Category: Trade

  • MIL-OSI USA: Republicans Block Murray Amendment to Reverse Devastating and Illegal Cuts to NIH Research

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ICYMI: Senator Murray on Senate Republicans’ Pro-Billionaire Budget Resolution, Trump and Musk’s Devastating Funding Freeze and Mass Firings

    ICYMI: Senator Murray Leads Entire Democratic Caucus in Raising Alarm Over Trump Admin Pushing Illegal Indiscriminate Funding Cuts to NIH, Derailing Lifesaving Research

    ICYMI: Senator Murray Statement on Meeting with NIH Nominee Jay Bhattacharya

    Washington, D.C. — Today on the Senate floor, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a senior member and former Chair of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (HELP) Committee, put forward an amendment to Senate Republicans’ budget resolution that would reverse massive, arbitrary cuts to lifesaving research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) that Donald Trump and Elon Musk tried to make earlier this month by setting the maximum reimbursement rate for indirect costs to 15 percent.

    Republicans blocked Murray’s amendment.

    Importantly, the Trump administration’s move to change the indirect costs rate is illegal—Congress’ bipartisan Labor-HHS-Education Appropriations Bill prohibits modifications to NIH’s indirect costs. The policy is currently temporarily blocked in the courts. Last week, Murray led the entire Senate Democratic caucus in sending a letter to Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. expressing alarm over the funding cuts and other recent moves by the Trump administration that threaten to undermine America’s biomedical research infrastructure and set us back generations.

    MURRAY AMENDMENT #880: Senator Murray offered an amendment to reverse the Trump Administration’s indiscriminate cut to biomedical research and the lifesaving work supported by the NIH at research institutions across the country. Murray offered an identical amendment at the Senate Budget Committee markup last week—which no Republican spoke in opposition to during debate, but every Republican voted against.  

    Senator Murray said on the Senate floor when offering her amendment, #880:

    “The Trump administration is working to destroy medical research as we know it with an illegal, unrealistic cap on the NIH reimbursement rate for indirect costs. That would mean: cancer researchers laid off, lifesaving clinical trials cancelled, and more. It’s also violates bipartisan appropriations law. I should know, I helped author that provision. And Republicans should know—they worked with me to pass it.”

    Earlier today, Murray delivered a lengthy speech on the Senate floor where she laid out in detail how Republicans’ budget resolution is a blueprint for deep, painful cuts to programs like Medicaid and SNAP that help working familiesall in service of passing more tax giveaways for billionaires. Murray also underscored how the Trump administration’s lawless mass firings and funding freeze is hurting people and jeopardizing critical services in every part of the country, and why a clean full-year CR is not an acceptable solution to government funding.

    Last week at the Senate Budget Committee mark up of Senate Republicans’ Budget resolution, Senator Murray, a senior member and former chair of the committee, put forward six amendments to steer Republicans toward a bipartisan approach to spending, affirm Congress’ power of the purse, reverse cuts to NIH, deliver transparency into the so-called Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), and more. Republicans unanimously opposed every amendment Murray and other Democrats offered. In her opening remarks, Murray also called for Elon Musk to come before the Committee to discuss his already in-motion efforts to decimate programs people count on.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: STEALTHGAS INC. Reports Fourth Quarter and Twelve Months 2024 Financial and Operating Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ATHENS, Greece, Feb. 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — STEALTHGAS INC. (NASDAQ: GASS), a ship-owning company serving the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) sector of the international shipping industry, announced today its unaudited financial and operating results for the fourth quarter and twelve months ended December 31, 2024.

    OPERATIONAL AND FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS

    • All-time record Net Income of $69.9 million for the twelve month period of 2024, a 34.7% increase compared to the same period last year. Strong profitability continued for the fourth quarter, with Net income of $14.2 million corresponding to a basic EPS of $0.38.
    • Revenues increased by 27.3% compared to the same period of last year to $43.5 million for the fourth quarter of 2024.
    • Further increased period coverage. About 70% of fleet days for 2025 are secured on period charters, with total fleet employment days for all subsequent periods generating over $200 million (excl. JV vessels) in contracted revenues.
    • Continued reducing leverage, making $108.2 million in debt repayments during the twelve month period of 2024 and $34.4 million in the current quarter of 2025. Currently, 26 out of 28 vessels in the fully owned fleet are unencumbered.
    • Maintaining ample cash and cash equivalents (incl. restricted cash) of $84.5 million as of December 31, 2024 enabling the Company to further reduce debt.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Results1:

    • Revenues for the three months ended December 31, 2024 amounted to $43.5 million compared to revenues of $34.1 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023, based on an average of 27.6 vessels and 27.0 vessels owned by the Company, respectively, as the vessels remaining in the fleet earned higher revenues due to better market conditions.
    • Voyage expenses and vessels’ operating expenses for the three months ended December 31, 2024 were $3.2 million and $13.6 million, respectively, compared to $3.3 million and $12.9 million, respectively, for the three months ended December 31, 2023. The $0.7 million increase in vessels’ operating expenses was mainly due to increase in crew costs and maintenance expenses, while the voyage expenses remained stable between 2024 and 2023.
    • Drydocking costs for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 were $1.9 million and $0.03 million, respectively. Drydocking expenses during the fourth quarter of 2024 mainly relate to the completed drydocking of three vessels, compared to no drydocking of vessels in the same period of last year.
    • General and administrative expenses for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 were $3.0 million and $1.7 million, respectively. The change is mainly attributed to the increase in stock-based compensation expense.
    • Depreciation for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 was $6.6 million and $5.6 million, respectively, a $1.0 million increase is mainly related to the increase in average number of vessels owned by the Company and to the partial replacement of some of the older vessels with newer and larger ones which have a higher cost.
    • Interest and finance costs for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, were $1.4 million and $2.3 million, respectively. The $0.9 million decrease from the same period of last year is primarily due to continued debt prepayments.
    • Interest income for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, were $1.1 million and $1.0 million, respectively.
    • Equity earnings in joint ventures for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 was a gain of $0.5 million and $0.9 million, respectively. The $0.4 million decrease was primarily due to decrease in number of vessels in joint ventures.
    • As a result of the above, for the three months ended December 31, 2024, the Company reported net income of $14.2 million, compared to net income of $8.9 million for the three months ended December 31, 2023. The weighted average number of shares outstanding, basic, for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 was 35.3 million and 35.3 million, respectively.
    • Earnings per share, basic, for the three months ended December 31, 2024 amounted to $0.38 compared to earnings per share, basic, of $0.25 for the same period of last year.
    • Adjusted net income was $16.4 million corresponding to an Adjusted EPS, basic, of $0.44 for the three months ended December 31, 2024 compared to Adjusted net income of $10.3 million corresponding to an Adjusted EPS, basic, of $0.29 for the same period of last year.
    • EBITDA for the three months ended December 31, 2024 amounted to $21.2 million. Reconciliations of Adjusted Net Income, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA to Net Income are set forth below.
    • An average of 27.6 vessels were owned by the Company during the three months ended December 31, 2024 compared to 27.0 vessels for the same period of 2023.

    Twelve months 2024 Results:

    • Revenues for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024, amounted to $167.3 million, an increase of $23.8 million, or 16.6%, compared to revenues of $143.5 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2023, as the vessels remaining in the fleet earned higher revenues due to better market conditions.
    • Voyage expenses and vessels’ operating expenses for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 were $11.7 million and $49.8 million, respectively, compared to $13.2 million and $53.1 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2023. The $1.5 million decrease in voyage expenses was mainly due to the decrease in spot days, while the $3.3 million decrease in vessels’ operating expenses was mainly due to the decrease in the average number of owned vessels in our fleet.
    • Drydocking costs for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 were $5.3 million and $2.6 million, respectively. The costs for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 mainly related to the completed drydocking of seven vessels, while the costs for the same period of last year mainly related to the completed drydocking of three of the larger handysize vessels.
    • General and administrative expenses for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 were $10.3 million and $5.3 million, respectively. The change is mainly attributed to the increase in stock-based compensation expense.
    • Depreciation for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024, was $26.1 million, a $2.4 million increase from $23.7 million for the same period of last year, as the Company partly replaced some of the older vessels with newer and larger vessels which have a higher cost.
    • Impairment loss for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 was nil and $2.8 million, respectively. The impairment loss for the year ended December 31, 2023, related to two vessels for which the Company had entered into separate agreements to sell to third parties.
    • Gain on sale of vessels for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 was $0.05 million compared to $7.6 million for the same period last year. The decrease is attributed to the sale of four of the Company’s vessels during the twelve months ended December 31, 2023 compared to the sale of two vessels during the twelve months ended December 31, 2024, which had been classified as held for sale as of December 31, 2023.
    • Interest and finance costs for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 were $9.1 million and $10.0 million, respectively. The $0.9 million decrease from last year is primarily due to continued debt prepayments.
    • Interest income for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 was $3.4 million and $3.7 million, respectively. The $0.3 million decrease is mainly attributed to decrease in interest rates and over the corresponding period.
    • Equity earnings in joint ventures for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 was a gain of $15.6 million and a gain of $12.3 million, respectively. The $3.3 million increase from the same period of last year is mainly due to a profitable sale of one of the Medium Gas carriers owned by one of our joint ventures.
    • As a result of the above, the Company reported a net income for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 of $69.9 million, compared to a net income of $51.9 million for the twelve months ended December 31, 2023. The weighted average number of shares outstanding, basic, for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023 was 35.2 million and 37.2 million, respectively.
    • Earnings per share, basic, for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 amounted to $1.91 compared to earnings per share, basic, of $1.38 for the same period of last year.
    • Adjusted net income was $77.3 million, corresponding to an Adjusted EPS, basic, of $2.11 per share, for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 compared to adjusted net income of $50.5 million, or $1.34 per share, for the same period of last year.
    • EBITDA for the twelve months ended December 31, 2024 amounted to $101.6 million. Reconciliations of Adjusted Net Income, EBITDA and Adjusted EBITDA to Net Income are set forth below.
    • An average of 27.2 vessels were owned by the Company during the twelve months ended December 31, 2024, compared to 29.3 vessels for the same period of 2023.

      As of December 31, 2024, cash and cash equivalents (including restricted cash) amounted to $84.5 million and total debt amounted to $84.9 million.

      1  EBITDA, Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted Net Income and Adjusted EPS are non-GAAP measures. Refer to the reconciliation of these measures to the most directly comparable financial measure in accordance with GAAP set forth later in this release.

    Fleet Update Since Previous Announcement

    The Company announced the conclusion of the following chartering arrangements (of three or more months duration):  

    • A twelve months time charter for its 2024 built LPG carrier Eco Wizard, until Dec 2025.
    • A twelve months time charter for its 2020 built LPG carrier Eco Alice, until Feb 2026.
    • A twelve months time charter for the JV-owned 2007 built LPG carrier Gas Haralambos, until Dec 2025.
    • A three months time charter for the 2012 built LPG carrier Gas Husky, until April 2025.

    As of February 2025, the Company has total contracted revenues of approximately $200 million.

    As of February 2025, the Company has circa 70% of fleet days secured under period contracts and contracted revenues of approximately $107 million for the remainder of the year.

    On January 21, 2025, the previously announced sale of the Gas Shuriken was concluded and the vessel was delivered to its new owners.

    Share Repurchase Program Increase

    Today the Board of Directors authorized a $5 million increase to the existing $25 million common stock repurchase program for a total aggregate amount of $30 million. Shares of common stock may be purchased, from time to time, in open market or privately negotiated transactions, at times and prices that are considered to be appropriate by the Company, and the program may be suspended or discontinued at any time. As of the date hereof, the Company has repurchased an aggregate of approximately $19.4 million.

    CEO Harry Vafias Commented

    It is with great pride that we announce today for the third consecutive year record annual profits. After a successful fourth quarter we concluded 2024 reporting net income of $70 million for the year, a 35% increase, far outpacing the underlying market improvement for our vessels. We are delivering on our strategic priorities, modernizing the fleet, securing revenues and de-risking the business, aiming to bring strong value to StealthGas shareholders. We can now say we are net debt free, after having further reduced our debt in the current quarter. We are close to completing our deleverage that will bring a long term advantage to the fleet and the Company is in a solid footing. As successful as we have been we are established in the shipping markets long enough not to forget that we operate in a volatile sector where fortunes can be made and lost quite rapidly. We are optimistic for the future albeit evermore cautiously not least because the current global geopolitics that can have a strong influence on shipping markets are for the time being quite opaque with too many developing situations. Finally, in order to give further value back to our shareholders, we are renewing our share repurchases and increasing up to $10.5 million the amount available to us for this task.

     Conference Call details:

    On February 21, 2025 at 10:00 am ET, the company’s management will host a conference call to discuss the results and the company’s operations and outlook.

    Conference call participants should pre-register using the below link to receive the dial-in numbers and a personal PIN, which are required to access the conference call.

    https://register.vevent.com/register/BIa607c71e1abf4ac08816dfc43bd8d733

    Slides and audio webcast:
    There will also be a live and then archived webcast of the conference call, through the STEALTHGAS INC. website (www.stealthgas.com). Participants to the live webcast should register on the website approximately 10 minutes prior to the start of the webcast.

    About STEALTHGAS INC.

    StealthGas Inc. is a ship-owning company serving the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) sector of the international shipping industry. StealthGas Inc. has a fleet of 31 LPG carriers, including three Joint Venture vessels in the water. These LPG vessels have a total capacity of 349,170 cubic meters (cbm). StealthGas Inc.’s shares are listed on the Nasdaq Global Select Market and trade under the symbol “GASS.”

    Visit our website at www.stealthgas.com

    Forward-Looking Statements

    Matters discussed in this release may constitute forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and financial performance and may include statements concerning plans, objectives, goals, strategies, future events or performance and underlying assumptions and other statements, which are other than statements of historical facts. The forward-looking statements in this release are based upon various assumptions, many of which are based, in turn, upon further assumptions, including without limitation, management’s examination of historical operating trends, data contained in our records and other data available from third parties. Although STEALTHGAS INC. believes that these assumptions were reasonable when made, because these assumptions are inherently subject to significant uncertainties and contingencies which are difficult or impossible to predict and are beyond our control, STEALTHGAS INC. cannot assure you that it will achieve or accomplish these expectations, beliefs or projections. Important factors that, in our view, could cause actual results to differ materially from those discussed in the forward-looking statements include the strength of world economies and currencies, general market conditions, including changes in charter hire rates and vessel values, charter counterparty performance, changes in demand that may affect attitudes of time charterers to scheduled and unscheduled drydockings, shipyard performance, changes in STEALTHGAS INC’s operating expenses, including bunker prices, drydocking and insurance costs, ability to obtain financing and comply with covenants in our financing arrangements, actions taken by regulatory authorities, potential liability from pending or future litigation, domestic and international political conditions, the conflict in Ukraine and related sanctions, the conflict in Israel and Gaza, potential disruption of shipping routes due to ongoing attacks by Houthis in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden or  accidents and political events or acts by terrorists.

    Risks and uncertainties are further described in reports filed by STEALTHGAS INC. with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

    Fleet List        
    For information on our fleet and further information:
    Visit our website at www.stealthgas.com

    Fleet Data:
    The following key indicators highlight the Company’s operating performance during the periods ended December 31, 2023 and 2024.

    FLEET DATA Q4 2023   Q4 2024   12M 2023   12M 2024  
    Average number of vessels (1) 27.0   27.6   29.3   27.2  
    Period end number of owned vessels in fleet 27   28   27   28  
    Total calendar days for fleet (2) 2,484   2,542   10,698   9,944  
    Total voyage days for fleet (3) 2,441   2,446   10,566   9,677  
    Fleet utilization (4) 98.3 % 96.2 % 98.8 % 97.3 %
    Total charter days for fleet (5) 2,207   2,265   9,544   8,930  
    Total spot market days for fleet (6) 234   181   1,022   747  
    Fleet operational utilization (7) 96.8 % 95.0 % 96.6 % 95.4 %
                     

    1) Average number of vessels is the number of owned vessels that constituted our fleet for the relevant period, as measured by the sum of the number of days each vessel was a part of our fleet during the period divided by the number of calendar days in that period.
    2) Total calendar days for fleet are the total days the vessels we operated were in our possession for the relevant period including off-hire days associated with major repairs, drydockings or special or intermediate surveys.
    3) Total voyage days for fleet reflect the total days the vessels we operated were in our possession for the relevant period net of off-hire days associated with major repairs, drydockings or special or intermediate surveys.
    4) Fleet utilization is the percentage of time that our vessels were available for revenue generating voyage days, and is determined by dividing voyage days by fleet calendar days for the relevant period.
    5) Total charter days for fleet are the number of voyage days the vessels operated on time or bareboat charters for the relevant period.
    6) Total spot market charter days for fleet are the number of voyage days the vessels operated on spot market charters for the relevant period.
    7) Fleet operational utilization is the percentage of time that our vessels generated revenue, and is determined by dividing voyage days excluding commercially idle days by fleet calendar days for the relevant period.

    Reconciliation of Adjusted Net Income, EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA and adjusted EPS:

    Adjusted net income represents net income before loss/gain on derivatives excluding swap interest paid/received, impairment loss, net gain/loss on sale of vessels and share based compensation. EBITDA represents net income before interest and finance costs, interest income and depreciation. Adjusted EBITDA represents net income before interest and finance costs, interest income, depreciation, impairment loss, net gain/loss on sale of vessels, share based compensation and loss/gain on derivatives.

    Adjusted EPS represents Adjusted net income divided by the weighted average number of shares.

    EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted net income and adjusted EPS are included herein because they are a basis, upon which we and our investors assess our financial performance. They allow us to present our performance from period to period on a comparable basis and provide investors with a means of better evaluating and understanding our operating performance.

    EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted net income and adjusted EPS are not recognized measurements under U.S. GAAP. Our calculation of EBITDA, adjusted EBITDA, adjusted net income and adjusted EPS may not be comparable to that reported by other companies in the shipping or other industries. In evaluating Adjusted EBITDA, Adjusted net income and Adjusted EPS, you should be aware that in the future we may incur expenses that are the same as or similar to some of the adjustments in this presentation.

    (Expressed in United States Dollars,
    except number of shares)
    Fourth Quarter Ended
    December 31st,
    Twelve months Periods
    Ended December 31st,
      2023 2024 2023 2024
    Net Income – Adjusted Net Income        
    Net income 8,889,046   14,198,527   51,936,829   69,862,177  
    Plus/(Less) loss/(gain) on derivatives 255,736     (237,618 ) (99,286 )
    (Less)/Plus swap interest (paid)/received 216,432     1,027,127   208,127  
    (Less)/Plus (gain)/loss on sale of vessels, net     (7,645,781 ) (46,384 )
    Plus impairment loss     2,816,873    
    Plus share based compensation 940,216   2,206,295   2,589,405   7,326,807  
    Adjusted Net Income 10,301,430   16,404,822   50,486,835   77,251,441  
             
    Net income – EBITDA        
    Net income 8,889,046   14,198,527   51,936,829   69,862,177  
    Plus interest and finance costs 2,344,430   1,425,886   9,956,712   9,062,562  
    Less interest income (952,287 ) (1,052,786 ) (3,712,239 ) (3,416,221 )
    Plus depreciation 5,565,955   6,598,549   23,707,797   26,076,687  
    EBITDA 15,847,144   21,170,176   81,889,099   101,585,205  
             
    Net income – Adjusted EBITDA        
    Net income 8,889,046   14,198,527   51,936,829   69,862,177  
    Plus/(Less) loss/(gain) on derivatives 255,736     (237,618 ) (99,286 )
    (Less)/Plus (gain)/loss on sale of vessels, net     (7,645,781 ) (46,384 )
    Plus impairment loss     2,816,873    
    Plus share based compensation 940,216   2,206,295   2,589,405   7,326,807  
    Plus interest and finance costs 2,344,430   1,425,886   9,956,712   9,062,562  
    Less interest income (952,287 ) (1,052,786 ) (3,712,239 ) (3,416,221 )
    Plus depreciation 5,565,955   6,598,549   23,707,797   26,076,687  
    Adjusted EBITDA 17,043,096   23,376,471   79,411,978   108,766,342  
             
    EPS – Adjusted EPS        
    Net income 8,889,046   14,198,527   51,936,829   69,862,177  
    Adjusted net income 10,301,430   16,404,822   50,486,835   77,251,441  
    Weighted average number of shares, basic 35,300,965   35,345,251   37,166,449   35,237,059  
    EPS – Basic 0.25   0.38   1.38   1.91  
    Adjusted EPS – Basic 0.29   0.44   1.34   2.11  
     
    StealthGas Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Income
    (Expressed in United States Dollars, except for number of shares)
      Quarters Ended
    December 31,
      Twelve month Periods Ended
    December 31,
      2023   2024   2023   2024
               
    Revenues              
    Revenues 34,139,248     43,467,117     143,527,769     167,262,185  
                   
    Expenses              
    Voyage expenses 2,878,732     2,679,927     11,429,716     9,594,880  
    Voyage expenses – related party 426,108     535,991     1,779,488     2,063,228  
    Vessels’ operating expenses 12,690,873     13,404,725     52,206,248     48,961,137  
    Vessels’ operating expenses – related party 207,500     212,500     911,250     875,002  
    Drydocking costs 27,696     1,855,672     2,641,706     5,312,614  
    Management fees – related party 1,048,800     1,089,040     4,531,920     4,258,240  
    General and administrative expenses 1,657,671     3,010,733     5,331,029     10,309,693  
    Depreciation 5,565,955     6,598,549     23,707,797     26,076,687  
    Impairment loss         2,816,873      
    Net gain on sale of vessels         (7,645,781 )   (46,384 )
    Total expenses 24,503,335     29,387,137     97,710,246     107,405,097  
                   
    Income from operations 9,635,913     14,079,980     45,817,523     59,857,088  
                   
    Other (expenses)/income              
    Interest and finance costs (2,344,430 )   (1,425,886 )   (9,956,712 )   (9,062,562 )
    (Loss)/gain on derivatives (255,736 )       237,618     99,286  
    Interest income 952,287     1,052,786     3,712,239     3,416,221  
    Foreign exchange (loss)/gain (27,829 )   25,598     (190,722 )   (70,692 )
    Other expenses, net (1,675,708 )   (347,502 )   (6,197,577 )   (5,617,747 )
                   
    Income before equity in earnings of investees 7,960,205     13,732,478     39,619,946     54,239,341  
    Equity earnings in joint ventures 928,841     466,049     12,316,883     15,622,836  
    Net Income 8,889,046     14,198,527     51,936,829     69,862,177  
                   
    Earnings per share              
    – Basic 0.25     0.38     1.38     1.91  
    – Diluted 0.25     0.38     1.37     1.90  
                   
    Weighted average number of shares              
    – Basic 35,300,965     35,345,251     37,166,449     35,237,059  
    – Diluted 35,430,883     35,409,350     37,236,951     35,333,160  
     
    StealthGas Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Balance Sheets
    (Expressed in United States Dollars)
      December 31,   December 31,  
      2023   2024  
             
    Assets        
    Current assets        
    Cash and cash equivalents 77,202,843     80,653,398  
    Trade and other receivables 4,506,741     6,156,300  
    Other current assets 130,589     193,265  
    Claims receivable 55,475     55,475  
    Inventories 1,979,683     3,891,147  
    Advances and prepayments 1,409,418     733,190  
    Restricted cash 659,137      
    Assets held for sale 34,879,925      
    Fair value of derivatives     387,630  
    Total current assets 120,823,811     92,070,405  
             
    Non current assets        
    Advances for vessel acquisitions 23,414,570      
    Operating lease right-of-use assets 99,379      
    Vessels, net 504,295,083     608,214,416  
    Other receivables 48,040     370,053  
    Restricted cash 5,893,721     3,867,752  
    Investments in joint ventures 39,671,603     27,717,238  
    Deferred finance charges 1,105,790      
    Fair value of derivatives 1,858,677      
    Total non current assets 576,386,863     640,169,459  
    Total assets 697,210,674     732,239,864  
             
    Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity        
    Current liabilities        
    Payable to related parties 955,567     388,130  
    Trade accounts payable 9,953,137     10,994,434  
    Accrued liabilities 5,681,144     4,922,587  
    Operating lease liabilities 71,173      
    Deferred income 5,386,126     4,304,667  
    Current portion of long-term debt 16,624,473     23,333,814  
    Total current liabilities 38,671,620     43,943,632  
             
    Non current liabilities        
    Operating lease liabilities 28,206      
    Deferred income 1,928,712     213,563  
    Long-term debt 106,918,176     61,555,855  
    Total non current liabilities 108,875,094     61,769,418  
    Total liabilities 147,546,713     105,713,050  
             
    Commitments and contingencies        
             
    Stockholders’ equity        
    Capital stock 453,434     370,414  
    Treasury stock (44,453,836 )    
    Additional paid-in capital 446,938,868     409,912,934  
    Retained earnings 145,993,681     215,855,858  
    Accumulated other comprehensive income 731,814     387,608  
    Total stockholders’ equity 549,663,961     626,526,814  
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity 697,210,674     732,239,864  
     
    StealthGas Inc.
    Unaudited Condensed Consolidated Statements of Cash Flows
    (Expressed in United States Dollars)
     
      Twelve month Periods Ended
    December 31,
      2023   2024
       
    Cash flows from operating activities      
    Net income for the year 51,936,829     69,862,177  
           
    Adjustments to reconcile net income to net cash      
    provided by operating activities:      
    Depreciation 23,707,797     26,076,687  
    Amortization of deferred finance charges 1,345,941     711,378  
    Amortization of operating lease right-of-use assets 99,379     99,379  
    Share based compensation 2,589,405     7,326,807  
    Change in fair value of derivatives 789,509     108,841  
    Proceeds from disposal of interest rate swaps     1,018,000  
    Equity earnings in joint ventures (12,316,883 )   (15,622,836 )
    Dividends received from joint ventures 14,589,215     20,570,036  
    Impairment loss 2,816,873      
    Gain on sale of vessels (7,645,781 )   (46,384 )
    Changes in operating assets and liabilities:      
    (Increase)/decrease in      
    Trade and other receivables 238,627     (1,971,610 )
    Other current assets 139,925     (62,676 )
    Inventories 1,365,189     (1,664,736 )
    Changes in operating lease liabilities (99,379 )   (99,379 )
    Advances and prepayments (728,005 )   676,228  
    Increase/(decrease) in      
    Balances with related parties (1,532,943 )   (555,589 )
    Trade accounts payable (1,813,377 )   628,898  
    Accrued liabilities (100,515 )   (758,558 )
    Deferred income 2,058,409     (2,796,608 )
    Net cash provided by operating activities 77,440,215     103,500,055  
           
    Cash flows from investing activities      
    Insurance proceeds 126,666      
    Proceeds from sale of vessels, net 80,109,781     34,679,584  
    Acquisition and improvements of vessels (85,201 )   (106,169,013 )
    Maturity of short term investments 26,500,000      
    Return of investments from joint ventures 4,688,785     7,007,164  
    Net cash provided by/(used in) investing activities 111,340,031     (64,482,265 )
           
    Cash flows from financing activities      
    Proceeds from exercise of stock options 747,500     356,250  
    Stock repurchase (19,080,455 )   (338,176 )
    Deferred finance charges paid (988,166 )   (22,167 )
    Advances from joint ventures 11,847      
    Advances to joint ventures     (11,847 )
    Loan repayments (154,870,215 )   (108,236,401 )
    Proceeds from long-term debt     70,000,000  
    Net cash used in financing activities (174,179,489 )   (38,252,341 )
           
    Net increase in cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash 14,600,757     765,449  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at beginning of period 69,154,944     83,755,701  
    Cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash at end of year 83,755,701     84,521,150  
    Cash breakdown      
    Cash and cash equivalents 77,202,843     80,653,398  
    Restricted cash, current 659,137      
    Restricted cash, non current 5,893,721     3,867,752  
    Total cash, cash equivalents and restricted cash shown in the statements of cash flows 83,755,701     84,521,150  

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Global: China: Xi Jinping has learned from Trump’s first trade war and is ready to fight back

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Tom Harper, Lecturer in International Relations, University of East London

    The start of 2025 has been good for China and its reputation as a high-tech innovator. The unveiling of the Chinese-made artificial intelligence (AI) tool, DeepSeek, caused consternation on the US stock exchange and from potential competitors in Silicon Valley.

    Chinese firms are increasingly at the forefront of key high-level technologies such as electric vehicles (EVs) and AI, as reflected by the success of China’s electric vehicles, BYD, and now DeepSeek.

    These moves have made the Chinese economy more self sufficient than it was during Trump’s first term, and has made Beijing more confident about pushing back politically against Trump.

    This is all underlined by a high-level meeting hosted by President Xi Jinping at China’s Great Hall of the People this week. He told the heads of China’s leading tech firms it was time for them “to give full play to their capabilities” and spoke of it as a patriotic duty, according to official accounts.

    This comes as China starts being hit by US tariffs of an additional 10% on its goods, as well as a slew of anti-China rhetoric from the Trump government.

    But China’s high tech industries are on the up, and this is a significant boost for Xi. For instance, in January this year, sales of the Chinese EVs exceeded those of Tesla in the UK for the first time.

    Part of the Chinese EV’s success could be attributed to a backlash against Tesla’s co-founder Elon Musk, after he started backing far-right parties around the world.

    Another factor that Chinese high-tech goods have in their favour are lower prices. Prices for Chinese EVs start at £7,697 in the UK, for example – much lower than Tesla’s Model 3 at £25,490.

    This price difference will be significant in the latest phase of the Sino-US trade war, particularly in countries struggling with a cost-of-living crisis. China is also hoping its cheap prices and tech innovations will help it find new trading allies to counteract Washington’s proposed tariffs.

    What China has to offer

    China is a fast-growing economic and political power and is expected to account for nearly a quarter of the global economy by 2030.

    The success of BYD and DeepSeek comes at a time where Beijing feels more prepared for Trump’s tough tariffs and tension with Washington, than it did in his previous term. China has responded to Trump’s threats with reciprocal tariffs on US coal and liquefied gas, as well as a ban on the export of critical minerals. These are a key component for many US military technologies varying from communications equipment to missiles.

    China accounts for 72% of all rare earth imports for the US. Such measures contrast with the cautious approach taken by Beijing in 2017, when US tariffs during Trump’s first term met little retaliation from Beijing.

    The changes in China’s tactics can partly be attributed to what Beijing learned from the previous trade war. In 2017 there were weaknesses in the supply chains of many Chinese firms, most notably ZTE and Huawei.

    They struggled when Washington pressurised its own chipmakers and those of allied states, such as Britain’s Arm, to stop sales of semiconductor technology to China. As a result, finding long-term alternatives to US technology in the supply chain has become a key priority for Beijing.

    What is Deep Seek?

    Xi has recognised the value of firms such as Huawei and BYD in aiding China’s wider technological (and geopolitical) ambitions, most notably as part of the Made in China 2025 strategy, a national strategy to make China a leader in high-tech technology.




    Read more:
    DeepSeek: how China’s embrace of open-source AI caused a geopolitical earthquake


    Traditionally, China was seen as the home of cheap, low-quality goods, which had been central to its development in the 1980s and 1990s. But many of companies producing these products are increasingly moving to south-east Asia to take advantage of lower labour costs.

    However, Chinese industries are now gaining ground in fields that have traditionally been the preserve of developed nations. For instance, Huawei has developed a spin off, Honor, which has gone from producing cheap, simple smartphones and into AI technology.

    Meanwhile, the success of BYD and DeepSeek have demonstrated that China is, in some ways at least, far better placed for a prolonged trade war. Beijing is feeling more confident, which explains its willingness to push back against Washington this time.

    So the White House will have to deal with higher prices for US goods going into China, as well as additional trade spats with the EU, Canada and the UK. It might be a bumpy ride for US consumers.

    How Beijing responds and its new-found clout may determine the course of this new trade war, and potentially add to its long-term standing in the world.

    Tom Harper does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. China: Xi Jinping has learned from Trump’s first trade war and is ready to fight back – https://theconversation.com/china-xi-jinping-has-learned-from-trumps-first-trade-war-and-is-ready-to-fight-back-250101

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Video: Young Trade Leaders: Sunny, China

    Source: World Trade Organization – WTO (video statements)

    The Young Trade Leaders Programme was established to connect young people with the work of the WTO. Shangyi (Sunny) Li, from China, earned her master’s degrees in international relations from both Tsinghua University and Johns Hopkins University.

    Sunny talks about the different ways trade has been an important part of her life.

    Download this video from the WTO website:
    https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/webcas_e/webcas_e.htm

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=InhWs1xCu64

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI: American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) CEO Andy Ross Promotes the American Dream and Patriotic Products on NBC KSHB 41 Kansas City Morning Show KC Spotlight

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Nashville, TN, Feb. 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) (“American Rebel” or the “Company”), creator of American Rebel Light Beer (americanrebelbeer.com), and a designer, manufacturer, and marketer of branded safes and personal security and self-defense products (americanrebel.com), proudly announces that CEO Andy Ross will appear on the local NBC television affiliate, KSHB 41, in his home state, promoting the values of the American Dream and the Company’s patriotic products.

    Hometown “American Rebel” Andy Ross appears on Kansas City NBC affiliate KSHB 41

    NBC affiliate KSHB 41 (KSHB 41 Kansas City: News, Weather, Chiefs, Traffic and Sports), home of the Kansas City Chiefs and known for its award winning news, is owned by the E.W. Scripps Company and is the Kansas City market’s fastest growing news outlet. The segment featuring American Rebel Andy Ross is schedule to air Friday, February 20, 2025, at some point during the 11 am Central hour-long broadcast.

    “We believe in the American Dream, and our products reflect the values and pride that come with it,” said Andy Ross – CEO American Rebel Holdings, Inc. “I’m thrilled to share our story on KSHB 41, the home of my favorite team, the Kansas City Chiefs, and with the people of Kansas. I’ve spent my time in Kansas City visiting key accounts to ensure that American Rebel Light Beer is readily available to those who appreciate quality and patriotism.”

    American Rebel Holdings, Inc. Focuses on Media Exposure to Expand America’s Patriotic Beer in New Markets

    A key strategic focus at American Rebel is to continually share America’s Patriotic Brand Story as told by our CEO – Andy Ross. To truly expand America’s Patriotic Brand, we needed to have a product that reaches the masses and is consumable. American Rebel Beer has always been at the top of the list and due to current events and opportunities that have opened up in the market, American Rebel is well positioned to continue to expand into new markets that allow our consumers to enjoy America’s Patriotic Beer (americanrebelbeer.com).

    The American Rebel Brand Story is all about chasing the American Dream as a NASDAQ company

    “I have been blessed to turn my passions into success. On my show, Maximum Archery World Tour, I bowhunted the world for 10 years on outdoor TV. By incorporating my music into the show, and with the emergence of digital music distribution, I had a springboard to develop a great music career. In 2015 a decision was made to build a brand around my song ‘American Rebel,’ and America’s Patriotic Brand was born. In February 2022, we became a publicly traded company on NASDAQ, symbol: AREB.” – Andy Ross, CEO American Rebel Holdings

    American Rebel Light Beer positioned for success throughout Kansas and the Kansas City Area

    During his appearance, Mr. Ross passionately discussed the inspiration behind American Rebel Light Beer, a premium light lager that embodies the spirit of America’s Patriotic, God-Fearing, Constitution-Loving, National Anthem-Singing, Stand Your Ground Beer. He also highlighted Champion Safe Co., a wholly-owned subsidiary of American Rebel Holdings known for its American-made safes designed to protect what matters most to American families. Champion Safe Co. manufactures Champion, Superior and American Rebel branded safes.

    In addition to his media appearance, Mr. Ross has been actively focusing on expanding American Rebel Beer’s presence in the eastern Kansas area. With the support of distribution partner Standard Beverage, the Company is strategically targeting key accounts to enhance both on-premise and off-premise locations. This effort is part of a larger initiative to bring American Rebel’s exceptional products to a wider audience.

    Mr. Ross’s recent meetings with several key accounts in Kansas have yielded promising results, further solidifying the Company’s growth plans in the region. By leveraging the strength of the Standard Beverage distribution network, American Rebel is poised to make a significant impact in the Kansas market.

    Premium Safes, Concealed Carry Backpacks and Apparel at our Overland Park, Kansas store.

    We build American Rebel Safes – one of the most desirable residential safes on the market. We are also the proud owners of Champion Safe Co. Our safes are specifically designed to meet the needs of homeowners and gun aficionados.

    In a time when National Spirit is being rekindled, American Rebel positions itself as “America’s Patriotic Brand. We are proud advocates of the 2nd Amendment and encourage safe and responsible gun ownership.

    American Rebel’s store is located at 8500 Marshall Drive in Overland Park, Kansas, next to the Bushnell Factory Outlet conveniently located right off I-35.

    For more information about American Rebel Holdings, Inc. and its products, please visit americanrebel.com, championsafe.com and americanrebelbeer.com.

    About American Rebel Holdings, Inc.

    American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB) has operated primarily as a designer, manufacturer, and marketer of branded safes and personal security and self-defense products and has recently transitioned into the beverage industry through the introduction of American Rebel Light Beer. The Company also designs and produces branded apparel and accessories. To learn more, visit americanrebel.com and americanrebelbeer.com. For investor information, visit americanrebel.com/investor-relations.

    About American Rebel Light Beer

    Produced in partnership with AlcSource, American Rebel Light Beer (americanrebelbeer.com) is a premium domestic light lager celebrated for its exceptional quality and patriotic values. It stands out as America’s Patriotic, God-Fearing, Constitution-Loving, National Anthem-Singing, Stand Your Ground Beer.

    American Rebel Light is a Premium Domestic Light Lager Beer – All Natural, Crisp, Clean and Bold Taste with a Lighter Feel. With approximately 100 calories, 3.2 carbohydrates, and 4.3% alcoholic content per 12 oz serving, American Rebel Light Beer delivers a lighter option for those who love great beer but prefer a more balanced lifestyle. It’s all natural with no added supplements and importantly does not use corn, rice, or other sweeteners typically found in mass produced beers.

    Forward-Looking Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. American Rebel Holdings, Inc. (NASDAQ: AREB; AREBW) (the “Company,” “American Rebel,” “we,” “our,” or “us”) desires to take advantage of the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and is including this cautionary statement in connection with this safe harbor legislation. The words “forecasts,” “believe,” “may,” “estimate,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “intend,” “should,” “plan,” “could,” “target,” “potential,” “is likely,” “expect” and similar expressions, as they relate to us, are intended to identify forward-looking statements. We have based these forward-looking statements primarily on our current expectations and projections about future events and financial trends that we believe may affect our financial condition, results of operations, business strategy, and financial needs. Important factors that could cause actual results to differ from those in the forward-looking statements include benefits of marketing outreach efforts, actual placement timing and availability of American Rebel Beer, success and availability of the promotional activities, our ability to effectively execute our business plan, and the Risk Factors contained within our filings with the SEC, including our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2023. Any forward-looking statement made by us herein speaks only as of the date on which it is made. Factors or events that could cause our actual results to differ may emerge from time to time, and it is not possible for us to predict all of them. We undertake no obligation to publicly update any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future developments, or otherwise, except as may be required by law.

    Media Inquiries:
    Matt Sheldon
    Precision Public Relations
    Matt@PrecisionPR.co
    917-280-7329

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: StoneX Payments to Showcase Cross-Border FX Capabilities at BAFT Europe Bank-to-Bank Forum 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, Feb. 21, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — StoneX Group Inc. (“StoneX”; NASDAQ: SNEX) announced that its Payments Division (“StoneX Payments”) will participate as a sponsor and speaker at the 2025 BAFT Europe Bank-to-Bank Forum in Amsterdam. The event brings together senior banking executives, regulators, and industry experts to discuss the evolving landscape of cross-border payments and banking relationships.

    StoneX Payments will highlight its institutional-grade infrastructure, which enables banks, credit unions, and financial institutions to execute efficient, transparent international payments across more than 140 currencies and 180 countries.

    Expanding Access to Cross-Border FX Solutions

    StoneX Payments continues to strengthen its position as a trusted partner for financial institutions looking to enhance their FX payment capabilities. By leveraging its network of nearly 400 correspondent banks and deep market expertise, StoneX provides seamless currency flows, competitive pricing, and full principal protection to clients operating in complex financial environments.

    As part of the event’s agenda, David Willacy, Head of Trading EMEA – Payments FX at StoneX, will deliver a presentation on cross-border FX transactions in emerging and lesser-traded currencies, focusing on key challenges such as liquidity, settlement risks, and regulatory constraints.

    Session: “Navigating the Complexities of Cross-border FX Payments in Exotic Currencies: Opportunities for European Corporates and Banks”
    Date: March 11, 2025 | Time: 16:40 – 17:00
    Speaker: David Willacy, Head of Trading EMEA – Payments FX, StoneX

    Enhancing Financial Institutions’ Payment Strategies

    Banks and financial institutions face a growing demand for faster, lower-cost, and more transparent international transactions. StoneX Payments works closely with clients to eliminate inefficiencies, reduce transaction costs, and ensure seamless cross-border payments, even in traditionally hard-to-access markets.

    Connect with StoneX Payments at BAFT Europe

    StoneX Payments representatives will be available for one-on-one discussions about customized strategies to improve cross-border payment capabilities for financial institutions. To schedule a meeting, email payments@stonex.com.

    About StoneX Group Inc.

    StoneX Group Inc. (NASDAQ: SNEX) is a Fortune 100 global financial services company that provides execution, risk management, advisory, and market access solutions across commodities, securities, global payments, and foreign exchange. Headquartered in New York City, StoneX and its 4,300+ employees serve more than 54,000 commercial, institutional, and global payments clients, as well as 400,000+ retail accounts, from over 80 offices spanning six continents.

    For additional information about StoneX Payments and its participation in BAFT Europe Bank-to-Bank Forum 2025, click here.

    NASDAQ: SNEX

    www.stonex.com

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Hong Kong Customs seizes suspected smuggled seafood worth about $1.39 million at Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge Hong Kong Port (with photo)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

         Hong Kong Customs yesterday (February 20) detected a suspected smuggling case involving a cross-boundary goods vehicle at the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge (HZMB) Hong Kong Port. A batch of suspected smuggled seafood, including about 1 450 kilograms of oysters, 1 150kg of fish, 300kg of lobsters, with a total estimated market value of about $1.39 million, was seized.

         Based on risk assessment, Customs yesterday intercepted an outgoing goods vehicle at the HZMB Hong Kong Port. Upon inspection, Customs officers found the batch of unmanifested cargo items inside the vehicle.

         A 57-year-old male driver was arrested and was put on bail pending further investigation.

         Customs will continue to combat cross-boundary smuggling activities with firm enforcement action based on risk assessment and intelligence analysis.

         Smuggling is a serious offence. Under the Import and Export Ordinance, any person found guilty of importing or exporting unmanifested cargo is liable to a maximum fine of $2 million and imprisonment for seven years. 

         Members of the public may report any suspected smuggling activities to Customs’ 24-hour hotline 182 8080 or its dedicated crime-reporting email account (crimereport@customs.gov.hk) or online form (eform.cefs.gov.hk/form/ced002/).   

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Import of poultry eggs from Chhindwara District of Madhya Pradesh State in India suspended

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    Import of poultry eggs from Chhindwara District of Madhya Pradesh State in India suspended
    Import of poultry eggs from Chhindwara District of Madhya Pradesh State in India suspended
    ******************************************************************************************

         The Centre for Food Safety (CFS) of the Food and Environmental Hygiene Department announced today (February 21) that in view of a notification from the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) about an outbreak of highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza in Chhindwara District of Madhya Pradesh State in India, the CFS has instructed the trade to suspend the import of poultry eggs from the area with immediate effect to protect public health in Hong Kong.     A CFS spokesman said that Hong Kong has currently established a protocol with India for the import of poultry eggs but not for poultry meat. According to the Census and Statistics Department, no eggs were imported into Hong Kong from India last year.     “The CFS has contacted the Indian authority over the issue and will closely monitor information issued by the WOAH and the relevant authorities on the avian influenza outbreak. Appropriate action will be taken in response to the development of the situation,” the spokesman said.

     
    Ends/Friday, February 21, 2025Issued at HKT 16:15

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: BCP clearance services, transportation and other arrangements for 15th National Games athletics (marathon) test event

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    BCP clearance services, transportation and other arrangements for 15th National Games athletics (marathon) test event
    BCP clearance services, transportation and other arrangements for 15th National Games athletics (marathon) test event
    ******************************************************************************************

         The 2025 Shenzhen-Hong Kong marathon and the 15th National Games (NG) athletics (marathon) test event will be held on Sunday (February 23). The entire track is 42.195 kilometres long, of which the section in Hong Kong is 21.841km. Setting off from the Shenzhen Bay Sports Center, the races will enter Hong Kong via the Shenzhen Bay Port, run along the Shenzhen Bay Bridge and Kong Sham Western Highway Viaduct, then turn back to the Shenzhen Bay Port through the same route, and finally end at the Shenzhen Bay Sports Center. The event comprises men’s and women’s races, with the women’s group to depart at 7am and the other to set off at 7.30am. The athletes will enter the Hong Kong section upon completion of approximately 2km of the race route. Both groups are expected to spend around two hours in the Hong Kong section.      To facilitate the smooth running of the race, clearance services of the Shenzhen Bay Port (including all passenger and cargo clearance services) will be suspended during part of the morning on the event day, while temporary control measures will be implemented on the Shenzhen Bay Bridge and other related roads that day. Members of the public and travellers should pay attention to the following key points:      Arrival and departure clearance services at the Shenzhen Bay Port will be suspended from 2am to 11am on the event day, and passengers and vehicles will be prohibited from entering the port. In the meantime, temporary control measures will be implemented on Shenzhen Bay Bridge, Kong Sham Western Highway and Ha Tsuen Interchange. During the temporary control period, Shenzhen Bay Bridge, Kong Sham Western Highway and Ha Tsuen Interchange will be closed to all vehicular traffic from eastbound and westbound of Yuen Long Highway and Ha Tsuen Road.      Cross-boundary vehicles (including good vehicles, passenger vehicles and private cars) with valid closed road permits for the Shenzhen Bay Port may choose to use the Lok Ma Chau, Heung Yuen Wai and Man Kam To boundary control points (BCP) according to the operating hours of the relevant control points on the event day. The above special arrangement will cease upon the reopening of the Shenzhen Bay Port.      Cross-boundary coach services running between Hong Kong and the Mainland via the Shenzhen Bay Port as well as local public transport services serving the Shenzhen Bay Port, including franchised buses, green minibuses (GMB), urban and New Territories taxis, will be suspended during the implementation of the temporary control at the Shenzhen Bay Port on the day of event. The bus companies and GMB operators will display notices at termini and en-route stops of the affected routes to inform affected passengers. Travellers should choose other control points to Shenzhen.      During the suspension of the Shenzhen Bay Port departure service, the Transport Department (TD) expects that the roads leading to the Lok Ma Chau Spur Line Station Public Transport Interchange, Lok Ma Chau/Huanggang, Man Kam To and Heung Yuen Wai BCPs, including San Tin Interchange, San Sham Road and Lok Ma Chau Road, will be busy with traffic. The full clearance services at the Shenzhen Bay Port are expected to resume at around 11am that day, by then traffic will be expected to be relatively busy. Therefore, the TD appeals to travellers and drivers who plan to use all BCPs concerned on that day to plan their trips in advance. Cross-boundary private cars and other drivers are also advised to avoid driving to the above districts during the relevant hours unless necessary. Depending on the prevailing traffic conditions in the different areas, the Police will deploy appropriate manpower and implement corresponding crowd management measures or special traffic arrangements at the affected control points and relevant road sections.      For details of the special traffic and transport arrangements for the test event, please refer to the Transport Department Notice (www.td.gov.hk/en/traffic_notices/index_id_79334.html) and the Police’s press release on the special traffic arrangements for the test event (www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/202502/13/P2025021300398.htm).      The National Games Coordination Office (Hong Kong) (NGCO) has liaised with relevant government departments and organisations to disseminate information of the relevant BCP clearance services and transportation arrangements to be implemented for the event to the public, travellers and stakeholders through various channels.      The TD will liaise with public transport operators to suitably adjust the services to cater for passenger demand, and issue transport departmental notice of the traffic and transport arrangements for the test event and appeal for cross-boundary and local travellers and members of the public via various channels to take heed of arrangements for various public transport travelling to and from the Shenzhen Bay Port and plan their journeys early, including the HKeMobility mobile application, variable messages signs at strategic roads and tunnels, public announcement at MTR stations, Agent T Facebook page (www.facebook.com/AgentT.hk) as well as the social media platform of the Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay Area Development Office and the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in Guangdong of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.      The Marine Department has liaised with cross-boundary ferry operators, with a view to working out manpower and sailing schedule arrangements for ferry services to and from Shekou, Shenzhen, in advance.      The Home Affairs Department has disseminated the relevant message through the district network (including District Councils, Area Committees and District Committees, Youth Committees, as well as District Services and Community Care Teams). On the day of the test event, the Care Teams will deploy staff to inspect the districts of Tuen Mun and Yuen Long, and provide appropriate assistance to members of the public in need (e.g. responding to enquiries).      Hong Kong Customs has informed the transport trades of the traffic arrangements on that day and to use other land BCPs as far as possible for entry and exit. Customs has also posted notices at the clearance facilities of the Hong Kong Port and informed the public through its website (www.customs.gov.hk/en/home/index.html) and social media platform.      The Immigration Department (ImmD) will update the situation of the control points in real time through its mobile application on the event day. Travellers are advised to check the waiting time situation of the Shenzhen Bay Control Point and other land BCPs through the ImmD’s mobile application before travelling to make better planning for their itinerary and minimise waiting time.      The Police will also remind the public of the temporary traffic control arrangements through its social media platform (www.facebook.com/HongKongPoliceForce).      The Tourism Commission (TC) has informed the hotel sector through their trade associations to remind their guests of the special transportation arrangements. The TC has also informed licensed travel agents through the Travel Industry Authority and the Travel Industry Council of Hong Kong to avoid bringing tour groups across the Shenzhen Bay Bridge on the event day. The Hong Kong Tourism Board has also notified its trade partners and disseminated the relevant information on its website (www.discoverhongkong.com/eng/index.html) to facilitate visitors’ itinerary planning.      Shenzhen will broadcast the event online, while Hong Kong has also arranged for live webcast by Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) (RTHK weblink: www.rthk.hk/nationalgames and RTHK YouTube channel: www.youtube.com/RTHK).      A spokesperson for the NGCO said as the NG is the country’s highest-level event, this marathon test event has to meet stringent requirements in terms of the selection of race course and the organisational arrangements to ensure the safety of athletes. Relevant departments will work together to facilitate the special traffic and transportation arrangements to minimise the impact on the public and travellers who usually use the Shenzhen Bay Port. The spokesperson thanked members of the public and travellers for their understanding, as well as the contributions of various organisations and departments to implementing the relevant arrangements.

     
    Ends/Friday, February 21, 2025Issued at HKT 12:00

    NNNN

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: New York ETO celebrates Year of Snake with Georgia (with photos)

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    New York ETO celebrates Year of Snake with Georgia (with photos)
    New York ETO celebrates Year of Snake with Georgia (with photos)
    ****************************************************************

         ​The Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in New York (New York ETO) celebrated the Year of the Snake with Atlanta, Georgia, at the Hong Kong Spring Reception on February 19 (Atlanta time).           In her welcome remarks, the Director of New York ETO, Ms Maisie Ho, emphasised the strong ties between Hong Kong and Atlanta and the state of Georgia.           “Last year, total exports from Georgia to Hong Kong reached US$980 million, a 14.5 per cent year-on-year increase. This makes Georgia the fifth largest exporter to Hong Kong among all 50 US states in 2024,” she said.           Ms Ho also highlighted Hong Kong’s resilience in navigating global uncertainties, noting that the city’s GDP growth of 2.5 per cent last year is a testament to its ability to maintain stability and leverage its strategic position as a gateway between East and West.           “Looking ahead, we remain committed to enhancing our existing strengths, including our competitiveness as an international financial centre,” she added. “We are also exploring and investing in emerging sectors, such as fintech, biotech, and green energy. These sectors are not only reshaping our economic landscape but also paving the way for sustainable growth and innovation.”           Some 200 guests from Atlanta’s academic, business, diplomatic, finance, and political sectors, as well as students from Hong Kong, attended the annual event cohosted by New York ETO and the Hong Kong Association of Atlanta. Ms Ho encouraged them to visit Hong Kong and experience first-hand the city’s vibrant offerings – from delectable culinary delights and iconic skyline to its breathtaking natural scenery and the dynamic arts and cultural scene, which seamlessly blend East and West.           To further showcase Hong Kong’s vibrant culture and culinary flair, the event featured two inflatable installations designed by popular Hong Kong creative brand Chocolate Rain, as well as two Hong Kong-themed cocktails.

     
    Ends/Friday, February 21, 2025Issued at HKT 11:30

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    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: Prosafe SE: Operational update – January 2025

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    21 February – Fleet utilisation for January 2025 was 57 per cent.  

    Safe Notos and Safe Concordia operated at full capacity during this period, achieving 100% utilisation. Safe Eurus and Safe Zephyrus achieved a utilisation rate of 99% each.

    Safe Caledonia has commenced reactivation activities in Scapa Flow, UK, and will mobilise to the Captain Field, UK, within June 2025.

    Safe Boreas is in Norway preparing for relocation in Q2 2025 for a contract in Australia commencing between mid November 2025 and mid February 2026.

    Prosafe has entered into an agreement to sell Safe Concordia to an undisclosed party. The vessel is expected to be delivered to its new owner upon completion of her current charter obligations, within a window of March through June 2025. The sale of the vessel is subject to customary closing conditions and requirements.

    Safe Scandinavia remains laid up in Norway.

    Prosafe is a leading owner and operator of semi-submersible accommodation vessels. The company is listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange with ticker code PRS. For more information, please refer to https://www.prosafe.com

    For further information, please contact:

    Terje Askvig, CEO
    Phone: +47 952 03 886

    Reese McNeel, CFO
    Phone: +47 415 08 186

    This information is subject to the disclosure requirements pursuant to Section 5-12 the Norwegian Securities Trading Act.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Ireland’s AI Advisory Council Report to Government: “Helping to Shape Ireland’s AI Future”

    Source: Government of Ireland – Department of Jobs Enterprise and Innovation

    The AI Advisory Council today 21st February announced the release of its latest report, “Ireland’s AI Advisory Council Recommendations – Helping to Shape Ireland’s AI Future (February 2025).” This comprehensive report outlines key opportunities and strategic policy recommendations aimed at accelerating AI adoption in Ireland while safeguarding the nation’s economy, competitiveness, workforce, and society.

    The report delves into six critical areas:

    1. AI and the Future of Skills and Work: Improving our understanding of the transformative impact of AI on the labour market and promoting proactive policies to navigate the uncertainty ahead.
    2. AI Ecosystem: Strategies to lead in applied AI: supporting start-ups and SMEs, accelerating funding, leveraging and expanding existing testbed initiatives, and unifying vision for growth.
    3. AI Literacy and Education: Emphasising the importance of AI literacy training for educators and ensuring equitable access to AI tools in education.
    4. AI Sovereignty and Infrastructure: Recognising the value of sovereign data and highlighting the importance of investment in energy infrastructure to our future participation in the AI economy.
    5. Biometrics and the Public Service: Providing recommendations for the responsible use of AI powered Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) in public services.
    6. AI and Ireland’s Creative Sector: Exploring the transformative impact of AI on the creative sector and proposing measures to protect creators and address AI misuse.

    Dr Patricia Scanlon, Chair of the AI Advisory Council said: 

    “This report lays out actionable recommendations to ensure Ireland remains competitive in the global AI arena while fostering an inclusive, ethical, and sustainable future. 

    “We look forward to collaborating with the Government to further explore these opportunities and stimulate a forward-thinking dialogue that aligns Ireland’s AI development with best practices and ethical standards, ultimately securing long-term benefits for our economy and society.”

    The Council presented the advice papers to Minister for Enterprise, Tourism and Employment Peter Burke and the new AI and Digital Transformation Minister of State, Niamh Smyth. The advice was also sent to the Taoiseach.

    Minister for Enterprise, Tourism and Employment Peter Burke said:

    “The Council have emphasised that Government must take decisive and informed action to deliver a vision for AI in Ireland. These are all important issues that have been raised by the Council and I will ensure that their views and expert advice is considered by Government.”

    Minister of State for Trade Promotion, AI and Digital Transformation, Niamh Smyth said: 

    “The Council’s advice is very much welcomed and will be given full consideration. I look forward to working with the Council and with Government colleagues over the coming months as we continue our focus on implementing the National AI Strategy”. 

    The AI Advisory Council will continue to provide insights and refine its recommendations over the coming year, ensuring that Ireland remains agile and well-prepared to navigate the rapidly evolving AI landscape and remain globally competitive.

    Three supplementary advice papers provide more in-depth analyses on three specific thematic areas. The High-Level Recommendations report serves as the main document, while additional deep-dive analyses on the Creative Sector, Education, and Biometrics (FRT) further elaborate on these subjects. More detailed examinations of other thematic areas are planned for release over the coming year.

    Read the AI Advisory Council Advice Papers.

    Notes for Editors

    About the AI Advisory Council:

    The AI Advisory Council is an independent body established to provide expert advice to the Irish Government on all aspects of Artificial Intelligence. The Council comprises leading experts from academia, industry, and civil society.

    The Council’s mandate also includes public engagement to continue to build confidence in the use of trustworthy AI. Since January 2024, the Council members have participated in hundreds of events, interviews, panels, and other engagements.

    See the membership of the AI Advisory Council.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: President Lai meets Abe Akie, wife of late Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai attends opening of 2025 Halifax Taipei forum
    On the afternoon of February 20, President Lai Ching-te attended the opening of the 2025 Halifax Taipei forum. In remarks, President Lai thanked the Halifax International Security Forum for their strong support for Taiwan, and for having chosen Taiwan as the first location outside North America to hold a forum. Noting that we face a complex global landscape, the president called on the international community to take action. He said that as authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must also come closer in solidarity, and called on the international community to create non-red global supply chains, as well as unite to usher in peace. President Lai emphasized that Taiwan will work toward maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and collaborate with democratic partners to form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and together greet a bright, new era. A transcript of President Lai’s remarks follows: To begin, I want to give a warm welcome to all the distinguished guests here at the very first Halifax Taipei forum. The Halifax International Security Forum, held every year in Canada, has been an important gathering for freedom-loving nations worldwide. I would like to thank Halifax and President [Peter] Van Praagh for their strong support for Taiwan. Every year since 2018, Taiwan has been invited to participate in the forum. Last year, former President Tsai Ing-wen was invited to speak, and this year, Halifax has chosen Taiwan as the first location outside North America to hold a forum. As President Van Praagh has said, “While the security challenges ahead are too big for any single country to solve alone, there is no challenge that can’t be met when the world’s democracies work together.” Today, we have world leaders and experts who traveled from afar to be here, showing that they value and support Taiwan. It demonstrates solidarity among democracies and the determination to take on challenges as one. I would like to express my gratitude and admiration to all of you for serving as defenders of freedom. At this very moment, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is still ongoing. Authoritarian regimes including China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran continue to consolidate. China is hurting economies around the world through its dumping practices. We face grave challenges to global economic order, democracy, freedom, peace, and stability. Taiwan holds a key position on the first island chain, directly facing an authoritarian threat. But we will not be intimidated. We will stand firm and safeguard our national sovereignty, maintain our free and democratic way of life, and uphold peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan cherishes peace, but we also have no delusions about peace. We will uphold the spirit of peace through strength, using concrete actions to build a stronger Taiwan and bolster the free and democratic community. I sincerely thank the international community for continuing to attach importance to the situation in the Taiwan Strait. Recently, US President Donald Trump and Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru issued a joint leaders’ statement expressing their firm support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and for Taiwan’s participation in international affairs. As we face a complex global landscape, I call on the international community to take the following actions: First, as authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must also come closer in solidarity. Just a few days ago, the top diplomats of the US, Japan, and South Korea held talks, underlining the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. They also conveyed their stance against “any effort to destabilize democratic institutions, economic independence, and global security.” On these issues, Taiwan will also continue to contribute its utmost. I recently announced that we will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP.  Soon after I assumed office last year, I formed the Whole-of-Society Defense Resilience Committee at the Presidential Office. This committee aims to combine the strengths of government and civil society to enhance our resilience in national defense, economic livelihoods, disaster prevention, and democracy. We will also deepen our strategic partnerships in the democratic community to mutually increase defense resilience, demonstrate deterrence, and achieve our goal of peace throughout the world. Second, let’s create non-red global supply chains.  For the democratic community to deter the expansion of authoritarianism, it must have strong technological capabilities. These can serve as the backbone of national defense, promote industrial development, and enhance economic resilience. So, in addressing China’s red supply chain and the impact of its dumping, Taiwan is willing and able to work with global democracies to maintain the technological strengths among our partners and build resilient non-red supply chains. As a major semiconductor manufacturing nation, Taiwan will introduce an initiative on semiconductor supply chain partnerships for global democracies. We will collaborate with our democratic partners to form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and establish democratic supply chains for industries connected to high-end chips. The achievements of today’s semiconductor industry in Taiwan can be attributed to our collective efforts. Government, industry, academia, and research institutions had to overcome various challenges over the last 50 years for us to secure this position.  We hope Taiwan can serve as a base for linking the capabilities of our democratic partners so that each can play a suitable role in the semiconductor industry chain and develop its own strengths, deepening our mutually beneficial cooperation in technology. This benefits all of us. Moreover, it allows us to further enhance deterrence and maintain global security. Third, let’s unite to usher in peace. China has not stopped intimidating Taiwan politically and militarily. Last year, China launched several large-scale military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. Its escalation of gray-zone aggression now poses a grave threat to the peace and stability of the Indo-Pacific region. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will maintain the status quo. We will not seek conflict. Rather, we are willing to engage in dialogue with China, under the principles of parity and dignity, and work toward maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. As the agenda of this forum suggests, democracy and freedom create more than just opportunities; they also bring resilience, justice, partnerships, and security. Taiwan will continue working alongside its democratic partners to greet a bright, new era. Once again, a warm welcome to all of you. I wish this forum every success. Thank you. Also in attendance at the event were Mrs. Abe Akie, wife of the late former Prime Minister Abe Shinzo of Japan, and Halifax International Security Forum President Van Praagh.

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai meets British-Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary Group delegation
    On the morning of February 18, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation from the British-Taiwanese All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG). In remarks, President Lai thanked the delegation members, the Parliament of the United Kingdom, and the UK government for continuing to demonstrate support for Taiwan through a variety of means. He also stated that Taiwan-UK relations have advanced significantly in recent years, noting that the Taiwan-UK Enhanced Trade Partnership (ETP) is the first institutionalized economic and trade framework signed between Taiwan and any European country. The president said he looks forward to continuing to deepen Taiwan-UK relations and jointly maintaining regional and global peace and stability, and indicated that together, we can create win-win developments for both Taiwan and the UK and Taiwan and European nations. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: This is the first UK parliamentary delegation of the current session to visit Taiwan. On behalf of the people of Taiwan, I extend my sincerest welcome to you all. APPG Chair Sarah Champion visited Taiwan last May to attend the inauguration ceremony of myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao. In July, she also attended the annual summit of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC), which was held in Taipei. I am delighted that we are meeting once again. Taiwan-UK relations have advanced significantly in recent years. I would especially like to thank our distinguished guests, as well as the UK Parliament and government, for continuing to demonstrate support for Taiwan through a variety of means. For example, the House of Commons held a debate on Taiwan’s international status last November. After the debate, a motion was unanimously passed affirming that United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan. Responding to the motion, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State Catherine West stated that the UK opposes any attempt to broaden the interpretation of the resolution to rewrite history. This highlighted concrete progress in Taiwan-UK bilateral relations. I would also like to thank the UK Parliament and government for openly opposing on multiple occasions any unilateral change to the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, and for emphasizing that the security of the Indo-Pacific and transatlantic regions is closely intertwined. We look forward to continuing to deepen Taiwan-UK relations and jointly maintaining regional and global peace and stability. Together, we can create win-win developments for both Taiwan and the UK and Taiwan and European nations. For example, the Taiwan-UK ETP is the first institutionalized economic and trade framework signed between Taiwan and any European country. We hope to swiftly conclude negotiations on signing sub-arrangements on investment, digital trade, and energy and net-zero transition. This will facilitate even more exchanges and cooperation between Taiwan and the UK. We also hope that the UK will continue to support Taiwan’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Together, we can build even more resilient global supply chains and further contribute to global prosperity and development. I believe that this visit adds to a strong and solid foundation for future Taiwan-UK cooperation. Thank you once again for backing Taiwan. I wish you a fruitful and successful visit. Chair Champion then delivered remarks, thanking President Lai for his warm welcome and for the hospitality he has shown to her and the delegation, and thanking Taiwan’s excellent team of officials for their care and attention. Chair Champion expressed that she thinks the IPAC conference held in Taiwan at the end of July last year was very significant, with legislators from 23 countries coming to show support for Taiwan, adding that that is something they have built on since the conference. She stated that she is also very proud that the UK Parliament supported the motion which made very clear that UNGA Resolution 2758 is specific to China and only to China, expressing that it was important and powerful that they recognize that. The chair went on to say that after the UK’s general election, more than half of the members of parliament are now new. She said she is very proud that there are new MPs as part of the delegation, and that she hopes it gives President Lai reassurance that their commitment to Taiwan is still there.  Chair Champion emphasized that the all-party group is important because it is indeed all-party, and that they work together for their common interests, stating that the common interest for the UK and for the world is to maintain Taiwan’s sovereignty. She also noted that the United States has now come out very much in support of Taiwan, which she said she hopes encourages other countries around the world to do the same. Chair Champion said that the UK will be going into the 27th trade negotiation with Taiwan, and that they hope the partnership that develops is very fruitful. The chair closed by saying that it is wonderful for the delegation to be meeting President Lai, as well as legislators and ministers, and to be understanding more about the culture of Taiwan so that they can build a deeper, longer-lasting friendship. The delegation also included Lord Purvis of Tweed of the House of Lords and Members of Parliament Ben Spencer, Helena Dollimore, Noah Law, and David Reed. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Political and Communications Director at the British Office in Taipei Natasha Harrington.  

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai meets former United States Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger
    On the morning of February 17, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by former United States Deputy National Security Advisor Matthew Pottinger. In remarks, President Lai thanked the delegation for demonstrating staunch support for Taiwan through their visit. The president pointed out that increased cooperation between authoritarian regimes is posing risks and challenges to the geopolitical landscape and regional security. He emphasized that only by bolstering our defense capabilities can we demonstrate effective deterrence and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and around the world. The president stated that moving forward, Taiwan will continue to enhance its self-defense capabilities. He also expressed hope of strengthening the Taiwan-US partnership and jointly building secure and resilient non-red supply chains so as to ensure that Taiwan, the US, and democratic partners around the world maintain a technological lead. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I am delighted to welcome our good friends Mr. Pottinger and retired US Rear Admiral Mr. Mark Montgomery to Taiwan once again. Last June, Mr. Pottinger and Mr. Ivan Kanapathy came to Taiwan to launch their new book The Boiling Moat. During that visit, they also visited the Presidential Office. We held an extensive exchange of views on Taiwan-US relations and regional affairs right here in the Taiwan Heritage Room. Now, as we meet again eight months later, I am pleased to learn that Mr. Kanapathy is now serving on the White House National Security Council. The Mandarin translation of The Boiling Moat is also due to be released in Taiwan very soon. This book offers insightful observations from US experts regarding US-China-Taiwan relations and valuable advice for the strengthening of Taiwan’s national defense, security, and overall resilience. I am sure that Taiwanese readers will benefit greatly from it. I understand that this is Mr. Montgomery’s fourth visit to Taiwan and that he has long paid close attention to Taiwan-related issues. I look forward to an in-depth discussion with our two friends on the future direction of Taiwan-US relations and cooperation. Increased cooperation between authoritarian regimes is posing risks and challenges to the geopolitical landscape and regional security. One notion we all share is peace through strength. That is, only by bolstering our defense capabilities and fortifying our defenses can we demonstrate effective deterrence and maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and around the world. Moving forward, Taiwan will continue to enhance its self-defense capabilities. We also hope to strengthen the Taiwan-US partnership in such fields as security, trade and the economy, and energy. In addition, we will advance cooperation in critical and innovative technologies and jointly build secure and resilient non-red supply chains. This will ensure that Taiwan, the US, and democratic partners around the world maintain a technological lead. We believe that closer Taiwan-US exchanges and cooperation not only benefit national security and development but also align with the common economic interests of Taiwan and the US. I want to thank Mr. Pottinger and Mr. Montgomery once again for visiting and for continuing to advance Taiwan-US exchanges, demonstrating staunch support for Taiwan. Let us continue to work together to deepen Taiwan-US relations. I wish you a smooth and fruitful visit.  Mr. Pottinger then delivered remarks, first congratulating President Lai on his one-year election anniversary and on the state of the economy, which, he added, is doing quite well. Mentioning President Lai’s recent statement pledging to increase Taiwan’s defense budget to above 3 percent of GDP, Mr. Pottinger said he thinks that the benchmark is equal to what the US spends on its defense and that it is a good starting point for both countries to build deterrence. Echoing the president’s earlier remarks, Mr. Pottinger said that peace through strength is the right path for the US and for Taiwan right now at a moment when autocratic, aggressive governments are on the march. He then paraphrased the words of former US President George Washington in his first inaugural address, saying that the best way to keep the peace is to be prepared at all times for war, which captures the meaning of peace through strength. In closing, he said he looks forward to exchanging views with President Lai.

    Details
    2025-02-20
    President Lai meets Deputy Prime Minister Thulisile Dladla of the Kingdom of Eswatini
    On the afternoon of February 11, President Lai Ching-te met with a delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Thulisile Dladla of the Kingdom of Eswatini. In remarks, President Lai thanked Eswatini for continuing to support Taiwan’s international participation at international venues. The president stated that Taiwan and Eswatini work closely in such areas as agriculture, the economy and trade, education, and healthcare, and expressed hope that the two countries will continue to support each other on the international stage and strive together for the well-being of both peoples.  A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: I warmly welcome our distinguished guests to the Presidential Office. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla previously visited Taiwan while serving as minister of foreign affairs. This is her first time leading a delegation here as deputy prime minister. I want to extend my sincerest welcome. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla has earned a high degree of recognition and trust from His Majesty King Mswati III. She was not only Eswatini’s first woman foreign minister, but is also the second woman to have held her current key position. She shows an active interest in people’s welfare, and has a reputation for being deeply devoted to her compatriots. I have great admiration for this. I am truly delighted to meet with Deputy Prime Minister Dladla today. I would like to take this opportunity to once again express my gratitude to His Majesty the King for leading a delegation to attend the inauguration ceremony for myself and Vice President Bi-khim Hsiao last year. This demonstrated the close diplomatic ties between our countries. I also want to thank Eswatini for continuing to support Taiwan’s international participation at international venues. I would ask that when Deputy Prime Minister Dladla returns to Eswatini, she conveys Taiwan’s greetings and gratitude to His Majesty the King and Her Majesty the Queen Mother Ntombi Tfwala. Diplomatic ties between Taiwan and Eswatini have endured for over half a century. Our two nations have continued to work closely in such areas as agriculture, the economy and trade, education, and healthcare. Our largest collaboration to date has been assisting Eswatini in the construction of a strategic oil reserve facility. We will continue to push forward with this project, and look forward to achieving even greater results in all areas. I understand that Deputy Prime Minister Dladla is very concerned about issues regarding gender equality and women’s empowerment. During her term as foreign minister, she facilitated bilateral cooperation in those areas. Now, as deputy prime minister, she is actively attending to the disadvantaged and advancing social welfare. These policies are very much in line with the priorities of my administration. I look forward to strengthening cooperation with Deputy Prime Minister Dladla for the benefit of both our societies. Taiwan and Eswatini are peace-loving nations. Faced with a constantly changing international landscape and the growing threat posed by authoritarianism, we hope that our two countries will continue to support each other on the international stage and strive together for the well-being of both our peoples. In closing, I wish Deputy Prime Minister Dladla and our distinguished guests a pleasant and successful visit. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla then delivered remarks, first greeting President Lai on behalf of the King, the Queen Mother, and the people of Eswatini, and extending gratitude for the warm reception afforded to her and her delegation, which underscores the strong bonds of friendship between our two nations. The deputy prime minister stated that, in reflecting on the fruits of our partnership, the evidence of Taiwan’s commitment to Eswatini is all around us. The strategic oil reserve project launching in April, she indicated, will redefine Eswatini’s energy security, and the Central Bank complex and electrification project stand as monuments of Taiwan’s vision for Eswatini’s progress and indicate that our partnerships are very strong. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla pointed out that education is the foundation of any nation’s progress, and that Taiwan’s contribution to Eswatini’s education sector cannot be overstated. Through Ministry of Foreign Affairs scholarship programs, she said, Eswatini has sent numerous students to Taiwan, where they’ve received world-class education in various disciplines, including engineering, business, and medicine. In turn, she said, these graduates are now contributing to the development of Eswatini. The deputy prime minister stated that Taiwan has also strengthened Eswatini’s industrial and technological sectors, with collaborations and partnerships that create new opportunities for employment and innovation, and that Taiwan’s technical and medical assistance has strengthened Eswatini’s healthcare systems and uplifted the expertise of its professionals. Deputy Prime Minister Dladla also congratulated President Lai once again on his presidency, which she stated will lead Taiwan to new heights, adding that His Majesty coming to Taiwan personally for the inauguration was a resounding declaration of Eswatini’s enduring support for Taiwan’s sovereignty, stability, and rightful place on the world stage. She emphasized that Eswatini stands with Taiwan always and unwaveringly. In conclusion, the deputy prime minister stated that Eswatini fully agrees with Taiwan that we must all safeguard our national sovereignty and protect the lives and property of our people. She said that our common enemy will always be poverty and natural disasters, but against all odds, we will stand united, and we shall remain united and be one. The delegation was accompanied to the Presidential Office by Eswatini Ambassador Promise Sithembiso Msibi.

    Details
    2025-02-20
    Presidential Office thanks US and Japan for joint leaders’ statement
    On February 7 (US EST), President Donald Trump of the United States and Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru of Japan issued a joint leaders’ statement reiterating “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community.” In the statement, the two leaders also “encouraged the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues, and opposed any attempts to unilaterally change the status quo by force or coercion” and “expressed support for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in international organizations.” Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo (郭雅慧) on February 8 expressed sincere gratitude on behalf of the Presidential Office to the leaders of both countries for taking concrete action to demonstrate their firm support for peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and for Taiwan’s international participation. Spokesperson Kuo pointed out that there is already a strong international consensus on the importance of peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. The spokesperson emphasized that Taiwan, as a responsible member of the international community, is capable and willing to work together with the international community and will continue strengthening its self-defense capabilities as it deepens its trilateral security partnership with the US and Japan and works alongside like-minded countries to uphold the rules-based international order. The spokesperson said that Taiwan will work toward ensuring a free and open Taiwan Strait and Indo-Pacific region, as well as global peace, stability, and prosperity, as it continues to act as a force for good in the world.

    Details
    2025-02-14
    President Lai holds press conference following high-level national security meeting
    On the morning of February 14, President Lai Ching-te convened the first high-level national security meeting of the year, following which he held a press conference. In remarks, President Lai announced that in this new year, the government will prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that Taiwan’s defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. He stated that the government will also continue to reform national defense, reform our legal framework for national security, and advance our economic and trade strategy of being rooted in Taiwan while expanding globally. The president also proposed clear-cut national strategies for Taiwan-US relations, semiconductor industry development, and cross-strait relations. President Lai indicated that he instructed the national security and administrative teams to take swift action and deliver results, working within a stable strategic framework and according to the various policies and approaches outlined. He also instructed them to keep a close watch on changes in the international situation, seize opportunities whenever they arise, and address the concerns and hope of the citizens with concrete actions. He expressed hope that as long as citizens remain steadfast in their convictions, are willing to work hand in hand, stand firm amidst uncertainty, and look for ways to win within changing circumstances, Taiwan is certain to prevail in the test of time yet again. A translation of President Lai’s remarks follows: First, I would like to convey my condolences for the tragic incident which occurred at the Shin Kong Mitsukoshi department store in Taichung, which resulted in numerous casualties. I have instructed Premier Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰) to lead the relevant central government agencies in assisting Taichung’s municipal government with actively resolving various issues regarding the incident. It is my hope that these issues can be resolved efficiently. Earlier today, I convened this year’s first high-level national security meeting. I will now report on the discussions from the meeting to all citizens. 2025 is a year full of challenges, but also a year full of hope. In today’s global landscape, the democratic world faces common threats posed by the convergence of authoritarian regimes, while dumping and unfair competition from China undermine the global economic order. A new United States administration was formed at the beginning of the year, adopting all-new strategies and policies to address challenges both domestic and from overseas. Every nation worldwide, including ours, is facing a new phase of changes and challenges. In face of such changes, ensuring national security, ensuring Taiwan’s indispensability in global supply chains, and ensuring that our nation continues to make progress amidst challenges are our top priorities this year. They are also why we convened a high-level national security meeting today. At the meeting, the national security team, the administrative team led by Premier Cho, and I held an in-depth discussion based on the overall state of affairs at home and abroad and the strategies the teams had prepared in response. We summed up the following points as an overall strategy for the next stage of advancing national security and development. First, for overall national security, so that we can ensure the freedom, democracy, and human rights of the Taiwanese people, as well as the progress and development of the nation as we face various threats from authoritarian regimes, Taiwan must resolutely safeguard national sovereignty, strengthen self-sufficiency in national defense, and consolidate national defense. Taiwan must enhance economic resilience, maintain economic autonomy, and stand firm with other democracies as we deepen our strategic partnerships with like-minded countries. As I have said, “As authoritarianism consolidates, democratic nations must come closer in solidarity!” And so, in this new year, we will focus on the following three priorities: First, to demonstrate our resolve for national defense, we will continue to reform national defense, implement whole-of-society defense resilience, and prioritize special budget allocations to ensure that our defense budget exceeds 3 percent of GDP. Second, to counter the threats to our national security from China’s united front tactics, attempts at infiltration, and cognitive warfare, we will continue with the reform of our legal framework for national security and expand the national security framework to boost societal resilience and foster unity within. Third, to seize opportunities in the restructuring of global supply chains and realignment of the economic order, we will continue advancing our economic and trade strategy of being rooted in Taiwan while expanding globally, strengthening protections for high-tech, and collaborating with our friends and allies to build supply chains for global democracies. Everyone shares concern regarding Taiwan-US relations, semiconductor industry development, and cross-strait relations. For these issues, I am proposing clear-cut national strategies. First, I will touch on Taiwan-US relations. Taiwan and the US have shared ideals and values, and are staunch partners within the democratic, free community. We are very grateful to President Donald Trump’s administration for their continued support for Taiwan after taking office. We are especially grateful for the US and Japan’s joint leaders’ statement reiterating “the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity for the international community,” as well as their high level of concern regarding China’s threat to regional security. In fact, the Democratic Progressive Party government has worked very closely with President Trump ever since his first term in office, and has remained an international partner. The procurement of numerous key advanced arms, freedom of navigation critical for security and stability in the Taiwan Strait, and many assisted breakthroughs in international diplomacy were made possible during this time. Positioned in the first island chain and on the democratic world’s frontline countering authoritarianism, Taiwan is willing and will continue to work with the US at all levels as we pursue regional stability and prosperity, helping realize our vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Although changes in policy may occur these next few years, the mutual trust and close cooperation between Taiwan and Washington will steadfastly endure. On that, our citizens can rest assured. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances, the US announced a total of 48 military sales to Taiwan over the past eight years amounting to US$26.265 billion. During President Trump’s first term, 22 sales were announced totaling US$18.763 billion. This greatly supported Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. On the foundation of our close cooperation with the past eight years’ two US administrations, Taiwan will continue to demonstrate our determination for self-defense, accelerate the bolstering of our national defense, and keep enhancing the depth and breadth of Taiwan-US security cooperation, along with all manner of institutional cooperation. In terms of bilateral economic cooperation, Taiwan has always been one of the US’s most reliable trade partners, as well as one of the most important cooperative partners of US companies in the global semiconductor industry. In the past few years, Taiwan has greatly increased both direct and indirect investment in the US. By 2024, investment surpassed US$100 billion, creating nearly 400,000 job opportunities. In 2023 and 2024, investment in the US accounted for over 40 percent of Taiwan’s overall foreign investment, far surpassing our investment in China. In fact, in 2023 and 2024, Taiwanese investment in China fell to 11 percent and 8 percent, respectively. The US is now Taiwan’s biggest investment target. Our government is now launching relevant plans in accordance with national development needs and the need to establish secure supply systems, and the Executive Yuan is taking comprehensive inventory of opportunities for Taiwan-US economic and trade cooperation. Moving forward, close bilateral cooperation will allow us to expand US investment and procurement, facilitating balanced trade. Our government will also strengthen guidance and support for Taiwanese enterprises on increasing US investment, and promote the global expansion and growth of Taiwan’s industries. We will also boost Taiwan-US cooperation in tech development and manufacturing for AI and advanced semiconductors, and work together to maintain order in the semiconductor market, shaping a new era for our strategic economic partnership. Second, the development of our semiconductor industry. I want to emphasize that Taiwan, as one of the world’s most capable semiconductor manufacturing nations, is both willing and able to address new situations. With respect to President Trump’s concerns about our semiconductor industry, the government will act prudently, strengthen communications between Taiwan and the US, and promote greater mutual understanding. We will pay attention to the challenges arising from the situation and assist businesses in navigating them. In addition, we will introduce an initiative on semiconductor supply chain partnerships for global democracies. We are willing to collaborate with the US and our other democratic partners to develop more resilient and diversified semiconductor supply chains. Leveraging our strengths in cutting-edge semiconductors, we will form a global alliance for the AI chip industry and establish democratic supply chains for industries connected to high-end chips. Through international cooperation, we will open up an entirely new era of growth in the semiconductor industry. As we face the various new policies of the Trump administration, we will continue to uphold a spirit of mutual benefit, and we will continue to communicate and negotiate closely with the US government. This will help the new administration’s team to better understand how Taiwan is an indispensable partner in the process of rebuilding American manufacturing and consolidating its leadership in high-tech, and that Taiwan-US cooperation will benefit us both. Third, cross-strait relations. Regarding the regional and cross-strait situation, Taiwan-US relations, US-China relations, and interactions among Taiwan, the US, and China are a focus of global attention. As a member of the international democratic community and a responsible member of the region, Taiwan hopes to see Taiwan-US relations continue to strengthen and, alongside US-China relations, form a virtuous cycle rather than a zero-sum game where one side’s gain is another side’s loss. In facing China, Taiwan will always be a responsible actor. We will neither yield nor provoke. We will remain resilient and composed, maintaining our consistent position on cross-strait relations: Our determination to safeguard our national sovereignty and protect our free and democratic way of life remains unchanged. Our efforts to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, as well as our willingness to work alongside China in the pursuit of peace and mutual prosperity across the strait, remain unchanged. Our commitment to promoting healthy and orderly exchanges across the strait, choosing dialogue over confrontation, and advancing well-being for the peoples on both sides of the strait, under the principles of parity and dignity, remains unchanged. Regarding the matters I reported to the public today, I have instructed our national security and administrative teams to take swift action and deliver results, working within a stable strategic framework and according to the various policies and approaches I just outlined. I have also instructed them to keep a close watch on changes in the international situation, seize opportunities whenever they arise, and address the concerns and hope of the citizens with concrete actions. My fellow citizens, over the past several years, Taiwan has weathered a global pandemic and faced global challenges, both political and economic, arising from the US-China trade war and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Through it all, Taiwan has persevered; we have continued to develop our economy, bolster our national strength, and raise our international profile while garnering more support – all unprecedented achievements. This is all because Taiwan’s fate has never been decided by the external environment, but by the unity of the Taiwanese people and the resolve to never give up. A one-of-a-kind global situation is creating new strategic opportunities for our one-of-a-kind Taiwanese people, bringing new hope. Taiwan’s foundation is solid; its strength is great. So as long as everyone remains steadfast in their convictions, is willing to work hand in hand, stands firm amidst uncertainty, and looks for ways to win within changing circumstances, Taiwan is certain to prevail in the test of our time yet again, for I am confident that there are no difficulties that Taiwan cannot overcome. Thank you.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Video: 30 years of the WTO

    Source: World Trade Organization – WTO (video statements)

    What is the WTO? Why does it matter? What’s next?

    To mark the WTO’s 30th anniversary, ambassadors from the organization’s members reflected on the organization’s significance and shared their visions for its future.

    Download this video from the WTO website:
    https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/webcas_e/webcas_e.htm

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1urodKu87cU

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI: Finnvera Group’s Report of the Board of Directors and Financial Statements 2024 – Level of financing reduced from previous year, expectations of future demand positive – Result EUR 228 million

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Finnvera Group, Stock Exchange Release, 21 February 2025

    Finnvera Group’s Report of the Board of Directors and Financial Statements 2024

    Level of financing reduced from previous year, expectations of future demand positive – Result EUR 228 million

    Finnvera Group, summary 2024 (vs. 2023)

    • Result 228 MEUR (433) – The result for the period under review was strong for all business operations. Net interest income grew by 20% and net fee and commission income by 12%. During the period under review, Finnvera was able to partially reverse loss provisions for export credit guarantees and special guarantees, which have had a significant impact on the company’s result in recent years, especially those relating to cruise shipping companies. The reference period saw larger reversals of loss provisions than the period under review.
    • Result by business operations: Result of parent company Finnvera plc’s SME and midcap business stood at 23 MEUR (55) and that of Large Corporates business at 173 MEUR (351). The impact of Finnvera’s subsidiary, Finnish Export Credit Ltd, on the Group’s result was 32 MEUR (27).
    • The cumulative self-sustainability target set for Finnvera’s operations was achieved.
    • The balance sheet total EUR 14.8 bn (14.3) increased by 3%.
    • Contingent liabilities decreased by 9% and stood at EUR 14.9 bn (16.4).
    • Non-restricted equity and the assets of the State Guarantee Fund, which provide the Group’s reserves for covering potential future losses, increased by 12% and totalled EUR 2.1 bn (1.9).
    • Expected credit losses on the balance sheet were reduced by 4% to EUR 1.1 bn (1.2).
    • The NPS index (Net Promoter Score) used to measure client satisfaction improved by 15 points to 79 (64).
    • Outlook for 2025: The business outlook for cruise shipping companies continued to improve in 2024. The credit loss risk of export financing liabilities remains high, however, which causes uncertainty concerning the Finnvera Group’s financial performance in 2025.
    Finnvera Group, year 2024 (vs. 2023)
    Result
    228 MEUR
    (433), change -47%
    Balance sheet total
    EUR 14.8 bn
    (14.3), change 3%
    Contingent liabilities
    EUR 14.9 bn
    (16.4), change -9%
    Non-restricted equity and
    the assets of The State Guarantee Fund
    EUR 2.1 bn (1.9), change 12%
    Expense-income ratio
    17.3%
    (19.4), change -2,1 pp
    NPS index
    (net promoter score)
    79
    (64), change 15 points

    Comments from CEO Juuso Heinilä: 

    “Year 2024 was challenging for the Finnish economy, even if a cautious improvement could be observed in the early part of the year. Finland’s key export markets were also affected by a downturn, which dampened Finnish export companies’ prospects. While interest rates dropped and inflation decreased, geopolitical uncertainty persisted.

    Finnvera granted EUR 0.9 billion (1.8) in domestic loans and guarantees in 2024. The significant decrease in financing from the previous year is due to a major individual amount of working capital financing granted to a large corporate in the reference period. The level of SME and midcap financing was similar to the reference period. The largest share of funding by sector was granted to industry, and the regional drivers were the Helsinki Metropolitan Area and Lapland. Financing for investments did not reach the previous year’s level. The level of financing for corporate acquisitions and transfers of ownership was also lower than in previous years.

    A total of EUR 73 million (36) was granted in climate and digitalisation loans intended for green transition and digitalisation projects under the InvestEU guarantee programme. These loans were first granted in June 2023. To ensure that companies of all sizes have access to financing, we launched loans for micro-enterprises’ growth as a pilot project at the beginning of October 2024. Over three months, EUR 6 million in these loans was granted to micro-enterprises. The pilot project will continue until the end of March 2025, after which we will reassess the availability of financing for small companies.

    In accordance with Finnvera’s strategy, 92% of domestic financing was allocated to start-ups, SMEs seeking growth and internationalisation, investments, transfers of ownership, export and delivery projects, and SME guarantee projects. The long period of economic uncertainty eroded SMEs’ liquidity and increased the number of applications for corporate restructuring and bankruptcy.

    Finnvera granted export credit guarantees, export guarantees and special guarantees amounting to EUR 2.9 billion (5.4). The lower amount of export financing reflected the post-cyclical nature of Finnish exports and reduced demand for exports. Annual fluctuations are also always influenced by the timing of large individual export transactions. In particular, financing was granted to companies in the telecommunications, cruise shipping and mining sectors.

    Largest export credit guarantee agreement related to telecommunications sector in Finnvera’s history was signed in April concerning Nokia’s deliveries for the Indian 5G network worth USD 1.5 billion. In the mining sector, we financed Sibanye-Stillwater’s Keliber lithium project with a Finance Guarantee, which can be granted for domestic investments that support exports. In the energy sector, we financed Wärtsilä’s deliveries of energy storage systems for solar and wind power projects in the United States and Chile. These mining and energy projects, whose total value was approx. EUR 500 million, were the first export financing projects compliant with Finnvera’s climate criteria. Towards the end of the year, Finnvera participated in Meyer Turku’s construction financing that amounted to around EUR 1 billion for the Icon 3 ship.

    Finnish Export Credit Ltd, which is Finnvera’s subsidiary, granted EUR 0.6 billion in export credits (0.5) in 2024. While the demand for export credits increased slightly, it remains significantly lower than in pre-pandemic years. An increasing number of export transactions are financed by a bank to which Finnvera grants a guarantee.

    2024 was a successful year for Finnvera. The Finnvera Group’s result was EUR 228 million (433). The SME and midcap business, export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations, and subsidiary Finnish Export Credit Ltd turned a profit. Finnvera also built up its reserves for possible future losses. The business outlook for the cruise shipping sector, which is important for Finnvera’s export credit guarantee exposure, has continued to improve. Repayments have also helped to reduce exposure relating to Russia. In recent years, Finnvera has been able to partially reverse loss provisions for export financing, which have had a significant impact on the Group’s financial performance since 2020. The reversal of loss provisions has especially impacted the good results for the last two financial periods.

    As a result of crises affecting the global economy, the difficulties faced by some companies around the world and in various sectors have built up to form an insurmountable obstacle. During the period under review, Finnvera incurred major export credit guarantee losses in two cases. Our mission is to bear the risks of export companies. Our core business enjoys a high level of profitability, building up our reserves and creating preconditions for enabling companies’ growth and exports. However, the credit loss risks of exposure relating to export financing remain high, which may affect Finnvera’s future financial performance and reserves.

    We continued to develop our operations and services in line with our strategy in 2024. The ongoing upgrade of our basic information systems supports the digitalisation of services and a good client experience. Our client satisfaction reached an exceptionally high level, as did our personnel satisfaction. We invested in accelerating the growth of midcap enterprises in close cooperation with the European Investment Bank and the Tesi Group, and worked together with the Team Finland network and Business Finland to promote exports. We maintained export financing expertise, especially in SMEs and midcap enterprises, and we brought out new export financing instruments to ensure the availability of financing. The overhaul of the legislation applicable to Finnvera, which is included in the Government Programme and which is extremely important in terms of developing Finnvera’s operations and the competitiveness of export financing, was circulated for comments.

    We advanced our sustainability measures based on our goals in 2024. We joined the Net-Zero ECA Alliance of export credit agencies, which enables us to focus on the sustainability theme and enhance our impact through international cooperation. We developed Finnvera’s sustainability reporting as planned.

    In 2025–2028, our new strategy adopted by the company’s Board of Directors at the end of the year will emphasise increasing the volume of Finnish exports and the number of exporters as well as enabling growth and new business. The achievement of these goals will be supported by our competent personnel and management as well as client-oriented digitalisation. Finnvera contributes to ensuring that Finnish companies are able to invest, develop their products and get their products out around the world. This is a prerequisite for ensuring that we can continue to look after our welfare in Finland in the future.”

    Finnvera Group Financing granted, EUR bn 2024 2023 Change, %
    Domestic loans and guarantees 0.9 1.8 -51%
    Export credit guarantees, export guarantees and special guarantees 2.9 5.4 -47%
    Export credits 0.6 0.5 15%
    The fluctuation in the amount of granted financing is influenced by the timing of individual major financing cases.

    The credit risk for the subsidiary Finnish Export Credit Ltd’s export credits is covered by the parent company Finnvera plc’s export credit guarantee.

    Exposure, EUR bn 31 Dec 2024 31 Dec 2023 Change, %
    Domestic loans and guarantees 2.9 3.0 -4%
    Export credit guarantees, export guarantees and special guarantees 21.1 23.4 -10%
    – Drawn exposure 14.3 14.2 1%
    – Undrawn exposure 4.4 4.5 -2%
    – Binding offers 2.4 4.7 -49%
    Parent company’s total exposure 24.0 26.4 -9%
    Contract portfolio of export credits 10.2 11.0 -8%
    – Drawn exposure 6.5 7.3 -11%
    – Undrawn exposure 3.7 3.7 -2%
    The exposure includes binding credit commitments as well as recovery and guarantee receivables.

    Financial performance 

    The Finnvera Group’s result for 2024 was EUR 228 million (433). Finnvera’s result was strong for all business operations. EUR 46 million of the total result was generated in the last quarter of the year, and EUR 182 million between January and September. Compared to the year before, the result was most significantly affected by the changes in the amount of expected losses, or loss provisions. Loss provisions have had a significant impact on the Group’s result in recent years. Finnvera was able to partially reverse its loss provisions for export credit guarantees and special guarantees in 2024, especially those relating to cruise shipping companies. In the reference period, Finnvera was able to reverse more loss provisions than in the review period, which led to an exceptionally good result in 2023. The result for the review period was also significantly affected by higher net interest income and fee and commission income as well as changes in the value of items recognised at fair value through profit or loss.

    The Group’s realised credit losses and change in expected losses totalled EUR 49 million during the review period, whereas the corresponding item was positive with a value of EUR 210 million during the reference period. The realised credit losses of EUR 121 million (128) were slightly lower than in the reference period. During the period under review, two larger individual export credit guarantee compensations were paid. Expected losses, or loss provisions, decreased by EUR 51 million (320), of which the reversal of loss provisions for export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations accounted for EUR 74 million (376). Credit loss compensation from the State covering losses in domestic financing totalled EUR 20 million (18).

    Compared to the year before, the Group’s net interest income increased by 20% to EUR 139 million (115) and net fee and commission income by 12% to EUR 198 million (177). The higher level of market interest rates was a particularly important factor affecting the increased net interest income. The most significant factors increasing the net fee and commission income were recognition of guarantee premiums for reimbursed export and special guarantees and prepayments of individual liabilities as well as the reimbursement of insurance premiums received as a result of the cancellation of reinsurance contracts. The changes in the Group’s value of items recognised at fair value through profit or loss and net income from foreign currency operations amounted to EUR 8 million (-9).

    After the result of the period under review, the parent company’s reserves for domestic operations as well as export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations for covering potential future losses amounted to a total of EUR 1,878 million (1,676) at the end of December. These reserves, which also cover the credit risk of export credits granted by the subsidiary, consisted of the following: the reserve for domestic operations, EUR 432 million (405) as well as the reserve for export credit guarantees and special guarantees and the assets of the State Guarantee Fund for covering losses, totalling EUR 1,446 million (1,272). The State Guarantee Fund is an off-budget fund whose assets include the assets accumulated from the activities of Finnvera’s predecessor organisations. Under the Act on the State Guarantee Fund, the Fund covers the result showing a loss in the export credit guarantee and special guarantee operations if the reserve funds in the company’s balance sheet are not sufficient. The non-restricted equity of the subsidiary, Finnish Export Credit Ltd, amounted to EUR 230 million (198) at the end of December.

    Finnvera Group
    Financial performance
    2024
    MEUR
    2023
    MEUR
    Change
    %
    Q4/2024
    MEUR
    Q4/2023
    MEUR
    Change
    %
    Net interest income 139 115 20% 37 33 10%
    Net fee and commission income 198 177 12% 50 40 24%
    Gains and losses from financial instruments carried at fair value through P&L and foreign exchange gains and losses 8 -9 -2 -5 -54%
    Net income from investments and other operating income 0 1 -95% 0 0 -23%
    Operational expenses -53 -50 6% -16 -14 12%
    Other operating expenses, depreciation and amortisation -7 -5 35% -3 -1 118%
    Realised credit losses and change in expected credit losses, net -49 210 -19 209
    Operating result 236 439 -46% 47 262 -82%
    Income tax -8 -6 45% -1 -1 4%
    Result 228 433 -47% 46 261 -82%

    Outlook for financing 

    The worst of the recession is behind us, and the Finnish economy is forecast to start growing in 2025. Great expectations are currently placed on the improved outlook for exports as well as the growth and renewal of the entire business sector.

    We expect that the demand for Finnvera’s domestic financing will increase, including more and more financing for investments, as the economic upturn drives a need for more production capacity. Due to the long-standing uncertainty, the economic position of many companies is weak. Finnvera’s role is stressed in arranging financing and sharing the risk with other providers of financing.

    We encourage companies to grasp the growth opportunities created by the green transition with the help of our climate and digitalisation loans and other incentives for sustainable financing. We will continue piloting loans for micro-enterprises’ growth projects until the end of March 2025. While we expect the high demand for the loans to continue, we will reassess small companies’ access to financing after the conclusion of the pilot. Finnvera strives to be active wherever our input is needed to arrange access to financing.

    We expect that the demand for export credit guarantees will start growing in 2025 and that this growth will continue in 2026. Exportation of investment goods, which is vital for Finland’s exports, is post-cyclical and the increase in demand will be reflected in export credit guarantees granted by Finnvera with a delay. Positive signs can already be seen in several sectors, however. Finnvera plays an important role in granting guarantees for long-term trade. We encourage export companies to seek growth in emerging and new markets and to rely on Finnvera for financing export transactions and risk hedging. We will continue to grant export credit guarantees to Ukraine as part of Finland’s national reconstruction programme for the country.

    Finnvera, the Tesi Group and Business Finland will step up their cooperation with the goal of boosting companies’ growth, exports, and the impact of financing. We will continue to work actively together with Team Finland and promote the growth and internationalisation of companies, also while the renewal of public export functions is underway. Finnvera’s Trade Facilitators strive to bring together foreign buyers and Finnish exporters and to promote trade using Finnvera’s export financing together with Business Finland. The aims also include increasing the number of midcap enterprises in Finland.

    Outlook for 2025

    The business outlook for cruise shipping companies continued to improve in 2024. The credit loss risk of export financing liabilities remains high, however, which causes uncertainty concerning the Finnvera Group’s financial performance in 2025.

    Further information:

    Juuso Heinilä, CEO, tel. +358 29 460 2576

    Ulla Hagman, CFO, tel. +358 29 460 2458

    Finnvera publishes the Report of the Board of Directors and its financial statements as an XHTML file compliant with the European Single Electronic Format (ESEF) requirements. Auditor Ernst & Young Ltd has issued an independent assurance report that provides reasonable assurance concerning Finnvera’s ESEF financial statements. The XHTML file is available in Finnish and English. Finnvera additionally publishes the report and financial statements in PDF format.

    ESEF Report 2024 (ZIP)

    Finnvera Group’s Report of the Board of Directors and Financial Statements 1 January – 31 December 2024 (PDF)

    Distribution: NASDAQ Helsinki Ltd, London Stock Exchange, key media, www.finnvera.fi

    The report is available in Finnish and English at www.finnvera.fi/financial_reports

    Attachments

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Dmitry Chernyshenko: The latest domestic developments are presented at the Future Technologies Forum

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Previous news Next news

    Dmitry Chernyshenko visited the exhibition of the Future Technologies Forum

    Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Chernyshenko inspected the exhibition of the Future Technologies Forum, which is taking place in Moscow on February 20–21.

    The forum’s exposition brought together developments from high-tech enterprises and startups from all over the country – achievements are presented at the stands of the largest corporations that develop science-intensive production.

    “The joint work of representatives of science, business and the state is of key importance in achieving Russia’s technological leadership – a national goal set by President Vladimir Putin. The Future Technologies Forum exhibition shows striking examples of such interaction. It presents dozens of the latest domestic developments that are being introduced into industrial production and have high export potential,” the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized.

    The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade presented the national project “New Materials and Chemistry” at the forum. The ministry’s stand featured developments and samples in four areas of the national project: chemistry, biotechnology, composites and rare earth metals. The exhibits included an absorbent carbon dressing for healing open wounds and burns; synthetic blood vessel prostheses that allow replacing critically damaged areas of blood vessels in atherosclerosis, aneurysm, and thrombosis; polymeric materials for the manufacture of bone substitutes that are similar in properties to human bone tissue; samples of raw biomass obtained from medicinal plants without harming the environment; innovative fertilizers; composite materials based on carbon fiber and thermoplastics, which are used in aviation, UAV design, and automotive engineering, as well as products made of rare and rare earth metals, which are used in high-tech products, and other developments.

    “It is extremely important that Russia ensures its sovereignty, including in the extraction of minerals for the needs of our industry. It is also important to form directions and invest in science: the processing of these materials and the creation of technologies based on them,” noted Dmitry Chernyshenko.

    The Kurchatov Institute National Research Center, one of the leaders in modern Russian materials science, demonstrated aircraft parts manufactured using additive technologies, polymeric materials for medical use, heat-resistant materials for engine building, special cold-resistant steels and coatings for Arctic use, and other developments.

    The stand presents a model of the synchrotron-laser complex “SILA” – a fundamentally new research mega-installation, which is being built at the site of the National Research Center “Kurchatov Institute” in Protvino (Moscow Region) and will allow obtaining unique data on the structure and properties of any substances at the level of individual atoms.

    Rosatom demonstrated developments of nuclear industry organizations, they were presented by the CEO of the state corporation Alexey Likhachev. Composite material with boron carbide is capable of effectively blocking different types of radiation. The material is indispensable in nuclear power plants, where it reduces the impact of radiation on personnel and equipment, in medicine (in radiotherapy) and in industry, where they work with radioactive substances.

    The drug synthesis platform is designed to create radiopharmaceuticals – drugs with radioactive elements. The essence of the development is that radioactive substances are added to microspheres that can decompose in the body, which help directly destroy diseased cells. The drugs attack only the affected cells without harming healthy ones – this is their main advantage.

    The Rosatom stand also features beryllium-based materials, which have high strength, withstand high temperatures and can be used in spacecraft, in the production of spark-proof alloys and in the radio-electronic industry.

    Another exhibit is carbon fiber, a unique component for the production of composite materials. The fiber consists almost entirely of carbon atoms, which means high strength with a significantly lower weight than metals and their alloys, and is used to create structural elements of aircraft, to strengthen wind turbine blades and in gas centrifuges, to create prostheses and orthoses, in automobile and shipbuilding, sports and construction.

    Gazprombank presented several high-tech developments of Russian startups at once. The companies Prokeramika and M-Shape demonstrated titanium and steel intervertebral disc prostheses printed using 3D technologies, ceramic scaffolds – biological tissue implants grown on a 3D printer.

    “Such work needs to be supported and accelerated. Especially now, in the conditions of the SVO, when a lot is required for operations and for the creation of implants,” the Deputy Prime Minister emphasized.

    Gazprombank’s subsidiary N2Tech demonstrated the innovative CryoSafe-42 tank container, which allows for safe and lossless transportation of liquid hydrogen, one of the most promising sources of clean energy, over a distance of up to 15,000 km. All developments are designed to ensure high efficiency of their implementation and use in practice with a focus on saving resources and technological leadership in Russian industry, medicine, and the aerospace industry. The stand also demonstrated the interface and workflow of products from KuBoard, a developer of quantum software.

    At the Moscow government stand, Dmitry Chernyshenko was presented with samples of the latest materials and products manufactured at Moscow enterprises. Among them are lithium-ion and sodium-ion batteries, composite panels, carbon fibers, innovative building materials, and much more. For example, prototypes of implants for bone tissue restoration, forearm and hip prostheses with biocoating, and knee modules with microprocessor control, which are used in restorative medicine and surgery, are on display.

    “In the context of rapid changes in the global economy and technological progress, events such as the Future Technologies Forum are becoming a platform for exchanging knowledge, experience and innovation. Moscow actively promotes research and development in the field of new materials. The prospects for using achievements in this area are enormous. This concerns not only industry, but also the daily life of the capital’s residents. We are talking about improving the quality of life through the creation of safer, more durable and efficient products, such as building materials, medical products and much more. This approach not only meets modern requirements for sustainable development, but also emphasizes our commitment to creating a comfortable environment for every resident,” said Anatoly Garbuzov, Minister of the Moscow Government and Head of the Department of Investment and Industrial Policy.

    During the Future Technologies Forum, Sber demonstrated the concept of the AI for Science platform with artificial intelligence (AI) tools, which is designed to improve the quality of scientific research in Russia. The main goal of the platform is to help scientists speed up research, improve its quality and facilitate the writing of scientific articles.

    At the stand, Dmitry Chernyshenko made a number of proposals on the possible use of digital technologies in the work of scientists.

    Detailed information about the events of the Future Technologies Forum is available on the website Futura-forum.The.

     

    The Future Technologies Forum is a flagship event where leading researchers and industry leaders present high-tech technologies, innovative scientific developments and implemented projects that determine the vector of development of economic sectors in the coming years.

    The forum has been held in Moscow annually since 2023 with the participation of the President of Russia. The event is supported by the Government of Russia, and the operator is the Roscongress Foundation.

    In 2023, the FBT was dedicated to quantum technologies, in 2024 it focused on the future of medicine. In 2025, the forum is dedicated to new materials and chemistry.

    In 2025, the forum is held with the support of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Science Foundation, and the Russian Quantum Center. The co-organizers of the forum are Gazprombank, the Moscow government, and the Rosatom state corporation. The general partner is Sber, the strategic partner is PJSC Rosseti, and the strategic scientific partner is the Kurchatov Institute National Research Center.

     

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: 47-2025: Services Restored: Friday 21 February 2025 – DAFF messaging, COLS

    Source: Australia Government Statements – Agriculture

    21 February 2025

    Who does this notice affect?

    All clients submitting the below declarations:

    • Full Import Declaration (FID)
    • Long Form Self Assessed Clearance (LFSAC)
    • Short Form Self Assessed Clearance (SFSAC)
    • Cargo Report Self Assessed Clearance (CRSAC)
    • Cargo Report Personal Effects (PE)

    All importers and customs brokers who will be required to lodge imported cargo documentation to the department for biosecurity assessment…

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Baldwin to Trump: Hold China Accountable for Decades of Cheating American Workers and Shipbuilders

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Wisconsin Tammy Baldwin

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, U.S. Senator Tammy Baldwin (D-WI) led a group of her colleagues in calling on President Donald Trump to hold China accountable for cheating trade laws to gain an unfair advantage in the shipbuilding industry. In the final days of the Biden Administration, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) released a report Senator Baldwin pushed for that confirmed China has used unfair trade practices to undercut American shipbuilding. Now, Senator Baldwin is pushing the Trump Administration to take immediate action to level the playing field for American workers, businesses, and national security.

    “To stand up for the hardworking Americans employed in the shipbuilding industry, those who serve in the military branches that need these vessels, and those who live in communities supported by these jobs, we must act quickly to hold China accountable and reverse the decimation of our maritime strength and capacity inflicted over the last two decades,” wrote Senator Baldwin and the lawmakers in a letter to President Trump. “As we strive to grow the American economy, compete with the PRC, strengthen our ability to engage in international commerce and ensure the American military has the resources necessary to succeed, we urge your Administration to take action regarding the PRC’s actions in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors.”

    In March of 2024, Senator Baldwin called on the Biden Administration to fight China’s unfair trade practices, leading her colleagues in support of the United Steelworkers’ (USW) effort to have then-USTR Katherine Tai initiate a full investigation into China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. The USTR launched an investigation last year, and the report released last month found that China targeted the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors for dominance, concluding that the PRC’s targeted dominance in these sectors is unreasonable and burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and is therefore “actionable” under Section 301. 

    The report lays out China’s efforts to target the shipbuilding and maritime industry for dominance – using state-sponsored financial support to elevate their own industry, imposing barriers for foreign firms, and stealing intellectual property to give China’s shipbuilding and maritime industry an advantage. According to the report, China also severely and artificially suppressed labor costs in the maritime, shipbuilding, and logistics sectors, undercutting American workers.

    In her letter to President Trump today, Senator Baldwin called on this administration to act on the results of the investigation that has confirmed China’s unfair trading practices are undercutting American shipbuilding and workers and undermining our economic and national security. Over the last 20 years, the United States has lost industrial shipbuilding capacity while China’s subsidized shipbuilding has only grown. State-owned enterprises and other facilities in China are now capable of producing over 1,000 ocean-going vessels a year, while the United States currently produces fewer than ten. While shipbuilding capacity, suppliers, and shipyards remain vital to the U.S. economy and national security, China’s uncompetitive trade practices have led to 25,000 domestic shipbuilding suppliers leaving the U.S. market over the past 20 years.

    Senators Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), John Fetterman (D-PA), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), and Amy Klobuchar (D-MN) also signed the letter.

    A full version of this letter is available here and below.

    Dear Mr. Trump:

    We write to you about the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC)’s actions in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sector and urge you to act on the results of the investigation that has confirmed China’s unfair trading practices are undercutting American shipbuilding and workers and undermining our economic and national security.

    Last year, the United Steelworkers (USW) and other unions filed a petition under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) responded by initiating an investigation and determined “China has largely achieved its dominance goals, severely disadvantaging U.S. companies, workers, and the U.S. economy generally through lessened competition and commercial opportunities and through the creation of economic security risks from dependencies and vulnerabilities.” USTR found that China’s unfair trade practices in maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding are “actionable,” and we therefore urge your Administration to identify and implement appropriate relief measures and partner with Congress as needed. Enacting strong measures to address the PRC’s actions will be a critical step towards promoting our domestic industrial base, growing America’s economy, creating good-paying jobs in these important sectors, and protecting our national security.

    After World War II, the United States led the world in commercial shipbuilding. Over the last twenty years, the PRC has executed a comprehensive strategy to significantly diminish the shipbuilding industry in the United States and to become the dominant shipbuilding force globally. The PRC can now produce over 1,000 ships per year, while the United States only has the capacity to produce fewer than ten ocean-going vessels per year. America has lost 25,000 domestic shipbuilding suppliers over the last two decades. This drastic difference in capacity is a result of the PRC’s anti-competitive practices to gain an advantage in shipbuilding through unfair and discriminatory tactics, such as government subsidies and favorable loans from PRC-operated banks. According to USTR’s report, the non-market excess capacity in China’s steel sector significantly contributes to the price competitiveness of PRC-made vessels, and there are instances where Chinese steel intended for vessels in Chinese shipyards has been sold at a lower rate than Chinese steel intended for market economies. To give the American shipbuilding industry a more level playing field and the opportunity to grow, China’s harmful, market-distorting practices should be addressed immediately by this Administration.

    The PRC’s dominance in the shipbuilding industry has dire consequences for America’s economic security and national security. It is essential that the United States prioritizes scaling up our shipbuilding capacity, to both guard against the economic harms felt by loss of jobs at shipyards and suppliers, and because privately-owned shipyards provide essential help to build and maintain the Navy’s fleet. To allow the PRC to control the global transportation supply chain is to open the United States and our allies to immeasurable risks, from supply chain shortages to severe national security concerns. USTR’s report describes the dangers of the PRC’s Maritime Silk Road initiative, including a Chinese government-sponsored logistics platform, LOGINK. LOGINK is used in ports around the world and collects information that could easily be manipulated to disrupt supply chains, allow Chinese companies to reduce prices and undermine competitors, and provide details about the movement of sensitive equipment through commercial ports. The PRC cannot be allowed to continue to expand this intelligence network unchecked, or the United States will experience additional economic harm and threaten our  national security.

    Our states are home to companies that specialize in shipbuilding and repair for both the Navy and commercial vessels, as well as suppliers of necessary inputs to build ships. These businesses are significant employers in communities around the country and provide a pathway to the middle class. Retaining these companies and their workforce ensures the knowledge and ability to build vessels, both for military purposes and to transport goods across the world, remains made in America. A shipyard closing or reducing their number of employees, or a supplier shifting their operations overseas, means local economies lose good-paying, often union, jobs, and America takes another step back in the competition with the PRC. To stand up for the hardworking Americans employed in the shipbuilding industry, those who serve in the military branches that need these vessels, and those who live in communities supported by these jobs, we must act quickly to hold China accountable and reverse the decimation of our maritime strength and capacity inflicted over the last two decades.

    As we strive to grow the American economy, compete with the PRC, strengthen our ability to engage in international commerce and ensure the American military has the resources necessary to succeed, we urge your Administration to take action regarding the PRC’s actions in the maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding sectors. USTR’s determination concludes the PRC’s targeting is unreasonable, burdens or restricts U.S. commerce, and that “responsive action is appropriate to obtain the elimination of the acts, policies, or practices covered in the investigation.” The United States must take action expeditiously to address the PRC’s unfair, harmful, and discriminatory practices. Thank you for your attention to this most important matter.

     Sincerely,

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The promise of green iron, steel and ammonia is keeping the green hydrogen dream alive

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Changlong Wang, Research fellow in Civil and Environmental Engineering, Monash University

    D.Alimkin, Shutterstock

    Hydrogen was once sold as a universal climate fix — a clean, green wonder fuel for cars, homes, power grids and even global export. But reality has cooled that buzz.

    This week, the South Australian government shelved plans for a A$593 million hydrogen power plant, in favour of injecting that money into the $2.4 billion Whyalla steelworks rescue package. Premier Peter Malinauskas said there was “no point in producing hydrogen” without a customer: the steelworks.

    It’s the latest in a series of setbacks for hydrogen. Last year, Australian mining and energy giant Fortescue pared back its green hydrogen projects as a result of increasing costs and changing financial circumstances in the United States.

    Then, gas and oil heavyweight Woodside withdrew plans for two large-scale green hydrogen projects and Origin Energy dropped out of the Hunter Valley Hydrogen Hub.

    Meanwhile, the Hydrogen Energy Supply Chain project in Victoria, meant to ship hydrogen to Japan, has met with delays and overruns. Earlier this month, the new Queensland government chose to halt further investment in the Central Queensland Hydrogen Project, putting plans to export hydrogen in doubt.

    These setbacks show hydrogen isn’t the ultimate solution to all our energy needs, especially if we want to export it. But they don’t spell doom. Instead, they nudge us toward where hydrogen really shines: in heavy industry, right where it’s made.

    Heavy industry: where hydrogen makes sense

    Heavy industries such as steel manufacturing and ammonia production are where hydrogen proves its worth. These sectors are significant contributors to climate change — steel accounts for about 8% of global greenhouse gas emissions, ammonia a further 2%.

    Most emissions from steelmaking come from burning coal in blast furnaces to convert ore into iron and carbon dioxide.

    In a cleaner alternative, hydrogen (when produced using renewable energy) can be used to strip oxygen from the ore and make iron, with water as a byproduct. The result is green iron, ready to be turned into steel in an electric arc furnace – with a fraction of the emissions.

    Ammonia is used to make fertiliser and industrial chemicals, and hydrogen is one of the main ingredients in its production. Hydrogen bonds with nitrogen from the air to form ammonia. No hydrogen, no ammonia — it’s that simple. Conventional ammonia plants get hydrogen from methane, producing CO₂ in the process. Green ammonia uses renewable energy to produce hydrogen by splitting water via electrolysis.

    Our recent research crunched the numbers on producing these new green commodities. We found making green iron in Australia with hydrogen and shipping it to Europe for steel production could be 21% cheaper than exporting raw iron ore and hydrogen separately. Plus, it could cut emissions by up to 95% compared to traditional methods.

    There are huge economic opportunities for Australia too. Instead of shipping low-value raw materials, Australia could export ready-to-use green iron or green steel, reshaping global supply chains while cutting costs and carbon. That’s the kind of rethink hydrogen enables.

    Industry hubs: a practical fix

    Transporting hydrogen long distances is costly and inefficient. The fix? Industry hubs that produce hydrogen right where it’s needed — next to steel mills, ammonia plants, desalination plants, water treatment plants or even aluminium smelters. Putting producers and consumers together slashes transport costs and unlocks efficiencies.

    We’ve built tools to pinpoint places with the greatest potential to produce these new green commodities.

    The Hydrogen Economic Fairways Tool maps where renewable energy, infrastructure and industrial sites align for cost-effective hydrogen production.

    The Green Steel Economic Fairways Mapper zooms in on prime locations for green steel, spotlighting places such as Eyre Peninsula in SA and the Pilbara in Western Australia, among others (see below). These locations have abundant wind and solar resources alongside an existing industrial base.

    The Green Steel Economic Fairways Mapper compares the levelised cost of steel, including production and transport to the port. a) Regional changes across Australia b) Example of how to optimise the system to minimise the levelised cost of producing 1 million tonnes per annum c) Breakdown of costs d) Hourly system performance, in terms of energy flows.
    Green Steel Economic Fairways Mapper, Geoscience Australia

    Challenges remain

    Green hydrogen promises to revolutionise heavy industries, but significant hurdles stand in the way of widespread domestic adoption. The biggest challenge comes from the unpredictable nature of renewable energy, which makes it hard to maintain the steady hydrogen supply industries need.

    The costs remain steep, too. Splitting water into hydrogen using renewable electricity isn’t cheap, particularly when you need backup storage systems to keep production going during cloudy or windless periods.

    Getting hydrogen where it needs to go poses another major challenge. As hydrogen is both bulky to transport and highly flammable, it requires special handling and infrastructure, driving up costs, especially for facilities far from production sites.

    Many companies also hesitate to invest in hydrogen-compatible equipment, as retrofitting existing plants or building new ones requires substantial upfront costs without guaranteed returns.

    The $2.4 billion rescue package for the Whyalla Steelworks (ABC News)

    Government backing: a push in the right direction

    Thursday’s announcement of A$2.4 billion investment in the Whyalla steelworks along with plans for a $1 billion green iron investment fund are a bold bet on green steel. Furthermore, the landmark Future Made in Australia legislation introduces a $6.7 billion Hydrogen Production Tax Incentive, offering $2 per kilogram of renewable hydrogen produced between 2027–28 and 2039–40, alongside a 10% tax credit for critical minerals processing.

    Meanwhile tax credits for green aluminium and alumina should help another heavy industry to navigate the energy transition using clean hydrogen.

    These measures aim to unlock tens of billions in private investment, boost regional economies, and position Australia as a leader in clean energy manufacturing. This isn’t just about one-off projects. It’s laying the groundwork for hubs that link renewable energy and hydrogen production to industrial demand.

    There’s more in the pipeline. The Hydrogen Headstart program pumps funds into hydrogen innovation, and the Future Made in Australia initiative backs clean industry with billions more. Add in policies like carbon pricing or low-interest loans, and the economics tilt even further toward green steel and ammonia. Government buying power — in the form of procurement targets for low-carbon materials — could seal the deal by guaranteeing demand.

    These policies aren’t just wishful thinking — they’re practical steps that are already working elsewhere. Sweden’s HYBRIT project, which paired green steel with government-backed demand, has already led to construction starting on new industrial-scale green steel facilities. At the same time, the European Union’s hydrogen strategy leans on carbon pricing and subsidies to guide industries and suppliers through the energy transition, while Japan offers incentives for the use of green steel in their automotive industry.

    Australia has the renewable energy and the industrial base to take advantage of these opportunities. With the right leadership, we can turn hydrogen’s stumbles into a global triumph for heavy industry.

    Changlong receives funding from the South Australian Department for Energy and Mining to conduct the SA Green Iron Study, and from Geoscience Australia under the Exploring for the Future program to develop the Hydrogen and Green Steel Economic Fairways tool. Changlong is affiliated with Melbourne Climate Futures, University of Melbourne, and is a visiting fellow at Engineering Science, Oxford University, UK.

    Stuart Walsh receives funding from Geoscience Australia supporting the development of the Bluecap software suite, which highlights opportunities for new renewable energy and critical mineral projects in Australia. Stuart received funding from the South Australian Department for Energy and Mining to conduct the SA Green Iron Study and from Geoscience Australia under the Exploring for the Future program to develop the Hydrogen and Green Steel Economic Fairways tool.

    ref. The promise of green iron, steel and ammonia is keeping the green hydrogen dream alive – https://theconversation.com/the-promise-of-green-iron-steel-and-ammonia-is-keeping-the-green-hydrogen-dream-alive-250410

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: China’s probes into EU pork, dairy products imports underway: commerce ministry

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    The anti-dumping investigation into pork imports from the European Union (EU) and the anti-subsidy investigation into EU dairy products imports are currently ongoing, the Ministry of Commerce said on Thursday.

    China will approach these cases in an open and transparent manner based on Chinese laws and regulations and by following the World Trade Organization rules, said He Yadong, spokesperson for the ministry, during a regular press conference.

    The ministry will ensure that the rights of all parties are fully protected, the spokesperson added.

    In August last year, China launched the anti-subsidy investigation into certain dairy products imported from the EU. It examines any damage brought to related Chinese industries from Jan. 1, 2020, to March 31, 2024.

    Additionally, a year-long investigation into pork imports from the EU began on June 17, 2024, following a request from the China Animal Agriculture Association. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cramer, Smith and Colleagues Introduce Legislation to Support North Dakota Bus Manufacturing

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. – In recent years, several prominent bus manufacturers have declared bankruptcy. Outdated payment practices from the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) are contributing to the challenging business environment and unnecessarily raising costs for bus manufacturers and their customers. Amendments to the FTA are referred to the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Development (Banking) Committee, which has jurisdiction.

    U.S. Senator Kevin Cramer (R-ND), member of the Senate Banking Committee, and U.S. Senators Tina Smith (D-MN), Katie Britt (R-AL), and John Fetterman (D-PA) introduced the Bus Rolling Stock Modernization Act. The bill modernizes the 40-year-old structure for bus payments, allowing transit agencies to make advance payments of up to 20% for bus rolling stock purchased using federal funds. This simple reform provides flexibility and cost savings for both local transit agencies and manufacturers. These savings free up much-needed capital for bus manufacturers, allowing for more significant investments in their operations to meet customer demand.

    FTA regulations only allow for advance payment when the manufacturer obtains a performance bond or letter of credit, and the grantee receives pre-approval from FTA. The existing process is cumbersome, time consuming, and costly for both transit agencies and manufacturers. The Bus Rolling Stock Modernization Act would simplify the purchasing process and help drive down costs for agencies and manufacturers.

    “Our legislation cuts unnecessary red tape, allowing bus manufacturers across America to invest in their production capacity,” said Cramer. “This commonsense change provides greater flexibility for North Dakota’s local transit agencies and directly benefits manufacturers like Motor Coach Industries in Pembina.”

    “Each day, transit systems connect Minnesotans to their jobs, schools, and countless other opportunities – all while reducing traffic congestion,” said Smith. “This bill makes a commonsense update to current practice by cutting unnecessary red tape and strengthen the domestic bus manufacturing market. This small change will also support U.S. bus manufacturing jobs, get more buses into service, and help Americans get to their work, school, and health care appointments more easily.”

    “This bill strengthens the motorcoach industry, driving job creation and economic growth at Motor Coach Industries (MCI) in Pembina, North Dakota, and across all our U.S. manufacturing sites, which employ 4,000 Americans,” said Paul Soubry, President and CEO of NFI Group, MCI’s parent company. “We sincerely appreciate the Senator’s leadership in championing policies that drive innovation, investment, and workforce expansion in American manufacturing.”

    Click here for bill text.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: (WIP) Big batteries in 2025: the market evolution continues

    Source: Allens Insights

    Another big year for BESS 12 min read

    Utility-scale batteries reached new heights in 2024, achieving several industry firsts. Milestones include the first project-financed virtual offtake agreement and long-term energy service agreement (LTESA), coupled with inventive approaches to revenue stack structuring. As investor interest intensifies, the future of battery storage looks promising.

    This latest Insight on the Australian big battery market delves into the recent trends, the potential opportunities and hurdles for this rapidly evolving industry.

    Key takeaways

    • Project financing of battery energy storage system (BESS) projects is on the rise, with an increasingly sophisticated market, a widening pool of sponsors and diverse range of investment structures.
    • Virtual offtake agreements are dominating the offtake market, giving developers greater flexibility in their revenue stack and opportunities for equity upside through market arbitrage.
    • Interest in the Capacity Investment Scheme and LTESAs is increasing and contributing to projects reaching financial close.
    • Equity investors continue to be attracted to standalone and co-located BESS projects, as well as investment in the hardware and software of a battery.

    What we are seeing in the market

    A growing number of battery projects achieved financial close across the past year and project finance has continued to be the dominant approach. We have seen significant greenfield and operational battery projects financed on a standalone basis and as part of hybrid projects, as well as portfolio-based financings. 

    Key examples of this trend are the renewables portfolio financings for Global Power Generation, FRV and Neoen, all of which included battery projects as part of the technology mix. Akaysha Energy’s standalone financing of its Orana Battery Energy Storage System marked a financing for the largest four-hour BESS in Australia’s National Energy Market (NEM), and one of the largest in the world. 

    The continued support in the project finance market for battery storage projects has been driven by a range of factors, including:

    • a widening pool of sponsors—and, in some cases, extremely strong sponsors—who are investing in the technology;
    • a diverse range of investment structures and rationales, which have seen developers and sponsors raise debt financing for batteries on a standalone and portfolio basis, or as part of co-located or hybrid projects. In some cases, this has been motivated by a business pivot or expansion in response to an increasing need to couple projects with intermittent generation sources with a firming energy source or, more generally, net zero and decarbonisation objectives; and
    • increasing sophistication and experience of developers, contractors and other stakeholders in relation to procurement and contracting strategy, trading strategy, management of interface and gap risk in the context of split contracting, and innovation in revenue structures.

    These trends have been accompanied by—and, in some ways, conducive to—an expanding range of financiers (including mainstream commercial banks, government lenders and other non-bank lenders) participating in financings for battery projects; a greater understanding from lenders of technology and degradation risk; and a greater market acceptance of split contracting structures and non-traditional revenue structures as bankable.

    Throughout 2024 we observed a marked increase in the development and adoption of virtual offtake agreements as a preferred offtake structure. Notable examples are Neoen’s Western Downs BESS and Victorian Big Battery, and, as mentioned earlier, Akaysha’s Orana BESS. 

    A virtual offtake agreement decouples the financial offtake from the physical project. The project company may therefore choose not to follow the instructions of the offtaker and instead operate the BESS according to its own internal trading strategy, but it must still settle the financial swap on pre-agreed terms, regardless of battery capacity and how much the battery is charged or discharged. 

    From the project company’s perspective, unlike a traditional physical toll, it retains control of the physical battery. This increases the opportunities for equity upside through trading arbitrage. The structure also facilitates greater flexibility for a single project to procure offtake agreements with multiple offtakers. It may also be compatible with hybrid or co-located projects in need of multiple offtakers for different components of the project.

    Virtual offtakes are not, however, for everyone. Both the owner and the offtaker need sophisticated trading teams to allow them to make the most of the virtual arrangements and to reduce the risk of making losses. Similarly, developers who want to sell out of a project prior to financial close may want to consider whether a virtual offtake agreement could limit the potential buyer pool to those that have the technical capability to trade the asset.

    In considering this type of structure from a financing perspective, lenders will be focused on mitigating the potential downside exposure in circumstances where physical trading by the project company underperforms against the virtual nominations, eroding actual base case revenue against revenue assumptions against which debt is sized.  

    Providing lenders with appropriate oversight and protections (including, if required, agreed trading protocols), while providing sufficient room for equity to seek upside opportunities, will be the key to building broader market acceptance of the bankability of non-traditional revenue structures such as virtual offtake agreements.

    Last year saw the Federal Government launch the first five tenders in its Capacity Investment Scheme, which wrapped in a tender for the NSW Government’s LTESAs.

    Each tender round has been oversubscribed, indicating a strong appetite from project developers to secure a government underwriting contract such as a Capacity Investment Scheme Agreement (CISA) or an LTESA

    While these underwriting contracts have typically been viewed by project financiers as welcome enhancements, they have traditionally been seen as a ‘nice-to-have’ feature, with the primary focus of lenders being on whether the project has the benefit of a traditional tolling or offtake agreement. At most, we saw sponsors and borrowers proposing to recognise CISAs and LTESAs acting as a floor against any potential market risk (either due to the residual life of the BESS past the offtake tenor or for partially contracted assets). 

    More recently, we are seeing lenders develop a greater understanding of how such agreements can underpin forecast project cashflows in a way that enables higher weighting to be placed on them as a certain and bankable revenue line in the base case financial model. This approach is often supported by tailored protections that are agreed in the debt documents, such as:

    • undertakings around how the project activates and manages its rights to receive support payments;
    • information undertakings, to provide lenders with appropriate visibility over the operation of the underwriting agreement during the facility term; and
    • cash reserving requirements, to facilitate the project maximising the benefit of underwriting agreements, while providing for a buffer should there be a need to meet any payment obligations back to the counterparty (eg reconciliation payments or rebates).

    As more government underwriting agreements are awarded under the LTESA and CISA schemes, there will be an increasing number of projects in the market where such agreements are a feature of the revenue profile. We expect that market acceptance of this approach will continue to broaden over time.

    Split contracting has established itself as the market standard for BESS projects, with sponsors and financiers becoming significantly more comfortable with managing and banking the interface risks between battery supply and balance of plant (BOP) scope.

    Commissioning, handover, defects, security, liability caps and liquidated damages coverage continue to be key areas of focus in negotiations, gaps analysis and bankability assessments. However, the issues, and the related mitigation strategies and contingencies, are now well understood.

    As the BESS split contracting structure has matured, we have also begun to see sponsors with a portfolio of upcoming BESS and other renewables projects seek to partner informally with preferred battery suppliers and/or BOP contractors across that pipeline—the goal being to expedite procurement timeframes, secure production slots and standardise terms across their portfolio.

    With BESS projects increasingly being co-developed with related solar/wind projects (either greenfield or expansions), we also expect to see an increase in a common BOP contractor delivering both the battery and solar/wind BOP scope. At this stage, the BOP scope usually remains ringfenced between assets (eg there is a BESS BOP contract and a solar BOP contract). However, we expect to see sponsors push towards a single hybrid project BOP contract covering both assets, to seek to streamline contracting terms and construction programs on hybrid projects.

    In order to ensure that the structure is bankable, project financiers require a rigorous gaps analysis process underpinning the contract negotiations, along with confidence in the capability and experience of the contractors themselves. The need for a robust gaps analysis does mean more substantial engagement with financiers, and sponsors and developers have had to factor this into the overall transaction timetable. However, the continued rise in standard terms contracts from certain contractors in the market may facilitate efficiencies in the due diligence process, especially on portfolio-based financings.

    Investors continue to be attracted to BESS assets. Unsurprisingly, the reasons for their increasing investment appeal are similar to why we are seeing more and more BESS projects reach financial close.

    These factors enable BESS owners to diversify and maximise revenue output from their renewable energy portfolios. Coupled with favourable investment characteristics for BESS assets, such as lower capex costs and shorter development timelines (particularly when compared with other renewable asset types), we expect to see investment appetite for BESS assets continue to grow.

    In the Australian M&A market, this investor appetite has manifested primarily in the form of co-location ‘add-ons’—where vendors looking to sell a solar or wind project have added a BESS development opportunity to the project. If the BESS can be developed on the project’s existing land footprint, the ‘add-on’ process is relatively simple (other than for the connection process, which continues to cause headaches for developers), and the project up for sale can be rebranded as a co-located wind/solar and BESS project, unlocking for the buyer the various new revenue streams. For the vendor, those additional revenue streams mean a higher purchase price.

    What’s on the horizon

    Recognition of sub-investment grade offtakers?

    The offtaker’s credit quality will continue to be a focus for lenders when assessing BESS projects. However, as a greater range of offtakers enter the market, we can expect more frequent proposals for financiers to consider counterparties that may not have the credit ratings that would typically be required for a bankable project.

    We are seeing this area incrementally develop. This is particularly so in renewables portfolio financings, where certain sub-investment grade offtakers may be recognised and given greater weighting (and, in some cases, equivalent to an investment grade offtaker) as part of debt sizing cashflows, subject to appropriate percentage caps and other criteria being met.

    Opportunities for fully merchant BESS projects

    A further example of the evolving market for BESS financings may be found in the recent Amp Energy project financing of a fully merchant BESS project by commercial bank lenders and Export Development Canada. While we have certainly seen project financings for BESS projects with merchant exposure, those projects have typically included at least some contracted revenue component (whether through a tolling agreement, virtual power purchase agreement, LTESA or revenue risk-sharing agreement). 

    This makes the Amp transaction an interesting market development. Depending on the project and the sponsor, the debt model on the Amp transaction may not be feasible for all sponsors and developers, given that a fully merchant BESS compared with a contracted BESS would necessarily mean more conservative debt sizing, at least in the short term. However, for certain sponsors with strong equity backing, where a high percentage of equity is available to be contributed to individual projects, and where there are challenges or other commercial reasons for not procuring an offtake, a fully merchant-based project financing may still be attractive. 

    Whether this means we will see a growing number of merchant BESS project financings is unclear. The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) forecasts energy storage capacity in the NEM will increase from approximately 2GW at the end of 2024 to nearly 7GW by the end of 2025.1 As more BESS projects come online over time, there may be fewer arbitrage and other similar revenue opportunities. 

    At least in the short term, we expect this may lead to certain sponsors and developers more closely exploring opportunities to raise debt against BESS projects that are fully merchant or that have substantial merchant exposure.

    Investment in BESS platforms and core components

    A growing trend is the investment in BESS-specific investment platforms. While only a limited number have come to market in Australia so far (including the recent ZEBRE BESS platform announced by ZEN Energy and HDRE), we have worked with a number of investors who are looking at opportunities in this space. Investors are drawn to the benefits of BESS projects described above and the potential to accelerate the growth of those benefits when they are aggregated on a portfolio basis.

    We have also seen increased investment interest in core BESS components, including:

    • the hardware—as rival technologies, focused on cost efficiency and safety, are emerging to challenge lithium-based batteries; and
    • the software—focusing in particular on storage and discharge optimisation.

    While the current focus from investors in these core BESS components appears to be on systems designed for the residential and commercial and industrial markets, the ambition for a number of these technologies is to scale up to the utility-scale BESS market.

    Commencement of the GO Scheme

    The Guarantee of Origin Scheme (the GO Scheme) is set to commence in 2025, bringing with it new tradeable certificates in the form of Renewable Energy Guarantee of Origin (REGO) certificates. Unlike large-scale generation certificates, REGOs will be able to be created by energy storage systems (such as batteries) where there is a ‘direct supply relationship’ with an eligible renewable energy facility.

    In addition, REGOs will be time-stamped, meaning they will record the hour of the day in which they were generated. This will allow temporal matching of electricity generation and consumption, and will likely drive a price differentiation between eg REGO certificates generated at 1pm when there is excess solar generation and 1am when renewable energy supply is scarce.

    The introduction of REGO certificates presents an interesting opportunity, and a potential new revenue source, for BESS projects.

    More information on the GO Scheme can be found in our previous Insight.

    Revenue implications from AEMO’s market interventions

    Under the National Electricity Rules, AEMO has powers to issue mandatory ‘directions’ to registered participants in the NEM in relation to the operation of their facilities. This is not uncommon, and is primarily used by the market operator to manage periods of volatility in the market and maintain the reliability standard. Participants are subsequently reimbursed for their compliance via a well-established compensation framework administered by AEMO.

    AEMO has indicated that it intends to use its directions power on battery operators to address the increasingly commonplace minimum system load issues— eg by directing an operator to fully discharge batteries early in the morning and to hold the batteries at minimum charge during the morning, with the direction lifted in the early afternoon.

    However, there are growing concerns that this directions compensation model is not fit for purpose for standalone batteries and other energy storage technologies. The financial model for a standalone BESS is particularly reliant on taking advantage of exactly these periods of financial volatility in the market, and AEMO’s directions compensation framework may not be appropriate in providing adequate financial redress for the opportunity cost that is lost by virtue of being required to comply with an AEMO direction.

    Following the AEMC’s ‘Review into electricity compensation frameworks’, the final report for which was published in December 2024 and can be found here, we expect there to be continued discussions on this issue, to ensure that BESS operators are fairly compensated for AEMO’s market interventions.

    Vanadium flow as an emerging alternative to lithium-ion?

    As the BESS market expands, we expect to see competing technologies emerge as alternatives to lithium-ion batteries. The WA Government recently announced $150 million of funding to develop a 50MW / 500MWh vanadium flow battery (VFB) in Kalgoorlie, which would be Australia’s largest VFB. While VFBs have been mooted for a number of years as a potential utility-scale alternative to lithium-ion batteries, the first (and largest) ‘commercial’ VFB in Australia (a 2MW / 8MWh battery) was only commissioned in mid-2023, as part of the Spencer Energy Project.

    The key roadblocks to the widespread adoption of utility-scale VFBs seem to be higher upfront costs compared with lithium-ion batteries (vanadium is heavily used in steel refining, which creates price and supply chain volatility), and lower roundtrip efficiency of around 70–85% (compared with 90–95% for lithium-ion batteries).

    Despite this, VFBs seemingly provide a number of commercial benefits compared with lithium-ion batteries. In particular, VFBs offer longer storage duration (between 8–12 hours), and the theoretical ability to discharge completely and for an unlimited number of times without significant degradation (providing a much longer and consistent asset life). Further, VFBs are said to be safer (and fire resistant), and storage capacity can be easily increased by adding more electrolyte. At scale and over time, these benefits could help drive a significantly lower LCOE. The WA Government’s funding may be the catalyst to cut upfront costs and kickstart VFBs as a leading alternative to lithium-ion batteries.

    The continuing evolution

    As we look ahead, it is clear that 2025 promises to be another exciting year for the BESS sector. We expect to see more diverse, and growing, opportunities for battery projects, including across construction contracting, revenue structures, project and portfolio-based financing, and M&A. 

    If you would like to hear more about what we’re seeing in the market, please contact any of the team members below.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Murray, Schrier Lead Letter to Energy Secretary on Trump and Musk’s Indiscriminate Firings at Bonneville Power Administration, Threatening PNW Energy Reliability and Increased Costs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ICYMI: Senator Murray on Trump Indiscriminately Firing Workers at Hanford and Bonneville Power Administration, Threatening Energy Security in Washington State

    ***FACT SHEET: Impact in Washington State of Trump and Musk’s Reckless Mass Layoffs***

    Washington, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Congresswoman Kim Schrier, M.D. (D, WA-08) led their colleagues in Washington’s Congressional delegation—U.S. Senator Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and Representatives Suzan DelBene (D, WA-01), Rick Larsen (D, WA-02), Emily Randall (D, WA-06), Pramila Jayapal (D, WA-07), Adam Smith (D, WA-09), and Marilyn Strickland D, WA-10),—in sending a letter to Department of Energy (DOE) Secretary Chris Wright laying out their grave concerns with Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s recent mass firings at the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and how these reckless layoffs threaten grid reliability for the people in Washington state.

    “Pursuant to President Trump’s Executive Order (EO) 14210, last week DOE implemented large scale, department-wide reductions in the workforce. At the Bonneville Power Administration, these have been nothing short of devastating, totaling nearly 20 percent of BPA’s total headcount. These public servants literally helped keep the lights on for tens of millions of Americans. Beyond harming BPA’s ability to address existing and future needs, these cuts immediately jeopardize the reliability of the Pacific Northwest’s electrical grid and severely hamper economic development in the region. Such significant reductions in BPA’s workforce will result in increased costs to consumers and delays to further economic investments in the Northwest,” the Members wrote.

    BPA provides 28 percent of the Pacific Northwest’s electric power, ensuring affordable electricity for more than 13 million people across Washington, Idaho, Oregon, and Western Montana. BPA owns and operates 75 percent of the Northwest’s high voltage electrical transmission system, amounting to over 15,000 miles of transmission lines—the services BPA provides support the entire Northwest. Importantly, BPA does not receive federal funding—Northwest ratepayers ensure that BPA is able to remain self-funded.

    Last week, Senator Murray raised the alarm immediately after hearing about mass firings at BPA—between employees who were fired, those whose job offers were rescinded, and those who took the “Fork in the Road offer,” we estimate that BPA is losing between 450 and 600 skilled workers as a result of Trump and Elon Musk’s attempts to gut the federal workforce. This includes everyone from electricians and engineers to dispatchers, lineworkers, cybersecurity experts, and so many other people who help keep the lights on in the Northwest. Again, these are positions funded by ratepayers.

    “Beyond those fired, hundreds of BPA employees opted in to OPM’s so-called ‘deferred resignation’ program, which will leave critical positions open without the ability to backfill easily. Both workers and ratepayers are now left without certainty on what funding will be used or when payments under this legally dubious program will begin. Encouraging resignation of these highly specialized workers alone risks grid reliability and stable rates in the region, draining BPA’s institutional knowledge with no solution to account for these additional vacancies,” the Members continued.

    “The EO also calls for further large-scale Reductions in Force (RIFs). There may also be further firings of probational employees. Additionally, the EO requires the hiring of ‘no more than one employee for every four employees that depart.’ BPA cannot afford to follow through on such directives. The EO states that workforce reductions ‘shall not apply to functions related to public safety’—ensuring the reliable provision of electricity is clearly a matter of public safety. As such, we call on you to continue to swiftly rescind the terminations of staff and reverse rescinded job offers at BPA, in acknowledgement of the critical role that these employees play ensuring grid reliability in the Northwest. It cannot be stated more plainly: this is a matter of life-and-death for millions of Americans,” the Members wrote.

    The Members concluded by asking Secretary Wright to rescind the terminations of BPA employees, reverse rescinded job offers, and “explain why BPA employees were not deemed necessary to meet public safety responsibilities and exempted from last weeks’ workforce reductions in the first place.”

    A PDF of the full letter is available HERE.

    Yesterday, Senator Murray released this fact sheet detailing Washington state impacts of Trump and Elon Musk’s reckless assault on the federal workforce, and late last week she immediately released a national fact sheet detailing how Trump and Musk’s mass firings at all manner of federal agencies will hurt families, veterans, small businesses, farmers, and so many others across the country who need a government that works for them. Senator Murray has spoken out repeatedly on the Senate floor against this administration’s attacks on federal workers, and recently sent an open letter to federal workers and a newsletter to her constituents in Washington state outlining her concerns with the administration’s so-called “Fork in the Road” offer. Senator Murray has also sent recent oversight letters demanding answers about indiscriminate staffing reductions across federal agencies including to HUD Secretary Scott Turner on reports of massive staff cuts at HUD, Interior Secretary Doug Burham on National Parks Service staffing cuts, and Acting USDA Secretary Gary Washington on the universal hiring pause for USDA firefighters, among others.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI China: China-South Africa Economic and Trade Forum, China Int’l Supply Chain Expo roadshow held in Johannesburg

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    China-South Africa Economic and Trade Forum, China Int’l Supply Chain Expo roadshow held in Johannesburg

    JOHANNESBURG, Feb. 20 — The China-South Africa Economic and Trade Forum and the third China International Supply Chain Expo Promotion Conference were held in Johannesburg on Thursday.

    The event, held by the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), was attended by over 200 people, including Minister at the Chinese Embassy in South Africa Li Zhigang, South Africa’s Gauteng Member of the Executive Council Jacob Mamabolo, and representatives from business associations and enterprises of both countries.

    In his opening speech, Ren Hongbin, chairman of the CCPIT, said the council has long been committed to promoting economic and trade cooperation between China and South Africa.

    He expressed willingness to work with the South African side to implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of both countries, promote high-quality Belt and Road cooperation, and strengthen bilateral economic and trade cooperation.

    Ren extended a sincere welcome to the South African business community to participate in the third China International Supply Chain Expo to deepen bilateral cooperation in industrial and supply chains.

    Representatives from the South African political and business sectors underscored the huge potential of economic and trade cooperation between the two countries, pledging to actively participate in the upcoming supply chain expo and deepen ties with China in digital infrastructure construction, green economy, inclusive finance, digital technology, and other fields for win-win outcomes.

    The third China International Supply Chain Expo will be held in Beijing from July 16 to 20. As the world’s first national-level exhibition focusing on supply chains, the expo has contributed to building more secure, stable, open, and inclusive global industrial and supply chains.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Thailand

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    February 20, 2025

    Washington, DC: On February 11, The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Thailand and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis.

    Thailand’s economy is gradually recovering, but at a slower pace than peers. Economic activity expanded modestly by 1.9 percent in 2023 and 2.3 percent in the first three quarters of 2024, driven by private consumption growth and a rebound in tourism. Inflation remained subdued, averaging 0.4 percent (y/y) annually in 2024, well below the Bank of Thailand’s target range of 1 to 3 percent. External factors such as the decline in global energy and food prices, lower import prices have played a role, but domestic factors such as energy subsidies, price controls, and the unwinding of pandemic-related fiscal support have also contributed to the lower inflation. The current account balance strengthened to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2023, from -3.5 percent of GDP in 2022, and continues to register a moderate surplus as of November 2024, supported by the continued recovery in tourism and higher exports.

    A gradual cyclical recovery is expected to continue. Real GDP is projected to grow by 2.7 percent in 2024 and to increase to 2.9 percent in 2025. This is underpinned by the expansionary fiscal stance envisaged under the 2025 budget, which includes additional cash transfers of 1.0 percent of GDP and a rebound in public investment. Tourism-related sectors are expected to continue to support growth, as well as private consumption that will be further boosted by the authorities’ cash transfers. As growth continues to firm up, inflation is expected to pick up but remain in the bottom half of the target range in 2025. The current account balance is expected to improve further in 2024 and 2025, driven by the ongoing recovery in tourist arrivals.

    Risks to Thailand’s economic outlook are tilted to the downside. On the external front, an escalation of global trade tensions or deepening geoeconomic fragmentation could disrupt Thailand’s export recovery and dampen FDI inflows, while increased commodity price volatility could affect growth and lead to inflation spikes, and potentially tighter-for-longer global financial conditions. The intensification of regional conflicts could disrupt trade and travel flows while more frequent extreme climate events would adversely impact growth prospects. On the domestic front, the private sector debt overhang could impair financial institutions’ balance sheets and further decrease credit supply, negatively affecting growth. Renewed political uncertainty could hinder policy implementation and undermine confidence.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Thailand, Executive Directors endorsed the staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    Thailand’s economic recovery is ongoing, but it has been relatively slow and uneven. Economic activity expanded modestly in 2024, driven by private consumption and a rebound in tourism-related activities, while delayed budget implementation slowed the pace of public investment. The slow recovery, compared to ASEAN peers, is also rooted in Thailand’s longstanding structural weaknesses, while emerging external and domestic headwinds have also contributed to subdued inflation. The outlook remains highly uncertain with significant downside risks.

    As economic slack narrows, the focus should shift to rebuilding fiscal space. A less expansionary fiscal stance than envisaged under the FY25 budget would still provide impulse to support the recovery while helping to preserve policy space. Alternatively, reallocating part of the planned cash transfers toward productivity-enhancing investments or social protection would enable stronger inclusive growth and help reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Starting in FY26, a revenue-based medium-term fiscal consolidation is needed to bring down public debt and rebuild buffers.

    Thailand’s fiscal framework can be further strengthened. This would require strengthening fiscal rules to better support the debt anchor by introducing a risk-based rules approach. Costs associated with quasi-fiscal operations such as energy price caps should be adequately accounted for, and fiscal risks closely monitored. Improving data provision for government finance statistics and SOEs is important.

    Staff welcomes the BOT’s decision to cut the policy rate in October and recommends a further reduction in the policy rate to support inflation and also translate into improvements in borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity with limited risk of additional leverage amid tight lending. Given remaining high uncertainty in the outlook, the authorities should stand ready to adjust their monetary policy stance in a data and outlook-dependent manner. Central bank independence with clear communication of policy moves is key to maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy in anchoring inflation expectations.

    Effective coordination across policy tools, underpinned by adequate buffers, is essential for managing adverse scenarios. While the flexible exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber, the complementary use of FXI might alleviate policy trade-offs by smoothing destabilizing premia when large non-fundamental shocks render the FX market dysfunctional. Further liberalization of the FX ecosystem and phasing out of remaining capital flow management measures would help deepen the FX market and limit the need for FXI over time.

    A comprehensive package of prudential and legal measures needs to be deployed to facilitate an orderly private deleveraging. Staff welcomes the measures already implemented to address both the existing household debt stock and the buildup of new leverage. However, simultaneous and forceful implementation of personal debt workouts via more effective bankruptcy proceedings is essential to lower the existing household debt stock.

    The external position in 2024 was moderately stronger than warranted by fundamentals and desirable policy settings. Policies aimed at promoting investment, enhancing social safety nets, liberalizing the services sector, and minimizing tax incentives and subsidies that distort competition would facilitate external rebalancing.

    Resolute structural reforms are needed to boost productivity and competitiveness. Reform priorities include facilitating competition and openness, upgrading physical and ICT infrastructure, upskilling/reskilling the labor force, increasing export sophistication by leveraging digitalization, and strengthening governance. Providing an adequate social protection floor to vulnerable households could help enhance their resilience to shocks and address structural drivers of household debt accumulation.

    Table 1. Thailand: Selected Economic Indicators, 2019–30

    Per capita GDP (2023): US$7,338

    Exchange Rate (2023): 34.8 Baht/USD

    Unemployment rate (2023): 1 percent

    Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (2021): 6.3 percent

    Net FDI (2023): US$ -7.16 billion

    Population (2023): 70.18 million

                       

    Actual

    Projections

    2019

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    Real GDP growth (y/y percent change) 1/

    2.1

    -6.1

    1.6

    2.5

    1.9

    2.7

    2.9

    2.6

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    Consumption

    3.4

    -0.3

    1.3

    4.8

    4.6

    4.3

    4.0

    2.9

    2.1

    2.3

    2.6

    2.6

    Gross fixed investment

    2.0

    -4.8

    3.1

    2.3

    1.2

    0.1

    4.1

    2.1

    1.8

    2.3

    2.4

    2.5

    Inflation (y/y percent change)

                           

    Headline CPI (end of period)

    0.9

    -0.3

    2.2

    5.9

    -0.8

    1.2

    1.3

    1.5

    1.5

    1.7

    1.7

    1.8

    Headline CPI (period average)

    0.7

    -0.8

    1.2

    6.1

    1.2

    0.4

    1.0

    1.3

    1.5

    1.6

    1.7

    1.8

    Core CPI (end of period)

    0.5

    0.2

    0.3

    3.2

    0.6

    0.8

    1.3

    1.0

    1.2

    1.4

    1.4

    1.6

    Core CPI (period average)

    0.5

    0.3

    0.2

    2.5

    1.3

    0.6

    1.1

    1.2

    1.1

    1.3

    1.4

    1.5

    Saving and investment (percent of GDP)

                           

    Gross domestic investment

    23.8

    23.8

    28.6

    27.8

    22.5

    20.8

    21.9

    22.2

    22.0

    21.8

    21.8

    21.6

    Private

    16.9

    16.8

    16.9

    17.3

    17.3

    16.7

    16.6

    16.4

    16.3

    16.1

    16.1

    16.0

    Public

    5.7

    6.4

    6.5

    6.1

    5.6

    5.6

    5.9

    5.8

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    Change in stocks

    1.2

    0.5

    5.1

    4.5

    -0.4

    -1.5

    -0.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross national saving

    30.8

    27.9

    26.5

    24.4

    24.0

    22.6

    24.0

    24.5

    24.4

    24.4

    24.5

    24.4

    Private, including statistical discrepancy

    25.8

    26.2

    26.8

    22.6

    21.0

    19.8

    21.8

    21.9

    21.7

    21.7

    21.8

    21.6

    Public

    5.0

    1.8

    -0.3

    1.7

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.5

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.8

    Foreign saving

    -7.0

    -4.2

    2.1

    3.5

    -1.4

    -1.8

    -2.2

    -2.3

    -2.4

    -2.6

    -2.7

    -2.8

    Fiscal accounts (percent of GDP) 2/

                           

    General government balance 3/

    0.4

    -4.5

    -6.7

    -4.5

    -2.0

    -2.2

    -3.6

    -3.2

    -2.9

    -2.8

    -2.8

    -2.8

      SOEs balance

    0.4

    0.6

    -0.3

    -0.6

    -0.7

    -0.1

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    0.0

    Public sector balance 4/

    0.8

    -3.9

    -7.1

    -5.1

    -2.7

    -2.3

    -3.8

    -3.3

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.9

    -2.8

    Public sector debt (end of period) 4/

    41.1

    49.4

    58.3

    60.5

    62.4

    63.3

    64.7

    65.4

    66.0

    66.1

    66.4

    66.4

    Monetary accounts (end of period, y/y percent change)

               

    Broad money growth

    3.6

    10.2

    4.8

    3.9

    1.9

    2.3

    3.7

    3.5

    3.2

    3.8

    3.2

    3.7

    Narrow money growth

    5.7

    14.2

    14.0

    3.1

    4.2

    5.9

    3.2

    4.7

    4.2

    5.1

    4.3

    4.9

    Credit to the private sector (by other depository corporations)

    2.4

    4.5

    4.5

    2.5

    1.5

    0.1

    1.0

    1.6

    1.8

    2.1

    2.3

    2.5

    Balance of payments (billions of U.S. dollars)

                           

    Current account balance

    38.3

    20.9

    -10.7

    -17.2

    7.4

    9.5

    11.9

    13.2

    14.6

    16.5

    18.2

    19.4

    (In percent of GDP)

    7.0

    4.2

    -2.1

    -3.5

    1.4

    1.8

    2.2

    2.3

    2.4

    2.6

    2.7

    2.8

    Exports of goods, f.o.b.

    242.7

    227.0

    270.6

    285.2

    280.7

    293.6

    301.8

    312.5

    327.2

    343.1

    359.0

    375.5

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -3.3

    -6.5

    19.2

    5.4

    -1.5

    4.6

    2.8

    3.6

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.6

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -3.7

    -5.8

    15.4

    1.2

    -2.7

    2.1

    1.9

    2.7

    3.5

    3.6

    3.2

    3.2

    Imports of goods, f.o.b.

    216.0

    186.6

    238.6

    271.6

    261.4

    274.9

    284.6

    295.1

    309.1

    324.1

    339.1

    354.9

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -5.6

    -13.6

    27.9

    13.8

    -3.8

    5.2

    3.5

    3.7

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.7

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -5.8

    -10.4

    18.0

    1.0

    -4.1

    3.7

    3.5

    3.3

    3.4

    3.3

    3.3

    3.3

    Capital and financial account balance 5/

    -24.7

    -2.6

    3.6

    6.9

    -4.9

    -9.5

    -11.9

    -13.2

    -14.6

    -16.5

    -18.2

    -19.4

    Overall balance

    13.6

    18.4

    -7.1

    -10.2

    2.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross official reserves (including net forward position, end of period) (billions of U.S. dollars)

    259.0

    286.5

    279.2

    245.8

    254.6

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    (Months of following year’s imports)

    16.7

    14.4

    12.3

    11.3

    11.1

    11.1

    10.7

    10.2

    9.7

    9.3

    8.9

    8.5

    (Percent of short-term debt) 6/

    338.0

    315.3

    291.2

    236.3

    242.7

    239.6

    231.7

    222.5

    213.7

    206.2

    199.6

    252.3

    (Percent of ARA metric)

    252.5

    278.3

    263.3

    222.3

    233.2

    231.8

    226.4

    219.2

    212.3

    205.4

    199.3

    200.0

    Exchange rate (baht/U.S. dollar)

    31.0

    31.3

    32.0

    35.1

    34.8

    35.3

    NEER appreciation (annual average)

    7.2

    -0.3

    -4.5

    -1.8

    3.9

    REER appreciation (annual average)

    5.8

    -2.6

    -5.7

    -1.1

    1.2

    External debt

                           

    (In percent of GDP)

    31.7

    38.0

    38.9

    40.6

    38.2

    38.4

    38.5

    38.6

    38.7

    38.7

    38.8

    38.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    172.7

    190.1

    196.9

    201.4

    196.5

    202.4

    213.1

    223.8

    233.8

    245.9

    257.0

    270.0

    Public sector 7/

    38.0

    37.2

    41.5

    41.2

    35.8

    38.4

    40.8

    43.3

    45.6

    48.1

    50.8

    53.7

    Private sector

    134.0

    152.9

    155.4

    160.3

    160.7

    164.5

    172.9

    181.1

    188.8

    198.3

    206.8

    217.0

    Medium- and long-term

    74.6

    79.4

    82.3

    82.3

    80.3

    80.7

    86.5

    91.1

    95.3

    101.5

    107.1

    114.0

    Short-term (including portfolio flows)

    59.4

    73.5

    73.1

    78.0

    80.4

    83.8

    86.4

    90.0

    93.5

    96.8

    99.7

    103.0

    Debt service ratio 8/

    7.8

    7.5

    6.3

    7.3

    7.9

    7.8

    7.8

    7.3

    8.3

    9.3

    10.3

    10.3

    Memorandum items:

                           

    Nominal GDP (billions of baht)

    16889.2

    15661.3

    16188.6

    17378.0

    17922.0

    18603.0

    19371.2

    20282.2

    21143.0

    22211.7

    23164.5

    24307.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    544.0

    500.5

    506.3

    495.6

    515.0

    527.1

    553.9

    580.2

    604.8

    635.4

    662.7

    695.4

    Output Gap (in percent of potential output)

    0.2

    -4.2

    -4.1

    -2.0

    -1.5

    -0.7

    0.0

    0.1

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Sources: Thai authorities; CEIC Data Co. Ltd.; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ This series reflects the new GDP data based on the chain volume measure methodology, introduced by the Thai authorities in May 2015.

    2/ On a fiscal year basis. The fiscal year ends on September 30.

    3/ Includes budgetary central government, extrabudgetary funds, and local governments.

    4/ Includes general government and SOEs.

    5/ Includes errors and omissions.

    6/ With remaining maturity of one year or less.

    7/ Excludes debt of state enterprises.

    8/ Percent of exports of goods and services.

                                                             

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-Evening Report: Deepfakes can ruin lives and livelihoods – would owning the ‘rights’ to our own faces and voices help?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Graeme Austin, Chair of Private Law, Te Herenga Waka — Victoria University of Wellington

    Getty Images

    Not that long ago, the term “deepfake” wasn’t in most people’s vocabularies. Now, it is not only commonplace, but is also the focus of intense legal scrutiny around the world.

    Known in legal documents as “digital replicas”, deepfakes are created by artificial intelligence (AI) to simulate the visual and vocal appearance of real people, living or dead.

    Unregulated, they can do a lot of damage, including financial fraud (already a problem in New Zealand), political disinformation, fake news, and the creation and dissemination of AI-generated pornography and child sexual abuse material.

    For professional performers and entertainers, the proliferation and increasing sophistication of deepfake technology could demolish their ability to control and derive income from their images and voices.

    And deepfakes might soon take away jobs: why employ a professional actor when a digital replica will do?

    One possible solution to this involves giving individuals the ability to enforce intellectual property (IP) rights to their own image and voice. The United States is currently debating such a move, and New Zealand lawmakers should be watching closely.

    Owning your own likeness

    Remedies already being discussed in New Zealand include extending prohibitions in the Harmful Digital Communications Act to cover digital replicas that do not depict a victim’s actual body.

    Using (or amending) the Crimes Act, the Fair Trading Act and the Electoral Act would also be helpful.

    At the same time, there will be political pressure to ensure regulation does not stymie investment in AI technologies – a concern raised in a 2024 cabinet paper.

    Legislation introduced to the US Congress last year – the Nurture Originals, Foster Art, and Keep Entertainment Safe Bill – proposes a new federal intellectual property right that individual victims can use against creators and disseminators of deepfakes.

    Known informally as the “No Fakes Bill”, the legislation has bipartisan and industry support, including from leading entertainment worker unions. The US Copyright Office examined the current state of US law and concluded that enforceable rights were “urgently needed”.

    From the New Zealand perspective, the No Fakes Bill contains both helpful ideas and possible pitfalls. As we discuss in a forthcoming paper, its innovations include expanding IP protections to “everyday” individuals – not just celebrities.

    All individuals would have the right to seek damages and injunctions against unlicensed digital replicas, whether they’re in video games, pornographic videos, TikTok posts or remakes of movies and television shows.

    But these protections may prove illusory because the threshold for protection is so high. The digital replica must be “readily identifiable as the voice or visual likeness of an individual”, but it’s not clear how identifiable the individual victim of a deepfake needs to be.

    Well known New Zealand actors such as Anna Paquin and Cliff Curtis would certainly qualify. But would a New Zealand version of the bill protect an everyday person, “readily identifiable” only to family, friends and workmates?

    Can you license a digital replica?

    Under the US bill, the new IP rights can be licensed. The bill does not ban deepfakes altogether, but gives individuals more control over the use of their likenesses. An actor could, for example, license an advertising company to make a digital replica to appear in a television commercial.

    Licences must be in writing and signed, and the permitted uses must be specified. For living individuals, this can last only ten years.

    So far, so good. But New Zealand policy analysts should look carefully at the scope of any licensing provisions. The proposed IP right is “licensable in whole or in part”. Depending on courts’ interpretation of “in whole”, individuals could unknowingly sign away all uses of their images and voice.

    The No Fakes Bill is also silent on the reputational interests of individuals who license others to use their digital replicas.

    Suppose a performing artist licensed their digital replica for use in AI-generated musical performances. They should not, for example, have to put up with being depicted singing a white supremacist anthem, or other unsanctioned uses that would impugn their dignity and standing.

    Protectng parody and satire

    On the other side of the ledger, the No Fakes Bill contains freedom of expression safeguards for good faith commentary, criticism, scholarship, satire and parody.

    The bill also protects internet service providers (ISPs) from liability if they quickly remove “all instances” of infringing material once notified about it.

    This is useful language that might be adopted in any New Zealand legislation. Also, the parody and satire defence would be an advance on New Zealand’s copyright law, which currently contains no equivalent exception.

    But the US bill contains no measures empowering victims to require ISPs to block local subscribers’ access to online locations that peddle in deepfakes. Known as “site-blocking orders”, these injunctions are available in at least 50 countries, including Australia. But New Zealand and the US remain holdouts.

    For individual victims of deepfakes circulating on foreign websites that are accessible in New Zealand, site-blocking orders could offer the only practical relief.

    The No Fakes Bill is by no means a perfect or comprehensive solution to the deepfakes problem. Many different weapons will be needed in the legal and policy armoury – including obligations to disclose when digital replicas are used.

    Even so, creating an IP right could be a useful addition to a suite of measures aimed at reducing the economic, reputational and emotional harms deepfakes can inflict.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Deepfakes can ruin lives and livelihoods – would owning the ‘rights’ to our own faces and voices help? – https://theconversation.com/deepfakes-can-ruin-lives-and-livelihoods-would-owning-the-rights-to-our-own-faces-and-voices-help-249929

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Agriculture export growth narrows goods trade deficit – Stats NZ media and information release: Overseas merchandise trade: January 2025

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Agriculture export growth narrows goods trade deficit 21 February 2025 – The trade balance for the January 2025 month was a deficit of $486 million, according to figures released by Stats NZ today.

    In the January 2024 month, the deficit was $1.1 billion.

    Total exports were valued at $6.2 billion in January 2025, an increase of $1.4 billion when compared with January 2024. Imports were valued at $6.7 billion, an increase of $787 million over the same period.

    The narrowing of the deficit in January 2025, compared with the same month last year, was driven by agricultural commodity exports.

    Files:

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Carbon capture one step closer

    Source: New Zealand Government

    The Government has made key decisions on a Carbon Capture, Utilisation, and Storage (CCUS) framework to enable businesses to benefit from storing carbon underground will support New Zealand’s businesses to continue operating while reducing net carbon emissions, Energy and Climate Change Minister Simon Watts says.
    “Economic growth is a key focus for this Government, and we want the energy sector to be the engine for our economy – driving electrification and unlocking economic growth,” Mr Watts says.
    “The Government is committed to removing regulatory barriers to enable the supply of abundant, affordable energy to power our homes and businesses – and to reduce net carbon emissions.”
    The Government has made decisions on the key elements of a CCUS framework, designed to enable carbon capture and storage in New Zealand, with legislation expected to be introduced this year.
    “Under our CCUS framework, businesses that capture and store CO2   will be rewarded through the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), our Government’s key tool to reducing net emissions. This will help reduce emissions obligations for New Zealand businesses as we progress towards a low-emissions economy,” Mr Watts says.
    “By making these decisions, we are aligning New Zealand with other countries that are successfully utilising CCUS to drive economic growth and attract investment. Our framework not only supports innovation but also provides a pathway for businesses to remain competitive while reducing net emissions.
    “Ensuring safe and effective storage of CO2 is critically important. That’s why our framework will require any CCUS project to undertake a thorough assessment of storage site suitability and proposed operations, followed by ongoing monitoring.
    “CCUS is gaining momentum internationally as a way to reduce net emissions and support economic growth. In New Zealand, this innovative approach has significant untapped potential of capturing CO2 emissions that would not otherwise benefit Kiwis to create valuable products and materials.
    “Our Government’s second emissions reduction plan, which was released at the end of last year, highlighted carbon capture and storage as a key tool to meeting the second and third emissions budgets.”

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Submissions: Agriculture export growth narrows goods trade deficit – Stats NZ media and information release: Overseas merchandise trade: January 2025

    Source: Statistics New Zealand

    Agriculture export growth narrows goods trade deficit21 February 2025 – The trade balance for the January 2025 month was a deficit of $486 million, according to figures released by Stats NZ today.

    In the January 2024 month, the deficit was $1.1 billion.

    Total exports were valued at $6.2 billion in January 2025, an increase of $1.4 billion when compared with January 2024. Imports were valued at $6.7 billion, an increase of $787 million over the same period.

    The narrowing of the deficit in January 2025, compared with the same month last year, was driven by agricultural commodity exports.

    Files:

    MIL OSI

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Concludes 2024 Article IV Consultation with Thailand

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    February 20, 2025

    Washington, DC: On February 11, The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) concluded the Article IV consultation[1] with Thailand and endorsed the staff appraisal without a meeting on a lapse-of-time basis.

    Thailand’s economy is gradually recovering, but at a slower pace than peers. Economic activity expanded modestly by 1.9 percent in 2023 and 2.3 percent in the first three quarters of 2024, driven by private consumption growth and a rebound in tourism. Inflation remained subdued, averaging 0.4 percent (y/y) annually in 2024, well below the Bank of Thailand’s target range of 1 to 3 percent. External factors such as the decline in global energy and food prices, lower import prices have played a role, but domestic factors such as energy subsidies, price controls, and the unwinding of pandemic-related fiscal support have also contributed to the lower inflation. The current account balance strengthened to 1.4 percent of GDP in 2023, from -3.5 percent of GDP in 2022, and continues to register a moderate surplus as of November 2024, supported by the continued recovery in tourism and higher exports.

    A gradual cyclical recovery is expected to continue. Real GDP is projected to grow by 2.7 percent in 2024 and to increase to 2.9 percent in 2025. This is underpinned by the expansionary fiscal stance envisaged under the 2025 budget, which includes additional cash transfers of 1.0 percent of GDP and a rebound in public investment. Tourism-related sectors are expected to continue to support growth, as well as private consumption that will be further boosted by the authorities’ cash transfers. As growth continues to firm up, inflation is expected to pick up but remain in the bottom half of the target range in 2025. The current account balance is expected to improve further in 2024 and 2025, driven by the ongoing recovery in tourist arrivals.

    Risks to Thailand’s economic outlook are tilted to the downside. On the external front, an escalation of global trade tensions or deepening geoeconomic fragmentation could disrupt Thailand’s export recovery and dampen FDI inflows, while increased commodity price volatility could affect growth and lead to inflation spikes, and potentially tighter-for-longer global financial conditions. The intensification of regional conflicts could disrupt trade and travel flows while more frequent extreme climate events would adversely impact growth prospects. On the domestic front, the private sector debt overhang could impair financial institutions’ balance sheets and further decrease credit supply, negatively affecting growth. Renewed political uncertainty could hinder policy implementation and undermine confidence.

    Executive Board Assessment[2]

    In concluding the 2024 Article IV consultation with Thailand, Executive Directors endorsed the staff’s appraisal, as follows:

    Thailand’s economic recovery is ongoing, but it has been relatively slow and uneven. Economic activity expanded modestly in 2024, driven by private consumption and a rebound in tourism-related activities, while delayed budget implementation slowed the pace of public investment. The slow recovery, compared to ASEAN peers, is also rooted in Thailand’s longstanding structural weaknesses, while emerging external and domestic headwinds have also contributed to subdued inflation. The outlook remains highly uncertain with significant downside risks.

    As economic slack narrows, the focus should shift to rebuilding fiscal space. A less expansionary fiscal stance than envisaged under the FY25 budget would still provide impulse to support the recovery while helping to preserve policy space. Alternatively, reallocating part of the planned cash transfers toward productivity-enhancing investments or social protection would enable stronger inclusive growth and help reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio. Starting in FY26, a revenue-based medium-term fiscal consolidation is needed to bring down public debt and rebuild buffers.

    Thailand’s fiscal framework can be further strengthened. This would require strengthening fiscal rules to better support the debt anchor by introducing a risk-based rules approach. Costs associated with quasi-fiscal operations such as energy price caps should be adequately accounted for, and fiscal risks closely monitored. Improving data provision for government finance statistics and SOEs is important.

    Staff welcomes the BOT’s decision to cut the policy rate in October and recommends a further reduction in the policy rate to support inflation and also translate into improvements in borrowers’ debt-servicing capacity with limited risk of additional leverage amid tight lending. Given remaining high uncertainty in the outlook, the authorities should stand ready to adjust their monetary policy stance in a data and outlook-dependent manner. Central bank independence with clear communication of policy moves is key to maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of monetary policy in anchoring inflation expectations.

    Effective coordination across policy tools, underpinned by adequate buffers, is essential for managing adverse scenarios. While the flexible exchange rate should continue to act as a shock absorber, the complementary use of FXI might alleviate policy trade-offs by smoothing destabilizing premia when large non-fundamental shocks render the FX market dysfunctional. Further liberalization of the FX ecosystem and phasing out of remaining capital flow management measures would help deepen the FX market and limit the need for FXI over time.

    A comprehensive package of prudential and legal measures needs to be deployed to facilitate an orderly private deleveraging. Staff welcomes the measures already implemented to address both the existing household debt stock and the buildup of new leverage. However, simultaneous and forceful implementation of personal debt workouts via more effective bankruptcy proceedings is essential to lower the existing household debt stock.

    The external position in 2024 was moderately stronger than warranted by fundamentals and desirable policy settings. Policies aimed at promoting investment, enhancing social safety nets, liberalizing the services sector, and minimizing tax incentives and subsidies that distort competition would facilitate external rebalancing.

    Resolute structural reforms are needed to boost productivity and competitiveness. Reform priorities include facilitating competition and openness, upgrading physical and ICT infrastructure, upskilling/reskilling the labor force, increasing export sophistication by leveraging digitalization, and strengthening governance. Providing an adequate social protection floor to vulnerable households could help enhance their resilience to shocks and address structural drivers of household debt accumulation.

    Table 1. Thailand: Selected Economic Indicators, 2019–30

    Per capita GDP (2023): US$7,338

    Exchange Rate (2023): 34.8 Baht/USD

    Unemployment rate (2023): 1 percent

    Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line (2021): 6.3 percent

    Net FDI (2023): US$ -7.16 billion

    Population (2023): 70.18 million

                       

    Actual

    Projections

    2019

    2020

    2021

    2022

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    2027

    2028

    2029

    2030

    Real GDP growth (y/y percent change) 1/

    2.1

    -6.1

    1.6

    2.5

    1.9

    2.7

    2.9

    2.6

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    Consumption

    3.4

    -0.3

    1.3

    4.8

    4.6

    4.3

    4.0

    2.9

    2.1

    2.3

    2.6

    2.6

    Gross fixed investment

    2.0

    -4.8

    3.1

    2.3

    1.2

    0.1

    4.1

    2.1

    1.8

    2.3

    2.4

    2.5

    Inflation (y/y percent change)

                           

    Headline CPI (end of period)

    0.9

    -0.3

    2.2

    5.9

    -0.8

    1.2

    1.3

    1.5

    1.5

    1.7

    1.7

    1.8

    Headline CPI (period average)

    0.7

    -0.8

    1.2

    6.1

    1.2

    0.4

    1.0

    1.3

    1.5

    1.6

    1.7

    1.8

    Core CPI (end of period)

    0.5

    0.2

    0.3

    3.2

    0.6

    0.8

    1.3

    1.0

    1.2

    1.4

    1.4

    1.6

    Core CPI (period average)

    0.5

    0.3

    0.2

    2.5

    1.3

    0.6

    1.1

    1.2

    1.1

    1.3

    1.4

    1.5

    Saving and investment (percent of GDP)

                           

    Gross domestic investment

    23.8

    23.8

    28.6

    27.8

    22.5

    20.8

    21.9

    22.2

    22.0

    21.8

    21.8

    21.6

    Private

    16.9

    16.8

    16.9

    17.3

    17.3

    16.7

    16.6

    16.4

    16.3

    16.1

    16.1

    16.0

    Public

    5.7

    6.4

    6.5

    6.1

    5.6

    5.6

    5.9

    5.8

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    5.7

    Change in stocks

    1.2

    0.5

    5.1

    4.5

    -0.4

    -1.5

    -0.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross national saving

    30.8

    27.9

    26.5

    24.4

    24.0

    22.6

    24.0

    24.5

    24.4

    24.4

    24.5

    24.4

    Private, including statistical discrepancy

    25.8

    26.2

    26.8

    22.6

    21.0

    19.8

    21.8

    21.9

    21.7

    21.7

    21.8

    21.6

    Public

    5.0

    1.8

    -0.3

    1.7

    3.0

    2.8

    2.2

    2.5

    2.7

    2.7

    2.7

    2.8

    Foreign saving

    -7.0

    -4.2

    2.1

    3.5

    -1.4

    -1.8

    -2.2

    -2.3

    -2.4

    -2.6

    -2.7

    -2.8

    Fiscal accounts (percent of GDP) 2/

                           

    General government balance 3/

    0.4

    -4.5

    -6.7

    -4.5

    -2.0

    -2.2

    -3.6

    -3.2

    -2.9

    -2.8

    -2.8

    -2.8

      SOEs balance

    0.4

    0.6

    -0.3

    -0.6

    -0.7

    -0.1

    -0.2

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    -0.1

    0.0

    Public sector balance 4/

    0.8

    -3.9

    -7.1

    -5.1

    -2.7

    -2.3

    -3.8

    -3.3

    -3.0

    -2.9

    -2.9

    -2.8

    Public sector debt (end of period) 4/

    41.1

    49.4

    58.3

    60.5

    62.4

    63.3

    64.7

    65.4

    66.0

    66.1

    66.4

    66.4

    Monetary accounts (end of period, y/y percent change)

               

    Broad money growth

    3.6

    10.2

    4.8

    3.9

    1.9

    2.3

    3.7

    3.5

    3.2

    3.8

    3.2

    3.7

    Narrow money growth

    5.7

    14.2

    14.0

    3.1

    4.2

    5.9

    3.2

    4.7

    4.2

    5.1

    4.3

    4.9

    Credit to the private sector (by other depository corporations)

    2.4

    4.5

    4.5

    2.5

    1.5

    0.1

    1.0

    1.6

    1.8

    2.1

    2.3

    2.5

    Balance of payments (billions of U.S. dollars)

                           

    Current account balance

    38.3

    20.9

    -10.7

    -17.2

    7.4

    9.5

    11.9

    13.2

    14.6

    16.5

    18.2

    19.4

    (In percent of GDP)

    7.0

    4.2

    -2.1

    -3.5

    1.4

    1.8

    2.2

    2.3

    2.4

    2.6

    2.7

    2.8

    Exports of goods, f.o.b.

    242.7

    227.0

    270.6

    285.2

    280.7

    293.6

    301.8

    312.5

    327.2

    343.1

    359.0

    375.5

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -3.3

    -6.5

    19.2

    5.4

    -1.5

    4.6

    2.8

    3.6

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.6

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -3.7

    -5.8

    15.4

    1.2

    -2.7

    2.1

    1.9

    2.7

    3.5

    3.6

    3.2

    3.2

    Imports of goods, f.o.b.

    216.0

    186.6

    238.6

    271.6

    261.4

    274.9

    284.6

    295.1

    309.1

    324.1

    339.1

    354.9

    Growth rate (dollar terms)

    -5.6

    -13.6

    27.9

    13.8

    -3.8

    5.2

    3.5

    3.7

    4.7

    4.9

    4.6

    4.7

            Growth rate (volume terms)

    -5.8

    -10.4

    18.0

    1.0

    -4.1

    3.7

    3.5

    3.3

    3.4

    3.3

    3.3

    3.3

    Capital and financial account balance 5/

    -24.7

    -2.6

    3.6

    6.9

    -4.9

    -9.5

    -11.9

    -13.2

    -14.6

    -16.5

    -18.2

    -19.4

    Overall balance

    13.6

    18.4

    -7.1

    -10.2

    2.6

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Gross official reserves (including net forward position, end of period) (billions of U.S. dollars)

    259.0

    286.5

    279.2

    245.8

    254.6

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    262.5

    (Months of following year’s imports)

    16.7

    14.4

    12.3

    11.3

    11.1

    11.1

    10.7

    10.2

    9.7

    9.3

    8.9

    8.5

    (Percent of short-term debt) 6/

    338.0

    315.3

    291.2

    236.3

    242.7

    239.6

    231.7

    222.5

    213.7

    206.2

    199.6

    252.3

    (Percent of ARA metric)

    252.5

    278.3

    263.3

    222.3

    233.2

    231.8

    226.4

    219.2

    212.3

    205.4

    199.3

    200.0

    Exchange rate (baht/U.S. dollar)

    31.0

    31.3

    32.0

    35.1

    34.8

    35.3

    NEER appreciation (annual average)

    7.2

    -0.3

    -4.5

    -1.8

    3.9

    REER appreciation (annual average)

    5.8

    -2.6

    -5.7

    -1.1

    1.2

    External debt

                           

    (In percent of GDP)

    31.7

    38.0

    38.9

    40.6

    38.2

    38.4

    38.5

    38.6

    38.7

    38.7

    38.8

    38.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    172.7

    190.1

    196.9

    201.4

    196.5

    202.4

    213.1

    223.8

    233.8

    245.9

    257.0

    270.0

    Public sector 7/

    38.0

    37.2

    41.5

    41.2

    35.8

    38.4

    40.8

    43.3

    45.6

    48.1

    50.8

    53.7

    Private sector

    134.0

    152.9

    155.4

    160.3

    160.7

    164.5

    172.9

    181.1

    188.8

    198.3

    206.8

    217.0

    Medium- and long-term

    74.6

    79.4

    82.3

    82.3

    80.3

    80.7

    86.5

    91.1

    95.3

    101.5

    107.1

    114.0

    Short-term (including portfolio flows)

    59.4

    73.5

    73.1

    78.0

    80.4

    83.8

    86.4

    90.0

    93.5

    96.8

    99.7

    103.0

    Debt service ratio 8/

    7.8

    7.5

    6.3

    7.3

    7.9

    7.8

    7.8

    7.3

    8.3

    9.3

    10.3

    10.3

    Memorandum items:

                           

    Nominal GDP (billions of baht)

    16889.2

    15661.3

    16188.6

    17378.0

    17922.0

    18603.0

    19371.2

    20282.2

    21143.0

    22211.7

    23164.5

    24307.8

    (In billions of U.S. dollars)

    544.0

    500.5

    506.3

    495.6

    515.0

    527.1

    553.9

    580.2

    604.8

    635.4

    662.7

    695.4

    Output Gap (in percent of potential output)

    0.2

    -4.2

    -4.1

    -2.0

    -1.5

    -0.7

    0.0

    0.1

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    0.0

    Sources: Thai authorities; CEIC Data Co. Ltd.; and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    1/ This series reflects the new GDP data based on the chain volume measure methodology, introduced by the Thai authorities in May 2015.

    2/ On a fiscal year basis. The fiscal year ends on September 30.

    3/ Includes budgetary central government, extrabudgetary funds, and local governments.

    4/ Includes general government and SOEs.

    5/ Includes errors and omissions.

    6/ With remaining maturity of one year or less.

    7/ Excludes debt of state enterprises.

    8/ Percent of exports of goods and services.

                                                             

    [1] Under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, the IMF holds bilateral discussions with members, usually every year. A staff team visits the country, collects economic and financial information, and discusses with officials the country’s economic developments and policies. On return to headquarters, the staff prepares a report, which forms the basis for discussion by the Executive Board.

    [2] The Executive Board takes decisions under its lapse-of-time procedure when the Board agrees that a proposal can be considered without convening formal discussions.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Pavis Devahasadin

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/02/20/pr25040-thailand-imf-executive-board-concludes-2024-article-iv-consultation-with-thailand

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