Category: Trade

  • MIL-OSI Security: Alleged Member of Cartel Enforcement Group Extradited from Mexico

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    SAN DIEGO – Edgar Perez Villa, an alleged member of a Tijuana-based enforcement group for the Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, commonly known as CJNG, was extradited from Mexico to the United States on Thursday and made his first appearance in federal court in San Diego today.

    Perez Villa was indicted along with other alleged Mexican drug cartel enforcers in connection with their alleged violent support of heroin and methamphetamine trafficking.

    At today’s hearing, Perez Villa was arraigned and entered a not-guilty plea before U.S. Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt. The government asked that Perez Villa be detained on grounds that he is a significant flight risk. Judge Burkhardt scheduled a detention hearing for February 27, 2025, at 2 p.m. before Judge Michelle Pettit. The Court also set March 28, 2025, at 10:30 a.m. for a motion hearing/trial setting before U.S. District Court Judge Cynthia A. Bashant.

    The superseding indictment, returned on March 6, 2020, plus a related indictment returned on March 16, 2021, collectively charged Perez Villa, aka Cabo 89, along with other alleged cartel leaders – including Edgar Herrera Pardo, aka Caiman; Carlos Lorenzo Hinojosa Guerrero, aka Cabo 96; and Israel Alejandro Vazquez-Vazquez, aka Cabo 50, among others. They are charged with drug trafficking crimes.

    According to court documents, the defendants were leaders of a violent group of cartel enforcers known as “Los Cabos” who operated in Baja California to secure control of the region for CJNG.

    Los Cabos allegedly employed rampant violence to ensure that CJNG maintained the ability to traffic drugs through Tijuana and into the United States through San Diego. According to the indictment, investigators learned through judicially-authorized interceptions that the leaders of Los Cabos planned more than 150 murders, the majority of which took place in Tijuana, according to the filings.

    Los Cabos allegedly engaged in this violence in support of CJNG, one of the most dangerous transnational criminal organizations in the world.  The cartel has its hands in trafficking multiple deadly substances. It is responsible for moving tons of cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl-laced heroin into the United States.  CJNG is also a prolific methamphetamine producer and chemical importer, using precursors procured from China and India. CJNG is one of the most powerful Mexican cartels operating within the United States.

    “For far too long, violent cartels have inflicted untold suffering through violence and drug addiction,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Andrew Haden. “Our fight against this reign of terror will not waver.”

    “Cartels use violence and intimidation to control the areas they terrorize,” said DEA Special Agent in Charge Brian Clark. “As an alleged member of Los Cabos, Perez-Villa spent years destroying the community through drug trafficking and violence. One by one, the DEA will hold these criminals accountable and bring them to justice.”

    This case is the result of ongoing efforts by the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF), a partnership that brings together the combined expertise and unique abilities of federal, state and local law enforcement agencies. The principal mission of the OCDETF program is to identify, disrupt, dismantle and prosecute high-level members of drug trafficking, weapons trafficking and money laundering organizations and enterprises.

    The Justice Department’s Office of International Affairs worked with law enforcement partners in Mexico to secure the arrest and extradition of Perez Villa.

    DEFENDANT                                                                                        

    Case Number: 19CR1274-BAS

    Edgar Perez Villa, aka Cabo 89, aka Nier                Age 35                 Tijuana

    SUMMARY OF CHARGES

    Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances for Purpose of Unlawful Importation, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 959, 960 and 963

    Maximum Sentence: Mandatory minimum ten years and up to life imprisonment, $10 million fine

    Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances, in violation of Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846

    Maximum Sentence: Mandatory minimum ten years and up to life imprisonment, $10 million fine

    INVESTIGATING AGENCIES

    Drug Enforcement Administration

    Homeland Security Investigations

    Department of Justice, Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force

    Department of Justice, Office of Enforcement Operations

    Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs

    San Diego Sheriff’s Department

    *An indictment or complaint is not evidence that the defendant committed the crimes charged. The defendant is presumed innocent until the Government meets its burden in court of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI: Faircourt Asset Management Inc. Announces February Distribution

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Toronto, Feb. 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Faircourt Asset Management Inc., as Manager of the Faircourt Fund (CBOE:FGX), is pleased to announce the monthly distribution payable on the Shares of the below listed Fund.

    Faircourt Funds Trading Symbol Distribution Amount (per share/unit) Ex-Dividend Date Record Date Payable Date
    Faircourt Gold Income Corp. FGX $0.024 February 28, 2025 February 28, 2025 March 14, 2025

    Faircourt Asset Management Inc. is the Investment Advisor for Faircourt Gold Income Corp.

    This press release is not for distribution in the United States or over United States wire services.

    For further information on the Faircourt Funds, please visit www.faircourtassetmgt.com or
    please contact 1-800-831-0304.

    You will usually pay brokerage fees to your dealer if you purchase or sell Shares of the Fund on the CBOE Canada Exchange or other alternative Canadian trading system (an “exchange”). If the Shares are purchased or sold on an exchange, investors may pay more than the current net asset value when buying Shares of the Fund and may receive less than the current net asset value when selling them.

    There are ongoing fees and expenses associated with owning units of an investment fund. An investment fund must prepare disclosure documents that contain key information about the fund. You can find more detailed information about the fund in the public filings available at www.sedar.com. Investment funds are not guaranteed, their values change frequently and past performance may not be repeated.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA News: America First Investment Policy

    Source: The White House

    class=”has-text-align-left”>MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
             THE SECRETARY OF STATE
             THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
             THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
             THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
             THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
             THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
             THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY
             THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
             THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
             THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
             THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
             THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS
             THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY
             THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
             THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

    SUBJECT:       America First Investment Policy
     
     
    By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, I hereby direct the following:
     
             Section 1.  Principles and Objectives.  America’s investment policy is critical to our national and economic security.  Welcoming foreign investment and strengthening the United States’ world-leading private and public capital markets will be a key part of America’s Golden Age.  The United States has the world’s most attractive assets, in technology and across our economy, and we will make it easier for our overseas allies to support United States jobs, United States innovators, and United States economic growth with their capital.
     
             Investment by United States allies and partners can create hundreds of thousands of jobs and significant wealth for the United States.  Our Nation is committed to maintaining the strong, open investment environment that benefits our economy and our people, while enhancing our ability to protect the United States from new and evolving threats that can accompany foreign investment.
     
             Investment at all costs is not always in the national interest, however.  Certain foreign adversaries, including the People’s Republic of China (PRC), systematically direct and facilitate investment in United States companies and assets to obtain cutting-edge technologies, intellectual property, and leverage in strategic industries.  The PRC pursues these strategies in diverse ways, both visible and concealed, and often through partner companies or investment funds in third countries. 
     
             Economic security is national security.  The PRC does not allow United States companies to take over their critical infrastructure, and the United States should not allow the PRC to take over United States critical infrastructure.  PRC-affiliated investors are targeting the crown jewels of United States technology, food supplies, farmland, minerals, natural resources, ports, and shipping terminals.
     
             The PRC is also increasingly exploiting United States capital to develop and modernize its military, intelligence, and other security apparatuses, which poses significant risk to the United States homeland and Armed Forces of the United States around the world.  Related actions include the development and deployment of dual-use technologies, weapons of mass destruction, advanced conventional weapons, and malicious cyber‑enabled actions against the United States and its people.  Through its national Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the PRC increases the size of its military-industrial complex by compelling civilian Chinese companies and research institutions to support its military and intelligence activities.
     
             Those Chinese companies also raise capital by:  selling to American investors securities that trade on American and foreign public exchanges; lobbying United States index providers and funds to include these securities in market offerings; and engaging in other acts to ensure access to United States capital and accompanying intangible benefits.  In this way, the PRC exploits United States investors to finance and advance the development and modernization of its military.
     
             Sec2.  Policy.  (a)  It is the policy of the United States to preserve an open investment environment to help ensure that artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies of the future are built, created, and grown right here in the United States.  Investment in our economy from our allies and partners, some of whom have tremendous sovereign wealth funds, supports the national interest.  My Administration will make the United States the world’s greatest destination for investment dollars, to the benefit of all of us. 
     
             (b)  Yet for investment in United States businesses involved in critical technology, critical infrastructure, personal data, and other sensitive areas, restrictions on foreign investors’ access to United States assets will ease in proportion to their verifiable distance and independence from the predatory investment and technology-acquisition practices of the PRC and other foreign adversaries or threat actors.
     
             (c)  The United States will create an expedited “fast-track” process, based on objective standards, to facilitate greater investment from specified allied and partner sources in United States businesses involved with United States advanced technology and other important areas.  This process will allow for increased foreign investment subject to appropriate security provisions, including requirements that the specified foreign investors avoid partnering with United States foreign adversaries.  
     
             (d)  My Administration will also expedite environmental reviews for any investment over $1 billion in the United States.
     
             (e)  The United States will reduce the exploitation of public and private sector capital, technology, and technical knowledge by foreign adversaries such as the PRC.  The United States will establish new rules to stop United States companies and investors from investing in industries that advance the PRC’s national Military-Civil Fusion strategy and stop PRC-affiliated persons from buying up critical American businesses and assets, allowing only those investments that serve American interests.
     
             (f)  The United States will use all necessary legal instruments, including the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), to restrict PRC-affiliated persons from investing in United States technology, critical infrastructure, healthcare, agriculture, energy, raw materials, or other strategic sectors.  My Administration will protect United States farmland and real estate near sensitive facilities.  It will also seek, including in consultation with the Congress, to strengthen CFIUS authority over “greenfield” investments, to restrict foreign adversary access to United States talent and operations in sensitive technologies (especially artificial intelligence), and to expand the remit of “emerging and foundational” technologies addressable by CFIUS.
     
             (g)  To reduce uncertainty for investors, reduce administrative burden, and increase Government efficiency, my Administration will cease the use of overly bureaucratic, complex, and open-ended “mitigation” agreements for United States investments from foreign adversary countries.  In general, mitigation agreements should consist of concrete actions that companies can complete within a specific time, rather than perpetual and expensive compliance obligations.  More administrative resources, in turn, will be directed toward facilitating investments from key partner countries.
     
             (h)  The United States will continue to welcome and encourage passive investments from all foreign persons.  These include non-controlling stakes and shares with no voting, board, or other governance rights and that do not confer any managerial influence, substantive decisionmaking, or non-public access to technologies or technical information, products, or services.  This will allow our cutting-edge businesses to continue to benefit from foreign investment capital, while ensuring protection of our national security.
     
             (i)  The United States will also use all necessary legal instruments to further deter United States persons from investing in the PRC’s military-industrial sector.  These may include the imposition of sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) through the blocking of assets or through other actions, including actions pursuant to Executive Order 13959 of November 12, 2020 (Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies), as amended by Executive Order 13974 of January 13, 2021 (Amending Executive Order 13959 — Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies) and Executive Order 14032 of June 3, 2021 (Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Certain Companies of the People’s Republic of China), and actions pursuant to Executive Order 14105 of August 9, 2023 (Addressing United States Investments in Certain National Security Technologies and Products in Countries of Concern).  Executive Order 14105 is under review by my Administration, pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of January 20, 2025 (America First Trade Policy), to examine whether it includes sufficient controls to address national security threats.
     
             (j)  This review will build on measures taken under my authority in 2020 and 2021 and consider new or expanded restrictions on United States outbound investment in the PRC in sectors such as semiconductors, artificial intelligence, quantum, biotechnology, hypersonics, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, directed energy, and other areas implicated by the PRC’s national Military-Civil Fusion strategy.  Covered sectors should be reviewed and updated regularly, including by the Office of Science and Technology Policy.  As part of the review, my Administration will consider applying restrictions on investment types including private equity, venture capital, greenfield investments, corporate expansions, and investments in publicly traded securities, from sources including pension funds, university endowments, and other limited-partner investors.  It is past time for American universities to stop supporting foreign adversaries with their investment decisions, much as they should stop granting university access to supporters of terrorism.
     
             (k)  To further reduce incentives for United States persons to invest in our foreign adversaries, we will review whether to suspend or terminate the 1984 United States-The People’s Republic of China Income Tax Convention.  That tax treaty, along with the PRC’s admission to the World Trade Organization and the related undertaking by the United States to accord unconditional Most Favored Nation treatment to goods and services of the PRC, led to the deindustrialization of the United States and the technological modernization of the PRC military.  We will seek to reverse both those trends.  United States investors will invest in the future of America, not the future of the PRC.
     
             (l)  To protect the savings of United States investors and channel them into American growth and prosperity, my Administration will also:
     
             (i)    determine if adequate financial auditing standards are upheld for companies covered by the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act;
     
             (ii)   review the variable interest entity and subsidiary structures used by foreign-adversary companies to trade on United States exchanges, which limit the ownership rights and protections for United States investors, as well as allegations of fraudulent behavior by these companies; and
     
             (iii)  restore the highest fiduciary standards as required by the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, seeking to ensure that foreign adversary companies are ineligible for pension plan contributions.
     
             Sec3.  Implementation.  The policy set forth in section 2 of this memorandum shall be implemented, to the extent permitted by law and available appropriations, and subject to internal programmatic and budgetary processes, as follows:
     
             (a)  With respect to sections 2(a) through 2(k) of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, and the heads of other executive departments and agencies (agencies) as deemed appropriate by the Secretary of the Treasury, and with respect to the authorities of CFIUS in coordination with the members thereof, shall take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, to support all powers granted to the President by IEEPA, section 721 of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and other statutes to carry out the purposes of this memorandum.
     
             (b)  With respect to section 2(d) of this memorandum, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, in consultation with the heads of other agencies as appropriate, shall carry out the purposes of this memorandum.
     
             (c)  With respect to section 2(l)(i) of this memorandum, the Secretary of the Treasury shall engage as appropriate with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board; with respect to section 2(l)(ii) of this memorandum, the Attorney General, in coordination with the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall provide a written recommendation on the risk posed to United States investors based on the auditability, corporate oversight, and evidence of criminal or civil fraudulent behavior for all foreign adversary companies currently listed on domestic exchanges; and with respect to section 2(l)(iii) of this memorandum, the Secretary of Labor shall publish updated fiduciary standards under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 for investments in public market securities of foreign adversary companies.
     
             Sec4.  Definition.  For purposes of this memorandum, the term “foreign adversaries” includes the PRC, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region; the Republic of Cuba; the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; the Russian Federation; and the regime of Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro.
     
             Sec. 5.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

                      (i.) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or

                      (ii.) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

             (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
     
             (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: 2025 Action Plan for Stabilizing Foreign Investment

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    2025 Action Plan for Stabilizing Foreign Investment

    Ministry of Commerce and

    National Development and Reform Commission

    Foreign investment is crucial for promoting high-level opening-up. It plays an important role in fostering new quality productive forces and advancing Chinese modernization. We have thus formulated this action plan to intensify efforts to attract and stabilize foreign investment in 2025.

    I. Expanding self-initiated opening-up in an orderly manner

    1. Expanding pilot programs to open up the telecommunications, healthcare, and education sectors. We will support efforts of the pilot regions to publicize and implement the opening-up policies for value-added telecommunications, biotechnology, and wholly foreign-owned hospitals, and assemble special teams to follow foreign-invested projects under discussion and help solve problems timely, and push for early implementation of these projects. We will expand pilot programs to open up the telecommunications and healthcare sectors at an appropriate time. We will study and formulate plans to expand self-initiated opening-up of the education and cultural sectors in an orderly manner, publish them at an appropriate time and implement them with steady steps.

    2. Ensuring the lift of restrictions on foreign investment in the manufacturing sector is well-implemented. For areas not on the negative lists for foreign investment access, we will administer foreign investment access in the principle of equal treatment for domestic and foreign investment alike. We will revise the negative lists and further reduce the listed items to expand opening-up to all types of market operators.

    3. Improving the national comprehensive demonstration zones for expanding opening-up in the services sector. We will support the leading role of the Beijing demonstration zone in expanding services liberalization to accelerate and intensify the pilot efforts. We will further expand the scope of the pilot to include new elements and tasks, and experiment with the opening-up measures in key areas in the demonstration zones first. We will conduct in-depth studies on policy measures to open up the services sector further, closely follow the progress of the pilot, and timely replicate pilot experience. We will support the standardization in the national comprehensive demonstration zones for expanding opening-up in the services sector.

    4. Advancing opening-up of the biomedicine sector in an orderly manner. We will support the participation of qualified foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in the segmented production of biological products on a pilot basis, speed up the review of pilot programs and quality monitoring programs at the provincial level, promote the optimization of resource allocation in the biomedicine industry, and coordinate for the timely resolution of difficulties facing enterprises in the pilot process. We will study and improve the opening-up policies for the pharmaceutical sector, facilitate more rapid launch of new drugs, optimize volume-based drug procurement, and make medical device procurement more predictable.

    5. Encouraging foreign equity investment in China. We will earnestly implement the Measures for the Administration of Strategic Investment in Listed Companies by Foreign Investors, formulate and release guidelines for making strategic investment, and intensify publicity efforts targeting listed companies, overseas funds, investment institutions, etc., to encourage more high-quality long-term foreign investment in listed Chinese companies.

    II. Improving the level of investment promotion

    6. Building continuously the brand of “Invest in China”. We will deepen the institutional reform of the foreign investment promotion system as required, devise an annual implementation plan for building the brand of “Invest in China”, and meticulously design and implement a series of “Invest in China” events. Central and local governments will make coordinated efforts in organizing overseas investment promotion events to fill in the gaps in and strengthen industrial and supply chains in the manufacturing sector with foreign investment. In light of the different characteristics of China’s major sources of foreign investment, we will research and formulate differentiated investment attraction targets and strategies, work closely with bilateral joint (mixed) economic and trade committees, and fully activate bilateral investment promotion working groups to boost project matchmaking.

    7. Strengthening support for FIEs’ reinvestment in China. We will keep optimizing the business environment and ensure full national treatment for FIEs. We will research and formulate policy measures to encourage FIEs to reinvest in China and use more of their profits made in China for reinvestment. We will pilot an information report program for FIEs’ investment in China.

    8. Encouraging foreign investment in a wider range of industries. We will revise and expand the catalogue of industries where foreign investment is encouraged, optimize foreign investment mix, promote the high-quality development of China’s manufacturing sector with foreign investment, steer foreign investment to the modern services sector, and support more foreign investment flows into China’s central, western and northeastern regions.

    9. Removing restrictions on foreign-invested investment companies’ access to domestic loans. Foreign-invested investment companies will be allowed to access domestic loans for equity investment. We will make greater efforts to communicate relevant policies and provide facilitation for multinational companies to invest in and establish headquarters and similar institutions in China.

    10. Encouraging multinational companies to invest in and establish investment companies. We will refine the rules for setting up foreign-invested investment companies and provide facilitation for multinational companies to invest in and establish investment companies in China in terms of foreign exchange administration, cross-border movement of personnel and cross border data flows. Companies invested in and established in China by foreign-invested investment companies will be eligible for FIE treatment in accordance with law and regulation.

    11. Facilitating merger & acquisition (M&A) investment in China by foreign investors. The Provisions on the Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Companies by Foreign Investors will be amended under the framework of the Foreign Investment Law, with refined M&A rules and transaction procedures, better defined scope of administration and lower threshold for cross-border share swaps.

    12. Intensifying investment attraction in key sectors. We will encourage and ensure national treatment for foreign investment in animal husbandry-related sectors such as breeding, production of rearing equipment and production of animal feed and veterinary medicine. To create more business opportunities and cooperation space for FIEs, we will support their participation in China’s new industrialization process, with a focus on high-tech sectors. Foreign investment utilization will be encouraged in services sectors including elderly care, culture and tourism, sports, healthcare, vocational education and finance to meet consumer demand for multi-tiered services.

    13. Promoting communications on economic policies and the business environment. Press releases and briefings, interviews and expert comments will be fully utilized to showcase and explain China’s new policies, measures and highlights for expanding high-standard opening up.

    III. Strengthening the functions of opening-up platforms

    14. Deepening institutional reforms in economic and technological development zones. We will improve policy support systems and develop policy papers on deepening reforms and innovations in national economic and technological development zones, roll out new measures in guaranteeing production factors, opening up key sectors, carrying out pilot reform tasks and delegating economic management power, so as to improve the standards of export-oriented economy in national economic and technological development zones. For national high-tech industrial development zones, special customs supervision areas and various provincial development zones, we will tap into their role as opening-up platforms for stabilizing foreign investment.

    15. Implementing the strategy to upgrade pilot free trade zones. We will improve the quality and efficiency of pilot free trade zones, expand the authorization of reform tasks, accelerate the implementation of core policies for the Hainan Free Trade Port and create a highland for attracting foreign investment. We support pilot free trade zones in stepping up stress tests in sectors accessible to foreign investment and continuing to expand institutional opening up in rules, regulation, management and standards.

    IV. Redoubling efforts to enhance services

    16. Promoting the implementation of major and key foreign-invested projects. We will encourage the inclusion of more foreign-invested projects in the lists of major and key foreign-invested projects and enhance policy support and services to accelerate the implementation of projects.

    17. Establishing a system of standards for domestic products in government procurement. We will speed up developing and issuing relevant documents to specify the standards of domestic products in government procurement and ensure that products produced by enterprises of different ownerships within China participate equally in government procurement activities. We will enhance policy communication in the field of government procurement and improve the handling of complaints from FIEs.

    18. Broadening financing channels for FIEs. We will encourage financial institutions to provide financing services for FIEs, research the borrowing needs, investment and operation of key FIEs, and organize targeted bank-enterprise matchmaking events. Various types of funds will be guided to carry out equity investment cooperation with FIEs, and FIEs supported in expanding their investment and business and deepening their footprint in China.

    19. Facilitating personnel exchange. We will accelerate negotiations on mutual visa exemption agreements, and continue to expand the coverage of China’s unilateral visa-free policy in a prudent manner. Policies for port visa, visa-free transit and regional visa-free entry will be optimized to promote cross-border movements of people. A Guide to Working and Living in China as Business Expatriates will be upgraded.

    20. Improving the level of trade facilitation for FIEs. We will work earnestly on issuing Certificates of Origin under preferential trade agreements to help FIEs enjoy tariff concessions from agreement partners. The inspection and regulation of complete sets of equipment imported for key foreign-invested projects will be optimized. More efforts will be made to support FIEs in obtaining the “Authorized Economic Operator” (AEO) certificate, and random inspections will be further optimized and reduced for AEOs. We will promote the adoption of inspection results of imports in an active and prudent manner, and include more qualified Chinese and foreign inspection institutions on the list of institutions whose inspection results are adopted. FIEs will be encouraged to apply for recordation of their intellectual property rights, and any infringement in the process of import and export will be resolutely combated.

    Under the centralized and unified leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, all regions and relevant departments should unswervingly deepen reform and opening up, refine specific implementation measures, and innovate working methods and strengthen policy and factor support in areas including investment promotion, rights and interests protection and services guarantee, to ensure that the measures can be put in place and take effect in 2025, so as to effectively boost the confidence of foreign investors. Relevant departments should be organized to visit key regions and major FIEs to better understand the requests of FIEs and effectively respond to their concerns. The Ministry of Commerce and the National Development and Reform Commission will work with relevant departments and agencies to enhance guidance and coordination for effective policy communication and implementation. Significant matters should be reported in a timely manner.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Delegation of Chinese entrepreneurs visits South Africa

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    JOHANNESBURG, Feb. 21 — A delegation of Chinese entrepreneurs visited South Africa from Wednesday to Friday to promote cooperation between businesses of the two countries.

    The delegation, led by Ren Hongbin, chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), took the elevation of China-South Africa bilateral ties to an all-round strategic cooperative partnership in the new era as an opportunity to deepen mutual exchanges.

    During the visit, Ren engaged in extensive discussions with South African officials and business representatives. He also attended the China-South Africa Economic and Trade Forum, the third China International Supply Chain Expo Promotion Conference, as well as the China-South Africa Business Networking.

    The CCPIT chairman introduced China’s high-quality development to promote the Chinese path to modernization and its adherence to high-level opening up. He welcomed the South African business community to participate in the third China International Supply Chain Expo to deepen bilateral cooperation in industrial and supply chains.

    The enterprises and institutions from both sides have conducted multiple business negotiations and exchanges, achieving fruitful results.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Issues Directive to Prevent the Unfair Exploitation of American Innovation

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    SAFEGUARDING AMERICA’S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS ECONOMY: Today, President Donald J. Trump signed a memorandum to defend American companies and innovators from overseas extortion.
    This Administration will consider responsive actions like tariffs to combat the digital service taxes (DSTs), fines, practices, and policies that foreign governments levy on American companies.
    DSTs allow foreign governments to collect tax revenue from American companies simply because they operate in foreign markets, even though those companies are generally not otherwise subject to foreign jurisdiction.

    President Trump will not allow foreign governments to appropriate America’s tax base for their own benefit.
    This memorandum directs the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to renew the DST investigations under Section 301 that were initiated during President Trump’s first term, and investigate any additional countries that use a DST to discriminate against U.S. companies. 
    The Administration will review whether any act, policy, or practice in the European Union or United Kingdom incentivizes U.S. companies to develop or use products and technology in ways that undermine free speech or foster censorship.
    Foreign governments will invite responsive actions from the Administration if they take steps to coerce U.S. businesses to hand over their intellectual property.
    Regulations that dictate how American companies interact with consumers in the European Union, like the Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act, will face scrutiny from the Administration.
    DEFENDING AMERICAN COMPANIES FROM EXTORTION: President Trump’s memorandum unveils a comprehensive approach to ensuring that U.S. products and services are governed by the United States of America, not foreign governments.
    Rather than position their own companies and workers for success, foreign governments have been taxing the success of America’s companies and workers.
    America’s economy will not be a source of revenue for countries that have failed to cultivate economic success of their own.  

    To the detriment of America’s economy, in recent years, a number of our trading partners began enacting DSTs to raise revenue for their own government spending.
    Foreign governments could collect billions in DSTs from U.S. companies annually.

    This exploitation goes beyond DSTs to other forms of unfair fines, practices, and penalties that undermine the ability of American companies to operate as intended and force them to incur additional compliance costs, lowering U.S. global economic competitiveness.
    In terms of GDP, the United States digital economy has been larger than most countries’ entire economy in recent years, including Australia, Canada, and most members of the European Union.
    America’s digital economic dominance is driven by cutting-edge American tech companies, and the American innovation and workers behind them.
    RESTORING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT OF AMERICA: President Donald J. Trump has a track record of protecting American manufacturers and empowering American innovators and workers.
    During his first administration, President Trump initiated Section 301 cases against DSTs and negotiated platinum-standard rules for digital trade with Japan and separately through the USMCA.  
    President Trump demonstrated in his first term that punitive measures like tariffs strengthened the U.S. economy and brought back American industry.
    Just last week, President Trump announced the “Fair and Reciprocal Plan” on trade to restore fairness in U.S. trade relationships and counter non-reciprocal trade agreements.    
    On Day One, President Trump initiated his America First Trade Policy to make America’s economy great again.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Defending American Companies and Innovators From Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    class=”has-text-align-left”>MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
         THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
         THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
         THE SENIOR COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT FOR TRADE
         AND MANUFACTURING
    SUBJECT:       Defending American Companies and Innovators From               Overseas Extortion and Unfair Fines and Penalties      Section 1.  Purpose.  In recent years, the gross domestic product of the United States’ digital economy alone, driven by cutting-edge American technology companies, has been bigger than the entire economy of Australia, Canada, or most members of the European Union.  Instead of empowering their own workers and economies, foreign governments have increasingly exerted extraterritorial authority over American companies, particularly in the technology sector, hindering these companies’ success and appropriating revenues that should contribute to our Nation’s well-being, not theirs.        Beginning in 2019, several trading partners enacted digital services taxes (DSTs) that could cost American companies billions of dollars and that foreign government officials openly admit are designed to plunder American companies.  Foreign countries have additionally adopted regulations governing digital services that are more burdensome and restrictive on United States companies than their own domestic companies.  Additional foreign legal regimes limit cross-border data flows, require American streaming services to fund local productions, and charge network usage and Internet termination fees.  All of these measures violate American sovereignty and offshore American jobs, limit American companies’ global competitiveness, and increase American operational costs while exposing our sensitive information to potentially hostile foreign regulators.      My Administration will not allow American companies and workers and American economic and national security interests to be compromised by one-sided, anti-competitive policies and practices of foreign governments.  American businesses will no longer prop up failed foreign economies through extortive fines and taxes.      Sec. 2.  Policy.  It is the policy of my Administration that where a foreign government, through its tax or regulatory structure, imposes a fine, penalty, tax, or other burden that is discriminatory, disproportionate, or designed to transfer significant funds or intellectual property from American companies to the foreign government or the foreign government’s favored domestic entities, my Administration will act, imposing tariffs and taking such other responsive actions necessary to mitigate the harm to the United States and to repair any resulting imbalance.      In taking such responsive action, my Administration shall consider:      (a)  taxes imposed on United States companies by foreign governments, including those that may discriminate against United States companies;      (b)  regulations imposed on United States companies by foreign governments that could inhibit the growth or intended operation of United States companies;      (c)  any act, policy, or practice of a foreign government that could require a United States company to jeopardize its intellectual property; and      (d)  Any other act, policy, or practice of a foreign government that serves to undermine the global competitiveness of United States companies.   
         Sec. 3.  Agency Responsibilities.  (a)  The United States Trade Representative shall determine, in accordance with applicable law, whether to renew investigations under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2411) of the DSTs of France, Austria, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, which were initiated under my Administration on July 16, 2019, and June 5, 2020.  If the United States Trade Representative determines to renew such investigations, he shall take all appropriate and feasible action in response to those DSTs.
         (b)  The United States Trade Representative shall determine, consistent with section 302(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2412(b)) (section 302(b)), whether to investigate the DST of any other country that may discriminate against United States companies or burden or restrict United States commerce.  He shall further determine whether to pursue a panel under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement on the DST imposed by Canada and whether to investigate Canada’s DST under section 302(b).  In making these determinations, the United States Trade Representative shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury, as appropriate.      (c)  The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative shall jointly identify trade and other regulatory practices by other countries, including, without limitation, those described in section 2 of this memorandum, that discriminate against, disproportionately affect, or otherwise undermine the global competitiveness or intended operation of United States companies, in the digital economy and more generally, and recommend to me appropriate actions to counter such practices under applicable authorities.  The United States Trade Representative shall include the results of this review as part of the report required in section 5(c) of the Presidential Memorandum of January 20, 2025 (America First Trade Policy) (America First Trade Policy Memorandum).      (d)  The Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the United States Trade Representative shall investigate whether any act, policy, or practice of any country in the European Union or the United Kingdom has the effect of requiring or incentivizing the use or development of United States companies’ products or services in ways that undermine freedom of speech and political engagement or otherwise moderate content, and recommend appropriate actions to counter such practices under applicable authorities.  The United States Trade Representative shall include the results of this review as part of the report required in section 5(c) of the America First Trade Policy Memorandum.      (e)  The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, shall determine whether any foreign country subjects United States citizens or companies, including, without limitation, in the digital economy, to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes, or has any tax measure in place that otherwise undermines the global competitiveness of United States companies, is inconsistent with any tax treaty of the United States, or is otherwise actionable under section 891 of title 26, United States Code, or other tax-related legal authority.  The Secretary of the Treasury shall include the results of this determination as part of the report required in section 2 of the Presidential Memorandum of January 20, 2025 (The Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) Global Tax Deal).      (f)  The United States Trade Representative shall identify tools the United States can use to secure among trading partners a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.  The United States Trade Representative shall include the results of this review as part of the report required in section 5(c) of the America First Trade Policy Memorandum.      (g)  The United States Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the Senior Counselor to the President for Trade and Manufacturing, shall establish a process that allows American businesses to report to the United States Trade Representative foreign tax or regulatory practices that disproportionately harm United States companies.      Sec. 4.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this memorandum shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:           (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or           (ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.      (b)  This memorandum shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.      (c)  This memorandum is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.
         (d)  The United States Trade Representative is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Brazilian Extradited from Switzerland to the United States to Face Indictment Charging Involvement in $290M+ Cryptocurrency Fraud Scheme

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

    Tens of thousands of investors deposited bitcoin expecting an investment strategy – Instead, new investor bitcoin used to pay off other investors in a Ponzi scheme

    SEATTLE – A citizen of Brazil appeared in U.S. District Court in Seattle today, after being extradited from Switzerland to face a 13-count indictment for wire fraud and conspiracy regarding his bitcoin investment scheme, announced Acting U.S. Attorney Teal Luthy Miller. Douver T. Braga, 48, lived in Florida between approximately 2016 and 2021 during the bulk of the alleged fraud. The indictment alleges Braga operated a bitcoin investment scheme that was really a Ponzi scheme, as well as an illegal multilevel marketing scheme.

    The grand jury returned the indictment in October 2022. It was unsealed last week following Braga’s arrest in Switzerland. Today Braga pleaded “Not Guilty,” and trial was scheduled in front of U.S. District Judge Tana Lin on April 28, 2025.

    “Mr. Braga allegedly ran a fraud scheme that harkens back more than a century, but he updated his ‘Ponzi’ scheme with the hot new thing: bitcoin,” said U.S. Attorney Teal Luthy Miller. “The victim investors have waited years to see justice. I commend our federal partners at the FBI and IRS Criminal Investigation for their diligent work on this case.”

    According to the indictment, Braga conspired with others to create a cryptocurrency trading platform called Trade Coin Club (TCC) with an office in Belize. As early as 2016, Braga worked with others to promote TCC, claiming that investors would make money because the TCC had a sophisticated software program that allowed investors to profit on the fluctuating price of bitcoin. Braga also promised that investors could make money by referring other investors to the platform. In reality, there was no investment platform and no sophisticated software. Those who invested early were paid off by later investors as in a Ponzi scheme.

    Braga traveled the world promoting TCC: In Thailand in March 2017, in Nigeria and Macau in May 2017.  TCC was promoted on social media and in videos. At various events Braga claimed TCC had as many as 126,000 members in 231 different countries.

    Through his false promises of sophisticated investments and high returns, Braga induced tens of thousands of people to entrust over 82,000 bitcoin, valued at over $290 million at the time of investment, and to deposit it with TCC. Braga continued the false representations, creating an “online portal” where investors could track the supposed activity of their investment accounts. The site was a fiction as there was no trading activity.

    Braga withdrew and misappropriated investor funds. Between December 2016 and July 2019, at least $50 million in bitcoin was transferred to accounts Braga controlled.

    However, by late 2017 and early 2018, investors had trouble accessing their funds. In January 2018, TCC announced to investors that it was ceasing to operate in the United States and was cancelling their accounts.  Many investors were located in the Western District of Washington.

    Braga allegedly profited handsomely, while failing to report the earnings to the IRS. In 2017, he received bitcoin worth $30.5 million, but only reported income of $152, 298. In 2018, he reported $73,473 in income but got $13.1 million in bitcoin and in 2019, reported $72,870 in income while he received $10 million in bitcoin.

    “The type of scheme Mr. Braga is charged with operating is not new, he just used the allure of a flashy new technology to obscure the well-worn scam.” said W. Mike Herrington, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Seattle field office. “While the victims in this case waited and wondered about the fate of their investments, he siphoned off millions of dollars for his personal use. This case demonstrates the determination of the FBI and our partners in IRS Criminal Investigation to hold fraudsters accountable, no matter where in the world they may be.”

    “The charges against Mr. Braga and his co-conspirators reflect a well-designed scheme to solicit investment in a fake cryptocurrency trading platform from victims around the globe,” said Special Agent in Charge Tyler Hatcher of IRS-Criminal Investigation (CI), Los Angeles Field Office.  “Furthermore, Mr. Braga is alleged to have knowingly ignored and circumvented laws regulating multi-level marketing programs in the U.S.- laws that exist to protect investors from becoming victims in pyramid schemes.  Despite the complexity of this scheme, IRS Criminal Investigation and our partners at the FBI successfully uncovered the evidence necessary to bring forth these charges.”

    Braga is charged with 12 counts of wire fraud reflecting 12 wires investors sent to TCC for deposits in their “accounts.” Braga is charged with one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

    The charges are punishable by up to 20 years in prison.

    The charges contained in the indictment are only allegations.  A person is presumed innocent unless and until he or she is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    The case was investigated by the IRS-CI and the FBI.

    The case is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorneys Mike Dion and Phillip Kopczynski. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of International Affairs provided valuable assistance with securing the extradition.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Man Sentenced to 15 Years in Prison for a Stabbing Outside of a Shelter

    Source: Office of United States Attorneys

                WASHINGTON – Willie Byrd, 61, of Washington D.C., was sentenced today to 15 years in prison for stabbing another man outside of a shelter in February 2023, announced U.S. Attorney Edward R. Martin, Jr. and Chief Pamela Smith, of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD).

                Superior Court Judge Michael O’Keefe sentenced Byrd to concurrent sentences of 15 years in prison for aggravated assault while armed and three years in prison for carrying a dangerous weapon, and five years of supervised release. Byrd was found guilty by a Superior Court jury on November 20, 2024. 

                According to the government’s evidence, at approximately 8:30 pm, on February 28, 2023, Byrd stabbed the victim in the chest with a large fixed-blade knife near the corner of 2nd and D Streets, N.W. Before the stabbing occurred, the defendant was trying to take money from the victim while attempting to conduct a drug transaction. The victim suffered life-threatening injuries to multiple organs and required surgery and an extended hospital stay. MPD officers and detectives reviewed surveillance video footage of the stabbing from the nearby Federal City Shelter, which led to Byrd’s identification as the assailant. MPD detectives located Byrd inside of the shelter, and he was placed under arrest. 

                In announcing the sentence, U.S. Attorney Martin and Chief Smith commended the work of those who investigated the case from the Metropolitan Police Department. They commended the work those who assisted with the case’s preparation from the U.S. Attorney’s Office, including Supervisory Paralegal Specialist Renee Prather and Paralegal Specialist Marcella Trader. Finally, they commended the work of Assistant United States Attorneys Erica Rudolf and Ella Gladman, who prosecuted the case, and Assistant United States Attorney Gregory Evans, who investigated the case.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Africa – Scotland London Africa Week Celebrates Success as Dates Announced for 2025 Programme

    SOURCE: Scottish Africa Business Association (SABA)

    Scotland London Africa Week has quickly established itself as a pivotal event for increasing trade, collaboration and business opportunities between Scotland and African markets

    ABERDEEN, Scotland, February 21, 2025/ — Following the resounding success of Scotland London Africa Week 2024, the Scottish Africa Business Association (SABA) (www.AfricaScot.com) is delighted to announce that the business programme will return this year from 25th to 27th November 2025.

    Scotland London Africa Week has quickly established itself as a pivotal event for increasing trade, collaboration and business opportunities between Scotland and African markets. The 2024 programme brought together senior diplomats, government officials and business leaders to strengthen partnerships and unlock new opportunities for more than 20 delegates.

    The 2025 programme is already shaping up to build on this success, with confirmed highlights including a strategic meeting with the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) Africa Team and a high-profile networking reception at Dover House, with kind permission of the Secretary of State for Scotland The Rt Hon Ian Murray MP.

    SABA is also working closely with High Commissioners and Ambassadors from across the African continent to ensure the event continues to offer Scottish businesses unrivalled access to African market insights, key decision-makers and potential partners within London’s thriving African business ecosystem.

    Frazer Lang, Chief Executive of SABA, said: “Scotland London Africa Week has proven to be an invaluable platform for Scottish businesses looking to expand into Africa. The engagement we saw last year from both African and UK stakeholders was fantastic and we are excited to bring an even more impactful programme to our participants in 2025.  As a result of last year’s programme, one of our success stories was the news that VG Energy and Norco signed a Memorandum of Understanding, binding the two companies in an exclusive partnership that will bring growth and technical innovation to Nigeria.”

    Commenting on the partnership, Frank Burns, Contract Support Engineer at Norco said: “We are extremely pleased to be able to declare our exclusive partnership with VG Energy via this Memorandum of Agreement. This is a new and exciting chapter for Norco as we expand our presence and service offering in Nigeria. Together with VG Energy, who bring significant experience in identifying and securing new business opportunities, we feel well-placed to unlock new growth opportunities in the energy sector and beyond.”

    This year’s Scotland London Africa Week will feature sector-specific briefings, market insights and networking opportunities designed to equip Scottish businesses with the tools and connections to thrive in African markets.

    Scottish businesses interested in participating are encouraged to register their interest early to secure a place.  

    About the Scottish Africa Business Association (SABA):
    SABA is the preeminent non-political, Africa focussed, members trade organisation with an unrivalled board of experienced directors which promotes trade, investment and knowledge sharing between Scotland’s world class expertise and Africa’s priority sectors including energy, agriculture, the blue economy, healthcare, skills training and education by leveraging extensive commercial, trade, political and government contacts across Scotland and Africa.

    As part of this, our team organises private meetings, round tables, seminars, conferences, global trade missions and offers market research, intelligence sharing and consultancy services.

    MIL OSI – Submitted News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Understanding Trade Dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    Summary

    This paper explores export and import dynamics in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), both regionally and across various country groups. The findings underscore the significant associations that domestic demand and exports have with import changes, albeit the magnitude of these associations varies across countries. Variations in consumption and investment are highly correlated with changes in imports across the region and in nearly all country groups. Changes in exports are also associated with increased import growth, with this link being most notable in resource-intensive countries. Furthermore, an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate is correlated with reduced import growth in East African countries, while resource-intensive countries experience a less pronounced correlation. Exports, on the other hand, show a strong sensitivity to global economic cycles, reflecting the region’s reliance on commodities. Finally, the correlation between exchange rates and exports exhibits considerable heterogeneity across countries.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: There Must Be Some Way Out of Here

    Source: Securities and Exchange Commission

    [1]Five years ago, I remarked that “figuring out how to deal with the SEC on crypto issues [was] like a regulatory version of an escape room.”[2] Now it is time to help open the door. The Task Force, which is composed of exceptional Commission staff, is working on the unlock with other expert, dedicated staff across the Commission. Greater crypto clarity, however, requires the public’s input. We welcome input from anyone in the public with an interest in these topics, and a wide range of perspectives (including from skeptics) will make that input richer. This document invites such input by posing some of the questions with which the Task Force is wrestling. The Task Force is actively considering solutions to many of the issues presented. However, your input can significantly aid in that process.

    As always, let me start with several disclaimers. My views are my own as a Commissioner and not necessarily those of the Commission or my fellow Commissioners. These questions are not a roadmap to actions the Commission or its staff will take. They are not meant to limit the discussion, so feel free to pose and answer other questions and to address topics that we have not raised. The scope of this inquiry is expansive and calls on the particularized knowledge of a broad range of people. The Task Force welcomes your responses to as many of the questions as you would like to address, but do not feel compelled to swim outside your lane.

    To aid readers, we have drafted questions with a potential taxonomy in mind:

    • First, crypto assets that are securities because they have the intrinsic characteristics of securities;
    • Second, crypto assets that are offered and sold as part of an investment contract, which is a security, even though the crypto asset may not itself be a security;
    • Third, tokenized securities; and
    • Finally, all other crypto assets, which are not securities, in my view, and are currently the biggest category.

    The Task Force welcomes your thoughts as to the best paths to improve this taxonomy.

    The questions below identify some statutes and rules that may present challenges to firms seeking to innovate with crypto assets and blockchain technology, but please identify other federal laws, or state corporate or commercial laws, that present challenges to innovation by Commission registrants. We are looking for creative solutions that comport with the Commission’s statutory framework. The Commission’s three-part mission will guide our work: 1) protecting investors, 2) maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and 3) facilitating capital formation. Because we hope to make rapid progress and would like to foster a dynamic discussion among respondents, we would appreciate your timely responses but will welcome input at any time. We plan to continue making progress in the meantime, so the earlier we receive your input the more likely it is to inform the options for consideration. Thank you in advance for your help.

    Finally, as the Task Force works on the issues below, the Commission’s efforts continue unabated to combat fraud involving securities, including crypto assets that are securities or that were offered and sold as part of an investment contract, and tokenized securities. The Commission welcomes the public’s tips about securities violations.[3]

    Security Status

    Blockchain technology has given rise to novel assets that rely on cryptographic protocols for their existence (“crypto assets”). Market participants have expressed a reasonable desire to determine with ease whether such an asset is a security or is being offered or sold as part of an investment contract. When crypto assets that are sold along with promises of future work to develop the ecosystem within which those assets operate, analyzing them under Howey’s investment contract test can be difficult.[4] Market participants have expressed concern that the Howey test, as the Commission has applied it, is a complex analysis that can be difficult to apply consistently. One of the Task Force’s goals is to make it easier for investors, market participants, and the Commission to categorize crypto assets and crypto asset transactions. To that end, the Task Force is considering questions, including the following:

    1. What type of regulatory taxonomy would provide a predictable, legally precise, and economically rational approach to determining the security status of crypto assets and transactions in such assets without undermining settled approaches for evaluating the security status of non-crypto assets and transactions?
    2. Should the Commission address when crypto assets fall within any category of financial instruments, other than investment contracts, that are specifically listed in the definition of “security” in the federal securities laws?[5]
    3. Certain crypto assets are used in a variety of functions inherent to the operation of a blockchain network, such as mining or staking as part of a consensus mechanism or securing the network, validating transactions or other related activities on the network, and paying transaction or other fees on the network. These technology functions may be conducted directly or indirectly, such as through third-party service providers. What types of technology functions are inherent to the operation of a blockchain network? Should the Commission address the status of technology functions under the federal securities laws and, if so, what issues should be addressed?
    4. Users of liquid staking applications receive a so-called “liquid staking token.” This token represents their staked crypto asset, and the token can be used in other activities, all while continuing to participate in the proof-of-stake protocol. Should the Commission address the status of liquid staking tokens under the federal securities laws, and, if so, what issues should it address?

    Scoping Out

    The Commission may be able to provide greater clarity to investors and other market participants by identifying categories of crypto assets (and transactions) that do not fall within its authority. In some cases, these types of crypto assets may be within another regulator’s authority. In determining what falls outside the Commission’s authority, the Commission should look to the economic reality of what is being offered or sold. Simply saying something is not a security does not mean it is not a security.

    1. Should the security status of certain categories of crypto assets be addressed, such as stablecoins, wrapped tokens, and NFTs?
    2. How can the Commission establish a workable taxonomy while remaining merit- and technology-neutral?

    Public Offerings

    People who have conducted or attempted to conduct registered or qualified token offerings have expressed frustration about the cost and feasibility of registration. Tokens and their issuers can differ significantly in some aspects from traditional securities and their issuers. Allowing token issuers to use appropriately tailored registration regimes may protect investors better than insisting that they use registration forms and mechanisms that are designed for other types of securities offerings.

    1. Could disclosure guidance and/or targeted relief address the concern, or are new forms or other mechanisms needed?
    2. Should the Commission develop tailored disclosure requirements for offerings or classes of specific categories of crypto assets? What types of disclosures would be important for investor protection? Should disclosure occur both at the time of sale and on an ongoing basis? If so, what information should the ongoing disclosure contain and how should that disclosure occur?
    3. Does Regulation A under the Securities Act, including the disclosure and ongoing reporting requirements, provide a useful vehicle to conduct offerings of crypto assets? Would revising aspects of Regulation A make it more useful for crypto asset offerings?

    Safe Harbor from Registration

    I previously proposed that the Commission consider putting in place a non-exclusive safe harbor—provisionally called Rule 195—that would, among other things, provide a time-limited exemption from the registration requirements under the Securities Act for offers and sales of crypto assets during the development of a blockchain project.[6] My motivation for suggesting such a safe harbor was to enhance and encourage disclosure and provide network developers with a grace period within which, under certain conditions, they can facilitate broad participation in and the development of a functional or decentralized network. At the end of the safe harbor’s term, token transactions may not be securities transactions if the network had matured into a decentralized or functioning network that is not dependent on a single person or group to carry out the essential managerial or entrepreneurial efforts. The safe harbor, which would include tailored disclosures subject to the antifraud provisions in the federal securities laws, is intended to respond to the concern that the disclosure requirements under the federal securities laws applicable to registration and offering statements, as well as ongoing reporting, are not tailored for blockchain projects and crypto assets. To be clear, any safe harbor the Task Force recommends will not offer protection for perpetrators of securities fraud.

    1. Should the Commission consider a version of Rule 195, my proposed token safe harbor? Is the iteration on my proposed safe harbor known as “Safe Harbor X,”[7] or some other iteration, a better approach?
    2. Should the safe harbor be available retroactively for projects that comply with the disclosure requirements?
    3. If a safe harbor of some form is the right approach, what disclosure requirements would be feasible for early-stage projects to provide to token purchasers the material information regarding the blockchain project, crypto assets, and development team? What information should be required to be updated on an ongoing basis, and how should that information be provided?
    4. At the expiration of the safe harbor as envisioned, if the network were sufficiently decentralized or functional, registration of the tokens would not be required. If decentralization is used as an indicator of network maturity, should the Commission define objective quantitative thresholds (such as percentage thresholds for ownership and control) to provide greater clarity for issuers, developers, or minters of tokens regarding whether their networks and protocols are sufficiently decentralized and to allow third parties to verify decentralization?
      1. Is dispersion of control a better framework than decentralization? If so, how should ownership of governance tokens and voting rights be considered in assessing dispersion of control? How should the delegation of voting rights be taken into account?
      2. If an exit marker is achieved, who should be responsible for notifying the Commission?
    5. How should the decentralization of a deployed protocol best be evaluated? How should permissioned aspects of crypto-adjacent software or participant roles, such as validators, relayers, and sequencers, be considered? Are there tech-neutral thresholds that can be agreed upon for determining thresholds for decentralization?

    Trading

    Secondary market trading of crypto assets raises a variety of issues, some of which may fall within the Commission’s authority. The Commission’s authority in secondary markets generally is limited to assets that themselves are securities based on their intrinsic economic properties or rights, so we have to grapple with how to regulate platforms and market participants that trade securities alongside non-securities.

    1. Should the Commission create a new entity registration status with tailored registration requirements for any platform that trades crypto assets that are securities? Should the Commission use or adapt the existing requirements for national securities exchange registration or the alternative trading system exemption from such registration, and if so, how?
    2. What updates to the Commission rulebook are needed for side-by-side pairs trading of securities and non-security crypto assets to allow for enhanced interoperability and composability in finance?
    3. Does execution in offchain order books or on blockchain networks pose complexities for broker-dealers in satisfying any applicable best execution obligations? Does onchain execution pose complexities for broker-dealers in satisfying their best execution obligations, given onchain complexities such as transaction ordering and block construction? Should any rules, guidelines, or disclosures be modified to address broker-dealer execution reasonably available under the circumstances in offchain and onchain trading environments?
    4. The crypto markets are inherently transparent because they use open-source data, from public blockchains to open application programming interfaces (“APIs”). Are there programmatic/technological ways that crypto market participants, intermediaries, potential self-regulatory organizations, or regulators can monitor crypto markets using open-source data? How would this take into consideration nested accounts on centralized exchanges, given that this activity may not appear in public ledgers? Is open-source data sufficient for the market to monitor trading and therefore what non-public information might warrant mandatory disclosure? What sort of open-source tools can be used for enhanced transparency, such as proof of reserves, or proof of holdings? What are the limitations of such tools and such data?
    5. With the understanding that both APIs and public ledgers can provide order books, what would be a good strategy for regulators to efficiently ingest and analyze order book data? How can the regulators leverage publicly available data to become more efficient and alleviate regulatory burdens?
    6. How should Commission registrants assess Maximal Extractable Value (“MEV”) when they consider building or transacting in these environments? How best should Commission registrants delineate between the different types of MEV occurring onchain? In what ways is the market addressing the MEV in which MEV extractors order or re-order transactions to engage in front running, back running, or so-called “sandwich attacks”?

    Custody

    Market participants have broad and specific questions regarding custody requirements for Commission regulated entities—broker-dealers, investment advisers, and investment companies—including whether existing requirements suffice for custodying crypto assets. The Task Force is seeking input on answers to these questions so that individuals and organizations can safely, legally, and practicably custody client crypto assets themselves or with a third party.

    1. Should the Commission amend existing rules, propose new rules, or provide guidance to facilitate custody arrangements for crypto assets? If so, what rule amendments or new rules would be appropriate, and to which types of activities should they apply? Should the Commission propose any specific changes to its rules to accommodate the self-custody of crypto assets by entities registered with the Commission? If so, what conditions should apply to self-custody arrangements to mitigate any related risks? Should the requirements for crypto assets that are securities and those that are not differ?
    2. Public, permissionless blockchains are being used to tokenize permissioned assets. To the extent the custody rules for broker-dealers, investment advisers, and investment companies are implicated, how should the Commission differentiate between native crypto assets of permissionless blockchains and tokenized permissioned assets? Does either type of crypto asset present greater risks of theft or loss?
    3. Are there commonly accepted practices and standards for auditing and accounting for crypto asset investments and transactions, including those related to valuation? How about with respect to verifying the existence and valuation of crypto assets, both among auditors and attestation providers (including non-accountant providers)? Should the Commission propose additional or specific requirements to address the unique nature of crypto assets?

    Broker-Dealer Custody and Other Financial Responsibility Requirements

    1. Should the Commission modify its Special Purpose Broker-Dealer Statement (“SPBD Statement”) or formally withdraw it? If the former, what should those modifications be? For example, should the Commission expand the SPBD Statement to cover broker-dealers that custody crypto asset securities alongside crypto assets that are not securities? If the Commission decides to eliminate the SPBD Statement, should the Commission propose any modifications to the customer protection rule (17 CFR 240.15c3-3) to address crypto assets?
    2. The net capital rule (17 CFR 240.15c3-1) requires a broker-dealer to maintain sufficient liquid assets to meet all liabilities, including obligations to customers, counterparties, and other creditors and to have adequate additional resources to wind down its business in an orderly manner, without the need for a formal proceeding if the firm fails financially.
      1. Under the net capital rule, assets held by a broker-dealer must be readily convertible into cash to count as allowable for meeting minimum net capital requirements (e.g., intangible assets, furniture, fixtures, equipment, and most unsecured receivables are not readily convertible into cash under the rule and, therefore, do not qualify as allowable net capital). How should a given crypto asset be evaluated to assess whether it is readily convertible into cash?
      2. Under the net capital rule, securities and commodities are treated as readily convertible into cash. However, they are subject to deductions (known as haircuts) to account for the market, credit, liquidity, basis, and other risks inherent in the instrument. The haircuts range from 0 to 100 percent. For example, exchange-traded equity securities have a 15 percent haircut, while securities without a ready market (e.g., securities that are not exchange traded) are subject to haircuts as high as 100 percent. Commodities are subject to a 20 percent haircut. How should crypto assets be evaluated to determine the appropriate haircut to apply?
    3. The recordkeeping rules for broker-dealers (17 CFR 240.17a-3 and 17 CFR 240.17a-4) require the creation and maintenance of accounting and operational records designed to assist a firm in tracking and understanding its assets, liabilities, positions, and obligations to customers (e.g., cash owed to customers and securities held for customers).
      1. What challenges, if any, do the requirements of these recordkeeping rules present with respect to crypto assets that are not an issue for traditional securities? What modifications to the rules could address these challenges?
      2. Should crypto assets generally be treated as if they are traditional securities for purposes of these recordkeeping rules?

    Investment Adviser Custody and Other Requirements

    1. What challenges do registered investment advisers (“RIAs”) face in complying with the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) as it relates to investments in crypto assets that are securities? What common practices, if any, have developed to address these challenges?
      1. Could best execution or recordkeeping obligations, or compliance with Form ADV or Form PF disclosure requirements, be clearer in the crypto asset context?
      2. Do any crypto asset characteristics or market structures place advisory client crypto assets at a greater or different risk of theft, loss, or misappropriation? If so, how can those risks be addressed?
    2. Can RIAs trade, stake, vote, or otherwise participate without moving crypto assets outside a qualified custodian? Should the Commission amend the existing RIA custody rule to provide an exception to allow RIAs to move client crypto assets temporarily out of qualified custodial arrangements to engage in staking, voting, or other novel participatory features of crypto assets? If so, should that exception be subject to time limits or other limitations or requirements?
    3. What clarifications, if any, are needed in the Advisers Act regulations to address the cold or hot storage of crypto assets held in custody on behalf of a client?
      1. What requirements, if any, should the Commission consider for the custody of crypto assets held in each type of wallet on behalf of a client? Should the requirements be the same for both types of wallets?
      2. How would a requirement to maintain custody of some or all crypto assets in either cold or hot storage affect an adviser’s ability to transact in those crypto assets or otherwise implement its investment strategy?
      3. What means are available to mitigate the risks related to maintaining crypto assets in hot storage?

    Investment Company Custody

    1. What challenges do registered investment companies (“funds”) face in complying with section 17(f) of the Investment Company Act and the rules thereunder (governing custody) with respect to investments in crypto assets? Are any specific requirements of section 17(f) or the rules thereunder categorically inconsistent with custody of crypto assets? Do funds anticipate that custodians currently eligible to act as fund custodians under the Investment Company Act and the custody rules (e.g., banks, foreign banks, broker-dealers) will offer fund custodial services for crypto assets?
    2. Can a fund comply with the requirements of section 17(f) and the rules thereunder when trading, staking, voting, or otherwise engaging with crypto assets in which it invests? Should the Commission consider any changes to rule 17f-2 (the self-custody rule) or any other rules to facilitate transactions in crypto assets, and if so, what tailored conditions should the Commission propose to mitigate any related risks?
    3. Should any provisions relating to investment company custody be revised to account for investment activities or other transactions that are unique to crypto assets (e.g., staking, mining, airdrops)? Do the existing custody rules present obstacles to such activities or transactions? How might these activities or transactions place a fund’s assets at risk of theft or loss?

    Crypto Lending

    Crypto platforms may offer custodial and noncustodial services through which people can lend their crypto assets in return for interest. Crypto lending concepts vary widely, challenging many traditional notions of financial products. I would welcome any input you have on these diverse products to ensure the Commission has an adequate understanding.

    1. How should the Commission approach various crypto lending concepts in a way that doesn’t stifle the potential opportunities they provide?
    2. Participation in traditional securities lending programs, such as fully paid securities lending programs offered by broker-dealers, generally does not represent a new securities transaction or implicate Investment Company Act registration requirements. How are crypto lending programs similar to or different from traditional securities lending programs?

    Crypto Exchange-Traded Products (“ETPs”)

    Exchange Act Section 6(b)(5) requires that an exchange’s rules be designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices. In reviewing listing applications for crypto asset-based ETPs, the Commission previously has considered whether the exchange has a comprehensive surveillance-sharing agreement (“SSA”) with a regulated market of significant size related to the underlying or reference assets. How should the Commission address listing applications for crypto asset-based ETPs going forward?

    1. If the listing exchange does not have an SSA with a regulated market and no regulated market for the crypto asset underlying an ETP exists, could the listing exchange address concerns regarding fraud and manipulation based on the size and liquidity of the underlying spot market? What would be an appropriate measure of size and liquidity that would address these concerns? Are there more appropriate ways to address concerns regarding fraud and manipulation?
    2. How should the Commission consider market capitalization, unique number of wallets, trading volume, the number of spot markets, geographic distribution of spot markets, size and frequency of price divergences, or speed of price convergence/arbitrage?
    3. How should the Commission consider crypto asset-based ETPs that are investing in assets that are already referenced in crypto asset-based exchange-traded funds registered as investment companies under the Investment Company Act?
    4. What factors should the Commission consider with respect to an SSA between an
      exchange listing an ETP on a crypto asset and a spot crypto market?
    5. How should the Commission weigh the reliability, frequency, and dissemination of pricing information on the crypto assets underlying the ETP in its consideration?

    Tokenized Securities

    Creating a digital representation of a security on a blockchain or issuing a security directly on a blockchain does not change the substance of the security but may benefit issuers and investors. Moreover, the use of a blockchain-based database may be more secure in some respects than using a centralized database with a single point of failure. Tokenization also may give rise to unique risks and challenges.

    1. Tokenization enables dematerialized securities to be mobilized (i.e., not held in and confined to a single centralized ledger). Are there any provisions under the federal securities laws that prevent these securities from being used in new blockchain-based transactions and applications, and, if so, what steps should the Commission consider taking to facilitate this innovation while mitigating any related risks? Are there amendments or new rules that the Commission should consider to ensure a merit- and technology-neutral approach to tokenization? Does the type of blockchain used (i.e., permissioned versus permissionless) bear on this risk assessment?
    2. How do the programmability and composability properties of blockchain technology and blockchain-based technologies, such as smart contracts, affect the role of a transfer agent? Are there provisions in the transfer agent rules that prevent transfer agents from using blockchain technology for this purpose to the fullest extent possible? Is an offchain record still needed as an official or a complementary record in a tokenization arrangement? Are there any legal or regulatory impediments to using onchain identity solutions?
    3. Does the tokenization of redeemable registered investment company securities, such as those of a mutual fund or money market fund, raise any unique issues under the Investment Company Act or the rules thereunder? Would secondary transactions in these securities (e.g., peer-to-peer transactions or transactions occurring on or through an ATS) require relief from any provisions of the Investment Company Act? If so, should the Commission propose any changes to facilitate tokenization of registered investment company securities, and what should any such conditions be?
    4. How should the Commission approach tokenized securities that seek to maintain a stable value and may be designed to be used as a means of payment or settlement? What are the challenges and impediments to the usability and transferability of these tokenized securities, particularly securities issued by offchain entities (e.g., registered investment companies)? Should transactions involving the use of these tokenized securities as a means of payment be treated differently from other security-based transactions?
    5. Do other federal laws, or state corporate or commercial laws present challenges to firms seeking to issue tokenized securities or engage in activities involving tokenized securities?
    6. The Commission recently adopted rule amendments to shorten the standard settlement cycle for most broker-dealer transactions from “T+2” to “T+1,” subject to certain exceptions. Tokenization is often characterized as an innovation that facilitates instant or simultaneous settlement (“atomic settlement”) if all parts of a transaction are executed and settled on the same blockchain. What are the benefits of atomic settlement, and what are the risks? Should the Commission consider taking any actions that would encourage adoption of atomic settlement?
    7. What issues are raised by the tokenization of securities subject to National Market System (“NMS”) requirements? Should the Commission clarify any requirements or provide relief from any requirements under Regulation NMS? Are there any other SEC rules that should be clarified or amended to address the trading of tokenized equity or debt securities?

    Sandbox and Related International Issues

    Last year, I proposed the creation of a micro-innovation sandbox (“Sandbox”), which could be used for small-scale projects, including tokenization and blockchain projects.[8]

    1. Would the Sandbox help foster tokenization and blockchain innovation? What types of products and services across the fintech landscape would firms like to test in the Sandbox? What regulatory, technical, and operational barriers pose the biggest challenges to innovation in this space? Could the Sandbox mitigate those challenges?
    2. Could a cross-border Sandbox address challenges that U.S. and non-U.S. firms face when attempting to innovate in multiple jurisdictions? If so, how should the Commission structure it to operate globally? Do sandboxes in other jurisdictions serve as a good model?

    How to Provide Feedback

    Members of the public interested in providing input on these or other related matters may do so using the written submission form for input to the Crypto Task Force on the Commission’s website. Members of the public also may request a meeting to discuss their feedback on these and other related matters via the meeting request form on the Commission’s website.


    [1] Hat tip to Bob Dylan. See Bob Dylan, “All Along the Watchtower,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xpphVwyLMQ. Dylan’s dialogue is between a joker and a thief. The lack of regulatory clarity has fostered an environment in which jokers and thieves thrive, while legitimate crypto projects struggle. This document is part of the effort to change that environment.

    [4] SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).

    [5] Under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”), the definition of “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a “security,” or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase any of the foregoing. The definition of “security” under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), is virtually identical.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 21.02.2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nokia Corporation
    Stock Exchange Release
    21 February 2025 at 22:30 EET

    Nokia Corporation: Repurchase of own shares on 21.02.2025

    Espoo, Finland – On 21 February 2025 Nokia Corporation (LEI: 549300A0JPRWG1KI7U06) has acquired its own shares (ISIN FI0009000681) as follows:

    Trading venue (MIC Code) Number of shares Weighted average price / share, EUR*
    XHEL 1,384,423 4.78
    CEUX
    BATE
    AQEU
    TQEX
    Total 1,384,423 4.78

    * Rounded to two decimals

    On 22 November 2024, Nokia announced that its Board of Directors is initiating a share buyback program to offset the dilutive effect of new Nokia shares issued to the shareholders of Infinera Corporation and certain Infinera Corporation share-based incentives. The repurchases in compliance with the Market Abuse Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR), the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2016/1052 and under the authorization granted by Nokia’s Annual General Meeting on 3 April 2024 started on 25 November 2024 and end by 31 December 2025 and target to repurchase 150 million shares for a maximum aggregate purchase price of EUR 900 million.

    Total cost of transactions executed on 21 February 2025 was EUR 6,616,434. After the disclosed transactions, Nokia Corporation holds 255,830,208 treasury shares.

    Details of transactions are included as an appendix to this announcement.

    On behalf of Nokia Corporation

    BofA Securities Europe SA

    About Nokia
    At Nokia, we create technology that helps the world act together.

    As a B2B technology innovation leader, we are pioneering networks that sense, think and act by leveraging our work across mobile, fixed and cloud networks. In addition, we create value with intellectual property and long-term research, led by the award-winning Nokia Bell Labs which is celebrating 100 years of innovation.

    With truly open architectures that seamlessly integrate into any ecosystem, our high-performance networks create new opportunities for monetization and scale. Service providers, enterprises and partners worldwide trust Nokia to deliver secure, reliable and sustainable networks today – and work with us to create the digital services and applications of the future.

    Inquiries:

    Nokia Communications
    Phone: +358 10 448 4900
    Email: press.services@nokia.com
    Maria Vaismaa, Global Head of External Communications

    Nokia Investor Relations
    Phone: +358 931 580 507
    Email: investor.relations@nokia.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Average electricity supply in rural areas has increased from 12.5 hours in 2014 to 22.6 hours in 2025, and in urban areas to 23.4 hours in 2025: Shri Manohar Lal

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Average electricity supply in rural areas has increased from 12.5 hours in 2014 to 22.6 hours in 2025, and in urban areas to 23.4 hours in 2025: Shri Manohar Lal

    Non-fossil power capacity has increased by 180% compared to 2014: Shri Manohar Lal

    1 lakh EV charging stations will be installed by 2030:Shri Manohar Lal

    AT&C losses have reduced from 22.62% in 2014 to 15% in 2025: Shri Manohar Lal

    Posted On: 21 FEB 2025 7:54PM by PIB Delhi

    “It is our goal to make power accessible to everyone and all times and the government is aiming for 100% electrification of households across the country,” said Union Minister Shri Manohar Lal while addressing a press conference in New Delhi today.

    1. Power Accessibility and Special Focus on Tribal and Border Areas

    Union Minister informed that with the help of initiatives like  Deeen Dayal Upadhyay Gram Jyoti Yojana (DDUGJY) ,  PM Sahaj Bijli Har Ghar Yojana (SAUBHAGYA), Pradhan Mantri Janjati Adivasi Nyaya Maha Abhiyan for Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups (PVTG ) the accessibility to power has increased significantly in the last 10 years.

    Shri Manohar Lal said that average electricity supply in rural areas has increased from 12.5 hours in 2014 to 22.6 hours in 2025 and in urban areas to 23.4 hours in 2025.

    2. Fossil and Non-Fossil Power Generation

    Union Minister informed that fossil based power capacity has increased from 168 GW in 2014 to 246 GW in Jan 2025 which shows an increase of around 46 percent.

    He also informed that the increase in non fossil capacity has increased from around 80GW in 2014 to around 220 GW in 2025 (as of 31 January 2025 ) which is around 180 percent increase .

    3. Transmission Growth and Projections

    Highlighting the addition and transmission network, Shri Manohar Lal informed that the Transmission Network has increased from 2.91 lakh ckm in 2014 to 4.92 lakh ckm in 2025.

    Transmission Network Expansion:

    Year

    Total Transmission Network (lakh ckm)

    2014

    2.91

    2024

    4.85

    2025

    4.92

    4. Power Import and Export: India as a Net Exporter

    Addressing the media, the Union Minister informed that India has become net exporter of power and the net export in 2025 amounts to 1625 MU. He also informed that in 2014 India was a net importer of power.

    Year

    Power Import (MU)

    Power Export (MU)

    Net Export (MU)

    2014

    5,555

    2,288

    -3,267 (Importing Nation)

    2024

    3,863

    8,576

    +4,713

    2025

    8,365

    9,980

    +1,625

    5. Power Distribution: Declining Shortage Gap

    The Union Minister informed that energy shortage has reduced from 4.2% in 2014 to 0.1% in 2025. He also said that the steps are being taken to overcome the current energy shortage.

    6. DISCOMs: Reduction in Losses

    AT&C losses have reduced from 22.62% in 2014 to 15% in 2025, and this will be further reduced to 10% by 2030.

    7. Smart Meters: Achievements and Targets

    Union Minister informed that around 2.13 Cr smart meters have been installed. He further informed that 19.8 Cr smart meters, 52.5 lakh DTRs and 2.1 lakh feeders have been sanctioned.

    8. Energy Efficiency and Carbon Reduction

    Shri Manohar Lal said that consistent efforts since 2014 have led to a savings in annual energy consumption of 53 MTOE in 2024 in the Indian economy.  The corresponding savings in emissions has been 321 Mn tons CO2. He also informed that government has launched sustainable building codes to improve energy efficiency of commercial and residential buildings.

    9 Transport Sector: Focus on Electric Vehicles

    Shri Manohar Lal said that the government is focused on promoting electric vehicles. He added that by 2030, 1 lakh EV charging stations will be installed to facilitate electric mobility.

    Click here for more details.

    Click here for more details.

    *******

    SK

    (Release ID: 2105394) Visitor Counter : 86

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DPIIT Secretary chairs PMG Review of Mega Infrastructure Projects in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Delhi, and Jharkhand

    Source: Government of India (2)

    Posted On: 21 FEB 2025 6:10PM by PIB Delhi

    Secretary, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT),Shri Amardeep Bhatia chaired a high-level meeting to review key issues affecting mega infrastructure projects in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Delhi, and Jharkhand. The meeting, attended by senior officials from central ministries, state governments, and project proponents, focused on expediting issue resolution through enhanced inter-ministerial and state coordination facilitated by the Project Monitoring Group (PMG).

    In the meeting, 21 issues across 17 significant projects were reviewed, including 9 projects under the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, with a total cost of all projects exceeding Rs 13,501 crore.The Varanasi-Ranchi-Kolkata Expressway project, valued at Rs 9,623.72 crore and comprising seven issues across six packages, was also reviewed.

    The meeting placed significant emphasis on the project of setting up new NITs in strategic locations through which the government seeks to bridge regional disparities in technical education and meet the increasing demand for skilled engineers and technical professionals. These institutions will not only enhance the academic landscape but also contribute to regional economic growth by fostering innovation, research, and industry collaboration.

    The Varanasi-Ranchi-Kolkata Expressway project, a key project under the Bharat Mala Yojana, will enhance regional connectivity across Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and West Bengal,and is expected to significantly boost trade and freight movement, particularly benefiting industries reliant on the Kolkata and Haldia ports for maritime trade– was also reviewed.

    The Secretary,DPIIT, reaffirmed the commitment to enhancing the institutional framework for project monitoring and instructed the relevant authorities to take a proactive approach in addressing pending issues.He emphasized the importance of private proponents leveraging this specialized mechanism of Project Monitoring Group (PMG) (https://pmg.dpiit.gov.in/) to expedite project implementation and ensure efficient and timely resolution of their concerns through collaboration among the Central Government, State Authorities, and Private Stakeholders.

    ****

    Abhishek Dayal/ Abhijith Narayanan

    (Release ID: 2105334) Visitor Counter : 76

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: DPIIT Secretary chairs PMG Review of Mega Infrastructure Projects ofArunachalPradesh, Sikkim, Delhi, and Jharkhand

    Source: Government of India

    Posted On: 21 FEB 2025 5:41PM by PIB Delhi

    Shri Amardeep Bhatia, Secretary, Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT),chaired a high-level meeting to review key issues affecting mega infrastructure projects in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Delhi, and Jharkhand. The meeting, attended by senior officials from central ministries, state governments, and project proponents, focused on expediting issue resolution through enhanced inter-ministerial and state coordination facilitated by the Project Monitoring Group (PMG).

    In the meeting, 21 issues across 17 significant projects were reviewed, including 9 projects under the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, with a total cost of all projects exceeding Rs 13,501 crore.The Varanasi-Ranchi-Kolkata Expressway project, valued at Rs 9,623.72 crore and comprising seven issues across six packages, was also reviewed.

    The meeting placed significant emphasis onthe project of setting up new NITs in strategic locations through which the government seeks to bridge regional disparities in technical education and meet the increasing demand for skilled engineers and technical professionals. These institutions will not only enhance the academic landscape but also contribute to regional economic growth by fostering innovation, research, and industry collaboration.

    The Varanasi-Ranchi-Kolkata Expressway project, a key project under the Bharat Mala Yojana, will enhance regional connectivity across Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Jharkhand, and West Bengal,and is expected to significantly boost trade and freight movement, particularly benefiting industries reliant on the Kolkata and Haldia ports for maritime trade– was also reviewed.

    The Secretary,DPIIT, reaffirmed the commitment to enhancing the institutional framework for project monitoring and instructed the relevant authorities to take a proactive approach in addressing pending issues.He emphasized the importance of private proponents leveraging this specialized mechanism of Project Monitoring Group (PMG) (https://pmg.dpiit.gov.in/) to expedite project implementation and ensure efficient and timely resolution of their concerns through collaboration among the Central Government, State Authorities, and Private Stakeholders.

    ******

    Abhishek Dayal/ Abhijeet Narayanan

    (Release ID: 2105316) Visitor Counter : 55

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Director-General of Investment Promotion concludes visit to Japan and Korea (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Director-General of Investment Promotion concludes visit to Japan and Korea (with photos)
    Director-General of Investment Promotion concludes visit to Japan and Korea (with photos)
    *****************************************************************************************

         ​The Director-General of Investment Promotion at Invest Hong Kong, Ms Alpha Lau, today (February 21) concluded her visit to Japan and Korea, which was aimed at promoting Hong Kong’s business advantages and exploring new opportunities for collaboration.           During the trip, Ms Lau met with representatives from various corporations, including leading global enterprises, long-established trading companies, influential local businesses and industry associations, as well as entrepreneurs in both countries. The discussions focused on Hong Kong business opportunities in areas such as financial services, trade, innovation and technology, advanced manufacturing, as well as opportunities arising from the Northern Metropolis development. She also took the opportunity to meet with the local media to elaborate on the latest business advantages in Hong Kong.     Ms Lau said, “Both Japan and Korea are facing the issue of an aging population. For corporates looking for growth, they have to expand into overseas markets. Hong Kong, as a ‘super connector’ and a ‘super value-adder’, serves not only as a gateway to the Mainland market, but also as the perfect platform for Japanese and Korean companies to expand into the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area (GBA) and the entire ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) market.           “The Hong Kong Government is committed to promoting the development of innovation and technology. With our sophisticated innovation and technology ecosystem, Hong Kong provides huge business opportunities for Japanese and Korean start-ups that want to expand overseas. At the same time, the city is actively promoting the silver economy, and Japan and Korea have solid experience in this area. We can further cooperate with Japan and Korea to address the issue of an aging population,” she added.           The President of the Hong Kong Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr Kiichiro Takanami, said, “Hong Kong is the ideal platform for Japanese businesses to expand internationally. Apart from being the culinary and movie capital of Asia, the city also plays a vital role in the innovation development of the GBA, offering unmatched connectivity, a business-friendly environment and skilled talent. Japanese companies can leverage Hong Kong’s business advantages to scale their operations and tap into Mainland China and new markets across Asia.”           The Director General of the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency in Hong Kong, Mr Jaesun Uh, said, “Hong Kong is an unparalleled gateway for Korean corporates and start-ups looking to expand globally. With its crucial role as an international financial centre, its investor-friendly policies and strategic access to the GBA, Hong Kong provides an ideal launchpad for innovation-driven businesses seeking international expansion.”           He added, “For Korean start-ups aiming to go global, Hong Kong presents an exceptional opportunity. With its vibrant start-up ecosystem, easy access to venture capital, deep connections to international markets, and a business-friendly regulatory environment, it is a strategic choice for scaling innovation.”           The visit culminated in a commitment to continue dialogues and explore further avenues for collaboration, reinforcing Hong Kong’s status as a premier business destination for corporates and entrepreneurs from Japan and Korea.

     
    Ends/Friday, February 21, 2025Issued at HKT 20:05

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: London ETO supports Hong Kong designers at London Fashion Week (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, London (London ETO) supported Fashion Hong Kong at London Fashion Week AW25 on February 20 (London time), showcasing the collections of four outstanding designers from Hong Kong.

         The event commenced with a runway show and was followed by an after-show celebration that welcomed over 380 distinguished guests from the fashion community.

         Delivering his remarks at the event, the Director-General of the London ETO, Mr Gilford Law, congratulated the designers for their awe-inspiring collections. He said, “The unlimited creativity and impressive artisanship of our designers speak volumes about Hong Kong’s unique position as the East-meets-West centre for international cultural exchange. We welcome our British friends to visit Hong Kong to see for themselves the dynamic energy of our city, which champions creativity, innovation and sustainability.”

         Fashion Hong Kong is a series of international promotional events organised by the Hong Kong Trade Development Council to promote Hong Kong fashion designers and labels in the global fashion arena.         

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Upgrade to iPhone 16e and save with incredible offers from Verizon

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Upgrade to iPhone 16e and save with incredible offers from Verizon

    NEW YORK – Verizon will offer iPhone 16e, a new addition to the iPhone 16 lineup, featuring breakthrough battery life, the fast performance of the A18 chip, Apple Intelligence1, and a 48MP 2-in-1 camera system — all at an incredible value. Customers can pre-order the new iPhone 16e starting Friday, February 21, with availability beginning Friday, February 28. Visit verizon.com for complete pricing and availability details,

    Major savings and value on iPhone 16e at Verizon

    Starting February 21, Verizon customers can get:

    • Switch to Verizon or add a new line and can get iPhone 16e for $5 a month for 36 months on myPlan2.
    • Want to trade in your phone? Get iPhone 16e on us when you trade-in your current iPhone, Samsung or Google phone — in any condition — and sign up for a new line on myPlan3.
    • Verizon Business customers: For a limited time, get iPhone 16e on us with a new activation on either the Business Unlimited Plus or Unlimited Pro plan with a Verizon Device Payment agreement4. And, eligible Public Sector customers can get a new 128GB iPhone 16e on us on a qualifying two year agreement5.

    Verizon myPlan gives you ultimate access to Apple One

    Supercharge your iPhone 16e with Verizon myPlan, built to give you more flexibility, more perks and more value. Whether you’re upgrading to the latest iPhone for yourself or keeping your business running smoothly with a Verizon Business Unlimited Plan, you’ll stay connected with Verizon’s ultra-fast 5G network—built for whatever life throws your way.

    With myPlan, you’re in control. Pick the perks that matter to you, like Apple One for just $10/month (Individual Plan) or $20/month (Family Plan), plus get deals on entertainment, shopping and more. It’s your phone, your plan, your way — only with Verizon.

    Everything you need to know about the iPhone 16e

    iPhone 16e offers powerful capabilities at a more affordable price. It delivers fast, smooth performance and the best battery life ever on a 6.1-inch iPhone, thanks to the industry-leading efficiency of the A18 chip and the new Apple C1, the first cellular modem designed by Apple. iPhone 16e is also built for Apple Intelligence, the intuitive personal intelligence system that delivers helpful and relevant intelligence while taking an extraordinary step forward for privacy in AI. The 48MP Fusion camera takes gorgeous photos and videos, and with an integrated 2x Telephoto, it is like having two cameras in one, so users can zoom in with optical quality. When outside of cellular and Wi-Fi coverage, iPhone 16e can use Apple’s groundbreaking satellite features — including Emergency SOS, Roadside Assistance, Messages, and Find My via satellite.

    With custom-designed components and deeply integrated software, iPhone 16e users can stay connected and get help when it matters most6. iPhone 16e will be available in two elegant matte finishes — black and white — with colorful cases available to accessorize.

    iPhone 16e can be activated with an eSIM, a more secure alternative to a physical SIM card. With eSIM, users can quickly activate their cellular plan, store multiple cellular plans on the same device, and stay connected. Verizon supports eSIM Quick Transfer which allows users to transfer their existing plan to their new iPhone.

    Visit verizon.com on February 28 to order your new iPhone 16e.

    For more details on Apple products, please visit www.apple.com.


    1 Apple Intelligence is available in localized English for Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa, the U.K., and the U.S. Additional languages, including French, German, Italian, Portuguese (Brazil), Spanish, Japanese, Korean, and Chinese (simplified), English (Singapore), and English (India) will be available in April. Some features, applications, and services may not be available in all regions or all languages.

    2 $599.99 (128 GB only) purchase w/new smartphone line on Unlimited Ultimate, postpaid Unlimited Plus or Unlimited Welcome plan req’d. Less $419.99 promo credit applied over 36 mos.; promo credit ends if eligibility req’s are no longer met; 0% APR. Offer may not be combined with other offers. Apple Intelligence requires iOS 18.1 or later.

    3 $599.99 (128 GB only) purchase w/new smartphone line on Unlimited Ultimate, postpaid Unlimited Plus or Unlimited Welcome plan (min. $65/mo w/Auto Pay (+taxes/fees) for 36 mos) req’d. Less $600 trade-in/promo credit applied over 36 mos.; promo credit ends if eligibility req’s are no longer met; 0% APR. Trade-in must be from Apple, Google or Samsung; trade-in terms apply. Apple Intelligence requires iOS 18.1 or later.

    4 Taxes & fees apply. New line w/device payment purchase agmt & Business Unlimited Plus or Unlimited Pro plan req’d. $599.99 credit applied to acct. over the term of your agmt (up to 36 mos, 0% APR); promo credit ends when eligibility requirements are no longer met. Credits begin in 2-3 bills & will include appropriate credit amounts from order date. Cannot be combined with other device offers. This device supports only 5G Ultra Wideband mid-band (C-band), 5G and 4G LTE. iPhone 16e 128GB monthly fee after credit: $0. Offer ends 3.31.2025.

    5 iPhone 16e offer only. Plan Requirements: Fed – $15+ with data feature; State & Local – $19.99+ with data feature; State of TN – flat rate plan with data feature (must meet PP requirement). Available to government-liable subscribers only and subject to the terms, provisions and conditions of Verizon Wireless-approved government contracting vehicles. An Offer Recovery Fee (ORF) will be assigned to NASPO MA 152 customer lines that take advantage of select quarterly offers and will be charged on the customer’s bill if the line is disconnected before the end of the line term. 5G and 5G UWB may not be available to all government customers. See terms and conditions of your contract. Pricing excludes taxes and fees and is subject to change without notice. Offer ends 3.31.2025.

    6 Apple’s satellite features are included for free for two years starting at the time of activation of a new iPhone 16e . For Emergency SOS via satellite availability, visit support.apple.com/en-us/HT213426. Messages via satellite will be available in the U.S. and Canada in iOS 18 or later. SMS availability will depend on carrier. Carrier fees may apply. Users should check with their carrier for details. Roadside Assistance via satellite is currently available in the U.S. with AAA and Verizon Roadside Assistance, and in the U.K. with Green Flag. Participating roadside assistance providers may charge for services, and iPhone users who are not members can take advantage of their roadside assistance services on a pay-per-use basis. Apple’s satellite features were designed for use in open spaces with a clear line of sight to the sky. Performance may be impacted by obstructions such as trees or surrounding buildings.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Applications open for Global Workshop on Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 2012

    Source: WTO

    Headline: Applications open for Global Workshop on Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) 2012

    The purpose of the Workshop is to deepen participants’ knowledge and skills and share experiences on the interface between government procurement, international trade, development and good governance, with a specific focus on the GPA 2012.  
    The workshop will seek to familiarize participants with the GPA 2012 and related recent developments in government procurement, the WTO Committee on Government Procurement, and the synergies between the GPA 2012 and other international instruments and free trade agreements. The workshop will also provide an opportunity to learn about the benefits and challenges of acceding to the GPA 2012, the accession procedure, the flexibilities available to developing economies seeking accession, and the observer status in the Committee.
    Aspects relating to the implementation of the GPA 2012, including the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises in government procurement markets, the prevention of corrupt practices, domestic review procedures, e-procurement and sustainable procurement will also be addressed. 
    The workshop will be held in the three WTO official languages — English, French and Spanish.
    Who should apply?
    The workshop is aimed at government officials from WTO members and observers eligible to benefit from WTO training activities and having policy responsibility and/or a demonstrated background in trade and/or government procurement policy matters. Candidates should also have an excellent knowledge of one of the working languages of the workshop. Successful completion of the WTO e-learning course on the objectives, rules and operation of the GPA 2012 (Course 1) would be an asset. Following registration, the course can be accessed here (available in English, French and Spanish).
    How to apply?
    Detailed information regarding the application procedure is available here.

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Israeli Freight Forwarder Sentenced to Two Years in Prison for Violating Export Restrictions Imposed on Russia

    Source: US Justice – Antitrust Division

    Headline: Israeli Freight Forwarder Sentenced to Two Years in Prison for Violating Export Restrictions Imposed on Russia

    Gal Haimovich, 49, of Israel, was sentenced today to 24 months in prison and three years of supervised release for conspiracy to illegally ship aircraft parts and avionics from U.S. manufacturers and suppliers to Russia, including for the benefit of sanctioned Russian airline companies. In addition, Haimovich paid the full forfeiture amount of $2,024,435.44 at today’s sentencing.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Israeli Freight Forwarder Sentenced to Two Years in Prison for Violating Export Restrictions Imposed on Russia

    Source: United States Attorneys General

    Gal Haimovich, 49, of Israel, was sentenced today to 24 months in prison and three years of supervised release for conspiracy to illegally ship aircraft parts and avionics from U.S. manufacturers and suppliers to Russia, including for the benefit of sanctioned Russian airline companies. In addition, Haimovich paid the full forfeiture amount of $2,024,435.44 at today’s sentencing.

    As part of his plea agreement, Haimovich admitted that his scheme involved deceiving U.S. companies about the true destination of the goods at issue, and that the defendant and others attempted to conceal the scheme by submitting false information in export documents filed with the U.S. government.

    According to court documents, Haimovich owned an international freight forwarding company that was an affiliate in a group of companies that did business in various countries, including the United States and Israel. Haimovich, through those companies, operated as a freight forwarder of choice for individuals and entities seeking to illegally export goods to Russia in violation of U.S. export control laws. Between approximately March 2022 and May 2023, Haimovich facilitated the export of aircraft parts and avionics, including those with missile technology applications, from the United States through the Southern District of Florida, to various third-party transhippers on behalf of Russian customers. These Russian-end customers routinely instructed Haimovich to deceive the U.S.-based manufacturers and suppliers about the ultimate destination of the goods.

    For example, between April 2022 and April 2023, after the United States imposed additional restrictions on the export of goods to Russia in response to the country’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Haimovich arranged for more than 160 shipments to companies in the Maldives and United Arab Emirates that were responsible for the illicit transshipment of the goods to Russia. One such shipment, of an air data module, occurred in August 2022. Haimovich, who had been hired by Siberia Airlines (doing business as S7 Airlines) to deliver the aircraft component to Russia, directed a co-conspirator to falsely inform the U.S. supplier that the part was destined for the Maldives; in fact, Haimovich knew that the part was destined for Russia for the benefit of S7 Airlines.

    Haimovich also agreed that, between March 2022 and May 2023, he billed Russian customers, including Siberia Airlines (doing business as S7 Airlines), more than two million dollars to have aircraft parts and avionics illegally exported from the United States to Russia. In connection with Haimovich’s plea, he agreed to the entry of a forfeiture money judgment in the sum of $2,024,435 and to forfeit various aircraft parts and components.

    Sue Bai, head of the Justice Department’s National Security Division, Assistant Secretary for Export Enforcement Kevin J. Kurland of the Department of Commerce’s Office of Export Enforcement, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), U.S. Attorney Hayden P. O’Byrne for the Southern District of Florida, and Assistant Director Kevin Vorndran of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division made the announcement.

    BIS and FBI investigated the case.

    Trial Attorney Christopher M. Rigali of the National Security Division’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Christopher Browne for the Southern District of Florida are prosecuting the case. Assistant U.S. Attorney Joshua Paster for the Southern District of Florida handled the asset forfeiture component of the case.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Financial News: One Million Retail Investors Became Shareholders in Money Market ETFs in a Year

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Moscow Exchange – Moscow Exchange –

    On February 20, 2025, Moscow Exchange held a conference “The Collective Investment Market – from the First Trillion to a Place in Every Investor’s Portfolio”. The event was timed to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the start of trading in units of exchange-traded mutual investment funds (EMIF) of the money market.

    The event discussed the current state and development prospects of the collective investment market as a whole and one of its flagship products – money market exchange-traded funds. Participants reviewed and assessed the market from different angles: regulatory, client and commercial – and during the discussions outlined the main trends in the industry and investors’ expectations.

    As of February 1, 2025, the number of investors who invested in money market funds on the Moscow Exchange approached 1.4 million people. Thus, over the year, one million private investors became shareholders.

    Trading in the first money market mutual fund started on the Moscow Exchange stock market on January 20, 2020. Today, investors have access to 16 money market mutual funds (13 ruble and 3 yuan), 10 of which were launched in 2024. Money market funds account for 85% of the total net asset value of all mutual funds (more than 1 trillion rubles in absolute terms as of February 1 of this year) and 83% of the total trading turnover in mutual funds.

    Viktor Zhidkov, Chairman of the Board of Moscow Exchange:

    “The Russian collective investment industry is still relatively young and is in the stage of active growth, the significant potential of which is embedded in the retail segment. Collective investment mechanisms contribute to the best implementation of this potential, and Moscow Exchange is interested in their further development and distribution. Funds, primarily exchange-traded funds, are the instrument with which one should begin to get acquainted with the financial market and which should find a place in the portfolio of every investor. We welcome the efforts of management companies to develop new mutual funds and are always ready to meet market participants halfway, both by creating new benchmarks for them and by helping to solve problems that arise when launching exchange trading in units. We congratulate the industry on its anniversary and wish it stable growth rates, new products and grateful investors.”

    At the end of the conference, a ceremonial award ceremony was held for management companies – market leaders with the largest money market funds by net asset value:

    UK VIM Investments for the mutual fund “Liquidity” with assets of 379.6 billion rubles; UK Pervaya for the mutual fund “Pervaya – Savings Fund” with assets of 227.6 billion rubles; UK Alfa-Capital for the mutual fund “Alfa-Capital Money Market” with assets of 210.5 billion rubles.

    Also awarded were the money market fund managers of UK BrokerCreditService, UK AAA Capital Management, Finam Management, UK Promsvyaz, UK Sistema Capital, Finstar Capital, AK Bars Capital, UK DOKHOD and T-Capital.

    There are currently 80 mutual funds on the Moscow Exchange. As of the end of 2024, the number of shareholders in exchange-traded funds was 6.2 million, of which 3.8 million made at least one transaction per month on average.

    The Moscow Exchange Money Market is one of the most important segments of the Russian financial market, with the help of which both large corporations and small companies and individual investors manage their monetary liquidity. The list of money market instruments includes repo with the Central Credit Union, repo with the Central Credit Union, repo with the Bank of Russia, interdealer repo, deposits with the Central Credit Union, loans, as well as deposit and loan auctions. The Moscow Exchange acts as the organizer of trades, clearing and settlements are carried out by the National Clearing Center (NCC, part of the Moscow Exchange Group).

    Contact information for media 7 (495) 363-3232Pr@moex.kom

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    Please Note; This Information is Raw Content Directly from the Information Source. It is access to What the Source Is Stating and Does Not Reflect

    HTTPS: //VVV. MEEX.K.M.M.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Canada: Prime Minister announces changes to the parliamentary secretary team

    Source: Government of Canada – Prime Minister

    The Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau, today announced changes to the parliamentary secretary team.

    In their new roles, the parliamentary secretaries will support their respective cabinet ministers to make progress on the priorities that matter most to Canadians. They will engage directly with Canadians on key initiatives and represent the government at home and abroad. Their appointments are effective immediately.

    The changes to the parliamentary secretary team are as follows:

    • Vance Badawey becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport and Internal Trade
    • Jaime Battiste becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs and Minister responsible for the Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency
    • Chris Bittle becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing, Infrastructure and Communities and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Families, Children and Social Development
    • Mike Kelloway becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Rural Economic Development and Minister responsible for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
    • Irek Kusmierczyk becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment, Workforce Development and Labour and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Seniors
    • Bryan May becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister
    • Yasir Naqvi becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Health and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Mental Health and Addictions and Associate Minister of Health
    • Taleeb Noormohamed becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance and Intergovernmental Affairs (Canada-U.S.)
    • Jennifer O’Connell becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety (Cybersecurity)
    • Marc G. Serré becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources
    • Terry Sheehan becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indigenous Services and Minister responsible for the Federal Economic Development Agency for Northern Ontario
    • Ryan Turnbull becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance and Intergovernmental Affairs and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry
    • Adam van Koeverden becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Environment and Climate Change and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Sport and Minister responsible for Prairies Economic Development Canada

    The Prime Minister also welcomed the following new members to the parliamentary secretary team:

    • Kody Blois becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Rural Economic Development and Minister responsible for the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency
    • Julie Dzerowicz becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Consular Affairs and Latin America)
    • Arielle Kayabaga becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Small Business
    • Viviane Lapointe becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Official Languages and Associate Minister of Public Safety
    • Tim Louis becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage
    • Francesco Sorbara becomes Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Finance and Intergovernmental Affairs

    These new parliamentary secretaries will work to deliver real, positive change for Canadians. They join the following parliamentary secretaries remaining in their portfolio:

    • Paul Chiang, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship
    • Julie Dabrusin, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Environment and Climate Change and Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources
    • Peter Fragiskatos, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing, Infrastructure and Communities
    • Lisa Hepfner, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Women and Gender Equality and Youth
    • Anthony Housefather, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board
    • Iqra Khalid, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Revenue
    • Annie Koutrakis, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Tourism and Minister responsible for the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec
    • Marie-France Lalonde, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence
    • Kevin Lamoureux, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons
    • Stéphane Lauzon, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Citizens’ Services
    • James Maloney, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada
    • Rob Oliphant, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs
    • Sherry Romanado, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the King’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Emergency Preparedness 
    • Randeep Sarai, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence
    • Maninder Sidhu, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development
    • Charles Sousa, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Services and Procurement 
    • Anita Vandenbeld, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Development
    • Sameer Zuberi, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Diversity, Inclusion and Persons with Disabilities

    Quote

    “Our government is laser-focused on the issues that matter most to you and your family. With these additions to our strong team, we will create and protect Canadian jobs, build more homes, reduce emissions, make life cost less, and defend Canadian interests.”

    Quick Facts

    • Parliamentary secretaries are chosen by the Prime Minister to assist ministers.
    • The responsibilities of parliamentary secretaries generally fall into two broad categories: House of Commons business and department-related duties.
    • Parliamentary secretaries are not members of Cabinet and do not play a formal role in the Cabinet decision-making process. They support their ministers, but overall responsibility and accountability remains with the minister.

    Associated Links

    MIL OSI Canada News

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: York and Yorkshire-based investigators help secure jail for plumbing fraudster who exploited vulnerable homeowners

    Source: City of York

    A man from Bolton who targeted victims across the North West has been sentenced to four years in prison at Bradford Crown Court today, after defrauding vulnerable customers out of a total of £250,000.

    Suhaib Sirajudin, 39, of Fifth Avenue, Bolton, operated as an ‘emergency plumber’ and pleaded guilty to two counts of fraudulent trading on 9 October 2024. The court heard how he took advantage of homeowners’ urgent need for a plumber by charging grossly inflated emergency callout and repair fees, frequently targeting victims who were older, vulnerable or lived alone. As well as seriously overcharging for initial works he often deliberately damaged victims’ properties in order to charge more for repairs.

    Between June 2021 and December 2022, trading as Plumbing Emergency 24/7 Limited and Expert Plumbing Limited 24/7, Mr Sirajudin advertised his services online and responded to emergency callouts from householders seeking urgent help with leaks. Mr Sirajudin would then exploit his victims, pressurising them into paying ‘extortionate’ sums for works that he completed to such a poor standard that the problem was either unresolved, or got worse.

    One older victim watched her kitchen ceiling fall in after Mr Sirajudin said a hole needed to be made in it to repair a bathroom leak. In total she and her husband, who was bedbound, paid almost £10,000 – almost all their savings. Another victim paid over £3,000 for the repair of a toilet leak that should have cost around £300. An expert said even that minor repair was not done properly.

    Another elderly couple were quoted £39,000 to repair their gas fire and boiler – which Mr Sirajudin was not qualified to do. They said Sirajudin made them feel belittled and as though they could not question the bill. They eventually paid £21,000.

    Many victims describe how Mr Sirajudin became aggressive when challenged, shouting and refusing to leave or threatening to take away new parts if payment was not made immediately. When victims or their relatives later contacted the companies to complain, their refund requests were often refused and they were cut off on the phone.

    As well as the financial losses, the emotional, mental and physical toll taken on victims has been significant, with a loss of confidence, depression and problems sleeping being among the lasting impacts of Mr Sirajudin’s crimes.

    The defendant was sentenced following an investigation by the National Trading Standards Yorkshire and Humber Regional Investigations Team, hosted by City of York Council, and the National Trading Standards eCrime Team, hosted by North Yorkshire Council.

    As well as the custodial sentence, Mr Sirajudin is also subject to a £250,000 confiscation order for victim compensation and £30,000 in prosecution costs. He will be disqualified from being a company director for 8 years.

    Cllr Jenny Kent, Executive Member with portfolio for Trading Standards at City of York Council, said:

    Mr Sirajudin intimidated and exploited people at a time when they needed emergency plumbing help, often late at night, in their own homes. Many victims were elderly or vulnerable and were charged extortionate amounts for often minor repairs which were badly done; in some cases made considerably worse. I hope they gain some small comfort from the sentencing today, and I’m very grateful for the persistence and dedication of our investigating teams here in York and North Yorkshire who worked hard to bring this case to trial.”

    Lord Michael Bichard, Chair, National Trading Standards, said:

    “With householders in desperate need of a plumber, often in the middle of the night, Mr Sirajudin was already in a position of power by the time he arrived at a caller’s home. If he saw that a customer was older, vulnerable or lived alone he took the opportunity to exploit them, leaving many feeling frightened in their own homes as well as thousands of pounds out of pocket.

    “I hope today’s sentencing provides some comfort for those involved and serves as a stark reminder that this type of callous intimidation and deceit will be investigated, and perpetrators brought to justice.

    “If you or someone you know has fallen victim to a fraud like this you should report it to the Citizens Advice consumer service helpline by calling 0808 223 1133.”

    MIL OSI United Kingdom

  • MIL-OSI USA: Bringing 893 New Jobs to Western Colorado: Morgan Mining to Expand Manufacturing Industry in Grand Junction and Mesa County

    Source: US State of Colorado

    GRAND JUNCTION – Today, Governor Polis, the Global Business Development Division of the Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT), and the Grand Junction Economic Partnership (GJEP) announced that Morgan Mining, a leading interdisciplinary construction, mining, engineering, and management firm, has selected Grand Junction, Colorado, for expansion. This project will grow the advanced manufacturing industry and create new, good-paying jobs in rural Colorado.

    “I’m thrilled that Morgan Mining is expanding in western Colorado, bringing 893 new good-paying jobs to Grand Junction and Mesa County. Colorado is the best place to live, work, and do business, and this exciting announcement shows that our leadership to lower costs for workers and build a strong workforce continues to attract businesses to our strong economy, strengthening our Colorado for All,” said Governor Polis.

    Morgan Mining provides specialized mining labor, production management, and mining supplies for mining operations and other ancillary services. The company plans to expand its business through additional contracts throughout the United States and has identified the need to purchase a new site and refurbished mining equipment. The new site will serve as a hub for product and material suppliers to consign substantial inventory and equipment that would provide faster delivery to end users.

    “We are excited to move forward with our expansion plans in Mesa County. We decided that creating a mining-focused hub in Mesa County provided the best economic and growth opportunities for Morgan.  From the outset of this expansion project, OEDIT and GJEP were very actively engaged with us and ultimately provided the support needed to tip the scales in favor of Mesa County.  We look forward to continuing our relationship with these entities, as well as other local leaders, as this expansion moves forward,” said Justin Morgan, President of Morgan Mining.  

    In Mesa County, Morgan Mining expects to create 893 net new jobs at an average annual wage of $92,447, or 167% of the average annual wage in Mesa County. The positions will include engineers, electricians, and finance roles.

    “We are thrilled to partner with Grand Junction Economic Partnership and support Morgan Mining’s expansion in Mesa County. When advanced manufacturing companies expand in rural Colorado, they strengthen and diversify regional communities and economies. That’s a win for western Colorado and a win for the state of Colorado,” said OEDIT Executive Director Eve Lieberman.

    “Morgan Mining’s investment into Mesa County represents a significant milestone for the regional economy. With up to 893 new jobs projected over the next eight years, this expansion provides incredible opportunities for local workforce development while reinforcing the region’s reputation for supporting industry growth. We are proud to partner with Project West Co Mining as they invest in our community’s future,” said Curtis Englehart, Executive Director for the Grand Junction Economic Partnership.

    The Colorado Economic Development Commission approved up to $10,890,875 in a performance-based Job Growth Incentive Tax Credit for the company over an eight-year period. These incentives are contingent upon Morgan Mining, referred to as Project WesCo Mining throughout the OEDIT review process, meeting net new job creation and salary requirements.

    In addition to Colorado, Morgan Mining considered Tennessee for expansion. The company currently has 226 employees, 196 of whom are in Colorado.

    About Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade

    The Colorado Office of Economic Development and International Trade (OEDIT) works to empower all to thrive in Colorado’s economy. Under the leadership of the Governor and in collaboration with economic development partners across the state, we foster a thriving business environment through funding and financial programs, training, consulting and informational resources across industries and regions. We promote economic growth and long-term job creation by recruiting, retaining, and expanding Colorado businesses and providing programs that support entrepreneurs and businesses of all sizes at every stage of growth. Our goal is to protect what makes our state a great place to live, work, start a business, raise a family, visit and retire—and make it accessible to everyone. Learn more about OEDIT.

    About the Grand Junction Economic Partnership

    The Grand Junction Economic Partnership (GJEP) works to enhance the economic vitality and quality of life in the Grand Junction area by supporting high-impact capital investment and job creation. GJEP is a single stop for businesses looking to relocate or expand in the cities of Grand Junction and Fruita, the Town of Palisade, and surrounding communities in Mesa County. Operating as a 501(c)3, GJEP offers free services that help businesses navigate incentives and opportunity zones and connect with realtors and developers, the workforce, local leadership, and more. Visit www.gjep.org for more information.

    ###

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Afreximbank to Set up $1 Billion Oil Service Financing Facility in Guyana

    Source: Africa Press Organisation – English (2) – Report:

    GEORGETOWN, Guyana, February 21, 2025/APO Group/ —

    In a significant announcement at the Guyana Energy Conference and Supply Chain Expo being held from, February 18 – 21, Prof. Benedict Oramah, President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com), declared the multilateral Bank’s intention to establish a $1 billion oil service financing facility in Guyana. This initiative aims to enhance local participation in the country’s fast growing oil industry, in alignment with the government’s local content policies. The Bank will deploy the $1 billion facility directly to qualifying corporate clients or through a factoring line via local banks, enabling them to finance invoices from local contractors.

    President Oramah highlighted the transformative potential of Guyana’s estimated 12 billion barrels of crude oil reserves. Emphasising the transformative power in proactive resource management, he advised Guyana to aggressively harness and build capital from its oil resources.

    He said, “Given the level of oil production in Guyana and its offshore location, I estimate that the oil service sector would amount to 5 to 8 billion US dollars annually. But where will it go? Most of it would be paid to oil service companies abroad, if Guyana does nothing to avoid that. A 50% retention in Guyana would increase Guyana’s GDP by 29% to 47%.” As such, he called for robust local content policies that would enable Guyanese entrepreneurs to become significant players in the oil value chain.

    Based on Afreximbank’s rich history of supporting commodity-dependent economies, President Oramah shared insights to complement the ongoing efforts of the Guyanese government. He acknowledged the inherent risks associated with dependency on a single commodity and laid stress on the importance of diversification.

    He cautioned, “The commodity market is prone to volatility and cyclicality; hence, the reliance on crude revenues as a primary source of government funding could expose the national economy to volatile commodity markets.” As such, he advised the government to secure long-term off-take contracts with oil service companies, which will enhance market access and price stability.

    In the spirit of deepening Afri-Caribbean partnership, President Oramah remarked that skilled oil service companies from Ghana, Egypt, and South Africa, are “ready and willing to support Guyanese… And of course, Afreximbank is there to underwrite the marriage.”

    He added that: “These measures are necessary if Guyana and other new entrants in the Caribbean and Africa are to avoid the painful “Dutch Disease. We make these suggestions based on the three long decades of financing oil and gas activities across Africa. We have witnessed oil-dependent economies transform for better or worse through these periods. In all these, the difference reflected the policy choices the leaders made.”

    MIL OSI Africa

  • MIL-OSI: Peoples Bancorp Announces Cash Dividend

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEWTON, N.C., Feb. 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — The Board of Directors of Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina, Inc., Newton, NC (Nasdaq: PEBK) declared the Company’s regular cash dividend for the first quarter of 2025 in the amount of $0.20 per share. The first quarter cash dividend will be paid on March 14, 2025 to shareholders of record on March 3, 2025.

    Shareholders are encouraged to enroll in the Company’s Dividend Reinvestment and Stock Purchase Plan. For details, contact Krissy Price at (828) 464-5620 or (800) 948-7195 or you may email any questions to our transfer agent, Broadridge Corporate Issuer Solutions, Inc. at shareholder@broadridge.com.

    Peoples Bank, the wholly-owned subsidiary of Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina, Inc. operates 16 banking offices entirely in North Carolina, with offices in Catawba, Alexander, Lincoln, Mecklenburg, Iredell, and Wake Counties. The Bank also operates loan production offices in Lincoln, Mecklenburg, Rowan, and Forsyth Counties. The Company’s common stock is publicly traded and is quoted on the Nasdaq Global Market under the symbol “PEBK.”

    Statements made in this press release, other than those concerning historical information, should be considered forward-looking statements pursuant to the safe harbor provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995. These forward-looking statements are based on information currently available to management and are subject to various risks and uncertainties, including but not limited to those described in Peoples Bancorp of North Carolina, Inc.’s annual report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023, under “General Description of Business” and otherwise in the Company’s reports and filings.

    Contact:  William D. Cable, Sr.
      President and Chief Executive Officer
       
      Jeffrey N. Hooper
      Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
       
      Phone 828-464-5620

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI USA: Jefferson, Reading between the Lines? Textual Analysis of Central Bank Communications

    Source: US State of New York Federal Reserve

    Thank you, President Daly, for organizing this conference and for the opportunity to talk to this group.1 I have paid close attention to the papers presented at this annual conference in the past, and I look forward to today’s presentations and discussion.

    Today, I will talk about central bank communications and the use of textual analysis tools. These tools help process qualitative information that may be hard to capture in numerical forecasts. Also, they can improve our understanding of economic concepts that are otherwise difficult to measure. This topic has been covered at this conference in the past. Last year, for example, there was a paper on the program that highlighted the importance of considering the impact that speeches by the Chair of the Federal Reserve (Fed) have on asset prices when evaluating the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of the economy.2 This paper also shows that speeches by the Vice Chair are less important than those by the Chair. So this might be a good time to catch up on your text messages! (Just kidding!)
    My talk is organized as follows. First, I will briefly discuss central bank communication and its effect on asset prices. Next, I will discuss how recent advances in automated textual analysis may be having an impact on how the information in central bank communication is incorporated into asset prices. Then I will review how researchers and market participants use textual analysis techniques, among other techniques, to gauge who is listening to central bank communication and to understand how monetary policy is transmitted to the economy. Before concluding, I will broaden my coverage and discuss how textual analysis tools can be used to estimate difficult-to-measure concepts in economics such as uncertainty and supply chain disruptions.
    These new textual analysis techniques are important to me as a policymaker because I want to understand how our communications are being heard, interpreted, understood, and acted upon.
    Central Bank Communication and its Effect on Financial MarketsFormer Fed Chair Ben Bernanke often highlighted the importance of central bank communication, saying that “monetary policy is 98 percent talk and 2 percent action.”3 Obviously, the “98 percent” is hyperbole; it is not meant to be taken as an exact measure of how much of the transmission of monetary policy is due to central bank communication. Even so, research and my own experience confirm that central bank communication is key for the transmission of monetary policy. In remarks I delivered almost two years ago, I discussed how monetary policy is transmitted to the rest of the economy through financial market prices.4 Changes in the federal funds target range are transmitted to overnight money market rates and other short-term interest rates through arbitrage relationships. The configuration of short-term interest rates, central bank communication about the likely future path of short-term interest rates, and the associated economic outlook, in turn, affect long-term interest rates through investors’ expectations.5 Higher long-term interest rates increase the cost of borrowing for households and businesses, thereby affecting households’ and businesses’ spending, savings, and investment decisions.
    Evolution of Fed CommunicationsPolicymakers’ approach to communication has evolved over time. In the past, policymakers were not focused on clarity and transparency in their communications as they are today. For example, former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan famously quipped in 1987, “If I seem unduly clear to you, you must have misunderstood what I said.”6 In the 1990s, however, he started to embrace transparency. Figure 1 shows a timeline of the steps taken toward increasing transparency at the Fed since the 1990s. In 1993, the Fed started to publish Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting minutes in their current form, and, soon after, it began releasing FOMC meeting transcripts with a five-year lag. In February 1994, the FOMC started to issue post-FOMC meeting statements following meetings at which there was a change in the intended policy stance. Later, it regularly incorporated the target federal funds rate into these statements. In May 1999, the FOMC started to publish statements after every meeting, even on occasions when there was no change in policy. In 2004, the FOMC accelerated the release of the minutes to three weeks after the meeting as opposed to after the subsequent FOMC meeting. During the tenure of former Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, the Fed’s transparency increased significantly. In November 2007, the FOMC began releasing the Summary of Economic Projections (SEP). In 2011, Chair Bernanke started holding press conferences after every other FOMC meeting. In 2012, under his leadership, the FOMC adopted an explicit inflation target of 2 percent in its new Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. Also, it started publishing anonymized individual FOMC participants’ views on the appropriate future path of the federal funds rate, now famously known as the “dot plot.” In 2019, Chair Powell continued this march toward transparency and started holding press conferences after every FOMC meeting.
    Of course, Chair Powell and other policymakers testify regularly before Congress, as required by law. Also, FOMC participants give public speeches and transparently discuss their views on monetary policy and associated issues, as evidenced by my speech here today.
    Previously, I have spoken about two primary reasons for the increase in transparency.7 First, transparency allows for greater accountability to the public. Second, there is a growing appreciation in the economics profession that clarity about policy actions helps the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of the economy by, for example, making asset prices more informationally efficient. Relatedly, by conveying aspects of the Fed’s reaction function, communications can help inform investors’ views about the likely future path of monetary policy in a way that helps achieve the Fed’s monetary policy objectives.
    Using Textual Analysis to Quantify Central Bank CommunicationCentral bank communication is clearly important in shaping the path of interest rates, so it is not surprising that investors and researchers use textual analysis techniques, including artificial intelligence, to quantify in an automated way information conveyed through FOMC statements and other communications, such as speeches by Governors and Fed Bank presidents.8 Researchers have tested the hypothesis that clarity about policy actions would help the transmission of monetary policy to the rest of the economy. Using textual analysis, high-frequency asset price data, and high-frequency central bank communication data, this research shows that investors’ reactions to specific sentences communicated by the central bank are quickly incorporated into asset prices.9 In addition, economists have used textual analysis to understand how media reporting of central bank communication affects short-term interest rates.10 For example, some have used a bag-of-words technique to estimate media sentiment during FOMC announcement days.11 By design, a high media sentiment is meant to capture times when journalists report that the FOMC is more likely to tighten monetary policy in the near future. Figure 2 shows that the correlation between media sentiment and six-month U.S. Treasury yield changes is positive and relatively high (40 percent), which suggests that media reporting of central bank communication plays an important role in the transmission of monetary policy.
    Policymakers know that their communications are likely to affect the course of short-term interest rates, other asset prices, and the associated economic outlook, resulting in an easing or tightening of financial conditions. Therefore, policymakers have always paid close attention to what they say, well before market participants started applying artificial intelligence tools to central bank communications.
    In general, researchers argue that automated textual analysis and automated trading have increased the speed with which information is incorporated into asset prices. That suggests that asset prices have become more informationally efficient, sometimes in a matter of seconds or even milliseconds instead of minutes after information is released.12 Thus, increased transparency and advances in technology have potentially made asset prices more informationally efficient, which, in turn, helps with the transmission of monetary policy. Yet others argue that automated algorithms may be more prone to mistakes than humans, may provide an incentive for investors to value speed over accuracy, and may reduce the long-run informativeness of asset prices, which could hurt the transmission of monetary policy.13
    I look forward to the findings of future research as we develop a deeper understanding of this issue. For now, I do not think artificial intelligence is changing the way policymakers communicate, but research shows that it has affected how quickly information about policy is incorporated into asset prices.
    Central Bank Communication: Is Anyone Listening?Next, I will discuss whether research using textual analysis is helping policymakers to understand better who is listening to central bank communication. In 2018, former Fed Vice Chair Alan Blinder predicted that “central banks will keep trying to communicate with the general public, as they should. But for the most part, they will fail.”14 He explained further that “many economic models presume that central bank communication is aimed at wage-setters, price-setters, consumers, or investors—maybe all of them. But are they listening?” His answer was no, they are not listening to central bank communications, and he cited economic research using survey data to support his answer.15
    More recently, however, research shows that nonexperts and households are listening to central bank communications. Some of this research uses textual analysis, and some uses randomized control trials. Researchers have used textual analysis to process automatically and quantify more than 3.2 million posts on social media by experts and nonexperts. This research shows that journalists and professional forecasters who comment often on central bank policies, as well as nonexperts who do not comment regularly on central bank policies do listen to central bank communications.16
    Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy TransmissionFurther, research shows that direct central bank communication and the media’s reporting of central bank communication are highly correlated. Yet when they do not align, the media’s reporting tends to have a larger effect on asset prices and professional forecasters’ views about the future than the central bank’s direct communication.17 In addition, a randomized control trial with nearly 20,000 U.S. individuals shows that central bank communication affects households’ inflation expectations, which, in turn, affects their behavior as measured by scanner-collected data.18 This research shows that while central bank communication tends to affect household expectations and spending behavior, the way households receive information matters. In particular, households appear to react more to information conveyed by social media, friends, and family than to information conveyed by traditional media. All told, this research suggests that central bank efforts to communicate with the general public are having some success, but there is still room for improvement.
    Measuring Economic Concepts Using Textual AnalysisTextual analysis is not only helping researchers understand who is listening to central bank communication. Generally, it is helping them to measure qualitative information that is hard to capture with numerical forecasts and estimate difficult-to-measure economic concepts such as uncertainty, supply chain disruptions, and financial conditions.19 As I mentioned in a previous speech, uncertainty is not directly observable in the same way that inflation and economic output are.20 Notwithstanding the difficulty in measuring uncertainty, researchers have developed tools to assess it. In fact, in the past two decades, there has been tremendous growth in research devoted to the subject, especially on text-based measures of uncertainty. For example, researchers created an economic policy uncertainty index, shown in figure 3, based on the number of leading newspaper articles that contain a combination of words related to economic policy uncertainty.21 As shown in the figure, economic uncertainty in the U.S. reached an all-time high at the onset of the pandemic, came down slightly after the pandemic, and has recently increased as the potential economic implications of new government policies are discussed in newspaper articles. Research also shows that newspaper text-based measures are highly correlated with stock price volatility, and that higher values of these measures are associated with lower investment and employment. A corollary to that insight is that policymakers should communicate as clearly as possible to avoid increasing uncertainty.
    Recent research has also discovered that narrative sentiment conveys information that may be hard to capture in numerical forecasts. For example, it was shown that the tone of text accompanying a set of economic forecasts produced by the Fed’s staff, predicts forecast errors of the Fed’s staff as well as Blue Chip participants.22 The predictive power of sentiment seems to be arising from signaling the downside risks to economic performance for output, employment, and stock returns. These findings suggest that the tone of the narrative captures information that is not necessarily provided by corresponding forecasts. Not surprisingly, given this information, the tonality has predictive power for stock prices as well as monetary policy surprises.
    Another example of how textual analysis is helping researchers estimate difficult-to-measure concepts is new measures of firms’ demand and supply shocks. Traditionally, academic researchers use sign restrictions in price and quantity measures to identify and differentiate demand shocks from supply shocks. An increase in price and quantity is considered a demand shock; an increase in price accompanied by a decline in quantity is considered a supply shock. These so-called sign restrictions are useful tools; however, it is possible that an increase in price and quantity can be due to a surge in demand in the face of supply chain disruptions. Other popular measures of supply chain disruptions are supplier delivery times and order backlogs provided by the Institute for Supply Management (ISM). These measures, however, only estimate firm activity relative to the previous month and can lack important context for understanding short-term dynamics that can otherwise be captured in qualitative, text-based measures. Thus, it can be useful to complement sign restriction methods, supplier delivery times, and order backlogs with textual analysis techniques that quantify firms’ narratives in earnings calls and the Beige Book to identify better demand and supply shocks.23 For example, figure 4 shows the Supply Chain Bottleneck Sentiment Index, the solid black line, estimated by a Board economist using textual analysis techniques to quantify the information conveyed in the Fed’s Beige Book publications, along with the ISM Supplier Delivery Index, the dashed red line.24 For illustration purposes, both indexes are normalized to have a zero mean and a standard deviation equal to one, with large positive numbers indicating that supply chains are stressed. Both indexes surged in the 1970s after the oil price increase and ensuing energy crisis. Supply chain disruptions reappeared in the 2000s with chip shortages, and, most recently, bottlenecks arose during the COVID-19 pandemic. The figure illustrates how the text-based measure signals a more prolonged period of supply chain disruptions during the pandemic. Comparing both measures, we see that the monthly changes in delivery times improved at a fast pace, as shown in the ISM index, but narratives of the post-pandemic recovery, as captured in the Beige Book, were signaling elevated levels of supply chain disruptions that eased more slowly.
    ConclusionThe idea of using qualitative information on media, government records, central bank, or management communication in economic research to understand better the transmission of monetary policy is not new.25 What is novel is that, in the past two decades, there have been advances in textual analysis techniques and incredible growth of data that are easily available to researchers and investors, in terms of both volume and variety. The advances in textual analysis techniques and the growth in alternative data have, in turn, helped researchers to better estimate difficult-to-measure economic concepts, to more easily identify who listens to central bank communications, and to investigate how quickly central bank communication is incorporated into asset prices, among other things. Also, we have greater access to high-frequency data, such as millisecond timestamp financial transactions, and “alternative data,” which includes textual information from social media posts. As I mentioned earlier, these new textual analysis techniques are important to policymakers because we seek to understand how our communications are being heard, interpreted, understood, and acted upon.
    While I am grateful that textual analysis techniques and data access have improved over the years, I will end on a cautionary note. Automatic textual analysis should not be regarded as superseding other analysis of the historical record on monetary policy. A wealth of data and techniques to analyze text does not necessarily translate into greater insight. Therefore, it is important that policymakers, researchers, and investors continue to be diligent in using the right tools and the right data to make the best possible inferences.26
    Thank you!
    ReferencesAdams, Travis, Andrea Ajello, Diego Silva, and Francisco Vazquez-Grande (2023). “More than Words: Twitter Chatter and Financial Market Sentiment,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-034. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May.
    Appelbaum, Binyamin (2012). “A Fed Focused on the Value of Clarity,” New York Times, December 13.
    Baker, Scott R., Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis (2016). “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 131 (November), pp. 1593–636.
    Bernanke, Ben S. (2015). “Inaugurating a New Blog,” Ben Bernanke’s Blog, March 30.
    ——— (2022). “Ben Bernanke: The Fed from the Great Inflation to COVID-19 (PDF),” webinar, Brookings Institution, Washington, May 23.
    Bernanke, Ben S., and Kenneth N. Kuttner (2005). “What Explains the Stock Market’s Reaction to Federal Reserve Policy?” Journal of Finance, vol. 60 (June), pp. 1221–57.
    Blinder, Alan S. (2018). “Through a Crystal Ball Darkly: The Future of Monetary Policy Communication,” AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol. 108 (May), pp. 567–71.
    Chaboud, Alain P., Benjamin Chiquoine, Erik Hjalmarsson, and Clara Vega (2014). “Rise of the Machines: Algorithmic Trading in the Foreign Exchange Market,” Journal of Finance, vol. 69 (October), pp. 2045–84.
    Cieslak, Anna, and Michael McMahon (2023). “Tough Talk: The Fed and Risk Premium,” working paper, April (revised June 2024).
    Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Michael Weber (2022). “Monetary Policy Communications and Their Effects on Household Inflation Expectations,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 130 (June), pp. 1537–84.
    Dessaint, Olivier, Thierry Foucault, and Laurent Fresard (2024). “Does Alternative Data Improve Financial Forecasting? The Horizon Effect,” Journal of Finance, vol. 79 (June), pp. 2237–87.
    Dugast, Jerome, and Thierry Foucault (2017). “Data Abundance and Asset Price Informativeness,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 130 (November), pp. 367–91.
    Gertler, Mark, and Peter Karadi (2015). “Monetary Policy Surprises, Credit Costs, and Economic Activity,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 7 (January), pp. 44–76.
    Ehrmann, Michael, and Alena Wabitsch (2022). “Central Bank Communication with Non-experts – A Road to Nowhere?” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 127 (April), pp. 69–85.
    Gardner, Ben, Chiara Scotti, and Clara Vega (2022). “Words Speak as Loudly as Actions: Central Bank Communication and the Response of Equity Prices to Macroeconomic Announcements,” Journal of Econometrics, vol. 231 (December), pp. 387–409.
    Gómez-Cram, Roberto, and Marco Grotteria (2022). “Real-Time Price Discovery via Verbal Communication: Method and Application to Fedspeak,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 143 (March), pp. 993–1025.
    Hanson, Samuel G., and Jeremy C. Stein (2015). “Monetary Policy and Long-Term Real Rates,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 115 (March), pp. 429–48.
    Jefferson, Philip N. (2023a). “Implementation and Transmission of Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at the H. Parker Willis Lecture, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va., March 27.
    ——— (2023b). “Communicating about Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at “Central Bank Communications: Theory and Practice,” a conference hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland, Ohio, May 13.
    ——— (2023c). “Elevated Economic Uncertainty: Causes and Consequences,” speech delivered at “Global Risk, Uncertainty, and Volatility,” a research conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Swiss National Bank, and the Bank for International Settlements, Zurich, Switzerland, November 14.
    Kumar, Saten, Hassan Afrouzi, Olivier Coibion, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko (2015). “Inflation Targeting Does Not Anchor Inflation Expectations: Evidence from Firms in New Zealand (PDF),” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, pp. 151–208.
    O’Hara, Maureen (2015). “High Frequency Market Microstructure,” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 116 (May), pp. 257–70.
    Piazzesi, Monika, and Martin Schneider (2006). “Equilibrium Yield Curves,” NBER Working Paper Series 12609. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, October (revised January 2007).
    Romer, Christina D., and David H. Romer (1989). “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test in the Spirit of Friedman and Schwartz,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual, vol. 4, pp.121–70.
    ——— (2023). “Presidential Address: Does Monetary Policy Matter? The Narrative Approach after 35 Years.” American Economic Review, vol. 113 (June), pp. 1395-423.
    ——— (2024). “Lessons from History for Successful Disinflation,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol.148, Supplement (November), 103654.
    Schmanski, Bennett, Chiara Scotti, Clara Vega, and Hedi Benamar (2023). “Fed Communication, News, Twitter, and Echo Chambers,” Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-36. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, May.
    Sharpe, Steven A., Nitish R. Sinha, and Christopher A. Hollrah (2023). “The Power of Narrative Sentiment in Economic Forecasts,” International Journal of Forecasting, vol. 39 (July–September), pp. 1097–121.
    Soto, Paul (2023). “Measurement and Effects of Supply Chain Bottlenecks Using Natural Language Processing,” FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, February 6 (revised January 16, 2025).
    Swanson, Eric T., and Vishuddhi Jayawickrema (2024). “Speeches by the Fed Chair Are More Important Than FOMC Announcements: An Improved High-Frequency Measure of U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks,” working paper, University of California, Irvine.
    von Beschwitz, Bastian, Donald B. Keim, and Massimo Massa (2020). “First to ‘Read’ the News: News Analytics and Algorithmic Trading,” Review of Asset Pricing Studies, vol. 10 (February), pp. 122–78.
    Young, Henry L., Anderson Monken, Flora Haberkorn, and Eva Van Leemput (2021). “Effects of Supply Chain Bottlenecks on Prices using Textual Analysis,” FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, December 3.

    1. The views expressed here are my own and are not necessarily those of my colleagues on the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Open Market Committee. Return to text
    2. See Swanson and Jayawickrema (2024). Return to text
    3. See Bernanke (2015, 2022). Return to text
    4. See Jefferson (2023a). Arbitrage is the economic force that keeps prices of financial instruments with similar payoffs, such as the federal funds rate and repo rates, close to each other. Return to text
    5. More specifically, according to the expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates, intermediate- and long-term interest rates are importantly affected by the weighted average of expected future short-term interest rates. In addition, monetary policy affects risk premiums (see, for example, Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005; Hanson and Stein, 2015; and Gertler and Karadi, 2015) and term premiums (if monetary policy tightens in response to inflationary shocks, term premiums also tend to rise as longer-maturity bonds become riskier; see, for example, Piazzesi and Schneider, 2006). Return to text
    6. See Appelbaum (2012). Return to text
    7. See Jefferson (2023b). Return to text
    8. See, for example, Cieslak and McMahon (2023); Gardner, Scotti, and Vega (2022); Gómez-Cram and Grotteria (2022); and Sharpe, Sinha and Hollrah (2023). Return to text
    9. See, for example, Gómez-Cram and Grotteria (2022), who use textual analysis, high-frequency asset price data, and high-frequency central bank communication data to understand investors’ reactions to specific sentences communicated by the FOMC. Return to text
    10. See Schmanski and others (2023). Return to text
    11. A bag-of-words technique is a natural language processing technique that uses a collection (or “bag”) of words and a scoring system to quantify qualitative textual information. Schmanski and others (2023) use this technique to pair a set of topic keywords with modifiers and determine whether the combination of topic-modifier communicates tightening, neutral, or easing news. By construction, the sentiment is high when the media thinks the FOMC is more likely to tighten monetary policy in the near future. Return to text
    12. See Chaboud and others (2014) for evidence that automated trading has increased the informational efficiency of foreign exchange markets by reducing the frequency of triangular arbitrage opportunities and the autocorrelation of high-frequency returns. See von Beschwitz and others (2020) for evidence that automated textual analysis speeds up the stock price response to news. Return to text
    13. See, for example, von Beschwitz, Keim, and Massa (2020); Dugast and Foucault (2017); and O’Hara (2015). Return to text
    14. See Blinder (2018, p. 569). Return to text
    15. See Kumar and others (2015). Return to text
    16. Ehrmann and Wabitsch (2022) document that the number of expert and nonexpert comments posted on the X platform (formerly known as Twitter) that discuss central bank communication increases after European Central Bank (ECB) press conferences and other ECB communications, such as speeches by the ECB president. The authors also document that the content of the discussion tends to be objective (factual) rather than subjective, according to the authors’ dictionary base subjectivity measure. Return to text
    17. See Schmanski and others (2023). Return to text
    18. See Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Weber (2022). Return to text
    19. See, for example, Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) for textual analysis measures of economic policy, Soto (2023) and Young and others (2021) for textual analysis measures of supply chain disruptions, and Adams and others (2023) for a textual analysis measure of financial conditions. Return to text
    20. See Jefferson (2023c). Return to text
    21. See Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Return to text
    22. See Sharpe, Sinha, and Hollrah (2023). Return to text
    23. See Young and others (2021) and Soto (2023). Return to text
    24. See Soto (2023). Return to text
    25. See, for example, Romer and Romer (1989, 2023, 2024) for a description of the “narrative” approach. Return to text
    26. For example, Dessaint, Foucault, and Fresard (2024) suggest that alternative data mainly help forecast short-term outcomes, and not so much long-term outcomes. Return to text

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Director General in Japan Supporting Nuclear Safety and Remediation

    Source: International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA

    During the Director General’s visit to Kashiwazaki Kariwa, Japan’s largest nuclear power plant, he viewed improvements in safety response and secure access facilities, as well as enhanced seismic and tsunami proofing.

    There he met with TEPCO President Tomoaki Kobayakawa and Site Vice President Takeyuki Inagaki, a former IAEA safety officer who was working at the Fukushima Daiichi plant when it was struck by the tsunami in 2011.

    “Needless to say, it was the most bitter experience in my life with many lessons learned that needed to be reflected,” said Mr Inagaki. “Now as Site Vice President of the Kashiwazaki Kariwa station, I am determined to never let such an accident happen again.”

    After viewing the improvements at the station, the Director General spoke to local media, and said he was “very satisfied with the progress” he had seen.

    “Nuclear safety and security are an everyday effort. One by one all the recommendations made by IAEA experts have been duly and correctly addressed here.”

    During his trip, the Director General also joined an ongoing IAEA effort to monitor marine radioactivity near the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station. On a boat off the coast in front of the station, Mr Grossi worked with scientists from the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland, to collect seawater samples together.

    The samples will be now be analysed by the IAEA laboratories in Monaco, and national laboratories in Japan and the participating countries, each members of the IAEA’s Analytical Laboratories for the Measurement of Environmental Radioactivity (ALMERA) network, chosen to ensure a high level of proficiency.

    Read more about the Director General’s sampling trip and the additional measures aim to facilitate broader participation in the monitoring of the ALPS-treated water being released from the station.

    “Through these efforts, third parties can independently verify that water discharge levels are, and will continue to be, in strict compliance and consistent with international safety standards,” said Director General Grossi.

    Additional remediation efforts being managed by Japan in the region are focused on soil removal and recycling, another area where the IAEA is providing safety guidance.

    “In this area, the presence of the IAEA is as intense and systematic as in other areas in the decommissioning effort,” said Mr Grossi.

    Read more about the IAEA’s safety review of Japan’s plan for the managed recycling and the final disposal of removed soil and radioactive waste around the Fukushima Daiichi site.

    During his trip the Director General also met with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba and other key political leaders, including the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Takeshi Iwaya, the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Yoji Muto, and the Minister of Environment Keiichiro Asao.

    Mr Grossi also had an extended meeting and joint press conference with Foreign Minister Takeshi Iwaya, where they discussed their strong cooperation, and Japanese support to IAEA work, including non-proliferation worldwide, nuclear safety and security in Ukraine, cancer care through the Rays of Hope initiative, food security and more.

    On his final day in the country the Director General strengthened IAEA cooperation with the Japanese private sector, by signing a practical arrangement with the Sumitomo Corporation and addressing the Japanese business federation, Keidanren. Read more about the meetings with industry here.

    The Director General also signed practical arrangements on cooperation for IAEA educational and training activities with Sophia University and engaged with students and faculty members on IAEA contributions to global issues.

    During his visit to Tokyo, Rafael Mariano Grossi also met with Japan Atomic Energy Agency President Masanori Koguchi and signed practical arrangements on cooperation for both nuclear power and non-power applications.

    View images from the Director General’s entire trip.

    MIL Security OSI