Category: terrorism

  • MIL-OSI Russia: NSU took 7th place in the ranking of the best universities in Russia in terms of salaries of IT specialists

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Novosibirsk State University – Novosibirsk State University –

    Portal Superjob published a rating of the best Russian universities by the salary level of IT specialists who graduated from the university in 2019-2024. Novosibirsk State University took 7th place, it comes right after the universities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Two more universities are in the same position – Kazan Federal University and National University of Science and Technology “MISIS”. The average income of NSU graduates working in the IT sector was 230 thousand rubles, an increase of 30 thousand rubles compared to last year.

    At NSU, the IT direction is one of the key ones: for example, if you look at the distribution of budget places based on the results of the 2024 admission campaign, more than 20% are in IT. NSU has a specialized Faculty of Information Technology, which turns 25 this year, at the same time IT is represented in almost all faculties and in all institutes. The Mechanics and Mathematics Faculty has a program in systems programming, the Physics Faculty has a program in physical informatics, and the Humanities Institute has a program in fundamental and applied linguistics.

    Machine learning and artificial intelligence have also been actively developing at NSU in recent years. At the end of April this year, the university won a government grant to train top IT specialists and is launching a new bachelor’s degree program in Applied Artificial Intelligence from September 2025. It will be developed in cooperation with industrial partners Rostelecom and Innotech (T1). The pilot enrollment will be 150 students. Grant support will allow students to study for free and receive scholarships from partner companies.

     

    About the rating methodology

    The rating was prepared by the SuperJob research center based on an analysis of the average salaries of graduates of Russian universities graduating in 2019–2024. The source of information is the SuperJob resume database (more than 30 million resumes) and other open sources. The data collection period is 2 months before the rating release date. The sample for each university participating in the rating is at least 70 resumes of graduates of specialized faculties of the specified graduation years, excluding resumes of interns, junior specialists, and applicants with less than 1 year of work experience in their specialty. Resumes for positions in the fields of development, information security, software testing, DevOps, analytics, data research, Machine Learning, Data engineering, etc. are considered.

     

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Pakistani National Extradited to Face Charges in Connection with Plot to Carry Out ISIS-Inspired Mass Shooting at Jewish Center in New York City

    Source: US State of California

    A Pakistani citizen residing in Canada, Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, 20, also known as Shahzeb Jadoon, was extradited to the United States on June 10, in connection with an indictment filed in the Southern District of New York. Khan was charged with attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO), the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and attempting to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. Khan is scheduled to make an initial appearance in court on June 11.

    “The foreign terrorist organization ISIS remains a clear and present danger to the American people, and our Jewish citizens are especially targeted by evil groups like these,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “The Department of Justice is proud to help secure this extradition, and we will prosecute this man to the fullest extent of the law.”

    “Khan allegedly tried to enter the United States to commit an attack on the Jewish community in New York City, planning an ISIS-inspired mass shooting around the one-year anniversary of the attack on Gaza by Hamas,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Thankfully, the great work of the FBI and our partners shut that down, and Khan has now been extradited to New York to face American justice. I want to thank our teams and partners for their diligent work in this case and executing the mission.”

    “As alleged, Muhammad Shahzeb Khan attempted to enter the United States to carry out a deadly terrorist attack on a Jewish center in New York City,” said U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton for the Southern District of New York. “He planned to use automatic weapons to kill as many members of our Jewish community as possible, all in support of ISIS. Khan’s deadly, antisemitic plan was thwarted by the diligent work of our law enforcement partners and the career prosecutors in this Office who are committed to rooting out antisemitism and stopping terror. Thanks to their efforts, Khan will now face justice in New York.”

    Khan was provisionally arrested in Canada on Sept. 4, 2024 based on a complaint filed in the Southern District of New York. As alleged in the complaint, Khan, who resided in Canada, attempted to travel from Canada to New York City, where he intended to use automatic and semi-automatic weapons to carry out a mass shooting in support of ISIS at a Jewish center in Brooklyn, New York. Khan began posting on social media and communicating with others on an encrypted messaging application about his support for ISIS in or about November 2023, when, among other things, Khan distributed ISIS propaganda videos and literature. Subsequently, Khan began communicating with two undercover law enforcement officers (collectively, the UCs).

    During those conversations, Khan confirmed that he and a U.S.-based ISIS supporter (Associate-1) had been planning to carry out an attack in a particular U.S. city (City-1). Among other things, Khan said that he had been actively attempting to create “a real offline cell” of ISIS supporters to carry out a “coordinated assault” in City-1 using AR-style rifles to “target[] Israeli Jewish chabads . . . scattered all around [City-1].” During subsequent conversations, Khan repeatedly instructed the UCs to obtain AR-style assault rifles, ammunition, and other materials to carry out the attacks, and identified the specific locations in City-1 where the attacks would take place. Khan also provided details about how he would cross the border from Canada into the United States to conduct the attacks. During these conversations with the UCs, Khan emphasized that “Oct 7th and oct 11th are the best days for targeting the jews” because “oct 7 they will surely have some protests and oct 11 is yom.kippur.”

    On or about Aug. 20, Khan changed his target location from City-1 to New York City. After initially suggesting certain neighborhoods in New York City to the UCs, Khan decided to target Location-1, a Jewish center located in Brooklyn, New York. Khan told the UCs that he planned to carry out this attack on or around Oct. 7, 2024 — which Khan recognized as the one-year anniversary of the brutal terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas, a designated FTO, which, on Oct. 7, 2023, launched a wave of violent, large-scale terrorist attacks in Israel. In support of his choice of New York City as his target location, Khan boasted that “New york is perfect to target jews” because it has the “largest Jewish population In america” and therefore, “even if we dont attack a[n] Event[,] we could rack up easily a lot of jews.” Khan proclaimed that “we are going to nyc to slaughter them,” and sent a photograph of the specific area inside of Location-1 where he planned to carry out the attack.

    Thereafter, Khan continued to urge the UCs to acquire AR-style rifles, ammunition, and other equipment for his attack, including “some good hunting [knives] so we can slit their throats.” Khan repeatedly reiterated his desire to carry out the attack in support of ISIS, and discussed planning for the attack, including by identifying rental properties close to Location-1 and paying for a human smuggler to help him reach and cross the border from Canada into the United States. During one communication, Khan noted that “if we succeed with our plan this would be the largest Attack on US soil since 9/11.”

    On or about Sept. 4, as Khan said he planned to do in connection with his attack, Khan attempted to reach the U.S-Canada border. To do so, Khan used three separate cars to travel across Canada towards the United States, before he was stopped by Canadian authorities in or around Ormstown, Canada, approximately 12 miles from the U.S.-Canada border.

    Khan is charged with one count of attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization and one count of attempting to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. If convicted, he faces a maximum sentence of life in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The FBI’s New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles Field Offices are investigating the case. The Justice Department is grateful to Canadian law enforcement for their actions in this matter. The Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division accomplished the extradition of Khan from Canada.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kaylan E. Lasky and David J. Robles for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorney Kevin C. Nunnally of the Justice Department’s National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A complaint or an indictment merely contain allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Duckworth, Durbin Join Van Hollen, Klobuchar and Colleagues in Pressing Administration for Answers on Cancelled Protected Status for Afghans Living in U.S.

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Tammy Duckworth
    June 10, 2025
    Decision could endanger thousands of Afghans, including many who supported U.S. efforts during the war in Afghanistan
    [WASHINGTON, D.C.] – U.S. Senator Tammy Duckworth (D-IL) and U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL) joined U.S. Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-MD) and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) and U.S. Representative Glenn Ivey (D-MD-04) in leading 96 of their colleagues in pressing for answers from the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State around the decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghan nationals living in the United States. The lawmakers’ letter, sent to Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, notes the devastating impact of this decision, including on the many Afghans who supported the U.S. military during the war in Afghanistan and who face significant danger upon their return.
    “We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions,” the lawmakers wrote.
    They go on to note, “The Secretary of Homeland Security ‘may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.’  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.”
    “The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls,” they stress.
    The lawmakers close the letter urging the Administration to reverse course and seeking the following information:
    Any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023. 
    Details on how the Administration made the determination that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security” and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.
    A description the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS.
    Any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan.
    The steps being taken to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan
    Duckworth has been an outspoken leader in calling for the protection of our Afghan allies who’ve aided the United States during the war in Afghanistan. During July of 2021, after learning of and encountering problems with the efficiency of employment verification for applicants in the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, Duckworth wrote to Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin asking them to take immediate action to fix the problem. By the fall, DoD responded to Duckworth’s request to confirm they have taken steps to in line with her suggestions to improve the process through Project Rabbit, a program designed to simplify the employment verification process for Afghan employees who have applied for a SIV.
    In addition to Duckworth and Durbin, U.S. Senators Van Hollen (D-MD), Klobuchar (D-MN) and U.S. Representative Ivey (D-MD-04), the letter was signed by U.S. Senators Alsobrooks (D-MD), Baldwin (D-WI), Blumenthal (D-CT), Booker (D-NJ), Coons (D-DE), Cortez Masto (D-NV), Fetterman (D-PA), Gillibrand (D-NY), Heinrich (D-NM), Hirono (D-HI), Kaine (D-VA), Kelly (D-AZ), Kim (D-NJ), King (I-ME), Markey (D-MA), Padilla (D-CA), Reed (D-RI), Rosen (D-NV), Sanders (I-VT), Schiff (D-CA), Smith (D-MN), Warner (D-VA), Warnock (D-GA), Welch (D-VT) and Wyden (D-OR) and U.S. Representatives Gabe Amo (D-RI-01), Ansari (D-AZ-03), Balint (D-VT-At-Large), Bell (D-MO-01), Beyer (D-VA-08), Budzinski (D-IL-13), Carbajal (D-CA-24), Carter (D-LA-07), Casten (D-IL-06), Castro (D-TX-20), Chu (D-CA-28), Clarke (D-NY-09), Cleaver (D-MO-05), Courtney (D-CT-02), Dean (D-PA-04), DeGette (D-CO-01), DelBene (D-WA-01), Elfreth (D-MD-03), Evans (D-PA-03), Fields (D-LA-06), Garcia (D-CA-42), García (D-IL-04), Garcia (D-TX-29), Goldman (D-NY-10), Gomez (D-CA-34), Gonzalez (D-TX-34), Gottheimer (D-NJ-05), Hayes (D-CT-05), Jackson (D-IL-01), Jayapal (D-WA-07), Johnson (D-GA-04), Johnson (D-TX-32), Kaptur (D-OH-09), Keating (D-MA-09, Kelly (D-IL-02), Kennedy (D-NY-26), Krishnamoorthi (D-IL-08), Landsman (D-OH-01), Larson (D-CT-01), Latimer (D-NY-16), Levin (D-CA-49), Lieu (D-CA-36), Lofgren (D-CA-18), Lynch (D-MA-08), McClain Delaney (D-MD-06), McClellan (D-VA-04), McCollum (D-MN-04), McGovern (D-MA-02), Meeks (D-NY-05), Mfume (D-MD-07), Moulton (D-MA-06), Norton (D-DC-At-Large), Olszewski (D-MD-02), Pallone (D-NJ-06), Panetta (D-CA-19), Peters (D-CA-50), Raskin (D-MD-08), Sánchez (D-CA-38), Scanlon (D-PA-05), Schakowsky (D-IL-09), Sherman (D-CA-32), Sorensen (D-IL-17), Subramanyam (D-VA-10), Swalwell (D-CA-14), Titus (D-NV-01), Tlaib (D-MI-12), Tokuda (D-HI-02), Tonko (D-NY-20), Vargas (D-CA-52), Veasey (D-TX-33) and Watson Coleman (D-NJ-12).
    The full text of the letter is available on Senator Duckworth’s website and below.
    Dear Secretary Noem and Secretary Rubio:
    We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions.
    The Secretary of Homeland Security “may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.” This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS. In September 2023, the U.S. extended and redesignated TPS for Afghanistan. The Administration’s decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan negatively impacts approximately 9,000 Afghan nationals.
    In your announcement, you state that “there are notable improvements in the security and economic situation such that requiring the return of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan does not pose a threat to their personal safety due to armed conflict or extraordinary and temporary conditions.” But you also concede that threats of violence and terrorism, as well as humanitarian concerns, remain. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), continues to launch attacks against ethnic and religious minorities and against the Taliban, leading to innocent civilian casualties. If Afghan nationals are forced to return to Afghanistan, they will be caught in the crossfire between the Taliban and ISKP. According to Human Rights Watch, in 2024, Taliban authorities intensified their crackdown on human rights, especially against women and girls. Women and girls are banned from attending secondary school or university and are unable to move freely. The Taliban also continues to detain and torture journalists, curtailing free speech and media. The 2023 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report covering Afghanistan found that women’s rights rapidly declined and restrictions on freedom of expression increased. The horrific human rights conditions in Afghanistan are unsafe for Afghan nationals to return to and returning would put their personal safety at immediate risk.
    We are also deeply concerned about the State Department Human Rights Report finding that widespread arbitrary and unlawful killings against officials associated with the pre-August 2021 government have occurred. Afghan nationals who assisted the U.S. military should not be put in harm’s way because they supported the U.S. in its fight against the Taliban. This would be a betrayal of those who bravely served alongside our servicemembers for nearly two decades.
    Afghan civilians still face devastating humanitarian and economic conditions. Over half of the population in Afghanistan needs urgent humanitarian assistance. Human Rights Watch reports that in 2024, 12.4 million people were facing food insecurity and 2.9 million were at emergency levels of hunger. The World Bank also found that in Afghanistan, as of May 2025, “per capita income has stagnated, while poverty and food insecurity remain pressing challenges, exacerbated by high unemployment and restrictions on women’s economic participation.” 
    The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls.
    In August 2021, Americans welcomed Afghan nationals at Washington Dulles International Airport in Virginia with open arms, and we refuse to turn our backs on them now. We strongly urge you to reconsider your decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan and ask that you respond to the following requests no later than two weeks of receipt of this letter:
    Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023.
    The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.
    Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS.
    Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan.
    What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan?
    Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter and we hope to receive your responses soon.
    Sincerely,
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Pakistani National Extradited to Face Charges in Connection with Plot to Carry Out ISIS-Inspired Mass Shooting at Jewish Center in New York City

    Source: United States Attorneys General 11

    A Pakistani citizen residing in Canada, Muhammad Shahzeb Khan, 20, also known as Shahzeb Jadoon, was extradited to the United States on June 10, in connection with an indictment filed in the Southern District of New York. Khan was charged with attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO), the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and attempting to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. Khan is scheduled to make an initial appearance in court on June 11.

    “The foreign terrorist organization ISIS remains a clear and present danger to the American people, and our Jewish citizens are especially targeted by evil groups like these,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “The Department of Justice is proud to help secure this extradition, and we will prosecute this man to the fullest extent of the law.”

    “Khan allegedly tried to enter the United States to commit an attack on the Jewish community in New York City, planning an ISIS-inspired mass shooting around the one-year anniversary of the attack on Gaza by Hamas,” said FBI Director Kash Patel. “Thankfully, the great work of the FBI and our partners shut that down, and Khan has now been extradited to New York to face American justice. I want to thank our teams and partners for their diligent work in this case and executing the mission.”

    “As alleged, Muhammad Shahzeb Khan attempted to enter the United States to carry out a deadly terrorist attack on a Jewish center in New York City,” said U.S. Attorney Jay Clayton for the Southern District of New York. “He planned to use automatic weapons to kill as many members of our Jewish community as possible, all in support of ISIS. Khan’s deadly, antisemitic plan was thwarted by the diligent work of our law enforcement partners and the career prosecutors in this Office who are committed to rooting out antisemitism and stopping terror. Thanks to their efforts, Khan will now face justice in New York.”

    Khan was provisionally arrested in Canada on Sept. 4, 2024 based on a complaint filed in the Southern District of New York. As alleged in the complaint, Khan, who resided in Canada, attempted to travel from Canada to New York City, where he intended to use automatic and semi-automatic weapons to carry out a mass shooting in support of ISIS at a Jewish center in Brooklyn, New York. Khan began posting on social media and communicating with others on an encrypted messaging application about his support for ISIS in or about November 2023, when, among other things, Khan distributed ISIS propaganda videos and literature. Subsequently, Khan began communicating with two undercover law enforcement officers (collectively, the UCs).

    During those conversations, Khan confirmed that he and a U.S.-based ISIS supporter (Associate-1) had been planning to carry out an attack in a particular U.S. city (City-1). Among other things, Khan said that he had been actively attempting to create “a real offline cell” of ISIS supporters to carry out a “coordinated assault” in City-1 using AR-style rifles to “target[] Israeli Jewish chabads . . . scattered all around [City-1].” During subsequent conversations, Khan repeatedly instructed the UCs to obtain AR-style assault rifles, ammunition, and other materials to carry out the attacks, and identified the specific locations in City-1 where the attacks would take place. Khan also provided details about how he would cross the border from Canada into the United States to conduct the attacks. During these conversations with the UCs, Khan emphasized that “Oct 7th and oct 11th are the best days for targeting the jews” because “oct 7 they will surely have some protests and oct 11 is yom.kippur.”

    On or about Aug. 20, Khan changed his target location from City-1 to New York City. After initially suggesting certain neighborhoods in New York City to the UCs, Khan decided to target Location-1, a Jewish center located in Brooklyn, New York. Khan told the UCs that he planned to carry out this attack on or around Oct. 7, 2024 — which Khan recognized as the one-year anniversary of the brutal terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas, a designated FTO, which, on Oct. 7, 2023, launched a wave of violent, large-scale terrorist attacks in Israel. In support of his choice of New York City as his target location, Khan boasted that “New york is perfect to target jews” because it has the “largest Jewish population In america” and therefore, “even if we dont attack a[n] Event[,] we could rack up easily a lot of jews.” Khan proclaimed that “we are going to nyc to slaughter them,” and sent a photograph of the specific area inside of Location-1 where he planned to carry out the attack.

    Thereafter, Khan continued to urge the UCs to acquire AR-style rifles, ammunition, and other equipment for his attack, including “some good hunting [knives] so we can slit their throats.” Khan repeatedly reiterated his desire to carry out the attack in support of ISIS, and discussed planning for the attack, including by identifying rental properties close to Location-1 and paying for a human smuggler to help him reach and cross the border from Canada into the United States. During one communication, Khan noted that “if we succeed with our plan this would be the largest Attack on US soil since 9/11.”

    On or about Sept. 4, as Khan said he planned to do in connection with his attack, Khan attempted to reach the U.S-Canada border. To do so, Khan used three separate cars to travel across Canada towards the United States, before he was stopped by Canadian authorities in or around Ormstown, Canada, approximately 12 miles from the U.S.-Canada border.

    Khan is charged with one count of attempting to provide material support and resources to a designated foreign terrorist organization and one count of attempting to commit acts of terrorism transcending national boundaries. If convicted, he faces a maximum sentence of life in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The FBI’s New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles Field Offices are investigating the case. The Justice Department is grateful to Canadian law enforcement for their actions in this matter. The Office of International Affairs of the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division accomplished the extradition of Khan from Canada.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Kaylan E. Lasky and David J. Robles for the Southern District of New York and Trial Attorney Kevin C. Nunnally of the Justice Department’s National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A complaint or an indictment merely contain allegations. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: PKK’s decision to disband shows the benefit of engaging in politics rather than an armed struggle

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Rebecca Lucas, Senior Analyst – Defence Economics and Acquisition, RAND Europe

    The recent decision by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to disarm and disband has important lessons for any country facing a seemingly intractable insurgency. On May 12, the group stated that following its 12th Congress it will “dissolve the PKK’s organizational structure and end the armed struggle method”. The organisation has said that it will now pursue its goals “through democratic politics”.

    The PKK’s decision follows talks between the Turkish government and the group’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in Turkish custody since 1998. Regional dynamics, Turkish domestic politics, and personal ambition have all played key roles in bringing the conflict to this point.

    Much uncertainty remains. The PKK and Turkey have embarked on peace processes before, only to return to conflict. But the group’s formal announcement of its intention to disband marks an important step towards ending an insurgency that has lasted over 40 years. If so, it will bring to an end a conflict that has cost all sides involved tens of thousands of lives.

    The possibility of ending this insurgency not only raises questions about this specific conflict, but also what we know more broadly about how insurgencies end.


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    The PKK has a long track record of combining military action with political struggle. As with many other insurgent organisations, the group has worked to gain and maintain public support among ethnic Kurds, despite its use of violence.

    Its strategy has also evolved over the years to adapt to circumstances. It moved away from the its original Marxist beginnings with the end of the cold war and over the years changed its fundamental aim from separatism to increased regional autonomy and local government, through the system of what it calls democratic confederalism. Over the decades the group and its affiliates have also decreased their use of terrorism in Europe and western Turkey.

    This is in keeping with characteristics that researchers have found facilitate the transformation of organisations from armed groups to participants in institutional politics. There are a large number of cases in which insurgencies or terrorist organisations shifted – successfully or unsuccessfully – to either transform into a political party or combine with one.

    There’s no doubt that military pressure has been important in downgrading the PKK as an insurgency. But military victories over the PKK have failed to end the conflict – in fact military oppression against the PKK has often backfired and reinforced public support for the group.

    Many of the factors that have made it possible for the PKK to transform itself have been political, rather than narrowly military. Research by the RAND Corporation thinktank has found that rather than simply aiming to defeat an insurgency, it’s usually more effective to combine military pressure with political reform that aims to remove the reasons for the insurgency.

    Combining armed force with political pressure

    Turkey has taken this mixed approach, something many analysts have attributed to the foreign minister, Hakan Fidan. Ankara has pursued parallel tracks of negotiation and force. This has included improved counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency techniques, investment in drones and other military pressure.

    But Ankara has in parallel cut off financial flows to the organisation, while strengthening economic opportunities for Kurdish citizens – particularly in western Turkey. Many Kurds moved west to escape violence in the traditionally Kurdish regions in Turkey’s southeast: Istanbul is now the city with the largest Kurdish population in Turkey.

    The Turkish government has also strengthened its relationships with other Kurdish groups, primarily the Kurdistan Democratic Party in northern Iraq, to provide both military and political support.

    This case is another example of the importance of blending strictly military tactics with diplomacy, economic policy and strategic communications. The celebrated Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz said that war is politics by other means – and many insurgencies are fundamentally political in nature. So this requires multiple lines of effort to be pursued in parallel to effectively respond to this – with an emphasis on political solutions rather than just the use of force.

    This has been seen in conflicts with a number of insurgent groups in recent years – including the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Farc) or the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (Biaf) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines. In all of these cases, central governments have engaged in constructive political dialogue, providing amnesty and other incentives for fighters to demobilise while offering broader concessions in order to build a more sustainable peace.

    Successfully bringing insurgencies to and through a negotiated settlement requires long-term investment and effort. The issues that caused the insurgency in the first place do not simply disappear when the document is signed. In the case of the PKK, there are a number of ways in which this recent progress could be reversed. Concerns have been raised about whether the Turkish government will deliver on promised constitutional reforms or prisoner releases. There is also the question of whether PKK fighters will be willing and able to demobilise and reintegrate into society.

    Research has indicated that states with flawed democracies have more difficulty ending insurgencies on favourable terms. Freedom House and similar organisations currently rank Turkey as “Not Free”. The country has been backsliding for years under the presidency of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

    Despite these misgivings, the initial success of Turkey’s approach support previous research on how insurgencies end, and how armed groups might turn instead to politics. For the governments of countries facing insurgency, it means taking a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach to encourage this to happen. Governments may also need to move away from a binary definition of “winning” or “losing” to a more nuanced understanding of how all parties stand to gain from the end of an insurgency.

    Rebecca Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. PKK’s decision to disband shows the benefit of engaging in politics rather than an armed struggle – https://theconversation.com/pkks-decision-to-disband-shows-the-benefit-of-engaging-in-politics-rather-than-an-armed-struggle-258221

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • Don’t think it as conflict between India and Pakistan, it is India vs ‘Terroristan’: EAM Jaishankar

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Reiterating that India will not give in to any kind of nuclear blackmail, External Affairs Minister (EAM) S. Jaishankar on Tuesday reaffirmed that the country strongly believes in zero tolerance for terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

    “This is not a conflict between two states per se. This is actually a response to the threat and to the practice of terrorism. So, I would urge you to don’t think of it as India-Pakistan, think of it as India and ‘Terroristan’, you would then appreciate,” Jaishankar said while addressing a joint press conference with European Union High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission Kaja Kallas in Brussels.

    Asserting that terrorism is a shared and interconnected challenge for the global community, the EAM mentioned that it is imperative that there must be strong international cooperation and understanding on the matter.

    EAM Jaishankar and Kallas were addressing the media after holding the first strategic dialogue between India and the European Union where both sides held an open and productive meeting with discussions focused on defence and security – including maritime, cyber and space.

    “Nuclear threats cannot pay off. This is a mutual concern. We see different actors in the world using it. In this global changing world, we need more partners, and therefore we are working to intensify our cooperation regarding security and defence,” Kallas stated.

    EAM Jaishankar highlighted that both sides exchanged views on global order, including the situation in Europe, the Ukraine conflict, the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and Indo-Pacific.

    “My visit to Brussels is taking place three months after that of the EU College of Commissioners to India. Even in that time, it was apparent that the world order was in the midst of a profound change. These trends have intensified in many ways. We have entered an era of multipolarity and strategic autonomy, which are two important forces for India and the EU to forge deeper ties. Working towards that goal requires intensified cooperation in many domains,” he stated

    “There will be situations when our perspectives will not be entirely identical and which is understandable. But what is important is that we expand common ground and understanding and enhance levels of trust,” he added.

    Jaishankar also mentioned that India aims to conclude the ambitious India-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA) by the end of the year.

    “Stabilising and de-risking the international economy today is a strategic priority for us. This has many dimensions, including more resilient and reliable supply chains as well as increasing trust and transparency in digital interactions. Creating stronger economic and technology partnerships between major players acquires greater value. It is with that perspective that we support the goal of concluding an ambitious and balanced India-EU FTA by the end of this year,” the EAM remarked.

    (IANS)

  • India’s security apparatus transformed under Modi government: Rajnath Singh

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Defence Minister Rajnath Singh on Tuesday addressing a dialogue on “National Security & Terrorism” in Dehradun, asserted that the Indian government under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has fundamentally transformed the nation’s security approach over the past 11 years. Citing Operation Sindoor as a watershed moment, Singh described it as the biggest counter-terror operation in India’s history, conducted in retaliation to the recent terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu & Kashmir.

    Calling the Pahalgam incident a direct assault on India’s social unity, Singh said the government responded decisively by eliminating terrorist bases in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). “Post the abrogation of Article 370, Jammu & Kashmir has entered an era of peace and development. Our adversaries could not digest this progress and resorted to terrorism,” he said. The Defence Minister further added that the Udhampur-Srinagar-Baramulla railway line symbolizes this developmental push, confidently asserting, “Soon, PoK will say, ‘I too am Bharat’.”

    In a strong message to the global community, Singh urged nations to exert strategic, diplomatic, and economic pressure on Pakistan, which he labelled the “Father of Global Terrorism.” “Pakistan has become a nursery for terrorists, training and sheltering them while seeking to justify terrorism on ideological or religious grounds,” he stated. He criticized the recent United Nations Security Council decision to name Pakistan as Vice-Chair of its Counter-Terrorism Panel, describing it as “shocking and contradictory,” especially given Pakistan’s track record of harbouring terrorists like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar.

    “Funding Pakistan is akin to funding terror,” Singh declared, calling for a halt to international financial aid that could be misused for nurturing terrorism.

    Highlighting the indigenous strength of India’s military, Singh noted that Made-in-India weapons and platforms were used in Operation Sindoor. “India is no longer solely dependent on foreign defence equipment,” he said, crediting the government’s focus on indigenisation. The Defence Minister revealed that India’s defence production has surged from ₹40,000 crore in 2014 to ₹1.3 lakh crore in 2024-25, with exports reaching a record ₹23,622 crore. Targets for this year have been set at ₹1.75 lakh crore in production and ₹30,000 crore in exports, with an ambitious long-term goal of ₹3 lakh crore production and ₹50,000 crore in exports by 2029.

    He also highlighted the issuance of 10 Positive Indigenisation Lists, containing over 5,500 items aimed at promoting domestic defence manufacturing.

    Singh warned of the growing threat posed by information warfare, citing Pakistan’s attempts to disrupt Indian morale through fake news and manipulated content** during Operation Sindoor. He urged citizens to become “social soldiers” by combating misinformation and being vigilant in cyberspace. “Cybersecurity is not just a government concern—it’s a national responsibility,” he said.

    He also called on the media to prioritize accuracy over speed, noting that journalism has a crucial role in national security. “In today’s age, journalism is not just a profession but a national duty,” Singh remarked, encouraging responsible and fact-based reporting.

    Rajnath Singh appealed the international community and global organisations, including the United Nations, to take terrorism seriously and act decisively. “Only when the world is free from terrorism can we truly move toward global peace, prosperity, and progress,” he said.

     

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Syria—IMF Staff Concludes Staff Visit to Damascus

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 10, 2025

    End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. This mission will not result in a Board discussion.

    • An IMF staff team visited Syria for the first time since 2009, to assess the economic and financial conditions in Syria and discuss with the authorities their economic policy and capacity building priorities to support the recovery of the Syrian economy.
    • Amidst enormous challenges, the Syrian authorities are determined to rehabilitate Syria’s economy. In the near term, it is critical to restore public confidence and macro-economic stability through the pursuit of sound fiscal and monetary policies and create conditions for the private sector to lead Syria’s development and growth.
    • Syria will need substantial international assistance to support the authorities’ efforts to rehabilitate the economy, meet urgent humanitarian needs, and rebuild essential institutions and infrastructure. This not only includes concessional financial support, but also extensive capacity development assistance.

    Damascus, Syria: A staff team from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), led by Ron van Rooden, visited Damascus from June 1–5, 2025, to assess the economic and financial conditions in the country, discuss the authorities’ policy priorities, and develop a roadmap for capacity building to assist the formulation and implementation of economic policies. At the conclusion of the mission, Mr. van Rooden issued the following statement:

    Syria faces enormous challenges following years of conflict that caused immense human suffering and reduced its economy to a fraction of its former size. Some six million people fled the country, mostly to neighboring countries, and an additional seven million were displaced internally. Output has plummeted, real incomes have fallen sharply, and poverty rates are high. State institutions have been weakened, the delivery of basic services has been disrupted, and large parts of the country’s infrastructure have been damaged or destroyed. Humanitarian and reconstruction needs are very large. There is great urgency to address these challenges and achieve a sustainable economic recovery, including to absorb the increasing number of returning refugees.

    The authorities are keen to restore economic growth and improve people’s living standards, and they intend to pursue sound economic policies. In this regard, the mission’s discussions focused on near-term policy and institution building priorities, including: (i) adopting a budget for the remainder of 2025, identifying available domestic and external resources and ensuring that priority spending needs are met, including the government payroll, basic health and education services, and assistance to the most vulnerable segments of the population; (ii) improving revenue mobilization, by modernizing the tax and customs regime, and by strengthening tax and custom administration, bringing both under the purview of the finance ministry; (iii) strengthening public financial management to improve budget execution and monitoring; (iv) empowering the central bank to ensure price stability and restore confidence in the national currency and adopting a monetary policy framework suited to achieve this; (v) rehabilitating the payment and banking systems, while enhancing the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, to improve transaction efficiency, rebuild confidence in banks and restart financial intermediation, and allow reconnection with the international financial system; (vi) addressing immediate obstacles to market-based private sector development and improving the investment climate; and (vii) enhancing data collection, processing and dissemination, separate from economic planning, to ensure adequate data to support policy formulation and assessment.

    The authorities will need strong international support for their efforts. This includes financial support at highly concessional terms—given Syria’s financing and external sustainability constraints—and extensive capacity development assistance to strengthen economic institutions and upgrade outdated technologies and systems. While the years of conflict and displacement have weakened administrative capacity, staff at the finance ministry and central bank demonstrated strong commitment and solid understanding.

    “The mission reaffirmed the IMF’s commitment to supporting Syria in these efforts. Based on the findings of the mission, IMF staff is developing a detailed roadmap for policy and capacity building priorities for key economic institutions, notably the finance ministry, central bank, and statistics agency. Staff will coordinate closely with other development partners in formulating this roadmap and ensuring effective support to the Syrian authorities, also considering constraints in absorptive capacity.     

    “The staff team is grateful to the authorities for the candid and constructive discussions, and for their warm hospitality during this mission, the first in 16 years. The team met with Minister of Finance Yisr Barnieh, Governor of the Central Bank of Syria Abdulkader Husrieh, other senior officials, and representatives of the private sector and state-owned banks.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/10/pr-25188-syria-imf-staff-concludes-staff-visit-to-damascus

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Monroe Michigan Man Arrested for Calling-In Hoax Bomb Threat for a Flight at Detroit Metro Airport

    Source: US FBI

    DETROIT – A Monroe, Michigan, resident was arrested on a criminal complaint for calling Spirit Airlines and reporting a fake bomb threat for a flight departing from Detroit Metropolitan Airport yesterday, announced United States Attorney Jerome F. Gorgon, Jr.

    Gorgon was joined in the announcement by Special Agent in Charge Cheyvoryea Gibson, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Detroit Division.

    Charged was John Charles Robinson, 23.

    According to the affidavit, on June 5, 2025, at approximately 6:25 am, an individual later identified as Robinson, used a cellphone to call into Spirit Airlines and conveyed false information about a bomb threat to Flight 2145 departing from Detroit Metro bound for Los Angeles. During the call, Robinson stated in part, “I was calling about 2145… because I have information about that flight,” and “there’s gonna be someone who’s gonna try to blow up the airport,” and “there’s gonna be someone that’s gonna try to blow up that flight, 2145.”  After giving a description of an individual, he then stated: “they’re going to be carrying a bomb through the TSA,” and “they’re still threatening to do it, they’re still attempted to do it, they said it’s not going to be able to be detected.  Please don’t let that flight board.”  The flight was immediately canceled, and the flight’s passengers and crew were deplaned. Bomb sniffing dogs and FBI agents were deployed to sweep the airplane. No bomb or explosives were found.

    Agents soon learned that Robinson was booked on Flight 2145 but missed the flight and was told at the gate that he needed to rebook.  FBI agents subsequently arrested Robinson when he returned to the airport to depart on another flight bound for Los Angeles.

    U.S. Attorney Gorgon said, “No American wants to hear the words ‘bomb’ and ‘airplane’ in the same sentence. Making this kind of threat undermines our collective sense of security and wastes valuable law enforcement resources.”

    “Anyone who threatens to bomb an aircraft and endanger public safety will be swiftly investigated and brought to justice,” said Cheyvoryea Gibson, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI Detroit Field Office. “The alleged bomb threat prompted a coordinated response by our FBI Detroit Joint Terrorism Task Force, in partnership with the Wayne County Airport Authority Police Department and the U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service, leading to the arrest of John Robinson as he attempted to board another flight at Detroit Metropolitan Airport. We remain committed to protecting the public and confronting those who seek to spread fear in our communities.”

    Robinson appeared in federal court in Detroit this afternoon and was released on bond.  His next court appearance will be June 27 for a preliminary examination.

    The charges in a complaint are merely allegations. A defendant remains innocent unless and until proven guilty in a court of law.

    This case is being investigated by special agents from the FBI.

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Hank Moon and Douglas Salzenstein are prosecuting the case.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Restoring American Airspace Sovereignty

    US Senate News:

    Source: US Whitehouse
    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered:
    Section 1.  Purpose. Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), otherwise known as drones, offer the potential to enhance public safety as well as cement America’s leadership in global innovation.  But criminals, terrorists, and hostile foreign actors have intensified their weaponization of these technologies, creating new and serious threats to our homeland.  Drug cartels use UAS to smuggle fentanyl across our borders, deliver contraband into prisons, surveil law enforcement, and otherwise endanger the public.  Mass gatherings are vulnerable to disruptions and threats by unauthorized UAS flights.  Critical infrastructure, including military bases, is subject to frequent — and often unidentified — UAS incursions.  Immediate action is needed to ensure American sovereignty over its skies and that its airspace remains safe and secure.
    Sec. 2.  Definitions.  For the purposes of this order:
    (a)  the term “unmanned aircraft systems” or “UAS” has the meaning given in 49 U.S.C. 44801;
    (b)  the term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given in 42 U.S.C. 5195c(e), and includes systems and assets in all of the designated critical infrastructure sectors identified in National Security Memorandum 22 of April 30, 2024 (Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience) (NSM-22); and
    (c)  the term Sector Risk Management Agency or “SRMA” has the same meaning given in 6 U.S.C. 650 and as further described in NSM-22.
    Sec. 3.  Policy.  It is the policy of the United States to ensure control over our national airspace and to protect the public, critical infrastructure, mass gathering events, and military and sensitive government installations and operations from threats posed by the careless or unlawful use of UAS.
    Sec. 4.  Task Force to Restore American Airspace Sovereignty.  To assist in ensuring control over our national airspace, there is hereby established the Federal Task Force to Restore American Airspace Sovereignty (Task Force).  The Task Force shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA) or a designee, and include principals, or their designees, from appropriate executive departments and agencies as identified by the APNSA.  The Task Force shall review relevant operational, technical, and regulatory frameworks and develop and propose solutions to UAS threats, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law, and shall make recommendations on the implementation of all actions identified in this order.
    Sec. 5.  Airspace Regulations to Protect the Public.  The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) shall:
    (a)  with respect to the rulemaking required by section 2209(f) of the FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, as amended:
    (i)   promptly submit a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Task Force establishing the statutorily required process for restricting drone flights over fixed site facilities, and interpreting, to the extent appropriate, critical infrastructure consistent with the definition of that term in this order; and
    (ii)  promulgate a final rule as soon as practicable after publication of the NPRM;
    (b)  make national security and homeland security assessments under section 2209 in coordination with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs), the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Attorney General, as appropriate, and whenever military installations or operations are implicated, with the Secretary of Defense; and
    (c)  within 180 days of the date of this order, make freely available online Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs) in an open format easily accepted for drone geofencing and Aircraft Navigation and Guidance system purposes.  This online availability should supplement, but not replace, existing NOTAMs and TFR promulgation methods.
    Sec. 6.  Enhancing Airspace Sovereignty.  (a)  the Attorney General, in coordination with the Administrator of the FAA, shall take appropriate steps to ensure full enforcement of applicable civil and criminal laws when drone operators endanger the public, violate established airspace restrictions, or operate a drone in furtherance of an element of another crime;
    (b)  on a recurring basis, the Attorney General shall submit to the President, through the APNSA, legislative proposals that would revise criminal penalties for violations of restricted airspace; and
    (c)  within 30 days of the date of this order, and to the extent allowed by law, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall ensure that their respective departments’ grant programs permit otherwise eligible State, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) agencies to receive grants to purchase UAS or equipment or services for the detection, tracking, or identification of drones and drone signals, consistent with the legal authorities of those SLTTs.
    Sec. 7.  Detection, Tracking, and Identification of Drones and Drone Signals.  (a)  To the extent permitted by law and consistent with the Fourth Amendment, executive departments and agencies shall use all available existing authorities to employ equipment to detect, track, and identify drones and drone signals.
    (b)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission shall revise the August 2020 “Advisory on the Application of Federal Laws to the Acquisition and Use of Technology to Detect and Mitigate Unmanned Aircraft Systems” to reflect relevant developments in Federal law and regulations addressing drones.
    (c)  Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Administrator of the FAA shall provide, to the extent permitted by law, including the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a), automated real-time access to personal identifying information associated with UAS remote identification signals to appropriate executive departments and agencies and SLTT agencies for the purposes of enforcing applicable Federal or State law, with appropriate national security and privacy safeguards.
    (d)  Within 60 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Administrator of the FAA, in coordination with the heads of other SRMAs as appropriate, shall publish guidance to aid private critical infrastructure owners or operators in employing technologies to detect, track, and identify drones and drone signals.
    Sec. 8.  Enhancing General Protections.  Within 90 days of the date of this order, the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation, shall submit a recommendation to the President, through the APNSA, using risk-based assessment as defined in 6 U.S.C. 124n(k)(8), on whether the northern and southern land borders; large airports; Federal facilities; critical infrastructure; and military installations, facilities, and assets should be designated as covered facilities or assets under 6 U.S.C. 124n and 10 U.S.C. 130i and whether any changes to law would be necessary relating to such designation.  
    Sec. 9.  Building Counter-UAS Capacity.  (a)  Within 30 days of the date of this order, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall explore integrating counter-UAS operational responses as part of Joint Terrorism Task Forces for the purpose of protecting mass gathering events.
    (b)  The Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Administrator of the FAA; the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director of OMB; and the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, shall promptly take all appropriate steps to implement the recommendations of the March 2022 Feasibility Report to Congress with regard to the creation of the National Training Center for Counter-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Center), and, upon establishment of the Center, focus initial training provided by the Center on development of Federal and SLTT capabilities to secure major upcoming national and international sporting events held in the United States, such as the FIFA World Cup 2026 and the 2028 Summer Olympics.
    Sec. 10.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
    (d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of Transportation.
    DONALD J. TRUMP
    THE WHITE HOUSE,
        June 6, 2025.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restores American Airspace Sovereignty

    US Senate News:

    Source: US Whitehouse
    ENSURING AMERICAN SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS SKIES: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed an Executive Order to ensure American sovereignty over its skies and a safe and secure airspace.
    Unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), otherwise known as drones, pose a growing threat as criminals, terrorists, and hostile foreign actors increasingly weaponize these technologies to endanger public safety and national security. 
    The Order establishes the Federal Task Force to Restore American Airspace Sovereignty to review and propose solutions to UAS threats.
    It directs the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to establish a process to restrict drone flights over critical infrastructure and other public facilities.  
    It instructs the FAA Administrator to make Notices to Airmen and Temporary Flight Restrictions freely available online for drone geofencing and Aircraft Navigation and Guidance system purposes.
    The Order requires the Attorney General and FAA Administrator to increase enforcement of civil and criminal laws against drone operators endangering the public, violating airspace restrictions, or committing a crime.
    It authorizes Federal agencies to use existing authorities to detect, track, and identify drones and drone signals, and enables state, local, tribal, and territorial  law enforcement agencies to access grant programs for similar equipment.
    The Order mandates the publication of guidance to help private critical infrastructure owners and operators employ drone detection technologies.
    It calls for a risk-based assessment to designate borders, large airports, Federal facilities, critical infrastructure, and military installations as protected areas.
    The Order directs the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security to explore integrating counter-UAS operation responses as part of Joint Terrorism Task Forces that are stood up for mass gathering events.
    It also directs the Administration to create a National Training Center for Counter-UAS to build the needed counter-UAS capacity to secure major events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup and 2028 Summer Olympics.  
    ADDRESSING GROWING DRONE THREATS: President Trump is taking decisive action to counter the escalating misuse of drones.
    Criminals, terrorists, and hostile foreign actors have intensified their weaponization of drone technologies, creating new and serious threats to our homeland.
    Drug cartels use drones to smuggle fentanyl across our borders, deliver contraband into prisons, surveil law enforcement, and otherwise endanger the public.
    Mass gatherings are vulnerable to disruptions and threats by unauthorized drone flights.
    Critical infrastructure, including military bases, is subject to frequent—and often unidentified—drone incursions.
    ADVANCING NATIONAL SECURITY: President Trumphas consistently prioritized making America safe and secure. 
    Immediately upon taking office, President Trump fulfilled his promise to address the mysterious drone sightings in New Jersey by clarifying that these were FAA-authorized flights, not a national security threat.
    President Trump has deployed drones to patrol the southern border, strengthening national security through advanced surveillance and monitoring capabilities.
    President Trump has advanced cutting-edge drone technologies through smart, targeted regulation, unlocking economic growth while strengthening safety, security, and innovation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Art dealer jailed for terrorism offence

    Source: United Kingdom London Metropolitan Police

    An art dealer from London has been jailed after an investigation by officers from the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command revealed £140,000 of sales to a suspected financier of the proscribed group Hizballah.

    Oghenochuko Ojiri 53 (05.05.72) of west London, was sentenced at the Old Bailey on Friday, 6 June after he admitted eight counts of failing to make a disclosure during the course of business within the regulated sector, contrary to section 21A of the Terrorism Act 2000.

    Commander Dominic Murphy, head of the Met’s Counter Terrorism Command, said:

    “This prosecution, using specific Terrorism Act legislation, is the first of its kind and should act as a warning to all art dealers that we can, and will, pursue those who knowingly do business with people identified as funders of terrorist groups.

    “Oghenochuko Ojiri wilfully obscured the fact he knew he was selling artwork to Nazem Ahmad, someone who has been sanctioned by the UK and US Treasury and described as a funder of the proscribed terrorist group Hizballah.

    “Financial investigation is a crucial part of the counter-terrorism effort. A team of specialist investigators, analysts and researchers in the National Terrorist Financial Investigation Unit works all year round to prevent money from reaching the hands of terrorists or being used to fund attacks.”

    Ojiri was arrested on 18 April 2023 in Wrexham on the same day the UK Government announced sanctions against Nazem Ahmad, a wealthy art collector, based in Lebanon, suspected of providing funding to Hizballah, a proscribed organisation.

    Officers subsequently obtained a warrant to seize a number of artworks belonging to Ahmad held in two UK-based warehouses.

    The artwork, including a Picasso and Andy Warhol paintings, were seized on 4 May 2023 and the NTFIU obtained a forfeiture order later the same year. The artwork, valued at almost £1 million, is due to be sold and the funds will be reinvested back into the police, CPS and Home Office.

    The Met’s investigation into Ojiri was carried out in partnership with US Homeland Security, which is conducting a wider investigation into alleged money laundering by Ahmad using shell companies.

    Officers from the NTFIU analysed a series of invoices for sales of art by Ojiri and identified that eight purchases were completed with names inserted on the invoices that were not Ahmad’s – despite Ojiri knowing the sale was being conducted for him and on his behalf.

    The art market became regulated in 2019 under Anti-Money Laundering regulations. This brought the art market in line with other regulated sectors such as banking and solicitors. The regulator is HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC).

    People who operate in the art market, like gallery owners, must be registered with the HMRC as an Art Market Participant (AMP), undertake due diligence and report any suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing.

    Detectives from the NTFIU recovered WhatsApp messages on Ojiri’s mobile phone from 31 January 2020, which showed Ojiri discussing the new money laundering regulations with a colleague.

    Analysis of messages and web history on Ojiri’s mobile phone also showed that he was aware of the financial sanctions by the US Treasury against Ahmad due to his suspected involvement in being a high-level financier of Hizballah.

    In police interview, Ojiri apologised for his actions but denied that money or greed were the motivating factors behind dealing with Ahmed, claiming it was the excitement and kudos of dealing with a ‘name’ in the art collecting world.

    Ojiri pleaded guilty to the charges, which relate to a period from October 2020 to December 2021, at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 9 May.

    On Friday, 6 June Ojiri was sentenced to two years and six months’ imprisonment.

    The prosecution, believed to be the first of its kind, followed an investigation by the NTFIU, alongside the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) in HM Treasury, HMRC, and the Met’s Art and Antiques Unit.

    Bethan David, Head of the CPS Counter Terrorism Division, said: “It is clear that Oghenochuko Ojiri was aware of new money laundering regulations in the art world and that he had knowledge of Nazem Ahmad’s background.

    “Ojiri engaged in activity designed to conceal the identity of the true purchaser by changing the details on invoices and storing Mr Ahmad’s name under a different alias in his mobile phone.

    “His motivation appears to be financial along with a broader desire to boost his gallery’s reputation within the art market by dealing with such a well-known collector.

    “This prosecution is believed to be the first of its kind, and the CPS will not hesitate to bring criminal charges against individuals who flout the law in this way.”

    Louise MacDonald, Deputy Director of Economic Crime at HMRC’s Fraud Investigation Service, said:

    “This landmark case clearly shows how government and law enforcement is effectively tackling those who may fund terrorism.

    “As a money laundering supervisor, we know criminals prey on weaknesses. That’s why we work tirelessly with sectors like the art market to ensure they have the defences in place to stop criminals in their tracks.”

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Moran, Fine Push Tougher Penalties for Visa Overstays After Boulder Attack

    Source: Congressman Nathaniel Moran (R-TX-01)

    Congressmen Nathaniel Moran (R-TX-01) and Randy Fine (R-FL-06) reintroduced the Visa Overstays Penalties Act to close dangerous immigration loopholes and hold accountable those who abuse the legal entry system.

    Washington, D.C. — Today, Congressmen Nathaniel Moran (R-TX-01) and Randy Fine (R-FL-06) reintroduced the Visa Overstays Penalties Act to close dangerous immigration loopholes and hold accountable those who abuse the legal entry system.

    “East Texans understand that illegal immigration doesn’t stop at the border,” said Rep. Moran. “Thousands have entered the U.S. legally, only to overstay their visas and remain here unlawfully. This bill reclassifies visa overstays as ‘illegal entry’ and imposes serious penalties to help restore law and order.”

    The legislation would impose up to six months of jail time for first-time offenders and civil fines starting at $500—doubling with each violation. Several 9/11 hijackers overstayed visas, as did Mohamed Sabry Soliman, the suspect in the recent Boulder, Colorado, terror attack.

    “As we all know, the failed policies of the former Biden-Harris Administration turned every state into a border state,” Moran added. “We cannot allow that era of lawlessness to ever return. We must build on President Trump’s historic momentum to secure and protect our border. Visa overstays must carry real consequences—and this legislation delivers on restoring peace and justice.”

    Rep. Randy Fine (R-FL-06) said, “The only place a foreigner should be the day their visa expires is on a plane out of our country. If you’re not, congratulations—you’re now a criminal alien. Being a criminal has consequences, and this bill adds teeth to existing immigration laws to deter and discourage foreign visitors from violating American law. This law makes preventable tragedies like the antisemitic Muslim terrorist attacks in Boulder less likely and makes our communities safer overall. I’m proud to work with Congressman Moran to co-lead this bill, and I’m looking forward to seeing it passed in the House again.”

    “In 2023, Mohamed Soliman overstayed his tourist visa but was never deported; two years later, he launched an antisemitic terrorist attack that maimed 15 innocent American citizens,” said Rep. August Pfluger (R-TX-11), Chairman of the Republican Study Committee. “This man should have never even been in our country—and yet he was, because the Biden Administration refused to enforce our laws. I’m thankful to Congressman Moran for his leadership in reintroducing the Visa Overstays Penalties Act, which will criminalize the act of overstaying a visa and guarantee that terrorists like Soliman are never again able to illegally remain in our country.”

    Background:

    The legislation is being co-led by Congressman Randy Fine (R-FL-06), reinforcing its national importance and broad Republican support.

    The Visa Overstays Penalties Act includes:

    • Reclassification of Visa Overstays: Overstaying a visa for more than 10 days would be classified as “illegal entry,” aligning it with unauthorized border crossings.
    • Criminal Penalties:

    o    First Offense: Up to six months of imprisonment.

    o    Subsequent Offenses: Up to two years of imprisonment.

    • Civil Penalties:

    o    First Violation: Fines ranging from $500 to $1,000.

    o    Repeat Violations: Fines doubling from the initial amount.

    This legislation aims to address security concerns by ensuring that visa overstays are met with the necessary legal consequences, thereby reinforcing the integrity of the U.S. immigration system.

    The Visa Overstays Penalties Act was originally included as part of H.R. 2, the Secure the Border Act of 2023, which passed the United States House of Representatives with a 219-213 vote last Congress.

    ###

    Related Coverage: Exclusive: Reps. Moran, Fine Introduce Visa Overstays Penalties Act in Wake of Boulder, Colorado Terrorist Attack — Breitbart News

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Pfluger Announces Hearing on Rise in Antisemitic, Anti-Israel Terror Attacks on U.S. Soil

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman August Pfluger (TX-11)

    This week, Chairman Pfluger (R-TX) and Chairman Mark E. Green, MD (R-TN) also sent a letter to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Kristi Noem requesting the alien file for the suspect, an Egyptian national named Mohamed Sabry Soliman, which will include information on his expired visa, work authorization, and asylum application.

    HEARING DETAILS:

    What: A Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence hearing entitled, “The Rise of Anti-Israel Extremist Groups and Their Threat to U.S. National Security

    When: Wednesday, June 11,at 10:30 AM EDT

    Where:310 Cannon House Office Building

    Watch: Witness testimony will be added here. The hearing will be livestreamed on YouTube and will be open to the public and press. Press must RSVP in advance.

    WITNESSES:

    Kerry Sleeper

    Deputy Director, Intelligence and Information Sharing, Secure Community Network

    Oren Segal

    Senior Vice President, Counter-Extremism and Intelligence, Anti-Defamation League

    Additional witnesses will be announced and are by invitation only.

    BACKGROUND:

    In 2024, Chairmen Pfluger and Green sent a letter to then-DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director Christopher Wray, requesting information and documents pertaining to any efforts by DHS and the FBI to assist law enforcement and other partners in response to anti-Semitic, pro-Hamas mobs on college campuses.

    In 2023, the Subcommittee held a roundtable on the growing trend of antisemitism on U.S. college campuses in the aftermath of the October 7 attacks against Israel by Hamas terrorists.

    In October 2024, an illegal alien who had been released into the country under the Biden-Harris administration shot and killed a Jewish man on his way to his Chicago Synagogue.

    In February, Chairman Pfluger introduced the “Generative AI Terrorism Risk Assessment Act,” which would require DHS to conduct annual assessments on terrorism threats to the U.S. posed by terrorist organizations, like ISIS and al Qaeda, utilizing generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) applications for terroristic activity. Chairman Pfluger also reintroduced the “Countering Online Radicalization and Terrorism Act,” legislation requiring DHS to conduct annual assessments on terrorism threats posed to the United States by terrorist organizations like ISIS, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and others, utilizing foreign cloud-based mobile and desktop messaging applications like Telegram.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Was the Boulder attack terrorism or a hate crime? 2 experts unpack the complexities

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Frederic Lemieux, Professor of the Practice and Faculty Director of the Master’s in Applied Intelligence, Georgetown University

    A woman places flowers outside the Boulder, Colo., courthouse after an attack that injured 12 people. David Zalubowski/AP Photo

    Twelve people in Boulder, Colorado, were injured by a man wielding a makeshift flamethrower and Molotov cocktails on June 1, 2025. Those burned in the attack were taking part in a peaceful, silent walk on Pearl Street, a pedestrian mall, with the aim of raising awareness about Israeli hostages held by Hamas in Gaza.

    The suspect, Mohamed Sabry Soliman, 45, yelled, “Free Palestine,” according to local news reports. Soliman is an Egyptian immigrant who was living in the U.S. illegally after his tourist visa and work authorization both expired.

    On June 3, Soliman’s family, who lived with him in Colorado Springs, were detained by federal immigration authorities. Soliman’s wife and five children were placed in expedited removal proceedings.

    The FBI and local authorities initially said they were investigating a “targeted terror attack”. But Soliman was later charged with hate crimes in federal court. He also faces attempted murder and other charges in state court.

    We study terrorism and hate crimes.

    Whether an attack like the one in Boulder is considered an act of terrorism or a hate crime changes the way a suspect is charged and sentenced.

    Let’s look at how these two terms differ.

    What is a hate crime?

    Hate crimes are crimes motivated by bias on the basis of race, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. In some states, gender, age and gender identity are also included. Hate crime laws have been passed by 47 states and the federal government since the 1980s, when activists first began to press state legislatures to recognize the role of bias in violence against minority groups. Today, only Arkansas, South Carolina and Wyoming do not have hate crime laws.

    Colorado’s 2024 statute prohibits bias-motivated attacks based on a wide variety of categories, from ancestry to gender identity.

    In order to be charged as a hate crime, attacks – whether vandalism, assault or killings – must be directed at individuals because of the prohibited biases. Hate crimes, in other words, punish motive; the prosecutor must convince the judge or jury that the victim was targeted because of their race, religion, sexual orientation or other protected characteristic.

    If the defendant is found to have acted with bias motivation, hate crimes often add an additional penalty to the underlying charge. Charging people with a hate crime, then, presents additional layers of complexity to what may otherwise be a straightforward case for prosecutors. Bias motivation can be hard to prove, and prosecutors can be reluctant to take cases that they may not win in court.

    Dylann Roof, who killed nine worshipers at a Black church in South Carolina in 2015, was convicted of 33 charges, including hate crimes.
    Grace Beahm-Pool/Getty Images

    What is terrorism?

    Terrorism is a violent tactic – a strategy used to achieve a specific end.

    This strategy is often used in asymmetric power struggles when a weaker person, or group, is fighting against a powerful nation-state. The violence is aimed at creating fear in the targeted population.

    Terrorists often justify their bloody acts on the basis of perceived social, economic and political unfairness. Or they take inspiration from religious beliefs or spiritual principles.

    Many forms of terrorism were inspired by struggle between races, the rich and poor, or political outcasts and elites.

    How different terrorist groups act is informed by what they are trying to achieve. Some adopt a reactionary perspective aimed at stopping or resisting social, economic and political changes. Others adopt a revolutionary doctrine and want to provoke change.

    In the United States, terrorism attacks were in sharp decline from 1970 to 2011, decreasing from approximately 475 incidents a year to fewer than 20.

    The U.S. government began to take more note of domestic terrorism after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. And the number of domestic terrorism incidents began to rise after 2011, with notable increases in the mid-to-late 2010s and early 2020s.

    Data compiled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies shows right-wing terrorist attacks and plots grew substantially during the past decade, with right-wing extremists being responsible for the majority of attacks and plots each year since 2011, except for 2013. There were 44 incidents in 2019 alone.

    The Department of Homeland Security’s 2025 Homeland Threat Assessment indicates that the terrorism threat environment in the United States remains high, driven largely by domestic violent extremists motivated by a mix of racial, religious and anti-government grievances.

    Terrorism is not a successful tactic. American University professor Audrey Cronin studied 457 terrorist groups worldwide going back to 1968. The groups lasted an average of eight years before they lost support or were dismantled. No terrorist organizations that she studied were able to conquer a state, and 94% were unable to achieve even one of their strategic goals.

    Portions of this article originally appeared in articles published on March 19, 2021, and May 23, 2017.

    Read more of our stories about Colorado.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Was the Boulder attack terrorism or a hate crime? 2 experts unpack the complexities – https://theconversation.com/was-the-boulder-attack-terrorism-or-a-hate-crime-2-experts-unpack-the-complexities-258217

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Security: Crown Point Man Sentenced to 54 Months in Prison

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    HAMMOND- Daeshawn Jones, 29 years old, of Crown Point, Indiana, was sentenced by United States District Court Judge Philip P. Simon after pleading guilty to being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, announced Acting United States Attorney Tina L. Nommay.

    Jones was sentenced to 54 months in prison followed by 24 months of supervised release.

    According to documents in the case, on October 8, 2023, law enforcement conducted a traffic stop on a vehicle in Merrillville, Indiana, in which Jones was a passenger.  During a search of the vehicle, a loaded semi-automatic pistol with an obliterated serial number was discovered from the rear driver’s side seat. Jones attempted to flee but was apprehended.  His criminal history revealed that he had a prior 2022 Illinois felony conviction for attempted criminal sexual assault/force and a 2021 Indiana felony conviction for forgery, and as such, he is prohibited from possessing the firearm. 

    This case was investigated by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives Indiana High Intensity Drug Trafficking Task Force and the Merrillville Police Department.  This case was prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Kristian R. Mukoski.         

    This case is part of Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN), a program bringing together all levels of law enforcement and the communities they serve to reduce violent crime and gun violence, and to make our neighborhoods safer for everyone. On May 26, 2021, the Department launched a violent crime reduction strategy strengthening PSN based on these core principles: fostering trust and legitimacy in our communities, supporting community-based organizations that help prevent violence from occurring in the first place, setting focused and strategic enforcement priorities, and measuring the results.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary Noem Ends Politicized TSA Watchlist Program That Has Failed to Prevent a Single Terrorist Attack in its Existence; Calls for Congressional Investigation

    Source: US Federal Emergency Management Agency

    Headline: Secretary Noem Ends Politicized TSA Watchlist Program That Has Failed to Prevent a Single Terrorist Attack in its Existence; Calls for Congressional Investigation

    lass=”text-align-center”>The Quiet Skies Program is a redundant, corrupted program that costs US taxpayers $200 million a year
    WASHINGTON — Today, the Department of Homeland Security announced it is ending the Quiet Skies Program, which since its existence has failed to stop a single terrorist attack while costing US taxpayers $200 million a year

    The program, under the guise of “national security,” was used to target political opponents and benefit political allies

    TSA will continue performing important vetting functions tied to legitimate commercial aviation security threats to both ensure the safety of the American traveler and uphold its statutory obligations

    REAL ID, implemented on May 7 of this year, will further help bolster TSA security

     
    DHS and TSA have uncovered documents, correspondence, and timelines that clearly highlight the inconsistent application of Quiet Skies and watchlisting programs, circumventing security policies to benefit politically aligned friends and family at the expense of the American people

    In addition to its own internal investigation, DHS’s Secretary Kristi Noem is calling for a Congressional investigation to uncover further corruption through this program

    “It is clear that the Quiet Skies program was used as a political rolodex of the Biden Administration—weaponized against its political foes and exploited to benefit their well-heeled friends

    I am calling for a Congressional investigation to unearth further corruption at the expense of the American people and the undermining of US national security,” said Secretary Kristi Noem

    “TSA’s critical aviation and security vetting functions will be maintained, and the Trump Administration will return TSA to its true mission of being laser-focused on the safety and security of the traveling public

    This includes restoring the integrity, privacy, and equal application of the law for all Americans

    ” 
    DHS revealed earlier this week evidence detailing the politicization of TSA’s watchlisting program under the previous administration

    This includes William “Billy” Shaheen, spouse of fellow Democrat and sitting U

    S

    New Hampshire Senator, Jeanne Shaheen, being given blanket exemptions from review, while non-politically aligned members like then-Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard received additional screening and monitoring by Federal Air Marshalls

    Despite William Shaheen traveling with a known or suspected terrorist three times, then TSA Administrator Pekoske gave explicit direction to exclude Shaheen from the Silent Partner Quiet Skies list

    After Senator Shaheen directly lobbied then former Administrator Pekoske, on her husband’s behalf, Pekoske granted Billy Shaheen a blanket Quiet Skies exemption

     
    Shaheen was not the only high-profile individual that was placed on this exclusion list: this list also included members of foreign royal families, political elites, professional athletes, and favored journalists

    For more information on TSA security screening protocols, click here

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee Chairman Lawler Delivers Opening Remarks at Hearing on Syria

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee Chairman Michael Lawler delivered opening remarks at a subcommittee hearing titled, “After Assad: The Future of Syria.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks-

    Syria is at a turning point. The fall of Bashar al-Assad this past December following four decades of authoritarian rule has created conditions for unprecedented change for Syria and for the Middle East. This change comes with significant risk. The Syrian war dating back to 2011 has left most of the country in ruins, destroyed by years of indiscriminate bombing by Assad and his Russian and Iranian backers. The cost of reconstructing this broken country will be in the tens of billions, even by the most modest assessment, and investors face significant hurdles as they work to navigate the complex sanctions regime that has emerged after four decades of Assad family rule. While there are rightfully many who seek to break down barriers, advocating for sanctions relief to ensure reconstruction can take place and put Syria on a path of success, we must not lose sight of core US interests in this rush to embrace Syria’s new regime. There remain significant questions about Syria’s new interim authorities led by US-designated foreign terrorist organization Hayat Tahir al-Sham (HTS), a former al Qaeda affiliate. Ahmed al Shara, despite his hardened past, continues to verbally signal a commitment to reform through his ability, though his ability to deliver remains to be seen, which is why we must be explicit with our goals for Syria. This includes the counter ISIS mission, which has been a central part of US foreign policy since 2014.

    We must set clear expectations for the interim authorities on what we expect from them with respect to counterterrorism cooperation to prevent a resurgence and assume responsibility for detention centers holding thousands of ISIS members and affiliated individuals in the Northeast. Concerns about extremism are not by any means limited to ISIS. Iran and its proxies have long used the country as a sanctuary space to plan and carry out attacks, including against Israel, while Russia sees Syria as a strategic launch pad to undermine our interest not just in the Middle East but much further afield from Africa to Europe. There must be clear red lines when it comes to Iran and its proxies as well as Russia’s ability to operate in Syria. Preventing Syria from being used as a sanctuary space is vital not just for the US but also for Syria.

    This will no doubt be one of the metrics used as the international community measures the success of Syria’s transition and by extension for the prospects for further economic relief. For Syria to succeed and reestablish itself on the international world stage, it must take action to prevent extremism from thriving once again, including by signaling a commitment to inclusive governance by establishing a positive working relationship with our Kurdish partners, the Syrian Democratic Forces. They have been at the forefront of the campaign to ensure the enduring defeat of ISIS. On that basis, the Trump administration has rightfully taken steps to waive US sanctions on a limited and temporary basis, giving Alhara sufficient time to demonstrate he is able to turn his words into actions, but this is not, I have to stress, a full embrace of Al Shara or those he continues to surround himself with. We must use this opportunity to press him on key US priorities, notably as to counterterrorism while also retaining limitations on US sanctions relief to ensure Iran and Russia cannot benefit financially. Al Shara has expressed a concerning willingness to embrace Moscow despite Putin’s complicity in war crimes against the Syrian people. For Russia, their presence in Syria is not just about the Middle East. It’s a vital staging ground essential to everything they do in Africa and the eastern Mediterranean. We underestimate the strategic importance Syria holds for the Russians at our own peril.

    Make no mistake, what happens in Syria does not stay in Syria. The country has consistently demonstrated its ability to impact and shape affairs far outside its borders, from Europe’s migrant crisis to ISIS to the war in Ukraine. When Secretary Rubio testified before Congress last month, he said, “There is no guarantee that by outreach and working with the transitional authority in Syria, things are going to work out. It may work out. It may not work out. But if we don’t reach out and try, it’s a guarantee not to work out.” I echo the secretary’s sentiments and just came back along with the ranking member from a trip to the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Jordan. That was the sentiment shared there as well. We want to give this an opportunity to work but are fully cognizant of the consequences of failure. Here during this hearing, we will further examine Syrian stability and the vital role Syria and the Syrian people play in the Middle East.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Trump’s justifications for the latest travel ban aren’t supported by the data on immigration and terrorism

    Source: The Conversation – USA – By Charles Kurzman, Professor of Sociology, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

    Taliban fighters guard the former U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, on June 5, 2025. AP Photo/Ebrahim Noroozi

    The Trump administration on June 4, 2025, announced travel restrictions targeting 19 countries in Africa and Asia, including many of the world’s poorest nations. All travel is banned from 12 of these countries, with partial restrictions on travel from the rest.

    The presidential proclamation, entitled “Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” is aimed at “countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the entry or admission of nationals from those countries.”

    In a video that accompanied the proclamation, President Donald Trump said: “The recent terror attack in Boulder, Colorado, has underscored the extreme dangers posed to our country by the entry of foreign nationals who are not properly vetted.”

    The latest travel ban reimposes restrictions on many of the countries that were included on travel bans in Trump’s first term, along with several new countries.

    But this travel ban, like the earlier ones, will not significantly improve national security and public safety in the United States. That’s because migrants account for a minuscule portion of violence in the U.S. And migrants from the latest travel ban countries account for an even smaller portion, according to data that I have collected. The suspect in Colorado, for example, is from Egypt, which is not on the travel ban list.

    As a scholar of political sociology, I don’t believe Trump’s latest travel ban is about national security. Rather, I’d argue, it’s primarily about using national security as an excuse to deny visas to nonwhite applicants.

    Terrorism and public safety

    In the past five years, the U.S. has witnessed more than 100,000 homicides. Political violence by militias and other ideological movements accounted for 354 fatalities, according to an initiative known as the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data, which tracks armed conflict around the world. That’s less than 1% of the country’s homicide victims. And foreign terrorism accounted for less than 1% of this 1%, according to my data.

    The Trump administration says the U.S. cannot appropriately vet visa applicants in countries with uncooperative governments or underdeveloped security systems. That claim is false.

    The State Department and other government agencies do a thorough job of vetting visa applicants, even in countries where there is no U.S. embassy, according to an analysis by the CATO Institute.

    The U.S. government has sophisticated methods for identifying potential threats. They include detailed documentation requirements, interviews with consular officers and clearance by national security agencies. And it rejects more than 1 in 6 visa applications, with ever-increasing procedures for detecting fraud.

    Members of the Yemeni community and others wave American and Yemeni flags as they gather on the steps of Brooklyn’s Borough Hall to protest President Donald Trump’s first travel ban on Feb. 2, 2017, in New York.
    AP Photo/Kathy Willens

    The thoroughness of the visa review process is evident in the numbers.

    Authorized foreign-born residents of the U.S. are far less likely than U.S.-born residents to engage in criminal activity. And unauthorized migrants are even less likely to commit crimes. Communities with more migrants – authorized and unauthorized – have similar or slightly lower crime rates than communities with fewer migrants.

    If vetting were as deficient as Trump’s executive order claims, we would expect to see a significant number of terrorist plots from countries on the travel ban list. But we don’t.

    Of the 4 million U.S. residents from the 2017 travel ban countries, I have documented only four who were involved in violent extremism in the past five years.

    Two of them were arrested after plotting with undercover law enforcement agents. One was found to have lied on his asylum application. One was an Afghan man who killed three Pakistani Shiite Muslim immigrants in New Mexico in 2022.

    Such a handful of zealots with rifles or homemade explosives can be life-altering for victims and their families, but they do not represent a threat to U.S. national security.

    Degrading the concept of national security

    Trump has been trying for years to turn immigration into a national security issue.

    In his first major speech on national security in 2016, Trump focused on the “dysfunctional immigration system which does not permit us to know who we let into our country.”

    His primary example was an act of terrorism by a man who was born in the U.S.

    The first Trump administration’s national security strategy, issued in December 2017, prioritized jihadist terrorist organizations that “radicalize isolated individuals” as “the most dangerous threat to the Nation” – not armies, not another 9/11, but isolated individuals.

    If the travel ban is not really going to improve national security or public safety, then what is it about?

    Protesters wave signs during a demonstration against President Donald Trump’s revised travel ban on May 15, 2017, in Seattle.
    AP Photo/Ted S. Warren

    Linking immigration to national security seems to serve two long-standing Trump priorities. First is his effort to make American more white, in keeping with widespread bias among his supporters against nonwhite immigrants.

    Remember Trump’s insults to Mexicans and Muslims in his escalator speech announcing his presidential campaign in 2015. He has also expressed a preference for white immigrants from Norway in 2018 and South Africa in 2025.

    Trump has repeatedly associated himself with nationalists who view immigration by nonwhites as a danger to white supremacy.

    Second, invoking national security allows Trump to pursue this goal without the need for accountability, since Congress and the courts have traditionally deferred to the executive branch on national security issues.

    Trump also claims national security justifications for tariffs and other policies that he has declared national emergencies, in a bid to avoid criticism by the public and oversight by the other branches of government.

    But this oversight is necessary in a democratic system to ensure that immigration policy is based on facts.

    Charles Kurzman has received funding for research on terrorism from the National Institute of Justice and the National Science Foundation.

    ref. Trump’s justifications for the latest travel ban aren’t supported by the data on immigration and terrorism – https://theconversation.com/trumps-justifications-for-the-latest-travel-ban-arent-supported-by-the-data-on-immigration-and-terrorism-255471

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ivey, Van Hollen, Klobuchar Lead Nearly 100 Members in Pressing Administration for Answers on Cancellation of Protected Status for Afghans Living in U.S.

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Glenn Ivey – Maryland (4th District)

    Decision could endanger thousands of Afghans, including many who supported U.S. efforts during the war in Afghanistan

    WASHINGTON – Congressman Glenn Ivey (D-Md.), joined Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) and Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.)  in leading 98 of their colleagues in pressing for answers from the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State around the decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghan nationals living in the United States. The lawmakers’ letter, sent to Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, notes the devastating impact of this decision, including on the many Afghans who supported the U.S. military during the war in Afghanistan and who face significant danger upon their return. 

    “We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions,” the lawmakers began. 

    They go on to note, “The Secretary of Homeland Security ‘may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.’  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.” 

    “The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls,” they stress. 

    The lawmakers close the letter urging the Administration to reverse course and seeking the following information: 

    Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023. 

    The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.

    Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS. 

    Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan. 

    What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan?

    In addition to Senator Van Hollen, Congressman Ivey, and Senator Klobuchar, the letter was signed by Senators Alsobrooks, Baldwin, Blumenthal, Booker, Coons, Cortez Masto, Duckworth, Durbin, Fetterman, Gillibrand, Heinrich, Hirono, Kaine, Kelly, Kim, King, Markey, Padilla, Reed, Rosen, Sanders, Schiff, Smith, Warner, Warnock, Welch, and Wyden and Representatives Amo, Ansari, Balint, Bell, Beyer, Budzinski, Carbajal, Carter, Casten, Castro, Chu, Clarke, Cleaver, Courtney, Dean, DeGette, DelBene, Elfreth, Evans (Pa.), Fields, Garcia (Calif.), García (Ill.), Garcia (Texas), Goldman, Gomez, Gonzalez, Gottheimer, Hayes, Jackson (Ill.), Jayapal, Johnson (Ga.), Johnson (Texas), Kaptur, Keating, Kelly (Ill.), Kennedy (N.Y.), Krishnamoorthi, Landsman, Larson, Latimer, Levin, Lieu, Lofgren, Lynch, McClain Delaney, McClellan, McCollum, McGovern, Meeks, Mfume, Moulton, Norton, Olszewski, Pallone, Panetta, Peters (Calif.), Raskin, Sánchez, Scanlon, Schakowsky, Sherman, Sorensen, Subramanyam, Swalwell, Titus, Tlaib, Tokuda, Tonko, Vargas, Veasey, and Watson Coleman.

    The full text of the letter is available here and below. 

    Dear Secretary Noem and Secretary Rubio:

    We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions. 

    The Secretary of Homeland Security “may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.”  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.  In September 2023, the U.S. extended and redesignated TPS for Afghanistan. The Administration’s decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan negatively impacts approximately 9,000 Afghan nationals. 

    In your announcement, you state that “there are notable improvements in the security and economic situation such that requiring the return of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan does not pose a threat to their personal safety due to armed conflict or extraordinary and temporary conditions.”  But you also concede that threats of violence and terrorism, as well as humanitarian concerns, remain.  The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), continues to launch attacks against ethnic and religious minorities and against the Taliban, leading to innocent civilian casualties. If Afghan nationals are forced to return to Afghanistan, they will be caught in the crossfire between the Taliban and ISKP.  According to Human Rights Watch, in 2024, Taliban authorities intensified their crackdown on human rights, especially against women and girls. Women and girls are banned from attending secondary school or university and are unable to move freely. The Taliban also continues to detain and torture journalists, curtailing free speech and media. The 2023 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report covering Afghanistan found that women’s rights rapidly declined and restrictions on freedom of expression increased. The horrific human rights conditions in Afghanistan are unsafe for Afghan nationals to return to and returning would put their personal safety at immediate risk. 

    We are also deeply concerned about the State Department Human Rights Report finding that widespread arbitrary and unlawful killings against officials associated with the pre-August 2021 government have occurred.  Afghan nationals who assisted the U.S. military should not be put in harm’s way because they supported the U.S. in its fight against the Taliban. This would be a betrayal of those who bravely served alongside our servicemembers for nearly two decades. 

    Afghan civilians still face devastating humanitarian and economic conditions. Over half of the population in Afghanistan needs urgent humanitarian assistance. Human Rights Watch reports that in 2024, 12.4 million people were facing food insecurity and 2.9 million were at emergency levels of hunger.  The World Bank also found that in Afghanistan, as of May 2025, “per capita income has stagnated, while poverty and food insecurity remain pressing challenges, exacerbated by high unemployment and restrictions on women’s economic participation.”  

    The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls. 

    In August 2021, Americans welcomed Afghan nationals at Washington Dulles International Airport in Virginia with open arms, and we refuse to turn our backs on them now.  We strongly urge you to reconsider your decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan and ask that you respond to the following requests no later than two weeks of receipt of this letter:

    Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023.  

    The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.

    Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS. 

    Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan. 

    What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan? Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter and we hope to receive your responses soon.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: King Calls for Answers on Cancellation of Protected Status for Afghans Living in U.S.

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Angus King
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Angus King (I-ME), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) and long a fierce advocate to protect Afghans who supported and protected American troops, joined 28 of his Senate colleagues to call on the White House for answers on the cancellation of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for those who served alongside America’s military. In a letter to Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the Senators note the devastating impact of this decision, including on the many Afghans who supported the U.S. military during the war in Afghanistan and who face significant danger upon their return.
    “We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions,” the lawmakers began.
    They continued, “The Secretary of Homeland Security ‘may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.’  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.”
    “The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls,” the lawmakers concluded.
    In addition to King, the letter was signed by Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Angela Alsobrooks (D-MD), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Corey Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), Kristen Gillibrand (D-NY), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Tim Kaine (D-VA), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Ed Markey (D-MA), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Jack Reed (D-RI), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Tina Smith (D-MN), Mark Warner (D-VA), Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Peter Welch (D-VT), and Ron Wyden (D-OR).
    Senator King has long supported the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program for America’s Afghan allies who assisted the U.S. government during the war in Afghanistan. More specifically, he cosponsored the Afghan Allies Protection Act to increase the number of authorized visas for Afghan civilians who risked their lives to support the U.S. mission, remove extraneous paperwork requirements and improve the program’s efficiency during the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. 
    The full text of the letter is available here and below.
    +++
    Dear Secretary Noem and Secretary Rubio:
    We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions.
    The Secretary of Homeland Security “may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.”  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.  In September 2023, the U.S. extended and redesignated TPS for Afghanistan. The Administration’s decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan negatively impacts approximately 9,000 Afghan nationals.
    In your announcement, you state that “there are notable improvements in the security and economic situation such that requiring the return of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan does not pose a threat to their personal safety due to armed conflict or extraordinary and temporary conditions.”  But you also concede that threats of violence and terrorism, as well as humanitarian concerns, remain.  The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), continues to launch attacks against ethnic and religious minorities and against the Taliban, leading to innocent civilian casualties. If Afghan nationals are forced to return to Afghanistan, they will be caught in the crossfire between the Taliban and ISKP.  According to Human Rights Watch, in 2024, Taliban authorities intensified their crackdown on human rights, especially against women and girls. Women and girls are banned from attending secondary school or university and are unable to move freely. The Taliban also continues to detain and torture journalists, curtailing free speech and media. The 2023 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report covering Afghanistan found that women’s rights rapidly declined and restrictions on freedom of expression increased. The horrific human rights conditions in Afghanistan are unsafe for Afghan nationals to return to and returning would put their personal safety at immediate risk.
    We are also deeply concerned about the State Department Human Rights Report finding that widespread arbitrary and unlawful killings against officials associated with the pre-August 2021 government have occurred. Afghan nationals who assisted the U.S. military should not be put in harm’s way because they supported the U.S. in its fight against the Taliban. This would be a betrayal of those who bravely served alongside our servicemembers for nearly two decades.
    Afghan civilians still face devastating humanitarian and economic conditions. Over half of the population in Afghanistan needs urgent humanitarian assistance. Human Rights Watch reports that in 2024, 12.4 million people were facing food insecurity and 2.9 million were at emergency levels of hunger.  The World Bank also found that in Afghanistan, as of May 2025, “per capita income has stagnated, while poverty and food insecurity remain pressing challenges, exacerbated by high unemployment and restrictions on women’s economic participation.” 
    The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls.
    In August 2021, Americans welcomed Afghan nationals at Washington Dulles International Airport in Virginia with open arms, and we refuse to turn our backs on them now.  We strongly urge you to reconsider your decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan and ask that you respond to the following requests no later than two weeks of receipt of this letter:
    Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023. 
    The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.
    Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS.
    Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan.
    What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan?
    Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter and we hope to receive your responses soon.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Pine Ridge Man Sentenced to Over 3 Years in Federal Prison for Manslaughter and Firearm Possession

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    RAPID CITY – United States Attorney Alison J. Ramsdell announced today that U.S. District Judge Camela C. Theeler has sentenced a Pine Ridge, South Dakota, man convicted of Involuntary Manslaughter and Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person. The sentencing took place on June 2, 2025.

    Daeshawn Poor Bear, 19, was sentenced to three years and one month in federal prison, followed by three years of supervised release. He was ordered to pay restitution and $200 in special assessments to the Federal Crime Victims Fund.

    Poor Bear was indicted for the charges by a federal grand jury in October 2024. He pleaded guilty on January 8, 2025.

    Poor Bear, the victim, and two other friends consumed alcohol and edibles containing THC and smoked THC wax at an abandoned trailer in Pine Ridge on the evening of September 2, 2024. The victim and the other friends were all juveniles. The victim threw a firearm onto a bed near Poor Bear. Poor Bear picked up the firearm, pointed it at the victim, and pulled the trigger. The bullet struck the victim and killed him. Poor Bear and the other two friends ran to Poor Bear’s mother’s residence. Poor Bear’s mother called 911. The Oglala Sioux Tribe Department of Public Safety arrived at the abandoned residence and found that the victim had passed away. Poor Bear has a history of using THC, making him prohibited by law from possessing a firearm.

    This matter was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office because the Major Crimes Act, a federal statute, mandates that certain violent crimes alleged to have occurred in Indian Country be prosecuted in Federal court as opposed to State court.

    This case was investigated by the Oglala Sioux Tribe Department of Public Safety and the FBI. Assistant U.S. Attorney Megan Poppen prosecuted the case.

    Poor Bear was immediately remanded to the custody of the U.S. Marshals Service. 

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Staff Concludes Mission to Lebanon

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    June 5, 2025

    End-of-Mission press releases include statements of IMF staff teams that convey preliminary findings after a visit to a country. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. This mission will not result in a Board discussion.

    • The IMF mission held productive discussions with the Lebanese authorities on a comprehensive economic reform program. Discussions are expected to continue, both from IMF headquarters and through follow-up missions.
    • Bank restructuring remains a critical priority to restore the health of the banking sector, move away from the cash-based economy, restart credit to the private-sector, and protect depositors to the maximum extent possible.
    • Given Lebanon’s substantial reconstruction needs, limited fiscal space, and lack of capacity to borrow, the country will require significant support from external partners on highly concessional terms.

    BEIRUT, Lebanon: At the authorities’ request, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission led by Ernesto Ramirez Rigo visited Lebanon from May 28 to June 5, 2025, to initiate discussions on policies and a reform program that could be supported by an IMF arrangement.

    At the conclusion of the mission, Mr. Ramirez Rigo issued the following statement:

    “The IMF mission held productive discussions with the Lebanese authorities on a comprehensive economic reform program aimed at restoring macroeconomic sustainability and supporting financing for reconstruction. These initial discussions covered several reform areas, including (i) restoring the viability of the banking sector and protecting depositors to the maximum extent possible, (ii) achieving fiscal and debt sustainability, while enhancing social safety nets and rebuilding institutional capacity, (iii) establishing credible monetary and exchange rate policy frameworks, (iv) strengthening governance and transparency, (v) enhancing the Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regime, and (vi) reforming state-owned enterprises.

    It was agreed that the rehabilitation of the banking system remains a critical priority to rebuild confidence in banks, move away from the current cash-based economy, and restart credit to the private-sector, which is necessary for growth. The authorities have made some progress recently, including the amendment of the Bank Secrecy Law and submission of a new bank resolution law to Parliament. The next step is for Parliament to approve this legislation, which will establish powers to underpin the recovery of orderly banking intermediation, while safeguarding the public interest. The mission also engaged with the authorities on their emerging bank restructuring and deposit recovery strategy. More work in close cooperation with the authorities will be needed to ensure this strategy is aligned with international standards and debt sustainability requirements.

    “The mission also discussed the 2026 Budget and the development of a medium-term fiscal framework. For the 2026 Budget, given the limited fiscal space and available financing, it is critical that any additional expenditures be fully offset by corresponding revenue efforts, including by strengthening enforcement and compliance in tax and customs administration. An ambitious medium-term revenue mobilization and expenditure rationalization strategy along with improved fiscal transparency and public financial management is needed to strengthen public finances and create space for increased social protection and capital expenditures. The medium-term fiscal framework should also support the restructuring of Eurobonds to restore debt sustainability. Given Lebanon’s substantial reconstruction needs, the authorities’ reform efforts will require significant support from external partners, preferably on highly concessional terms. Enhanced support to Lebanon is also needed to help the country shoulder the continued burden of hosting a large refugee population.

    “Building on these key reform pillars, discussions on formulating a comprehensive reform program are expected to continue, both from IMF headquarters and through follow-up missions. The mission reaffirmed the Fund’s commitment to supporting Lebanon during this challenging period, consistent with its mandate and policies.

    “The mission thanks the Lebanese authorities and all stakeholders for their cooperation and constructive engagement.”

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Wafa Amr

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/06/05/pr-25182-lebanon-imf-staff-concludes-mission-to-lebanon

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Welch Joins Colleagues in Pressing Administration to Stand by America’s Promises of Safety for Afghan Allies, Who Protected and Fought Alongside U.S. Troops

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.) joined Senator Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.), Congressman Glenn Ivey (D-Md.), and Senator Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.) in pressing for answers from the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State on the decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghan nationals living in the United States. The lawmakers’ letter, sent to Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, notes the devastating impact of this decision, including on the many Afghans who supported the U.S. military during the war in Afghanistan and who face significant danger upon their return. The letter was signed by more than 100 lawmakers. 
      “We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions,” the lawmakers began.  
     They go on to note, “The Secretary of Homeland Security ‘may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.’  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.”  
      “The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls,” they stress.  
     The lawmakers close the letter urging the Administration to reverse course and seeking the following information:  
      Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023.   
     The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are. 
     Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS.  
     Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan.  
      What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan? 
    The letter was signed by Senator Welch, and led by Senator Van Hollen, Congressman Ivey, and Senator Klobuchar. The letter was also signed by Senators Alsobrooks, Baldwin, Blumenthal, Booker, Coons, Cortez Masto, Duckworth, Durbin, Fetterman, Gillibrand, Heinrich, Hirono, Kaine, Kelly, Kim, King, Markey, Padilla, Reed, Rosen, Sanders, Schiff, Smith, Warner, Warnock, and Wyden and Representatives Amo, Ansari, Balint, Bell, Beyer, Budzinski, Carbajal, Carter, Casten, Castro, Chu, Clarke, Cleaver, Courtney, Dean, DeGette, DelBene, Elfreth, Evans (Pa.), Fields, Garcia (Calif.), García (Ill.), Garcia (Texas), Goldman, Gomez, Gonzalez, Gottheimer, Hayes, Jackson (Ill.), Jayapal, Johnson (Ga.), Johnson (Texas), Kaptur, Keating, Kelly (Ill.), Kennedy (N.Y.), Krishnamoorthi, Landsman, Larson, Latimer, Levin, Lieu, Lofgren, Lynch, McClain Delaney, McClellan, McCollum, McGovern, Meeks, Mfume, Moulton, Norton, Olszewski, Pallone, Panetta, Peters (Calif.), Raskin, Sánchez, Scanlon, Schakowsky, Sherman, Sorensen, Subramanyam, Swalwell, Titus, Tlaib, Tokuda, Tonko, Vargas, Veasey, and Watson Coleman. 
      The full text of the letter is available here and below.  
      Dear Secretary Noem and Secretary Rubio: 
     We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions.  
     The Secretary of Homeland Security “may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.”  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.  In September 2023, the U.S. extended and redesignated TPS for Afghanistan. The Administration’s decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan negatively impacts approximately 9,000 Afghan nationals.  
     In your announcement, you state that “there are notable improvements in the security and economic situation such that requiring the return of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan does not pose a threat to their personal safety due to armed conflict or extraordinary and temporary conditions.”  But you also concede that threats of violence and terrorism, as well as humanitarian concerns, remain.  The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), continues to launch attacks against ethnic and religious minorities and against the Taliban, leading to innocent civilian casualties. If Afghan nationals are forced to return to Afghanistan, they will be caught in the crossfire between the Taliban and ISKP.  According to Human Rights Watch, in 2024, Taliban authorities intensified their crackdown on human rights, especially against women and girls. Women and girls are banned from attending secondary school or university and are unable to move freely. The Taliban also continues to detain and torture journalists, curtailing free speech and media. The 2023 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report covering Afghanistan found that women’s rights rapidly declined and restrictions on freedom of expression increased. The horrific human rights conditions in Afghanistan are unsafe for Afghan nationals to return to and returning would put their personal safety at immediate risk.  
     We are also deeply concerned about the State Department Human Rights Report finding that widespread arbitrary and unlawful killings against officials associated with the pre-August 2021 government have occurred.  Afghan nationals who assisted the U.S. military should not be put in harm’s way because they supported the U.S. in its fight against the Taliban. This would be a betrayal of those who bravely served alongside our servicemembers for nearly two decades.  
     Afghan civilians still face devastating humanitarian and economic conditions. Over half of the population in Afghanistan needs urgent humanitarian assistance. Human Rights Watch reports that in 2024, 12.4 million people were facing food insecurity and 2.9 million were at emergency levels of hunger.  The World Bank also found that in Afghanistan, as of May 2025, “per capita income has stagnated, while poverty and food insecurity remain pressing challenges, exacerbated by high unemployment and restrictions on women’s economic participation.”   
     The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls.  
     In August 2021, Americans welcomed Afghan nationals at Washington Dulles International Airport in Virginia with open arms, and we refuse to turn our backs on them now.  We strongly urge you to reconsider your decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan and ask that you respond to the following requests no later than two weeks of receipt of this letter: 
     Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023.   
     The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.  
    Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS.   
    Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan.  
     What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan? 
     Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter and we hope to receive your responses soon. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: American Rebel Light Beer Completes Production Run to Meet Surging National Customer and Consumer Demand

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    • American Rebel Light Beer Expanded Presence in Nashville, Motorsports (NHRA) & Music Events—Fueling Surging Demand for America’s Patriotic Beer

    NASHVILLE, TN, June 05, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) (“American Rebel” or the “Company”), creator of American Rebel Beer (americanrebelbeer.com) and a designer, manufacturer, and marketer of branded safes, personal security and self-defense products and apparel (americanrebel.com), proudly reports that American Rebel Premium Light Lager Beer (“Rebel Light”) American Rebel Light Beer, America’s Patriotic Beer, continues to see surging consumer and customer demand driven by its strategic presence at major events and iconic establishments in Nashville, motorsports partnerships, and music sponsorships. This rising demand has led to the completion of another production run, with additional runs planned throughout the year to support expanding retail placements, distributor partnerships, and new market entries.

    “American Rebel Holdings and American Rebel Light Beer remain committed to supporting military events, motorsports, and music festivals—bringing Americans together under one shared belief: Good beer, great moments, and unwavering patriotism.” Andy Ross, CEO – American Rebel Holdings. “We are experiencing unstoppable momentum. Motorsports, music, and Nashville’s patriotic culture are fueling our expansion. With more production runs planned, retail growth accelerating, and new distributors coming on board, American Rebel Light Beer is quickly becoming a dominant force in the market. Our continued partnership with AlcSource and City Brewing ensures we can scale at speed and meet the growing demand nationwide.”

    Strategic Positioned for Continued Growth & Market Expansion

    • Production Scaling Success – American Rebel Light Beer recently completed another production run to meet increasing consumer and retail demand. The company is well-positioned to scale rapidly thanks to its key partnerships with AlcSource and City Brewing, with the ability for production capacity of up to 2M+ annual cases.

    American Rebel Light Beer is brewed in LaCrosse, Wisconsin, using 100% natural ingredients for a refreshing, better-for-you domestic light lager with 100 calories, 3.2 carbs, and 4.3% ABV per 12oz serving.

    • Recent Retail Expansion Announcement – American Rebel Light Beer to expand into 62 Total Wine & More locations across seven states, further cementing its presence in the U.S. market. This strategic retail placement reinforces the brand’s rapid growth, fueled by increasing consumer demand, patriotic branding, and key distributor partnerships. As America’s Patriotic Beer, American Rebel Light Beer continues its mission to bring high-quality domestic light lager to new audiences through music, motorsports, and retail expansion.

    For the full press release, visit: American Rebel Light Beer Expands into Total Wine & More.

    Todd Porter, President of American Rebel Beverages, emphasized the beer’s meteoric rise. “I believe that American Rebel Beer will be the fastest-growing beer in U.S. history. I’ve been in the beverage industry for much of my professional life, and I’ve never seen consumers so aligned with a beverage brand. American Rebel Light Beer delivers a refreshing, all-natural taste that stands out in the domestic light beer market. With no corn, rice, or added sweeteners, it’s a clean, crisp lager that resonates with consumers looking for a high-quality, better-for-you beer option.”

    • Nashville Momentum – American Rebel Light Beer continues to thrive in high-profile venues, offering millions of visitors and locals a true American beer experience.

      CEO Andy Ross often refers to Nashville as the heartbeat of America, embodying the nation’s spirit of resilience and tradition. The American Rebel Light Beer’s epic launch at Kid Rock’s Big Ass Honky Tonk (https://www.kidrockshonkytonkandsteakhouse.com/) on Broadway packed the American Rebel Light Beer Suite, as fans enjoyed music by legendary Broadway icon John Stone (https://johnstonecountry.com), with a special appearance by Ross himself.

      Since its launch, American Rebel Light Beer has secured premier Nashville accounts and is now an official sponsor of the summer-long Loser’s (Midtown) Parking Lot Concert Series, further solidifying its presence in Music City’s vibrant scene and ensuring that visitors experience the beer as part of their Nashville experience.

    For information on Loser’s Parking Lot Concert Series visit Loser’s Original

    • Motorsports Impact – Key partnerships with TSR Nitro Racing and the NHRA have connected the brand with influential distributors and retail accounts at the track, proving that beer and motorsports are a proven winning combination.

      CEO Andy Ross, presented by American Rebel Beer will be performing this weekend on Saturday June 6th at the Super Grip NHRA Thunder Valley Nationals in Bristol, TN.

      Andy Ross is scheduled to perform at the American Rebel Light Virginia NHRA Nationals at North Dinwiddle, VA on June 20 – 22. In addition to being the title sponsor American Rebel Light Beer will also be the primary sponsor for the Tony Stewart Top Fuel Dragster and the Matt Hagan Funny Car.

    • Event & Music Partnerships – Sponsorship of Loser’s Midtown Parking Lot Concert Series, CMA Fest, and other major events further solidifies American Rebel’s presence in entertainment-driven consumer markets.

      Special Announcement: American Rebel Light Beer Joins Week of the Eagles Celebration Honoring the 250th Birthday of the U.S. Army at Fort Campbell, KY

      American Rebel Light Beer, America’s Patriotic Beer, is proud to be a key sponsor of the Week of the Eagles celebration at Fort Campbell, honoring the 250th Birthday of the U.S. Army. This special event brings together the soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division, veterans, and patriotic Americans to pay tribute to the legacy, sacrifice, and strength of our nation’s military.

      On Saturday June 14th, 2025, American Rebel CEO Andy Ross, a passionate advocate for American values and patriotism, will headline the Week of the Eagles Concert, delivering a performance that embodies the spirit of freedom and patriotic rock and roll. His presence reinforces American Rebel’s deep commitment to honoring the men and women who serve and celebrating the traditions that make our country great.

      The event is free and open to the public, welcoming soldiers, veterans, and civilians to honor the legacy of the 101st Airborne Division and the 250th Birthday of the U.S. Army.

    About American Rebel Light Beer

    American Rebel Light is more than just a beer—it’s a celebration of freedom, passion, and quality. Brewed with care and precision, our light beer delivers a refreshing taste that’s perfect for every occasion.

    Since its launch in September 2024, American Rebel Light Beer has rolled out in Tennessee, Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Ohio, Iowa, Missouri, North Carolina, Florida and Indiana and is adding new distributors and territories regularly. For more information about the launch events and the availability of American Rebel Beer, please visit americanrebelbeer.com or follow us on our social media platforms.

    Produced in partnership with AlcSource, American Rebel Light Beer (americanrebelbeer.com) is a domestic premium light lager celebrated for its exceptional quality and patriotic values. It stands out as America’s Patriotic, God-Fearing, Constitution-Loving, National Anthem-Singing, Stand Your Ground Beer.

    American Rebel Light is a Premium Domestic Light Lager Beer – All Natural, Crisp, Clean and Bold Taste with a Lighter Feel. With approximately 100 calories, 3.2 carbohydrates, and 4.3% alcoholic content per 12 oz serving, American Rebel Light Beer delivers a lighter option for those who love great beer but prefer a more balanced lifestyle. It’s all natural with no added supplements and importantly does not use corn, rice, or other sweeteners typically found in mass produced beers.

    For more information about American Rebel Light Beer follow us on social media @AmericanRebelBeer

    For more information, visit americanrebelbeer.com

    About American Rebel Holdings, Inc.

    American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) has operated primarily as a designer, manufacturer and marketer of branded safes and personal security and self-defense products and has recently transitioned into the beverage industry through the introduction of American Rebel Light Beer.. The Company also designs and produces branded apparel and accessories. To learn more, visit www.americanrebel.com and www.americanrebelbeer.com. For investor information, visit www.americanrebel.com/investor-relations.

    Watch the American Rebel Story as told by our CEO Andy Ross visit The American Rebel Story

    Media Inquiries:
    Matt Sheldon
    Matt@Precisionpr.co
    917-280-7329

    American Rebel Holdings, Inc.
    info@americanrebel.com
    ir@americanrebel.com

    American Rebel Beverages, LLC
    Todd Porter, President
    tporter@americanrebelbeer.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. American Rebel Holdings, Inc., (NASDAQ: AREB; AREBW) (the “Company,” “American Rebel,” “we,” “our” or “us”) desires to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and is including this cautionary statement in connection with this safe harbor legislation. The words “forecasts” “believe,” “may,” “estimate,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “should,” “plan,” “could,” “target,” “potential,” “is likely,” “expect” and similar expressions, as they relate to us, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. We have based these forward-looking statements primarily on our current expectations and projections about future events and financial trends that we believe may affect our financial condition, results of operations, business strategy, and financial needs. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ from those in the forward-looking statements include benefits of our continued sponsorship of high profile events, continued scheduled placements in Total Wine & More locations, success and availability of the promotional activities, our ability to effectively execute our business plan, and the Risk Factors contained within our filings with the SEC, including our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024 and our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q for the three months ended March 31, 2025. Any forward-looking statement made by us herein speaks only as of the date on which it is made. Factors or events that could cause our actual results to differ may emerge from time to time, and it is not possible for us to predict all of them. We undertake no obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future developments or otherwise, except as may be required by law.

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    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Restricting The Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats

    US Senate News:

    Source: US Whitehouse
    class=”has-text-align-center”>BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A PROCLAMATION
    During my first Administration, I restricted the entry of foreign nationals into the United States, which successfully prevented national security threats from reaching our borders and which the Supreme Court upheld.  In Executive Order 14161 of January 20, 2025 (Protecting the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats), I stated that it is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes. 
    I also stated that the United States must be vigilant during the visa-issuance process to ensure that those aliens approved for admission into the United States do not intend to harm Americans or our national interests.  More importantly, the United States must identify such aliens before their admission or entry into the United States.  The United States must ensure that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already present in the United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government, institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign terrorists or other threats to our national security.
    I directed the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to identify countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(f).  After completing that process, the Secretary of State determined that a number of countries remain deficient with regards to screening and vetting.  Many of these countries have also taken advantage of the United States in their exploitation of our visa system and their historic failure to accept back their removable nationals. 
    As President, I must act to protect the national security and national interest of the United States and its people.  I remain committed to engaging with those countries willing to cooperate to improve information-sharing and identity-management procedures, and to address both terrorism-related and public-safety risks.  Nationals of some countries also pose significant risks of overstaying their visas in the United States, which increases burdens on immigration and law enforcement components of the United States, and often exacerbates other risks related to national security and public safety.
    Some of the countries with inadequacies face significant challenges to reform efforts.  Others have made important improvements to their protocols and procedures, and I commend them for these efforts.  But until countries with identified inadequacies address them, members of my Cabinet have recommended certain conditional restrictions and limitations.  I have considered and largely accepted those recommendations and impose the limitations set forth below on the entry into the United States by the classes of foreign nationals identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation.
    NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including sections 212(f) and 215(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) and 1185(a), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, hereby find that, absent the measures set forth in this proclamation, the immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of persons described in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and that their entry should be subject to certain restrictions, limitations, and exceptions.  I therefore hereby proclaim the following:
    Section 1.  Policy and Purpose.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States to protect its citizens from terrorist attacks and other national security or public-safety threats.  Screening and vetting protocols and procedures associated with visa adjudications and other immigration processes play a critical role in implementing that policy.  These protocols enhance our ability to detect foreign nationals who may commit, aid, or support acts of terrorism, or otherwise pose a safety threat, and they aid our efforts to prevent such individuals from entering the United States.
    (b)  Information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices of foreign governments are important for the effectiveness of the screening and vetting protocols and procedures of the United States.  Governments manage the identity and travel documents of their nationals and residents. They also control the circumstances under which they provide information about their nationals to other governments, including information about known or suspected terrorists and criminal-history information.  It is, therefore, the policy of the United States to take all necessary and appropriate steps to encourage foreign governments to improve their information-sharing and identity-management protocols and practices and to regularly share their identity and threat information with the immigration screening and vetting systems of the United States.
    (c)  Section 2(b) of Executive Order 14161 directed the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, within 60 days of the date of that order, to jointly submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, a report identifying countries throughout the world for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full or partial suspension on the entry or admission of nationals from those countries pursuant to section 212(f) of the INA (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)).
    (d)  On April 9, 2025, the Secretary of State, with the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, presented the report described in subsection (c) of this section, recommending that entry restrictions and limitations be placed on foreign nationals of several countries.  The report identified countries for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a full suspension of admissions and countries that warrant a partial suspension of admission.
    (e)  In evaluating the recommendations from the Secretary of State and in determining what restrictions to impose for each country, I consulted with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, appropriate Assistants to the President, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.  I considered foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism goals.  And I further considered various factors, including each country’s screening and vetting capabilities, information sharing policies, and country-specific risk factors — including whether each country has a significant terrorist presence within its territory, its visa-overstay rate, and its cooperation with accepting back its removable nationals. 
    I also considered the different risks posed by aliens admitted on immigrant visas and those admitted on nonimmigrant visas.  Persons admitted on immigrant visas become lawful permanent residents of the United States.  Such persons may present national security or public-safety concerns that may be distinct from those admitted as nonimmigrants.  The United States affords lawful permanent residents more enduring rights than it does to nonimmigrants.  Lawful permanent residents are more difficult to remove than nonimmigrants, even after national security concerns arise, which increases the costs and aggravates the dangers of errors associated with admitting such individuals.  And although immigrants are generally subject to more extensive vetting than nonimmigrants, such vetting is far less reliable when the country from which someone seeks to emigrate maintains inadequate identity-management or information-sharing policies or otherwise poses risks to the national security of the United States.
    I reviewed these factors and assessed these goals, with a particular focus on crafting country-specific restrictions.  This approach was designed to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances.  The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are, in my judgment, necessary to prevent the entry or admission of foreign nationals about whom the United States Government lacks sufficient information to assess the risks they pose to the United States.  The restrictions and limitations imposed by this proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
    (f)  After reviewing the report described in subsection (d) of this section, and after accounting for the foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives of the United States, I have determined to fully restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 12 countries:  Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.  These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants.
    (g)  I have determined to partially restrict and limit the entry of nationals of the following 7 countries:  Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.  These restrictions distinguish between, but apply to both, the entry of immigrants and nonimmigrants. 
    (h)  Sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation describe some of the identity-management or information-sharing inadequacies that led me to impose restrictions.  These inadequacies are sufficient to justify my finding that unrestricted entry of nationals from the named countries would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.  Publicly disclosing additional details on which I relied in making these determinations, however, would cause serious damage to the national security of the United States, and many such details are classified.
    Sec. 2.  Full Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.  The entry into the United States of nationals of the following countries is hereby suspended and limited, as follows, subject to the categorical exceptions and case-by-case waivers described in section 5 of this proclamation:
    (a)  Afghanistan
    (i)   The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan.  Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B-1/B-2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Afghanistan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (b)  Burma
    (i)   According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent.  Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Burma as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (c)  Chad
    (i)   According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent.  According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent.  The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for United States immigration laws.  
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Chad as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (d)  Republic of the Congo
    (i)   According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of the Republic of the Congo as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (e)  Equatorial Guinea
    (i)   According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Equatorial Guinea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (f)  Eritrea
    (i)   The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea.  Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals.  Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Eritrea as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (g)  Haiti
    (i)   According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent.  Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration.  This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats.  As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States. 
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Haiti as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (h)  Iran
    (i)   Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.  Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Iran as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby suspended.
    (i)  Libya
    (i)   There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya.  The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Libya as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (j)  Somalia
    (i)   Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects.  A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory.  The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven.  Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations.  Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States.  The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement.  Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Somalia as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (k)  Sudan
    (i)   Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent. 
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Sudan as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    (l)  Yemen
    (i)   Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  The government does not have physical control over its own territory.  Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active United States military operations.
    (ii)  The entry into the United States of nationals of Yemen as immigrants and nonimmigrants is hereby fully suspended.
    Sec. 3.  Partial Suspension of Entry for Nationals of Countries of Identified Concern.
    (a)  Burundi
    (i)    According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent. 
    (ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Burundi as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
    (iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Burundi to the extent permitted by law.
    (b)  Cuba
    (i)    Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism.  The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States.  Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
    (ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Cuba as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
    (iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Cuba to the extent permitted by law.
    (c)  Laos
    (i)    According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent.  Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
    (ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Laos as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas, is hereby suspended.
    (iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Laos to the extent permitted by law.
    (d)  Sierra Leone
    (i)    According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent.  Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
    (ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Sierra Leone as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
    (iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Sierra Leone to the extent permitted by law.
    (e)  Togo
    (i)    According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent. 
    (ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Togo as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B‑2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
    (iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Togo to the extent permitted by law.
    (f)  Turkmenistan
    (i)   According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B-1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent. 
    (ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Turkmenistan as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
    (iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Turkmenistan to the extent permitted by law.
    (g)  Venezuela
    (i)    Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B‑1/B-2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.
    (ii)   The entry into the United States of nationals of Venezuela as immigrants, and as nonimmigrants on B‑1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J visas is hereby suspended.
    (iii)  Consular officers shall reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa issued to nationals of Venezuela to the extent permitted by law.
    Sec. 4.  Scope and Implementation of Suspensions and Limitations.  (a)  Scope.  Subject to the exceptions set forth in subsection (b) of this section and any exceptions made pursuant to subsections (c) and (d) of this section, the suspensions of and limitations on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall apply only to foreign nationals of the designated countries who:
    (i)   are outside the United States on the applicable effective date of this proclamation; and
    (ii)  do not have a valid visa on the applicable effective date of this proclamation.
    (b)  Exceptions.  The suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation shall not apply to:
    (i)     any lawful permanent resident of the United States;
    (ii)    any dual national of a country designated under sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation when the individual is traveling on a passport issued by a country not so designated;
    (iii)   any foreign national traveling with a valid nonimmigrant visa in the following classifications:  A-1, A-2, C-2, C-3, G-1, G-2, G-3, G-4, NATO-1, NATO‑2, NATO-3, NATO-4, NATO-5, or NATO-6;
    (iv)    any athlete or member of an athletic team, including coaches, persons performing a necessary support role, and immediate relatives, traveling for the World Cup, Olympics, or other major sporting event as determined by the Secretary of State;
    (v)     immediate family immigrant visas (IR-1/CR-1, IR-2/CR-2, IR-5) with clear and convincing evidence of identity and family relationship (e.g., DNA);
    (vi)    adoptions (IR-3, IR-4, IH-3, IH-4);
    (vii)   Afghan Special Immigrant Visas;
    (viii)  Special Immigrant Visas for United States Government employees; and
    (ix)    immigrant visas for ethnic and religious minorities facing persecution in Iran.
    (c)  Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made for certain individuals for whom the Attorney General finds, in her discretion, that the travel by the individual would advance a critical United States national interest involving the Department of Justice, including when individuals must be present to participate in criminal proceedings as witnesses.  These exceptions shall be made only by the Attorney General, or her designee, in coordination with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security.
    (d)  Exceptions to the suspension of and limitation on entry pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation may be made case-by-case for individuals for whom the Secretary of State finds, in his discretion, that the travel by the individual would serve a United States national interest.  These exceptions shall be made by only the Secretary of State or his designee, in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security or her designee.
    Sec. 5.  Adjustments to and Removal of Suspensions and Limitations.  (a)  The Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director for National Intelligence, devise a process to assess whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented.  Within 90 days of the date of this proclamation, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit a report to the President, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security, describing his assessment and recommending whether any suspensions and limitations imposed by sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented.
    (b)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall immediately engage each of the countries identified in sections 2 and 3 of this proclamation on measures that must be taken to comply with United States screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements.
    (c)  Additionally, and in light of recent events, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide me an update to the review of the practices and procedures of Egypt to confirm the adequacy of its current screening and vetting capabilities.
    Sec. 6.  Enforcement.  (a)  The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall consult with appropriate domestic and international partners, including countries and organizations, to ensure efficient, effective, and appropriate implementation of this proclamation.
    (b)  In implementing this proclamation, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall comply with all applicable laws and regulations.
    (c)  No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.
    (d)  This proclamation shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum by the United States, to a refugee who has already been admitted to the United States, or to an individual granted withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment (CAT).  Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to limit the ability of an individual to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT, consistent with the laws of the United States.
    Sec. 7.  Severability.  It is the policy of the United States to enforce this proclamation to the maximum extent possible to advance the national security, foreign policy, and counterterrorism interests of the United States.  Accordingly:
    (a)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this proclamation and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby; and
    (b)  if any provision of this proclamation, or the application of any provision of this proclamation to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid because of the lack of certain procedural requirements, the relevant executive branch officials shall implement those procedural requirements to conform with existing law and with any applicable court orders.
    Sec. 8.  Effective Date.  This proclamation is effective at 12:01 am eastern daylight time on June 9, 2025.
    Sec. 9.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this proclamation shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
    (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or
    (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
    (b)  This proclamation shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
    (c)  This proclamation is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fourth day of June, in the year of our Lord two thousand twenty‑five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and forty-ninth.
                                 DONALD J. TRUMP

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Restricts the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats

    US Senate News:

    Source: US Whitehouse
    COMBATING TERRORISM THROUGH COMMON SENSE SECURITY STANDARDS: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a Proclamation to protect the nation from foreign terrorist and other national security and public safety threats from entry into the United States.
    Pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order 14161, issued on January 20, 2025, titled “Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” national security agencies engaged in a robust assessment of the risk that countries posed to the United States, including regarding terrorism and national security.
    In Trump v. Hawaii, the Supreme Court upheld the President’s authority to use section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to protect the United States through entry restrictions.
    The Proclamation fully restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 12 countries found to be deficient with regards to screening and vetting and determined to pose a very high risk to the United States: Afghanistan, Burma, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Haiti, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen.
    The Proclamation partially restricts and limits the entry of nationals from 7 countries who also pose a high level of risk to the United States: Burundi, Cuba, Laos, Sierra Leone, Togo, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela.
    The Proclamation includes exceptions for lawful permanent residents, existing visa holders, certain visa categories, and individuals whose entry serves U.S. national interests.
    SECURING OUR BORDERS AND INTERESTS: The restrictions and limitations imposed by the Proclamation are necessary to garner cooperation from foreign governments, enforce our immigration laws, and advance other important foreign policy, national security, and counterterrorism objectives.
    It is the President’s sacred duty to take action to ensure that those seeking to enter our country will not harm the American people.
    After evaluating a report submitted by the Secretary of State, in coordination with other cabinet officials, President Trump has determined that the entry of nationals from certain countries must be restricted or limited to protect U.S. national security and public safety interests.
    The restrictions are country-specific in order to encourage cooperation with the subject countries in recognition of each country’s unique circumstances.
    Some of the named countries have inadequate screening and vetting processes, hindering America’s ability to identify potential security threats before entry.
    Certain countries exhibit high visa overstay rates, demonstrating a disregard for U.S. immigration laws and increasing burdens on enforcement systems.
    Other countries lack cooperation in sharing identity and threat information, undermining effective U.S. immigration vetting.
    Some countries have a significant terrorist presence or state-sponsored terrorism, posing direct risks to U.S. national security.
    Several countries have historically failed to accept back their removable nationals, complicating U.S. efforts to manage immigration and public safety.
    MAKING AMERICA SAFE AGAIN: President Trump is keeping his promise to restore the travel ban and secure our borders.
    President Trump: “We will restore the travel ban, some people call it the Trump travel ban, and keep the radical Islamic terrorists out of our country that was upheld by the Supreme Court.”
    In his first term, President Trump successfully implemented a travel ban that restricted entry from several countries with inadequate vetting processes or significant security risks.
    The Supreme Court upheld the travel ban, ruling that it “is squarely within the scope of Presidential authority” and noting that it is “expressly premised on legitimate purposes.”
    This Proclamation builds on President Trump’s first-term travel ban, incorporating an updated assessment of current global screening, vetting, and security risks.
    JUSTIFICATION FOR FULL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY
    Afghanistan
    The Taliban, a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) group, controls Afghanistan.  Afghanistan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Fiscal Year 2023 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Entry/Exit Overstay Report (“Overstay Report”), Afghanistan had a business/tourist (B1/B2) visa overstay rate of 9.70 percent and a student (F), vocational (M), and exchange visitor (J) visa overstay rate of 29.30 percent.
    Burma
    According to the Overstay Report, Burma had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 27.07 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 42.17 percent.  Additionally, Burma has historically not cooperated with the United States to accept back their removable nationals.
    Chad
    According to the Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 49.54 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.64 percent.  According to the Fiscal Year 2022 Overstay Report, Chad had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 37.12 percent.  The high visa overstay rate for 2022 and 2023 is unacceptable and indicates a blatant disregard for U.S. immigration laws.  
    Republic of the Congo
    According to the Overstay Report, the Republic of the Congo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 29.63 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.14 percent.
    Equatorial Guinea
    According to the Overstay Report, Equatorial Guinea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 21.98 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 70.18 percent.
    Eritrea
    The United States questions the competence of the central authority for issuance of passports or civil documents in Eritrea. Criminal records are not available to the United States for Eritrean nationals.  Eritrea has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Eritrea had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 20.09 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 55.43 percent.
    Haiti
    According to the Overstay Report, Haiti had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 31.38 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 25.05 percent.  Additionally, hundreds of thousands of illegal Haitian aliens flooded into the United States during the Biden Administration.  This influx harms American communities by creating acute risks of increased overstay rates, establishment of criminal networks, and other national security threats. As is widely known, Haiti lacks a central authority with sufficient availability and dissemination of law enforcement information necessary to ensure its nationals do not undermine the national security of the United States. 
    Iran
    Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.  Iran regularly fails to cooperate with the United States Government in identifying security risks, is the source of significant terrorism around the world, and has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
    Libya
    There is no competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents in Libya.  The historical terrorist presence within Libya’s territory amplifies the risks posed by the entry into the United States of its nationals.
    Somalia
    Somalia lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Somalia stands apart from other countries in the degree to which its government lacks command and control of its territory, which greatly limits the effectiveness of its national capabilities in a variety of respects.  A persistent terrorist threat also emanates from Somalia’s territory.  The United States Government has identified Somalia as a terrorist safe haven.  Terrorists use regions of Somalia as safe havens from which they plan, facilitate, and conduct their operations.  Somalia also remains a destination for individuals attempting to join terrorist groups that threaten the national security of the United States.  The Government of Somalia struggles to provide governance needed to limit terrorists’ freedom of movement.  Additionally, Somalia has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.
    Sudan
    Sudan lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  According to the Overstay Report, Sudan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 26.30 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 28.40 percent. 
    Yemen
    Yemen lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  The government does not have physical control over its own territory.  Since January 20, 2025, Yemen has been the site of active U.S. military operations.
    JUSTIFICATION FOR PARTIAL SUSPENSION BY COUNTRY (Immigrants and Nonimmigrants on B-1, B-2, B-1/B-2, F, M, and J Visas)
    Burundi
    According to the Overstay Report, Burundi had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and an F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 17.52 percent. 
    Cuba
    Cuba is a state sponsor of terrorism.  The Government of Cuba does not cooperate or share sufficient law enforcement information with the United States.  Cuba has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Cuba had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 7.69 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 18.75 percent.
    Laos
    According to the Overstay Report, Laos had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 34.77 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 6.49 percent.  Laos has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
    Sierra Leone
    According to the Overstay Report, Sierra Leone had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.43 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.83 percent.  Sierra Leone has historically failed to accept back its removable nationals. 
    Togo
    According to the Overstay Report, Togo had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 19.03 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 35.05 percent. 
    Turkmenistan
    According to the Overstay Report, Turkmenistan had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 15.35 percent and a F, M, and J visa overstay rate of 21.74 percent. 
    Venezuela
    Venezuela lacks a competent or cooperative central authority for issuing passports or civil documents and it does not have appropriate screening and vetting measures.  Venezuela has historically refused to accept back its removable nationals.  According to the Overstay Report, Venezuela had a B1/B2 visa overstay rate of 9.83 percent.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner, Kaine, Colleagues Press Trump Administration for Answers and Demand Reversal of Termination of Temporary Protected Status for Afghans Living in the U.S.

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senators Mark R. Warner and Tim Kaine, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (both D-VA) joined nearly 100 of their congressional colleagues in pressing the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and State regarding the Trump Administration’s decision to terminate Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghan nationals living in the United States. Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, nearly 200,000 Afghans came to the U.S. From 2018 to 2022, nearly 20,000 of these individuals settled in Virginia—the most of any state after California.
    In the letter sent to DHS Secretary Kristi Noem and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the lawmakers noted the thousands of lives this decision could endanger—particularly the lives of many Afghans who supported the U.S. efforts during the war in Afghanistan and face significant danger upon their return to Afghanistan. The lawmakers also urged the Trump Administration to reverse course and continue TPS for Afghans.
    “We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country,” the lawmakers wrote. “Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions.”
    The lawmakers continued, “The Secretary of Homeland Security ‘may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.’  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.”
    “The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls,” the lawmakers stressed.
    The lawmakers closed the letter requesting the following information:
    Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023. 
    The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.
    Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS.
    Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan.
    What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan?
    In addition to Warner and Kaine, the letter was signed by U.S. Senators Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Angela Alsobrooks (D-MD), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Chris Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Angus King (I-ME), Ed Markey (D-MA), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Jack Reed (D-RI), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Tina Smith (D-MN), Rev. Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Peter Welch (D-VT), and Ron Wyden (D-OR). The letter is signed by 72 members of the U.S. House of Representatives.
    A copy of the letter is available here and below.
    Dear Secretary Noem and Secretary Rubio:
    We write with deep concern about the Department of Homeland Security’s termination of Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Afghanistan, which is scheduled to take effect on July 14, 2025. This decision is devastating for resettled Afghan nationals in the United States who have fled widespread violence, economic instability, challenging humanitarian conditions, and human rights abuses in their home country. Many of these Afghans fearlessly served as strong allies to the United States military during the war in Afghanistan, and we cannot blatantly disregard their service. We respectfully ask that you redesignate Afghanistan for TPS to ensure Afghan nationals in the U.S. are not forced to return to devastating humanitarian, civic, and economic conditions.
    The Secretary of Homeland Security “may designate a foreign country for TPS due to conditions in the country that temporarily prevent the country’s nationals from returning safely, or in certain circumstances, where the country is unable to handle the return of its nationals adequately.”  This is why, following the withdrawal of American troops and the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, in May 2022 the U.S. designated Afghanistan for TPS.  In September 2023, the U.S. extended and redesignated TPS for Afghanistan. The Administration’s decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan negatively impacts approximately 9,000 Afghan nationals.
    In your announcement, you state that “there are notable improvements in the security and economic situation such that requiring the return of Afghan nationals to Afghanistan does not pose a threat to their personal safety due to armed conflict or extraordinary and temporary conditions.”  But you also concede that threats of violence and terrorism, as well as humanitarian concerns, remain.  The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), continues to launch attacks against ethnic and religious minorities and against the Taliban, leading to innocent civilian casualties. If Afghan nationals are forced to return to Afghanistan, they will be caught in the crossfire between the Taliban and ISKP.  According to Human Rights Watch, in 2024, Taliban authorities intensified their crackdown on human rights, especially against women and girls. Women and girls are banned from attending secondary school or university and are unable to move freely. The Taliban also continues to detain and torture journalists, curtailing free speech and media. The 2023 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report covering Afghanistan found that women’s rights rapidly declined and restrictions on freedom of expression increased. The horrific human rights conditions in Afghanistan are unsafe for Afghan nationals to return to and returning would put their personal safety at immediate risk.
    We are also deeply concerned about the State Department Human Rights Report finding that widespread arbitrary and unlawful killings against officials associated with the pre-August 2021 government have occurred.  Afghan nationals who assisted the U.S. military should not be put in harm’s way because they supported the U.S. in its fight against the Taliban. This would be a betrayal of those who bravely served alongside our servicemembers for nearly two decades.
    Afghan civilians still face devastating humanitarian and economic conditions. Over half of the population in Afghanistan needs urgent humanitarian assistance. Human Rights Watch reports that in 2024, 12.4 million people were facing food insecurity and 2.9 million were at emergency levels of hunger.  The World Bank also found that in Afghanistan, as of May 2025, “per capita income has stagnated, while poverty and food insecurity remain pressing challenges, exacerbated by high unemployment and restrictions on women’s economic participation.” 
    The grave conditions that forced Afghan nationals to flee and seek refuge in the U.S. following the return of the Taliban to power remain. Because of this harsh reality, forcing Afghan nationals in the U.S. to return to Afghanistan would be reckless and inhumane, and would threaten the safety and well-being of thousands of individuals and families, especially women and girls.
    In August 2021, Americans welcomed Afghan nationals at Washington Dulles International Airport in Virginia with open arms, and we refuse to turn our backs on them now.  We strongly urge you to reconsider your decision to terminate TPS for Afghanistan and ask that you respond to the following requests no later than two weeks of receipt of this letter:
    Please provide any reports that credibly determine that conditions have improved in Afghanistan since 2023. 
    The TPS termination announcement stated that “there are recipients who have been under investigation for fraud and threatening our public safety and national security.” Please provide additional details on how the Administration made this determination and how widespread these allegations of fraud and threats are.
    Describe the collaboration with the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State to reach the determination that Afghanistan no longer meets the conditions for designation for TPS.
    Please provide any reports that indicate the Taliban is no longer a threat to Afghan nationals that assisted the United States military during the war in Afghanistan.
    What steps are you taking to ensure that Afghan nationals who previously had TPS will not be sent back to persecution or torture in Afghanistan?
    Thank you for your attention to this urgent matter and we hope to receive your responses soon.
    Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

    Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

    “This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

    “Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,”  said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

    “This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

    According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

    Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

    Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

    During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

    Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States. 

    If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.  

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI USA: Washington State Man Arrested on Federal Charges Alleging He Provided Material Support to Palm Springs Fertility Clinic Bomber

    Source: US State of California

    A Washington state man was arrested on a federal criminal complaint alleging he provided material support to the Palm Springs fertility clinic bomber by shipping and paying for significant quantities of ammonium nitrate – an explosive precursor – prior to the suicidal terror attack last month.

    Daniel Jongyon Park, 32, of Kent, was arrested last night shortly after his flight from Poland arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York. Park is charged with providing and attempting to provide material support to terrorists and made his initial court appearance today in the Eastern District of New York.

    “This defendant is charged with facilitating the horrific attack on a fertility center in California. Bringing chaos and violence to a facility that exists to help women and mothers is a particularly cruel, disgusting crime that strikes at the very heart of our shared humanity,” said Attorney General Pamela Bondi. “We are grateful to our partners in Poland who helped get this man back to America and we will prosecute him to the fullest extent of the law.”

    “Park allegedly sent large amounts of explosive precursors to the man who drove a car bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs, an attack that potentially could have killed innocent people,”  said FBI Director Kash Patel. “The FBI and our partners work together to find and hold accountable those who engage in domestic terrorism and other illegal activity. I also want to express my thanks to authorities in Poland for their vital assistance in this case.”

    “This defendant is charged with shipping large quantities of explosive precursors to the man whose suicide bombing last month destroyed a fertility clinic in Palm Springs,” said U.S. Attorney Bill Essayli for the Central District of California. “Domestic terrorism is evil and unacceptable. Those who aid terrorists can expect to feel the cold wrath of justice.”

    According to an affidavit filed with the complaint, Guy Edward Bartkus, 25, of Twentynine Palms, California, drove a car containing a bomb to a fertility clinic in Palm Springs on May 17. Bartkus detonated the bomb, killing himself, injuring numerous victims, destroying the fertility clinic’s building, and damaging surrounding buildings and areas. Bartkus’s attack was motivated by his pro-mortalism, anti-natalism, and anti-pro-life ideology, which is the belief that individuals should not be born without their consent and that non-existence is best.

    Park – who shares Bartkus’s extremist views – shipped large quantities of explosive precursor materials to Bartkus, including approximately 180 pounds of ammonium nitrate. Days before the Palm Springs bombing, Park paid for an additional 90 pounds (40.8 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate that was shipped to Bartkus.

    Park sent the first shipments of approximately 180 pounds (81.7 kilograms) of ammonium nitrate to Bartkus shortly before traveling to Bartkus’s residence, where he stayed with Bartkus from Jan. 25 to Feb. 8. Three days before Park arrived at Bartkus’s house, records from an AI chat application show that Bartkus researched how to make powerful explosions using ammonium nitrate and fuel.

    During his stay at Bartkus’s residence, Park and Bartkus spent time in Bartkus’s room as well as in a detached garage “running experiments,” according to the affidavit. This was the same garage where law enforcement, during a search after the May 17 bombing, located significant amounts of chemicals commonly used in the construction of homemade bombs.

    Four days after Bartkus conducted the suicide bombing, Park flew to Europe. On May 30, Park was detained in Poland and later was ordered deported to the United States. 

    If convicted, Park would face a statutory maximum penalty of 15 years in federal prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    The FBI’s Inland Empire Joint Terrorism Task Force is investigating this matter. Considerable assistance was provided by the Palm Springs Police Department, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department; the FBI’s legal attaché in Warsaw, Polish authorities, and FBI field offices in Seattle, New York, San Diego, Las Vegas, and Portland.  

    Assistant U.S. Attorneys Sarah E. Gerdes and Anna P. Boylan for the Central District of California, and Trial Attorney Patrick J. Cashman of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News