     262,822
    Total current assets     1,722,636     1,882,259
    Restricted cash     148     148
    Solar energy systems, net     15,032,115     13,028,871
    Property and equipment, net     121,239     149,139
    Goodwill         3,122,168
    Other assets     3,021,746     2,267,652
    Total assets   $ 19,897,884   $ 20,450,237
    Liabilities and total equity        
    Current liabilities:        
    Accounts payable   $ 354,214   $ 230,723
    Distributions payable to noncontrolling interests and redeemable noncontrolling interests     41,464     35,180
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities     543,752     499,225
    Deferred revenue, current portion     129,442     128,600
    Deferred grants, current portion     7,900     8,199
    Finance lease obligations, current portion     26,045     22,053
    Non-recourse debt, current portion     231,665     547,870
    Pass-through financing obligation, current portion         16,309
    Total current liabilities     1,334,482     1,488,159
    Deferred revenue, net of current portion     1,208,905     1,067,461
    Deferred grants, net of current portion     196,535     195,724
    Finance lease obligations, net of current portion     66,139     68,753
    Line of credit     384,226     539,502
    Non-recourse debt, net of current portion     11,806,181     9,191,689
    Convertible senior notes     479,420     392,867
    Pass-through financing obligation, net of current portion         278,333
    Other liabilities     119,846     190,866
    Deferred tax liabilities     137,940     122,870
    Total liabilities     15,733,674     13,536,224
    Redeemable noncontrolling interests     624,159     676,177
    Total stockholders’ equity     2,554,207     5,230,228
    Noncontrolling interests     985,844     1,007,608
    Total equity     3,540,051     6,237,836
    Total liabilities, redeemable noncontrolling interests and total equity   $ 19,897,884   $ 20,450,237
    Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (In Thousands, Except Per Share Amounts)

        Three Months Ended
    December 31,
      Year Ended
    December 31,
          2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Revenue:                
    Customer agreements and incentives   $ 388,574     $ 321,555     $ 1,505,227     $ 1,186,706  
    Solar energy systems and product sales     129,918       195,035       532,492       1,073,107  
    Total revenue     518,492       516,590       2,037,719       2,259,813  
    Operating expenses:                
    Cost of customer agreements and incentives     292,632       287,780       1,169,213       1,077,114  
    Cost of solar energy systems and product sales     128,361       194,808       539,952       1,019,638  
    Sales and marketing     150,751       166,760       617,162       740,821  
    Research and development     8,794       7,663       39,304       21,816  
    General and administrative     72,045       57,110       245,127       221,067  
    Goodwill Impairment     3,122,168             3,122,168       1,158,000  
    Total operating expenses     3,774,751       714,121       5,732,926       4,238,456  
    Loss from operations     (3,256,259 )     (197,531 )     (3,695,207 )     (1,978,643 )
    Interest expense, net     (233,385 )     (181,826 )     (848,366 )     (652,989 )
    Other income (expense), net     89,829       (157,644 )     161,539       (63,900 )
    Loss before income taxes     (3,399,815 )     (537,001 )     (4,382,034 )     (2,695,532 )
    Income tax benefit     136       (1,595 )     (26,817 )     (12,691 )
    Net loss     (3,399,951 )     (535,406 )     (4,355,217 )     (2,682,841 )
    Net loss attributable to noncontrolling interests and redeemable noncontrolling interests     (586,294 )     (185,282 )     (1,509,050 )     (1,078,344 )
    Net loss attributable to common stockholders   $ (2,813,657 )   $ (350,124 )   $ (2,846,167 )   $ (1,604,497 )
    Net loss per share attributable to common stockholders                
    Basic   $ (12.51 )   $ (1.60 )   $ (12.81 )   $ (7.41 )
    Diluted   $ (12.51 )   $ (1.60 )   $ (12.81 )   $ (7.41 )
    Weighted average shares used to compute net loss per share attributable to common stockholders                
    Basic     224,896       218,461       222,215       216,642  
    Diluted     224,896       218,461       222,215       216,642  
    Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (In Thousands)

        Three Months Ended December 31,   Year Ended December 31,
          2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Operating activities:                
    Net loss   $ (3,399,951 )   $ (535,406 )   $ (4,355,217 )   $ (2,682,841 )
    Adjustments to reconcile net loss to net cash used in operating activities:                
    Depreciation and amortization, net of amortization of deferred grants     162,343       143,024       620,876       531,669  
    Goodwill impairment     3,122,168             3,122,168       1,158,000  
    Deferred income taxes     136       (1,623 )     (26,817 )     (12,716 )
    Stock-based compensation expense     28,869       27,555       112,825       111,781  
    Interest on pass-through financing obligations           4,862       8,837       19,504  
    Reduction in pass-through financing obligations           (9,820 )     (20,787 )     (40,352 )
    Unrealized (gain) loss on derivatives     (122,319 )     108,226       (120,008 )     28,105  
    Other noncash items     105,220       118,956       210,479       261,390  
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:                
    Accounts receivable     5,741       5,762       (14,974 )     15,748  
    Inventories     (59,735 )     202,055       57,663       324,158  
    Prepaid expenses and other current assets     (301,380 )     (142,438 )     (771,997 )     (476,628 )
    Accounts payable     141,070       (52,514 )     177,449       (108,785 )
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities     4,182       (31,986 )     80,588       (56,473 )
    Deferred revenue     55,297       47,340       152,762       106,700  
    Net cash used in operating activities     (258,359 )     (116,007 )     (766,153 )     (820,740 )
    Investing activities:                
    Payments for the costs of solar energy systems     (791,785 )     (651,462 )     (2,699,452 )     (2,587,183 )
    Purchase of equity investment           (5,000 )           (5,000 )
    Purchases of property and equipment, net     (627 )     (4,662 )     (1,572 )     (20,960 )
    Net cash provided by (used in) investing activities     (792,412 )     (661,124 )     (2,701,024 )     (2,613,143 )
    Financing activities:                
    Proceeds from state tax credits, net of recapture                 5,203       4,033  
    Proceeds from trade receivable financing     124,261       41,225       124,261       41,225  
    Repayment of trade receivable financing           (41,225 )           (41,225 )
    Proceeds from line of credit     48,700       473,277       354,256       1,124,675  
    Repayment of line of credit     (56,998 )     (451,023 )     (509,532 )     (1,090,331 )
    Proceeds from issuance of convertible senior notes, net of capped call transaction                 444,822        
    Repurchase of convertible senior notes     (117,235 )     (1,545 )     (346,581 )     (1,545 )
    Proceeds from issuance of non-recourse debt     644,950       556,100       4,009,906       3,745,580  
    Repayment of non-recourse debt     (102,748 )     (175,728 )     (1,794,962 )     (1,575,527 )
    Payment of debt fees     (128 )     (412 )     (93,875 )     (47,342 )
    Proceeds from pass-through financing and other obligations, net           2,100       4,795       8,812  
    Repayment of pass-through financing obligation                 (240,288 )      
    Payment of finance lease obligations     (6,605 )     (6,484 )     (27,240 )     (23,279 )
    Contributions received from noncontrolling interests and redeemable noncontrolling interests     521,480       459,858       1,811,966       1,572,399  
    Distributions paid to noncontrolling interests and redeemable noncontrolling interests     (70,269 )     (51,578 )     (308,657 )     (225,114 )
    Acquisition of noncontrolling interest     (4,761 )           (26,195 )     (46,274 )
    Proceeds from transfer of investment tax credits     148,586       6,980       705,697       6,980  
    Payments to redeemable noncontrolling interests and noncontrolling interests of investment tax credits     (148,586 )     (6,980 )     (705,697 )     (6,980 )
    Net proceeds related to stock-based award activities     6,923       8,459       18,876       22,611  
    Net cash provided by financing activities     987,570       813,024       3,426,755       3,468,698  
    Net change in cash and restricted cash     (63,201 )     35,893       (40,422 )     34,815  
    Cash and restricted cash, beginning of period     1,010,617       951,945       987,838       953,023  
    Cash and restricted cash, end of period   $ 947,416     $ 987,838     $ 947,416     $ 987,838  
    Reconciliation between GAAP and Non-GAAP diluted (loss) income per share:

        Three Months Ended
    December 31, 2024
      Year Ended
    December 31, 2024
        Net (Loss)
    Income
      Diluted EPS   Net (Loss)
    Income
      Diluted EPS
    GAAP diluted loss per share   $ (2,813,657 )   $ (12.51 )   $ (2,846,167 )   $ (12.81 )
    Debt Discount Amortization     1,131       0.01       6,438       0.03  
    Non-cash impairment charges (2)     3,173,450       14.11       3,173,450       14.28  
    Non-GAAP diluted income per share (1)   $ 360,924     $ 1.41     $ 333,721     $ 1.33  
                     
    GAAP weighted average shares for diluted EPS     224,896           222,215      
    Non-GAAP weighted average shares for diluted EPS     256,614           250,622      


    (1)
       Non-GAAP diluted income per share excludes the effects of the pro forma adjustment detailed above. Non- GAAP diluted income per share is adjusted to exclude this item, as it is not used by management to evaluate the performance of the business.
    (2)   Excluding this item of non-recurring, infrequent or unusual nature and its impact on the comparability of our results for the period to prior periods and future expected trends.

    Key Operating and Financial Metrics

    The following operating metrics are used by management to evaluate the performance of the business. Management believes these metrics, when taken together with other information contained in our filings with the SEC and within this press release, provide investors with helpful information to determine the economic performance of the business activities in a period that would otherwise not be observable from historic GAAP measures. Management believes that it is helpful to investors to evaluate the present value of cash flows expected from subscribers over the full expected relationship with such subscribers (“Subscriber Value”, more fully defined in the definitions appendix below) in comparison to the costs associated with adding these customers, regardless of whether or not the costs are expensed or capitalized in the period (“Creation Cost”, more fully defined in the definitions appendix below). The Company also believes that Subscriber Value, Creation Costs, and Total Value Generated are useful metrics for investors because they present an unlevered view of all of the costs associated with new customers in a period compared to the expected future cash flows from these customers over a 30-year period, based on contracted pricing terms with its customers, which is not observable in any current or historic GAAP-derived metric. Management believes it is useful for investors to also evaluate the future expected cash flows from all customers that have been deployed through the respective measurement date, less estimated costs to maintain such systems and estimated distributions to tax equity partners in consolidated joint venture partnership flip structures, and distributions to project equity investors (“Gross Earning Assets”, more fully defined in the definitions appendix below). The Company also believes Gross Earning Assets is useful for management and investors because it represents the remaining future expected cash flows from existing customers, which is not a current or historic GAAP-derived measure.

    Various assumptions are made when calculating these metrics. Both Subscriber Value and Gross Earning Assets utilize a 6% rate to discount future cash flows to the present period. Furthermore, these metrics assume that customers renew after the initial contract period at a rate equal to 90% of the rate in effect at the end of the initial contract term. For Customer Agreements with 25-year initial contract terms, a 5-year renewal period is assumed. For a 20-year initial contract term, a 10-year renewal period is assumed. In all instances, we assume a 30-year customer relationship, although the customer may renew for additional years, or purchase the system. Estimated cost of servicing assets has been deducted and is estimated based on the service agreements underlying each fund.

    In-period volume metrics: Three Months Ended
    December 31, 2024
     
    Customer Additions   32,932  
    Subscriber Additions (included within Customer Additions)   30,709  
    Solar Energy Capacity Installed (in Megawatts)   242.4  
    Solar Energy Capacity Installed for Subscribers (in Megawatts)   232.0  
    Storage Capacity Installed (in Megawatt hours)   392.0  
         
    In-period value creation metrics: Three Months Ended
    December 31, 2024
     
    Subscriber Value Contracted Period $52,035  
    Subscriber Value Renewal Period $3,776  
    Subscriber Value $55,811  
    Creation Cost $36,634  
    Net Subscriber Value $19,177  
    Total Value Generated (in millions) $588.9  
         
    In-period environmental impact metrics: Three Months Ended
    December 31, 2024
     
    Positive Environmental Impact from Customers (over trailing twelve months, in millions of metric tons of CO2 avoidance)   4.0  
    Positive Expected Lifetime Environmental Impact from Customer Additions (in millions of metric tons of CO2 avoidance)   4.8  
         
    Period-end metrics: December 31, 2024  
    Customers   1,048,842  
    Subscribers (subset of Customers)   889,186  
    Households Served in Low-Income Multifamily Properties   21,129  
    Networked Solar Energy Capacity (in Megawatts)   7,531  
    Networked Solar Energy Capacity for Subscribers (in Megawatts)   6,436  
    Networked Storage Capacity (in Megawatt hours)   2,525  
    Annual Recurring Revenue (in millions) $1,644  
    Average Contract Life Remaining (in years)   17.6  
    Gross Earning Assets Contracted Period (in millions) $13,791  
    Gross Earning Assets Renewal Period (in millions) $4,043  
    Gross Earning Assets (in millions) $17,834  
    Net Earning Assets (in millions) $6,766  
           

    Figures presented above may not sum due to rounding. For adjustments related to Subscriber Value and Creation Cost, please see the supplemental Creation Cost and Net Subscriber Value calculation memo for each applicable period, which is available on investors.sunrun.com.

    Definitions

    Deployments represent solar or storage systems, whether sold directly to customers or subject to executed Customer Agreements (i) for which we have confirmation that the systems are installed, subject to final inspection, or (ii) in the case of certain system installations by our partners, for which we have accrued at least 80% of the expected project cost (inclusive of acquisitions of installed systems).

    Customer Agreements refer to, collectively, solar or storage power purchase agreements and leases.

    Subscriber Additions represent the number of Deployments in the period that are subject to executed Customer Agreements.

    Customer Additions represent the number of Deployments in the period.

    Solar Energy Capacity Installed represents the aggregate megawatt production capacity of our solar energy systems that were recognized as Deployments in the period.

    Solar Energy Capacity Installed for Subscribers represents the aggregate megawatt production capacity of our solar energy systems that were recognized as Deployments in the period that are subject to executed Customer Agreements.

    Storage Capacity Installed represents the aggregate megawatt hour capacity of storage systems that were recognized as Deployments in the period.

    Creation Cost represents the sum of certain operating expenses and capital expenditures incurred divided by applicable Customer Additions and Subscriber Additions in the period. Creation Cost is comprised of (i) installation costs, which includes the increase in gross solar energy system assets and the cost of customer agreement revenue, excluding depreciation expense of fixed solar assets, and operating and maintenance expenses associated with existing Subscribers, plus (ii) sales and marketing costs, including increases to the gross capitalized costs to obtain contracts, net of the amortization expense of the costs to obtain contracts, plus (iii) general and administrative costs, and less (iv) the gross profit derived from selling systems to customers under sale agreements and Sunrun’s product distribution and lead generation businesses. Creation Cost excludes stock based compensation, amortization of intangibles, and research and development expenses, along with other items the company deems to be non-recurring or extraordinary in nature. The gross margin derived from solar energy systems and product sales is included as an offset to Creation Cost since these sales are ancillary to the overall business model and lowers our overall cost of business. The sales, marketing, general and administrative costs in Creation Costs is inclusive of sales, marketing, general and administrative activities related to the entire business, including solar energy system and product sales. As such, by including the gross margin on solar energy system and product sales as a contra cost, the value of all activities of the Company’s segment are represented in the Net Subscriber Value.

    Subscriber Value represents the per subscriber value of upfront and future cash flows (discounted at 6%) from Subscriber Additions in the period, including expected payments from customers as set forth in Customer Agreements, net proceeds from tax equity finance partners, payments from utility incentive and state rebate programs, contracted net grid service program cash flows, projected future cash flows from solar energy renewable energy credit sales, less estimated operating and maintenance costs to service the systems and replace equipment, consistent with estimates by independent engineers, over the initial term of the Customer Agreements and estimated renewal period. For Customer Agreements with 25 year initial contract terms, a 5 year renewal period is assumed. For a 20 year initial contract term, a 10 year renewal period is assumed. In all instances, we assume a 30-year customer relationship, although the customer may renew for additional years, or purchase the system.

    Net Subscriber Value represents Subscriber Value less Creation Cost.

    Total Value Generated represents Net Subscriber Value multiplied by Subscriber Additions.

    Customers represent the cumulative number of Deployments, from the company’s inception through the measurement date.

    Subscribers represent the cumulative number of Customer Agreements for systems that have been recognized as Deployments through the measurement date.

    Networked Solar Energy Capacity represents the aggregate megawatt production capacity of our solar energy systems that have been recognized as Deployments, from the company’s inception through the measurement date.

    Networked Solar Energy Capacity for Subscribers represents the aggregate megawatt production capacity of our solar energy systems that have been recognized as Deployments, from the company’s inception through the measurement date, that have been subject to executed Customer Agreements.

    Networked Storage Capacity represents the aggregate megawatt hour capacity of our storage systems that have been recognized as Deployments, from the company’s inception through the measurement date.

    Gross Earning Assets is calculated as Gross Earning Assets Contracted Period plus Gross Earning Assets Renewal Period.

    Gross Earning Assets Contracted Period represents the present value of the remaining net cash flows (discounted at 6%) during the initial term of our Customer Agreements as of the measurement date. It is calculated as the present value of cash flows (discounted at 6%) that we would receive from Subscribers in future periods as set forth in Customer Agreements, after deducting expected operating and maintenance costs, equipment replacements costs, distributions to tax equity partners in consolidated joint venture partnership flip structures, and distributions to project equity investors. We include cash flows we expect to receive in future periods from tax equity partners, government incentive and rebate programs, contracted sales of solar renewable energy credits, and awarded net cash flows from grid service programs with utilities or grid operators.

    Gross Earning Assets Renewal Period is the forecasted net present value we would receive upon or following the expiration of the initial Customer Agreement term but before the 30th anniversary of the system’s activation (either in the form of cash payments during any applicable renewal period or a system purchase at the end of the initial term), for Subscribers as of the measurement date. We calculate the Gross Earning Assets Renewal Period amount at the expiration of the initial contract term assuming either a system purchase or a renewal, forecasting only a 30-year customer relationship (although the customer may renew for additional years, or purchase the system), at a contract rate equal to 90% of the customer’s contractual rate in effect at the end of the initial contract term. After the initial contract term, our Customer Agreements typically automatically renew on an annual basis and the rate is initially set at up to a 10% discount to then-prevailing utility power prices.

    Net Earning Assets represents Gross Earning Assets, plus total cash, less adjusted debt and less pass-through financing obligations, as of the same measurement date. Debt is adjusted to exclude a pro-rata share of non-recourse debt associated with funds with project equity structures along with debt associated with the company’s ITC safe harboring facility. Because estimated cash distributions to our project equity partners are deducted from Gross Earning Assets, a proportional share of the corresponding project level non-recourse debt is deducted from Net Earning Assets, as such debt would be serviced from cash flows already excluded from Gross Earning Assets.

    Cash Generation is calculated using the change in our unrestricted cash balance from our consolidated balance sheet, less net proceeds (or plus net repayments) from all recourse debt (inclusive of convertible debt), and less any primary equity issuances or net proceeds derived from employee stock award activity (or plus any stock buybacks or dividends paid to common stockholders) as presented on the Company’s consolidated statement of cash flows. The Company expects to continue to raise tax equity and asset-level non-recourse debt to fund growth, and as such, these sources of cash are included in the definition of Cash Generation. Cash Generation also excludes long-term asset or business divestitures and equity investments in external non-consolidated businesses (or less dividends or distributions received in connection with such equity investments). Restricted cash in a reserve account with a balance equal to the amount outstanding of 2026 convertible notes is considered unrestricted cash for the purposes of calculating Cash Generation.

    Annual Recurring Revenue represents revenue arising from Customer Agreements over the following twelve months for Subscribers that have met initial revenue recognition criteria as of the measurement date.

    Average Contract Life Remaining represents the average number of years remaining in the initial term of Customer Agreements for Subscribers that have met revenue recognition criteria as of the measurement date.

    Households Served in Low-Income Multifamily Properties represent the number of individual rental units served in low-income multi-family properties from shared solar energy systems deployed by Sunrun. Households are counted when the solar energy system has interconnected with the grid, which may differ from Deployment recognition criteria.

    Positive Environmental Impact from Customers represents the estimated reduction in carbon emissions as a result of energy produced from our Networked Solar Energy Capacity over the trailing twelve months. The figure is presented in millions of metric tons of avoided carbon emissions and is calculated using the Environmental Protection Agency’s AVERT tool. The figure is calculated using the most recent published tool from the EPA, using the current-year avoided emission factor for distributed resources on a state by state basis. The environmental impact is estimated based on the system, regardless of whether or not Sunrun continues to own the system or any associated renewable energy credits.

    Positive Expected Lifetime Environmental Impact from Customer Additions represents the estimated reduction in carbon emissions over thirty years as a result of energy produced from solar energy systems that were recognized as Deployments in the period. The figure is presented in millions of metric tons of avoided carbon emissions and is calculated using the Environmental Protection Agency’s AVERT tool. The figure is calculated using the most recent published tool from the EPA, using the current-year avoided emission factor for distributed resources on a state by state basis, leveraging our estimated production figures for such systems, which degrade over time, and is extrapolated for 30 years. The environmental impact is estimated based on the system, regardless of whether or not Sunrun continues to own the system or any associated renewable energy credits.

    Total Cash represents the total of the restricted cash balance and unrestricted cash balance from our consolidated balance sheet.

    Investor & Analyst Contact:

    Patrick Jobin
    SVP, Deputy CFO & Investor Relations Officer
    investors@sunrun.com

    Media Contact:

    Wyatt Semanek
    Director, Corporate Communications
    press@sunrun.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social priorities for 2025 – A10-0023/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the European Semester for economic policy coordination: employment and social priorities for 2025

    (2024/2084(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

      having regard to Articles 9, 121, 148 and 149 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights (EPSR) proclaimed and signed by the Council, Parliament and the Commission on 17 November 2017,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 4 March 2021 entitled ‘The European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan’ (COM(2021)0102) and its proposed 2030 headline targets on employment, skills and poverty reduction,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester – Autumn package’ (COM(2024)0700),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘2025 European Semester: bringing the new economic governance framework to life’ (COM(2024)0705),

      having regard to the Commission proposal of 17 December 2024 for a joint employment report from the Commission and the Council (COM(2024)0701),

     having regard to the Commission recommendation of 17 December 2024 for a Council recommendation on the economic policy of the euro area (COM(2024)0704),

      having regard to the Commission report of 17 December 2024 entitled ‘Alert Mechanism Report 2025’ (COM(2024)0702),

      having regard to the Commission staff working document of 26 November 2024 entitled ‘Fiscal statistical tables providing relevant background data for the assessment of the 2025 draft budgetary plans’ (SWD(2024)0950),

     having regard to the Commission staff working document of 17 December 2024 on the changes in the scoreboard the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure Scoreboard in the context of the regular review process (SWD(2024)0702),

     having regard to its resolution of 22 October 2024 on the Council position on Draft amending budget No 4/2024 of the European Union for the financial year 2024 – update of revenue (own resources) and adjustments to some decentralised agencies[1],

     having regard to Mario Draghi’s report of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 on the future of the single market[2],

     having regard to the La Hulpe Declaration on the Future of the European Pillar of Social Rights signed by Parliament, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council on 16 April 2024,

     having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060[3],

     having regard to the Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[4], and in particular to Articles 3, 4, 13 and 27 thereof,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 17 January 2023 entitled ‘Harnessing talent in Europe’s regions’ (COM(2023)0032),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2023 entitled ‘Labour and skills shortages in the EU: an action plan’ (COM(2024)0131),

     having regard to the 2020 European Skills Agenda,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 7 September 2022 on the European care strategy (COM(2022)0440),

     having regard to the Council Recommendation on access to affordable, high-quality long-term care[5],

     having regard to the EU Social Scoreboard and its headline and secondary indicators,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 3 March 2021 entitled ‘Union of Equality: Strategy for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2021-2030’ (COM(2021)0101),

     having regard to the Commission report of 19 September 2024 entitled ‘Employment and Social Developments in Europe (ESDE): upward social convergence in the EU and the role of social investment’,

     having regard to the Council Decision on Employment Guidelines, adopted by the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council on 2 December 2024, which establishes employment and social priorities aligned with the principles of the EPSR,

     having regard to the Tripartite Declaration for a thriving European Social Dialogue and to the forthcoming pact on social dialogue,

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2041 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on adequate minimum wages in the European Union[6] (Minimum Wage Directive),

     having regard to the European Social Charter, referred to in the preamble of the EPSR,

     having regard to the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation for 2020-2030,

     having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),

     having regard to the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025,

     having regard to the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0023/2025),

    A. whereas progress has been made towards achieving the EU’s employment targets, namely that at least 78 % of people aged 20 to 64 should be in employment by 2030, despite the uncertainty created by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the impact of high inflation; whereas, according to the Commission’s 2025 autumn economic forecast, EU employment has reached a rate of 75.3 %; whereas growth in employment in the EU remained robust in 2023; whereas in two thirds of the Member States, employment growth in 2023 was on track to reach the national 2030 target; whereas significant challenges nevertheless persist, such as high unemployment rates in some Member States, particularly among young people and persons with disabilities, as do significant inequalities between sectors and regions, which can negatively affect social cohesion and the well-being of European citizens in the long term;

    B. whereas the European Semester combines various different instruments in an integrated framework for multilateral coordination and surveillance of economic, employment and social policies within the EU and it must become a key tool for fostering upward social convergence; whereas the Social Convergence Framework is a key tool for assessing social challenges and upward convergence within the European Semester and for monitoring social disparities across Member States, while addressing the challenges identified in the Joint Employment Report (JER);

    C. whereas the Union has adopted the 2030 target of reducing the number of people at risk of poverty and social exclusion by at least 15 million compared to 2019, including at least 5 million children; whereas in nearly half of the Member States the trend is heading in the opposite direction; whereas one child in four in the European Union is still at risk of poverty and social exclusion; and whereas the current trend will not make it possible to meet the 2030 target; whereas public spending on children and youth should not be seen only as social expenditure but as an investment in the future; whereas the promotion of strong, sustainable and inclusive economic growth can succeed only if the next generation can develop their full educational potential in order to be prepared for the changing labour market, whereas to meet the 2030 Barcelona targets for early childhood education and care, the EU should invest an additional EUR 11 billion per year[7];

    D. whereas despite a minimal reduction in the number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in the EU in 2023, approximately one in five still faces this challenge, with notable disparities for children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, LGTBI, non-EU born individuals, and Roma communities;

    E. whereas significant disparities are observed among children from ethnic or migrant backgrounds and children with disabilities; whereas 83 % of Roma children live in households at risk of poverty; whereas the EU and national resources currently deployed are in no way sufficient for addressing the challenge of child poverty in the EU and, therefore, a dedicated funding instrument for the European Child Guarantee as well as synergies with other European and national funds are of the utmost importance in both the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the next one;

    F. whereas the EPSR must be the compass guiding EU social and economic policies, whereas the Commission should monitor progress on the implementation of the EPSR using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework;

    G. whereas poor quality jobs among the self-employed are disproportionately widespread while the rate of self-employment is declining, including among young people;

    H. whereas there are still 1.4 million people residing in institutions in the EU; whereas residents of institutions are isolated from the broader community and do not have sufficient control over their lives and the decisions that affect them; whereas despite the fact that the European Union has long been committed to the process of deinstitutionalisation, efforts are still needed at both European and national level to enable vulnerable groups to live independently in a community environment;

    I. whereas demographic challenges, including an ageing population, low birth rates and rural depopulation, with young people in particular moving to urban areas, profoundly affect the economic vitality and attractiveness of EU regions, the labour markets, and consequently, the sustainability of welfare systems, and further aggravate the regional disparities in the EU, and hence represent a structural challenge for the EU economy; and whereas, as underlined in the Draghi report, sustainable growth and competitiveness in Europe depend to a large extent on adapting education and training systems to evolving skills needs, prioritising adult learning and vocational education and training, and the inclusion of the active population in the labour market and on a robust welfare system;

    J. whereas, as highlighted in the Draghi report, migrant workers have been an important factor in reducing labour shortages and are more likely to work in occupations with persistent shortages than workers born in the EU;

    K. whereas 70 % of workers in Europe are in good-quality jobs, 30 % are in high-strain jobs where demands are more numerous than resources available to balance them leading to overall poor job quality; whereas in many occupations suffering from persistent labour shortages the share of low-quality jobs is higher than 30 %;

    L. whereas the Letta report states that there is a decline in the birth rate, noting the importance of creating a framework to support all families as part of a strategy of inclusive growth in line with the EPSR; whereas the report notes that the free movement of people remains the least developed of the four freedoms and argues for reducing barriers to intra-EU occupational mobility while addressing the social, economic and political challenges facing the sending Member States and their most disadvantaged regions, as well as safeguarding the right to stay; whereas there is a need to promote family-friendly and work-life balance policies, ensuring accessible and professional care systems as well as public quality education, family-related leave and flexible working arrangements in line with the European Care Strategy;

    M. whereas inflation has increased the economic burden on households, having a particularly negative impact on groups in vulnerable situations, such as single parents, large families, older people or persons with disabilities, whereas housing costs and energy poverty remain major problems; whereas housing is becoming unaffordable for those who live in households where housing costs account for 40 % of total disposable income; whereas investment in social services, housing supply – including social housing – and policies that facilitate the accessibility and affordability of housing play a key role in reducing poverty among vulnerable households;

    N. whereas the EU’s micro, small and medium-sized enterprises face particular challenges such as staying competitive against third-country players, maintaining production levels despite rising energy costs and finding the necessary skills for the green and digital transitions; whereas they need financial and technical support to comply with regulatory requirements and take advantage of the opportunities offered by the twin transitions;

    O. whereas labour and skills shortages remain a problem at all levels, and are reported by companies of all sizes and sectors; whereas these shortages are exacerbated by a lack of candidates to fill critical positions in key sectors such as education, healthcare, transport, science, technology, engineering and construction, especially in areas affected by depopulation; whereas these shortages can result from a number of factors, such as difficult working conditions, unattractive salaries, demand for new skill sets and a shortage of relevant training, the lack of public services, barriers of access to medium and higher education and lack of recognition of skills and education;

    P. whereas the Union has adopted the target that at least 60 % of adults should participate in training every year by 2030; whereas the Member States have committed themselves to national targets in order to achieve this headline goal and whereas the majority of Member States lost ground in the pursuit of these national targets; whereas further efforts are needed to ensure the provision of, and access to, quality training policies that promote lifelong learning; whereas upskilling, reskilling and training programmes must be available for all workers, including those with disabilities, and should also be adapted to workers’ needs and capabilities;

    Q. whereas in 2022, the average Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) score across the OECD on the measures of basic skills (reading, mathematics and science) of 15-year-olds dropped by 10 points compared to the last wave in 2018; whereas underachievement is prevalent among disadvantaged learners, demonstrating a widening of educational inequalities; whereas this worrying deterioration calls for reforms and investments in education and training;

    R. whereas the EU’s capacity to deal with future shocks, crises and ‘polycrises’ while navigating the demographic, digital and green transitions, will depend greatly on the conditions under which critical workers will be able to perform their work; whereas addressing the shortages and retaining all types of talent requires decent working conditions, access to social protection systems, and opportunities for skills development tailored to the needs; and whereas addressing skills shortages is crucial to achieving the digital and green transitions, ensuring inclusive and sustainable growth and boosting the EU’s competitiveness;

    S. whereas it is essential to promote mobility within the EU and consider attracting skilled workers from third countries, while ensuring respect for and enforcement of labour and social rights and channelling third-country nationals entering the EU through legal migration pathways towards occupations experiencing shortages, supported by an effective integration policy, in full complementarity with harnessing talents from within the Union;

    T. whereas gender pay gaps remain considerable in most EU Member States and whereas care responsibilities are an important factor that continue to constrain women into part-time employment or lead to their exclusion from the labour market, resulting in a wider gender employment gap;

    U. whereas the JER highlights the right to disconnect, in particular in the context of telework, acknowledging the critical role of this right in ensuring a work-life balance in a context of increasing digitalisation and remote working;

    V. whereas challenges to several sectors, such as automotive manufacturing and energy intensive industries, became evident in 2024 and a number of companies announced large-scale restructuring;

    W. whereas there are disparities in the coverage of social services, including long-term care, child protection, domestic violence support, and homelessness aid, that need to be addressed through the European Semester;

    X. whereas there is currently no regular EU-wide collection of data on social services investment and coverage; whereas collecting such data is key for an evidence-based analysis of national social policies in the European Semester analysis; whereas this should be addressed through jointly agreed criteria and data collection standards for social services investment and coverage in the Member States; whereas the European Social Network’s Social Services Index is an example of how such data collection can contribute to the European Semester analysis;

    Y. whereas the crisis in generational renewal, demographic changes, and lack of sufficient investment in public services have led to an increased risk of poverty and social exclusion, particularly affecting children and older people, single-parent households and large families, the working poor, persons with disabilities, and people from marginalised backgrounds; whereas an ambitious EU anti-poverty strategy will be essential to reverse this trend and provide responses to the multidimensional phenomenon of poverty;

    Z. whereas Eurofound research shows that suicide rates have been creeping up since 2021, after decreasing for decades; whereas more needs to be done to address causes of mental health problems in working and living conditions (importantly social inclusion), and access to support for people with poor mental health remains a problem;

    AA. whereas there were still over 3 300 fatal accidents and almost 3 million nonfatal accidents in the EU-27 in 2021; whereas over 200 000 workers die each year from work-related illnesses; whereas these data do not include all accidents caused by undeclared work, making it plausible to assume that the true numbers greatly exceed the official statistics; whereas in 2017, according to Eurofound, 20 % of jobs in Europe were of ‘poor quality’ and put workers at increased risk regarding their physical or mental health; whereas 14 % of workers have been exposed to a high level of psychosocial risks; whereas 23 % of European workers believe that their safety or their health is at risk because of their work;

    AB. whereas the results of the April 2024 Eurobarometer survey on social Europe highlight that 88 % of European citizens consider social Europe to be important to them personally; whereas this was confirmed by the EU Post-Electoral Survey 2024, where European citizens cited rising prices and the cost of living (42 %) and the economic situation (41 %) as the main topics that motivated them to vote in the 2024 European elections;

    AC. whereas according to Article 3 TEU, social progress in the EU is one of the aims of a highly competitive social market economy, together with full employment, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment; whereas Article 3 TEU also states that the EU ‘shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child’;

    AD. whereas the new EU economic governance framework entered into force in April 2024 and aims to promote sustainable and inclusive growth and to give more space for social investment and achievement of the objectives of the EPSR; whereas, for the first time, the revision includes a social convergence framework as an integrated part of the European Semester;

    AE. whereas under the new EU economic governance framework, all Member States have to include reforms and investments in their medium-term plans addressing common EU priorities and challenges identified in country-specific recommendations in the context of the European Semester; whereas the common EU priorities include social and economic resilience, including the EPSR;

    AF. whereas European social partners, during Macroeconomic Dialogue, have denounced the lack of involvement of social partners in the drafting of the medium-term fiscal structural plans and ETUC, SMEUnited and SGIEurope have signed a joint statement for a material and factual involvement of social partners in the economic governance and the European Semester;

    AG. whereas public investment is expected to increase in 2025 in almost all Member States, with a significant contribution from NextGenerationEU’s Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and EU funds and will contribute to social spending, amounting to around 25 % of the total estimated expenditure under the RRF, securing growth and economic resilience[8]; whereas social investments and reforms in key areas can boost employment, social inclusion, competitiveness and economic growth[9]; whereas social partners are essential for designing and implementing policies that promote sustainable and inclusive growth, decent and quality work, and fair transitions and must be involved at all levels of governance in accordance with the TFEU;

    AH. whereas the Member States should implement the Minimum Wage Directive without delay and prepare action plans that increase collective bargaining coverage in line with the directive, where applicable;

    AI. whereas according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), on average across OECD countries, occupations at highest risk of automation account for about 28 % of employment[10]; whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are crucial in this context to ensure a participatory approach to managing change driven by technological developments, addressing potential concerns, while fostering workers’ adaptation (including via skills provision); whereas digitalisation, robotisation, automation and artificial intelligence (AI) must benefit workers and society by improving working conditions and quality of life, ensuring a good work-life balance, creating better employment opportunities, and contributing to socio-economic convergence; whereas workers and their trade unions will play a critical role in anticipating and tackling risks emerging from those challenges;

     

    AJ. whereas social dialogue and collective bargaining are essential for the EU’s competitiveness, labour productivity and social cohesion;

    1. Considers that the Commission and the Council should strengthen their efforts to implement the EPSR, in line with the action plan of March 2021 and the La Hulpe Declaration, to achieve the 2030 headline targets; calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 analyses the implementation of all the principles of the EPSR in line with Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 and includes an analysis of the social dimension of the national medium-term fiscal structural plans related to social resilience, including the EPSR; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of a new Action Plan on the implementation of the EPSR[11] for 2025 to give a new impetus to social progress; welcomes the fact that almost all Member States are expected to increase public investment in 2025, which is necessary to ensure access to quality public services and achieve the aims of the EPSR; recalls that the Member States can mobilise the RRF within the scope defined by the Regulation (EU) 2021/241[12] until 31 December 2026 on policies for sustainable and inclusive growth and the young;

    2. Stresses the importance of using the Social Scoreboard and the Social Convergence Framework to identify risks to, and to track progress in, reducing inequalities, strengthening social protection systems and promoting decent working conditions and supportive measures for workers to manage the transitions; stresses that in this regard, it is necessary to ensure a sustainable, fair and inclusive Europe where social rights are fully protected and safeguarded at the same level as economic freedoms; recalls that EU citizens identify social Europe as one of their priorities;

    3. Regrets the lack of data on and analysis of wealth inequality and wealth concentration in the EU as this is one of the main determinants of poverty; points out that according to Distributional Wealth Accounts, a dataset developed by the European System of Central Banks, the share of wealth held by the top 10 % stood at 56 % in the fourth quarter of 2023, while the bottom half held just 5 %;

    4. Welcomes the inclusion of analysis on the positive contribution of the SDGs and the European equality strategies in the JER 2025 and calls on the Commission to ensure that the JER 2026 includes both a section analysing the progress towards the SDGs related to employment and social policy, and another on progress towards eliminating social and labour discrimination in line with the Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025, the EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025, the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation 2020-2030, the LGBTIQ Equality Strategy 2020-2025, and the Strategy for the rights of persons with disabilities 2021-2030;

    5. Calls on the Member States to implement the updated employment guidelines, with an emphasis on education and training for all, new technologies such as AI, and recent policy initiatives on platform work, affordable and decent housing and tackling labour and skills shortages, with a view to strengthening democratic decision-making;

    6. Reiterates the importance of investing in workforce skills development and occupational training and of ensuring quality employment, with an emphasis on the individual right to training and lifelong learning; urges the Member States to develop upskilling and reskilling measures in collaboration with local stakeholders, including educational and training bodies and the social partners, in order to reinforce the link between the education and training systems and the labour market and to anticipate labour market needs; welcomes the fact that employment outcomes for recent graduates from vocational education and training (VET) continue to improve across the EU; is concerned about young people’s declining educational performance, particularly in basic skills; welcomes, in this regard, the announcement of an Action Plan on Basic Skills and a STEM Education Strategic Plan; calls on the Member States to invest in programmes to equip learners with the basic, digital and transversal skills needed for the world of work and its digitisation as well as to help them to contribute meaningfully to society; recalls the important role that the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for displaced workers can play in supporting and reskilling workers who were made redundant as a result of major restructuring events;

    7. Welcomes the announcement of a quality jobs roadmap to ensure a just transition for all; calls on the Commission to include in this roadmap considerations for measures linked to the use of AI and algorithmic management in the world of work so that new technologies are harnessed to improve working conditions and productivity while respecting workers’ rights and work-life balance as recognised in the JER[13]; calls on the Commission to propose a directive on the use of AI in the workplace that ensures that workers’ rights are protected and respected;

    8. Stresses that the response to labour shortages in the European Union also involves improving and facilitating labour mobility within the Union; calls on the Member States to strengthen and facilitate the recognition of skills and qualifications in the Union, including those of third-country nationals; calls on the Commission to analyse the effectiveness of the European Employment Services (EURES) platform with a view to a potential revision of its operation;

    9. Notes that the number of early leavers from education and training, people with lower levels of education, young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs) and among them vulnerable groups, including Roma, women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background, depending on the country-specific context, remains high in several Member States, despite a downward trend in the European Union; calls on the Member States to reinforce the Youth Guarantee as stated in Principle 4 of the EPSR; in order to support young people in need throughout their personal and professional development; reiterates the pivotal role that VET plays in providing the knowledge, skills and competencies necessary for young people entering the labour market; emphasises the need to invest in the quality and attractiveness of VET through the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+); recalls, therefore, the need to address this situation and develop solutions to keep young people in education, training or employment and the importance of ensuring their access to traineeships and apprenticeships, enabling them to gain their first work experience and facilitating their transition from education to employment as well as to create working conditions that enable an ageing workforce to remain in the labour market;

    10. Considers that, although there has been an improvement, persons with disabilities, especially women with disabilities, still face significant obstacles in the labour market, and that there is therefore a need for vocational and digital training, while promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities, targeting the inactive labour force and groups with low participation in the labour market, including women, young people, older workers and persons with chronic diseases; calls on the Commission to update the EU Disability Strategy with new flagship initiatives and actions from 2025 onwards, such as a European Disability Employment and Skills Guarantee and the sharing of best practices such as the disability card, in particular to address social inclusion and independent living for people with disabilities, also ensuring their access to quality education, training and employment through guidance on retaining disability allowances;

    11. Expresses concern that Roma continue to face significant barriers to employment, with persistent biases limiting their prospects; notes that the EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion, and participation highlights a lack of progress in employment access and a growing share of Roma youth not in employment, education, or training; emphasises the framework’s goal of halving the employment gap between Roma and the general population and ensuring that at least 60 % of Roma are in paid work by 2030; urges the Member States to adopt an integrated, equality-focused approach and to ensure that public policies and services effectively reach all Roma, including those in remote rural areas;

    12. Stresses the need to pay attention to the social and environmental aspects of competitiveness, emphasising the need for investments in education and training for all to ensure universal access to high-quality public education and professional training programmes, as well as sustainable practices to foster inclusive growth; underlines that social partners should play a key role in identifying and addressing skills needs across the EU;

    13. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to include specific recommendations on housing affordability in the European Semester and to promote housing investment; urges the Member States to ensure that housing investments support long-term quality housing solutions that are actually affordable for low-income and middle-income households, highlighting that investments in social and affordable housing are crucial in order to ensure and improve the quality of life for all; stresses the need for a better use of EU funding, such as through European Investment Bank financial instruments, in particular to support investments to increase the energy efficiency of buildings; calls on the Commission and the Member States to take decisive action to provide an EU regulatory framework for the housing sector, together with an assessment of Union policies, funds and bottlenecks that should facilitate the construction, conversion and renovation of accessible, affordable and energy-efficient housing, including social housing, that meets the needs of young people, people with reduced mobility, low- and middle-income groups, families at risk and people in more vulnerable situations, while protecting homeowners and those seeking access to home ownership from a further reduction in supply;

    14. Welcomes the announced European Affordable Housing Plan to support Member States in addressing the housing crisis and soaring rents; calls on the Commission to assess and publish which potential barriers on State aid rules affect housing accessibility; recalls that the Social Climate Fund aims to provide financial aid to Member States from 2026 to support vulnerable households, in particular with measures and investments intended to increase the energy efficiency of buildings, decarbonisation of heating and cooling of buildings and the integration in buildings of renewable energy generation and storage;

    15. Considers that homelessness is a dramatic social problem in the EU; calls for a single definition of homelessness in the EU, which would enable the systematic comparison and assessment of the extent of homelessness across different EU Member States; calls on the Commission to develop a strategy and work towards ending homelessness in the EU by 2030 by promoting access to affordable and decent housing as well as access to quality social services; urges the Member States to better use the available EU instruments, including the ESF+, in this matter[14];

    16. Calls on the Member States to design national homelessness strategies centred around housing-based solutions; welcomes the intention to deliver a Council recommendation on homelessness[15]; urges the Commission to further increase the ambition of the European Platform on Combating Homelessness, in particular by providing it with a dedicated budget;

    17. Considers that EU action is urgently needed to address the persistently high levels of poverty and social exclusion in the EU, particularly among children, young and older people, persons with disabilities, non-EU born individuals, LGTBI and Roma communities; highlights that access to quality social services should be prioritised, with binding targets to reduce homelessness and ensure energy security for vulnerable households; calls on the Commission to adopt the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy;

    18. Recalls the Union objective of transitioning from institutional to community or family-based care; calls on the Commission to put forward an action plan on deinstitutionalisation; stresses that this action plan should cover all groups still living in institutions, including children, persons with disabilities, people with mental health issues, people affected by homelessness and older people; calls on the Member States to make full use of the ESF+ funds as well as other relevant European and national funds in order to finalise the deinstitutionalisation process so as to ensure that every EU citizen can live in a family or community environment;

    19. Calls on the Commission to deliver a European action plan for mental health, in line with its recent recommendations[16], and to complement it with a directive on psychosocial risks in the workplace; calls on the Member States to strengthen access to mental health services and emotional support programmes for all, particularly children, young people and older people; requests a better use of the Social Scoreboard indicators to address the impact of precarious living conditions and uncertainty on mental health;

    20. Calls on the Commission to address loneliness by promoting a holistic EU strategy on loneliness and access to professional care; calls also for this EU strategy to address the socio-economic impact of loneliness on productivity and well-being by tackling issues such as rural isolation; urges the Member States to continue implementing the Council recommendation on access to affordable, quality long-term care with a view to ensuring access to quality care while ensuring decent working conditions for workers in the care sector, as well as for informal carers;

    21. Recognises that 44 million Europeans are frequent informal long-term caregivers, the majority of whom are women[17];

    22. Recognises the unique role of carers in society, and while the definition of care workers is not harmonised across the EU, the long-term care sector employs 6.4 million people across the EU;

    23. Is concerned that, in 2023, 94.6 million people in the EU were still at risk of poverty or social exclusion; stresses that without a paradigm shift in the approach to combating poverty, the European Union and its Member States will not achieve their poverty reduction objectives; believes that the announcement of the first-ever EU Anti-Poverty Strategy is a step in the right direction towards reversing the trend, but must provide a comprehensive approach to tackling the multidimensional aspects of poverty and social exclusion with concrete actions, strong implementation and monitoring; calls for this Strategy to encompass everybody experiencing poverty and social exclusion, first and foremost the most disadvantaged, but also specific measures for different groups such as persons experiencing in-work poverty, homeless people, people with disabilities, single-parent families and, above all, children in order to sustainably break the cycle of poverty; stresses that the transposition of the Minimum Wage Directive will be key to preventing and fighting poverty risks among workers, while reinforcing incentives to work, and welcomes the fact that several Member States have amended or plan to amend their minimum wage frameworks; is concerned about the rise of non-standard forms of employment where workers are more likely to face in-work poverty and find themselves without adequate legal protections; stresses that an EU framework directive on adequate minimum income and active inclusion, in compliance with the subsidiarity principle, would contribute to the goals of reducing poverty and fostering the integration of people absent from the labour market;

    24. Reiterates its call on the Commission to carefully monitor implementation of the Child Guarantee in all Member States as part of the European Semester and country-specific recommendations; reiterates its call for an increase in the funding of the European Child Guarantee with a dedicated budget of at least EUR 20 billion and for all Member States to allocate at least 5 % of their allocated ESF+ funds to fighting child poverty and promoting children’s well-being; considers that the country-specific recommendations should reflect Member States’ budgetary compliance with the minimum required allocation for tackling child poverty set out in the ESF+ Regulation[18]; calls on the Commission to provide an ambitious budget for the Child Guarantee in the next MFF in order to respond to the growing challenge of child poverty and social exclusion;

    25. Is concerned about national policies that create gaps in health coverage, increasing inequalities both within and between Member States, such as privatisation of public healthcare systems, co-payments and lack of coverage; highlights that these deepen poverty, erode health and well-being, and increase social inequalities within and across EU countries; warns that this also undermines the implementation of principle 16 of the EPSR and of SDG 3.8 on universal health coverage, as well as the EPSR’s overall objective of promoting upward social convergence in the EU, leaving no one behind; believes that the indicators used in the Social Scoreboard do not provide a comprehensive understanding of healthcare affordability;

    26. Underlines that employers need to foster intergenerational links within companies and intergenerational learning between younger and older workers, and vice versa; underlines that an ageing workforce can help a business develop new products and services to adapt to the needs of an ageing society in a more creative and productive way; calls, furthermore, for the creation of incentives to encourage volunteering and mentoring to induce the transfer of knowledge between generations;

    27. Warns that, according to European Central Bank reports, real wages are still below their pre-pandemic level, while productivity was roughly the same; agrees that this creates some room for a non-inflationary recovery in real wages and warns that if real wages do not recover, this would increase the risk of protracted economic weakness, which could cause scarring effects and would further dent productivity in the euro area relative to other parts of the world; believes that better enforcement of minimum wages and strengthening collective bargaining coverage can have a beneficial effect on levels of wage inequality, especially by helping more vulnerable workers at the bottom of the wage distribution who are increasingly left out;

    28. Calls for the Member States to ensure decent working conditions, comprising among other things decent wages, access to social protection, lifelong learning opportunities, occupational health and safety, a good work-life balance and the right to disconnect, reasonable working time, workers’ representation, democracy at work and collective agreements; urges the Member States to foster democracy at work, social dialogue and collective bargaining and to protect workers’ rights, particularly in the context of the green and digital transitions, and to ensure equal pay for equal work by men and women, enhance pay transparency and address gender-based inequality to close the gender pay gap in the EU;

    29. Recalls the importance of improving access to social protection for the self-employed and calls on the Commission to monitor the Member States’ national plans for the implementation of the Council Recommendation of 8 November 2019 on access to social protection for workers and the self-employed[19] as part of the country-specific recommendations; recalls, in this regard, as the rate of self-employed professionals in the cultural and creative sectors is more than double that in the general population, the 13 initiatives laid down in the Commission’s 21 February 2024 response to the European Parliament resolution of 21 November 2023 on an EU framework for the social and professional situation of artists and workers in the cultural and creative sectors[20] and calls on the Commission to start implementing them in cooperation with the Member States;

    30. Stresses that the role of social dialogue and social partners should be systematically integrated into the design and implementation of employment and social policies, ensuring the involvement of social partners at all levels;

    31. Calls for the implementation of policies that promote work-life balance and the right to disconnect, with the aim of improving the quality of life for all families and workers, for ensuring the implementation of the Work-Life Balance Directive[21] and of the European Care Strategy; calls on the Commission to put forward a legislative proposal to address teleworking and the right to disconnect; as well as a proposal for the creation of a European card for all types of large families and a European action plan for single parents, offering educational and social advantages; calls, ultimately, for initiatives to combat workforce exclusion as a consequence of longer periods of sick leave, to adapt the workplace and to promote flexible working conditions and to develop strategies to support workers’ return after longer periods of absence;

    32. Calls for demographic challenges to be prioritised in the EU’s cohesion policy and for concrete action at EU and national levels; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of the Commission communication on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions and the ‘Talent Booster Mechanism’ in order to promote social cohesion and to step up funding for rural and outermost areas and regions with a high rate of depopulation, supporting quality job creation, public services, local development projects and basic infrastructure that favour the population’s ‘right to stay’, especially in the case of young people; highlights the importance of introducing specific measures to address regional inequalities in education and training, ensuring equal access to high-quality and affordable education for all;

    33. Is concerned that, despite improvements, several population groups are still significantly under-represented in the EU labour market, including women, older people, low- and medium-qualified people, persons with disabilities and people with a migrant or minority background; warns that  educational inequalities have deepened, further exacerbating the vulnerabilities of students from disadvantaged and migrant backgrounds; points out that, according to the JER, people with migrant or minority backgrounds can significantly benefit from targeted measures in order to address skills mismatches, improve language proficiency, combat discrimination and receive tailored and integrated support services; stresses the importance of strengthening efforts in the implementation of the 2021-27 Action Plan on Integration and Inclusion, which provides a common policy framework to support the Member States in developing national migrant integration policies;

    34. Calls on the Commission and the Council to prioritise reducing administrative burdens with the aim of simplification while respecting labour and social standards; believes that better support for SMEs and actual and potential entrepreneurs will improve the EU’s competitiveness and long-term sustainability, boost innovation and create quality jobs; notes that SMEs and self-employed professionals in all sectors are essential for the EU’s economic growth and thus the financing of social policies; urges the implementation of specific recommendations to improve the single market; takes note of the Commission’s publication of the ‘Competitiveness Compass’ on 29 January 2025[22];

    35. Calls on the Commission to conduct competitiveness checks on every new legislative proposal, taking into account the overall impact of EU legislation on companies, as well as on other EU policies and programmes;

    36. Considers that the social economy is an essential component of the EU’s social market economy and a driver for the implementation of the EPSR and its targets, often providing employment to vulnerable and excluded groups; calls on the Commission and the Member States to strengthen their support for all social economy enterprises but especially non-profit ones, as highlighted in the Social Economy Action Plan 2021 and the Liège Roadmap for the Social Economy, in order to promote quality, decent, inclusive work and the circular economy, to encourage the Member States to facilitate access to funding and to enhance the visibility of social economy actors; calls for the Commission to explore innovative funding mechanisms to support the development of the social economy in Europe[23] and to foster a dynamic and inclusive business environment;

    37. Believes that, in this year of transition, with the implementation of the revised economic governance rules, the Member States should align fiscal responsibility with sustainable and inclusive growth and employment, notes that the involvement of social partners, including in the development of medium-term fiscal structural plans, should be enhanced to contribute to the goals of the new economic governance framework;

    38. Welcomes the fact that the national medium-term fiscal structural plans, under the new economic governance framework, have to include the reforms and investments responding to the main challenges identified in the context of the European Semester and also to ensure debt sustainability while investing strategically in the principles of the EPSR with the aim of fostering upward social convergence;

    39. Is concerned that compliance with the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) remains low; reiterates its call, therefore, for an effective implementation of CSRs by the Member States so as to promote healthcare and sustainable pension systems, in line with principles 15 and 16 of the EPSR, and long-term prosperity for all citizens, taking into account the vulnerability of those workers whose careers are segmented, intermittent and subject to labour transitions; insists that the Commission should reinforce its dialogues with the Member States on the implementation of existing recommendations and of the Employment Guidelines as well as on current or future policy action to address identified challenges;

    40. Welcomes the establishment of a framework to identify risks to social convergence within the European Semester, for which Parliament called strongly; recalls that under this framework, the Commission assesses risks to upward social convergence in Member States and monitors progress on the implementation of the EPSR on the basis of the Social Scoreboard and of the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; welcomes the fact that the 2025 JER delivers country-specific analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework; calls on the Commission to further develop innovative quantitative and qualitative analysis tools under this new Framework in order to make optimal use of it in the future cycles of the European Semester;

    41. Welcomes the fact that the first analysis based on the principles of the Social Convergence Framework points to upward convergence in the labour market in 2023[24]; notes with concern that employment outcomes of under-represented groups still need to improve and that risks to upward convergence persist at European level in relation to skills development, ranging from early education to lifelong learning, and the social outcomes of at-risk-of-poverty and social exclusion rates; calls on the Commission to further analyse these risks to upward social convergence in the second stage of the analysis and to discuss with the Member States concerned the measures undertaken or envisaged to address these risks;

    42. Recognises the cost of living crisis, which has increased the burden on households, and the rising cost of housing, which, in conjunction with high energy costs, is contributing to high levels of energy poverty across the EU; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to comprehensively address the root causes of this crisis by prioritising policies that promote economic resilience, social cohesion, and sustainable development;

    43. Warns of the social risks stemming from the crisis in the automotive sector, which is facing unprecedented pressure from both external and internal factors; calls on the Commission to pay attention to this sector and enhance social dialogue and the participation of workers in transition processes; stresses the urgent need for a coordinated EU response via an emergency task force of trade unions and employers to respond to the current crisis;

    44. Calls on the Commission to monitor data on restructuring and its impact on employment, such as by using the European Restructuring Monitor, to facilitate measures in support of restructuring and labour market transitions, and to consider highlighting national measures supporting a socially responsible way of restructuring in the European Semester;

    45. Calls on the Commission to monitor the development of minimum wages in the Member States following the transposition of the Minimum Wage Directive to determine whether the goal of ‘adequacy’ of minimum wages is being achieved;

    46. Is concerned about the Commission’s revision of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) Scoreboard, particularly the reduction in employment and social indicators, which are crucial for assessing the social and labour market situation in the Member States; regrets the fact that youth unemployment is no longer considered as a headline indicator, despite its relevance in identifying and addressing specific labour market challenges and in adopting adequate public policies; stresses that social standards indicators should be given greater consideration in the decision-making process; regrets the fact that the Commission did not duly consult Parliament and reminds the Commission of its obligation to closely cooperate with Parliament, the Council and social partners before drawing up the MIP scoreboard and the set of macroeconomic and macro-financial indicators for Member States; stresses that the implementation of the principles of the EPSR must be part of the MIP scoreboard;

    47. Considers that territorial and social cohesion are essential components of the competitiveness agenda, and legislation such as the European Instrument for Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) remain a positive example to inspire future EU initiatives;

    48. Considers that the Commission and the Member States should ensure that fiscal policies under the European Semester support investments aligned with the EPSR, particularly in areas such as decent and affordable housing, quality healthcare, education, and social protection systems, as these are critical for social cohesion and long-term economic sustainability and to address the challenges identified through social indicators;

    49. Stresses the need to address key challenges identified in the Social Scoreboard as ‘critical’ and ‘to watch’, including children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, the gender employment gap, housing cost overburden, childcare, and long-term care the disability employment gap, the impact of social transfers on reducing poverty, and basic digital skills[25];

    50. Stresses the negative impacts that the cost of living crisis has had on persons with disabilities;

    51. Urges the Member States to consider robust policies that ensure fair wages and improve working conditions, particularly for low-income and precarious workers;

    52. Calls on the Member States to strengthen social safety nets to provide adequate support to those whose income from employment is insufficient to meet basic living costs;

    53. Stresses the need for timely and harmonised data on social policies to improve evidence-based policymaking and targeted social investments; calls for improvements to be made to the Social Scoreboard in order to cover the 20 EPSR principles with the introduction of relevant indicators reflecting trends and causes of inequality, such as quality employment, wealth distribution, access to public services, adequate pensions, the homelessness rate, mental health and unemployment; recalls that the at-risk-of-poverty-or-social-exclusion (AROPE) indicator fails to reveal the causes of complex inequality; calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a European data collection framework on social services to monitor the investment in and coverage of social services;

    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Inuit children in Nunavut face a preventable food security crisis

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Vandna Sinha, Adjunct Professor of Social Work, McGIll University & Associate Research Professor of Education, University of Colorado, Boulder, McGill University

    Nunavut has the highest rate of child poverty and the highest rate of food insecurity of any Canadian province or territory. In 2022, around 80 per cent of Indigenous children aged between one and 14 in Nunavut lived in households experiencing food insecurity. In 2018, the rate of childhood food insecurity in Nunavut was almost six times higher than in Canada as a whole.

    The Hamlet Food Voucher Program, funded through the Inuit Child First Initiative (ICFI), has recently offered some relief. This program gives families funds for groceries to meet the nutritional needs of Inuit children.

    However, ICFI funding only runs until March 31, 2025. With Parliament prorogued, plans for further funding remain uncertain. That means starting April 1, many Inuit children in Nunavut may again go hungry. The Canadian government can make sure that does not happen by extending funding for ICFI and the food voucher program.

    Long-term effects of food insecurity

    Food insecurity can have harmful, and sometimes lasting, impacts on a young person’s physical health, mental health, academic performance and cognitive development. Infants and toddlers are particularly vulnerable because they are completely dependent on adult caregivers whose physical and mental health can also be impacted by food insecurity.

    Recently, food security initiatives in Nunavut have been funded through the ICFI, which was launched in 2018. ICFI was meant to be a temporary measure to help families access essential services while an Inuit-specific framework is being developed.

    Nutrition support for children has been one of the most requested services under ICFI. Initially, each family had to submit extensive documentation, and often faced months-long delays before receiving services and supports.

    In 2023, municipal governments in Nunavut began to request, and receive, ICFI funding for nutrition supports for all Inuit children in their community. By December 2024, all but one community received funding for Hamlet Food Voucher Programs. These programs provide $500 per child for groceries and an additional $250 for children under four.

    High grocery costs

    The support provided through the Hamlet Food Voucher Program is significant, but $500 covers far less in Nunavut than in southern Canada. Groceries must be brought to Nunavut by plane or ship, and most communities have only one or two grocery stores. Accordingly, despite efforts to reduce prices through programs like Nutrition North Canada (NNC), the cost of groceries in Nunavut is much higher than in the rest of Canada.

    Grocery prices in Nunavut are also rising much faster than in the rest of Canada. Our research shows that, between 2022 and 2024, the cost of a basket of goods in Qikiqtaaluk, Nunavut’s largest region, rose by 26 per cent (compared to 13 per cent across Canada) and is now more than double the average cost in Canada.

    Even food subsidized through NNC is far more expensive: four litres of milk cost $9.95 in Qikiqtaaluk compared to a Canada average of $5.10. Prices for other items can be even higher: a February 2025 video from the hamlet of Grise Fiord shows a jar of jam selling for $35, pickles for $66 and a six-pack of apple sauce for $58.

    The high rate of food insecurity in Nunavut reflects a vast gap between household incomes and the money required to support a basic standard of living. Nunavut saw sustained income growth between 2005 and 2019, and a declining percentage of people receiving social assistance. Still, employment rates remain lower than in other territories.

    In 2023, the median income for households with two adults and two children was just under $36,000.

    This was around 40 per cent of the $89,420 needed for a two-adult, three-child family living in social housing in Iqaluit to afford the “modest, basic standard of living” represented by the official poverty threshold.

    The social assistance available to low-income Nunavut families is comparable to that in provinces with a lower cost of living. Even with $1,000 a month in food vouchers, a family of four making the median income remains far below the “deep poverty” threshold of 75 per cent of the official poverty line.

    An Inuit-led solution

    We have been interviewing service providers, grocery store employees and people co-ordinating Hamlet Food Voucher Programs. The interviews are part of an ongoing research project we are working on in collaboration with Sindu Govindapillai and Dheeksha Reddy from Qupanuaq, a service co-ordination program operated by the Arctic Children and Youth Foundation, and research team members Kelly Mitchell, Mohammad N. Khan, Josee G. Lavoie and Tracey Galloway.

    Interviewees tell us that, because of the program, fewer people go without food and more families can cover rent, utilities and other necessities. People also told us that families are eating healthier, children are going to school more often and are more engaged when there, and families are less stressed. Other programs and services that were previously busy addressing food-related crises can now focus on providing medical care, fostering learning and keeping children safe.

    The people we interviewed also make it clear the Hamlet Food Voucher Program is not enough to solve the problem of food insecurity in Nunavut. They stressed that food security initiatives must be paired with supports for healing, well-being and life-long learning.

    Inuit plans for addressing poverty include such supports. They also include measures to increase community decision-making, reform income assistance, increase access to housing and strengthen local economies.

    Until such a framework is fully implemented, the Hamlet Food Voucher Program must remain in place. Nunavut families currently face record levels of child poverty, rising food prices and a potential North American trade war that would further drive-up costs.

    Losing food voucher support would be catastrophic for many households, particularly those with young children. The Canadian government must support Inuit leaders working toward a long-term solution to food insecurity in Nunavut. By funding the Hamlet Food Voucher program in the interim, it can help ensure that the children of Nunavut do not go hungry.

    The ongoing research described in this article is funded by the Arctic Children and Youth Foundation and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated.

    Financial support for this research was provided by CN and Mr. Dan Einwechter through the Einwechter Centre for Supply Chain
    Management, Wilfrid Laurier University

    Nicholas Li receives funding from a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Development Grant that helped support this research.

    Jessica Penney does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Inuit children in Nunavut face a preventable food security crisis – https://theconversation.com/inuit-children-in-nunavut-face-a-preventable-food-security-crisis-250004

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Millions have now taken action to access their eVisa

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Millions have now taken action to access their eVisa

    Published statistics show millions have accessed their eVisa, as an extension to the period expired immigration documents can be used for travel is confirmed.

    Over 4 million UK visa holders have successfully created an account to access their eVisa, according to Home Office statistics published today. An estimated 600,000 people are yet to switch from their physical document to an eVisa.

    Securing our borders is a key part of the government’s Plan for Change and eVisas are a key part of delivering a border and immigration system which is more digital and streamlined. This change will enhance the experience of people using the system, and increase the immigration system’s security and efficiency.

    To support a continued smooth transition to eVisas, and ensure no one is disadvantaged, the Home Office is extending the ‘grace period’ announced in December 2024. We committed to keep this transitional measure under review and we are extending the end date from 31 March 2025 to 1 June 2025.

    This allows people with a biometric residence permit (BRP) or EUSS biometric residence card (BRC) that expired on or after 31 December 2024, and who continue to hold underlying immigration status, to continue to use their expired document for international travel up to and including 1 June 2025.

    From the 2 June 2025, expired BRPs and EUSS BRCs will no longer be acceptable evidence of immigration status when travelling to the UK. 

    Minister for Migration and Citizenship, Seema Malhotra MP said:

    Today’s encouraging eVisa statistics show that a significant majority of the immigration status holders who needed to take action have done so.

    We continue to listen carefully to feedback, and our confirmation that expired immigration documents can be used for travel until June this year will help to further ensure the transition to eVisas continues to be as smooth as possible.

    Those yet to create an account to access their eVisa are encouraged to do so as soon as possible, to make the most of the benefits of using an eVisa and join the millions – including all EU Settlement Scheme (EUSS) status holders – who already have an eVisa. It is free, and straightforward for those who hold physical and paper documents to create a UKVI account to access their eVisa.

    People with indefinite leave to remain (ILR, also known as settlement) who use an ink stamp or vignette in a passport to prove their rights can continue to use their documents as they do today, including for travel, but are encouraged to make the switch to an eVisa to take advantage of the benefits it brings.

    We had previously estimated the number of BRP holders who need to create an account to access their eVisa at over 4 million, but this number is hard to establish accurately given the daily fluctuations in this data. This is because of people’s leave expiring, people leaving the country before their leave expires, or leave being cancelled or curtailed.

    Since the first eVisa statistics publication in December 2024, we have carried out further analysis and quality assurance to enhance our understanding of who has not yet acted, though the data is presented in same format for clarity.

    A number of people who created a UKVI account already had one created as part of their visa application, and therefore now have 2 UKVI accounts – although only one eVisa. This should not cause issues for those people, but it does mean that the published data includes a number of duplicate accounts. To maintain consistency, we are continuing to publish data on eVisa account creation numbers, recognising that this contains duplicates.

    However, we are also clarifying our revised estimate of the numbers of immigration status holders who still need to access their eVisa, which we anticipate to be approximately 600,000 BRP holders. This number will decrease as people’s leave expires and they leave the UK.

    Further information can be found in our eVisa factsheet.

    Updates to this page

    Published 27 February 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Increases made to higher education grants27 February 2025 The Minister for Education and Lifelong Learning, Deputy Rob Ward, has signed a Ministerial order which increases the funding for a number of grants for higher education students from 1 September 2025.… Read more

    Source: Channel Islands – Jersey

    27 February 2025

    The Minister for Education and Lifelong Learning, Deputy Rob Ward, has signed a Ministerial order which increases the funding for a number of grants for higher education students from 1 September 2025. 

    These changes contribute towards one of this Government’s top strategic priorities, to ‘increase the provision of lifelong learning and skills development’, by implementing sustainable higher education student finance. 

    For most grants, the amount a student can receive depends on household income thresholds. These thresholds will increase by 5.2%. The increase has been based on the economic assumptions on average incomes in Jersey published by the Fiscal Policy Panel in 2024. 

    The income threshold to receive: 

    1. the maximum maintenance grant will increase from £50,000 to £52,600 
    2. the maximum tuition grant will increase from £110,000 to £115,720 
    3. the clinical component grant will increase from £100,000 to £105,200 
    4. a grant to attend an interview will increase from £50,000 to £52,600 
    5. a grant for specialist equipment for a student with a disability will increase from £90,000 to £94,680. 

    Maintenance grants will receive an uplift of 2.5%, based on the *Consumer Price Index for December 2024 published by the Office for National Statistics. The maximum maintenance grant will increase from £8,915 to £9,138. 

    Tuition fee grants will increase by 3.1% to align with the new higher cap in England and Wales. The new maximum tuition grant will increase from £9,250 to £9,535. 

    Deputy Ward said: ‘It is important we continue to review the support we have available for our students to continue their education post the age of 18. 

    ‘These changes ensure we are in line with increases to the cost of living and will help to reduce any cost-based barriers that may prevent our young people from continuing their studies, particularly when the majority of our young adults study in the UK and so living at home to reduce those costs isn’t an option.’

    ​*As most students study in the UK, that is where the majority of their maintenance money is spent.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: USDA releases Census of Agriculture data for the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands

    Source: US National Agricultural Statistics Service

    WASHINGTON, Feb. 27, 2025 – The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) released the 2023 Census of Agriculture data for the Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) today.

    The most widely used statistics in the agriculture industry, the Census of Agriculture, is conducted every five years and provides the most comprehensive and impartial agriculture data at the island level. “We thank the producers who gave their time to complete the questionnaire. The Census of Agriculture data tells their agriculture story,” said NASS Administrator Joseph Parsons. “The agricultural census data provides vital data that helps shape policies, allocate resources, and support the growth and sustainability of agriculture in the CNMI.”

    Federal and local governments, agribusinesses, organizations, and many more use Census of Agriculture data to support funding research and programs to improve farming techniques and equipment, building infrastructure for high-speed internet, providing effective production and distribution systems as well as natural disaster preparation, response, and recovery assistance.

    Highlights from the 2023 Census of Agriculture for CNMI:

    • There were 316 farms, up 25% from the last census. Land in farms totaled 2,833 acres, with an average farm size of 9 acres.
    • The total value of sales was $ 2.8 million, with an average value of $ 8,731 per farm.
    • Vegetables and melons represented the largest category of production, with sales of $ 1.3 million.

    The Census of Agriculture in CNMI defined a farm as any place from which $1,000 or more of agricultural products were produced and sold, or normally would have been sold, in 2023.

    The full Census of Agriculture report as well as publication dates for additional data products from the census can be found at nass.usda.gov/AgCensus.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Bowman, Community Banking

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    It is a pleasure to join you today at Fort Hays State University for the Robbins Banking Institute Lecture.1 I have been a supporter of this institute since it was first created here at Fort Hays State, including by giving a lecture to students during my tenure as the Kansas State Bank Commissioner. Today, my view is slightly different than at that time, and I thought it would be a good time to share my thoughts on the critical role community banks play, not only in the U.S. banking system but also as drivers of local and regional economic growth and as anchors of their local communities. I will also explore the responsibility of bank regulators to support community banks.
    In a broad and diverse economy, banks of all sizes play an important role in the creation and funding of business and consumer opportunities and investments. Without this diverse banking ecosystem, 30 percent of American communities would not have access to a physical bank location. There is little doubt that community banks have an extensive presence across this landscape and that they are essential to the success of the American economy.
    No other country in the world enjoys this direct access to and presence of financial services in remote and rural areas. These bankers are members of the community. They are neighbors and friends, and their kids attend local schools and play sports in the local recreational league. The term “relationship” banking has true meaning in this context.
    The direct relationships provide an opportunity for bankers to understand the unique financing needs of local businesses and enables them to develop specialized services for specific segments of the local economy, including agriculture and small business lending.2
    Community banks are catalysts for local economic growth, and their bankers often also serve as civic leaders in the region. I served as one of those community leaders while I was a banker in Council Grove. That experience—whether serving as the President of the local Chamber of Commerce or the Rotary Club—provided a unique view into the local economy. And today, as I travel across the country to visit with bankers in just about every state, I learn about how they are driving investment, philanthropy, and financial support for the local economy. While this work is rewarding, it is also challenging. It is sometimes tedious—especially in today’s regulatory environment—and it is a seven days a week job. Bankers are often “working” while engaged in social activities, attending church or their kids athletic events, and shopping at the grocery store, and I often hear about customers giving a loan payment to their banker in the grocery store or asking about financing terms for the new car they might have their eye on.
    Once a policymaker grasps the perspective of community banking from this vantage point, it becomes clear that the regulatory approach is much more complex than necessary to address many small bank issues. A community bank that has no out-of-market customers applying for new accounts likely does not need the same know-your-customer processes as a large or regional bank that opens accounts online and may be more vulnerable to fraud. A community bank can operate safely and soundly, and in compliance with laws, without being subject to the same extensive guidance and regulatory requirements as larger, more complex banks that offer a broader range of products and may be exposed to wider range of risks. A number of onerous requirements imposed on community banks seem to reflect an assumption of an indirect and less personal banking relationship.
    Public debates about the banking system often feature academics that tend to downplay the significant role of community banks in the financial system. Instead, they imagine a banking system with fewer banks as equally effective in meeting the banking needs of every community throughout the United States. The eight largest U.S. banks hold $15.4 trillion in assets, which is several times larger than the assets controlled by the more than 4,000 community banks in the United States.3 But as we all know, aggregate asset size is not an accurate indication of these banks’ importance.
    Of course, metrics do not provide the full picture of how relationship-based lending practices drive local economic activity. They ignore that banking has a regional component, where local knowledge and expertise—and a commitment to the local community—can help enable the community to thrive. There is an important place for the largest banks and regional banks in the banking system, but it is a fallacy to assume that the presence of fewer community banks would not have devastating consequences for a number of consumers and businesses. Some community banks serve rural and underserved banking markets and may be the only option for consumers and businesses, especially those that have unique balance sheets or less pristine credit histories. If community banks were to disappear, many communities would be left with few or no alternative options for banking services.
    While metrics do not tell the whole story, this is not meant to downplay the importance of data, research, and analysis, all of which assist us in our understanding of the banking system and how that understanding could be improved. Data can help us identify issues that must be addressed or remediated. Data can help us evaluate which elements of the current bank regulatory framework may be effective or ineffective. And data can help regulators update regulations and guidance with a clearer understanding of the intended and unintended consequences.
    Over the past 20 years, we have seen the number of community banks continue to decline. Bank consolidation through mergers has contributed to this decline, and de novo bank formation has been largely nonexistent. Many factors have contributed to the bank consolidation trend, including competition from nonbank financial service providers and the ever-increasing regulatory burdens on the community banking model. Many of these same challenges have acted as a deterrent to bankers who have considered pursuing a de novo bank charter. And while many factors influence the health of the community bank model—including the interest rate environment, economic conditions, and alternative sources of competition for credit—we should consider whether there are actions regulators can take to support and ensure the future of community banks.
    The Benefits of ExperienceOne of the biggest barriers to the community bank model is the competition for qualified bank management and staff. Attracting, developing, and retaining future and current bank leadership is a significant challenge. Yet, one of the most important priorities for bank management is to develop the next generation of leadership. Educational programs like this institute, bank and regulator internships, and regional graduate schools of banking can help develop this pipeline of talent to support the industry and supervisory responsibilities. These programs also help regulators recruit the next generation of bank examiners.
    Working in my family’s community bank reinforced the mission focus and relationship model of community banking for me. This holds true for many family-owned community banks across the country.
    Since we are on the campus of Fort Hays State University today and we have a number of students in the audience, part of my message today is to encourage each of you to consider exploring a career in the financial services industry—including in community banking or with a state or federal banking regulator. Whether that experience becomes a lifelong career or a stepping stone along your path, having experience in banking provides valuable perspective on how local economies function and the importance of access to banking services and financial inclusion. This experience has helped to shape my perspective and approach as the state bank commissioner and as a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
    This experience is also not something that I take for granted—seeing different perspectives empowers me to be a better policymaker. For example, as a bank compliance officer you understand the challenges of ensuring the bank is in compliance with rules and guidance and is prepared for interactions with bank examiners. Further, having this perspective enables a policymaker to approach the process of drafting rules and guidance and relaying supervisory messages in a way that recognizes a need for clarity, efficiency, and simplicity. The outcomes of our work are enhanced by a better understanding of the costs and unintended consequences of getting it wrong.
    The Responsibility of RegulatorsOverregulation and unnecessary rules and guidance imposed on smaller and community banks create disproportionate burdens on these banks, eventually eroding the viability of the community banking model.
    Policymakers and regulators have a responsibility to ensure that the banking and financial systems encourage growth and innovation and foster a strong and growing economy. One of the great strengths of the U.S. banking system is the variety of institutions that meet the needs of consumers and businesses, not only through offering a range of products and services but also by reaching customers throughout the country, including in the most rural and remote locations. Our goal must be to facilitate a banking and regulatory environment that enables banks of all types and sizes to thrive. For community banks, this includes building a better regulatory and supervisory framework to effectively support the unique characteristics of these institutions.
    What should that framework look like?
    First, it includes thresholds that better reflect risk and business model.
    As currently defined, community banks are those with less than $10 billion in assets. The Federal Reserve divides banks into distinct supervisory portfolios that oversee “community,” “regional,” and four categories of larger banks.4 The portfolio approach helps regulators differentiate standards and supervisory focus based on bank characteristics and risks. In theory, it allows examiners to better organize supervisory activities and to provide specialized training to help examiners focus on issues that are most relevant for the institutions being examined. If appropriately executed, this portfolio-based approach should lead to better and more risk-focused supervision, and in turn a safer and more sound banking system.
    An organizational structure that better allocates and directs supervisory resources seems like a worthwhile goal, but over time, it becomes clear that there are downsides to this approach. One of these downsides is the static nature of the fixed thresholds defining the categories. Currently, our framework includes fixed thresholds that are not adjusted with economic growth, inflation, or the growth in deposits from unexpected sources and fiscal programs, like those from the COVID era. They also do not account for changed industry dynamics, especially those resulting from a particular bank’s activities or risk profile. In this environment, some firms with stable growth, a static business model, and a straightforward risk profile cross the $10 billion threshold unintentionally, subjecting them to additional regulatory and supervisory requirements that were specifically designed and implemented for larger and more complex firms. Banks approaching the $10 billion threshold often choose to curtail their asset growth to stay below the threshold.
    Another significant problem with the current approach—that specifically challenges community banks—is the failure to index and update how a community bank is defined. Given the low fixed-dollar asset thresholds, regulators must focus on ensuring that asset-based benchmarks remain reasonable and appropriate in their work to supervise banks, especially as they apply tailored, but static, supervisory standards. As is the case now, over time, economic growth and inflation have created an environment in which thresholds are inappropriately low.
    We also need to implement a better, more timely, transparent, and viable path for all bank regulatory applications. The application process can be a significant obstacle to applications activity, in particular mergers and acquisitions. Applications often experience significant delays between the application filing date and before receiving final regulatory approval. In some cases, even for non-complex transactions, the regulatory approval process has taken more than a year. A healthy banking system is one in which banks can make decisions to merge with peers or acquire new assets or business lines, and one that allows new bank formation, in a reasonable amount of time in accordance with statutory timelines. As the bank applications process has become a barrier to bank merger activity, we have seen credit unions acquiring community banks in record numbers. In the absence of a better functioning bank applications process, institutions will explore other options, including credit union acquisitions.
    I think this trend should be a wake up call for regulators to reevaluate our approaches to many areas of our responsibility, but especially whether our applications processes are operating as effectively and efficiently as they should. It is important that the regulatory framework ensures that competition and broader availability of banking services remain a feature of the U.S. banking system.
    A necessary approach to solving this is by making targeted improvements to the applications process. If you follow my work, you know that I often discuss how the applications process can be improved.5 So I will note some of the important changes that I believe would be a catalyst to returning our bank applications review function to an appropriate processing timeline. These are simply threshold steps that should be easy to accomplish and would be a great start to fundamentally improving the process.
    I believe that we should not be complacent when facing excessive and longstanding delays. For bank applications, we must focus our resources and expertise to review and promptly act on all bank applications, to streamline the required forms and procedures, and to provide clear standards for approval.
    Bank regulators should be prepared to act promptly on applications, and yet the significant delays in applications processing we see suggests we can do better. The published statistics on applications processing also tell an incomplete story, as they do not reflect the time spent by applicants who withdraw applications before final regulatory action or that simply forgo business opportunities that require an application out of concern that the regulatory approval process is too uncertain and unpredictable.6
    Many banks experience these frictions in the applications process firsthand. And judging from the number of bankers that contact me as they experience unexplained and prolonged delays, there is clear need for improvement. Uncertainty regarding the status of the application and an expected timeline for resolution creates challenges in moving forward with related business processes often resulting in costly delays for systems conversions and unhealthy uncertainty among bank staff.
    We can certainly learn from the inefficiencies in the current process and leverage these experiences by consulting with banks about these challenges and identifying a clear path to improve the process. One step could be to ensure that our applications teams have access to specialized knowledge required to more effectively approach applications for infrequent activities, like de novo formations. We should ensure that a Reserve Bank has the resources necessary to assist them in making the applications process smooth, and ensuring prompt action is taken on the application.
    We also know that the applications process itself can be a significant barrier and has in recent years been used by regulators to delay decisions. While many activities that require regulatory approval rely on common application forms, some bank applications require regulatory approvals from multiple regulators. Even where only one primary federal regulator must act on an application, there may be requirements to solicit views from other regulators, or the need to request additional information from the applicant that was not included in the initial filing forms.
    Each additional step in the process can lead to delays and prolonged uncertainty. Without question, there is a better process, and it should start with aligned requirements across the banking agencies, coordinated review processes, and clearer standards for approval.
    The standards for approval should be clear to all applicants and consistently applied. This must include transparency not only in approval standards but also in timelines, which are equally critical to banks seeking regulatory approval. Banking applications are not filed without extensive work up front and specific plans in mind. For example, a merger application will include information about the pro forma institution’s management team, geographies to be served in the merged institution’s banking footprint, what products will be offered, and how the application will be consistent with the various statutory approval standards.
    If we determine that we consistently need more information to process an application, we should amend the applications form instead of relying on time-consuming additional information requests that extend the decision timeline. And if there are standards we expect applicants to meet—for example, the minimum amount of capital required for a de novo bank formation or an expansionary proposal—we should be clear and transparent about those expectations in advance.
    Uncertainty in the standards and timelines for action on bank applications can contribute to a regulatory environment that favors nonbanks. This more favorable treatment includes allowing them to engage in the same activities without the same regulatory burdens, like more favorable tax and regulatory treatment for credit unions and the exemption from Community Reinvestment Act requirements for nonbank financial institutions, again, including credit unions. Why would a new business choose to become a bank if they can avoid the complexities of the banking regulatory framework and still provide similar services?
    TailoringWhile these steps—developing a pipeline of future leadership for community banks and promoting a more efficient bank applications process—would help support the community banking system generally, perhaps the most critical feature of the framework that affects community banks is tailoring to address the ongoing burden of compliance.
    Tailoring is the term we use in banking to describe an approach to regulation that strives to match regulation and supervision with the size, risk, complexity, and business model of an institution. Tailoring helps us calibrate regulation and supervision to the activities and risks at every tier within our framework, but it is particularly important when we think about its application for smaller and community banks.
    Frankly, when you consider the fundamental differences between the largest banks and the smallest, tailoring seems like common sense rather than a distinct regulatory philosophy. But in the absence of industry experience among bank policymakers, the trend over time has been an erosion of tailoring in favor of one-size-fits-all approaches.
    Pushing down requirements more appropriate for larger institutions to smaller banks—either formally through regulation or informally through supervisory messaging—encourages homogenization of the industry. This trend becomes even more concerning when regulators “grade on a curve” by evaluating a bank relative to other institutions, instead of evaluating a bank against a clear legal standard.
    It is also important for regulators evaluating regulations and supervisory approach to consider the aggregate benefits and costs of the framework, rather than looking at each part of the framework on a piecemeal basis. Often, the regulations and supervisory guidance issued by regulators has a “cumulative” or “compounding” effect on banks. A piecemeal approach ensures that banks cannot go to a single source or one regulation to understand supervisory expectations or requirements for a particular activity. While it may be possible to justify or explain any single regulation or piece of guidance on a standalone basis, when we consider the aggregate effects, it is clear that we need to rethink our approach and recommit to tailoring.
    Regulatory ambivalence to tailoring comes at a significant cost. If current trends continue—where we push down requirements from large banks to small and attempt to “smooth” or standardize requirements and expectations across all banks—we will eventually find ourselves achieving the academically preferred end state of only a few large banks ineffectively serving the financial needs of the entire U.S. economy. In this state of the world, not only will community banks suffer but so will the communities they serve.
    Closing ThoughtsThank you again for the invitation to join you today. It is wonderful to see the ongoing success and commitment of the Robbins Banking Institute in preparing the next generation of leaders to play an important role in the banking and financial system. While I have expressed concern about some recent trends, one of the many benefits of our system is that there are always opportunities to change course, and I am confident that with committed and experienced leadership we can.
    I am also confident that the future of community banking is bright, as long as we focus on right sized and appropriate regulations and guidance and a recognition that investment in innovation and growth is a necessity, not a roadblock. Regulators have an important opportunity now to prioritize changes that will support the safe and sound operation of community banks while allowing these banks to support the U.S. economy, serve their communities, innovate, and grow. Community banks enable the economic success of our country and will continue to support financial opportunities for many future generations. I look forward to seeing how the students in attendance here today will be a part of and shape that bright future.

    1. The views expressed in these remarks are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of my colleagues on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. Allen N. Berger, Nathan H. Miller, Mitchell A. Petersen, Raghuram G. Rajan, and Jeremy C. Stein, “Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks (PDF),” National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 8752 (Cambridge, MA: NBER, February 2002). Return to text
    3. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Supervision and Regulation Report (PDF) (Washington: Board of Governors, November 2024), Table 2, Summary of organizations supervised by the Federal Reserve (as of 6/30/2024). Return to text
    4. Larger banks are defined using tests that look primarily at asset size but may include other metrics like cross-jurisdictional activity, nonbank assets, short-term wholesale funding, or off-balance sheet exposures. Return to text
    5. Michelle W. Bowman, “Brief Remarks on the Economy and Accountability in Supervision, Applications, and Regulation (PDF)” (remarks at the American Bankers Association 2025 Conference for Community Bankers, Phoenix, AZ, February 17, 2025). Return to text
    6. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking Applications Activity Semiannual Report, January 1-June 30, 2024 (PDF) (Washington, Board of Governors, October 2024). Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News