Category: Tourism

  • MIL-Evening Report: Range anxiety – or charger drama? Australians are buying hybrid cars because they don’t trust public chargers

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Ganna Pogrebna, Executive Director, AI and Cyber Futures Institute, Charles Sturt University

    VisualArtStudio/Shutterstock

    Range anxiety has long been seen as the main obstacle stopping drivers from going electric.

    But range isn’t the real issue. The average range of a new electric vehicle (EV) is more than 450 kilometres, and top models offer more than 700km per charge. By contrast, the average car is driven about 33km per day in Australia as of 2020.

    What’s really going on is charger anxiety – the question of whether you can find somewhere reliable to recharge when you’re away from home. Australia’s public chargers are not common enough or reliable enough to give motorists certainty they can find a place to recharge.

    This is why many drivers are hedging their bets. Rather than embracing battery-electric vehicles, many Australian drivers are opting for hybrids as well as plug-in hybrids (PHEVs), which couple a smaller battery with an internal combustion engine. Hybrids and PHEVs accounted for almost 20% of new car sales from July–September last year, compared to 6.5% for fully electric vehicles.

    Labor’s reelection could lead to better charging infrastructure. Last term, the federal government set a goal of a fast charging station every 150km along major highways, while state governments are also building more. But so far, these efforts aren’t enough to ensure Australia has reliable chargers in the right locations. Until then, cautious drivers will buy hybrids.

    Australia’s charger network has expanded, but many drivers are anxious about availability and reliability.
    Stepan Skorobogadko/Shutterstock

    Public chargers matter

    EV owners charge their cars at home an estimated 70–85% of the time. They use public chargers just 10–20% of the time and workplace charging 6–10% of the time.

    This makes sense – home charging is reliable and cheap. But these figures also point to a problem: EV drivers don’t trust public chargers.

    At present, Australia has about 3,700 public chargers nationwide. Each charging station typically supports one or two EVs, often offering different charging speeds. By contrast, there are around 6,600 service stations, with the ability to fuel multiple vehicles at once.



    Other countries have much larger charger networks. The United Kingdom has more than 40,000 and Canada 16,000. China, the world leader, has almost 10 million.

    China now has 10 million EV chargers.
    Tang Yan Song/Shutterstock

    Outside major Australian cities, chargers are harder to find and are often broken or in use. Chargers are usually not staffed, meaning there’s no one watching to prevent vandalism or organise maintenance.

    EV plugs are not yet standardised. Some plugs may not be available, and using chargers isn’t always easy. By contrast, petrol cars use standard nozzles, payment is simpler and staff and CCTV presence discourages vandalism and ensures the pumps work.

    If a petrol car runs out of fuel, the problem can be solved with a lift and a jerry can. But if your EV runs flat in a rural area because you can’t find a charger, you may have to get it towed.

    This lack of reliability is more than just a logistical hurdle — it’s a psychological barrier.

    Psychological roadblocks

    A recent study found the fear of running out of charge was a major psychological barrier to buying an EV – particularly for rural and regional Australians, who drive longer distances. As long as chargers remain unreliable or located too far apart, this anxiety will persist.

    In Australia, it’s easy to find reports of broken chargers, long queues at charging stations, gaps in the rural network and personal anecdotes of EV owners struggling to find a way to charge.

    A 2023 survey found almost 70% of EV owners had come across an inoperable charger at least once over the previous six months.

    What can Australia take from overseas experience?

    Australia’s government wants to increase EV uptake. While EVs are getting cheaper, the supporting infrastructure isn’t good enough yet to make them the norm.

    Across the European Union, chargers are being installed every 60km along major highways and efforts are being made to tackle psychological barriers to uptake.

    Federal and state governments in the United States have invested heavily in filling gaps in the charger network and working with consumers to encourage more sustainable commuting.

    Plug-in hybrids are powered by batteries and an internal combustion engine.
    algre/Shutterstock

    Choosing a hybrid is rational but not ideal

    It should be no surprise more Australians are buying hybrids as a safety net, given there are plenty of service stations and not as many EV chargers. City driving can allow near-total use of the electric motor, while longer trips still require petrol.

    The choice is rational. But it’s not ideal from an environmental point of view. Traditional hybrids are still largely powered by an internal combustion engine, while PHEVs can run as electric for longer but still use their combustion engines.

    While plug-ins have lower emissions than traditional vehicles, they often fail to deliver the full emissions savings drivers and regulators might hope for. Many drivers don’t charge regularly and rely instead on petrol.

    Chargers aren’t the only factor, of course. A tax break for PHEVs boosted their popularity for several years before ending in April, while sales of Tesla EVs have fallen off a cliff due to the unpopularity of owner Elon Musk.

    What needs to change?

    The solutions are straightforward: expand the charger network, especially in regional and rural areas. Improve maintenance schedules and ensure existing chargers are reliable. Make sure data on their availability is accessible in real time so drivers can avoid anxiety and frustration. Counter EV misinformation and anecdotal biases with information campaigns.

    When EV ownership and charging in Australia is practical and low risk, the sluggish EV transition will accelerate. But until then, many drivers will keep buying hybrids as a compromise.

    Ganna Pogrebna does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Range anxiety – or charger drama? Australians are buying hybrid cars because they don’t trust public chargers – https://theconversation.com/range-anxiety-or-charger-drama-australians-are-buying-hybrid-cars-because-they-dont-trust-public-chargers-250281

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A looming workforce crisis in NZ tourism and hospitality threatens industry growth plans

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Anthony Brien, Associate Professor, Department of Global Value Chains and Trade, Lincoln University, New Zealand

    Getty Images

    Last week’s big tourism conference in Rotorua saw plenty of optimism about the industry’s potential, but also warnings that airline capacity is hampering post-COVID growth.

    The focus on bringing more foreign tourists to New Zealand is understandable, given the sector accounts for 7.5% of GDP and is our second highest export earner. But there is deeper problem, too. We already struggle to serve current visitor numbers – how will we handle more?

    International tourism injected NZ$16.9 billion into the economy in the year to March 2024. Total tourism expenditure (domestic and international) hit a record $44.4 billion, up nearly 15% from the previous year.

    The government has responded with a $13.5 million global marketing boost, and business leaders are celebrating. The big question is whether we will have the workforce to match the ambition.

    Because right now, the pipeline of skilled, engaged people willing to work, grow and lead in tourism and hospitality isn’t flowing.

    Without an industry-led, well-funded campaign to rebuild the perception of tourism and hospitality as credible, rewarding and sustainable career options, New Zealand has a crisis in the making.

    Who wants to work in tourism and hospo?

    Fewer New Zealanders are choosing tourism and hospitality as a career. With the number of locals studying tourism and hospitality collapsing, both sectors are increasingly dependent on foreign workers.

    Tourism education numbers for the past decade show:

    • 1,355 equivalent full-time students were enrolled in tourism-related courses in 2024, down from 3,750 in 2015 – a 63% drop

    • enrolments in bachelor’s degrees in tourism management fell from 45 in 2015 to 25 in 2024 – a 44% drop

    • postgraduate enrolments in tourism management are down 75%, with only 20 in 2024.

    The figures for hospitality education paint an even grimmer picture:

    • enrolments in hospitality courses fell from from 915 in 2015 to just 250 in 2024 – a 73% drop

    • cookery course enrolments fell from 4,125 to 1,140 – a 72% drop

    • food and beverage service training fell from 1,445 in 2015 to just 340 in 2024 – a 76% drop

    • hospitality management degree enrolments fell from 380 in 2015 to 210 in 2024 – a 45% drop.

    These figures do not include actual workplace training, but they still illustrate a clear trend.

    The looming workforce shortage

    Minister of Tourism and Hospitality Louise Upston recently said, “We need to grow tourism businesses. We need to grow the value from the tourism visitors we have.” She’s right. But without a viable workforce, none of this is possible.

    As to why more New Zealanders aren’t keen to work in the sector, Upston said, “I just don’t think the sector’s promoted it well enough.” This is despite many years of industry exhortations to “grow the domestic workforce”, “attract more young people” and “build career pathways”.

    COVID-19 certainly hurt the industry’s image as a place to work. But the challenges around neglected workforce development, career promotion and long-term planning predate the pandemic.

    Other industries and professions – including construction, agriculture and accounting – have invested heavily in scholarships, internships, mentoring and reputation building. Tourism and hospitality haven’t matched this and now risk losing young people to global demand.

    If the pattern continues, there will be a national shortage of qualified staff and competent managers, and greater reliance on short-term and migrant labour. That leads in turn to overworked staff, poorer service, and businesses forced to reduce hours or close altogether.

    Investment in the future

    In the 1970s and 80s, New Zealand had to import tourism and hospitality talent to grow the industries. Without real change, those days may return.

    Apart from what is offered by two major hotel chains, few formal internships exist. Such programmes are not simply part-time jobs, they’re investments in future talent, involving professional guidance and meaningful experience. They take effort, but they work.

    Meanwhile, degree-level programmes are already being dropped. If lower-level course enrolments continue to fall, these programmes may close too. The burden then falls on businesses to train and educate staff. But those same businesses say they can’t find enough staff today.

    This is more than a workforce problem, it’s a national economic risk. Spending millions on attracting visitors only to deliver a substandard experience is not a good use of taxpayer money.

    Without people, there is no hospitality. Without hospitality, there is no tourism. And without a sustainable tourism industry, New Zealand’s economy will suffer.

    Anthony Brien is a member of Tourism Industry Aotearoa.

    ref. A looming workforce crisis in NZ tourism and hospitality threatens industry growth plans – https://theconversation.com/a-looming-workforce-crisis-in-nz-tourism-and-hospitality-threatens-industry-growth-plans-256212

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – Ninth report on economic and social cohesion – P10_TA(2025)0098 – Thursday, 8 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

    –  having regard to Articles 4, 162, 174 to 178, and 349 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund Plus, the Cohesion Fund, the Just Transition Fund and the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund and financial rules for those and for the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, the Internal Security Fund and the Instrument for Financial Support for Border Management and Visa Policy(1) (Common Provisions Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund(2),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1059 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on specific provisions for the European territorial cooperation goal (Interreg) supported by the European Regional Development Fund and external financing instruments(3),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013(4),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund(5),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(6),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013, (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 508/2014 as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the healthcare systems of Member States and in other sectors of their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak (Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative)(7),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2020 amending Regulations (EU) No 1301/2013 and (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak(8),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 March 2020 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 in order to provide financial assistance to Member States and to countries negotiating their accession to the Union that are seriously affected by a major public health emergency(9),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/2221 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 December 2020 amending Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 as regards additional resources and implementing arrangements to provide assistance for fostering crisis repair in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its social consequences and for preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery of the economy (REACT-EU)(10),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/562 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 April 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) No 223/2014 as regards Cohesion’s Action for Refugees in Europe (CARE)(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2022/2039 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013 and (EU) 2021/1060 as regards additional flexibility to address the consequences of the military aggression of the Russian Federation FAST (Flexible Assistance for Territories) – CARE(12),

    –  having regard to the URBACT programme for sustainable urban cooperation, established in 2002,

    –  having regard to the Urban Agenda for the EU of 30 May 2016,

    –  having regard to the Territorial Agenda 2030 of 1 December 2020,

    –  having regard to the 9th Cohesion Report, published by the Commission on 27 March 2024(13), and the Commission communication of 27 March 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report (COM(2024)0149),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘The future of EU cohesion: Scenarios and their impacts on regional inequalities’, published by the European Parliamentary Research Service in December 2024,

    –  having regard to the Commission report of February 2024 entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’(14),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee of 31 May 2024 on the 9th Cohesion Report(15),

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 21 November 2024 entitled ‘A renewed Cohesion Policy post 2027 that leaves no one behind – CoR responses to the 9th Cohesion Report and the Report of the Group of High-Level Specialists on the Future of Cohesion Policy’,

    –  having regard to the report entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness – A competitiveness strategy for Europe’, published by the Commission on 9 September 2024,

    –  having regard to the agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the study entitled ‘Streamlining EU Cohesion Funds: addressing administrative burdens and redundancy’, published by its Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union in November 2024(16),

    –  having regard to a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 May 2025 on the Border Regions’ Instrument for Development and Growth in the EU (BRIDGEforEU)(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 3 May 2022 entitled ‘Putting people first, securing sustainable and inclusive growth, unlocking the potential of the EU’s outermost regions’ (COM(2022)0198),

    –  having regard to the opinion in the form of a letter from the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 25 March 2021 on cohesion policy and regional environment strategies in the fight against climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 20 May 2021 on reversing demographic trends in EU regions using cohesion policy instruments(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 September 2021 entitled ‘Towards a stronger partnership with the EU outermost regions(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 September 2022 on economic, social and territorial cohesion in the EU: the 8th Cohesion Report(22),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 21 November 2023 on possibilities to increase the reliability of audits and controls by national authorities in shared management(23),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 23 November 2023 on harnessing talent in Europe’s regions(24),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 March 2024 entitled ‘Cohesion policy 2014-2020 – implementation and outcomes in the Member States(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Regional Development (A10-0066/2025),

    A.  whereas cohesion policy is at the heart of EU policies and is the EU’s main tool for investments in sustainable economic, social and territorial development, and contributing to the Green Deal objectives, across the EU under its multiannual financial frameworks for the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027; whereas cohesion policy, as mandated by the Treaties, is fundamental for a well-functioning and thriving internal market by promoting the development of all regions in the EU, and especially the less developed ones;

    B.  whereas cohesion policy has fostered economic, social and territorial convergence in the EU, notably by increasing the gross domestic products, for example, of central and eastern EU Member States, which went from 43 % of the EU average in 1995 to around 80 % in 2023; whereas the 9th Cohesion Report highlights that, by the end of 2022, cohesion policy supported over 4,4 million businesses, creating more than 370 000 jobs in these companies; whereas it also underlines that cohesion policy generates a significant return on investment, and that each euro invested in the 2014–2020 and 2021–2027 programmes will have generated 1,3 euros of additional GDP in the Union by 2030; whereas cohesion policy constituted, on average, around 13 % of total public investment in the EU(26);

    C.  whereas the Commission report entitled ‘The long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas: key achievements and ways forward’, presented alongside the ninth Cohesion Report, underlines that EUR 24,6 billion, or 8 % of the rural development pillar of the common agricultural policy, is directed towards investments in rural areas beyond farming investments, setting the scene for a debate on the future of rural areas;

    D.  whereas between 2021 and 2027, cohesion policy will have invested over EUR 140 billion in the green and digital transitions(27), to help improve networks and infrastructure, support nature conservation, improve green and digital skills and foster job creation and services for the public;

    E.  whereas despite the widely acknowledged and proven positive impact of cohesion policy on social, economic and territorial convergence, significant challenges remain, marked notably by development disparities at sub-national level, within regions and in regions caught in a development trap, and by the impact of climate change, in terms of demography, the digital and green transitions, and connectivity, but also in terms of sustainable economic development, in particular in least developed regions and rural and remote areas;

    F.  whereas cohesion policy and sectoral programmes of the EU have repeatedly and efficiently helped regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters, even though it is a long-term, structural policy and not a crisis management instrument or the ‘go-to’ emergency response funding mechanism; whereas such crises have delayed the implementation of the European Structural and Investment Funds and whereas a considerable number of projects financed with Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) funds have been taken for the most part from projects that had been slated for investment under cohesion policy;

    G.  whereas despite measures already taken for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods, the regulatory framework governing the use and administration of cohesion policy instruments and funds should be further simplified and interoperable digital tools better used and developed, including the establishment of one-stop digitalised service centres, with the objective of streamlining procedures, enhancing stakeholder trust, reducing the administrative burden, increasing flexibility in fund management and speeding up payments, not only for the relevant authorities but also for the final beneficiaries; whereas it is necessary to increase the scope for using funds more flexibly, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products; whereas it is of utmost importance to formulate any future cohesion policy with a strategic impetus throughout the funding period, which could, however, be reassessed at midterm;

    H.  whereas the low absorption rate of the 2021-2027 cohesion policy funds, currently at just 6 %, is not because of a lack of need from Member States or regions, but rather stems from delays in the approval of operational programmes, the transition period between financial frameworks, the prioritisation of NextGenerationEU by national managing authorities, limited administrative capacity and complex bureaucratic procedures; whereas Member States and regions may not rush to absorb all available funds as they anticipate a possible extension under the N+2 or N+3 rules;

    I.  whereas radical modifications to the cohesion regulatory framework, from one programming period to the next, contribute to generating insecurity among the authorities responsible and beneficiaries, gold-plating legislation, increasing error rates (and the accompanying negative reputational and financial consequences), delays in implementation and, ultimately, disaffection among beneficiaries and the general population;

    J.  whereas there is sometimes competition between cohesion funds, emergency funds and sectoral policies;

    K.  whereas demographic changes vary significantly across EU regions, with the populations of some Member States facing a projected decline in the coming years and others projected to grow; whereas demographic changes also take place between regions, including movement away from outermost regions, but are generally observed as movement from rural to urban areas within Member States, wherein women are leaving rural areas in greater numbers than men, but also to metropolitan areas, where villages around big cities encounter difficulties in investing in basic infrastructure; whereas the provision of essential services such as healthcare, education and transportation must be reinforced in all regions, with a particular focus on rural and remote areas; whereas a stronger focus is needed on areas suffering from depopulation and inadequate services, requiring targeted measures to encourage young people to remain through entrepreneurship projects, high-quality agriculture and sustainable tourism;

    L.  whereas taking account of the ageing population is crucial in order to ensure justice among the generations and thereby to strengthen participation, especially among young people;

    M.  whereas urban areas are burdened by new challenges resulting from the population influx to cities, as well as rising housing and energy prices, requiring the necessary housing development, new environmental protection and energy-saving measures, such as accelerated deep renovation to combat energy poverty and promote energy efficiency; whereas the EU cohesion policy should help to contribute to an affordable and accessible housing market for all people in the EU, especially for low- and middle-income households, urban residents, families with children, women and young people;

    N.  whereas effective implementation of the Urban Agenda for the EU can enhance the capacity of cities to contribute to cohesion objectives, thereby improving the quality of life of citizens and guaranteeing a more efficient use of the EU’s financial resources;

    O.  whereas particular attention needs to be paid to rural areas, as well as areas affected by industrial transition and EU regions that suffer from severe and permanent natural or demographic handicaps, brain drain, climate-related risks and water scarcity, such as the outermost regions, and in particular islands located at their peripheries or at the periphery of the EU, sparsely populated regions, islands, mountainous areas and cross-border regions, as well as coastal and maritime regions;

    P.  whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has created a new geopolitical reality that has had a strong impact on the employment, economic development and opportunities, and general well-being of the population living in regions bordering Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, as well as candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova, which therefore require special attention and support, including by accordingly adapting cohesion policy; whereas this war has led to an unprecedented number of people seeking shelter in the EU, placing an additional burden on local communities and services; whereas the collective security of the EU is strongly dependent on the vitality and well-being of regions situated at the EU’s external borders;

    Q.  whereas the unique situation of Northern Ireland requires a bespoke approach building on the benefits of PEACE programmes examining how wider cohesion policy can benefit the process of reconciliation;

    R.  whereas 79 % of citizens who are aware of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy believe that EU-funded projects have a positive impact on the regions(28), which contributes to a pro-EU attitude;

    S.  whereas overall awareness of EU-funded projects under cohesion policy has decreased by 2 percentage points since 2021(29), meaning that greater decentralisation should be pursued to bring cohesion policy even closer to the citizen;

    1.  Insists that the regional and local focus, place-based approach and strategic planning of cohesion policy, as well as its decentralised programming and implementation model based on the partnership principle with strengthened implementation of the European code of conduct, the involvement of economic and civil society actors, and multi-level governance, are key and positive elements of the policy, and determine its effectiveness; is firmly convinced that this model of cohesion policy should be continued in all regions and deepened where possible as the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies, protecting the environment, and as a key contributor to EU competitiveness and just transition, as well as helping to cope with new challenges ahead;

    2.  Calls for a clear demarcation between cohesion policy and other instruments, in order to avoid overlaps and competition between EU instruments, ensure complementarity of the various interventions and increase visibility and readability of EU support; in this context, notes that the RRF funds are committed to economic development and growth, without specifically focusing on economic, social and territorial cohesion between regions; is concerned about the Commission’s plans to apply a performance-based approach to the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF); acknowledges that performance-based mechanisms can be instrumental in making the policy more efficient and results-orientated, but cautions against a one-size-fits-all imposition of the model and expresses serious doubt about ideas to link the disbursement of ESIF to the fulfilment of centrally defined reform goals, even more so if the reform goals do not fall within the scope of competence of the regional level;

    3.  Is opposed to any form of top-down centralisation reform of EU funding programmes, including those under shared management, such as the cohesion policy and the common agricultural policy, and advocates for greater decentralisation of decision-making to the local and regional levels; calls for enhanced involvement of local and regional authorities and economic and civil society actors at every stage of EU shared management programmes, from preparation and programming to implementation, delivery and evaluation, keeping in mind that the economic and social development of, and territorial cohesion between, regions can only be accomplished on the basis of good cooperation between all actors;

    4.  Emphasises that the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) plays a key role, alongside cohesion policy funds, in supporting rural areas; stresses that the EAFRD’s design must align with the rules of cohesion policy funds to boost synergies and facilitate multi-funded rural development projects;

    5.  Is convinced that cohesion policy can only continue to play its role if it has solid funding; underlines that this implies that future cohesion policy must be provided with robust funding for the post-2027 financial period; stresses that it is necessary to provide funding that is ambitious enough and easily accessible to allow cohesion policy to continue to fulfil its role as the EU’s main investment policy, while retaining the flexibility to meet potential new challenges, including the possibility of financing the development of dual-use products, and to enable local authorities, stakeholders and beneficiaries to effectively foster local development; is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy;

    6.  Underlines the importance of the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the mid-term review of cohesion policy programmes 2021-2027 in shaping the future of cohesion policy; reiterates the need for a more ambitious post-2027 cohesion policy in the next MFF 2028-2034; calls, therefore, for the upcoming MFF to ensure that cohesion policy continues to receive at least the same level of funding as in the current period in real terms; furthermore calls for cohesion policy to remain a separate heading in the new MFF; stresses that cohesion policy should be protected from statistical effects that may alter the eligibility of regions by changing the average EU GDP; reiterates the need for new EU own resources;

    7.  Proposes, therefore, that next MFF be more responsive to unforeseen needs, including with sufficient margins and flexibilities from the outset; emphasises in this regard, however, that cohesion policy is not a crisis instrument and that it should not deviate from its main objectives, namely from its long-term investment nature; calls for the European Union Solidarity Fund to be strengthened, including in its pre-financing, making it less bureaucratic and more easily accessible, in order to develop an appropriate instrument capable of responding adequately to the economic, social and territorial consequences of future natural disasters or health emergencies; emphasises the need for Parliament to have adequate control over any emergency funds and instruments;

    8.  Recognises the need to also use nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (NUTS) 3 classification for specific cases, in a manner that recognises that inequalities in development exist within all NUTS 2 regions; is of the opinion that regional GDP per capita must remain the main criterion for determining Member States’ allocations under cohesion policy; welcomes the fact that, following Parliament’s persistent calls, the Commission has begun considering additional criteria(30) such as greenhouse gas emissions, population density, education levels and unemployment rates, in order to provide a better socio-economic overview of the regions;

    9.  Stresses that the rule of law conditionality is an overarching conditionality, recognising and enforcing respect for the rule of law, also as an enabling condition for cohesion policy funding, to ensure that Union resources are used in a transparent, fair and responsible manner with sound financial management; considers it necessary to reinforce respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights, and to ensure that all actions are consistent with supporting democratic principles, gender equality and human rights, including workers’ rights, the rights of disabled people and children’s rights, in the implementation of cohesion policy; highlights the important role of the European Anti-Fraud Office and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office in protecting the financial interests of the Union;

    10.  Calls for further efforts to simplify, make more flexible, strengthen synergies and streamline the rules and administrative procedures governing cohesion policy funds at EU, national and regional level, taking full advantage of the technologies available to increase accessibility and efficiency, building on the existing and well-established shared management framework, in order to strengthen confidence among users, thus encouraging the participation of a broader range of economic and civil society actors in projects supported and maximising the funds’ impact; calls for further initiatives enabling better absorption of cohesion funds, including increased co-financing levels, higher pre-financing and faster investment reimbursements; calls for local administration, in particular representing smaller communities, to be technically trained for better administrative management of the funds; stresses, therefore, the importance of strengthening the single audit principle, further expanding simplified cost options and reducing duplicating controls and audits that overlap with national and regional oversight for the same project and beneficiary, with a view to eliminating the possibility of repeating errors in subsequent years of implementation;

    11.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to give regions greater flexibility already at the programming stage, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, emphasising the need to involve the economic and civil society actors; underlines that thematic concentration was a key element in aligning cohesion policy with Europe 2020 objectives; asks the Commission, therefore, to present all findings related to the implementation of thematic concentration and to draw lessons for future legislative proposals;

    12.  Acknowledges that the green, digital and demographic transitions present significant challenges but, at the same time, opportunities to achieve the objective of economic, social and territorial cohesion; recognises that, statistically, high-income areas can hide the economic problems within a region; is aware of the risk of a widening of regional disparities, a deepening of social inequalities and a rising ‘geography of discontent’ related to the transition process; underlines the need to reach the EU’s sustainability and climate objectives, and to maintain shared economic growth by strengthening the Union’s competitiveness; calls, therefore, for a European strategy that guarantees harmonious growth within the Union, meeting the respective regions’ specific needs; reaffirms its commitment to pursuing the green and digital transitions, as this will create opportunities to improve the EU’s competitiveness; underlines the need to invest in infrastructure projects that enhance connectivity, particularly in sustainable, intelligent transport, and in energy and digital networks, ensuring that all regions, including remote and less-developed ones, are fully integrated into the single market and benefit equitably from the opportunities it provides; emphasises, in this context, the need to support the development of green industries, fostering local specificities and traditions to increase the resilience of the economic environment and civil society to future challenges;

    13.  Urges that the cohesion policy remain consistent with a push towards increasing innovation and completing the EU single market, in line with the conclusions of the Draghi report on European competitiveness; underlines, in the context of regional disparities, the problem of the persisting innovation divide and advocates for a tailored, place-based approach to fostering innovation and economic convergence across regions and reducing the innovation gap; calls for a stronger role for local and regional innovation in building competitive research and innovation ecosystems and promoting territorial cohesion; points to new EU initiatives, such as regional innovation valleys and partnerships for regional innovation, that aim to connect territories with different levels of innovation performance and tackle the innovation gap; considers that this approach will reinforce regional autonomy, allowing local and regional authorities to shape EU policies and objectives in line with their specific needs, characteristics and capacities, while safeguarding the partnership principle;

    14.  Is convinced that cohesion policy needs to continue to foster the principle of just transition, addressing the specific needs of regions, while leaving no territory and no one behind; calls for continued financing of the just transition process, with the Just Transition Fund being fully integrated into the Common Provisions Regulation and endowed with reinforced financial means for the post-2027 programming period; emphasises, nonetheless, the need to assess the impact of the Just Transition Fund on the transformation of eligible regions and, while ensuring it remains part of cohesion policy, refine its approach in the new MFF on the basis of the findings and concrete measures to ensure the economic and social well-being of affected communities;

    15.  Underlines the need to improve the relationship between cohesion policy and EU economic governance, while avoiding a punitive approach; stresses that the European Semester should comply with cohesion policy objectives under Articles 174 and 175 TFEU; calls for the participation of the regions in the fulfilment of these objectives and for a stronger territorial approach; calls for a process of reflection on the concept of macroeconomic conditionality and for the possibility to be explored of replacing this concept with new forms of conditionality to better reflect the new challenges ahead;

    16.  Is concerned about the growing number of regions in a development trap, which are stagnating economically and are suffering from sharp demographic decline and limited access to essential services; calls, therefore, for an upward adjustment in co-financing for projects aimed at strengthening essential services; stresses the role of cohesion policy instruments in supporting different regions and local areas that are coping with demographic evolution affecting people’s effective right to stay, including, among others, challenges related to depopulation, ageing, gender imbalances, brain drain, skills shortages and workforce imbalances across regions; recognises the need for targeted economic incentives and structural interventions to counteract these phenomena; in this context, calls for the implementation of targeted programmes to attract, develop and retain talent, particularly in regions experiencing significant outflows of skilled workers, by fostering education, culture, entrepreneurship and innovation ecosystems that align with local and regional economic needs and opportunities;

    17.  Recognises the importance of supporting and financing specific solutions for regions with long-standing and serious economic difficulties or severe permanent natural and demographic handicaps; reiterates the need for maintaining and improving the provision of quality essential services (such as education and healthcare), transport and digital connectivity of these regions, fostering their economic diversification and job creation, and helping them respond to challenges such as rural desertification, population ageing, poverty, depopulation, loneliness and isolation, as well as the lack of opportunities for vulnerable people such as persons with disabilities; underlines the need to prioritise the development and adequate funding of strategic sectors, such as renewable energy, sustainable tourism, digital innovation and infrastructure, in a manner that is tailored to the economic potential and resources of each region, in order to create broader conditions for endogenous growth and balanced development across all regions, especially rural, remote and less-developed areas, border regions, islands and outermost regions; recalls the importance of strong rural-urban linkages and particular support for women in rural areas;

    18.  Emphasises the need for a tailored approach for the outermost regions, as defined under Article 349 TFEU, which face unique and cumulative structural challenges due to their remoteness, small market size, vulnerability to climate change and economic dependencies; underlines that these permanent constraints, including the small size of the domestic economy, great distance from the European continent, location near third countries, double insularity for most of them, and limited diversification of the productive sector, result in additional costs and reduced competitiveness, making their adaptation to the green and digital transition particularly complex and costly; underlines their great potential to further develop, inter alia through improved regional connectivity, key sectors such as blue economy, sustainable agriculture, renewable energies, space activities, research or eco-tourism; reiterates its long-standing call on the Commission to duly consider the impact of all newly proposed legislation on the outermost regions, with a view to avoiding disproportionate regulatory burdens and adverse effects on these regions’ economies;

    19.  Underlines the fact that towns, cities and metropolitan areas have challenges of their own, such as considerable pockets of poverty, housing problems, traffic congestion and poor air quality, generating challenges for social and economic cohesion created by inharmonious territorial development; emphasises the need for a specific agenda for cities and calls for deepening their links with functional urban areas, encompassing smaller cities and towns, to ensure that economic and social benefits are spread more evenly across the entire territory; highlights the need to strengthen coordination between the initiatives of the Urban Agenda for the EU and the instruments of cohesion policy, favouring an integrated approach that takes into account territorial specificities and emerging challenges; calls, furthermore, for more direct access to EU funding for regional and local authorities, as well as cities and urban authorities, by inter alia widening the use of integrated territorial investments (ITI);

    20.  Stresses the need to continue and strengthen investments in affordable housing within the cohesion policy framework, recognising its significance for both regions and cities; highlights the need to foster its changes relevant to investing in housing beyond the two current possibilities (energy efficiency and social housing); emphasises the important role that cohesion policy plays in the roll-out and coordination of these initiatives; believes, furthermore, that it is important to include housing affordability in the URBACT initiative;

    21.  Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; calls on the Commission to support the Member States and regions affected by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular the regions on the EU’s eastern border, by revising the Guidelines on regional State aid(31), through tailor-made tools and investments under the cohesion policy, as well as supporting them to make the most of the possibilities offered by the cohesion policy funds, including Interreg, in a flexible way, to help cope with the detrimental socio-economic impact of the war on their populations and territories; calls, furthermore, for support to be given to regions bordering candidate countries such as Ukraine and Moldova to strengthen connections and promote their EU integration;

    22.  Highlights the added value of territorial cooperation in general and cross-border cooperation in particular; underlines the importance of Interreg for cross-border regions, including outermost regions; emphasises its important role in contributing to their development and overcoming cross-border obstacles, including building trust across borders, developing transport links, identifying and reducing legal and administrative obstacles and increasing the provision and use of cross-border public services, among others; considers Interreg as the main EU instrument for tackling the persistent cross-border obstacles faced by emergency services, and proposes that there be a more prominent focus on these services; underlines the fact that cross-border areas, including areas at the EU’s external borders, bordering aggressor countries often face specific challenges; believes that EU border regions, facing multiple challenges, must be supported and is of the opinion that they must be provided with increased means; welcomes the new regulation on BRIDGEforEU; emphasises the importance of small-scale and cross-border projects and stresses the need for effective implementation on the ground; calls on the Commission to encourage Member States to actively support awareness-raising campaigns in bordering regions to maximise the impact of cross-border cooperation;

    23.  Recalls the need to ‘support cohesion’, rather than just rely on the ‘do no harm to cohesion’ principle, which means that no action should hamper the convergence process or contribute to regional disparities; calls for a stronger integration of these principles as cross-cutting in all EU policies, to ensure that they support the objectives of social, economic and territorial cohesion, as set out in Articles 3 and 174 TFEU; calls, furthermore, on the Commission to issue specific guidelines on how to implement and enforce these principles across EU policies, paying particular attention to the impact of EU laws on the competitiveness of less developed regions; reiterates that new legislative proposals need to take due account of local and regional realities; suggests that the Commission draw on innovative tools such as RegHUB (the network of regional hubs) to collect data on the impact of EU policies on the regions; to this end, underlines the need to strengthen the territorial impact assessment of EU legislation, with a simultaneous strengthening of the territorial aspects of other relevant policies; insists that promoting cohesion should also be seen as a way of fostering solidarity and mutual support among Member States and their regions; calls on the Commission and the Member States to continue their efforts regarding communication and visibility of the benefits of cohesion policy, demonstrating to citizens the EU’s tangible impact and serving as a key tool in addressing Euroscepticism; welcomes the launch of the multilingual version of the Kohesio platform;

    24.  Notes with concern the severe decline in recent years of adequate levels of national funding by Member States towards their poorer regions; recalls the importance of respecting the EU rule on additionality; calls on the Commission to ensure that national authorities take due account of internal cohesion in drafting and implementing structural and investment fund projects;

    25.  Insists that, in addition to adjusting to regional needs, cohesion policy must be adapted to the smallest scale, i.e. funds must be accessible to the smallest projects and project bearers; points out that their initiatives are often the most innovative and have a significant impact on rural development; reiterates that these funds should be accessible to all, regardless of their size or scope; approves of the Cohesion Alliance’s call for ‘a post-2027 Cohesion Policy that leaves no one behind’;

    26.  Stresses that delays in the MFF negotiations, together with the fact that Member States have placed a greater focus on the programming of the RRF funds, led to considerable delays in the programming period 2021-2027; stresses the importance of a timely agreement in the next framework, and therefore calls for the Common Provisions Regulation (CPR) and the budget negotiations to be finalised at least one year before the start of the new funding period so that Member States can develop their national and regional funding strategies in good time to ensure a successful transition to the next funding period and the continuation of existing ESIF projects;

    27.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee, the European Committee of the Regions and the national and regional parliaments of the Member States.

    (1) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 159, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1060/oj.
    (2) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 60, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1058/oj.
    (3) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 94, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1059/oj.
    (4) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj.
    (5) OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1056/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (7) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 5, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/460/oj.
    (8) OJ L 130, 24.4.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/558/oj.
    (9) OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/461/oj.
    (10) OJ L 437, 28.12.2020, p. 30, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2221/oj.
    (11) OJ L 109, 8.4.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/562/oj.
    (12) OJ L 275, 25.10.2022, p. 23, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2039/oj.
    (13) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, 2024.
    (14) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy, Forging a sustainable future together: Cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe – Report of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy, February 2024.
    (15) OJ C, C/2024/4668, 9.8.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4668/oj.
    (16) European Parliament: Policy Department for Structural and Cohesion Policies, Directorate-General for Internal Policies, Streamlining EU Cohesion funds – addressing administrative burdens and redundancy, 2024.
    (17) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (18) Not yet published in the Official Journal.
    (19) OJ C 494, 8.12.2021, p. 26.
    (20) OJ C 15, 12.1.2022, p. 125.
    (21) OJ C 117, 11.3.2022, p. 18.
    (22) OJ C 125, 5.4.2023, p. 100.
    (23) OJ C, C/2024/4207, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4207/oj.
    (24) OJ C, C/2024/4225, 24.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/4225/oj.
    (25) OJ C, C/2024/6562, 12.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6562/oj.
    (26) European Commission, Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op.cit.
    (27) European Commission: Ninth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion, op. cit.
    (28) European Commission: Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy and Directorate-General for Communication, Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU Regional Policy, Flash Eurobarometer 531, 2023.
    (29) Flash Eurobarometer 531, op. cit.
    (30) European Court of Auditors, Rapid case review – Allocation of Cohesion policy funding to Member States for 2021-2027, March 2019.
    (31) Commission communication of 29 April 2021 entitled ‘Guidelines on regional State aid’ (OJ C 153, 29.4.2021, p. 1).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – The European Water Resilience Strategy – P10_TA(2025)0091 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), in particular Article 191 thereof,

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), with particular emphasis on the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, adopted in December 2022,

    –  having regard to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants of 22 May 2001,

    –  having regard to the precautionary principle and the principles that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay, as enshrined in Article 191(2) TFEU,

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1119 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 June 2021 establishing the framework for achieving climate neutrality and amending Regulations (EC) No 401/2009 and (EU) 2018/1999 (European Climate Law)(1),

    –  having regard to Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy(2) (Water Framework Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration(3) (Groundwater Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/105/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directives 82/176/EEC, 83/513/EEC, 84/156/EEC, 84/491/EEC, 86/280/EEC and amending Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council(4) (Environmental Quality Standards Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and management of flood risks(5),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2020/2184 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on the quality of water intended for human consumption(6) (Drinking Water Directive),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2020/741 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 2020 on minimum requirements for water reuse(7) (Water Reuse Regulation),

    –  having regard to Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive)(8),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/3019 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 concerning urban wastewater treatment(9) (revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1785 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 April 2024 amending Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) and Council Directive 1999/31/EC on the landfill of waste(10),

    –  having regard to Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources(11),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1991 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2024 on nature restoration and amending Regulation (EU) 2022/869(12),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2557 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 December 2022 on the resilience of critical entities and repealing Council Directive 2008/114/EC(13) (Critical Entities Resilience Directive),

    –  having regard to Directive (EU) 2022/2555 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 14 December 2022 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148 (NIS 2 Directive)(14),

    –  having regard to Directive 2009/128/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 October 2009 establishing a framework for Community action to achieve the sustainable use of pesticides(15),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013(16),

    –  having regard to Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190 of 19 December 2024 on the use of bisphenol A (BPA) and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives with harmonised classification for specific hazardous properties in certain materials and articles intended to come into contact with food, amending Regulation (EU) No 10/2011 and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/213(17),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2021 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 December 2019 on the European Green Deal (COM(2019)0640),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 12 May 2021 entitled ‘Pathway to a Healthy Planet for All – EU Action Plan: ‘Towards Zero Pollution for Air, Water and Soil’’ (COM(2021)0400),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 24 February 2021 entitled ‘Forging a climate-resilient Europe – the new EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change’ (COM(2021)0082),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing the challenge of water scarcity and droughts in the European Union (COM(2007)0414),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 March 2020 entitled ‘A new Circular Economy Action Plan: For a cleaner and more competitive Europe’ (COM(2020)0098),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 14 November 2012 entitled ‘A Blueprint to Safeguard Europe’s Water Resources’ (COM(2012)0673),

    –  having regard to the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030,

    –  having regard to the COP29 Declaration on Water for Climate Action, endorsed by the European Union,

    –  having regard to the European Oceans Pact announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the European climate adaptation plan and the European water resilience strategy announced by Commission President von der Leyen in her political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on 18 July 2024,

    –  having regard to the EU’s 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regards to its resolution of 5 October 2022 entitled ‘Access to water as a human right – the external dimension’(18),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 19 September 2024 on the devastating floods in central and eastern Europe, the loss of lives and the EU’s preparedness to act on such disasters exacerbated by climate change(19),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 6 October 2022 on momentum for the ocean: strengthening ocean governance and biodiversity(20),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 28 November 2019 on the climate and environment emergency(21),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 14 November 2024 on the UN climate change conference in Baku, Azerbaijan (COP29)(22),

    –  having regard to the Commission report of 4 February 2025 on the implementation of the Water Framework Directive (2000/60/EC) and the Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) entitled ‘Third river basin management plans – Second flood risk management plans’ (COM(2025)0002),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 15/2024 of 16 October 2024 entitled ‘Climate adaptation in the EU – action not keeping up with ambition’,

    –  having regard to former Finnish President Sauli Niinistö’s report of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s civil and military preparedness and readiness’,

    –  having regard to Enrico Letta’s report of April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2020 on the implementation of the EU water legislation(23),

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 33/2018 of 18 December 2018 entitled ‘Combating desertification in the EU: a growing threat in need of more action,

    –  having regard to the European citizens’ initiative (ECI) on the right to water,

    –  having regard to its resolution of 8 September 2015 on the follow-up to the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water(24),

    –  having regard to UN General Assembly Resolution 64/292 of 28 July 2010, which recognises the human right to water and sanitation,

    –  having regard to the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture,

    –  having regard to the European Court of Auditors special report 20/2024 of 30 September 2024 entitled ‘Common Agricultural Policy Plans – Greener, but not matching the EU’s ambitions for the climate and the environment’,

    –  having regard to European Environment Agency report 07/2024 of 15 October 2024 entitled ‘Europe’s state of water 2024: the need for improved water resilience’ (EEA Report 07/2024),

    –  having regard to the Environment Council conclusions of 17 June 2024 on the 8th environment action programme,

    –  having regard to European Court of Auditors special report 20/2021 of 28 September 2021 entitled ‘Sustainable water use in agriculture: CAP funds more likely to promote greater rather than more efficient water use’,

    –  having regard to the European Economic and Social Committee declaration of 26 October 2023 for an EU Blue Deal,

    –  having regard to the Commission proposal of 5 July 2023 for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Soil Monitoring and Resilience (Soil Monitoring Law) (COM(2023)0416),

    –  having regard to its position at first reading of 24 April 2024 on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2000/60/EC establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, Directive 2006/118/EC on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration and Directive 2008/105/EC on environmental quality standards in the field of water policy(25),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety (A10-0073/2025),

    A.  whereas water is essential for life and humanity; whereas the EU has to manage current and future water resources efficiently and respond effectively to the current water challenges, as they directly affect human health, the environment and its ecosystems, strategic socio-economic activities such as energy production, agriculture and food security, and the EU’s competitiveness;

    B.  whereas water is a scarce and limited resource and, while 70 % of the earth’s surface is water-covered, available and usable fresh water accounts for only 0,5 % of water on earth(26); whereas mountains are real water towers and important freshwater reservoirs in Europe, the Alps alone providing 40 % of Europe’s fresh water(27);

    C.  whereas groundwater supplies two thirds of the EU’s drinking water and supports many ecosystems(28); whereas the services provided by freshwater ecosystems are worth over EUR 11 trillion in Europe, and provide considerable health and recreational benefits, such as from angling(29);

    D.  whereas water stress is already occurring in Europe, affecting approximately 20 % of Europe’s territory and 30 % of the population on average every year, figures that are likely to increase in the future on account of climate change(30), despite the fact that total water abstraction at the EU-27 level appeared to decrease by 15 % between 2000 and 2019; whereas the increase in the number and recurrence of extreme weather events such as droughts and floods, and the fact that they are expected to become yet more frequent in the near future, poses a risk to human life and the EU’s food sovereignty and could lead to regions in Europe becoming uninhabitable;

    E.  whereas 78 % of Europeans consider that the EU should propose additional measures to address water-related issues in Europe and 21 % of Europeans consider pollution to be the main threat linked to water in their country(31);

    F.  whereas the human right to water and sanitation was recognised as a human right in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly on 28 July 2010;

    G.  whereas the European Citizens’ Initiative Right2Water was the first ever to gather the required number of signatories, calling for the EU to ensure the right to water for all;

    H.  whereas the provisions of Article 14 TFEU and Protocol No 26 thereto on Services of General Interest are key elements to be prominently taken into account in all aspects of the design and implementation of the European water resilience strategy (EWRS), thus safeguarding the status of Europe’s water services as essential public services, and ensuring accessibility, equity, affordability and the maintenance of high quality standards;

    I.  whereas the Member States should follow up on the recommendations of the Commission report of November 2023(32) in order to improve water balances as the knowledge basis for making decisions about water allocation;

    J.  whereas substantive corporate value may be at risk owing to worsening water insecurity, with a decrease in the capacity of production or its complete halt as a consequence; whereas assets in water-stressed regions could become stranded, temporarily or permanently, if assumptions made about water availability and access prove inaccurate, if regulatory responses are unanticipated or if risk mitigation and stewardship plans are not put in place(33);

    K.  whereas the deadline set by the Water Framework Directive (WFD) for European rivers, lakes, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwaters to achieve ‘good’ status was 2015, with a possible postponement to 2027 under certain conditions; whereas the objective of achieving good chemical status for all EU water bodies by 2027 remains far from being achieved, primarily due to substances such as mercury, brominated flame retardants and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons(34);

    L.  whereas the 2025 report on the implementation of the WFD shows that delays in meeting the WFD’s targets are not due to a deficiency in the legislation but to a lack of funding, slow implementation and insufficient integration of environmental objectives into sectoral policies; whereas analysis has shown that the Member States are not meeting the annual investment needs, which are estimated to be EUR 77 billion, with a financing gap currently estimated at around EUR 25 billion a year; whereas the report also shows the clear need for the Member States to increase their level of ambition and accelerate action to reduce the compliance gap as much as possible before 2027, to increase investment and ensure adequate financing, including via EU funds, to achieve the objectives of their programmes of measures, as well as to put in place additional measures to reduce current persistent environmental challenges to and improve transboundary cooperation;

    M.  whereas the water legislation has been evaluated as fit for purpose; whereas it establishes a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater; whereas, at the same time, it allows for less stringent environmental objectives to be achieved if socio-economic needs served by such human activity cannot be achieved by other means and it allows for a failure to achieve the objectives for water bodies if the reason for the failure is overriding public interest; whereas the legislation is proportionate and mandates the authorities of the Member States, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, to decide on the overriding public interest; whereas in some cases this may be the protection of the environment and in others a socio-economic activity;

    N.  whereas industry accounts for approximately 40 % of total water abstraction in Europe; whereas the largest categories of the annual water abstraction in the EU-27, according to the statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community (NACE), are abstraction for cooling in electricity generation (34 %), followed by abstraction for agriculture (29 %), public water supply (21 %) and manufacturing (15 %)(35); whereas data on water abstraction and use in the EU is historical and poor(36);

    O.  whereas electricity production is the largest water-abstracting sector, but most of the water is returned to the environment after cooling or turbine propulsion; whereas overall, agriculture is the highest net water-consuming sector at the EU level, as most of the water is consumed by the crop or evaporates; whereas other uses, such as industry and water utilities, abstract and consume comparatively less water, but they can represent significant pressures at a local level, especially on groundwater(37);

    P.  whereas all industrial activity requires water to produce its end products or to support production activities; whereas businesses depend on water for their daily operations, and as water scarcity increases, it can disrupt operations, raise costs and create regulatory and reputational risks;

    Q.  whereas the energy sector relies heavily on water resources; whereas this dependency poses a serious risk as water scarcity can impact energy production processes and supply security, especially where water is used as feedstock or for cooling; whereas the transition to renewable energy, particularly wind and solar energy, offers sustainable and water-efficient decarbonisation pathways and the opportunity to halt or reverse the trend of increasing water consumption;

    R.  whereas water is an essential resource for agriculture in the production of high-quality food, feed and renewable raw materials; whereas agriculture depends on water availability and irrigation helps to shield farmers from irregular rainfall and to increase the viability, yield and quality of the crops, but is a significant drain on water resources; whereas in view of climate change, changing weather patterns and increased frequency of floods and droughts, the importance of water as a resource for the production of high-quality agricultural products and of the need for water to be used efficiently will therefore be fundamental to the security of food supply and to the solutions to address water scarcity; whereas reducing pressure on surface water and groundwater from agriculture must go hand in hand with investment aimed at the use of reclaimed water and innovative desalination technologies, thereby achieving a better water balance as well as promoting clean alternative energies such as green hydrogen;

    S.  whereas global population growth requires increased food production, and the EU must guarantee food sovereignty, as laid down in Article 39 TFEU;

    T.  whereas reliable data on water accounting, that is, the systematic study of the current status and trends in water supply, demand, accessibility and use in domains that have been specified(38), is crucial for an assessment of the current situation in the EU and for European competitiveness;

    U.  whereas the potential of wastewater as an alternative water supply is underestimated, given that 60-70 % of the potential value of wastewater across the EU is currently unexploited(39) and less than 3 % of treated wastewater is reused in the EU(40); whereas there is significant potential for circular approaches to water in households, as only a small amount of the water in households is used for drinking and eating and therefore requires the highest quality standards;

    V.  whereas a very large quantity of water is lost due to obsolete or ageing water networks and the lack of necessary maintenance; whereas investment in the maintenance, improvement and development of resilient innovative irrigation infrastructures is essential for reducing and improving the efficiency of water consumption in agriculture; whereas such improvements in efficiency enable the water saved to be used for other purposes or enable the natural flow rates of watercourses to be maintained;

    W.  whereas clean and sufficient water is an essential element in implementing and achieving a real sustainable circular economy in the EU;

    X.  whereas water leakage is an underestimated global issue, which significantly exacerbates water scarcity, with an average of 23 % of treated water lost during distribution in the EU due to leaky pipes, outdated treatment facilities and insufficient reservoirs(41); whereas the revised Drinking Water Directive included measures to reduce water leakages, as well as risk assessment and management of the catchment areas for drinking water abstraction;

    Y.  whereas in 2021, 91 % of Europe’s groundwater bodies were reported as having achieved ‘good quantitative status’, while 77 % were reported as having ‘good chemical status’(42);

    Z.  whereas in 2021, only 37 % of Europe’s surface water bodies were reported as being in ‘good’ or ‘high’ ecological status, while 29 % achieved ‘good chemical status’(43);

    AA.  whereas the European Environment Agency emphasises that the proportion of surface waters failing to achieve good ecological status is uneven across Europe, and that these are more prevalent in parts of central and western Europe, and stresses that differences in water status between the Member States may be caused by different pressures, but that those differences may also result from varying approaches to monitoring and assessment(44);

    AB.  whereas the quality of surface waters across the continent reflects continuing and combined pressures, in particular diffuse pollution and the degradation of their natural flow and physical features; whereas pollution by nutrients and persistent priority substances, as well as by substances newly emerging as pollutants, continues; whereas groundwaters are affected by diffuse pollution and also suffer from intensive abstraction(45);

    AC.  whereas groundwater supplies 65 % of water for drinking and 25 % of water for agricultural irrigation in the EU(46); whereas it is a finite resource that needs to be protected from pollution and over-exploitation(47);

    AD.  whereas monitoring data from the European Environment Agency indicates widespread pollution by per- and polyfluoralkyl substances (PFAS), commonly referred to as ‘forever chemicals’, in European waters, posing significant risks to aquatic ecosystems and human health; whereas short-chain PFAS trifluoroacetic acid (TFA) has been detected in drinking water all over Europe; whereas PFAS persist in the environment, bioaccumulate in living organisms and cause adverse (eco)toxicological effects; whereas from a group of 6 000 to 10 000 individual substances, only a few have been extensively studied and their impact on human health and environment is known; whereas 99 % of PFAS remain undetected in the environment as a result of limits in monitoring;

    AE.  whereas the lack of EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and insufficient monitoring of less-studied PFAS compounds exacerbate the challenge of achieving good chemical status for EU waters in line with the WFD and pose a substantial technical and financial burden on health systems and on water service providers while jeopardising applications of water and sewage sludge reuse;

    AF.  whereas hazardous chemicals, including heavy metals and other pollutants, released into water bodies by industrial activities, significantly impact water quality and aquatic ecosystems(48);

    AG.  whereas pharmaceutical substances are increasingly identified in surface water and groundwater; whereas pollution caused by pharmaceutical residues necessitates advanced water treatment technologies, including membrane filtration, activated carbon treatment, advanced oxidation processes and other innovative purification techniques;

    AH.  whereas Directive 2010/75/EU(49) mandates that the potential aggravation of the impact of industrial discharges on the state of water bodies due to variations of water flow dynamics should be explicitly taken into account in the granting and reviewing of permits; whereas the best available techniques will newly incorporate notions of environmental performance levels related to water and permits, which translate the use of these techniques into environmental performance limit values; whereas this is a welcome change with a potential improvement to the industry’s resilience, as EU installations may already face a lower production capacity seasonally due to water scarcity;

    AI.  whereas urban wastewater is one of the main sources of water pollution, if not properly collected and treated; whereas the objectives of the Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive should not be lowered, and its scope should be extended to other sectors and substances that contribute to water pollution;

    AJ.  whereas nutrient pollution in EU water bodies leads to eutrophication, loss of biodiversity, and degradation of aquatic ecosystems(50); whereas pesticide run-off contaminates surface water and groundwater, threatening water quality and human health;

    AK.  whereas research indicates that exposure in Europe to the synthetic chemical bisphenol A (BPA), which is used in products ranging from plastic and metal food containers to reusable water bottles, is well above acceptable health safety levels(51);

    AL.  whereas soil and nutrient management lies at the basis of improving water quality and availability; whereas the EWRS should focus on improving nutrient management, with the aim of closing nutrient loops to reduce nutrient emissions to waterways; whereas the safe use of sewage sludge in agriculture will also reduce the EU’s very high dependency on the import of phosphorus mineral fertiliser, for example, from Russia; whereas the safe use of sludge should therefore also be considered as contributing to European resilience and strategic autonomy;

    AM.  whereas climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; whereas many impacts of climate change are felt through water, such as more intense and frequent droughts, more extreme flooding and more erratic seasonal rainfall; whereas floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security, and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion, economic prosperity and stability, as well as jeopardising the long-term availability of this valuable resource;

    AN.  whereas the European climate risk assessment recognised that Europe’s policies and adaptation actions are not keeping pace with the rapidly growing risks that threaten ecosystems, infrastructure, food and water supply and people’s health, as well as the economy and finance(52);

    AO.  whereas assessments by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change show that the sea level rise due to climate change is leading to an increase in the salinity of soils and freshwaters, compromising ecosystem health and water quality, as well as affecting 80 million Europeans living in low elevation coastal zones and flood plains; whereas freshwater and marine ecosystems are interconnected as riverine pollution, disruption to sediment flows and water shortages all have a very strong impact on the health of marine ecosystems, particularly the coastal ones, as well as on the viability of social and economic activities that depend on them, such as transport, fisheries, agriculture, aquaculture and tourism;

    AP.  whereas prolonged drought, extreme heat and large-scale flooding events, caused by changing weather patterns, will intensify and become more frequent throughout the continent, damaging ecosystems and human health and leading to major disruption to economic activities and decreasing the overall quantity and quality of available water; whereas preserving water resources and the natural functions of rivers, while supplying sufficient water of good quality, is becoming a major challenge that will require increased climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts, effective management and innovative measures to increase water availability; whereas managing water scarcity and flood risks affordably and sustainably will increasingly become important across the EU;

    AQ.  whereas in 2022, Europe experienced its hottest summer and the second warmest year on record, leading to drought impacting over 15 % of EU territory; whereas the average annual economic loss caused by droughts in the EU between1981 and 2010 was estimated at around EUR 9 billion per year; whereas with no adaptation measures, it is estimated that annual drought losses in Europe and the UK could increase to EUR 45 billion per year up to 2100 with warming of 3°C(53); whereas in the period of 1998-2020, floods comprised 43 % of all disaster events in Europe; whereas climate change impacts and socio-economic developments are leading to more frequent flooding, affecting an increasing number of people and causing increasing damage; whereas 12 % of Europe’s population lives in floodplains(54);

    AR.  whereas the cost of inaction in addressing water-related challenges is extremely high, given that 90 % of disasters are related to water(55); whereas without policy action, the cost of economic losses from coastal floods alone could exceed EUR 1 trillion per year by the end of the century in the EU(56) and the economic cost of droughts in Europe could exceed EUR 65 billion a year by 2100(57);

    AS.  whereas significant differences exist between the Member States in water availability, management strategies and usage patterns, and vulnerability to climate change impacts can vary considerably; whereas a tailored approach is required to enhance water resilience and ensure sustainable water management;

    AT.  whereas droughts constitute one of the chief catastrophic consequences of climate change; whereas around 23 % of the EU’s territory is moderately susceptible to desertification and 8 % is highly susceptible to it; whereas Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Italy are among the countries most affected, and 74 % of Spain’s surface area is at risk of desertification; whereas the EWRS should look beyond prolonged droughts, but rather address the reality that the semi-arid line is moving north, resulting in increasing areas in the EU that will face chronic long-term unavailability of sufficient freshwater resources;

    AU.  whereas policies related to desertification, water consumption and climate change are closely interconnected; whereas as part of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the EU reaffirmed in 2015 and later re-confirmed in 2024(58) its commitment to achieving land degradation neutrality by 2030, which, according to the European Court of Auditors special report on desertification, is unlikely to be achieved;

    AV.  whereas water infrastructure can help maintain a constant and predictable flow and supply of water; whereas in 2022, the annual average river discharge across Europe was the second lowest since records began in 1991(59);

    AW.  whereas downstream areas are particularly dependent on upstream water management and abstraction; whereas the Member States should refrain from implementing measures that significantly increase flood risks upstream or downstream of other countries in the same river basin, in accordance with the WFD;

    AX.  whereas nature-based solutions are pertinent interventions that, when tailored to specific ecosystems and needs, can increase resilience in the water cycle and provide multiple benefits in terms of biodiversity protection, carbon sequestration, improved water quality, nutrient retention, supply of drinking water, wildfire prevention and flood risk mitigation; whereas nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and the operable life of water infrastructure, therefore ensuring, in many cases, complementarity of both solutions;

    AY.  whereas natural water retention measures are nature-based solutions that aim to store water in natural, agricultural, forested and urban landscapes;

    AZ.  whereas water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such; whereas, under Directive (EU) 2024/1203 on the protection of the environment through criminal law(60), abstraction of surface water or groundwater within the meaning of the WFD constitutes a criminal offence where such conduct is unlawful and intentional, and causes, or is likely to cause, substantial damage to the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or to the quantitative status of groundwater bodies;

    BA.  whereas soil biodiversity and soil organic carbon affect water retention capacity; whereas soil erosion, compaction and certain soil management practices that cause soil degradation lead to a steady decrease in the water retention capacity of soil, which as a consequence exacerbates drought and flood events with a direct negative impact on farming; whereas healthy soil is therefore one of the drivers of water resilience, which itself should be approached and managed at river basin level; whereas better land management is key to preventing disasters;

    BB.  whereas the current multiannual financial framework (MFF) includes an ambitious but non-binding target of dedicating at least 7,5 % of annual EU spending to the biodiversity objectives in 2024 and 10 % in both 2026 and 2027; whereas the new financial framework should incorporate a water perspective with a view to allocating sufficient resources to the future EWRS in order to ensure resilient water ecosystems and infrastructure, and security of water supply, and to facilitate investments in innovative solutions;

    BC.  whereas cohesion funding has played a crucial role in improving water and sanitation services across the Member States; whereas continued support is required to ensure their long-term resilience and compliance with increasingly stringent quality standards;

    BD.  whereas pricing policies can improve the efficiency of water use; whereas such policies are a national competence and account for the regional differences in water availability and the source of water supply; whereas pricing can play a significant role in prompting households and other economic sectors to optimise consumption, as well as in ensuring that water users effectively participate in recovering the costs of water services; whereas pricing policies should also consider affordability for households and small businesses;

    BE.  whereas digitalisation and innovation can effectively assist the Member States, regional bodies and the Commission in collecting data on and monitoring water management; whereas the EU is at the forefront of new technological developments in the water sector, accounting for 40 % of all international patent families in this sector between 1992 and 2021(61), a position that needs to be fostered and nurtured, and the potential of the internal market fully exploited; whereas hurdles for the introduction and scaling-up of new water technologies need to be examined and a just European level playing field guaranteed; whereas continued support for research in water technology innovation is needed to secure and to create jobs and boost European competitiveness;

    BF.  whereas innovation is a crucial tool to help the water sector meet the challenges of the United Nation’s SDGs, adapt to climate change and become more water-efficient;

    BG.  whereas deployment of monitoring and modelling technologies is still lagging behind in many Member States, and the digitalisation of the sector is too slow; whereas provisions on the river basin management plans in the WFD do not explicitly include concrete measures to digitise the water sector; whereas common shortcomings for the current policies harnessing the potential digital solutions are related to the lack of technology guidance, monitoring standards, policy integration, standardisation and public involvement;

    BH.  whereas the water sector is vulnerable to various threats, including physical attacks, cyberattacks and contamination with harmful agents; whereas such incidents could result in widespread illness, casualties and service disruptions, significantly impacting public health, the environment and economic stability; whereas the digitalisation of water management might introduce further security risks in a context of increasing hostile attacks on critical infrastructure; whereas the implementation of the NIS2 Directive and Critical Entities Resilience Directive can contribute to mitigating security risks to vital (drinking) water systems and (drinking) water infrastructure, arising from geopolitical tensions;

    BI.  whereas advances in sensor technology, computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data management can help monitor water quantity and quality and inform the operational decisions of the policymakers and water management companies; whereas innovations in nature-based systems to manage water are available and can contribute to resilient water management;

    BJ.  whereas water is a vital component in the life cycle of AI, both in the operation of data centres and the manufacture of hardware; whereas the rapid expansion of AI could result in an exponential increase in water demand; whereas that dependency on an increasingly scarce resource poses significant challenges in terms of sustainability; whereas strategic technologies, such as semiconductors, hydrogen, electric vehicle batteries and data centres, play a key role in achieving a competitive and autonomous EU;

    BK.  whereas chiller and cooling tower systems, based on innovative cooling technologies such as evaporative and closed-loop cooling, are already available and can contribute to reducing water consumption in industrial, heating, ventilation and air conditioning systems applications;

    BL.  whereas research must be promoted with a view to producing alternative active ingredients to combat pests, to ensure greater plant health and reduce the use of inputs and phytosanitary products;

    BM.  whereas water resilience is crucial in education and teaching, and in raising awareness and giving information about the functioning of the water cycle;

    BN.  whereas limited access to water and related infrastructure has a negative impact, especially on women, as it undermines the realisation of other human rights, such as self-determination, economic independence and education;

    BO.  whereas 60 % of European river basin districts are transnational, which makes effective transboundary cooperation crucial; whereas 20 European countries depend on other countries for more than 10 % of their water resources, with five countries relying on more than 75 % of their resources coming from abroad via rivers(62); whereas this cooperation should be strengthened to account for current and future climate challenges such as droughts and floods;

    BP.  whereas United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres appointed a Special Envoy on Water, aiming to enhance international cooperation and synergies among international water processes;

    BQ.  whereas clean water access and sustainable and resilient sanitation infrastructure are key components of the One Health approach, recognising the interconnection between the health of humans and water pollution;

    BR.  whereas water cooperation across borders and sectors generates many benefits, including enhancing food security, sustaining healthy livelihoods and ecosystems, helping address resilience to climate change, contributing to disaster risk reduction, providing renewable energy, supporting cities and industry, and fostering regional integration and peace;

    BS.  whereas geopolitical developments demonstrate that the EU should be ready to withstand the challenges that go beyond the environmental sphere; whereas non-environmental threats, such as recent accidents related to the damaged cable in the Baltic Sea, send the EU a strong message that strengthening transboundary cooperation is key in addressing both the environmental and security-related objectives;

    BT.  whereas about 41 000 kilometres of inland waterways flow through 25 of the Member States; whereas inland waterways, which rely on the availability of water resources, perform a crucial role in optimising water supply and mitigating the impact of droughts and floods, as well as supporting the economic activities and the development of regions;

    BU.  whereas the increasing water scarcity, inequalities in access to water, and external shocks to the water sector have heightened interdependencies, increasing competition for water and leading to complex economic repercussions;

    General remarks

    1.  Welcomes and supports President von der Leyen’s announcement in the political guidelines for the next European Commission (2024-2029) on putting forward a European Water Resilience Strategy (EWRS) addressing water efficiency, scarcity, pollution and water-related risks, as well as the recognition that water is an indispensable resource that is increasingly under stress from climate change and increasing demands;

    2.  Believes that while implementing legislation, economic competitiveness should be taken into account in line with the Competitiveness Compass; calls for the implementation of EU environmental legislation in order to build a resilient and competitive Europe, mitigate and adapt to climate change, halt biodiversity loss, prevent pollution, ensure food security, limit resource use and waste, and strive towards efficient use of resources, including water, while taking into account the precautionary principle, the control-at-source principle and the polluter-pays principle; highlights the fact that water availability impacts the quantity, quality, variety and seasonal availability of foods that can be produced;

    3.  Calls for the EU to integrate its commitments to the COP29 Baku Dialogue on Water for Climate Action and the UN 2023 Water Conference into the international dimension of the strategy;

    4.  Stresses the urgent need to enhance water resilience and management to ensure sustainable freshwater supplies for people, the economy and the environment; emphasises that the EWRS should be developed in coordination with the European Oceans Pact, ensuring a cohesive and integrated approach to managing freshwater and ocean resources, addressing interconnected challenges, enhancing competitiveness and promoting sustainable water management across inland and marine environments, while ensuring a holistic ‘source-to-sea’ approach;

    5.  Insists on the need for a comprehensive and holistic EWRS that integrates water quality, quantity, security, infrastructure, technology and management aspects and includes the restoration of the water cycle as a key element, as it underpins economic activities, ensures resource availability and contributes to climate regulation;

    6.  Stresses the importance of water supply, in particular drinking water, as well as water security of supply; points out that all environmental restoration projects should take into account the water security aspects, prioritising solutions that not only provide environmental benefits, but also guarantee the supply and efficient management of water; emphasises, furthermore, that ecological restoration measures should be carried out in synergy with the development of the EU’s renewable energy potential and not impact the overall energy resilience;

    7.  Recommends that lakes and other freshwater-dependent habitats be included in the strategy, alongside rivers, transitional waters and groundwater, as essential components of the EU’s water resilience efforts;

    8.  Stresses the urgent need to improve crisis-warning systems with regard to heavy water incidents, as well as to improve preventive measures;

    9.  Calls on the Commission to present a European climate adaptation plan, including concrete legislative proposals and actions, particularly regarding infrastructure resilience, water management and nature-based solutions, while prioritising the protection of vulnerable communities, to make the EU more resilient and to lead by example;

    10.  Reiterates that access to clean and safe drinking water and sanitation is a human right; emphasises that this right must be unequivocally ensured, with everyone having access to affordable and good quality water services, including the inhabitants of islands and outermost regions;

    11.  Stresses that no one, whether in public places or private establishments, should be denied access to water supplied from a distribution network intended for human consumption, where available;

    12.  Notes that industrial activities and agricultural production require water to produce their end products or to support production activities, with the amount of water used varying depending on the type of activity; highlights the fact that ensuring Europe’s competitiveness and strategic autonomy requires a water-smart society where technology and data enhance a circular economy, fostering sustainable and water-efficient practices; calls on all relevant actors to accelerate the transition towards water-efficient, circular industry and agriculture by promoting and investing in innovative solutions, including digital tools and technologies, resource recovery, water reuse, renewable energy production, infrastructure, nature-based solutions and inclusive governance mechanisms;

    13.  Urges the Commission to integrate and mainstream the water dimension into internal and external EU policies through a cross-sectoral approach in order to ensure that water resilience, sustainability and security is woven into the fabric of European policies; calls on the Commission, in particular, to carry out a water-related assessment of any regulatory measure, including related to energy, as part of the socio-economic and environmental impact assessment; emphasises that assessing how each EU policy, and EU-funded projects and infrastructure, can impact water resources in terms of quantity, quality and accessibility would ensure that water resilience is a cornerstone of policy formulation and implementation, thus shifting the paradigm from treating water as an infinite resource to recognising its intrinsic value for humanity and for the EU’s ecological and socio-economic landscape and its competitiveness;

    Water efficiency

    14.  Stresses that efficient water use is essential for preserving the EU’s water resources and that water efficiency should be a key objective of the EU; calls, in this regard, for a consequential reduction in water demand, including by addressing excessive leakage levels, investing in research and innovative solutions, modernising industrial and production processes, upgrading water infrastructure, managing water resources and peak demands sustainably, prioritising uses and ensuring that higher water efficiency results in a reduction in overall freshwater consumption as well as in an increase in water availability in water-stressed areas at the local and regional levels; believes that areas affected by prolonged drought and desertification should be given priority;

    15.  Calls for a legislative framework setting sectoral water efficiency and water abstraction targets at basin level, based on up-to-date assessments of water availability and climate risks, including a water valuation approach that accounts for ecosystem services and long-term sustainability, and covering all water uses, including industry, energy, agriculture, public institutions and households; underlines the fact that these targets should be ambitious yet adaptable, taking into account the specific circumstances and progress already achieved by each Member State to ensure continued efforts towards efficiency gains across all regions; stresses the importance of efficient and uniform data collection practices across the Member States and all sectors, including through the use of innovative technologies, as well as real-time data collection points for more transparency on water consumption; emphasises the need to carry out an appropriate assessment of the environmental and socio-economic impacts of water use; stresses that the strategic importance of food production must not be compromised; emphasises that science, research and technology are important for water efficiency and water use as well as for the circular economy in this regard; calls for the creation and promotion of new smart and high-performance irrigation systems, rainwater retention and water from reuse, as well as water-efficient irrigation systems;

    16.  Reiterates the need to develop a common EU methodology for setting water efficiency and water abstraction targets to ensure the sustainable use of available renewable water resources within an integrated water resources management framework which gives due consideration to linkages beyond the water sector through the water-energy-food-ecosystems nexus, thus enabling decision-makers and economic actors to plan the necessary investment to ensure water supply security in an increasingly sustainable manner, while giving due consideration to the characteristics of the water bodies concerned;

    17.  Calls for close collaboration on integrated energy and water resource planning and related technologies across all sectors at national, regional and local levels, including between all stakeholders, in order to establish mechanisms for ensuring coherence across water and energy policies;

    18.  Calls on the Commission to put forward a comprehensive policy on sustainable water management for industry based on reducing, recovering, reusing and recycling, including a focus on the use of water-efficient and circular technologies, water recycling, pollutant reduction strategies and the promotion of closed-loop systems;

    19.  Recalls that the growing threat of water scarcity is jeopardising industries and projects that are key to Europe’s competitiveness drive, including semiconductors, data centres, renewable hydrogen and electric vehicle battery production; notes that these industries will increasingly face pressure to reduce their environmental impact and improve water resource efficiency, including both direct and indirect water usage; calls on the Member States to support water-intensive industries in setting up water-efficiency plans aimed at saving, reusing and recycling water, preventing water pollution and implementing water-efficient technologies; calls on the Commission to incorporate comprehensive water management strategies into relevant EU industrial policies and sector-specific transition pathways, with a particular focus on strategic water-intensive sectors;

    20.  Stresses that knowledge, data, research and technology are key for efficient water use; calls for adequate financial and technical support to be given to the Member States to implement efficient water management measures, including by means of innovative and modern technologies;

    21.  Welcomes the recommendations of the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture underlining that sustainable farming practices and new business models need to be scaled up to promote more efficient use of natural resources, especially water;

    22.  Calls for the transition to a more sustainable and competitive farming model, assisted by the implementation of sustainable practices and innovative solutions that promote biodiversity, reduce chemical inputs and enable water resources to be managed efficiently, including nature-based solutions, regenerative management, smart precision irrigation technologies, digital monitoring systems, advanced treatment methods and smart water distribution networks, optimising consumption and preventing water resource depletion, and that help ensure continued productivity while enabling agriculture to reduce pollution, use pesticides and fertilisers efficiently, improve the hydrological cycle, enhance groundwater recharge and adapt to lower water use; considers that technological solutions can also include measures that can increase water absorption, infiltration and retention in agricultural systems, which are important amid increasing occurrences of both drought and heavy rains;

    23.  Points out that innovative irrigation solutions and practices can enhance water efficiency in agriculture, gaining an economic advantage while also reducing environmental burdens; notes that farmers generally lack sufficient means and incentives to know about water use by crops, actual irrigation applications, the yield responses of crops to different water management practices, and thus current on-farm water-efficiency levels; calls on the Commission and the Member States to incentivise the uptake and support the maintenance of innovative irrigation solutions such as drip irrigation to allow for an active management of water levels and efficient use of water resources, as well as to promote continuous knowledge exchange, so that all relevant stakeholders can share greater responsibility across the entire water supply chain;

    24.  Recalls that the use of nutrients such as nitrate and phosphate is essential for food production, as this activity would not be possible without their use; recommends better consideration of the nutrient cycle in agricultural production and the exploitation of the value in urban wastewater; calls for more research into the effective use of nutrients and the development of nutrient recovery technologies, in order to decrease the Union’s dependence on imported raw materials; recognises the high potential for nutrient recovery from water and calls on the Member States to support the agricultural sector to optimise their nutrient consumption including by using resources (nitrate and phosphorus) recovered from wastewater treatment plants; calls on the Commission to propose an integrated nutrient management action plan to effectively address loss of valuable agricultural inputs, recycling of nutrients, nutrient pollution and inefficiencies in the nutrient cycle; calls for the proper and safe recovery of phosphorus from organic sources and for incentivising investments in its recovery and circular nutrient management in accordance with the Commission’s JRC publication(63);

    25.  Stresses that the current Nitrates Directive is due for revision, as outdated provisions promote the use of artificial fertilisers rather than organic manure; calls for an urgent review of the Nitrates Directive before the end of this year, and its revision to promote circular nutrient management;

    26.  Emphasises, in line with the final report of the Strategic Dialogue on the future of EU agriculture, the need to support the transition to regionally adapted crop and seed varieties and the switch to different crops, with reduced water requirements and greater drought resistance, as well as the need to support the adoption of appropriate soil management practices; considers the need for stronger support for scientific research and technological development related to the breeding of new species, to enable the production and supply of foodstuffs to be diversified and their quality enhanced, while raising the level of protection for human health and the environment; notes the potential of plant varieties that are more resistant to water stress and pests and could play a role in reducing water use and could reduce the environmental footprint of crops;

    27.  Calls for financial and technical support for farmers and rural communities, particularly in water-stressed areas, to help them adopt sustainable land management practices that improve soil and water quality, contribute to biodiversity and mitigate climate change; emphasises the need for special attention to be given to regions that are particularly vulnerable to soil degradation and water scarcity;

    28.  Acknowledges the significant efforts made by farmers to enhance water quality and emphasises the need for an appropriate timeframe to allow the effects of these measures to be accurately assessed;

    29.  Points to the success of the agricultural European Innovation Partnership EIP‑AGRI and calls for the continuation of knowledge exchange, expertise and peer-to-peer learning via the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Network;

    30.  Notes the links between carbon sinking and water availability, and calls for coherence between the water resilience strategy and carbon farming schemes;

    31.  Reiterates that the Water Reuse Regulation aims at reducing the pressure on water bodies by setting out provisions on reusing water after appropriate treatment extends its life cycle, thereby preserving water resources; emphasises, however, that regulatory, financial and technological barriers, including the economic competitiveness of reclaimed wastewater, risk management planning and the sharing of responsibilities, contribute to the slow uptake of reuse of reclaimed water for agriculture; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to adopt supportive policies, at both the EU and the local level, that incentivise water reuse practices, taking into account the importance of adapting wastewater treatment and quality requirements to the intended water use; notes that treated wastewater also finds valuable applications in various industrial processes and urban contexts, contributing to reducing the pressure on freshwater resources and the conservation of drinking water; calls therefore on the Commission to assess a possible extension of the scope of the Water Reuse Regulation in order to establish, at EU level, minimum water quality standards for safe water reuse for industrial and urban purposes;

    32.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to specify systems of regulatory and financial incentives for the reuse of treated wastewater in water-intensive sectors and to provide specific funding for the construction of infrastructure connecting wastewater treatment plants and refined water distribution networks; urges a streamlined approach in EU legislation to remove administrative barriers and promote safe and efficient water recycling across the Member States; calls on the Member States to set up national water reuse and saving plans to incentivise cross-sectoral cooperation in water management;

    33.  Reiterates that reused water could alleviate abstraction from rivers, lakes and groundwater for irrigated agriculture; underlines the fact that reused water can contribute to maintaining base flows and minimum water levels during dry periods;

    34.  Highlights the potential of the building sector to save water, for example, with the help of smart sub-metering systems, efficient greywater systems, reuse of domestic wastewater or rainwater harvesting; stresses that the energy performance of buildings can be enhanced by water efficiency, reducing greenhouse gas emissions; calls on the Member States and local authorities to incentivise water-saving features in new buildings; stresses, in this regard, that water-efficient practices should be factored into urban planning; highlights the fact that harvesting rain water as well as using and reusing water efficiently can improve climate adaptation in cities;

    35.  Calls for the transition, in industry and in the energy and digital sectors, to optimised cooling efficiency and alternative cooling methods that are less water-dependent, in order to ensure significant water savings in these sectors;

    36.  Points out that, while households represent 10 % of the overall water consumption in the EU, action on improving domestic water efficiency is also necessary; notes that water-saving technological solutions are readily available and can reduce water consumption in households without compromising comfort or requiring high investment; calls on the Member States to support consumers in transitioning towards such technologies and to strengthen consumer awareness of water consumption and potential efficiency gains by anchoring domestic water efficiency in water, building and consumer policies across the EU;

    37.  Notes that the leakage rates from pipes are high in some Member States, which increases the total share of domestic water consumption; welcomes the provisions of the new Drinking Water Directive on leakage rates and the ongoing work of the Commission to evaluate those rates and set threshold values that will trigger action in the Member States concerned; calls on the Member States to urgently tackle leakage in water supply networks and to fully implement the monitoring and reporting requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, so that the Commission can set a threshold value for leakage by January 2028; emphasises the need for sustainable urban irrigation networks to be modernised, to curb leakages and reduce their water footprint; calls on the Member States to regularly inform the public about the efficiency and effectiveness of their water supplies;

    38.  Points out that public sector organisations provide significant untapped potential for saving water by virtue of their size or their nature as public organisations; believes that the public sector should act as a role model for other sectors;

    39.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to promote easily accessible and free information, training, advisory programmes and information campaigns aimed at raising public awareness of sustainable water resource management;

    40.  Recommends that water-efficiency aspects, such as reductions in water loss and reuse of water, be integrated in the upcoming revision of the public procurement framework;

    Water pollution

    41.  Underlines the fact that the existing EU water policy framework is designed to address the effective management of water resources and the protection and restoration of freshwater and marine ecosystems, but that its poor implementation and enforcement, insufficient funding and lack of proper cost-benefit analyses of the implementation measures undermine its effectiveness;

    42.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to implement and enforce the current legislation, in particular the WFD and its ‘daughter’ directives (the Groundwater Directive and the Environmental Quality Standards Directive), with a particular focus on strengthening the monitoring and reporting mechanisms to ensure that all Member States consistently implement the required water protection measures; recalls the need for sufficient funding to implement these acts;

    43.  Stresses that the chemical pollution of surface water and groundwater poses a threat to the aquatic environment, with effects such as acute and chronic toxicity in aquatic organisms, accumulation of pollutants in the ecosystem and loss of habitats and biodiversity, as well as to human health;

    44.  Calls for the establishment of comprehensive EU-wide quality standards for PFAS in groundwater and surface water; stresses that respective updates of the relevant directives are essential for safeguarding water quality and achieving good chemical status for water bodies as mandated under the WFD;

    45.  Insists that essential uses of PFAS in critical sectors, such as medical devices, pharmaceuticals and products necessary for the twin transition to a climate neutral and digital economy, are not endangered in the context of upcoming legislative and non-legislative proposals; calls on the Commission to propose to phase out forever chemicals (PFAS) – starting with consumer goods – linked to harmful effects on human health and the environment, based on scientific evidence, allowing their use where there are no safe alternatives; underlines the need to scale up investments and accelerate the research and development of equivalent and safe alternatives;

    46.  Calls on the Commission to propose updated limits on PFAS in drinking water, taking into account the latest scientific knowledge;

    47.  Emphasises the urgency of addressing, primarily at the source, and effectively monitoring pollution from pharmaceuticals, bisphenols, antimicrobial resistance genes, persistent organic pollutants and other existing and emerging pollutants, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition and the goal of achieving good chemical status for all water bodies;

    48.  Calls on the Commission to close the gaps with enhanced funding and the enforcement of current laws, and the integration of circular economy principles to mitigate pollution at its source and safeguard water ecosystems for future generations; underscores the fact that antibiotic-resistant bacteria and certain emerging pollutants remain insufficiently addressed, necessitating further innovation and investment; emphasises the need for all sectors to apply sustainable production processes and circular practices, proactively preventing pollutants from entering water systems;

    49.  Recalls that microplastics may enter drinking water sources in a number of ways: from surface run-off (for example, after a rain event) to wastewater effluent (both treated and untreated), combined sewer overflows, industrial effluent, degraded plastic waste and atmospheric deposition; calls on the Commission to put forward, in line with the requirements of the Drinking Water Directive, a full risk assessment of microplastics in drinking water, while continuously working on reliable and robust sampling and analytical methods in order to appropriately address the potential threat of this emerging pollutant to sources of water intended for human consumption;

    50.  Emphasises the need to improve the monitoring and regulation of plastic pollution in freshwater and marine environments, with particular attention to microplastics and single-use plastics; encourages the Commission to assess current enforcement mechanisms and consider further measures to protect water quality;

    51.  Calls on the stakeholders to develop safe water contact materials, to substitute BPA and other bisphenols and ensure compliance with Regulation (EU) 1935/2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food(64) and the recently adopted provisions as regards the use of BPA and other bisphenols and bisphenol derivatives (Commission Regulation (EU) 2024/3190);

    52.  Recalls that the revised Urban Wastewater Treatment Directive, in effect since 1 January 2025, imposes new obligations regarding water purification, requiring pharmaceutical and cosmetic producers to cover at least 80 % of the costs of removing micropollutants from wastewater, with the aim of reducing harmful substances in the environment; notes the existence of differing figures and assessments regarding the impact this would have on the pharmaceutical sector and, consequently, on the availability and affordability of medicines, and therefore calls on the Commission to conduct a new and comprehensive assessment of the impact on this sector;

    53.  Calls for increased EU support for local authorities for the modernisation of wastewater treatment plants and the promotion of water reuse, to align with the EU’s zero pollution ambition, ensuring that municipal wastewater management contributes effectively to good chemical and ecological water status;

    54.  Calls for increased monitoring of pesticide residues in water bodies and enforcement of pesticide application regulations to mitigate their impact on water quality; stresses the need for increased funding to support farmers in the adoption of low-input and organic farming practices that reduce reliance on chemical pesticides and fertilisers, as well as to provide appropriate training and independent advisory services to farmers and other operators on the use, effectiveness and toxicity of pesticides, as well as best practice;

    55.  Insists on the integration of circular economy principles to reduce hazardous chemical use in industrial processes; stresses the need for additional funding to support industries in transitioning to clean technologies that minimise water pollution(65);

    56.  Recognises the role of treated sludge as a local and circular source of fertiliser, contributing to soil health, nutrient recycling and reduced dependency on synthetic fertilisers; emphasises the importance of preventing PFAS, heavy metals, microplastics and other harmful substances from entering sewer networks in order to enable the safe and sustainable use of high-quality sewage sludge in agriculture;

    57.  Calls on the Commission to include an overview of measures in an annex to the EWRS, with a timeline for achieving the objectives in question;

    Adaptation to climate change: floods, droughts, stress areas, disaster preparedness

    58.  Calls for the climate adaptation proofing of all new EU legislative and non-legislative acts in order to ensure the integration of climate adaptation into sectoral plans and policy measures affecting water and land use; highlights, in this regard, the need for increased climate ambition as part of the fight against climate change, while urging the Member States to ensure that all climate adaptation measures affecting water use contribute to long-term, improved water resilience; calls on the Commission to take fully into account the geographical and environmental conditions in the Member States, as well as the specific situation of islands, outermost regions and other areas of high vulnerability, such as areas affected by desertification, when adopting new legislative and non-legislative proposals; asks the Commission to present a roadmap for current and ongoing legislative and non-legislative policy measures, including targets and monitoring requirements affecting water and land use;

    59.  Emphasises the need for tailored climate adaptation measures for the Mediterranean region, which faces unique challenges such as prolonged droughts and saline intrusion into freshwater resources;

    60.  Stresses the specific challenges faced by island areas due to the scarcity of drinking water and calls for targeted measures to protect island water resources, including improving rainwater collection and storage infrastructure, and implementing alternative water sources, while enhancing water resource monitoring and management systems; calls, further, on the Member States to take better account of mountainous regions in national adaptation plans in order to meet the specific challenges of water management in mountainous areas;

    61.  Reiterates that climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should not come at the cost of ecosystem degradation, and should avoid increasing the demand for water- and energy-intensive activities, and should instead prioritise energy- and water-efficient innovation and technologies as part of moving towards a more resource-efficient economy, without undermining its productivity, while ensuring equitable access to water for all; points out that, in order to be effective, climate change mitigation and adaptation solutions should be tailored to national circumstances, while enhancing competitiveness and productivity in the short and long term; points out the possibilities of synergies, in this regard, with innovative energy production such as photovoltaics and biogas, as it can also contribute to an increase in agricultural income;

    62.  Recognises the importance of reserving water for nature and the need to maintain healthy freshwater ecosystems, for the good functioning of the water cycle, for human activities and for mitigating the impacts of droughts and water scarcity; underlines, in the context of restoring freshwater ecosystems and the natural functions of rivers, the importance of removing ‘obsolete barriers’, namely artificial barriers that no longer fulfil their original purpose or are no longer needed, wherever such opportunities exist, on the basis of current knowledge and experience; calls for the establishment of specific programmes for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring minimum flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    63.  Insists that, with climate change impact becoming more persistent, flood and drought management must fully integrate the arising risks, including changing weather patterns, such as increased rain patterns leading to excess of water; is convinced that a combination of monitoring and data collection, preparedness, emergency and recovery responses taking into account the principle of ‘building back better’(66)on the one hand, and adapting societal and economic activities on the other, is essential to reduce vulnerability and increase resilience, especially in the light of the quantitative aspect of water becoming more prominent; stresses, in this regard, the need for climate-resilient nature-based solutions and infrastructure that take into account the impact of extreme climate events in their development to ensure their viability in the face of extreme climate events;

    64.  Recalls that in 2007, the WFD was supplemented by Directive 2007/60/EC on the assessment and management of flood risks, which aims to establish a framework to reduce the adverse consequences of flooding on human health, the environment, cultural heritage and economic activity; notes that making the two directives mutually compatible is achieved through risk management plans and river basin flood management plans as the components of an integrated water management system in which coordination is crucial; recalls that flood prevention is closely connected to urban green spaces, soil protection strategies and investment in drainage networks;

    65.  Stresses that preparedness for water scarcity and drought can be significantly improved in the EU, considering that no drought management plans are in place in several Member States(67); calls on the Member States and, where applicable, competent regional and local authorities, to develop drought management plans, particularly with a view to ensuring the provision of drinking water, ensuring food production and integrating digitalised monitoring, control and early warning systems in order to support effective and data-based decisions on protection, response and communication measures with clearly defined areas of responsibility; points out the need to introduce EU-level provisions as regards drought management plans, similar to the ones on flood management plans;

    66.  Insists, in view of the numerous climatic events, such as floods, droughts and cyclones, which have affected Europe, on the importance of the EU having a robust mechanism for responding to such crises, including systems for warning and providing assistance to the civilian population; points out that digital monitoring, adequate public display of relevant data and early warning systems are key to developing effective drought and flood management plans at the level of the Member States; emphasises, further, the importance of fully using the available EU tools, such as the flood forecasts of the European Flood Awareness System and the Global Flood Awareness System, and the Global Flood Monitoring tool, as part of the Copernicus Emergency Management Service;

    67.  Stresses the importance of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) in helping countries hit by water-related disasters such as flood and droughts; calls for increased funding to provide the UCPM with sufficient and upgraded resources in order to increase preparedness and improve capacity building;

    68.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to enhance citizen preparedness in the event of water-related disasters or crisis; stresses the importance of information campaigns and demonstration exercises in education facilities, public administration and businesses in order to build a ‘preparedness culture’ for citizens;

    69.  Calls on the Member States to systematically renew and upgrade their water infrastructure, including drinking water and sanitation infrastructure, as well as infrastructure regulating river flows, and to invest in innovative solutions based on good practice, making water systems more resilient to climate change, ensuring stable drinking water supply, enabling the early detection of losses and reducing water leakages and waste, while optimising water transport and storage systems; highlights the fact that funding for innovative water infrastructure is insufficient compared to the investment needs across the EU; calls, in this regard, for dedicated funding, on national, regional or EU level, to ensure adequate financing for the development, maintenance and modernisation of water-resilient infrastructure, to foster innovative solutions and technologies and ensure long-term sustainability of that water infrastructure;

    70.  Regrets that, despite the threat that desertification poses to water quality and availability, soil fertility and food production, and despite the fact that 13 Member States have declared themselves to be affected by desertification in the context of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the Commission is not addressing desertification effectively and efficiently; urges the Commission, therefore, in line with the Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on desertification, land degradation and drought, to present an integrated EU-wide action plan to combat desertification, land degradation and drought, aiming at building resilience to drought and achieving land degradation neutrality in the EU by 2030, based on a full impact assessment;

    71.  Insists that the agricultural sector be further supported in implementing new technologies to reduce the demand for water, while at the same time increasing access to water, including by supporting water retention and groundwater recharge; calls for research results, for example on seawater desalination, to be made accessible and to facilitate the deployment of innovative desalination solutions; calls on the Member States to create natural water reserves based on up-to-date assessments of climate risks to protect critical water supplies and their catchments, and taking into consideration the environmental and socio-economic impact of developing such reserves; points out that such natural water reserves would complement the WFD’s requirement for Member States to identify water bodies used for drinking water abstraction, making sure they meet the objectives set out in Article 4 WFD and in the Drinking Water Directive, and would ensure their necessary protection; notes that such natural water reserves already exist under different forms in various Member States; stresses that assistance should be given to Member States or local and regional governments to help them develop natural water reserves;

    72.  Notes the potential of retention infrastructure as an example of water generation systems created using the best available, cost-effective techniques that have the lowest environmental impact, including by means of wastewater reuse or rainwater collection, in order to reduce the risks of droughts and floods, increase water security and foster circularity, water reclamation and reuse; believes that water retention facilities may be useful tools provided that they are authorised by local or national authorities under clear conditions, including the capacity of local groundwater to sustain such activities and the need for farmers accessing the water resource to adapt their practices to more sustainable practices, in particular in terms of water needs and water quality; calls on the Commission to use its available tools, including financial support, to streamline this approach among the Member States;

    73.  Deplores the unlawful or intentional abstraction of water, which is likely to cause substantial damage to water bodies; calls for strong dissuasive measures to be applied, including through the criminal law, to protect the ecological status or the ecological potential of surface water bodies or of the quantitative status of groundwater bodies; notes that additional support for training and knowledge transfer for national enforcement capacities is needed;

    74.  Notes the important cross-cutting role of nature-based solutions in addressing the challenges of the triple planetary crisis and restoring the natural water cycle; calls on the Commission and the Member States to prioritise, taking into account the environmental and socio-economic impacts, the deployment of nature-based solutions for water resilience in their policy actions and recommendations, such as the re-wetting of wetlands and peatlands to increase ground water availability and surrounding soil moisture, the restoration and protection of floodplains, natural water retention measures, revegetation as a barrier against floods, and rainwater conservation, in order to strengthen water availability, mitigate climate change risks and support long-term resilience for communities, businesses and food production; underlines that, in addition to nature-based solutions, complementary investment in engineering solutions remains necessary to ensure successful climate adaptation and water resilience in the long term;

    Funding and pricing

    75.  Notes that nature-based solutions and natural water retention measures have the potential to restore groundwater levels and support ecological flows while reducing water-related risks from water scarcity, floods and droughts; notes that in flood management, nature-based solutions cannot usually replace existing solutions and may not be effective for the most extreme events; points out, however, that nature-based solutions can enhance the effectiveness and operable life of grey infrastructure by increasing water absorption capacity, reducing water velocity and regulating peak flows; reiterates, in this regard, that the effectiveness of nature-based solutions is context-specific and must be adapted to the local situation; emphasises in this regard that a ‘one solution that fits all’ does not exist;

    76.  Stresses the need to provide financial support for sustainable innovative methods and solutions, while having due regard to public-private partnerships;

    77.  Stresses, in the context of climate adaptation, the importance of healthy soils in ensuring water security and circularity; emphasises that the natural water retention of soils must be improved through measures to enhance soil health, minimising carbon losses, as well as actions at the level of the water body, such as the stabilisation of riverbanks, including through re-naturalisation, and the restoration of the retention capacities of aquifers;

    78.  Notes that thoroughly designed forest management measures can improve watershed health, regulate water flow and reduce drought and flood stress, given the essential role of trees and forests in water cycle regulation, through their ability to purify water, increase the availability of water resources and improve soil moisture retention; proposes that this be duly considered when the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, develops Union disaster resilience goals and that it be considered in the development and refinement of disaster risk management and contingency planning; highlights the need, in this regard, for more research, data collection, innovation and funding to support land managers in preventing the impact of environmental stressors such as drought floods and diminishing watershed function;

    79.  Recognises that urban areas are increasingly vulnerable to water-related climate risks such as flooding, water shortages and heat stress; calls for the integration of urban water resilience planning into climate adaptation strategies, including investment in green roofs, permeable infrastructure, rainwater harvesting and storm water retention systems, as well as measures aimed at increasing green and blue spaces in urban areas, in order to mitigate extreme weather impacts and to reduce the risks to human life and property; calls further for the maintenance of, and regained access to, urban waterways in cities;

    80.  Emphasises that the EWRS should ensure adequate funding from public and private sources in order to support the modernisation, upgrading, adaptation and maintenance of resilient water infrastructure, sustainable water management, data collection, research, effective monitoring, digitalisation, upskilling, nature-based solutions, the development and the uptake of innovative water-efficient technologies, as well as to ensure environmental and socio-economic sustainability in line with the goals set by the new European Competitiveness Compass;

    81.  Calls on the Commission to create a separate and dedicated fund for water resilience within the upcoming MFF; believes that specific financial mechanisms should also be established within the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund to support water-smart technologies and water investment; strongly believes that, in the interim, water should be prioritised in existing funding frameworks, including the Cohesion Fund; stresses that EU funding mechanisms must incorporate considerations of social equity and affordability, in particular in the context of providing water services to the population, ensuring support for Member States and citizens with greater financial constraints and specific realities, while meeting water management obligations; highlights the importance of adjusting existing funding, subsidies and financing streams related to water management and other related land uses, moving away from outdated engineering solutions to innovative ones, as well as nature-based solutions or a combination thereof;

    82.  Calls for targeted funding, via Horizon Europe and the EIP-AGRI, for field trials on the water relations of different cropping systems; calls for the recognition of the role of women in water policies and for specific funding to be identified to promote their access to agriculture;

    83.  Recalls that the lack of dedicated funding for water or binding funding targets within the current MFF limits the EU’s capacity to direct targeted investment towards essential water resilience measures, including infrastructure modernisation, innovation, climate adaptation measures and the implementation of nature-based solutions, and thus its competitive capacity, as the absence of a water balance creates an additional burden for the economy of the regions; notes that outermost and mountainous regions and islands in the EU are particularly struggling to access funding or public-private partnerships to support local and regional investment in water management and infrastructure;

    84.  Stresses the important role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) in water financing; highlights the fact that the EIB is actively investing in and supporting the water sector; stresses that the EU should collaborate with the EIB to share best practice and calls, further, on the EIB and other financial institutions to strengthen their role in the funding of innovative and resilient water infrastructure, improved sanitation and drinking water infrastructure, digitalisation, as well as to support projects aimed at flood risk reduction, erosion prevention and the revitalization of watercourses, by facilitating favourable conditions for water investment;

    85.  Urges the Commission to explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms, including payments for ecosystem services and green bonds, while ensuring regulatory clarity and safeguards to prevent market distortions; calls on the EIB and other financial institutions to prioritise low-interest loans and credits for Member States and regional and local authorities undertaking large-scale restoration projects, with specific provisions to support economically disadvantaged regions;

    86.  Highlights the importance of public-private partnerships as a source of funding for water investment; calls on the Commission to incentivise private investment in the water sector by creating a supportive regulatory framework that may include co-financing opportunities and public-private partnerships in order to drive innovation, improve infrastructure and ensure sustainable water management solutions across the Member States; underlines, nevertheless, that the involvement of private investment in the EU water sector must not undermine the status of water as a public good and a public service, and that the long-term resilience of the sector, as well as the principles of accessibility, affordability and sustainability must be ensured;

    87.  Calls on the Member States to adopt governance frameworks that clearly define the roles and responsibilities of stakeholders in planning, financing and implementing nature-based solutions; believes that these frameworks should integrate funding from diverse sources, including philanthropic contributions and private-sector partnerships, while ensuring equitable access to resources for small-scale projects, particularly managed at local or regional levels;

    88.  Urges the Commission and the Member States to address water aspects in their budgets and to improve governance within the regions in the use of EU funds;

    89.  Underlines the need to provide targeted financial and technical assistance to municipalities to facilitate compliance with water-related legislation;

    90.  Encourages the Member States to accelerate the granting of authorisations for sustainable and innovative resilient water infrastructure projects to enable their rapid implementation in the face of the urgent challenges;

    91.  Notes that the application of the cost recovery principle on water services, which provides that all water users effectively and proportionately participate financially in the recovery of the costs of water services, remains low to non-existent in several Member States; calls on the Member States and their regional authorities to implement adequate water pricing policies and apply the cost recovery principle for both environmental and resource costs in line with the WFD; calls on the Member States to take into account the long investment cycles when implementing the cost recovery principle and to ensure sufficient funding is available for needed (re)investment;

    92.  Stresses the importance of ensuring that water pricing supports long-term water security by reflecting the economic, environmental and resource costs of water use; encourages the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to ensure that water pricing is economically sustainable, socially fair and promotes efficient water use, and that it reflects the availability of water across different Member States and regions, particularly in water-stressed regions, while safeguarding affordability for households and small businesses; calls on the Member States and competent regional and local authorities to insure transparent water prices and to raise awareness of the value of water services;

    93.  Points out that competent national water authorities will play a central role in implementing new water management and conservation plans at the level of the Member States; calls, therefore, on the Members States to financially and technically increase the capacity of those competent authorities to play a more significant enabling and advisory role in sustainable and future-proof water management and storage infrastructure; believes that EU funds, such as the Just Transition Fund, should be used to further assist Member States and water agencies in implementation;

    Digitalisation, security and technological innovation

    94.  Stresses the potential and the necessity for digitalisation and AI in improving the management and monitoring of bodies of water and water infrastructure, as well as in reporting and ensuring the comparability of data reflecting different geographical flow conditions;

    95.  Calls on the Commission, the Member States and water providers to mainstream transparency and digitalisation as fundamental principles in water management and to enhance the use of management and metering data, with the aim of strengthening monitoring, assessment, accountability and decision-making, while optimising and simplifying reporting obligations; calls for digitally enabled water technologies to facilitate real-time, sample-based and distance monitoring and reporting on water quality, leakages, usage and resources; calls for improved efficiency in the use of public funds and public spending in this area; recognises that widespread deployment of innovative digital technologies needs to be accompanied by digital skills training;

    96.  Emphasises the need to promote digitalisation and data-centric solutions in building a water-smart society; stresses the need to develop digital solutions for monitoring water consumption and optimising the use of water resources across all sectors; calls on the Commission, in cooperation with the Member States, to provide financial support for the implementation of smart water management systems, focusing on the needs of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs);

    97.  Points out that water systems, including water treatment and distribution systems, are considered one of the nation’s critical infrastructures and security pillars, and hence key for the EU’s strategic autonomy, and require increased protection and the ability of utilities to detect, respond to, and recover from physical and cyberthreats and cyberattacks; notes that a higher level of digitalisation comes with new vulnerabilities; points out that, in the event of a threat or an attack, water system operators can lose their ability to control the flow and quality of the water or lose the ability to track the true status of the water system; insists that vulnerability assessments and an emergency response plan should be an integral part of the water management system in every Member State; encourages the promotion of information sharing about threats to cybersecurity and procedures to exchange best practice among operators, as well as to establish a cybersecurity culture through technical security measures, competence building and awareness creation and communication; draws attention to the measures and provisions in the NIS2 Directive and the Critical Entities Resilience Directive which could help mitigate the arising security risks; calls on the Commission to take the lead in reinforcing the EU-level coordination formats and to propose effective tools in the upcoming Preparedness Union Strategy with the aim of ensuring timely preparedness to tackle environmental and non-environmental risks to the water bodies that are threatening the EU’s overall security;

    98.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to increase the involvement of women in decisions regarding water resilience; calls for the adoption of a methodological approach that effectively considers gender-related needs in the implementation of water supply projects, by implementing monitoring, reporting and tracking that use tools and indicators disaggregated by gender;

    99.  Notes that better data and data analysis are key to evidence-based decision-making and the swift identification of small changes in water quality that could present a threat to bodies of water, together with the evaluation of best practice and identification of the most cost-effective and impactful measures;

    100.  Stresses that improved, reliable and interoperable data on water supply, demand, distribution, accessibility and use are needed and that data points need to be established; urges the Commission and the Member States to enhance data collection and improve data interoperability across all levels to support the implementation of current water legislation, as well as to facilitate circular economy and water-smart industrial symbiosis strategies; highlights the fact that data and AI could be used in modelling water and energy consumption as well as reuse and recycling capacities;

    101.  Calls on the Commission to better recognise the fundamental role of the water sector in bolstering EU competiveness by fostering research and innovation and promoting entrepreneurship and talent; emphasises, in this regard, the importance of ramping up innovation in the water sector; points out that the European Innovation Centre for Industrial Transformation and Emissions, created as part of Directive 2010/75/EU, could play a role in this regard, as it evaluates the environmental performance of industrial technologies and gathers information on innovative industrial environmental techniques; points, further, to existing partnerships like the Water4All Partnership, a funding programme for scientific research;

    102.  Believes that there is a need to build and nurture multi-stakeholder platforms to promote innovation uptake at all levels, local and national; recommends that these platforms involve a wide range of participants – the public and private sectors, and civil society associations – to build a coalition of partners to bring about change; supports the promotion of knowledge sharing on how digital water technologies can support the implementation of existing EU water legislation, as well as capacity building at local, regional and national levels; calls on the Commission and the Members States to expand digital skills, and research and development (R&D) programmes targeting water, including through collaboration with universities, research centres and SMEs;

    103.  Acknowledges the critical role of data centres in the digital economy; notes with concern that the rapid expansion of the technology could lead to a substantial increase in AI’s demand for water resources associated with their operations, which could undermine the environmental benefits that AI promises to deliver, such as resource optimisation and carbon emission reductions, and stresses the need to integrate water efficiency measures in their design and operation; urges the Commission to address the use of water resources by information and communications technologies (ICT) and, in particular, by AI and data centres in its EWRS, in particular by encouraging data centres to reuse treated water and to promote the design of more efficient chips and components to reduce the need for cooling; recommends that the Member States prioritise water resilience strategies that address the specific challenges posed by data centres to ensure the sustainability of both the digital and the environmental agendas;

    104.  Recalls that seawater desalination is the process of removing salt from sea or brackish water to make it useable for a range of ‘fit for use’ purposes, including drinking, and that it is thus an important technological solution for people’s livelihoods; notes that, at the same time, desalination is an energy-intensive process and should ideally be done using renewable energy, whenever possible, in order to minimise environmental impacts; reiterates that desalination produces a by-product, brine (a concentrated salt solution), that must be properly disposed of to avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment; considers, therefore, that desalination based on reverse osmosis or thermal technologies should be applied, if other more environmentally sustainable options are not available or cannot be implemented, particularly in remote areas and islands; highlights, in this regard, the ongoing work on new technological solutions, such as microbial desalination cells, offering an environmentally sustainable and innovative alternative to traditional desalination methods, particularly to provide clean water and wastewater treatment to small, isolated locations without electricity;

    105.  Stresses the need for increased funding and R&D into technologies such as innovative desalination techniques in order to increase the efficiency, sustainability and the scaling up of such technologies; calls for research into the possibilities of using such technologies in agriculture to diversify the water supply points and therefore decrease the vulnerability of the sector to water stress;

    106.  Notes that in the last decade, there have been many scientific breakthroughs for making water treatment smarter and more circular, with these solutions offering opportunities for using digital solutions, AI and remote sensing to use water more efficiently and by reusing treated wastewater for irrigation and recovering energy and nutrients from wastewater;

    107.  Calls on the Commission and the Member States to address the regulatory obstacles within the single market to facilitate the development, scaling-up, and placing on the market of innovative biotechnology and biomanufacturing solutions and the promotion of cleaner manufacturing and circularity;

    108.  Calls for the funding, development and authorisation of innovative solutions for crop protection and fertilisation, including biological control agents and active substances with lower impact on the environment, which are needed for a just transition to more sustainable agricultural systems;

    109.  Calls for specific programmes to be established for the cleaning and conservation of river channels, ensuring adequate flow and reducing the accumulation of debris and sediment that can affect water storage and distribution capacity;

    Cross-border and international cooperation

    110.  Stresses the need for a comprehensive EWRS that fosters cross-border cooperation, more uniform data collection and reporting, sharing best practice between local, regional and national actors, ensuring sustainable water management and equitable resource distribution among the Member States, preventing water challenges such as scarcity and flood risk from being passed on to other Member States;

    111.  Emphasises that climate change represents a major threat to water resources and aquatic ecosystems; notes that floods and water scarcity compromise food and water security and the health of the general population, ultimately affecting social cohesion and stability; recognises that water resilience is crucial for preventing and addressing current and future health, food, energy and security crises; emphasises that water resilience promotes transboundary water cooperation, serving as a catalyst for peace and security, as countries are interconnected through shared rivers and groundwater resources;

    112.  Calls for increased cross-border cooperation between the Member States in the management of shared river basins and groundwater aquifers and in the effective collection and sharing of data on water quality, pollution levels and water levels; recommends the establishment of regional cooperation centres to coordinate the implementation of joint water resilience strategies, taking into account the climate, social and economic challenges of each territory;

    113.  Calls for enhanced international cooperation, including at the level of river basins, to address the growing water crisis, ensure clean and high-quality water, promote sustainable water management and implement various innovative water technologies, including nature-based solutions; calls for the anchoring of cooperation across borders at operational, tactical and strategic levels;

    114.  Calls for the establishment of cross-border projects under Interreg and other EU funds to improve regional cooperation in the management of water resources, with a particular focus on ensuring the fair distribution of water between sectors and Member States;

    115.  Stresses the need to strengthen EU monitoring capacities through digitalisation and modern technologies, including satellite surveillance and real-time pollution tracking, which are essential for preventing and combating cross-border pollution;

    116.  Urges the Commission to implement a specific diplomatic role dedicated to resolving water-related conflicts, promoting water cooperation and protecting water sources and systems, particularly during armed conflicts and in transboundary contexts;

    117.  Urges the EU to lead international efforts to protect and restore water ecosystems in line with the SDG 6 on clean water and sanitation;

    o
    o   o

    118.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 243, 9.7.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1119/oj.
    (2) OJ L 327, 22.12.2000, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2000/60/oj.
    (3) OJ L 372, 27.12.2006, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2006/118/oj.
    (4) OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 84, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/105/oj.
    (5) OJ L 288, 6.11.2007, p. 27, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2007/60/oj.
    (6) OJ L 435, 23.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2020/2184/oj.
    (7) OJ L 177, 5.6.2020, p. 32, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/741/oj.
    (8) OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2008/56/oj.
    (9) OJ L, 2024/3019, 12.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/3019/oj.
    (10) OJ L, 2024/1785, 15.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1785/oj.
    (11) OJ L 375, 31.12.1991, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/1991/676/oj.
    (12) OJ L, 2024/1991, 29.7.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1991/oj.
    (13) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 164, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2557/oj.
    (14) OJ L 333, 27.12.2022, p. 80, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2022/2555/oj.
    (15) OJ L 309, 24.11.2009, p. 71, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2009/128/oj.
    (16) OJ L 435, 6.12.2021, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/2115/oj.
    (17) OJ L, 2024/3190, 31.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/3190/oj.
    (18) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 54.
    (19) OJ C, C/2024/7216, 10.12.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/7216/oj.
    (20) OJ C 132, 14.4.2023, p. 106.
    (21) OJ C 232, 16.6.2021, p. 28.
    (22) OJ C, C/2025/808, 11.2.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/808/oj.
    (23) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 126.
    (24) OJ C 316, 22.9.2017, p. 99.
    (25) Texts adopted, P9_TA(2024)0358.
    (26) World Meteorological Organization, 2021 State of Climate Services – Water, WMO-No 1278, WMO, Geneva, 2021.
    (27) European Environment Agency, Water resources across Europe – confronting water scarcity and drought, EEA Report 2/2009.
    (28) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (29) WWF, High Cost of Cheap Water, WWF, Gland, 2021.
    (30) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (31) European Commission, Attitudes of Europeans towards the environment, Special Eurobarometer 550, May 2024.
    (32) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, et al., Implementation of water balances in the EU – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.
    (33) Disclosure Insight Action (CDP) and Planet Tracker, High and Dry. How Water Issues Are Stranding Assets, 2022.
    (34) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (35) European Environment Agency, ‘Water abstraction by economic sector in the 27 EU Member States, 2000-2022’, European Environment Agency website, 5 December 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/water-abstraction-by-source-and/water-abstraction-by-economic?activeTab=8a280073-bf94-4717-b3e2-1374b57ca99d.
    (36) Eurostat, ‘Archive: Water use in industry’, Eurostat website, https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Archive:Water_use_in_industry&oldid=196132#Further_Eurostat_information.
    (37) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (38) Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Water accounting and auditing, A sourcebook, FAO Water Reports 43, FAO, Rome, 2016.
    (39) European Investment Bank, Wastewater as a resource, EIB, 2022.
    (40) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Water reuse: New EU rules to improve access to safe irrigation’, European Commission website, 26 June 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/water-reuse-new-eu-rules-improve-access-safe-irrigation-2023-06-26_en.
    (41) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment, ‘Zero pollution: Improved quality and access to drinking water’, European Commission website, 12 January 2023, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/news/improved-quality-and-access-drinking-water-all-europeans-2023-01-12_en.
    (42) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (43) Ibid.
    (44) Ibid.
    (45) Ibid.
    (46) Ibid.
    (47) Ibid.
    (48) European Environment Agency, ‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe’, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (49) Directive 2010/75/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 on industrial emissions (integrated pollution prevention and control) (OJ L 334, 17.12.2010, p. 17, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2010/75/oj).
    (50) European Commission ‘Nitrates’, European Commission website, https://environment.ec.europa.eu/topics/water/nitrates_en#implementation.
    (51) European Environment Agency, ‘Public exposure to widely used Bisphenol A exceeds acceptable health safety levels’, European Environment Agency website, 14 September 2023, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/newsroom/news/public-exposure-to-bisphenol-a.
    (52) European Environment Agency, European Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (53) Cammalleri, C. et al., Global warming and drought impacts in the EU, JRC Technical Report , Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (54) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (55) Feyen, L. et al., Climate change impacts and adaptation in Europe, JRC PESETA IV final report, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg.
    (56) European Environment AgencyEuropean Climate Risk Assessment, EEA Report 01/2024.
    (57) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, GAR Special Report on Drought 2021, Geneva, UNDRR, 2021.
    (58) Council conclusions of 14 October 2024 on Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought.
    (59) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (60) Directive (EU) 2024/1203 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 on the protection of the environment through criminal law and replacing Directives 2008/99/EC and 2009/123/EC (OJ L, 2024/1203, 30.4.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1203/oj).
    (61) European Patent Office, Innovation in water-related technologies, EPO, Munich 2024.
    (62) EEA Report 07/2024.
    (63) European Commission JRC Science for Policy Report, ‘Technical proposals for the safe use of processed manure above the threshold established for Nitrate Vulnerable Zones by the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC)’, 2020.
    (64) Regulation (EC) No 1935/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 October 2004 on materials and articles intended to come into contact with food and repealing Directives 80/590/EEC and 89/109/EEC (OJ L 338, 13.11.2004, p. 4, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2004/1935/oj).
    (65) European Environment Agency,‘Industrial pollutant releases to water in Europe, European Environment Agency website, 30 May 2024, https://www.eea.europa.eu/en/analysis/indicators/industrial-pollutant-releases-to-water.
    (66) United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, Build Back Better in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction, UNISDR, Geneva, 2019.
    (67) European Commission: Directorate-General for Environment et al. Stock-taking analysis and outlook of drought policies, planning and management in EU Member States – Final Report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Text adopted – A revamped long-term budget for the Union in a changing world – P10_TA(2025)0090 – Wednesday, 7 May 2025 – Strasbourg

    Source: European Parliament

    The European Parliament,

    –  having regard to Articles 311, 312, 323 and 324 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

    –  having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(1) and to the joint declarations agreed between Parliament, the Council and the Commission in this context and the related unilateral declarations,

    –  having regard to Council Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 of 14 December 2020 on the system of own resources of the European Union and repealing Decision 2014/335/EU, Euratom(2),

    –  having regard to the amended Commission proposal of 23 June 2023 for a Council decision amending Decision (EU, Euratom) 2020/2053 on the system of own resources of the European Union (COM(2023)0331),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources(3) (the IIA),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (recast)(4) (the Financial Regulation),

    –  having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget(5) (the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

    –  having regard to its position of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(6),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 10 May 2023 on own resources: a new start for EU finances, a new start for Europe(7),

    –  having regard to its resolution of 15 December 2022 on upscaling the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework: a resilient EU budget fit for new challenges(8),

    –  having regard to its position of 16 December 2020 on the draft Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027(9),

    –  having regard to the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights of 13 December 2017(10) and to the Commission Action Plan of 4 March 2021 on the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights (COM(2021)0102),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 15th Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP 15) in Montreal on 19 December 2022 (Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework),

    –  having regard to the Agreement adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 21) in Paris on 12 December 2015 (the Paris Agreement),

    –  having regard to the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals,

    –  having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer together – strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and readiness’ (the Niinistö report),

    –  having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (the Draghi report),

    –  having regard to the report of 4 September 2024 of the Strategic Dialogue on the Future of EU Agriculture entitled ‘A shared prospect for farming and food in Europe’,

    –  having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market – speed, security, solidarity: empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’ (the Letta report),

    –  having regard to the report of 20 February 2024 of the High-Level Group on the Future of Cohesion Policy entitled ‘Forging a sustainable future together – cohesion for a competitive and inclusive Europe’,

    –  having regard to the Budapest Declaration on the New European Competitiveness Deal,

    –  having regard to the joint communication of 26 March 2025 entitled ‘European Preparedness Union Strategy’ (JOIN(2025)0130),

    –  having regard to the joint white paper of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘European Defence Readiness 2030’ (JOIN(2025)0120),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 7 March 2025 entitled ‘A Roadmap for Women’s Rights’ (COM(2025)0097),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: a joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 19 February 2025 entitled ‘A Vision for Agriculture and Food’ (COM(2025)0075),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

    –  having regard to the Commission communication of 9 December 2021 entitled ‘Building an economy that works for people: an action plan for the social economy’ (COM(2021)0778),

    –  having regard to the European Council conclusions of 20 March 2025, 6 March 2025 and 19 December 2024,

    –  having regard to the political guidelines of 18 July 2024 for the next European Commission 2024-2029,

    –  having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘EU budget and place-based policies: proposals for new design and delivery mechanisms in the MFF post-2027’(11),

    –  having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    –  having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Development, the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety, the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, the Committee on Transport and Tourism, the Committee on Regional Development, the Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development, the Committee on Culture and Education, the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, and the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,

    –  having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0076/2025),

    A.  whereas, under Article 311 TFEU, the Union is required to provide itself with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through its policies;

    B.  whereas the Union budget is primarily an investment tool that can achieve economies of scale unattainable at Member State level and support European public goods, in particular through cross-border projects; whereas all spending through the Union budget must provide European added value and deliver discernible net benefits compared to spending at national or sub-national level, leading to real and lasting results;

    C.  whereas spending through the Union budget, if effectively targeted, aligned with the Union’s political priorities and better coordinated with spending at national level, helps to avoid fragmentation in the single market, promote upwards convergence, decrease inequalities and boost the overall impact of public investment; whereas public investment is essential as a catalyst for private investment in sectors where the market alone cannot drive the required investment;

    D.  whereas the NextGenerationEU recovery instrument (NGEU) established in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic enabled significant additional investment capacity of EUR 750 billion in 2018 prices – beyond the Union budget, which amounts to 1,1 % of the EU-27’s gross national income (GNI) – prompting a swift recovery and return to growth and supporting the green and digital transitions; whereas NGEU will not be in place post-2027;

    E.  whereas in 2022 Member States spent an average of 1,4 % of gross domestic product (GDP) on State aid – significantly more than their contribution to the Union budget – with over half of the State aid unrelated to crises;

    F.  whereas the Union budget, bolstered by NGEU and loans through the SURE scheme, has been instrumental in alleviating the economic and social impact of the COVID-19 crisis and in responding to the effects of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas the Union budget remains ill-equipped, in terms of size, structure and rules, to fully play its role in adjusting to evolving spending needs, addressing shocks and responding to crises and giving practical effect to the principle of solidarity, and to enable the Union to fulfil its objectives as established under the Treaties;

    G.  whereas people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget, including the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to evolving needs and to provide them with the necessary support, especially in times of crisis;

    H.  whereas, since the adoption of the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), the political, economic and social context has changed beyond recognition, compounding underlying structural challenges for the Union and leading to a substantial revision of the MFF in 2024;

    I.  whereas the context in which the Commission will prepare its proposals for the post-2027 MFF is every bit as challenging, with the established global and geopolitical order changing quickly and radically, the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis; whereas, as the Commission has made clear, the status quo is not an option and the Union budget will need to change accordingly;

    J.  whereas the US administration has decided to retreat from the country’s post-war global role in guaranteeing peace and security, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world; whereas the Union will therefore have to step up to fill part of the void the US appears set to leave, placing additional demands on the budget;

    K.  whereas the Union has committed to take all the steps needed to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest and to protect nature and reverse biodiversity loss; whereas delivering on the policy framework put in place to achieve this objective will require substantial investment; whereas the Union budget will have to play a key role in providing and incentivising that investment;

    L.  whereas, in order to compensate for the budget’s shortcomings, there have been numerous workaround solutions that make the budget more opaque, leaving the public in the dark about the real volume of Union spending, undermining the longer-term predictability of investment the budget is designed to provide and undercutting not only the principle of budget unity, but also Parliament’s role as a legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account;

    M.  whereas the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities; whereas breaches of those values undermine the cohesion of the Union, erode the rights of Union citizens and weaken mutual trust among Member States;

    1.  Insists that, in a fast changing world where people rightly expect more from the Union and its budget and where the Union is confronted with a growing number of crises, the next MFF must be endowed with increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI;

    2.  Underscores that the next MFF must focus on financing European public goods with discernible added value compared to national spending; highlights the need for enhanced synergies and better coordination between Union and national spending; emphasises that spending will have to address major challenges, such as the return of large-scale warfare in the Union’s immediate neighbourhood, a highly challenging economic and social backdrop, a competitiveness gap and the worsening climate and biodiversity crisis;

    3.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach as envisaged by the Commission, with the Recovery and Resilience Facility model as a blueprint, cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must fully safeguard Parliament’s roles as legislator and budgetary and discharge authority and be designed and implemented through close collaboration with regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders;

    4.  Calls for the next MFF to continue support for economic, social and territorial cohesion in order to help bind the Union together, deepen the single market, promote convergence and reduce inequality, poverty and social exclusion;

    5.  Considers that the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund and complementing existing, highly successful programmes;

    6.  Stresses that, in particular in the light of the US’s retreat from its role as a global guarantor of peace and security, there is a clear need to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, with the next MFF supporting a comprehensive security approach through an increase in investment; stresses that defence spending cannot come at the expense of nor lead to a reduction in long-term investment in the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the Union;

    7.  Calls for genuine simplification for final beneficiaries by avoiding programmes with overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions; underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    8.  Insists on enhanced in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF and sufficient margins under each heading; stresses that, alongside predictability for investment, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; underlines that flexibility for humanitarian aid should be ring-fenced; considers that the post-2027 MFF should include two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters and one for general-purpose crisis response;

    9.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; insists that the Union budget be protected against misuse, fraud and breaches of the principle of the rule of law and calls for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027;

    10.  Underlines that the repayment of NGEU borrowing must not endanger the financing of EU policies and priorities; stresses, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the future MFF architecture;

    11.  Calls on the Council to adopt new own resources as a matter of urgency in order to enable sustainable repayment of NGEU borrowing; stresses that new genuine own resources, beyond the IIA, are essential for the Union’s higher spending needs; considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with the necessary resources, and considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises, such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    12.  Stands ready to work constructively with the Council and Commission to deliver a long-term budget that addresses the Union’s needs; highlights that the post-2027 MFF is being constructed in a far from ‘business as usual’ context and takes seriously its institutional role as enshrined in the Treaties; insists that it will only approve a long-term budget that is fit for purpose for the Union in a changing world and calls for swift adoption of the MFF to enable timely implementation of spending programmes from 1 January 2028;

    A long-term budget with a renewed spending focus

    13.  Considers that, in view of the structural challenges facing the Union, the post-2027 MFF should adjust its spending focus to ensure that the Union can meet its strategic policy aims as detailed below;

    Competitiveness, strategic autonomy, social, economic and territorial cohesion and resilience

    14.  Is convinced that boosting competitiveness, decarbonising the economy and enhancing the Union’s innovation capacity are central priorities for the post-2027 MFF and are vital to ensure long-term, sustainable and inclusive growth and a thriving, more resilient economy and society;

    15.  Considers that the Union must develop a competitiveness framework in line with its own values and political aims and that competitiveness must foster not only economic growth, but also social, economic and territorial cohesion and environmental sustainability as underlined in both the Draghi and Letta reports;

    16.  Underlines that, as spelt out in the Letta and Draghi reports, the European economy and social model are under intense strain, with the productivity, competitiveness and skills gap having knock-on effects on the quality of jobs and on living standards for Europeans already grappling with high housing, energy and food prices; is concerned that a lack of job opportunities and high costs of living increase the risk of a brain drain away from Europe;

    17.  Points out that Draghi puts the annual investment gap with respect to innovation and infrastructure at EUR 750-800 billion per year between 2025 and 2030; underlines that the Union budget must play a vital role but it cannot cover that shortfall alone, and that the bulk of the effort will have to come from the private sector – points to the need to exploit synergies between public and private investment, in particular by simplifying and harmonising the EU investment architecture;

    18.  Stresses that the Union budget must be carefully coordinated with national spending, so as to ensure complementarity, and must be designed such that it can de-risk, mobilise and leverage private investment effectively, enabling start-ups and SMEs to access funds more readily; calls, therefore, for programmes such as InvestEU, which ensures additionality and follows a market-based, demand-driven approach, to be significantly reinforced in the next MFF; considers that financial instruments and budgetary guarantees are an effective use of resources to achieve critical Union policy goals and calls for them to be further simplified;

    19.  Insists that more must be done to maximise the potential of the role of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group – together with other international and national financial institutions – in lending and de-risking in strategic policy areas, such as climate and, latterly, security and defence projects; calls for an increased risk appetite and ambition from the EIB Group to crowd in investment, based on a strong capital position, and for a reinforced investment partnership to ensure that every euro spent at Union level is used in the most effective manner;

    20.  Emphasises that funding for research and innovation, including support for basic research, should be significantly increased, should be focused on the Union’s strategic priorities, should continue to be determined by the principle of excellence and should remain merit-based; considers that there should be sufficient resources across the MFF and at national level to fund all high-quality projects throughout the innovation cycle and to achieve the 3 % GDP target for research and development spending by 2030;

    21.  Stresses that the next MFF, building on the current Connecting Europe Facility, should include much greater, directly managed funding for energy, transport and digital infrastructure, with priority given to cross-border connections and national links with European added value; considers that such infrastructure is an absolute precondition for a successful deepening of the single market and for increasing the Union’s resilience in a changing geopolitical order;

    22.  Points out that a secure and robust space sector is critical for the Union’s autonomy and sovereignty and therefore needs sustained investment;

    23.  Underlines that a more competitive, productive and socially inclusive economy helps to generate high-quality, well-paid jobs, thus enhancing people’s standard of living; emphasises that, through programmes such as the European Social Fund+ and Erasmus+, the Union budget can play an important role in supporting education and training systems, enhancing social inclusion, boosting workforce adaptability through reskilling and upskilling, and thus preparing people for employment in a modern economy;

    24.  Insists that the Union budget should continue to support important economic and job-creating sectors where the Union is already a world leader, such as tourism and the cultural and creative sectors; underscores the need for dedicated funding for tourism, including to implement the EU Strategy for Sustainable Tourism, in the Union budget post-2027; points to the importance of Creative Europe in contributing to Europe’s diversity and competitiveness and in supporting vibrant societies;

    25.  Stresses that, in order to compete with other major global players, the European economy must also become more competitive and resilient on the supply side by investing more in the Union’s open strategic autonomy through enhanced industrial policy and a focus on strategic sectors, resource-efficiency and critical technologies to reduce dependence on third countries;

    26.  Considers that, in light of the above, the idea of an umbrella Competitiveness Fund merging existing programmes as envisaged by the Commission is not fit for purpose; stresses that the fund should instead be a new instrument taking advantage of a toolbox of funding based on lessons learned from InvestEU and the Innovation Fund; recalls that, under Article 182 TFEU, the Union is required to adopt a framework programme for research;

    27.  Notes that, in the Commission communication on the competitiveness compass, the Commission argues that a new competitiveness coordination tool should be established in order to better align industrial and research policies and investment between EU and national level; notes that the proposed new tool is envisaged as part of a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament must play a full decision-making role in both mechanisms;

    28.  Emphasises that food security is a vital component of strategic autonomy and that the next MFF must continue to support the competitiveness and resilience of the Union’s farming and fisheries sectors, including small-scale and young farmers and fishers, and help the sectors to better protect the climate and biodiversity, as well as the seas and oceans; highlights that a modern and simplified common agricultural policy is crucial for increasing productivity through technical progress, ensuring a fair standard of living for farmers, guaranteeing food security and the production of safe, high-quality and affordable food for Europeans, fostering generational renewal and ensuring the viability of rural areas;

    29.  Points out that the farming sector is particularly vulnerable to inflationary shocks which affect farmers’ purchasing power; calls for an increased and dedicated budget for the CAP in the next MFF, safeguarding it from possible cuts, in order to maintain its integrity and commonality, as well as the coherence and interconnection between its first and second pillar, and therefore opposes the idea of integrating the CAP into a single fund for each Member State; calls for additional dedicated funding sources to be explored where appropriate, including outside of the CAP, in order to cope with natural disasters and provide incentives to farmers and foresters to contribute to climate change mitigation, biodiversity recovery and nature protection, without measures causing a regression in EU agricultural production;

    30.  Stresses that the new global challenges facing EU farmers, including the present geopolitical situation, climate change and rising input prices, require sound financial allocation in the next CAP; emphasises that, in order to address these challenges, taking into account the lessons learned from the COVID-19 crisis, and to avoid reductions to farmers’ support, the CAP urgently needs an increased budget in the next MFF that is indexed to inflation through annual re-evaluation; underlines, in that respect, that direct payments in the current form generate clear EU added value and should continue to strengthen income security, production and protection against price volatility, better targeting persons actively engaged in agricultural production and the provision of public goods, while respecting realistic and balanced EU environmental and social standards; calls for a fair and efficient distribution of CAP support within and among the Member States; calls for the continuation and reinforcement of measures that maintain production in vulnerable areas and guarantee the viability of rural communities and the adequacy of public infrastructure, specifically regarding digitalisation and particularly through the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development, and the renewed involvement of local and regional authorities in the management of such measures; stresses the need to increase and reform the agricultural reserve in order to respond effectively and rapidly to future crises that the European agricultural sector will have to deal with, and to establish new tools for managing natural, market and sanitary risks, such as an EU reinsurance scheme to better mitigate the effects of future crises and provide greater stability for farmers; emphasises that specific solutions must be found for the farmers in eastern Europe who are most affected by the cascade effects of Russia’s war against Ukraine, such as high input prices, inflation and market disturbances; urges the Commission to continue to set up the necessary financial and legal framework for the food supply chain in order to strengthen the position of farmers and better combat unfair trading practices; calls on the Commission to support EU farmers by promoting agri-food products inside and outside the Union through a dynamic and stronger EU promotion policy; regrets the funding cuts made to the programme on the promotion of agricultural products during the review of the current MFF; emphasises that the next MFF must include dedicated funds for agri-tourism, female entrepreneurship, vocational training and technological innovation in agriculture;

    31.  Recalls that social, economic and territorial cohesion is a cornerstone of European integration and is vital in binding the Union together and deepening the single market; reaffirms, in that respect, the importance of the convergence process; underlines that a modernised cohesion policy must follow a decentralised, place-based, multilevel governance approach and be built around the shared management and partnership principle, fully involving local and regional authorities and relevant stakeholders, ensuring that resources are directed where they are most needed to reduce regional disparities;

    32.  Stresses that cohesion policy funding must tackle the key challenges the Union faces, such as demographic change and depopulation, and target the regions and people most in need; calls, furthermore, for enhanced access to EU funding for cities, regions and urban authorities; recalls that, under Article 349 TFEU, the Union is required to put in place specific measures for the outermost regions and stresses, therefore, the need for continued, targeted support for these regions in the next MFF, including via a reinforced programme of options specifically relating to remoteness and insularity (POSEI);

    33.  Recalls the importance of the social dimension of the European Union and of promoting the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, its Action Plan and headline targets; emphasises that the Union budget should, therefore, play a pivotal role in reducing inequality, poverty and social exclusion, including by supporting children, families and vulnerable groups; recalls that around 20 million children in the Union are at risk of poverty and social exclusion; stresses that addressing child poverty across the Union requires appropriately funded, comprehensive and integrated measures, together with the efficient implementation of the European Child Guarantee at national level; emphasises that Parliament has consistently requested a dedicated budget within the ESF+ to support the Child Guarantee as a central pillar of the EU anti-poverty strategy;

    34.  Highlights, in this regard, the EU-wide housing crisis affecting millions of families and young people; stresses the need for enhanced support for housing through the Union budget, in particular via cohesion policy, and through other funding sources, such as the EIB Group and national promotional banks; acknowledges that, while Union financing cannot solve the housing crisis alone, it can play a crucial role in financing urgent measures and complementing broader Union and national efforts to improve housing affordability and enhance energy efficiency of the housing stock;

    35.  Points out that Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has had substantial economic and social consequences, in particular in Member States bordering Russia and Belarus; insists that the next MFF provide support to these regions;

    The green and digital transitions

    36.  Highlights that the green and digital transitions are inextricably linked to competitiveness, the modernisation of the economy and the resilience of society and act as catalysts for a future-oriented and resource-efficient economy; insists therefore, that the post-2027 MFF must continue to support and to further accelerate the twin transitions;

    37.  Recalls that the Union budget is an essential contributor to achieving climate neutrality by 2050, including through support for the 2030 and 2040 targets; underlines that the transition will require a decarbonisation of the economy, in particular through the deployment of clean technologies, improved energy and transport infrastructure and more energy-efficient housing; notes that the Commission estimates additional investment needs to achieve climate neutrality by 2050 at 1,5 % of GDP per year compared to the decade 2011-2020 and that, while the Union budget alone cannot cover the gap, it must remain a vital contributor; calls, therefore, for increased directly managed support for environment and biodiversity protection and climate action building on the current LIFE programme;

    38.  Underlines that industry will be central in the transition to net zero and the establishment of the Energy Union, and that support will be needed in helping some industrial sectors and their workers to adapt; stresses the importance of a just transition that must leave no one behind, requiring, inter alia, investment in regions that are heavily fossil-fuel dependent and increased support for vulnerable households, in particular through the Just Transition Mechanism and the Social Climate Fund;

    39.  Points to the profound technological shift under way, with technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum both creating opportunities, in terms of the Union’s economic potential and global leadership and improvements to citizens’ lives, and posing reliability, ethical and sovereignty challenges; stresses that the next MFF must support research into, and the development and safe application of digital technologies and help people to hone the knowledge and skills they need to work with and use them;

    Security, defence and preparedness

    40.  Recalls that peace and security are the foundation for the Union’s prosperity, social model and competitiveness, and a vital pillar of the Union’s geopolitical standing; stresses that the next MFF must support a comprehensive security approach by investing significantly more in safeguarding the Union against the myriad threats it faces;

    41.  Underlines that, as the Niinistö report makes clear, multiple threats are combining to heighten instability and increase the Union’s vulnerability, chief among them the fragmenting global order, the security threat posed by Russia and Belarus, growing tensions globally, hostile international actors, the globalisation of criminal networks, hybrid campaigns – which include cyberattacks, foreign information manipulation, disinformation and interference and the instrumentalisation of migration – increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events as a result of climate change, and health threats;

    42.  Points out that the Union has played a vital role in achieving lasting peace on its territory and must continue to do so by adjusting to the reality of war on its doorstep and the need to vastly boost defence infrastructure, capabilities and readiness, including through the Union budget, going far beyond the current allocation of less than 2 % of the MFF;

    43.  Notes that European defence capabilities suffer from decades of under-investment and that, according to the Commission, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade; underlines that the Union budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play, in conjunction with national budgets and with a focus on clear EU added value; considers that the Union budget and lending through the EIB Group can help incentivise investment in defence; stresses that defence spending must not come at the expense of social and environmental spending, nor must it lead to a reduction in funding for long-standing Union policies that have proved their worth over time;

    44.  Underlines the merits of the defence programmes and instruments put in place during the current MFF, which have enhanced joint research, production and procurement in the field of defence, providing a valuable foundation on which to build further Union policy and investment;

    45.  Emphasises that, given the geopolitical situation, there is a clear need to act and to progress towards a genuine Defence Union, in coordination with NATO and in full alignment with the neutrality commitments of individual Member States; concurs, in that regard, with the Commission’s analysis that the next MFF must provide a comprehensive and robust framework in support of EU defence;

    46.  Underscores the importance of a competitive and resilient European defence technological and industrial base; considers that enhanced joint EU-level investment in defence in the next MFF backed up by a clear and transparent governance structure can help to avoid duplication, generate economies of scale, and thus significant savings for Member States, reduce fragmentation and ensure the interoperability of equipment and systems; underscores the importance of technology in modern defence systems and therefore of investing in research, cyber-defence and cybersecurity and in dual-use products; points to the need to direct support towards the defence industry within the Union, thus strengthening strategic autonomy, creating quality high-skilled jobs, driving innovation and creating cross-border opportunities for EU businesses, including SMEs;

    47.  Points to the importance of increasing support in the budget for military mobility, which upgrades infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, enabling the large-scale movement of military equipment and personnel at short notice and thus contributing to the Union’s defence capabilities and collective security; highlights, in that regard, the importance of financing for the trans-European transport networks to enable their adaptation for dual-use purposes;

    48.  Emphasises that the Union needs to ramp up funding for preparedness across the board; is alarmed by the growing impact of natural disasters, which are often the result of climate change and are therefore likely to occur with greater frequency and intensity in the future; points out that, according to the 2024 European Climate Risk Assessment Report, cumulated economic losses from natural disasters could reach about 1,4 % of Union GDP;

    49.  Underlines, therefore, that, in addition to efforts to mitigate climate change through the green transition, significant investment is required to adapt to climate change, in particular to prevent and reduce the impact of natural disasters and severe weather events; considers that support for this purpose, such as through the current Union Civil Protection Mechanism, must be significantly increased in the next MFF and made available quickly to local and regional authorities, which are often on the frontline;

    50.  Emphasises that reconstruction and recovery measures after natural disasters must be based on the ‘build back better’ approach and prioritise nature-based solutions; stresses the importance of sustainable water management and security and hydric resilience as part of the Union’s overall preparedness strategy;

    51.  Recalls that the COVID-19 pandemic wreaked economic and social havoc globally and that a key lesson from the experience is that there is a need to prioritise investment in prevention of, preparedness for and response to health threats, in medical research and disease prevention, in access to critical medicines, in healthcare infrastructure, in physical and mental health and in the resilience and accessibility of public health systems in the Union; recalls that strategic autonomy in health is key to ensuring the Union’s preparedness in this area;

    52.  Considers that the next MFF must build on the work done in the current programming period by ensuring that the necessary investment is in place to build a genuine European Health Union that delivers for all citizens;

    53.  Underlines that, with technological developments, it has become easier for malicious and opportunistic foreign actors to spread disinformation, encourage online hate speech, interfere in elections and mount cyberattacks against the Union’s interests; insists that the next MFF must invest in enhanced cybersecurity capabilities and equip the Union to counter hybrid warfare in its various guises;

    54.  Stresses that a free, independent and pluralistic media is a fundamental component of Europe’s resilience, safeguarding not only the free flow of information but also a democratic mindset, critical thinking and informed decision-making; points to the importance of investment in independent and investigative journalism, fact-checking initiatives, digital and media literacy and critical thinking to safeguard against disinformation, foreign information manipulation and electoral interference as part of the European Democracy Shield initiative and therefore to guarantee democratic resilience; underscores the need for continued Union budget support for initiatives in these areas;

    55.  Underscores the importance of continued funding, in the next MFF, for effective protection of the EU’s external borders; underlines the need to counter transnational criminal networks and better protect victims of trafficking networks, and to strengthen resilience and response capabilities to address hybrid attacks and the instrumentalisation of migration, by third countries or hostile non-state actors; highlights, in particular, the need for support to frontline Member States for the purposes of securing the external borders of the EU;

    56.  Underlines that the EU’s resilience and preparedness are inextricably linked to those of its regional and global partners; emphasises that strengthening partners’ capacity to prevent, withstand and effectively respond to extreme weather events, health crises, hybrid campaigns, cyberattacks or armed conflict also lowers the risk of spill-over effects for Europe;

    External action and enlargement

    57.  Insists that, in a context of heightened global instability, the Union must continue to engage constructively with third countries and support peace, and conflict prevention, stability, prosperity, security, human rights, the rule of law, equality, democracy and sustainable development globally, in line with its global responsibility values and international commitments;

    58.  Regrets the fact that external action in the current MFF has been underfunded, leading to significant recourse to special instruments and substantial reinforcements in the mid-term revision; notes, in particular, that humanitarian aid funding has been woefully inadequate, prompting routine use of the Emergency Aid Reserve;

    59.  Underlines that the US’s retreat from its post-war global role in guaranteeing peace, security and democracy, in leading on global governance in the rules-based, multilateral international order and in providing essential development and humanitarian aid to those most in need around the world will leave an enormous gap and that the Union has a responsibility and overwhelming strategic interest in helping to fill that gap; calls on the Commission to address the consequences of the US’s retreat at the latest in its proposal for the post-2027 MFF;

    60.  Stresses that the next MFF must continue to tackle the most pressing global challenges, from fighting climate change, to providing relief in the event of natural disasters, preventing and addressing violent conflict and guaranteeing global security, ensuring global food security, improving healthcare and education systems, reducing poverty and inequality, promoting democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social justice and boosting competitiveness and the security of global supply chains, in full compliance with the principle of policy coherence for development; emphasises, in particular, the need for support for the Union’s Southern and Eastern Neighbourhoods;

    61.  Underlines that, in particular in light of the drastic cuts to the USAID budget, the budget must uphold the Union’s role as the world’s leading provider of development aid and climate finance in line with the Union’s global obligations and commitments; recalls, in that regard, that the Union and its Member States have collectively committed to allocating 0,7 % of their GNI to official development assistance and that poverty alleviation must remain its primary objective; insists that the budget must continue to support the Union in its efforts to defend the rules-based international order, democracy, multilateralism, human rights and fundamental values;

    62.  Insists that, given the unprecedented scale of humanitarian crises, mounting global challenges and uncertainty of US assistance under the current administration, humanitarian aid funding must be significantly enhanced and that its use must remain solely needs-based and respect the principles of neutrality, independence and impartiality; emphasises that the needs-based nature of humanitarian aid requires ring-fenced funding delivered through a stand-alone spending programme, distinct from other external action financing; underscores, furthermore, that effective humanitarian aid provision is contingent on predictability through a sufficient annual baseline allocation;

    63.  Emphasises that humanitarian aid, by its very nature, requires substantial flexibility and response capacity; considers, therefore, that, in addition to an adequate baseline figure, humanitarian aid will require significant ring-fenced flexibility in its design to enable an effective response to the growing crises;

    64.  Emphasises that, in a context in which global actors are increasingly using trade interdependence as a means of economic coercion, the Union must bolster its capacity to protect and advance its own strategic interests, develop more robust tools to counter coercion and ensure genuine reciprocity in its partnerships; stresses that such an approach requires the strategic allocation of external financing so as to support, for example, economic, security and energy partnerships that align with the Union’s values and strategic interests;

    65.  Considers that enlargement represents an opportunity to strengthen the Union as a geopolitical power and that the next MFF is pivotal for preparing the Union for enlargement and the candidate countries for accession; recalls that the stability, security and democratic resilience of the candidate countries are inextricably connected to those of the EU and require sustained strategic investment, linked to reforms, to support their convergence with Union standards; underlines the important role that citizens and civil society organisations play in the process of enlargement;

    66.  Points to the need for strategically targeted support for pre-accession and for growth and investment; is of the view that post-2027 pre-accession assistance should be provided in the form of both grants and loans; believes, in that context, that the future framework should allow for innovative financing mechanisms, as well as lending to candidate countries backed by the budgetary headroom (the difference between the own resources and the MFF ceilings);

    67.  Stresses that financial support must be conditional on the implementation of reforms aligned with the Union acquis and policies and adherence to Union values; emphasises, in this regard, the need for a strong governance model that ensures parliamentary accountability, oversight and control and a strong, effective anti-fraud architecture;

    68.  Reiterates its full support for Ukrainians in their fight for freedom and democracy and deplores the terrible suffering and impact resulting from Russia’s unprovoked and unjustifiable war of aggression; welcomes the decision to grant Ukraine and the neighbouring Republic of Moldova candidate country status and insists on the need to deploy the necessary funds to support their accession processes;

    69.  Underlines that pre-accession support to Ukraine has to be distinct from and additional to financial assistance for macroeconomic stability, reconstruction and post-war recovery, where needs are far more substantial and require a concerted international effort, of which support through the Union budget should be an important part;

    70.  Is convinced that the existing mandatory revision clause in the event of enlargement should be maintained in the next framework and that national envelopes should not be affected; underlines that the next MFF will also have to put in place appropriate transitional and phasing-in measures for key spending areas, such as cohesion and agriculture, based on a careful assessment of the impacts on different sectors;

    Fundamental rights, Union values and the rule of law

    71.  Emphasises the importance of the Union budget and programmes like Erasmus+ and Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values in promoting and protecting democracy and the Union’s values, fostering the Union’s common cultural heritage and European integration, enhancing citizen engagement, civic education and youth participation, safeguarding and promoting fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rule of law; calls, in this regard, for increased funding for Erasmus+ in the next MFF; points to the importance of the independence of the justice system, the sound functioning of national institutions, de-oligarchisation, robust support for and, in line with article 11(2) TEU, an active dialogue with civil society, which is vital for fostering an active civic space, ensuring accountability and transparency and informing policymakers about best practices from the ground;

    72.  Highlights, in that connection, that the recast of the Financial Regulation requires the Commission and the Member States, in the implementation of the budget, to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights and to respect the values on which the Union is founded, which are enshrined in Article 2 TEU; expects the Commission to ensure that the proposals for the next MFF, including for the spending programmes, are aligned with the Financial Regulation recast;

    73.  Stresses that instability in neighbouring regions and beyond, poverty, underlying trends in economic development, demographic changes and climate change, continue to generate migration flows towards the Union, placing significant pressure on asylum and migration systems; underlines that the post-2027 MFF must support the full and swift implementation of the Union’s Asylum and Migration Pact and effective return and readmission policies, in line with fundamental rights and EU values, including the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility; underlines, moreover, that, in line with the Pact, the EU must pursue enhanced cooperation and mutually beneficial partnerships with third countries on migration, with adequate parliamentary scrutiny, and that such cooperation must abide by EU and international law;

    74.  Underlines that compliance with Union values and fundamental rights is an essential pre-requisite to access EU funds; highlights the importance of strong links between respect for the rule of law and access to EU funds under the current MFF; believes that the protection of the Union’s financial interests depends on respect for the rule of law at national level; welcomes, in particular, the positive impact of the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation in protecting the Union’s financial interests in cases of systemic and persistent breaches of the rule of law; calls on the Commission and the Council to apply the regulation strictly, consistently and without undue delay wherever necessary; emphasises that decisions to suspend or reduce Union funding over breaches of the rule of law must be based on objective criteria and not be guided by other considerations, nor be the outcome of negotiations;

    75.  Points to the need for a stronger link between the rule of law and the Union budget post-2027 and welcomes the Commission’s commitment to bolster links between the recommendations in the annual rule of law report and access to funds through the budget; calls on the Commission to outline, in the annual rule of law report from 2025 onwards, the extent to which identified weaknesses in rule of law regimes potentially pose a risk to the Union budget; welcomes, furthermore, the link between respect for Union values and the implementation of the budget and calls on the Commission to actively monitor Member States’ compliance with this principle in a unified manner and to take swift action in the event of non-compliance;

    76.  Calls for the consolidation of a robust rule of law toolbox, building on the current conditionality provisions under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF), the horizontal enabling conditions in the Common Provisions Regulation and the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation and insists that the toolbox should cover the entire Union budget; underlines the need for far greater transparency and consistency with regard to the application of tools to protect the rule of law and for Parliament’s role to be strengthened in the application and scrutiny of such measures; insists, furthermore, on the need for consistency across instruments when assessing breaches of the rule of law in Member States;

    77.  Recalls that the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation provides that final recipients should not be deprived of the benefits of EU funds in the event of sanctions being applied to their government; believes that, to date, this provision has not been effective and stresses the importance of applying a smart conditionality approach so that beneficiaries are not penalised because of their government’s actions; calls on the Commission, in line with its stated intention in the political guidelines, to propose specific measures to ensure that local and regional authorities, civil society and other beneficiaries can continue to benefit from Union funding in cases of breaches of the rule of law by national governments without weakening the application of the regulation and maintaining the Member State’s obligation to pay under Union law;

    A long-term budget that mainstreams the Union’s policy objectives

    78.  Stresses that a long-term budget that is fully aligned with the Union’s strategic aims requires that key objectives be mainstreamed across the budget through a set of horizontal principles, building on the lessons from the current MFF and RRF;

    79.  Recalls that the implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries and be in line with the principle of proportionality; calls for innovative solutions and the use of automated reporting tools, including artificial intelligence, to achieve more efficient data collection;

    80.  Underlines, therefore, that the next MFF must ensure that, across the board, spending programmes pursue climate and biodiversity objectives, promote and protect rights and equal opportunities for all, including gender equality, support competitiveness and bolster the Union’s preparedness against threats;

    81.  Points out that effective mainstreaming is best achieved through a toolbox of measures, primarily through policy, project and regulatory design, thorough impact assessments and solid tracking of spending and, in specific cases, spending targets based on relevant and available data; welcomes the significant improvements in performance reporting in the current MFF, which allow for much better scrutiny of the impact of EU spending and calls for this to be further developed in the next programing period;

    82.  Welcomes the development of a methodology to track gender-based spending and considers that the lessons learnt, in particular as regards the collection of gender-disaggregated data, the monitoring of implementation and impact and administrative burden, should be applied in the next MFF in order to improve the methodology; calls on the Commission to explore the feasibility of gender budgeting in the next MFF; stresses, in the same vein, the need for a significant improvement in climate and biodiversity mainstreaming methodologies to move towards the measurement of impact;

    83.  Regrets that the Commission has not systematically conducted thorough impact assessments, including gender impact assessments, for all legislation involving spending through the budget and insists that this change;

    84.  Is pleased that the climate mainstreaming target of 30 % is projected to be exceeded in the current MFF; regrets, however, that the Union is not on track to meet the 10 % target for 2026 for biodiversity-related expenditure; insists that the targets in the IIA have nevertheless been a major factor in driving climate and biodiversity spending; calls on the Commission to adapt the spending targets contributing positively to climate and biodiversity in line with the Union policy ambitions in this regard, taking into account the investment needs for these policy ambitions;

    85.  Stresses, furthermore, that the Union budget should be implemented in line with Article 33(2) of the Financial Regulation, therefore without doing significant harm(12) to the specified objectives, respecting applicable working and employment conditions and taking into account the principle of gender equality;

    86.  Welcomes the Commission’s commitment to phase out all fossil fuel subsidies and environmentally harmful subsidies in the next MFF; expects the Commission to come forward with its planned roadmap in this regard as part of its proposal for the next MFF;

    A long-term budget with an effective administration at the service of Europeans

    87.  Underlines the need for Union policies to be underpinned by a well-functioning administration; insists that, post-2027, sufficient financial and staff resources be allocated from the outset so that Union institutions, bodies, decentralised agencies and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office can ensure effective and efficient policy design, high-quality delivery and enforcement, provide technical assistance, continue to attract the best people from all Member States, thus ensuring geographical balance, and have leeway to adjust to changing circumstances;

    88.  Regrets that the Union’s ability to implement policy effectively and protect its financial interests within the current MFF has been undermined by stretched administrative resources and a dogmatic application of a policy of stable staffing, despite increasing demands and responsibilities; points, for example, to the failure to provide sufficient staff to properly implement and enforce the Digital Services(13) and Digital Markets Acts(14), thus undercutting the legislation’s effectiveness and to the repeated redeployments from programmes to decentralised agencies to cover staffing needs; insists that staffing levels be determined by an objective needs assessment when legislation is proposed and definitively adopted, and factored into planning for administrative expenditure from the outset;

    89.  Emphasises that the Commission has sought, to some degree, to circumvent its own stable staffing policy by increasing staff attached to programmes and facilities and thus not covered by the administrative spending ceiling; underscores, however, that such an approach merely masks the problem and may ultimately undermine the operational capacity of programmes; insists, therefore, that additional responsibilities require administrative expenditure and must not erode programme envelopes;

    90.  Stresses that up-front investment in secure and interoperable IT infrastructure and data mining capabilities can also generate longer-term cost savings and hugely enhance policy delivery and tracking of spending;

    91.  Acknowledges that, in the absence of any correction mechanism in the current MFF, high inflation has significantly driven up statutory costs, requiring extensive use of special instruments to cover the shortfall; regrets that the Council elected not to take up the Commission’s proposal to raise the ceiling for administrative expenditure in the MFF revision, thus further eroding special instruments;

    A long-term budget that is simpler and more transparent

    92.  Stresses that the next MFF must be designed so as to simplify the lives of all beneficiaries by cutting unnecessary red tape; underlines that simplification will require harmonising rules and reporting requirements wherever possible, including, as relevant, ensuring consistency between the applicable rules at European, national and regional levels; underlines, in that respect, the need for a genuine, user-friendly single entry point for EU funding and a simplified application procedure designed in consultation with relevant stakeholders; points out, furthermore, that the next MFF must be implemented as close to people as possible;

    93.  Calls for genuine simplification where there are overlapping objectives, diverging eligibility criteria and different rules governing horizontal provisions that should be uniform across programmes; considers that an assessment of which spending programmes should be included in the next MFF must be based on the above aspects, on the need to focus spending on clearly identified policy objectives with clear European added value and on the policy intervention logic of each programme; stresses that reducing the number of programmes is not an end in itself;

    94.  Underlines that simplification cannot mean more leeway for the Commission without the necessary checks and balances and must therefore be achieved with full respect for the institutional balance provided for in the Treaties;

    95.  Insists that simplification cannot come at the expense of the quality of programme design and implementation and that, therefore, a simpler budget must also be a more transparent budget, enabling better accountability, scrutiny, control of spending and reducing the risks of double funding, misuse and fraud; underlines that any reduction in programmes must be offset by a far more detailed breakdown of the budget by budget line, in contrast to some programme mergers in the current MFF, such as the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI – Global Europe), which is an example not to follow; calls, therefore, for a sufficiently detailed breakdown by budget line to enable the budgetary authority to exercise proper accountability and ensure that decision-making in the annual budgetary procedure and in the course of budget implementation is meaningful;

    96.  Recalls that transparency is essential to retain citizens’ trust, and that fraud and misuse of funds are extremely detrimental to that trust; underlines, therefore, the need for Parliament to be able to control spending and assess whether discharge can be granted; insists that proper accountability requires robust auditing for all budgetary expenditure based on the application of a single audit trail; calls on the Commission to put in place harmonised and effective anti-fraud mechanisms across funding instruments for the post-2027 MFF that ensure the protection of the Union’s budget;

    97.  Reiterates its long-standing position that all EU-level spending should be brought within the purview of the budgetary authority, thereby ensuring transparency, democratic control and protection of the Union’s financial interests; calls, therefore, for the full budgetisation of (partially) off-budget instruments such as the Social Climate Fund, the Innovation Fund and the Modernisation Fund, or their successors;

    A long-term budget that is more flexible and more responsive to crises and shocks

    98.  Points out that, traditionally, the MFF has not been conceived with a crisis response or flexibility logic, but rather has been designed primarily to ensure medium-term investment predictability; underlines that, in a rapidly changing political, security, economic and social context, such an approach is no longer tenable; insists on sufficient in-built crisis response capacity in the next MFF;

    99.  Underscores that the current MFF has been beset by a lack of flexibility and an inability to adjust to evolving spending priorities; considers that the next MFF needs to strike a better balance between investment predictability and flexibility to adjust spending focus; highlights that spending in certain areas requires greater stability than in others where flexibility is more valuable; stresses that recurrent redeployments are not a viable way to finance the Union’s priorities as they damage investments and jeopardise the delivery of agreed policy objectives;

    100.  Believes that, while allocating a significant portion of funding to objectives up-front, spending programmes should retain a substantial in-built flexibility reserve, with allocation to specific policy objectives to be decided by the budgetary authority; notes that the NDICI – Global Europe’s emerging challenges and priorities cushion provides a model for such a flexibility reserve, but that the decision-making process for its mobilisation must not be replicated in the future MFF; points to the need for stronger, more effective scrutiny powers of the co-legislators over the setting of policy priorities and objectives and a detailed budgetary breakdown to ensure that the budgetary authority is equipped to make meaningful and informed decisions;

    101.  Underlines that the MFF must have sufficient margins under each heading to ensure that new instruments or spending objectives agreed over the programming period can be accommodated without eroding funding for other policy and long-term strategic objectives or eating into crisis response capacity;

    102.  Underlines that the possibility for budgetary transfers under the Financial Regulation already provides for flexibility to adjust to evolving spending needs in the course of budget implementation; stresses that, under the current rules, the Commission has significant freedom to transfer considerable amounts between policy areas without budgetary authority approval, which limits scrutiny and control; calls, therefore, for the rules to be changed so as to introduce a maximum amount, in addition to a maximum percentage per budget line, for transfers without approval; considers that for transfers from Union institutions other than the Commission that are subject to a possible duly justified objection by Parliament or the Council, a threshold below which they would be exempt from that procedure could be a useful measure of simplification;

    103.  Recalls that the current MFF has been placed under further strain due to high levels of inflation in a context where an annual 2 % deflator is applied to 2018 prices, reducing the budget’s real-terms value and squeezing its operational and administrative capacity; considers, therefore, that the future budget should be endowed with sufficient response capacity to enable the budget to adapt to inflationary shocks;

    104.  Calls for a root-and-branch reform of the existing special instruments to bolster crisis response capacity and ensure an effective and swift reaction through more rapid mobilisation; underlines that the current instruments are both inadequate in size and constrained by excessive rigidity, with several effectively ring-fenced according to crisis type; points out that enhanced crisis response capacity will ensure that cohesion policy funds are not called upon for that purpose and can therefore be used for their intended investment objectives;

    105.  Considers that the post-2027 MFF should include only two special instruments – one dedicated to ensuring solidarity in the event of natural disasters (the successor to the existing European Solidarity Reserve) and one for general-purpose crisis response and for responding to any unforeseen needs and emerging priorities, including where amounts in the special instrument for natural disasters are insufficient (the successor to the Flexibility Instrument); insists that both special instruments should be adequately funded from the outset and able to carry over unspent amounts indefinitely over the MFF period; believes that all other special instruments can either be wound up or subsumed into the two special instruments or into existing programmes;

    106.  Calls for the future Flexibility Instrument to be heavily front-loaded and subsequently to be fed through a number of additional sources of financing: unspent margins from previous years (as with the current Single Margin Instrument), the annual surplus from the previous year, a fines-based mechanism modelled on the existing Article 5 of the MFF Regulation, reflows from financial instruments and decommitted appropriations; underlines that the next MFF should be designed such that the future special instruments are not required to cover debt repayment;

    107.  Underlines that re-use of the surplus, of reflows from financial instruments and surplus provisioning and of decommitments would require amendments to the Financial Regulation;

    108.  Points out that, with sufficient up-front resources and such arrangements for re-using unused funds, the budget would have far greater response capacity without impinging on the predictability of national GNI-based contributions; insists that an MFF endowed with greater flexibility and response capacity is less likely to require a substantial mid-term revision;

    A long-term budget that is more results-focused

    109.  Emphasises that, in order to maximise impact, it is imperative that spending under the next MFF be much more rigorously aligned with the Union’s strategic policy aims and better coordinated with spending at national level; underlines that, in turn, consultation with regional and local authorities is vital to facilitate access to funding and ensure that Union support meets the real needs of final recipients and delivers tangible benefits for people; underscores the importance of technical assistance to implementing authorities to help ensure timely implementation, additionality of investments and therefore maximum impact;

    110.  Underlines that, in order to support effective coordination between Union and national spending, the Commission envisages a ‘new, lean steering mechanism’ designed ‘to reinforce the link between overall policy coordination and the EU budget’; insists that Parliament play a full decision-making role in any coordination or steering mechanism;

    111.  Considers that the RRF, with its focus on performance and links between reforms and investments and budgetary support, has helped to drive national investments and reforms that would not otherwise have taken place;

    112.  Underlines that the RRF can help to inform the delivery of Union spending under shared management; recalls, however, that the RRF was agreed in the very specific context of the COVID-19 pandemic and cannot, therefore, be replicated wholesale for future investment programmes;

    113.  Points out that spending under shared management in the next MFF must involve regional and local authorities and all relevant stakeholders from design to delivery through a place-based and multilevel governance approach and in line with an improved partnership principle, ensure the cross-border European dimension of investment projects, and focus on results and impact rather than outputs by setting measurable performance indicators, ensuring availability of relevant data and feeding into programme design and adjustment;

    114.  Underlines that the design of shared management spending under the next MFF must safeguard Parliament’s role as legislator, budgetary and discharge authority and in holding the executive to account, putting in place strict accountability mechanisms and guaranteeing full transparency in relation to final recipients or groups of recipients of Union spending funds through an interoperable system enabling effective tracking of cash flows and project progress;

    115.  Considers that the ‘one national plan per Member State’ approach envisaged by the Commission is not in line with the principles set out above and cannot be the basis for shared management spending post-2027; recalls that, in this regard, the Union is required, under Article 175 TFEU, to provide support through instruments for agricultural, regional and social spending;

    A long-term budget that manages liabilities sustainably

    116.  Recalls Parliament’s very firm opposition to subjecting the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs to a cap within an MFF heading given that these costs are subject to market conditions, influenced by external factors and thus inherently volatile, and that the repayment of borrowing costs is a non-discretionary legal obligation; stresses that introducing new own resources is also necessary to prevent future generations from bearing the burden of past debts;

    117.  Deplores the fact that, under the existing architecture and despite the joint declaration by the three institutions as part of the 2020 MFF agreement whereby expenditure to cover NGEU financing costs ‘shall aim at not reducing programmes and funds’, financing for key Union programmes and resources available for special instruments, even after the MFF revision, have de facto been competing with the repayment of NGEU borrowing costs in a context of steep inflation and rising interest rates; recalls that pressure on the budget driven by NGEU borrowing costs was a key factor in cuts to flagship programmes in the MFF revision;

    118.  Underlines that, to date, the Union budget has been required only to repay interest related to NGEU and that, from 2028 onwards, the budget will also have to repay the capital; underscores that, according to the Commission, the total costs for NGEU capital and interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25-30 billion a year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of payment appropriations in the 2025 budget;

    119.  Acknowledges that, while NGEU borrowing costs will be more stable in the next MFF period as bonds will already have been issued, the precise repayment profile will have an impact on the level of interest and thus on the degree of volatility; insists, therefore, that all costs related to borrowing backed by the Union budget or the budgetary headroom be treated distinctly from appropriations for EU programmes within the MFF architecture;

    120.  Points, in that regard, to the increasing demand for the Union budget to serve as a guarantee for the Union’s vital support through macro-financial assistance and the associated risks; underlines that, in the event of default or the withdrawal of national guarantees, the Union budget ultimately underwrites all macro-financial assistance loans and therefore bears significant and inherently unpredictable contingent liabilities, notably in relation to Ukraine;

    121.  Calls, therefore, on the Commission to design a sound and durable architecture that enables sustainable management of all non-discretionary costs and liabilities, fully preserving Union programmes and the budget’s flexibility and response capacity;

    A long-term budget that is properly resourced and sustainably financed

    122.  Underlines that, as described above, the budgetary needs post-2027 will be significantly higher than the amounts allocated to the 2021-2027 MFF and, in addition, will need to cover borrowing costs and debt repayment; insists, therefore, that the next MFF be endowed with significantly increased resources compared to the 2021-2027 period, moving away from the historically restrictive, self-imposed level of 1 % of GNI, which has prevented the Union from delivering on its ambitions and deprived it of the ability to respond to crises and adapt to emerging needs;

    123.  Considers that all instruments and tools should be explored in order to provide the Union with those resources, in line with its priorities and identified needs; considers, in this respect, that joint borrowing through the issuance of EU bonds presents a viable option to ensure that the Union has sufficient resources to respond to acute Union-wide crises such as the ongoing crisis in the area of security and defence;

    124.  Reiterates the need for sustainable and resilient revenue for the Union budget; points to the legally binding roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources in the IIA, in which Parliament, the Council and the Commission undertook to introduce sufficient new own resources to at least cover the repayment of NGEU debt; underlines that, overall, the basket of new own resources should be fair, linked to broader Union policy aims and agreed on time and with sufficient volume to meet the heightened budgetary needs;

    125.  Recalls its support for the amended Commission proposal on the system of own resources; is deeply concerned by the complete absence of progress on the system of own resources in the Council; calls on the Council to adopt this proposal as a matter of urgency; and urges the Commission to spare no effort in supporting the adoption process;

    126.  Calls furthermore, on the Commission to continue efforts to identify additional innovative and genuine new own resources and other revenue sources beyond those specified in the IIA; stresses that new own resources are essential not only to enable repayment of NGEU borrowing, but to ensure that the Union is equipped to cover its the higher spending needs;

    127.  Calls on the Commission to design a modernised budget with a renewed spending focus, driven by the need for fairness, greater simplification, a reduced administrative burden and more transparency, including on the revenue side; underlines that existing rebates and corrections automatically expire at the end of the current MFF;

    128.  Welcomes the decision, in the recast of the Financial Regulation, to treat as negative revenue any interest or other charge due to a third party relating to amounts of fines, other penalties or sanctions that are cancelled or reduced by the Court of Justice; recalls that this solution comes to an end on 31 December 2027; invites the Commission to propose a definitive solution for the next MFF that achieves the same objective of avoiding any impact on the expenditure side of the budget;

    A long-term budget grounded in close interinstitutional cooperation

    129.  Underlines that Parliament intends to fully exercise its prerogatives as legislator, budgetary authority and discharge authority under the Treaties;

    130.  Recalls that the requirement for close interinstitutional cooperation between the Commission, the Council and Parliament from the early design stages to the final adoption of the MFF is enshrined in the Treaties and further detailed in the IIA;

    131.  Emphasises Parliament’s commitment to play its role fully throughout the process; believes that the design of the MFF should be bottom-up and based on the extensive involvement of stakeholders; underlines, furthermore, the need for a strategic dialogue among the three institutions in the run-up to the MFF proposals;

    132.  Calls on the Commission to put forward practical arrangements for cooperation and genuine negotiations from the outset; points, in particular, to the importance of convening meetings of the three Presidents, as per Article 324 TFEU, wherever they can aid progress, and insists that the Commission follow up when Parliament requests such meetings; reminds the Commission of its obligation to provide information to Parliament on an equal footing with the Council as the two arms of the budgetary authority and as co-legislators on MFF-related basic acts;

    133.  Recalls that the IIA specifically provides for Parliament, the Council and the Commission to ‘seek to determine specific arrangements for cooperation and dialogue’; stresses that the cooperation provisions set out in the IIA, including regular meetings between Parliament and the Council, are a bare minimum and that much more is needed to give effect to the principle in Article 312(5) TFEU of taking ‘any measure necessary to facilitate the adoption of a new MFF’; calls, therefore, on the successive Council presidencies to respect not only the letter, but also the spirit of the Treaties;

    134.  Recalls that the late adoption of the MFF regulation and related legislation for the 2014-2020 and 2021-2027 periods led to significant delays, which hindered the proper implementation of EU programmes; insists, therefore, that every effort be made to ensure timely adoption of the upcoming MFF package;

    135.  Expects the Commission, as part of the package of MFF proposals, to put forward a new IIA in line with the realities of the new budget, including with respect to the management of contingent liabilities; stresses that the changes to the Financial Regulation necessary for alignment with the new MFF should enter into force at the same time as the MFF Regulation;

    o
    o   o

    136.  Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    (1) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 11, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2093/oj.
    (2) OJ L 424, 15.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2020/2053/oj.
    (3) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 28, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/agree_interinstit/2020/1222/oj.
    (4) OJ L 2024/2509, 26.9.2024, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj.
    (5) OJ L 433I, 22.12.2020, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj.
    (6) OJ C, C/2024/6751, 26.11.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2024/6751/oj.
    (7) OJ C, C/2023/1067, 15.12.2023, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2023/1067/oj.
    (8) OJ C 177, 17.5.2023, p. 115.
    (9) OJ C 445, 29.10.2021, p. 240.
    (10) OJ C 428, 13.12.2017, p. 10.
    (11) OJ C, C/2025/279, 24.1.2025, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/C/2025/279/oj.
    (12) Article 9 of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment, and amending Regulation (EU) 2019/2088 (OJ L 198, 22.6.2020, p. 13, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/852/oj).
    (13) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 October 2022 on a Single Market For Digital Services and amending Directive 2000/31/EC (Digital Services Act) (OJ L 277, 27.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/2065/oj).
    (14) Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act) (OJ L 265, 12.10.2022, p. 1, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/1925/oj).

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: £100bn potential of ‘transformational’ projects in the Highlands and Islands

    Source: Scotland – Highland Council

    Issued by Highlands and Islands Enterprise

    The scale of transformational opportunity facing the Highlands and Islands economy has been quantified for the first time in a new report.

    The study reports 251 planned development projects in the economic pipeline of what it refers to as regional transformational opportunities (RTOs).

    Together they represent a potential total investment value of up to £100.35bn, and could bring around 16,000 jobs at the peak of construction and development, and 18,000 operational jobs by 2040.

    The study was commissioned by Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) in partnership with the Highlands and Islands Regional Economic Partnership (HIREP) and carried out by research specialists ekosgen.

    It will be discussed at the Convention of the Highlands and Islands meeting taking place in Strathpeffer today (Monday 12th May).

    The scale of opportunity is described in the report as ‘unprecedented’ for the Highlands and Islands and possibly even Scotland and much of the UK.

    It has the potential to far exceed previous transformational periods, including even the post-war development of the Highlands’ hydro potential and the main period of the oil and gas exploration era.

    The dual purpose of the study is to better understand the breadth of economic opportunities with the greatest potential to bring transformational change to the region’s economy and society, and to inform planning and decision-making by HIREP partners to maximise benefits.

    Renewable energy projects, including offshore and onshore wind, pumped storage hydro green hydrogen and marine energy account for around three quarters of the total RTO investment value.

    Others relate to space, marine biotech, life sciences, natural capital and critical infrastructure developments such as electricity grid upgrades improvements to ports and harbours and research and creation of innovation facilities.

    Projects are generally well dispersed across the region’s local authority areas. They include clusters of initiatives in Shetland and Orkney, Caithness and Sutherland, Lewis, Argyll and Kintyre, as well as Moray, the Inner Moray Firth and down the Great Glen.

    The RTOs are largely private sector-driven with some public sector co-investment and some investment through Growth Deals.

    The report did not look at growth projects in other industries, such as tourism, food and drink and creative industries, many of which will have significant impact at a more local level. Neither did it feature other public sector investment in the likes of roads, schools and hospitals, all of which is in addition to the RTOs.

    The authors are clear when it comes to highlighting barriers to growth that will need to be overcome, and the study explored what needs to be in place to support delivery of the RTO projects.

    The findings will be used to inform policies and planning around topics such as population attraction and retention, skills, housing provision and transport.

    A collaborative, holistic, and place-based approach is described in the report as ‘critical’ in realising the benefits of the opportunities, and something that ‘must happen at pace’.

    Stuart Black, HIE chief executive, said:

    “It would be difficult to overstate the importance of this research and its implications for the role that this region has in Scotland’s economic future.

    “We’ve certainly been aware for some time of projects at various stages of development across the region that could transform our economy and communities and significantly enhance Scotland’s economy. This report quantifies the impacts of those projects in a way we’ve not been able to do so far. The Highlands and Islands will be the engine room for growth for the Scottish economy in the years ahead.

    “We know there’s a lot to get right. Bringing these projects to fruition means addressing some serious challenges facing the region and a strong commitment to partnership. But the sheer scale of the potential prize from these efforts makes all that very worthwhile and that’s where our focus should be. The report will be crucial in informing decisions around things like planning and investment in order to realise as much of the potential benefits as possible.

    “We must support businesses and communities to ensure these investments leave a long-term legacy. We also need to work together and with businesses, social enterprises and community groups to ensure the benefits are spread across the whole region.”

    Cllr Raymond Bremner, chair of HIREP, said:

    “On behalf of the Highlands and Islands Regional Economic Partnership (HIREP), I welcome this report, which highlights the size and scale of opportunity for our region and the crucial role of local authorities and public sector bodies in fostering sustainable economies. We stand on the brink of a once-in-a-generation opportunity for economic transformation.

    “For the first time, this report quantifies 251 planned development projects, representing up to £100.35 billion in investment. These projects could create around 16,000 jobs during construction and 18,000 operational jobs by 2040. This scale of opportunity is unprecedented for the Highlands and Islands, and possibly for Scotland and the UK.

    “Investing in our workforce is essential, prioritising upskilling and reskilling to meet the demands of a green and inclusive economy, while also focusing on significant sectors such as space, marine biotech, life sciences, and critical infrastructure developments.

    “Addressing the challenges ahead demands an unwavering commitment to collaboration. HIREP will play a pivotal role in uniting partners, aligning efforts, and creating the conditions necessary for inclusive and sustainable growth. By strengthening our existing partnerships and actively engaging with our communities, we can drive meaningful progress, build long-term resilience across the region, increase job opportunities for working people, and enhance the quality of life for our communities .”

    Deputy First Minister Kate Forbes said:

    “The Scottish Government’s Programme for Government 2025 puts a clear focus on attracting investment as a key driver to creating jobs and growing our regional and national economies.

    “The skills, talent and natural resources running across the Highlands and Islands are well known but this report sets out the true scale of the opportunities that lie ahead.

    “The challenge now is to capitalise on this promise. I look forward to working alongside our public and private sector partners to deliver on this enormous potential, creating thousands of top-quality jobs for future generations.”

    Membership of the HIREP includes local authorities, Highlands and Islands Enterprise, Skills Development Scotland, Scottish Funding Council, UHI, NatureScot, VisitScotland, Bòrd na Gàidhlig, HITRANS, Cairngorms National Park Authority, the Crofting Commission, business representatives and third sector organisations.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: CE leads delegation to continue visit to Qatar

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    CE leads delegation to continue visit to Qatar 
    In the morning, Mr Lee met with the Minister of Labour of Qatar, Dr Ali bin Saeed bin Samikh Al Marri, to discuss plans on enhancing talent exchanges between Hong Kong and Qatar, with a view to promoting cultural exchanges and communication between the two places. Noting that Hong Kong is home to five of the world’s top 100 universities and is actively developing into an international hub for post-secondary education, Mr Lee highlighted that Hong Kong offers a Belt and Road Scholarship to encourage students from Belt and Road countries or regions to pursue post-secondary studies in the city. This initiative aims to attract more outstanding non-local students and talent to Hong Kong. He welcomed more young people of Qatar to study and develop their careers in Hong Kong.
     
    After that, Mr Lee and the delegation attended a roundtable meeting with representatives of the Qatari Businessmen Association and the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry respectively. Highlighting Hong Kong’s robust legal system, resilient financial system and simple and low tax regime, Mr Lee welcomed Qatari enterprises to capitalise on Hong Kong’s advantages in connecting with both the Mainland and the world under the “one country, two systems” principle. Qatari enterprises can also leverage Hong Kong’s high-quality financial, logistics and professional services, as well as its bridging roles to assist enterprises in going global and attracting external investment, tapping into business opportunities on the Mainland market.
     
    In the afternoon, Mr Lee attended a business luncheon co-hosted by the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Dubai and the Hong Kong Trade Development Council. Addressing the luncheon, Mr Lee introduced Hong Kong’s development opportunities and business advantages to over 300 local political and business representatives. Noting that the Middle East is a key region under the Belt and Road Initiative, Mr Lee said this marks his second visit to the Middle East since taking office, and that he was very pleased to see the continuous strengthening of ties and co-operation between Hong Kong and the region. Pointing out that Qatar is Hong Kong’s third-largest trading partner in the Middle East region, Mr Lee announced that Hong Kong and Qatar had substantially concluded negotiations on the Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, and would begin discussions on mutual recognition arrangements for their respective Authorized Economic Operator Programmes, creating a more favourable environment for flows of capital and goods. He also announced a new arrangement allowing Hong Kong Special Administrative Region passport holders to visit Qatar visa-free for up to 30 days. He said he looks forward to further deepening co-operation with Qatar in such areas as economy and trade, tourism, and culture. He said that Hong Kong and Mainland enterprises complement each other’s strengths, and that Hong Kong will continue to play its bridging role to serve enterprises in going global and attracting external investment, with a view to deepening international exchanges and co-operation. Hong Kong and Qatar can jointly seize the significant development opportunities brought by the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area and the Belt and Road Initiative.
     
    During the luncheon, government departments, enterprises, and institutions from Hong Kong, the Mainland and Qatar exchanged and announced 35 MOUs and co-operation agreements covering economic co-operation, investment, technology, legal collaboration, as well as finance, banking, and capital market development. In addition to the co-operation between Hong Kong and Qatar, two agreements were signed directly between Mainland and Qatari enterprises to foster co-operation in financial services and high-end manufacturing. Furthermore, a tripartite agreement was signed among Hong Kong, the Mainland, and Qatar to strengthen co-operation in fintech, covering Web3 and AI, leveraging the respective technological strengths of each region for mutual development.
     
    Afterwards, Mr Lee visited Hamad International Airport in Doha to learn about the operation and effectiveness of its autonomous vehicle pilot project and to examine the application of autonomous buses. The pilot project, which had participation by a Chinese enterprise, UISEE, set a precedent for applying autonomous driving technology at airports in the Middle East region. UISEE is one of the leading companies in autonomous driving technology on the Mainland, having established its international headquarters in Hong Kong as a springboard to expand its business globally. The company collaborated with Hong Kong International Airport on autonomous vehicle projects to enhance the safety and operational efficiency of airport logistics, drawing on the successful experiences to promote the technology to the international market. Hamad International Airport, which is the latest pilot site of UISEE, demonstrated the co-operation among Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Qatar.
     
    Mr Lee and the delegation will depart for Kuwait tonight.
     
    Issued at HKT 23:58

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Alberta is set for a championship season

    Alberta is renowned as a premier destination for major sporting events, and the province is continuing to build upon this legacy by welcoming seven national and five international sporting events over the next three months. Together, these 12 events will bring thousands of athletes, coaches and fans to Alberta, showcasing the province’s warm hospitality, world-class facilities and stunning landscapes to the world.

    Alberta’s government has committed more than $1.2 million in Major Sport Event grant funding to help bring these elite competitions to the province. Each event will inject millions into the local economies of their host communities, as visitors support businesses in the region with dining, shopping, entertainment and accommodation bookings.

    “Twelve major sport events. Hundreds of thousands of fans. Endless Alberta pride. Hosting major sporting events in our province is about more than the competition — it’s about building on our province’s reputation as a premier destination, providing opportunities for local athletes and driving economic growth. I am thrilled to welcome these events to our province, and I encourage everyone to be a part of the excitement. Best of luck to all our Alberta athletes!”

    Joseph Schow, Minister of Tourism and Sport

    Spanning communities across Alberta and featuring diverse disciplines, from women’s hockey and judo to mountain biking and shooting, these 12 major sporting events highlight the province’s diversity and vibrancy. They also inspire the next generation of Alberta athletes by giving them a front-row seat to athletic excellence and a chance for homegrown athletes compete in front of a hometown crowd.

    “Explore Edmonton is pleased to see this provincial investment in major sporting events in Edmonton. The events are great ways to showcase Edmonton’s vibrancy, celebrate athletic talent and gather community. Major sporting events are an economic driver that demonstrate the incredible impact of the visitor economy, drawing people to Edmonton who support our hotels, restaurants, cultural experiences and attractions.”

    Traci Bednard, CEO, Explore Edmonton

    The 2025 Volleyball Canada Youth National Championships are taking place in Edmonton with support from the Major Sport Event Program. From May 9-25, the EXPO Centre will welcome over 40,000 athletes, coaches, referees and spectators as more than 1,500 teams compete for the title. These championships alone are expected to inject $53 million into the province’s economy. Other events supported through the Major Sport Event program include the 2025 Esso Cup, which wrapped up with an Edmonton Junior Oilers victory in Lloydminster, as well as the 2025 Open National Judo Championships happening in Calgary later this week.

    “We’re thrilled to bring the Youth National Championships back to Edmonton. This event not only showcases top volleyball talent but delivers a major boost to Alberta’s sport tourism sector — energizing the local economy and spotlighting the province as a premier destination for major events.”

    Sandra de Graaff, director of domestic competitions, Volleyball Canada

    “Having the opportunity to compete in my own city, with friends and family there to support me, means everything. It pushes me to be my best and persevere through the tough times. It also allows me to celebrate the wins with those who helped me get here. It’s a feeling like no other, and I’m truly grateful to the Government of Alberta for making it possible.”

    Carter Shank, athlete in volleyball Youth Nationals

    Alberta’s Major Sport Event grant program provides up to $250,000 to eligible sport events to help with costs associated with hosting national and international competitions, including facility rentals, venue enhancements, promotional and marketing campaigns, and more. More funding for world-class sport events will be announced in the coming months.

    Quick facts

    • International and national sport events funded this intake:
      • 2025 Esso Cup (hockey) – April 20-26 – Lloydminster
      • 2025 Volleyball Canada Youth National Championships – May 9-25 – Edmonton
      • 2025 Open National Championships (judo) – May 15-18 – Calgary
      • 2025 Canmore Canada Cup (mountain biking) – June 11-14 – Canmore
      • World Athletics Silver Continental Tour (Edmonton Athletics Invitational) – June 13-14 – Edmonton
      • North American Cup Series (climbing) – June 20-22 – Edmonton
      • 2025 Speedo Junior Elite National Championships (diving) – July 17-21 – Edmonton
      • 2025 U18 Women’s Football National Championship – July 17-26 – Calgary
      • FIBA 3×3 Women’s Series (basketball) – July 25-27 – Edmonton
      • FIBA 3×3 World Tour (basketball) – July 25-27 – Edmonton
      • 2025 IPSC Canadian Handgun Nationals – July 28-Aug. 3 – Taber
      • IWWF Under 21 World Waterski Championships – July 31-Aug. 3 – Foothills

    Related information

    • Major Sport Event Grant Program
    • 2025 Volleyball Canada Youth National Championships
    • For media interested in attending the Volleyball Canada Youth National Championships Media Day at noon on May 19, contact Mezi Tamrat at [email protected] for more information.

    Related news

    • She shoots, she scores! (April 17, 2025)
    • Alberta scores big with major sport events (Feb. 18, 2025)

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: KZN welcomes Global delegates to G20 tourism meeting

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    KwaZulu-Natal Premier Thamsanqa Ntuli, has expressed pride in the province’s role in shaping international tourism discourse, as the second G20 Tourism Working Group (TWG) meeting kicks off in Durban.

    Welcoming the international delegates attending the second G20 Tourism Working Group meeting on Sunday, Ntuli highlighted KwaZulu-Natal’s diverse offerings, from cultural heritage and natural beauty to world class hospitality, and innovation, as pillars of its appeal for global tourism partnerships and investment.

    “This is more than a meeting. It is a statement that KwaZulu-Natal is ready to lead, connect, and contribute on the global stage. We are honoured to host the world’s tourism leaders and share our vision for a sustainable tourism economy that creates jobs, drives growth, and uplifts communities,” Ntuli said.

    The Second G20 Tourism Working Group (TWG) meeting is taking place at the Coastlands Hotel, from 11 to 13 May 2025.

    The high-level gathering brings together policymakers, tourism experts, and industry leaders from G20 member countries, to discuss collaborative strategies for inclusive and sustainable tourism development.

    The meeting also forms part of South Africa’s broader G20 chairship programme, positioning both the country and the province as influential players in shaping the future of global tourism.

    Ntuli reaffirmed the province’s commitment to supporting national development priorities and emphasised the importance of using international platforms to boost local economic development.

    Upon arrival, delegates were welcomed with the warm spirit of ubuntu and a vibrant showcase of KwaZulu-Natal’s rich cultural diversity y that defines the region.

    The Durban meeting follows the first virtual TWG engagement held in March 2025, where the G20 member states agreed on four strategic priorities that will inform the G20 action plan on tourism development.

    These include a people-centred artificial intelligence (AI) and innovation to enhance travel and tourism start-ups and SMMEs [Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises]; enhancing tourism financing and investment to enhance equality and promote sustainable development; strengthening air connectivity for seamless travel; and building an enhanced resilience for inclusive, sustainable tourism development. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: F.E. McWilliam Gallery & Studio to remain open as major expansion gets underway

    Source: Northern Ireland City of Armagh

    Lord Mayor of Armagh City, Banbridge and Craigavon, Councillor Sarah Duffy, joins Gallery Curator and Manager Dr Riann Coulter and Council Chief Executive Roger Wilson to mark the start of the F.E. McWilliam Gallery’s multi-million pound expansion.

    Construction work on a major multi-million pound expansion and upgrade of the F.E. McWilliam Gallery & Studio in Banbridge will commence today (Monday 12th May). The award-winning accredited museum will continue to host exhibitions and remain open and accessible to the public throughout much of the 15-month contract period.

    Armagh City, Banbridge and Craigavon Borough Council has appointed McKelvey Construction Ltd to bring this large-scale capital project to fruition and transform this facility so that it can further capitalise on its A1 location and expand its role as a cultural hub attracting significantly more local, national and international visitors.

    Opened in 2008 to celebrate the life and work of Banbridge-born, internationally renowned sculptor Frederick Edward McWilliam, the gallery has established a reputation as one of the best regional arts museums in the UK and Ireland. Recognised for its high-quality exhibitions, inclusive education programmes and excellent customer service, the venue has outgrown its current facilities with visitor numbers now surpassing 50,000 a year.

    The development, designed by Belfast-based Hall Black Douglas Architects, has been driven by an ambition to transform the experience of visiting F.E. McWilliam Gallery and to offer a suite of modern facilities that ensure the museum along with its collection are more accessible to more people and meet the needs of the wider community.

    Welcoming the start of construction work, Lord Mayor Councillor Sarah Duffy said:

    “Getting this once-in-a-generation project off the ground is a major feat. I applaud everyone involved in the planning and design process for helping us reach this significant milestone. 

    “This redevelopment is a testament to the gallery’s emergence as a nationally significant cultural destination. We are proud to be building upon McWilliam’s legacy and leading the way with this arts and culture investment.

    Our vision is to create a stunning and dynamic museum for displaying more of McWilliam’s work as well as showcasing both established and emerging artists.

    “Due to complete in autumn 2026, this project will significantly increase visitor capacity and further the gallery’s ability to serve as a thriving hub for artistic expression, learning and engagement as well as a much-enhanced space encouraging connection, providing inspiration and enhancing the wellbeing of all who walk through its doors.

    “The expanded and upgraded gallery will be a major gateway for boosting tourism across the wider region. I look forward to seeing this project become a reality and yielding positive benefits for local people for generations to come.”

    The programme of works will double the size of the facility and introduce a swathe of improvements.

    A new climate-controlled collection gallery will allow an increased number of artworks to be taken out of storage and put on permanent display, making more of F.E. McWilliam’s work accessible to the public and ensuring the collection’s long-term preservation.

    The provision of a large, well-resourced education and community space will help meet demand from schools and other education providers, increase engagement with community groups and create opportunities for the gallery to host workshops, classes and events that are currently limited due to lack of space.

    The popular craft shop will double in size, providing a platform for craftspeople and artisans from the borough and beyond to showcase their work.

    The car park will be reconfigured to provide a turning point and parking bay for coaches and buses, enabling the facility to cater for large school groups and visiting coach trips. EV charging points will also be installed.

    Two multi-purpose meeting rooms will be created, allowing the gallery to expand its programme of events and activities. These rooms will be available for hire by arts and community groups as well as businesses.

    The extended reception area will incorporate a Banbridge Visitor Information office. Additional seating capacity will be provided within the popular Quails café. More toilets and a Changing Places facility will also be provided.

    The new building has been designed to be more energy efficient and sustainable, and provision will also be made to increase storage space and improve staff accommodation.

    Gallery Curator and Manager Dr Riann Coulter added: We are delighted that the gallery, including its popular Quails café, will continue to welcome visitors over the summer months and beyond as this project progresses with minimal disruption expected.

    “The expansion and upgrade of this distinctive building will enable us to realise our ambitions and increase the scope and impact of our arts and education programmes, championing the importance of art, culture, and public space that is free to all.

    “We are committed to elevating the visitor experience and making the museum more open, engaging, accessible and inviting to new and diverse audiences.

    “The F.E. McWilliam Gallery & Studio is set to become the jewel in the crown of our region’s rich cultural offering. We are grateful to our funders for their incredible support.”

    This project is one of ten key infrastructure projects across Northern Ireland to receive substantial funding from the UK Government’s Levelling Up Fund.

    The Council has also secured funding from the Wolfson Foundation to fit out the new collection gallery and improve interpretation through multi-lingual video guides and accessible tours of the F.E. McWilliam collection in both British and Irish Sign Language.

    For further information and regular updates on this project, visit www.armaghbanbridgecraigavon.gov.uk/femcwilliam

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI China: Nurturing overall cooperation between China, Latin America

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    An aerial drone photo taken on March 12, 2024 shows the BYD battery factory in Manaus, capital of Amazonas state, Brazil. [Xinhua]

    Invoked by the 18th-century English writer Samuel Johnson, the phrase “From China to Peru” once conjured images of distant lands bound only by imagination. Today, it sketches a far more concrete arc — marked by shipping lanes, megaports and logistics corridors — linking China and Latin America across the Pacific.

    This transformation has gathered pace over the past decade, thanks in large part to the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum, a cooperative mechanism launched under the aegis of Chinese President Xi Jinping. What Xi once described as “a young seedling” has since taken firm root.

    Ten years on, this mechanism has matured into a key platform for South-South collaboration that has drawn China and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) into a closer partnership across political, economic, cultural and other domains.

    The forum’s fourth ministerial meeting is set to take place on Tuesday in Beijing. Xi will address its opening ceremony and unveil new initiatives and measures to promote closer ties.

    Qiu Xiaoqi, the Chinese government’s special representative for Latin American affairs, said the upcoming meeting is expected to deliver a message of peace, development and cooperation amid global turbulence, charting a new chapter in China-LAC relations.

    TOP-LEVEL DESIGN

    China and countries in Latin America and the Caribbean are fellow developing nations that hold common political aspirations, face similar development tasks, and can benefit from complementary economic strengths.

    Spanning one-fifth of the world’s land area and accounting for a quarter of the global population and economy, China and the LAC combined represent one of the most dynamic and promising regions on the planet.

    “Our shared aspiration for independence, development and rejuvenation has brought us closer together,” Xi said.

    Since the turn of the century, ties between the two sides have grown rapidly. Both sides realized they needed something more than the traditional one-on-one tango — a broader framework for cooperation.

    During the CELAC summit in Cuba in early 2014, Latin American and Caribbean leaders expressed support for such a framework. Xi welcomed the move, saying that “the time is ripe.”

    In July 2014, Xi flew half the globe for his second visit to the region as head of state. He was heading for a BRICS summit in Brazil, state visits to some countries in the region, and a historic moment — the first meeting between leaders of China and Latin America and the Caribbean.

    In the Brazilian capital Brasilia, the leaders announced the establishment of the China-CELAC Forum, an institutional framework to advance the vision of building a China-LAC community with a shared future.

    At the meeting, Xi laid out the guiding principles for this comprehensive cooperative partnership — equality, mutual benefit and common development. Backing his proposal was a roadmap driven by trade, investment and finance.

    Six months later, the inaugural ministerial meeting of the forum was held in Beijing, turning the vision of an overall cooperation platform covering China and all 33 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean into reality.

    Observers said this marked a new phase of China-LAC ties, where China’s cooperation with the region as a whole complements and strengthens its bilateral relations with individual regional countries.

    Xi proposed principles for the forum’s growth — equal partnership, shared wins, flexibility and pragmatism, and openness and inclusivity.

    Comparing it to a seedling just breaking through the soil, he said that “the forum needs the dedication and cultivation of both sides for it to grow bigger and stronger.”

    In the decade that has followed, Xi has provided consistent support to nurture this forum. At each of the three previous ministerial meetings, he offered clear guidance that helped shape the forum’s development at key moments in its evolution.

    Under the guidance of Xi and his Latin American and Caribbean counterparts, the forum now hosts a constellation of institutional interactions such as ministerial meetings, dialogues among foreign ministers, coordinators’ meetings, and a growing number of specialized sub-forums ranging from digital technology to poverty reduction.

    Chai Yu, director of the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said Xi has led by example in advancing the forum’s development, which is key to deepening political trust and building consensus on cooperation.

    COMMON DEVELOPMENT

    Chancay, a modest city on the Peruvian coast, has been transformed into a megaport equipped with towering cranes and unmanned trucks.

    Last November, Xi and his Peruvian counterpart Dina Boluarte inaugurated the port via video link from the capital Lima, marking the launch of South America’s first smart port.

    Built in just three years through Chinese-Peruvian collaboration, the port shortens the shipping time across the Pacific by nearly one-third, reduces logistics costs by 20 percent, and is expected to create over 8,000 direct jobs.

    Boluarte lauded the project as a bold stride toward “deeper integration and shared prosperity with China” and “a gateway opening Latin America to the vibrant promise of the Asia-Pacific.”

    Chancay’s story is the latest episode in the booming cooperation under the China-CELAC Forum. Across the region, more than 200 Chinese infrastructure projects have been launched — generating over 1 million jobs.

    In Brazil, an ultra-high-voltage transmission project has overcome challenges in delivering clean hydropower over vast distances from the Amazon. In Jamaica, a Chinese-built highway has cut cross-island travel time by more than half, while in Bolivia, satellite collaboration has enabled free television access for half a million households.

    Visitors learn about coffee beans at the booth of Honduras at the 6th China International Import Expo (CIIE) in east China’s Shanghai, Nov. 6, 2023. [Xinhua]

    Numbers tell a compelling story. Trade between China and the region reached 518.4 billion U.S. dollars in 2024, doubling the figure recorded a decade ago. By 2023, Chinese investment in the region had exceeded 600 billion dollars. These figures have exceeded the goals announced by Xi when he and Latin American and Caribbean leaders met in 2014 to plan for closer cooperation.

    As the second-largest trading partner of Latin America and the Caribbean, China now has more free trade agreements in the region than anywhere outside Asia.

    One such deal with Chile has turned premium cherries into a symbol of thriving cross-Pacific commerce. In 2024, Chile’s cherry exports surged 51.4 percent to 3.57 billion dollars — with over 90 percent going to China.

    “The Chinese market has created a positive ripple effect in Chile, generating jobs across the supply chain, from harvesting to packaging,” said Hernan Garces Gazmuri, a Chilean cherry producer who moved his family to Shanghai for greater business opportunities.

    As Pavel Aleman, a Cuban scholar from the University of Havana, pointed out, China-LAC cooperation is mutually beneficial in essence, with China’s economic vitality fueling Latin America’s development, while the region plays a vital role in supporting China’s continued growth.

    “Deeper cooperation between the two sides can help offset the impact of tariff barriers and effectively counter global risks,” he said.

    Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has brought China into closer partnership with countries across the vast Pacific. To date, more than 20 countries in the region have joined the Belt and Road cooperation framework, and 10 countries have signed cooperation plans with China under the initiative.

    Xi once described Latin America as a natural extension of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road — an essential pillar of the BRI. He emphasized China’s commitment to strengthening cooperation with the region, aligning development strategies and promoting shared growth.

    “As we roll out the blueprint for the BRI, we strive to forge a route of cooperation across the Pacific, in order to draw closer the two lands of abundance of China and Latin America and the Caribbean,” Xi said in his congratulatory message to the second ministerial meeting of the China-CELAC Forum.

    Beyond trade and investment, collaboration between China and this region has also deepened in the fields of science, technology and environmental protection. China has supported joint Earth-resource satellite programs with Brazil, contributing to efforts aimed at curbing deforestation and preserving biodiversity in the Amazon.

    Xi said China and Latin America and the Caribbean should promote joint development to contribute to strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth of the global economy.

    HEART-TO-HEART CONNECTIONS

    Xi has long believed that strong state-to-state relations are built on people-to-people connections. Over his six trips to the region as head of state, he made a point of engaging with everyday people despite tight schedules.

    In Costa Rica, Xi visited the home of a coffee grower who showed him around his house and plantation. Over a cup of coffee, Xi chatted with the family and shared that he, too, had rural beginnings — having spent years working the land in his youth.

    A girl learns Chinese calligraphy at the 4th edition of the Chinese New Year cultural festival at the National Arts Center in Mexico City, capital of Mexico, Jan. 25, 2025. [Xinhua]

    His engagement has ignited vibrant people-to-people exchanges, with cultural festivals, youth projects and journalist initiatives flourishing under the China-CELAC Forum.

    To date, China has provided the region with 17,000 government scholarships and 13,000 training opportunities. It has signed 26 educational cooperation agreements or memoranda of understanding with 19 countries and established 68 Confucius Institutes or Confucius Classrooms in the region.

    Connections between China and the region have also been strengthened through practical measures — such as the launch of new direct air routes and the inclusion of more Latin American countries in China’s 240-hour visa-free transit program.

    As many countries in the region now officially celebrate the Chinese New Year, a growing number of Chinese travelers have headed to Latin America in recent years — some for business, others as tourists drawn by the region’s stunning landscapes and rich cultural diversity.

    These efforts have brought China and the region closer than ever, said Qiu, the Chinese government’s special representative for Latin American affairs.

    Both China and Latin America are home to ancient histories and flourishing civilizations. For Xi, civilizations grow richer and more colorful through exchanges and mutual learning.

    In 2013, at Mexico’s Chichen Itza, Xi explored ancient Maya ruins with archaeologist Jose Huchim Herrera. Amid stepped pyramids and temples, he inquired about the features of the ruins, such as the meaning of carved reliefs.

    His questions revealed a deep curiosity about the host civilization, said Huchim Herrera.

    In a signed article published last November ahead of his visit to Peru, Xi highlighted a cultural connection by pointing out the resemblance between the Incan gold masks unearthed in Peru and those discovered at the Sanxingdui archaeological site in southwest China’s Sichuan Province.

    That same month, a joint exhibition in the ancient city of Cusco showcased dazzling gold artifacts, bronze statues, jade treasures and wooden relics from Sichuan’s Sanxingdui and Jinsha sites, captivating nearly 10,000 Peruvian visitors.

    Daniel Grimaldi, executive director of the think tank Chile 21, praised exchanges between Chinese and Latin American civilizations for opening new channels of communication. Such interactions, he said, strengthen ties through mutual respect and open dialogue, while supporting both sides on their shared journey toward modernization.

    As Xi has said, in a globalization and information age, the Pacific is no barrier but rather a bond and a bridge. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Governments shouldn’t chase growth at all costs. The harms of over tourism show why

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Ilaria Pappalepore, Reader in Tourism and Events, University of Westminster

    Amsterdam hit its self-imposed limit of 20 million overnight stays in 2023. 4kclips/Shutterstock

    In the controversial case of expansion at Heathrow airport, the UK government insists that the benefits of economic growth outweigh the environmental and wellbeing costs. But what if focusing on prosperity is a shortsighted approach? The debate about a third runway, placed in the context of exponential growth in travel and tourism, makes the impact on people and the environment clear to see.

    Tourism accounts for an estimated 8% of global CO2 emissions, and emissions related to tourism will continue to grow despite technological advances. The Heathrow expansion, for example, has been shown to be incompatible with net-zero requirements.

    Meanwhile, many tourism destinations are struggling to cope with growing numbers of visitors. Residents have protested at the impact of overtourism on their quality of life, with harms including overcrowding, loss of amenities for residents and a skewed property market.

    London’s airport development plans (expansion is also mooted at Gatwick and Luton) aim to inject investment into a range of sectors beyond tourism. However, our research suggests that aligning tourism with other sectors and better cooperation of decision-making at different levels of government could lead to increased wellbeing, a healthier environment and greater benefits to the local economy.

    This provides options to rethink what tourism could look like when the focus is not just economic growth.

    It should be possible to look at new models that take a holistic approach to tourism development. This means putting the wellbeing of the community and the environment first. Falling under the umbrella term of “post-growth”, there are various approaches that all rethink the role of economic growth. They advocate prioritising human wellbeing within planetary boundaries.

    “Degrowth” argues that limiting growth is essential for a sustainable future. On the other hand, “doughnut economics” and regenerative approaches are more agnostic about economic growth. They argue that human prosperity and wellbeing should be prioritised regardless of whether GDP is going up or down.

    In the context of tourism and travel, these approaches provide a different perspective on the role of the sector and what it can bring to a place, beyond economic growth.

    They also go further than most strategies being implemented in popular tourist cities to prioritise residents’ wellbeing, quality of life, and lower-carbon travel.

    Taking the heat off tourist hotspots

    As part of a net-zero emission pledge, and in an attempt to curb overtourism and the frustration of locals, some cities across Europe are enforcing restrictions on cruise ships. And Greece is applying a climate resilience tax on top of the tourism tax on all overnight stays.

    One of the cities that has done the most to curb tourism is Amsterdam. After the start of the COVID pandemic, it adopted a citizen initiative to cap tourism at 20 million overnight stays per year.

    This number was reached in 2023, and the city has put forward a wide range of measures since then. These include a tourist tax rate of 12.5%, strict rules on short-term rentals, limits on visitor numbers at large attractions and reducing the number of cruises. The city has also strengthened its environmental regulations.

    Copenhagen, on the other hand, chooses not to restrict tourism. Rather, it now rewards visitors who engage in climate-friendly actions, with the “CopenPay” pilot project. Visitors who choose to cycle, use public transport or participate in volunteering are eligible for discounts or free access to 24 attractions.

    Visitors to Greece pay a climate charge as well as a tourist tax.
    ecstk22/Shutterstock

    While these initiatives are laudable, there are two reasons why they don’t go far enough.

    The first is that the majority of the measures are based on financial disincentives, such as charging entrance fees to destinations and taxing the most polluting transport. They rest on the assumption that we do not need to address the underlying pursuit of growth that led to this unsustainability.

    Likewise, arguments in favour of green growth are based on technological advances, such as sustainable aviation fuel (SAF). This underpins claims that air travel can continue to grow. However, both within and beyond the travel sector, it has been argued that green growth is a myth.




    Read more:
    There isn’t enough ‘sustainable’ aviation fuel to make a dent in our emissions – and there won’t be for years


    In the long run, these measures do not cut the ever-growing number of travellers. Nor do they effectively address climate issues.

    Second, cities need support from higher levels of government if they want to encourage travel that is more environmentally friendly and contributes to the wellbeing of residents. In the case of Amsterdam, the ongoing expansion of Schiphol airport can be linked to overtourism, as well as noise and air pollution.

    City leaders want to cut the maximum number of flights. But they cannot do much as long as economic growth is the focus of the Dutch government’s plans.

    This highlights the deep complexities of controlling visitor numbers. And it also suggests that the economic benefits that come with the growth of London’s airports may come with societal and environmental costs. These will be felt by London and its residents, and cannot be solved with local policies.

    Rather than going further and faster with growth, when it comes to travel and tourism we may need to go “closer by and slower”.

    That might mean placing greater emphasis on promoting destinations to nearby markets, investment in low-carbon travel options and regenerative tourism activities. A post-growth approach should ensure that the economic benefits do not outweigh long-term ecological and societal growth. After all, these are the things we all need for a resilient society.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Governments shouldn’t chase growth at all costs. The harms of over tourism show why – https://theconversation.com/governments-shouldnt-chase-growth-at-all-costs-the-harms-of-over-tourism-show-why-255038

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Global: Fifty years ago, Junko Tabei became the first woman to summit Everest – why do so few people know her story?

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Jenny Hall, Associate Professor in Tourism and Events, York St John University

    It was May 4 1975. The Japanese Women’s Everest Expedition team had been living at a high altitude for six weeks, and were less than a week away from their scheduled bid for the summit of Mount Everest. Exhausted, having established camp five at just below 8,000m on the south side of the mountain, Junko Tabei and the team descended to camp two at 6,300m to rest.

    Then – avalanche!

    In the early hours, tons of ice and snow engulfed the camp, burying several of the teammates. Crushed by the snow and ice, Tabei was unable to move. It took the strength of four Sherpas, the elite Nepali climbing guides assisting the expedition, to pull her out. Suffering severe bruising, Tabei argued that she did not need to be returned to base camp to recover, and would remain at camp two.

    “There was no way I was leaving the mountain,” she later recalled in her memoir.

    It had taken five years for this group – the first all-women team – to get to Everest. The pressure on them to succeed was immense, given the limited number of annual international permits to climb Mount Everest issued by the Nepalese government. If they gave up, they might have to wait several years to make another attempt.

    Meanwhile, on the Tibetan side of the mountain, Tabei’s team had competition. A 200-strong Chinese team was also working to place a woman on the summit at the same time.

    From the late 1950s, Tibetan women were recruited to participate in state-sponsored Chinese mountaineering expeditions. In 1958, Pan Duo had been selected to participate in the successful Chinese 1960 Everest expedition – but was ordered to remain below 6,400 metres because above that height was “a man’s world”. Nonetheless, Pan Duo – referred to as “Mrs Phanthog” in some older accounts – was celebrated in her country and elected deputy captain of the 1975 Chinese Everest Expedition.

    Unfortunately, the Chinese team suffered a climbing accident resulting in the death of a team member. They retreated to recover – only to be ordered by the Chinese government to “climb ahead of the Japanese women”.

    They were too late. On May 16 1975, the all-women Japanese expedition worked together to place Tabei on the summit of Everest. Two team members – Tabei and Yuriko Watanabe – had been nominated to make the summit attempt. However, other teammates were suffering from altitude sickness, so Watanabe was assigned to help return them to camp two.

    The ascent Tabei was making was arduous. Given her injuries, it took great tenacity to muster the strength to continue. But finally, she took her last steps to the summit, becoming the first woman and 40th person, according to the latest official record, to summit the peak. She was part of only the tenth successful Everest expedition, later recalling:

    I felt pure joy as my thoughts registered: ‘Here is the summit. I don’t have to climb any more.’

    Eleven days later, the Chinese team returned to the high slopes to make another attempt. Using minimal oxygen, Pan Duo was also successful, becoming the second woman to summit Everest – and the first to climb the harder northern side of the mountain.

    Prior to these two successful expeditions, only 38 people had summited Everest – all of them men. News of Tabei’s feat travelled fast across Asia, leading to national celebrations in Japan, Nepal and India. But it made little impact in the west.

    In my own career as both a mountaineer and researcher of adventure tourism, I had been struck by how few women I encountered on the mountainside. I wanted to understand why this might be, and what women had achieved. It was through this research that I discovered Tabei’s story.

    I was astonished both by her achievements – she is also the first woman to complete the “Seven Summits”, climbing the highest peaks on every continent – and by how few prominent mountaineering organisations and mountaineers appeared to know about her.

    Tabei’s bravery helped her lead record-setting all-women expeditions and overcome the mountain of sexism in this male-dominated space. Yet very few organisations, even in Japan, have thought to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the first ascent of Everest by a woman.

    Breaking the mould

    Historically, men have dominated the public record in mountaineering. In the last few years, the 70th anniversary of the first summit of Everest in 1953 by Sir Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay has been marked, along with the centenary of the unsuccessful and fatal attempt by George Mallory and Andrew Irvine in 1924.

    During that period, women were excluded from many mountaineering clubs. When they did join, they often faced prejudice, were discouraged and sometimes not permitted to publish records of their adventures. In 1975, women were finally admitted to the Alpine Club, the first and one of the most prestigious climbing institutions.

    At a time when Japanese women were expected to remain at home, many members of the Japanese Women’s Everest Expedition, including Tabei, were working, with two of them also raising children. Tabei’s daughter, Noriko, was three at the time of her Everest summit. Tabei later revealed that the expedition encountered significant resistance:

    Most of the men in the alpine community opposed our plan, claiming it would be impossible for a women-only expedition to reach Everest.

    As a married woman and the assistant expedition leader, Tabei felt torn between motherhood and mountaineering, explaining: “Although I would never forfeit Everest, I felt pulled in the two directions of mountains and motherhood.”

    Facing unsympathetic attitudes from team members when childcare conflicts arose, Tabei realised she needed to put in extra effort to prove herself as a leader.


    The Insights section is committed to high-quality longform journalism. Our editors work with academics from many different backgrounds who are tackling a wide range of societal and scientific challenges.


    Years before the Everest expedition, Tabei and other Japanese women were already logging major climbing achievements across the globe. These included the first ascent of the north face of the Matterhorn by an all-women’s team in 1967, and the first all-women’s Japanese expedition to the Himalayas in 1970 to climb Annapurna III. Tabei was both the first woman and Japanese person to ascend the peak.

    This set the scene for the Japanese Women’s Everest Expedition. To locate and train suitable candidates for the expedition, Tabei helped establish the Joshi-Tohan Japanese Ladies Climbing Club, founded on the slogan: “Let’s go on an overseas expedition by ourselves.”

    Tabei’s contribution to women’s high-altitude mountaineering was astounding. To reach Everest, she defied mid-20th-century social norms that tied Japanese women to domestic roles, later musing: “I tried to picture myself as a traditional Japanese wife who followed her husband. The idea never sat well with me.”

    Throughout her career, Tabei contributed significantly to the emerging culture of women’s climbing and mountaineering expeditions. She felt strongly that climbing with other women was more rewarding because there was greater physical equality.

    In 1992, she became the first woman to ascend the highest peaks on all seven continents. Using her celebrity, Tabei was also an activist for environmental change in high-altitude regions, having grown appalled by the degradation of fragile mountain glaciers that was being caused by the mountaineering industry.

    Film by 4GTV Nepal.

    With her friend and Everest teammate Setsuko Kitamura, Tabei established the first Mount Everest conference in 1995, inviting all 32 women who had by then successfully climbed Everest (not all attended). Under her leadership, this transnational exchange created a space to celebrate women’s mountaineering achievements.

    Soon after her Everest achievement, Tabei had been a symbol of social progress and women’s emancipation at the UN International Women’s Year world conference. Yet her status as one of the greatest high-altitude mountaineers has since faded from the public eye. This has much to do with the stories we tell about man – and it’s almost always a man – vs. nature.

    Telling her own story

    Hillary’s much-lauded autobiography, High Adventure (1955), was published two years after his first successful ascent of Everest. In contrast, it was 42 years after her ascent before Tabei’s memoir, Honouring High Places, was published and translated.

    The way Japanese women’s experiences were represented in the media did not, in Tabei’s view, represent the reality of women’s experiences. She was particularly perplexed by the inability of the press to see beyond her gender. She was repeatedly asked how it felt “as a woman” to climb at high altitudes.

    Portrayals of Tabei focused on her stature as a small Japanese woman. This only reinforced the perception that women like her did not fit the norm of the heroic white, male mountaineer. She reflected:

    When people meet me for the first time, they are surprised by my size. They expect me to be bigger than I am, more strapping, robust, like a wrestler … I was always puzzled by this, by people’s obsession with the physical appearance of a mountaineer.

    Tabei’s memoir.
    (Rocky Mountain Books)

    To counter this narrative, Tabei brought a new approach to writing about Japanese women mountaineers’ achievements – challenging the tendency of traditional Japanese expedition publications to gloss over the harsh realities of expedition life.

    Critical of the flowery and vain writing style of these reports, Tabei’s frank accounts reported on the “unkinder side of human behaviour”. Making tough choices was particularly difficult for women, she wrote, because of their social conditioning to be a “good person”:

    It was unusual enough to be a female climber in that era of yesteryear, let alone to make a stand in front of your friends that would possibly upset them.

    Transcending these social norms had a personal impact. Tabei lamented that, although “I remained strong-willed about Everest, tears of doubt fell down my cheeks at night”.

    Her honesty was criticised by some in the established mountaineering community in Japan, particularly in her published account, Annapurna: Women’s Battle, which expressed the raw emotions and feelings experienced on their 1970 expedition. Tabei shared “the feelings of the team members when things failed to go in the direction they had envisioned … We put our honest experiences on paper”.

    Reflecting on how she had to overcome social norms to lead the expedition – “In my day, we were strictly advised that being different was abnormal” – Tabei concluded that: “A person must be able to voice her opinion without worrying about criticism.”

    A problem of representation

    Ever since the late 1850s, women have made a significant yet often-hidden contribution to mountaineering. It retains a powerful legacy of male-dominated clubs and governing institutions founded on masculine norms such as risk-taking. This has often cast mountaineering achievements in a way that privileges men.

    Clubs established traditions based on the first ascents of mountains – very few of which were made by women. Their absence from leading mountaineering clubs and lack of representation in published club journals meant their achievements were often attributed to male companions.

    In 1872, the American climber Meta Brevoort felt it best, due to social prejudice, to publish her extraordinary first ascents in the European Alps under the name of her nephew, William A.B. Coolidge. Mountaineer and author David Mazel notes that Brevoort’s account was “carefully written to conceal the author’s sex”.

    Mountain exploration and climbing have traditionally been framed as heroic endeavours dominated by men. Figures such as Hillary, Mallory and Reinhold Messner are celebrated for their bravery, strength and leadership — traits associated with masculinity.

    Early mountaineering narratives often emphasised physical endurance, dominance over nature, and the ability to withstand extreme conditions – reinforcing ideas of masculine heroism. Mountains as towering, imposing and seemingly unconquerable landscapes have been metaphorically linked to power and challenge.

    Traditions that have been passed down through generations – from ascent styles to route names – have also been synonymous with masculinity. In the words of mountaineering historian Walt Unsworth, climbing Everest “is the story of Man’s attempts to climb a very special mountain”.

    This has had real-world consequences for mountaineering. Today, only 6% of British mountain guides are women, while globally, less than 2% of those registered to the International Federation of Mountain Guide Association (IFMGA) are women. If you don’t see your face reflected, it becomes a daunting prospect to imagine yourself in mountaineering – whether as a mountain guide, or an amateur mountaineer like me.

    By 2024, women represented 13% of all Everest summiteers since 1953, yet their stories are seldom told. White, male, able-bodied and middle-class voices dominate representations in published records and popular portrayals of adventure on the world’s highest mountain.

    As anthropologist Sherry B. Ortner attests, this is not surprising given mountaineering’s history as a western imperialist and colonising project that aimed to conquer nations and nature, built upon all-male institutions. Yet men and women have the same statistical odds of making a successful summit or dying on Everest.

    Julie Rak, in her book False Summit, shows how some accounts can treat women’s achievements with ambivalence, and at worst question their authenticity. It has even been suggested that Tabei was effectively dragged up the mountain by her friend, the male Sherpa Ang Tsering.

    Having suffered significant trauma following the avalanche that nearly wiped out their 1975 expedition, Tabei showed enormous courage and resilience to summit Everest just a few days later. She describes the ascent as difficult – and yes, accepted help from Ang Tsering – but this was her achievement, not a “stunt” to be denied by those who were not even present.

    Diversity on the mountain

    Since Tabei’s Everest summit, mountaineering has undergone changes as a sport, shifting from an elite, exploratory pursuit to a commercialised industry where wealthy clients can hire companies to reach summits with professional support.

    From the late 1980s, high-altitude mountaineering became a valuable tourism commodity. Seizing the opportunity to boost tourism, the Nepalese government began to issue more permits, fuelling the growth of commercial companies offering clients the opportunity to be guided up 8,000-metre summits. In 2023, Nepal welcomed over 150,000 high-altitude trekking and mountaineering visitors, with 47 teams attempting to climb Everest.

    Yet despite the popularity and commercialisation of the sport, mountaineering remains stubbornly resistant to diversity.

    Scholar Jennifer Hargreaves argues that women have been excluded from being represented as the “sporting hero”. What constitutes our cultural identity, meaning and values almost exclusively solidifies heroic masculinity in most forms of sport, including mountaineering.

    And much of this is due to the stories that are – not – told.

    Delphine Moraldo’s research found that of the mountaineering autobiographies published in Britain and Europe from the late 1830s to 2013, only 6% were written by women.

    Historically, literary representations of women mountaineers have often been met with ambivalence, their achievements portrayed as lesser. Women are stereotyped as weaker, bound to domesticity and lacking the hardiness required to be a “good mountaineer”.

    These perceptions, coupled with a lack of representation, have reduced women’s opportunities to secure funding for expeditions, or to access female-specific clothing and equipment. Tabei and her team had to make their own expedition clothing because women’s sizes did not exist, a problem that remains today. When raising sponsorship for Everest, she was told: “Raise your children and keep your family tight, rather than do something like this.”

    But while there is still a mountain to climb when it comes to attaining equality in adventure sports, there is a growing body of research and media celebrating women’s achievements – from campaigns such as Sport England’s This Girl Can to films charting the lives of some women mountaineers.

    A hidden sisterhood

    Junko Tabei and Pan Duo’s names may never be as well known as Edmund Hillary’s. But they are just two of many women whose achievements reach far beyond the peaks. I’ve written about many of them in my research.

    Polish mountaineer Wanda Rutkiewicz was the third woman and first from Europe to summit Everest. When asked in 1979 by high-altitude record holder Maurice Herzog why she had climbed Everest, Rutkiewicz responded that she did it for “women’s liberation”. By the late 1980s, such activism was harnessed by large sponsors such as Tata Steel, who recruited Indian mountaineer Bachendri Pal, the fifth woman to summit Everest, to lead a women’s adventure programme.

    Corporate sponsorship has, however, eluded many leading women mountaineers. Despite all her outstanding achievements – including holding a world-record ten Everest summits by a woman – Lhakpa Sherpa struggled for years to achieve recognition and the status of her male contemporaries. In 2019, writer Megan Mayhew Bergman asked why she didn’t have sponsors.

    More recently, however, Lhakpa Sherpa’s mountaineering career was documented in the 2023 Netflix documentary Mountain Queen, which raised her profile and has led to new sponsorship opportunities.

    Film by Netflix.

    There is also work being done to change the exclusion of women from mountaineering. In Nepal and around the world, charitable organisations have been initiated by women mountaineers to help their fellow women climbers, including Empowering Women Nepal and 3Sisters Adventure Trekking.

    My research has shown how women and mountaineers from other marginalised backgrounds can use their successes to become role models for and drivers of social change.

    Tabei, for example, was appalled at the degradation mountaineering had caused to Mount Everest, and spoke out about the need for responsible mountaineering and conservation. She led cleanup expeditions and researched the environmental impact of tourism and climate change on both mountain ecosystems and local communities.

    Tabei’s efforts helped bring global attention to the need for conservation in high-altitude environments, inspiring climbers to take a more responsible approach to their expeditions.

    In research about Asian women’s contribution to climbing Everest, I examined how the struggle for women’s emancipation, empowerment and recognition is a phenomenon that is shared globally. A new generation of Asian women mountaineers such as Dawa Yangzum Sherpa, the first woman to achieve IFMGA status, and Shailee Basnet are defying gender norms and achieving status as internationally recognised mountaineers and mountaineering guides.

    Basnet became one of ten women to scale Everest in 2008 as part of Sagarmatha Expedition, which was established to draw attention to climate change and gender equality, and to reclaim the Nepali name for the mountain: Sagarmatha. The expedition brought together ten women from six different religious, caste and ethnic backgrounds. All ten reached the summit, making it the most successful women’s expedition to date.

    Following this, in 2014 Basnet led the formation of the first all-women Seven Summits project to climb the highest peak on every continent. Importantly, she harnessed the team’s newfound profile to undertake a large-scale social justice programme, visiting hundreds of schools, leading hikes and giving talks across the Kathmandu Valley. Their mission was to improve educational awareness concerning opportunities for women and girls, and also to protect the environment.

    Tabei on expedition in the Pamir mountains of central Asia, 1985.
    Jaan Künnap via Wikimedia., CC BY-NC-SA

    ‘A life we would never regret’

    Since the mid-1950s, a hidden sisterhood has forged a route for women to access high-altitude mountaineering. Their impact has reached far beyond the expeditions they led.

    Women have used their status as mountaineers to empower and support other women to achieve social, political and environmental justice, and raise awareness about poverty, sex trafficking, religious and ethnic marginalisation, environmental degradation and the impact of mass tourism.

    Junko Tabei was a pioneer whose tenacity helped a whole generation of women in mountaineering. By not recognising their achievements, we deny an important part of our cultural heritage – and miss the opportunity to learn and share the inspirational work that women continue to undertake.

    Tabei’s memoir is not simply a remarkable mountaineering account, it is, in the words of Julie Rak, a feminist text that challenges what society has always thought it means to be heroic, brave and adventurous.

    Tabei died in 2016 at the age of 77. On the 50th anniversary of one of her many achievements, it’s fitting to end with these words from her memoir:

    My approach was one of not worrying about the loss of a job or missing out on a promotion. I felt it was important to live a life we would never regret.


    For you: more from our Insights series:

    To hear about new Insights articles, join the hundreds of thousands of people who value The Conversation’s evidence-based news. Subscribe to our newsletter.

    Jenny Hall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Fifty years ago, Junko Tabei became the first woman to summit Everest – why do so few people know her story? – https://theconversation.com/fifty-years-ago-junko-tabei-became-the-first-woman-to-summit-everest-why-do-so-few-people-know-her-story-248800

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: The Government has approved the Concept of Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East until 2036

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    From January 1, 2026, Russia will begin implementing the updated Concept for the Sustainable Development of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East until 2036. The order approving it was signed by Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin.

     

    The main goals of the concept are the economic, social and cultural development of indigenous peoples, the preservation of their original territories of residence, as well as support for their traditional way of life, economic activity and culture.

     

    Thus, work on preserving the original territories of residence of small peoples implies monitoring the ecological state of such places, as well as taking into account the interests of indigenous peoples when implementing infrastructure projects. Representatives of the peoples of the North should be involved in public hearings and environmental assessments when developing federal and regional programs for the development of natural resources.

     

    Support for traditional economic activities and trades of indigenous peoples is supposed to be carried out by improving the mechanisms for their priority use of hunting and fishing grounds. In addition, it is necessary to promote products of traditional trades on the domestic and foreign markets. Other areas include the development of the tourism industry and grant support for small and medium entrepreneurs.

     

    The creation of a comfortable and safe living environment will proceed in several directions at once. One of them is improving the quality of communications and providing access to the Internet. Another is expanding the network of multifunctional public service centers, including by organizing mobile teams of MFC specialists. This also includes the development of a network of medical institutions, organizing medical examinations and medical check-ups, expanding the use of telemedicine technologies and mobile forms of assistance.

     

    A separate section of the concept is devoted to ensuring accessibility of education. Such work, in particular, involves providing schools in areas where indigenous peoples live with modern equipment and textbooks in their native languages. A new vector of work is supporting the languages of small peoples in the information and digital space. This means creating keyboard layouts, electronic dictionaries, online translators and search engines.

     

    A special place is occupied by the topic of preserving the ethnocultural heritage and traditions of the peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East. The events of this section include preserving and popularizing cultural heritage objects and intangible ethnocultural heritage objects (legends, songs, rituals). In addition, assistance will be provided to the activities of theaters and folk groups that use native languages in their performances. Fundamental and applied scientific research in the field of history, culture, and ethnography of small peoples will receive state support.

     

    The Federal Agency for Nationalities Affairs, together with other interested government bodies, has been tasked with developing an action plan for implementing the concept within six months.

     

    The previous concept for the sustainable development of indigenous peoples of the North, Siberia and the Far East, the implementation of which will continue until the end of 2025, was approved in 2009.

    The document will be published.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko and To Lam opened the Russian-Vietnamese business forum

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Deputy Prime Minister of Russia Dmitry Chernyshenko and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam To Lam greeted the participants of the Russian-Vietnamese business forum. Also in their presence, the start of work was given to the plant for the production and processing of dairy products of the company “TH True Milk” in the Kaluga region.

    The event took place as part of To Lam’s official visit to Russia. Earlier, on May 10, negotiations between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Secretary General took place in the Kremlin.

    The forum featured speeches by representatives of VTB Bank, AFK Sistema, and the Cyberus Foundation for the Development of Effective Cybersecurity.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko thanked the Vietnamese delegation for participating in the festive events dedicated to the 80th anniversary of the Great Victory. He quoted President Vladimir Putin as saying that relations between Russia and Vietnam continue to develop steadily in the spirit of equality, mutual respect and consideration of each other’s interests.

    This year our countries celebrate a significant date – 75 years since the establishment of diplomatic relations. As was indicated at the recent meeting of To Lam with the Chairman of the Russian Government Mikhail Mishustin, today special attention is paid to increasing trade and economic cooperation and increasing mutual trade turnover between Russia and Vietnam.

    “We see how much Vietnam has achieved in these areas

    in recent years. By the end of 2024, the GDP growth rate exceeded 7%, and the country’s trade turnover approached the $800 billion mark. The Russian economy is also showing high growth rates: by the end of last year – more than 4.1%. Today, the demand of the state and business for increasing economic ties, including with our friendly Vietnam, is obvious. The key tasks of our bilateral cooperation are mutual investments and the implementation of specific projects. We need to create the most favorable climate for the fruitful work of Russian and Vietnamese companies in the markets of both countries,” said the Russian Deputy Prime Minister.

    The Free Trade Agreement has been in force between Russia and Vietnam for almost 10 years. It provides duty-free access to almost all groups of goods. Especially in such important positions as dairy products, meat, wheat, fertilizers and cars. It is important to come to a joint decision on how to use this agreement even more effectively.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko also noted the Comprehensive Cooperation Plan for the period up to 2030 signed in January: “It was this strategic document that allowed us to agree on joint measures and new mechanisms for cooperation on projects in the scientific sphere, energy and mechanical engineering, which will lead to an almost threefold increase in trade turnover between our countries – up to 15 billion dollars by 2030.”

    Cooperation is developing on the digital track: “Vietnam is the leader in terms of growth rates of the digital economy and e-commerce. Russia offers the best solutions in the field of digital technologies, industrial software and telecommunications. The work of the joint Center for Artificial Intelligence and Digital Technologies in Hanoi has already been launched,” the Russian Deputy Prime Minister said.

    In agriculture, Russia and Vietnam not only successfully carry out mutual deliveries of food products, but are already localizing production.

    Dmitry Chernyshenko also highlighted cooperation in the tourism sector: “According to the Ministry of Economic Development, following the results of the first quarter of 2025, Russia came out on top in terms of growth rates of tourist flow to Vietnam – 110%. We are creating comfortable conditions for your tourists in Russia. An electronic visa for Vietnamese citizens has been launched, and we are increasingly adapting the service sector to their wishes. We will increase the length of stay, for example, with an electronic visa to 30 days. We are expanding the geography of flights of Russian airlines to Vietnamese cities. We sincerely thank the Vietnamese side for the fact that on May 8, with the participation of the Secretary General, the flight program of Vietnam Airlines from Hanoi to Moscow was resumed. I am confident that this will allow us to qualitatively improve the level of our relations in the tourism industry!” he said.

    The Deputy Prime Minister invited Vietnamese partners to take part in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum and the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in 2025.

    To Lam stressed the importance of economic cooperation between Vietnam and Russia. According to him, the parties reached an agreement to expand investment volumes to $15 billion. To Lam called on business circles of both countries to actively conclude contracts and agreements within the framework of the business forum in order to maximize the benefits in all areas: investment, trade, and scientific and technical cooperation. He also expressed Vietnam’s interest in deepening partnership relations with Russia in such sectors as agriculture, energy, industry, mechanical engineering, and information technology. He specifically mentioned the great potential for cooperation in energy and agriculture.

    In conclusion, the Secretary General thanked the Russian Government for providing conditions for Vietnamese investors and businessmen aimed at developing tourism in Russia.

    In the presence of Dmitry Chernyshenko and To Lam, a ceremony of exchanging bilateral documents between Russian and Vietnamese companies took place. Among them are the Agreement on Cooperation between the National Research University Higher School of Economics and the Vietnam Academy of Science and Technology, as well as the Memorandum of Understanding, Strategic Cooperation for 2025-2026 for the purpose of jointly promoting Vietnam as a tourist destination and Vinpearl products between Anex Tour LLC and Vinpearl.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Water park beyond the Arctic Circle: the best report of the “Architectural Seasons” has been named

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Saint Petersburg State University of Architecture and Civil Engineering – Ekaterina Voznyak and Grand Prix winner Victoria Ivanova

    The results of the III National (All-Russian) scientific-practical conference “Architectural Seasons” were summed up at SPbGASU. The conference work was held in four departments-sections, 88 reports were heard.

    Each department identified the best speakers who presented their work to the competition jury, which included faculty members of the architecture department and invited experts. However, there were not four but five contenders for the award: the architectural design department nominated two finalists at once.

    “The smartest and strongest master’s students of our faculty have gathered here. Representatives of Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University have also come to us. We need to develop, compare our level with others: we will take something from you, and you will take something from us. We will compete, but this will not cancel our deep respect for each other,” said Ekaterina Voznyak, Dean of the Faculty of Architecture, in her welcoming speech.

    Associate Professor of the Department of Architectural Design Fyodor Perov announced the opening of a new training program in the Master’s program 07.04.01 Architecture. Architectural Design and Urbanism for the Arctic Zone of Russia since 2025. Fyodor Viktorovich emphasized that the Arctic has become the most important area of development and training at SPbGASU.

    During the presentations of the students, the master’s student of SPbGASU Victoria Talavirya presented the results of her dissertation work. She examined the formation of the architectural and design environment of the equestrian complex as a public space (scientific supervisor – associate professor of the landscape architecture department Irina Shkolnikova).

    According to Victoria, modern society has faced a number of problems in the environmental, social, and economic spheres, indirectly or directly related to the equestrian industry. Such problems include the deterioration of the physiological and psychological state of the population, the reduction of buffer zones within the city, the destruction of natural landscapes, and the low level of equestrian sports in Russia. As a solution to these problems, the student proposed holding sports events, creating unique public spaces, developing domestic horse breeding, etc.

    “The concept of an ideal equestrian complex should be based on the symbiosis of three factors: the creation of a public space that attracts people to equestrian sports; involvement in the culture of ecotourism, promotion of views and ideas that influence attitudes towards ecology; creation of conditions that satisfy all the needs of horses. The results of the dissertation can be used in further theoretical and practical work on the design of multifunctional equestrian complexes. Two scientific articles have been published on the topic of the dissertation research,” said Victoria. Alexandra Sudarikova, a student of the Higher School of Design and Architecture of the St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, presented a report on “Development of Ecotourism Territories in Russia Using the Example of the Republic of Karelia” (supervisor – Associate Professor of the Higher School of Design and Architecture Elena Ladik).

    According to Alexandra, domestic tourism is becoming increasingly popular in Russia. At the same time, ecotourism is becoming the most dynamically developing direction, which is due to the desire of modern people for clean and safe recreation, saving resources and preserving the natural environment. Ecotourists prefer recreation in small groups in active interaction with nature, choose environmentally friendly options for transport and accommodation. In this context, Karelia with its unique natural landscapes is one of the most attractive regions.

    The student chose the city of Kem, located on the route to the Murmansk Region and the Solovetsky Islands, as the territory for the study. By order of the President of Russia, the Kemsky District and the Belomorsky District are classified as Arctic support settlements.

    Alexandra identified the territory for the development of tourist infrastructure and proposed to form additional walking and water routes in the city. In addition, she developed a project proposal for an all-season tourist complex on the riverside territory of the Kem River, which will become a potential point of attraction for city residents and tourists.

    Vasilisa Smirnova, a master’s student at SPbGASU, spoke about the regional architectural features of the manor development of the 18th–19th centuries in the city of Toropets in the Tver Region (academic supervisor: associate professor of the Department of Architectural and Urban Heritage Natalia Dubrovina).

    There are six estate complexes on the territory of modern Toropets. They are significantly ruined and in a lost state. To find analogues, Vasilisa expanded the boundaries of the study and studied 46 estates where the main house has been preserved. She focused on estates built of stone in the 18th–19th centuries in the classical and eclectic styles.

    “Five main types were identified in general according to the volumetric-spatial and compositional solution of the main house. The estates of the city of Toropets turned out to be diverse. They are related to the types of the Pskov, Novgorod, Tver and Smolensk regions. However, the estate has characteristic features of the so-called Toropets Baroque,” the student said.

    The author believes that the main results of his project are the organization of points of attraction for local residents and tourists, the design of development zones for children and the improvement of territories.

    Master’s student Nikita Milov developed a project for a multifunctional sea terminal in Kandalaksha, Murmansk Region (supervised by associate professors of the Department of Architectural Design Alexey Mikhalychev, Igor Ivanov, Yulia Devyatova and Valeria Supranovich). The topic of the work is based on a fundamental approach to the development of the Far North. The student is confident that Kandalaksha has great tourism potential as a point for sea and river cruises from Moscow and St. Petersburg to Arkhangelsk, Salekhard, Tiksi and further along the northern coast. Kandalaksha can become both a transit point for these routes and create its own package of offers. The routes can be one-day, short-term, medium-term and long-term.

    Victoria Ivanova, a student of the Department of Urban Development at SPbGASU, designed a residential area with a multifunctional tourist complex in Monchegorsk, Murmansk Region (scientific supervisors: associate professors of the Department of Architectural Design Fyodor Perov and Alexandra Eremeeva, associate professor and academic secretary of the department Olga Kokorina, senior lecturer Larisa Venatovskaya).

    “Based on the urban development analysis, I identified the main hubs of public life in the city, drew up a diagram of the relationship between the main hubs and identified four main sites that were the most promising for development. The choice was made on the territory of the Leningradskaya Embankment with a park near Komsomolskoye Lake and a yacht club. It would seem, what kind of yacht club is there in the north? However, in Monchegorsk, one has existed since the 1950s. In the summer season, sailing competitions and regattas are held annually; in March of this year, the Russian Windsurfing Championship was held. At the same time, the infrastructure of the yacht club is in decline: the building is falling apart, there are vacant lots and chaotically located boathouses and garages around. There is a complex system of residential development in the block. It is mainly represented by outdated Soviet-era buildings in need of renovation.”

    According to Victoria, the main urban problems are ecology and population outflow. However, there are recreational resources that can be used wisely.

    Victoria proposed creating a single route that would connect four key points – the bus station, the park at Komsomolskoye Lake, Leningradskaya Embankment and the yacht club, which could become a center of attraction not only within the block, but for the entire city. The complex consists of various buildings connected to each other: residential buildings, a hotel, a preserved yacht club building, new and under-construction boathouses, a panoramic restaurant on the water, a building of a water entertainment complex with a water park, an entertainment center, exhibition halls, and a cafe. The water park offers a view of Lake Imandra and the Khibiny Mountains. The architectural appearance was formed in accordance with Sami motifs (the Sami are the indigenous people of the territory).

    The author of the project is confident that the multifunctional complex can become an additional vector for the city’s development, slow down the rate of outflow of local residents and increase the flow of tourists to the region.

    Alexandra Sudarikova, Vasilisa Smirnova, Victoria Talavirya, Nikita Milov and Victoria Ivanova received first-degree diplomas. Victoria Ivanova also received the Grand Prix.

    We wish you further professional success!

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Seawater sampling season 2025 begins tomorrow12 May 2025 ​​The 2025 seawater sampling season starts on Tuesday 13 May and continues for 20 weeks ending on Tuesday 23 September 2025. The sampling is carried out in a total of 16 bays with sampling at eight bays… Read more

    Source: Channel Islands – Jersey

    12 May 2025

    ​​

    The 2025 seawater sampling season starts on Tuesday 13 May and continues for 20 weeks ending on Tuesday 23 September 2025. 

    The sampling is carried out in a total of 16 bays with sampling at eight bays on Mondays and eight bays on Tuesdays as required by the EU Bathing Water Directive that we follow.

    Each week the latest results are displayed in an interactive map which is updated automatically. Please visit Seawater monitoring for more information. 

    New signs 

    Over the coming weeks we will be rolling out new signs at each sampling point in the bays. The signs will display a QR code which allows easy access to the latest results. 

    We monitor seawater quality to: 

    • Measure compliance against the EU Bathing water directive 
    • Get valuable information for Islanders and tourists on the quality of seawater 
    • Identify episodes of pollution 
    • Provide information to other stakeholders including the Aquaculture Industry.

    Different teams are involved in the monitoring process:

    • Water & Air and Environment & Consumer Protection teams take the samples 
    • Official Analyst’s laboratory carry out the analysis. 

    Since 2015 bathing water classifications throughout Europe are based on sampling data collected over 4 years. Monitoring in Jersey started in 1992. 

    Although monitoring of seawater provides valuable public health data, it is only a snap-shot of the water quality at the time of sampling and bathers enter coastal waters at their own risk. 

    General public health advice is to avoid swimming for 48 hours following heavy rainfall and to avoid seafoam if present. Sea foam forms naturally when waves agitate organic matter in seawater, but may also contain substances that could be harmful to health. ​

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI China: Camping boom ignites outdoor industry growth across China

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    On a crisp April morning, Pan Rongfeng, a middle school teacher in his 30s, pulled up to a verdant campsite at the foot of Daming Mountain, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, before unloading his dog and a panoply of camping gear from his car.

    It was a cherished holiday ritual for Pan as he took to the great outdoors to savor his time off.

    “Over the past two years, more and more people around me have started to turn to campsites for a little escape from urban life,” said Pan. “As long as the weather is agreeable, I love to gather outdoors to unwind.”

    In recent years, once a niche hobby, camping has broken into the mainstream across China, transforming the way people pursue quality time in their leisure.

    Data from Meituan, a leading life services provider, highlighted the trend. During this year’s Tomb-Sweeping Day, a traditional Chinese holiday where people are entitled to a block of days off, searches for “campgrounds” in Guangxi skyrocketed 50 percent over the same period of last year.

    The allure of such outdoor activity has not gone unnoticed on Chinese social media, with many camping-related posts amassing millions of views.

    On rednote, a Chinese lifestyle app and the country’s version of Instagram, the popularity of notes titled “camping tips” and “campsite recommendations” continued to rise before and during the five-day Labor Day holiday, while short-video platforms like Douyin have logged billions of plays for relevant content.

    At a riverside park in Nanning, weekend campers packed the vast grassy field, with latecomers like Huang Xiaqing, a Nanning local, struggling to find a big enough space to settle her family and friends.

    “If you arrive here half past nine on a weekend morning, it can be a huge hassle to find a spot to put up your tent,” said Huang. “That has almost always been the case since we began this holiday ritual one year ago.”

    Wei Wanqing, a sociology professor with East China Normal University in Shanghai, believes that the growing appeal of camping has extended far beyond the scope of social media influencers doing location check-ins and boosting their online traction by sharing outdoor lifestyle photos.

    “Families are increasingly embracing it as a way to bond and create shared memories,” said Wei.

    In recent years, camping, driven by the dual appeal of reconnecting with nature and fostering greater social connection, has gradually become a prominent element in China’s cultural and tourism landscape while giving rise to a burgeoning industry in the country.

    According to iiMedia Research, the growing appetite for camping generated about 213.97 billion yuan (about 29.69 billion U.S. dollars) in 2024, with projections of continued growth in 2025, as the booming sector has also helped catalyze the growth of related businesses.

    At a store specializing in outdoor gear in Nanning, Lyu Hongping, the shop owner, saw a 30 percent annual revenue spike over the past three years, fueled by various demands for camping and hiking equipment.

    “Camping has gone from a niche pastime for some to something that has attracted an increasing number of people from all walks of life,” said Lyu.

    The influx of campers has a ripple effect, bringing in revenues for the local economy through increased patronage of nearby restaurants, rental shops and tourist attractions, noted Hong Tao with the China Consumer Economics Society.

    “Some of the campsites serve as a one-stop shop that offers everything from essential outdoor gear to personalized travel arrangements,” said Hong.

    On Chinese e-commerce giant Taobao, a simple keyword search for “camping” would yield many relevant results, with many of the top sellers like waterproof mats, folding tables, and hammocks flying off the virtual shelves, some logging over 100,000 units sold in total and more than 1,000 daily purchases.

    A recent consultancy report suggested that there has been a trend toward adding more eye-popping and tech-laden equipment and products, such as foldable outdoor projection screens and in-vehicle fridges, among modern-day campers.

    Research highlights that the traditional style of “roughing it” with canvass tents and sleeping bags has given way to “glamping”, a new form of camping that involves more amenities and comforts, as camping has transformed from a budget-friendly alternative to traditional travel to a highly customized activity that caters to different outdoor pursuits.

    Xu Luyuan, a professor at Guangxi University of Finance and Economics, saw the rise of experience economy like camping as an indication of an exciting shift away from the “Daka” tourism, where tourists rush through cities and tick off as many attractions as possible within a limited timeframe, in favor of a form that focuses more on immersive experiences.

    “It meets the growing demand among Chinese consumers for more personalized, experiential leisure pursuits, and helps drive up domestic consumption and charges up the integration of culture into tourism,” said Xu.

    However, the surge in campers has put nature’s accommodating capacity to the test. Striking a balance between economic gains and environmental sustainability is a key challenge for the emerging sector to scale.

    In response to the concern regarding the environmental impact of the rapid expansion of the camping economy, local authorities across the country have taken proactive steps by introducing guidelines to promote responsible camping practices that prioritize environmental protection and safety.

    “Camping isn’t just a fad,” said Hong, who is convinced that with a focus on establishing a model that emphasizes differentiated services and supply-chain coordination, along with clear policy guidance, the sector can evolve beyond transient craze and become a lasting growth area for the country’s economy. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Don’t miss St Albans Spring Festival – thousands expected at FREE street party

    Source: St Albans City and District

    Publication date:

    Thousands of people are expected to join an exciting St Albans City Centre event with free entertainment suitable for all.

    The first St Albans Spring Festival will be held on Sunday 18 May and will be a celebration of food, well-being, community spirit and sustainability.

    Among the attractions will be live music, arts and crafts, street theatre and dozens of stalls selling takeaway food, drink and other produce. There will also be opportunities to learn, play and create with fun activities.

    The event runs from 11am to 5pm, with St Peter’s Street, Chequer Street and High Street closed to traffic to create a safe and vibrant environment. 

    To ensure accessibility, sighted guides and British Sign Language interpreters will be in attendance.

    St Albans City and District Council is organising the festival which will highlight the District’s hospitality businesses and tourism offering.

    It is part-funded by the UK Shared Prosperity Fund and sponsored by Code Ninjas, Côte St Albans and Corker Taxis.

    Councillor Anthony Rowlands, Lead for Events, said:

    This is a new event which we are bringing to the City Centre as the warmer weather takes hold and residents look for things to do at the weekend.

    There will be lots of exciting activities and entertainment that will appeal to people of all ages and interests. They will enjoy an afternoon of free music, games, activities, arts and crafts, eating, drinking and shopping.

    One of our priorities is to make the event inclusive and accessible, so among the facilities are reserved seating for those less able to stand, wheelchair ramps beside kerbs and accessible viewing zones.

    We are expecting the Spring Festival to attract many thousands of residents and visitors, so I would urge people to come along and not to miss out on the fun.

    Among the many attractions to look out for are the:

    • Main Stage, situated near the Beech House, where there will be live performances by a host of local musicians.
    • Food and Drink Stalls selling a vast variety of refreshments and cuisines with plenty of outdoor seating.
    • Create and Play Zone with activities including traditional wooden games, toddler soft play and chalk pavement drawing.
    • Experience Zone by the Museum + Gallery where there will be drumming and dance workshops as well as information about plastic-free living, composting and cooking sustainably. There will also be chair-based yoga.
    • Code Ninjas, one of our sponsors, is offering young and old alike the opportunity to learn about game design and coding in their special pop-up dojo on St Peter’s Street.
    • Challenge Area with rodeo sheep, sideshow games and giant inflatable football darts provided by St Albans City FC.
    • Clock Tower Stage, supported by Côte St Albans, featuring music from OVO and Morris dancing.
    • Street Entertainers including stilt walkers and drummers.
    • Community Safe Zone, a quiet spot by the Civic Centre where people can take some time out.

    Corker Taxis are providing some free as well as 10% discounted rides to the event.

    If travelling by bus, you can find City Centre bus stop arrangements for the day and further information about the Spring Festival here: https://www.enjoystalbans.com/event/st-albans-spring-festival/.

    Photo: scene from a street event last year.

    Note: The UK Shared Prosperity Fund aims to improve pride in place and increase life chances across the UK by investing in communities and place, supporting local business, and people and skills. 

    For more information, visit: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-shared-prosperity-fund-prospectus

    Media contact:  John McJannet, Principal Communications Officer: 01727- 819533; john.mcjannet@stalbans.gov.uk.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-Evening Report: France tightens security for riots anniversary after aborted New Caledonia political talks

    Fresh, stringent security measures have been imposed in New Caledonia following aborted political talks last week and ahead of the first anniversary of the deadly riots that broke out on 13 May 2024, which resulted in 14 deaths and 2.2 billion euros (NZ$4.2 billion) in damages.

    On Sunday, the French High Commission in Nouméa announced that from Monday, May 12, to Friday, May 15, all public marches and demonstrations will be banned in the Greater Nouméa Area.

    Restrictions have also been imposed on the sale of firearms, ammunition, and takeaway alcoholic drinks.

    The measures aim to “ensure public security”.

    In the wake of the May 2024 civil unrest, a state of emergency and a curfew had been imposed and had since been gradually lifted.

    The decision also comes as “confrontations” between law enforcement agencies and violent groups took place mid-last week, especially in the township of Dumbéa — on the outskirts of Nouméa — where there were attempts to erect fresh roadblocks, High Commissioner Jacques Billant said.

    The clashes, including incidents of arson, stone-throwing and vehicles being set on fire, are reported to have involved a group of about 50 individuals and occurred near Médipôle, New Caledonia’s main hospital, and a shopping mall.

    Clashes also occurred in other parts of New Caledonia, including outside the capital Nouméa.

    It adds another reason for the measures is the “anniversary date of the beginning of the 2024 riots”.

    Wrecked and burnt-out cars gathered after the May 2024 riots and dumped at Koutio-Koueta on Ducos island in Nouméa. Image: NC 1ère TV

    Law and order stepped up
    French authorities have also announced that in view of the first anniversary of the start of the riots tomorrow, law and order reinforcements have been significantly increased in New Caledonia until further notice.

    This includes a total of 2600 officers from the Gendarmerie, police, as well as reinforcements from special elite SWAT squads and units equipped with 16 Centaur armoured vehicles.

    Drones are also included.

    The aim is to enforce a “zero tolerance” policy against “urban violence” through a permanent deployment “night and day”, with a priority to stop any attempt to blockade roads, especially in Greater Nouméa, to preserve freedom of movement.

    One particularly sensitive focus would be placed on the township of Saint-Louis in Mont-Dore often described as a pro-independence stronghold which was a hot spot and the scene of violent and deadly clashes at the height of the 2024 riots.

    “We’ll be present wherever and whenever required. We are much stronger than we were in 2024,” High Commissioner Billant told local media during a joint inspection with French gendarmes commander General Nicolas Matthéos and Nouméa Public Prosecutor Yves Dupas.

    Dupas said that over the past few months the bulk of criminal acts was regarded as “delinquency” — nothing that could be likened to a coordinated preparation for fresh public unrest similar to last year’s.

    Billant said that, depending on how the situation evolves in the next few days, he could also rely on additional “potential reinforcements” from mainland France if needed.

    French High Commissioner Jacques Billant, Public Prosecutor Yves Dupas and the Gendarmerie commander, General Nicolas Matthéos, confer last Wednesday . . . “We are much stronger than we were in 2024.”  Image: Haut-Commissariat de la République en Nouvelle-Calédonie

    New Zealand ANZAC war memorial set alight
    A New Zealand ANZAC war memorial in the small rural town of Boulouparis (west coast of the main island of Grande Terre) was found vandalised last Friday evening.

    The monument, inaugurated just one year ago at last year’s ANZAC Day to commemorate the sacrifice of New Zealand soldiers during world wars in the 20th century, was set alight by unidentified people, police said.

    Tyres were used to keep the fire burning.

    An investigation into the circumstances of the incident is underway, the Nouméa Public Prosecutor’s office said, invoking charges of wilful damage.

    Australia, New Zealand travel warnings
    In the neighbouring Pacific, two of New Caledonia’s main tourism source markets, Australia and New Zealand, are maintaining a high level or increased caution advisory.

    The main identified cause is an “ongoing risk of civil unrest”.

    In its latest travel advisory, the Australian brief says “demonstrations and protests may increase in the days leading up to and on days of national or commemorative significance, including the anniversary of the start of civil unrest on May 13.

    “Avoid demonstrations and public gatherings. Demonstrations and protests may turn violent at short notice.”

    Pro-France political leaders at a post-conclave media conference in Nouméa last Thursday . . . objected to the proposed “sovereignty with France”, a kind of independence in association with France. Image: RRB/RNZ Pacific

    Inconclusive talks
    Last Thursday, May 8, French Minister for Overseas Manuel Valls, who had managed to gather all political parties around the same table for negotiations on New Caledonia’s political future, finally left the French Pacific territory. He admitted no agreement could be found at this stage.

    In the final stage of the talks, the “conclave” on May 5-7, he had put on the table a project for New Caledonia’s accession to a “sovereignty with France”, a kind of independence in association with France.

    This option was not opposed by pro-independence groups, including the FLNKS (Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front).

    French Overseas Territories Minister Manuel Valls . . . returned to Paris last week without a deal on New Caledonia’s political future. Image: Caledonia TV screenshot APR

    But the pro-France movement, in support of New Caledonia remaining a part of France, said it could not approve this.

    The main pillar of their argument remained that after three self-determination referendums held between 2018 and 2021, a majority of voters had rejected independence (even though the last referendum, in December 2021, was massively boycotted by the pro-independence camp because of the covid-19 pandemic).

    The anti-independence block had repeatedly stated that they would not accept any suggestion that New Caledonia could endorse a status bringing it closer to independence.

    New Caledonia’s pro-France MP at the French National Assembly, Nicolas Metzdorf, told local media at this stage, his camp was de facto in opposition to Valls, “but not with the pro-independence camp”.

    Metzdorf said a number of issues could very well be settled by talking to the pro-independence camp.

    Electoral roll issue sensitive
    This included the very sensitive issue of New Caledonia’s electoral roll, and conditions of eligibility at the next provincial elections.

    Direct contacts with Macron
    Both Metzdorf and Backès also said during interviews with local media that in the midst of their “conclave” negotiations, they had had contacts as high as French President Emmanuel Macron, asking him whether he was aware of the “sovereignty with France” plan and if he endorsed it.

    Another pro-France leader, Virginie Ruffenach (Le Rassemblement-Les Républicains), also confirmed she had similar exchanges, through her party Les Républicains, with French Minister of Home Affairs Bruno Retailleau, from the same right-wing party.

    As Minister of Home Affairs, Retailleau would have to be involved later in the New Caledonian issue.

    Divided reactions
    Since minister Valls’s departure, reactions were still flowing at the weekend from across New Caledonia’s political chessboard.

    “We have to admit frankly that no agreement was struck”, Valls said last week during a media conference.

    “Maybe the minds were not mature yet.”

    But he said France would now appoint a “follow up committee” to keep working on the “positive points” already identified between all parties.

    During numerous press conferences and interviews, anti-independence leaders have consistently maintained that the draft compromise put to them by Minister Valls during the latest round of negotiations last week, was not acceptable.

    They said this was because it contained several elements of “independence-association”, including the transfer of key powers from Paris to Nouméa, a project of “dual citizenship” and possibly a seat at the United Nations.

    “In proposing this solution, minister [Valls] was biased and blocked the negotiations. So he has prevented the advent of an agreement”, pro-France Les Loyalistes and Southern Province President leader Sonia Backès told public broadcaster NC la 1ère on Sunday.

    “For us, an independence association was out of the question because the majority of [New] Caledonians voted three time against independence,” she said.

    More provincial power plan
    Instead, the Le Rassemblement-LR and Les Loyalistes bloc were advocating a project that would provide more powers to each of the three provinces, including in terms of tax revenue collection.

    The project, often described as a de facto partition, however, was not retained in the latest phases of the negotiations, because it contravened France’s constitutional principle of a united and indivisible nation.

    “But no agreement does not mean chaos”, Backès said.

    On the contrary, she believes that by not agreeing to the French minister’s deal plan, her camp had “averted disaster for New Caledonia”.

    “Tomorrow, there will be another minister . . . and another project”, she said, implicitly betting on Valls’s departure.

    On the pro-independence front, a moderate “UNI” (National Union For Independence) said a in a statement even though negotiations did not eventuate into a comprehensive agreement, the French State’s commitment and method had allowed to offer “clear and transparent terms of negotiations on New Caledonia’s institutional and political future”.

    The main FLNKS group, mainly consisting of pro-independence Union Calédonienne (UC) party, also said that even though no agreement could be found as a result of the latest round of talks, the whole project could be regarded as “advances” and “one more step . . . not a failure” in New Caledonia’s decolonisation, as specified in the 1998 Nouméa Accord, FLNKS chief negotiator and UC party president Emmanuel Tjibaou said.

    Deplored the empty outcome
    Other parties involved in the talks, including Eveil Océanien and Calédonie Ensemble, have deplored the empty outcome of talks last week.

    They called it a “collective failure” and stressed that above all, reaching a consensual solution was the only way forward, and that the forthcoming elections and the preceding campaign could bear the risk of further radicalisation and potential violence.

    In the economic and business sector, the conclave’s inconclusive outcome has brought more anxiety and uncertainty.

    “What businesses need, now, is political stability, confidence. But without a political agreement that many of us were hoping for, the confidence and visibility is not there, there’s no investment”, New Caledonia’s MEDEF-NC (Business Leaders Union) vice-president Bertrand Courte told NC La Première.

    As a result of the May 2024 riots, more than 600 businesses, mainly in Nouméa, were destroyed, causing the loss of more than 10,000 jobs.

    Over the past 12 months, New Caledonia GDP (gross domestic product) has shrunk by an estimated 10 to 15 percent, according to the latest figures produced by New Caledonia statistical institute ISEE.

    What next? Crucial provincial elections
    As no agreement was found, the next course of action for New Caledonia was to hold provincial elections no later than 30 November 2025, under the existing system, which still restricts the list of persons eligible to vote at those local elections.

    The makeup of the electoral roll for local polls was the very issue that triggered the May 2024 riots, as the French Parliament, at the time, had endorsed a Constitutional amendment to push through opening the list.

    At the time, the pro-independence camp argued the changes to eligibility conditions would eventually “dilute” their votes and make indigenous Kanaks a minority in their own country.

    The Constitutional bill was abandoned after the May 2024 rots.

    The sensitive issue remains part of the comprehensive pact that Valls had been working on for the past four months.

    The provincial elections are crucial in that they also determine the proportional makeup of New Caledonia’s Congress and its government and president.

    The provincial elections, initially scheduled to take place in May 2024, and later in December 2024, and finally no later than 30 November 2025, were already postponed twice.

    Even if the provincial elections are held later this year (under the current “frozen” rules), the anti-independence camp has already announced it would contest its result.

    According to the anti-independence camp, the current restrictions on New Caledonia’s electoral roll contradict democratic principles and have to be “unfrozen” and opened up to any citizen residing for more than 10 uninterrupted years.

    The present electoral roll is “frozen”, which means it only allows citizens who have have been livingin New Caledonia before November 1998 to cast their vote at local elections.

    The case could be brought to the French Constitutional Council, or even higher, to a European or international level, said pro-France politicians.

    This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

    Article by AsiaPacificReport.nz

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Russia: China and Russia: Friendship between the two states begins with friendship between peoples

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Recently, Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a state visit to Russia. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to further deepening the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation in the new era. It is especially important to hear such statements in the era of global instability. Russian-Chinese relations are not just diplomacy and economics, but also a history of sincere friendship, respect and mutual understanding. Having lived in China for more than five years, I realized that true friendship between countries begins with friendship between people.

    Connecting Peoples – Beyond Economics and Trade

    To truly understand another culture, information from books, travel or news is not enough, you need to experience it from the inside, through work, study and communication. For more than five years, China was my home, a place where I learned Chinese, gained valuable professional experience and made friends with whom I still maintain warm ties. China became a part of my identity: I learned to think more broadly, to see the world through the eyes of others and to appreciate differences. Over the years, I have seen that the relationship between China and Russia is not limited to economics and trade, they are connected by many human stories like mine.

    The Language That Changed Lives

    My first encounter with China was in 2006, when I visited Beijing on a tourist trip. Even then, it felt like the country was on the verge of big changes, although high-speed trains and large-scale international projects were still to come. When I returned to China in 2009 to study Chinese, I had no idea how important this choice would become. Chinese became for me not just a communication tool, but also a bridge between cultures and a powerful asset.

    The work that opened up a whole world

    Later, I got a job at a Chinese media outlet in Beijing, where I contributed to stories for overseas audiences. We covered Chinese innovations in agriculture, infrastructure development, poverty eradication, and the preservation of intangible cultural heritage. It was an invaluable experience: I saw China from different sides, not only through official data, but also through people’s stories, dreams, and aspirations. Each article became a new step toward mutual understanding.

    Personal connections as a path to understanding

    Every day, living and working in China, I admired the hard work of the Chinese people, their willingness to learn and develop. I saw how cities were changing rapidly, innovations were being introduced, and Chinese technologies were spreading around the world. This progress was impressive, but even more impressive was the human warmth. My friends and colleagues were interested in asking about Russia and sharing their stories. We exchanged experiences and views – it is these personal connections that, as I now understand, create a solid foundation for international relations.

    Respect as the basis of trust

    It was especially valuable to feel the respectful attitude towards Russia on the part of the Chinese. In contrast to the criticism that can often be heard in the West, in China I encountered genuine interest in Russia and admiration for Russian culture. This strengthened my confidence in the future partnership of our countries. It seems to me that it is respect, openness and trust that become the foundation of strong relations between states, starting from the level of ordinary people.

    The Future in Dialogue: Language, Science, Culture

    Today, Russian-Chinese relations go beyond traditional trade and economic cooperation, embracing science, education, and culture. Educational projects, scientific research, and academic exchanges play a special role. More and more young people are learning each other’s languages, which opens up new horizons and builds trust. Cultural exchanges – festivals, exhibitions, theater productions, film screenings – help to understand mentalities, strengthen interest and mutual sympathy. Art is becoming a universal language that overcomes barriers.

    Strength lies in shared values

    I have always been touched by the similarity of our cultural values: respect for elders, high value of education, hospitality. These common foundations, as I have understood from personal experience, are truly a strong foundation for the friendship of our peoples and countries.

    Conclusion: Looking to the Future

    Watching the development of Chinese-Russian relations today, I feel joy. For me, this is not just the history of two states, it is also the history of two peoples who want to understand and respect each other. I believe that we still have many joint steps ahead, each of which begins with dialogue, mutual interest and trust.

    Author: Anna Buyanova

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • Ceasefire agreement reflects India, Pakistan commitment to regional peace: UNGA president

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    United Nations General Assembly President Philemon Yang has said the cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan reflects their commitment to regional peace.

    Welcoming the ceasefire, he said on Saturday, “It is a meaningful step towards de-escalation reflecting the commitment of both nations to regional peace and stability.”

    Secretary-General Antonio Guterres sees the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan as a “positive step” towards easing tensions and hopes it will contribute to “lasting peace,” according to his Spokesperson Stephane Dujarric.

    India and Pakistan reached a cease-fire agreement on Saturday. However, hours after the agreement, Pakistan violated the ceasefire.

    Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said that the Indian armed forces have been responding adequately to the ceasefire violations.

    Speaking at a press briefing, Misri said the government has taken a serious note of the Pakistani actions. “This is a breach of understanding. The army is monitoring the situation closely,” he said.

    He informed that the agreement to halt the ongoing hostilities over the past few days was reached this evening. However, in the past few hours, there have been serious violations of this agreement from the Pakistani side.

    Notably, India launched ‘Operation Sindoor’ on Wednesday, targeting “terrorist infrastructures” in retaliation against last month’s killing of 26 people in the Kashmir tourist spot Pahalgam by The Resistance Front, an offshoot of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba.

    While the tension was mounting last week, Guterres had expressed deep concern over the conflict, saying, “The world cannot afford a military confrontation between India and Pakistan.”

    He repeatedly asked for de-escalating the conflict, including by holding a meeting with reporters exclusively on the subject.

    While many international leaders, including the US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, were calling both Indian and Pakistani leaders to de-escalate the conflict, Guterres’ Deputy Spokesperson Farhan Haq said , “We encourage all efforts to de-escalate the situation.”

    Guterres has condemned the Pahalgam terrorist massacre in the strongest terms several times.

    He said, “Targeting civilians is unacceptable — and those responsible must be brought to justice through transparent, credible, and lawful means.”

    (IANS)

  • MIL-Evening Report: As Donald Trump cuts funding to Antarctica, will the US be forced off the icy continent?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Lynda Goldsworthy, Research Associate, Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania

    Mozgova/Shutterstock

    President Donald Trump has begun eroding the United States presence in Antarctica by announcing deep funding cuts to his nation’s science and logistics on the icy continent.

    The Trump administration has significantly reduced funding for both Antarctica’s largest research and logistics station, McMurdo, and the National Science Foundation which funds US research in Antarctica.

    More cuts are foreshadowed. If carried through, US science and overall presence in Antarctica will be seriously diminished – at a time when China is significantly expanding its presence there.

    Since 1958, the US has been a leader in both Antarctic diplomacy and science. Shrinking its Antarctic presence will diminish US capacity to influence the region’s future.

    Why the US matters in Antarctica

    The US has historically focused its Antarctic influence in three key areas:

    1. Keeping Antarctica free from military conflict

    The US has built considerable Antarctic geopolitical influence since the late 1950s. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, it initiated (and later hosted) negotiations that led to the development of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.

    It was also key to establishing the fundamental principles of the treaty, such as using the Antarctic region only for peaceful purposes, and prohibiting military activities and nuclear weapons testing.

    2. Governing Antarctica together

    The US was influential in developing the international legal system that governs human activities in the Antarctic region.

    In the 1970s, expanding unregulated fishing in the Southern Ocean led to serious concerns about the effects on krill-eating species – especially the recovery of severely depleted whale populations.

    The US joined other Antarctic Treaty nations to champion the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR), signed in 1980. It prioritises conservation of Southern Ocean ecosystems and all species, over maximum fish harvesting.

    The US also contributed to the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection. Among other measures it prohibits mining and designates Antarctica as “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”.

    3. Scientific research and collaboration

    The US operates three year‑round Antarctic research stations: Palmer, Amundsen-Scott and McMurdo.

    McMurdo is Antarctica’s largest research station. Amundsen-Scott is located at the South Pole, the geographic centre of Antarctica, and the point at which all Antarctic territorial claims meet. The South Pole station is thus important symbolically and strategically, as well as for science.

    The US has the largest number of Antarctic scientists of any nation in the continent.

    US scientific work has been at the forefront of understanding Antarctica’s role in the global climate system, and how climate change will shape the future of the planet. It has also played a major role in Southern Ocean ecosystem and fisheries research.

    This research has underpinned important policies. For example, US input into models to predict and manage sustainable krill yields has been pivotal in regulating the krill fishery, and ensuring it doesn’t harm penguin, seal and whale populations.

    The US has also been a staunch supporter of a comprehensive network of marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean. The Ross Sea Region Marine Protected Area proposed by the US and New Zealand is the largest in the world.

    A broad ripple effect

    The US influence in Antarctica extends beyond the list above. For example, the US has a significant Antarctic-based space program. And US citizens make up most Antarctic tourists, and the US plays a significant role in regulating tourism there.

    The full extent of the Trump administration’s cuts is still to play out. But clearly, if they proceed as signalled, the cuts will be a major blow not to just US interests in Antarctica, but those of many other countries.

    The US has the best-resourced logistics network in Antarctica. Its air transport, shipping and scientific field support has traditionally been shared by other countries. New Zealand, for instance, is closely tied with the US in resupply of food and fuel, and uses US air and sea logistics for many operations to the Ross Sea region.

    And joint research programs with the US will be affected by reduced funding in Antarctica directly, and elsewhere.

    For example, reported cuts to the climate programs of NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) may hamper satellite coverage of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean. This would affect Australian scientists collecting data on ocean temperature, sea-ice state and other metrics used in climate research and weather forecasting.

    Worrying times ahead

    China has signalled its intention to be a key geopolitical player in Antarctica and has greatly expanded its Antarctic presence in recent years.

    China has five Antarctic research stations. Its sixth summer station is due for completion in 2027. China also operates two icebreaker ships, helicopters and a fixed-wing aircraft in Antarctica and is building new, large krill trawlers.

    Both China and Russia, are increasingly active in their opposition to environmental initiatives such as marine protected areas.

    A smaller US presence creates greater opportunities for others to shape Antarctica’s geopolitics. This includes pressure to erode decades-long protection of the Antarctic environment, a push for more intensive fish and krill harvesting, and potentially reopening debate on mining in the region.

    Lynda Goldsworthy and Tony Press co-authored the chapter Power at the Bottom of the World in the new book Antarctica and the Earth System.

    A smaller US presence creates opportunities for others to shape Antarctica’s geopolitics.
    Oleksandr Matsibura/Shutterstock

    Lynda Goldsworthy, research associate with IMAS, UTAS, undertakes occasional contract work with the Deep Sea Conservation, is a member of AFMA’s SouthMac advisory group ) and of CSIRO National Benefit Advisory Committee.

    Tony Press receives funding from the Australia-Japan Foundation (Department of .Foreign Affairs and Trade)

    ref. As Donald Trump cuts funding to Antarctica, will the US be forced off the icy continent? – https://theconversation.com/as-donald-trump-cuts-funding-to-antarctica-will-the-us-be-forced-off-the-icy-continent-254786

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Chinese hospitals bordering Russia see influx of people seeking TCM

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    A doctor talks with patients at a hospital in Hunchun, northeast China’s Jilin province, June 28, 2023. Hunchun is located at China’s border with Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Traditional Chinese medicine treatments such as acupuncture and Tuina remedial massage have drawn Russian tourists to the city. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Traditional Chinese medicine is fueling a growing wave of inbound medical tourism in China’s border regions, particularly in cities such as Heihe and Suifenhe in Heilongjiang province.

    At the Traditional Chinese Medicine Hospital in Heihe, the scent of moxa wafts through the outpatient corridors. Consultation rooms feature traditional Chinese decor, with bilingual signage in Chinese and Russian.

    Vladimir Andriushenko, a 56-year-old from Russia’s Amur Oblast, found relief from chronic neck and shoulder pain after undergoing massage therapy at the hospital.

    “I have suffered from neck and shoulder pain for quite a long time,” he said. “When I first experienced traditional Chinese massage, I felt its magical effect.”

    Andriushenko said he discovered TCM through books and online research and has developed a strong interest in it since his first treatment years ago.

    “In many parts of Russia, where it’s cold, people often suffer from bone and joint diseases,” he said. “In Russia, rehabilitation mainly depends on medical equipment, but TCM therapies such as massage, acupuncture, cupping and herbal tea have become popular because they’re gentle and effective.”

    During his two-day trip to Heihe in April, Andriushenko also bought acupuncture needles and herbal cough medicine.

    “Most Russian patients prefer pulse diagnosis and herbal medicine,” said Liu Xuesong, director of the hospital. “The revisit rate for conditions such as rheumatism and neck pain is quite high.

    “As trust in TCM grows, many patients refer their relatives and friends,” he said. “To better serve Russian patients, we established an international medical department last year, trained our staff in Russian and hired professional translators to ensure smooth communication.”

    In 2024, the hospital provided acupuncture, cupping and other TCM therapies to more than 600 Russian patients and prescribed over 300 herbal formulas.

    The hospital has signed a cooperation agreement with a rehabilitation center in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Russia, Liu said.

    “We plan to send four medical staff members there to help set up a TCM experience hall and offer massage therapy,” he said.

    Beyond hospital visits, Heihe has also leveraged its natural volcanic magnetic field and cold mineral springs in the Wudalianchi scenic area to attract older Russian visitors.

    Last year, the scenic area welcomed 210,000 health tourists, 40 percent of whom were from Russia.

    “The cold mineral springs are effective for rheumatism and spinal diseases, which are common among the Russians who visit,” said Yuan Xiaobo, head of the scenic area’s culture and tourism bureau. “We offer seven- to 14-day health packages combining spring water therapy and TCM — a good fit for short-term medical tourists.”

    The scenic area has also attracted investment from major companies like Yiling Hospital Management Group to build high-end therapeutic hospitals, offering personalized care plans and international-standard equipment.

    A similar trend is emerging in Suifenhe, another Heilongjiang city on the Russian border.

    At the People’s Hospital of Suifenhe, signage in Chinese, Russian and English helps guide patients through the facility.

    Last year, the hospital treated over 10,000 foreign patients. Since the start of this year, it has served more than 600, mostly from Russia’s Far East, according to hospital officials.

    “To better serve Russian patients, we’ve set up a dedicated reception room with traditional Chinese health exercises,” said Liu Ximing, director of the national TCM service export base at the hospital. “We’ve also upgraded our salt therapy room to blend treatment with leisure.”

    The hospital has established a remote consultation center and an international emergency dispatch center, using an “internet plus medical” model to efficiently meet the healthcare needs of Russian patients.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Global: As Donald Trump cuts funding to Antarctica, will the US be forced off the icy continent?

    Source: The Conversation – Global Perspectives – By Lynda Goldsworthy, Research Associate, Institute for Marine and Antarctic Studies, University of Tasmania

    Mozgova/Shutterstock

    President Donald Trump has begun eroding the United States presence in Antarctica by announcing deep funding cuts to his nation’s science and logistics on the icy continent.

    The Trump administration has significantly reduced funding for both Antarctica’s largest research and logistics station, McMurdo, and the National Science Foundation which funds US research in Antarctica.

    More cuts are foreshadowed. If carried through, US science and overall presence in Antarctica will be seriously diminished – at a time when China is significantly expanding its presence there.

    Since 1958, the US has been a leader in both Antarctic diplomacy and science. Shrinking its Antarctic presence will diminish US capacity to influence the region’s future.

    Why the US matters in Antarctica

    The US has historically focused its Antarctic influence in three key areas:

    1. Keeping Antarctica free from military conflict

    The US has built considerable Antarctic geopolitical influence since the late 1950s. Under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, it initiated (and later hosted) negotiations that led to the development of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty.

    It was also key to establishing the fundamental principles of the treaty, such as using the Antarctic region only for peaceful purposes, and prohibiting military activities and nuclear weapons testing.

    2. Governing Antarctica together

    The US was influential in developing the international legal system that governs human activities in the Antarctic region.

    In the 1970s, expanding unregulated fishing in the Southern Ocean led to serious concerns about the effects on krill-eating species – especially the recovery of severely depleted whale populations.

    The US joined other Antarctic Treaty nations to champion the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CAMLR), signed in 1980. It prioritises conservation of Southern Ocean ecosystems and all species, over maximum fish harvesting.

    The US also contributed to the 1991 Protocol on Environmental Protection. Among other measures it prohibits mining and designates Antarctica as “a natural reserve, devoted to peace and science”.

    3. Scientific research and collaboration

    The US operates three year‑round Antarctic research stations: Palmer, Amundsen-Scott and McMurdo.

    McMurdo is Antarctica’s largest research station. Amundsen-Scott is located at the South Pole, the geographic centre of Antarctica, and the point at which all Antarctic territorial claims meet. The South Pole station is thus important symbolically and strategically, as well as for science.

    The US has the largest number of Antarctic scientists of any nation in the continent.

    US scientific work has been at the forefront of understanding Antarctica’s role in the global climate system, and how climate change will shape the future of the planet. It has also played a major role in Southern Ocean ecosystem and fisheries research.

    This research has underpinned important policies. For example, US input into models to predict and manage sustainable krill yields has been pivotal in regulating the krill fishery, and ensuring it doesn’t harm penguin, seal and whale populations.

    The US has also been a staunch supporter of a comprehensive network of marine protected areas in the Southern Ocean. The Ross Sea Region Marine Protected Area proposed by the US and New Zealand is the largest in the world.

    A broad ripple effect

    The US influence in Antarctica extends beyond the list above. For example, the US has a significant Antarctic-based space program. And US citizens make up most Antarctic tourists, and the US plays a significant role in regulating tourism there.

    The full extent of the Trump administration’s cuts is still to play out. But clearly, if they proceed as signalled, the cuts will be a major blow not to just US interests in Antarctica, but those of many other countries.

    The US has the best-resourced logistics network in Antarctica. Its air transport, shipping and scientific field support has traditionally been shared by other countries. New Zealand, for instance, is closely tied with the US in resupply of food and fuel, and uses US air and sea logistics for many operations to the Ross Sea region.

    And joint research programs with the US will be affected by reduced funding in Antarctica directly, and elsewhere.

    For example, reported cuts to the climate programs of NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) may hamper satellite coverage of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean. This would affect Australian scientists collecting data on ocean temperature, sea-ice state and other metrics used in climate research and weather forecasting.

    Worrying times ahead

    China has signalled its intention to be a key geopolitical player in Antarctica and has greatly expanded its Antarctic presence in recent years.

    China has five Antarctic research stations. Its sixth summer station is due for completion in 2027. China also operates two icebreaker ships, helicopters and a fixed-wing aircraft in Antarctica and is building new, large krill trawlers.

    Both China and Russia, are increasingly active in their opposition to environmental initiatives such as marine protected areas.

    A smaller US presence creates greater opportunities for others to shape Antarctica’s geopolitics. This includes pressure to erode decades-long protection of the Antarctic environment, a push for more intensive fish and krill harvesting, and potentially reopening debate on mining in the region.

    Lynda Goldsworthy and Tony Press co-authored the chapter Power at the Bottom of the World in the new book Antarctica and the Earth System.

    A smaller US presence creates opportunities for others to shape Antarctica’s geopolitics.
    Oleksandr Matsibura/Shutterstock

    Lynda Goldsworthy, research associate with IMAS, UTAS, undertakes occasional contract work with the Deep Sea Conservation, is a member of AFMA’s SouthMac advisory group ) and of CSIRO National Benefit Advisory Committee.

    Tony Press receives funding from the Australia-Japan Foundation (Department of .Foreign Affairs and Trade)

    ref. As Donald Trump cuts funding to Antarctica, will the US be forced off the icy continent? – https://theconversation.com/as-donald-trump-cuts-funding-to-antarctica-will-the-us-be-forced-off-the-icy-continent-254786

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Flower Economy Turns Nature’s Beauty into ‘Wealth Code’

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    In recent years, Miaojiatan Community in Dalu Town, Jungar Qi District, Ordos City, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region has been actively developing the flower industry by taking advantage of natural resources. Through the application of intelligent cultivation technology and the improvement of the industrial chain, natural resources have been successfully converted into economic benefits, making flower cultivation an important industry for rural revitalization.

    The flower growing industry has already become a significant part of the community’s collective economy. With the growing popularity of tourism and guesthouses, the annual income from the flower industry has increased by about 30%. Miaojiatan Community plans to introduce new varieties and technologies, and expand the scale of cultivation, so that the flower economy can become a powerful engine for the village’s revival.

    The flower industry not only contributed to the growth of the collective economy, but also provided stable jobs for local residents.

    As the flower industry develops, Miaojiatan Community accelerates the upgrading of production, creating a unique flower economy that integrates flower viewing, flower sales and tourism experience. Every day, tourists come here in an endless stream to buy flowers, pick them and enjoy them. This becomes a new growth point for the local economy.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • Operation Sindoor: Know what India has achieved

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    n the early hours of May 7, India launched “Operation Sindoor,” a bold and calculated military response to the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack that claimed the lives of 26 civilians, mostly tourists. The operation, which involved deep strikes inside Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK), marked a significant shift in India’s counterterrorism doctrine.

    Destruction of Terror Launchpads

    India successfully destroyed nine high-value terror launchpads linked to Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Hizbul Mujahideen. These locations were identified as key training and operational hubs for attacks against India.

    Deep Strikes into Pakistan’s Mainland

    Operation Sindoor broke conventional norms by targeting locations deep within Pakistan’s mainland, including strategic zones like Punjab province and Bahawalpur — areas once considered untouchable. By doing so, India discarded the old distinction between terrorists and their state sponsors, treating both as legitimate targets. This demonstrated that no part of Pakistan would be considered safe if terror emanates from its soil.

    Assertion of a Red Line

    The response signaled a doctrinal shift in India’s strategy, establishing that state-sponsored terrorism would now invite targeted, visible, and proportional retaliation. Operation Sindoor underlined a new red line that Pakistan could no longer ignore.

    Exposing Pakistan’s Air Defence Vulnerabilities

    Indian forces, including Rafale jets equipped with SCALP missiles and HAMMER bombs, executed the strikes with pinpoint accuracy. The 23-minute mission exposed significant gaps in Pakistan’s air defence network, which was either bypassed or neutralised. Not a single Indian asset was lost in the operation.

    Demonstration of Robust Air Defence Capabilities

    India also proved its robust air defence capabilities at home. The Akashteer Air Defence System played a key role in intercepting hundreds of Pakistani drones and missiles, and is now positioned as a serious global export contender.

    Precision Without Escalation

    While India’s actions were assertive, they were not escalatory. No civilian or general military infrastructure was targeted — only identified terror assets. The response followed India’s long-standing doctrine of zero tolerance toward terrorism, coupled with a clear effort to avoid civilian casualties.

    Elimination of Key Terrorist Operatives

    Several high-value terrorist operatives were eliminated, including individuals on India’s most-wanted list. The leadership of multiple terror modules was dismantled in one night.

    Damage to Pakistan’s Military Establishment

    In retaliation to Pakistan’s drone and missile attacks on May 9–10, India carried out strikes on 11 Pakistani air bases, including Nur Khan, Rafiqi, Murid, Sukkur, Sialkot, Pasrur, Chunian, Sargodha, Skardu, Bholari, and Jacobabad. These strikes reportedly destroyed 20 percent of Pakistan’s air force infrastructure. Among the dead was Pakistan’s squadron leader Usman Yousuf.

    Tri-Service Coordination

    The operation showcased seamless tri-service coordination between the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Indian Navy’s deployment in the Arabian Sea kept Pakistan’s naval assets pinned near the coast, while weapon drills ensured full operational preparedness at sea.

    Global Message Sent

    Globally, the operation sent a strong message. In contrast to previous conflicts where India was urged to show restraint, this time the world’s leading powers largely expressed support for India’s right to defend its citizens and territory.

    Changing the Narrative on Kashmir

    Operation Sindoor also helped shift the narrative around Kashmir. The strikes were viewed not through the prism of the bilateral dispute, but as part of a legitimate response to terrorism. For the first time, the Kashmir issue was effectively de-hyphenated from India’s right to act against terror.

    India’s message was unambiguous: those who shelter terrorists will no longer be safe. The response to Pahalgam was not just retaliation — it was a declaration of resolve.

  • Pakistan proposed ceasefire, violated it within hours: Indian Army

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (2)

    irector General of Military Operations (DGMO) Lt Gen Rajeev Ghai on Sunday revealed that it was Pakistan’s DGMO who proposed a ceasefire between the two sides—an understanding that was violated by Pakistan within hours of taking effect.

    Addressing a press briefing in New Delhi, Ghai said the proposal to halt hostilities was made during a direct hotline conversation initiated by Pakistan on May 10.

    “My communication with the Pak DGMO was conducted at 15:35 hours yesterday (Saturday) and resulted in the cessation of cross-border firing and air intrusions by either side with effect from 17:00 hours, 10th of May, after he proposed that we cease hostilities,” Ghai said

    The ceasefire was aimed at de-escalating tensions along the Line of Control and the international border following the April 22 terrorist attack in Jammu and Kashmir’s Pahalgam, which killed 26 tourists. The understanding was reached purely through bilateral means and without preconditions, reflecting India’s commitment to restoring calm after Indian forces destroyed major terror camps in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK).

    Lt Gen Ghai further added, “We also decided to speak again on the 12th of May at 12:00 hours to discuss the modalities that would ensure the longevity of this understanding.”

    However, he added that the violation of the truce by Pakistan just hours later came as no surprise.

    “Expectedly, it took only a couple of hours for the Pakistan Army to violate these arrangements through cross-border and Line of Control firing, followed by drone intrusions during the night and early hours of today,” said Lt Gen Ghai.

    India responded strongly to the provocations and lodged a formal protest with Pakistan through the hotline channel.

    “We have, earlier today, sent another hotline message to my counterpart highlighting these violations of the understanding between the DGMOs on the 10th of May, and our firm and clear intent to respond fiercely if these are repeated tonight, subsequently, or later,” he said.

    Ghai also confirmed that the Chief of Army Staff had granted full operational authority to the Army Commander to initiate counteraction in the event of any violation by Pakistan.

    IANS

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Iran and Uzbekistan Sign Four Documents on Expanding Bilateral Cooperation

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    TEHRAN, May 11 (Xinhua) — Iran and Uzbekistan signed four documents in Tehran on Sunday to expand bilateral cooperation, Iran’s official IRNA news agency reported.

    According to the report, the signing took place during a meeting of delegations from the two countries, which included high-ranking officials, including Iran’s First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref and Uzbek Prime Minister Abdulla Aripov, who is visiting the Islamic Republic.

    According to IRNA, these four documents include an intergovernmental protocol on the implementation of a preferential trade agreement, a memorandum of understanding on quarantine and plant protection, a memorandum of understanding in the field of halal standardization, and an intergovernmental roadmap for bilateral cooperation for the period 2025-2027.

    During the meeting, M.R. Aref said that Iran is determined to improve relations with Uzbekistan in all areas, viewing “the numerous cultural and historical commonalities between the two countries as valuable assets” for developing bilateral ties in the economy, energy, tourism, culture, science and trade, as well as between representatives of the private sector.

    A. Aripov, for his part, pointed out that Iran is a “close friend and reliable partner” of Uzbekistan in the region. He noted that in 2024, the volume of bilateral trade reached 500 million US dollars.

    The Prime Minister of Uzbekistan stressed that the expansion of cooperation between the two countries should be future-oriented and based on long-term planning. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: CE begins Qatar visit

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    Chief Executive John Lee met Qatar’s leaders and government officials and learnt about the latest developments of the country’s sovereign wealth fund on the first day of a visit to Qatar.

    Leading a business delegation comprising representatives from Hong Kong and Mainland enterprises, Mr Lee in the morning, met respectively the Amir, head of state of Qatar Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Qatar Prime Minister & Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani and Minister of Communications & Information Technology Mohammed bin Ali bin Mohammed Al Mannai to exchange views on strengthening bilateral relations and economic co-operation between Hong Kong and Qatar.

    The Chief Executive said that Qatar and Hong Kong are economic powerhouses in the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region respectively. Noting that Qatar is Hong Kong’s third-largest trading partner in the Middle East with bilateral trade in goods worth US$1.6 billion last year, Mr Lee said that there is plenty of room for further growth in trade and business between the two places.

    He also expressed his anticipation that during this visit, multiple memoranda of understanding and agreements will be made between Hong Kong and Qatar, covering various areas including trade and investment promotion, financial services, innovation and technology (I&T), and cultural tourism, with a view to further enhancing co-operation among the governments and institutions of the two places.

    Mr Lee noted that Hong Kong, as a functional platform of the Belt & Road Initiative, is committed to deepening international exchanges and co-operation and leveraging its strengths as a “super connector” and “super value-adder” to facilitate and add value to government and business projects along the Belt & Road through the city’s world-class professional services.

    He also said that the Qatar National Vision 2030 and the Belt & Road Initiative align in their values and aspirations for achieving high-quality development through all-round co-operation, embracing economic diversification and innovation, as well as fostering friendship and facilitating exchanges.

    The Chief Executive supplemented that both Hong Kong and Qatar attach great importance to technological development and regard artificial intelligence as an engine of new economic development, and that he hoped Hong Kong and Qatar would enhance collaboration through joint research and exchanges, joint ventures, and cross-border investments to achieve mutual benefits.

    In addition, Mr Lee visited the Qatar Investment Authority to learn about the development of Qatar’s financial sector. Established in 2005, the authority is Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund. It manages and grows Qatar’s financial assets, with an aim to diversify Qatar’s economic development and ensure the country’s long-term financial sustainability. Mr Lee received an in-depth briefing on the operation and investment strategies of the sovereign wealth fund, and explored with the authority the development and co-operation opportunities for both sides in finance and the economy.

    In the afternoon, he attended a luncheon hosted by an international financial group, where he gained insights into the group’s analysis of Qatar’s banking and financial services industry, as well as its capital markets.

    Pointing out that Hong Kong is an international financial centre now moving towards also becoming an international green finance hub, Mr Lee said that last year the total amount of green and sustainable debt issued in Hong Kong exceeded US$84 billion, with green and sustainable bonds accounting for approximately US$43 billion. It captured around 45% of the total Asian market, ranking first in the region for seven consecutive years. He highlighted that under the principle of “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong and Mainland enterprises complement each other’s strengths, and that Hong Kong would give full play to its bridging role in attracting international investments to China and “going global” with Mainland enterprises. He welcomed Qatari enterprises to leverage Hong Kong’s broad and deep capital markets, professional financial services and seamless connectivity with the Mainland market to raise international funds for their sustainable infrastructure projects.

    Afterwards, Mr Lee led the delegation to visit Lusail City, the second-largest city in Qatar, to understand how the city integrates I&T with urban planning and infrastructure development. Lusail City is one of Qatar’s flagship smart cities, focusing on information and communication technology, with the aim of developing into a model for intelligent living, urban evolution and diverse cultural landscapes. He noted that Hong Kong, as the world’s third-largest financial centre, offers world-class professional services that can support Qatar’s investment needs, adding that Hong Kong and Qatar can explore co-operation and exchanges in areas such as sustainable urban development.

    Next on the itinerary is a visit to the National Museum of Qatar to learn about the country’s history and cultural heritage as well as a dinner hosted by the Ambassador Extraordinary & Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to the State of Qatar Cao Xiaolin.

    The Chief Executive and his delegation will continue their visit to Qatar tomorrow by meeting local political and business leaders before departing for Kuwait.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News