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Category: Switzerland

  • MIL-OSI Global: Faced with new tariffs and a truculent Trump, Japan and South Korea toe a cautious line

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Sebastian Maslow, Associate Professor, International Relations, University of Tokyo

    Two months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, the liberal international order is on life support.

    Alliances and multilateral institutions are now seen by the United States as burdens. Europe and NATO are framed as bad business, “ripping off” the US. On his so-called “Liberation Day”, Trump also imposed 20% tariffs on all European Union imports.

    The Trump administration has been far less critical of the US’ alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. On a visit to Tokyo this week, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth described Japan as America’s “indispensable partner” in deterring Chinese aggression.

    Yet, Japan and South Korea fared even worse than the EU with Trump’s new tariffs. Trump slapped Japan with 24% tariffs and South Korea 25%. (Both countries enjoy a trade surplus with the US.)

    So, how are the US’ two main allies in the Indo-Pacific dealing with the mercurial US leader? Will they follow Europe’s lead in reassessing their own security relationships with the US?

    Japan: a positive summit but concerns remain

    America’s post-war security strategy in Asia differs from Europe. While NATO was built on the premise of collective defence among its members, the US adopted a “hub-and-spokes” model in Asia, relying on bilateral alliances to contain the spread of communism.

    Japan and South Korea have long sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella and hosted major US military bases. Both are also highly sensitive to changes in the US’ Indo-Pacific policies.

    Japan, in particular, has a long history of careful alliance management with the US, epitomised by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s courting of Trump.

    During Trump’s first term in office, Abe’s policy goals aligned closely with the US: transforming Japan’s security posture to make it a serious military and diplomatic power. Japan increased military spending, lifted arms export restrictions and deepened ties with India and Australia.

    Prime Minister Fumio Kishida continued to raise Japan’s security profile from 2021-24, again increasing military spending and taking a tough line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He emphasised “Europe today could be Asia tomorrow”.

    His successor, Shigeru Ishiba, had a successful summit with Trump in February, immediately after his inauguration. The joint statement reaffirmed US security guarantees to Japan, including over the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by China.

    Japan also agreed to import American liquefied natural gas, and later committed to working with South Korea to develop a US$44 billion (A$70 billion) plan to export LNG from Alaska.

    However, these positive developments do not mean the relationship is on firm ground.

    In early March, Trump complained the US-Japan security agreement signed in 1960 was “one-sided” and a top administration official again called for Japan to increase its defence spending to 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) – a huge increase for a country facing serious demographic and fiscal pressures.

    Reports also emerged the US was considering cancelling a new joint headquarters in Japan aimed at deeper integration between US and Japanese forces.

    South Korea: extremely vulnerable on trade

    South Korea faces similar pressures. Ties between the two countries were strained during Trump’s first term over his demand South Korea increase the amount it pays to host US forces by
    nearly 400%. A 2021 agreement restored some stability, but left Seoul deeply worried about the future of the alliance.

    South Korea’s acting president, Choi Sang-mok, has expressed a desire to strengthen ties with the US, though Trump has reportedly been cool to his advances.

    With a US$66 billion (A$105 billion) trade surplus with the US, South Korea is considered the country most vulnerable to trade risk with the Trump administration, according to a Swiss research group.

    Trump’s past suggestions that both South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons or pay for US nuclear protection has also rattled some nerves. As confidence in the US alliance erodes, both countries are engaging in an urgent public debate about the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.

    Tensions moving forward

    Potential for conflict is on the horizon. For example, Tokyo and Washington are set to renegotiate the deal that dictates how much Japan pays to host US troops next year.

    Both allies pay huge sums to host US bases. South Korea will pay US$1.14 billion (A$1.8 billion) in 2026, and Japan pays US$1.72 billion (A$2.7 billion) annually.

    A trade war could also prompt a reassessment of the costs of US efforts to decouple from China, potentially leading to closer economic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. The three countries have agreed to accelerate talks on a trilateral free trade agreement, which had been on hold since 2019.

    Another challenge is semiconductors. Japan’s new semiconductor revitalisation strategy is prioritising domestic investment, raising questions about whether Trump will tolerate “friendshoring” if Japan diverts investments from the US.

    In 2024, Japan outspent the US in semiconductor subsidies (as a share of GDP), while Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s largest contract chipmaker, expanded its production capacity in Japan.

    Seoul remains an important partner to Washington on semiconductors. Samsung and SK Hynix are both boosting their investments on new semiconductor plants in the US. However, there is now uncertainty over the subsidies promised to both companies to invest in America under the CHIPS Act.

    Ultimately, the strength of these alliances depends on whether the Trump administration views them as long-term bulwarks against China’s rise in the region, or merely vassals that can be extorted for financial gain.

    If the US is serious about countering China, its regional alliances are key. This would give Japan and South Korea some degree of leverage – or, in Trump terms, they’ll hold valuable cards. Whether they get to play them, however, depends on what Trump’s China policy turns out to be.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Faced with new tariffs and a truculent Trump, Japan and South Korea toe a cautious line – https://theconversation.com/faced-with-new-tariffs-and-a-truculent-trump-japan-and-south-korea-toe-a-cautious-line-244172

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 5, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Euro area quarterly balance of payments and international investment position: fourth quarter of 2024

    Source: European Central Bank

    4 April 2025

    • Current account surplus at €426 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP) in 2024, after a €243 billion surplus (1.7% of GDP) a year earlier.
    • Geographical counterparts: largest bilateral current account surpluses vis-à-vis United Kingdom (€197 billion) and Switzerland (€76 billion) and largest deficit vis-à-vis China (€105 billion).
    • International investment position showed net assets of €1.66 trillion (10.9% of euro area GDP) at end of 2024.
    • Bilateral current account vis-à-vis the United States: surplus of €3 billion (0.0% of euro area GDP) in 2024, following a deficit of €30 billion (0.2% of GDP) in 2023. For more details see dedicated section on economic and financial linkages between the euro area and the United States.

    Current account

    The current account of the euro area recorded a surplus of €426 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP) in 2024, following a €243 billion surplus (1.7% of GDP) a year earlier (Table 1). This development was driven by larger surpluses for goods (from €264 billion to €372 billion), services (from €127 billion to €169 billion) and primary income (from €20 billion to €54 billion). The deficit for secondary income increased moderately from €167 billion to €168 billion.

    The estimates on goods trade broken down by product group show that in 2024 the increase in the goods surplus was mainly due to a reduction in the deficit for energy products (from €314 billion to €260 billion). In addition, the surpluses for chemical products and machinery and manufactured products increased (from €244 billion to €268 billion and from 283 billion to €300 billion, respectively).

    The larger surplus for services in 2024 was mainly due to widening surpluses for telecommunication, computer and information (from €169 billion to €203 billion) and travel (from €52 billion to €61 billion), and a lower deficit for other business services (from €60 billion to €28 billion). These developments were partly offset by a widening deficit for charges for the use of intellectual property (from €100 billion to €126 billion).

    In 2024, the increase in the primary income surplus was mainly due to larger surpluses in direct investment (from €72 billion to €104 billion), portfolio debt (from €59 billion to €79 billion), and other primary income (from €3 billion to €15 billion), which were partly offset by a larger deficit in portfolio equity (from €163 billion to €194 billion).

    Table 1

    Current account of the euro area

    (EUR billions, unless otherwise indicated; transactions during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Notes: “Equity” comprises equity and investment fund shares. Goods by product group is an estimated breakdown using a method based on statistics on international trade in goods. Discrepancies between totals and their components may arise from rounding.

    Data for the current account of the euro area

    Data on the geographical counterparts of the euro area current account (Chart 1) show that in 2024, the euro area recorded its largest bilateral surpluses vis-à-vis the United Kingdom (€197 billion, down from €220 billion a year earlier) and Switzerland (€76 billion, up from €65 billion). The euro area also recorded surpluses vis-à-vis other emerging countries (€155 billion, up from €135 billion a year earlier) and other advanced countries (€114 billion, up from €80 billion). The largest bilateral deficit was recorded vis-à-vis China (€105 billion, down from €109 billion a year earlier) and a deficit was also recorded vis-à-vis the residual group of other countries (€96 billion, down from €142 billion).

    The most significant changes in the geographical components of the current account in 2024 relative to 2023 were as follows: the goods surpluses increased vis-à-vis the United States (from €179 billion to €213 billion) and vis-à-vis other advanced countries (from €27 billion to €50 billion), while the goods deficit vis-à-vis China increased from €131 billion to €141 billion. In services, the deficit vis-à-vis the United States increased (from €124 billion to €156 billion), while the balance vis-à-vis offshore centres shifted from a deficit (€8 billion) to a surplus (€16 billion). In primary income, the balance vis-à-vis the United Kingdom shifted from a surplus (€31 billion) to a deficit (€4 billion) while a smaller deficit was recorded vis-à-vis the United States (from €84 billion to €52 billion). The deficit in secondary income vis-à-vis the EU Member States and EU institutions outside the euro area decreased slightly (from €76 billion to €73 billion).

    Chart 1

    Geographical breakdown of the euro area current account balance

    (four-quarter moving sums in EUR billions; non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Note: “EU non-EA” comprises the non-euro area EU Member States and those EU institutions and bodies that are considered for statistical purposes as being outside the euro area, such as the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. “Other advanced” includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway and South Korea. “Other emerging” includes Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Türkiye. “Other countries” includes all countries and country groups not shown in the chart, as well as unallocated transactions.

    Data for the geographical breakdown of the euro area current account

    International investment position

    At the end of 2024, the international investment position of the euro area recorded net assets of €1.66 trillion vis-à-vis the rest of the world (10.9 % of euro area GDP), up from €1.25 trillion in the previous quarter (Chart 2 and Table 2).

    Chart 2

    Net international investment position of the euro area

    (net amounts outstanding at the end of the period as a percentage of four-quarter moving sums of GDP)

    Source: ECB.

    The €407 billion increase in net assets was mainly driven by larger net assets in portfolio debt (up from €1.27 trillion to €1.42 trillion), direct investment (up from €2.54 trillion to €2.66 trillion) and reserve assets (up from €1.32 trillion to €1.39 trillion).

    Table 2

    International investment position of the euro area

    (EUR billions, unless otherwise indicated; amounts outstanding at the end of the period, flows during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Notes: “Equity” comprises equity and investment fund shares. Net financial derivatives are reported under assets. “Other volume changes” mainly reflect reclassifications and data enhancements. Discrepancies between totals and their components may arise from rounding.

    Note: “Other volume changes” mainly reflect reclassifications and data enhancements. 

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 5, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Euro area quarterly balance of payments and international investment position: fourth quarter of 2024

    Source: European Central Bank

    4 April 2025

    • Current account surplus at €426 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP) in 2024, after a €243 billion surplus (1.7% of GDP) a year earlier.
    • Geographical counterparts: largest bilateral current account surpluses vis-à-vis United Kingdom (€197 billion) and Switzerland (€76 billion) and largest deficit vis-à-vis China (€105 billion).
    • International investment position showed net assets of €1.66 trillion (10.9% of euro area GDP) at end of 2024.
    • Bilateral current account vis-à-vis the United States: surplus of €3 billion (0.0% of euro area GDP) in 2024, following a deficit of €30 billion (0.2% of GDP) in 2023. For more details see dedicated section on economic and financial linkages between the euro area and the United States.

    Current account

    The current account of the euro area recorded a surplus of €426 billion (2.8% of euro area GDP) in 2024, following a €243 billion surplus (1.7% of GDP) a year earlier (Table 1). This development was driven by larger surpluses for goods (from €264 billion to €372 billion), services (from €127 billion to €169 billion) and primary income (from €20 billion to €54 billion). The deficit for secondary income increased moderately from €167 billion to €168 billion.

    The estimates on goods trade broken down by product group show that in 2024 the increase in the goods surplus was mainly due to a reduction in the deficit for energy products (from €314 billion to €260 billion). In addition, the surpluses for chemical products and machinery and manufactured products increased (from €244 billion to €268 billion and from 283 billion to €300 billion, respectively).

    The larger surplus for services in 2024 was mainly due to widening surpluses for telecommunication, computer and information (from €169 billion to €203 billion) and travel (from €52 billion to €61 billion), and a lower deficit for other business services (from €60 billion to €28 billion). These developments were partly offset by a widening deficit for charges for the use of intellectual property (from €100 billion to €126 billion).

    In 2024, the increase in the primary income surplus was mainly due to larger surpluses in direct investment (from €72 billion to €104 billion), portfolio debt (from €59 billion to €79 billion), and other primary income (from €3 billion to €15 billion), which were partly offset by a larger deficit in portfolio equity (from €163 billion to €194 billion).

    Table 1

    Current account of the euro area

    (EUR billions, unless otherwise indicated; transactions during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Notes: “Equity” comprises equity and investment fund shares. Goods by product group is an estimated breakdown using a method based on statistics on international trade in goods. Discrepancies between totals and their components may arise from rounding.

    Data for the current account of the euro area

    Data on the geographical counterparts of the euro area current account (Chart 1) show that in 2024, the euro area recorded its largest bilateral surpluses vis-à-vis the United Kingdom (€197 billion, down from €220 billion a year earlier) and Switzerland (€76 billion, up from €65 billion). The euro area also recorded surpluses vis-à-vis other emerging countries (€155 billion, up from €135 billion a year earlier) and other advanced countries (€114 billion, up from €80 billion). The largest bilateral deficit was recorded vis-à-vis China (€105 billion, down from €109 billion a year earlier) and a deficit was also recorded vis-à-vis the residual group of other countries (€96 billion, down from €142 billion).

    The most significant changes in the geographical components of the current account in 2024 relative to 2023 were as follows: the goods surpluses increased vis-à-vis the United States (from €179 billion to €213 billion) and vis-à-vis other advanced countries (from €27 billion to €50 billion), while the goods deficit vis-à-vis China increased from €131 billion to €141 billion. In services, the deficit vis-à-vis the United States increased (from €124 billion to €156 billion), while the balance vis-à-vis offshore centres shifted from a deficit (€8 billion) to a surplus (€16 billion). In primary income, the balance vis-à-vis the United Kingdom shifted from a surplus (€31 billion) to a deficit (€4 billion) while a smaller deficit was recorded vis-à-vis the United States (from €84 billion to €52 billion). The deficit in secondary income vis-à-vis the EU Member States and EU institutions outside the euro area decreased slightly (from €76 billion to €73 billion).

    Chart 1

    Geographical breakdown of the euro area current account balance

    (four-quarter moving sums in EUR billions; non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Note: “EU non-EA” comprises the non-euro area EU Member States and those EU institutions and bodies that are considered for statistical purposes as being outside the euro area, such as the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. “Other advanced” includes Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway and South Korea. “Other emerging” includes Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Türkiye. “Other countries” includes all countries and country groups not shown in the chart, as well as unallocated transactions.

    Data for the geographical breakdown of the euro area current account

    International investment position

    At the end of 2024, the international investment position of the euro area recorded net assets of €1.66 trillion vis-à-vis the rest of the world (10.9 % of euro area GDP), up from €1.25 trillion in the previous quarter (Chart 2 and Table 2).

    Chart 2

    Net international investment position of the euro area

    (net amounts outstanding at the end of the period as a percentage of four-quarter moving sums of GDP)

    Source: ECB.

    Data for the net international investment position of the euro area

    The €407 billion increase in net assets was mainly driven by larger net assets in portfolio debt (up from €1.27 trillion to €1.42 trillion), direct investment (up from €2.54 trillion to €2.66 trillion) and reserve assets (up from €1.32 trillion to €1.39 trillion).

    Table 2

    International investment position of the euro area

    (EUR billions, unless otherwise indicated; amounts outstanding at the end of the period, flows during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Notes: “Equity” comprises equity and investment fund shares. Net financial derivatives are reported under assets. “Other volume changes” mainly reflect reclassifications and data enhancements. Discrepancies between totals and their components may arise from rounding.

    Data for the international investment position of the euro area

    The developments in the euro area’s net international investment position in the fourth quarter of 2024 were driven mainly by positive exchange rate changes, and to a lesser extent by positive transactions and other volume changes (Table 2 and Chart 3).

    At the end of the fourth quarter of 2024, direct investment assets of special purpose entities (SPEs) amounted to €3.58 trillion (28% of total euro area direct investment assets), up from €3.53 trillion at the end of the previous quarter (Table 2). Over the same period, direct investment liabilities of SPEs increased from €3.10 trillion to €3.13 trillion (31% of total direct investment liabilities).

    At the end of the fourth quarter of 2024 the gross external debt of the euro area amounted to €16.70 trillion (110% of euro area GDP), up by €1 billion compared with the previous quarter.

    Chart 3

    Changes in the net international investment position of the euro area

    (EUR billions; flows during the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Note: “Other volume changes” mainly reflect reclassifications and data enhancements. 

    Data for changes in the net international investment position of the euro area

    At the end of 2024 euro area direct investment assets were €12.62 trillion, 23% of which was invested in the United States and 19% in the United Kingdom (see Table 3). Euro area direct investment liabilities were €9.96 trillion, with 28% being investments from the United States, 19% from offshore centres and 18% from the United Kingdom.

    In portfolio investment, euro area holdings of foreign securities amounted to €7.57 trillion in equity and €7.09 trillion in debt securities at the end of 2024. The largest holdings of equity were in securities issued by residents of the United States (accounting for 60%). In debt securities, the largest euro area holdings were in securities issued by residents of the United States (accounting for 38%), the United Kingdom (17%) and the EU Member States and EU institutions outside the euro area (16%).

    On the portfolio investment liabilities side, non-residents’ holdings of securities issued by euro area residents stood at €10.84 trillion in equity and at €5.67 trillion in debt at the end of 2024. The largest holder countries of euro area equity were the United States (27%) and the United Kingdom (13%), while for euro area debt securities the largest holders were the BRIC group of countries (14%), the United States (13%) and Japan (11%).

    In other investment, euro area residents’ claims on non-residents amounted to €7.18 trillion, 29% of which was vis-à-vis the United Kingdom and 24% vis-à-vis the United States. Euro area other investment liabilities amounted to €7.71 trillion, with the United Kingdom accounting for 25% and the United States for 19%.

    Table 3

    International investment position of the euro area – geographical breakdown

    (as a percentage of the total, unless otherwise indicated; at the end of the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Notes: “Equity” comprises equity and investment fund shares. “EU non-EA” comprises the non-euro area EU Member States and those EU institutions and bodies that are considered for statistical purposes as being outside the euro area, such as the European Commission and the European Investment Bank. The “BRIC” countries are Brazil, Russia, India and China. “Other advanced” includes Australia, Canada, Norway and South Korea. “Other emerging” includes Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Türkiye. “Other countries” includes all countries and country groups not listed in the table as well as unallocated positions.

    Data for the international investment position of the euro area – geographical breakdown

    Economic and financial linkages between the euro area and the United States

    This statistical release provides a longer-term perspective on the euro area’s bilateral current account balance and international investment position vis-à-vis the United States by presenting developments over the past decade.

    In 2024 the euro area recorded a current account surplus of €3 billion (0.0% of euro area GDP) vis-à-vis the United States, following a deficit of €30 billion (0.2% of GDP) in 2023 (see Chart 4). The euro area had recorded a rather stable current account surplus vis-à-vis the United States of around 1.0% of GDP between 2015 and 2019, which gradually declined subsequently and turned into a deficit in 2022. Since 2015 the euro area has run a persistent and sizeable goods surplus vis-à-vis the United States, rising from €127 billion in 2015 to €213 billion in 2024. The marked decline in the euro area current account surplus vis-à-vis the United States over the past decade was mainly due to a pronounced widening in the deficit for services (from €21 billion in 2015 to €156 billion in 2024), driven by an increasing deficit in charges for the use of intellectual property (from €5 billion to €168 billion). In addition, the euro area’s primary income balance vis-à-vis the United States changed from a surplus of €2 billion in 2015 to a deficit of €52 billion in 2024, largely due to a widening deficit in direct investment income. The developments in the euro area’s bilateral current account balance vis-à-vis the United States, in particular the significant changes observed since 2019, are partly connected to the activities of US multinational enterprises in the euro area.

    Chart 4

    Euro area current account balance vis-à-vis the United States

    (left-hand scale: four-quarter moving sums in EUR billions; right-hand scale: four-quarter moving sums as a percentage of GDP; non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.

    Data for the current account of the euro area vis-a-vis the United States

    At the end of 2024, the euro area’s bilateral investment position vis-à-vis the United States showed net assets equivalent to 26% of euro area GDP, up from 18% of GDP at the end of 2023 and 4% of GDP at the end of 2015 (Chart 5). Net asset positions in portfolio investment debt (13% of GDP) and portfolio investment equity (11% of GDP) contributed most to the euro area’s bilateral net asset position at the end of 2024. The increase in the euro area bilateral net asset position since 2015 was driven mainly by a shift in portfolio investment equity from a net debtor to a net creditor position, as euro area portfolio investment equity assets vis-à-vis the United States rose more strongly than the corresponding liabilities. Developments in portfolio investment debt and direct investment also contributed, albeit to a lesser extent, to the increase in total net assets vis-à-vis the United States.

    Chart 5

    vis-à-vis the United States

    Euro area net investment position

    (net amounts outstanding at the end of the period as a percentage of four-quarter moving sums of GDP)

    Source: ECB.

    Notes: “Total net position” refers to the sum of net direct investment, net portfolio investment, net other investment and net financial derivatives. Reserve assets are not included in the total. Net positions are computed as the asset positions minus the liability positions of the respective item. Discrepancies between totals and their components may arise from rounding.

    The United States is the largest destination country for euro area cross-border financial investment. Euro area financial assets vis-à-vis the United States amounted to €12.38 trillion at the end of 2024 (82% of euro area GDP), with an 83% increase since the end of 2015 (see Table 4). This development increased the share of the United States in euro area external assets from 27% to 33%. The increase was mainly due to euro area holdings of portfolio investment equity issued by residents of the United States, which have risen by 286% since the end of 2015, mainly as a result of positive price revaluations. At the same time, euro area holdings of portfolio investment debt securities have increased by 91% since the end of 2015.

    The United States is also the largest source country for euro area cross-border financial investment, accounting for bilateral financial liabilities of €8.41 trillion (56% of euro area GDP) at the end of 2024, a 32% increase since the end of 2015. Over the same period, the share of the United States in euro area external liabilities remained broadly stable at 22%. This development mainly reflected an increase of 97% in portfolio investment equity liabilities vis-à-vis the United States, while direct investment liabilities vis-à-vis the United States declined by 9%.

    Table 4

    Euro area international investment position vis-à-vis the United States

    (at the end of the period; non-working day and non-seasonally adjusted)

    Source: ECB.
    Notes: “p.p.” refers to percentage points. “Equity” comprises equity and investment fund shares. “Total assets/liabilities” refers to the sum of direct investment, portfolio investment, other investment and financial derivatives. Reserve assets are not included in the total. Around 17% of the Eurosystem’s total reserve assets of €1.3 trillion are held in the form of securities, of which an undisclosed part is invested in securities issued in the United States. Financial derivatives are reported separately in gross terms under assets and liabilities. Discrepancies between totals and their components may arise from rounding.

    Data for the international investment position of the euro area – vis-à-vis the US

    Data revisions

    This statistical release incorporates revisions to the data for the reference periods between the first quarter of 2021 and the third quarter of 2024. The revisions reflect revised national contributions to the euro area aggregates because of the incorporation of newly available information.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI: Indosuez Wealth Management plans to acquire Banque Thaler

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press release

    Geneva / Paris / Brussels, 4 April 2025

    Indosuez Wealth Management plans to acquire Banque Thaler

    Indosuez Wealth Management, a subsidiary of the Crédit Agricole Group, has announced that its entity in Switzerland has signed an agreement to purchase the entire capital of Banque Thaler, a Swiss banking institution recognised for the excellence of its services and its long-term expertise in wealth management.

    This acquisition is fully in line with Indosuez Wealth Management’s development strategy, strengthening its position in the Swiss market, the global hub for wealth management, where Indosuez has been present since 1876. Banque Thaler, founded in 1982, is renowned for the excellence of its services and its long-term expertise in wealth management.

    With this acquisition, Banque Thaler and Indosuez clients will have access to a broader range of products and expertise. In particular, Banque Thaler’s clients will be able to benefit from the Group’s solidity, its international network and its multiple capabilities in financing, corporate finance, fund servicing and asset management.

    For Jacques Prost, Chief Executive Officer of Indosuez Wealth Management: “This acquisition strengthens our position in Switzerland and illustrates our determination to provide our clients with solutions that are increasingly tailored to their needs. Indosuez is pursuing its growth strategy in a sector undergoing consolidation and is now a major stakeholder in wealth management in Europe.” Marc-André Poirier, Chief Executive Officer of Indosuez in Switzerland, adds: “We are delighted to welcome Banque Thaler. Following record revenue in 2024, this acquisition will bring our assets under management to nearly €50 billion1. We will work with Banque Thaler’s teams to make this acquisition a success for both clients and employees.”

    Dirk Eelbode, Chief Executive Officer of Banque Thaler: “Indosuez Wealth Management in Switzerland is the ideal partner for Banque Thaler. What our management can offer will not only be maintained but enhanced thanks to the substantial resources made available by a major banking group with exceptional financial strength. This can only benefit our clients. At Indosuez we also find the entrepreneurial spirit that characterises Banque Thaler, and this is a great opportunity for all our employees to join an ambitious growth project. These are all positives that will contribute to our continued goal of being the leading player in Switzerland for our clients.”

    The finalisation of the transaction remains subject to the prior approval of the relevant supervisory authorities, and is expected to be completed in the second half of 2025. This acquisition would bring Indosuez Wealth Management’s total assets under management to nearly €220 billion.
    The impact on Crédit Agricole S.A.’s CET1 ratio would be limited.

    ****

    Indosuez Wealth Management contacts

    Indosuez Wealth Management: Jenny Sensiau I jenny.sensiau@ca-indosuez.com I +33 7 86 22 15 24 
    Indosuez Wealth Management: Melinda Raverdy | melinda.raverdy@ca-indosuez.ch | +41 79 258 7829

    About Indosuez Wealth Management

    Indosuez Wealth Management is the global wealth management brand of the Crédit Agricole Group, the world’s 9th largest bank by balance sheet (The Banker 2024).

    For over 150 years, Indosuez Wealth Management has been helping major private clients, families, entrepreneurs and professional investors to manage their private and professional assets. The bank offers a customised approach enabling each of its clients to preserve and develop their wealth in line with their aspirations. Its teams offer a continuum of services and products including Advisory & Financing, Investment Solutions, Fund Servicing & Technology and Banking Solutions.

    Indosuez Wealth Management employs more than 4,500 people in 16 territories around the world: in Europe (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Monaco, Spain and Switzerland), Asia-Pacific (Hong Kong SAR, New Caledonia and Singapore), the Middle East (Dubai, Abu Dhabi) and Canada (representative office).

    With €215 billion in client assets at the end of December 2024, Indosuez Wealth Management is one of Europe’s leading wealth management companies.

    Find out more at https://ca-indosuez.com/.

    About Indosuez in Switzerland

    Indosuez Wealth Management is one of Switzerland’s leading financial institutions, and is now one of the country’s top three foreign banks.
    The bank in Switzerland handles wealth management, transactional commodity financing and commercial banking. Its roots date back to 1876, when it was established in Geneva. Its teams include more than 800 specialists based in Geneva, Lugano and Zurich, as well as in Asia (Hong Kong and Singapore) and in the Middle East (Abu Dhabi and Dubai). They combine their knowledge of the local environment with the extensive expertise and scope for action of the global network of Indosuez, Crédit Agricole CIB and the Crédit Agricole Group.

    The Swiss platform is in charge of developing Indosuez Wealth Management’s activities in Switzerland, the Middle East and Asia.

    Find out more at www.ca-indosuez.com and at https://switzerland.ca-indosuez.com/

    About Banque Thaler
    Banque Thaler is a Swiss wealth management bank that became independent in 1999 and is mainly owned by its directors. Throughout its existence, it has stood out for its focus on a targeted client base and on its discretionary management services. Serving families and entrepreneurs, its management is based on dynamic asset allocation by integrating solid expertise in selecting alternative funds and private equity. The bank has offices in Geneva and Zurich.

    https://banquethaler.ch/

    1 For CA Indosuez (Switzerland) SA – Pro forma to date

    Attachment

    • EN 04 04 2025 Indosuez Wealth Management plans to acquire Banque Thaler

    The MIL Network –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI: Waterfall Network Partners with Generative Mind and WaterSwap to Build AI-Powered Decentralized Solutions

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Zug, Switzerland, April 03, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Waterfall Network (https://waterfall.network/), the most decentralized and scalable ledger, has announced a partnership with Generative Mind, a leader in AI-driven blockchain intelligence and WaterSwap, the first AI-powered BTC DEX with real-time market sentiment. This collaboration combines Generative Mind’s advanced AI capabilities with Waterfall’s decentralized infrastructure to develop innovative, transparent, and efficient Web3 solutions. WaterSwap is the first of many groundbreaking projects to launch under the partnership that will introduce practical tools for improving token launches, market performance, influencer credibility, and machine learning efficiency.

    “AI is transforming blockchain by making data-driven decisions more accessible and transparent,” said Anna Maria Di Sciullo, CEO and Co-Founder of Generative Mind. “Our partnership with Waterfall and WaterSwap allows us to bring AI-powered insights to Web3 in a way that benefits the entire ecosystem.” 

    AI-Powered Launchpad for New Projects

    By aggregating real-time internet data and historical project performance, Generative Mind and Waterfall are creating a smart launchpad that will automatically assign a “hype score” to new crypto projects. This score will help the community evaluate investment potential and make informed decisions.

    Decentralized Exchange (DEX) with Predictive Market Insights

    Leveraging the same AI-driven analytics, the planned DEX integration will provide real-time hype scores for already launched projects, offering traders a powerful new tool to anticipate potential price movements and market trends.

    Trust-Based Marketplace for Influencers and Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs)

    The partnership will also introduce a marketplace that evaluates the credibility and impact of crypto influencers. By analyzing past project performance and influencer involvement, an algorithm will generate a “community trust score” for key opinion leaders (KOLs). This score will help investors and projects assess an influencer’s reliability based on their track record with successful launches.

    Decentralized AI Compute Infrastructure

    Waterfall’s robust decentralized network will serve as the foundation for a groundbreaking decentralized AI computing framework. Using grid computing principles, this system will allow multiple machines to work together on AI tasks, speeding up the training of AI models. Those who contribute computing power will be rewarded based on the amount of work they provide.

    Furthermore, this infrastructure will facilitate on-demand AI model consumption, enabling developers to access pre-installed NLP models with expansion capabilities. By bridging computational resources with AI demand, this initiative will create a self-sustaining AI economy, where contributors earn rewards while developers gain access to scalable AI solutions.

    “By integrating AI with blockchain infrastructure, we are bridging the gap between data intelligence and decentralized finance,” said Vincent Di Sciullo COO and Co-Founder of Generative Mind. “With Waterfall’s scalable network and WaterSwap’s innovative trading platform, we are creating tools that empower users with real-time market sentiment and predictive analytics, driving a new era of informed decision-making in Web3.”

    WaterSwap, A First of Its Kind

    WaterSwap is the first AI-powered BTC DEX, combining real-time AI market insights, gas-free transactions, and deep liquidity to optimize execution for traders and liquidity providers. As the first project under this collaboration, WaterSwap unlocks new trading strategies with AI-optimized liquidity management, perpetual futures, and cross-chain BTC interoperability. In essence, WaterSwap is redefining Bitcoin trading, integrating AI-driven sentiment analysis, deep liquidity pools, and institutional-grade compliance into a seamless, on-chain trading experience.

    “This partnership with Waterfall and Generative Mind accelerates our mission to bring smarter, more transparent trading solutions to the crypto space,” said Andrey Sarayev, Founder of Waterswap. “For the first time, traders can access real-time sentiment analysis directly on a DEX, unlocking more strategic and efficient trading.”

    Shaping the Future of AI and Blockchain

    “Generative Mind, WaterSwap and Waterfall share a common vision of leveraging AI and decentralized technology to bring trust, efficiency, and intelligence to Web3,” said Dr. Sergii Grybniak, Head of Research at Waterfall Network. “Our joint initiatives will set new standards for how blockchain projects are launched, traded, and evaluated while expanding the frontiers of decentralized AI computing.”

    Waterfall’s infrastructure, combined with Generative Mind’s AI expertise, has the potential to redefine the token launch ecosystem, decentralized trading strategies, and the role of AI in blockchain development. The companies plan to release further details on these initiatives in the coming months.

    For more information on what’s next, visit https://waterfall.network/ and follow Waterfall Network on all its channels: 

    Discord: https://discord.gg/Nwb8aR2XvR 
    Twitter: https://x.com/waterfall_dag 
    Telegram: https://t.me/waterfall_network

    About Generative Mind
    Generative Mind is an AI-driven blockchain analytics company specializing in real-time fine-grained natural language understanding, data aggregation, predictive modeling, and intelligence solutions for the Web3 ecosystem. Generative Mind’s innovative technology and decentralized data solutions make it uniquely positioned to compute and deploy leading social media hype signals.

    About Waterfall
    Waterfall Network is a leading layer one (L1) ledger that provides an innovative solution for security, scalability and decentralization, helping dAPP developers to change the world.  Waterfall Network is built atop a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) architecture that enables users to run a validator node from any device, including low-cost laptops and, in the near future, mobile phones. Waterfall Network is compatible with Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), allowing for portability of decentralized applications (dAPPs), with minimal  hardware requirements for participants who want to become validators. 

    Media Contact:
    bluewave@transformgroup.com 

    The MIL Network –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Luján, Warnock Blast President Trump’s Tariffs, Highlight Increase in Cost of Prescription Drugs

    US Senate News:

    Source: US Senator for New Mexico Ben Ray Luján

    Experts State President Trump’s New Tariffs Can Bring Higher Drug Prices and Supply Chain Disruptions

    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Ben Ray Luján (D-N.M.) and Reverend Raphael Warnock (D-Ga.), both members of the Senate Committee on Finance, wrote to President Trump highlighting the devasting impacts the administration’s sweeping new tariffs will have on the cost of prescription drugs for Americans and on domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers.

    “We are concerned that the tariffs you have proposed on our trade partners will impact prescription drugs, driving up prices for Americans, exacerbating supply chain issues, and hurting domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers. Steep tariffs on our closest trade partners only further increase the cost of prescription drugs for both consumers and manufacturers and will lead to drug shortages,” said the Senators.

    The Senators highlighted the impacts of rising prescription drug costs, “rising costs have real consequences: nearly one-third of Americans are leaving prescriptions unfilled at the pharmacy every month due to cost. This has forced some patients to ration their prescriptions to stretch their budgets, which has deadly consequences. To cut down on cost, most Americans depend on access to generic drugs which account for 90 percent of all U.S. prescriptions. Many of these drugs and their components are imported from overseas.”

    “In addition to raising prices for everyday Americans, blanket tariffs also threaten domestic prescription drug manufacturers. Many pharmaceutical companies outsource production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), which are then imported and used to formulate prescription drugs here in the United States,” the Senators continued. 

    The text of the letter is here and below:

    Dear President Trump,

    We are concerned that the tariffs you have proposed on our trade partners will impact prescription drugs, driving up prices for Americans, exacerbating supply chain issues, and hurting domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers. Steep tariffs on our closest trade partners only further increase the cost of prescription drugs for both consumers and manufacturers and will lead to drug shortages.

    Americans have faced increasing prescription drug prices for decades. Rising costs have real consequences: nearly one-third of Americans are leaving prescriptions unfilled at the pharmacy every month due to cost. This has forced some patients to ration their prescriptions to stretch their budgets, which has deadly consequences. To cut down on cost, most Americans depend on access to generic drugs which account for 90 percent of all U.S. prescriptions. Many of these drugs and their components are imported from overseas.

    Many Americans also depend on brand-name drugs. Most brand-name prescription drugs available in the U.S. are manufactured overseas and imported by their marketers. In fact, several of these drugs were recently found to have price increases greatly outpacing the rate of inflation. Just three of these drugs used to treat type 2 diabetes, a disease developing more in children, teens, and young adults than ever before, were responsible for more than $8.5 billion in total Medicare Part D spending in 2022. Of these drugs, one has had a lifetime price increase of 293 percent. Thus, broad and sweeping tariffs will only exacerbate the issue of access to affordable medicine continually perpetuated by greedy actors.

    In addition to raising prices for everyday Americans, blanket tariffs also threaten domestic prescription drug manufacturers. Many pharmaceutical companies outsource production of active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs), which are then imported and used to formulate prescription drugs here in the United States. One such example is the anticoagulant drug Eliquis, whose API is manufactured in Switzerland. This drug has accounted for more Medicare Part D spending than any other drug for several years in a row. These trade barriers will drive up the cost of this already costly drug, further increasing Medicare spending and burdening patients’ pocketbooks. While brand-name pharmaceutical companies may have the resources to continue operations with rising costs, those that manufacture generic drugs will not. Generic manufacturers do not have this financial flexibility, which makes their ability to absorb new costs difficult. If generic manufacturers cannot keep up with rising costs, they may be forced to exit the market, leading to shortages of generic drugs that Americans rely on. As such, tariffs on imported APIs and other materials used to manufacture prescription drugs may hurt domestic pharmaceutical manufacturers, the supply chain, and thereby the American consumer.

    We strongly urge you to consider the impacts of broad and sweeping tariffs on Americans and domestic manufacturing. Americans cannot afford to continue emptying their pockets just to refill their prescriptions at the pharmacy. 

    Thank you for your attention to this critical matter.

    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: 2024: A remarkable year for the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

    In 2024, the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland (OAG) obtained several ground-breaking convictions in the fields of international criminal law, national security, terrorism and white-collar crime. Summary penalty orders imposed on international commodities companies and the first trial of a company in the Federal Criminal Court for the bribery of foreign public officials are proof that Swiss corporate criminal law is effective. However, additional legal instruments would make criminal prosecution in this field far more efficient and effective. In its efforts to guarantee Switzerland’s long-term internal security, the OAG is reliant on the Federal Criminal Police being able to provide a sufficient number of investigators.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Global: Uganda’s speedy motorbike taxis will slow down for cash – if incentives are cleverly designed

    Source: The Conversation – Africa – By Claude Raisaro, Assistant Professor, International Economics, Graduate Institute – Institut de hautes études internationales et du développement (IHEID)

    Every day, 10 people die on the roads of Kampala, Uganda’s capital.

    Road accidents cost Uganda US$1.2 billion annually, which is about 5% of its GDP. The cost typically arises from healthcare spending. Families face crippling medical bills and businesses lose workers.

    Motorbike taxis, which are popular in Uganda, are a leading cause of accidents. They are responsible for 64% of all recorded accidents – mostly as a result of speeding.

    Why do so many motorbike taxi drivers in Uganda speed? The common wisdom suggests that they do it for financial reasons. Higher speed translates to more trips, and more trips mean more income.

    But a closer look reveals a more complex reality: speeding isn’t just a money decision – it’s about social pressure among motorbike taxi drivers and the need to adhere with behaviours that signal masculinity. Most drivers are male.

    Uganda’s current approaches to counter speeding include fines and awareness campaigns. There is little evidence that these methods have been effective.

    My recent study in Kampala challenges these traditional road safety approaches, which often fail to change behaviour. I am a behavioural economist, and my findings show offering financial incentives can work – but only if these incentives provide drivers with a socially acceptable reason to slow down.

    Financial incentives need to be made public, and only work when they allow motorbike taxi drivers to justify safer behaviour to their peers. This is key, because getting road safety incentives right saves lives. It also reduces healthcare costs, lowers fuel consumption and emissions, and helps shift harmful social norms that encourage reckless driving.

    Why drivers speed

    My research finds that speeding among motorbike taxi drivers isn’t just a financial decision in Uganda, it’s a social one. Drivers work in tight-knit communities where reputation matters as much as income.

    I collected data from a representative sample of 386 passengers and found commuters prefer safer drivers and are willing to pay up to 8% more for careful driving. Yet, speeding remains the norm.

    The reason? Driving fast is a status symbol for motorbike taxi drivers.

    I carried out an experiment to test whether drivers who speed are perceived more positively by their co-workers. Results are clear: fast drivers are perceived as more skilled and have a higher social status, measured as their ability to influence decisions at their taxi stations.

    This presents a policy challenge: how can financial incentives encourage safer driving without making drivers feel like they are losing respect among their peers?

    To test how financial incentives could encourage safer driving, I conducted an experiment in which a research team offered 360 drivers two options:

    1. a contract that paid them a daily incentive of UGSh6,000 (US$1.64) – roughly a third of their daily income – for observing speed limits

    2. or an equivalent lump sum cash payment with no conditions attached, including limiting a driver’s speed.

    But the framing of these choices mattered.

    • Some drivers knew their decision would be private, meaning no one else would know if they took the safe-driving contract.

    • Others knew that only the safe-driving contract would be public, while the alternative lump sum cash option remained private – giving them a socially acceptable reason to slow down.

    • A third group knew their decision would be fully public, meaning their peers would see if they chose the safe-driving contract over the lump sum.

    The results were clear. Twice as many drivers accepted the safe-driving contract when it was public and provided a justification for slower speeds.

    Why? Because when the incentive was visible but also justified, drivers could explain their decision as a financial one:

    I’m not driving slower because I’m scared, I’m doing it because I’m getting paid.

    The design of this experiment allowed me to answer the question: what mechanism favours socially desirable behaviours when incentives are offered?

    But would the drivers actually slow down?

    Did it work?

    To see whether these contracts actually changed driving behaviour, I conducted an impact experiment, offering incentives for two weeks and tracking drivers for six months.

    Drivers were randomly offered one of the following contracts:

    1. a private safe-driving contract – where only the driver knew about the financial reward

    2. a public safe-driving contract – where their peers knew they were being paid to slow down

    3. a control group – who received a contract consisting of a simple cash payment with no conditions.

    The results were striking. While both safe-driving contracts reduced speeding, the public contract was nearly twice as effective as the private one. The most significant reductions were seen in extreme speeding (occurrences of 80km/h or more) – the kind most likely to cause severe accidents.

    The key takeaway is that visibility makes incentives work, but only when it provides justification. If a driver had to publicly choose the safe-driving contract over another cash offer, it lost effectiveness. But when structured as a justifiable contract, it allowed drivers to slow down without social consequences.

    Reframing safe driving as a smart decision, not just a rule, is important. Featuring respected drivers in safety programmes can potentially help shift perceptions of what makes a “good” driver.

    Finally, drivers operate in tight social networks. Policies should be developed with their input rather than imposed externally. Programmes that actively engage drivers will be more widely accepted and successful.

    Rethinking how incentives shape behaviour

    Speeding is often framed as a problem of reckless individuals making bad choices. My research shows that’s rarely the case – rather it’s about social incentives and peer influence.

    A poorly designed financial incentive may slow drivers down temporarily, but it won’t change long-term behaviour. Incentives that help drivers escape the social pressure of adopting risky behaviours may shift norms – creating lasting improvements in road safety, economic efficiency and environmental impact.

    Claude Raisaro receives funding from the Swiss National Science Foundation (grant no. 195266), the Forschungskredit of the University of Zurich (grant no. FK-22-020), the Swiss Re Foundation for Research in Development Economics, and SurveyCTO. He is affiliated with Mistra Center for Sustainable Markets at Stockholm School of Economics.

    – ref. Uganda’s speedy motorbike taxis will slow down for cash – if incentives are cleverly designed – https://theconversation.com/ugandas-speedy-motorbike-taxis-will-slow-down-for-cash-if-incentives-are-cleverly-designed-249608

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Swiss exports affected by US tariff increases

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Finance

    On 3 April the Federal Council took note of the US government’s announcements on the imposition of wide-ranging tariffs. These will affect all of the USA’s trading partners including Switzerland. The Federal Council will analyse the measures and their impact on Switzerland in greater detail. It is in contact with the affected industries and the US authorities. The Federal Council has instructed the EAER to begin preparatory work on a possible solution with the USA.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Economics: €157 million finance package for private Ukraine wind farms

    Source: Black Sea Trade and Development Bank

    Press Release | 03-Apr-2025

    Loans from EBRD, IFC and BSTDB, supported by EU, the UK, and CIF’s CTF, will boost Ukraine’s energy security

    • International finance package of €157 million for private wind project to boost Ukraine’s energy security
    • Project is co-financed by European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, International Finance Corporation and Black Sea Trade and Development Bank
    • The European Union (EU), the United Kingdom and Climate Investment Funds’ (CIF’s) Clean Technology Fund (CFT) supported the mobilisation of the finance package
    • Deal marks a pivotal step in advancing Ukraine’s shift towards renewable energy

    An international finance package will bring €157 million of project finance debt to a private wind power project that aims to boost Ukraine’s energy security. The deal, announced today in Kyiv, is co-financed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB) and supported by the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom, and the Climate Investment Funds’ (CIF’s) Clean Technology Fund (CTF).

    One of the first greenfield private projects in Ukraine’s power sector since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, this project forms part of efforts to advance Ukraine’s shift towards renewable energy generation as well as bolster its energy security following attacks from Russia on the country’s energy generation infrastructure.

    The EBRD and IFC will each lend €60 million and BSTDB €37 million. The total cost of the project is estimated at €225 million (excluding VAT), with the rest to be met by equity from the project sponsor, GNG Group or Galnaftogaz, widely known in Ukraine as OKKO Group. The loans are to Wind Power GSI Volyn LLC and Wind Power GSI Volyn 3 LLC, special purpose vehicles incorporated in Ukraine.

    The loans will support OKKO to construct and operate wind power plants in Ukraine with a combined capacity of 147 MW. The plants are expected to generate at least 380 GWh of renewable zero carbon electricity annually, resulting in carbon dioxide emission savings of approximately 245,000 tons per year.

    The EBRD’s funding will be backed by financial guarantees from the European Union provided under its Ukraine facility, the Ukraine Investment Framework. This comes from the Ukraine Investment Framework Hi-Bar guarantee programme, which supports both new and existing climate mitigation technologies, in particular in the energy sector, in line with the EU’s detailed Ukraine Plan.

    IFC and BSTDB’s loans are backed by guarantees from the European Union under the Ukraine Investment Framework as part of IFC’s Better Futures Program: RE-Ukraine. The United Kingdom’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) provided £3.8 million (€4.5 million) in grant funding as a first loss guarantee to enable the mobilisation of IFC and BSTDB’s loans. IFC’s funding package also includes €10 million in debt financing from the CTF and was enabled by pre-investment work through which IFC helped optimise the project structure in a highly volatile market environment. This was possible thanks to support from Austria’s Federal Ministry of Finance and the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO.

    “We are grateful to our partners for their long-term, sustainable cooperation, which is especially valuable during wartime — for both business and the country as a whole. This project addresses several key challenges at once. Firstly, it strengthens the country’s energy security and independence. Secondly, it advances the transition to zero-emission electricity production,” said OKKO Chief Executive Officer Vasyl Danyliak.

    “With significant power generation capacity in Ukraine destroyed as a result of the war, this investment is crucial to address the severe current energy shortfall, support Ukraine’s decarbonisation goals and boost the private sector’s role in further development of the renewable energy sector in the country,” said Matteo Patrone, the EBRD’s Vice President, Banking.

    Ines Rocha, IFC’s Regional Director for Europe, said: “This project will ensure that people can keep the lights on, stay warm and connected – therefore marking a significant milestone in Ukraine’s recovery. While paving the way for a more resilient Ukraine, this transaction also sends a clear signal about the country’s readiness for private investment and ability to meet the challenges of tomorrow.”

    “Ukraine’s energy sector has faced unprecedented challenges due to the ongoing crisis, making the diversification and resilience of its power infrastructure more critical than ever. Supporting projects that strengthen the country’s energy independence and accelerate its transition to renewable energy is a priority for BSTDB. This wind power project is a tangible step toward building a sustainable energy future for Ukraine. We are proud to stand alongside our development partners in mobilizing essential resources, enabling investments that will help restore and stabilize Ukraine’s energy supply while fostering long-term economic recovery and environmental sustainability,” said Dr Serhat Köksal, BSTDB President.

    “This is a smart investment at a critical time. It boosts Ukraine’s energy security and supports its shift to renewables. The EU is glad to help make it happen,” said Stefan Schleuning, Head of Cooperation at the EU Delegation to Ukraine.

    The EBRD and IFC have been supporting OKKO Group, their client since 2005, to move forward with the decarbonisation strategy it is pursuing against the backdrop of Russia’s war on Ukraine, as it prepares for Ukraine’s integration into the European Union and a future net-zero economy. The EBRD, which initially supported the group to grow its petroleum retail business, branded OKKO, into the one of the largest national fuel retail chains in the country, also financed GNG’s first biofuel project last year.

    The BSTDB’s partnership with OKKO Group has been ongoing for over 20 years, with the first transaction closed back in 2004, unlocking subsequently the Company’s potential to a wider investment community. Since then, BSTDB and OKKO Group have entered into several financings, contributing to the Company’s expansion and operational success. Supporting projects that strengthen the country’s energy independence and accelerate its transition to renewable energy is a priority for BSTDB.

    As part of the wind project, tailored technical cooperation from the EBRD, provided by the TaiwanBusiness-EBRD Technical Cooperation Fund, will strengthen the client’s ability to detect cybersecurity threats.

    The EBRD, a leading climate financier, has offered Ukraine strong support in wartime, making almost €6.5 billion available to support the country’s real economy since 2022. It has secured shareholders’ agreement for a €4 billion capital increase to continue its Ukraine investments. Energy security is one of its five priority investment areas, along with support for vital infrastructure, food security, trade and the private sector.

     

    Wind Power GSI Volyn LLC and/or Wind Power GSI Volyn 3 LLC are Ukraine-incorporated legal entities established as a special purpose vehicle (SPV) in charge of the development, construction, commissioning, operation, and maintenance of project. The special purpose vehicle is owned and controlled by Galnaftogaz.

    JSC “Concern Galnaftogaz (GNG), is an independent petroleum products distribution company in Ukraine. It operates one of the largest and most efficient gas filling stations networks in the county under the OKKO brand. Besides distribution of light petroleum products, the Company also actively participates in the petroleum wholesale market and provides logistics services to other distribution companies

    The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank (BSTDB)is an international financial institution headquartered in Thessaloniki, Greece. BSTDB supports economic development and regional cooperation in the countries of the greater Black Sea region by providing loans, credit lines, equity and guarantees for projects and trade financing in the public and private sectors in its member countries. The authorized capital of the Bank is EUR 3.45 billion. Through its active role in the partnership with other MDBs and donors, BSTDB continues to demonstrate its commitment to fostering a resilient energy infrastructure in Ukraine and throughout the wider Black Sea region, with a focus on sustainable development, climate resilience, and energy security.

    For information on BSTDB, visit www.bstdb.org

     

    Contact: Haroula Christodoulou

    : @BSTDB

    MIL OSI Economics –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, February 2025

    Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis

    The U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis announced today that the goods and services deficit was $122.7 billion in February, down $8.0 billion from $130.7 billion in January, revised.

    U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services Deficit
    Deficit: $122.7 Billion  –6.1%°
    Exports: $278.5 Billion  +2.9%°
    Imports: $401.1 Billion     0.0%°

    Next release: Tuesday, May 6, 2025

    (°) Statistical significance is not applicable or not measurable. Data adjusted for seasonality but not price changes

    Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, April 3, 2025

    Exports, Imports, and Balance (exhibit 1)

    February exports were $278.5 billion, $8.0 billion more than January exports. February imports were $401.1 billion, less than $0.1 billion less than January imports.

    The February decrease in the goods and services deficit reflected a decrease in the goods deficit of $8.8 billion to $147.0 billion and a decrease in the services surplus of $0.8 billion to $24.3 billion.

    Year-to-date, the goods and services deficit increased $117.1 billion, or 86.0 percent, from the same period in 2024. Exports increased $24.0 billion or 4.6 percent. Imports increased $141.2 billion or 21.4 percent.

    Three-Month Moving Averages (exhibit 2)

    The average goods and services deficit increased $14.8 billion to $117.1 billion for the three months ending in February.

    • Average exports increased $1.6 billion to $271.8 billion in February.
    • Average imports increased $16.5 billion to $389.0 billion in February.

    Year-over-year, the average goods and services deficit increased $50.1 billion from the three months ending in February 2024.

    • Average exports increased $10.2 billion from February 2024.
    • Average imports increased $60.3 billion from February 2024.

    Exports (exhibits 3, 6, and 7)

    Exports of goods increased $8.3 billion to $181.9 billion in February.

      Exports of goods on a Census basis increased $6.2 billion.

    • Industrial supplies and materials increased $3.0 billion.
      • Nonmonetary gold increased $3.2 billion.
      • Fuel oil decreased $1.0 billion.
    • Capital goods increased $2.7 billion.
      • Computer accessories increased $0.9 billion.
      • Civilian aircraft increased $0.5 billion.
    • Automotive vehicles, parts, and engines increased $1.6 billion.
      • Passenger cars increased $1.0 billion.
      • Trucks, buses, and special purpose vehicles increased $0.6 billion.
    • Other goods decreased $1.3 billion. (See the “Notice” for more information.)

      Net balance of payments adjustments increased $2.1 billion.

    Exports of services decreased $0.4 billion to $96.5 billion in February.

    • Transport decreased $0.3 billion.
    • Travel decreased $0.3 billion.
    • Government goods and services decreased $0.2 billion.
    • Financial services increased $0.2 billion.

    Imports (exhibits 4, 6, and 8)

    Imports of goods decreased $0.5 billion to $328.9 billion in February.

      Imports of goods on a Census basis decreased $0.6 billion.

    • Industrial supplies and materials decreased $4.2 billion.
      • Finished metal shapes decreased $2.6 billion.
      • Nonmonetary gold decreased $1.3 billion
    • Consumer goods increased $2.4 billion.
      • Cell phones and other household goods increased $1.5 billion.
      • Pharmaceutical preparations increased $1.2 billion.
    • Capital goods increased $1.0 billion.
      • Computers increased $0.7 billion.
      • Medical equipment increased $0.5 billion.
      • Civilian aircraft decreased $0.7 billion.

      Net balance of payments adjustments increased $0.1 billion.

    Imports of services increased $0.5 billion to $72.2 billion in February.

    • Travel increased $0.2 billion.
    • Charges for the use of intellectual property increased $0.1 billion.

    Real Goods in 2017 Dollars – Census Basis (exhibit 11)

    The real goods deficit decreased $6.9 billion, or 4.8 percent, to $135.4 billion in February, compared to a 4.4 percent decrease in the nominal deficit.

    • Real exports of goods increased $4.9 billion, or 3.4 percent, to $147.9 billion, compared to a 3.6 percent increase in nominal exports.
    • Real imports of goods decreased $2.0 billion, or 0.7 percent, to $283.3 billion, compared to a 0.2 percent decrease in nominal imports.

    Revisions

    Revisions to January exports

    • Exports of goods were revised up $0.8 billion.
    • Exports of services were revised down $0.2 billion.

    Revisions to January imports

    • Imports of goods were revised down $0.1 billion.
    • Imports of services were revised up $0.1 billion.

    Goods by Selected Countries and Areas: Monthly – Census Basis (exhibit 19)

    The February figures show surpluses, in billions of dollars, with South and Central America ($4.8), Netherlands ($4.1), United Kingdom ($3.4), Hong Kong ($2.4), Belgium ($0.8), Brazil ($0.4), and Saudi Arabia ($0.2). Deficits were recorded, in billions of dollars, with European Union ($30.9), China ($26.6), Switzerland ($18.8), Mexico ($16.8), Ireland ($14.0), Vietnam ($12.4), Taiwan ($8.7), Germany ($8.1), Canada ($7.3), India ($5.6), Japan ($5.2), Italy ($5.1), South Korea ($4.5), Malaysia ($3.1), Australia ($2.1), France ($1.5), Singapore ($1.1), and Israel ($0.7).

    • The deficit with Switzerland decreased $4.0 billion to $18.8 billion in February. Exports increased $0.7 billion to $2.5 billion and imports decreased $3.3 billion to $21.3 billion.
    • The balance with the United Kingdom shifted from a deficit of $0.5 billion in January to a surplus of $3.4 billion in February. Exports increased $3.3 billion to $9.5 billion and imports decreased $0.6 billion to $6.1 billion.
    • The deficit with the European Union increased $5.4 billion to $30.9 billion in February. Exports decreased $2.3 billion to $29.9 billion and imports increased $3.2 billion to $60.8 billion.

    All statistics referenced are seasonally adjusted; statistics are on a balance of payments basis unless otherwise specified. Additional statistics, including not seasonally adjusted statistics and details for goods on a Census basis, are available in exhibits 1-20b of this release. For information on data sources, definitions, and revision procedures, see the explanatory notes in this release. The full release can be found at www.census.gov/foreign-trade/Press-Release/current_press_release/index.html or www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/international-trade-goods-and-services. The full schedule is available in the Census Bureau’s Economic Briefing Room at www.census.gov/economic-indicators/ or on BEA’s website at www.bea.gov/news/schedule.

    Next release: May 6, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. EDT
    U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, March 2025

    Notice

    Impact of Canada Border Services Agency’s (CBSA) Release of CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management (CARM)

    The CBSA introduced a new accounting system (CARM) on October 21, 2024. As a result, importers in Canada have experienced delays in filing shipment information. These delays affected the compilation of statistics on U.S. exports of goods to Canada for September 2024 through February 2025, which are derived from data compiled by Canada through the United States – Canada Data Exchange. A dollar estimate of the filing backlog is included in estimates for late receipts and, following the U.S. Census Bureau’s customary practice for late receipt estimates, is included in the export end-use category “Other goods” as well as in exports to Canada. This estimate will be replaced with the actual transactions reported by the Harmonized System classification in June 2025 with the release of “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, Annual Revision.” Until then, please refer to the supplemental spreadsheet “CARM Exports to Canada Corrections,” which provides a breakdown of the late receipts by 1-digit end-use category for statistics through 2024. This spreadsheet will be updated as late export transactions are received to reflect reassignments from the initial “Other goods” category to the appropriate 1-digit end-use category. Any 2025 impacts will be revised in June 2026.

    If you have questions or need additional information, please contact the Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division, International Trade Macro Analysis Branch, on 800-549-0595, option 4, or at eid.international.trade.data@census.gov.

    Upcoming Updates to Goods and Services

    With the releases of the “U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services” report (FT-900) and the FT-900 Annual Revision on June 5, 2025, statistics on trade in goods, on both a Census basis and a balance of payments (BOP) basis, will be revised beginning with 2020 and statistics on trade in services will be revised beginning with 2018. The revised statistics for goods on a BOP basis and for services will also be included in the “U.S. International Transactions, 1st Quarter 2025 and Annual Update” report and in the international transactions interactive database, both to be released by BEA on June 24, 2025.

    Revised statistics on trade in goods will reflect:

    • Corrections and adjustments to previously published not seasonally adjusted statistics for goods on a Census basis.
    • End-use reclassifications of several commodities.
    • Recalculated seasonal and trading-day adjustments.
    • Newly available and revised source data on BOP adjustments, which are adjustments that BEA applies to goods on a Census basis to convert them to a BOP basis. See the “Goods (balance of payments basis)” section in the explanatory notes for more information.

    Revised statistics on trade in services will reflect:

    • Newly available and revised source data, primarily from BEA surveys of international services.
    • Corrections and adjustments to previously published not seasonally adjusted statistics.
    • Recalculated seasonal adjustments.
    • Revised temporal distributions of quarterly source data to monthly statistics. See the “Services” section in the explanatory notes for more information.

    A preview of BEA’s 2025 annual update of the International Transactions Accounts will be available in the Survey of Current Business later in April 2025.

    If you have questions or need additional information, please contact the Census Bureau, Economic Indicators Division, International Trade Macro Analysis Branch, on (800) 549-0595, option 4, or at eid.international.trade.data@census.gov or BEA, Balance of Payments Division, at InternationalAccounts@bea.gov.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Serious Fraud Office sets out next steps in ambitious plan

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    News story

    Serious Fraud Office sets out next steps in ambitious plan

    The SFO has published its plan for the year ahead focusing on using new tools, enhancing its intelligence capacity and with domestic and international partners.

    The SFO today published its plan for the year ahead focusing on using new tools, enhancing its intelligence capacity and working ‘more vigorously’ with domestic and international partners.  

    The Business Plan 2025-26 is the next step in the SFO’s ambition to be bolder and more pragmatic as an organisation.  

    This approach has already delivered faster progression of cases with stricter case discipline creating capacity to open eight new investigations and charge a case within 15 months of opening. 

    This year, the SFO aims to use the new “failure to prevent fraud” offence, part of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act, which comes into force in September. The plan also includes delivery of refreshed corporate guidance for engaging with the SFO and advancing plans for a whistleblower incentivisation scheme.  

    Operational divisions will also begin rolling out Technology Assisted Review (TAR), which has been found during a pilot to review documents for disclosure up to 40 per cent faster than our standard method.  

    The SFO will continue to invest in its covert operational capacity and work more closely with key law enforcement and regulatory partners. The SFO recently created a new taskforce to tackle international bribery and corruption, with key partners Switzerland and France 

    Read the full SFO 2025-26 Business Plan (PDF, 2.8 MB, 9 pages), including a message from Nick Ephgrave QPM, Director of the Serious Fraud Office.

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    Published 3 April 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Swissmedic joins the Management Committee of the IMDRF

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

    Swissmedic has been accepted as a member of the Management Committee (MC) of the International Medical Device Regulators Forum (IMDRF). The decision was made on 14 March 2025 at the 27th IMDRF meeting in Tokyo, Japan. The IMDRF is an international platform composed of regulatory authorities from around the world. Their common goal is to promote harmonisation and cooperation in regulatory matters relating to medical devices.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Sustainable water wheel: old technology revisited

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

    At the end of March, a new type of water pumping system was put into operation in Steffisburg. It ensures that a tributary of the Zulg river continues to be supplied with water despite improved flood protection. This is the second project of this kind in which Empa has been involved – a self-powered water wheel based on historical models.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: EasyGov.swiss: Now with an online registration process for short-term employment

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Foreign Affairs in English

    The State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) has again expanded Easy-Gov.swiss, the online service desk for companies. As of 17 March, Swiss employers and foreign service providers can use the EasyGov platform to complete the registra-tion process for short-term employment of workers from EU/EFTA countries. This in-tegration is an important step in optimising the notification procedure as a central in-strument of the accompanying measures.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Regional Forum on Sustainable Development in Geneva: Switzerland calls for joint efforts by all actors to achieve goals of 2030 Agenda

    Source: Switzerland – Federal Administration in English

    How can we move forward with the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in a time dominated by crises and conflict? This was the focus of the UNECE Regional Forum on Sustainable Development on 2 and 3 April 2025. As explained by the head of the Swiss delegation, Federal Council Delegate for the 2030 Agenda Markus Reubi, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can only be implemented if all actors work together. This includes states, regions, cities, civil society, and the academic and business communities.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 4, 2025

  • MIL-Evening Report: New modelling reveals full impact of Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs – with US hit hardest

    ANALYSIS: By Niven Winchester, Auckland University of Technology

    We now have a clearer picture of Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs and how they will affect other trading nations, including the United States itself.

    The US administration claims these tariffs on imports will reduce the US trade deficit and address what it views as unfair and non-reciprocal trade practices. Trump said this would

    forever be remembered as the day American industry was reborn, the day America’s destiny was reclaimed.

    The “reciprocal” tariffs are designed to impose charges on other countries equivalent to half the costs they supposedly inflict on US exporters through tariffs, currency manipulation and non-tariff barriers levied on US goods.

    Each nation received a tariff number that will apply to most goods. Notable sectors exempt include steel, aluminium and motor vehicles, which are already subject to new tariffs.

    The minimum baseline tariff for each country is 10 percent. But many countries received higher numbers, including Vietnam (46 percent), Thailand (36 percent), China (34 percent), Indonesia (32 percent), Taiwan (32 percent) and Switzerland (31 percent).

    The tariff number for China is in addition to an existing 20 percent tariff, so the total tariff applied to Chinese imports is 54 percent. Countries assigned 10 percent tariffs include Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

    Canada and Mexico are exempt from the reciprocal tariffs, for now, but goods from those nations are subject to a 25 percent tariff under a separate executive order.

    Although some countries do charge higher tariffs on US goods than the US imposes on their exports, and the “Liberation Day” tariffs are allegedly only half the full reciprocal rate, the calculations behind them are open to challenge.

    For example, non-tariff measures are notoriously difficult to estimate and “subject to much uncertainty”, according to one recent study.

    LIBERATION DAY RECIPROCAL TARIFFS 🇺🇸 pic.twitter.com/ODckbUWKvO

    — The White House (@WhiteHouse) April 2, 2025

    GDP impacts with retaliation
     Other countries are now likely to respond with retaliatory tariffs on US imports. Canada (the largest destination for US exports), the EU and China have all said they will respond in kind.

    To estimate the impacts of this tit-for-tat trade standoff, I use a global model of the production, trade and consumption of goods and services. Similar simulation tools — known as “computable general equilibrium models” — are widely used by governments, academics and consultancies to evaluate policy changes.

    The first model simulates a scenario in which the US imposes reciprocal and other new tariffs, and other countries respond with equivalent tariffs on US goods. Estimated changes in GDP due to US reciprocal tariffs and retaliatory tariffs by other nations are shown in the table below.

    The tariffs decrease US GDP by US$438.4 billion (1.45 percent). Divided among the nation’s 126 million households, GDP per household decreases by $3,487 per year. That is larger than the corresponding decreases in any other country. (All figures are in US dollars.)

    Proportional GDP decreases are largest in Mexico (2.24 percent) and Canada (1.65 percent) as these nations ship more than 75 percent of their exports to the US. Mexican households are worse off by $1,192 per year and Canadian households by $2,467.

    Other nations that experience relatively large decreases in GDP include Vietnam (0.99 percent) and Switzerland (0.32 percent).

    Some nations gain from the trade war. Typically, these face relatively low US tariffs (and consequently also impose relatively low tariffs on US goods). New Zealand (0.29 percent) and Brazil (0.28 percent) experience the largest increases in GDP. New Zealand households are better off by $397 per year.

    Aggregate GDP for the rest of the world (all nations except the US) decreases by $62 billion.

    At the global level, GDP decreases by $500 billion (0.43 percent). This result confirms the well-known rule that trade wars shrink the global economy.

    GDP impacts without retaliation
     In the second scenario, the modelling depicts what happens if other nations do not react to the US tariffs. The changes in the GDP of selected countries are presented in the table below.

    Countries that face relatively high US tariffs and ship a large proportion of their exports to the US experience the largest proportional decreases in GDP. These include Canada, Mexico, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Switzerland, South Korea and China.

    Countries that face relatively low new tariffs gain, with the UK experiencing the largest GDP increase.

    The tariffs decrease US GDP by $149 billion (0.49 percent) because the tariffs increase production costs and consumer prices in the US.

    Aggregate GDP for the rest of the world decreases by $155 billion, more than twice the corresponding decrease when there was retaliation. This indicates that the rest of the world can reduce losses by retaliating. At the same time, retaliation leads to a worse outcome for the US.

    Previous tariff announcements by the Trump administration dropped sand into the cogs of international trade. The reciprocal tariffs throw a spanner into the works. Ultimately, the US may face the largest damages.

    Dr Niven Winchester is professor of economics, Auckland University of Technology. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Monkeys are world’s best yodellers – new research

    Source: Anglia Ruskin University

    Black and gold howler monkeys (Alouatta caraya) – photograph by Dr Jacob Dunn, Anglia Ruskin University

    A new study has found that the world’s finest yodellers aren’t from Austria or Switzerland, but the rainforests of Latin America.

    Published in the journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B and led by experts from Anglia Ruskin University (ARU) and the University of Vienna, the research provides significant new insights into the diverse vocal sounds of non-human primates, and reveals for the first time how certain calls are produced.

    Apes and monkeys possess special anatomical structures in their throats called vocal membranes, which disappeared from humans through evolution to allow for more stable speech. However, the exact benefit these provide to non-human primates had previously been unclear.

    The new research has discovered that these vocal membranes, which are extremely thin and sit above the vocal folds in the larynx, allow monkeys to introduce “voice breaks” to their calls.

    These voice breaks occur when the monkeys switch sound production from the vocal folds to the vocal membranes. The calls produced possess the same rapid transitions in frequency heard in Alpine yodelling, or in Tarzan’s famous yell, but cover a much wider frequency range.

    The study involved analysis of CT scans, computer simulations and fieldwork at La Senda Verde Wildlife Sanctuary in Bolivia. There, researchers recorded and studied the calls of various primate species, including the black and gold howler monkey (Alouatta caraya), tufted capuchin (Sapajus apella), black-capped squirrel monkey (Saimiri boliviensis), and Peruvian spider monkey (Ateles chamek).

    New World monkeys, whose range stretches from Mexico to Argentina, were found to have evolved the largest vocal membranes of all the primates, suggesting these thin ribbons of tissue play a particularly important role in their vocal production and repertoire of calls.

    The study also revealed that the “ultra-yodels” produced by these monkeys can involve frequency leaps up to five times larger than the frequency changes that are possible with the human voice, and while human yodels typically span one octave or less, New World monkeys are capable of exceeding three musical octaves.

    “These results show how monkeys take advantage of an evolved feature in their larynx – the vocal membrane – which allows for a wider range of calls to be produced, including these ultra-yodels.

    “This might be particularly important in primates, which have complex social lives and need to communicate in a variety of different ways.

    “It’s highly likely this has evolved to enrich the animals’ call repertoire, and is potentially used for attention-grabbing changes, call diversification, or identifying themselves.”

    Senior author Dr Jacob Dunn, Associate Professor in Evolutionary Biology at Anglia Ruskin University (ARU)

    “This is a fascinating example of how nature provides the means of enriching animal vocalisation, despite their lack of language.

    “The production of these intricate vocal patterns is mostly enabled by the way the animals’ larynx is anatomically shaped, and does not require complex neural control generated by the brain.”

    Lead author Dr Christian T Herbst, of the Department of Behavioural and Cognitive Biology at the University of Vienna

    “Our study shows that vocal membranes extend the monkey’s pitch range, but also destabilise its voice. They may have been lost during human evolution to promote pitch stability in singing and speech.”

    Professor Tecumseh Fitch, an expert in human vocal evolution from the University of Vienna and co-author of the study

    In addition to ARU and the University of Vienna, experts from Osaka University and Ritsumeikan University in Japan, KTH Royal Institute of Technology in Sweden, and La Senda Verde Wildlife Sanctuary in Bolivia also contributed to the research.

    The paper is published by the journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, and is available here https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2024.0005

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Swiss resident population exceeds 9 million in 2024 despite a decline in births

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Home Affairs

    The Swiss population passed the 9 million mark in 2024. On 31 December, there were 9 048 900 permanent residents. The fertility rate fell for the third year in a row. The average number of children per woman is at an all-time low. The number of deaths remained stable and life expectancy continues to rise. Immigration fell sharply after a record year in 2023, while emigration has risen. These are some of the provisional annual results for 2024 from the Population and Household Statistics and Vital Statistics of the Federal Statistical Office (FSO).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Swiss Consumer Price Index in March 2025 – Consumer prices remained stable in March

    Source: Switzerland – Department of Home Affairs

    The consumer price index (CPI) remained unchanged in March 2025 compared with the previous month, at 107.5 points (December 2020 = 100). Inflation was +0.3% compared with the same month of the previous year. These are the results of the Federal Statistical Office (FSO).

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-Evening Report: Slammed by tariffs and defence demands, Japan and South Korea toe a cautious line with Trump

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Sebastian Maslow, Associate Professor, International Relations, University of Tokyo

    Two months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, the liberal international order is on life support.

    Alliances and multilateral institutions are now seen by the United States as burdens. Europe and NATO are framed as bad business, “ripping off” the US. On his so-called “Liberation Day”, Trump also imposed 20% tariffs on all European Union imports.

    The Trump administration has been far less critical of the US’ alliances in the Indo-Pacific region. On a visit to Tokyo this week, US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth described Japan as America’s “indispensable partner” in deterring Chinese aggression.

    Yet, Japan and South Korea fared even worse than the EU with Trump’s new tariffs. Trump slapped Japan with 24% tariffs and South Korea 25%. (Both countries enjoy a trade surplus with the US.)

    So, how are the US’ two main allies in the Indo-Pacific dealing with the mercurial US leader? Will they follow Europe’s lead in reassessing their own security relationships with the US?

    Japan: a positive summit but concerns remain

    America’s post-war security strategy in Asia differs from Europe. While NATO was built on the premise of collective defence among its members, the US adopted a “hub-and-spokes” model in Asia, relying on bilateral alliances to contain the spread of communism.

    Japan and South Korea have long sheltered under the US nuclear umbrella and hosted major US military bases. Both are also highly sensitive to changes in the US’ Indo-Pacific policies.

    Japan, in particular, has a long history of careful alliance management with the US, epitomised by former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s courting of Trump.

    During Trump’s first term in office, Abe’s policy goals aligned closely with the US: transforming Japan’s security posture to make it a serious military and diplomatic power. Japan increased military spending, lifted arms export restrictions and deepened ties with India and Australia.

    Prime Minister Fumio Kishida continued to raise Japan’s security profile from 2021-24, again increasing military spending and taking a tough line on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. He emphasised “Europe today could be Asia tomorrow”.

    His successor, Shigeru Ishiba, had a successful summit with Trump in February, immediately after his inauguration. The joint statement reaffirmed US security guarantees to Japan, including over the Senkaku Islands, which are claimed by China.

    Japan also agreed to import American liquefied natural gas, and later committed to working with South Korea to develop a US$44 billion (A$70 billion) plan to export LNG from Alaska.

    However, these positive developments do not mean the relationship is on firm ground.

    In early March, Trump complained the US-Japan security agreement signed in 1960 was “one-sided” and a top administration official again called for Japan to increase its defence spending to 3% of gross domestic product (GDP) – a huge increase for a country facing serious demographic and fiscal pressures.

    Reports also emerged the US was considering cancelling a new joint headquarters in Japan aimed at deeper integration between US and Japanese forces.

    South Korea: extremely vulnerable on trade

    South Korea faces similar pressures. Ties between the two countries were strained during Trump’s first term over his demand South Korea increase the amount it pays to host US forces by
    nearly 400%. A 2021 agreement restored some stability, but left Seoul deeply worried about the future of the alliance.

    South Korea’s acting president, Choi Sang-mok, has expressed a desire to strengthen ties with the US, though Trump has reportedly been cool to his advances.

    With a US$66 billion (A$105 billion) trade surplus with the US, South Korea is considered the country most vulnerable to trade risk with the Trump administration, according to a Swiss research group.

    Trump’s past suggestions that both South Korea and Japan develop nuclear weapons or pay for US nuclear protection has also rattled some nerves. As confidence in the US alliance erodes, both countries are engaging in an urgent public debate about the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons.

    Tensions moving forward

    Potential for conflict is on the horizon. For example, Tokyo and Washington are set to renegotiate the deal that dictates how much Japan pays to host US troops next year.

    Both allies pay huge sums to host US bases. South Korea will pay US$1.14 billion (A$1.8 billion) in 2026, and Japan pays US$1.72 billion (A$2.7 billion) annually.

    A trade war could also prompt a reassessment of the costs of US efforts to decouple from China, potentially leading to closer economic ties between Japan, South Korea and China. The three countries have agreed to accelerate talks on a trilateral free trade agreement, which had been on hold since 2019.

    Another challenge is semiconductors. Japan’s new semiconductor revitalisation strategy is prioritising domestic investment, raising questions about whether Trump will tolerate “friendshoring” if Japan diverts investments from the US.

    In 2024, Japan outspent the US in semiconductor subsidies (as a share of GDP), while Taiwan’s TSMC, the world’s largest contract chipmaker, expanded its production capacity in Japan.

    Seoul remains an important partner to Washington on semiconductors. Samsung and SK Hynix are both boosting their investments on new semiconductor plants in the US. However, there is now uncertainty over the subsidies promised to both companies to invest in America under the CHIPS Act.

    Ultimately, the strength of these alliances depends on whether the Trump administration views them as long-term bulwarks against China’s rise in the region, or merely vassals that can be extorted for financial gain.

    If the US is serious about countering China, its regional alliances are key. This would give Japan and South Korea some degree of leverage – or, in Trump terms, they’ll hold valuable cards. Whether they get to play them, however, depends on what Trump’s China policy turns out to be.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Slammed by tariffs and defence demands, Japan and South Korea toe a cautious line with Trump – https://theconversation.com/slammed-by-tariffs-and-defence-demands-japan-and-south-korea-toe-a-cautious-line-with-trump-244172

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cantwell Statement on Major Trump Tariff Announcement

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington Maria Cantwell

    04.02.25

    Cantwell Statement on Major Trump Tariff Announcement

    Auto tariffs could increase car prices by up to $15,000 – the Port of Vancouver, WA is the largest importer of Subarus in the U.S.

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, President Donald Trump announced a “National Economic Emergency,” and signed an executive order declaring a 10% minimum baseline tariff on all countries as well as additional tariffs on nearly 60 countries. The baseline tariff will go into effect April 5 and additional reciprocal tariffs will go into effect April 9. Also included in today’s announcement, Trump reiterated his intention to impose a 25% tariff on all imported automobiles starting at 12AM on April 3. U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell, ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and senior member of the Senate Finance Committee, released the following statement:

    “As a representative of one of the most trade dependent economies in America, I disagree with President Trump’s tariffs. His announcement today will hurt sectors we care about: agriculture, manufacturing, and tech,” Sen. Cantwell said. “And ultimately, consumers will pay the price. It’s time for Congress to take action to counter the president’s trade war.”

    Trump’s reciprocal tariffs set to take effect April 9 include:

    • China – 34% 
    • EU – 20%  
    • Vietnam – 46% 
    • Taiwan – 32% 
    • Thailand –36% 
    • Indonesia – 32% 
    • Switzerland – 31% 
    • India – 26% 
    • South Korea – 25% 
    • Japan – 24% 
    • Malaysia – 24% 
    • Israel – 17%  
    • Cambodia – 49%

    In Washington state, two out of every five jobs are tied to trade and trade-related industries. 

    Today’s announcement is in addition to previous tariffs President Trump announced over the past few weeks, including on goods from Mexico, Canada, and China.  More information about how those tariffs will affect consumers and businesses in the State of Washington can be found HERE.  

    Those tariffs will also have significant impacts nationwide:

    • A 25% tariff on all Canadian and Mexican goods would add an estimated $144 billion a year to the cost of manufacturing in the United States.
    • Tariffs on Canada and Mexico could increase U.S. car prices by as much as $15,000.
    • According to the Yale Budget Lab, Trump’s proposed tariffs would result in the highest U.S. effective tariff rate in more than 80 years, and depending on the level of retaliation by other trading partners, will result in increased costs of between $1,600 and $2,000 per household. According to their analysis, food, clothing, cars, and electronics will all see above-average price increases.

    The tariffs could also impact West Coast ports that import automobiles, such as the Port of Vancouver, WA, which is the largest gateway for Subaru imports in the country. In 2023, 98,000 Subarus came through the Port of Vancouver.

    Last month, Sen. Cantwell joined the Washington Council of International Trade for a Q&A session on the whiplash caused by the administration’s chaotic tariff policies – and how they particularly harm the Pacific Northwest, which is among the most trade-dependent regions in the country. Sen. Cantwell said that the current administration’s approach to trade focuses on punitive tariffs, even with America’s largest trading partners and closest allies, as opposed to innovation and alliance-building. That ethos is fundamentally at odds with how the Pacific Northwest has historically built its trade-oriented economy.

    Sen. Cantwell has remained a steadfast supporter of increased trade to grow the economy and keep prices in check in the State of Washington and nationwide. Sen. Cantwell was the leading voice in negotiations to end India’s 20% retaliatory tariff on American apples, which was imposed in response to tariffs on steel and aluminum and devastated Washington state’s apple exports. India had once been the second-largest export market for American apples, but after President Trump imposed tariffs on steel and aluminum in his first term, India imposed retaliatory tariffs in response and U.S. apple exports plummeted. The impact on Washington apple growers was severe: Apple exports from the state dropped from $120 million in 2017 to less than $1 million by 2023.  In September 2023, following several years of Sen. Cantwell’s advocacy, India ended its retaliatory tariffs on apples and pulse crops which was welcome news to the state’s more than 1,400 apple growers and the 68,000-plus workers they support.

    For the past three months, President Trump has been sowing economic chaos across the country with unpredictable and ever-changing tariff announcements. His back-and-forth announcements and actions, which have whipsawed American businesses and consumers, as well as close neighbors and allies, include:

    • On January 31 — citing punishment for failing to crack down on fentanyl trafficking — the Trump administration announced plans to impose a 25% tax on many goods imported into the U.S. from Canada and Mexico and a 10% tax on goods imported from China, then abruptly postponed those tariffs.
    • Last month, he doubled down, announcing an additional 25% tax on all steel and aluminum imports.
    • At 12:01 a.m. ET on March 4, President Trump’s long-promised 25% tariffs on goods from Mexico and Canada and 10% tariff increase on goods from China took effect, causing stock prices in the United States to plummet.
    • Then, on March 5, he announced that automobiles from Canada and Mexico would be exempt from his tariffs for one month.
    • The morning of March 6, he announced that he would suspend the tariffs for some products from Mexico. Then, later that same afternoon, he announced he was suspending most new tariffs on products from both Mexico and Canada until April 2.
    • On March 11, Trump threatened to double tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum – increasing them to 50% – before reversing himself later the same day.
    • On March 13, he threatened 200% tariffs on alcoholic products from the European Union, including all wine and Champagne.
    • On March 27, he announced plans to impose a 25% tax on all imported sedans, SUVs, crossovers, minivans, cargo vans, and light trucks, as well as some auto parts, beginning on April 2.
    • On March 29, President Trump said, “I couldn’t care less,” if automakers raise the price of cars in response to his tariffs.

    MIL OSI USA News –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI China: Trump signs executive order on ‘reciprocal tariffs’ amid widespread opposition

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Amid widespread opposition, U.S. President Donald Trump on Wednesday signed an executive order on the so-called “reciprocal tariffs,” imposing a 10-percent “minimum baseline tariff” and higher rates on certain trading partners.

    All imports would be subject to 10 percent additional tariffs, except as otherwise provided, the executive order said. This will take effect on April 5.

    Trump will impose an “individualized reciprocal higher tariff” on the countries and regions with which the United States “has the largest trade deficits,” according to a White House document. This will take effect on April 9.

    In his speech at the White House Rose Garden, Trump presented a chart on “reciprocal tariffs.” The chart shows that different countries and regions face different tariff rates.

    For example, China will face a 34-percent tariff, the European Union 20 percent, Vietnam 46 percent, Japan 24 percent, India 26 percent, South Korea 25 percent, Thailand 36 percent, Switzerland 31 percent, Indonesia 32 percent, Malaysia 24 percent, and Cambodia 49 percent.

    Some goods will not be subject to the reciprocal tariff, including steel and aluminum, as well autos and auto parts already subject to Section 232 tariffs, copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and lumber, the White House noted.

    Despite Trump’s claim that higher tariffs will help bring in revenue for the government and revitalize U.S. manufacturing, economists have warned that such measures will push up prices for U.S. consumers and businesses, disrupt global trade, and hurt global economy. 

    MIL OSI China News –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Global: New modelling reveals full impact of Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs – with the US hit hardest

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Niven Winchester, Professor of Economics, Auckland University of Technology

    Getty Images

    We now have a clearer picture of Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs and how they will affect other trading nations, including the United States itself.

    The US administration claims these tariffs on imports will reduce the US trade deficit and address what it views as unfair and non-reciprocal trade practices. Trump said this would

    forever be remembered as the day American industry was reborn, the day America’s destiny was reclaimed.

    The “reciprocal” tariffs are designed to impose charges on other countries equivalent to half the costs they supposedly inflict on US exporters through tariffs, currency manipulation and non-tariff barriers levied on US goods.

    Each nation received a tariff number that will apply to most goods. Notable sectors exempt include steel, aluminium and motor vehicles, which are already subject to new tariffs.

    The minimum baseline tariff for each country is 10%. But many countries received higher numbers, including Vietnam (46%), Thailand (36%), China (34%), Indonesia (32%), Taiwan (32%) and Switzerland (31%).

    The tariff number for China is in addition to an existing 20% tariff, so the total tariff applied to Chinese imports is 54%. Countries assigned 10% tariffs include Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

    Canada and Mexico are exempt from the reciprocal tariffs, for now, but goods from those nations are subject to a 25% tariff under a separate executive order.

    Although some countries do charge higher tariffs on US goods than the US imposes on their exports, and the “Liberation Day” tariffs are allegedly only half the full reciprocal rate, the calculations behind them are open to challenge.

    For example, non-tariff measures are notoriously difficult to estimate and “subject to much uncertainty”, according to one recent study.

    GDP impacts with retaliation

    Other countries are now likely to respond with retaliatory tariffs on US imports. Canada (the largest destination for US exports), the EU and China have all said they will respond in kind.

    To estimate the impacts of this tit-for-tat trade standoff, I use a global model of the production, trade and consumption of goods and services. Similar simulation tools – known as “computable general equilibrium models” – are widely used by governments, academics and consultancies to evaluate policy changes.

    The first model simulates a scenario in which the US imposes reciprocal and other new tariffs, and other countries respond with equivalent tariffs on US goods. Estimated changes in GDP due to US reciprocal tariffs and retaliatory tariffs by other nations are shown in the table below.

    The tariffs decrease US GDP by US$438.4 billion (1.45%). Divided among the nation’s 126 million households, GDP per household decreases by $3,487 per year. That is larger than the corresponding decreases in any other country. (All figures are in US dollars.)

    Proportional GDP decreases are largest in Mexico (2.24%) and Canada (1.65%) as these nations ship more than 75% of their exports to the US. Mexican households are worse off by $1,192 per year and Canadian households by $2,467.

    Other nations that experience relatively large decreases in GDP include Vietnam (0.99%) and Switzerland (0.32%).

    Some nations gain from the trade war. Typically, these face relatively low US tariffs (and consequently also impose relatively low tariffs on US goods). New Zealand (0.29%) and Brazil (0.28%) experience the largest increases in GDP. New Zealand households are better off by $397 per year.

    Aggregate GDP for the rest of the world (all nations except the US) decreases by $62 billion.

    At the global level, GDP decreases by $500 billion (0.43%). This result confirms the well-known rule that trade wars shrink the global economy.

    GDP impacts without retaliation

    In the second scenario, the modelling depicts what happens if other nations do not react to the US tariffs. The changes in the GDP of selected countries are presented in the table below.

    Countries that face relatively high US tariffs and ship a large proportion of their exports to the US experience the largest proportional decreases in GDP. These include Canada, Mexico, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Switzerland, South Korea and China.

    Countries that face relatively low new tariffs gain, with the UK experiencing the largest GDP increase.

    The tariffs decrease US GDP by $149 billion (0.49%) because the tariffs increase production costs and consumer prices in the US.

    Aggregate GDP for the rest of the world decreases by $155 billion, more than twice the corresponding decrease when there was retaliation. This indicates that the rest of the world can reduce losses by retaliating. At the same time, retaliation leads to a worse outcome for the US.

    Previous tariff announcements by the Trump administration dropped sand into the cogs of international trade. The reciprocal tariffs throw a spanner into the works. Ultimately, the US may face the largest damages.

    Niven Winchester has previously received funding from the Productivity Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to estimate the impacts of potential trade policies. He is affiliated with Motu Economic & Public Policy Research.

    – ref. New modelling reveals full impact of Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs – with the US hit hardest – https://theconversation.com/new-modelling-reveals-full-impact-of-trumps-liberation-day-tariffs-with-the-us-hit-hardest-253320

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-Evening Report: New modelling reveals full impact of Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs – with the US hit hardest

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Niven Winchester, Professor of Economics, Auckland University of Technology

    Getty Images

    We now have a clearer picture of Donald Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs and how they will affect other trading nations, including the United States itself.

    The US administration claims these tariffs on imports will reduce the US trade deficit and address what it views as unfair and non-reciprocal trade practices. Trump said this would

    forever be remembered as the day American industry was reborn, the day America’s destiny was reclaimed.

    The “reciprocal” tariffs are designed to impose charges on other countries equivalent to half the costs they supposedly inflict on US exporters through tariffs, currency manipulation and non-tariff barriers levied on US goods.

    Each nation received a tariff number that will apply to most goods. Notable sectors exempt include steel, aluminium and motor vehicles, which are already subject to new tariffs.

    The minimum baseline tariff for each country is 10%. But many countries received higher numbers, including Vietnam (46%), Thailand (36%), China (34%), Indonesia (32%), Taiwan (32%) and Switzerland (31%).

    The tariff number for China is in addition to an existing 20% tariff, so the total tariff applied to Chinese imports is 54%. Countries assigned 10% tariffs include Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

    Canada and Mexico are exempt from the reciprocal tariffs, for now, but goods from those nations are subject to a 25% tariff under a separate executive order.

    Although some countries do charge higher tariffs on US goods than the US imposes on their exports, and the “Liberation Day” tariffs are allegedly only half the full reciprocal rate, the calculations behind them are open to challenge.

    For example, non-tariff measures are notoriously difficult to estimate and “subject to much uncertainty”, according to one recent study.

    GDP impacts with retaliation

    Other countries are now likely to respond with retaliatory tariffs on US imports. Canada (the largest destination for US exports), the EU and China have all said they will respond in kind.

    To estimate the impacts of this tit-for-tat trade standoff, I use a global model of the production, trade and consumption of goods and services. Similar simulation tools – known as “computable general equilibrium models” – are widely used by governments, academics and consultancies to evaluate policy changes.

    The first model simulates a scenario in which the US imposes reciprocal and other new tariffs, and other countries respond with equivalent tariffs on US goods. Estimated changes in GDP due to US reciprocal tariffs and retaliatory tariffs by other nations are shown in the table below.

    The tariffs decrease US GDP by US$438.4 billion (1.45%). Divided among the nation’s 126 million households, GDP per household decreases by $3,487 per year. That is larger than the corresponding decreases in any other country. (All figures are in US dollars.)

    Proportional GDP decreases are largest in Mexico (2.24%) and Canada (1.65%) as these nations ship more than 75% of their exports to the US. Mexican households are worse off by $1,192 per year and Canadian households by $2,467.

    Other nations that experience relatively large decreases in GDP include Vietnam (0.99%) and Switzerland (0.32%).

    Some nations gain from the trade war. Typically, these face relatively low US tariffs (and consequently also impose relatively low tariffs on US goods). New Zealand (0.29%) and Brazil (0.28%) experience the largest increases in GDP. New Zealand households are better off by $397 per year.

    Aggregate GDP for the rest of the world (all nations except the US) decreases by $62 billion.

    At the global level, GDP decreases by $500 billion (0.43%). This result confirms the well-known rule that trade wars shrink the global economy.

    GDP impacts without retaliation

    In the second scenario, the modelling depicts what happens if other nations do not react to the US tariffs. The changes in the GDP of selected countries are presented in the table below.

    Countries that face relatively high US tariffs and ship a large proportion of their exports to the US experience the largest proportional decreases in GDP. These include Canada, Mexico, Vietnam, Thailand, Taiwan, Switzerland, South Korea and China.

    Countries that face relatively low new tariffs gain, with the UK experiencing the largest GDP increase.

    The tariffs decrease US GDP by $149 billion (0.49%) because the tariffs increase production costs and consumer prices in the US.

    Aggregate GDP for the rest of the world decreases by $155 billion, more than twice the corresponding decrease when there was retaliation. This indicates that the rest of the world can reduce losses by retaliating. At the same time, retaliation leads to a worse outcome for the US.

    Previous tariff announcements by the Trump administration dropped sand into the cogs of international trade. The reciprocal tariffs throw a spanner into the works. Ultimately, the US may face the largest damages.

    Niven Winchester has previously received funding from the Productivity Commission and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to estimate the impacts of potential trade policies. He is affiliated with Motu Economic & Public Policy Research.

    – ref. New modelling reveals full impact of Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’ tariffs – with the US hit hardest – https://theconversation.com/new-modelling-reveals-full-impact-of-trumps-liberation-day-tariffs-with-the-us-hit-hardest-253320

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Rule of Two for faster access to medicines

    Source: New Zealand Government

    Associate Health Minister David Seymour is welcoming Cabinet’s decision to enable medicines to be approved in less than 30 days if the product has approval from two recognised overseas jurisdictions.   
    This change is included in the Medicines Amendment Bill (the Bill), which amends the Medicines Act 1981. The pathway will be in operation by early 2026.
    The policy will start with Australia, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, Singapore and Switzerland, as recognised countries. These are the main countries Medsafe currently recognises. 
    “Faster access to medicines has always been a priority of mine. For many New Zealanders, pharmaceuticals are life or death, or the difference between a life of pain and suffering or living freely,” Mr Seymour says. 
    “This change will increase access to medicines for Kiwis by introducing a streamlined verification pathway for medicines. People will access new treatments more quickly. This is committed to in the ACT-National and National-NZ First coalition agreements. 
    “Cabinet has agreed to give the responsible Minister powers to regulate the Rule of Two. That means I will be outlining the proposed regulatory pathway for industry and the public to feedback on via the Select Committee process. This system should be as straightforward as possible to allow New Zealanders the greatest level of access to innovative medicine possible. 
    “New cars are acceptable for the New Zealand market if they meet at least one of several foreign standards. We can apply the same principle to medicines, if other jurisdictions have already done the work and can ensure the products’ safety, we don’t need to delay patient’s access by doing the exact same tests,” Mr Seymour says. 
    “This is a common-sense efficiency that costs nothing. It helps Kiwis in need. It can shave months off the approval process. A perfect example of this was with a treatment for asthma which could have been approved by the end of 2022 under this pathway, but was not approved until 16 months later in May 2024. 
    “This Government is making medicines access a priority because it leads to better patient outcomes. So far, we have:

    Changed Pharmac’s process so it can assess a funding application at the same time as Medsafe is assessing the application for regulatory approval
    Allocated Pharmac its largest ever budget of $6.294 billion over four years, and a $604 million uplift to give Pharmac the financial support it needs to carry out its functions – negotiating the best deals for medicine for New Zealanders
    Made patient voice a crucial consideration in Pharmac’s funding decisions
    Put pseudoephedrine back on the shelves of pharmacies

    “We’re committed to ensuring that the regulatory system for pharmaceuticals is not unreasonably holding back access. It will lead to more Kiwis being able to access the medicines they need to live a fulfilling life.”
    Notes to editors: 
    Draft criteria for regulatory pathway rules will likely relate to ensuring that:

    manufacturing sites associated with product have evidence of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) compliance which is valid to Medsafe’s satisfaction,
    if a product is a generic or biosimilar prescription medicine, the innovator or reference product is identical to that approved for New Zealand.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Amid Record High Killing of Humanitarian Workers, Speakers Implore Security Council to Ensure Accountability for Attacks on Personnel in Conflict Zones

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI b

    What is the Council going to do to ensure accountability for the killing of aid workers and to prevent more such deaths, a senior United Nations humanitarian official asked the 15-member body today, as she detailed the unprecedented attacks that such workers face in conflict zones around the world.

    Joyce Msuya, Assistant-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, noting the record number of humanitarian workers killed in 2024 — 377 across 20 countries — said many more were injured, kidnapped, and arbitrarily detained.  “Being shot at should not be part of the job,” she emphasized. 

    In Sudan, at least 84 humanitarian workers, all Sudanese nationals, have been killed since the current conflict began in 2023.  Three days ago, the bodies of 15 emergency aid workers were recovered from a mass grave in Rafah — killed several days earlier by Israeli forces while trying to save lives.  “Gaza is the most dangerous place for humanitarians ever”, she said — a statement echoed several times in the ensuing discussion.  More than 408 aid workers were killed there, since 7 October 2023.  

    There is no shortage of robust international legal frameworks to tackle this, she added — “what is lacking is the political will to comply.”   Almost 95 per cent of those killed are local aid workers; but the killing of a local aid worker receives 500 times less media coverage than that of an international staff member.  She also highlighted the challenge posed by disinformation and misinformation campaigns targeting aid organizations. 

    Respect for International Law Is Critical 

    Highlighting three asks, she called on the Council to ensure respect for international law and protect humanitarian workers.  Secondly, “speak out”, she said, adding that “silence, inconsistency and selective outrage is emboldening perpetrators”.  Finally, accountability is crucial, she stressed, adding that the Council must ask concerned Governments to pursue justice, and when national jurisdictions fail it must use international mechanisms.

    Gilles Michaud, Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, recalled that he had previously urged the Council to “translate words of support for the protection of humanitarian and United Nations personnel into meaningful action”.  At the time, he also called on Member States to join the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.  “Since that briefing, I regret to inform you that progress has been elusive,” he said.

    In Gaza, the breakdown of the ceasefire has been “particularly brutal”, he emphasized, noting, among others, the direct attack on a clearly identified UN building on 19 March.  On 23 March, a worker of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other humanitarian staff were killed while providing life-saving assistance — “their bodies left for days before they could be retrieved”, he noted. 

    “Impunity for attacks on humanitarian personnel have become the ‘new normal’,” he said.  Such attacks are perpetrated by non-State actors and Governments alike and, while the motives vary, he stressed:  “But, above all, they do it because they can get away with it.” 

    Closure of Vital Services Due to ‘Criminalization of Aid’ 

    “Through the eyes of a humanitarian, the world is a volatile place,” Nic Lee, Executive Director of the International NGO Safety Organisation told the Council.  On average, at least one aid worker is abducted, injured or killed every day.  Nationally and locally recruited personnel are particularly vulnerable and the international response to their death is lacking.  Violence at the hands of non-State armed groups continues to remain prevalent, with the most common incidents occurring in West and Central Africa. Further, the “criminalization of aid” amid an “explosive growth” in NGO restrictions has led to the closure of vital services for populations in dire need, he said.

    The Council must do more to facilitate diplomatic engagement on humanitarian issues, protect the humanitarian space and “challenge the worrying trend of criminalization of aid”, he said. “The fact is that violence against aid workers is more commonly linked to their identity as civilians than as aid workers,” he added.  The Council must address the double standards of Member States who continue to support those responsible for civilian and aid worker deaths alike. 

    Patterns of Violence Extend Across Multiple Conflict Zones

    When the floor opened, Council members reaffirmed that it is unacceptable to target humanitarian workers and highlighted the frontlines where they are in danger.  The representative of Slovenia recalled the words of the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), who addressed the Council in September 2024:  “One conflict informs the other, boundaries are pushed into the zone of the acceptable, and more human suffering follows.” 

    “The pattern of violence against humanitarian workers extends across multiple conflict zones,” Somalia’s delegate said, noting that in Sudan, over 100 aid workers have been killed since April 2023, while Ukraine has lost 23 brave souls, and in Gaza, 399 humanitarian personnel, including 289 UN staff members, paid the ultimate price.  Eight of the aid workers whose bodies were discovered in a mass grave in Rafah recently, he noted, were Red Crescent medics still wearing their protective gear.  This is a “stark violation of every principle we hold sacred”, he said. 

    In Gaza UN Workers Systematically Suppressed, Aid Workers Attacked

    Algeria’s delegate noted that the bodies were buried near destroyed ambulances — they were assassinated by Israeli occupying forces while attempting to save lives.  They deserve justice, he said, stressing that attacks directed at humanitarian personnel, their premises and assets are considered war crimes under international law.  The fact that these basic principles do not seem to apply to the Israeli occupying Power calls into question the relevance of international humanitarian law and the Security Council itself, he said.  Also stressing the need for accountability, China’s delegate stressed the role of UNRWA in Gaza, noting that it has been systematically suppressed and its humanitarian workers attacked. 

    The representative of the United Kingdom noted the one-year anniversary of the attack on a World Central Kitchen convoy in Gaza, which killed seven aid workers, including three British citizens, and called for the conclusion of the Military Advocate General’s consideration of the incident, including determining whether criminal proceedings should be initiated. 

    In Gaza, the representative of the United States said, “Hamas has cynically misused civilian infrastructure to shield themselves” causing “civilians to be caught in the crossfire”.  He expressed concern about the surge in civilian deaths in Sudan, the constraints faced by humanitarians in South Sudan and the devastating effects of the Russian Federation’s war on Ukraine on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Further, “we condemn the Houthis’ sham so-called judicial proceedings against detainees,” he said, expressing concern about the humanitarian and diplomatic personnel detained by the Houthis. 

    In eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone’s delegate said, civilians are caught in the crossfire of armed group activity, while in Haiti, violence from armed gangs has engulfed urban centers, displaced thousands and left civilians at the mercy of lawlessness.  In Ukraine, the Russian Federation uses “cruel double-tap strikes” to target first responders, Denmark’s delegate pointed out.

    The Republic of Korea’s delegate noted that in Sudan, warring parties spread false narratives accusing the Sudan Emergency Response Room of collaborating with their enemies, thereby justifying the denial of humanitarian access and leaving millions in urgent need.  He called upon all States to consider sanctioning those responsible for disseminating unverified and libelous content.  Last year – the deadliest on record for humanitarian workers – also saw the adoption of Council resolution 2730 (2024), he recalled.

    Calls for Stronger Action to Implement Council Resolution 2730 (2024)

    The representative of Switzerland, who presented that text to the Council during the country’s tenure as a non-permanent member, stressed the importance of implementing it and guaranteeing unimpeded humanitarian access.  Several speakers reaffirmed support for that text, including the representative of Greece.  France’s delegate, Council President for April, speaking in his national capacity, echoed the call for justice and said that each time violations occur, the Council has to “speak out, it must react”.  Panama’s delegate said the text “set us on the right track, and it remains fully relevant.” 

    Pakistan’s delegate urged the creation of a “global implementation dashboard” for that resolution — it should provide real-time public tracking of violations, investigations and their outcomes “for everyone to see and follow”. The escalating attacks on humanitarian personnel are not just isolated incidents — “they reflect a growing disregard for international norms,” he said, adding that it is unacceptable that those who work to provide “dignity amidst displacement” are met “not with gratitude, but with gunfire”. 

    Guyana’s delegate expressed support for the Secretary-General’s recommendation for the Council to systematically request the concerned State authorities to conduct prompt, independent and effective investigations into incidents and to report to the Council about the outcomes of these investigations, including on measures to prevent reoccurrence.  The Council must also consider referrals to the International Criminal Court or other international tribunals where State authorities prove unable or unwilling to act, she said.

    “What new instruments can we talk about if the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations are unable to enforce previous ones which remain fully relevant?” asked the Russian Federation’s delegate.  Current international obligations are more than sufficient, he said, calling for more scrupulous compliance.  His delegation abstained from voting on Council resolution 2730 (2024) because it contained some language “which is not fully accurate” and may result in distorted interpretation, he said.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Response to the entry into force of the EES in the second half of 2025 in view of the lack of detail regarding the forms and the possible shortage of materials – E-001258/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-001258/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Borja Giménez Larraz (PPE)

    The Entry and Exit System (EES), the new registration system for travellers from outside the European Union, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland or Liechtenstein admitted for a short stay (up to 90 days within any 180-day period), comes into force in the second half of 2025.

    To date, the Commission has not communicated the exact procedure or the forms to be used. As a result, the Member States – especially Spain – do not have the logistical arrangements in place for the collection of this data, such as biometric checks.

    Given the high number of non-EU tourists visiting certain regions of the EU – such as southern Spain – particularly British visitors (with Málaga alone welcoming three million UK tourists annually, or 2 300 per hour):

    • 1.Has the European Commission prepared any contingency plans in case the entry into force of the EES causes disruptions to the European Union’s infrastructure and at the ports of entry?

    Submitted: 26.3.2025

    Last updated: 2 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI: XploraDEX Is Quietly Becoming the Biggest DeFi Opportunity on The XRP Blockchain — Join $XPL Presale

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ZURICH, Switzerland, April 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — XRP Ledger, an ecosystem long admired for its speed, scalability, and utility, one glaring gap has remained: a truly intelligent, AI-enhanced decentralized exchange. That’s exactly what XploraDEX is delivering and it’s gaining traction fast.

    Now live with its $XPL Token Presale, XploraDEX is positioning itself as the premier DeFi opportunity on the XRP Ledger, bringing next-level trading automation, deep market analytics, and AI-powered execution to a chain that’s ready to scale.

    A New Kind of DEX for a New Kind of Trader

    Unlike traditional DEXs that simply offer token swaps, XploraDEX is built for the future of finance. Traders on XploraDEX gain access to:

    • AI-Driven Trade Execution: Eliminate emotional trading with machine-learning algorithms that trigger high-probability buy/sell decisions in real time.
    • Predictive Insights: Built-in AI dashboards give users market outlooks, trend alerts, and asset-level risk scoring.
    • Intelligent Liquidity Optimization: XploraDEX automatically routes trades for best pricing and minimal slippage—all at XRPL speeds.
    • Portfolio Smart Tools: AI helps rebalance portfolios, alert users to volatility shifts, and suggest yield-maximizing strategies.

    This isn’t just a better DEX. It’s a smarter way to trade, powered by the intelligence of artificial intelligence.

    PARTICIPATE IN $XPL PRESALE

    Why $XPL Matters: Utility, Access & Ownership

    The $XPL token is the fuel behind the engine a multi-utility asset designed to reward users, decentralize governance, and unlock premium features:

    • Access to AI-powered trading tools
    • Trading fee discounts and platform incentives
    • Staking with boosted rewards and early liquidity farming access
    • Governance rights to shape the future of XploraDEX

    $XPL Presale Buzz: Quiet Beginnings, Big Momentum

    While XploraDEX launched quietly, the momentum has been anything but slow:

            • unique wallets connected within the presale phase

            • XRP whales have begun acquiring strategic $XPL allocations

            • Crypto Twitter and Telegram are lighting up with organic chatter and bullish sentiment

    Built on the Right Chain at the Right Time

    XRPL is fast, cheap, and sustainable. But what it’s lacked is a truly user-first, AI-powered DEX. XploraDEX changes that—giving XRP holders and DeFi users a native, scalable platform.

    The $XPL Presale Is Live, Participate Now: https://sale.xploradex.io

    If you’re looking for an edge in 2025’s evolving crypto market, look no further. XploraDEX is building the infrastructure of intelligent trading on one of the most underutilized chains in DeFi.

    Stay connected and Join the XploraDEX AI Revolution

    Website | $XPL Token Presale | X | Telegram

    Contact:
    Oliver Muller
    oliver@xploradex.io
    contact@xploradex.io

    Disclaimer: This press release is provided by the XploraDEX. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice.

    Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed.

    Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/b4083d56-2c83-43b7-9e26-fcf7043775ba

    The MIL Network –

    April 3, 2025

  • MIL-OSI: WISeKey, OISTE Foundation, Abraham House (AbrahamID.Com), and GFLI Announce Major Milestone in Landmark Global Initiative to Deliver Digital Identity to Over One Billion People

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    WISeKey, OISTE Foundation, Abraham House (AbrahamID.Com), and GFLI Announce Major Milestone in Landmark Global Initiative to Deliver Digital Identity to Over One Billion People

    New York | April 2, 2025 – WISeKey International Holding (“WISeKey” or the “Company”) (NASDAQ: WKEY; SIX: WIHN), in collaboration with the OISTE Foundation, Abraham House, and the Global Financial Literacy Initiative (GFLI), today announced significant progress in the global AbrahamID.com initiative, a groundbreaking humanitarian technology project aimed at providing secure digital identities to more than one billion unbanked and underserved individuals worldwide.

    See more information by visiting this video – https://drive.google.com/file/d/1MXJSQmftxPGo_Yc47R-7_i07km5Ldvkl/view?usp=drivesdk.

    This transformative initiative was first introduced at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2025, where it received global media coverage, including features in the Financial Times and other leading international outlets. It will be officially launched tomorrow in New York during the Partners for Prosperity Summit, an event hosted by FinFit in collaboration with Salary Finance, and powered by SHINE at Harvard. The summit is not just a gathering—it is a global catalyst for systems-level change, bringing together innovators, policy-makers, philanthropists, and technologists committed to reshaping the future of inclusion, equity, and prosperity.

    At the heart of this announcement is the launch of the AbrahamID.com platform, now live and operational. Through this secure digital portal, individuals from every corner of the globe can create their verified digital identity, opening the door to critical services and opportunities that were previously out of reach. These include access to financial services, healthcare, education, employment, voting systems, and social safety nets, especially in regions where individuals lack official documentation or access to banking systems.

    Built on WISeKey’s WISeID platform and underpinned by the OISTE Foundation’s global cryptographic Root of Trust, the platform utilizes cutting-edge blockchain, AI, and post-quantum cryptography to ensure data integrity, privacy, and cross-border interoperability. These identities are tamper-proof, privacy-respecting, and legally recognized—making them suitable for use by individuals, NGOs, and governments in both the physical and digital domains.

    This initiative directly supports multiple United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 1 (No Poverty), SDG 4 (Quality Education), SDG 8 (Decent Work and Economic Growth), SDG 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure), SDG 10 (Reduced Inequalities), and SDG 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). By addressing the fundamental right to identity and financial access, the AbrahamID project lays the foundation for social and economic inclusion at an unprecedented scale.

    The platform is especially transformative for marginalized populations—refugees, displaced persons, women in rural communities, youth in informal labor markets, and migrant workers—who often remain invisible to formal systems due to the lack of identification. AbrahamID offers these individuals a secure and portable identity solution that is lightweight, mobile-compatible, and functional even in low-bandwidth environments.

    To complement the digital infrastructure, the initiative integrates the work of the Global Financial Literacy Initiative (GFLI), co-founded by James Rosebush and Daniel Shakhani. GFLI provides practical, culturally relevant financial education to empower individuals with the tools to manage money, plan for the future, and break free from poverty. Combined with digital identity, this dual approach equips individuals not just with access, but with the agency and knowledge to fully engage in today’s digital economy.

    “Digital identity is the gateway, but financial literacy is the roadmap,” said James Rosebush, a globally recognized financial advisor, author, and former senior advisor to President Ronald Reagan. “Together, they enable people to not just survive—but thrive. We’re proud to contribute to this historic effort that bridges technology and humanity.”

    Daniel Shakhani, co-founder of Abraham House, emphasized the moral urgency behind the mission. “As the world becomes more digitized, millions are being left behind. Without identity, people are denied opportunity, justice, and dignity. Abraham House exists to bring together the world’s most forward-thinking minds and ensure innovation serves humanity equitably. This partnership with WISeKey and GFLI is about impact at scale—driving global justice, economic empowerment, and digital inclusion.”

    Co-founded by Shakhani and Jennifer de Broglie, Abraham House serves as a global convener dedicated to solving systemic humanitarian challenges through collaboration, diplomacy, and entrepreneurship. With the AbrahamID.com platform now active, this vision is being brought to life as a real-time, scalable solution for peace and prosperity.

    The technology behind this initiative—WISeID—offers not just a tool for access, but a framework for trusted, ethical, and future-proof digital citizenship. Legally binding digital signatures, encrypted communications, and post-quantum protections ensure that even the most vulnerable individuals are shielded from rising cybersecurity threats and misuse of AI. In an age where identity fraud, digital surveillance, and algorithmic bias disproportionately affect underserved populations, this platform provides digital dignity and control over personal data.

    The range of immediate applications is vast and deeply impactful. Migrant workers can receive secure remittances, patients can access healthcare records, students can register for education, and entrepreneurs can apply for microloans. In fragile states and diaspora communities, digital identity can also restore civic participation by enabling secure digital voting and engagement in public decision-making.

    WISeKey, along with its subsidiaries—including SEALSQ, WISe.ART, WISeSat, and SEALCOIN—continues to pioneer responsible, human-centric innovation. As a Swiss-based global technology leader, WISeKey is committed to embedding trust, privacy, and resilience at the core of digital ecosystems, working toward a future where technology uplifts, protects, and empowers every person.

    Governments, NGOs, corporations, and individuals are now invited to join this global movement by visiting www.AbrahamID.com, where they can register identities, support deployments, and become part of the mission to digitally and financially empower over one billion people.

    #AbrahamID #DigitalDignity #OneBillionStrong #FinancialInclusion #IdentityForAll #TechForGood #SDGs #WISeID #OISTE #AbrahamHouse #GFLI #DigitalInclusion #HumanCentricAI

    About Abraham House
    Abraham House is a global organisation dedicated to fostering peace, collaboration, and innovation. It unites individuals and organisations to address global challenges and deliver tangible benefits for future generations.

    About the Global Financial Literacy Initiative (GFLI)
    Founded by James Rosebush and Daniel Shakhani, GFLI is a UK-registered charity under Kingdom Network and a 501(c)(3) organisation in the United States. It partners with leading organisations to drive financial literacy and stability at scale.

    About WISeKey

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd (“WISeKey”, SIX: WIHN; Nasdaq: WKEY) is a global leader in cybersecurity, digital identity, and IoT solutions platform. It operates as a Swiss-based holding company through several operational subsidiaries, each dedicated to specific aspects of its technology portfolio. The subsidiaries include (i) SEALSQ Corp (Nasdaq: LAES), which focuses on semiconductors, PKI, and post-quantum technology products, (ii) WISeKey SA which specializes in RoT and PKI solutions for secure authentication and identification in IoT, Blockchain, and AI, (iii) WISeSat AG which focuses on space technology for secure satellite communication, specifically for IoT applications, (iv) WISe.ART Corp which focuses on trusted blockchain NFTs and operates the WISe.ART marketplace for secure NFT transactions, and (v) SEALCOIN AG which focuses on decentralized physical internet with DePIN technology and house the development of the SEALCOIN platform.

    Each subsidiary contributes to WISeKey’s mission of securing the internet while focusing on their respective areas of research and expertise. Their technologies seamlessly integrate into the comprehensive WISeKey platform. WISeKey secures digital identity ecosystems for individuals and objects using Blockchain, AI, and IoT technologies. With over 1.6 billion microchips deployed across various IoT sectors, WISeKey plays a vital role in securing the Internet of Everything. The company’s semiconductors generate valuable Big Data that, when analyzed with AI, enable predictive equipment failure prevention. Trusted by the OISTE/WISeKey cryptographic Root of Trust, WISeKey provides secure authentication and identification for IoT, Blockchain, and AI applications. The WISeKey Root of Trust ensures the integrity of online transactions between objects and people. For more information on WISeKey’s strategic direction and its subsidiary companies, please visit www.wisekey.com.

    Disclaimer
    This communication expressly or implicitly contains certain forward-looking statements concerning WISeKey International Holding Ltd and its business. Such statements involve certain known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors, which could cause the actual results, financial condition, performance or achievements of WISeKey International Holding Ltd to be materially different from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. WISeKey International Holding Ltd is providing this communication as of this date and does not undertake to update any forward-looking statements contained herein as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    This press release does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities, and it does not constitute an offering prospectus within the meaning of the Swiss Financial Services Act (“FinSA”), the FinSa’s predecessor legislation or advertising within the meaning of the FinSA. Investors must rely on their own evaluation of WISeKey and its securities, including the merits and risks involved. Nothing contained herein is, or shall be relied on as, a promise or representation as to the future performance of WISeKey.

    Press and Investor Contacts

    WISeKey International Holding Ltd
    Company Contact: Carlos Moreira
    Chairman & CEO
    Tel: +41 22 594 3000
    info@wisekey.com     		 WISeKey Investor Relations (US) 
    The Equity Group Inc.
    Lena Cati
    Tel: +1 212 836-9611
    lcati@equityny.com

    The MIL Network –

    April 3, 2025
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