Category: Trade

  • MIL-OSI China: EU warns US tariff hike on steel, aluminum threatens trade talks

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The European Union’s (EU) trade chief warned on Wednesday that the United States’ decision to raise tariffs on steel and aluminum “clearly doesn’t help the ongoing negotiations” and risks undermining recent progress.

    European Commissioner for Trade and Economic Security Maros Sefcovic made the remarks at a press conference in Paris during the OECD 2025 Ministerial Council Meeting, held Tuesday and Wednesday.

    The EU trade chief added that the EU stands ready to defend its interests and will do its utmost to rebalance bilateral trade should negotiations collapse.

    Sefcovic said that during a meeting with U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer, he had told him the EU strongly regrets Washington’s decision to raise duties on imported steel and aluminium from 25 percent to 50 percent, effective Wednesday.

    “I explained to him that it clearly doesn’t help the ongoing negotiations, especially as we are making progress,” he said.

    He noted that transatlantic trade accounts for roughly 30 percent of global commerce and warned that if the relationship does not function properly, its repercussions would ripple beyond the two sides and across the global trading system. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cortez Masto Leads Nevada Delegation in Urging President Trump to Reverse Harmful Tariffs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Nevada Cortez Masto

    Washington, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Catherine Cortez Masto (D-Nev.) led Senator Jacky Rosen (D-Nev.) and Representatives Dina Titus (D-Nev.-01), Susie Lee (D-Nev.-03), and Steven Horsford (D-Nev.-04) in a letter to President Donald Trump urging him to reverse his blanket tariffs that have had harmful impacts on Nevada. The delegation expressed concern that the tariffs will continue to raise costs for Nevada families, make small businesses harder to operate, worsen the housing shortage, and threaten Nevada’s tourism economy.

    “We write to express our deep concern that your reckless and uncoordinated tariffs imposed on American allies and partners will have a destructive effect on the economy in our home state of Nevada,” wrote the delegation. “Targeted tariffs on our adversaries can be a useful tool to protect American jobs and support our national security; however, your blanket tariffs are the opposite of that. We urge you to reverse your approach and remove harmful tariffs that will only create uncertainty and higher costs for hardworking families and small businesses across Nevada.”

    “That is why we believe U.S. trade policy must be thoughtfully implemented to strengthen our economic bonds with our allies, while strongly confronting adversaries like China. Your administration’s implementation of blunt, widespread tariffs is just the opposite,” concluded the delegation. “It has only served to create chaos and uncertainty across the economy. Your tariffs are raising prices of everyday items for Nevada families and imposing higher costs on Nevada businesses including manufacturers, tourism, and other companies, stunting our state’s previously booming economic growth. We urge your administration to reverse course and commit to working with Congress to modernize our trade policies to ensure they work in the best interest of Nevada and the United States.”

    Read the full letter here.

    Senator Cortez Masto has continued to push the Trump Administration to address the impacts of Trump’s tariffs on working families and Nevada small businesses. Earlier this year, the Senator wrote a letter to the Administration demanding they provide their plan to mitigate the economic stress caused by the implementation of President Donald Trump’s tariffs and other executive actions. During a Senate Finance Committee hearing, Cortez Masto pressed U.S. Trade Representative Greer about the impacts of President Trump’s blanket tariffs on Nevadans, particularly those employed in the tourism and hospitality industry. The Senator introduced the Tariff Transparency Act to require the U.S. International Trade Commission to publicly investigate how Donald Trump’s recent tariffs on imports from Mexico and Canada will impact the American people.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: New report highlights food safety system at work

    Source: NZ Ministry for Primary Industries

    A report by New Zealand Food Safety identifies the recall of imported sesame seeds with the potential to cause Salmonella poisoning as last year’s biggest food safety event.

    The ‘Consumer-level food recalls annual report for 2024’, published today, says Salmonella was detected during routine testing by a New Zealand business importing the seeds.

    Consumer-level food recalls annual report for 2024 [PDF, 4.8 MB]

    “Thanks to the swift action of the team at New Zealand Food Safety, risk to the public was minimised. It was complex and meticulous work, involving testing and tracing potentially affected sesame seeds through the domestic market,” says New Zealand Food Safety deputy director-general Vincent Arbuckle.

    “As a result of these efforts potentially affected product was identified and removed from shelves. In total there were 15 related recalls where the seeds were used, including as ingredients in other products. Most importantly there were no confirmed reports of related illness.

    “Recalls are an important part of our work to protect consumers. New Zealand’s food safety system has a strong track record of keeping people safe and – given the volumes of food being produced, manufactured, and imported – incidences of related illness remain rare.

    “However, there are occasions when food safety issues occur, and that’s when we work quickly with food businesses to recall the affected product, removing it from the food supply chain and promoting public awareness.

    “Good regulations also play a key role. The rules for imported sesame seeds have recently been strengthened. They now receive more scrutiny at the border to help minimise the risk of Salmonella contamination.”

    Importing crushed sesame seeds

    The 2024 report shows New Zealand Food Safety supported food businesses to conduct 88 consumer-level food recalls.

    “It’s important to note that the number of recalls is not an accurate indicator of the level of risk to consumers. Numbers are dependent on many factors, including regulatory changes, business and public awareness of food-related problems, and reporting of those problems,” says Mr Arbuckle.

    Of the 88 recalls, 56 were initiated for domestically produced foods and 32 were for imported foods.

    Allergens in food were the leading cause for recalls in 2024, accounting for 46% of all recalls.

    “Food recalls are a sign that our food safety system is working to protect consumers,” says Mr Arbuckle.

    “You can help keep yourself and your family safe by subscribing to our recall alerts from the New Zealand Food Safety food recall page.

    Subscibe to food recall

    “With World Food Safety Day coming up on Saturday (7 June 2025) it’s a good time to make sure you’ve got the latest information to help keep you and yours safe.”

    Find details of recalled food products here:

    Recalled food products list

    By the numbers:

    • 88 consumer-level recalls in 2024.
    • Allergens were the leading cause for recalls in 2024 (40).
    • Gluten was the allergen that triggered the most recalls (12). 
    • 29 recalls were due to microbiological contamination.
    • 10 recalls were due to physical contamination.
    • 56 recalls were initiated from domestically produced foods and 32 recalls were from imported foods.

    Read the full report here:

    Consumer-level food recalls annual report 2024 [PDF, 4.8 MB]

    For further information and general enquiries, call MPI on 0800 00 83 33 or email info@mpi.govt.nz

    For media enquiries, contact the media team on 029 894 0328.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI: BitMine Immersion Technologies, Inc. Announces $18 Million Public Offering and Uplisting to NYSE American

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LAS VEGAS, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BitMine Immersion Technologies, Inc. (“BitMine” and the “Company”) (NYSE American: BMNR), a technology company focused on the accumulation of bitcoin for long-term investment, whether acquired by their bitcoin mining operations or from the proceeds of capital raising transactions, today announced the pricing of an underwritten public offering of 2,250,000 shares of its common stock at a price to the public of $8.00 per share, for gross proceeds of $18 million, before deducting underwriting discounts and offering expenses. In addition, the Company has granted the underwriters a 45-day option to purchase up to an additional 337,500 shares of common stock to cover over-allotments, if any. The offering is expected to close on June 6, 2025 subject to satisfaction of customary closing conditions.

    The Company also announced today that its common stock has been approved for listing on the NYSE American LLC stock exchange (“NYSE American”). Trading on NYSE American is expected to commence on June 5, 2025 under the trading symbol “BMNR.” Prices for the Company’s common stock will cease being quoted on the OTC Markets’ OTCQX Best Market concurrent with the NYSE American listing. Current stockholders of the Company do not need to take any action as a result of the uplisting.

    The Company intends to use the net proceeds of the offering to purchase bitcoin.

    ThinkEquity is acting as sole book-running manager for the offering.

    A registration statement on Form S-1 (File No. 333-284361) relating to the shares was filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and became effective on June 4, 2025. This offering is being made only by means of a prospectus. Copies of the final prospectus, when available, may be obtained from ThinkEquity, 17 State Street, 41st Floor, New York, New York 10004. The final prospectus will be filed with the SEC and will be available on the SEC’s website located at http://www.sec.gov.

    This press release shall not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy, nor shall there be any sale of these securities in any state or jurisdiction in which such an offer, solicitation or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such state or jurisdiction.

    About BitMine:
    BitMine is a Bitcoin Network Company, with a focus on Bitcoin mining, Synthetic Bitcoin Mining through involvement in Bitcoin mining hashrate as a financial product, offering advisory and mining services to companies interested in earning Bitcoin denominated revenues, and general Bitcoin advisory to public companies. BitMine’s operations are located in low-cost energy regions in Trinidad; Pecos, Texas; and Silverton, Texas.

    Forward Looking Statements:
    This press release contains statements that constitute “forward-looking statements.” The statements in this press release that are not purely historical are forward-looking statements which involve risks and uncertainties. This document specifically contains forward-looking statements regarding the offering, the expected proceeds from such offering, the expected use of proceeds from such offering, the expected start of trading on the NYSE American and the expected closing date of the offering. In evaluating these forward-looking statements, you should consider various factors, including our ability to keep pace with new technology and changing market needs; our ability to finance our current business and proposed future business; and the competitive environment of our business, as well as the performance of the stock market in general. Actual future performance outcomes and results may differ materially from those expressed in forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements are subject to numerous conditions, many of which are beyond BitMine’s control, including those set forth in the Risk Factors section of BitMine’s Form 10-K filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on April 3, 2025, as well as any other SEC filings, as amended or updated from time to time. Copies of BitMine’s filings with the SEC are available on the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov. BitMine undertakes no obligation to update these statements for revisions or changes after the date of this release, except as required by law.

    BitMine Immersion Technologies Contact:
    Jonathan Bates, Chairman and CEO
    info@bitminetech.io

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: ICYMI: Grassley Discusses AI Whistleblower Protection Act During “A Starting Point” Interview

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Iowa Chuck Grassley
    WASHINGTON – Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-Iowa) joined “A Starting Point” to share details about his AI Whistleblower Protection Act.
    The legislation provides explicit whistleblower protections to those developing and deploying Artificial Intelligence (AI). Currently, some AI companies’ restrictive severance and nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) create a chilling effect on current and former employees looking to make whistleblower disclosures to the federal government, including Congress.
    Video and excerpts of Grassley’s remarks follow.

    VIDEO
    On the Importance of Whistleblowers:
    “A whistleblower can be anybody, most often in government that I deal with, but sometimes in the private sector. People that know something isn’t right, [that a] law might be violated. People might be stealing taxpayers’ money [or] taxes aren’t being paid, whatever the case might be. They think it’s not right. They may not even think of themselves as a whistleblower. I think of them as just patriotic Americans that want the government to do what the government’s supposed to do: obey the laws [and] spend the taxpayers’ money the way Congress intended.”
    On the Need for AI-Specific Whistleblower Protections:
    “I’ve had [AI] whistleblowers come to me and say that things aren’t right. They want to expose it … That’s why we need laws that would protect whistleblowers within the AI community, as we would any place in government or in the private sector …
    “My bill will explicitly protect communications of current and former AI employees making legally protected disclosure to Congress or a federal agency or to a supervisor. It seems as time goes on, AI is growing. My timely legislation will bring transparency and accountability to the artificial intelligence sector before it’s too late.”
    On Shady Non-Disclosure Agreements:
    “[These] non-disclosure statements that would say ‘you can’t talk about this,’ and it just prohibits and inhibits people that know something’s wrong coming to Congress to talk about it. It’s a violation of free speech, [and] it’s a way of covering up things that are wrong, that either people in government don’t want public, or private business wants to keep the information within the business.”
    On the Free Market System:
    “I believe in the free enterprise system. And of course, that causes me to support pro-business, pro-growth policies. I don’t see my whistleblower protection interest in any way violating that, because the government is legitimately a referee within the free enterprise system. So, all of this legislation isn’t about upending any non-disclosure agreements or ending companies’ rights to confidentiality. This is pretty simply stated as being something to ensure people who see wrongdoing can speak up without retribution before more harm is done to the public.
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: The Government of Canada outlines 2025 measures to protect Southern Resident killer whales

    Source: Government of Canada News

    The Government of Canada recognizes that Southern Resident killer whales continue to face imminent threats to their survival and recovery, and that protecting these iconic marine mammals requires comprehensive and immediate action. The 2025 management measures focus on addressing the three primary threats to Southern Resident killer whales: acoustic and physical disturbance; prey availability and accessibility; and contaminants.

    1. Acoustic and physical disturbances from vessels

    Approach distance

    Vessels must stay at least 400 metres away and must not impede the path of all killer whales year-round in Southern British Columbia coastal waters between Campbell River to just north of Ucluelet. Commercial whale-watching and ecotourism companies who receive an authorization from the Minister of Transport and Internal Trade will be able to view non-Southern Resident killer whales (such as transient (Biggs) killer whales) from 200 metres, given their expertise in identifying different types of killer whales.

    If a vessel finds itself within 400 metres of a killer whale, they are asked to turn off fish finders and echo sounders and put the engine in neutral when safe to do so to allow animals to pass.

    If a vessel is within 1,000 metres of a killer whale, they are asked to reduce speed to less than seven knots when safe to do so to lessen engine noise and vessel wake.

    To address imminent threats to Southern Resident killer whale survival and the Government of Canada’s commitment to develop longer-term actions for the recovery of Southern Resident killer whales, Fisheries and Oceans Canada proposes to increase the approach distance to 1,000 metres for Southern Resident killer whales through amendments to the Marine Mammal Regulations under the Fisheries Act. The process for amending the Marine Mammal Regulations remains ongoing. The exact scope and implementation of any regulatory measures will be informed by future consultations with directly affected First Nations, Wildlife Management Boards, stakeholders, and other affected parties upon publication of the draft regulation in the Canada Gazette, Part 1. The consultations are intended to seek feedback on the scope of these measures and identify and mitigate, to the extent possible, potential impacts.

    Speed restricted zones

    The 2025 measures continue the mandatory speed restricted zones near Swiftsure Bank, co-developed with the Pacheedaht First Nation.

    • From June 1 until November 30, 2025, all vessels must slow down to a maximum of 10 knots over ground in two speed restricted zones near Swiftsure Bank. The first area is in the Protected Fisheries Management Area 121-1 and the second speed restricted zone is located near the mouth of the Nitinat River from Carmanah Point to Longitude 125 degrees west.
    • Exemptions are in place for the following:
      • vessels in distress or providing assistance to a vessel or person in distress
      • vessels avoiding immediate or unforeseen danger
      • government or law enforcement on official business
      • permitted research if the research requires higher speed; and
      • a sailing vessel proceeding under sail and not being propelled by machinery
    • While the mandatory speed restricted zones and the voluntary slowdowns coordinated by the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority’s Enhancing Cetacean and Habitat Observation (ECHO) Program both cover known foraging areas at or near Swiftsure Bank, they are separate measures from each other and take place in different locations. The ECHO Program slowdown at Swiftsure Bank is a voluntary ship slowdown which takes effect across 23 nautical miles in both the outbound and inbound lanes at Swiftsure Bank.

    Vessel restricted zones (Formerly Interim sanctuary zones)

    Formerly known as Interim Sanctuary Zones, Vessel Restricted Zones create spaces of refuge for the whales. The location of these zones is based on scientific and Indigenous knowledge of historically important foraging areas for Southern Resident killer whales.

    • From June 1 until November 30, 2025, no vessel traffic or fishing activity is allowed in vessel restricted zones off the southwest coast of South Pender Island and the southeast end of Saturna Island. Exceptions will be allowed for emergency situations and vessels engaged in Indigenous food, social, and ceremonial fisheries.
    • To ensure the safety of those operating human-powered vessels, a 20-metre corridor next to shore will allow kayakers and other paddlers to transit through these zones. If a killer whale is in the sanctuary at the time, paddlers must remain 400 metres away from the whales.

    Voluntary speed reduction zone

    In 2025, Transport Canada is continuing with a voluntary speed reduction zone in Tumbo Channel, in effect once again from June 1 to November 30, 2025. When travelling through this area, it is recommended that vessels reduce their speed to 10 knots, when safe to do so.

    2. Prey availability

    Chinook, chum and coho salmon are an essential part of the Southern Resident killer whale diet. Last year’s process developed and consulted on salmon fisheries management measures for both 2024 and 2025, which were announced on June 3, 2024.

    To address the limited availability of prey, Fisheries and Oceans Canada is continuing a combination of fishing restrictions in key foraging areas within their critical habitat, along with voluntary measures coastwide. These measures will reduce disturbance and competition for salmon between fish harvesters and killer whales. Opportunities will be available for non-salmon related recreational and commercial fisheries, for Indigenous food, social and ceremonial harvest as well as Treaty-defined fishing access.

    For 2025, the following measures will help protect the whales’ access to salmon and minimize disturbance in key foraging areas:

    • Area-based closures in Southern Resident killer whale key foraging areas for recreational and commercial salmon fisheries:
      • around the Strait of Juan de Fuca (portions of Subareas 20-4 and 20-5) in effect from August 1 until October 31
      • Swiftsure Bank (portions of Subareas 20-1, 21-0, 121-1 and 121-2) in effect from July 15 until October 31
      • around the mouth of the Fraser River (a portion of Subarea 29-3) from August 1 to September 30
    • The Southern Gulf Islands area-based closures (Subarea 18-9 and portions of 18-2, 18-4 and 18-5) will be in effect as early as May 1, based on confirmed presence of Southern Resident killer whales. These closures will be in place until November 30, 2025.
    • All fishers are encouraged to temporarily cease fishing activities (e.g., do not haul in gear where appropriate) when killer whales are within 1,000 metres. This voluntary measure is in place year-round throughout Canadian Pacific waters.

    To address the ongoing imminent threats to Southern Resident killer whale survival and recovery, proposed adjustments to the Southern Resident killer whale commercial and recreational salmon fishing closures are being considered and consulted on for 2025 and or 2026 under the Fisheries Act to address the threat of reduced prey availability. The exact scope and implementation of any regulatory measures will be informed by consultations with directly affected First Nations, Wildlife Management Boards, industry stakeholders, and other affected parties. The consultations are intended to seek feedback on the scope of these measures and identify and mitigate, to the extent possible, potential impacts.

     

    Enhancing Cetacean Habitat and Observation Program (ECHO)

    For the ninth year in a row, the Vancouver Fraser Port Authority-led Enhancing Cetacean and Habitat Observation (ECHO) Program will coordinate large-scale threat reduction measures to support the recovery of endangered southern resident killer whales. These measures will include a ship slowdown in Haro Strait, Boundary Pass and Swiftsure Bank, and a route alteration in the Strait of Juan de Fuca. Full details of the ECHO Program’s voluntary measures, including dates, target slowdown speeds and location coordinates, are available on the ECHO Program’s website (www.portvancouver.com/echo).

    3. Contaminants

    Considering the persistence of many contaminants in the environment, the Government of Canada and its partners continue to progress on long-term actions to support Southern Resident killer whale recovery in the following areas:

    The Government of Canada has also developed and updated the online Pollutants Affecting Whales and their Prey Inventory Tool, which maps estimates of pollutant releases within the habitats of Southern Resident killer whales and their primary prey, Chinook salmon. This tool will help model the impacts of additional mitigation measures and controls.

    To better understand the threat of contaminants and to provide input into government action, the Government of Canada leads a technical working group focused on contaminants in the environment. This group is comprised of key partners from all orders of government, academia and non-governmental organizations and:

    • has identified priority contaminants of concern;
    • has provided recommendations for the long-term actions to support Southern Resident killer whale recovery; and
    • conducts important monitoring and research, to identify contaminant exposures to Southern Resident killer whales, their habitat and their prey.

    In addition, the group continues to recommend and develop environmental quality guidelines for the protection of Southern Resident killer whales and their prey and compares them with monitoring data to identify areas of potential risk for further action.

    Compliance with management measures depends on public awareness. The Government of Canada continues to collaborate with educational organizations, environmental groups, Indigenous partners, and government bodies to raise awareness of the Southern Resident killer whale protection measures through public education and outreach efforts. For further information, please see Whales and contaminants – Canada.ca and how Canada is reducing the threat of contaminants to Southern Resident Killer Whales – Canada.ca.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: SPEC Resumes Global Collaboration with Companies on U.S. BIS Entity List

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    GAINESVILLE, Va., June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Standard Performance Evaluation Corp. (SPEC), the trusted leader in computing benchmarks, announced today that SPEC International Standards Group (ISG) successfully advocated that the United States clarify export policies to allow companies on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Entity List to participate in creating standards. SPEC ISG invites the return of member companies excluded from collaborating due to policy reasons, bringing together the strength of industry, academia, and research from all over the world to cooperate on future computing energy efficiency standards.

    A few years ago, in order to ensure the safe application of 5G technology, the US government stipulated that US agencies should not cooperate with companies on the BIS Entity List. This ban was never intended to restrict the development of global standards. However, due to the overly strict definition of the term “standard” in the original exemption clause of BIS, the SPEC SERT suite was classified as a restricted technology, which prevented SPEC (an international standards organization with 12 Chinese member companies) from continuing to develop standards with its members on the Entity List.

    Harmonized standards are best suited to consistent design and regulatory requirements, resulting in significant cost reduction for manufacturers to meet additional benchmark requirements worldwide.

    SPEC President David Reiner said: “Restricting companies on the Entity List from participating in the development of energy efficiency benchmarks risks dividing the global standards process, negating the primary goal of standardization. Through years of hard work, in collaboration with other international organizations, we are pleased to have successfully promoted changes to U.S. policies to remove the unintended restrictions on the development of international standardized benchmarks.”

    SPEC successfully advocated changes to U.S. rules

    In 2020, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s BIS changed its rules to allow U.S. companies to work in standards organizations to ensure U.S. proposals take full account of international standards that underlie product development and interoperability. While this was an important milestone, the change did not allow SPEC to invite Entity List businesses that were among its former members to re-join, nor to invite other entities on the Entity List to join. In response, SPEC took a series of actions to advocate for the revision of relevant U.S. laws and to promote international technology exchanges and innovation. As part of these efforts, SPEC created the International Standards Group (ISG), specifically designed to comply with the updated BIS requirements and provide a clear separation between SPEC’s international standards work and other SPEC projects.

    As a result of SPEC’s successful efforts, BIS improved regulations in late 2022. Under the final regulations, organizations on the BIS Entity List are no longer restricted from licensing, obtaining updates, or participating in the development of the SPEC SERT Suite within the SPEC ISG. These standards development activities related to the implementation, promulgation, or maintenance of the ISO/IEC 21836:2020 standard qualify for the BIS updated standards-related activities exemption. As a result, BIS listed entities are now able to obtain SPEC SERT Suite licenses, updates, and membership status in the SPEC ISG Server Efficiency Committee.

    The return of excluded members is critical because it will enable SPEC to continue to promote effective global standardized benchmarks and apply them to government energy efficiency regulations. The successful adoption of SPEC SERT suites by government regulations such as China National Institute of Standardization, EU Lot9 Ecodesign, Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the U.S. EPA Energy Star is critical to SPEC’s efforts to promote sustainable technology development around the world. For example, computer servers that are ENERGY STAR certified are, on average, about 38% more energy efficient than standard servers. This means that if all computer servers sold in the United States were ENERGY STAR certified, end users would save more than $4 billion per year.

    The next-generation energy efficiency rating tool is currently under development by the SPEC ISG Server Committee, which includes representatives from Ampere, AMD, Dell, HPE, IBM, Intel, IEIT, Microsoft, Nvidia, and the University of Würzburg. The SERT 3 Suite utilizes the SPECpower Committee’s innovative modular architecture, allowing streamlined integration of the latest versions of the Chauffeur benchmark harness and the PTDaemon Interface, which are also utilized by other SPEC benchmarks. This modular design reduces the time required for developing future workloads, adding new architectures, and supporting new power analyzers and temperature sensors.

    Klaus-Dieter Lange, Chair of SPEC ISG, said: “We are pleased that SPEC was able to successfully work with the U.S. Department of Commerce to find a solution to this critical issue. We welcome the world’s innovative companies to join in the development of the next-generation SPEC SERT Suite, which will enable governments and businesses to more effectively achieve sustainable development and carbon emission reduction goals.”

    About SPEC
    SPEC is a non-profit organization that establishes, maintains and endorses standardized benchmarks and tools to evaluate performance for the newest generation of computing systems. Its membership comprises more than 120 leading computer hardware and software vendors, educational institutions, research organizations and government agencies worldwide.

    Media contact:
    Brigit Valencia
    360.597.4516
    brigit@compel-pr.com

    Images available upon request.

    SPEC® and SERT® are trademarks of the Standard Performance Evaluation Corporation. All other product and company names herein may be trademarks of their registered owners.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Government of Canada announces 2025 measures to protect Southern Resident killer whales

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    June 4, 2025            British Columbia, Canada                            

    The government is acting to protect Canada’s nature, biodiversity and water. Southern Resident killer whales are iconic to Canada’s Pacific coast and hold deep cultural significance for Indigenous Peoples and coastal communities in British Columbia.  

    That’s why today, the Minister of Transport and Internal Trade, the Honourable Chrystia Freeland, the Minister of Fisheries, the Honourable Joanne Thompson, and the Minister of Environment and Climate Change Canada, the Honourable Julie Dabrusin, announced measures to protect Southern Resident killer whales on the west coast.

    These measures will primarily address acoustic and physical disturbance to Southern Resident killer whales from recreational, fishing, and whale watching vessels.

    The 2025 vessel and fishery measures include: 

    • Two mandatory speed restricted zones near Swiftsure Bank, effective June 1 to November 30, 2025.
    • Two vessel restricted zones off Pender and Saturna Islands, effective June 1 to November 30, 2025.
    • The continued requirement for vessels to stay at least 400 metres away from all killer whales, and a prohibition from impeding the path of all killer whales in Southern British Columbia coastal waters between Campbell River and Ucluelet, including Barkley and Howe Sound. This is now in effect until May 31, 2026.
    • A voluntary speed reduction zone in Tumbo Channel, off the North side of Saturna Island, effective June 1 to November 30, 2025.
    • An agreement with authorized local whale watching and ecotourism industry partners to abstain from offering or promoting tours viewing Southern Resident killer whales.
    • Fishery closures for commercial and recreational salmon fisheries in key Southern Resident killer whale foraging areas.  
    • Continued actions to reduce contaminants in the environment affecting whales and their prey, including developing tools to track pollutants and their sources and monitoring contaminants in air, freshwater, sediments, and wastewater.

    Fisheries and Oceans Canada proposes to increase the approach distance to 1,000 metres for Southern Resident killer whales through amendments to the Marine Mammal Regulations under the Fisheries Act.

    The federal government will continue its ongoing efforts and long-term actions alongside all partners, including First Nations, stakeholders, and the marine and tourism industries to support the protection and recovery of the Southern Resident killer whale population.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI: ETF Approval Sparks Institutional Mining Rush, PAIRMiner Scales Up

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LOS ANGELES, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — More offline retail inverter community can now participate in the mining economy without the hassle of hardware or technical knowledge using PAIRMiner, a UK-regulated cloud mining platform, as Bitcoin experiences a surge driven by growing institutional adoption and recent approval of spot Bitcoin ETFs.

    Founded in 2009, PAIRMiner offers users remote access to hash power for mining Bitcoin (BTC), Ethereum (ETH), Litecoin (LTC), and other cryptocurrencies. Interest in the platform sharply rose in early June 2025, coinciding with broader market enthusiasm following regulatory breakthroughs that have brought institutional investors more deeply into the crypto ecosystem.

    Institutional Momentum Reshapes the Crypto Industry

    The trajectory of Bitcoin in 2025 has been greatly influenced by several notable measures enacted by various authorities and organizations. This year, certain regions, including parts of the US and Europe, approved spot Bitcoin Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs), allowing direct investment in Bitcoin via standard brokerage accounts. This has significantly expanded market participation by pension funds, asset managers, and sovereign wealth funds.

    “The approval of spot ETFs has not only validated Bitcoin’s role as an asset class but also created structural demand from institutions that were previously hesitant due to regulatory uncertainties,” said Heindrova, spokesperson for PAIRMiner. “ Individual investors are now looking for efficient and straightforward methods to be involved with the digital asset economy, particularly through mining, as this change is streaming down to retail. “

    These developments have also led to a tightening of available Bitcoin supply, increasing the attractiveness of mining as a method of accumulation.PAIRMiner serves as a connection between the changing institutional environment and personal involvement, providing a secure, cloud-based platform for mining cryptocurrencies without the need to own physical mining rigs. 

    Regulated, Accessible, and Built for All Investors

    Recognized by the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), PAIRMiner presents a compliant and clear entry point into the world of crypto mining for all investors. Its platform is designed for both beginners and seasoned crypto users and provides access to mining services without the need for capital-intensive hardware or ongoing maintenance.

    Fundamental highlights of the platform include:  

    • $150 Free Cloud Hashrate Credit: New users get a free allocation to start mining right away, and every new user qualifies for a free allocation.
    • Unique Mining Contracts: A range of flexible options suitable to cater to different financial plans and levels of risks.
    • Instant Income Tracking: An easy-to-use dashboard that helps users to efficiently manage and adjust their passive income approach.
    • Secure and Safe  Withdrawals: Users can withdraw their profits at any time, fully supported by platform transparency and fund control.

    Market Sentiment Turns Positive

    Bitcoin trading above major support levels and spot ETF inflows reaching record levels, PAIRMiner has noticed a jump in activity on its platform. The company reveals a 40% surge in registrations since the beginning of Q2 2025, more users have chosen to go with short-term mining contracts that are delivering daily consistent rewards to them.

    The change mirrors the whole crypto space’s upbeat mood. From hedge funds redistributing portfolios to retail investors looking for alternative to dormant savings accounts, digital asset is again the leading financial innovation—the mining is still one of the few ways to get crypto directly.

    Forward Outlook

    While PAIRMiner stays in its three-dimensional growth and innovation on user-core mining features, it keeps on the path of supporting safe and scalable participation. The platform’s clear operation and FCA compliance put it at the very centre of the game, helping it to satisfy the newcomers and well-experienced investors in the market of rapid maturity.

    To get more details or check out contract options, visit https://pairminer.com/

    Media Contact:
    Agnes Heindrova
    PR Manager
    Email: agnes@pairminer.com
    Web: https://pairminer.com

    Disclaimer: This press release is for informational purposes only and does not constitute financial advice, legal advice, or investment recommendations.Cryptocurrency involves risk and market volatility. Please research or consult a licensed financial advisor before making investment decisions a Pairminer.com and associated parties are not liable for any financial loss incurred.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Shaheen Grills Secretary Lutnick on Impacts of Damaging Steel Tariff on Granite State Businesses, Defense Supply Chain

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New Hampshire Jeanne Shaheen

    (Washington, NH) – U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), a senior member of the U.S. Senate Appropriations and Small Business Committees, today questioned U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick during a Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations Subcommittee hearing examining the U.S. Department of Commerce’s budget request. During the hearing, Shaheen grilled Secretary Lutnick on President Trump’s damaging steel tariffs – which were recently doubled – and drew attention to the impacts on New Hampshire businesses and the nation’s defense supply chain. You can watch the Senator’s full remarks and questions here.

    “Last month I visited a New Hampshire company that makes ball bearings for the aerospace industry. And I agree we should be protecting the aerospace industry in this country. It’s our biggest export in New Hampshire – aerospace parts. They were very concerned about the impact of the steel tariffs on their ability to get ball bearings. They said not only has their costs gone up, but the lead time to get the steel to make the bearings. They only have one domestic supplier. While they had suppliers in the Indo-Pacific and in Canada, those have been eliminated under the tariffs. They said that their lead times have gone from 20 weeks to two and a half years because of the tariffs. I think this creates a real challenge with respect to our national security. A good percentage of the work they do is with the Department of Defense,” Shaheen said of the impacts tariffs are having on a Granite State manufacturer.

    Secretary Lutnick dismissed Senator Shaheen’s concerns about rising costs for small businesses.

    Shaheen also raised concerns over Secretary Lutnick’s plans to eliminate the Manufacturing Extension Partnership whose Centers provide access to expert advisors and technological services that help grow the U.S. manufacturing base, reduce operating costs, develop new technology and jobs and compete on a global scale. Shaheen noted that in Fiscal Year 2023, every dollar of federal investment in the program generated $24.60 in new sales growth and $27.50 in new client investment.

    Senator Shaheen is helping lead efforts in Congress to mitigate the harmful impacts of President Trump’s tariffs. In January, Shaheen introduced the Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes on Imported Goods Act which would limit the president’s ability to leverage sweeping tariffs that increase costs for American consumers and families. Her effort to pass this bill by unanimous consent was blocked by Senate Republicans. In recent months, Shaheen has traveled across the Granite State to visit businesses including Chatila’s Bakery, C&J, DCI Furniture, Mount Cabot Maple, American Calan Inc., NH Ball Bearings and Colby Footwear. to hear directly from Granite Staters impacted by the administration’s tariffs. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Parliament Hansard Report – Invest New Zealand Bill — In Committee—Clauses 1 and 2 – 001500

    Source: New Zealand Parliament

    Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. We understand what the purpose is, because we had a discussion about this last night. But just following on from the previous speaker, the Hon Damien O’Connor, who was the previous trade Minister—and he captured it quite nicely—we already have a number of one-stop shop agencies for this. What is unique about this particular one?

    I want to go on to the commencement date first, which is 1 July 2025. I want to check with the Minister, the Hon Tama Potaka: we’ve heard from the Minister previously on some of the work that is being done, potentially, in the background. But I think what we haven’t heard, succinctly, is a response to the question that was asked around the transition measures and whether they will be in time for 1 July, particularly from the perspective of collective agreements in terms of the Public Service perspective. So that’s my question in terms of the commencement date—whether 1 July is feasible or whether we should be looking at pushing the 1 July date out further.

    But just now coming to the title of the bill, I know that we talk about “Invest New Zealand”, but what we’ve heard from the Minister—and, to be honest, every three questions that we ask, we get maybe one answer and the other two left unanswered; you know, we still haven’t heard exactly what was the advice given from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and we still haven’t really heard why the regulatory impact statement and the Budget had different amounts allocated to Invest New Zealand.

    We are really curious as to whether “Invest New Zealand” is actually the best name for this, because there seems to be a half-heartedness when it comes to this particular bill and this particular agency, and there’s going to be a lot of confusion, and, to the Minister’s own words, “opaqueness”, when it comes to the way that agencies can be set up. Fundamentally, when we’re looking at the title of this bill, I wonder if the Minister in the chair would consider, from all of the things we’ve discussed, the lack of reassurance we have received from the Minister that this is indeed something that is going to be good for New Zealanders and for New Zealand in general. We’ve heard things and we’ve heard more concerns and more questions than actual responses, and the previous speaker, the Hon Damien O’Connor, mentioned that this is essentially going to be a real estate agency that’s going to sell off New Zealand one bit at a time.

    So I wondered if a better title for this bill, rather than “Invest New Zealand”, would be “Divest New Zealand”, because that’s what, fundamentally, the concerns around this agency are going to be. We are actually no longer supporting New Zealand entrepreneurship and also innovation, but, instead, we expect overseas companies, carte-blanche, without any sort of precautions and provisions—we didn’t hear anything around how they’re going to ensure, from a procedural perspective, from an operational perspective, that there is not going to be any sort of anti-competitive measures, anti – money-laundering measures, or any of those things. Yes, I admit that they’re part of domestic legislation, but the fact is that just because the law is in place does not mean that the agency is well equipped to ensure that they are followed.

    So I personally think that “Divest New Zealand” is a better term for us to use. But other ones—to be fair, if the Minister thinks that “Divest New Zealand” is a bit too on the nose and too similar to “Invest New Zealand”, we can look, I think, at changing the title to “Country for Sale”, because that seems kind of appropriate as well, or even just “Selling New Zealand Out”.

    I think the other appropriate title, when we’re looking at the title of this—again, although we do see in the departmental report some of the advice that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has undertaken in terms of our Te Tiriti obligations, we’re still not entirely convinced, particularly in light of some of our trade agreements but also in light of some of the current trajectory that the Government is going in. I think if we really want to signal to the world that we are a country that upholds indigenous rights, “Invest Aotearoa” would be a more appropriate title.

    So I would like to hear from the Minister as to whether he would consider any of those titles and the change to the commencement date.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Parliament Hansard Report – Wednesday, 4 June 2025 (continued on Thursday, 5 June 2025) – Volume 784 – 001501

    Source: New Zealand Parliament

    Dr LAWRENCE XU-NAN (Green): Thank you, Madam Chair. We understand what the purpose is, because we had a discussion about this last night. But just following on from the previous speaker, the Hon Damien O’Connor, who was the previous trade Minister—and he captured it quite nicely—we already have a number of one-stop shop agencies for this. What is unique about this particular one?

    I want to go on to the commencement date first, which is 1 July 2025. I want to check with the Minister, the Hon Tama Potaka: we’ve heard from the Minister previously on some of the work that is being done, potentially, in the background. But I think what we haven’t heard, succinctly, is a response to the question that was asked around the transition measures and whether they will be in time for 1 July, particularly from the perspective of collective agreements in terms of the Public Service perspective. So that’s my question in terms of the commencement date—whether 1 July is feasible or whether we should be looking at pushing the 1 July date out further.

    But just now coming to the title of the bill, I know that we talk about “Invest New Zealand”, but what we’ve heard from the Minister—and, to be honest, every three questions that we ask, we get maybe one answer and the other two left unanswered; you know, we still haven’t heard exactly what was the advice given from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and we still haven’t really heard why the regulatory impact statement and the Budget had different amounts allocated to Invest New Zealand.

    We are really curious as to whether “Invest New Zealand” is actually the best name for this, because there seems to be a half-heartedness when it comes to this particular bill and this particular agency, and there’s going to be a lot of confusion, and, to the Minister’s own words, “opaqueness”, when it comes to the way that agencies can be set up. Fundamentally, when we’re looking at the title of this bill, I wonder if the Minister in the chair would consider, from all of the things we’ve discussed, the lack of reassurance we have received from the Minister that this is indeed something that is going to be good for New Zealanders and for New Zealand in general. We’ve heard things and we’ve heard more concerns and more questions than actual responses, and the previous speaker, the Hon Damien O’Connor, mentioned that this is essentially going to be a real estate agency that’s going to sell off New Zealand one bit at a time.

    So I wondered if a better title for this bill, rather than “Invest New Zealand”, would be “Divest New Zealand”, because that’s what, fundamentally, the concerns around this agency are going to be. We are actually no longer supporting New Zealand entrepreneurship and also innovation, but, instead, we expect overseas companies, carte-blanche, without any sort of precautions and provisions—we didn’t hear anything around how they’re going to ensure, from a procedural perspective, from an operational perspective, that there is not going to be any sort of anti-competitive measures, anti – money-laundering measures, or any of those things. Yes, I admit that they’re part of domestic legislation, but the fact is that just because the law is in place does not mean that the agency is well equipped to ensure that they are followed.

    So I personally think that “Divest New Zealand” is a better term for us to use. But other ones—to be fair, if the Minister thinks that “Divest New Zealand” is a bit too on the nose and too similar to “Invest New Zealand”, we can look, I think, at changing the title to “Country for Sale”, because that seems kind of appropriate as well, or even just “Selling New Zealand Out”.

    I think the other appropriate title, when we’re looking at the title of this—again, although we do see in the departmental report some of the advice that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has undertaken in terms of our Te Tiriti obligations, we’re still not entirely convinced, particularly in light of some of our trade agreements but also in light of some of the current trajectory that the Government is going in. I think if we really want to signal to the world that we are a country that upholds indigenous rights, “Invest Aotearoa” would be a more appropriate title.

    So I would like to hear from the Minister as to whether he would consider any of those titles and the change to the commencement date.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Proposition 123 Equity Program to Support 1,017 Affordable Housing Units Across Colorado

    Source: US State of Colorado

    DENVER – Today, Gov. Jared Polis, the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT), and Colorado Housing and Finance Authority (CHFA) announced eleven recipients of voter-approved Proposition 123 Equity funds. This funding is intended to provide investment capital for an estimated 1,017 low- and middle-income multifamily affordable rental housing units in communities across the state including Buena Vista, Denver, Monte Vista and Trinidad. 

    “We are focused on building more housing Coloradans can afford and these funds are an important step in building more homes across the state so Coloradans can live where you choose, close to jobs, schools, in the communities we love,” said Gov. Jared Polis. 

    Among the recipients, the Fieldhouse Apartments in Idaho Springs plans to serve residents earning 70% – 100% of the Area Median Income (AMI), and will offer a preference to local school district employees. The proposed Holy Trinity Apartments is an adaptive reuse of the Historic Holy Trinity Convent and School, located in downtown Trinidad. The development of St. Louis Landing Phase I will include a purpose-built Early Childhood Learning Center and offer units for residents earning 30% – 120% AMI in Fraser. Denver’s Blue Room House plans to offer rental apartments between 30% – 80% AMI, using modular construction. 

    Five recipients plan to utilize modular and off-site construction, including Colorado manufacturers Vederra Modular, Aboda, and Fading West, all companies supported by the Innovative Housing Incentive Program (IHIP) and Proposition 123’s Modular and Factory-built Finance program as part of the state’s efforts to support and grow this industry. 

    “We’re committed to strengthening economies across Colorado by ensuring everyone has a place to call home. These investments will strengthen communities while providing residents the opportunity to benefit directly from the success of these developments through the Tenant Equity Vehicle, expected to launch this year,” said Eve Lieberman, OEDIT Executive Director. 

    The Proposition 123 Equity program offers below-market-rate equity investments for developers focused on building low- and/or middle-income housing. The recipients announced today prioritized the State’s strategic land use goals including transit oriented development or walkability to a community job center, water and energy efficient or all electric design, plus demonstrating a readiness to proceed. In addition, residents will benefit from the Tenant Equity Vehicle (TEV), a program being designed to share Proposition 123 program earnings with tenants to assist with building up savings that can be used for down payment assistance or other important needs. 

    “These investments will support the development of quality affordable housing in communities located throughout Colorado,” said Thomas Bryan, Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer of CHFA. “In addition, the Tenant Equity Vehicle is an exciting innovation to further support housing stability and economic prosperity for residents supported by the Equity program.” 

    A total of $67,500,074 has been preliminarily approved for the eleven recipients. Final award details will be determined during the underwriting process for each project. The AMIs proposed by the recipients range from 30% – 120% AMI. 

    The awardees include: 

    Alpine Valley Apartments – $3,700,00 – Monte Vista 2
    6 units for tenants earning 80%-120% of the AMI 

    Balsam Townhomes – $1,881,360 – Lakewood 
    20 units for tenants earning 90% of the AMI 

    Blue Room House One – $3,800,000 – Denver 
    54 units for tenants earning 30%-80% of the AMI 

    Cityline Station Phase II – $8,049,671 – Greeley 
    310 units for tenants earning 70%-90% of the AMI Exodus at 

    Green Valley Ranch – $9,000,000 – Denver 
    205 units for tenants earning 70%-90% of the AMI 

    Fieldhouse Apartments – $8,500,000 – Idaho Springs 1
    20 units for tenants earning 70%-100% of the AMI 

    Holy Trinity Apartments – $6,889,956 – Trinidad 
    46 units for tenants earning 80%-100% of the AMI 

    St. Louis Landing Phase I – $12,900,000 – Fraser 
    129 units for tenants earning 30%-120% of the AMI 

    Teller Street Apartments – $6,500,000 – Arvada 
    54 units for tenants earning 70%-90% of the AMI 

    The Crossing Apartments – $4,279,087 – Buena Vista 
    33 units for tenants earning 90% of the AMI 

    The Flour Mill – $2,000,000 – Salida 
    20 units for tenants earning 80%-100% of the AMI 

    The Equity program is funded by the Affordable Housing Financing Fund established by Proposition 123, which is managed by OEDIT and administered by CHFA to distribute 60% of Proposition 123 funding in support of land banking, equity and concessionary debt for affordable housing. With the projects announced today, approximately $252 million has been awarded through the Affordable Housing Financing Fund. 

    Ongoing updates on funding are available at coloradoaffordablehousingfinancingfund.com and by signing up to receive newsletter updates. 

    About the Colorado Affordable Housing Financing Fund 

    Passed by voters in November 2022, Proposition 123 established the State Affordable Housing Fund to advance the development and preservation of affordable housing in Colorado. The measure directs 40% of those funds to the Colorado Affordable Housing Support Fund administered by the state Department of Local Affairs (DOLA) and 60% of funds to the Colorado Affordable Housing Financing Fund managed by OEDIT. OEDIT selected Colorado Housing and Finance Authority (CHFA) to serve as the Affordable Housing Financing Fund third-party administrator. The Affordable Housing Financing Fund consists of three programs: Land Banking, Equity and Concessionary Debt. 

    About the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT) 

    The Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT) works to empower all to thrive in Colorado’s economy. Under the leadership of the Governor and in collaboration with economic development partners across the state, we foster a thriving business environment through funding and financial programs, training, consulting and informational resources across industries and regions. We promote economic growth and long-term job creation by recruiting, retaining, and expanding Colorado businesses and providing programs that support entrepreneurs and businesses of all sizes at every stage of growth. Our goal is to protect what makes our state a great place to live, work, start a business, raise a family, visit and retire—and make it accessible to everyone. Learn more about OEDIT. 

    About Colorado Housing and Finance Authority (CHFA) 

    For more than 50 years, CHFA has strengthened Colorado by investing in affordable housing and community development. CHFA invests in affordable homeownership, the development and preservation of affordable rental housing, helps small- and medium-sized businesses access capital, offers technical assistance and financial support to strengthen local communities, and supports mission-aligned nonprofits through philanthropic investment. CHFA is not a state agency. CHFA is a self-sustaining public enterprise. For more information about CHFA, please visit chfainfo.com or call 1.800.877.chfa (2432).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Federated Farmers – Save our sheep billboards hit Wellington

    Source: Federated Farmers

    Federated Farmers have taken the fight for the future of New Zealand sheep farming to the streets of Wellington, with bold digital billboards visible directly from Ministers’ Beehive offices.
    The message to politicians is clear and concise: sheep are not the problem – stop planting productive farmland in pine trees for carbon credits.
    “We wanted this campaign to be bold and directly in politicians’ faces. That’s the only way we’re going to get their attention,” Federated Farmers meat & wool chair Toby Williams says.
    “Sheep farming is in crisis. We need the Government to urgently wake up to the impact poor policy is having on our farming families and rural communities.
    “Each year we’re losing tens of thousands of hectares of productive farmland.
    “Where sheep and lambs once grazed there’s now nothing but pine trees as far as the eye can see.”
    Between 2017 and 2024, more than 260,000 hectares of productive sheep farming land were plastered in pine trees – never to return to pasture.
    In just one generation New Zealand has lost over two-thirds of our national flock, reducing from over 70 million sheep in 1982 to fewer than 25 million sheep today.
    “Our national flock is declining by almost a million sheep every year and the number one driver is carbon forestry,” Williams says.
    “Farms are being converted to forestry because Government policy is screwing the scrum and making it more profitable to plant pine trees than to farm sheep.
    “The Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is effectively subsidising pine trees to offset fossil fuel emissions, and that’s pushing farming families off the land and destroying rural communities.”
    New Zealand is the only country in the world that allows 100% carbon offsetting through forestry, with other countries recognising the risk and putting restrictions in place.
    Federated Farmers is now calling on the Government to urgently review the ETS and fix the rules to either limit or stop the offsetting of fossil fuel emissions with forestry.
    You can sign the petition at www.saveoursheep.nz

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Powrsuit Founders Wow at Soda’s Women in Business Expo

    Source: Soda Inc.
    More than 150 female entrepreneurs and business owners attended Soda’s Women in Business Expo last week with guest speakers – Hatch and Powrsuit founders, Kristen Lunman and Natalie Ferguson – sharing insights around fear, failure and the importance of mindset.
    Sponsored by Deloitte, the expo was an opportunity for female business owners and founders to be inspired, network with like-minded women in business and learn more about business support options available in Aotearoa New Zealand.
    Soda General Manager Anna Devcich says: “Soda connects business owners and entrepreneurs with government support and funding to help their businesses thrive. We’re also passionate about supporting women in business so our Women in Business Expo is an opportunity for female business owners, entrepreneurs and leaders to connect and learn in a welcoming and supportive environment.
    “As a business owner or founder, it’s vital to access the right support and make connections that allow you to grow – as an individual and as a business. Soda’s Women in Business Expo creates a space where women can do just that.
    “Nat and Kristen from Powrsuit shared some powerful messages with our audience about the importance of mindset and the value of learning through doing. As founders of a career accelerator (among other successful businesses), their advice really hit the mark.”
    Held in The Atrium at Wintec House, organisations at the expo included Craigs Women’s Wealth, Deloitte, Cambridge Chamber of Commerce, Finance NZ, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, NZ Entrepreneur, New Zealand Growth Capital Partners, On Your Terms NZ, Osbaldiston Lane, Powrsuit, Rocketspark, RWA Lawyers, She by Shan, Soda, Takatini Waikato District Economic Development, Te Whatu Ora: National Public Health Service, Waikato Waahine Collective and Waipā District Council.
    Soda’s Regional Business Partner contract has recently been extended for a further two years, so Soda looks forward to continuing to support Waikato businesses.
    ABOUT SODA
    Soda helps businesses achieve their goals and create success. We connect entrepreneurs, business owners and key decision makers with the right people, tools, resources and programmes to accelerate business growth. Based in Hamilton, Soda is the Waikato’s Regional Business Partner (RBP), connecting business owners with government funding and support.
    ABOUT POWRSUIT
    Kristen Lunman and Natalie Ferguson are the co-founders and directors of Powrsuit – a career accelerator for women at every stage (with a space for allies, too). Combining bite-sized learning and micro-networking, Powrsuit takes professional development out of to-do lists and into weekly routines. With over 700 members across NZ, Australia, North America and Europe (and a handful in Singapore!), Powrsuit’s research-backed approach delivers a tangible return on investment. After six months, 82% of members increase self-leadership skills and 28% take a tangible step forward in their careers.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI: Descartes Announces Fiscal 2026 First Quarter Financial Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Record Services Revenues

    WATERLOO, Ontario and ATLANTA, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Descartes Systems Group Inc. (TSX:DSG) (Nasdaq:DSGX) announced its financial results for its fiscal 2026 first quarter (Q1FY26). All financial results referenced are in United States (US) currency and, unless otherwise indicated, are determined in accordance with US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).

    “Our first quarter of fiscal 2026 showed strong annual growth, consistent with our communicated plans,” said Edward J. Ryan, Descartes’ CEO. “This is a challenging and uncertain economic and trade environment for shippers, carriers and logistics services providers. They face challenges on how, when, or if, to react to changes in global trade relationships, tariffs, sanctions and economic forecasts. We continue to see strong interest in our domain expertise and our solutions to help companies navigate the complex trade landscape. We remain committed to growing our business with prudent investments and cost discipline to build the premier network and technology for logistics-intensive businesses.”

    Q1FY26 Financial Results
    As described in more detail below, key financial highlights for Descartes’ Q1FY26 included:

    • Revenues of $168.7 million, up 12% from $151.3 million in the first quarter of fiscal 2025 (Q1FY25) and up 1% from $167.5 million in the previous quarter (Q4FY25);
    • Revenues were comprised of services revenues of $156.6 million (93% of total revenues), professional services and other revenues of $11.8 million (7% of total revenues) and license revenues of $0.3 million (less than 1% of total revenues). Services revenues were up 14% from $137.8 million in Q1FY25 and consistent with $156.5 million in Q4FY25;
    • Cash provided by operating activities of $53.6 million, down from $63.7 million in Q1FY25 and down from $60.7 million in Q4FY25;
    • Income from operations of $46.2 million, up 9% from $42.4 million in Q1FY25 and down from $47.1 million in Q4FY25;
    • Net income of $36.2 million, up 4% from $34.7 million in Q1FY25 and down from $37.4 million in Q4FY25. Net income as a percentage of revenues was 21%, compared to 23% in Q1FY25 and 22% in Q4FY25;
    • Earnings per share on a diluted basis of $0.41, up 2% from $0.40 in Q1FY25 and down from $0.43 in Q4FY25; and
    • Adjusted EBITDA of $75.1 million, up 12% from $67.0 million in Q1FY25 and consistent with $75.0 million in Q4FY25. Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues was 45%, compared to 44% in Q1FY25 and 45% in Q4FY25.

    Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues are non-GAAP financial measures provided as a complement to financial results presented in accordance with GAAP. We define Adjusted EBITDA as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, stock-based compensation (for which we include related fees and taxes) and other charges (for which we include restructuring charges, acquisition-related expenses, and contingent consideration incurred due to better-than-expected performance from acquisitions). These items are considered by management to be outside Descartes’ ongoing operational results. We define Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues as the quotient, expressed as a percentage, from dividing Adjusted EBITDA for a period by revenues for the corresponding period. A reconciliation of Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues to net income determined in accordance with GAAP is provided later in this release.

    The following table summarizes Descartes’ results in the categories specified below over the past 5 fiscal quarters (unaudited; dollar amounts, other than per share amounts, in millions):

      Q1
    FY26
    Q4
    FY25
    Q3
    FY25
    Q2
    FY25
    Q1
    FY25
    Revenues 168.7 167.5 168.8 163.4 151.3
    Services revenues 156.6 156.5 149.7 146.2 137.8
    Gross margin 76% 76% 74% 75% 77%
    Cash provided by operating activities 53.6 60.7 60.1 34.7 63.7
    Income from operations 46.2 47.1 45.8 45.9 42.4
    Net income 36.2 37.4 36.6 34.7 34.7
    Net income as a % of revenues 21% 22% 22% 21% 23%
    Earnings per diluted share 0.41 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.40
    Adjusted EBITDA 75.1 75.0 72.1 70.6 67.0
    Adjusted EBITDA as a % of revenues 45% 45% 43% 43% 44%
               

    Cash Position
    At April 30, 2025, Descartes had $176.4 million in cash. Cash decreased by $59.7 million in Q1FY26. The table set forth below provides a summary of cash flows for Q1FY26 in millions of dollars:

      Q1FY26
    Cash provided by operating activities 53.6
    Additions to property and equipment (1.9)
    Acquisitions of subsidiaries, net of cash acquired (112.3)
    Issuances of common shares, net of issuance costs 3.6
    Payment of withholding taxes on net share settlements (6.5)
    Effect of foreign exchange rate on cash 3.8
    Net change in cash (59.7)
    Cash, beginning of period 236.1
    Cash, end of period 176.4
       

    Acquisition of 3GTMS
    On March 24, 2025, Descartes acquired all of the shares of 3GTMS, a leading provider of transportation management solutions. The purchase price for the acquisition was approximately $112.7 million, net of cash acquired, which was funded from cash on hand.

    Cost Reduction Initiatives
    Considering the economic and global trade uncertainty many Descartes customers are facing, Descartes has undertaken cost reduction initiatives designed to reduce its cost base. The plan is designed to reduce Descartes’ global workforce by approximately 7% and eliminate various other operating expenses. As a result, Descartes expects to incur restructuring charges of approximately $4 million in the second quarter of fiscal 2026 (Q2FY26), which will also impact cash generated from operations in Q2FY26. Once completed, Descartes anticipates annualized cost savings of approximately $15 million.

    Management Update
    Descartes is pleased to announce the appointment of William Green as Executive Vice President, Global Sales. Mr. Green has served as Descartes’ Senior Vice President for North American Sales since August 2020. Mr. Green has previously held senior commercial roles at Salesforce, PROLIFIQ and CDC Software (now Aptean). “We’re excited for Bill to extend his leadership of our growth successes in North America to our global commercial operations,” said Mr. Ryan.

    Andrew Roszko, Descartes’ Chief Commercial Officer, will depart the company in Q2FY26 to pursue another opportunity. Mr. Roszko was appointed EVP Global Sales in February 2019 and appointed Chief Commercial Officer in June 2022. “Andrew has been a valuable contributor to Descartes’ commercial development. We wish him well in his future endeavors,” said Mr. Ryan.

    Conference Call
    Members of Descartes’ executive management team will host a conference call to discuss the company’s financial results at 5:30 p.m. ET on Wednesday, June 4. Designated numbers are +1 289 514 5100 for North America and +1 800 717 1738 for international, using conference ID 26605.

    The company will simultaneously conduct an audio webcast on the Descartes website at www.descartes.com/descartes/investor-relations. Phone conference dial-in or webcast login is required approximately 10 minutes beforehand.

    Replays of the conference call will be available until June 11, 2025, by dialing +1 289 819 1325 or Toll-Free for North America using +1 888 660 6264 with Playback Passcode: 26605#. An archived replay of the webcast will be available at www.descartes.com/descartes/investor-relations.

    About Descartes

    Descartes (Nasdaq:DSGX) (TSX:DSG) is the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, security and sustainability of logistics-intensive businesses. Customers use our modular, software-as-a-service solutions to route, track and help improve the safety, performance and compliance of delivery resources; plan, allocate and execute shipments; rate, audit and pay transportation invoices; access global trade data; file customs and security documents for imports and exports; and complete numerous other logistics processes by participating in the world’s largest, collaborative multimodal logistics community. Our headquarters are in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and we have offices and partners around the world. Learn more at www.descartes.com, and connect with us on LinkedIn and X (Twitter).

    Descartes Investor Contact
    Laurie McCauley                                                                     
    (519) 746-2969
    investor@descartes.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements This release may contain forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws (“forward-looking statements”) that relates to Descartes’ expectations concerning future revenues and earnings, and our projections for any future reductions in expenses or growth in margins and generation of cash; our assessment of the potential impact of geopolitical events, such as the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine (the “Russia-Ukraine Conflict”), and between Israel and Hamas (“Israel-Hamas Conflict”), or other potentially catastrophic events, on our business, results of operations and financial condition; our assessment of the potential impact of tariffs, sanctions and other actions by individual countries on global trade and our business; continued growth and acquisitions including our assessment of any increased opportunity for our products and services as a result of trends in the logistics and supply chain industries; rate of profitable growth and Adjusted EBITDA margin operating range; demand for Descartes’ solutions; growth of Descartes’ Global Logistics Network (“GLN”); customer buying patterns; customer expectations of Descartes; development of the GLN and the benefits thereof to customers; and other matters. These forward-looking statements are based on certain assumptions including the following: global shipment volumes continuing at levels generally consistent with those experienced historically; the Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Israel-Hamas Conflict not having a material negative impact on shipment volumes or on the demand for the products and services of Descartes by its customers and the ability of those customers to continue to pay for those products and services; countries continuing to implement and enforce existing and additional customs and security regulations relating to the provision of electronic information for imports and exports; countries continuing to implement and enforce existing and additional trade restrictions and sanctioned party lists with respect to doing business with certain countries, organizations, entities and individuals; Descartes’ continued operation of a secure and reliable business network; the stability of general economic and market conditions, currency exchange rates, and interest rates; equity and debt markets continuing to provide Descartes with access to capital; Descartes’ continued ability to identify and source attractive and executable business combination opportunities; Descartes’ ability to develop solutions that keep pace with the continuing changes in technology, and our continued compliance with third party intellectual property rights. These assumptions may prove to be inaccurate. Such forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance or achievements of Descartes, or developments in Descartes’ business or industry, to differ materially from the anticipated results, performance or achievements or developments expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, Descartes’ ability to successfully identify and execute on acquisitions and to integrate acquired businesses and assets, and to predict expenses associated with and revenues from acquisitions; the impact of network failures, information security breaches or other cyber-security threats; disruptions in the movement of freight and a decline in shipment volumes including as a result of the impact of current and future trade barriers, including tariffs, further protectionist measures and reactive countermeasure or contagious illness outbreaks; a deterioration of general economic conditions or instability in the financial markets accompanied by a decrease in spending by our customers; the ability to attract and retain key personnel and the ability to manage the departure of key personnel and the transition of our executive management team; changes in trade or transportation regulations that currently require customers to use services such as those offered by Descartes; changes in customer behaviour and expectations; Descartes’ ability to successfully design and develop enhancements to our products and solutions; departures of key customers; the impact of foreign currency exchange rates; Descartes’ ability to retain or obtain sufficient capital in addition to its debt facility to execute on its business strategy, including its acquisition strategy; disruptions in the movement of freight; the potential for future goodwill or intangible asset impairment as a result of other-than-temporary decreases in Descartes’ market capitalization; and other factors and assumptions discussed in the section entitled, “Certain Factors That May Affect Future Results” in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and other securities commissions across Canada, including Descartes’ most recently filed Management’s Discussion and Analysis. If any such risks actually occur, they could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. In that case, the trading price of our common shares could decline, perhaps materially. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Forward-looking statements are provided for the purpose of providing information about management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. We do not undertake or accept any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements to reflect any change in our expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based, except as required by law.

    Reconciliation of Non-GAAP Financial Measures – Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues

    We prepare and release quarterly unaudited and annual audited financial statements prepared in accordance with GAAP. We also disclose and discuss certain non-GAAP financial information, used to evaluate our performance, in this and other earnings releases and investor conference calls as a complement to results provided in accordance with GAAP. We believe that current shareholders and potential investors in our company use non-GAAP financial measures, such as Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues, in making investment decisions about our company and measuring our operational results.

    The term “Adjusted EBITDA” refers to a financial measure that we define as earnings before certain charges that management considers to be non-operating expenses and which consist of interest, taxes, depreciation, amortization, stock-based compensation (for which we include related fees and taxes) and other charges (for which we include restructuring charges, acquisition-related expenses, and contingent consideration incurred due to better-than-expected performance from acquisitions). Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues divides Adjusted EBITDA for a period by the revenues for the corresponding period and expresses the quotient as a percentage.

    Management considers these non-operating expenses to be outside the scope of Descartes’ ongoing operations and the related expenses are not used by management to measure operations. Accordingly, these expenses are excluded from Adjusted EBITDA, which we reference to both measure our operations and as a basis of comparison of our operations from period-to-period. Management believes that investors and financial analysts measure our business on the same basis, and we are providing the Adjusted EBITDA financial metric to assist in this evaluation and to provide a higher level of transparency into how we measure our own business. However, Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues are non-GAAP financial measures and may not be comparable to similarly titled measures reported by other companies. Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues should not be construed as a substitute for net income determined in accordance with GAAP or other non-GAAP measures that may be used by other companies, such as EBITDA. The use of Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues does have limitations. In particular, we have completed six acquisitions since the beginning of fiscal 2025 and may complete additional acquisitions in the future that will result in acquisition-related expenses and restructuring charges. As these acquisition-related expenses and restructuring charges may continue as we pursue our consolidation strategy, some investors may consider these charges and expenses as a recurring part of operations rather than expenses that are not part of operations.

    The table below reconciles Adjusted EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA as a percentage of revenues to net income reported in our unaudited Consolidated Statements of Operations for Q1FY26, Q4FY25, Q3FY25, Q2FY25, and Q1FY25, which we believe is the most directly comparable GAAP measure.

      Q1FY26 Q4FY25 Q3FY25 Q2FY25 Q1FY25
    Net income, as reported on Consolidated Statements of Operations 36.2 37.4 36.6 34.7 34.7
    Adjustments to reconcile to Adjusted EBITDA:          
    Interest expense 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
    Investment income (1.9) (1.9) (2.9) (2.7) (4.1)
    Income tax expense 11.7 11.4 11.9 13.6 11.5
    Depreciation expense 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4
    Amortization of intangible assets 19.1 19.4 17.5 17.4 15.0
    Stock-based compensation and related taxes 4.9 5.4 5.6 5.8 4.3
    Other charges 3.4 1.6 1.8 0.2 3.9
    Adjusted EBITDA 75.1 75.0 72.1 70.6 67.0
               
    Revenues 168.7 167.5 168.8 163.4 151.3
    Net income as % of revenues 21% 22% 22% 21% 23%
    Adjusted EBITDA as % of revenues 45% 45% 43% 43% 44%
               
    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (US dollars in thousands; US GAAP; Unaudited)
         
      April 30, January 31,
      2025 2025
    ASSETS    
    CURRENT ASSETS    
    Cash 176,411 236,138
    Accounts receivable (net)    
    Trade 60,456 53,953
    Other 15,646 16,931
    Prepaid expenses and other 43,100 45,544
      295,613 352,566
    OTHER LONG-TERM ASSETS 27,366 24,887
    PROPERTY AND EQUIPMENT, NET 13,944 12,481
    RIGHT-OF-USE ASSETS 7,721 7,623
    DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 4,867 3,802
    INTANGIBLE ASSETS, NET 368,122 321,270
    GOODWILL 992,257 924,755
      1,709,890 1,647,384
    LIABILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY    
    CURRENT LIABILITIES    
    Accounts payable 23,154 20,650
    Accrued liabilities 73,151 79,656
    Lease obligations 3,402 3,178
    Income taxes payable 9,535 9,313
    Deferred revenue 109,608 104,230
      218,850 217,027
    LEASE OBLIGATIONS 4,533 4,718
    DEFERRED REVENUE 2,196 978
    INCOME TAXES PAYABLE 6,540 5,531
    DEFERRED INCOME TAXES 25,834 34,127
      257,953 262,381
         
    SHAREHOLDERS’ EQUITY    
    Common shares – unlimited shares authorized; Shares issued and outstanding totaled 85,782,830 at April 30, 2025 (January 31, 2025 – 85,605,969) 574,816 568,339
    Additional paid-in capital 498,092 503,133
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss (21,243) (50,497)
    Retained earnings 400,272 364,028
      1,451,937 1,385,003
      1,709,890 1,647,384
         
    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Consolidated Statements of Operations
    (US dollars in thousands, except per share and weighted average share amounts; US GAAP; Unaudited)
       
      Three Months Ended
      April 30, April 30,
      2025 2024
         
    REVENUES 168,739 151,348
    COST OF REVENUES (exclusive of amortization presented separately below) 39,747 35,413
    GROSS MARGIN 128,992 115,935
    EXPENSES    
    Sales and marketing 18,850 17,471
    Research and development 25,069 22,191
    General and administrative 16,312 14,948
    Other charges 3,449 3,918
    Amortization of intangible assets 19,114 15,024
      82,794 73,552
    INCOME FROM OPERATIONS 46,198 42,383
    INTEREST EXPENSE (236) (273)
    INVESTMENT INCOME 1,962 4,059
    INCOME BEFORE INCOME TAXES 47,924 46,169
    INCOME TAX EXPENSE (RECOVERY)    
    Current 12,251 12,318
    Deferred (571) (816)
      11,680 11,502
    NET INCOME 36,244 34,667
    EARNINGS PER SHARE    
    Basic 0.42 0.41
    Diluted 0.41 0.40
    WEIGHTED AVERAGE SHARES OUTSTANDING (thousands)    
    Basic 85,677 85,274
    Diluted 87,577 87,116
         
    The Descartes Systems Group Inc.
    Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (US dollars in thousands; US GAAP; Unaudited)
       
      Three Months Ended
      April 30, April 30,
      2025 2024
    OPERATING ACTIVITIES    
    Net income 36,244 34,667
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to cash provided by operating activities:    
    Depreciation 1,450 1,358
    Amortization of intangible assets 19,114 15,024
    Stock-based compensation expense 4,366 3,769
    Other non-cash operating activities (34) 96
    Deferred tax recovery (571) (816)
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities (6,966) 9,643
    Cash provided by operating activities 53,603 63,741
    INVESTING ACTIVITIES    
    Additions to property and equipment (1,862) (1,764)
    Acquisition of subsidiaries, net of cash acquired (112,327) (139,973)
    Cash used in investing activities (114,189) (141,737)
    FINANCING ACTIVITIES    
    Payment of debt issuance costs (38) (38)
    Issuance of common shares for cash, net of issuance costs 3,558 4,231
    Payment of withholding taxes on net share settlements (6,487) (6,745)
    Cash used in financing activities (2,967) (2,552)
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes on cash 3,826 (1,482)
    Decrease in cash (59,727) (82,030)
    Cash, beginning of period 236,138 320,952
    Cash, end of period 176,411 238,922
         

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: SAUDI ARABIA/UN: Labour agreement must lead to comprehensive reforms to be a game-changer for migrant workers

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Responding to the announcement of a third phase of cooperation between thepartnership agreement made earlier today between the Government of Saudi Arabia and the International Labour Organization (ILO) to advance decent work reforms, Iain Byrne, Amnesty International’s Head of Economic and Social Justice, said:

    “While today’s announcement recognizes the need for labour reforms for migrant workers in Saudi Arabia, it remains unclear how comprehensive this programme will be and what impact it will have on the rights, health and livelihoods of millions of workers who depend on this being much more than a façade.

    “Human rights groups and unions have long been demanding for a serious and far-reaching labour reform process that would put an end to the severe exploitation of migrant workers in Saudi Arabia. The fact that global unions filed a formal complaint against the country at the ILO on the very same day as this agreement was signed, speaks volumes of just how far Saudi Arabia still has to go to protect the rights of migrant workers in the country.

    If this programme is to be truly transformative for migrant workers, it must among other things fully tackle the core features of the abusive kafala system that leave workers wholly dependent on
    their employers.

    Iain Byrne, Amnesty International’s Head of Economic and Social Justice

    “If this programme is to be truly transformative for migrant workers, it must among other things fully tackle the core features of the abusive kafala system that leave workers wholly dependent on their employers. It must also address the severe limits on the freedoms of expression and association in the country, together with the lack of access for NGOs and trade unions which make it impossible to independently monitor the implementation of any labour agreement, further undermining its credibility and effectiveness.

    “We urge the Saudi authorities and the ILO to make all aspects of this cooperation public and allow independent monitoring of its implementation. To sufficiently safeguard the rights of the country’s 13.4 million migrant workers, this agreement must lead to a complete overhaul of the current labour system and end the prevalent culture of impunity.”

    Background

    On 4 June 2025, the ITUC lodged a landmark complaint against Saudi Arabia at the ILO, alleging widespread violations of migrant workers’ rights in the country that’s set to host the 2034 FIFA World Cup. The ILO governing body is already considering a complaint submitted a year prior by another global trade union, BWI, accusing Saudi Arabia of breaches of the ILO forced labour convention.

    In May, Amnesty International published a report documenting the experiences of more than 70 Kenyan women recruited to work in private homes in Saudi Arabia, only to find themselves trapped in conditions that often amounted to forced labour.

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility – A10-0098/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility

    (2024/2085(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     

     having regard to Article 175 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[1] (RRF Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2023/435 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 February 2023 amending Regulation (EU) 2021/241 as regards REPowerEU chapters in recovery and resilience plans and amending Regulations (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) 2021/1060 and (EU) 2021/1755, and Directive 2003/87/EC[2] (REPowerEU Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget[3] (Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765 of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[4] (MFF Regulation),

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[5] (the IIA),

     having regard to Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union[6] (Financial Regulation),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1263 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2024 on the effective coordination of economic policies and on multilateral budgetary surveillance and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97[8],

     having regard to its resolution of 23 June 2022 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility[9],

     having regard to the Commission notice of 22 July 2024 entitled ‘Guidance on recovery and resilience plans’[10],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 21 February 2024 on strengthening the EU through ambitious reforms and investments (COM(2024)0082),

     having regard to the Commission’s third annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility (COM(2024)0474),

     having regard to the Court of Auditors’ (ECA) annual report of 10 October 2024 on the implementation of the budget for the 2023 financial year, together with the institutions’ replies,

     having regard to special report 13/2024 of the ECA of 2 September 2024 entitled ‘Absorption of funds from the Recovery and Resilience Facility – Progressing with delays and risks remain regarding the completion of measures and therefore the achievement of RRF objectives’, special report 14/2024 of the ECA of 11 September 2024 entitled ‘Green transition – Unclear contribution from the Recovery and Resilience Facility’, and special report 22/2024 of the ECA of 21 October 2024 entitled ‘Double funding from the EU budget – Control systems lack essential elements to mitigate the increased risk resulting from the RRF model of financing not linked to costs’,

     having regard to the study of December 2023 supporting the mid-term Evaluation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility,

     having regard to the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) 2024 annual report published on 3 March 2025,

     having regard to the report of September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’ (Draghi report),

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 8 October 2024 entitled ‘Mid-term review of the post-COVID European recovery plan (Recovery and Resilience Facility)’[11],

     having regard to the information published on the Recovery and Resilience Scoreboard (RRF Scoreboard),

     having regard to the Commission staff working document of 20 November 2024 entitled ‘NGEU Green Bonds Allocation and Impact report 2024’ (SWD(2024)0275),

     having regard to its in-house research, in-depth analysis and briefings related to the implementation of the RRF[12],

     having regard to its resolution of 18 January 2024 on the situation in Hungary and frozen EU funds[13],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure, as well as Article 1(1)(e) of, and Annex 3 to, the decision of the Conference of Presidents of 12 December 2002 on the procedure for granting authorisation to draw up own-initiative reports,

     having regard to the opinions of the Committee on Budgetary Control, the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, the Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety and the Committee on Transport and Tourism,

     having regard to the joint deliberations of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs under Rule 59 of the Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0098/2025),

     

    A. whereas the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was created to make European economies and societies more sustainable, resilient and better prepared in the light of unprecedented crises in 2019 and 2022, by supporting Member States in financing strategic investments and in implementing reforms;

    B. whereas reforms and investments under the RRF help to make the EU more resilient and less dependent by diversifying key supply chains and thereby strengthening the strategic autonomy of the EU; whereas reforms and investments under the RRF also generate European added value;

    C. whereas the RRF, as well as other EU funds, such as the European instrument for temporary support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency, has helped to protect labour markets from the risk of long-term damage caused by the double economic shock of the pandemic and the energy crisis;

    D. whereas RRF expenditure falls outside the ceilings of the multiannual financial framework (MFF) and borrowing proceeds constitute external assigned revenue; whereas Parliament regrets that they do not form part of the budgetary procedure; whereas based on the Financial Regulation’s principle of transparency, citizens should know how and for what purpose funds are spent by the EU;

    E. whereas, due to the lack of progress in introducing new own resources in the EU and the need to ensure the sustainability of the EU’s repayment plan, a clear and reliable long-term funding strategy is essential to meet repayment obligations without forcing difficult trade-offs in the EU budget that could undermine future investments and policy priorities; whereas further discussions and concrete financial solutions will be necessary to secure the long-term viability of the EU’s debt repayment plan;

    F. whereas the borrowing costs for NextGenerationEU (NGEU) have to be borne by the EU budget and the actual costs exceed the 2020 projections by far as a result of the high interest rates; whereas the total costs for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget; whereas Parliament has insisted that the refinancing costs be placed over and above the MFF ceilings; whereas a three-step ‘cascade mechanism’ including a new special EURI instrument was introduced during the 2024 MFF revision to cover the significant cost overruns resulting from NGEU borrowing linked to major changes in the market conditions; whereas an agreement was reached during the 2025 budgetary procedure to follow an annual 50/50 benchmark, namely to finance the overrun costs in equal shares by the special EURI instrument de-commitment compartment and the Flexibility Instrument;

    G. whereas the bonds issued to finance the RRF are to be repaid in a manner that ensures the steady and predictable reduction of liabilities, by 2058 at the latest; whereas the Council has yet to adopt the adjusted basket of new own resources proposed by the Commission, which raises concerns about the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU;

    H. whereas the social dimension is a key aspect of the RRF, contributing to upward economic and social convergence, restoring and promoting sustainable growth and fostering the creation of high-quality employment;

    I. whereas the RRF should contribute to financing measures to strengthen the Member States’ resilience to climate disasters, among other things, and enhance climate adaptation; whereas the Member States should conduct proper impact assessments for measures and should share best practice on the implementation of the ‘do no significant harm’ (DNSH) principle;

    J. whereas the RRF plays an important role in supporting investments and reforms in sustainable mobility, smart transport infrastructure, alternative fuels and digital mobility solutions, thus enhancing connectivity and efficiency across the EU; whereas it is regrettable that only a few Member States chose to use the RRF to support investments, particularly in high-speed railway and waterway infrastructure, aimed at developing European corridors, despite the encouragement of cross-border and multi-country projects; whereas it is crucial to increase investments in transport infrastructure, particularly in underserved regions, to improve connectivity, support regional cohesion and contribute to the green transition;

    K. whereas by 31 December 2024, Member States had submitted 95 payment requests and the level of RRF disbursements including pre-financing stood at EUR 197.46 billion in grants (55 % of the total grants envelope) and EUR 108.68 billion in loans (37 % of the total loans envelope); whereas three Member States have already received their fifth payment, while one Member State has not received any RRF funding; whereas all Member States have revised their national recovery and resilience plans (NRRP) at least once; whereas 28 % of milestones and targets have been satisfactorily fulfilled and the Commission has made use of the possibility to partially suspend payments where some milestones and targets linked to a payment request were not found to be satisfactorily fulfilled; whereas delays in the execution of planned reforms and investments, particularly in social infrastructure and public services, could lead to the underutilisation of available resources, thereby reducing the expected impact on economic growth, employment and social cohesion;

    L. whereas the ECA has revealed various shortcomings of the RRF, in particular in relation to its design, its transparency and reporting, the risk of double funding and the implementation of twin transition measures;

    M. whereas robust audit and control systems are crucial to protect the financial interests of the EU throughout the life cycle of the RRF; whereas the milestones commonly known as ‘super milestones’, in particular related to the rule of law, had to be fulfilled prior to any RRF disbursements;

    N. whereas the RRF Regulation refers to the RRF’s ‘performance-based nature’ but does not define ‘performance’; whereas RRF performance should be linked to sound financial management principles and should measure how well an EU-funded action, project or programme has met its objectives and provided value for money;

    O. whereas effective democratic control and parliamentary scrutiny over the implementation of the RRF require the full involvement of Parliament and the consideration of all its recommendations at all stages;

    P. whereas the Commission has to provide an independent ex post evaluation report on the implementation of the RRF by 31 December 2028, consisting of an assessment of the extent to which the objectives have been achieved, of the efficiency of the use of resources and of the European added value, as well as a global assessment of the RRF, and containing information on its impact in the long term;

    Q. whereas the purpose of this report is to monitor the implementation of the RRF, in accordance with Parliament’s role as laid down in the RRF Regulation, by pointing to the benefits and shortcomings of the RRF, while drawing on the lessons learnt during its implementation;

    Strengthening Europe’s social and economic resilience

     

    1. Highlights the fact that the RRF is an unprecedented instrument of solidarity in the light of two unprecedented crises and a cornerstone of the NGEU instrument, ending in 2026; emphasises the importance of drawing lessons from its implementation for the upcoming MFF, including as regards transparency, reporting and coherent measurement of deliverables; highlights the stabilising effect of the RRF for Member States at a time of great economic uncertainty, as it mitigates negative economic and social consequences and supports governments by contributing to the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights, by promoting economic recovery and competitiveness, boosting resilience and innovation, and by supporting the green and digital transitions;

    2. Highlights the important role of the RRF in preventing the fragmentation of the internal market and the further deepening of macroeconomic divergence, in fostering social and territorial cohesion by providing macroeconomic stabilisation, and in offering assurance to the financial markets by improving investor confidence in turbulent times, thereby lowering yield spreads;

    3. Welcomes the fact that the RRF is a one-off instrument providing additional fiscal space that has contributed to the prevention of considerable economic and social divergences between Member States with diverse fiscal space; highlights the Commission finding that the RRF has led to a sustained increase in investments across the EU and that the Commission expects the RRF to have a lasting impact across the EU beyond 2026, given its synergies with other EU funds; is, however, concerned that the RRF expiration in 2026 poses a significant risk of a substantial decline in public investment in common European priorities;

    4. Recalls that the MFF and RRF combined amount to almost EUR 2 trillion for the 2021-2027 programming period, but points to the fact that the high inflation rates and the associated increases in the cost of goods and services have decreased the current value of European spending agreed in nominal terms;

    5. Takes note of the Commission’s projection in 2024 concerning the potential of NGEU’s impact on the EU’s real gross domestic product (GDP) by 2026, which is significantly lower than its simulation in 2020 (1.4 % compared with 2.3 %), due in part to adverse economic and geopolitical conditions, and of the estimation that NGEU could lead to a sizeable, short-run increase in EU employment by up to 0.8 %; notes that the  long-term benefits of the RRF on GDP will likely exceed the budgetary commitments undertaken by up to three to six times , depending on the productivity effects of RRF investment and the diligent implementation of reforms and investments;

    6. Highlights the difficulty of quantifying the precise social and economic impact of the RRF, as it takes time for the impact of reforms and investments to become clear; stresses the need for further independent evaluations to assess the effective impact of reforms and investments and for further improvements of the underlying methodology; notes the Commission’s finding that approximately half of the expected increase in public investment between 2019 and 2025 is related to investment financed by the EU budget, particularly by the RRF, but notes that some investments have not yet delivered measurable impact;

    7. Notes that the RRF has incentivised the implementation of some reforms included in the country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester through the inclusion of such reforms in the NRRPs; underlines that there has been a qualitative leap forward in terms of monitoring RRF implementation; recalls that the RRF Scoreboard is used to monitor the progress made towards achieving milestones and targets, as well as compliance with horizontal principles, and in particular the six pillars, namely the green transition, the digital transformation, smart, sustainable and inclusive growth (including economic cohesion, jobs, productivity, competitiveness, research, development and innovation, and a well-functioning internal market with strong small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs)), social and territorial cohesion, health, economic, social and institutional resilience with the aim of, inter alia, increasing crisis preparedness and crisis response capacity, and policies for the next generation, children and young people, such as education and skills; highlights that the overall uptake of country-specific recommendations made in the context of the European Semester remains low and has even dropped;

    8. Highlights that in the context of the new economic governance framework, the set of reforms and investments underpinning an extension of the adjustment period should be consistent with the commitments included in the approved NRRPs during the period of operation of the RRF and the Partnership Agreement under the Common Provisions Regulation[14]; observes that the five Member States that requested an extension of the adjustment period by 31 December 2024 relied partly on the reforms and investments already approved under the RRF to justify the extension; takes note of the fact that most Member States have included information on whether the reforms and investments listed in the medium-term fiscal-structural plans are linked to the RRF;

    9. Welcomes the fact that the RRF provides support for both reforms and investments in the Member States, but notes with concern that the short timeframe for the remaining RRF implementation poses challenges to the completion of key reforms and large-scale investments that are to be finalised towards the end of the RRF and to the timely fulfilment of the 70 % of milestones and targets that are still pending;

    10. Recalls that RRF expenditure should not substitute recurring national budgetary expenditure, unless duly justified, and should respect the principle of additionality of EU funding; insists that the firm, sustainable and verifiable implementation of non-recurrence, together with the targeting of clearly defined European objectives of reforms and investments, is key to ensure additionality and the long-lasting effect of additional European funds; recalls the need to uphold this principle and appeals against the crowding out or replacement of cohesion policy by the RRF or other temporary instruments, as cohesion policy remains essential for long-term sustainable territorial cohesion and convergence;

    11. Highlights that prioritising RRF implementation, the lack of administrative capacity in many Member States and challenges posed by global supply chains have contributed to the delayed implementation of cohesion policy; calls on the Commission, in this context, to provide a comprehensive assessment of the RRF’s impact on other financial instruments and public investments, technical support, and the administrative and absorption capacities of the Member States;

    12. Recalls that, in reaction to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the REPowerEU revision contributes to Europe’s energy security by reducing its dependence on fossil fuels, diversifying its energy supplies, investing in European resources and infrastructure, tackling energy poverty and investing in energy savings and efficiency in all sectors, including transport; emphasises that through REPowerEU, an additional EUR 20 billion in grants was made available in 2023, including EUR 8 billion generated from the front-loading of Emissions Trading System allowances and EUR 12 billion from the Innovation Fund; highlights Parliament’s successes in negotiations, in particular on the provisions on replenishing the Innovation Fund, the 30 % funding target for cross-border projects, the focus of investments on tackling energy poverty for vulnerable households, SMEs and micro-enterprises, and the flexible use of unspent cohesion funds from the 2014-2020 MFF and of up to 7.5 % of national allocations under the 2021-2027 MFF;

    13. Recalls its call to focus RRF interventions on measures with European added value and therefore regrets the shortage of viable cross-border or multi-country measures, including high-speed railway and sustainable mobility infrastructure projects for dual use that are essential for completing the TEN-T network, and the related risk of re-nationalising funding; notes that the broad scope of the RRF objectives has contributed to this by allowing a wide variety of nationally focused projects to fall within its remit;

    14. Highlights the modification of Article 27 of the RRF Regulation through REPowerEU, which significantly strengthened the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of the RRF by encouraging the Member States to amend their NRRPs to add RepowerEU chapters, including a spending target of at least 30 % for such measures in order to guarantee the EU’s energy autonomy; is concerned by the broad interpretation adopted by the Commission, which allows any reduction in (national) energy demand to make a case for a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    15. Welcomes the possibility of using RRF funding to contribute to the objectives of the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) by supporting investments in critical technologies in the EU in order to boost its industrial competitiveness; notes that no Member State has made use of the possibility to include in its NRRP an additional cash contribution to STEP objectives via the Member State compartment of InvestEU; recalls that Member States can still amend their national plans in that regard; expects the revision processes to be efficient, streamlined and simple, especially considering the final deadline of 2026, the current geopolitical context and the need to invest in European defence capabilities;

    16. Recalls the application of the DNSH principle for all reforms and investments supported by the RRF, with a targeted derogation under REPowerEU for energy infrastructure and facilities needed to meet immediate security of supply needs; encourages the Commission to assess the feasibility of a more uniform interpretation of the DNSH principle between the RRF and the EU taxonomy for sustainable activities, while taking into account the specificities of the RRF as a public expenditure programme;

    Financial aspects of the RRF

     

    17. Stresses that the RRF is the first major performance-based instrument at EU level which is exclusively based on financing not linked to costs (FNLC); recalls that Article 8 of the RRF Regulation stipulates that the RRF must be implemented by the Commission in direct management in accordance with the relevant rules adopted pursuant to Article 322 TFEU, in particular the Financial Regulation and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation; regrets that the Council did not agree to insert specific rules in the Financial Regulation to address the risks of this delivery model, such as double funding; considers that the rules of the Financial Regulation should be fully applicable to future instruments based on FNLC, including as regards fines, penalties and sanctions;

    18. Notes that only 13 Member States have requested loans and that EUR 92 billion of the EUR 385.8 billion available will remain unused since this amount was not committed by the deadline of 31 December 2023; takes note of the fact that loans were attractive for Member States that faced higher borrowing costs on the financial markets or that sought to compensate for a reduction in RRF grants; points out that some Member States have made limited use of RRF loans, either due to strong fiscal positions or administrative considerations; calls on the Commission to analyse the reasons for the low uptake in some Member States and to consider these findings when designing future EU financial instruments; notes with concern that national financial instruments to implement the NRRPs have not been sufficiently publicised, leading to limited awareness and uptake by potential beneficiaries; considers that a political discussion is needed on the use of unspent funds in the light of tight public budgets and urgent EU strategic priorities; calls for an assessment of how and under which conditions unused RRF funds could be redirected to boost Europe’s competitiveness, resilience, defence, and social, economic and territorial cohesion, particularly through investments in digital and green technologies aligned with the RRF’s original purpose;

    19. Recalls the legal obligation to ensure full repayment of NGEU expenditure by 31 December 2058 at the latest; reminds the Council and the Commission of their legal commitment under the interinstitutional agreement concluded in 2020 to ensure a viable path to refinancing NGEU debt, including through sufficient proceeds from new own resources introduced after 2021 without any undue reduction in programme expenditure or investment instruments under the MFF; deplores the lack of progress made in this regard, which raises concerns regarding the viability of the repayment of the debt undertaken under NGEU, and urges the Council to adopt new own resources without delay and as a matter of urgency; urges the Commission, furthermore, to continue efforts to identify additional genuine new own resources beyond the IIA and linked to EU policies, in order to cover the high spending needs associated with the funding of new priorities and the repayment of NGEU debt;

    20. Notes with concern the Commission’s estimation that the total cost for NGEU capital interest repayments are projected to be around EUR 25 to 30 billion per year from 2028, equivalent to 15-20 % of the 2025 annual budget ; recalls that recourse to special instruments had to be made in the last three budgetary procedures to cover EURI instrument costs; highlights that the significant increase in financing costs puts pressure on the future EU budget and limits the capacity to respond to future challenges;

    21. Takes note of the Commission’s target to fund up to 30 % of NGEU costs by issuing greens bonds; notes that by 31 December 2024 the Commission had issued European green bonds amounting to EUR 68.2 billion;

    Design and implementation of NRRPs

     

    22. Notes that 47 % of the available RRF funds had been disbursed by 31 December 2024, with grants reaching 55 % and loans 37 %, which has resulted in a high proportion of measures still to be completed in 2025 and 2026; is concerned, however, about the ECA’s finding that only 50 % of disbursed funds had reached final beneficiaries in 15 out of 22 Member States by October 2023; calls on the Commission to take the recommendations of the ECA duly into account in order to improve the functioning of any future performance-based instruments similar to the RRF, in particular in the context of a more targeted MFF;

    23. Welcomes the fact that all Member States have surpassed the targets for the green (37 %) and the digital transitions (20 %), with average expenditure towards climate and digital objectives of the RRF as a whole standing at 42 % and 26 % respectively; notes that the ECA has cast doubt on how the implementation of RRF measures has contributed to the green transition and has recommended improvements to the methodologies used to estimate the impact of climate-related measures; highlights the fact that the same methodological deficiencies exist across all pillars of the RRF;

    24. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on social objectives, with Member States planning to spend around EUR 163 billion; underlines that such spending must be result-oriented, ensuring measurable economic and/or social benefits; stresses the need to accelerate investments in the development of rural, peripheral and outermost, isolated and remote areas, and in the fields of affordable housing, social protection and the integration of vulnerable groups, and youth employment, where expenditure is lagging behind; calls for an in-depth evaluation by the Commission, under the RRF Scoreboard, of the projects and reforms related to education and young people implemented by Member States under the RRF; regrets the delayed implementation of health objectives observed in certain Member States, given that the instrument should also improve the accessibility and capacity of health systems, and of key social infrastructure investments, including early childhood education and care facilities; stresses that these delays, in some cases linked to shifting budgetary priorities and revised national implementation timelines, risk undermining the achievement of the RRF’s social cohesion objectives;

    25. Reiterates its negotiating position to include targets for education (10 %) and for cultural activities (2 %); encourages the Commission’s effort to evaluate these targets as a benchmark in its assessment of education policy in NRRPs, through the RRF Scoreboard;

    26. Observes that a large majority of NRRPs include a specific section explaining how the plan addresses gender-related concerns and challenges; is concerned, however, that some NRRPs do not include an explanation of how the measures in the NRRP are expected to contribute to gender equality and equal opportunities for all and calls on the Member States concerned to add such explanations without delay;

    27. Stresses the importance of reforms focusing on labour market fragmentation, fostering quality working conditions, addressing wage level inequalities, ensuring decent living conditions, and strengthening social dialogue, social protection and the social economy;

    28. Notes the tangible impact that the RRF could have on the digital transformation objective, with EUR 166 billion allocated to corresponding plans; welcomes the contributions made under the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth pillar, in particular to competitiveness and support for SMEs; notes the need for an acceleration of investments in transnational cooperation, support for competitive enterprises leading innovation projects, and regulatory changes for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, which are lagging behind;

    29. Stresses that the success of EU investments depends on well-functioning capital markets; calls on the Member States to ensure a more effective and timely disbursement of funds, particularly for SMEs and young entrepreneurs, to streamline application procedures with a view to enhancing accessibility and to implement specific measures to provide targeted support to help them play a more prominent role in the process of smart and inclusive growth;

    30. Is concerned that the achievement of milestones and targets lags behind the indicative timetable provided in the NRRPs, and that the pace of progress is uneven across Member States; regrets the time lag between the fulfilment of milestones and targets and the implementation of projects; highlights that the RRF will only achieve its long-term and short-term potential if the reform and investment components, respectively, are properly implemented; welcomes the fact that, following a slow start, RRF implementation has picked up since the second half of 2023 but significant delays affecting key reforms and investments still persist and have been attributed to various factors, including the revisions linked to the inclusion of REPowerEU, mounting inflation, the insufficient administrative capacity of Member States, in particular the smaller Member States, uncertainties regarding specific RRF implementation rules, high energy costs, supply shortages and an underestimation of the time needed to implement measures; notes that the postponement of key implementation deadlines by some governments to 2026 raises concerns about the capacity of some Member States to fully absorb the allocated funds within the set timeframe of the RRF; stresses the importance of maintaining a realistic and effective implementation schedule to prevent the risk of incomplete projects and missed opportunities for structural improvements; calls on the Commission to ensure that administrative bottlenecks are urgently addressed;

    31. Recalls the modification of the RRF Regulation through the inclusion of the REPowerEU chapter; stresses the importance of the REPowerEU chapters in NRRPs and calls on the Member States to prioritise mature projects and implement their NRRPs more quickly, both in terms of reforms and investments, and, where necessary, to adjust NRRPs in line with the RRF’s objectives, without undermining the overall balance and level of ambition of the NRRPs, in order to respond to challenges stemming from geopolitical events and to tackle current realities on the ground;

    32. Highlights the fact that the RRF could have helped to mitigate the effects of the current EU-wide housing crisis; regrets that some Member States did not make use of this opportunity and stresses the importance for the Member States to accelerate investments in availability and affordability of housing;

    33. Highlights the role of ‘super milestones’ in protecting the EU’s financial interests against rule of law deficiencies and in ensuring the full implementation of the requirements under Article 22 of the RRF Regulation; welcomes the fact that all but one Member State have satisfactorily fulfilled their ‘super milestones’; recalls that the Commission must recover any pre-financing that has not been netted against regular payment requests by the end of the RRF;

    34. Notes the high administrative burden and complexity brought by the RRF; stresses the considerable efforts required at national level to implement the RRF in parallel with structural funds; notes that between 2021 and 2024 the demand-driven Technical Support Instrument supported more than 500 RRF-related reforms in the Member States, directly or indirectly related to the preparation, amendment, revision and implementation of the NRRPs; takes note of the Commission guidance of July 2024 with simplifications and clarifications to streamline RRF implementation but expects the Commission to act swiftly on its promise to cut the administrative burden by 25 %; urges the Commission to give clear and targeted technical support to the Member States, allowing them to develop efficient administrative capacity to implement the milestones and targets; calls on the Commission to decrease the level of complexity of EU public procurement rules which apply to higher-value contracts;

    35. Expresses concern over the complexity of application procedures for RRF funding, particularly for SMEs and non-governmental organisations, which require external consultancy services even for small grants; emphasises that such bureaucratic obstacles contradict the original objectives of the RRF, which aimed to provide rapid and direct financial support; calls for an urgent simplification of application and reporting requirements, particularly for smaller beneficiaries, to maximise the absorption and impact of funds and to assist with their contribution to the green and digital transitions;

    36. Believes that implementation delays underscore the risk that measures for which RRF funding has been paid will not be completed by the 2026 payment deadline; welcomes the Commission’s statement at the Recovery and Resilience Dialogue (RRD) of 16 September 2024 that it will not reimburse non-implemented projects; considers it a shortcoming that RRF funds paid for milestones and targets assessed as fulfilled cannot be recovered if related measures are not eventually completed; encourages the Commission to take into account the ECA’s recommendations related to this and to assess, in cooperation with the Member States, the measures most at risk of not being completed by 31 August 2026; stresses the importance of monitoring these measures, facilitating timely follow-up and working towards solutions to overcome delays;

    37. Notes with concern that the remaining implementation timeframe of the RRF is too short for the implementation of many innovative projects; further notes that innovative projects, by definition, are more difficult to plan and more likely to encounter obstacles during implementation, making them unsuited to the RRF’s strict deadlines; urges the Commission to create future programmes that are flexible enough to give proper answers in changing circumstances and that at the same time guarantee a certain degree of predictability;

    38. Notes that some milestones and targets may be no longer achievable because of objective circumstances; stresses that any NRRP revisions should be made in accordance with the RRF Regulation, including the applicable deadlines, and should not entail backtracking on reforms, commitments or lower quality projects but should maintain the overall ambition and the efficiency of public spending;

    39. Is concerned about the Commission’s uneven assessment of NRRPs, which has led to double standards in the application of the Regulation; is further concerned about the uneven and different definition of milestones and targets from one NRRP to the other, as consistently reported by the ECA;

    40. Highlights that the duration of the Commission’s assessment of payment requests by Member States differs considerably among the Member States and stresses the need for more transparency from the Commission; urges the Commission to accelerate its assessments and to ensure the equal treatment of the Member States; highlights the need to ensure a level playing field across the EU for measures and indicators that are used to assess all RRF projects;

    41. Urges the Member States to increase their efforts to address administrative bottlenecks and provide sufficient administrative capacity to accelerate RRF implementation in view of the 2026 deadline and to avoid concentrating RRF projects in more developed regions and capitals by enabling RRF funds to flow into projects in the most vulnerable regions, thereby serving the RRF’s objective to enhance the EU’s social, territorial and economic cohesion; emphasises the importance of fair regional distribution within the NRRPs while ensuring that RRF funds are allocated based on economic and social impact, feasibility and long-term benefits;

    42. Calls for an 18-month extension of mature RRF projects through an amendment of the RRF Regulation by co-decision, if needed; emphasises that the envisaged extension of projects will be conducted by the Commission based on objective, clear and fair benchmarks; welcomes the possibility of establishing a targeted and performance-based prioritisation and transfer system after the 2026 deadline in order to allow for the finalisation of ongoing projects through other funding schemes, including the European Investment Fund and a possible new European competitiveness fund; urges the Commission to present a strategy to address the huge demand for public investment beyond 2026 without compromising budgetary resources in other critical areas;

    43. Calls for an evaluation of how this framework could enable targeted investments in EU defence supply chains, strategic stockpiles and defence innovation, ensuring alignment with broader European security objectives;

    44. Is concerned that some Member States might choose to forego parts of the amounts or entire amounts associated with their last payment request, thus avoiding the fulfilment of the last milestones and targets;

    Transparency, monitoring and control

     

    45. Takes note of the fact that the Commission had planned to conduct 112 RRF audits in all Member States in 2024; reminds the Commission of its obligation, in accordance with Article 24(3) of the RRF Regulation, to recover funding in case of incorrect disbursements or reversals of measures;

    46. Notes that the Commission relies on its own methodologies when calculating partial payments and suspensions of funds; regrets that these methodologies were only developed two years after the start of the RRF implementation and without the consultation of Parliament;

    47. Welcomes the extensive work of the ECA in relation to the RRF and deems it important to thoroughly assess its findings, in particular its findings that milestones and targets are often rather vague and output-oriented and are therefore not fit to measure results and impacts, and its findings regarding the risks of double funding resulting from overlaps with other policies; notes that the Commission has accepted many but not all of the ECA’s recommendations; stresses that weaknesses in financial controls, as highlighted by the ECA, must be urgently addressed to prevent double funding, cost inefficiencies, and mismanagement of EU funds; calls for enhanced transparency and for the full consideration of the ECA’s recommendations without adding unnecessary administrative burden;

    48. Notes that the ECA’s audits revealed several cases in which funding had been disbursed but the requirements related to the fulfilment of corresponding milestones and targets had not been adequately met; further notes that the Commission framework for assessing the ‘satisfactory fulfilment’ of the relevant milestones and targets contains discretionary elements, such as ‘minimal deviation from a requirement’ or ‘proportional delays’, and that the methodology for the determination of partial payments does not provide an explanation for the values chosen as coefficients, thereby leaving room for interpretation; asks the Commission to provide Parliament with further clarification;

    49. Insists that, as a rule, measures already included in other national plans benefiting from EU funding (e.g. cohesion, agriculture, etc.) should not be included in NRRPs, even if they do not incur any costs; urges the Commission to remain vigilant and proactive in identifying any potential situation of double funding in particular in regard to the different implementation models of the RRF and other EU funding instruments;

    50. Regrets the lack of a proper RRF audit trail and the persistent lack of transparency despite the bi-annual reporting requirement for Member States on the 100 largest final recipients, which was introduced into REPowerEU upon Parliament’s request; regrets the delays in reporting by some Member States and the limited informative value of the information provided, which ultimately prevents compliance checks by the Commission or the ECA; reiterates its call for the lists of the largest final recipients for each Member State to be regularly updated and published on the RRF Scoreboard and to include information on the economic operators involved, including contractors and sub-contractors, and their beneficial owners, and not simply ministries or other government bodies or state companies; further regrets that the current definition of ‘final recipient’ leaves room for interpretation, resulting in different final beneficiaries for similar measures among Member States; calls on the Commission, in this context, to ensure a common understanding of what constitutes a ‘final recipient’ so that this can be applied consistently;

    51. Is concerned about persistent weaknesses in national reporting and control mechanisms, due in part to absorption pressure affecting the capacity to detect ineligible expenditure and due to the complexity of the audit and control procedures, which created uncertainty in the Member States and an overload of administrative procedures; calls on the Commission to provide assurance on whether Member States’ control systems function adequately and to check the compliance of RRF-funded investment projects with EU and national rules; calls for payments to be reduced and, where appropriate, amounts to be recovered in accordance with Article 22 of the RRF Regulation, should weaknesses persist in the national control systems; regrets the reliance on manual cross-checks and self-declarations by recipients of EU funds in the absence of interoperable IT tools and harmonised standards, despite the existence of tools such as the Early Detection and Exclusion System and ARACHNE, whose use is currently not mandatory, thereby risking that expenditure is declared twice; recalls, in this regard, the reluctance of the Member States to make progress in developing the relevant IT tools in a timely manner;

    52. Shares the view of the ECA that the FNLC model does not preclude reporting on actual costs; notes that having clear insights on costs also facilitates the work of control and oversight bodies, as well as the EPPO and the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and enables enhanced public scrutiny;

    53. Reiterates the role of the RRF Scoreboard in providing information for citizens on the overall progress in the implementation of NRRPs; underlines the importance of the Scoreboard in strengthening transparency and calls on the Commission to increase the level of transparency and data visualisation in the Scoreboard;

    54. Recalls that the reporting on the progress of implementation in the RRF Scoreboard is based on information provided by the Member States on a bi-annual basis;

    55. Highlights the important role of the EPPO and OLAF in protecting the EU’s financial interests; welcomes the fact that EPPO investigations into RRF-related fraud and corruption cases have led to several arrests, indictments and seizures of RRF funds; recalls that the EPPO was handling 307 active cases related to the RRF in 2024, corresponding to about 17 % of all expenditure fraud investigations and causing an estimated damage to the EU’s financial interests of EUR 2.8 billion; expects the number of investigations to grow as RRF implementation advances; calls on the Commission to look into the management declarations of the Member States in terms of their reporting of detected fraud and the remedial measures taken;

    Role of the European Parliament

     

    56. Reiterates the importance of Parliament’s role in scrutinising and monitoring the implementation of the RRF and in holding the Commission accountable; highlights Parliament’s input provided through various channels, in particular through various plenary debates, parliamentary resolutions, bi-monthly RRD meetings with the responsible Commissioners, over 30 meetings of the standing working group on the scrutiny of the RRF, numerous parliamentary questions, the annual discharge procedure of the Commission and the regular flow of information and ad hoc requests for information from the Commission; regrets that the model of using milestones and targets to trigger disbursement was not accompanied by adequate budgetary control mechanisms, resulting in a diminished role for Parliament compared to its scrutiny of MFF spending;

    57. Recalls Parliament’s rights as laid down in Article 25 of the RRF Regulation, in particular the right to simultaneously receive from the Commission information that it transmits to the Council or any of its preparatory bodies in the context of the RRF Regulation or its implementation, as well as an overview of its preliminary findings concerning the satisfactory fulfilment of the relevant milestones and targets included in the NRRPs; encourages the sharing of relevant outcomes of discussions held in Council preparatory bodies with the competent parliamentary committees;

    58. Recalls further the right of Parliament’s competent committees to invite the Commission to provide information on the state of play of the assessment of the NRRPs in the context of the RRD meetings;

    59. Regrets the fact that Parliament has no role in the design of NRRPs and is not consulted on payment requests; criticises furthermore the fact that Parliament has not been provided with a clear and traceable overview of the implementation status of projects and payments; expects to be informed about the context of NRRP revisions in order to make its own assessment of the revisions and to have an enhanced role in possible future instruments based on the RRF experience;

    Stakeholder involvement

    60. Regrets the insufficient involvement of local and regional authorities (LRAs), civil society organisations, social partners, national parliaments and other relevant stakeholders in the design, revision or implementation of NRRPs leading to worse policy outcomes, as well as limited ownership; regrets that in the design and implementation of the NRRPs, some Member States have clearly favoured some LRAs or stakeholders to the detriment of others; recalls that the participation of LRAs, national authorities and those responsible for developing these policies is crucial for the success of the RRF, as stated in Article 28 of the RRF Regulation; recalls that Parliament supported a binding provision in the RRF to establish a multilevel dialogue to engage relevant stakeholders and discuss the preparation and implementation of NRRPs with them, with a clear consultation period; calls, therefore, for the maximum possible stakeholder involvement in the implementation of NRRPs, in accordance with the national legal framework and based on clear and transparent principles;

    61. Reiterates the need for regular interaction between national coordinating authorities and national stakeholders involved in the monitoring of the implementation of the NRRPs, in line with the principle of transparency and accountability; stresses that more regular and public communication from the national coordinating authorities is needed to ensure that updated information about the progress of the implementation of NRRPs is made available;

    62. Stresses that decisions should be made at the level that is most appropriate; is convinced that the application of the partnership principle and a stronger involvement of LRAs could make project implementation more efficient, reduce disparities within Member States and result in more and better quality measures with a cross-border and multi-country dimension;

    63. Believes that valuable lessons can be drawn from the RRF to be reflected in the design of performance-based instruments in the next MFF, in particular in the light of the EU’s competitiveness and simplification agendas;

    Lessons for the future

    64. Believes that the combination of reforms and investments has proved successful but that a clearer link is needed between the two; highlights the importance of aligning any funding with the objectives of the instrument and disbursing it in line with the progress made towards them; insists that the level of ambition of NRRPs should not be lowered but should be commensurate with the RRF timeline to ensure their successful implementation;

    65. Is convinced, as highlighted by the Draghi report, that boosting EU competitiveness, decarbonising the EU’s economy and making it more circular and resource-efficient, as well as closing the skills gap, creating quality jobs and enhancing the EU’s innovation capacity, will be central priorities beyond 2026; is concerned that a sizeable funding gap will arise after the RRF ceases to operate at the end of 2026, notably for public investment in common European priorities, since financial resources from national budgets vary significantly among Member States; highlights the need to use the lessons learned from the RRF to better leverage public and private investments with a view to addressing the financing gap in European objectives and transitions, which the Draghi report estimates at over EUR 800 billion annually, while ensuring seamless continuity of investments in common European goods;

    66. Welcomes the enhanced use of financial instruments made possible by the option to channel RRF funds towards the Member States’ compartment of InvestEU;

    67. Urges the Commission to apply the lessons learned and the ECA’s observations, and to ensure that future performance-based instruments are well-targeted, aligned with the aim of financing European public goods and prioritising the addressing of clearly defined strategic challenges, economic sustainability and competitiveness; calls for it to be ensured that all future instruments are designed to measure not only inputs or short-term outputs and progress but also results in terms of long-term impacts backed by outcomes;

    68. Calls on the Commission to conduct an independent evaluation and to report on the RRF impact on private investments at aggregate EU level, in particular on its potential crowding-out effect on private investments and its determinants; calls further for objective and clear analyses from the Commission on how the implementation of reforms and investments within the NRRPs affects the economies of the individual Member States, with special regard to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth; urges the Commission to take the lessons learned from these analyses and from the ECA’s observations on the RRF implementation into account when drawing up its proposals for the next programming period;

    69. Underlines that all EU-funded investments and reforms should be coordinated and coherent with strategic planning at national level and should focus on projects with a clear European added value; underlines the need for a spending target for cross-border and multi-country investments; calls on the Commission to develop a credible methodology to assess the cross-border and multi-country dimensions of EU funded projects;

    70. Highlights that meaningful social and territorial dialogues with a high level of involvement of LRAs, social partners, civil society organisations and national parliaments within the national legal framework are essential for national ownership, successful implementation and democratic accountability; expresses concern over the insufficient involvement of all relevant stakeholders in the implementation and oversight of RRF-funded initiatives; stresses in particular that regions and city councils cannot be mere recipients of decisions, without being given the opportunity to have a say on reforms and investments that truly transform their territories;

    71. Believes that it is essential to adopt differentiated strategies that recognise the cultural diversity of the various regions and enhance their economic and social cohesion instead of applying a homogeneous or one-size-fits-all approach that could be to the detriment of the less developed regions; calls, therefore, for dialogues with stakeholders to be strengthened and more diligently employed as they could inspire future initiatives and mechanisms in the EU and its Member States;

    72. Underlines the requirement of the RRF Regulation to publicly display information about the origin of funding for projects funded by the EU to ensure buy-in from European citizens;

    73. Highlights that the RRD meetings have been an important tool in enhancing transparency and accountability, which are crucial for the optimal implementation of the RRF;

    74. Reiterates that further efforts are required to improve the transparency and traceability of the use of EU funds; stresses the need to ensure that data that is relevant for performance measurement is available and that information on performance is presented in a better and more transparent manner; stresses that the feedback mechanism between performance information and programme design or adjustment should be enhanced;

    75. Considers that better training and capacity-building across all regions and authorities involved, in particular at national level, could have accelerated the RRF’s implementation and enabled the implementing authorities to better adapt to the performance-based nature of the RRF; considers that the Commission could have assisted Member States more at the planning stage and provided earlier implementation guidance, in particular with a view to strengthening their audit and control systems and the cross-border dimension of the RRF;

    76. Highlights the importance of mitigating the risk of double funding; suggests the deployment of an integrated and interoperable IT and data mining system and the development of clear standards for datasets to be applied across Member States, with a view to allowing comprehensive and automated expenditure tracking; calls for improved coordination mechanisms that define clear responsibilities among the bodies involved in the implementation of the various EU and national programmes, while avoiding unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and ensuring an efficient allocation of funds; encourages the integration of advanced data analytics and AI tools to enhance performance tracking, evaluation and reporting to alleviate manual workload and to streamline reporting processes; underlines that such progress can only happen if there is also operational support to digitalise administrations;

    77. Strongly urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure that any type of EU FNLC or EU funding that is performance based complies with EU and national rules, ultimately protecting the financial interests of the EU; reiterates the accountability and responsibility of the Commission and the Member States to ensure the legality and the regularity of EU funding, as well as the respect of sound financial management principles;

    78. Considers that the role of Parliament in the monitoring of the RRF should be further enhanced;

    79. Calls for future performance-based instruments to have a single audit trail to trace budget contributions to the projects funded; underlines the need for project-level auditing to mitigate reputational risks in the eyes of the general public and to facilitate the recovery of funds in case measures are reversed; underlines the need to reduce administrative bottlenecks and burden;

    80. Demands that any possible future performance-based programmes make clearer links between the milestones and targets and the actual projects being implemented; stresses that there should be less of a delay between the fulfilment of milestones and the implementation of projects;

    81. Reiterates its call for an open platform which contains data on all projects, final recipients and the regional distribution of funding, thereby facilitating auditing and democratic oversight;

    82. Stresses that any possible future budgetary decisions on EU borrowing should respect the unity of the budget and Parliament’s role as part of the budgetary authority; highlights the risks of cost overruns for the repayment of debt, resulting inter alia from volatile interest rates; deems it important to ensure from the outset that sufficient funding is available to cover these costs without presenting a detriment to other programmes or political priorities;

    83. Invites the Commission and the Member States to closely assess and learn from instruments and tools such as the RRF, in order to maximise the efficiency and impact of EU funding, investments and reforms, streamline policy objectives, improve the collaboration of the institutions and stakeholders at national and European level, and increase national ownership;

    84. Notes the declared intention of the Commission to draw on the RRF experience when designing its proposals for the post-2027 EU funding programmes, due later this year; acknowledges that the independent ex post evaluation will come too late to feed into the process leading up to the next programming period, but expects the Commission and the co-legislators to take due account of the lessons learned from the RRF and of the recommendations of relevant stakeholders, in particular LRA, civil society organisations and social partners; believes that, as the EU plans for future economic resilience, there is also a need to further mobilise private investment, strengthen capital markets and ensure that public spending remains fiscally responsible and strategically targeted to make the EU more resilient and sovereign in an ever more conflictual geopolitical context;

    85. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, and to the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Plan worth over EUR 100 billion – E-001001/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Clean Industrial Deal[1] includes measures to speed up the decarbonisation of European industry by strengthening the business case for decarbonisation.

    The action plan for Affordable Energy[2], presents actions to lower energy bills in the short term, while accelerating the implementation of much-needed cost-saving structural reforms and strengthening energy systems to mitigate future price shocks.

    The Commission also reviews state aid rules to make it easier for Member States to demonstrate compatibility of proposed support measures with State rules.

    The Steel and Metals Action Plan[3] introduces several immediate measures to support industry and protect workers. To address high energy costs, the plan promotes the use of power purchase agreements and encourages Member States to apply energy tax flexibility and reduced network tariffs, to stabilise electricity prices for energy-intensive industries.

    Trade protection measures are also strengthened. Before the end of the year, the Commission will propose a new long-term measure to maintain highly effective protection of the EU’s steel sector once the current safeguard expires in mid-2026.

    The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism[4] ensures that foreign producers pay an equivalent price to that paid by European producers under the Emissions Trading System.

    The Commission provides support to Member States that have identified territories expected to be the most negatively impacted by the transition towards climate-neutrality.

    The Just Transition Fund[5] supports the economic diversification and reconversion of the territories concerned. This includes among others the upskilling and reskilling of workers and investments in small and medium-sized enterprises.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/9db1c5c8-9e82-467b-ab6a-905feeb4b6b0_en?filename=Communication%20-%20Clean%20Industrial%20Deal_en.pdf.
    • [2] https://energy.ec.europa.eu/publications/action-plan-affordable-energy-unlocking-true-value-our-energy-union-secure-affordable-efficient-and_en.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_805.
    • [4] https://taxation-customs.ec.europa.eu/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en.
    • [5] https://commission.europa.eu/funding-tenders/find-funding/eu-funding-programmes/just-transition-fund_en.
    Last updated: 4 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: G7 Foreign Ministers Declaration on Maritime Security and Prosperity

    Source: United States Department of State (3)

    Office of the Spokesperson

    The text of the following statement was released by the G7 Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union.

    Begin Text:

    1. We, the Foreign Ministers of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, and the High Representative of the European Union, reaffirm the G7’s steadfast commitment to contribute towards a free, open, and secure maritime domain based on the rule of law that strengthens international security, fosters economic prosperity, and ensures the sustainable use of marine resources.
    2. Maritime security and prosperity are fundamental to global stability, economic resilience, and the well-being of all nations, and the conservation and sustainable use of ocean ecosystems is essential to all life on Earth. Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea, and 97% of global data flows through submarine cables. Disruptions to maritime routes pose a direct threat to international food security, critical minerals, energy security, global supply chains, and economic stability. We express deep concern over the growing risks to maritime security, including strategic contestation, threats to freedom of navigation and overflight, and illicit shipping activities. State behaviour in these areas has increased the risk of conflict and environmental damage, and imperils all nations’ prosperity and living standards, especially for the world’s poorest.
    3. We recognize the role of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the legal framework for governing all activities in the oceans and the seas.
    4. We recall the G7 Statements on Maritime Security adopted in Lübeck (2015) and Hiroshima (2016). We welcome related work presently underway through other G7 ministerial tracks and working groups, on a range of issues including securing undersea cable networks and combating abandoned fishing gear. We welcome, as well, G7 work relating to transnational organized crime and terrorism that touches on the maritime domain, including in relation to piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking in persons, and strengthening the maritime law enforcement capabilities of coastal states. We acknowledge the importance of regional maritime security frameworks, to support coastal states to address collectively threats to their maritime security. We welcome existing initiatives, such as the G7++ Friends of the Gulf of Guinea (G7++ FoGG, that Canada chairs this year), which has been, the primary forum for dialogue among G7 members and partners on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

    Emerging Threat on Safe Seas and Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

    1. Enhancing Stability: We underscore the importance of freedom of navigation and overflight and other internationally lawful uses of the high seas and the exclusive economic zones as well as to the related rights and freedoms in other maritime zones, including the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, as provided for under international law. We share a growing concern at recent, unjustifiable efforts to restrict such freedom and to expand jurisdiction through use of force and other forms of coercion, including across the Taiwan Strait, and in the South China Sea, the Red Sea, and the Black Sea. We condemn China’s illicit, provocative, coercive and dangerous actions that seek unilaterally to alter the status quo in such a way as to risk undermining the stability of regions, including through land reclamations, and building of outposts, as well as their use for military purpose. In areas pending final delimitation, we underline the importance of coastal states refraining from unilateral actions that cause permanent physical change to the marine environment insofar as such actions jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement, as well as the importance of making every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature, in those areas. We condemn, as well, dangerous vessel maneuvers, the indiscriminate attacks against commercial vessels and other maritime actions that undermine maritime order based on the rule of law and international law. We reiterate that the award rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal on 12 July 2016 is a significant milestone, which is legally binding upon the parties to those proceedings and a useful basis for peacefully resolving disputes between the parties. We reaffirm that our basic policies on Taiwan remain unchanged and emphasize the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to international security and prosperity. We welcome the resumption of exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. Freedom of navigation for commercial shipping in the Black Sea must be upheld.
    2. Attempts to Change the Status Quo by Force: We oppose unilateral attempts to change the status quo, in particular by force or coercion including in the East and South China Seas. We undertake to implement means through which to track systematically and report on attempts to change the status quo by force and by the establishment of new geographical facts, including through coercive and dangerous actions on the oceans and seas that might threaten regional and international peace and security.
    3. Protecting Critical Maritime and Undersea Infrastructure: We are seized of the fact that vital energy and telecommunications infrastructure under the oceans and seas connects our economies and is vital to our prosperity. We recall the G7 Joint Statement on Cable Connectivity for Secure and Resilient Digital Communications Networks (2024) and the New York Joint Statement on the Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables in a Globally Digitalized World (2024). We share a growing concern that undersea communications cables, subsea interconnectors and other critical undersea infrastructure have been subject to critical damage through sabotage, poor seamanship or irresponsible behaviour which have resulted in potential internet or energy disruption in affected regions, delays in global data transmission, or compromised sensitive communications. We will enhance our cooperation with industry mitigate risks, reduce bottlenecks to operational tasks while strengthening repair capacities in order to improve the overall resilience of critical undersea and maritime infrastructure. In this respect, we welcome the EU Action Plan on Cable Security adopted in February 2025 by the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
    4. Maritime Crime: Maritime crime, including piracy, armed robbery at sea, maritime arms trafficking and sanctions evasion, human trafficking, illegal drug trafficking and Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, continues to impede maritime security, freedom of navigation, and our economy and prosperity. We have been working together to tackle these maritime crimes, but maritime illegal activities have extended into new areas, to become an urgent issue to be addressed. We welcome the G7 Action Plan to combat migrant smuggling adopted under Italy’s 2024 G7 Presidency.
    5. Protecting Freedom of Trade: In the past year, indiscriminate Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have endangered maritime security of vessels and their crews, disturbed international trade, and exposed neighboring countries to environmental hazards. Enabled by Iran’s military, financial, and intelligence support, these illegal attacks have also contributed to increased tension in the Middle East and Yemen, with severe repercussions on the intra-Yemeni peace process. The vessel “Galaxy Leader” seized by the Houthis must be released immediately. We appreciate the efforts of all those countries that have engaged to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, protecting crucial shipping lanes and helping to restore regular flows of trade through the Suez Canal connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, we commend the efforts of EU’s maritime operation “Aspides” and U.S.-led operation “Prosperity Guardian”.

    Safe Shipping and Supply Chain Security

    1. Curtailing Unsafe and Illicit Shipping Practices: The rise of unsafe and illicit shipping practices, including fraudulent registration and registries, poses a significant threat to global trade and environmental sustainability. We are concerned that unsafe and illicit shipping imposes heavy costs on industry, governments and citizens. Russia’s ability to earn revenue has been sustained through its extensive effort to circumvent the G7+ oil price cap policy through its shadow fleet of often older, underinsured, and poorly maintained ships that routinely disable their automatic identification systems or engage in “spoofing” to avoid detection and circumvent international safety, environmental, and liability rules and standards. North Korea continues to pursue its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and evade sanctions, particularly through its illicit maritime activities, including prohibited ship to-ship transfers of petroleum and other UN-banned commodities. Through G7 coordination, we have exposed North Korea uses of “dark” vessels – those that engage in illicit activity – to circumvent United Nations Security Council mandated sanctions. Russia and North Korea are strengthening their economic relations including through maritime routes, such as the reported transfer of petroleum products from Russia to North Korea Unregulated, “dark” vessels undertake IUU fishing, destroying marine habitats and depleting fish stocks, with negative impacts for biodiversity and food security. Unregulated, inadequately insured “dark” vessels also pose a high risk of maritime accidents, including in fragile ecosystems such as the Arctic and Antarctic. We commit to strengthen our coordination, amongst the G7 and with other partners, to prevent the use of unregistered or fraudulently registered, uninsured and substandard vessels engaged in sanctions evasion, arms transfers, illegal fishing and illicit trade. We encourage relevant International Organizations to improve maritime domain awareness by expanding satellite-based vessel tracking and establishing comprehensive data records of the movement of individual ships and of ship-to-ship transfers, as a means of identifying and tracking illicit maritime activities. We are also committed to capacity building of the countries in the region in law enforcement and Maritime Domain Awareness.
    2. Shadow Fleet Task Force: We invite members of the Nordic-Baltic 8 (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Sweden), and possibly others, to join participating G7 members in a Shadow Fleet Task Force to enhance monitoring and detection and to otherwise constrain the use of shadow fleets engaged in illegal, unsafe or environmentally perilous activities, building on the work of others active in this area. The Task Force will constitute a response by the participating States to the call by the International Maritime Organization in its Resolution A.1192(33) of 6 December 2023 for Members States and all relevant stakeholders to promote actions to prevent illegal operations in the maritime sector by shadow fleets and their flag states, including illegal operations for the purposes of circumventing sanctions, evading compliance with safety or environmental regulations, avoiding insurance costs, or engaging in other illegal activities.
    3. Enhancing Maritime Supply Chain Resilience and Energy and Food Security: Maritime supply chains will continue to underpin the global economy, but these face a variety of threats, both present and future, stemming from both geopolitical tensions and environmental factors. Maritime disruptions raise consumer costs, increase transit times, and can reduce demand in importing countries, which in turn means lower revenues and diminished competitiveness for producers in exporting countries. Such vulnerabilities in maritime transport can undermine energy and food security, particularly for developing nations reliant on stable shipping routes, including Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). We welcome maritime initiatives involving and supported by G7 partners intended to promote energy and food security, such as the Grain from Ukraine scheme, and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific. We invite cooperation with the African Union (pursuant to Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050) and other relevant International Organizations to identify best practices for enhancing maritime supply chain resilience and for safeguarding energy and food security, including in times of geopolitical crisis.
    4. Promoting Safe and Resilient Ports and Strategic Waterways: Port ownership and operational control matter to national security, as foreign control or influence over critical port infrastructure can create vulnerabilities in trade, in defense and security, and in economic stability. Port resilience is also crucial to economic stability and global trade and yet ports face growing risks from environmental degradation, extreme weather events and geopolitical conflicts. Strengthening port security and modernizing infrastructure are essential to maintaining safe and efficient maritime trade. Ensuring that the ownership and management of strategic waterways and key maritime choke points are not vulnerable to undue influence by potential adversaries is also essential to national security. We underscore the importance of scrutiny of ownership structures and port management and resilience within our own national jurisdictions, including with regard to Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems, to ensure that adversaries do not gain leverage over supply chains, military operations, or the flow of strategic resources. We will work with partners and with relevant International Organizations to encourage robust cybersecurity standards for port ICT infrastructure, to increase resilience against malicious cyber incidents on maritime logistical networks, to reduce monopolistic power over key supply chain nodes, to promote secure and transparent port ownership, to limit unsolicited or undue foreign influence over critical infrastructures and strategic waterways, and to otherwise encourage greater focus on such potential vulnerabilities.
    5. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) at sea poses a significant hazard to the marine environment, to the safety of fishermen and other users of the maritime space, and to various marine economic activities. We commit to enhancing diplomatic efforts and to exchanging best practices among national authorities, relevant international and regional organizations, and relevant industry sectors to accelerate the clean-up of UXO from the seas and ocean.

    Sustainable Stewardship of Maritime Resources

    1. Strengthen Enforcement Against IUU Fishing: IUU fishing is a major contributor to declining fish stocks and to marine habitat destruction. It may account for a third of all fishing activity worldwide, at a cost to the global economy of more than US$23 billion per year and with negative consequences for fisheries as an enduring economic asset, including for developing countries. We welcome the Canadian-led Dark Vessel Detection System in Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, the Philippines, and members of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and would see value in replicating the model to support other partners whose fisheries are under threat from IUU fishing. We recognize that data sharing and transparency play a key role in this fight by exposing bad actors and that technological advances can support a robust Monitoring, Control and Surveillance and enforcement landscape. We encourage further progress in addressing IUU fishing, working with and through relevant International Organizations to establish and strengthen rules to sustainably manage fish stocks on the high seas and to improve the enforcement of these measures, including through the further development of detection technologies, aircraft patrols and high seas boarding and inspection of vessels, building upon the 2022 G7 Ocean Deal.
    2. We welcome the Third UN Ocean Conference, in Nice, France, from 9 to 13 June 2025.

    PARTNERSHIPS

    1. This G7 Maritime Security and Prosperity Declaration provides a framework for cooperation with non-G7 Partners, including countries hosting major ports, large merchant fleets, or extensive flag registries as well as relevant regional and International Organizations, such as the International Maritime Organization and ASEAN. We would welcome robust cooperation with Partners to take forward the goals set out in this Declaration, consistent with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, under the efforts of the G7 countries, including a free, open, prosperous and secure Indo-Pacific region, to build a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, and of commitment to the sustainable development of the world’s maritime spaces.
    2. We welcome the cooperation on Coast Guard Functions, including the Global Coast Guard Forum hosted by Italy in 2025, as well as the Arctic Coast Guard Forum, which could also support the objectives of this Declaration.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Federal Life Insurance Company Announces Acquisition of Texas Service Life Insurance Company, Signaling a New Era in Preneed Insurance

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    AUSTIN, Texas, June 04, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) —  Federal Life Insurance Company has completed the acquisition of Texas Service Life Insurance Company, a leader in preneed insurance, marking a bold step forward for the industry.

    This strategic move underscores Federal Life’s commitment to expanding growth pathways and forward-thinking solutions that empower families to plan with confidence.

    With an A- (Excellent) rating from AM Best, and backed by leading investment firm, Bain Capital, Federal Life is in a strong financial position to collaboratively build a new future for preneed insurance.

    “This is more than an acquisition, it’s a signal to the market that preneed is an essential product for families and we believe the market is underserved,” said Knut Olson, CEO of Federal Life with over 20 years of experience in the insurance industry. “We are reimagining how families prepare for the future by delivering exceptional service and innovative opportunities to access preplanning. Our team is ready to push boundaries, drive industry change, and ensure families receive the support they deserve.”

    Following the acquisition, George Wise steps in as President of Texas Service Life, leading the charge toward a national expansion strategy that prioritizes accessibility, trust, and cutting-edge financial security for families across the country.

    “We are evolving with purpose, ready to strengthen and scale a business designed to meet the ever-changing needs of families everywhere,” Wise stated. “The future of preneed planning is here, and we’re shaping it with fresh ideas, dynamic solutions, and a commitment to delivering lasting value.”

    Federal Life and Texas Service Life are committed to building better products, exceeding service expectations, and helping funeral homes and families evolve in an ever-changing world. Together, they embody a more creative, dynamic, future-forward vision for preneed insurance.

    About Federal Life Insurance Company
    Federal Life Insurance Company is shaping the future of insurance with innovative solutions designed to protect individuals and families at every stage of life. Rooted in financial strength and stability, Federal Life is committed to delivering reliable accident & health and life products that evolve with its clients’ changing needs. As the company expands its reach and enhances its offerings, the focus remains on providing trusted, forward-thinking coverage that empowers financial security for generations to come.

    About Texas Service Life Insurance Company
    Texas Service Life Insurance Company has been serving customers since 1985. With a proven track record in the industry and a robust financial foundation, Texas Service Life consistently delivers the dependability families require when planning their insurance arrangements. Family1® is a Registered Trademark of Texas Service Life Insurance Company, Austin, TX.

    Media Contact:
    Jessica Grann
    Chief Marketing and Culture Officer
    Federal Life Insurance Company
    jgrann@federallife.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: SBM Offshore signs Share Purchase Agreement with GEPetrol

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Amsterdam, June 4, 2025

    SBM Offshore announces it has signed a Share Purchase Agreement for the full divestment of SBM Offshore’s equity interest in the lease and operating entities of the FPSO Aseng to GEPetrol. The Company’s exit from Equatorial Guinea will take place following an operational transition phase lasting up to 12 months.

    SBM Offshore’s sale of its participation in the unit in Equatorial Guinea is in line with its strategy to rationalize its Lease & Operate portfolio, as per other recent transactions.

    The agreement remains subject to several conditions precedent and approvals.

    Corporate Profile

    SBM Offshore is the world’s deepwater ocean-infrastructure expert. Through the design, construction, installation, and operation of offshore floating facilities, we play a pivotal role in a just transition. By advancing our core, we deliver cleaner, more efficient energy production. By pioneering more, we unlock new markets within the blue economy. 
    More than 7,800 SBMers collaborate worldwide to deliver innovative solutions as a responsible partner towards a sustainable future, balancing ocean protection with progress.
    For further information, please visit our website at www.sbmoffshore.com.

    Financial Calendar   Date Year
    Half Year 2025 Earnings   August 7 2025
    Third Quarter 2025 Trading Update   November 13 2025
    Full Year 2025 Earnings   February 26 2026
    Annual General Meeting   April 15 2026
    First Quarter 2026 Trading Update   May 7 2026

    For further information, please contact:

    Investor Relations

    Wouter Holties
    Corporate Finance & Investor Relations Manager

    Media Relations

    Giampaolo Arghittu
    Head of External Relations

    Market Abuse Regulation

    This press release may contain inside information within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the EU Market Abuse Regulation.

    Disclaimer

    Some of the statements contained in this release that are not historical facts are statements of future expectations and other forward-looking statements based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance, or events to differ materially from those in such statements. These statements may be identified by words such as ‘expect’, ‘should’, ‘could’, ‘shall’ and / or similar expressions. Such forward-looking statements are subject to various risks and uncertainties. The principal risks which could affect the future operations of SBM Offshore N.V. are described in the ‘Impacts, Risks and Opportunities’ section of the 2024 Annual Report.

    Should one or more of these risks or uncertainties materialize, or should underlying assumptions prove incorrect, actual results and performance of the Company’s business may vary materially and adversely from the forward-looking statements described in this release. SBM Offshore does not intend and does not assume any obligation to update any industry information or forward-looking statements set forth in this release to reflect new information, subsequent events or otherwise.

    This release contains certain alternative performance measures (APMs) as defined by the ESMA guidelines which are not defined under IFRS. Further information on these APMs is included in the 2024 Annual Report, available on our website Annual Reports – SBM Offshore.

    Nothing in this release shall be deemed an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy, any securities. The companies in which SBM Offshore N.V. directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this release “SBM Offshore” and “SBM” are sometimes used for convenience where references are made to SBM Offshore N.V. and its subsidiaries in general. These expressions are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular company or companies.

    “SBM Offshore®“, the SBM logomark, “Fast4Ward®”, “emissionZERO®” and “F4W®” are proprietary marks owned by SBM Offshore.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of International Trade of Canada

    Source: ASEAN

    Secretary-General of ASEAN, Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, met with the Minister of International Trade of Canada, H.E Maninder Sidhu, at the OECD Headquarters in Paris, France, on 4 June 2025. Their discussions explored potential opportunities to deepen ASEAN- OECD cooperation, aligned with the implementation of the OECD Southeast Asia Regional Programme (SEARP) in 2026, including specific areas to support the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.
     

    The post Secretary-General of ASEAN meets with the Minister of International Trade of Canada appeared first on ASEAN Main Portal.

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Microsoft launches new European security initiative

    Source: Microsoft

    Headline: Microsoft launches new European security initiative

    As AI and digital technologies advance, the European cyber threat landscape continues to evolve, presenting new challenges that require stronger partnerships and enhanced solutions. Ransomware groups and state-sponsored actors from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea continue to grow in scope and sophistication, and European cyber protection cannot afford to stand still.

    That is why, today, in Berlin, we are announcing a new Microsoft initiative to expand our longstanding work to help defend Europe’s cybersecurity. Implementing one of the five European Digital Commitments I shared in Brussels five weeks ago, we are launching a new European Security Program that adds to the company’s longstanding global Government Security Program.

    This new program expands the geographic reach of our existing work and adds new elements that will become critical to Europe’s protection. It puts AI at the center of our work as a tool to protect traditional cybersecurity needs and strengthens our protection of digital and AI infrastructure.

    We are launching the European Security Program with three new elements:

    • Increasing AI-based threat intelligence sharing with European governments;
    • Making additional investments to strengthen cybersecurity capacity and resilience; and
    • Expanding our partnerships to disrupt cyberattacks and dismantle the networks cybercriminals use.

    We are making this program available to European governments, free of charge, including all 27 European Union (EU) member states, as well as EU accession countries, members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the UK, Monaco, and the Vatican.

    Together, these efforts reflect Microsoft’s long-term commitment to defending Europe’s digital ecosystem—ensuring that, no matter how the threat landscape evolves, we will remain a trusted and steadfast partner to Europe in securing its digital future.

    The need for new steps – the current threat environment

    Microsoft continues to observe persistent threat activity targeting European networks from nation state actors, with Russian and Chinese activity being particularly prolific in Europe. Unsurprisingly, Russia continues to be especially focused on targets in Ukraine and European nations providing support to Ukraine. Nation-state actors, including those engaging in malicious activity from Iran and North Korea, are predominantly pursuing espionage objectives in Europe through credential theft or the exploitation of vulnerabilities to gain access to corporate and government networks. Several campaigns, including those from China, have also targeted academic institutions, compromising accounts to access sensitive research data or conduct geopolitical espionage against think tanks. Cybercriminals continue to develop Ransomware-as-a-Service beyond nation-state threats. We have seen the emergence of illicit websites rapidly gaining followings by leaking ransomware insights to be used by criminal groups to conduct attacks across Europe.

    The rise of AI is also augmenting and evolving threat actor behavior. Microsoft has observed AI use by threat actors for reconnaissance, vulnerability research, translation, LLM-refined operational command techniques, resource development, scripting techniques, detection evasion, social engineering, and brute force attacks. This is why Microsoft now tracks any malicious use of new AI models we release and proactively prevents known threat actors from using our AI products. This also underscores the importance of secure development and rigorous testing of AI models, leveraging AI to benefit cyber defenders, and close public-private partnerships to share the latest insights about AI and cybersecurity.

    Increasing AI-based threat intelligence sharing with governments

    Microsoft’s Government Security Program (GSP) has long provided governments with confidential security information and resources to help them better understand our products and the evolving threat landscape, particularly threats from nation-state actors. Building on existing efforts, our new European Security Program will increase the flow and expand access to actionable threat intelligence to European governments. Tailored to discrete national threat environments using AI insights, and delivered, when possible, in real time, this program is designed to help governments stay ahead of advancing cyber threats through:

    • Leveraging threat intelligence insights – Microsoft tracks the most sophisticated nation-state cyber activity, offering timely insights into evolving global threats. We use AI to support our analysis, which has improved our visibility and accelerated our ability to share the latest intelligence on the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by advanced persistent threat actors, including the malicious use of AI. By providing more information and faster, Microsoft will help European governments strengthen their cyber resilience and enable proactive defense.
    • Expanding cybercrime reporting – The Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) plays a critical role in detecting and disrupting global cybercriminal infrastructure, generating invaluable real-time intelligence in the process. As part of this new effort, we are expanding the availability of this intelligence to trusted European partners to support rapid response and coordinated enforcement action through the Cybercrime Threat Intelligence Program (CTIP).
    • Providing foreign influence operations updates – The Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) continues to monitor influence operations in Europe, which are increasingly using AI to mislead and deceive with deepfake synthetic media. MTAC also uses AI to look for commonalities across operations and will provide regular intelligence briefings on foreign influence, offering timely insights into the tactics, narratives, and digital platforms leveraged by state-affiliated actors. These briefings help policymakers and security stakeholders stay ahead of evolving disinformation campaigns and hybrid threats targeting democratic institutions and public trust.
    • Identifying vulnerabilities and prioritizing security communications – Microsoft is committed to proactive and transparent security communications, particularly in the face of emerging threats and evolving vulnerabilities. We provide customers with timely, actionable intelligence through structured programs such as the Threat Microsoft Security Update Guide, Vulnerability Reporting process, and Microsoft Defender Vulnerability Management. As part of this expanded commitment, we will offer prioritized notice of security communications, including vulnerability remediation guidance to our European Security Program partners, helping to enhance situational awareness and enabling faster responses.

    Participating governments will have a dedicated Microsoft point of contact to coordinate responses and escalate concerns. These efforts are designed to improve situational awareness and to support faster, more coordinated action across borders.

    Making additional investments to strengthen cybersecurity capacity and resilience

    Digital resilience—the ability to anticipate, withstand, recover from, and adapt to cyber threats and disruptions—requires more than technology. It requires investment in people, institutions, and partnerships. As part of the European Security Program, we are investing additional resources to further our work with European governments, civil society, and innovators to strengthen local capabilities and build long-term resilience. Highlights include:

    • Strengthening public-private collaboration – Microsoft has launched a new pilot program with Europol’s European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), embedding Microsoft Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) investigators at EC3 headquarters in The Hague to enhance intelligence sharing and operational coordination. Through this enhanced collaboration, we will enable joint investigations, identify faster threat identification, and be better positioned to disrupt cybercriminal activity targeting European institutions and citizens more effectively.
    • Supporting civil society and defending against ransomware – Microsoft has renewed our three-year partnership with the CyberPeace Institute to support NGOs and to promote accountability for bad actors, including nearly 100 Microsoft employees volunteering their time and expertise to help defend the most vulnerable in cyberspace. We will continue to support the Institute’s efforts to trace ransomware origins, identify safe havens, and uncover potential links to nation-state actors.
    • Expanding cybersecurity support to the Western Balkans – Through a new collaboration with the Western Balkans Cyber Capacity Centre (WB3C), Microsoft will scale cybersecurity in a region where malicious actors have long sought to destabilize countries bordering the EU. Microsoft stands firmly in defense of Ukraine and is now extending that commitment with WB3C to help scale cybersecurity capabilities in a geopolitically sensitive and digitally under-resourced region, aligning with broader European cybersecurity priorities.
    • Advancing AI security and innovation – Microsoft is investing additional resources to support research, expand the cybersecurity talent pipeline, and test advanced AI-assisted security tools in real-world environments using Microsoft’s security stack and Azure and Copilot capabilities. We’re working with the UK’s Laboratory for AI Security Research (LASR), a public-private partnership established to advance AI security in support of UK’s national security and economic prosperity. Together, we’re launching a joint research program focused on AI-cybersecurity challenges with a focus on critical infrastructure and agentic AI security, with an initial investment from Microsoft and research-collaboration between LASR and Microsoft Security Research Center.
    • Securing open-source innovation Through the recently launched GitHub Secure Open Source Fund, we will support open-source projects that underpin the digital supply chain, catalyze innovation, and are critical to the AI stack. By raising the security posture for European projects such as Log4J and Scancode, which are critical to the IT systems of governments and companies across the continent, the program aims to reduce future security vulnerabilities. Ensuring these tools can continuously withstand and sustainably defend against sophisticated cyber threats is essential to strengthening cyber resilience.

    These new and enhanced initiatives reflect our belief that cybersecurity is a collective endeavor—and that Europe’s digital resilience must be built from the ground up.

    Expanding partnerships to disrupt cyberattacks and dismantle cybercriminal networks

    Finally, as part of our European Security Program we are expanding our partnerships with law enforcement and regional actors to proactively identify new and innovative ways to disrupt malicious and criminal activity.

    For instance, last month, Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU) worked with Europol and others to take down Lumma, a prolific infostealer malware used to steal passwords, financial data, and crypto wallets. In just two months, Lumma infected nearly 400,000 devices globally, many of them in Europe. The operation seized or blocked over 2,300 command-and-control domains. Off the back of this action, we are working with Europol to identify new opportunities to continue to meaningfully disrupt and deter cybercrime.

    Lumma-infected devices by country in Europe

    To accelerate future takedowns, we also launched the Statutory Automated Disruption (SAD) Program in April 2025. This initiative automates legal abuse notifications to hosting providers, enabling faster removal of malicious domains and IP addresses. Focused initially on Europe and the U.S., SAD raises the cost of doing business for cybercriminals and makes it harder for them to operate at scale.

    In addition, we’re working with local internet service providers to help remediate affected users and ensure governments have greater visibility into emerging threats.

    The DCU has long played a leading role in proactively combating cyber threats, including those originating from nation-state actors. Since 2016, Microsoft has filed seven legal actions to spotlight and disrupt nation-state threat actors from countries such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which we refer to internally by the weather-themed names Blizzard, Typhoon, Sandstorm, and Sleet, respectively. Most recently, in September 2024, Microsoft initiated a disruption action against the Russian actor Star Blizzard, mentioned above, known for hacking political targets surrounding UK’s 2022 elections and targeting NATO countries to advance its geopolitical interests involving Ukraine. Microsoft exposed the Russian actors and directly seized over 140 malicious domains in total, substantially blunting ongoing campaigns and forcing Star Blizzard to significantly alter its attack methods to other platforms, which Microsoft Threat Intelligence thereafter publicly exposed in a security blog. We will continue to act against those seeking to harm customers, governments, and individual users. These efforts are part of our broader strategy to partner with law enforcement across Europe. We are already working on coordinated disruptions to protect the digital ecosystem, and we stand ready to provide robust incident response services during crises, ensuring our partners and customers are never alone in the face of cyber adversity.

    We also believe that deterrence is a critical pillar of modern cybersecurity. The EU’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox plays a vital role in this effort, helping to coordinate crisis response and send a clear message that malicious activity will not go unanswered—legally, operationally, or reputationally.

    Taken together, operations like the Lumma disruption, the launch of SAD, and future coordinated disruptions are helping to prevent cybercriminals and state actors from establishing malicious infrastructure in Europe.

    * * *

    At Microsoft, our commitment to Europe is deep, enduring, and unwavering. We believe that Europe’s digital future is one of the most important opportunities of our time—and protecting that future is a responsibility we share. We will stand shoulder to shoulder with European governments, institutions, and communities to defend against threats, build capacity, and strengthen resilience. We are proud to be a trusted partner to Europe, and we will continue to work every day to earn trust through transparency, collaboration, and a steadfast commitment to protecting what matters most.

    Tags: Brad Smith, cybersecurity, Digital commitments, Europe

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Parliament updated on work undertaken to set up Transformation Fund

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    The establishment of the R100 billion Transformation Fund marks a significant step towards addressing the historical funding gaps that have hindered the growth of black-owned businesses in South Africa.

    This is according to the Acting Deputy Director-General (DDG) of Transformation and Competition at the Department of Trade, Industry and Competition, Susan Mangole.

    She was part of a delegation led by the Deputy Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, Zuko Godlimpi, who briefed the Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry during a virtual meeting on the work the department has undertaken so far to set up the fund.

    READ I Transformation Fund to drive inclusive economic growth

    In March, the department published a draft concept document on the Transformation Fund and called for public comments in a period that ended on 28 May 2025. The department further undertook a public engagement process which targeted different stakeholders to elicit their inputs into the document. 

    During the briefing, Mangole emphasised that the fund does not seek to bring additional tax burdens on businesses or any other requirements beyond mechanisms that already exist in line with the Section 11(2)(b) of the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Act 2003. 

    “The Transformation Fund will be anchored by the B-BBEE policy provisions and therefore the R100 billion over the next five years will be sourced from the Competition Commission’s public interest commitments, Enterprise and Supplier Development (ESD) funds, Equity Equivalent Investments from multinational companies, and other government funding initiatives,” Mangole said.

    In her presentation, Mangole highlighted some of the inputs received during the window of the public participation process and indicated the department is currently reviewing them.

    “Some of the comments and inputs received include a call for clarity on how the fund will work with existing ESD funds, particularly those that are well functioning, a clear transformation index on how to measure the impact of the fund and that it must be complemented by compliance by big corporations in terms of market access, technical skills development, infrastructure development and support, and other non-financial support,” Mangole said.

    She added that a partnership between government and the private sector in administering the fund and an oversight committee consisting of nine members from both sides will be established to provide oversight in the running of the fund. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Spaza Shop Support Fund information session to be held in Limpopo

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Limpopo spaza shop owners will get an opportunity to learn more about how they can access financial and non-financial support from the Spaza Shop Support Fund at an interactive session at the George Phadagi Town Hall, in Thohoyandou, on Friday.

    The session is part of a countrywide campaign aimed at creating awareness about the Spaza Shop Support Fund. 

    The campaign, which began in KwaZulu-Natal last month, is hosted by the Department of Trade, Industry, and Competition (the dtic) and the Department of Small Business Development (DSDB). 

    The R500 million fund was launched by the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition, Parks Tau, and the Minister of Small Business Development, Stella Ndabeni-Abrahams, in Soweto, on 8 April 2025. 

    The national education and awareness campaign is being held in partnership with the Small Enterprise Development and Finance Agency (SEDFA) and the National Empowerment Fund (NEF), the agencies of the DSBD and the dtic, respectively, which will be responsible for administering the fund. 

    The interactive session with spaza owners in the Vhembe District Municipality will be an opportunity to learn more about how to apply for the fund and which requirements will they be expected to comply with.

    According to Minister Tau, government is taking a concrete step to formalise and empower the informal sector with the fund. 

    Tau said supporting spaza shops would enable entrepreneurs, often women and young people, to participate fully in the economic process.

    “These small businesses generate employment, drive local commerce, and channel much-needed income into communities that have long been underserved. Studies show that small businesses account for a significant portion of job creation in South Africa. 

    “By providing spaza shop owners with financial support, infrastructure upgrades, and essential business training, we are setting the stage for sustainable job creation,” Tau said.

    Minister Ndabeni said the role played by Sedfa and NEF was truly appreciated and that the department believed this fund would go a long way in assisting shop owners that are registered and have operating permits.

    “Our partnership ensures that spaza shop owners are not only funded but are also trained, mentored, and integrated into reliable supply chains. This is about building long-term sustainability for township retail,” Ndabeni said.

    The aim of the fund is to support South African-owned township community convenience shops, including spaza shops, to increase their participation in the townships and rural areas’ retail trade sector and to provide critical financial and non-financial support to township businesses, including community convenience stores and spaza shops.

    The fund also provides various types of support including the initial purchase of stock via delivery channel partners, upgrading of building infrastructure, systems, refrigeration, shelving and security, as well as training programmes which includes Point of Sale devices, business skills, digital literacy, credit health, food safety, business compliance. 

    The fund also seeks to bolster the broader supply chain by fostering partnerships with local manufacturers, black industrialists and wholesalers. 

    Through bulk purchasing arrangements and the promotion of locally produced goods, spaza shops will benefit from reduced costs and increased access to quality products. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Africa: International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC)’s 2024 Annual Report Highlights Record Trade Support, Empowering Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) Economies and Expanding Global Impact

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    JEDDAH, Saudi Arabia, June 4, 2025/APO Group/ —

    The International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC) (www.ITFC-IDB.org), a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group, is proud to announce the release of its 2024 Annual Report, titled “Reaching New Frontiers.” The report captures a landmark year showcasing a period of transformative growth, expanded geographic reach, record trade finance approvals, and strengthened commitments to sustainable and inclusive development across its Member Countries.  

    In 2024, ITFC demonstrated agility and resilience amidst persistent geopolitical and economic challenges, prioritizing trade finance, facilitation, and trade development to support member countries’ national development agendas. 

    Highlights from the 2024 Annual Report 

    Record Trade Finance Approvals 

    • In 2024, ITFC approved a total of US$ 7.3 billion in trade finance across 110 operations in 26 countries. Of this amount, US$ 6.7 billion was successfully disbursed 
    • Notably, 38% of the approved financing was directed toward Least Developed Member Countries (LDMCs), underscoring ITFC’s commitment to inclusive development 
    • Furthermore, 41% of the total portfolio, equivalent to US$ 3 billion, was allocated to non-energy sectors such as agriculture, healthcare, and financial services 
    • ITFC successfully mobilized US$ 4.2 billion through Islamic syndications in 2024, representing 57% of its total trade finance approvals. 

    Accelerating Intra-OIC Trade 

    • A total of US$ 4.85 billion was dedicated to promoting trade among OIC member countries, marking a 6.5% increase compared to 2023 
    • These intra-OIC trade approvals accounted for 67% of ITFC’s total trade finance operations, reinforcing the Corporation’s role in fostering regional economic integration and cooperation 

    Strengthening the Private Sector 

    • In a continued effort to support private sector growth, ITFC provided US$ 1.2 billion in financing, reflecting a 14% increase over the previous year 
    • This support reached 47 financial institutions and included engagements with 19 new clients across Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia 

    Delivering on Food Security Commitments 

    • To address food insecurity, ITFC approved US$ 1.75 billion in financing for agriculture and food-related operations across 10 OIC countries  
    • Since the launch of the IsDB Group’s Food Security Response Program (FSRP) in 2022, ITFC has mobilized US$ 4.73 billion in food security financing, exceeding its initial commitment of US$ 4.5 billion. 
    • ITFC financing has helped Member Countries secure stable supplies of essential food commodities, reduce price volatility, and support agricultural resilience. 
    • In Tajikistan alone, ITFC’s food security financing contributed to reaching over 200,000 households—benefiting nearly 900,000 individuals—by ensuring access to staple goods such as wheat, sugar, and edible oil. 

    Sustainability Milestone 

    • ITFC launched its first Environmental and Social (E&S) Policy in October 2024 
    • The policy rollout included a 10-year E&S action plan, a 5-year carbon reduction strategy, and strengthened governance to embed ESG principles across all operations 

    The report also highlights that the Corporation was ranked at the top as Mandated Lead Arranger and Bookrunner in global Islamic syndications by both Refinitiv and Bloomberg, a reflection of its global leadership and strong investor confidence.  

    Additionally, the 2024 Annual Report spotlights the achievements of ITFC’s flagship programs: 

    • The Arab Africa Trade Bridges (AATB) Program actively supported the development of regional value chains by hosting targeted B2B meetings and launching Africa’s first textile and leather standards program, paving the way for improved quality and competitiveness across the continent 
    • The Aid for Trade Initiative for the Arab States (AfTIAS 2.0) Program saw the implementation progress on 21 ongoing projects across Arab States, with a strategic focus on job creation, trade facilitation, and export development. These initiatives continue to empower local economies and enhance regional trade capacity 
    • Trade Connect Central Asia+ (TCCA+): ITFC advanced regional integration among six Central Asian countries through projects that promote agri-business development, investment attraction, and food security, strengthening economic ties and resilience in the region 
    • The Global SMEs Program expanded its footprint in West Africa and officially launched in Cameroon, enhancing access to trade finance and advisory services for small and medium-sized enterprises and fostering inclusive economic growth 

    In addition to its flagship programs, ITFC delivered a diverse range of integrated trade solutions and targeted interventions in 2024 that reflect its holistic development approach. Through tailored capacity-building programs, reverse linkage initiatives, and trade facilitation tools, ITFC addressed specific needs across sectors such as energy, agriculture, finance, and trade policy. Highlights include the Indonesian Coffee Export Development Program enhancing sustainable farming practices; capacity-building workshops on Islamic finance in Nigeria, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan; technical support to Togo and Mali’s electricity sectors; and the rollout of electronic Certificates of Origin to boost cross-border trade in West Africa.  

    With an eye on the future, ITFC remains steadfast in its commitment to addressing the evolving priorities of its Member Countries. By driving innovation, strengthening strategic partnerships, and delivering high-impact trade finance solutions, the Corporation is poised to chart new frontiers and accelerate progress toward sustainable and inclusive development across the OIC region. 

    Read the full English version here- https://apo-opa.co/3T78A0R 

    Read the full Arabic version here- https://apo-opa.co/3FMasch

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI Banking: Why services can’t realistically be tariffed and shouldn’t be 

    Source: International Chamber of Commerce

    Headline: Why services can’t realistically be tariffed and shouldn’t be 

    In today’s digital economy, cross-border services are essential to how businesses operate, grow and compete. But while goods have long been subject to customs tariffs, applying tariffs to services would be both impractical and create significant legal, operational, and economic risks. 

    This is because services are fundamentally different from goods, making them virtually unworkable to tax at borders. Unlike physical products that customs agents can see and inspect, services are intangible—think of things like consulting, software, or design work—that often cross borders digitally or through the movement of people, rather than in shipping containers.  

    This creates multiple challenges: there is no clear moment when a service ‘enters’ a country, no global classification system comparable to the Harmonized System for goods, and no consistent method to assess what should be taxed.   

    Even when governments try to tax cross-border services – such as digital services taxes (DSTs) or withholding regimes – they face legal challenges, high enforcement costs, and risks of international retaliation, as these approaches often violate established rules or conflict with trade and tax agreements. 

    In contrast, some countries have opted for a more neutral approach by applying VAT to cross-border services—treating domestic and foreign providers equally.  

    Beyond feasibility, there is also a strong economic argument to be made against tariffs on services. Services account for more than half of global trade on a value-added basis and are vital enablers of productivity, innovation, and inclusion. Imposing tariffs would raise costs, fragment global supply chains, and disproportionately harm MSMEs and developing economies that rely on affordable cross-border services to grow and compete, including legal advice, design, IT support and marketing.  

    Tariffs on services would also increase compliance burdens and administrative costs for governments, requiring entirely new systems to monitor digital transactions, register providers, and audit contracts.  

    Exporters would not be spared either: many countries are net exporters of services in areas like finance, education, and media. Tariff measures could trigger retaliation and reduce market access for these firms. 

    In short: services can’t realistically be tariffed – and they shouldn’t be. Instead, policymakers should:  

    • Reaffirm multilateral norms by supporting the continuation of the WTO E-Commerce Moratorium and rejecting tariffs on services.  
    • Avoid unilateral tariff-like measures — such as DSTs or withholding regimes —that risk legal conflict, trade retaliation, and fragmentation. 
    • Pursue multilateral cooperation through appropriate multilateral and regional bodies to develop common rules for the taxation of the digital economy. 

    MIL OSI Global Banks

  • MIL-OSI: Siili Solutions Plc: Share Repurchase 4.6.2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Siili Solutions Plc       Announcement  4.6.2025  
           
           
    Siili Solutions Plc: Share Repurchase 4.6.2025    
           
    In the Helsinki Stock Exchange      
           
    Trade date           4.6.2025    
    Bourse trade         Buy    
    Share                  SIILI    
    Amount             1 100 Shares  
    Average price/ share    6,3600 EUR  
    Total cost            6 996,00 EUR  
           
           
    Siili Solutions Plc now holds a total of 3 998 shares  
    including the shares repurchased on 4.6.2025    
           
    The share buybacks are executed in compliance with Regulation   
    No. 596/2014 of the European Parliament and Council (MAR) Article 5
    and the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052.  
           
    On behalf of Siili Solutions Plc      
           
    Nordea Bank Oyj      
           
    Sami Huttunen Ilari Isomäki    
           
    Further information:      
    CFO Aleksi Kankainen      
    Email: aleksi.kankainen@siili.com      
    Tel. +358 50 584 2029      
           
    www.siili.com      
           

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Minister Sidhu meets with United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Business and Trade and President of the Board of Trade Jonathan Reynolds

    Source: Government of Canada News

    June 4, 2025 – Paris, France – Global Affairs Canada

    The Honourable Maninder Sidhu, Minister of International Trade, met with Jonathan Reynolds, the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Business and Trade and President of the Board of Trade, on the margins of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Ministerial Council Meeting in Paris, France.

    Minister Sidhu and Secretary of State Reynolds discussed expanding trade and investment through the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement. Minister Sidhu highlighted the importance of Canada continuing to work with the United Kingdom through forums such as the G7, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, and with international organizations in support of the rules-based global trading system.

    Minister Sidhu looks forward to continuing working with Secretary of State Reynolds on the Canada-UK trade relationship.

    Associated links

    MIL OSI Canada News