Category: Trade

  • MIL-OSI: Renasant Corporation Announces Earnings for the First Quarter of 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    TUPELO, Miss., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Renasant Corporation (NYSE: RNST) (the “Company”) today announced earnings results for the first quarter of 2025.

    (Dollars in thousands, except earnings per share) Three Months Ended
      Mar 31, 2025 Dec 31, 2024 Mar 31, 2024
    Net income and earnings per share:      
    Net income $41,518 $44,747 $39,409
    Basic EPS   0.65   0.70   0.70
    Diluted EPS   0.65   0.70   0.70
    Adjusted diluted EPS (Non-GAAP)(1)   0.66   0.73   0.65
                 

    “Results for the quarter represent a good start to the year with solid profitability and growth in loans and deposits,” remarked C. Mitchell Waycaster, Chief Executive Officer of the Company. “On April 1st, we completed the merger with The First Bancshares, Inc. and welcome their team to Renasant. Together, we are positioned to accelerate profit performance and operate in some of the country’s most attractive banking markets.”

    Quarterly Highlights

    Acquisition of The First Bancshares, Inc.

    • On April 1, 2025, the Company completed its merger with The First Bancshares, Inc. (“The First”). As of the acquisition date, The First operated 116 locations throughout Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and Florida and, prior to any purchase accounting adjustments, had approximately $8.0 billion in assets, which included approximately $5.4 billion in loans, and approximately $6.5 billion in deposits.

    Earnings

    • Net income for the first quarter of 2025 was $41.5 million; diluted EPS and adjusted diluted EPS (non-GAAP)(1) were $0.65 and $0.66, respectively
    • Net interest income (fully tax equivalent) for the first quarter of 2025 was $137.4 million, up $1.9 million linked quarter
    • For the first quarter of 2025, net interest margin was 3.45%, up 9 basis points linked quarter
    • Cost of total deposits was 2.22% for the first quarter of 2025, down 13 basis points linked quarter
    • Noninterest income increased $2.2 million linked quarter, driven in part by an increase in mortgage banking income and gains on the sale of SBA loans
    • Mortgage banking income increased $1.3 million linked quarter. The mortgage division generated $632.1 million in interest rate lock volume in the first quarter of 2025, up $149.8 million linked quarter. Gain on sale margin was 1.42% for the first quarter of 2025, down 59 basis points linked quarter
    • Noninterest expense decreased $0.9 million linked quarter. Merger and conversion expenses decreased $1.3 million linked quarter

    Balance Sheet

    • Loans increased $170.6 million linked quarter, representing 5.4% annualized net loan growth
    • Securities increased $146.8 million linked quarter. The Company purchased $175.7 million in securities during the first quarter, which was offset by cash flows related to principal payments, calls and maturities of $58.6 million and a positive fair market value adjustment in the Company’s available-for-sale portfolio of $29.7 million
    • Deposits at March 31, 2025 increased $199.5 million on a linked quarter basis. Noninterest bearing deposits increased $137.4 million linked quarter and represented 24.0% of total deposits at March 31, 2025

    Capital and Stock Repurchase Program

    • Book value per share and tangible book value per share (non-GAAP)(1) increased 1.6% and 2.7%, respectively, linked quarter
    • The Company has a $100.0 million stock repurchase program in effect through October 2025 under which the Company is authorized to repurchase outstanding shares of its common stock either in open market purchases or privately-negotiated transactions. There was no buyback activity during the first quarter of 2025

    Credit Quality

    • The Company recorded a provision for credit losses of $4.8 million for the first quarter of 2025, up $2.6 million linked quarter
    • The ratio of the allowance for credit losses on loans to total loans was 1.56% at March 31, 2025, down one basis point linked quarter
    • The coverage ratio, or the allowance for credit losses on loans to nonperforming loans, was 206.55% at March 31, 2025, compared to 178.11% at December 31, 2024
    • Net loan recoveries for the first quarter of 2025 were $0.1 million
    • Nonperforming loans to total loans decreased to 0.76% at March 31, 2025 compared to 0.88% at December 31, 2024, and criticized loans (which include classified and Special Mention loans) to total loans decreased to 2.45% at March 31, 2025, compared to 2.89% at December 31, 2024

    (1) This is a non-GAAP financial measure. A reconciliation of all non-GAAP financial measures disclosed in this release from GAAP to non-GAAP is included in the tables at the end of this release. The information below under the heading “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” explains why the Company believes the non-GAAP financial measures in this release provide useful information and describes the other purposes for which the Company uses non-GAAP financial measures.


    Income Statement

    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data) Three Months Ended
      Mar 31,
    2025
    Dec 31,
    2024
    Sep 30,
    2024
    Jun 30,
    2024
    Mar 31,
    2024
    Interest income          
    Loans held for investment $ 196,566 $ 199,240   $ 202,655   $ 198,397   $ 192,390  
    Loans held for sale   3,008   3,564     4,212     3,530     2,308  
    Securities   12,117   10,510     10,304     10,410     10,700  
    Other   8,639   12,030     11,872     7,874     7,781  
    Total interest income   220,330   225,344     229,043     220,211     213,179  
    Interest expense          
    Deposits   79,386   85,571     90,787     87,621     82,613  
    Borrowings   6,747   6,891     7,258     7,564     7,276  
    Total interest expense   86,133   92,462     98,045     95,185     89,889  
    Net interest income   134,197   132,882     130,998     125,026     123,290  
    Provision for credit losses          
    Provision for loan losses   2,050   3,100     1,210     4,300     2,638  
    Provision for (Recovery of) unfunded commitments   2,700   (500 )   (275 )   (1,000 )   (200 )
    Total provision for credit losses   4,750   2,600     935     3,300     2,438  
    Net interest income after provision for credit losses   129,447   130,282     130,063     121,726     120,852  
    Noninterest income   36,395   34,218     89,299     38,762     41,381  
    Noninterest expense   113,876   114,747     121,983     111,976     112,912  
    Income before income taxes   51,966   49,753     97,379     48,512     49,321  
    Income taxes   10,448   5,006     24,924     9,666     9,912  
    Net income $ 41,518 $ 44,747   $ 72,455   $ 38,846   $ 39,409  
               
    Adjusted net income (non-GAAP)(1) $ 42,111 $ 46,458   $ 42,960   $ 38,846   $ 36,572  
    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue (“PPNR”) (non-GAAP)(1) $ 57,507 $ 54,177   $ 56,238   $ 51,812   $ 48,231  
               
    Basic earnings per share $ 0.65 $ 0.70   $ 1.18   $ 0.69   $ 0.70  
    Diluted earnings per share   0.65   0.70     1.18     0.69     0.70  
    Adjusted diluted earnings per share (non-GAAP)(1)   0.66   0.73     0.70     0.69     0.65  
    Average basic shares outstanding   63,666,419   63,565,437     61,217,094     56,342,909     56,208,348  
    Average diluted shares outstanding   64,028,025   64,056,303     61,632,448     56,684,626     56,531,078  
    Cash dividends per common share $ 0.22 $ 0.22   $ 0.22   $ 0.22   $ 0.22  

    (1) This is a non-GAAP financial measure. A reconciliation of all non-GAAP financial measures disclosed in this release from GAAP to non-GAAP is included in the tables at the end of this release. The information below under the heading “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” explains why the Company believes the non-GAAP financial measures in this release provide useful information and describes the other purposes for which the Company uses non-GAAP financial measures.


    Performance Ratios

      Three Months Ended
      Mar 31,
    2025
    Dec 31,
    2024
    Sep 30,
    2024
    Jun 30,
    2024
    Mar 31,
    2024
    Return on average assets 0.94 % 0.99 % 1.63 % 0.90 % 0.92 %
    Adjusted return on average assets (non-GAAP)(1) 0.95   1.03   0.97   0.90   0.86  
    Return on average tangible assets (non-GAAP)(1) 1.01   1.07   1.75   0.98   1.00  
    Adjusted return on average tangible assets (non-GAAP)(1) 1.02   1.11   1.05   0.98   0.93  
    Return on average equity 6.25   6.70   11.29   6.68   6.85  
    Adjusted return on average equity (non-GAAP)(1) 6.34   6.96   6.69   6.68   6.36  
    Return on average tangible equity (non-GAAP)(1) 10.16   10.97   18.83   12.04   12.45  
    Adjusted return on average tangible equity (non-GAAP)(1) 10.30   11.38   11.26   12.04   11.58  
    Efficiency ratio (fully taxable equivalent) 65.51   67.61   54.73   67.31   67.52  
    Adjusted efficiency ratio (non-GAAP)(1) 64.43   65.82   64.62   66.60   68.23  
    Dividend payout ratio 33.85   31.43   18.64   31.88   31.43  

    Capital and Balance Sheet Ratios

      As of
      Mar 31, 2025 Dec 31, 2024 Sep 30, 2024 Jun 30, 2024 Mar 31, 2024
    Shares outstanding   63,739,467     63,565,690     63,564,028     56,367,924     56,304,860  
    Market value per share $ 33.93   $ 35.75   $ 32.50   $ 30.54   $ 31.32  
    Book value per share   42.79     42.13     41.82     41.77     41.25  
    Tangible book value per share (non-GAAP)(1)   27.07     26.36     26.02     23.89     23.32  
    Shareholders’ equity to assets   14.93 %   14.85 %   14.80 %   13.45 %   13.39 %
    Tangible common equity ratio (non-GAAP)(1)   9.99     9.84     9.76     8.16     8.04  
    Leverage ratio   11.39     11.34     11.32     9.81     9.75  
    Common equity tier 1 capital ratio   12.59     12.73     12.88     10.75     10.59  
    Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio   13.34     13.50     13.67     11.53     11.37  
    Total risk-based capital ratio   16.88     17.08     17.32     15.15     15.00  

    (1) This is a non-GAAP financial measure. A reconciliation of all non-GAAP financial measures disclosed in this release from GAAP to non-GAAP is included in the tables at the end of this release. The information below under the heading “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” explains why the Company believes the non-GAAP financial measures in this release provide useful information and describes the other purposes for which the Company uses non-GAAP financial measures.


    Noninterest Income and Noninterest Expense

    (Dollars in thousands) Three Months Ended
      Mar 31,
    2025
    Dec 31,
    2024
    Sep 30,
    2024
    Jun 30,
    2024
    Mar 31,
    2024
    Noninterest income          
    Service charges on deposit accounts $ 10,364 $ 10,549 $ 10,438 $ 10,286 $ 10,506  
    Fees and commissions   3,787   4,181   4,116   3,944   3,949  
    Insurance commissions         2,758   2,716  
    Wealth management revenue   7,067   6,371   5,835   5,684   5,669  
    Mortgage banking income   8,147   6,861   8,447   9,698   11,370  
    Gain on sale of insurance agency       53,349      
    Gain on extinguishment of debt           56  
    BOLI income   2,929   3,317   2,858   2,701   2,691  
    Other   4,101   2,939   4,256   3,691   4,424  
    Total noninterest income $ 36,395 $ 34,218 $ 89,299 $ 38,762 $ 41,381  
    Noninterest expense          
    Salaries and employee benefits $ 71,957 $ 70,260 $ 71,307 $ 70,731 $ 71,470  
    Data processing   4,089   4,145   4,133   3,945   3,807  
    Net occupancy and equipment   11,754   11,312   11,415   11,844   11,389  
    Other real estate owned   685   590   56   105   107  
    Professional fees   2,884   2,686   3,189   3,195   3,348  
    Advertising and public relations   4,297   3,840   3,677   3,807   4,886  
    Intangible amortization   1,080   1,133   1,160   1,186   1,212  
    Communications   2,033   2,067   2,176   2,112   2,024  
    Merger and conversion related expenses   791   2,076   11,273      
    Other   14,306   16,638   13,597   15,051   14,669  
    Total noninterest expense $ 113,876 $ 114,747 $ 121,983 $ 111,976 $ 112,912  

    Mortgage Banking Income

    (Dollars in thousands) Three Months Ended
      Mar 31,
    2025
    Dec 31,
    2024
    Sep 30,
    2024
    Jun 30,
    2024
    Mar 31,
    2024
    Gain on sales of loans, net $ 4,500 $ 2,379 $ 4,499 $ 5,199 $ 4,535  
    Fees, net   2,317   2,850   2,646   2,866   1,854  
    Mortgage servicing income, net   1,330   1,632   1,302   1,633   4,981  
    Total mortgage banking income $ 8,147 $ 6,861 $ 8,447 $ 9,698 $ 11,370  

    Balance Sheet

    (Dollars in thousands) As of
      Mar 31, 2025 Dec 31, 2024 Sep 30, 2024 Jun 30, 2024 Mar 31, 2024
    Assets          
    Cash and cash equivalents $ 1,091,339   $ 1,092,032   $ 1,275,620   $ 851,906   $ 844,400  
    Securities held to maturity, at amortized cost   1,101,901     1,126,112     1,150,531     1,174,663     1,199,111  
    Securities available for sale, at fair value   1,002,056     831,013     764,844     749,685     764,486  
    Loans held for sale, at fair value   226,003     246,171     291,735     266,406     191,440  
    Loans held for investment   13,055,593     12,885,020     12,627,648     12,604,755     12,500,525  
    Allowance for credit losses on loans   (203,931 )   (201,756 )   (200,378 )   (199,871 )   (201,052 )
    Loans, net   12,851,662     12,683,264     12,427,270     12,404,884     12,299,473  
    Premises and equipment, net   279,011     279,796     280,550     280,966     282,193  
    Other real estate owned   8,654     8,673     9,136     7,366     9,142  
    Goodwill and other intangibles   1,001,923     1,003,003     1,004,136     1,008,062     1,009,248  
    Bank-owned life insurance   337,502     391,810     389,138     387,791     385,186  
    Mortgage servicing rights   72,902     72,991     71,990     72,092     71,596  
    Other assets   298,428     300,003     293,890     306,570     289,466  
    Total assets $ 18,271,381   $ 18,034,868   $ 17,958,840   $ 17,510,391   $ 17,345,741  
               
    Liabilities and Shareholders’ Equity          
    Liabilities          
    Deposits:          
    Noninterest-bearing $ 3,541,375   $ 3,403,981   $ 3,529,801   $ 3,539,453   $ 3,516,164  
    Interest-bearing   11,230,720     11,168,631     10,979,950     10,715,760     10,720,999  
    Total deposits   14,772,095     14,572,612     14,509,751     14,255,213     14,237,163  
    Short-term borrowings   108,015     108,018     108,732     232,741     108,121  
    Long-term debt   433,309     430,614     433,177     428,677     428,047  
    Other liabilities   230,857     245,306     249,102     239,059     250,060  
    Total liabilities   15,544,276     15,356,550     15,300,762     15,155,690     15,023,391  
               
    Shareholders’ equity:          
    Common stock   332,421     332,421     332,421     296,483     296,483  
    Treasury stock   (91,646 )   (97,196 )   (97,251 )   (97,534 )   (99,683 )
    Additional paid-in capital   1,486,849     1,491,847     1,488,678     1,304,782     1,303,613  
    Retained earnings   1,121,102     1,093,854     1,063,324     1,005,086     978,880  
    Accumulated other comprehensive loss   (121,621 )   (142,608 )   (129,094 )   (154,116 )   (156,943 )
    Total shareholders’ equity   2,727,105     2,678,318     2,658,078     2,354,701     2,322,350  
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 18,271,381   $ 18,034,868   $ 17,958,840   $ 17,510,391   $ 17,345,741  

    Net Interest Income and Net Interest Margin

    (Dollars in thousands) Three Months Ended
      March 31, 2025 December 31, 2024 March 31, 2024
      Average
    Balance
    Interest
    Income/
    Expense
    Yield/  
     Rate
    Average
    Balance
    Interest
    Income/
    Expense
    Yield/  
     Rate
    Average
    Balance
    Interest
    Income/
    Expense
    Yield/  
     Rate
    Interest-earning assets:                  
    Loans held for investment $ 12,966,869 $ 199,504 6.24 % $ 12,746,941 $ 201,562 6.29 % $ 12,407,976 $ 194,640 6.30 %
    Loans held for sale   200,917   3,008 5.99 %   250,812   3,564 5.69 %   155,382   2,308 5.94 %
    Taxable securities   1,883,535   10,971 2.33 %   1,784,167   9,408 2.11 %   1,891,817   9,505 2.01 %
    Tax-exempt securities(1)   259,800   1,443 2.22 %   261,679   1,400 2.14 %   270,279   1,505 2.23 %
    Total securities   2,143,335   12,414 2.32 %   2,045,846   10,808 2.11 %   2,162,096   11,010 2.04 %
    Interest-bearing balances with banks   824,743   8,639 4.25 %   1,025,294   12,030 4.67 %   570,336   7,781 5.49 %
    Total interest-earning assets   16,135,864   223,565 5.61 %   16,068,893   227,964 5.65 %   15,295,790   215,739 5.66 %
    Cash and due from banks   181,869       188,493       188,503    
    Intangible assets   1,002,511       1,003,551       1,009,825    
    Other assets   669,392       682,211       708,895    
    Total assets $ 17,989,636     $ 17,943,148     $ 17,203,013    
    Interest-bearing liabilities:                  
    Interest-bearing demand(2) $ 7,835,617 $ 54,710 2.83 % $ 7,629,685 $ 57,605 3.00 % $ 6,955,989 $ 52,500 3.03 %
    Savings deposits   813,451   711 0.35 %   804,132   706 0.35 %   860,397   730 0.34 %
    Brokered deposits     %   60,298   1,013 6.68 %   445,608   5,987 5.39 %
    Time deposits   2,474,218   23,965 3.93 %   2,512,097   26,247 4.16 %   2,319,420   23,396 4.06 %
    Total interest-bearing deposits   11,123,286   79,386 2.89 %   11,006,212   85,571 3.09 %   10,581,414   82,613 3.13 %
    Borrowed funds   556,734   6,747 4.88 %   556,966   6,891 4.94 %   562,398   7,276 5.35 %
    Total interest-bearing liabilities   11,680,020   86,133 2.99 %   11,563,178   92,462 3.18 %   11,143,812   89,889 3.24 %
    Noninterest-bearing deposits   3,408,830       3,502,931       3,518,612    
    Other liabilities   208,105       220,154       226,308    
    Shareholders’ equity   2,692,681       2,656,885       2,314,281    
    Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity $ 17,989,636     $ 17,943,148     $ 17,203,013    
    Net interest income/ net interest margin   $ 137,432 3.45 %   $ 135,502 3.36 %   $ 125,850 3.30 %
    Cost of funding     2.31 %     2.44 %     2.46 %
    Cost of total deposits     2.22 %     2.35 %     2.35 %

    (1) U.S. Government and some U.S. Government Agency securities are tax-exempt in the states in which the Company operates.
    (2) Interest-bearing demand deposits include interest-bearing transactional accounts and money market deposits.


    Loan Portfolio

    (Dollars in thousands) As of
      Mar 31, 2025 Dec 31, 2024 Sep 30, 2024 Jun 30, 2024 Mar 31, 2024
    Loan Portfolio:          
    Commercial, financial, agricultural $ 1,888,580 $ 1,885,817 $ 1,804,961 $ 1,847,762 $ 1,869,408  
    Lease financing   85,412   90,591   98,159   102,996   107,474  
    Real estate – construction   1,090,862   1,093,653   1,198,838   1,355,425   1,243,535  
    Real estate – 1-4 family mortgages   3,583,080   3,488,877   3,440,038   3,435,818   3,429,286  
    Real estate – commercial mortgages   6,320,120   6,236,068   5,995,152   5,766,478   5,753,230  
    Installment loans to individuals   87,539   90,014   90,500   96,276   97,592  
    Total loans $ 13,055,593 $ 12,885,020 $ 12,627,648 $ 12,604,755 $ 12,500,525  

    Credit Quality and Allowance for Credit Losses on Loans

    (Dollars in thousands) As of
      Mar 31, 2025 Dec 31, 2024 Sep 30, 2024 Jun 30, 2024 Mar 31, 2024
    Nonperforming Assets:          
    Nonaccruing loans $ 98,638   $ 110,811   $ 113,872   $ 97,795   $ 73,774  
    Loans 90 days or more past due   95     2,464     5,351     240     451  
    Total nonperforming loans   98,733     113,275     119,223     98,035     74,225  
    Other real estate owned   8,654     8,673     9,136     7,366     9,142  
    Total nonperforming assets $ 107,387   $ 121,948   $ 128,359   $ 105,401   $ 83,367  
               
    Criticized Loans          
    Classified loans $ 224,654   $ 241,708   $ 218,135   $ 191,595   $ 206,502  
    Special Mention loans   95,778     130,882     163,804     138,343     138,366  
    Criticized loans(1) $ 320,432   $ 372,590   $ 381,939   $ 329,938   $ 344,868  
               
    Allowance for credit losses on loans $ 203,931   $ 201,756   $ 200,378   $ 199,871   $ 201,052  
    Net loan (recoveries) charge-offs $ (125 ) $ 1,722   $ 703   $ 5,481   $ 164  
    Annualized net loan charge-offs / average loans   %   0.05 %   0.02 %   0.18 %   0.01 %
    Nonperforming loans / total loans   0.76     0.88     0.94     0.78     0.59  
    Nonperforming assets / total assets   0.59     0.68     0.71     0.60     0.48  
    Allowance for credit losses on loans / total loans   1.56     1.57     1.59     1.59     1.61  
    Allowance for credit losses on loans / nonperforming loans   206.55     178.11     168.07     203.88     270.87  
    Criticized loans / total loans   2.45     2.89     3.02     2.62     2.76  

    (1) Criticized loans include classified and Special Mention loans.

    CONFERENCE CALL INFORMATION:
    A live audio webcast of a conference call with analysts will be available beginning at 10:00 AM Eastern Time (9:00 AM Central Time) on Wednesday, April 23, 2025.

    The webcast is accessible through Renasant’s investor relations website at www.renasant.com or https://event.choruscall.com/mediaframe/webcast.html?webcastid=3wLevlin. To access the conference via telephone, dial 1-877-513-1143 in the United States and request the Renasant Corporation 2025 First Quarter Earnings Webcast and Conference Call. International participants should dial 1-412-902-4145 to access the conference call.

    The webcast will be archived on www.renasant.com after the call and will remain accessible for one year. A replay can be accessed via telephone by dialing 1-877-344-7529 in the United States and entering conference number 6525571 or by dialing 1-412-317-0088 internationally and entering the same conference number. Telephone replay access is available until May 7, 2025.

    ABOUT RENASANT CORPORATION:
    Renasant Corporation is the parent of Renasant Bank, a 121-year-old financial services institution. As of April 1, 2025, Renasant has assets of approximately $26.0 billion and operates 280 banking, lending, mortgage and wealth management offices throughout the Southeast and also offers factoring and asset-based lending on a nationwide basis.

    CAUTIONARY NOTE REGARDING FORWARD-LOOKING STATEMENTS:
    This press release may contain, or incorporate by reference, statements about Renasant Corporation that constitute “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. Statements preceded by, followed by or that otherwise include the words “believes,” “expects,” “projects,” “anticipates,” “intends,” “estimates,” “plans,” “potential,” “focus,” “possible,” “may increase,” “may fluctuate,” “will likely result,” and similar expressions, or future or conditional verbs such as “will,” “should,” “would” and “could,” are generally forward-looking in nature and not historical facts. Forward-looking statements include information about the Company’s future financial performance, business strategy, projected plans and objectives and are based on the current beliefs and expectations of management. The Company’s management believes these forward-looking statements are reasonable, but they are all inherently subject to significant business, economic and competitive risks and uncertainties, many of which are beyond the Company’s control. In addition, these forward-looking statements are subject to assumptions with respect to future business strategies and decisions that are subject to change. Actual results may differ from those indicated or implied in the forward-looking statements, and such differences may be material. Prospective investors are cautioned that any forward-looking statements are not guarantees of future performance and involve risks and uncertainties and, accordingly, investors should not place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date they are made.

    Important factors currently known to management that could cause the Company’s actual results to differ materially from those in forward-looking statements include the following: (i) the Company’s ability to efficiently integrate acquisitions (including its recently-completed merger with The First Bancshares, Inc.) (“The First”) into its operations, retain the customers of these businesses, grow the acquired operations and realize the cost savings expected from an acquisition to the extent and in the timeframe anticipated by management (including the possibility that such cost savings will not be realized when expected, or at all, as a result of the impact of, or challenges arising from, the integration of the acquired assets and assumed liabilities into the Company, potential adverse reactions or changes to business or employee relationships, or as a result of other unexpected factors or events); (ii) potential exposure to unknown or contingent risks and liabilities the Company has acquired, or may acquire, or target for acquisition, including in connection with its merger with The First; (iii) the effect of economic conditions and interest rates on a national, regional or international basis; (iv) timing and success of the implementation of changes in operations to achieve enhanced earnings or effect cost savings; (v) competitive pressures in the consumer finance, commercial finance, financial services, asset management, retail banking, factoring and mortgage lending and auto lending industries; (vi) the financial resources of, and products available from, competitors; (vii) changes in laws and regulations as well as changes in accounting standards; (viii) changes in governmental and regulatory policy, whether applicable specifically to financial institutions or impacting the United States generally (such as, for example, changes in trade policy); (ix) increased scrutiny by, and/or additional regulatory requirements of, regulatory agencies as a result of the Company’s merger with The First; (x) changes in the securities and foreign exchange markets; (xi) the Company’s potential growth, including its entrance or expansion into new markets, and the need for sufficient capital to support that growth; (xii) changes in the quality or composition of the Company’s loan or investment portfolios, including adverse developments in borrower industries or in the repayment ability of individual borrowers or issuers of investment securities, or the impact of interest rates on the value of the Company’s investment securities portfolio; (xiii) an insufficient allowance for credit losses as a result of inaccurate assumptions; (xiv) changes in the sources and costs of the capital the Company uses to make loans and otherwise fund the Company’s operations, due to deposit outflows, changes in the mix of deposits and the cost and availability of borrowings; (xv) general economic, market or business conditions, including the impact of inflation; (xvi) changes in demand for loan and deposit products and other financial services; (xvii) concentrations of credit or deposit exposure; (xviii) changes or the lack of changes in interest rates, yield curves and interest rate spread relationships; (xix) increased cybersecurity risk, including potential network breaches, business disruptions or financial losses; (xx) civil unrest, natural disasters, epidemics and other catastrophic events in the Company’s geographic area; (xxi) geopolitical conditions, including acts or threats of terrorism and actions taken by the United States or other governments in response to acts or threats of terrorism and/or military conflicts, which could impact business and economic conditions in the United States and abroad; (xxii) the impact, extent and timing of technological changes; and (xxiii) other circumstances, many of which are beyond management’s control.

    Management believes that the assumptions underlying the Company’s forward-looking statements are reasonable, but any of the assumptions could prove to be inaccurate. Investors are urged to carefully consider the risks described in the Company’s filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) from time to time, including its most recent Annual Report on Form 10-K and subsequent Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, which are available at www.renasant.com and the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov.

    The Company undertakes no obligation, and specifically disclaims any obligation, to update or revise forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or to reflect changed assumptions, the occurrence of unanticipated events or changes to future operating results over time, except as required by federal securities laws.

    NON-GAAP FINANCIAL MEASURES:
    In addition to results presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles in the United States of America (“GAAP”), this press release and the presentation slides furnished to the SEC on the same Form 8-K as this release contain non-GAAP financial measures, namely, (i) adjusted loan yield, (ii) adjusted net interest income and margin, (iii) pre-provision net revenue (including on an as-adjusted basis), (iv) adjusted net income, (v) adjusted diluted earnings per share, (vi) tangible book value per share, (vii) the tangible common equity ratio, (viii) the adjusted return on average assets and on average equity and certain other performance ratios (namely, the ratio of pre-provision net revenue to average assets and the return on average tangible assets and on average tangible common equity (including each of the foregoing on an as-adjusted basis)), and (ix) the adjusted efficiency ratio.

    These non-GAAP financial measures adjust GAAP financial measures to exclude intangible assets, including related amortization, and/or certain gains or charges (such as, for the first quarter of 2025, merger and conversion expenses), with respect to which the Company is unable to accurately predict when these charges will be incurred or, when incurred, the amount thereof. Management uses these non-GAAP financial measures when evaluating capital utilization and adequacy. In addition, the Company believes that these non-GAAP financial measures facilitate the making of period-to-period comparisons and are meaningful indicators of its operating performance, particularly because these measures are widely used by industry analysts for companies with merger and acquisition activities. Also, because intangible assets such as goodwill and the core deposit intangible can vary extensively from company to company and, as to intangible assets, are excluded from the calculation of a financial institution’s regulatory capital, the Company believes that the presentation of this non-GAAP financial information allows readers to more easily compare the Company’s results to information provided in other regulatory reports and the results of other companies. Reconciliations of these non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures are included in the tables below under the caption “Non-GAAP Reconciliations”.

    None of the non-GAAP financial information that the Company has included in this release or the accompanying presentation slides are intended to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for any measure prepared in accordance with GAAP. Investors should note that, because there are no standardized definitions for the calculations as well as the results, the Company’s calculations may not be comparable to similarly titled measures presented by other companies. Also, there may be limits in the usefulness of these measures to investors. As a result, the Company encourages readers to consider its consolidated financial statements in their entirety and not to rely on any single financial measure.

    Non-GAAP Reconciliations

    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data) Three Months Ended
      Mar 31,
    2025
    Dec 31,
    2024
    Sep 30,
    2024
    Jun 30,
    2024
    Mar 31,
    2024
    Adjusted Pre-Provision Net Revenue (“PPNR”)      
    Net income (GAAP) $ 41,518   $ 44,747   $ 72,455   $ 38,846   $ 39,409  
    Income taxes   10,448     5,006     24,924     9,666     9,912  
    Provision for credit losses (including unfunded commitments)   4,750     2,600     935     3,300     2,438  
    Pre-provision net revenue (non-GAAP) $ 56,716   $ 52,353   $ 98,314   $ 51,812   $ 51,759  
    Merger and conversion expense   791     2,076     11,273          
    Gain on extinguishment of debt                   (56 )
    Gain on sales of MSR       (252 )           (3,472 )
    Gain on sale of insurance agency           (53,349 )        
    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue (non-GAAP) $ 57,507   $ 54,177   $ 56,238   $ 51,812   $ 48,231  
               
    Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted Tangible Net Income      
    Net income (GAAP) $ 41,518   $ 44,747   $ 72,455   $ 38,846   $ 39,409  
    Amortization of intangibles   1,080     1,133     1,160     1,186     1,212  
    Tax effect of adjustments noted above(1)   (270 )   (283 )   (296 )   (233 )   (237 )
    Tangible net income (non-GAAP) $ 42,328   $ 45,597   $ 73,319   $ 39,799   $ 40,384  
               
    Net income (GAAP) $ 41,518   $ 44,747   $ 72,455   $ 38,846   $ 39,409  
    Merger and conversion expense   791     2,076     11,273          
    Gain on extinguishment of debt                   (56 )
    Gain on sales of MSR       (252 )           (3,472 )
    Gain on sale of insurance agency           (53,349 )        
    Tax effect of adjustments noted above(1)   (198 )   (113 )   12,581         691  
    Adjusted net income (non-GAAP) $ 42,111   $ 46,458   $ 42,960   $ 38,846   $ 36,572  
    Amortization of intangibles   1,080     1,133     1,160     1,186     1,212  
    Tax effect of adjustments noted above(1)   (270 )   (283 )   (296 )   (233 )   (237 )
    Adjusted tangible net income (non-GAAP) $ 42,921   $ 47,308   $ 43,824   $ 39,799   $ 37,547  
    Tangible Assets and Tangible Shareholders’ Equity      
    Average shareholders’ equity (GAAP) $ 2,692,681   $ 2,656,885   $ 2,553,586   $ 2,337,731   $ 2,314,281  
    Average intangible assets   (1,002,511 )   (1,003,551 )   (1,004,701 )   (1,008,638 )   (1,009,825 )
    Average tangible shareholders’ equity (non-GAAP) $ 1,690,170   $ 1,653,334   $ 1,548,885   $ 1,329,093   $ 1,304,456  
               
    Average assets (GAAP) $ 17,989,636   $ 17,943,148   $ 17,681,664   $ 17,371,369   $ 17,203,013  
    Average intangible assets   (1,002,511 )   (1,003,551 )   (1,004,701 )   (1,008,638 )   (1,009,825 )
    Average tangible assets (non-GAAP) $ 16,987,125   $ 16,939,597   $ 16,676,963   $ 16,362,731   $ 16,193,188  
               
    Shareholders’ equity (GAAP) $ 2,727,105   $ 2,678,318   $ 2,658,078   $ 2,354,701   $ 2,322,350  
    Intangible assets   (1,001,923 )   (1,003,003 )   (1,004,136 )   (1,008,062 )   (1,009,248 )
    Tangible shareholders’ equity (non-GAAP) $ 1,725,182   $ 1,675,315   $ 1,653,942   $ 1,346,639   $ 1,313,102  
               
    Total assets (GAAP) $ 18,271,381   $ 18,034,868   $ 17,958,840   $ 17,510,391   $ 17,345,741  
    Intangible assets   (1,001,923 )   (1,003,003 )   (1,004,136 )   (1,008,062 )   (1,009,248 )
    Total tangible assets (non-GAAP) $ 17,269,458   $ 17,031,865   $ 16,954,704   $ 16,502,329   $ 16,336,493  
               
    Adjusted Performance Ratios          
    Return on average assets (GAAP)   0.94 %   0.99 %   1.63 %   0.90 %   0.92 %
    Adjusted return on average assets (non-GAAP)   0.95     1.03     0.97     0.90     0.86  
    Return on average tangible assets (non-GAAP)   1.01     1.07     1.75     0.98     1.00  
    Pre-provision net revenue to average assets (non-GAAP)   1.28     1.16     2.21     1.20     1.21  
    Adjusted pre-provision net revenue to average assets (non-GAAP)   1.30     1.20     1.27     1.20     1.13  
    Adjusted return on average tangible assets (non-GAAP)   1.02     1.11     1.05     0.98     0.93  
    Return on average equity (GAAP)   6.25     6.70     11.29     6.68     6.85  
    Adjusted return on average equity (non-GAAP)   6.34     6.96     6.69     6.68     6.36  
    Return on average tangible equity (non-GAAP)   10.16     10.97     18.83     12.04     12.45  
    Adjusted return on average tangible equity (non-GAAP)   10.30     11.38     11.26     12.04     11.58  
               
    Adjusted Diluted Earnings Per Share      
    Average diluted shares outstanding   64,028,025     64,056,303     61,632,448     56,684,626     56,531,078  
               
    Diluted earnings per share (GAAP) $ 0.65   $ 0.70   $ 1.18   $ 0.69   $ 0.70  
    Adjusted diluted earnings per share (non-GAAP) $ 0.66   $ 0.73   $ 0.70   $ 0.69   $ 0.65  
               
    Tangible Book Value Per Share          
    Shares outstanding   63,739,467     63,565,690     63,564,028     56,367,924     56,304,860  
               
    Book value per share (GAAP) $ 42.79   $ 42.13   $ 41.82   $ 41.77   $ 41.25  
    Tangible book value per share (non-GAAP) $ 27.07   $ 26.36   $ 26.02   $ 23.89   $ 23.32  
               
    Tangible Common Equity Ratio          
    Shareholders’ equity to assets (GAAP)   14.93 %   14.85 %   14.80 %   13.45 %   13.39 %
    Tangible common equity ratio (non-GAAP)   9.99 %   9.84 %   9.76 %   8.16 %   8.04 %
    Adjusted Efficiency Ratio          
    Net interest income (FTE) (GAAP) $ 137,432   $ 135,502   $ 133,576   $ 127,598   $ 125,850  
               
    Total noninterest income (GAAP) $ 36,395   $ 34,218   $ 89,299   $ 38,762   $ 41,381  
    Gain on sales of MSR       (252 )           (3,472 )
    Gain on extinguishment of debt                   (56 )
    Gain on sale of insurance agency           (53,349 )        
    Total adjusted noninterest income (non-GAAP) $ 36,395   $ 33,966   $ 35,950   $ 38,762   $ 37,853  
               
    Noninterest expense (GAAP) $ 113,876   $ 114,747   $ 121,983   $ 111,976   $ 112,912  
    Amortization of intangibles   (1,080 )   (1,133 )   (1,160 )   (1,186 )   (1,212 )
    Merger and conversion expense   (791 )   (2,076 )   (11,273 )        
    Total adjusted noninterest expense (non-GAAP) $ 112,005   $ 111,538   $ 109,550   $ 110,790   $ 111,700  
               
    Efficiency ratio (GAAP)   65.51 %   67.61 %   54.73 %   67.31 %   67.52 %
    Adjusted efficiency ratio (non-GAAP)   64.43 %   65.82 %   64.62 %   66.60 %   68.23 %
               
    Adjusted Net Interest Income and Adjusted Net Interest Margin      
    Net interest income (FTE) (GAAP) $ 137,432   $ 135,502   $ 133,576   $ 127,598   $ 125,850  
    Net interest income collected on problem loans   (1,026 )   (151 )   (642 )   146     (123 )
    Accretion recognized on purchased loans   (558 )   (616 )   (1,089 )   (897 )   (800 )
    Adjustments to net interest income $ (1,584 ) $ (767 ) $ (1,731 ) $ (751 ) $ (923 )
    Adjusted net interest income (FTE) (non-GAAP) $ 135,848   $ 134,735   $ 131,845   $ 126,847   $ 124,927  
               
    Net interest margin (GAAP)   3.45 %   3.36 %   3.36 %   3.31 %   3.30 %
    Adjusted net interest margin (non-GAAP)   3.42 %   3.34 %   3.32 %   3.29 %   3.28 %
               
    Adjusted Loan Yield          
    Loan interest income (FTE) (GAAP) $ 199,504   $ 201,562   $ 204,935   $ 200,670   $ 194,640  
    Net interest income collected on problem loans   (1,026 )   (151 )   (642 )   146     (123 )
    Accretion recognized on purchased loans   (558 )   (616 )   (1,089 )   (897 )   (800 )
    Adjusted loan interest income (FTE) (non-GAAP) $ 197,920   $ 200,795   $ 203,204   $ 199,919   $ 193,717  
               
    Loan yield (GAAP)   6.24 %   6.29 %   6.47 %   6.41 %   6.30 %
    Adjusted loan yield (non-GAAP)   6.19 %   6.27 %   6.41 %   6.38 %   6.27 %

    (1) Tax effect is calculated based on the respective legal entity’s appropriate federal and state tax rates (as applicable) for the period, and includes the estimated impact of both current and deferred tax expense. The tax effect of the discrete gain on sale of insurance agency was calculated based on an estimated tax rate of 27.0%.

    Contacts: For Media:   For Financials:
      John S. Oxford   James C. Mabry IV
      Senior Vice President   Executive Vice President
      Chief Marketing Officer   Chief Financial Officer
      (662) 680-1219   (662) 680-1281

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: In Seattle, Senator Murray Hears from U District Small Businesses About How Trump’s Trade War is Affecting Them

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ***AUDIO HERE; PHOTOS and B-ROLL HERE***

    Seattle, WA— Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, met with small business owners in Seattle’s University District to hear how Trump’s chaotic trade war is impacting them. Trump is currently taxing goods from every country—including close allies like Canada—at a minimum 10 percent tariff rate across-the-board. He has also significantly escalated his trade war with China, with 145 percent tariffs on Chinese goods—meaning higher prices and serious pain for families and small businesses across Washington state and the country. Even with his 90-day “pause” on reciprocal tariffs, Trump’s new tariffs are still the highest tariff rates in decades, and are estimated to cost American families more than $4,000 each year—the largest tax increase since 1968.

    During the visit, Senator Murray heard from small business owners about how the Trump administration’s reckless trade war is leading to serious uncertainty for businesses and consumers in Seattle. Businesses are worried that tariffs will push them to raise prices—potentially driving customers away—and lay off workers to cut costs. Participating in the discussion with Senator Murray, held at Café Allegro, were: Yasuaki Saito, Owner of Saint Bread; Miles Richardson, General Manager of University Volkswagen/Audi Seattle; Trevor Peterson, CEO of the University Book Store; Efrem Fesaha, CEO of Boon Boona coffee; Jennifer Antos, Executive Director of Seattle Neighborhood Farmers’ Markets; Chris Peterson, Owner of Cafe Allegro since 1985; Lois Ko, Owner of Sweet Alchemy ice cream shops in the U District, Ballard, and Capitol Hill, and Anson Lin, Owner of Astora Construction.

    “These small businesses are at the heart of the U District community, and it was important to hear from them about how Trump’s tariffs and his pointless trade war are affecting their bottom lines—it’s something I’m hearing about everywhere I go across Washington state,” said Senator Murray. “Trump’s ham-fisted trade war is threatening livelihoods here in Washington state—small businesses are worrying about whether they can keep their doors open without laying people off, families that are already scrambling to pay the bills are worried about rising costs at the grocery store, and our farmers are deeply concerned about retaliatory tariffs from other nations in response to Trump’s tariffs. Trump’s tariffs are an enormous new tax on hardworking Americans and businesses. I will continue to share the stories and raise the voices of the people in Washington state who are being affected by Trump’s thoughtless trade war. There is no good reason for us to be picking fights with our trading partners and close allies like Canada—it’s time for Republicans in Congress to stand up and vote with us to end this chaos.”

    Washington state has one of the most trade-dependent economies of any state in the country, with 40 percent of jobs tied to international commerce. Washington state is the top U.S. producer of apples, blueberries, hops, pears, spearmint oil, and sweet cherries—all of which risk losing vital export markets due to retaliatory tariffs from key trading partners including Canada. Additionally, more than 12,000 small and medium-sized companies in Washington state export goods and will struggle to absorb the impact of retaliatory tariffs. Canada is Washington’s largest trading partner, accounting for nearly $20 billion in imports and $10 billion in exports. China is the world’s second-largest economy and Washington state exported over $12 billion in goods to China last year—making China Washington state’s top export partner—and imported $11.2 billion in goods, the most in imports from any country aside from Canada. Trump’s tariffs during his first term were extremely costly for Washington state—for example, India imposed a 20 percent retaliatory tariff on U.S. apples, causing Washington apple shipments to India to fall by 99 percent and growers to lose hundreds of millions of dollars in exports.

    Senator Murray has been a vocal opponent of Trump’s chaotic trade war and has been lifting up the voices of people in Washington state harmed by this administration’s approach to trade and calling on Republicans to end Trump’s trade war—which Congress has the power to do—and take back Congress’ Constitutionally-granted power to impose tariffs. Earlier this month, Senator Murray brought together leaders across Washington state who highlighted how Trump’s ongoing trade war is already a devastating hit to Washington state’s economy, businesses, and our agriculture sector. Senator Murray also took to the Senate floor to lay out how Trump’s chaotic trade war is seriously threatening our economy, American businesses, families’ retirement savings, and so much else. Last week, Senator Murray joined her colleagues in pressing U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Jamieson Greer on how the Trump administration’s tariffs are affecting farmers across the country. Last week, Senator Murray also held a roundtable discussion in Tacoma with local businesses and ports, toured local businesses in downtown Vancouver, and held a roundtable discussion in Vancouver with local businesses and ports, to highlight how Trump’s chaotic trade war and senseless tariffs are harming the overall economy in Washington state.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: PHH Mortgage Launches Proprietary Reverse Mortgage Product

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    WEST PALM BEACH, Fla., April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — PHH Mortgage (“PHH” or the “Company”), a subsidiary of Onity Group Inc. (NYSE: ONIT) and a leading non-bank mortgage servicer and originator, today announced that the Company has launched a proprietary reverse mortgage product known as EquityIQ®. The product will be available through the Company’s wholesale network and marketed under PHH’s reverse mortgage product brand, Liberty Reverse Mortgage.

    “For more than two decades, we’ve leveraged our reverse mortgage expertise to help our partners and homeowners safely access reverse mortgage products and establish ourselves as an industry-leading reverse mortgage lender and servicer,” said Andy Peach, Executive Vice President and Chief Lending Officer. “We understand our customers’ needs and the many benefits of a reverse mortgage. With an estimated $14 trillion in senior home equity,1 we’re excited to launch EquityIQ, which complements our existing Home Equity Conversion Mortgage (HECM) product offering, to help senior homeowners unlock their home equity to meet personal and financial needs.”

    “Our release of the EquityIQ product is the latest example of how PHH continues to provide new opportunities for its partners to grow their businesses,” said Rich Bradfield, Executive Vice President and Chief Growth Officer. “We believe EquityIQ can be a valuable option for our wholesale partners and their clients, and we look forward to continuing to expand our product options to meet our customers’ needs.”

    EquityIQ®Product Information

    • Available to homeowners at least 55 years old (unless restricted by state law)
    • Private (not insured by the Federal Housing Administration), jumbo reverse mortgage; allows homeowners to access more available funds as compared to a traditional HECM
    • Fixed-rate loan with a maximum loan amount of $4 million
    • No upfront or ongoing mortgage insurance and no monthly servicing fee
    • Full draw of available proceeds required at closing
    • Eligible property types include single-family, condominium, townhomes, multi-family property (2-4 units) and planned unit development
    • All applicable parties must receive counseling from a PHH-approved housing counseling agency
    • Available for primary residence only and borrower is required to continue paying property taxes, homeowners insurance, HOA fees and maintenance costs

    For Information on becoming a wholesale partner please visit https://partner.libertyreversemortgage.com.

    1 Source: NRMLA/RiskSpan Reverse Mortgage Market Index quarterly release as of March 31, 2025

    About Onity Group

    Onity Group Inc. (NYSE: ONIT) is a leading non-bank financial services company providing mortgage servicing and originations solutions through its primary brands, PHH Mortgage and Liberty Reverse Mortgage. PHH Mortgage is one of the largest servicers in the country, focused on delivering a variety of servicing and lending programs to consumers and business clients. Liberty is one of the nation’s largest reverse mortgage lenders dedicated to providing loans that help customers meet their personal and financial needs. We are headquartered in West Palm Beach, Florida, with offices and operations in the United States, the U.S. Virgin Islands, India and the Philippines, and have been serving our customers since 1988. For additional information, please visit onitygroup.com.

    PHH Mortgage and Liberty Reverse Mortgage are equal housing lenders.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of Section 27A of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, and Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended. These forward-looking statements may be identified by a reference to a future period or by the use of forward-looking terminology. Forward-looking statements are typically identified by words such as “expect”, “believe”, “foresee”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “estimate”, “goal”, “strategy”, “plan” “target” and “project” or conditional verbs such as “will”, “may”, “should”, “could” or “would” or the negative of these terms, although not all forward-looking statements contain these words, and includes statements in this press release regarding the anticipated benefits of the EquityIQ product to PHH’s wholesale partners and clients and the ability of PHH to continue expanding product options.

    Forward-looking statements involve a number of assumptions, risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially. In the past, actual results have differed from those suggested by forward looking statements and this may happen again. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those suggested by the forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, changes in market conditions, the industry in which we operate, and our business, the actions of governmental entities and regulators, developments in our litigation matters, and other risks and uncertainties detailed in our reports and filings with the SEC, including our annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024. Anyone wishing to understand Onity Group Inc.’s business should review our SEC filings. Our forward-looking statements speak only as of the date they are made and, we disclaim any obligation to update or revise forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise.

    For Further Information Contact:

    Dico Akseraylian, SVP, Corporate Communications
    (856) 917-0066
    mediarelations@onitygroup.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: Hanmi Reports 2025 First Quarter Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    LOS ANGELES, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Hanmi Financial Corporation (NASDAQ: HAFC, or “Hanmi”), the parent company of Hanmi Bank (the “Bank”), today reported financial results for the first quarter of 2025.

    Net income for the first quarter of 2025 was $17.7 million, or $0.58 per diluted share, unchanged from the fourth quarter of 2024. The return on average assets for the first quarter of 2025 was 0.94% and the return on average equity was 8.92%, compared with a return on average assets of 0.93% and a return on average equity of 8.89% for the fourth quarter of 2024.

    CEO Commentary
    “Our team delivered strong results in the first quarter with solid operating performance across all of our business lines,” said Bonnie Lee, President and Chief Executive Officer. “We achieved our third consecutive quarter of net interest margin expansion, up 11 basis points to 3.02%, primarily driven by lower funding costs.”

    “Deposits increased 3% driven by new commercial accounts and contributions from our newly opened branches, a testament to our core relationship-based banking model. Loan production was solid, fueled by healthy originations in residential mortgages and our SBA business. Importantly, we maintained our strong credit quality, and continued to effectively manage our operating expenses, resulting in our best quarterly efficiency ratio since the fourth quarter of 2023.”

    “Overall, our first quarter results were well-balanced and reflected continued growth and positive momentum, including the successful opening of a new branch in the Atlanta region. Despite elevated macroeconomic uncertainty, our team’s focus, discipline, and commitment to providing exceptional service and market leading products positions us well to deliver long-term value to our shareholders.”

    First Quarter 2025 Highlights:        

    • First quarter net income was $17.7 million, or $0.58 per diluted share, unchanged from fourth quarter of 2024. Preprovision net revenues increased 5.9% from the prior quarter reflecting growth in net interest income, an expanding net interest margin, a solid contribution from fee-based activities, and disciplined expense management.
    • Loans receivable were $6.28 billion at March 31, 2025, up 0.5% from the end of the fourth quarter of 2024; loan production for the first quarter was $345.9 million, with a weighted average interest rate of 7.35%, compared with loan production for the fourth quarter of $339.0 million, with a weighted average interest rate of 7.37%.
    • Deposits were $6.62 billion at March 31, 2025, up 2.9% from the end of the fourth quarter of 2024; noninterest-bearing demand deposits at March 31, 2025 were 31.2% of total deposits.
    • Net interest income for the first quarter was $55.1 million, up 3.1% from the fourth quarter of 2024. Net interest margin (taxable equivalent) increased 11 basis points to 3.02%; the average yield on loans declined two basis points to 5.95%, while the cost of interest-bearing deposits fell 27 basis points to 3.69%.
    • Credit loss expense for the first quarter was $2.7 million, an increase from $0.9 million for the prior quarter. The allowance for credit losses increased $0.5 million to $70.6 million at March 31, 2025, or 1.12% of loans. For the first quarter, net loan charge-offs were $1.9 million, or 0.13% of average loans (annualized).
    • Nonperforming loans were $35.6 million at March 31, 2025, or 0.57% of loans. Criticized loans decreased to $164.9 million, as special mention loans decreased to $118.4 million, while classified loans increased to $46.5 million.

    For more information about Hanmi, please see the Q1 2025 Investor Update (and Supplemental Financial Information), which is available on the Bank’s website at www.hanmi.com and via a current report on Form 8-K on the website of the Securities and Exchange Commission at www.sec.gov. Also, please refer to “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” herein for further details of the presentation of certain non-GAAP financial measures.

    Quarterly Highlights
    (Dollars in thousands, except per share data)

      As of or for the Three Months Ended     Amount Change  
      March 31,     December 31,     September 30,     June 30,     March 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
                                             
    Net income $ 17,672     $ 17,695     $ 14,892     $ 14,451     $ 15,164     $ (23 )   $ 2,508  
    Net income per diluted common share $ 0.58     $ 0.58     $ 0.49     $ 0.48     $ 0.50     $     $ 0.08  
                                             
    Assets $ 7,729,035     $ 7,677,925     $ 7,712,299     $ 7,586,347     $ 7,512,046     $ 51,110     $ 216,989  
    Loans receivable $ 6,282,189     $ 6,251,377     $ 6,257,744     $ 6,176,359     $ 6,177,840     $ 30,812     $ 104,349  
    Deposits $ 6,619,475     $ 6,435,776     $ 6,403,221     $ 6,329,340     $ 6,376,060     $ 183,699     $ 243,415  
                                             
    Return on average assets   0.94 %     0.93 %     0.79 %     0.77 %     0.81 %     0.01       0.13  
    Return on average stockholders’ equity   8.92 %     8.89 %     7.55 %     7.50 %     7.90 %     0.03       1.02  
                                             
    Net interest margin   3.02 %     2.91 %     2.74 %     2.69 %     2.78 %     0.11       0.24  
    Efficiency ratio (1)   55.69 %     56.79 %     59.98 %     62.24 %     62.42 %     -1.10       -6.73  
                                             
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets (2)   9.59 %     9.41 %     9.42 %     9.19 %     9.23 %     0.18       0.36  
    Tangible common equity per common share (2) $ 24.49     $ 23.88     $ 24.03     $ 22.99     $ 22.86       0.61       1.63  
                                             
                                             
    (1) Noninterest expense divided by net interest income plus noninterest income.                    
    (2) Refer to “Non-GAAP Financial Measures” for further details.                    
                         

    Results of Operations
    Net interest income for the first quarter was $55.1 million, up 3.1% from $53.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. The increase was primarily due to a decrease in deposit interest expense from a decrease in deposit rates. The average rate paid on interest-bearing deposits for the fourth quarter decreased 27 basis points to 3.69% from 3.96% for the fourth quarter of 2024, primarily due to the decrease in the average cost of time deposits to 4.17% for the first quarter from 4.55% for the fourth quarter of 2024. The average balance of interest-bearing deposits increased to $4.46 billion for the first quarter of 2025 from $4.36 billion for the fourth quarter. The average balance of time deposits was $2.35 billion for the first quarter of 2025, essentially unchanged from the fourth quarter. The average balance of noninterest-bearing deposits for the first quarter decreased to $1.90 billion from $1.97 billion for the fourth quarter of 2024. Net interest margin (taxable equivalent) for the first quarter was 3.02%, up 11 basis points from 2.91% for the fourth quarter of 2024.

      For the Three Months Ended (in thousands)     Percentage Change  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
    Net Interest Income 2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
                                             
    Interest and fees on loans receivable (1) $ 90,887     $ 91,545     $ 92,182     $ 90,752     $ 91,674     -0.7 %   -0.9 %
    Interest on securities   6,169       5,866       5,523       5,238       4,955     5.2 %   24.5 %
    Dividends on FHLB stock   360       360       356       357       361     0.0 %   -0.3 %
    Interest on deposits in other banks   1,841       2,342       2,356       2,313       2,604     -21.4 %   -29.3 %
    Total interest and dividend income $ 99,257     $ 100,113     $ 100,417     $ 98,660     $ 99,594     -0.9 %   -0.3 %
                                             
    Interest on deposits   40,559       43,406       47,153       46,495       45,638     -6.6 %   -11.1 %
    Interest on borrowings   2,024       1,634       1,561       1,896       1,655     23.9 %   22.3 %
    Interest on subordinated debentures   1,582       1,624       1,652       1,649       1,646     -2.6 %   -3.9 %
    Total interest expense   44,165       46,664       50,366       50,040       48,939     -5.4 %   -9.8 %
    Net interest income $ 55,092     $ 53,449     $ 50,051     $ 48,620     $ 50,655     3.1 %   8.8 %
                                             
    (1) Includes loans held for sale.                    
                                             
      For the Three Months Ended (in thousands)     Percentage Change  
    Average Earning Assets and Interest-bearing Liabilities Mar 31,
    2025
        Dec 31,
    2024
        Sep 30,
    2024
        Jun 30,
    2024
         Mar 31,
    2024
        Q1-25 vs.
    Q4-24
        Q1-25 vs.
    Q1-24
     
    Loans receivable (1) $ 6,189,531     $ 6,103,264     $ 6,112,324     $ 6,089,440     $ 6,137,888     1.4 %   0.8 %
    Securities   1,001,499       998,313       986,041       979,671       969,520     0.3 %   3.3 %
    FHLB stock   16,385       16,385       16,385       16,385       16,385     0.0 %   0.0 %
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks   176,028       204,408       183,027       180,177       201,724     -13.9 %   -12.7 %
    Average interest-earning assets $ 7,383,443     $ 7,322,370     $ 7,297,777     $ 7,265,673     $ 7,325,517     0.8 %   0.8 %
                                             
    Demand: interest-bearing $ 79,369     $ 79,784     $ 83,647     $ 85,443     $ 86,401     -0.5 %   -8.1 %
    Money market and savings   2,037,224       1,934,540       1,885,799       1,845,870       1,815,085     5.3 %   12.2 %
    Time deposits   2,345,346       2,346,363       2,427,737       2,453,154       2,507,830     0.0 %   -6.5 %
    Average interest-bearing deposits   4,461,939       4,360,687       4,397,183       4,384,467       4,409,316     2.3 %   1.2 %
    Borrowings   179,444       141,604       143,479       169,525       162,418     26.7 %   10.5 %
    Subordinated debentures   130,718       130,567       130,403       130,239       130,088     0.1 %   0.5 %
    Average interest-bearing liabilities $ 4,772,101     $ 4,632,858     $ 4,671,065     $ 4,684,231     $ 4,701,822     3.0 %   1.5 %
                                             
    Average Noninterest Bearing Deposits                                        
    Demand deposits – noninterest bearing $ 1,895,953     $ 1,967,789     $ 1,908,833     $ 1,883,765     $ 1,921,189     -3.7 %   -1.3 %
                                             
    (1) Includes loans held for sale.                    
                                             
      For the Three Months Ended     Yield/Rate Change  
    Average Yields Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
    and Rates 2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Loans receivable (1) 5.95 %   5.97 %   6.00 %   5.99 %   6.00 %   -0.02     -0.05  
    Securities (2) 2.49 %   2.38 %   2.27 %   2.17 %   2.07 %   0.11     0.42  
    FHLB stock 8.92 %   8.75 %   8.65 %   8.77 %   8.87 %   0.17     0.05  
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks 4.24 %   4.56 %   5.12 %   5.16 %   5.19 %   -0.32     -0.95  
    Interest-earning assets 5.45 %   5.45 %   5.48 %   5.46 %   5.47 %   0.00     -0.02  
                                             
    Interest-bearing deposits 3.69 %   3.96 %   4.27 %   4.27 %   4.16 %   -0.27     -0.47  
    Borrowings 4.57 %   4.59 %   4.33 %   4.50 %   4.10 %   -0.02     0.47  
    Subordinated debentures 4.84 %   4.97 %   5.07 %   5.07 %   5.06 %   -0.13     -0.22  
    Interest-bearing liabilities 3.75 %   4.01 %   4.29 %   4.30 %   4.19 %   -0.26     -0.44  
                                             
    Net interest margin (taxable equivalent basis) 3.02 %   2.91 %   2.74 %   2.69 %   2.78 %   0.11     0.24  
                                             
    Cost of deposits 2.59 %   2.73 %   2.97 %   2.98 %   2.90 %   -0.14     -0.31  
                                             
    (1) Includes loans held for sale.                    
    (2) Amounts calculated on a fully taxable equivalent basis using the federal tax rate in effect for the periods presented.
                   

    Credit loss expense for the first quarter was $2.7 million, compared with $0.9 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. First quarter credit loss expense included a $2.4 million credit loss expense for loan losses and a $0.3 million credit loss expense for off-balance sheet items.

    Noninterest income for the first quarter increased $0.3 million, or 5.0%, to $7.7 million from $7.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. The increase was primarily due to a $0.6 million increase on gains from the sale of SBA loans. Gains on sales of SBA loans were $2.0 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared with $1.4 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. The volume of SBA loans sold for the first quarter increased to $32.2 million from $21.6 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, while trade premiums were 7.82% for the first quarter of 2025 compared with 8.53% for the fourth quarter. Mortgage loans sold for the first quarter were $10.0 million, with a premium of 2.50%, compared with $18.3 million and 1.96% for the fourth quarter. Gains on mortgage loans sold were $0.2 million for the first quarter, compared with $0.3 million for the fourth quarter.

      For the Three Months Ended (in thousands)     Percentage Change  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
    Noninterest Income 2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Service charges on deposit accounts $ 2,217     $ 2,192     $ 2,311     $ 2,429     $ 2,450     1.1 %   -9.5 %
    Trade finance and other service charges and fees   1,396       1,364       1,254       1,277       1,414     2.3 %   -1.3 %
    Servicing income   732       668       817       796       712     9.6 %   2.8 %
    Bank-owned life insurance income   309       316       320       638       304     -2.2 %   1.6 %
    All other operating income   897       1,037       1,008       908       928     -13.5 %   -3.3 %
    Service charges, fees & other   5,551       5,577       5,710       6,048       5,808     -0.5 %   -4.4 %
                                             
    Gain on sale of SBA loans   2,000       1,443       1,544       1,644       1,482     38.6 %   35.0 %
    Gain on sale of mortgage loans   175       337       324       365       443     -48.1 %   -60.5 %
    Gain on sale of bank premises               860                 0.0 %   0.0 %
    Total noninterest income $ 7,726     $ 7,357     $ 8,438     $ 8,057     $ 7,733     5.0 %   -0.1 %
                                             

    Noninterest expense for the first quarter increased $0.5 million to $35.0 million from $34.5 million for the fourth quarter of 2024. The increase was primarily due to a $1.6 million gain on the sale of an other-real-estate-owned property in the fourth quarter. Absent this gain, first quarter noninterest expense was down 3.2% sequentially due to decreases in professional fees, advertising and promotion, and other operating expenses, partially offset by a $0.5 million increase in salaries and benefits, which reflected seasonal first quarter increases. All other operating expenses decreased $0.7 million for the first quarter primarily due to the absence of a fourth quarter $0.5 million charge related to an SBA loan acquired in a previous acquisition. The efficiency ratio improved during the first quarter to 55.7%, compared with 56.8% for the fourth quarter of 2024.

      For the Three Months Ended (in thousands)     Percentage Change  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Noninterest Expense                                        
    Salaries and employee benefits $ 20,972     $ 20,498     $ 20,851     $ 20,434     $ 21,585     2.3 %   -2.8 %
    Occupancy and equipment   4,450       4,503       4,499       4,348       4,537     -1.2 %   -1.9 %
    Data processing   3,787       3,800       3,839       3,686       3,551     -0.3 %   6.6 %
    Professional fees   1,468       1,821       1,492       1,749       1,893     -19.4 %   -22.5 %
    Supplies and communication   517       551       538       570       601     -6.2 %   -14.0 %
    Advertising and promotion   585       821       631       669       907     -28.7 %   -35.5 %
    All other operating expenses   3,175       3,847       2,875       3,251       3,160     -17.5 %   0.5 %
    Subtotal   34,954       35,841       34,725       34,707       36,234     -2.5 %   -3.5 %
                                             
    Branch consolidation expense                     301           0.0 %   0.0 %
    Other real estate owned expense (income)   41       (1,588 )     77       6       22     102.6 %   86.4 %
    Repossessed personal property expense (income)   (11 )     281       278       262       189     -103.9 %   -105.8 %
    Total noninterest expense $ 34,984     $ 34,534     $ 35,080     $ 35,276     $ 36,445     1.3 %   -4.0 %
                                             

    Hanmi recorded a provision for income taxes of $7.4 million for the first quarter of 2025, compared with $7.6 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, representing an effective tax rate of 29.6% and 30.1%, respectively.

    Financial Position
    Total assets at March 31, 2025 increased 0.7%, or $51.1 million, to $7.73 billion from $7.68 billion at December 31, 2024. The increase reflected a $30.4 million increase in loans and a $24.2 million increase in cash, offset partially by a $7.6 million decrease in prepaid expenses and other assets.

    Loans receivable, before allowance for credit losses, were $6.28 billion at March 31, 2025, up from $6.25 billion at December 31, 2024.

    Loans held-for-sale were $11.8 million at March 31, 2025, up from $8.6 million at December 31, 2024. At the end of the first quarter, loans held-for-sale consisted of the guaranteed portion of SBA 7(a) loans.

      As of (in thousands)     Percentage Change  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Loan Portfolio                                        
    Commercial real estate loans $ 3,975,651     $ 3,949,622     $ 3,932,088     $ 3,888,505     $ 3,878,677     0.7 %   2.5 %
    Residential/consumer loans   979,536       951,302       939,285       954,209       970,362     3.0 %   0.9 %
    Commercial and industrial loans   854,406       863,431       879,092       802,372       774,851     -1.0 %   10.3 %
    Equipment finance   472,596       487,022       507,279       531,273       553,950     -3.0 %   -14.7 %
    Loans receivable   6,282,189       6,251,377       6,257,744       6,176,359       6,177,840     0.5 %   1.7 %
    Loans held for sale   11,831       8,579       54,336       10,467       3,999     37.9 %   195.8 %
    Total $ 6,294,020     $ 6,259,956     $ 6,312,080     $ 6,186,826     $ 6,181,839     0.5 %   1.8 %
                                                       
      As of  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    Composition of Loan Portfolio                            
    Commercial real estate loans 63.1 %   63.1 %   62.3 %   62.9 %   62.7 %
    Residential/consumer loans 15.6 %   15.2 %   14.9 %   15.4 %   15.7 %
    Commercial and industrial loans 13.6 %   13.8 %   13.9 %   13.0 %   12.5 %
    Equipment finance 7.5 %   7.8 %   8.0 %   8.5 %   9.0 %
    Loans receivable 99.8 %   99.9 %   99.1 %   99.8 %   99.9 %
    Loans held for sale 0.2 %   0.1 %   0.9 %   0.2 %   0.1 %
    Total 100.0 %   100.0 %   100.0 %   100.0 %   100.0 %
                                 

    New loan production was $345.9 million for the first quarter of 2025 with an average rate of 7.35%, while payoffs were $125.1 million during the quarter at an average rate of 6.40%.

    Commercial real estate loan production for the first quarter of 2025 was $146.6 million. Commercial and industrial loan production was $42.3 million, SBA loan production was $55.2 million, equipment finance production was $46.7 million, and residential mortgage loan production was $55.0 million.

      For the Three Months Ended (in thousands)  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    New Loan Production                            
    Commercial real estate loans $ 146,606     $ 146,716     $ 110,246     $ 87,632     $ 60,085  
    Residential/consumer loans   55,000       40,225       40,758       30,194       53,115  
    Commercial and industrial loans   42,344       60,159       105,086       59,007       50,789  
    Equipment finance   46,749       42,168       40,066       42,594       39,155  
    SBA loans   55,242       49,740       51,616       54,486       30,817  
    subtotal   345,941       339,008       347,772       273,913       233,961  
                                 
                                 
    Payoffs   (125,102 )     (137,933 )     (77,603 )     (148,400 )     (86,250 )
    Amortization   (90,743 )     (60,583 )     (151,674 )     (83,640 )     (90,711 )
    Loan sales   (42,193 )     (67,852 )     (43,868 )     (42,945 )     (55,321 )
    Net line utilization   (53,901 )     (75,651 )     9,426       1,929       (4,150 )
    Charge-offs & OREO   (3,190 )     (3,356 )     (2,668 )     (2,338 )     (2,123 )
                                 
    Loans receivable-beginning balance   6,251,377       6,257,744       6,176,359       6,177,840       6,182,434  
    Loans receivable-ending balance $ 6,282,189     $ 6,251,377     $ 6,257,744     $ 6,176,359     $ 6,177,840  
                                           

    Deposits were $6.62 billion at the end of the first quarter of 2025, up $183.7 million, or 2.9%, from $6.44 billion at the end of the prior quarter. Driving the change was a $140.4 million increase in money market and savings deposits and a $72.8 million increase in time deposits, partially offset by a $30.0 million decrease in noninterest-bearing demand deposits. Noninterest-bearing demand deposits represented 31.2% of total deposits at March 31, 2025 and the loan-to-deposit ratio was 94.9%.

      As of (in thousands)     Percentage Change  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Deposit Portfolio                                        
    Demand: noninterest-bearing $ 2,066,659     $ 2,096,634     $ 2,051,790     $ 1,959,963     $ 1,933,060     -1.4 %   6.9 %
    Demand: interest-bearing   80,790       80,323       79,287       82,981       87,374     0.6 %   -7.5 %
    Money market and savings   2,073,943       1,933,535       1,898,834       1,834,797       1,859,865     7.3 %   11.5 %
    Time deposits   2,398,083       2,325,284       2,373,310       2,451,599       2,495,761     3.1 %   -3.9 %
    Total deposits $ 6,619,475     $ 6,435,776     $ 6,403,221     $ 6,329,340     $ 6,376,060     2.9 %   3.8 %
                                                       
      As of  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    Composition of Deposit Portfolio                            
    Demand: noninterest-bearing 31.2 %   32.6 %   32.0 %   31.0 %   30.3 %
    Demand: interest-bearing 1.2 %   1.2 %   1.2 %   1.3 %   1.4 %
    Money market and savings 31.3 %   30.0 %   29.7 %   29.0 %   29.2 %
    Time deposits 36.3 %   36.2 %   37.1 %   38.7 %   39.1 %
    Total deposits 100.0 %   100.0 %   100.0 %   100.0 %   100.0 %

    Stockholders’ equity at March 31, 2025 was $751.5 million, up $19.3 million from $732.2 million at December 31, 2024. The increase included $9.5 million in net income, net of dividends paid, for the first quarter. In addition, the increase in stockholders’ equity included a $10.4 million decrease in unrealized after-tax losses on securities available for sale, and a $0.3 million decrease in unrealized after-tax losses on cash flow hedges, due to changes in interest rates during the first quarter of 2025. Hanmi also repurchased 50,000 shares of common stock at a cost of $1.1 million, for an average share price of $22.49, during the quarter. At March 31, 2025, 1,180,500 shares remain under Hanmi’s share repurchase program. Tangible common stockholders’ equity was $740.5 million, or 9.59% of tangible assets at March 31, 2025 compared with $721.1 million, or 9.41% of tangible assets at the end of the prior quarter. Please refer to the Non-GAAP Financial Measures section below for more information.

    Hanmi and the Bank exceeded minimum regulatory capital requirements, and the Bank continues to exceed the minimum for the “well capitalized” category. At March 31, 2025, Hanmi’s preliminary common equity tier 1 capital ratio was 12.13% and its total risk-based capital ratio was 15.29%, compared with 12.11% and 15.24%, respectively, at the end of the prior quarter.

      As of     Ratio Change  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Regulatory Capital ratios (1)                                        
    Hanmi Financial                                        
    Total risk-based capital 15.29 %   15.24 %   15.03 %   15.24 %   15.20 %   0.05     0.09  
    Tier 1 risk-based capital 12.47 %   12.46 %   12.29 %   12.46 %   12.40 %   0.01     0.07  
    Common equity tier 1 capital 12.13 %   12.11 %   11.95 %   12.11 %   12.05 %   0.02     0.08  
    Tier 1 leverage capital ratio 10.67 %   10.63 %   10.56 %   10.51 %   10.36 %   0.04     0.31  
    Hanmi Bank                                        
    Total risk-based capital 14.48 %   14.43 %   14.27 %   14.51 %   14.50 %   0.05     -0.02  
    Tier 1 risk-based capital 13.35 %   13.36 %   13.23 %   13.47 %   13.44 %   -0.01     -0.09  
    Common equity tier 1 capital 13.35 %   13.36 %   13.23 %   13.47 %   13.44 %   -0.01     -0.09  
    Tier 1 leverage capital ratio 11.49 %   11.47 %   11.43 %   11.41 %   11.29 %   0.02     0.20  
                                             
    (1) Preliminary ratios for March 31, 2025                    
                                             

    Asset Quality
    Loans 30 to 89 days past due and still accruing were 0.28% of loans at the end of the first quarter of 2025, compared with 0.30% at the end of the prior quarter.

    Criticized loans totaled $164.9 million at March 31, 2025, down from $165.3 million at the end of the fourth quarter of 2024. The $0.4 million decrease resulted from a $21.2 million decrease in special mention loans, partially offset by a $20.8 million increase in classified loans. The $21.2 million decrease in special mention loans included loan upgrades of $20.5 million and amortization/paydowns of $0.9 million, offset by additions of $0.2 million. The $20.8 million increase in classified loans resulted from $22.8 million of loan downgrades and $3.4 million of equipment financing downgrades. Loan downgrades were primarily the result of a $20.0 million syndicated commercial real estate office loan designated as nonaccrual during the first quarter of 2025. Additions were offset by $2.7 million of equipment financing  charge-offs, $1.1 million of payoffs, $1.0 million of amortization/paydowns, $0.3 million of loan charge-offs and $0.3 million of loan upgrades.

    Nonperforming loans were $35.6 million at March 31, 2025, up from $14.3 million at the end of the prior quarter. The $21.3 million increase primarily reflects additions of $26.1 million, offset by charge-offs of $3.0 million, pay-offs of $0.8 million, $0.9 million in paydowns, and loan upgrades of $0.1 million. Additions included $23.0 million of loans and $3.1 million of equipment financing agreements. Loan additions were driven primarily by the previously mentioned $20.0 million commercial real estate loan designated as nonaccrual during the first quarter of 2025.

    Nonperforming assets were $35.7 million at March 31, 2025, up from $14.4 million at the end of the prior quarter. As a percentage of total assets, nonperforming assets were 0.46% at March 31, 2025, and 0.19% at the end of the prior quarter.

    Gross charge-offs for the first quarter of 2025 were $3.2 million, compared with $3.4 million for the preceding quarter. Charge-offs included $2.8 million on equipment financing agreements. Recoveries of previously charged-off loans were $1.3 million in the first quarter of 2025, which included $0.8 million of recoveries on equipment financing agreements. As a result, there were $1.9 million of net charge-offs for the first quarter of 2025, compared to net recoveries of $0.1 million for the prior quarter.

    The allowance for credit losses was $70.6 million at March 31, 2025, compared with $70.1 million at December 31, 2024. Specific allowances for loans increased $5.6 million because of a $6.2 million specific allowance on the previously mentioned $20.0 million commercial real estate loan designated as nonaccrual during the first quarter of 2025, and collectively evaluated allowances decreased $5.2 million. The ratio of the allowance for credit losses to loans was 1.12% at March 31, 2025 and at the end of the prior quarter.

      As of or for the Three Months Ended (in thousands)     Amount Change  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Asset Quality Data and Ratios                                        
                                             
    Delinquent loans:                                        
    Loans, 30 to 89 days past due and still accruing $ 17,312     $ 18,454     $ 15,027     $ 13,844     $ 15,839     $ (1,142 )   $ 1,473  
    Delinquent loans to total loans   0.28 %     0.30 %     0.24 %     0.22 %     0.26 %     (0.02 )     0.02  
                                             
    Criticized loans:                                        
    Special mention $ 118,380     $ 139,612     $ 131,575     $ 36,921     $ 62,317     $ (21,232 )   $ 56,063  
    Classified   46,519       25,683       28,377       33,945       23,670       20,836       22,849  
    Total criticized loans (1) $ 164,899     $ 165,295     $ 159,952     $ 70,866     $ 85,987     $ (396 )   $ 78,912  
                                             
    Criticized loans to total loans   2.62 %     2.64 %     2.56 %     1.15 %     1.39 %     (0.02 )     1.23  
                                             
    Nonperforming assets:                                        
    Nonaccrual loans $ 35,459     $ 14,272     $ 15,248     $ 19,245     $ 14,025     $ 21,187     $ 21,434  
    Loans 90 days or more past due and still accruing   112             242                   112       112  
    Nonperforming loans (2)   35,571       14,272       15,490       19,245       14,025       21,299       21,546  
    Other real estate owned, net   117       117       772       772       117              
    Nonperforming assets (3) $ 35,688     $ 14,389     $ 16,262     $ 20,017     $ 14,142     $ 21,299     $ 21,546  
                                             
    Nonperforming assets to assets (2)   0.46 %     0.19 %     0.21 %     0.26 %     0.19 %     0.27       0.27  
    Nonperforming loans to total loans   0.57 %     0.23 %     0.25 %     0.31 %     0.23 %     0.34       0.34  
                                             
    (1) Includes nonaccrual loans of $34.4 million, $13.4 million, $13.6 million, $18.4 million, and $14.0 million as of Q1-25, Q4-24, Q3-24, Q2-24, and Q1-24, respectively. 
    (2) Excludes a $27.2 million nonperforming loan held-for-sale as of September 30, 2024.    
    (3) Excludes repossessed personal property of $0.7 million, $0.6 million, $1.2 million, $1.2 million, and $1.3 million as of Q1-25, Q4-24, Q3-24, Q2-24, and Q1-24, respectively. 
       
      As of or for the Three Months Ended (in thousands)  
      Mar 31,     Dec 31,     Sep 30,     Jun 30,     Mar 31,  
      2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    Allowance for credit losses related to loans:                            
    Balance at beginning of period $ 70,147     $ 69,163     $ 67,729     $ 68,270     $ 69,462  
    Credit loss expense (recovery) on loans   2,396       855       2,312       1,248       404  
    Net loan (charge-offs) recoveries   (1,946 )     129       (878 )     (1,789 )     (1,596 )
    Balance at end of period $ 70,597     $ 70,147     $ 69,163     $ 67,729     $ 68,270  
                                 
    Net loan charge-offs (recoveries) to average loans (1)   0.13 %     -0.01 %     0.06 %     0.12 %     0.10 %
    Allowance for credit losses to loans   1.12 %     1.12 %     1.11 %     1.10 %     1.11 %
                                 
    Allowance for credit losses related to off-balance sheet items:                            
    Balance at beginning of period $ 2,074     $ 1,984     $ 2,010     $ 2,297     $ 2,474  
    Credit loss expense (recovery) on off-balance sheet items   325       90       (26 )     (287 )     (177 )
    Balance at end of period $ 2,399     $ 2,074     $ 1,984     $ 2,010     $ 2,297  
                                 
    Unused commitments to extend credit $ 896,282     $ 782,587     $ 739,975     $ 795,391     $ 792,769  
                                 
    (1) Annualized                            

    Corporate Developments
    On January 28, 2025, Hanmi’s Board of Directors declared a cash dividend on its common stock for the 2025 first quarter of $0.27 per share. Hanmi paid the dividend on February 26, 2025, to stockholders of record as of the close of business on February 10, 2025.

    Earnings Conference Call        
    Hanmi Bank will host its first quarter 2025 earnings conference call today, April 22, 2025, at 2:00 p.m. PST (5:00 p.m. EST) to discuss these results. This call will also be webcast. To access the call, please dial 1-877-407-9039 before 2:00 p.m. PST, using access code Hanmi Bank. To listen to the call online, either live or archived, please visit Hanmi’s Investor Relations website at https://investors.hanmi.com/ where it will also be available for replay approximately one hour following the call.

    About Hanmi Financial Corporation
    Headquartered in Los Angeles, California, Hanmi Financial Corporation owns Hanmi Bank, which serves multi-ethnic communities through its network of 32 full-service branches and eight loan production offices in California, Texas, Illinois, Virginia, New Jersey, New York, Colorado, Washington and Georgia. Hanmi Bank specializes in real estate, commercial, SBA and trade finance lending to small and middle market businesses. Additional information is available at www.hanmi.com.

    Forward-Looking Statements
    This press release contains forward-looking statements, which are included in accordance with the “safe harbor” provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements other than statements of historical fact are “forward–looking statements” for purposes of federal and state securities laws, including, but not limited to, statements about our anticipated future operating and financial performance, financial position and liquidity, business strategies, regulatory and competitive outlook, investment and expenditure plans, capital and financing needs and availability, plans and objectives of management for future operations, developments regarding our capital and strategic plans, and other similar forecasts and statements of expectation and statements of assumption underlying any of the foregoing. In some cases, you can identify forward-looking statements by terminology such as “may,” “will,” “should,” “could,” “expects,” “plans,” “intends,” “anticipates,” “believes,” “estimates,” “predicts,” “potential,” or “continue,” or the negative of such terms and other comparable terminology. Although we believe that our forward-looking statements to be reasonable, we cannot guarantee future results, levels of activity, performance or achievements.

    Forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties and other factors that may cause our actual results, levels of activity, performance or achievements to differ from those expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements. These factors include the following:

    • a failure to maintain adequate levels of capital and liquidity to support our operations;
    • general economic and business conditions internationally, nationally and in those areas in which we operate, including any potential recessionary conditions;
    • volatility and deterioration in the credit and equity markets;
    • changes in consumer spending, borrowing and savings habits;
    • availability of capital from private and government sources;
    • demographic changes;
    • competition for loans and deposits and failure to attract or retain loans and deposits;
    • inflation and fluctuations in interest rates that reduce our margins and yields, the fair value of financial instruments, the level of loan originations or prepayments on loans we have made and make, the level of loan sales and the cost we pay to retain and attract deposits and secure other types of funding;
    • our ability to enter new markets successfully and capitalize on growth opportunities;
    • the current or anticipated impact of military conflict, terrorism or other geopolitical events;
    • the effect of potential future supervisory action against us or Hanmi Bank and our ability to address any issues raised in our regulatory exams;
    • risks of natural disasters;
    • legal proceedings and litigation brought against us;
    • a failure in or breach of our operational or security systems or infrastructure, including cyberattacks;
    • the failure to maintain current technologies;
    • risks associated with Small Business Administration loans;
    • failure to attract or retain key employees;
    • our ability to access cost-effective funding;
    • the imposition of tariffs or other domestic or international governmental policies;
    • changes in liquidity, including the size and composition of our deposit portfolio and the percentage of uninsured deposits in the portfolio;
    • fluctuations in real estate values;
    • changes in accounting policies and practices;
    • changes in governmental regulation, including, but not limited to, any increase in FDIC insurance premiums and changes in the monetary policies of the U.S. Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System;
    • the ability of Hanmi Bank to make distributions to Hanmi Financial Corporation, which is restricted by certain factors, including Hanmi Bank’s retained earnings, net income, prior distributions made, and certain other financial tests;
    • strategic transactions we may enter into;
    • the adequacy of and changes in the methodology for computing our allowance for credit losses;
    • our credit quality and the effect of credit quality on our credit losses expense and allowance for credit losses;
    • changes in the financial performance and/or condition of our borrowers and the ability of our borrowers to perform under the terms of their loans and other terms of credit agreements;
    • our ability to control expenses; and
    • cyber security and fraud risks against our information technology and those of our third-party providers and vendors.

    In addition, we set forth certain risks in our reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, including, Item 1A of our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024, our Quarterly Reports on Form 10-Q, and Current Reports on Form 8-K that we will file hereafter, which could cause actual results to differ from those projected. We undertake no obligation to update such forward-looking statements except as required by law.

    Investor Contacts:
    Romolo (Ron) Santarosa
    Senior Executive Vice President & Chief Financial Officer
    213-427-5636

    Lisa Fortuna
    Investor Relations
    Financial Profiles, Inc.
    lfortuna@finprofiles.com
    310-622-8251

    Hanmi Financial Corporation and Subsidiaries
    Consolidated Balance Sheets (Unaudited)
    (Dollars in thousands)

      March 31,     December 31,     Percentage     March 31,     Percentage  
      2025     2024     Change     2024     Change  
    Assets                            
    Cash and due from banks $ 329,003     $ 304,800       7.9 %   $ 256,038       28.5 %
    Securities available for sale, at fair value   907,011       905,798       0.1 %     872,190       4.0 %
    Loans held for sale, at the lower of cost or fair value   11,831       8,579       37.9 %     3,999       195.8 %
    Loans receivable, net of allowance for credit losses   6,211,592       6,181,230       0.5 %     6,109,570       1.7 %
    Accrued interest receivable   23,536       22,937       2.6 %     23,032       2.2 %
    Premises and equipment, net   20,866       21,404       -2.5 %     21,952       -4.9 %
    Customers’ liability on acceptances   552       1,226       -55.0 %     161       242.9 %
    Servicing assets   6,422       6,457       -0.5 %     6,890       -6.8 %
    Goodwill and other intangible assets, net   11,031       11,031       0.0 %     11,074       -0.4 %
    Federal Home Loan Bank (“FHLB”) stock, at cost   16,385       16,385       0.0 %     16,385       0.0 %
    Bank-owned life insurance   57,476       57,168       0.5 %     56,639       1.5 %
    Prepaid expenses and other assets   133,330       140,910       -5.4 %     134,116       -0.6 %
    Total assets $ 7,729,035     $ 7,677,925       0.7 %   $ 7,512,046       2.9 %
                                 
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity                            
    Liabilities:                            
    Deposits:                            
    Noninterest-bearing $ 2,066,659     $ 2,096,634       -1.4 %   $ 1,933,060       6.9 %
    Interest-bearing   4,552,816       4,339,142       4.9 %     4,443,000       2.5 %
    Total deposits   6,619,475       6,435,776       2.9 %     6,376,060       3.8 %
    Accrued interest payable   29,646       34,824       -14.9 %     38,007       -22.0 %
    Bank’s liability on acceptances   552       1,226       -55.0 %     161       242.9 %
    Borrowings   117,500       262,500       -55.2 %     172,500       -31.9 %
    Subordinated debentures   130,799       130,638       0.1 %     130,165       0.5 %
    Accrued expenses and other liabilities   79,578       80,787       -1.5 %     92,053       -13.6 %
    Total liabilities   6,977,550       6,945,751       0.5 %     6,808,946       2.5 %
                                 
    Stockholders’ equity:                            
    Common stock   34       34       0.0 %     34       0.0 %
    Additional paid-in capital   591,942       591,069       0.1 %     587,687       0.7 %
    Accumulated other comprehensive income   (60,002 )     (70,723 )     15.2 %     (76,890 )     22.0 %
    Retained earnings   360,289       350,869       2.7 %     326,526       10.3 %
    Less treasury stock   (140,778 )     (139,075 )     -1.2 %     (134,257 )     -4.9 %
    Total stockholders’ equity   751,485       732,174       2.6 %     703,100       6.9 %
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 7,729,035     $ 7,677,925       0.7 %   $ 7,512,046       2.9 %
                                 

    Hanmi Financial Corporation and Subsidiaries
    Consolidated Statements of Income (Unaudited)
    (Dollars in thousands, except share and per share data)

      Three Months Ended  
      March 31,     December 31,     Percentage     March 31,     Percentage  
      2025     2024     Change     2024     Change  
    Interest and dividend income:                            
    Interest and fees on loans receivable $ 90,887     $ 91,545       -0.7 %   $ 91,674       -0.9 %
    Interest on securities   6,169       5,866       5.2 %     4,955       24.5 %
    Dividends on FHLB stock   360       360       0.0 %     361       -0.3 %
    Interest on deposits in other banks   1,841       2,342       -21.4 %     2,604       -29.3 %
    Total interest and dividend income   99,257       100,113       -0.9 %     99,594       -0.3 %
    Interest expense:                            
    Interest on deposits   40,559       43,406       -6.6 %     45,638       -11.1 %
    Interest on borrowings   2,024       1,634       23.9 %     1,655       22.3 %
    Interest on subordinated debentures   1,582       1,624       -2.6 %     1,646       -3.9 %
    Total interest expense   44,165       46,664       -5.4 %     48,939       -9.8 %
    Net interest income before credit loss expense   55,092       53,449       3.1 %     50,655       8.8 %
    Credit loss expense   2,721       945       187.9 %     227       1098.7 %
    Net interest income after credit loss expense   52,371       52,504       -0.3 %     50,428       3.9 %
    Noninterest income:                            
    Service charges on deposit accounts   2,217       2,192       1.1 %     2,450       -9.5 %
    Trade finance and other service charges and fees   1,396       1,364       2.3 %     1,414       -1.3 %
    Gain on sale of Small Business Administration (“SBA”) loans   2,000       1,443       38.6 %     1,482       35.0 %
    Other operating income   2,113       2,358       -10.4 %     2,387       -11.5 %
    Total noninterest income   7,726       7,357       5.0 %     7,733       -0.1 %
    Noninterest expense:                            
    Salaries and employee benefits   20,972       20,498       2.3 %     21,585       -2.8 %
    Occupancy and equipment   4,450       4,503       -1.2 %     4,537       -1.9 %
    Data processing   3,787       3,800       -0.3 %     3,551       6.6 %
    Professional fees   1,468       1,821       -19.4 %     1,893       -22.5 %
    Supplies and communications   517       551       -6.2 %     601       -14.0 %
    Advertising and promotion   585       821       -28.7 %     907       -35.5 %
    Other operating expenses   3,205       2,540       26.2 %     3,371       -4.9 %
    Total noninterest expense   34,984       34,534       1.3 %     36,445       -4.0 %
    Income before tax   25,113       25,327       -0.8 %     21,716       15.6 %
    Income tax expense   7,441       7,632       -2.5 %     6,552       13.6 %
    Net income $ 17,672     $ 17,695       -0.1 %   $ 15,164       16.5 %
                                 
    Basic earnings per share: $ 0.59     $ 0.59           $ 0.50        
    Diluted earnings per share: $ 0.58     $ 0.58           $ 0.50        
                                 
    Weighted-average shares outstanding:                            
    Basic   29,937,660       29,933,644             30,119,646        
    Diluted   30,058,248       30,011,773             30,119,646        
    Common shares outstanding   30,233,514       30,195,999             30,276,358        
                                       

    Hanmi Financial Corporation and Subsidiaries
    Average Balance, Average Yield Earned, and Average Rate Paid (Unaudited)
    (Dollars in thousands)

      Three Months Ended  
      March 31, 2025     December 31, 2024     March 31, 2024  
            Interest   Average           Interest   Average           Interest   Average  
      Average     Income /   Yield /     Average     Income /   Yield /     Average     Income /   Yield /  
      Balance     Expense   Rate     Balance     Expense   Rate     Balance     Expense   Rate  
    Assets                                              
    Interest-earning assets:                                              
    Loans receivable (1) $ 6,189,531     $ 90,887   5.95 %   $ 6,103,264     $ 91,545   5.97 %   $ 6,137,888     $ 91,674   6.00 %
    Securities (2)   1,001,499       6,169   2.49 %     998,313       5,866   2.38 %     969,520       4,955   2.07 %
    FHLB stock   16,385       360   8.92 %     16,385       360   8.75 %     16,385       361   8.87 %
    Interest-bearing deposits in other banks   176,028       1,841   4.24 %     204,408       2,342   4.56 %     201,724       2,604   5.19 %
    Total interest-earning assets   7,383,443       99,257   5.45 %     7,322,370       100,113   5.45 %     7,325,517       99,594   5.47 %
                                                   
    Noninterest-earning assets:                                              
    Cash and due from banks   53,670                 54,678                 58,382            
    Allowance for credit losses   (69,648 )               (69,291 )               (69,106 )          
    Other assets   249,148                 246,744                 244,700            
                                                   
    Total assets $ 7,616,613               $ 7,554,501               $ 7,559,493            
                                                   
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity                                              
    Interest-bearing liabilities:                                              
    Deposits:                                              
    Demand: interest-bearing $ 79,369     $ 27   0.14 %   $ 79,784     $ 26   0.13 %   $ 86,401     $ 30   0.14 %
    Money market and savings   2,037,224       16,437   3.27 %     1,934,540       16,564   3.41 %     1,815,085       16,553   3.67 %
    Time deposits   2,345,346       24,095   4.17 %     2,346,363       26,816   4.55 %     2,507,830       29,055   4.66 %
    Total interest-bearing deposits   4,461,939       40,559   3.69 %     4,360,687       43,406   3.96 %     4,409,316       45,638   4.16 %
    Borrowings   179,444       2,024   4.57 %     141,604       1,634   4.59 %     162,418       1,655   4.10 %
    Subordinated debentures   130,718       1,582   4.84 %     130,567       1,624   4.97 %     130,088       1,646   5.06 %
    Total interest-bearing liabilities   4,772,101       44,165   3.75 %     4,632,858       46,664   4.01 %     4,701,822       48,939   4.19 %
                                                   
    Noninterest-bearing liabilities and equity:                                              
    Demand deposits: noninterest-bearing   1,895,953                 1,967,789                 1,921,189            
    Other liabilities   144,654                 162,064                 164,524            
    Stockholders’ equity   803,905                 791,790                 771,958            
                                                   
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity $ 7,616,613               $ 7,554,501               $ 7,559,493            
                                                   
    Net interest income       $ 55,092               $ 53,449               $ 50,655      
                                                   
    Cost of deposits           2.59 %             2.73 %             2.90 %
    Net interest spread (taxable equivalent basis)           1.70 %             1.44 %             1.28 %
    Net interest margin (taxable equivalent basis)           3.02 %             2.91 %             2.78 %
                                                   
                                                   
                                                   
    (1) Includes average loans held for sale.
    (2) Income calculated on a fully taxable equivalent basis using the federal tax rate in effect for the periods presented.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    These disclosures should not be viewed as a substitute for results determined in accordance with GAAP, nor is it necessarily comparable to non-GAAP performance measures that may be presented by other companies.

    Tangible Common Equity to Tangible Assets Ratio

    Tangible common equity to tangible assets ratio is supplemental financial information determined by a method other than in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). This non-GAAP measure is used by management in the analysis of Hanmi’s capital strength. Tangible common equity is calculated by subtracting goodwill and other intangible assets from stockholders’ equity. Banking and financial institution regulators also exclude goodwill and other intangible assets from stockholders’ equity when assessing the capital adequacy of a financial institution. Management believes the presentation of this financial measure excluding the impact of these items provides useful supplemental information that is essential to a proper understanding of the capital strength of Hanmi.

    The following table reconciles this non-GAAP performance measure to the GAAP performance measure for the periods indicated:

    Tangible Common Equity to Tangible Assets Ratio (Unaudited)
    (In thousands, except share, per share data and ratios)

      March 31,     December 31,     September 30,     June 30,     March 31,  
    Hanmi Financial Corporation 2025     2024     2024     2024     2024  
    Assets $ 7,729,035     $ 7,677,925     $ 7,712,299     $ 7,586,347     $ 7,512,046  
    Less goodwill and other intangible assets   (11,031 )     (11,031 )     (11,031 )     (11,048 )     (11,074 )
    Tangible assets $ 7,718,004     $ 7,666,894     $ 7,701,268     $ 7,575,299     $ 7,500,972  
                                 
    Stockholders’ equity (1) $ 751,485     $ 732,174     $ 736,709     $ 707,059     $ 703,100  
    Less goodwill and other intangible assets   (11,031 )     (11,031 )     (11,031 )     (11,048 )     (11,074 )
    Tangible stockholders’ equity (1) $ 740,454     $ 721,143     $ 725,678     $ 696,011     $ 692,026  
                                 
    Stockholders’ equity to assets   9.72 %     9.54 %     9.55 %     9.32 %     9.36 %
    Tangible common equity to tangible assets (1)   9.59 %     9.41 %     9.42 %     9.19 %     9.23 %
                                 
    Common shares outstanding   30,233,514       30,195,999       30,196,755       30,272,110       30,276,358  
    Tangible common equity per common share $ 24.49     $ 23.88     $ 24.03     $ 22.99     $ 22.86  
                                 
                                 
    (1) There were no preferred shares outstanding at the periods indicated.
             

    Preprovision Net Revenues

    Preprovision net revenues is supplemental financial information determined by a method other than in accordance with U.S. GAAP. This non-GAAP measure is used by management to measure Hanmi’s core operational performance, excluding the impact of provisions for loan losses. By isolating preprovision net revenues, management can better understand the Company’s true profitability and make more informed strategic decisions. Preprovision net revenues is calculated adding income tax expense and credit loss expense to net income. Management believes this financial measure highlights the Company’s revenue activities and operational efficiency, excluding unpredictable loan loss provisions.

    The following table details the Company’s preprovision net revenues, which are non-GAAP measures, for the periods indicated:

    Preprovision Net Revenues (Unaudited)
    (In thousands, except percentages)

                                    Amount Change  
    Hanmi Financial   March 31,     December 31,     September 30,     June 30,     March 31,     Q1-25     Q1-25  
    Corporation 2025     2024     2024     2024     2024     vs. Q4-24     vs. Q1-24  
    Net income $ 17,672     $ 17,695     $ 14,892     $ 14,451     $ 15,164              
    Add back:                                        
    Credit loss expense   2,721       945       2,286       961       227              
    Income tax expense   7,441       7,632       6,231       5,989       6,552              
    Preprovision net revenues $ 27,834     $ 26,272     $ 23,409     $ 21,401     $ 21,943     5.9 %   26.8 %

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Tribunal Initiates Final Injury Inquiry—Corrosion-resistant steel sheet from Türkiye

    Source: Government of Canada News (2)

    Ottawa, Ontario, April 22, 2025—The Canadian International Trade Tribunal today initiated an inquiry to determine whether the dumping of corrosion-resistant steel sheet originating in or exported from the Republic of Türkiye, by Borçelik Çelik Sanayi Ticaret A.Ş., has caused injury or retardation or is threatening to cause injury. This final injury inquiry was initiated further to a notice received from the Canada Border Services Agency stating that a preliminary determination had been made respecting the dumping of the above-mentioned goods.

    On August 15, 2025, the Tribunal will determine whether the dumping has caused injury or retardation or is threatening to cause injury to the domestic industry.

    The Tribunal is an independent quasi-judicial body that reports to Parliament through the Minister of Finance. It hears cases on dumped and subsidized imports, safeguard complaints, complaints about federal government procurement and appeals of customs and excise tax rulings. When requested by the federal government, the Tribunal also provides advice on other economic, trade and tariff matters.

    Any interested person, association or government that wishes to participate in the Tribunal’s inquiry may do so by filing Form I—Notice of Participation.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: World Economic Outlook Press Briefing

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    Speakers:

    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Deniz Igan, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF   

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start and we have a quorum. So good morning, everyone, and welcome. I want to welcome also those joining us online. I am Jose Luis de Haro with the Communications Department at the IMF and we are gathered here today for the presentation of our latest edition of the World Economic Outlook titled, “A Critical Juncture Amid Policy Shifts.” I hope by this time you all have had access to the document. If not, I am going to encourage you, as always, to go to IMF.org. There, you are going to find the document, the World Economic Outlook, also Pierre‑Olivier’s blog and many other assets, including the underlying data for some of the charts that are published on the World Economic Outlook.

    I also want to plug in that we have a new database portal that I encourage you to use, and what’s best, that to discuss the new outlook that having here with us today, Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas. He is the Economic Counsellor, the chief economist, and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks, she is the Deputy Director of the Research Department and last, but not least, we also have Deniz Igan, she is the division chief also with the Research Department.

    Pierre‑Olivier, as usual is going to start with some opening remarks, and then we are going to open the floor to your questions. I just want to remind everyone that this press briefing, it’s on the record and that we also have simultaneous translation.

    So let me stop here. Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose. And good morning, everyone. The landscape has changed since our last World Economic Outlook update in January. We are entering a new era as the global economic system that has operated for the last 80 years is being reset. Since late January, many tariff announcements have been made, culminating on April 2, with near universal levies from the United States and counterresponses from some trading partners. The U.S. effective tariff rate has surged past levels reached more than 100 years ago, while tariff rates on the U.S. have also increased.

    Beyond the abrupt increase in tariffs, the surge in policy uncertainty is a major driver of the economic outlook. If sustained, the increasing trade tensions and uncertainty will slow global growth significantly. Reflecting this complexity, our report presents a reference forecast which incorporates policy announcements up to April 4 by the U.S. and trading partners. Under these reference forecasts, global growth will reach 2.8 percent this year and 3 percent next year, a cumulative downgrade of about 0.8 percentage points relative to our January 2025 WEO update. Our report also offers a range of forecasts under different policy assumptions.

    Under an alternative path that excludes the April tariff announcements, global growth would have seen only a modest downgrade to 3.2 percent this year. We will also use a model‑based forecast to incorporate the temporary suspension of most tariffs announced on April 9, together with the increase in bilateral tariffs between China and the U.S. to prohibitive levels. This pause, even if extended permanently, delivers a similar growth outlook as a reference forecast, 2.8 percent, even if some highly tariffed countries could benefit.

    Now, while global growth remains well above recession levels, all regions are negatively impacted this year and next. And the global disinflation process continues, but at a slower pace with inflation revised up by 0.1 percentage point in both years. These trade tensions will greatly impact global trade. We project that global trade growth will be more than cut in half from 3.8 percent last year to 1.7 percent this year. The tariffs will play out differently in different countries. For the United States, the tariffs represent a supply shock that reduces productivity and output permanently and increases price pressures temporarily. This adds to an already weakening outlook and leads us to revise growth down by 0.9 percentage points to 1.8 percent, with a 0.4 percentage point downgrade from the tariffs only. While inflation is revised upwards.

    For trading partners, tariffs act mostly as a negative external demand shock. Weakening activity and prices, even if some countries could benefit from trade diversion. This is why we have lowered our China growth forecast this year to 4 percent, while inflation is revised down by 0.8 percentage points, increasing deflationary pressures. All countries are negatively affected by the surge in trade policy uncertainty, as businesses cut purchases and investment, while financial institutions reassess their borrowers’ exposure. Uncertainty also increases because of the complex sectoral disruptions that tariffs could cause up and down supply chains, as we saw during the pandemic.

    The effect of these shocks on exchange rates is complex. The tariffs could appreciate the US dollar, as in previous episodes. However, greater policy uncertainty, lower U.S. growth prospects, and an adjustment in the global demand for dollar assets are weighing down on the dollar.

    Risks to the global economic have increased and are firmly to the downside.

    First, while we are not projecting a global downturn, the risks it may happen this year have increased substantially, from 17 percent projected back in October to 30 percent now. An escalation of trade tensions would further depress growth. Financial conditions could also tighten, as markets react negatively to diminished growth prospects and increased uncertainty. On the flip side, growth prospects could immediately improve if countries ease from their current trade policy stance and promote a new, clear, and stable trade environment.

    Addressing domestic imbalances can also help raise growth while contributing significantly to closing external imbalances. For Europe, this means spending more on public infrastructure to accelerate productivity growth. For China, it means boosting support for domestic demand. While for the U.S., it means stepping up fiscal consolidation.

    Turning to policies. Our recommendations call for prudence and improved collaboration. Let me outline some key ones. First, an obvious priority is to restore trade policy stability. The global economy needs a clear, stable, and predictable trading environment, one that addresses some of the longstanding gaps in international trading rules. Monetary policy will need to remain agile and respond by tightening where inflation pressures re‑emerge, while easing where weak demand dominates. Monetary policy credibility will be key, especially where inflation expectations might de‑anchor. And central bank independence remains a cornerstone.

    Many fiscal authorities will face new spending needs to bolster defense spending or to offset the trade dislocations, likely to come. Some of the poorest countries also hit with reduced official aid could experience debt distress. Yet debt levels are still elevated and most countries still need to rebuild fiscal space, including by implementing structural reforms. Support, where needed, should remain narrowly targeted and temporary. It is easier to turn on the fiscal tap than to turn it off. Where new spending needs are permanent, as for defense spending in some countries, planning for offsetting cuts elsewhere or new revenues should be made.

    Finally, even if some of the grievances against our trading system have merit, we should all work toward fixing the system so that it can deliver better opportunities to all. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor to your questions, some ground rules. First of all, if you want to ask a question, raise your hand. If I call on you, please identify yourself and the media outlet you represent. Try to be succinct. Stick to one question. We want to answer as many questions as possible.

    And also, a reminder. We are here to discuss the World Economic Outlook. Those questions regarding country programs, institutional issues are going to be better placed for the regional press briefings that are happening later this week and also the Managing Director’s press briefing this Thursday.

    With that said, I want hands up. OK. So I am going to start here in the center. Then I am going to move the room to my left. Then to my right. I am going to start with the lady with the green jacket there.

    QUESTION: Thank you.. Thanks so much for doing this.

    Pierre‑Olivier, I wonder if you can speak a little bit to the fact that you haven’t called out a recession. And you know, we are hearing lots of economists in the United States and other places‑‑most recently yesterday, the IIF is now also forecasting a small recession in the second half of the year. What we see in the WEO is that the percentage of risk of a recession has increased pretty dramatically. Can you walk us through why you are not at this point calling a recession, for instance, likely in the United States and what it would take to tip it that way? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Andrea.

    So for the United States, we are projecting a significant slowdown. We are projecting growth will be at 1.8 percent in 2025. And that’s a 0.9 percentage‑point slowdown‑‑revision in our projections from January. But 1.9 percent is obviously not a recession. And the reason for this is is that we have a U.S. economy that, in our view, is coming from a position of strength. We had an economy that was growing very rapidly. We have a labor market that is still very robust. We have seen some signs of weakening and slowdown in the U.S. economy, even before the tariff announcements. So, in fact, the 0.9 percentage point downward revision that I just mentioned, only a part of this‑‑maybe 0.4 percentage points‑‑is coming from the tariffs. Some of that is also coming from weakening momentum. This was an economy that was doing very, very well but was self‑correcting and cooling off a bit on its own. And we were seeing already consumption numbers coming down. We are seeing consumer confidence coming down. So all of that was already factored in. But we are not seeing a recession in our reference forecast.

    As you mentioned, Andrea, we are‑‑when we do our risk assessment, if you want, we are seeing the probability of a recession increasing, from about 25 percent back in October to around 40 percent when we assess it now.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The lady here in red.

    QUESTION: Good morning.

    Pierre, I wanted to ask you about the downward pressure on the dollar now. To what extent you believe it can provide some relief from the pressure on highly indebted emerging economies with a large share of dollar‑denominated debt? And has this downward pressure on the dollar changed your outlook on all of those emerging economies that are still, you know, under the impact of the high debt‑‑as mentioned by the MD in previous meetings, where this high debt is really one of the impediments to growth? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So we are seeing a weakening of the dollar that is fairly broad‑based over the last few weeks, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of that is coming from the weaker growth prospects in the U.S. Some it is coming from the increased uncertainty. And it’s leading to a reassessment of the global demand for dollar assets. When we step back, we also have to realize we are coming from a position where, over the last few years, there have been tremendous capital inflows into U.S. markets, in particular, risk markets. That’s something that, of course, my colleague Tobias Adrian will talk about in the GFSR press conference. So we are seeing some adjustment, some contradiction. The markets are handling it. We don’t see signs of stress, even in currency markets.

    Now, the interesting development is, what does it mean for emerging markets? And you are right to point out that, in the past, when the dollar would strengthen, that would not necessarily be good news for emerging markets because they have dollar‑denominated debts, so that increases their liabilities and the pressure on them to service their debts. And this can lead to some tightening of financial conditions. So we are not seeing that right now. And so that’s a plus. The flip side of this is, of course, the appreciation of some of these emerging markets’ currencies means that they are also losing a little bit on the competitiveness side, so there is maybe something that is a bit easier on the finance conditions, something that is not as easy on the trade side.

    Finally, this is an environment of enormous uncertainty, increased volatility. And that I think is something that will dominate for many of the emerging markets. So when we are looking at our assessment, we are actually downgrading the emerging market economies for 2025 and 2026, most of them. Some of them may, as I mentioned, benefit. But overall, as a group, they are downgraded. While because they are also very plugged into the global supply chains, the uncertainty is leading to a pause in investment and activity, and they are going to suffer from the decline in demand for their products coming from the tariffs.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go with the gentleman here with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Thank you. I just have one question. Could you elaborate a little bit on what will happen with the trade flows in your models? I saw that in the basic assumption, the exports from the U.S. are [breaking quite heavily but not that much from China. Why is this so?

    And do I understand it right that this basic model does not yet integrate the additional hikes after ‑‑ happening after basically April 9, so above 100 percent on import tariffs by the U.S.? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we are seeing a large impact on global trade coming from the tariffs and that’s going to be the case under any combination of tariffs where the effective tariff rates remains very elevated. And the reason why when we looked at the different scenarios that I mentioned, whether it’s a reference scenario or our April 9 scenario which includes lower tariffs on many countries but sharply increased tariffs between the U.S. and China. The overall impact on the global economy is not very different because the effective tariff rate is, if anything, even higher under that pause. So global trade is going to be significantly affected. The particular configuration of trade, which bilateral trade flows are going to be affected versus others that will depend on the final landscape in terms of tariffs so we can anticipate that there will be much lower bilateral trade under either the reference scenario or the April 9, between the U.S. and China. And that is weighing down on global trade growth. This is weighing down on global trade generally.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to turn here to the center. I am going to go to the first row. I am going to go with the lady with the yellow bottle.

    QUESTION: Thank you,

    You have downgraded the U.K.’s growth forecast quite sharply and given the range of explanations, from higher tariff barriers to more domestic issues, like cost‑of‑living pressures. Out of those, so the global challenges versus domestic challenges, which one is weighing more heavily on the U.K.’s growth forecasts?

    Mr. De Haro: OK we are going to open the round of U.K. questions so if you have questions on the U.K., raise your hand. And I will pass the mic to you. I see  two there. Yep.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In a world where everyone is warning about the impact of tariffs on U.S. inflation and how much it will raise U.S. prices, why do you have the U.K. with the highest inflation rate in the G‑7 this year? And do you believe tariffs will be inflationary or disinflationary for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Joe here in the first row.

    QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. So Joel hills from ITV news. Obviously it’s impacting the tariffs are impacting the U.K. They are impacting most countries. I just wonder this, President Trump did say there would be some disruption. He suggested it would be sort of temporary. Is it possible that President Trump is actually a genius? That he knows something you do not?

    Mr. De Haro: And I think we have a last question on the U.K. and this is going to be the last question on the U.K. There on the back of the room.

    QUESTION: Yeah.

    The U.K. inflation forecast is, you know, much higher than we expected it to be, 0.7 percent higher. Is that going to impact on lowering interest rates in the U.K.? And does that affect the growth rate, which seems to be rather optimistic, compared with some of the other European countries?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to be done with the U.K. questions and then we will move along. So Pierre‑Olivier.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So many questions. Let me address them as best I can. First, on the revision for growth in the U.K. and inflation. So the tariffs are playing a role, as they are in most countries and uncertainty is also playing a role, as it is in all countries. And it’s weighing down on growth in the U.K. But there are some U.K.‑specific factors and I would say that in terms of the zero point 5 percentage point downward revision that we are saying for the U.K., the domestic factors are probably the biggest ones. And in particular, there is a lower carryover from weaker growth in the second half of last year. There is also some tightening of financial conditions, as interest rates have risen, longer‑term interest rates.

    On inflation, the revision in inflation in the U.K. is coming, again, from domestic factors, and in particular some change in regulated energy prices. So that’s expected to be temporary but it’s also very U.K.‑specific. The effect of the tariffs on countries like the U.K., like it is on the EU or China is like a negative demand shock. It’s weakening activity but it’s also lowering price pressures, not increasing them.

    Now, what is the impact of the tariffs in the medium and long term? Not just what’s going to happen this year and next but what’s going to happen longer term? Our assessment is it’s going to be negative. We have a box in our report that looks at the long‑term impact of the tariffs, if they are maintained. And it is negative for all regions, just like the short‑term impact. So we are seeing a negative impact in the short term, in the medium term, in the long term. Again, there are nuances. Some countries might benefit, depending on the particular configuration of tariffs. It might benefit from some trade diversion; but the broad picture is it’s negative for the outlook.

    Now, our ‑‑ and I will end with that. Our forecast for 2025 is slightly higher than OBR’s forecast. Some of this has to do with some of the underlying monetary policy assumptions for the U.K. The bank‑‑

    Our assumption for this year is that there are going to be four cuts through the year. One cut already happened. We expect three more.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. I am not going to forget about the people that are on WebEx, and I am going to pass a question there. I see Anton from TAS.

    QUESTION: Good morning. Thank you for doing this.

    Given the projected slowdown of Russia’s GDP growth from 4.1 in 2024 to 1.5 in 2025, what are the primary factors driving this sharp decline? And how sustainable is Russia’s growth model going forward? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Petya, would you like to answer?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. We are indeed expecting a slowdown in growth to 1.5 this year, and this, to a large extent is kind of the natural slowing of the economy after growing quite robustly in previous years. And also as a result of policy tightening that we have seen, both on the fiscal as well as on the monetary policy side. It is also due to the lower oil prices that have come about as a result of the‑‑as a response to the round of tariffs, as well as the uncertainty about global growth. So all these factors are behind that lower growth number, although I should point out that it is actually a slight upward revision, relative to what we had back in January. And the reason for that is that, again, we actually had seen upward surprises in 2024, which kind of carried into 2025.

    When it comes to the medium‑term growth outlook, we do expect that to be relatively weak. We are‑‑we have penciled in growth number of about 1.2, which is down from 1.7 which is what we had before the start of the war.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Let’s continue. I am going to go again in the center and then I am going to go to that side. The lady with the glasses there.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In Latin America, we received almost every country 10 percent. So I want to know about the impact of the tariffs in Latin America and if the impact is going to be limited, versus other regions, and when we are going to start to feeling this impact. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer the question, are there any questions on Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? OK. Argentina friends, go ahead.

    QUESTION: Hello.

    You’ve kept 5.5 growth projection that was decided in the latest program that Argentina signed with the IMF. I would like to know why you are not seeing so much impact yet about‑‑of this general context.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We can go ahead first with the Latin America overview and then we can go to Argentina.

    Mr. Gourinchas: I will just say something briefly and then ask my colleague Petya to come in. So for Latin America, as a whole, we are saying activity that is largely driven by consumption on the back of resilient labor markets while investment remains somewhat sluggish. And the slowdown in our projection reflects the impact of tariffs and the global growth slowdown, of course, which is also affecting countries in the region. Policy uncertainty. And the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus and in some countries monetary policy tightening.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: I don’t have a lot to add. Just to say that the disinflation process has also slowed a bit, and this is also‑‑also makes the policy trade‑offs a bit more complicated with slow‑‑with growth slowing down and at the same time, you know, having still challenges on the inflation side.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we are going to move on. I am going to ask the gentleman in the first row there because‑‑

    Oh, sorry. Sorry. I forgot about Argentina. Please go ahead.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: We cannot forget about Argentina.

    So the growth forecast for this year‑‑you are right‑‑we still have the upgrade of .5. And this is related to just the positive surprises that we had seen, in spite of a very strong fiscal adjustment, the recovery in confidence I think has definitely played a role in kind of driving us to have this forecast. That said, there are a number of risks related to tighter financial conditions, commodity prices, and a lot of others, which is true for many if not most other countries.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So now we can move on. I am going to go with the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. In the October 2024 outlook you saw a stable but slow growth for Africa. What’s new now? And what kind of initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area do for African economies amidst these trade tensions?

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer, I think‑‑

    QUESTION: Hi. Good morning.

    One of the things that you mentioned in your report is the demographic shift and the rise in the silver economy. Africa, on the other hand, has the reverse of that. So what is your recommendation in the short and medium term on how to deal with some of these challenges pertaining to tariffs, monetary policy, and now currency exchange? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Thank you. I will just say one word about the outlook in sub‑Saharan Africa and then I will ask my colleague Deniz to come in to add more color and answer also the question on the demographic trends.

    So regional growth in sub‑Saharan Africa improved significantly last year, to 4 percent. And it will ease in 2025. And this is in line with a softer global outlook. So we are seeing the same forces at play in the region, as we are seeing more globally. And a downturn‑‑and a downward revision in our projection that is of a similar magnitude at about 0.4 percentage point. Deniz?

    Ms. Igan: Thank you for the question. So on the demographic shifts, our Chapter 2 basically points out that countries’ age structures are evolving at different rates, as you pointed out as well. We have most western economies, some Asian economies that are aging fast. And you know in a health way some of them. And then we have many sub‑Saharan African countries that have a very young population. And what the chapter shows is actually, there are important medium‑term consequences of that, both for growth, as well as external balances of countries.

    In Africa’s case, basically, what we would see is a demographic dividend coming from having a young population. And the question then becomes how best to leverage that, how best to use that and channel it into growth. And the answer there, first and foremost, depends on the structural reforms, the investment that’s necessary on healthcare, on education, on human capital more generally and also international cooperation because our Chapter 3 looks more carefully into migration flows. And again, there, we see migration policy shifts in destination countries has spillovers for other countries. And this is especially true for emerging market economies and lower income economies. So, again, international cooperation there, making sure that growth dividends are utilized in the best way is what we delve into in the chapter.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go to the gentleman with‑‑raise your hand. Yeah. You. No, I am going back. Then I will go‑‑there you go.

    QUESTION: OK. I have a question about China’s growth.

    In your World Economic Outlook, you say China’s growth forecast has been cut to 4 percent for this year, which is a 0.6 percentage drop from an earlier projection. But China’s National Bureau of Statistics a couple of days ago predicted China’s growth GDP growth in the first quarter was 5.4 percent. So my question is, how do you see the disparity in the forecast? Is China more optimistic than you are? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So, yes, we are revising our growth projections for China down by 0.6 percentage points, as you have noted. I should flag that this number does not incorporate the latest release for Q1. That came after we closed our round of projections. So this is not reflected there. And we will have to see how it affects our projections when we have our next round of WEO updates.

    But let me give you a little bit of perspective on the rationale behind our revision for China. The tariff increase in tariffs especially since China is one of the countries that is facing the most elevated tariffs right now, is going to have a very significant impact in our projections on the Chinese economy. In fact, when we do a decomposition, which I showed during my opening remarks, the impact of the tariffs on the Chinese economy would be a negative 1.3 percentage point revision on growth.

    So why do we only have 0.6? Well, because there are other factors that are helping to support Chinese growth in 2025 and 2026. One of which‑‑which is quite important‑‑is the fiscal support that has been announced since the beginning of the year. And that is adding up, something of the amount of 0.5 percentage points. So the impact of the current trade tensions is very significant. It’s partly offset. We expect it to remain quite significant also in 2026 when we also have a downward revision by about 0.5 percentage points.

    The other side of this, where we are seeing the impact of the tariffs is on inflation, which is revised down. Our headline inflation projection for 2025 is actually at zero. So it’s down from 0.8 percent to zero. So China is facing stronger deflationary forces as a result of these trade tensions.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The gentleman with the glasses here.

    QUESTION: What impact did the oil price also have in exporting and importing countries in the Middle East? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we have seen oil prices declining since our last projections, and the decline in oil prices in our and our interpretation is coming mostly from weaker global demand, so it’s the weakening of global activity that is driving the decline in prices. There has been some increase in supply coming from OPEC Plus countries, but broadly speaking, the decline is mostly coming from weaker demand.

    So that is going to play out in ways you sort of would expect. The commodity exporters are going to face lower export revenues from the decline in oil prices. That’s going to weigh on their fiscal outlook, on their growth.

    For those countries that are oil importers, it’s going to lower inflation pressures because that‑‑lower oil prices is going to feed into lower headline inflation. It’s going to also provide some modest support to economic activity there.

    Deniz, anything to add on oil prices or‑‑or Petya?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: No, I don’t.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to move to the center. I am going to get the gentleman with the white shirt there.

    QUESTION: h I am not going to ask another question about the U.K., you will be pleased to know. Over the last week we have seen a number of attacks by the White House on the independence of the Federal Reserve. How destabilizing do you think this might be for financial markets?

    Mr. Gourinchas: So central banks are facing a delicate moment. As I have explained in many countries, the impact of the tariffs is going to be to increase recessionary forces and it is going to lower price pressures. And that will help central banks cut interest rates faster and provide some support to their economies. But in other countries ‑‑ and in our projections, the U.S. is in that category‑‑the tariffs are going to increase price pressures. Price pressures in the U.S. are increasing for other reasons as well. Service prices have been quite‑‑inflation of service prices have been quite strong. And that is something that we are seeing already. But the tariffs are likely to increase price pressures. We are projecting inflation to remain at 3 percent in the U.S. this year, the same level as last year, headline inflation.

    So in that context, if you also think about where we are coming from, we are coming from a period of very elevated inflation. We are just coming off the cost‑of‑living crisis, a surge in inflation rates to double digits that we haven’t seen in more than a generation. So the critical thing is to make sure that inflation expectations remain anchored, that everyone remains convinced that central banks will do what is necessary to bring inflation back to central bank targets in an orderly manner. And central banks have instruments to do this. They have their interest rate instruments. They have various instruments of monetary policy. But one critical aspect of what they do is coming from their credibility. So central banks need to remain credible. And part of that credibility is built upon their central bank independence. And so from that perspective, it’s very important to preserve that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to have time for two questions. One of them is going back to WebEx. I see Weier, please. Come in.

    QUESTION: Yes.I have a question.

    You mentioned that the global economic system is being reset. And I am not sure if one of the early signs in the financial markets, as we see that the markets moving from American exceptionalism to the sort of sell the U.S. narrative. So could you assess the implications for the financial markets and the world economy, as a whole?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yeah, well we have seen some volatility in the markets, of course, whenever there is going to be potentially a significant change in the economic structure of the global economy. I think we are bound to see some reassessment. And investors are going to try to figure out what’s happening, and that’s going to inject volatility. And we are seeing some of that.

    The good news is a lot of that volatility we have seen in the last few weeks has not led to significant market dislocations or market stress to levels that would, for instance, have necessitated the interventions by central banks around the world.

    So whether you are looking at equity markets, whether you are looking at bond markets, whether you are looking at currency markets, what we are saying is a reassessment of the world we are in now and that means that there is a reassessment of valuations of risk assets, of different currencies. But that is happening in an orderly manner. So from that perspective, we are seeing a system that is quite resilient, that remained resilient but, of course, we are watching carefully and there has been some tightening of financial conditions and that’s something to be looking out for. We want to make sure that it doesn’t get to a level where the stress in the financial system would become too extreme.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The lady here in the first row has been waiting patiently. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. I want to ask about the trading tensions impact on low‑income countries. You mentioned there are like downgrading for emerging markets but how about like those small countries who have lower income as a group, have you assessed the particular impact on them in these ongoing trade tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Well thanks. For low‑income countries as a group, we are also seeing a downgrade in which we report in our report of 0.4 percentage points. We are expecting growth of 4.2 percent in 2025. So the 0.4 is very similar to what we are seeing at the aggregate levels, 0.5. So from that perspective it looks quite the same. However, there are also a lot of differences across countries, and when we look more carefully, you might see some vulnerable countries, especially in sub‑Saharan Africa. But elsewhere as well‑‑who could face very challenging conditions as a result of the tariffs in an environment in which many of the countries, low‑income countries have been facing a funding squeeze for a number of years now, private capital flows to this region have been drying up or have been coming on very expensive terms. We are seeing a drying up also of some official aid flows. So some of these countries have very limited fiscal space. Near a situation where the situation could become more challenging.

    Now, on the flip side, the fact that we are seeing commodity prices coming down for many commodities will help some of them. The commodity importers in that group will hurt the ones who are commodity exporters. And there are a number of countries among the low-income group that are commodity exporters, so that is adding some additional pressure on them.

    Mr. De Haro: I am going to make an exception and just one last question. I am going to go with the gentleman in the white shirt there. He has been waiting patiently, too. And don’t get frustrated. There are going to be many opportunities for you to ask questions.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. AFP.

    I had a quick question about Spain because that’s the only countries among advanced economies where you had an upward revision. It’s going to be way better than the eurozone and even better than other advanced economies. What are the underlying reasons for that? And you formally talked much about tourism but are there any other things that might be pointed out? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes, indeed. Spain is doing better than its peers. Petya, would you like to talk about it?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed. We are actually having an upgrade for Spain this year, which is a rare occurrence in the many, many downgrades that we have had for many other countries. This is partly because the Spanish economy just had such strong momentum in 2024, coming into 2025. And part of that was due to the very strong services exports as well as the very strong labor accumulation. Part of that related to immigration. But all of that being said, Spain is still being affected indirectly and directly by the tariffs and the uncertainty associated with that. It’s just that, as I said, that underlying [strength is kind of having a bigger impact in the near term. But then again, in 2026, we do project kind of a slowing of growth to about 1.8.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. And on that point, I want to thank you, everyone, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, Deniz, the Research Department, the Communications Department. Some reminders. Next press briefing is going to happen in this same room, Global Financial Stability Report, please stay tuned. Tomorrow you have the Fiscal Monitor, and then later in the week, you have the Managing Director’s press briefing and also all the regional press briefings that we have been talking about. Thank you very much for your time. If you have questions, comments, send them my way to media@imf.org and hopefully you have a great week. I am sure it’s going to be busy.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Jose De Haro

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/tr-04222025-weo-press-briefing

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: France gives EUR 1.9 million to build capacity in developing economies, LDCs

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Through the agreement signed by France and the WTO in July 2024, France provides, over a period of three years,  funding of EUR 6 million to the French-Irish Mission Programme, the WTO Chairs Programme and the Standards and Trade Development Facility. These programmes are aimed at helping government officials from developing economies and LDCs better implement global trade rules and standards and at helping academic institutions provide support for trade policy-making.

     “Our support for technical assistance in the WTO is a concrete expression of our commitment to an inclusive multilateral system,” France’s WTO Ambassador Emmanuelle Ivanov-Durand said. “Technical assistance is an important part of the WTO – it increases the number of people who are able to participate in the multilateral trading system and ultimately reap its benefits. France is proud to support the French-Irish Mission Programme, the WTO Chairs Programme and the Standards and Trade Development Facility, especially in these difficult times when resources are increasingly difficult to mobilize and when the multilateral system is under strain.”

    The French-Irish Mission Programme, sponsored by France and Ireland, will receive EUR 900,000 (CHF 870,000) to finance the placement of government officials at the permanent missions of developing economies, LDCs and observers in Geneva.

    A total of EUR 550,000 (CHF 530,000) will support the WTO Chairs Programme aimed at helping academic institutions in developing and least developed members and observers build and sustain their expertise in international trade through projects focusing on research, curriculum development and outreach.

    The Standards and Trade Development Facility will receive EUR 500,000 (CHF 480,000) to help developing economies and LDCs implement food safety, animal health and plant health standards required for international trade. It will also help to improve their sanitary and phytosanitary capacity in line with the most recent STDF Strategy covering the period 2025-2030.

    Deputy Director-General Zhang said: “Given the pace of changes we are experiencing in trade, the value of technical assistance is more important than ever. With France’s targeted support, these programmes continue to make significant contributions to developing economies by providing hands-on experience at the WTO, facilitating practical projects and establishing sustainable systems to help government officials tackle complex new areas with the help of academia.”

    France has contributed just over EUR 34 million (approximately CHF 33 million) to the various WTO trust funds over more than 20 years.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Call for applications launched for support to women exporters through WTO-ITC WEIDE Fund

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Call for applications launched for support to women exporters through WTO-ITC WEIDE Fund

    A joint initiative of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Trade Centre (ITC), the WEIDE Fund is supported by a USD 50 million commitment to empower women entrepreneurs and help them thrive in global markets through the use of digital tools and platforms.
    WTO Director-General Dr Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala emphasized the importance of inclusive access to digital trade opportunities: “Digital trade is reshaping the global economy. Women — including those in developing countries — must be at the forefront. The WTO-ITC WEIDE Fund is about powering growth, innovation and job creation. It reflects the WTO’s broader commitment to sustainable and inclusive re-globalization, where no one is left behind.”
    The WEIDE Fund offers two types of grants:
    Discovery Grant (up to USD 5,000): For early-stage businesses exploring digital trade opportunities.
    Booster Grant (up to USD 30,000): For businesses ready to scale up their digital presence and expand into global markets.
    Beyond financial support, the WEIDE Fund provides technical assistance, mentorship and access to international business networks. The initiative aims to build the long-term competitiveness and resilience of women-led micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) involved in e-commerce, online services, or other forms of digital trade as well as those ready to engage in these activities.
    ITC Executive Director Pamela Coke-Hamilton highlighted the importance of removing barriers for women in global trade: “ITC is committed to breaking barriers for women exporters and ensuring they have the resources needed to succeed in the digital economy. The WTO-ITC WEIDE Fund is an opportunity for women-led businesses to access not only funding but also the expertise and networks critical for long-term success.”
    The WEIDE Fund announced on 7 March the selection of four pilot beneficiary countries: Dominican Republic, Jordan, Mongolia and Nigeria. Business support organizations in these countries were selected from a competitive call for proposals to implement programmes that can help women entrepreneurs expand their business through international trade and digitalization.
    To be eligible for support, women-led businesses must be:
    Registered and operational in the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Mongolia, or Nigeria
    Export-ready and keen to engage in digital trade
    Able to demonstrate potential for business growth and job creation
    The application period runs from 22 April to 18 May 2025 for the Dominican Republic, Mongolia and Nigeria. Applications from Jordan will be accepted at a later stage.
    In each country, the WEIDE Fund collaborates with the following business support organizations (BSOs) to strengthen outreach and local engagement:
    ProDominicana
    Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation (JEDCO)
    Mongolian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry (MNCCI)
    Nigerian Export Promotion Council (NEPC)
    The WEIDE Fund has been made possible through the support of the United Arab Emirates and the FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Legacy Fund.
    For more details on eligibility and how to apply, visit wto.org/weidefund or contact [email protected].

    Share

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: World Economic Outlook Press Briefing

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    April 22, 2025

    Speakers:

    Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas, Director, Research Department, IMF
    Petya Koeva Brooks, Deputy Director, Research Department, IMF
    Deniz Igan, Division Chief, Research Department, IMF

    Moderator:
    Jose Luis De Haro, Communications Officer, IMF   

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I think we can start and we have a quorum. So good morning, everyone, and welcome. I want to welcome also those joining us online. I am Jose Luis de Haro with the Communications Department at the IMF and we are gathered here today for the presentation of our latest edition of the World Economic Outlook titled, “A Critical Juncture Amid Policy Shifts.” I hope by this time you all have had access to the document. If not, I am going to encourage you, as always, to go to IMF.org. There, you are going to find the document, the World Economic Outlook, also Pierre‑Olivier’s blog and many other assets, including the underlying data for some of the charts that are published on the World Economic Outlook.

    I also want to plug in that we have a new database portal that I encourage you to use, and what’s best, that to discuss the new outlook that having here with us today, Pierre‑Olivier Gourinchas. He is the Economic Counsellor, the chief economist, and the Director of the Research Department. Next to him are Petya Koeva Brooks, she is the Deputy Director of the Research Department and last, but not least, we also have Deniz Igan, she is the division chief also with the Research Department.

    Pierre‑Olivier, as usual is going to start with some opening remarks, and then we are going to open the floor to your questions. I just want to remind everyone that this press briefing, it’s on the record and that we also have simultaneous translation.

    So let me stop here. Pierre‑Olivier, the floor is yours.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Jose. And good morning, everyone. The landscape has changed since our last World Economic Outlook update in January. We are entering a new era as the global economic system that has operated for the last 80 years is being reset. Since late January, many tariff announcements have been made, culminating on April 2, with near universal levies from the United States and counterresponses from some trading partners. The U.S. effective tariff rate has surged past levels reached more than 100 years ago, while tariff rates on the U.S. have also increased.

    Beyond the abrupt increase in tariffs, the surge in policy uncertainty is a major driver of the economic outlook. If sustained, the increasing trade tensions and uncertainty will slow global growth significantly. Reflecting this complexity, our report presents a reference forecast which incorporates policy announcements up to April 4 by the U.S. and trading partners. Under these reference forecasts, global growth will reach 2.8 percent this year and 3 percent next year, a cumulative downgrade of about 0.8 percentage points relative to our January 2025 WEO update. Our report also offers a range of forecasts under different policy assumptions.

    Under an alternative path that excludes the April tariff announcements, global growth would have seen only a modest downgrade to 3.2 percent this year. We will also use a model‑based forecast to incorporate the temporary suspension of most tariffs announced on April 9, together with the increase in bilateral tariffs between China and the U.S. to prohibitive levels. This pause, even if extended permanently, delivers a similar growth outlook as a reference forecast, 2.8 percent, even if some highly tariffed countries could benefit.

    Now, while global growth remains well above recession levels, all regions are negatively impacted this year and next. And the global disinflation process continues, but at a slower pace with inflation revised up by 0.1 percentage point in both years. These trade tensions will greatly impact global trade. We project that global trade growth will be more than cut in half from 3.8 percent last year to 1.7 percent this year. The tariffs will play out differently in different countries. For the United States, the tariffs represent a supply shock that reduces productivity and output permanently and increases price pressures temporarily. This adds to an already weakening outlook and leads us to revise growth down by 0.9 percentage points to 1.8 percent, with a 0.4 percentage point downgrade from the tariffs only. While inflation is revised upwards.

    For trading partners, tariffs act mostly as a negative external demand shock. Weakening activity and prices, even if some countries could benefit from trade diversion. This is why we have lowered our China growth forecast this year to 4 percent, while inflation is revised down by 0.8 percentage points, increasing deflationary pressures. All countries are negatively affected by the surge in trade policy uncertainty, as businesses cut purchases and investment, while financial institutions reassess their borrowers’ exposure. Uncertainty also increases because of the complex sectoral disruptions that tariffs could cause up and down supply chains, as we saw during the pandemic.

    The effect of these shocks on exchange rates is complex. The tariffs could appreciate the US dollar, as in previous episodes. However, greater policy uncertainty, lower U.S. growth prospects, and an adjustment in the global demand for dollar assets are weighing down on the dollar.

    Risks to the global economic have increased and are firmly to the downside.

    First, while we are not projecting a global downturn, the risks it may happen this year have increased substantially, from 17 percent projected back in October to 30 percent now. An escalation of trade tensions would further depress growth. Financial conditions could also tighten, as markets react negatively to diminished growth prospects and increased uncertainty. On the flip side, growth prospects could immediately improve if countries ease from their current trade policy stance and promote a new, clear, and stable trade environment.

    Addressing domestic imbalances can also help raise growth while contributing significantly to closing external imbalances. For Europe, this means spending more on public infrastructure to accelerate productivity growth. For China, it means boosting support for domestic demand. While for the U.S., it means stepping up fiscal consolidation.

    Turning to policies. Our recommendations call for prudence and improved collaboration. Let me outline some key ones. First, an obvious priority is to restore trade policy stability. The global economy needs a clear, stable, and predictable trading environment, one that addresses some of the longstanding gaps in international trading rules. Monetary policy will need to remain agile and respond by tightening where inflation pressures re‑emerge, while easing where weak demand dominates. Monetary policy credibility will be key, especially where inflation expectations might de‑anchor. And central bank independence remains a cornerstone.

    Many fiscal authorities will face new spending needs to bolster defense spending or to offset the trade dislocations, likely to come. Some of the poorest countries also hit with reduced official aid could experience debt distress. Yet debt levels are still elevated and most countries still need to rebuild fiscal space, including by implementing structural reforms. Support, where needed, should remain narrowly targeted and temporary. It is easier to turn on the fiscal tap than to turn it off. Where new spending needs are permanent, as for defense spending in some countries, planning for offsetting cuts elsewhere or new revenues should be made.

    Finally, even if some of the grievances against our trading system have merit, we should all work toward fixing the system so that it can deliver better opportunities to all. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. Before we open the floor to your questions, some ground rules. First of all, if you want to ask a question, raise your hand. If I call on you, please identify yourself and the media outlet you represent. Try to be succinct. Stick to one question. We want to answer as many questions as possible.

    And also, a reminder. We are here to discuss the World Economic Outlook. Those questions regarding country programs, institutional issues are going to be better placed for the regional press briefings that are happening later this week and also the Managing Director’s press briefing this Thursday.

    With that said, I want hands up. OK. So I am going to start here in the center. Then I am going to move the room to my left. Then to my right. I am going to start with the lady with the green jacket there.

    QUESTION: Thank you.. Thanks so much for doing this.

    Pierre‑Olivier, I wonder if you can speak a little bit to the fact that you haven’t called out a recession. And you know, we are hearing lots of economists in the United States and other places‑‑most recently yesterday, the IIF is now also forecasting a small recession in the second half of the year. What we see in the WEO is that the percentage of risk of a recession has increased pretty dramatically. Can you walk us through why you are not at this point calling a recession, for instance, likely in the United States and what it would take to tip it that way? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you, Andrea.

    So for the United States, we are projecting a significant slowdown. We are projecting growth will be at 1.8 percent in 2025. And that’s a 0.9 percentage‑point slowdown‑‑revision in our projections from January. But 1.9 percent is obviously not a recession. And the reason for this is is that we have a U.S. economy that, in our view, is coming from a position of strength. We had an economy that was growing very rapidly. We have a labor market that is still very robust. We have seen some signs of weakening and slowdown in the U.S. economy, even before the tariff announcements. So, in fact, the 0.9 percentage point downward revision that I just mentioned, only a part of this‑‑maybe 0.4 percentage points‑‑is coming from the tariffs. Some of that is also coming from weakening momentum. This was an economy that was doing very, very well but was self‑correcting and cooling off a bit on its own. And we were seeing already consumption numbers coming down. We are seeing consumer confidence coming down. So all of that was already factored in. But we are not seeing a recession in our reference forecast.

    As you mentioned, Andrea, we are‑‑when we do our risk assessment, if you want, we are seeing the probability of a recession increasing, from about 25 percent back in October to around 40 percent when we assess it now.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The lady here in red.

    QUESTION: Good morning.

    Pierre, I wanted to ask you about the downward pressure on the dollar now. To what extent you believe it can provide some relief from the pressure on highly indebted emerging economies with a large share of dollar‑denominated debt? And has this downward pressure on the dollar changed your outlook on all of those emerging economies that are still, you know, under the impact of the high debt‑‑as mentioned by the MD in previous meetings, where this high debt is really one of the impediments to growth? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes. So we are seeing a weakening of the dollar that is fairly broad‑based over the last few weeks, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, some of that is coming from the weaker growth prospects in the U.S. Some it is coming from the increased uncertainty. And it’s leading to a reassessment of the global demand for dollar assets. When we step back, we also have to realize we are coming from a position where, over the last few years, there have been tremendous capital inflows into U.S. markets, in particular, risk markets. That’s something that, of course, my colleague Tobias Adrian will talk about in the GFSR press conference. So we are seeing some adjustment, some contradiction. The markets are handling it. We don’t see signs of stress, even in currency markets.

    Now, the interesting development is, what does it mean for emerging markets? And you are right to point out that, in the past, when the dollar would strengthen, that would not necessarily be good news for emerging markets because they have dollar‑denominated debts, so that increases their liabilities and the pressure on them to service their debts. And this can lead to some tightening of financial conditions. So we are not seeing that right now. And so that’s a plus. The flip side of this is, of course, the appreciation of some of these emerging markets’ currencies means that they are also losing a little bit on the competitiveness side, so there is maybe something that is a bit easier on the finance conditions, something that is not as easy on the trade side.

    Finally, this is an environment of enormous uncertainty, increased volatility. And that I think is something that will dominate for many of the emerging markets. So when we are looking at our assessment, we are actually downgrading the emerging market economies for 2025 and 2026, most of them. Some of them may, as I mentioned, benefit. But overall, as a group, they are downgraded. While because they are also very plugged into the global supply chains, the uncertainty is leading to a pause in investment and activity, and they are going to suffer from the decline in demand for their products coming from the tariffs.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go with the gentleman here with the glasses.

    QUESTION: Thank you. I just have one question. Could you elaborate a little bit on what will happen with the trade flows in your models? I saw that in the basic assumption, the exports from the U.S. are [breaking quite heavily but not that much from China. Why is this so?

    And do I understand it right that this basic model does not yet integrate the additional hikes after ‑‑ happening after basically April 9, so above 100 percent on import tariffs by the U.S.? Thanks.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we are seeing a large impact on global trade coming from the tariffs and that’s going to be the case under any combination of tariffs where the effective tariff rates remains very elevated. And the reason why when we looked at the different scenarios that I mentioned, whether it’s a reference scenario or our April 9 scenario which includes lower tariffs on many countries but sharply increased tariffs between the U.S. and China. The overall impact on the global economy is not very different because the effective tariff rate is, if anything, even higher under that pause. So global trade is going to be significantly affected. The particular configuration of trade, which bilateral trade flows are going to be affected versus others that will depend on the final landscape in terms of tariffs so we can anticipate that there will be much lower bilateral trade under either the reference scenario or the April 9, between the U.S. and China. And that is weighing down on global trade growth. This is weighing down on global trade generally.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to turn here to the center. I am going to go to the first row. I am going to go with the lady with the yellow bottle.

    QUESTION: Thank you,

    You have downgraded the U.K.’s growth forecast quite sharply and given the range of explanations, from higher tariff barriers to more domestic issues, like cost‑of‑living pressures. Out of those, so the global challenges versus domestic challenges, which one is weighing more heavily on the U.K.’s growth forecasts?

    Mr. De Haro: OK we are going to open the round of U.K. questions so if you have questions on the U.K., raise your hand. And I will pass the mic to you. I see  two there. Yep.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In a world where everyone is warning about the impact of tariffs on U.S. inflation and how much it will raise U.S. prices, why do you have the U.K. with the highest inflation rate in the G‑7 this year? And do you believe tariffs will be inflationary or disinflationary for the U.K.?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Joe here in the first row.

    QUESTION: Yeah. Thank you. Thank you very much. So Joel hills from ITV news. Obviously it’s impacting the tariffs are impacting the U.K. They are impacting most countries. I just wonder this, President Trump did say there would be some disruption. He suggested it would be sort of temporary. Is it possible that President Trump is actually a genius? That he knows something you do not?

    Mr. De Haro: And I think we have a last question on the U.K. and this is going to be the last question on the U.K. There on the back of the room.

    QUESTION: Yeah.

    The U.K. inflation forecast is, you know, much higher than we expected it to be, 0.7 percent higher. Is that going to impact on lowering interest rates in the U.K.? And does that affect the growth rate, which seems to be rather optimistic, compared with some of the other European countries?

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to be done with the U.K. questions and then we will move along. So Pierre‑Olivier.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So many questions. Let me address them as best I can. First, on the revision for growth in the U.K. and inflation. So the tariffs are playing a role, as they are in most countries and uncertainty is also playing a role, as it is in all countries. And it’s weighing down on growth in the U.K. But there are some U.K.‑specific factors and I would say that in terms of the zero point 5 percentage point downward revision that we are saying for the U.K., the domestic factors are probably the biggest ones. And in particular, there is a lower carryover from weaker growth in the second half of last year. There is also some tightening of financial conditions, as interest rates have risen, longer‑term interest rates.

    On inflation, the revision in inflation in the U.K. is coming, again, from domestic factors, and in particular some change in regulated energy prices. So that’s expected to be temporary but it’s also very U.K.‑specific. The effect of the tariffs on countries like the U.K., like it is on the EU or China is like a negative demand shock. It’s weakening activity but it’s also lowering price pressures, not increasing them.

    Now, what is the impact of the tariffs in the medium and long term? Not just what’s going to happen this year and next but what’s going to happen longer term? Our assessment is it’s going to be negative. We have a box in our report that looks at the long‑term impact of the tariffs, if they are maintained. And it is negative for all regions, just like the short‑term impact. So we are seeing a negative impact in the short term, in the medium term, in the long term. Again, there are nuances. Some countries might benefit, depending on the particular configuration of tariffs. It might benefit from some trade diversion; but the broad picture is it’s negative for the outlook.

    Now, our ‑‑ and I will end with that. Our forecast for 2025 is slightly higher than OBR’s forecast. Some of this has to do with some of the underlying monetary policy assumptions for the U.K. The bank‑‑

    Our assumption for this year is that there are going to be four cuts through the year. One cut already happened. We expect three more.

    Mr. De Haro: Thank you, Pierre‑Olivier. I am not going to forget about the people that are on WebEx, and I am going to pass a question there. I see Anton from TAS.

    QUESTION: Good morning. Thank you for doing this.

    Given the projected slowdown of Russia’s GDP growth from 4.1 in 2024 to 1.5 in 2025, what are the primary factors driving this sharp decline? And how sustainable is Russia’s growth model going forward? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Petya, would you like to answer?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. We are indeed expecting a slowdown in growth to 1.5 this year, and this, to a large extent is kind of the natural slowing of the economy after growing quite robustly in previous years. And also as a result of policy tightening that we have seen, both on the fiscal as well as on the monetary policy side. It is also due to the lower oil prices that have come about as a result of the‑‑as a response to the round of tariffs, as well as the uncertainty about global growth. So all these factors are behind that lower growth number, although I should point out that it is actually a slight upward revision, relative to what we had back in January. And the reason for that is that, again, we actually had seen upward surprises in 2024, which kind of carried into 2025.

    When it comes to the medium‑term growth outlook, we do expect that to be relatively weak. We are‑‑we have penciled in growth number of about 1.2, which is down from 1.7 which is what we had before the start of the war.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. Let’s continue. I am going to go again in the center and then I am going to go to that side. The lady with the glasses there.

    QUESTION: Hi.

    In Latin America, we received almost every country 10 percent. So I want to know about the impact of the tariffs in Latin America and if the impact is going to be limited, versus other regions, and when we are going to start to feeling this impact. Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer the question, are there any questions on Mexico, Brazil, Argentina? OK. Argentina friends, go ahead.

    QUESTION: Hello.

    You’ve kept 5.5 growth projection that was decided in the latest program that Argentina signed with the IMF. I would like to know why you are not seeing so much impact yet about‑‑of this general context.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We can go ahead first with the Latin America overview and then we can go to Argentina.

    Mr. Gourinchas: I will just say something briefly and then ask my colleague Petya to come in. So for Latin America, as a whole, we are saying activity that is largely driven by consumption on the back of resilient labor markets while investment remains somewhat sluggish. And the slowdown in our projection reflects the impact of tariffs and the global growth slowdown, of course, which is also affecting countries in the region. Policy uncertainty. And the withdrawal of fiscal stimulus and in some countries monetary policy tightening.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: I don’t have a lot to add. Just to say that the disinflation process has also slowed a bit, and this is also‑‑also makes the policy trade‑offs a bit more complicated with slow‑‑with growth slowing down and at the same time, you know, having still challenges on the inflation side.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So we are going to move on. I am going to ask the gentleman in the first row there because‑‑

    Oh, sorry. Sorry. I forgot about Argentina. Please go ahead.

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: We cannot forget about Argentina.

    So the growth forecast for this year‑‑you are right‑‑we still have the upgrade of .5. And this is related to just the positive surprises that we had seen, in spite of a very strong fiscal adjustment, the recovery in confidence I think has definitely played a role in kind of driving us to have this forecast. That said, there are a number of risks related to tighter financial conditions, commodity prices, and a lot of others, which is true for many if not most other countries.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. So now we can move on. I am going to go with the gentleman in the first row.

    QUESTION: Thank you. In the October 2024 outlook you saw a stable but slow growth for Africa. What’s new now? And what kind of initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area do for African economies amidst these trade tensions?

    Mr. De Haro: And before we answer, I think‑‑

    QUESTION: Hi. Good morning.

    One of the things that you mentioned in your report is the demographic shift and the rise in the silver economy. Africa, on the other hand, has the reverse of that. So what is your recommendation in the short and medium term on how to deal with some of these challenges pertaining to tariffs, monetary policy, and now currency exchange? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: OK.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Thank you. I will just say one word about the outlook in sub‑Saharan Africa and then I will ask my colleague Deniz to come in to add more color and answer also the question on the demographic trends.

    So regional growth in sub‑Saharan Africa improved significantly last year, to 4 percent. And it will ease in 2025. And this is in line with a softer global outlook. So we are seeing the same forces at play in the region, as we are seeing more globally. And a downturn‑‑and a downward revision in our projection that is of a similar magnitude at about 0.4 percentage point. Deniz?

    Ms. Igan: Thank you for the question. So on the demographic shifts, our Chapter 2 basically points out that countries’ age structures are evolving at different rates, as you pointed out as well. We have most western economies, some Asian economies that are aging fast. And you know in a health way some of them. And then we have many sub‑Saharan African countries that have a very young population. And what the chapter shows is actually, there are important medium‑term consequences of that, both for growth, as well as external balances of countries.

    In Africa’s case, basically, what we would see is a demographic dividend coming from having a young population. And the question then becomes how best to leverage that, how best to use that and channel it into growth. And the answer there, first and foremost, depends on the structural reforms, the investment that’s necessary on healthcare, on education, on human capital more generally and also international cooperation because our Chapter 3 looks more carefully into migration flows. And again, there, we see migration policy shifts in destination countries has spillovers for other countries. And this is especially true for emerging market economies and lower income economies. So, again, international cooperation there, making sure that growth dividends are utilized in the best way is what we delve into in the chapter.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to go to the gentleman with‑‑raise your hand. Yeah. You. No, I am going back. Then I will go‑‑there you go.

    QUESTION: OK. I have a question about China’s growth.

    In your World Economic Outlook, you say China’s growth forecast has been cut to 4 percent for this year, which is a 0.6 percentage drop from an earlier projection. But China’s National Bureau of Statistics a couple of days ago predicted China’s growth GDP growth in the first quarter was 5.4 percent. So my question is, how do you see the disparity in the forecast? Is China more optimistic than you are? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Thank you. So, yes, we are revising our growth projections for China down by 0.6 percentage points, as you have noted. I should flag that this number does not incorporate the latest release for Q1. That came after we closed our round of projections. So this is not reflected there. And we will have to see how it affects our projections when we have our next round of WEO updates.

    But let me give you a little bit of perspective on the rationale behind our revision for China. The tariff increase in tariffs especially since China is one of the countries that is facing the most elevated tariffs right now, is going to have a very significant impact in our projections on the Chinese economy. In fact, when we do a decomposition, which I showed during my opening remarks, the impact of the tariffs on the Chinese economy would be a negative 1.3 percentage point revision on growth.

    So why do we only have 0.6? Well, because there are other factors that are helping to support Chinese growth in 2025 and 2026. One of which‑‑which is quite important‑‑is the fiscal support that has been announced since the beginning of the year. And that is adding up, something of the amount of 0.5 percentage points. So the impact of the current trade tensions is very significant. It’s partly offset. We expect it to remain quite significant also in 2026 when we also have a downward revision by about 0.5 percentage points.

    The other side of this, where we are seeing the impact of the tariffs is on inflation, which is revised down. Our headline inflation projection for 2025 is actually at zero. So it’s down from 0.8 percent to zero. So China is facing stronger deflationary forces as a result of these trade tensions.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. I am going to move to this side. The gentleman with the glasses here.

    QUESTION: What impact did the oil price also have in exporting and importing countries in the Middle East? Thank you.

    Mr. De Haro: Go ahead.

    Mr. Gourinchas: So we have seen oil prices declining since our last projections, and the decline in oil prices in our and our interpretation is coming mostly from weaker global demand, so it’s the weakening of global activity that is driving the decline in prices. There has been some increase in supply coming from OPEC Plus countries, but broadly speaking, the decline is mostly coming from weaker demand.

    So that is going to play out in ways you sort of would expect. The commodity exporters are going to face lower export revenues from the decline in oil prices. That’s going to weigh on their fiscal outlook, on their growth.

    For those countries that are oil importers, it’s going to lower inflation pressures because that‑‑lower oil prices is going to feed into lower headline inflation. It’s going to also provide some modest support to economic activity there.

    Deniz, anything to add on oil prices or‑‑or Petya?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: No, I don’t.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to move to the center. I am going to get the gentleman with the white shirt there.

    QUESTION: h I am not going to ask another question about the U.K., you will be pleased to know. Over the last week we have seen a number of attacks by the White House on the independence of the Federal Reserve. How destabilizing do you think this might be for financial markets?

    Mr. Gourinchas: So central banks are facing a delicate moment. As I have explained in many countries, the impact of the tariffs is going to be to increase recessionary forces and it is going to lower price pressures. And that will help central banks cut interest rates faster and provide some support to their economies. But in other countries ‑‑ and in our projections, the U.S. is in that category‑‑the tariffs are going to increase price pressures. Price pressures in the U.S. are increasing for other reasons as well. Service prices have been quite‑‑inflation of service prices have been quite strong. And that is something that we are seeing already. But the tariffs are likely to increase price pressures. We are projecting inflation to remain at 3 percent in the U.S. this year, the same level as last year, headline inflation.

    So in that context, if you also think about where we are coming from, we are coming from a period of very elevated inflation. We are just coming off the cost‑of‑living crisis, a surge in inflation rates to double digits that we haven’t seen in more than a generation. So the critical thing is to make sure that inflation expectations remain anchored, that everyone remains convinced that central banks will do what is necessary to bring inflation back to central bank targets in an orderly manner. And central banks have instruments to do this. They have their interest rate instruments. They have various instruments of monetary policy. But one critical aspect of what they do is coming from their credibility. So central banks need to remain credible. And part of that credibility is built upon their central bank independence. And so from that perspective, it’s very important to preserve that.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. We are going to have time for two questions. One of them is going back to WebEx. I see Weier, please. Come in.

    QUESTION: Yes.I have a question.

    You mentioned that the global economic system is being reset. And I am not sure if one of the early signs in the financial markets, as we see that the markets moving from American exceptionalism to the sort of sell the U.S. narrative. So could you assess the implications for the financial markets and the world economy, as a whole?

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yeah, well we have seen some volatility in the markets, of course, whenever there is going to be potentially a significant change in the economic structure of the global economy. I think we are bound to see some reassessment. And investors are going to try to figure out what’s happening, and that’s going to inject volatility. And we are seeing some of that.

    The good news is a lot of that volatility we have seen in the last few weeks has not led to significant market dislocations or market stress to levels that would, for instance, have necessitated the interventions by central banks around the world.

    So whether you are looking at equity markets, whether you are looking at bond markets, whether you are looking at currency markets, what we are saying is a reassessment of the world we are in now and that means that there is a reassessment of valuations of risk assets, of different currencies. But that is happening in an orderly manner. So from that perspective, we are seeing a system that is quite resilient, that remained resilient but, of course, we are watching carefully and there has been some tightening of financial conditions and that’s something to be looking out for. We want to make sure that it doesn’t get to a level where the stress in the financial system would become too extreme.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. The lady here in the first row has been waiting patiently. Please go ahead.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. I want to ask about the trading tensions impact on low‑income countries. You mentioned there are like downgrading for emerging markets but how about like those small countries who have lower income as a group, have you assessed the particular impact on them in these ongoing trade tensions? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: OK. Well thanks. For low‑income countries as a group, we are also seeing a downgrade in which we report in our report of 0.4 percentage points. We are expecting growth of 4.2 percent in 2025. So the 0.4 is very similar to what we are seeing at the aggregate levels, 0.5. So from that perspective it looks quite the same. However, there are also a lot of differences across countries, and when we look more carefully, you might see some vulnerable countries, especially in sub‑Saharan Africa. But elsewhere as well‑‑who could face very challenging conditions as a result of the tariffs in an environment in which many of the countries, low‑income countries have been facing a funding squeeze for a number of years now, private capital flows to this region have been drying up or have been coming on very expensive terms. We are seeing a drying up also of some official aid flows. So some of these countries have very limited fiscal space. Near a situation where the situation could become more challenging.

    Now, on the flip side, the fact that we are seeing commodity prices coming down for many commodities will help some of them. The commodity importers in that group will hurt the ones who are commodity exporters. And there are a number of countries among the low-income group that are commodity exporters, so that is adding some additional pressure on them.

    Mr. De Haro: I am going to make an exception and just one last question. I am going to go with the gentleman in the white shirt there. He has been waiting patiently, too. And don’t get frustrated. There are going to be many opportunities for you to ask questions.

    QUESTION: Thank you, Jose. AFP.

    I had a quick question about Spain because that’s the only countries among advanced economies where you had an upward revision. It’s going to be way better than the eurozone and even better than other advanced economies. What are the underlying reasons for that? And you formally talked much about tourism but are there any other things that might be pointed out? Thank you.

    Mr. Gourinchas: Yes, indeed. Spain is doing better than its peers. Petya, would you like to talk about it?

    Ms. Koeva Brooks: Sure. Indeed. We are actually having an upgrade for Spain this year, which is a rare occurrence in the many, many downgrades that we have had for many other countries. This is partly because the Spanish economy just had such strong momentum in 2024, coming into 2025. And part of that was due to the very strong services exports as well as the very strong labor accumulation. Part of that related to immigration. But all of that being said, Spain is still being affected indirectly and directly by the tariffs and the uncertainty associated with that. It’s just that, as I said, that underlying [strength is kind of having a bigger impact in the near term. But then again, in 2026, we do project kind of a slowing of growth to about 1.8.

    Mr. De Haro: OK. And on that point, I want to thank you, everyone, on behalf of Pierre‑Olivier, Petya, Deniz, the Research Department, the Communications Department. Some reminders. Next press briefing is going to happen in this same room, Global Financial Stability Report, please stay tuned. Tomorrow you have the Fiscal Monitor, and then later in the week, you have the Managing Director’s press briefing and also all the regional press briefings that we have been talking about. Thank you very much for your time. If you have questions, comments, send them my way to media@imf.org and hopefully you have a great week. I am sure it’s going to be busy.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Jose De Haro

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial news: On holding auctions on April 23, 2025 to place OFZ issue No. 26238RMFS and issue No. 26245RMFS

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    For bidders

    We inform you that, based on the letter of the Bank of Russia and in accordance with Part I. General Part and Part II. Stock Market Section of the Rules for Conducting Trading on the Stock Market, Deposit Market and Credit Market of Moscow Exchange PJSC, the order establishes the form, time, term and procedure for holding auctions for the placement and trading of the following federal loan bonds:

    1.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security federal loan bonds with constant coupon income
    State registration number of the issue 26238RMFS from 11.06.2021
    Date of the auction April 23, 2025
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code SE26238RMFS4
    ISIN code RO000A1038V6
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 14:30 – 15:00; bid execution period: 15:30 – 18:00.

    2.

    Name of the Issuer Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation
    Name of security federal loan bonds with constant coupon income
    State registration number of the issue 26245RMFS from 08.05.2024
    Date of the auction April 23, 2025
    Information about the placement (trading mode, placement form) The placement of Bonds will be carried out in the Trading Mode “Placement: Auction” by holding an Auction to determine the placement price. BoardId: PACT (Settlements: Ruble)
    Trade code CO26245RMFS9
    ISIN code RO000A108EG6
    Calculation code B01
    Additional conditions of placement The share of non-competitive bids in relation to the total volume of bids submitted by the Bidder may not exceed 90%.
    Trading time Trading hours: bid collection period: 12:00 – 12:30; bid execution period: 13:00 – 18:00.

    Contact information for media 7 (495) 363-3232Pr@moex.kom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DPIIT and Stride Ventures announce the winner of the Bharat Startup Grand Challenge 2025, with funding of up to INR 10 crore

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 22 APR 2025 4:28PM by PIB Delhi

    The Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), in partnership with  Startup India and Stride Ventures, announced the startup Buoyancy Plastics for Change Recycling Private Limited as the winner of the Bharat Startup Grand Challenge 2025, an initiative aimed at recognizing and empowering high-impact, homegrown startups.

    The winner was chosen from over 120 startup applications received during the 30 days of running the challenge. Applications were received from 22 states of the country, from startups working in the sustainability, fintech and e-mobility sector.

    The winner of this Challenge, Plastics for Change, was founded in 2015, and focuses on building a Fair Trade verified recycled plastics supply chain. The company is currently focused on ethical sourcing and aggregation of plastic waste to provide high-quality rPET, rHDPE and rPP materials to recycling units. Working directly with informal waste and plastics collectors and integrating them into the formal economy, the startup currently has a collection capacity of more than 20,000-ton and is now aiming to further deepen its presence in the Indian plastics recycling sector.

    Stride Ventures is the largest venture debt fund in India, having committed over $1 Billion to over 170 new-age startups in the last five years. Stride has now expanded its footprint to Singapore, Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and London. Earlier this year, Stride Ventures signed an MOU with DPIIT to provide funding, network, market access as well as mentorship support to budding startups across the country, as well as help Indian startups scale globally.

    This was the first time Stride Ventures hosted a Bharat Startup Grand Challenge. For the winner’s, Stride Ventures announced investing up to ₹10 Crore, subject to due diligence, along with further ecosystem support, mentorship and access to Stride’s network to help further scale up the startup’s endeavours in sustainability and circularity in India.

    ***

    Abhishek Dayal/Abhijith Narayanan

    (Release ID: 2123468) Visitor Counter : 48

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Unlocking $25+ Billion Exports in India’s Hand & Power Tools Sector

    Source: Government of India

    Unlocking $25+ Billion Exports in India’s Hand & Power Tools Sector

    Forging India’s Future

    Posted On: 22 APR 2025 3:23PM by PIB Delhi

    Introduction

    The tools industry—comprising hand and power tools—is a foundational pillar of the global manufacturing ecosystem, enabling production across multiple sectors such as construction, automotive, electronics, and infrastructure. In April 2025, NITI Aayog and the Foundation for Economic Development jointly published the report “Unlocking $25+ Billion Exports: India’s Hand & Power Tools Sector”, laying out a comprehensive roadmap to scale up India’s global exports from the current $1 billion to over $25 billion by 2035.

     

    India’s current export footprint in this sector remains modest, yet it possesses key strengthslow-cost labor, strategic trade positioning, and a growing manufacturing base—that offer significant potential to transform the nation into a competitive global player.

     

    This report is both a clarion call and a roadmap,

    urging policymakers, industry leaders, and stakeholders to seize a transformative export opportunity worth over $25 billion in the next decade.

     

    Overview

    • Global Market Size (2022): ~$100 billion
      • Hand Tools: $34 billion
      • Power Tools: $63 billion
    • Projected Market Size (2035): $190 billion (CAGR: 53%)
      • Hand Tools: $60 billion
      • Power Tools: $134 billion
    • India’s exports in 2025:
      • Hand Tools: $600 million (1.8% global share)
      • Power Tools: $425 million (0.7% global share)

     

    Targets by 2035 for India:

    • Hand Tools: 25% market share → $15 billion exports
    • Power Tools: 10% market share → $12 billion exports
    • Total Export Opportunity: Over $25 billion
    • Employment Generation: 3.5 million direct and indirect jobs

     

    India’s Current Export Profile

    Hand Tools

    India’s hand tools sector has developed a robust MSME ecosystem with key manufacturing clusters in Punjab (Jalandhar, Ludhiana), Maharashtra (Mumbai, Nagpur), and Rajasthan (Nagaur). Common exports include wrenches, pliers, screwdrivers, and hand saws. The sector’s success is linked to labor-intensive processes, localized supply chains, and historical evolution post-Independence.

    Power Tools

    The country currently lacks a comprehensive electronic manufacturing ecosystem for power tools, which require precision components like motors and batteries.

    Export Destinations and Trade Opportunities

     

    • Top Importers: USA and European Union account for 55–60% of global imports.
    • Although India’s exports have also grown by 24% year-on-year,

      there remains considerable untapped potential for further expansion.

      Tariff Advantage: U.S. imposed 7.5–25% additional tariffs on Chinese tools, creating new opportunities for alternative suppliers like India.

     

    Existing Government Support Mechanisms

    • Remission of Duties and Taxes on Exported Products (RoDTEP): RoDTEP provides rebates to exporters for taxes and duties on exported goods to help make Indian exporters more competitive in international markets. Under this scheme, hand tools exporters get rebates of 1.1% as a percentage of their Free on Board (FOB) value, and power tools get rebates of 0.9% as a percentage of their FOB value.
    • Duty Drawback Scheme: Duty Free Import Authorisation (DFIA) allows duty-free import of inputs but on a post export basis only. Inputs imported under this scheme are exempted of the Basic Customs Duty only. To qualify, the inputs must be listed under the Standard Input Output Norms (SION), and a minimum value addition of 20% must be achieved. Under this scheme, manufacturers of hand and power tools are eligible for duty drawbacks of 1.5% to 2% on their input costs, as per the Duty drawback rates, 2023.

     

    Strategic Policy Recommendations

    1. Create World-Class Clusters for Hand Tools

    • Goal: 3–4 clusters spanning ~4000 acres by 2035
    • Estimated Investment: ₹12,000 crore (Government) + ₹45,000 crore (Industry)
    • Cluster Features:
      • Plug-and-play industrial infrastructure
      • Worker housing, R&D centers, testing labs
      • Convention facilities, 24×7 power and water supply
    • To build world class clusters, it is important to invest in

      infrastructure such as effluent treatment plants, guaranteed 24×7 power supply, and plug and play factories.

      Governance Model: Public-Private Partnership (PPP) via a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), state Cluster Authority, and private developers

     

    2. Structural Reforms

    • Reduce import duties and rationalize Quality Control Orders (QCOs).
    • Reform Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) scheme to ease compliance.
    • Align labor laws with global standards (e.g., 300 hours quarterly overtime).
    • Liberalize Floor Area Ratio (FAR) and ground coverage norms.
    • Ensure 24×7 low-cost electricity and improve logistics.
    • If factor market reforms are implemented, no additional

      fiscal incentive will be required from the government.

      Encourage domestic R&D and ease technology transfer.

     

    3. Bridge Support (Contingent)

    If reforms are delayed, bridge support worth ₹5,800 crore over 5 years is recommended.

    • Hand Tools: ₹3,450 crore
      • Logistics: ₹450 crore
      • Interest Subvention: ₹700 crore
      • Competitiveness Incentive: ₹700 crore
      • Capital Subsidy: ₹1,600 crore
    • Power Tools: ₹2,230 crore
      • Interest Subvention: ₹430 crore
      • Competitiveness Incentive: ₹1,500 crore
      • Support should be treated as a strategic investment,

        not a subsidy, with a projected return of 2–3 times in tax revenues.

        Capital Subsidy: ₹300 crore

     

    Conclusion

    India stands at a pivotal juncture in its industrial transformation. The tools sector, though currently underrepresented in global trade, offers a rare and time-sensitive opportunity to reposition India as a reliable manufacturing alternative to China. The roadmap presented by NITI Aayog focuses on leveraging India’s inherent strengths—abundant labor, a rising manufacturing base, and sectoral synergies—while urgently addressing its structural weaknesses.

    References

    https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2025-04/India_Hand_Power_Tools_Sector_Report.pdf

    Click here to see PDF.

    ****

    Santosh Kumar | Sarla Meena | Rishita Aggarwal

    (Release ID: 2123437) Visitor Counter : 71

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Polis, Office of Just Transition and OEDIT Announce $2 Million for New Multi-Use Events and Resiliency Center in Moffat County

    Source: US State of Colorado

    DENVER — Today, the Office of Just Transition (OJT) within the Colorado Department of Labor and Employment (CDLE) and the Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT) announced their intent to award Moffat County a $2 million Just Transition Community Funding grant to support the creation of a Multi-Use Events and Resiliency Center. The project supports Moffat County’s economic transition strategy by capitalizing on year-round fairground utilization and enhancing opportunities for expanded use, generating increased economic benefits and cultural value.

    “Colorado will continue investing in our rural communities and their economies. This new grant will drive economic development in Moffat County and I’m excited to see the impact this new facility will have in the community,” said Governor Polis.

    “The events and resiliency center should be a major catalyst to help Moffat County diversify its economy, attract new visitors to the community, and stimulate business creation and expansion,” said OJT Director Wade Buchanan. “Moffat County and the City of Craig are taking control of their economic future, and we are excited to be a part of that.”  

    The funding is part of an ongoing effort by the Polis Administration, OEDIT and OJT to support communities that have relied on coal mines and coal-fired power plants for employment to find new sources of jobs and property tax revenues. Since 2022, OJT and OEDIT have dedicated over $8 million in funding to local economic development initiatives in northwest Colorado, including 18 grants to support community-led projects ranging from business parks and entrepreneurship centers to outdoor recreation attractions and regional planning efforts.

    “The construction of an event center will support business growth in the area and increase year-round event tourism in Northwest Colorado,” said OEDIT Executive Director Eve Lieberman. “We are happy to support Moffat County’s shift toward a more diversified and resilient economic model.”

    The Multi-Use Events and Resiliency Center project is a key initiative within Moffat County’s economic diversification efforts, intended to foster new industries, conventions, and year-round event tourism. Located at the Moffat County Fairgrounds, the center will be five blocks from downtown Craig, adjacent to an Urban Renewal Authority. It will also be within walking distance of the Craig Depot station, a proposed station for Mountain Passenger Rail.

    The new facility will be designed to LEED Gold standards with geothermal and solar power systems for year-round operations, and include a 45,000-square-foot arena with seating for up to 6,000 people and 15,000 square feet of conference space. In addition to spurring broader economic growth and diversification, the project itself is expected to create 30 full-time equivalent (FTE) jobs across operations, renewable energy and hospitality while earning the county an estimated $1.2 million in sales tax revenue in its first five years.

    In northwest Colorado, Just Transition Community Funding has supported economic diversification projects across Moffat, Routt and Rio Blanco counties, including support for a pumped storage hydropower project southeast of Craig, Pioneers Medical Center, South Routt Medical Center, the Town of Rangely and the Town of Yampa among others. In addition to northwest Colorado, Just Transition Community Funding is available for Fort Morgan County, Pueblo County, the West End of Montrose and San Miguel counties, and Delta, El Paso, Gunnison, La Plata and Larimer counties.

    About the Office of Just Transition

    Colorado created the Office of Just Transition within Colorado’s Department of Labor and Employment in 2019 to assist workers and communities that will be adversely affected by the loss of jobs and revenues due to the closure of coal mines and coal-fired power plants. Its purpose is to help workers transition to new, high-quality jobs to help communities continue to thrive by expanding and attracting diverse businesses, and to replace lost revenues. To learn more about the Office of Just Transition, its action plan and the corresponding legislation, please visit cdle.colorado.gov/offices/the-office-of-just-transition.

    About the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade

    The Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT) works with partners to create a positive business climate that encourages dynamic economic development and sustainable job growth. OEDIT partners with businesses and communities to offer financial, technical, and advisory assistance. From business retention services to incentives and funding, OEDIT supports economic growth across Colorado through its diverse programs and services. To learn more, visit oedit.colorado.gov.

    ###
     

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Latest news – Meeting of 2 April 2025, Strasbourg – Delegation for relations with the countries of South Asia

    Source: European Parliament

    A meeting of the Delegation for relations with the countries of South Asia (DSAS) was held on Wednesday, 2 April 2025 at 15.00-16.30 in Strasbourg.

    This meeting was dedicated to the preparation of the upcoming 14th European Union – Islamic Republic of Pakistan Inter-Parliamentary Meeting (IPM) planned to take place from 14 to 16 April in Islamabad and Lahore, Pakistan.

    As main topic on the draft agenda, there was an exchange of views with:

    • Mr Jan HOFMOKL, Deputy Head of Division, Asia and Pacific (ASIAPAC.2), European External Action Service (EEAS)
    • Mr Fabien GEHL, Deputy Head of Unit, South and South East Asia, Australia and New Zealand Unit (TRADE.C.2), and Mr Guido DOLARA, Policy Officer, Generalised Scheme of Preferences (TRADE.C.3), Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security (EC)
    • Mr Syed Faraz Hussain ZAIDI, Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Pakistan

    The meeting was held in camera.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Future of wine exports – new target markets and trade agreements by 2050 – E-000974/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Diversifying export destinations reduces market risks. Emerging markets in Africa, Latin America and Asia offer growth opportunities.

    After a quick growth, uncertainty prevails on Asian markets. Africa and Latin America, representing only 2.9% of imports, show a significant potential linked to projected consumption and demographic growth[1].

    The High-Level Group on Wine Policy (HLG)[2] recommends maintaining an ambitious export strategy, expanding market access, addressing trade barriers, protecting wine products from unrelated trade disputes and encouraging innovation and adaptation to changing market and consumer trends.

    The Mercosur Agreement is expected to facilitate the entry of European wine in South American countries, in particular on the growing Brazilian market.

    The Indian market has a great potential, and a Free Trade Agreement is being negotiated to tackle barriers. The EU is also negotiating trade agreements with Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines to improve market access for EU wines. The EU only has unilateral arrangements[3] with the African countries mentioned in the question.

    Promotion measures[4] covering EU wine geographical indications and wines with indication of wine grape variety can already target the above-mentioned prospective export markets.

    The work programme for 2025[5] allocates EUR 132 million to co-fund promotion activities, of which EUR 63.4 million are earmarked for non-EU countries.

    A map displaying past and ongoing campaigns is available online[6]. The recently published Commission legislative proposal[7] to support the wine sector includes an amendment to increase the duration of support for promotion operations under wine sectorial interventions to allow for better market consolidation.

    • [1] Prospects of the EU Wine Sector (https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/document/download/83588b14-0c75-43a4-b8ab-c5718bee6b01_en?filename=future-prospects-of-the-eu-wine-sector-june-2024.pdf).
    • [2] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/media/news/high-level-group-wine-outlines-policy-recommendations-future-eu-wine-sector-2024-12-17_en
    • [3] Generalised Scheme of Preferences or Everything but Arms.
    • [4]  Regulation (EU) No 1144/2014, OJ L 317, 4.11.2014, p. 56-70.
    • [5] https://agriculture.ec.europa.eu/common-agricultural-policy/market-measures/promotion-eu-farm-products_en#_blank
    • [6] https://enjoy-its-from-europe.campaign.europa.eu/en#_blank
    • [7] COM/2025/137 final.
    Last updated: 22 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Commission President Ursula von der Leyen concluding EU-Mercosur trade deal on her own – P-000127/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission is responsible for negotiating and concluding trade agreements with third countries on behalf of the EU, acting on the basis of a mandate of the Council. Member States are regularly informed about the state of play of negotiations through the Trade Policy Committee . This was also the case for the EU-Mercosur negotiations, at every stage of the process.

    The chief negotiators concluded the negotiations at the technical level during their last meeting in Brasília on 25-28 November 2024. In both private and public statements, including at leaders’ level, Mercosur countries indicated that the Mercosur Summit in Montevideo on 6 December 2024 would be the appropriate time and venue for a political conclusion.

    The College of Commissioners was informed about the announcement of the political conclusion of the EU-Mercosur negotiations.

    Last updated: 22 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Increased import tariffs on Chinese cars – E-002523/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    As stated in the impact assessment supporting the Commission’s proposal for amending the CO2 emission standards for cars and vans[1], one of the objectives was to stimulate innovation in zero-emission technologies to tackle the risk of the EU automotive value chain losing its technological leadership.

    The analysis pointed at the developments in the Chinese automotive sector and its competitive advantage in electric vehicle battery production.

    The trend towards zero-emission vehicles creates new business opportunities for automotive manufacturers, especially those taking an innovative approach, promoting and selling electric vehicles.

    Clear regulatory signals facilitate making appropriate investment decisions, to the benefit of EU industry’s competitiveness. The revised CO2 emission targets[2] provide a long-term regulatory signal.

    Delaying regulatory action would increase the uncertainty for the investments and the risk of the EU automotive industry losing its technological leadership and lose market share in the EU.

    The countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles (BEVs) from China are the result of a thorough anti-subsidy investigation, conducted according to the EU and World Trade Organisation rules.

    The Commission concluded that the BEV value chain in China benefits from unfair subsidisation, which is causing a threat of injury to EU BEV producers. The investigation also examined the likely impact of these measures on the EU producers, importers, users and suppliers of BEVs.

    Finally, with regard to the future of the car industry in Europe, the Commission released an industrial action plan for the automotive sector on 5 March 2025[3] after the President of the Commission conducted a Strategic Dialogue on this specific issue.

    • [1] Impact assessment accompanying Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2019/631 as regards strengthening the CO2 emission performance standards for new passenger cars and new light commercial vehicles in line with the Union’s increased climate ambition.
    • [2] http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/851/oj
    • [3] https://commission.europa.eu/topics/business-and-industry/boosting-european-car-sector_en
    Last updated: 22 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Türkiye’s purchase of Eurofighter Typhoon jets jeopardises Europe’s external security – E-002775/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU is fully committed to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, within the United Nations agreed framework, in accordance with all relevant United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions and in line with the principles on which the EU is founded and the acquis. It remains crucial that Türkiye commits and actively contributes to such a peaceful settlement, including its external aspects.

    The EU attaches particular importance to resumption of and progress in the Cyprus settlement talks in further enhancing EU-Türkiye cooperation[1].

    Welcoming the recent steps taken by the UN Secretary-General towards a resumption of settlement talks, the EU remains ready to play an active role in supporting all stages of the UN-led process, with all appropriate means at its disposal[2].

    The control on the export of arms by Member States is subject, inter alia[3], to the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP[4]. Under its Article 2(5)(b), when assessing export licence applications, they shall take into account the risk of use of the items against forces of other Member States.

    In line with EU’s Strategic Compass for Security and Defence and the Joint Communication on the State of play of EU-Türkiye political, economic and trade relations of November 2023[5], the High Representative/Vice-President remains committed to developing a mutually beneficial partnership with Ankara.

    This requires equal commitment on Türkiye’s side to advance on a path of cooperation, sustained de-escalation and to address EU concerns.

    • [1] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/m5jlwe0p/euco-conclusions-20240417-18-en.pdf
    • [2] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16983-2024-INIT/en/pdf
    • [3] This includes also national legislation and the Arms Trade Treaty, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.pdf?templateId=137253
    • [4] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008E0944
    • [5] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/joint-communication-european-council-state-play-eu-turkiye-political-economic-and-trade-relations-0_en
    Last updated: 22 April 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2025 Article IV Consultation with the Republic of Azerbaijan

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    April 22, 2025

    Washington, DC: On March 21, 2025, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Azerbaijan and endorsed the staff appraisal, as well as the 2024 Financial System Stability Assessment.

    Following a slowdown in 2023, growth accelerated, and inflation picked up. Real GDP increased by 4.1 percent in 2024, up from 1.4 percent in 2023, supported by strong growth in construction, communication, transportation, and hospitality sectors. After declining by 2 percent in 2023, hydrocarbon GDP stabilized in 2024, as moderate gas production expansion compensated for the decline in oil output. Inflation picked up in the second half of 2024, partly reflecting adjustment in administered prices, reaching 4.9 percent at the end of the year, still within the CBA target of 4 ±2 percent. The 2024 Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) found the financial sector to be broadly resilient against severe shocks.

    The decline in oil and gas prices reduced the 2024 external surplus, but fiscal consolidation resumed. After recording a surplus of 11.5 percent of GDP in 2023, the current account balance is projected to weaken in 2024. During the first three quarters of 2024, the current account surplus has been about 50 percent lower than in the same period last year. The combined CBA and SOFAZ reserves reached about US$ 71 billion by end-2024, covering 41 months of next year’s imports. After remaining broadly unchanged in 2023, the nonoil primary deficit declined in 2024 to 20.5 percent on nonoil GDP, from 22.1 percent of nonoil GDP in 2023, reflecting strong nonoil tax revenues.   

    Looking ahead, growth is projected to moderate and inflation to remain within the CBA target. Growth is projected to slow down to 3.5 percent in 2025, reflecting a slowdown in investment and flat hydrocarbon production. In the medium term, growth is projected to be 2 ½ percent, in line with potential growth. Assuming broadly stable international food and energy prices, inflation is projected to remain within the CBA target of 4 ±2 percent. External position is projected to weaken in the medium term as hydrocarbon production declines, but FX reserves will remain strong.

    Risks to the outlook remain broadly balanced but external uncertainty is high. Reduced hydrocarbon prices as a result of higher supply or lower demand could adversely affect growth, external position, and fiscal revenues. Conversely, intensification of conflicts could push hydrocarbon prices higher, providing a temporary boost to external and fiscal position. Deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, as well as trade and investment shocks, could affect prospects for development of the nonhydrocarbon sector and economic diversification, and slower global growth could weigh on Azerbaijan’s prospects. On the other side, trade and investment diversion to the region could also provide new opportunities. On the domestic side, pressures to increase budgetary spending could increase inflation, delay fiscal consolidation, and weaken the fiscal position and fiscal rule credibility. The presence of inefficient SOEs could undermine the development of the private sector, which is key to diversifying the economy and boosting growth.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    In concluding the AIV consultation with Azerbaijan, Executive Directors endorsed the staff’s appraisal as follows:

    Executive Directors agreed with the thrust of the staff appraisal. They noted that Azerbaijan’s growth has remained resilient, supported by robust non‑oil sector activity, and inflation is contained. Directors concurred that risks to the outlook are broadly balanced but are subject to significant uncertainty. They called for continued prudent policies and reforms to support diversification and sustainable growth over the medium term.

    Directors welcomed the authorities’ adherence to the fiscal targets under the fiscal rule. Cautioning that the expansionary 2025 budget would be procyclical, they broadly called on the authorities to continue with the fiscal adjustment in 2025, including by saving any revenue overperformance or expenditure shortfall to help contain inflationary pressures and reinforce fiscal sustainability. While recognizing Azerbaijan’s investment needs, Directors urged the authorities to pursue fiscal consolidation over the medium term to ensure intergenerational equity, underpinned by revenue and expenditure measures and reforms to strengthen the fiscal rule framework. They noted the benefits of a potential TADAT and PIMA to support these efforts.

    Directors viewed the central bank’s current monetary policy stance as appropriate, with inflation within the central bank target band and the recent increase appearing transitory. They emphasized the need to closely monitor inflation risks and to be prepared to act swiftly if needed. Directors welcomed the enhanced monetary policy transmission and called for continued efforts to improve the monetary policy framework to prepare for a possible transition to a hybrid inflation targeting regime.

    Directors welcomed the 2024 FSAP’s assessment that Azerbaijan’s financial system is broadly resilient, and the banking sector is well‑capitalized. They commended the authorities for the significant progress in reinvigorating the regulatory reform agenda, and bolstering banks’ capital and liquidity buffers to reinforce financial stability. Directors encouraged continued progress in strengthening prudential oversight and the financial safety net and expanding the systemic risk analysis and stress testing frameworks to address remaining vulnerabilities. In this regard, they underscored the importance of fully implementing consolidated supervision, developing early warning indicators and triggers for supervisory actions, reinforcing the resilience of domestic systemically important banks, and strengthening the emergency liquidity assistance framework.

    Directors emphasized the need for private sector development to support economic diversification. They called for continued reforms to strengthen corporate governance in state‑owned enterprises, and to create a level playing field for the private sector. Directors also called on the authorities to continue efforts to improve governance, combat corruption, and further strengthen the AML/CFT framework. They encouraged the authorities to intensify efforts to increase private sector access to finance and contribute to the global climate agenda.

    Azerbaijan: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2022–30

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

         

    Est.

    Projections

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

     

    (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise specified)

    National income

                     

       GDP at constant prices

    4.7

    1.4

    4.1

    3.5

    2.5

    2.4

    2.4

    2.5

    2.5

          Of which: Oil sector 1/

    -2.4

    -2.0

    0.3

    0.2

    -0.5

    -0.5

    -0.5

    -0.5

    -0.5

                              Non-oil sector

    9.1

    4.5

    6.2

    4.5

    3.7

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

    3.5

       Consumer price index (period average)

    13.9

    8.8

    2.2

    5.7

    4.5

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

       Consumer price index (end of period)

    14.4

    2.1

    4.9

    5.2

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    4.0

    Money and credit

                     

       Domestic credit, net

    29.9

    14.7

    5.0

    9.1

    6.9

    7.0

    6.8

    6.9

    6.9

          Of which: Credit to private sector

    17.4

    14.7

    15.9

    10.0

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

    8.0

       Manat base money

    -2.8

    19.4

    0.4

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

    9.0

       Manat broad money

    23.8

    19.6

    9.0

    10.6

    7.9

    8.4

    8.3

    8.4

    8.4

       Total broad money

    23.6

    5.3

    11.9

    9.2

    6.5

    7.0

    7.0

    7.0

    7.0

    External sector

                     

    Exports f.o.b.

    94.6

    -30.8

    -8.8

    10.8

    -10.0

    -9.9

    -8.0

    0.3

    0.3

    Of which: Oil sector

    105.1

    -34.0

    -10.1

    10.8

    -12.0

    -12.5

    -10.7

    -0.9

    -0.9

    Imports f.o.b.

    29.7

    21.4

    2.7

    12.0

    0.9

    3.0

    5.1

    6.5

    6.6

    Of which: Oil sector

    56.3

    12.2

    -6.9

    1.4

    1.5

    1.7

    2.1

    0.0

    0.0

    Real effective exchange rate

    11.8

    8.1

    -1.1

     

    (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise specified)

    Gross investment

    12.1

    18.3

    17.8

    18.3

    16.2

    14.6

    13.7

    13.7

    13.7

       Consolidated government

    8.0

    12.2

    11.3

    11.7

    10.0

    8.8

    8.1

    8.1

    8.1

       Private sector

    4.1

    6.1

    6.5

    6.7

    6.2

    5.8

    5.6

    5.6

    5.6

          Of which: Oil sector

    -6.3

    -0.3

    1.1

    1.3

    1.5

    1.6

    1.7

    1.6

    1.6

    Gross national savings

    42.1

    29.8

    25.7

    26.1

    20.4

    15.1

    11.3

    10.4

    9.6

    Consolidated general government finances 2/

                     

       Total revenue and grants

    32.1

    40.6

    37.1

    34.4

    32.8

    31.0

    29.8

    29.5

    29.2

       Total expenditure

    26.2

    32.7

    33.8

    35.6

    34.5

    33.4

    32.5

    31.7

    31.0

      Current expenditure

    18.2

    20.5

    22.5

    23.9

    24.4

    24.6

    24.4

    24.4

    24.0

      Net acquisition of non-financial assets

    8.0

    12.2

    11.3

    11.7

    10.0

    8.8

    8.1

    7.3

    7.0

       Overall fiscal balance

    6.0

    7.9

    3.2

    -1.3

    -1.7

    -2.4

    -2.8

    -2.1

    -1.8

       Non-oil primary balance, in percent of non-oil GDP

    -22.4

    -22.1

    -20.5

    -22.1

    -18.6

    -16.3

    -14.5

    -12.7

    -11.3

       General government debt 3/

    17.3

    21.8

    20.9

    21.0

    22.2

    22.7

    23.1

    23.8

    23.8

       General government and government-guaranteed debt

    26.9

    28.9

    27.6

    27.6

    28.6

    28.9

    29.1

    29.6

    29.4

    External sector

                     

       Current account (- deficit)

    29.8

    11.5

    7.8

    7.8

    4.1

    0.5

    -2.4

    -3.3

    -4.2

       Foreign direct investment (net)

    -6.5

    -2.9

    -0.7

    -0.4

    -0.2

    0.0

    0.2

    0.4

    0.5

    Memorandum items:

                     

       Gross official international reserves (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    8,996

    11,281

    10,960

    10,760

    10,560

    10,360

    10,160

    9,960

    9,760

    in months of next year’s non-oil imports f.o.b.

    5.4

    7.7

    6.6

    6.4

    6.1

    5.7

    5.3

    4.9

    4.6

       Nominal GDP (in millions of manat)

    133,973

    123,128

    126,337

    134,078

    139,182

    145,847

    153,556

    162,135

    171,522

       Nominal non-oil GDP (in millions of manat)

    69,764

    78,990

    85,712

    94,674

    102,595

    110,434

    118,825

    127,903

    137,675

       Nominal GDP (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    78,807

    72,429

    74,316

    78,870

    81,872

    85,792

    90,327

    95,373

    100,895

       Oil Fund Assets (in millions of U.S. dollars)

    49,034

    56,070

    60,031

    60,911

    61,797

    61,864

    61,594

    62,222

    62,949

       Assumed oil price, WEO plus $2-$3 premium (in U.S. dollars per barrel)

    98.4

    82.6

    81.2

    78.6

    73.5

    71.6

    70.6

    72.0

    73.4

       Assumed natural gas price, WEO plus a premium (in U.S. dollars per thousands of cubic meters)

    1340.0

    460.1

    389.0

    517.4

    424.7

    342.2

    290.2

    290.2

    290.2

       Exchange rate (manat/dollar, end of period)

    1.7

    1.7

    1.7

       Sources: National authorities; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

       1/ Includes the production and processing of oil and gas.

    2/ Consolidates State Budget, State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), Nakhchevan Autonomous Region (NAK) and State Social Protection Fund.

    3/ Starting in 2021, includes guarantees issued to Aqrakredit for its acquisition of distressed assets from the IBA.

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] At the conclusion of the discussion, the Managing Director, as Chairman of the Board, summarizes the views of Executive Directors, and this summary is transmitted to the country’s authorities. An explanation of any qualifiers used in summings up can be found here: http://www.IMF.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Mayada Ghazala

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/04/22/pr-25118-azerbaijan-imf-concludes-2025-article-iv-consultation

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI: Results of ING’s 2025 Annual General Meeting

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Results of ING’s 2025 Annual General Meeting

    The Annual General Meeting (AGM) of ING Groep N.V. was held today in Amsterdam.

    The AGM adopted all agenda items, including the annual accounts for 2024, discharge of the members of the Executive Board and the Supervisory Board and the dividend for 2024.

    The AGM also approved the reappointment of Steven van Rijswijk and Ljiljana Čortan to the Executive Board. Stuart Graham and Petri Hofsté were appointed to the Supervisory Board and Margarete Haase and Lodewijk Hijmans van den Bergh were reappointed to the Supervisory Board.

    Note for editors
    For further information on ING, please visit www.ing.com. Frequent news updates can be found in the Newsroom or via the @ING_news X feed. Photos of ING operations, buildings and its executives are available for download at Flickr.

    Press enquiries Investor enquiries
    Raymond Vermeulen ING Group Investor Relations
    +31 20 576 6369 +31 20 576 6396
    Raymond.Vermeulen@ing.com Investor.Relations@ing.com

    ING PROFILE
    ING is a global financial institution with a strong European base, offering banking services through its operating company ING Bank. The purpose of ING Bank is: empowering people to stay a step ahead in life and in business. ING Bank’s more than 60,000 employees offer retail and wholesale banking services to customers in over 100 countries.

    ING Group shares are listed on the exchanges of Amsterdam (INGA NA, INGA.AS), Brussels and on the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs: ING US, ING.N).

    ING aims to put sustainability at the heart of what we do. Our policies and actions are assessed by independent research and ratings providers, which give updates on them annually. ING’s ESG rating by MSCI was reconfirmed by MSCI as ‘AA’ in August 2024 for the fifth year. As of December 2023, in Sustainalytics’ view, ING’s management of ESG material risk is ‘Strong’. Our current ESG Risk Rating, is 17.2 (Low Risk). ING Group shares are also included in major sustainability and ESG index products of leading providers. Here are some examples: Euronext, STOXX, Morningstar and FTSE Russell. Society is transitioning to a low-carbon economy. So are our clients, and so is ING. We finance a lot of sustainable activities, but we still finance more that’s not. Follow our progress on ing.com/climate.

    Important legal information
    Elements of this press release contain or may contain information about ING Groep N.V. and/ or ING Bank N.V. within the meaning of Article 7(1) to (4) of EU Regulation No 596/2014 (‘Market Abuse Regulation’).

    ING Group’s annual accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (‘IFRS- EU’). In preparing the financial information in this document, except as described otherwise, the same accounting principles are applied as in the 2024 ING Group consolidated annual accounts. All figures in this document are unaudited. Small differences are possible in the tables due to rounding.

    Certain of the statements contained herein are not historical facts, including, without limitation, certain statements made of future expectations and other forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Actual results, performance or events may differ materially from those in such statements due to a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) changes in general economic conditions and customer behaviour, in particular economic conditions in ING’s core markets, including changes affecting currency exchange rates and the regional and global economic impact of the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and related international response measures (2) changes affecting interest rate levels (3) any default of a major market participant and related market disruption (4) changes in performance of financial markets, including in Europe and developing markets (5) fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States (6) discontinuation of or changes in ‘benchmark’ indices (7) inflation and deflation in our principal markets (8) changes in conditions in the credit and capital markets generally, including changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness (9) failures of banks falling under the scope of state compensation schemes (10) non- compliance with or changes in laws and regulations, including those concerning financial services, financial economic crimes and tax laws, and the interpretation and application thereof (11) geopolitical risks, political instabilities and policies and actions of governmental and regulatory authorities, including in connection with the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and the related international response measures (12) legal and regulatory risks in certain countries with less developed legal and regulatory frameworks (13) prudential supervision and regulations, including in relation to stress tests and regulatory restrictions on dividends and distributions (also among members of the group) (14) ING’s ability to meet minimum capital and other prudential regulatory requirements (15) changes in regulation of US commodities and derivatives businesses of ING and its customers (16) application of bank recovery and resolution regimes, including write down and conversion powers in relation to our securities (17) outcome of current and future litigation, enforcement proceedings, investigations or other regulatory actions, including claims by customers or stakeholders who feel misled or treated unfairly, and other conduct issues (18) changes in tax laws and regulations and risks of non-compliance or investigation in connection with tax laws, including FATCA (19) operational and IT risks, such as system disruptions or failures, breaches of security, cyber-attacks, human error, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including in respect of third parties with which we do business and including any risks as a result of incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed outputs from the algorithms and data sets utilized in artificial intelligence (20) risks and challenges related to cybercrime including the effects of cyberattacks and changes in legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity and data privacy, including such risks and challenges as a consequence of the use of emerging technologies, such as advanced forms of artificial intelligence and quantum computing (21) changes in general competitive factors, including ability to increase or maintain market share (22) inability to protect our intellectual property and infringement claims by third parties (23) inability of counterparties to meet financial obligations or ability to enforce rights against such counterparties (24) changes in credit ratings (25) business, operational, regulatory, reputation, transition and other risks and challenges in connection with climate change, diversity, equity and inclusion and other ESG-related matters, including data gathering and reporting and also including managing the conflicting laws and requirements of governments, regulators and authorities with respect to these topics (26) inability to attract and retain key personnel (27) future liabilities under defined benefit retirement plans (28) failure to manage business risks, including in connection with use of models, use of derivatives, or maintaining appropriate policies and guidelines (29) changes in capital and credit markets, including interbank funding, as well as customer deposits, which provide the liquidity and capital required to fund our operations, and (30) the other risks and uncertainties detailed in the most recent annual report of ING Groep N.V. (including the Risk Factors contained therein) and ING’s more recent disclosures, including press releases, which are available on www.ING.com.

    This document may contain ESG-related material that has been prepared by ING on the basis of publicly available information, internally developed data and other third-party sources believed to be reliable. ING has not sought to independently verify information obtained from public and third-party sources and makes no representations or warranties as to accuracy, completeness, reasonableness or reliability of such information.

    Materiality, as used in the context of ESG, is distinct from, and should not be confused with, such term as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or as defined for Securities and Exchange Commission (‘SEC’) reporting purposes. Any issues identified as material for purposes of ESG in this document are therefore not necessarily material as defined in the Market Abuse Regulation or for SEC reporting purposes. In addition, there is currently no single, globally recognized set of accepted definitions in assessing whether activities are “green” or “sustainable.” Without limiting any of the statements contained herein, we make no representation or warranty as to whether any of our securities constitutes a green or sustainable security or conforms to present or future investor expectations or objectives for green or sustainable investing. For information on characteristics of a security, use of proceeds, a description of applicable project(s) and/or any other relevant information, please reference the offering documents for such security.

    This document may contain inactive textual addresses to internet websites operated by us and third parties. Reference to such websites is made for information purposes only, and information found at such websites is not incorporated by reference into this document. ING does not make any representation or warranty with respect to the accuracy or completeness of, or take any responsibility for, any information found at any websites operated by third parties. ING specifically disclaims any liability with respect to any information found at websites operated by third parties. ING cannot guarantee that websites operated by third parties remain available following the publication of this document, or that any information found at such websites will not change following the filing of this document. Many of those factors are beyond ING’s control.

    Any forward-looking statements made by or on behalf of ING speak only as of the date they are made, and ING assumes no obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information or for any other reason.

    This document does not constitute an offer to sell, or a solicitation of an offer to purchase, any securities in the United States or any other jurisdiction.

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: American Rebel Light Beer Continues Rapid Expansion of National Distribution Footprint adding North Carolina’s Adams Beverages

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Strategic Growth Fuels American Rebel Beer as it Reaches 10 States with Several More to be Announced Soon

    Nashville, TN, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) (“American Rebel” or the “Company”), creator of American Rebel Beer (americanrebelbeer.com) and a designer, manufacturer, and marketer of branded safes, personal security and self-defense products and apparel (americanrebel.com), proudly announces its strategic expansion into North Carolina through a distribution agreement with Adams Beverages (adamsbev.com). This move is a significant milestone in the Company’s broader Southeast growth strategy.

    “I am thrilled to see how fast our American Rebel Light Beer distribution is growing across this great country,” said American Rebel CEO Andy Ross. “North Carolina is a great market and has strong tie-ins with our relationship with Tony Stewart Racing (tsrnitro.com) and Matt Hagan and the Charlotte Motor Speedway (charlottemotorspeedway.com). We have been able to establish distribution with some high-volume distributors in ten states and growing. It’s fair to say that American Rebel is burning patriotic fuel.”

    “We are very excited to partner with Adams Beverages to bring American Rebel Light Beer to 28 North Carolina counties,” said Todd Porter, President of American Rebel Beverages. “This collaboration allows us to serve the wonderful people of North Carolina who are looking for a clean, natural, and great-tasting light beer that embodies the values of our great nation.”

    American Rebel Beer will host a series of exciting events, including beer tastings, live music performances, and promotional giveaways, kicking off this weekend at the Charlotte Motor Speedway. The festivities will run through the Fall, offering a perfect opportunity for the community to come together and enjoy America’s Patriotic, God-Fearing, Constitution-Loving, National Anthem-Singing, STAND YOUR GROUND BEER!

    The first shipment of American Rebel Light Beer arrives in North Carolina this week and in just a few short days, several locations have placed orders and brought in Rebel Light. In addition to the Charlotte Motor Speedway, American Rebel Light Beer will be available at multiple locations across North Carolina, including these on-premise and off-premise locations:

    IRON THUNDER SALOON – CONCORD 10023 WEDDINGTON ROAD, CONCORD, NC 28027 MOTORSPORTS-THEMED SPORTS BAR
    CANNON CROSSROADS BP 9960 POPLAR TENT ROAD, CONCORD, NC 28027 CONVENIENCE STORE
    CITY FOOD MART – CONCORD MAIN 873 OLD CHARLOTTE ROAD, CONCORD, NC 28027 CONVENIENCE STORE
    COMPARE FOODS – CONCORD 840 CONCORD PKWAY NORTH, CONCORD, NC 28027 CONVENIENCE STORE
    DANNYS 300 NORTH CHURCH STREET, CONCORD, NC 28025 CONVENIENCE STORE
    FAST AND FRIENDLY MART 2 7340 POPLAR TENT ROAD, CONCORD, NC 28027 CONVENIENCE STORE
    SPEEDWAY XPRESS MART – SATYA 4521 MOREHEAD ROAD, CONCORD, NC 28027 CONVENIENCE STORE
    CONCORD SHOPS 450 PITTS SCHOOL ROAD NW, CONCORD, NC 28027 CONVENIENCE STORE
    TOTAL WINE 8054 CONCORD MILLS RD, CONCORD, NC 28027 LARGE WINE BEER RETAILER
    D AND D EXPRESS 5501 POPLAR TENT ROAD, CONCORD, NC 28027 CONVENIENCE STORE
    CAROLINA ALE HOUSE – CONCORD MILLS 8695 CONCORD MILLS BOULEVARD, CONCORD, NC 28027 CASUAL RESTAURANT/SPORTS BAR

    For more information about the launch events and American Rebel Beer, please visit (americanrebelbeer.com) or follow us on our social media platforms.

    About Adams Beverages

    Founded in Dothan, Alabama in 1937, Adams Beverages has since expanded into North Carolina under the management of Bill Adams, Clay Adams and Amy Adams Dupree. Adams Beverages now employs over 750 team members, currently providing service to 44 counties in Alabama and 28 counties in North Carolina. For more information on Adams Beverages, go to adamsbev.com.

    About American Rebel Light Beer

    Produced in partnership with AlcSource, American Rebel Light Beer (americanrebelbeer.com) is a premium domestic light lager celebrated for its exceptional quality and patriotic values. It stands out as America’s Patriotic, God-Fearing, Constitution-Loving, National Anthem-Singing, Stand Your Ground Beer.

    American Rebel Light is a Premium Domestic Light Lager Beer – All Natural, Crisp, Clean and Bold Taste with a Lighter Feel. With approximately 100 calories, 3.2 carbohydrates, and 4.3% alcoholic content per 12 oz serving, American Rebel Light Beer delivers a lighter option for those who love great beer but prefer a more balanced lifestyle. It’s all natural with no added supplements and importantly does not use corn, rice, or other sweeteners typically found in mass produced beers.

    About American Rebel Holdings, Inc.

    American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) has operated primarily as a designer, manufacturer and marketer of branded safes and personal security and self-defense products and has recently transitioned into the beverage industry through the introduction of American Rebel Light Beer. The Company also designs and produces branded apparel and accessories. To learn more, visit www.americanrebel.com and www.americanrebelbeer.com. For investor information, visit www.americanrebelbeer.com/investor-relations.

    Media Inquiries:
    Matt Sheldon
    Matt@Precisionpr.co
    917-280-7329

    American Rebel Holdings, Inc.
    info@americanrebel.com

    American Rebel Beverages, LLC
    Todd Porter, President
    tporter@americanrebelbeer.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. American Rebel Holdings, Inc., (NASDAQ: AREB; AREBW) (the “Company,” “American Rebel,” “we,” “our” or “us”) desires to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and is including this cautionary statement in connection with this safe harbor legislation. The words “forecasts” “believe,” “may,” “estimate,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “should,” “plan,” “could,” “target,” “potential,” “is likely,” “expect” and similar expressions, as they relate to us, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. We have based these forward-looking statements primarily on our current expectations and projections about future events and financial trends that we believe may affect our financial condition, results of operations, business strategy, and financial needs. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ from those in the forward-looking statements include benefits of marketing outreach efforts, actual placement timing and availability of American Rebel Beer, success and availability of the promotional activities, our ability to effectively execute our business plan, and the Risk Factors contained within our filings with the SEC, including our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2024. Any forward-looking statement made by us herein speaks only as of the date on which it is made. Factors or events that could cause our actual results to differ may emerge from time to time, and it is not possible for us to predict all of them. We undertake no obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future developments or otherwise, except as may be required by law.

    Company Contact:
    tporter@americanrebelbeer.com
    info@americanrebel.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Canada: The CBSA launches an investigation into the alleged dumping of certain carbon and alloy steel wire from the People’s Republic of China, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, the Republic of India, the Italian Republic, the Federation of Malaysia, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

    Source: Government of Canada News

    April 22, 2025
    Ottawa, Ontario

    The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) announced today that it is initiating an investigation to determine whether certain carbon and alloy steel wire originating in or exported from the People’s Republic of China, the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, the Republic of India, the Italian Republic, the Federation of Malaysia, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Republic of Türkiye, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is being sold at unfair prices in Canada. This practice of dumping goods into Canada can harm Canadian industries by undercutting Canadian prices, which undermines fair competition.

    The CBSA is investigating because of a complaint filed by Sivaco Wire Group 2004, L.P. and ArcelorMittal Long Products Canada G.P. The complainants allege that as a result of an increase in the volume of the dumped imports, they have suffered material injury in the form of price undercutting, price depression, lost sales, lost market share, reduced net income and profitability, reduction in capacity utilization, inability to raise capital for investments, and reduced employment.

    The CBSA and the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) both play a role in the investigation. The CITT will begin a preliminary inquiry to determine whether the imports are harming Canadian producers and will issue a decision by June 20, 2025. Concurrently, the CBSA will investigate whether the imports are being sold in Canada at unfair prices, and will make a preliminary decision by July 21, 2025.

    Currently, there are 158 special import measures in force in Canada, covering a wide variety of industrial and consumer products. These measures have directly helped to protect approximately 31,000 Canadian jobs and $11.6 billion in Canadian production.

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Saskatchewan’s Building Construction Growth Leads Among Provinces

    Source: Government of Canada regional news

    Released on April 22, 2025

    Province Ranks First for Investment in Building Construction 

    Today, Statistics Canada numbers show an increase of 29.9 per cent in February 2025 compared to February 2024 for building construction investment in the province. This places Saskatchewan first among the provinces for year-over-year growth.

    “These numbers reflect Saskatchewan’s strong economy, and continued growth in capital investment as more people are choosing to build and grow their families here in our province,” Trade and Export Development Minister Warren Kaeding said. “Whether they are building new housing, new infrastructure, or new businesses, they are investing in the future of Saskatchewan.”

    Investment in building construction is calculated based on the total spending value on building construction within the province. 

    Statistics Canada’s latest GDP numbers indicate that Saskatchewan’s 2023 real GDP reached an all-time high of $77.9 billion, increasing by $1.77 billion, or 2.3 per cent from 2022. This places Saskatchewan second in the nation for real GDP growth and above the national average of 1.6 per cent.

    Private capital investment in Saskatchewan increased last year by 17.3 per cent to $14.7 billion, ranking first among provinces. Private capital investment is projected to reach $16.2 billion in 2025, an increase of 10.1 per cent over 2024. This is the second highest anticipated percentage increase among the provinces.

    Last year, the Government of Saskatchewan unveiled its new Securing the Next Decade of Growth – Saskatchewan’s Investment Attraction Strategy. This strategy, combined with Saskatchewan’s trade and investment website, InvestSK.ca, contains helpful information for potential markets and solidifies the province as the best place to do business in Canada. 

    For more information visit: InvestSK.ca.

    -30-

    For more information, contact:

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI USA: With a Technology License From MIT and NREL in Hand, Comstock Fuels Aims To Produce Jet Fuel From Lignin

    Source: US National Renewable Energy Laboratory

    Patent-Pending Technology Turns Lignin—a Plant Structural Material—Into Aromatic Hydrocarbons That Could Help Leap Over Synthetic Aviation Fuel ‘Blend Wall’


    NREL research technician Spencer Lask prepares feedstock for hydrodeoxygenation using a batch pressure reactor—allowing NREL to work in parallel with industry partner Comstock Fuels. Photo by Mickey Stone, NREL

    It is an ideal complement to Comstock Fuels’ own technologies: an additional refining step to upgrade lignin from biomass into aromatic hydrocarbons, which are molecules needed to produce “drop-in” synthetic aviation fuel (SAF).

    SAF can be made with abundant biomass and waste resources from America’s farms, forests, and waste facilities. However, most SAF today must be combined with petroleum jet fuel (Jet A) to meet strict performance requirements for aviation. This is because jet engines need fuel that contains a blend of hydrocarbons for safe operation—alkanes (including n-alkanes, isoalkanes, and cycloalkanes) and aromatics. To date, most SAF production processes yield fuels rich in n-alkanes and isoalkanes, but pathways for producing aromatics and cycloalkanes are scarce.

    But the SAF technology being codeveloped by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is different. It yields aromatic-rich SAF by deconstructing lignin in plants and hydrodeoxygenating the resulting molecules to jet-range blendstocks.

    Understanding that SAF needs to comprise roughly 20% aromatics, Comstock Fuels President David Winsness jumped on the opportunity to scale up the technology. In September 2024, Comstock Fuels signed a cooperative research and development agreement with MIT and NREL.

    If the MIT–NREL technology is successfully scaled up and integrated into Comstock’s existing processes, the combination of technologies could help address the so-called SAF “blend wall”—providing a path toward SAF that is functionally identical to Jet A.

    A Chance Encounter Sparks Research Agreement

    Winsness discovered the patent-pending MIT–NREL lignin conversion technology during an exploratory meeting at NREL’s Golden, Colorado, campus, where he was discussing scaling up Comstock’s Bioleum SAF technology. During that meeting, NREL Principal Scientist Robert Baldwin introduced Winsness and his colleagues to the new lignin pathway and recommended an introduction to NREL Senior Research Fellow Gregg Beckham and NREL chemical engineer and group manager David Brandner, who together lead NREL’s component of the work with a team of researchers.

    A veteran of the biofuels industry, Winsness had himself developed and commercialized a patented process that recovers distillers corn oil from corn ethanol facilities for use in producing additional fuels, increasing yields and revenues. Upward of 95% of the U.S. corn ethanol industry uses the technology today. Winsness and his team then set their sights on lignin as their next innovation on the belief that doing so could support petroleum, pulp and paper, forestry, and other relevant industries.

    After more than 10 years, they developed a patented and patent-pending process that extracts and converts lignin into an intermediate called Bioleum. In an August 2024 press release, the company reported yields of cellulosic ethanol and Bioleum-derived fuels exceeding 125 gallons per metric ton of biomass (on a gasoline-gallon-equivalent basis), depending on feedstock, lignin content, site conditions, and other process parameters.

    After Baldwin’s initial introduction to Beckham and a series of follow-up communications, it became clear that the MIT–NREL lignin-based SAF technology could complement Comstock’s processes by refining Bioleum further to produce both alkane and aromatic SAF. The parties recently executed an exclusive license agreement, in addition to the research agreement, just six months after their first meeting.

    At its pilot facility in Wisconsin, Comstock Fuels is currently scaling up and demonstrating its Bioleum technology to convert woody biomass into SAF. One step of Comstock’s chemical processes isolates lignin by separating it from the other major plant polymers—the polysaccharides cellulose and hemicellulose—which continue through the process for conversion into alkane SAF.

    “The type of digestion we are already doing is ideal for MIT and NREL’s technology,” Winsness said.

    It was there—where Comstock produces a stream of lignin—that Baldwin and Winsness saw an exciting interdependency and linkage point.

    “MIT and NREL’s technology makes a highly aromatic blendstock, but that’s great because most of the other SAF technologies out there today make blendstocks that don’t contain aromatics,” Baldwin said. “To get 100% SAF, you have to have some source of aromatics, and one way to get them is from lignin.”

    MIT and NREL first described their lignin conversion technology in 2022, outlining steps for turning poplar (left) into lignin oil (center) and finally into aromatic-rich SAF (right). Photo by NREL

    From Lignin to Highly Aromatic SAF

    Lignin—which makes up around 30% of biomass—is a complex polymer that supports plants and helps them resist decay. Based on projections of future feedstock supply, which are outlined in the U.S. Department of Energy’s 2023 Billion-Ton Report, lignin could generate as much as 63 billion gallons of SAF annually by 2040—three times more fuel than U.S. airlines consumed in 2019.

    NREL and MIT’s technology uses reductive catalytic fractionation and hydrodeoxygenation to turn lignin into aromatic hydrocarbons. Figure by NREL

    However, for years the industry has lacked the key for unlocking that potential. Researchers continue to search for economical methods for turning lignin into useful products, including the aromatic hydrocarbons needed for SAF. In the pulp and paper industry today, lignin is burned for heat, though NREL and other researchers are also developing technologies for turning waste lignin into valuable bioproducts.

    However, building on advances in catalysis, a multi-institution team of researchers, including MIT’s Mickey Stone, Matt Webber, and Yuriy Román-Leshkov, unveiled a study with the potential to overturn that dynamic. With support from the U.S. Department of Energy’s Bioenergy Technologies Office, they demonstrated a method for removing oxygen from lignin and a catalyst to refashion the resulting molecules into an aromatic-rich SAF blendstock—an additive for mixing with alkane SAF.

    First described in a 2022 Joule article, the technology combines alcohol extraction of lignin from biomass with an Earth-abundant hydrodeoxygenation catalyst to stabilize the extracted lignin and produce an oil enriched with aromatics. Importantly, this catalyst resists deactivation or poisoning from impurities often present in biomass.

    Having successfully demonstrated the technology in the lab, MIT and NREL filed a patent application for the technology. Now, to show its value outside the lab for the biofuels industry, it is time to scale it up.

    The Three-Year Plan: Scaling It Up

    Over the next three years, Comstock will build a pilot-scale version of the MIT–NREL lignin conversion technology, a task that involves linking the various steps into an uninterrupted process that can run continuously. They will also incorporate larger reactors and equipment, moving from producing milliliters of the aromatic SAF blendstock to a few gallons.

    That process will provide Comstock with valuable data and engineering designs to consider as it works to integrate it with its own Bioleum technology. Winsness said that the MIT–NREL process can be added with a few minor modifications to accept the existing lignin stream.

    At its facility in Wausau, Wisconsin, Comstock’s 50-gallon flow-through reactor is a workhorse and represents the kind of reactor the company aims to integrate with the MIT–NREL technology. Photo from Comstock Fuels

    “We already have over 2,000 runs on our pilot reactor and a tremendous amount of data,” Winsness said. “We think we can take the MIT–NREL process from a technology readiness level (TRL) of 4 to 6 very quickly if all goes well.”

    Of course, that would not be the end of the systematic process for demonstrating and commercializing the technology. After successfully piloting the MIT–NREL process at TRL 6 and 7, Comstock would then need to integrate the process into even larger facilities in the coming years, elevating the Comstock and MIT–NREL processes to TRL 8 and 9. Comstock Fuels plans to license the technologies globally and to build, own, and operate its own network of Bioleum refineries in the United States with several sites under evaluation for construction of its initial demonstration-scale facility—paving the way for commercialization.

    Success could put millions of more gallons of SAF into the marketplace, according to NREL senior licensing executive Eric Payne.

    “It’s not every day the lab gets a partner like Comstock who’s ready to jump in and fund technology scale-up, which is so critical for commercialization,” he said. “They’ve got the potential to impact billions of gallons of SAF, and that is really exciting. This is a huge market.”

    Learn more about NREL’s biofuels and bio-based chemicals research, as well as the laboratory’s broader advanced aviation research.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Ciscomani Stands Up For Ranchers, Provides an Update on his work in Congress in Graham County

    Source: United States House of Representatives – Congressman Juan Ciscomani (Arizona)

    Safford, AZ – U.S. Congressman Juan Ciscomani told Graham County ranchers that they should receive full compensation for cattle killed by Mexican gray wolves. 

    “Ranchers in Arizona and other western states face an intolerable situation,” said Ciscomani. “Their livelihood is directly threatened by an animal that the federal government has reintroduced into our communities. Yet when a wolf kills their cattle, they can’t get full compensation. This just isn’t right.”  

    Ciscomani told ranchers he’s a co-sponsor of the Wolf and Livestock Fairness (WOLF) Act (H.R. 2227) to fully reimburse ranchers for any livestock killed or harmed by endangered Mexican gray wolves. Currently, ranchers are compensated for 75 percent of the value of livestock killed by gray wolves. This bill increases compensation for ranchers to 100 percent of the value of cattle loss and compensates them for decreased herd sizes. 

    “Government bureaucracy cannot stand between ranchers and their way of life,” said Ciscomani

    The Congressman’s meeting with ranchers in Safford was part of a day spent in Graham County. He also provided a congressional update to elected officials, students, business leaders, educators, and community members at Eastern Arizona College. Here is some of the legislation he has introduced and cosponsored to support students, veterans, and workers across Arizona’s 6th District: 

    • The Secure our Rural Schools Act (H.R. 1383) which provides funding to rural counties and schools that are impacted by federal land management, particularly those with large areas of federally owned, tax-exempt forests. 
    • The Veterans Education and Technical Skills (VETS) Opportunity Act (H.R. 1458), would expand veterans’ access to educational opportunities in high-demand skill and vocation programs, whether in-person or partially online.  
    • The Creating Opportunities for New Skills Training at Rural and Underserved Colleges and Trade Schools (CONSTRUCTS) Act (H.R. 1055) would create a grant program to fund and develop residential construction education and certification programs at community colleges, junior colleges, and trade schools 
       

    “I am committed to making sure that rural communities, which are often overlooked by the federal government, have a seat at the table,” said Ciscomani. “I spent the day in Graham County, where I met with ranchers to talk about my efforts to strengthen water security, the problem posed by Mexican gray wolves, and my support of a bipartisan bill to provide full reimbursement to ranchers when livestock are killed or harmed by these wolves. Afterwards, I had an engaging meeting with local leaders and community members where I provided an update on my work in Congress and reiterated my ironclad support of Pell Grants, protecting Medicaid, and next steps in reconciliation process. As I always say, you never have to wonder what people in rural Arizona think, and today’s dialogue equips me to better deliver for all of my constituents.” 

    Read coverage from the Gila Valley Central here

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: BloFin Among the First Four Exchanges Worldwide to Support Full Unified Trading Account (UTA)

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MAJURO, Marshall Islands, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — BloFin announces its achievement as one of the first four global exchanges—alongside OKX, Bybit, and Gate.io—to offer full Unified Trading Account (UTA) functionality to all users. This milestone reflects BloFin’s rapid product innovation and its commitment to delivering an institutional-grade trading experience, engineered for performance, capital efficiency, and operational flexibility.

    The latest update marks the complete rollout of Unified Trading Account Mode for all sub-accounts, allowing for the seamless management of Spot and Perpetual Futures positions within a single interface. At the same time, BloFin has officially launched Cross-Currency Margin Mode for sub-accounts, allowing users to utilize multiple asset types as collateral, enhancing margin efficiency and improving risk management across positions.

    To ensure a seamless transition and support a wide range of user preferences, the Master Account will continue operating under the traditional mode, ensuring a balanced experience for both new users and long-time traders. Sub-accounts, on the other hand, offer access to advanced features under the UTA framework.

    To accommodate diverse trading needs, BloFin offers three distinct account modes:

    • Spot Trading Mode – Tailored for users trading without leverage. This mode supports only spot trading and does not permit access to perpetual futures, copy trading (as trader or follower), trading bots, or the use of futures bonuses or vouchers.
    • Spot and Futures Trading Mode (Default) – Provides access to both spot and perpetual futures trading, along with copy trading functionality, trading bots, and the ability to utilize futures bonuses and vouchers. This mode also supports Single-Currency Margin, enabling users to consolidate margins across positions with the same settlement asset and offset unrealized PnL.
    • Multi-Currency Margin Mode – Available to accounts with an equity balance of 10,000 USDT or more, this mode allows users to post multiple cryptocurrencies as collateral for perpetual futures trading. Collateral is valued in USD, and margin obligations are shared across positions settled in different currencies. This mode enables cross-asset PnL offsetting but may also introduce spot trading liabilities and cross-currency liquidation risk.

    Together, these account modes provide traders with flexible, professional-grade tools to match their strategy, capital size, and risk appetite, underscoring BloFin’s ongoing commitment to building a comprehensive and customizable trading ecosystem.

    About BloFin
    ​BloFin is a top-tier cryptocurrency exchange that specializes in futures trading. The platform offers 480+ USDT-M perpetual pairs, spot trading, copy trading, API access, unified account management, and advanced sub-account solutions. Committed to security and compliance, BloFin integrates Fireblocks and Chainalysis to ensure robust asset protection. By partnering with top affiliates, BloFin delivers scalable trading solutions, efficient fund management, and enhanced flexibility for professional traders. ​As the constant sponsor of TOKEN2049, BloFin continues to expand its global presence, reinforcing its position as the place “WHERE WHALES ARE MADE.” For more information, visit BloFin’s official website at https://www.blofin.com.

    Follow us X(Twitter)|TelegramInstagramYouTube

    Contact:
    Annio W.
    annio@blofin.io

    Disclaimer: This press release is provided by the BloFin. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice.
    Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed.
    Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    A photo accompanying this announcement is available at https://www.globenewswire.com/NewsRoom/AttachmentNg/20355f39-b2ac-4b00-a620-44463c0f993d

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Press Release: Motorists Urged to Drive Carefully and Protect People in Work Zones

    Source: US State of Rhode Island

    National Work Zone Awareness Week is April 21-25, 2025

    Construction season has started, and the Rhode Island Department of Transportation (RIDOT) and its safety partners are reminding motorists to slow down and drive safely in work zones. This week (April 21-25) is National Work Zone Awareness Week � a time when drivers are asked to slow down when they approach a work zone � or a public safety vehicle.

    RIDOT Director Peter Alviti, Jr. today joined officials from the Rhode Island State Police, Federal Highway Administration, Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority, Rhode Island Police Chiefs Association, AAA Northeast, the Laborers’ International Union of North America and the Rhode Island Building and Construction Trades Council for a press conference at the Department’s headquarters in Providence.

    “This week, our construction and safety partners raise awareness about the dangers our workers face as they go about their jobs to make our roads better and safer,” Director Alviti said. “In Rhode Island alone there are hundreds of work zones set up throughout the year. These men and women are working mere feet from live, often high-speed traffic and we need to keep them safe.”

    This year’s Work Zone Awareness Week press conference featured the story of Lincoln Police Lieutenant Brad Stewart who was nearly struck by an errant driver in 2018 while assisting a work crew on Route 146 near Twin River Road. The driver thankfully did not hit his cruiser, but crashed into a sign board on a trailer, snapping it in half and nearly killing two workers on the road.

    It was a harrowing reminder of a serious injury crash in 2013 when a car slammed into the back of his cruiser at a high rate of speed on the side of Route 146, when he stopped to assist a motorist with a flat tire. The driver was heavily intoxicated � four times the legal limit. Stewart’s cruiser was totaled, and he was hospitalized with significant injuries. It took seven months of recovery before he was able to get back to work. Although that near miss happened five years after he was seriously injured, being in the center of another potentially bad crash really jolted him.

    “For a moment I was convinced that I got hit again,” he said. “It was that close. It all hit home again. You go out to work and you don’t know what could unfold when someone’s not paying attention and crashes into your work zone.”

    Across the country, fatal crashes in work zones have steadily increased. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, about 900 people a year die in work zone crashes. That’s up significantly from an average of 500 per year 10 years ago. At the current rate, that’s equivalent to 18 coach buses filled to capacity.

    “We have a shared responsibility to keep our roadways safe and this includes taking care when driving through a work zone,” said Lieutenant Colonel Robert Creamer, Deputy Superintendent and Chief of Field Operations for the Rhode Island State Police. “Our move-over law requires drivers to move over and slow down when they see emergency lights, so please follow the law and help us keep our roads safe for work crews and first responders.”

    Fortunately, RIDOT has not had any work zone fatalities among its staff or contractors in many years, however each year there are hundreds of crashes in work zones, resulting in many injuries and financial losses for those affected. Last year there were nearly 500 work zone-related crashes in Rhode Island, up from 346 crashes reported in 2021.

    “Distracted driving is an entirely preventable cause of work zone crashes, and we need to do more to protect the road workers and the police officers who are at these job sites every day,” said Chief Thomas F. Oates III, President of the Rhode Island Police Chiefs Association and Woonsocket Chief of Police. “Our ask is simple: please slow down and pay attention and help us make work zones safer for everyone.”

    Safety is RIDOT’s highest priority, and all work zones are established with careful attention to safety and in coordination with national standards and best practices. RIDOT routinely inspects all work zones on state roads, including those set up by contractors, bridge inspectors and utility companies. This interaction includes making sure work zones are set up correctly.

    RIDOT plans the timing and duration of work zones to reduce as much as possible the impact to traffic flow and travel time. The potential impact to traffic is carefully studied during the design process on each project with continual monitoring during projects for any changes that can be made to reduce congestion.

    In addition to today’s event, RIDOT coordinated with the Rhode Island Turnpike and Bridge Authority and Rhode Island Division of Capital Asset Management and Maintenance to illuminate key structures in orange in recognition of Work Zone Awareness Week. This includes the State House, the Sakonnet River Bridge and the Pawtucket River Bridge. Additionally, Big Blue Bug Solutions is currently displaying a Work Zone Awareness Week banner at its “Nibbles Woodaway” statue on the roof of its Providence office, highly visible to motorists on I-95. RIDOT will utilize a variety of advertising mediums to help spread the important message of safe driving in work zones.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Global: The focus on manufacturing in the federal election misses what could truly help Canadian workers

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Gerard Di Trolio, PhD candidate, Labour Studies, McMaster University

    Canada’s major political parties have been pledging support for the manufacturing sector ahead of next week’s election, but Canada’s working class is much broader than just manufacturing.

    Canadians are on edge because as many as 600,000 jobs are at stake due to tariffs levied by United States President Donald Trump.

    But the focus on manufacturing obscures what truly ails the working class in an advanced economy like Canada’s. Manufacturing’s share of employment hovers at around 8.9 per cent, while nearly 80 per cent of Canadians work in the service sector.

    A recent report from the non-partisan Cardus think tank notes that Canada’s working class today is “likely to be a female, recently immigrated worker in the services-producing sector. The new working class, in other words, is now more personified by a Walmart cashier or an Amazon delivery driver than a General Motors factory worker or a Domtar mill hand.”




    Read more:
    Canada’s labour market is failing racialized immigrant women, requiring an urgent policy response


    Manufacturing gives way to services

    So why is there such emphasis on manufacturing?

    It’s easy to understand. Manufacturing has been essential to industrialization, from the British Empire to China’s unprecedented growth in recent years.

    The late British-Hungarian economist Nicholas Kaldor argued that manufacturing is the engine of growth due to increasing returns to scale, strong links to other sectors and its role in technological development.

    But as countries become wealthier, an increased demand for services follows, creating jobs in that sector. Manufacturing sectors in wealthier countries tend to invest in labour-saving technologies. The U.S., for example, has seen manufacturing employment fall while output has increased.

    Labour-intensive sectors like clothing cannot compete with Bangladeshi wages, but discussions about manufacturing jobs in Canada and other advanced economies too often focus on wage competition instead of job losses through automation and increasing productivity.

    There were losers when the globalization era began, but countries like Canada and the U.S. are wealthier today than they were in 1994, when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed. As American economist Jeffrey Sachs has pointed out, governments have failed to redistribute the wealth created by gains from trade to those at the bottom of the income scale.




    Read more:
    Beyond NAFTA: Canada must find new global markets


    Four policies of a real working-class agenda

    There are several key policies that politicians should be proposing that would really help the working class.

    First is one that all politicians are talking about: building more housing.

    Second is related to key elements of social reproduction — that is, care work. There must be strong funding commitments to ensure a national childcare system functions properly.

    With Canada on track to experience a surge of its elderly population, long-term care also needs to be a focus. Personal support workers must earn a living wage and must have better working conditions. Canada’s aging population is also why decreased immigration is a bad idea.

    The third policy requires the federal and provincial governments to get serious about active labour market policies. This means building a labour market training system that actually works, something Canada has lacked.

    These policies are generally not implemented in liberal market economies like Canada and the U.S.

    But in countries like Sweden with active labour market policies in place, 80 per cent of the population has a favourable opinion of robots and AI compared to two-thirds of Americans who are concerned about technological job loss. The state’s ability — or lack of it — to provide social protections and job re-training has real impacts on how people perceive technological change.

    Canada also needs to recognize foreign credentials. Its reluctance to do so has had a negative impact on the economic prospects of immigrants. Canada should also consider making higher education free.

    The fourth policy involves better worker protections that include a strengthened Employment Insurance that is easier to qualify for, improved protections for gig workers and increasing union membership.

    Apart from the public sector, Canadian unions have not fared well organizing in service industries. Unions need to make a serious effort to organize in retail, food service, the gig economy and logistics, despite the challenges. Canadian unions may find that they have little choice but to do so, as their presence in the private sector continues to decline.




    Read more:
    Canada Post strike highlights labour struggle over gig economy and precarious work


    Inequality, wealth redistribution

    The most significant barrier of these four policy proposals is that most require an increased redistribution of wealth. Canada over the past several decades has retreated from wealth redistribution and as a result, economic inequality has surged.

    White blue-collar workers in the U.S. in areas hit by factory job losses swung to Trump. A Canadian version of this is happening with some blue-collar unions endorsing the Conservatives under Pierre Poilievre.




    Read more:
    Pierre Poilievre is popular among union members. What’s it really all about?


    Fixating on manufacturing is not a solution. After 2012, China began shedding manufacturing employment. Job demand in Chinese manufacturing today is in sectors that require skilled workers for software and AI systems. Services like retail, technology and transportation are also drawing in workers from manufacturing.

    Building infrastructure, green energy

    Not all blue-collar work will disappear. Canada needs labour to build not just homes, but high-speed rail.




    Read more:
    Canada is one step closer to high-speed rail, but many hurdles remain


    Active labour market policies will be key to ensuring manufacturing workers transition into building infrastructure and green energy. Canada can also remain competitive in areas like aluminum production .

    Policymakers need to understand our post-industrial moment, and focus on a just transition for manufacturing workers.

    Labour and progressive movements have long championed a just transition for fossil fuel workers. Like factory workers, fossil fuel workers have been courted by right-wing politicians who tell them environmental policies will destroy their jobs. At the same time, oil companies automate their jobs anyway.

    These policies are not easy to achieve, but there are few other options for Canada if it wants to be carbon-free, open to the world and more equal. Canada’s economic nostalgia for manufacturing is ultimately strange given it’s also a common talking point of Trump, a politician who’s wildly unpopular in Canada.

    Gerard Di Trolio does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The focus on manufacturing in the federal election misses what could truly help Canadian workers – https://theconversation.com/the-focus-on-manufacturing-in-the-federal-election-misses-what-could-truly-help-canadian-workers-254651

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI: XenDex Reveals the Problems It Aims to Tackle on the XRP Ledger, and Its Token Use Cases

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    SYDNEY, April 22, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Ripple (XRP) Ledger has been existing for more than a decade, and has also been long celebrated for its speed, low transaction costs, and scalability. However, as decentralized finance (DeFi) continues to evolve, the XRP Ledger has yet to offer the full suite of tools and functionality seen on other leading blockchains like Ethereum or BNB Chain. Specifically, Ripple lacks a native lending and borrowing platform, as well as AI-assisted trading tools, both of which are now standard expectations in modern DeFi ecosystems.

    This is where XenDex comes in; combining these functions and offering an interface where users can optimally maximize the functions being offered by XenDex.

    Visit XenDex Website & Join Telegram Community

    XenDex is the first all-in-one non-custodial decentralized exchange (DEX) built on the XRP Ledger, offering features like AI-powered copy trading, lending and borrowing, staking, and governance — all in one seamless platform. It’s designed to be fast, user-friendly, and perfect for both beginners and experienced crypto users. It is powered by its native token $XDX, XenDex gives its users full control over trading, decision-making, and earning rewards, making it the DeFi engine XRP has been missing.

    XenDex: Solving Real Problems on XRPL

    The team behind the development of XenDex identified some features and utilities which the Ripple ecosystem has long been lacking, and decided to band together with the aim of providing these features, and solving a few other problems which has been existing on the Ripple ecosystem. XenDex is not just another decentralized exchange, but it is the first all-in-one DeFi solution on the XRP Ledger, combining essential features such as:

    • Non-custodial lending and borrowing
    • AI-powered copy trading
    • Liquidity farming and staking
    • Spot and perpetual trading with AMM technology
    • Governance via DAO
    • Cross-chain swaps and future interoperability

    Join XenDex Community On Telegram

    $XDX Primary Use Cases And Advantages

    The native utility token of XenDex, $XDX, fuels the entire ecosystem. Holding $XDX gives users a wide range of advantages, including but not limited to:

    • Governance rights – giving holders real control to vote on listings, upgrades, etc.
    • DeFi Applications – used in our DeFi applications and functions, allowing users to borrow, lend, and trade within the ecosystem.
    • Staking rewards – earn passive income by providing liquidity to our pool
    • Trading benefits – reduced fees while using our platform, access to exclusive and premium features

    An Interface Built for Everyone

    One of XenDex’s standout strengths is its user-first interface. The app is designed to be sleek, fast, and incredibly easy to use, even for individuals transitioning from Web2. From real-time trading to lending dashboards, everything is accessible with clean navigation, no need for technical knowledge or third-party help. Onboarding on XenDex is seamless and frictionless.

    Why You Should Join the XenDex Community

    XenDex is fundamentally community-driven platform developed on the Ripple blockchain, and joining early offers major advantages such as:

    • Feeling among and being part of a like-minded community
    • Stay informed with first-hand updates and know more about XenDex through AMAs
    • Participate in events, contests, and community games
    • Get airdrops and other community rewards
    • Help shape the project’s future through community governance

    Follow Us On Our Socials Below:

    Website: https://xendex.net
    Telegram: https://t.me/XenDexCommunity
    Twitter: https://x.com/XenDex_XRP

    Contact:
    Frank Richards
    Frank@xendex.net

    Disclaimer: This is a paid post provided by XenDex. The statements, views, and opinions expressed in this content are solely those of the content provider and do not necessarily reflect the views of this media platform or its publisher. We do not endorse, verify, or guarantee the accuracy, completeness, or reliability of any information presented. We do not guarantee any claims, statements, or promises made in this article. This content is for informational purposes only and should not be considered financial, investment, or trading advice.Investing in crypto and mining-related opportunities involves significant risks, including the potential loss of capital. It is possible to lose all your capital. These products may not be suitable for everyone, and you should ensure that you understand the risks involved. Seek independent advice if necessary. Speculate only with funds that you can afford to lose. Readers are strongly encouraged to conduct their own research and consult with a qualified financial advisor before making any investment decisions. However, due to the inherently speculative nature of the blockchain sector—including cryptocurrency, NFTs, and mining—complete accuracy cannot always be guaranteed.Neither the media platform nor the publisher shall be held responsible for any fraudulent activities, misrepresentations, or financial losses arising from the content of this press release. In the event of any legal claims or charges against this article, we accept no liability or responsibility. Globenewswire does not endorse any content on this page.

    Legal Disclaimer: This media platform provides the content of this article on an “as-is” basis, without any warranties or representations of any kind, express or implied. We assume no responsibility for any inaccuracies, errors, or omissions. We do not assume any responsibility or liability for the accuracy, content, images, videos, licenses, completeness, legality, or reliability of the information presented herein. Any concerns, complaints, or copyright issues related to this article should be directed to the content provider mentioned above.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI China: New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor boosts development of mechanical equipment industry

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor boosts development of mechanical equipment industry

    Updated: April 22, 2025 21:52 Xinhua
    A staff member conducts performance test on an excavator at an equipment manufacturing company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 21, 2025. Launched in 2017, the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor is a trade and logistics passage jointly built by provincial-level regions in western China and ASEAN members. In recent years, along with the development of the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor, equipment manufacturing companies in China’s western regions have sped up digital and intelligent transformation, as a way to boost high-quality development of companies themselves as well as assist the building of the corridor with better mechanical equipment. According to statistics, as of early March, the New International Land-Sea Trade Corridor’s cargo services connect 158 locations across 73 domestic cities and reach 556 ports in 127 countries and regions. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Customs officers inspect loaders for export to Vietnam at the port of the Friendship Pass in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 17, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on March 21, 2025 shows loaders for export to Vietnam in Guangxi Pingxiang Integrated Free Trade Zone in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. [Photo/Xinhua]
    Staff members work on an assembly line of excavators for export to Laos and Myanmar at an equipment manufacturing company in southwest China’s Chongqing Municipality, April 21, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    An aerial drone photo taken on March 21, 2025 shows trucks loaded with equipment for export to Vietnam in Guangxi Pingxiang Integrated Free Trade Zone in Pingxiang, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member works on a production line of loaders at an equipment manufacturing company in Liuzhou, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 11, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member conducts test at an equipment manufacturing company in Liuzhou, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 12, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]
    A staff member verifies the information of machine parts for export to Qatar at a logistics center in Liuzhou, south China’s Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, March 12, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    MIL OSI China News