Category: terrorism

  • SCO members must condemn Pahalgam terror attack unequivocally: Rajnath Singh in China

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has called on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members to unequivocally condemn the evil and dastardly Pahalgam terror attack in India’s Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and said that any act of terrorism is “criminal and unjustifiable.”

    During his address at the SCO Defence Ministers’ meeting in China’s Qingdao, Defence Minister Singh recalled the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, in which 26 tourists were killed by ‘The Resistance Front’, an offshoot of the Pakistan-based UN-designated terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba.

    Defence Minister Singh said the pattern of the attack mirrored previous strikes by LeT in India.

    “In exercising its right to defend against terrorism and pre-empt as well as deter further cross-border terrorist attacks, India on May 7, 2025, successfully launched ‘Operation Sindoor’ to dismantle cross-border terrorist infrastructure,” he said.

    “We reiterate the need to hold the perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors of reprehensible acts of terrorism, including cross-border terrorism, accountable and bring them to justice. Any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivation, whenever, wherever and by whomever committed,” he said.

    “SCO members must condemn this evil unequivocally,” the Defence Minister added.

    He also called for united and decisive action against terrorism and the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in the possession of non-State actors and terrorist groups.

    He underlined that peace and prosperity cannot co-exist with terror and highlighted radicalisation, extremism and a growing trust deficit as the foremost challenges facing the region.

    “I believe that the biggest challenges that we are facing in our region are related to peace, security and trust deficit. And the root cause of these problems is increasing radicalisation, extremism and terrorism,” he said.

    “Peace and prosperity cannot co-exist with terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the hands of non-State actors and terror groups,” he said, stressing that only a collective and resolute stand can ensure safety and security for all.

    Defence Minister Singh said that it is “imperative that those who sponsor, nurture and utilise terrorism for their narrow and selfish ends must bear the consequences.”

    Defence Minister Singh warned that nations using cross-border terrorism as a tool of State policy must face consequences.

    “Some countries use cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy and provide shelter to terrorists. There should be no place for such double standards. SCO should not hesitate to criticise such nations,” he asserted.

    Reiterating India’s zero tolerance towards terrorism, he said, “India’s zero tolerance for terrorism is manifest today through its actions. This includes our right to defend ourselves against terrorism. We have shown that epicentres of terrorism are no longer safe, and we will not hesitate to target them.”

    Highlighting the need for global action to prevent the radicalisation of youth, Defence Minister Singh said the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has played a key role in coordinating counter-radicalisation efforts.

    He added that the joint statement issued during India’s chairmanship of the SCO Council of Heads of State on ‘Countering Radicalisation leading to Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism’ reflects the organisation’s shared commitment.

    Defence Minister Singh urged member states to act against the use of modern technology by terrorists, particularly the use of drones for smuggling weapons and narcotics.

    “In our interconnected world, traditional borders are no longer the sole barriers against threats. Instead, we face an intricate web of challenges that range from transnational terrorism and cyber-attacks to hybrid warfare,” he said.

    “These threats do not respect national boundaries, and they demand a unified response rooted in transparency, mutual trust, and collaboration.”

    The Defence Minister underscored the importance of multilateralism, emphasising India’s belief in dialogue and cooperation to prevent conflicts.

    “India believes that reformed multilateralism can help build cooperation to prevent conflict between countries by creating mechanisms for dialogue and collaboration. No country, however large and powerful, can manage alone,” he said, invoking the ancient Indian ethos of ‘Sarve Jana Sukhino Bhavantu (May all people be happy)’.

    He reiterated India’s consistent support for peace and stability in Afghanistan.

    “Our immediate priorities in Afghanistan include providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people and contributing to Afghanistan’s overall developmental needs. As Afghanistan’s largest regional development partner, India continues to implement capacity-building initiatives for the Afghan people,” Defence Minister Singh said.

    He concluded with a call for greater cooperation among SCO members, stating that India supports “greater cooperation and mutual trust among SCO members. We should collectively aspire to fulfil the aspirations and expectations of our people as well as tackle today’s challenges. We must all be in lockstep in our endeavour to strengthen stability and security in our neighbourhood.”

    (IANS)

  • India’s Defence Minister rejects coexistence of terror and peace at SCO Summit

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Defence Minister Rajnath Singh has called for united and decisive action against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the possession of non-state actors and terrorist groups during his address at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Defence Ministers’ Meeting in China’s Qingdao.

    He underlined that peace and prosperity cannot co-exist with terror and highlighted radicalisation, extremism and a growing trust deficit as the foremost challenges facing the region.

    “I believe that the biggest challenges that we are facing in our region are related to peace, security and trust deficit. And the root cause of these problems is increasing radicalisation, extremism and terrorism,” Singh said.

    “Peace and prosperity cannot co-exist with terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) in the hands of non-state actors and terror groups,” he said, stressing that only a collective and resolute stand can ensure safety and security for all.

    The Defence Minister said that it is “imperative that those who sponsor, nurture and utilise terrorism for their narrow and selfish ends must bear the consequences.” The Defence Minister warned that nations using cross-border terrorism as a tool of state policy must face consequences.

    “Some countries use cross-border terrorism as an instrument of policy and provide shelter to terrorists. There should be no place for such double standards. SCO should not hesitate to criticise such nations,” he asserted.

    Reiterating India’s zero tolerance towards terrorism, Singh said, “India’s zero tolerance for terrorism is manifest today through its actions. This includes our right to defend ourselves against terrorism. We have shown that epicentres of terrorism are no longer safe, and we will not hesitate to target them.”

    Highlighting the need for global action to prevent the radicalisation of youth, Singh said the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) has played a key role in coordinating counter-radicalisation efforts.

    He added that the joint statement issued during India’s chairmanship of the SCO Council of Heads of State on ‘Countering Radicalisation leading to Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism’ reflects the organisation’s shared commitment.

    Singh urged member states to act against the use of modern technology by terrorists, particularly the use of drones for smuggling weapons and narcotics.

    “In our interconnected world, traditional borders are no longer the sole barriers against threats. Instead, we face an intricate web of challenges that range from transnational terrorism and cyber-attacks to hybrid warfare,” he said.

    “These threats do not respect national boundaries, and they demand a unified response rooted in transparency, mutual trust, and collaboration.”

    Recalling the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, in which 26 tourists were killed by ‘The Resistance Front’, an offshoot of the Pakistan-based UN-designated terror group, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Rajnath Singh said the pattern of the attack mirrored previous strikes by LeT in India.

    “In exercising its right to defend against terrorism and pre-empt as well as deter further cross-border terrorist attacks, India on May 7, 2025, successfully launched Op Sindoor to dismantle cross-border terrorist infrastructure,” he said.

    Singh called for accountability for those behind terrorist acts.

    “We reiterate the need to hold the perpetrators, organisers, financiers and sponsors of reprehensible acts of terrorism, including cross-border terrorism, accountable and bring them to justice. Any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivation, whenever, wherever and by whomever committed. SCO members must condemn this evil unequivocally,” he said.

    The Defence Minister underscored the importance of multilateralism, emphasising India’s belief in dialogue and cooperation to prevent conflicts.

    “India believes that reformed multilateralism can help build cooperation to prevent conflict between countries by creating mechanisms for dialogue and collaboration. No country, however large and powerful, can manage alone,” he said, invoking the ancient Indian ethos of ‘Sarve Jana Sukhino Bhavantu’ (May all people be happy).

    He reiterated India’s consistent support for peace and stability in Afghanistan.

    “Our immediate priorities in Afghanistan include providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people and contributing to Afghanistan’s overall developmental needs. As Afghanistan’s largest regional development partner, India continues to implement capacity-building initiatives for the Afghan people,” Singh said.

    He concluded with a call for greater cooperation among SCO members, stating that India supports “greater cooperation and mutual trust among SCO members. We should collectively aspire to fulfil the aspirations and expectations of our people as well as tackle today’s challenges. We must all be in lockstep in our endeavour to strengthen stability and security in our neighbourhood.” (IANS)

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Two ISIS militants killed in northern Iraq

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BAGHDAD, June 26 (Xinhua) — Two militants of the Islamic State (IS) group were killed on Wednesday during a military operation in northern Iraq, the Iraqi counter-terrorism service said in a statement.

    Acting on intelligence, counter-terrorism forces ambushed militants in a remote area of Kirkuk province.

    The counter-terrorism service will continue to fight terrorism in all corners of Iraq, the statement said.

    While Iraq declared victory over ISIS in 2017, remnants of the group continue to carry out attacks on security forces and civilians in cities, deserts and remote areas. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Gov. Pillen Celebrates Passage of Bill to Protect Against Influence of Foreign Adversaries

    Source: US State of Nebraska

    . Pillen Celebrates Passage of Bill to Protect Against Influence of Foreign Adversaries

     

    LINCOLN, NE – Today, Governor Jim Pillen celebrated passage of LB644, brought on his behalf by Senator Eliot Bostar. During the news conference, the Governor signed ceremonial copies of the bill. He officially signed the legislation into law on June 4.

    LB644 creates two new acts: the Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act and the Crush Transnational Repression in Nebraska Act. Together, the acts are aimed at knowing who represents foreign adversaries within the state, curbing the information and/or data they may access or distribute, as well as providing protection against tactics that could be utilized by such organizations to cause undue influence or harm. Reporting requirements and penalties for violations are outlined within each Act.

    “Iran, China, Russia, North Korea, Cuba and the Maduro regime in Venezuela are all designated as foreign adversaries by the U.S. Government,” said Gov. Pillen. “They do not have our best interests at heart and as a result, we need to take appropriate steps to make sure that as a state, we are protected.”

    LB644 represents the latest of several executive and legislative actions that Gov. Pillen has authorized since taking office – all aimed at making sure state assets including infrastructure, land, technology and people are protected.

    “In today’s world, the means of getting access, of getting information, and crippling our most critical systems is easier than ever, which is why we are highly focused on addressing these issues,” continued Gov. Pillen.

    Lieutenant Governor Joe Kelly, who serves as the state’s director of homeland security, called attention to several of the executive orders and bills signed by Gov. Pillen over the two previous legislative sessions — including LB683 and LB1301 — both brought Sen. Bostar. Those bills, respectively, address the protection of communications equipment and prohibit companies from adversarial countries bidding on state and local procurement contracts.

    “This year, primarily, the legislation is focused on guarding against foreign adversarial influence operations,” said Bostar. “We have some existing transparency requirements for those who would seek to influence policy in the state of Nebraska, but not enough. It doesn’t prohibit the circumvention of full transparency over interests that would be adversarial to the interests of Nebraskans.”

    Michael Lucci, founder and CEO of State Armor, pointed to Nebraska’s leadership among other states when it comes to addressing national security issues.

    “Resilience is the key topic for states to address — being ready for potential conflict, being ready to counter political warfare — this is a part of resilience,” noted Lucci.

    State Armor works alongside states to identify solutions to global security issues and was founded following the introduction of LB683 in 2023.

    “One of the first things when our organization was founded was to tell states, ‘do what Nebraska did.’  And we have not stopped conveying that message.”  

    Lucci commended Nebraska lawmakers on taking a bipartisan approach to legislation aimed at protecting the state and signaled it was the approach President Trump and other federal officials want to see.  

    Major General Craig Strong, adjutant general for the Nebraska National Guard and director of the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) remarked that in his dual role, homeland security was top of mind.

    “Our adversaries can reach out at us through many different methods, and not just through the traditional, conventional munitions, but by way of cyber-attack, satellite imagery and other vectors that we have to be aware of, such as drones,” said MG Strong. “This bill clearly helps us maintain the level of awareness and readiness that are important elements of our state emergency response plans, particularly as it relates to Nebraska’s homeland defense.

     Also attending today’s news conference and ceremonial bill signing were senators Beau Ballard, Barry DeKay and Brian Hardin.

     Links to executive orders, legislation and letters signed by Gov. Pillen to protect the state against foreign adversaries can be found below.

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/press/gov-pillen-joins-letter-calling-halt-foreign-land-grabs

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/press/governor-pillen-senators-push-back-against-foreign-adversaries

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/press/gov-pillen-senators-and-dept-ag-present-laws-protect-nebraska-foreign-adversaries-during-news

    https://governor.nebraska.gov/gov-pillen-signs-executive-order-banning-more-ccp-tech

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: In Aftermath of Iran Strikes, Reed Urges Trump Admin. to Strengthen Cybersecurity

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Rhode Island Jack Reed

    WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. cyber officials and private experts are warning that Iran and Iran-linked groups may try to target the U.S. with a range of cyberattacks that could cause serious damage and disruption to private and public sector interests.  In the wake of U.S. airstrikes on Iran, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued a bulletin through the National Terrorism Advisory System, which read: “Low-level cyber attacks against U.S. networks by pro-Iranian hacktivists are likely, and cyber actors affiliated with the Iranian government may conduct attacks against U.S. networks.”

    In addition to these warnings, U.S. Senator Jack Reed (D-RI), the Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, is urging the Trump Administration to take action to bolster the nation’s cyber defenses and assist American industries and municipalities that may be targeted for attacks. 

    “As sophisticated cyber threats mount, we should be surging resources and reinforcements to America’s cyber defenses.  We’ve got to secure our infrastructure and protect critical systems.  Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has undermined the capacity and capabilities of our country’s most critical cybersecurity agencies,” said Senator Reed.

    Reed warns that the Trump Administration’s partisan efforts to purge the federal workforce and slash the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) — America’s primary cyber agency — is putting U.S. national security at risk.  CISA is the frontline federal agency in charge of defending federal networks, state and local governments, and critical infrastructure against cyber threats.  CISA’s mission includes ransomware defense, supply chain resilience, and public-private coordination.

    The Trump Administration has targeted CISA for downsizing, already forcing out over 1,000 CISA employees – roughly one-third of CISA’s workforce.  The drastic staff reductions coupled with proposed future budget cuts jeopardize America’s ability to effectively repel, thwart, and deter cyberattacks; defend federal networks; and support critical infrastructure operators.

    Reed stated: “As the cyber threat level is rising from Iran, affiliated hacktivists, and other adversaries, the Trump Administration is gutting CISA and taking down our best defenses, leaving America dangerously exposed to cyberattacks.  The Trump Administration must stop undermining the capacity of America’s cyber defense agency.  I urge the Trump Administration to take immediate action to rehire technical cyber talent, restore CISA funding, and reinstate key cyber defense programs immediately.  We need to ramp up in the weeks and months ahead and be vigilant in defending against offensive cyber operations by Iran or their partners.”

    The Trump Administration is seeking to reduce CISA’s budget by over $490 million – reducing the agency’s operational funding obligations from $2.38 billion to $1.96 billion.  This includes dismantling and eliminating several key programs entirely, such as the agency’s Election Security Program and the innovative Cyber Safety Review Board.

    Meanwhile, the Trump Administration is targeting other key U.S. cyber defense assets for major budget cuts, including:

    • The FBI, which leads domestic cybercriminal investigations, would have its budget reduced $560 million, alongside a loss of nearly 1,900 staff.
    • The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) National Security Division, which handles foreign intelligence surveillance policy and various counterintelligence operations, would have its budget reduced by $14 million, accompanied by a reduction of full-time employees.
    • The U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security and Emergency Response, which oversees cybersecurity for the nation’s electric grid, would see a sharp cut of $43 million and a staffing reduction of more than 30 percent.
    • The National Science Foundation’s computer science research activities would be cut by $606 million, or 64 percent of its budget, in FY26.

    Beyond CISA and domestic cyber defenses, President Trump abruptly fired the previous director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and head of U.S. Cyber Command, General Timothy Haugh, and his top deputy, without explanation this April, following a meeting with right-wing activist Laura Loomer at the White House.  With support from U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, Army Lt. General Richard Angle was then announced as the nominee to be the successor for the job.  However, the White House then opted not to move forward with Lt. General Angle’s nomination, without public explanation.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: In Dialogue with Kazakhstan, Experts of the Human Rights Committee Commend the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Ask about Excessive Use of Force during 2022 Demonstrations and Internet Censorship

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Human Rights Committee today concluded its consideration of the third periodic report of Kazakhstan on how it implements the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, with Committee Experts commending the State’s abolition of the death penalty, and raising issues concerning excessive use of force by law enforcement officials during demonstrations in January 2022 and internet censorship.

    Changrok Soh, Committee Chairperson, and other Committee Experts commended Kazakhstan for its abolition of the death penalty and ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant.

    A Committee Expert cited reports of excessive use of force during demonstrations in January 2022 that resulted in the deaths of several peaceful protesters.  Investigations into these incidents were reportedly insufficient. What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?

    Another Committee Expert said Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval.  Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts. Could the delegation comment on these issues?

    Botagoz Zhaxelekova, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said that, as part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.

    In the ensuing discussion, the delegation said that the 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.

    On internet censorship, the delegation said this year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked.  Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act. It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Ms. Zhaxelekova, in concluding remarks, thanked the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans, she said.

    In his concluding remarks, Mr. Soh said the delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    The delegation of Kazakhstan was made up of representatives of the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection of the Population; Ministry of Culture and Information; Ministry of Education; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Justice; Court Administration; Anti-Corruption Agency; Prosecutor General’s Office; and the Permanent Mission of Kazakhstan to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Human Rights Committee’s one hundred and forty-fourth session is being held from 23 June to 17 July 2025.  All the documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Meeting summary releases can be found here.  The webcast of the Committee’s public meetings can be accessed via the UN Web TV webpage.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Thursday, 26 June to begin its consideration of the initial report of Guinea Bissau (CCPR/C/GNB/1).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the third periodic report of Kazakhstan (CCPR/C/KAZ/3).

    Presentation of the Report

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, said international obligations were an integral part of Kazakhstan’s national legal system.  The provisions of the Covenant took precedence over national legislation, and the State’s primary priority was the protection of citizens’ rights.

    During the reporting period, the State made far-reaching reforms aiming to consolidate democracy and build a just Kazakhstan. In 2022, constitutional reforms reinforced human rights protections for all Kazakh citizens, moving the State from a super-Presidential form of Government to a Presidential Republic with a strengthened Parliament.  The President could now serve only a single seven-year term and could not seek re-election. Rural mayors were now directly elected, and regional authorities had been granted greater autonomy. 

    The role of the lower house of Parliament in forming the Government had been strengthened – Parliament’s consent was now required for the appointment of the Prime Minister and other members of the Government.  The lower house was also empowered to hear reports from the Government, including on human rights issues.

    In addition, the registration process for political parties had been simplified; the electoral process had been improved; and the registration threshold had been reduced fourfold, from 20,000 to 5,000 members.  For the first time, six political parties, including opposition parties, were represented in the lower house.  Nearly half of the members of Parliament had been newly elected, including independent candidates.  A 30 per cent quota for women, youth, and persons with disabilities was introduced for the allocation of party list mandates.  The Mazhilis (lower house of Parliament) now included 18 women, six persons with disabilities, and eight individuals under the age of 35.

    The Constitutional Court had been re-established as a key mechanism for protecting rights and freedoms.  All citizens could appeal to it free of charge, and interpretation services were available.  To date, the Court had issued over 500 rulings and 71 final decisions.  In 20 per cent of reviewed cases, legal provisions were found to be unconstitutional.

    Constitutional law had expanded the powers of the Human Rights Commissioner, who could now directly address the President, both chambers of Parliament, and the Government with proposals to improve human rights mechanisms and initiate systemic legislative measures.  The Ombudsman was empowered to file lawsuits to defend the rights of an unlimited number of individuals, access all penal institutions freely, interview any person, and intervene in cases of rights violations. Regional Ombudspersons for the rights of children and for socially vulnerable groups had also been appointed across the country.

    Extensive work had been carried out in the field of lawmaking.  Laws adopted during the reporting period included the law on peaceful assemblies, which introduced a notification-based system for assemblies; a law decriminalising defamation; a law granting citizens and civil society organizations the right to oversee Government and quasi-public entities; a law obliging the Government to respond to petitions that received more than 50,000 signatures; a law expanding journalists’ rights to access and disseminate information; and the Social Code, which guaranteed equality and the inadmissibility of discrimination in all areas of life and increased State social benefits by 15 per cent. 

    Other laws adopted included a law aimed at protecting victims of domestic violence, which led to the annual number of crimes against women decreasing by 2.5 times; legislation increasing penalties for crimes against the sexual integrity of children; a law granting public monitoring commissions and the national preventive mechanism unrestricted access to all closed facilities in the country without prior notice and establishing criminal liability for cruel and inhuman treatment; and a law on combatting human trafficking.

    As a result of preventive measures, the number of registered torture cases had declined each year.  In 2024, the number fell by 40 per cent.  Since 2020, a Compensation Fund for Victims of Torture had been operating, and over the past five years, more than 3,000 compensation payments had been made.

    Kazakhstan was also taking measures to protect its citizens abroad.  From 2019 to 2021, the country carried out special operations repatriating 754 individuals from Syria, including 526 children and citizens of neighbouring countries.  All children received passports and women were supported to return to a normal life.

    As part of national action plans, systemic efforts had been made to enhance human rights protections.  A total of 94 actions had been planned, more than 75 per cent of which had already been implemented.  These included the ratification of the Second Optional Protocol to the Covenant, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, without reservations.  This commitment was also enshrined in the Constitution.  Kazakhstan was currently working with countries in Central Asia and Mongolia to make the region the first death penalty-free zone.  In 2023, Kazakhstan also ratified two Optional Protocols: one to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and another to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 

    To ensure the effective implementation of decisions and requests from United Nations committees, a working group was established in 2022.  It included representatives from the main State authorities.  Kazakhstan had responded positively to decisions on individual communications by United Nations committees, including through the payment of compensation in the cases of Gerasimov, Bayramov and Malykhin. 

    The State party had also incorporated the recommendations of the United Nations High Commissioner Volker Türk, who visited Kazakhstan in 2023, into a comprehensive action plan on human rights and the rule of law.  The action plan focused on protecting the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities; combatting domestic violence; strengthening labour rights; and safeguarding freedom of association.

    The Government has been actively engaging with civil society on all major reforms.  One notable example of this engagement was the “Dialogue Platform for the Human Dimension” under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Since 2013, more than 50 meetings had been held, and their outcomes were reflected in three human rights action plans, including recently adopted laws on combatting human trafficking, the criminalisation of domestic violence, and the fight against torture.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the Committee welcomed Kazakhstan’s abolition of the death penalty and its ratification of the Second Optional Protocol in 2022, as well as the strengthening of the Constitutional Court in 2023 and the establishment of several mechanisms and institutions.  The Committee had, in recent years, issued a substantial number of Views concluding violations of the Covenant by the State party, but had received disturbing information that most of these had not been followed up.  Would the State party extend the mandate of the interagency working group, which was tasked with analysing these Views?  What measures had been taken to give full effect to the Committee’s recommendations?  How were members of the judiciary trained on international procedures?

    The adoption of the international treaties act enhanced the role of international treaties in the national legal order. Did the Covenant have direct effect? The Committee welcomed national plans related to human rights.  How effective had implementation of these plans been?  Domestic courts had assessed a substantial number of cases involving the Covenant.  Had these courts directly implemented the Covenant?  Was training on the Covenant for the judiciary compulsory?  How was the public educated on the Committee’s work?

    The Committee welcomed that the Human Rights Commission’s mandate had been expanded but noted that it had “B” status since 2012. Had the State worked to have it accredited with “A” status?  What were the obstacles in this regard?  How did the State party guarantee a transparent and independent procedure for appointing members of the Commission?  How did the Commissioner monitor the implementation of the Covenant?  Could the Commissioner be held accountable for inaction?  The State party had invested in the national preventive mechanism against torture, but this institution depended on the Human Rights Commission to carry out its operations and reportedly needed to announce visits to places of detention in advance.  How would the State party strengthen the mechanism?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed the significant changes to the national framework, including the establishment of the national Anti-Corruption Agency.  There were concerns about the influence of public officials over this institution. What measures were in place to ensure the independence of the Agency?  Media reportedly faced political pressure when reporting on corruption, with some having been imprisoned.  What measures were in place to protect media personnel investigating corruption?

    The law on countering extremism included a vague definition of “extremism” that allowed for arbitrary interpretation.  Would this definition be revised?  Were media personnel pressured to expose colleagues’ actions to reduce sentences against them?  Did the State party plan to remove people convicted of non-violent crimes from the list of people accused of financing terrorism?  Which objective standards were used in courts to define extremist activities?  The Committee called for statistics on persons tried for extremist crimes.

    The Committee welcomed legal safeguards against surgical sterilisation, but was concerned about uneven access to contraception and high rates of teenage pregnancy.  What steps had been taken to expand access to affordable contraceptives and family planning programmes?  The Committee was concerned by reports of forced sterilisation and abortion, particularly targeting persons with disabilities, and gender stereotypes embedded in school curricula.  What measures were in place to address these issues and develop adequate sexual and reproductive health education?

    A Committee Expert said that demonstrations in December 2011 resulted in the deaths and injuries of civilians, and reported torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals put under trial related to these protests.  Investigations into these incidents and many alleged perpetrators of human rights violations were reportedly insufficient.  What measures would the State party take to hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies to victims and their families?  How many investigations had been carried out thus far and what convictions had been handed down?

    The Committee welcomed measures taken to address the high suicide rate in detention centres, but this high rate reportedly persisted.  What further measures were planned to reduce the suicide rate and to investigate all deaths in custody?

    One Committee Expert said that the State party’s laws on discrimination did not address all forms of discrimination included in the Covenant, despite high levels of discrimination against certain groups in the State party.  Efforts to revise anti-discrimination laws seemed to have stalled.  Was there a plan to revive these?

    The Committee welcomed the State party’s efforts to promote the rights of persons with disabilities.  Would it remove discriminatory language in its laws related to persons with disabilities?

    In 2020, the Dungan community experienced ethnic violence resulting in deaths, injuries, property damage, and the displacement of thousands of community members.  Law enforcement authorities reportedly ignored these incidents, delaying investigations and prosecutions.  What progress had been made in setting up a reconciliation committee and in providing remedies to victims?

    There were credible reports of violence and discrimination targeting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals. Why had organizations of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons been denied formal registration and the right to peaceful assembly?  The Kazakhstan Union of Parents had submitted a petition seeking to ban “propaganda” related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  How had the Government responded to this petition?  Public funding had been removed from gender reassignment surgery and the minimum age for such procedures had been raised to 21.  How would the Government support persons who sought such surgery?

    Another Committee Expert welcomed that Kazakhstan’s law prohibited gender-based discrimination, but expressed concern that women accounted for only 27 per cent of the Mazhilis, and had limited representation in decision-making positions in public and private bodies.  There was a major salary gap between men and women, and the law did not ensure equal pay for equal work.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure substantive equality between men and women and to address discrimination in access to education, land and property rights?  How did the State party promote women’s representation in decision-making bodies and managerial roles?  What measures were in place to address the gender pay gap?

    The Committee welcomed that the State party had financed gender equality initiatives, but noted that the gender equality strategy had been replaced with the gender and family policy.  The 2009 law on domestic violence was limited to violence by immediate family members.  What legislative and other measures had been taken to combat violence against women and girls?  How had the State party tackled the rise in domestic violence observed during the COVID-19 pandemic?  How was it addressing issues such as forced and early marriages and ensuring a victim-centred approach to investigations and prosecutions? 

    Stigma surrounded reporting of cases of domestic and gender-based violence and police were reportedly reluctant to act on such cases. How did the State party encourage reporting of violence by victims, ensure adequate funding for victim support services, and collect data on complaints, investigations and sentences? What measures were in place to strengthen awareness raising campaigns on violence against women targeting public officials and civil society?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the Covenant was directly applicable in Kazakhstan and took precedence over domestic legislation. Over the past eight years, over 7,000 decisions were handed down by the courts that referenced the Covenant. Training seminars on Covenant rights were held for members of the judiciary.  The Government had made good progress on the human rights action plan, having implemented around 75 action points thus far, including actions promoting gender equality and women’s representation in decision-making bodies, as well as the investigation of torture.

    The Ombudsperson’s status was enshrined in the Constitution.  It did not report to Government bodies and had immunity in carrying out its activities. Its financial independence was guaranteed and it had direct access to all Government bodies.  In 2023, the Ombudsperson representatives carried out more than 700 monitoring visits and issued over 600 recommendations, some 70 per cent of which were implemented.  An assessment of institutional capacity was carried out in 2023 by the Human Rights Commissioner towards its accreditation with “A” status by the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions.

    The independent national preventive mechanism consisted of 126 members, a large percentage of whom were representatives of non-governmental organizations.  They were elected through a transparent process by the coordination council.  The Ombudsperson was working on improving the professional knowledge of the mechanism’s members.  Its annual budget was spent exclusively on its needs.  It had unlimited access to all detention centres in the country and did not need prior permission to conduct visits.

    The Anti-Corruption Agency was independent. It had held several high-level officials accountable for corruption and had seized several millions of dollars in assets from those officials, investing those assets directly in Government programmes such as school construction projects.  The Agency provided free consultations with citizens periodically and worked with citizen volunteers who monitored corruption.

    The State ensured the safety of journalists who investigated corruption, providing all assistance necessary to those journalists. Journalists had broad rights to receive answers to their questions from public officials and to attend public events.

    The concepts of “extremism” and “terrorism” defined in national legislation and the Constitution were in line with those of international law.  The State party welcomed the Committee’s recommendations for improving these laws. All inclusions in the list of organizations linked to terrorism financing were based on the sentences of judges.  Around 1,000 persons had been removed from the list after review, including persons already serving sentences under the Criminal Code and persons found to have given up extremist views.

    Kazakhstan’s Health Code guaranteed the right to reproductive healthcare.  Women had the right not to be subjected to forced abortions or sterilisation and had access to all sexual and reproductive health services.  Gynaecologists determined whether terminations of pregnancy were necessary.  Minors could seek terminations with the written permission of their parents. Family planning and contraception services were provided by the State.  Medical, out-patient and in-patient services had been established in rural areas – 308 medical facilities had been built last year. Events were held that promoted reproductive health and aimed to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies.  Increased access to maternal health services had led to a reduction in maternal mortality and the number of abortions.

    The Prosecutor’s Office had conducted investigations into the events of December 2011, as had monitoring bodies from the United Nations.  The Government had allowed representatives of non-governmental organizations and the media to attend trials related to these events.  Some 1,100 witness testimonies were conducted as part of investigations, which led to the sentencing of 13 officials.  All persons who had been arrested were now released. Investigations found that there was no evidence of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of arrested persons by public officials.  One official had been charged with granting officers permission to use lethal firearms, which led to the death of 12 persons.  These victims’ families had been granted damages by the courts.

    Discrimination was not allowed on grounds of sex, ethnicity, race, status, property or religion, among other characteristics. The State party had created a committee promoting inter-ethnic harmony, which had developed guidelines on access to legal remedies for victims of discrimination and recommendations for improving legislation on discrimination. 

    All citizens were equal before the law and no person could be subject to discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity.  Members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex community had access to all fundamental rights.  The State party had agreed to conduct research on the impact of propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons in response to the petition it had received.  Sex changes were regulated by domestic law; persons aged 21 or over with legal capacity had the right to change their sex.

    Some 87 persons had been convicted for having taking part in mass unrest in 2020 affecting the Dungan community, damaging property and obstructing the actions of the police.  All victims had had their property restored.

    The law on persons with disabilities granted persons with category two disabilities priority access to public housing. National standards were in place that supported access to infrastructure and services for persons with disabilities. The accessibility level of buildings was mapped by the State party, and more than 124,000 buildings had been adapted to promote accessibility.

    In April 2024, a law was adopted that aimed to protect women and girls from violence.  There was criminal liability for battery and bodily harm.  Police were obliged to investigate all suspected cases of domestic violence, even when there was no report.  The punishment for sexual violence had been increased to up to life imprisonment.  Forced marriage was punished with up to 10 years imprisonment.  Measures were in place to ensure that victims could file complaints.  The Government funded a specific unit on combatting domestic violence and provided training to officials on responding to domestic violence.  Courts issued restraining orders and instructions relating to behaviour in domestic violence cases as required.  Mobile units responded in a timely manner to reports of violence; they had worked with more than 100,000 families.

    The share of women in local assemblies was 22.7 per cent. There were three women ministers and eight women vice-ministers, and the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court was a woman.  Some 53 per cent of judges were women.  The State party was working actively to ensure that the quota of 30 per cent female candidates was respected.

    The ideology of the gender equality strategy had not changed.  The State party was working with United Nations agencies to promote gender-sensitive budgeting and establish bodies within ministries with gender-related mandates.

    Around 15 per cent of senior public officials were women. Since 2018, some 7,000 women had served in military operations and 15 Kazakh women had served in United Nations peacekeeping roles.  Equal pay for equal work for men and women was enshrined in the Constitution. Discrimination on any grounds was not allowed.  The Labour Code prohibited discrimination on the grounds of gender.  Women who felt they had been discriminated against could turn to the courts to seek remedies.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert welcomed that the procedure for follow-up on Views had led to legal changes and the payment of compensation to victims.  The Expert also welcomed efforts made by the State party to inform the public about the Committee’s work.  Another Committee Expert welcomed measures promoting access to registration for civil society organizations.  One Committee Expert commended the participation of 15 Kazakh women in United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the increasing number of women in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, said he was impressed by the abolition of the death penalty and progress in improving the representation of women, but noted that there were still issues that needed to be addressed.

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on how the State party promoted the independence of the Ombudsperson, despite the President’s role in appointing its members; investigations into individual cases of killings and claims of torture occurring during December 2011 protests and reparations provided to victims’ families, and whether an official public apology had been issued for these human rights violations; whether the State party would formally recognise the right of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons to protection from discrimination; details on planned revisions to discrimination legislation; the status of research into propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons; whether a law on gender-based harassment would be promulgated soon; and resistance to laws on violence against women from conservative segments of society.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the national preventive mechanism carried out more than 500 monitoring visits per year.  It had issued more than 16,000 recommendations to institutions as of 2020, of which 44 per cent had been implemented.

    An investigation was carried out into events related to December 2011 protests.  There was no evidence of the acts of torture that were alleged, preventing judicial investigation of those allegations.  The investigations into the murder of 12 individuals and the injury of six determined that arms were used with unlawful intent, inflicting grievous bodily harm, but not necessarily murder.  One official had refused to provide medical care to an injured person and was sentenced to five years imprisonment.

    Issues related to discrimination legislation and the petition on propaganda related to lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons would be considered once research into these issues was completed. Civil society was invited to join discussions related to the petition and other Government measures.

    National legislation allowed for liability for various forms of harassment.  Last year, changes were brought to the Criminal Code banning sexual activity with minors under age 16.  The Government was assessing the effectiveness of current legislation on gender-based violence, which would be revised in 2027.

    The 2022 constitutional law on the Human Rights Commissioner expanded the powers of the Ombudsperson and the mandate of the Human Rights Commissioner.  The findings of the visits of the national preventive mechanism were published in its annual report.  As a result of its findings, disciplinary actions had been taken against over 440 officials.  In addition to the national preventive mechanism, members of Parliament, judges, prosecutors and the Commissioner for the Rights of the Child could also visit places of detention without prior authorisation. 

    The Ombudsperson could participate in discussions on national reports for human rights treaty bodies.  They had not exercised their right to appeal to the Constitutional Court, as they had been able to address all complaints they had received through other legal recourses.  This did not indicate a refusal to exercise this authority.

    The Labour Code prohibited discrimination against women and regulated workers’ rights to respect and dignity. Employers were obliged to ensure safe and healthy working conditions.  Workers could submit complaints of workplace harassment to the Workplace Ethics Committee or to the police.

    There were 170 suicides in prisons between 2017 and 2024.  For each case, an investigation was carried out to determine the causes, and around 150 officials had been sanctioned for not fulfilling their care duties. Training was provided to prison guards on identifying at-risk inmates and preventing suicides, and to prisoners on promoting self-confidence and preparing for release.  Several additional measures had been implemented in prisons to prevent suicides.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the State party did not have a specific law on the use of force and firearms by officials.  Did it plan to enact such a law that was in line with international standards?  There were allegations of excessive use of force during January 2022 protests, which had led to the death of several peaceful protesters.  Did the State party plan to conduct thorough, independent investigations into these allegations, hold perpetrators to account, and provide adequate remedies for victims?  The mass detention of protesters reportedly led to disappearances, and detainees had been denied access to lawyers and medical care.  What further steps would the State party take to ensure that all detainees were informed of their rights, provided access to a lawyer and medical treatment, and to investigate all allegations of mistreatment of detainees and hold those responsible accountable?

    Peaceful assemblies held without advanced authorisation were typically dispersed by authorities, with demonstrators arrested. How would the State party bring its administrative detention practices in line with international standards? Courts had a high rate of extending pre-trial detention.  How did the State party ensure that pre-trial detention was used only as a last resort, and in line with international standards?

    Another Committee Expert said that the State party had not sufficiently responded to the Committee’s previous recommendation to align legal definitions of torture with those of the Convention against Torture. Despite the high number of torture cases, few effective punishments were imposed on perpetrators, and some persons who reported torture were punished for the crime of reporting false information. What steps had been taken to bring the definition of torture in the Criminal Code in line with international standards and ensure timely investigations?  How many complaints of torture had been filed, legal proceedings launched, and officials punished?

    Kazakhstan had not amended legislation allowing the Prosecutor General to shut down websites without court approval. Provisions designed to protect children from cyberbullying were reportedly misused to censor and restrict information, as were internet blackouts.  Could the delegation comment on these issues?  Laws adopted in 2023 and 2024 expanded State control over free speech, resulting in politically motivated trials against journalists and political opposition figures.  What steps had been taken to fully decriminalise defamation?  Could the State party provide statistics on detentions of journalists and human rights defenders?  What had the working group on the protection of human rights defenders achieved?

    A Committee Expert commended steps to transfer prison health services from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Health.  How was the State party supporting drug-dependent inmates and working to ensure the availability of sufficient medical equipment in prisons?  Were medical staff trained in detecting torture? Military schools were excluded from the mandate of the national preventive mechanism.  Did the State party intend to address this?

    The Committee was concerned that the right to conscientious objection to military services was not defined in law.  Were there plans to define this in law and establish an alternative to military service?  What steps had been taken to revise religious law to ensure full compliance with the Covenant?  The Committee was concerned by reports that some individuals had been imprisoned for engaging in non-violent religious expression.  How did the State party ensure that persons were not detained solely for expressing religious beliefs?

    What steps had been taken to remove complex registration requirements for non-governmental organizations and trade unions, and to prevent excessive State control of the activities of those organizations?

    Minorities continued to face discrimination and limited access to decision-making positions.  What was the legal and administrative framework covering political parties?  What steps had been taken to promote the effective participation of members of the Roma community in political life?

    One Committee Expert commended the State party for the 2024 law on combatting trafficking in persons and the amendment to article 128 of the Criminal Code.  How did the State party ensure the effective implementation of these reforms? There were reports of a lack of training for labour inspectors on trafficking.  How were inspectors trained to detect trafficking?  How did the State party ensure that the cases of all potential trafficking victims were assessed before deportation, and that all migrant children were properly registered and documented?  The Committee welcomed efforts to enhance trafficking penalties, but was concerned that trafficking offences were often not appropriately classified, leading to lower penalties.  Would this be addressed?

    There was no de facto procedure for processing asylum applications and authorities were reportedly reluctant to grant asylum to persons of Russian or Uzbek nationality.  Reportedly, migrants had been detained without being given access to legal representation.  Was the State party addressing these issues?  How did it ensure protection against refoulement?  Individuals were required to renounce their citizenship to apply for Kazakh nationality.  Would the State revise this law to prevent the risk of statelessness?

    What State services were provided to victims of domestic violence, including children?  Could children obtain these services independently of their parents? The Committee was concerned that the State party had not prohibited all forms of corporal punishment.  Would this be done?  Could children file complaints of mistreatment with the Human Rights Commissioner?  Workers at an orphanage had been caught on video beating children.  How was the State party working to prevent such abuse and promoting the foster family system?  Children born outside of medical institutions to undocumented parents did not receive birth certificates.  Would the State party address this issue?

    Another Committee Expert asked how the State party guaranteed the independence of Supreme Court judge candidates, who were nominated by the President, and of lawyers?  There were reports of corruption throughout the judicial system. How was the State fighting this? Had any judicial officials been found guilty of corruption?  Attorneys were not automatically appointed to suspects, and did not always get access to all case files.  How would this be addressed?  How were suspects made aware of their rights?  How did the State party prevent cases being unduly declared “secret”?  What percentage of court cases were now solely held online?  How did the State ensure proper proceedings in online cases?

    To what extent were spontaneous assemblies possible in Kazakhstan?  How did the State party ensure that notification procedures did not create delays or restrictions preventing assemblies?  Could people appeal restrictions on assemblies?  Foreigners were prohibited from participating in assemblies.  How did the State party ensure that foreigners’ assembly rights were respected?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said that in cases of mass violence, the State had the authority to use force to ensure public security.  The 2022 incident was a mass uprising that led to numerous injuries to law enforcement officials.  Investigations had been initiated into the incident, with nine officials sentenced for the excessive use of arms.  Changing the law on the excessive use of force was unnecessary, as the law functioned effectively.  All persons affected by violence related to this incident were provided with appropriate medical assistance, including detainees. Monitoring visits had led to the release of around 400 people who were arbitrarily detained.  There were 29 minors who had been detained after carrying out serious offences; they had since been released.

    There were 1,500 peaceful assemblies organised legally between 2017 and 2024.  Some 400 planned demonstrations had been cancelled because authorities had responded to complaints before the demonstration was held.  Some 1,000 demonstrations held during the reporting period were deemed unlawful as protesters had failed to respect notification deadlines or to correctly submit notification documents.  The State party continued to inform the public about notification procedures; this had led to a two-fold decrease in the number of illegal assemblies between 2022 and 2024.  Organisers of such assemblies were brought to court only in exceptional circumstances; in most cases, they were issued fines or warnings.  Law enforcement bodies needed to provide alternative proposals if the location for a planned demonstration was already being used by another event.

    As of 2019, exemption from liability for torture was not possible in Kazakhstan, nor were suspended sentences for perpetrators of torture.  There were 40,000 video cameras placed in detention centres to prevent torture. There had been a downward trend in the number of torture cases reported, from around 800 in 2019 to around 100 in 2024. More than 200 officials had been convicted of torture offences, and no officials found guilty of torture had received amnesties.  Housing and compensation payments were provided to the families of victims of torture. The State party intended to increase the amount of compensation provided to victims of torture ten-fold.

    This year, around 1,000 warning letters were issued to website operators calling for illegal content to be removed.  If it was removed, the site was not blocked. Internet services could only be suspended in emergency situations and when there was an extreme threat to public safety, such as during the January 2022 events.  The 2023 law on online platforms was based on the European Union’s digital services act.  It was geared toward the liberalisation of the online sphere.

    Defamation had been downgraded to an administrative offence.  There had been a downward trend in the number of cases of defamation in recent years. In 2024, only four cases of spreading misinformation were registered.  Journalists and activists were not prosecuted for defaming public officials.  Persons could not be charged for defaming public or private institutions.

    All persons who entered prisons were provided with a medical assessment.  Detainees requiring specialised assistance were brought to outpatient clinics, and they were isolated when they showed symptoms of contagious diseases.  Legal amendments were made to allow detainees with serious diseases to serve their sentences in appropriate facilities or to have their sentences commuted.

    Over the past few years, there had been an increase in religious practitioners and missionaries, and a decrease in the number of people fined for religious activities.  In the first quarter of this year, only 46 people had been fined. Kazakhstan recognised the right to practice and disseminate religion.  Only persons who practiced religion for financial or extremist purposes were sanctioned.  Legislation on religion was in line with the Covenant.  Members of religious institutions could be released from the obligation to carry out military service.

    Kazakhstan was a multi-ethnic State.  It had a special quota for members of the Senate who were representatives of different ethnic groups.  There were no limitations on the political participation of ethnic groups.

    The national preventive mechanism operated under the Ombudsperson, but maintained operational independence.  Work was underway to expand the national preventive mechanism’s mandate to include facilities under the aegis of the Ministry of Defence.  A draft law on the national preventive mechanism was currently under discussion with State authorities.

    In 2023, the State adopted a law reducing the number of members needed to form a public association to three.  There were no restrictions on organizations receiving foreign funding.  To date, 543 trade unions had been registered.  Political parties’ activities could be restricted when they threatened public order, but such restrictions were temporary.  Liquidation of political parties could only be forced by a court order.

    A law on combatting trafficking in persons was introduced in 2024, which aimed to bring the State’s mechanisms for combatting trafficking in line with international standards, and to increase identification and support for victims.  New offences had been established linked to trafficking, including related to procuring a minor for prostitution and online trafficking. Some 170 labour inspections had been held thus far this year.  These had led to the identification of trafficking victims and the disbanding of organised crime groups, the members of which were held criminally liable. Over 190 victims had been identified and punishments of up to 20 years imprisonment were issued to perpetrators.

    Legislation on refugees and asylum seekers was in line with international law.  Kazakhstan abided by the principle of non-refoulement.  Refugees had the right to seek medical assistance and education, and could apply for permanent or temporary residence in the State. Kazakhstan did not permit the extradition of individuals whose asylum requests were under consideration. Individuals had the right to appeal extradition requests to the Supreme Court.  Kazakhstan was a party to the Shanghai Convention on Combatting Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism, which included provisions specifying that signatories needed to respect international norms related to non-refoulement.

    Only citizens could participate in demonstrations in Kazakhstan; foreigners and stateless persons could not.  However, they could pursue other means to lodge complaints with the State.  Police did not monitor whether demonstrators were foreigners or not.

    The Judicial Office provided free legal assistance to persons involved in court cases.  Many court cases took place online.  Artificial intelligence helped judges to automate routine cases, allowing for the analysis of millions of cases and for the maintenance of judicial standards.  Court materials were provided in accessible formats.

    The State party had revised the judiciary’s financing model, allowing the judicial administrative body to set the budget. This had led to a large increase in the judicial budget.  There were sanctions imposed for judges who engaged in corrupt practices.  Cases of corruption were assessed by a judicial panel.

    Follow-Up Questions by Committee Experts

    Committee Experts asked follow-up questions on criteria used to determine whether to send warning letters to citizens regarding online content; alternatives to residential care facilities being developed; plans to prohibit corporal punishment; whether spontaneous protests were possible; whether persons who did not respect notification laws were restricted from filing future notifications; how the judiciary ensured that artificial intelligence was used in a safe manner that protected citizens’ rights; whether the Government intended to abolish the registry of organizations with foreign funding sources; and planned reforms to the registration process for non-governmental organizations.

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there was a specialised structure that monitored the information space and detected violations of Kazakh law.  When violations were detected, warning letters were sent to offending parties, often through social network operators, that explained why the content was illegal and needed to be removed.

    The State paid particular attention to the rights of children.  New legislation discouraged corporal punishment.  The number of beatings of children recorded by the State had been falling year-on-year; last year, there were only 250 cases.  Thorough investigations were carried out into complaints of corporal punishment in residential homes.  Video surveillance tools were installed in schools and kindergartens.  There was a hotline for reporting violence and providing consultations to children.

    There was no plan to amend the registry of organizations funded by foreign sources, which was developed in line with international principles.  The State party did not plan to develop a bill on foreign agents.

    All judicial services that used artificial intelligence had been assessed in terms of their implications on security.  They were implemented by the judiciary independently.  The State party had implemented use of electronic monitoring bracelets in around 1,000 cases as an alternative to pre-trial detention.

    Closing Remarks

    BOTAGOZ ZHAXELEKOVA, Vice-Minister of Justice of Kazakhstan and head of the delegation, expressed gratitude to the Committee for the constructive dialogue, and to all those who had facilitated the dialogue.  The State party welcomed the 22 alternative reports submitted by Kazakh civil society organizations, which it had reviewed carefully.  The Committee’s recommendations would be considered by the State and incorporated into future human rights action plans.  The State party thanked the Committee for its contributions to human rights in Kazakhstan and around the world.

    CHANGROK SOH, Committee Chairperson, expressed sincere gratitude to all those who contributed to the constructive dialogue. The delegation had engaged actively in the dialogue, which had addressed judicial independence, the prohibition of torture, the right to peaceful assembly, and the rights of vulnerable groups, among other topics.  The Committee expressed particular concern regarding the lack of accountability for the January 2022 events and restrictions on civil society and freedom of assembly.  It hoped that the dialogue would translate into increased protection of civil and political rights in Kazakhstan.

    ___________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

     

    CCPR25.010E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Exposes Spies, Lies and Mismanagement at the U.S. Agency for Global Media

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast delivered opening remarks at a full committee hearing titled, “Spies, Lies, and Mismanagement: Examining the U.S. Agency for Global Media’s Downfall.”

    Watch Here

    -Remarks-

    The purpose of today’s hearing is to examine the efficacy of the US Agency for Global Media, by allowing members the opportunity to discuss the agency’s history of national security concerns, the use of taxpayer dollars, and the Trump administration’s vision for a path forward. And I’m now going to recognize myself for an opening statement. As we meet to discuss the downfall of the US Agency for Global Media, or USAGM as we call it, an independent government agency.

    It’s an agency that can trace its roots back to fighting Nazi propaganda during World War II. But instead of staying true to its mandate of combating our adversaries and advocating for American values, in recent decades USAGM has unfortunately lost its way. Prior to this administration taking office again, the agency was riddled with OIG reports and investigations demonstrating that USAGM had been a cesspool of spies, lies and mismanagement.

    That is not an exaggeration. The agency has promoted the very propaganda that it was created to defeat.

    A case in point is Voice of America, or VOA as it’s known, a media outlet overseen directly by USAGM and funded by the American taxpayer, of course — because of Chinese pressure, Voice of America censored interviews with Chinese dissidents.

    VOA hired an admitted Taliban fighter, a jihadist, to criticize President Trump’s terror travel ban decision — it’s reminiscent of a headline that would be in the Babylon Bee: Terrorist hired to criticize President Trump’s travel ban — while instructing its reporters not to call Hamas terrorists, unless they used air quotes when they did so.

    VOA suppressed negative stories about Iran and its terrorist proxies. And VOA, which peddled the Russian collusion hoax, hired foreign nationals who previously worked for Russian state sponsored news outlets to tell that story.

    USAGM is a government agency tasked with promoting American ideals. But instead, it’s hired foreign adversaries with your tax dollars, who promoted anti-American propaganda, both at home and abroad.

    This is only a partisan issue because President Trump is in the White House. The fact is, Republicans and Democrat administrations alike have exposed USAGM’s hiring, vetting and messaging failures.

    During the Biden era, the State Department Inspector General found that USAGM skirted federal hiring guidelines when doling out jobs to foreign nationals. Many of these foreign nationals were quite literally security risks, yet they were given access to extremely sensitive information. To be specific, what’s known as tier 3 and tier 5, which are the equivalent of secret and top secret information. Everybody should be asking themselves why foreign nationals hired to be journalists need access to top secret information that most foreign militaries don’t get access to.

    This was not just incompetence. It was taxpayer funded self-sabotage. American taxpayers would have been better off if that money had just been lit on fire.

    Before President Trump won his historic second term, USAGM embraced and regurgitated enemy propaganda. It became a mouthpiece for our adversaries paid for, again, by your tax dollars. And we’re here to say that the grift is over.

    It’s not that USAGM has never provided any value. It’s that USAGM had drastically lost their way and allowed themselves to become a source of espionage. However, it’s clear that USAGM cannot continue to operate as it has in recent times. Drastic measures have to be taken to ensure that every taxpayer dollar for where those dollars come from, the American people. Not Xi Jinping. Not Vladimir Putin, not the Ayatollah.

    I want to thank our witness, Kari Lake, for appearing in front of this committee today. I’m looking forward to hearing your testimony. I’m looking forward to a productive and probably a rowdy discussion about the Trump administration’s vision for the future of US broadcasting.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

     having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

     having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

     having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

     having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

     having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

     having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

     having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

     having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

     having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

     having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

    °

    ° °

    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina – A10-0108/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Bosnia and Herzegovina

    (2025/2018(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina initialled in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995 (the Dayton Peace Agreement),

     having regard to the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States of the one part, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the other part[1], which entered into force on 1 June 2015,

     having regard to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for EU membership, submitted on 15 February 2016,

     having regard to the Commission opinion of 29 May 2019 on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s application for membership of the European Union (COM(2019)0261),

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 15 December 2022 granting EU candidate country status to Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council conclusions of 22 March 2024 on opening accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1529 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 September 2021 establishing the Instrument for Pre-Accession assistance (IPA III)[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1449 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on establishing the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans[3],

     having regard to the Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council meeting of 19 and 20 June 2003,

     having regard to the declarations of the EU-Western Balkans summits of 6 May 2020, 13 December 2023 and of 18 December 2024 in Brussels,

     having regard to the Berlin Process, launched on 28 August 2014,

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2021/1923 of 4 November 2021 on an Assistance Measure under the European Peace Facility to support capacity building for the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[4],

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2022/2353 of 1 December 2022 on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility to strengthen the capacities of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina[5],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2020 entitled ‘Enhancing the accession process – A credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0057),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 6 October 2020 entitled ‘An Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2020)0641),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘2023 Communication on EU Enlargement Policy’ (COM(2023)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023 Report’ (SWD(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 8 November 2023 entitled ‘New growth plan for the Western Balkans’ (COM(2023)0691),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 12 March 2024 entitled ‘Report on progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina – March 2024’ (COM(2024)0129),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 20 March 2024 on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (COM(2024)0146),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0691),

     having regard to the Commission’s overview and country assessments of 31 May 2023 and of 13 June 2024 of the Economic Reform Programme of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the fifth EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Council of 19 July 2023 and the seventh EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Committee meeting of 19 September 2024,

     having regard to the outcomes of the third, fourth, fifth and sixth meetings of the EU-Bosnia and Herzegovina Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee, held on 30 and 31 October 2023, 13 and 14 March 2024, 30 October 2024 and 12 and 13 March 2025 respectively,

     having regard to the expert report of 5 December 2019 on rule of law issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the European Council’s political agreement of 12 June 2022 on a on principles for ensuring a functional Bosnia and Herzegovina that advances on the European path,

     having regard to the 63rd, 64th, 65th and 66th reports of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the UN of 9 May 2023, 2 November 2023, 15 May 2024, 1 November 2024 respectively,

     having regard to UN Security Council Resolution 2757 (2024) of 1 November 2024, which extends the mandate of the EU Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) until 2 November 2025,

     having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 78/282 of 23 May 2024, designating 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica,

     having regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), ratified by Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 March 1992, and to its three Optional Protocols, namely: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, ratified on 10 October 2003; the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, ratified on 4 September 2001, and the Optional Protocol on a Communications Procedure, ratified on 19 October 2018,

     having regard to the UNESCO resolutions on the right of education in the mother tongue, the UNESCO Convention of 17 October 2003 for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, as well as the UNESCO Convention of 20 October 2005 on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,

     having regard to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to the amended Election Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina imposed by the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina on 26 March 2024,

     having regard to the visits of the Vice-President of the European Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) Kaja Kallas and of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte to Bosnia and Herzegovina in March and April 2025,

     having regard to the statement of the President of the European Council António Costa to the political leaders of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2025,

     having regard to its recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the new EU strategy for enlargement[6],

     having regard to its report of 17 January 2024 on the ‘Role of preventive diplomacy in tackling frozen conflicts around the world – missed opportunity or change for the future?’[7],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0108/2025),

    A. whereas enlargement is one of the EU’s most effective foreign policy instruments and a geostrategic investment in peace, democracy, stability, security and prosperity on the European continent, and remains of crucial importance, particularly in the context of rapid major geopolitical shifts and growing competition with authoritarian regimes;

    B. whereas each country is judged on its own merits in fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, including full respect for democracy, the rule of law and fundamental EU values, human rights, minority rights and media freedoms;

    C. whereas the EU remains the main political and economic partner of the Western Balkan countries; whereas the EU continues to be largest trade and investment partner of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), accounting for the majority of its foreign trade flows and playing a central role in its economic integration process;

    D. whereas Bosnia and Herzegovina is a candidate country and the clear majority of its citizens aspires to Euro-Atlantic integration for sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity; whereas 2025 marks the 30th anniversary of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which continues to form the foundation of BiH’s institutional set-up and that was intended as a safeguard for the equality of its three constituent peoples;

    E. whereas public support remains fragile owing to anti-EU narratives promoted by illiberal actors from the region and beyond;

    F. whereas the Dayton Peace Agreement despite its shortcomings, has fostered peace and the subsequent stabilisation in BiH by creating the key institutions that enabled the country to progress along the path of EU and NATO integration;

    G. whereas 30 years after the end of the war, BiH remains dysfunctional and finds itself again in a deep political and security crisis, with attempts at secession, and a high degree of corruption;

    H. whereas the EU strongly supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of BiH and will not accept any attempts to undermine it; whereas the Strategic Compass stated that as a matter of security and stability it is of a particular interest to support the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of BiH;

    I. whereas the President of the Republika Srpska (RS) entity, Milorad Dodik, and politicians from the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) have initiated unconstitutional actions to nullify state laws within the RS entity and attacked the key institutions of the state, namely the Office of the High Representative, the BiH Constitutional Court, and the judiciary; whereas the authorities of the RS entity participated in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’; whereas a process of forming a new pro-EU majority has been initiated;

    J. whereas EUFOR Althea is an EU CSDP mission helping BiH to maintain a stable and secure environment in the country and is supporting the armed forces’ efforts to align with NATO standards, while serving as a deterrent against any foreign threats;

    K. whereas BiH’s EU path is increasingly targeted by malign foreign actors, notably the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, which exploit ethnic divisions and institutional fragility to obstruct reforms, undermine the constitutional order and erode public trust in the EU; whereas Russian state-controlled media, including Sputnik Serbia and RT Balkan, continue to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in the RS entity, spreading disinformation and pro-Kremlin narratives in violation of EU sanctions on Russian propaganda outlets;

    L. whereas BiH is a multi-ethnic state in whose territory different religious and ethnic groups have lived for centuries, demonstrating that peoples with different views can coexist in an environment of tolerance and mutual respect; whereas linguistic and cultural diversity is one of the fundamental principles of the European Union, as enshrined in Articles 21 and 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights;

    M. whereas, for the 2022 general elections, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) Election Observation Mission concluded that the electoral process remained vulnerable to external interference, including the misuse of administrative resources and biased media coverage influenced by foreign-backed platforms, and called for enhanced protections against disinformation, transparency in campaign finance, and safeguards for journalists and civil society;

    Commitment to EU accession

    1. Reaffirms its support for BiH’s EU accession through a merit-based process based on the Copenhagen criteria, grounded in unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and equality among its citizens;

    2. Welcomes the European Council’s decision to open accession negotiations with BiH in the context of the changed geopolitical reality following Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; welcomes the adoption of several key laws in the run-up to this decision, but regrets that the positive reform dynamic has stalled, and notes the inadequate implementation and enforcement of the adopted laws; regrets that the legislative process has been marred by a lack of transparency and limited access for key stakeholders; notes the recent adoption of the Laws on Border Control and on Personal Data Protection and calls for their thorough implementation; calls for preparations to establish the institutional and financial basis for this enlargement to ensure sustainable EU integration;

    3. Urges BiH’s legitimate political leaders at all levels to take all relevant steps set out in the Commission’s recommendation of 12 October 2022, in full respect for proper democratic, transparent and inclusive procedures within the competent institutions, with a view to the negotiating framework being adopted by the Council once these conditions are met, and to step up the efforts to deliver on the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission in 2019; calls on all political actors to uphold BiH’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from all divisive rhetoric and acts, including secessionist rhetoric and acts, incitement to ethnic, religious and racial intolerance, denial of genocide and other war crimes, and the glorification of war crimes and their perpetrators;

    4. Reiterates that BiH’s accession process needs to be rooted in functioning democratic institutions, the rule of law, the fight against corruption and organised crime, as well as respect for fundamental rights and non-discrimination for all citizens, including constituent peoples, regardless of ethnic, religious or other affiliations;

    5. Strongly condemns the repeated use of inflammatory rhetoric and the adoption of secessionist laws and policies by Milorad Dodik, President of the RS entity, the SNSD party, and the Assembly of the RS entity, including the celebration of the so-called ‘Day of Republika Srpska’ and the Day of the State of the Republic of Serbia; emphasises that such actions undermine BiH’s constitutional order, territorial integrity and sovereignty, and are incompatible with its EU accession process and undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement;

    6. Urges all the Member States – and calls for their unity – as well as he European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Commission, to act more decisively to respond to these direct threats to European security and reiterates its call for targeted sanctions against all destabilising actors, notably Milorad Dodik, as well as other high-ranking RS entity and Serbian officials providing political and material support for secessionist policies; calls on all Member States to ensure that such sanctions can be adopted by the Council and to impose them bilaterally or in concert with other Member States if their adoption in the Council is not possible; condemns the Hungarian Government’s role in blocking sanctions; endorses the statements made by NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte on 10 March 2025 in Sarajevo and by VP/HR Kaja Kallas on 8 April in Sarajevo and calls for stability in the country to be safeguarded; believes that high-level EU officials should not engage with actors undermining the constitutional order of BiH in order not to harm the credibility of the EU in supporting BiH state institutions and welcomes the travel bans imposed on high-ranking RS individuals by some Member States;

    7. Takes note of the ruling of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the case of Milorad Dodik on 26 February 2025 and is highly alarmed by the escalating tensions and actions he has since led, including unprecedented attacks on BiH institutions and intimidation of opposition in the RS; deplores the support given to such policies by Russian and Serbian authorities, and calls upon all internal, regional and international actors to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH; calls for the international isolation of Milorad Dodik; condemns the recent decision of the RS entity’s government to declare a senior German foreign ministry official as persona non grata; notes with concern that Interpol refused to issue a Red Notice for an international warrant and calls on EUFOR to provide concrete support to the BiH authorities to put an end to the continued efforts to undermine the country’s legal and political stability, and to demonstrate the EU’s and EUFOR’s commitment and ability to uphold peace, enforce the rule of law, and maintain the integrity of legal institutions;

    8. Deplores that Milorad Dodik’s policies and actions, including frequent blockades of State-level bodies and decision-making and the hollowing out of the BiH institutions necessary for the technical work on alignment with the EU acquis, are a major factor in BiH’s troubled EU accession path and a clear violation of the 12 June 2022 political agreement; welcomes the work of the competent BiH institutions and calls on them to follow due procedures and to execute and implement all decisions in full respect for the rule of law; urges all political actors, notably in the RS entity, to reject all secessionist steps undermining of the country’s unity, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security; urges the RS National Assembly to ensure that its Official Gazette reflects the decisions of the BiH Constitutional Court regarding RS legislation, which has been found to undermine the constitutional order and been taken out of effect;

    9. Urges the Commission, in close cooperation with the Member States and international partners, including the Office of the High Representative, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, to take stock of the lessons learned over the past 15 years of European engagement in BiH and to recalibrate its strategy accordingly, with a renewed focus on delivering tangible progress and reforms that accelerate the country’s path toward EU membership, thereby reaffirming the EU’s unwavering commitment to the full integration of BiH into the Union;

    10. Welcomes BiH’s formal full alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy, including restrictive measures in response to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, and urges the effective implementation of these measures; welcomes BiH’s continued participation in EU crisis management missions and operations; condemns the pro-Russian stance of the RS entity’s leadership and its frequent meetings with Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials; expresses serious concerns about the security risks posed by these ties; urges the EU to investigate the use of the RS entity as a gateway for Russian intelligence operations and hybrid attacks on EU Member States; calls for support to BiH in countering disinformation campaigns originating from Russia as part of a joint effort against hybrid threats; strongly supports BiH’s sustained aspirations towards Euro-Atlantic integration and NATO membership and calls on all political actors to take concrete political action to achieve them;

    11. Reiterates its support for the Office of the High Representative and EUFOR Operation Althea in overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement in accordance with their mandates based on political neutrality and full respect for the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, until the country has fulfilled the ‘5+2 agenda’ and its international supervision ends; welcomes the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR Operation Althea; regrets that BiH is still heavily reliant on the mandate of the Office of the High Representative, and the presence of EUFOR Althea, but acknowledges and values it as a crucial institution in safeguarding not only peace, but also the bare functioning of the country;

    12. Recalls that EUFOR Operation Althea plays a key role in safeguarding the security, territorial integrity, stability, sovereignty and political independence of BiH, while ensuring that local stakeholders act in accordance with these fundamental principles as outlined in the Dayton Peace Agreement and UN Security Council resolutions; urges EUFOR to communicate this mandate unequivocally to the citizens of BiH as a confidence-building measure;

    13. Further welcomes the Council’s decision on an assistance measure under the European Peace Facility worth EUR 10 million to the benefit of the Armed Forces of BiH (AFBiH) and the Cooperation and Training Contract for 2023 between the AFBiH and EUFOR; calls on the Council and VP/HR to enable all eligible Member States to participate in the EU peacekeeping missions, such as EUFOR’s Operation Althea in BiH; calls on the BiH authorities, NATO and EUFOR Althea to launch a reform process of the BiH armed forces;

    14. Remains concerned by malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns by foreign actors in BiH, notably Russia and China, as well as their transmission through local media and political structures, particularly by the RS entity; expresses grave concern over Kremlin support for secessionist rhetoric, attempts to delegitimise state institutions, and interference in judicial and electoral matters; highlights recent Russian efforts at the UN Security Council to defend unconstitutional actions by RS entity authorities;

    15. Calls for further steps, inter alia aligning BiH legislation with the EU acquis, and EU support to effectively counter malign foreign interference and disinformation campaigns; calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation to BiH to intensify efforts in promoting the benefits of closer integration and to invest in communication campaigns to fight anti-democratic narratives and other forms of foreign influence;

    16. Deplores the participation of RS entity authorities in the ‘All-Serb Assembly’ held on 8 June 2024 in Belgrade under the slogan ‘One people, one assembly’ and rejects its declaration which undermines the sovereignty of BiH and other Western Balkan countries and fails to promote good neighbourly relations; condemns Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s interference in the affairs of BiH, including by expressing support for the illegitimate actions of Milorad Dodik and organising the Russia-backed ‘All-Serb Assembly’ which undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of BiH;

    17. Condemns the increase in Iran’s malign influence in the country and in the Western Balkans, which poses a threat to security for the EU and its Member States;

    18. Welcomes BiH’s renewed and sustained engagement in the EU-BiH Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee in fulfilment of one of the 14 key priorities set out by the Commission;

    19. Urges the BiH authorities to reform the coordination mechanism for EU matters, which has proved to be ineffective and inefficient in addressing EU integration-related tasks; calls on the authorities to submit a national programme for the adoption of the EU acquis (NPAA) in accordance with the Commission’s comments and to ensure coordinated alignment with the EU acquis throughout the country; highlights the need to establish an operational negotiating structure following the European Council’s decision to commence accession negotiations, including nomination of a negotiation team and a chief negotiator who is fully authorised to present the country’s position;

    Democracy and the rule of law

    20. Regrets the fact that political actors have still not enacted the necessary changes to the constitution and the electoral law to align them with the European Convention on Human Rights and to implement relevant rulings of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Court of Human Rights to eliminate all forms of inequality and discrimination in the electoral process and ensure non-discrimination, protection of fundamental rights, and equality for all BiH citizens to ‘move from Dayton to Brussels’; reiterates that failing to implement these rulings is incompatible with EU values and BiH’s EU integration; stresses the need for all constitutional and electoral reform processes to be inclusive, based on comprehensive consultations with citizens, civil society and independent experts and all relevant stakeholders in the country, and in line with European standards and principles; reiterates that any electoral reform must not deepen or cement ethnic division;

    21. Regrets that the BiH authorities have not been able to unite society or to create a just and functional system in the country, but rather have largely contributed to deepening divisions; calls on the EU and its Member States to initiate a transparent and inclusive reform process that would enable a sustainable transformation of the Dayton Peace Agreement into a constitution, fully in line with European standards and principles, with a view to ensuring a functional, accountable, representative, and popularly legitimate governance system, to overcome ethno-nationalistic divisions and achieve sustainable progress on the path towards the EU;

    22. Notes the changes made to the Election Law by the High Representative in March 2024 that introduced important integrity standards and confidence-building measures, aiming to restore voters’ trust in the overall election process; calls on the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH to urgently address all outstanding recommendations of the OSCE/ODIHR, of the Venice Commission and of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) especially on matters regarding election administration, the conduct of polling and counting, campaigning and campaign finance, explicit prohibition of indirect buying of votes, election dispute resolution, countering disinformation and foreign interference, increasing protection of journalists and sanctioning the misuse of administrative resources;

    23. Welcomes the fact that the local elections of 6 October 2024 were competitive and effectively managed; regrets that they were held in an environment lacking social and political cohesion;

    24. Strongly condemns the RS entity’s actions undermining BiH’s constitutional order and the competences of state bodies, and its obstructionism towards the Constitutional Court of BiH; condemns all illegal actions that conflict with the constitutional framework and calls on all political actors in BiH to pursue a pro-European approach;

    25. Notes the limited progress on justice reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly in relation to the independence, professionalism, efficiency and accountability of the judicial system; calls for urgent measures to accelerate reforms in these areas, ensuring full alignment with EU standards and strengthening the capacity of the judiciary to effectively serve justice and uphold the rule of law;

    26. Remains seriously concerned about corruption, notably high-level corruption, in BiH, which is a structural problem deeply embedded in the country’s highly complex governance system, and urges the relevant authorities to take a more decisive, coordinated, transparent and proactive stance in fighting it, including by improving anti-corruption legislation fully in line with international standards and recommendations and ensuring the effective implementation of laws, such as those on preventing conflicts of interest and protecting whistleblowers; encourages BiH to engage in structured cooperation and exchange of best practices with Member States; welcomes the Anti-Corruption Strategy 2024-2028 and the adoption of the action plan for its implementation, as well as ongoing international cooperation efforts;

    27. Regrets that the laws on public procurement, conflict of interest and the High Judicial Council are still not in line with European standards and urges the adoption of a new law on the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) in accordance with the recommendations of the Venice Commission; calls for the establishment of an independently functioning Asset Declarations Department within the HJPC, and advocates for the impartial and effective prosecution of high-level corruption cases;

    28. Stresses the need to strengthen the system for managing conflicts of interest among individuals holding top executive functions, in particular by ensuring that statements of interests are subject to regular and substantive verification; underlines that all individuals holding top executive functions, whether elected or appointed, should be subject to uniform disclosure obligations, and that all such declarations should systematically be made public and easily accessible online, in the interest of transparency and public accountability;

    29. Urges BiH to step up the fight against organised crime; is deeply concerned by vulnerabilities to criminal infiltration in the political, legal and economic systems; commends the BiH authorities for signing a Cooperation Agreement on Eurojust on 24 October 2024 to increase the efficiency of investigations and prosecution in the fields of organised crime, terrorism, trafficking in human beings, cybercrime and other criminal activities;

    30. Stresses that cooperation with the EU in the fight against drugs trafficking must be improved; calls for BiH to appoint a correspondent agent as part of its cooperation with the European Union Drugs Agency (EUDA);

    31. Welcomes the new Law on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Terrorism Financing and urges BiH to strengthen measures in this area, including the adoption of the necessary by-laws required for the effective implementation of the law, with particular attention to effective enforcement and monitoring; stresses, in particular, the need to fully align the anti-terrorism legislation with the EU acquis and international law; calls for the establishment of stricter sanctions for terrorism offences;

    32. Welcomes the adoption of BiH’s Law on Border Control aimed at improving compliance with European standards, and calls for full alignment with the EU’s visa policy as part of a controlled migration policy; stresses that BiH must uphold security at its borders and cooperate with Frontex and neighbouring countries to prevent irregular migration while ensuring sufficient access to asylum procedures for those eligible for international protection;

    33. Stresses the need to ensure that the appointment of senior police officials, particularly in the Border Police and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), is based on merit and conducted through open, standardised and transparent selection procedures;

    34. Recalls the need for a professional and depoliticised civil service; welcomes the steps taken in public administration reform; calls for the administrative burden in public administration to be reduced; calls on the BiH authorities to improve public authorities’ responsiveness to information requests;

    Fundamental freedoms and human rights

    35. Strongly condemns discrimination, violence and hate speech against all minorities; calls for the effective prosecution of such incidents; urges BiH to promote and safeguard the human rights, non-discrimination and protection of all minorities; calls for enhanced implementation of anti-discrimination mechanisms in BiH, with a particular focus on combating intolerance, hate speech and all forms of inequality; calls on the authorities to improve access to social, housing, education and healthcare services for all minorities and vulnerable groups; emphasises the importance of protecting the cultural and linguistic expression of all minorities in BiH;

    36. Expresses deep concern over the sharp increase in violence – including emerging forms of digital violence – against women, children, seniors and other vulnerable groups, including the LGBTIQ community; urges the BiH authorities to align their policies, legislation and practices on combating sexual and digital violence against women and girls with Council of Europe standards, particularly the Istanbul Convention, relevant ECtHR case law and the EU acquis; calls for targeted support to key institutions, for training professionals to provide victims with effective support, and for increased public awareness and institutional capacity to prevent and combat all forms of gender-based violence; stresses the key role of women’s associations in reaching out to the most vulnerable; calls on BiH to establish an official centralised data collection system on femicide; welcomes the 9 April 2025 decision of the government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) to include femicide in the criminal code and calls on the Parliament to urgently approve this new law;

    37. Regrets that the 2023-2027 gender action plan has so far lacked funding and monitoring; calls for an increase in the public and political participation of women in BiH; recognises the additional barriers and discrimination faced by women from ethnic minorities, particularly in accessing services;

    38. Condemns the RS entity’s adoption of legislative amendments that have removed gender identity as a protected characteristic, and those that no longer guarantee protection for children of diverse sexual orientations and gender identities;

    39. Calls on the relevant BiH authorities to develop and adopt the pending national action plan on the protection of the rights of the child; stresses that poverty and social exclusion affect a high percentage of children in the country, especially children from vulnerable groups, including Roma, children with disabilities, children in conflict with the law, and children on the move; recalls that BiH must uphold its international commitments so that no child is left behind;

    40. Emphasises the importance of inclusive and quality education, including the right to education in the mother tongue, and inter alia the importance of systematically reforming divisive curricula that seriously hamper internal mobility and limit critical thinking skills; reiterates its call for an end to the segregation practice of the ‘two schools under one roof’ system, which hampers social cohesion and equal opportunities, and stresses the need to favour reconciliation and integration and protect the right of every national community, including minorities, to their culture, language and identity; calls for the adoption of a common curriculum in history textbooks based on court-established facts related to the war as a means of avoiding historical revisionism and encourages the EU to support this initiative;

    41. Calls on BiH to guarantee the freedoms of assembly, association and expression, enabling the inclusion of civil society in policymaking; calls on the authorities to ensure meaningful, systematic and inclusive public consultation processes; condemns the RS entity’s reintroduction of a Russian-style law on ‘foreign agents’ and urges the authorities to repeal it; condemns the RS entity authorities’ use of criminalised defamation laws as a tool to stifle freedom of expression and calls for restoring criminalised defamation solely to the domain of civil law to prevent its misuse in restricting freedom of expression; calls on the Commission to attach strict conditionality to the revocation of these laws;

    42. Encourages the BiH Council of Ministers to adopt the Strategy for the Development of an Enabling Environment for Civil Society, ensuring that it unequivocally focuses on improving the legislative framework and securing more substantial and transparent funding for CSOs; calls for stronger protection of human rights defenders in BiH, including women activists, journalists and NGOs;

    43. Stresses the key importance of independent media and of respecting freedom of expression standards; calls on BiH to ensure the financial sustainability, emphasising the urgent financial crisis of the state-level public broadcaster BHRT, and political independence of public broadcasters and the Communications Regulatory Agency of BiH; calls on BiH to adopt legislation on media ownership transparency and public funding of the media; urges the state to accelerate the adoption of the Law on Electronic Communications, in line with the Digital Services Act[8] (DSA) and the new EU Media Freedom Act[9]; calls for ensuring pluralism in public media throughout the territory of BiH, including equal representation of all minorities; notes the appointment of the Public Broadcaster Board in FBiH after 12 years of blockages and calls on it to ensure impartial and objective information;

    44. Is strongly concerned by Russian propaganda in the RS entity’s public broadcaster and deplores the broadcasting of the RT (formerly Russia Today) channel, in violation of EU sanctions;

    45. Condemns the political pressure, attacks, intimidation, threats, demeaning remarks and strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) against journalists and media workers, especially by high-level politicians or their proxy organisations, and by foreign-aligned actors; regrets the lack of progress in guaranteeing freedom of expression and in amending the criminal laws to strengthen the protection of journalists from threats and attacks, in line with EU requirements, and calls on the authorities to adopt laws that effectively protect journalists, NGOs, human rights defenders, environmental activists and other stakeholders against SLAPPs; stresses the importance of ensuring appropriate judicial follow-up in cases of threats and violence against journalists;

    46. Urges BiH to ensure and effectively enforce relevant laws on general human rights; urges BiH to prosecute discriminatory crimes;

    47. Recalls the need for solidarity-based and fair migration and asylum management that combines upholding human rights with effective border control; calls on the EU to help BiH to take full responsibility for the management of reception centres, which are often at the border with the EU, to ensure sufficient reception conditions, and to guarantee access to effective and feasible asylum procedures in full respect for international law and human rights; is concerned about reports of insufficient reception conditions in the EU-funded centre in Lipa; stresses the need to increase transparency and democratic scrutiny in the allocation and implementation of EU funds in the field of migration; welcomes BiH’s upgraded status agreement with the Frontex and calls for its prompt signature; recalls that any eventual agreement with this agency should fully respect fundamental rights and international standards; urges BiH to step up its efforts against cross-border crime, especially human trafficking;

    Reconciliation, regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations

    48. Recalls that good neighbourly relations and regional cooperation are essential elements of the EU enlargement process;

    49. Stresses the importance of reconciliation in BiH and urges all authorities to actively promote and guarantee access to truth, justice and inclusive redress, including the adoption of a state-level law establishing minimum rights for wartime victims across the country, and the promotion of a women’s culture of remembrance; recognises that accountability as well as mutual respect among individuals and communities, and the promotion of mutual understanding, particularly among young people, can have a positive effect towards reconciliation; urges the BiH authorities to adopt a national transitional justice strategy; calls for further efforts to address the issue of missing persons; urges the Commission to invest additional efforts in promoting, supporting and facilitating reconciliation processes in BiH;

    50. Calls on the authorities of BiH to accelerate the prosecution of war crimes in accordance with the Revised State Strategy for Prosecuting War Crimes; highlights the importance of enhanced regional cooperation through the extradition of suspects, as well as cooperation between judicial authorities and exchange in all relevant formal aspects aimed at prosecution; encourages BiH authorities to align their legislation to ensure that all victims of war crimes have equal access to rights and protections;

    51. Recognises the extremely important role played by the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP), including by ensuring the institutional capacity, supporting families and providing evidence to Courts; urges the EU to ensure that the ICMP has access to sufficient funding to continue its activities;

    52. Reiterates its call for additional measures and concrete programmes to be implemented with regard to the sustainable return of refugees and internally displaced persons, access to healthcare and employment, social protection and education, and for full respect of all their rights to compensation for non-returnable property;

    53. Deplores all forms of historical revisionism, genocide denial, irredentism, glorification of war crimes and criminals, and contestation of facts or the independence and impartiality of international and domestic tribunals, especially by political leaders;

    54. Is concerned about the adoption of the ‘Declaration on the Protection of National and Political Rights and the Common Future of the Serbian People’ which is in violation of several aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement and undermines BiH’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity; notes that the ideas of Srpski Svet are incompatible with aspirations to join the EU; calls on Serbia to be constructively committed to the stability and territorial integrity of BiH and actively support BiH’s accession path;

    55. Emphasises the importance of preventive diplomacy in Bosnia and Herzegovina; calls on the EEAS to strengthen skills development among staff to improve the EU’s understanding of the local historical, cultural and religious contexts, as emphasised in the report on the role of preventive diplomacy adopted by Parliament in January 2024;

    56. Welcomes the UN General Assembly’s decision to designate 11 July as the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the 1995 Genocide in Srebrenica; calls on the authorities to ensure the security of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial Centre; emphasises that the Memorial Centre has had to temporarily close as a result of security concerns;

    57. Emphasises that regional cooperation via the common regional market is a beneficial attribution to promoting economic growth; calls on BiH to swiftly ratify all regional mobility agreements under the Berlin Process and to further strengthen economic cooperation through this market, in line with the objectives of EU enlargement;

    Socio-economic reforms

    58. Welcomes the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, which includes the Reform and Growth Facility for the Western Balkans, envisaging an indicative allocation for more than EUR 1 billion for BiH; regrets that BiH remains the only country in the Western Balkans that has not adopted a reform agenda; urges the Council of ministers and the cantons of BiH to unblock the adoption of its reform agenda without further delay in order to avoid its funding allocation being distributed among the other Western Balkan countries, and to establish a robust mechanism for transparent, inclusive and timely monitoring of its implementation; emphasises the need to prioritise key areas such as public administration, the rule of law, anti-corruption, decarbonisation, digitalisation, connectivity and human capital development, while also addressing social challenges; believes that embracing the opportunities of the Growth Plan would enhance BiH’s economy; calls on the Commission to explore ways of cooperating with willing and committed regional authorities, making more flexible use of the Reform and Growth Facility;

    59. Recalls that EU funding for projects in the RS entity should remain frozen until the reversal of democratic backsliding by the RS entity and until full alignment with the CFSP;

    60. Encourages BiH to make best use of all EU financial support; calls on the Commission to continue providing financial and technical support for BiH’s EU integration based on clearly defined conditionality and rigorous monitoring of spending and results, in line with the EU objectives of efficient and accountable budget management; believes that EU funds should better support the democratic reforms of the country; in that context, calls for the relevant EU funding to be reprogrammed to redirect more funds towards supporting technical assistance in absorbing the funds, judiciary reforms and anti-corruption measures; calls, furthermore, for the EU and the Western Balkan countries to establish a framework for fruitful cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in order to ensure that the EPPO can effectively exercise its competences in accession countries; encourages BiH to swiftly conclude bilateral working arrangements with the EPPO;

    61. Regrets that sustainable improvement and progress in this area is also hindered by the governance structure and a lack of country-wide strategies in all areas and on all levels; calls for the swift appointment of an IPA III coordinator and calls for better absorption of IPA III funds in BiH, including at local and regional levels; calls for the capacity of local and regional authorities to implement socio-economic reforms and manage projects co-financed from EU funds to be strengthened, in order to increase absorption and reduce regional inequalities;

    62. Urges BiH to prioritise measures aimed at improving competitiveness and the business environment, while improving economic and social cohesion, including progress towards the European Pillar of Social Rights, boosting economic diversification, promoting the digital and green transitions, addressing the informal economy and tackling unemployment;

    63. Expresses concern at the extremely negative demographic trends in the country, prompted in particular by the large number of young people leaving, and stresses the importance of the urgent adoption of additional measures to address this challenge; calls for a focus on youth as the driving force for EU integration in the country; calls on BiH to finalise and adopt the Youth Guarantee to improve access to employment, education, training and apprenticeships for young people, address high youth unemployment and skills mismatches and to promote social inclusion;

    64. Encourages EU institutions to work with civil society and experts to develop avenues to make health and social protections flexible and portable, to ensure equality and mobility within BiH;

    65. Welcomes the calls for the prompt integration of all Western Balkans into the EU’s Digital Single Market before actual EU membership, which would crucially benefit the creation of safe digital environment;

    Energy, the environment, biodiversity, sustainable development and connectivity

    66. Encourages BiH to accelerate the diversification of energy sources, particularly regarding ending its gas dependence on Russia; urges BiH to enhance energy security and efficiency by strengthening its electricity transmission and distribution grids, coupling with the European market and transitioning to renewables, particularly to solar and wind, while ensuring meaningful public consultations and effective environmental safeguards;

    67. Urges BiH to adopt its long-overdue national energy and climate plan and implement countrywide environmental protection strategies, including by legally protecting its candidate Emerald sites, improving the adequacy of its Emerald network, and ensuring the full implementation of the Habitats Directive[10], the Birds Directive[11] and the Water Framework Directive[12], while improving the quality and transparency of environmental investments; reiterates the need for effective air and water quality protection and improvement, and for effective, proportionate and dissuasive penalties for breaches of environmental law; notes that progress in the area of environmental and climate protection as well as alignment with the EU standards has remained low, and therefore urges BiH’s authorities to ensure greater alignment with EU standards and policy objectives on climate protection and energy in line with the 2020 Green Agenda and the Paris Agreement;

    68. Calls on the BiH authorities to reduce transboundary air pollution, especially in the case of Bosanski Brod oil refinery; recalls that BiH is a signatory party of the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo, 1991) and is bound by its obligations;

    69. Underlines the need to improve ex ante comprehensive strategic environmental assessments with the meaningful involvement of local communities, civil society organisations and independent experts; highlights the need to increase the transparency of procedures for infrastructure projects across eco-sensitive sectors; stresses the importance of increasing environmental mainstreaming across sectoral policies;

    70. Urges the country to implement measures to protect the biodiversity and ecologic integrity of rivers in line with the Espoo Convention;

    71. Expresses deep concern about the harmful impact of mining activities, including those conducted by foreign companies, on the environment in BiH and the health of its citizens; calls on all mining entities operating in BiH to fully comply with national legislation and to prioritise environmental protection and public health;

    72. Stresses the urgent need for the FBiH to adopt a fair, modern and expert-driven law on forests; further calls for stronger protection of forests and rivers through improved inspection oversight and the creation of a stringent legal framework in line with environmental and systemic standards; calls for the abolition of the provision in the relevant regulation in the FBiH that permits the release of waste water into rivers with minimal oversight, thereby posing a significant threat to public health and the environment;

    73.  Calls upon BiH to urgently finalise and adopt the legal designation of Livanjsko Polje as a Category V Protected Landscape, ensure appropriate monitoring;

    74. Stands in solidarity with BiH and all victims of the devastating floods and landslides of 3-4 October 2024; calls on the Federation of BiH authorities to increase support for those affected and ensure that any shortcomings in law enforcement and forest management that may have exacerbated the disaster are addressed;

    °

    ° °

    75. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council, the Commission, the Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the governments and parliaments of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska entity and the Brčko District, and the Office of the High Representative.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: ASIA/IRAQ – Patriarch Sako on the so-called “12-Day War”: “Regime change strategies can only worsen the situation”

    Source: Agenzia Fides – MIL OSI

    by Gianni ValenteBaghdad (Agenzia Fides) – The so-called “12-Day War” has also caused concern and fear in Iraq. This was confirmed by the Patriarch of the Chaldean Church, Cardinal Louis Raphael Sako, in a brief interview with Fides. The Iraqi Cardinal sees recent events as a further sign of the crisis in the international order. Faced with the scenario of an “endless war” and the bombings justified as instruments to bring about regime change, the Cardinal recalls the Iraqi experience, emphasizing that “regime change is a matter for the citizens of the country” and that such “regime change” strategies “can only worsen the situation.”Bombs from Israel and the US on Iran, Iranian missiles against Israel and US military bases. Patriarch Sako, how do you view the events in neighboring countries or on the border with Iraq, and how are the Iraqi people experiencing all this?CARDINAL SAKO: What has happened is sad. We have all experienced difficult moments of worry and fear. The world has lost its international order. Now we must regain common sense and reject the discourse of hatred, violence, and war. It is a pity if we destroy life and what has been built. Peace is a gift; we must welcome it and preserve it with enthusiasm, making the defense of peace an authentic life commitment.In recent days, the bombing on Iran has been portrayed as an operation designed to weaken Iranian power and lead to the country’s collapse. What do you think of such hypothetical strategies, also in light of the experiences in Iraq?CARDINAL SAKO: The sovereignty of countries must be respected, and problems should be resolved through sincere and courageous dialogue. Regime change is a matter for the citizens of a country. Imposing another regime would only worsen the situation. Change must come from within, if the citizens deem it necessary. Twenty-two years after the fall of the regime in Iraq, there is still no true citizenship, no law, no security, and no stability. Corruption and sectarianism persist.What can Christians in Iraq place their hope in at this time and in the face of these scenarios?CARDINAL SAKO: Christians, like all Iraqis, have suffered greatly because of ISIS. Such suffering leads to exodus and emigration. To this day, we are marginalized, our villages are occupied by militias, and the parliamentary seats reserved for Christians are being usurped… For all these reasons, a better future for Christians seems elusive. But despite what we have suffered, we feel we have a vocation in this land, with our faith. Therefore, we can remain confident and look toward a better future. (Agenzia Fides, 25/6/2025)
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    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Large-scale fraud using trusted online seller accounts uncovered

    Source: Eurojust

    The criminals used phishing techniques to obtain login credentials from legitimate sellers on a well-known online commerce platform. After gaining access to the account, they changed the login details, locking the rightful users out of their accounts. The criminals then continued to post advertisements of fake goods on the seller account. Because customers trusted the seller accounts, they initially put orders in for over EUR 106 million. In the end, 556 customers completed their order and purchased goods that would never arrive, causing damages of over EUR 400 000.

    When investigators identified the locations of the criminal group, Romanian and German authorities quickly began working together through a joint investigation team established by Eurojust. The cooperation led to a series of actions in December 2024, during which evidence was collected through house searches in Germany, Romania and Austria. Based on the evidence obtained, the authorities arrested four suspects in Romania and three in Germany. Preventative measures are in place for the four suspects in Romania, and two suspects in Germany remain in custody.

    Following the actions in December, investigations into the group continued. Authorities discovered that three members of the criminal group had continued their criminal activities. The Romanian and German investigators quickly identified the individuals and prepared further action.

    During an action day on 24 June, the three members were detained in Romania following a European Arrest Warrant issued by the German authorities. Eight house searches were also conducted where IT systems were seized containing more evidence. Investigations into the criminal group are ongoing.

    The following authorities carried out the operation:

    • Romania: Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice –Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism –Vâlcea Territorial Office; Service for Combating Organised Crime Vâlcea; Service for Combating Organised Crime Sibiu; Service for Special Actions Vâlcea; Service for Special Actions Sibiu
    • Germany: Bavarian Central Office for the Prosecution of Cybercrime; Criminal Police Department Nuremberg – K 52

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Large-scale fraud using trusted online seller accounts uncovered

    Source: Eurojust

    The criminals used phishing techniques to obtain login credentials from legitimate sellers on a well-known online commerce platform. After gaining access to the account, they changed the login details, locking the rightful users out of their accounts. The criminals then continued to post advertisements of fake goods on the seller account. Because customers trusted the seller accounts, they initially put orders in for over EUR 106 million. In the end, 556 customers completed their order and purchased goods that would never arrive, causing damages of over EUR 400 000.

    When investigators identified the locations of the criminal group, Romanian and German authorities quickly began working together through a joint investigation team established by Eurojust. The cooperation led to a series of actions in December 2024, during which evidence was collected through house searches in Germany, Romania and Austria. Based on the evidence obtained, the authorities arrested four suspects in Romania and three in Germany. Preventative measures are in place for the four suspects in Romania, and two suspects in Germany remain in custody.

    Following the actions in December, investigations into the group continued. Authorities discovered that three members of the criminal group had continued their criminal activities. The Romanian and German investigators quickly identified the individuals and prepared further action.

    During an action day on 24 June, the three members were detained in Romania following a European Arrest Warrant issued by the German authorities. Eight house searches were also conducted where IT systems were seized containing more evidence. Investigations into the criminal group are ongoing.

    The following authorities carried out the operation:

    • Romania: Prosecutor’s Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice –Directorate for Investigating Organised Crime and Terrorism –Vâlcea Territorial Office; Service for Combating Organised Crime Vâlcea; Service for Combating Organised Crime Sibiu; Service for Special Actions Vâlcea; Service for Special Actions Sibiu
    • Germany: Bavarian Central Office for the Prosecution of Cybercrime; Criminal Police Department Nuremberg – K 52

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Other events – Europol presents latest EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (EU TE-SAT 2025) – 24-06-2025 – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    At the LIBE Committee meeting on 24 June 2025, Ms Anna Sjöberg, Head of Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), delivered a presentation of the latest EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (EU TE-SAT) covering the year 2024. She opened by underscoring the report’s comprehensive scope, combining data on terrorist attacks, arrests, and convictions across EU Member States, contextualised within evolving ideological trends.

    Ms Sjöberg highlighted that in 2024, 14 EU Member States reported 58 terrorist attacks — including 34 completed, 5 failed and 19 foiled). The report distinguishes between and elaborates in-depth on different forms of terrorism, based on varying ideologies: jihadist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism and other types of terrorism. In assessing the terrorist threat in the EU, Europol emphasised the recent geopolitical developments such as the conflict in Gaza, anti-Semitism across the entire ideological spectrum, the Russian war against Ukraine, and the ability of Syria’s new government to fight terrorism.

    During the ensuing debate, Members were keen to highlight the need for enhanced information exchange between the Member States with Europol, the threat of returning foreign fighters, and the recruitment of minors through social media platforms. Discussion also touched upon the issue of state-sponsored terrorism.

    Concluding, Ms Sjöberg stressed the TE SAT’s crucial role in guiding EU-wide counter terrorism efforts and fostering coordinated responses via Europol’s ECTC.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Other events – Europol presents latest EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (EU TE-SAT 2025) – 24-06-2025 – Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

    Source: European Parliament

    At the LIBE Committee meeting on 24 June 2025, Ms Anna Sjöberg, Head of Europol’s European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC), delivered a presentation of the latest EU Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (EU TE-SAT) covering the year 2024. She opened by underscoring the report’s comprehensive scope, combining data on terrorist attacks, arrests, and convictions across EU Member States, contextualised within evolving ideological trends.

    Ms Sjöberg highlighted that in 2024, 14 EU Member States reported 58 terrorist attacks — including 34 completed, 5 failed and 19 foiled). The report distinguishes between and elaborates in-depth on different forms of terrorism, based on varying ideologies: jihadist terrorism, right-wing terrorism, left-wing and anarchist terrorism, ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism and other types of terrorism. In assessing the terrorist threat in the EU, Europol emphasised the recent geopolitical developments such as the conflict in Gaza, anti-Semitism across the entire ideological spectrum, the Russian war against Ukraine, and the ability of Syria’s new government to fight terrorism.

    During the ensuing debate, Members were keen to highlight the need for enhanced information exchange between the Member States with Europol, the threat of returning foreign fighters, and the recruitment of minors through social media platforms. Discussion also touched upon the issue of state-sponsored terrorism.

    Concluding, Ms Sjöberg stressed the TE SAT’s crucial role in guiding EU-wide counter terrorism efforts and fostering coordinated responses via Europol’s ECTC.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: LCQ5: Family offices

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    LCQ5: Family offices 
    Question:
     
         According to a consultancy study commissioned by Invest Hong Kong (InvestHK), it was estimated that around 2 700 single family offices were operating in Hong Kong as at end-2023. However, it has recently been reported that quite a number of “fake family offices” have emerged in the market and some of them may even be involved in money laundering or illegal fund-raising activities. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:
     
    (1) whether it will consider drawing up a clear official definition and establishing a regulatory regime for family offices, and stepping up regulation through legislation or administrative measures to prevent money laundering and other financial crimes; if so, of the specific details; if not, the reasons for that;
     
    (2) whether it has developed corresponding monitoring mechanisms or regulatory measures when considering enhancing the preferential tax regimes for family offices and funds, so as to prevent the relevant regimes from being abused as tax avoidance tools; if so, of the specific details; if not, the reasons for that; and
     
    (3) whether it has plans to provide more systematic training and accreditation schemes for professional talents to meet the demand from family offices for multi-disciplinary professionals, and whether it will regularly assess the effectiveness of the implementation of the policies relating to family offices, including market responses, economic contributions and potential risks; if so, of the specific details; if not, the reasons for that?
     
    Reply:
     
    President,
     
         As an international financial centre and the freest economy in the world, Hong Kong maintains an open market environment. Meanwhile, we also attach great importance to safeguarding the integrity of our financial systems by implementing international standards on anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing to deter and detect inward and outward flows of illicit funds.
     
         In consultation with Invest Hong Kong (InvestHK), the Inland Revenue Department (IRD), the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Hong Kong Academy for Wealth Legacy (HKAWL), my reply to the various parts of the question is as follows:
     
    (1) The Government welcomes all lawful and rule-compliant family offices (FOs) to set up in Hong Kong and respects the private financial arrangement of single FOs. Regarding the regulation of investment activities of FOs, the licensing regime under the Securities and Futures Ordinance is activity-based. Generally speaking, a single FO refers to an arrangement established by members of a single family to manage the family’s assets, investments, and long-term interests. A single FO is required to apply for a licence under the Securities and Futures Ordinance if it carries on a business of regulated activity in Hong Kong, for example, providing asset and wealth management services to clients other than members of the relevant family, and to fulfil relevant code of conduct and statutory requirements applicable to licensed corporations. The above requirements are also applicable to investment companies or multi-FOs. To facilitate the industry’s understanding of the regulatory regime in Hong Kong, the SFC has issued circular on the licensing obligations of FOs and quick reference guides to provide additional guidance.
     
         In addition, professionals of various sectors providing services concerned to FOs will conduct necessary due diligence in compliance with the statutory requirements and relevant guidelines. Among others, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorist Financing Ordinance (Cap. 615) provides that financial institutions (including banks, SFC-licensed corporations, insurance companies, money services operators, etc.) and designated non-financial businesses and professions (including solicitors, accountants, estate agents, and trust or company service providers) shall conduct customer due diligence, including identifying and verifying the identity of beneficial owners, continuously monitoring the business relationships with customers, as well as maintaining records. When service providers identify any suspicious transactions, they are also under the legal obligation to report to law enforcement agencies.
     
         Our systems and measures for combating money laundering and terrorist financing have all along adhere to international standards and best practices. We will closely monitor the risks related to money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as the developments in international standards, and will keep our systems and measures under constant review so as to safeguard the integrity and stability of Hong Kong’s financial system.
     
    (2) Family-owned investment holding vehicles (FIHVs) managed by single FOs in Hong Kong fulfilling the minimum asset threshold of HK$240 million and substantial activities requirement can enjoy profits tax exemption for qualifying transactions. Currently, a series of anti-avoidance measures have been put in place for the preferential tax regimes for single FOs and funds. For example, a business undertaking for general commercial or industrial purpose is not eligible for tax concessions with a view to avoiding abuse. The tax regimes also contain the anti-round tripping provisions to prevent abuse or round-tripping by resident persons to take advantage of the profits tax exemption via a fund or FIHV. Meanwhile, the general anti-avoidance provisions of the Inland Revenue Ordinance (IRO) are also applicable to the preferential tax regimes for single FOs and funds. Through these provisions, the IRD can address any artificial or fictitious transaction, disposition that is not in fact given effect to and transaction entered into for the sole or dominant purpose of enabling a person to obtain a tax benefit.
     
         To attract more FOs and high-net-worth individuals to choose Hong Kong as a destination for wealth management, we will enhance the preferential tax regimes for funds, single FOs and carried interest, including expanding the scope of “fund” under the tax exemption regime, increasing the types of qualifying transactions eligible for tax concessions for funds and single FOs, enhancing the tax concession arrangement on the distribution of carried interest by private equity funds, etc.
     
         The Government also proposes to introduce a tax reporting mechanism under the enhanced tax regime for funds to ensure that the funds and special purpose entities meet the relevant tax exemption conditions under the IRO. The Government will continue to closely communicate with the industry on formulating the details of the tax reporting regime, and minimise the compliance burden on funds and special purpose entities under the tax reporting regime.
     
    (3) The Government is committed to expanding the talent pool for wealth management and FOs to support the long-term development of the industry. We have since 2016 implemented the Pilot Programme to Enhance Talent Training for the Asset and Wealth Management Sector to nurture more industry talents. To date, over 4 700 applications for reimbursement of professional training course fees have been approved, and the Programme has provided internship opportunities for over 920 tertiary students, supporting the industry to offer more professional training and learning opportunities, thereby enhancing the professional standards of practitioners. Besides, we have included “management professionals in asset and wealth management (WAM)” and “professionals in compliance in WAM” under the Talent List since 2018 and 2021 respectively, so as to facilitate high-quality talents in these professions to pursue development in Hong Kong.
     
         The Government has also established the HKAWL in 2023 to provide a platform for collaboration, networking, knowledge sharing and talent development, and to provide relevant training for asset owners, wealth inheritors and the FO sector. In 2024-25, the HKAWL organised, co-organised, and participated in over 20 events, enabling asset owners, wealth inheritors and FO practitioners to engage in discussions and exchanges. These events brought together over 3 100 participants.
     
         The Government will maintain close communication with FOs to understand their needs, evaluate the effectiveness of relevant policies and introduce enhancements in a timely manner. For example, the New Capital Investment Entrant Scheme (New CIES) has been well-received by the industry since its launch. As of end-May this year, the New CIES has received over 1 370 applications. The current applications are expected to bring an investment amount of over HK$41 billion into Hong Kong. The Government has also implemented enhancement measures with effect from March 1 this year, allowing investment under the New CIES to be made through an eligible private company wholly owned by the applicant, creating synergy with the tax concession regime for FOs.
     
         According to the research findings of the consultant commissioned by InvestHK and publicised in March 2024, there were around 2 700 single FOs operating in Hong Kong as of end-2023. The number is expected to exceed 3 000 in the near future. Separately, since its establishment in June 2021 up to end-May this year, the dedicated FamilyOfficeHK team of InvestHK has assisted over 190 FOs to set up or expand their business in Hong Kong, and around 150 FOs have indicated that they are preparing or have decided to set up or expand their business in Hong Kong. The performance indicator to attract no less than 200 FOs to establish or expand their operations in Hong Kong by end-2025 as set out in the 2022 Policy Address is likely to be achieved.
     
         Thank you, President.
    Issued at HKT 14:58

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Wicker Leads SASC Hearing on CENTCOM and EUCOM Nominees

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Mississippi Roger Wicker

    Watch Video Here

     

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today led a hearing to consider the nominations of two senior military officers to lead U.S. Central Command, and U.S. European Command.

     

    In his opening remarks, Chairman Wicker praised our service members for their skill and proficiency in carrying out the Operation Midnight Hammer mission to degrade Iran’s nuclear weapon capability. The Chairman also emphasized the consequential threat environments in the CENTCOM and EUCOM theaters of operations and stressed the importance of alliances in achieving peace through strength.

     

    Read Senator Wicker’s hearing opening statement as delivered.

     

    The committee meets today to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, to be Commander, United States Central Command, and Lieutenant General Alexus G. Grynkewich, to be Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I welcome our nominees and their families, and I thank them for their continued willingness to serve our nation.

     

    I want to begin my remarks by recognizing the remarkable skill, courage, and professionalism displayed by the men and women of our military and intelligence communities who participated in Operation Midnight Hammer over the weekend.

     

    President Trump was right to authorize the mission to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities and address this longstanding threat to the United States. Our commander-in-chief gave Ayatollah Khamenei every chance to negotiate peacefully. The Iranian leader, however, rejected our President’s entreaties. He instead chose to continue his pursuit of a nuclear weapon and support of terrorism rather than a peaceful resolution that would have benefited the Iranian people. To be clear, the situation the Iranian regime finds itself in today is entirely of its own making.

     

    I know members of this committee will have questions about Operation Midnight Hammer and the administration’s Iran policy. I do remind my colleagues there will be a classified briefing for all senators later today with senior administration officials to address many of these questions.

     

    If confirmed, Admiral Cooper will assume command of CENTCOM in the midst of a seismic shift across the Middle East. These changes were precipitated by Hamas’ barbaric attack against Israel on October 7th, 2023. Since then, Iran’s conventional military capabilities have been severely degraded, Hezbollah’s leadership has been decimated, and Hamas has been crushed. Iran’s longtime political ally in the region – Syria’s Bashar Assad – is out of power and in exile.

     

    Iran and its terrorist allies are weaker than they have been in decades, but the job is not done.

     

    We must do all we can to support the defense of Israel and ensure that American forces in the region have what they need. I hope to hear Admiral Cooper’s unclassified assessment of recent developments and his description of the force posture and force protection requirements CENTCOM needs in order to contend with Iran, its proxies, and other threats emanating from the region.

     

    Lastly, we must not lose sight of the continuing threat posed by radical Islamist terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda. Although weakened, ISIS and al-Qaeda remain intent on killing Americans. I am interested in Admiral Cooper’s testimony about the current capabilities of terrorist groups in the region and what CENTCOM’s counterterrorism strategy should be in order to counter this threat.

     

    Now as to General Grynkewich — If confirmed, he will take command of EUCOM and NATO at a time of war and great uncertainty. Vladimir Putin continues to remind the West that Russia remains a determined enemy, one which is willing to use force to vindicate long-held grievances and to violate international law. The Russian dictator’s invasion of Ukraine has rained death and destruction upon a democratic people and serves as a warning to the world that the military threat from Russia is as relevant today as it ever has been.

     

    Indeed, earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned that “Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years.” He added that Putin’s war economy “produces more munitions in three months than the whole of NATO produces in a year.” Of course, Russia is not just a danger to our NATO allies. Russia also directly threatens the homeland. Its nuclear arsenal is sized and postured to destroy the United States. The members of this committee are keen to hear General Grynkewich’s views of the threat Russia poses, as well as his plans to counter it.

     

    The United States faces a dauting challenge: We must deter, and if necessary, defeat two nuclear peer adversaries. That task highlights the important role allies play in our security. President Trump deserves considerable credit for dramatically increasing allied burden sharing, which has helped to renew NATO’s purpose. NATO is now actively debating a commitment for members to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense.

     

    Amid this encouraging development, there are some in the Pentagon that believe the U.S. must draw down our military presence in Europe. This thinking bewilders most of us on this committee, given Russia’s aggression and the renewed willingness of allies to share our collective defense burden.

     

    Our presence in Europe helps deter Russia. It also has additional benefits, including enabling and assisting our military operations in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas of operation. That support is vital, especially now, as tensions once again rise in the Middle East.

     

    With that I look forward to our hearing today, and I turn to my colleague and friend, Ranking Member Reed.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Wicker Leads SASC Hearing on CENTCOM and EUCOM Nominees

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Mississippi Roger Wicker

    Watch Video Here

     

    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Roger Wicker, R-Miss., Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today led a hearing to consider the nominations of two senior military officers to lead U.S. Central Command, and U.S. European Command.

     

    In his opening remarks, Chairman Wicker praised our service members for their skill and proficiency in carrying out the Operation Midnight Hammer mission to degrade Iran’s nuclear weapon capability. The Chairman also emphasized the consequential threat environments in the CENTCOM and EUCOM theaters of operations and stressed the importance of alliances in achieving peace through strength.

     

    Read Senator Wicker’s hearing opening statement as delivered.

     

    The committee meets today to consider the nominations of Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, to be Commander, United States Central Command, and Lieutenant General Alexus G. Grynkewich, to be Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I welcome our nominees and their families, and I thank them for their continued willingness to serve our nation.

     

    I want to begin my remarks by recognizing the remarkable skill, courage, and professionalism displayed by the men and women of our military and intelligence communities who participated in Operation Midnight Hammer over the weekend.

     

    President Trump was right to authorize the mission to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities and address this longstanding threat to the United States. Our commander-in-chief gave Ayatollah Khamenei every chance to negotiate peacefully. The Iranian leader, however, rejected our President’s entreaties. He instead chose to continue his pursuit of a nuclear weapon and support of terrorism rather than a peaceful resolution that would have benefited the Iranian people. To be clear, the situation the Iranian regime finds itself in today is entirely of its own making.

     

    I know members of this committee will have questions about Operation Midnight Hammer and the administration’s Iran policy. I do remind my colleagues there will be a classified briefing for all senators later today with senior administration officials to address many of these questions.

     

    If confirmed, Admiral Cooper will assume command of CENTCOM in the midst of a seismic shift across the Middle East. These changes were precipitated by Hamas’ barbaric attack against Israel on October 7th, 2023. Since then, Iran’s conventional military capabilities have been severely degraded, Hezbollah’s leadership has been decimated, and Hamas has been crushed. Iran’s longtime political ally in the region – Syria’s Bashar Assad – is out of power and in exile.

     

    Iran and its terrorist allies are weaker than they have been in decades, but the job is not done.

     

    We must do all we can to support the defense of Israel and ensure that American forces in the region have what they need. I hope to hear Admiral Cooper’s unclassified assessment of recent developments and his description of the force posture and force protection requirements CENTCOM needs in order to contend with Iran, its proxies, and other threats emanating from the region.

     

    Lastly, we must not lose sight of the continuing threat posed by radical Islamist terrorist groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda. Although weakened, ISIS and al-Qaeda remain intent on killing Americans. I am interested in Admiral Cooper’s testimony about the current capabilities of terrorist groups in the region and what CENTCOM’s counterterrorism strategy should be in order to counter this threat.

     

    Now as to General Grynkewich — If confirmed, he will take command of EUCOM and NATO at a time of war and great uncertainty. Vladimir Putin continues to remind the West that Russia remains a determined enemy, one which is willing to use force to vindicate long-held grievances and to violate international law. The Russian dictator’s invasion of Ukraine has rained death and destruction upon a democratic people and serves as a warning to the world that the military threat from Russia is as relevant today as it ever has been.

     

    Indeed, earlier this month, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte warned that “Russia could be ready to use military force against NATO within five years.” He added that Putin’s war economy “produces more munitions in three months than the whole of NATO produces in a year.” Of course, Russia is not just a danger to our NATO allies. Russia also directly threatens the homeland. Its nuclear arsenal is sized and postured to destroy the United States. The members of this committee are keen to hear General Grynkewich’s views of the threat Russia poses, as well as his plans to counter it.

     

    The United States faces a dauting challenge: We must deter, and if necessary, defeat two nuclear peer adversaries. That task highlights the important role allies play in our security. President Trump deserves considerable credit for dramatically increasing allied burden sharing, which has helped to renew NATO’s purpose. NATO is now actively debating a commitment for members to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defense.

     

    Amid this encouraging development, there are some in the Pentagon that believe the U.S. must draw down our military presence in Europe. This thinking bewilders most of us on this committee, given Russia’s aggression and the renewed willingness of allies to share our collective defense burden.

     

    Our presence in Europe helps deter Russia. It also has additional benefits, including enabling and assisting our military operations in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM areas of operation. That support is vital, especially now, as tensions once again rise in the Middle East.

     

    With that I look forward to our hearing today, and I turn to my colleague and friend, Ranking Member Reed.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: California Man Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIS

    Source: US State Government of Utah

    Ammaad Akhtar, 33, of Stockton, was arrested today and charged with attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.

    According to court documents, since February 2025, Akhtar has been communicating online with a law enforcement-controlled individual, whom Akhtar believed was a member of ISIS. In these conversations, Akhtar voiced his support for ISIS and jihad, expressed a desire to travel overseas to join and fight with ISIS, and stated a desire to send guns and money to ISIS.

    In April 2025, during this investigation, Akhtar demonstrated a desire to provide support for ISIS and did so by providing financial funding on multiple occasions. After a few payments, the law enforcement-controlled individual indicated that ISIS had procured several guns with the money Akhtar had sent. In his response, Akhtar said, “may Allah destroy our enemies” and affirmed that he would send more money that same day.

    Akhtar also talked about planning acts of violence, including conducting an attack against a specific individual and an attack utilizing homemade explosives. He said he “want[s] to die in the cause of Allah fighting the kuffar [infidels]” and asked for instructions on how to make a homemade explosive device in order “to make a boom” at a populated event.

    Then, on June 23, 2025, Akhtar met with an individual he believed was an ISIS associate, but who was actually an undercover employee. Akhtar provided clothing, binoculars, $400 cash, two loaded guns, and six additional magazines. Akhtar then swore bayat (a pledge of loyalty) to ISIS.

    If convicted, Akhtar faces a maximum statutory penalty of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith for the Eastern District of California, and Assistant Director Donald M. Holstead of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division made the announcement.

    The FBI’s Sacramento Field Office is investigating the case, with valuable assistance provided by the FBI’s New York Field Office and the New York City Police Department.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Elliot Wong for the Eastern District of California and Trial Attorney Ryan D. White of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: California Man Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIS

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Ammaad Akhtar, 33, of Stockton, was arrested today and charged with attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization.

    According to court documents, since February 2025, Akhtar has been communicating online with a law enforcement-controlled individual, whom Akhtar believed was a member of ISIS. In these conversations, Akhtar voiced his support for ISIS and jihad, expressed a desire to travel overseas to join and fight with ISIS, and stated a desire to send guns and money to ISIS.

    In April 2025, during this investigation, Akhtar demonstrated a desire to provide support for ISIS and did so by providing financial funding on multiple occasions. After a few payments, the law enforcement-controlled individual indicated that ISIS had procured several guns with the money Akhtar had sent. In his response, Akhtar said, “may Allah destroy our enemies” and affirmed that he would send more money that same day.

    Akhtar also talked about planning acts of violence, including conducting an attack against a specific individual and an attack utilizing homemade explosives. He said he “want[s] to die in the cause of Allah fighting the kuffar [infidels]” and asked for instructions on how to make a homemade explosive device in order “to make a boom” at a populated event.

    Then, on June 23, 2025, Akhtar met with an individual he believed was an ISIS associate, but who was actually an undercover employee. Akhtar provided clothing, binoculars, $400 cash, two loaded guns, and six additional magazines. Akhtar then swore bayat (a pledge of loyalty) to ISIS.

    If convicted, Akhtar faces a maximum statutory penalty of 20 years in prison and a $250,000 fine. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

    Assistant Attorney General for National Security John A. Eisenberg, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith for the Eastern District of California, and Assistant Director Donald M. Holstead of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division made the announcement.

    The FBI’s Sacramento Field Office is investigating the case, with valuable assistance provided by the FBI’s New York Field Office and the New York City Police Department.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Elliot Wong for the Eastern District of California and Trial Attorney Ryan D. White of the National Security Division’s Counterterrorism Section are prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Global: Brazil’s dangerous flirtation with counterterrorism

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By James Fitzgerald, Associate Professor of Terrorism Studies, Dublin City University

    American pop star Lady Gaga delivered a free concert to over 2.1 million revellers on Copacabana beach in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro in May. Those attuned to security concerns saw a policing and public safety nightmare.

    And shortly after the concert, Rio de Janeiro’s civil police secretary, Felipe Curi, announced that the worst realisation of this nightmare had almost come to pass. An improvised bomb attack targeting fans had been thwarted thanks to police intelligence.

    A loose group of conspirators from across Brazil, gelled across chat apps and other social media by anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments, planned to murder civilians. The intention was to send a political message about resisting what they see as “indecency” and “social decadence”.

    Given the setting, volume of media coverage and possibility of a panicked stampede, Brazil had surely avoided the worst terrorist attack in its history.

    For an attack to qualify as “terrorism”, it must be carried out for explicitly political purposes – motives akin to reshaping society violently or agitating for self-determination through force.

    Yet, a month after the thwarted Copacabana attack, the main conversation about terrorism in Brazil is focused on mistaken efforts to label criminal groups as terrorists.

    In late May, Brazil’s Congress fast tracked a bill that would broaden the definition of terrorism to include the actions of criminal organisations and militias. This is on the basis that their routine practices of “imposing territorial control” are designed to spread “social or widespread terror”. The bill is overly vague and extremely dangerous.

    Brazilian organised crime

    Equating organised crime and the violence it produces with “terrorism” is somewhat understandable. Organised gangs in Brazil, such as Comando Vermelho (CV) and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC), control vast expanses of territory, and civilians ultimately pay the price.

    However, as endemic as organised crime is in Brazil, these groups strive for self-enrichment. Their violence is used solely to either protect or enhance this goal. Neither CV nor PCC have any political motive that would qualify their actions as terrorism.

    The government already has legal ways to deal with criminal groups, but it has been hard to achieve lasting, positive results using these methods.

    Should the actions of criminal organisations be reclassified as terrorism, a new suite of measures will become available to the state’s repressive apparatus. This will be true for the current government and future administrations.

    New measures to fight terrorism are practically guaranteed to erode democratic and procedural norms. Armed with a remit to eradicate terrorism, states have repeatedly shown that they exacerbate the very cycles of violence they aim to erase.


    Get your news from actual experts, straight to your inbox. Sign up to our daily newsletter to receive all The Conversation UK’s latest coverage of news and research, from politics and business to the arts and sciences.


    French-Algerian philosopher Jacques Derrida identified the essence of this dilemma in 2003. In an interview reflecting on the 9/11 attacks on the US, Derrida said that the primary threat of terrorism was not just in the violence itself, but in how societies respond to it.

    The US’s disastrous “war on terror”, for example, led to a consequential wave of violence worldwide. It is estimated to have killed over 500,000 civilians in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. And western countries that joined the fray have suffered jihadist attacks in return.

    Governments also adopted new measures to deal with security issues inside their own countries. Potential terrorists were apprehended through surveillance, with the new goal of counterterrorism being to intervene before violence is able to occur.

    States of emergency, which significantly curtail civil liberties, were routinely imposed in the aftermath of high-profile terrorist attacks. This included a state of emergency after the November 2015 attacks in Paris that gave the authorities power to search any premises without judicial oversight.

    The implementation of this logic continues today. At the time of writing, denunciations of Israel’s assault on Gaza continue to be spuriously tied to support for “terrorism”.

    Hamas is a terrorist organisation. But that should not see Palestinian civilians – nor supporters of their rights – labelled as potential terrorists. Yet student protesters in the US have been threatened with deportation, financial ruin and even imprisonment.

    The term “terrorism” contains within it a power to dress state repression as a proportionate response to emergency. In El Salvador, we have seen how counterterrorism is being applied as an emergency means to solve the country’s organised crime problem.

    Nayib Bukele’s government has sent countless criminals to the Terrorism Confinement Centre mega-prison in Tecoluca. It has also condemned many innocent civilians to a parallel fate, with little-to-no chance of redress or due process.

    The tragic consequences of state crackdowns against those spuriously labelled as “terrorists” lingers in the historical memory of Brazil. This new bill moves to the Senate at a time of renewed culturing reckoning with the consequences of Brazil’s repressive campaigns under the military dictatorship of 1964 to 1985.

    Brazil should recognise its fortune in never having truly adopted the discourse of the war on terror. Now, it should not adopt an evolved discourse of counterterrorism to address the very serious – but very separate – problem of organised crime.

    In the name of order and progress, and with an eye towards civilians who would ultimately pay the price, this bill cannot be allowed to become law.

    James Fitzgerald does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Brazil’s dangerous flirtation with counterterrorism – https://theconversation.com/brazils-dangerous-flirtation-with-counterterrorism-258347

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI USA: A Legacy of Leadership and Love: First Sergeant Charles Olivas Retires After 36 Years of Service

    Source: US State of Wyoming

    Wyoming National Guard

    By Joseph Coslett

    CHEYENNE, Wyo. — A hush fell over the auditorium as the final notes of the national anthem rang out. Then, surrounded by family, fellow Soldiers, and senior leaders from across the Wyoming Military Department, First Sergeant Charles A. Olivas Jr. stepped into a moment that marked the end of a 36-year journey and the beginning of a new chapter.

    For more than three decades, Olivas served as a steady anchor in the Wyoming Army National Guard, known as much for his logistical expertise as for his servant-hearted leadership. His career spanned deployments, state activations, leadership transformations and cultural shifts across the force. Yet through it all, one constant remained: His commitment to service and family.

    “This is a tremendous accomplishment,” said Maj. Gen. Greg Porter, Wyoming’s Adjutant General. “When you look at the slideshow and hear his story, it becomes clear—Charles Olivas’s life is about two things: service and family. Every role he’s taken has been about giving of himself. Whether it was food service, equal opportunity, or sexual assault prevention, he always showed up—not for himself, but for the people around him.”

    Olivas’s military journey began in 1988 as a junior in high school, when he enlisted through the Split Option Program. He went on to serve in a long list of units including the 289th General Supply Company, 22nd Support Command during Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the 115th Field Artillery Brigade, 94th Troop Command, and multiple deployments to Kuwait. Over the years, he filled nearly every NCO leadership billet, culminating in his final post as the G4 Superbird Logistics Management Specialist.

    His service wasn’t confined to uniforms and formations. Olivas’s parallel civilian role as a federal technician allowed him to impact the Guard’s day-to-day operations while his community engagement amplified his reach. He taught English as a second language, coached baseball for 17 years, led parent-teacher organizations, facilitated faith formation classes and served on statewide boards and prevention coalitions.

    During the ceremony, laughter and reverence interwove as family members recalled his sense of humor and relentless commitment. From teaching others to lead to turning “stupid but effective” ideas into policy, Olivas embraced both the science and art of military life. “I got lucky,” he said. “I got to be part of military science and military art. When those two come together, they make music, and I got to be the conductor.”

    Lt. Col. Robert Lejeune, Wyoming Army National Guard chief of staff, said Olivas was more than a logistics expert, he was a mentor who influenced generations of Soldiers.

    “In all the chaos and turbulence of the last four decades: Desert Storm, the Twin Towers, Iraq, Afghanistan, Charles was the one steady point we could count on,” Lejeune said. “There were times when I was off base, and he brought me back in. I wouldn’t be here today without his mentorship.”

    That sentiment echoed across the ceremony. Col. Kristina Tweedy, Wyoming Air Guard director of staff-air, recounted long conversations with Olivas during his time in human resources, calling him a “servant leader” whose unique perspective and integrity left a permanent mark.

    “When someone makes a real impact on your career, you never forget them,” she said. “Charles is the kind of person whose legacy is the number of people he’s touched, Army, Air. It doesn’t matter. They all know who he is.”

    Throughout his career, Olivas received dozens of honors, including the Meritorious Service Medal, Army Commendation and Achievement Medals with multiple Oak Leaf Clusters, the Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, the Kuwait Liberation Medal, and the Army Meritorious Unit Citation. He was also a recipient of the Order of Saint Barbara—recognizing his connection to the field artillery—and a long-standing member of the Wyoming Military Funeral Honors Team.

    But for Olivas, the awards were always secondary to the relationships.

    “Be the leader you want leading you,” he said during his final remarks. “When it’s your time to lead—lead. When it’s your time to follow—be a good follower too.”

    In true first sergeant fashion, he left the crowd with one final exercise: “Put your hands out like you’re going to clap,” he grinned. “On the count: 1… 2… 3… CLAP. That’s leadership. You see how I led you? You are now qualified.”

    A standing ovation followed.

    As the benediction closed the ceremony, Father Emilio offered a final prayer: “May Saint Michael, protector in battle, watch over you and your loved ones. May you never doubt that your service is remembered.”

    1st Sgt. Charles A. Olivas Jr. introduces his family during the ceremony, June 16, 2025. He credited his wife and children as the foundation behind his long career of service. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Joseph Coslett Jr.)
    Maj. Gen. Greg Porter presents the Meritorious Service Medal to 1st Sgt. Charles A. Olivas Jr. during the retirement ceremony in Cheyenne, Wyo., June 16, 2025. The award recognized Olivas’s leadership in logistics and organizational improvement. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Joseph Coslett Jr.)
    Maj. Gen. Greg Porter, Wyoming adjutant general, presided over 1st Sgt. Charles Olivas, Wyoming Army National Guard Soldier, retirement ceremony in Cheyenne, Wyoming, on June 18, 2025.
    Guests watch a slideshow highlighting the life and service of 1st Sgt. Charles A. Olivas Jr. during the ceremony in Cheyenne, Wyo., June 16, 2025. The photos reflected deployments, family memories, and decades of leadership. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Joseph Coslett Jr.)
    Theresa Olivas is escorted to the stage and honored with a certificate of appreciation during the ceremony in Cheyenne, Wyo., June 16, 2025. Her steadfast support was a key part of Olivas’s successful career. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Joseph Coslett Jr.)
    Guests watch a slideshow highlighting the life and service of 1st Sgt. Charles A. Olivas Jr. during the ceremony in Cheyenne, Wyo., June 16, 2025. The photos reflected deployments, family memories, and decades of leadership. (U.S. Army National Guard photo by Joseph Coslett Jr.)

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: SCO Defense Ministers’ Meeting to be held in Qingdao 2025-06-24 21:55:14 The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers’ Meeting will be held from June 25 to 26 in Qingdao City, east China’s Shandong Province. Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun will host and address the meeting.

    Source: People’s Republic of China – Ministry of National Defense

      BEIJING, June 24 — The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Defense Ministers’ Meeting will be held from June 25 to 26 in Qingdao City, east China’s Shandong Province. Chinese Defense Minister Admiral Dong Jun will host and address the meeting. Defense leaders of SCO member countries, as well as senior officials of SCO Secretariat and Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure will participate in the meeting.

      As one of the important activities hosted by China as the rotating president of SCO, the 2025 Defense Ministers’ Meeting will further consolidate and deepen the military mutual trust and pragmatic cooperation among SCO member countries, promote the implementation of co-building the shared home featuring solidarity and mutual trust, peace and tranquility, prosperity and development, good-neighborliness and friendship, as well as fairness and justice, and contribute to safeguarding world and regional peace and stability and promoting prosperity and development.

    loading…

    MIL OSI China News

  • NSA Doval urges SCO countries to shun double standards on terror

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    National Security Adviser Ajit Doval on Tuesday called on SCO countries to “shun double standards” in the fight against terrorism and take decisive action against UN-proscribed terror outfits.

    Speaking at the 20th meeting of SCO Security Council secretaries in Beijing, Doval highlighted India’s deep concern over terror groups designated by the UN Security Council — including Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, both state-backed outfits operating from Pakistan — as well as Al Qaeda, ISIS and their affiliates.

    He referred to the April 22 terror attack in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, and India’s subsequent Operation Sindoor to dismantle terror infrastructure across the border. Doval stressed that India’s measured, non-escalatory response was aimed at preventing future attacks and bringing those responsible to justice.

    “Any act of terrorism, including cross-border terror, is a crime against humanity,” he told SCO delegates. “We must hold perpetrators, sponsors and financiers accountable and dismantle their terror ecosystems,” Doval added.

    He also underscored India’s civilizational links with SCO nations and its commitment to “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” — the world as one family. Doval thanked member states for supporting India’s proposals on joint action against terrorist networks, counter-radicalisation, and countering extremist propaganda.

     

     

    On the sidelines of the meeting, Doval met Chinese Vice-President Han Zheng at the Great Hall of the People and held talks with Russian Deputy Security Council Secretary Aleksandr Venediktov. The Russian side invited Doval to Moscow for the next round of the bilateral strategic dialogue.

    On Monday, Doval also met Wang Yi, China’s Foreign Minister and Communist Party Politburo member. They discussed bilateral ties and regional stability, with Doval underlining the need to fight terrorism in all forms.

    IANS

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Mozambique: Armed Group’s Child Abductions Surge in North


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    An armed group linked to the Islamic State (ISIS) has ramped up abductions of children in northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province, Human Rights Watch said today. Most of the abducted children are being used for transporting looted goods, forced labor, forced marriages, and taking part in the fighting.

    National civil society groups and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report that such kidnappings are on the rise. While the armed group, locally known as Al-Shabab, released some of the children they abducted earlier this year, a number of children remain missing; those who have returned to their communities struggle with reintegration. 

    “The surge in abductions of children in Cabo Delgado adds to the horrors of Mozambique’s conflict,” said Ashwanee Budoo-Scholtz, deputy Africa director at Human Rights Watch. “Al-Shabab needs to spare children from the conflict and immediately release those who have been abducted.”

    In May and June 2025, Human Rights Watch interviewed nine people in Mozambique, including residents of Cabo Delgado, journalists, civil society activists, and a UN official, all of whom expressed concern about the resurgence of kidnappings. “In recent days, 120 or more children have been abducted,” said Abudo Gafuro, executive director at Kwendeleya, a national organization that monitors attacks and provides support to victims. 

    On January 23, 2025, Al-Shabab attacked the village of Mumu, in Mocímboa da Praia district, and abducted four girls and three boys. During Al-Shabab’s subsequent retreat, two children were released, but five remain missing. In March, the armed group abducted six children in Chibau to carry looted goods; four were released the following day. On May 3, Al-Shabab abducted a girl in the village of Ntotwe, Mocímboa da Praia district; on May 11, they kidnapped six girls and two boys near Magaia village in Muidumbe district. 

    When Al-Shabab fighters “enter or attack certain areas, they tend to abduct children,” said Augusta Iaquite, coordinator at the Association of Women in Legal Careers in Cabo Delgado. “They take them to train them and later turn them into their own fighters.” 

    When children who have been abducted return to the community, there are few resources to help them reintegrate, Human Rights Watch said. “The country needs a clear strategy on what to do when a child, especially one that has been rescued, returns,” said Benilde Nhalivilo, executive director at the Civil Society Forum for Children’s Rights. 

    Civil society organizations have called on Mozambique’s government to fulfill the country’s obligations under domestic and international law to protect the nation’s children. 

    Mozambique’s Constitution and the 2008 Law for the Promotion and Protection of Children’s Rights enshrine the state’s duty to protect children from all forms of violence, exploitation, and abuse. Additionally, Mozambique is a party to various international and regional instruments that guarantee children’s rights, including the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. Both explicitly prohibit the abduction, recruitment, and exploitation of children. The UN Optional Protocol to the Child Rights Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict, ratified by Mozambique in 2004, prohibits non-state armed groups from recruiting or using children under 18. 

    Under customary international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, children are entitled to special respect and protection, and recruiting or using children under the age of 15 to participate actively in hostilities is a war crime. 

    Mozambican authorities should seek to prevent further abductions, investigate existing cases and fairly prosecute those responsible, and ensure proper support for victims, Human Rights Watch said. Rescued children need medical care, psychosocial assistance, and reintegration mechanisms that provide for their protection and well-being.

    “Mozambique’s government needs to take concrete actions to safeguard children and prevent armed groups from using them as tools of conflict,” Budoo-Scholtz said. “There is a need to ensure that there are robust reintegration measures so that the children are not further ostracized when they come back to the community.”

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Human Rights Watch (HRW).

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Security: New report: major developments and trends on terrorism in Europe in 2024

    Source: Europol

    These numbers are sourced from Europol’s European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2025 (TE-SAT), published today. This flagship report – the only one of its kind in Europe – describes the major developments and trends in the terrorism landscape in the EU in 2024, based on qualitative and quantitative information provided by EU Member States and other Europol partners.Catherine…

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Amnesty International UK’s response to Home Secretary’s announcement that Palestine Action will be proscribed a terrorist organisation

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Sacha Deshmukh, Amnesty International UK Chief Executive said: 

    “Amnesty International is seriously concerned by the Home Secretary’s announcement that she intends to proscribe Palestine Action as a terrorist organisation. The UK has an overly broad definition of terrorism and proscribing a direct-action protest group like Palestine Action risks an unlawful interference with the fundamental rights of freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly.

    “Terrorism legislation must always be treated with the highest degree of caution and restraint, as it allows the state to curtail due process and interfere with other human rights in ways that would violate international human rights law. Given the enormous consequences of proscription, such an interference with fundamental rights will only be lawful when it is provided by a clear law and is strictly necessary and proportionate in the sense that it is the only step capable of securing a legitimate aim.

    “Clearly that is not the case when it comes to Palestine Action; the ordinary criminal law, accompanied by appropriate human rights protections, is more than capable of responding to direct action protesters of their kind. It should be remembered that proscribing Palestine Action not only makes membership of the organisation a criminal offence, through broadly worded speech offences such as ‘glorification’ it puts at risk the free speech rights of many other activists who are deeply concerned about the plight of Palestinians in the context of Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza.

    “Government embarrassment at security breaches is no proper basis for excessive and disproportionate interferences with human rights. It is precisely this kind of unlawful government action that critics of the UK’s terrorism laws warned would come one day.”   

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    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA: Chairman Mast Applauds House Vote to Defund Biden’s Cash Payments to Taliban

    Source: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Media Contact 202-321-9747

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Brian Mast issued the following statement after the House voted in favor of a bill sponsored by Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN) to ensure no more U.S. tax dollars fall into the hands of the Taliban after the Biden administration paid the terrorist regime millions of dollars following the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.

    “This bill makes sure not a single penny of American taxpayer money ends up in the hands of the Taliban—not directly, not through back doors, and not via weak-willed foreign governments or shady NGOs,” Chairman Mast said. “If you’re funding the Taliban, you’re no friend of the United States.”

    This issue has been a key focus for House Republicans since last Congress when lawmakers were made aware that weekly cash shipments of nearly $40 million were being sent to Afghanistan’s Taliban-controlled Central Bank.

    Additionally, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reported in May 2024 that more than $10 million had been paid to the Taliban in the form of taxes since they took over Afghanistan in August 2021. Secretary of State Antony Blinken later admitted that around $10 million had been paid to the Taliban in the form of taxes after testifying before the committee in December 2024. 

    Republicans, led by Rep. Burchett, introduced H.R. 6586 last Congress to oppose financial and material support from falling into the hands of the Taliban. The measure passed unanimously both in committee and on the House floor, but Senate Democrats refused to bring the bill up for final passage.

    This Congress, Republicans introduced H.R. 260 –  No Tax Dollars for Terrorist Act which builds upon H.R. 6586 to ensure no U.S. taxpayer dollars end up in the hands of the Taliban.

    The bill advanced to the House floor during the House Foreign Affairs Committee’s first full committee markup of the 119th Congress.

    “I would like to thank Chairman Mast and the entire House Foreign Affairs Committee for their tireless work on this legislation,” Rep. Burchett said. “We are one step closer to ensuring that US dollars stop flowing to terrorist organizations.”

    The measure now proceeds to the Senate for final passage.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Demand SDNY Misconduct Records Ahead of Emil Bove’s Nomination Hearing

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Jersey Cory Booker

    WASHINGTON, D.C. –  U.S. Senators Cory Booker (D-NJ), Peter Welch (D-VT), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Adam Schiff (D-CA), and Alex Padilla (D-CA), all members of the Senate Judiciary Committee, wrote a letter to Interim U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) Jay Clayton requesting personnel records relevant to Emil Bove III, President Trump’s nominee to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

    From 2012 to 2021, Mr. Bove served as an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New York (SDNY). During his tenure at SDNY, Mr. Bove was promoted to Acting Deputy Chief for the Narcotics Unit in 2019 and, later, Co-Chief of the Terrorism and International Narcotics Unit from 2019 to 2021.

    “According to public reporting, Mr. Bove’s unprofessional and unethical conduct and his vindictive and angry temperament with opposing counsel and his own colleagues led to multiple complaints, professional interventions, and the threat of demotion throughout his career at SDNY. In 2018, a group of federal criminal defense attorneys in Manhattan were so alarmed by Mr. Bove’s pattern of unethical conduct that they wrote his supervisors at SDNY to warn them that he was a liability for the office,” the Senators wrote. The Senators’ letter includes the text of that complaint, which described Mr. Bove as the “prosecutor version of a drunk driver — completely reckless and out of control.”

    “Mr. Bove’s record of alleged abuse of power, ethical lapses, dishonesty, and unstable, abusive behavior during his tenure as a federal prosecutor warrants a thorough review of his employment

    history at SDNY by members of the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Bove now seeks a lifetime appointment to a federal appeals court, an office that carries immense power and limited accountability. It is also a role that requires constant collaboration with and deep trust amongst all of the judges on the appeals court. Bove’s documented conduct raises serious concerns about his fitness for such a role,” the Senators continued. 

    The Senators requested the following records by no later than June 23, 2025:

    1. All internal complaints, formal and informal, against Mr. Bove during his tenure at the SDNY.
    2. All external complaints submitted to SDNY, including from opposing counsel, during his tenure at the SDNY.
    3. All records regarding Mr. Bove’s management style and alleged abusive behavior.

    To read the full text of the letter, click here. 

    MIL OSI USA News