Category: Trade

  • MIL-OSI Video: High-level visit from Iceland

    Source: World Trade Organization – WTO (video statements)

    Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala met with the President of Iceland, Halla Tómasdóttir, on 1 July at the WTO. They discussed the current uncertainty faced by global trade and the world economy and emphasized the importance of collective efforts to tackle global challenges. Both leaders reiterated the importance of the multilateral trading system and the need for reform and repositioning of the WTO.

    Download this video from the WTO website:
    https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/webcas_e/webcas_e.htm

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=37JPkDDMUtQ

    MIL OSI Video

  • MIL-OSI Russia: SPbPU defended a thesis on digital marketing of agribusiness in a Russian-Indonesian project

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University – Peter the Great St Petersburg Polytechnic University –

    The Higher School of Service and Trade (HSST) of the Institute of Industrial Management, Economics and Trade of SPbPU successfully defended the final qualification works of bachelors. The event became a key stage in the implementation of a large-scale joint research grant with the partner Indonesian University of Gunadarma.

    Students of the Higher School of Social Sciences of the Institute of Mathematics, Economics and Telecommunications of St. Petersburg Polytechnic University Anastasia Pakhaturidi and Yulia Mavlyutova presented the results of their research carried out within the framework of the project “Cross-cultural research and promotion of smart agribusiness of growing marigolds based on digital marketing (a joint project of Indonesia and Russia)”. Both defenses were rated excellent.

    The aim of the project is to study the potential of smart agribusiness and digital marketing in the flower industry, specifically focusing on marigolds, which have high economic importance for the cosmetic, pharmaceutical and food industries. The project is unique in its cross-cultural approach, synchronizing the agribusiness models of Russia (temperate climate, EAEU) and Indonesia (tropical climate, ASEAN) through the prism of digitalization.

    Anastasia Pakhaturidi (supervisor — PhD in Economics, Associate Professor Nelli Kozlova) and Yulia Mavlyutova (supervisor — Doctor of Economics, Professor Svetlana Bozhuk) developed a strategy for promoting the project in the Indonesian and ASEAN markets using digital marketing tools. Optimal promotion channels for the B2B and B2C segments were identified, their specifics were described, and recommendations on content were given. An in-depth analysis of the Russian flower market and marketing tools for promoting marigolds was also conducted, including the development of a brand concept and a content plan for the VKontakte social network.

    Working on the GUT Marigold project was not easy, but it left only pleasant impressions! The most interesting thing for me was studying consumers, since even at the initial stage it became clear how much the buyer in Asia differs from the Russian one I am used to. This expanded my worldview and gave me knowledge that I hope to apply in my profession in the future. I am grateful to my scientific supervisor Nelli Anatolyevna Kozlova for the opportunity, competent and qualified guidance and support, – shared Anastasia Pakhaturidi.

    The research project will continue next year.

    Yulia Mavlyutova noted: It was interesting to work on a part of a real project and feel my contribution to the common cause. Most of all I liked creating the concept of a new flower brand and making a content plan. I am very glad that I had the opportunity to work with Svetlana Bozhuk. She very competently guided me along the way and also gave very good advice.

    This initiative not only has high scientific and practical value in the field of digital marketing and smart agriculture, but also strengthens the position of St. Petersburg as a center of innovation and international cooperation. The project opens up new opportunities for St. Petersburg enterprises in the agricultural sector and promotes the development of international programs in the field of agrobiotechnology and digital marketing in the city’s scientific and educational institutions, fully consistent with its strategic development goals until 2035.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Investors will be able to purchase a historic building in the Donskoy district from the city

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    They put it up for sale cultural heritage site, built at the beginning of the last century. This was reported Ekaterina Solovieva, Minister of the Moscow Government, Head of the Moscow Department of City Property.

    The building is located at the address: Kanatchikovskiy proezd, building 7. The future owner of the property will have to rent a plot of land of about one thousand square meters on which the property is located.

    “Entrepreneurs will be able to purchase from the city a historic non-residential building built in the early 20th century in the Donskoy District. The cultural heritage site of regional significance, the “Residential Building”, is part of the ensemble of buildings and structures of the Kanatchikovo station (1903-1908, architects A.N. Pomerantsev and P.I. Rashevsky, engineers S.D. Kareisha, A.D. Proskuryakov, P.Ya. Kamenev). The area of the two-story house is almost 340 square meters. The winner of the auction will have to carry out restoration work and adapt it for modern use, which will allow the historical site to be preserved in the future,” said Ekaterina Solovyova.

    The Kanatchikovo station was built in the 1910s for the Moscow Ring Railway. The building was made in the Art Nouveau style. The object received its name in honor of a large estate owned by the merchant Kozma Kanatchikov.

    Today, the architectural monument may be of interest to investors who are considering the Southern Administrative District as a place for business development. The building is located three minutes’ drive from the Third Transport Ring, next to Gagarin Square.

    All information about the real estate objects put up for auction is presented on the capital’s investment portal. You can learn more about them, study the lot documentation and the rules for holding auctions in the section “Moscow Trades”.

    “The capital regularly puts real estate up for auction – from small premises for coffee shops to historic mansions. Purchasing objects from the city is convenient and transparent, and most importantly, all the main stages are held online. Applications for participation in the auction for the sale of a historic building in the Donskoy district will be accepted until July 24, and the auction will take place on August 5,” added the head of the capital’s Department of Competition Policy

    Kirill Purtov.

    The development of electronic services for entrepreneurs is being implemented within the framework of the national project “Data Economy”.

    Get the latest news quickly official telegram channel city of Moscow.

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    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/156206073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The takeaway from the Venice Biennale saga: the art world faces deep and troubling structural inequality

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Grace McQuilten, Professor of Art and Associate Dean, Research and Innovation, School of Art, RMIT University

    Creative Australia’s decision earlier this year to rescind the selection of artist Khaled Sabsabi and curator Michael Dagostino as Australia’s 2026 representatives at the Venice Biennale sent shockwaves through the arts sector.

    For many artists and arts workers, it reinforced concerns around participation and access for those from culturally and racially diverse backgrounds.

    This week’s reinstatement of the artistic team offers some comfort. However, the entire incident has reinforced that, while diversity in the arts is celebrated, inclusion at the highest level can’t be taken for granted.

    Some worrying stats

    Our 2024 survey of more than 900 visual and craft artists, and visual arts workers (who we define as workers who support the visual arts sector), revealed several concerning findings in relation to opportunity and inclusion for culturally and racially diverse creatives.

    The first key finding was more than 67% of artists and 78% of arts workers felt there were cultural and/or access-related barriers to them participating in the sector.

    The second was culturally diverse workers in the sector tended to identify as “early career” rather than “established”. This points to challenges for career progression and, in turn, to systemic and structural barriers to career development.

    Of all the people we surveyed, 17% of visual artists and 20% of visual arts workers reported being of a culturally diverse background. Of these, only 15% of artists and 14% of arts workers reported being at an “established” career stage.

    By contrast, among the general population of artists (including those without a diverse background), 30% of the artists reported being “established” in their careers, along with 26% of arts workers.

    Art shouldn’t be at the behest of politics

    Issues around political censorship and cultural bias in the sector were not a focus of our survey, which was conducted nine months after the war in Gaza began, and before Creative Australia’s selection (and swift cancellation) of the 2026 Venice Biennale team.

    Nonetheless, respondents were concerned their political views, and/or their cultural or racial background, could impact their likelihood of advancing a career in the sector.

    Some respondents explained if they were no longer working as an artist or arts worker in five years’ time, it would most likely be due to “systemic discrimination” and “increasing censorship prevalent in this industry”.

    According to an independent review into the Sabsabi decision (and its reversal):

    While no formal assessment was undertaken, it is clear that there was a general awareness within Creative Australia, among those with knowledge of the selected Artistic Team, that the decision had the potential to be controversial. The Panel heard that, at the time, the decision was described as ‘bold’ or ‘courageous’. The source of potential controversy was seen to lie in the fact of selecting any artist with heritage connected to the Middle East at a time when conflict in that region was so emotive and polarising, rather than because of the proposed nature of the work to be undertaken at the 2026 Venice Biennale.

    Entrenched harmful biases

    Sadly, the negative response from politicians to the initial selection of Khaled Sabsabi and Michael Dagostino gave credibility to our respondents’ concerns.

    One participant told us “being called Ahmed* is a bit of a disadvantage given the international situation”.

    Another said “only certain cultures and political plights are given support”.

    Financial security is also potentially at risk. As one respondent explained, the main barrier to their personal financial security were political values. “My work is at risk when governments change,” they said.

    Artists and arts workers from culturally and racially diverse backgrounds also reported more significant impacts from the cost-of-living crisis, along with poorer mental health and work-life balance.

    Importantly, our findings don’t stand in isolation. Similar issues have been identified by Diversity Arts Australia, who in 2022 reported on the significant negative impacts of the pandemic on First Nations artists and artists of colour.

    Also, in 2021, Creative Australia reported on problems around inclusion and access for culturally diverse communities in the arts and cultural sector.

    What might progress look like?

    Our research involved making a number of policy recommendations to tackle these issues.

    For one thing, there is a clear need for organisational change. On this front, arts organisations and employers should invest in cultural competency training for all staff and board members. They should also prioritise professional development and career growth for culturally and racially diverse staff.

    To drive meaningful change, funding incentives should be introduced to support diverse leadership. This should include higher pay for culturally and/or racially diverse leaders whose backgrounds lead them to having added responsibility in the workplace.

    The sector also needs greater transparency around cultural and racial representation in staffing and leadership roles, including board roles. This will promote accountability and help drive cultural change.

    Finally, success for artists from culturally and linguistically diverse backgrounds requires the Australian art world to engage with multiple world views – and understand not all art will be immediately accessible to all audiences.

    The controversy surrounding Creative Australia’s biennale backflip offers an opportunity for the visual arts sector to reckon with deep and troubling issues of structural inequity, along with broader questions of free expression – especially in a fraught political climate.

    These issues are wider than the art world. But what better place to start?


    *Name changed to protect identity.

    Grace McQuilten received funding from the Australian Research Council’s Linkage Projects funding scheme (project LP200100054). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian government or Australian Research Council.

    Kate MacNeill received funding from the Australian Research Council’s Linkage Projects funding scheme (project LP200100054). The views expressed herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Australian government or Australian Research Council.

    ref. The takeaway from the Venice Biennale saga: the art world faces deep and troubling structural inequality – https://theconversation.com/the-takeaway-from-the-venice-biennale-saga-the-art-world-faces-deep-and-troubling-structural-inequality-260316

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Vegetables, fruits and stretchers: how a farmer from Lipetsk region helps SVO fighters

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    A farmer from the Lipetsk region regularly delivers vegetables and fruits to special military operation (SVO) fighters, and also responds to requests for help from residents of border areas.

    Vladimir lives with his family in the village of Putyatino. For over 16 years, he has been engaged in agriculture and brings vegetables and fruits to Moscow for sale. His faithful assistants on the farm are his wife and sister. Vladimir’s stall at the weekend fair in the Eastern Administrative District is a real kaleidoscope of gifts of nature: apples, potatoes, carrots, beets, onions and seasonal berries. He also sends all these products to soldiers and residents of border areas.

    Organizational issues of sending food products are usually handled by his friend from his native village, it is from her that Vladimir learns what and when needs to be transferred. But there are other cases: when help is needed urgently, people turn to him for assistance directly.

    “One day, my fellow countrymen called me because I was at a fair in Moscow at the time: I urgently needed to buy and deliver a stretcher to the border region. Without leaving my work at the counter, I managed to team up with acquaintances and friends, find transport, and by midnight the stretcher was there,” Vladimir said.

    At such moments, he admits, you especially clearly understand how important any help is, even if it seems insignificant.

    “For me, as a farmer and citizen, it is important not just to pass on something, but to really help, even if it costs me nothing. The most important support is that which allows you to maintain strength, health and fighting spirit. And it is not only food, sometimes it is enough for a soldier to just know that there are people ready to help,” Vladimir shared.

    Products are brought to Moscow fairs from more than 40 Russian regions. According to Sergei Sobyanin, since the beginning of 2025, weekend fairs have already been visited two million Human.

    Each supplier guarantees the quality and freshness of its products, and specialists State Veterinary Service of Moscow check it before sending it to the shelves. The fair pavilions are provided with all the necessary trade and refrigeration equipment. They are located near metro stations and other crowded places.

    More information about the activities of the capital Department of Trade and Services can be found inofficial telegram channel departments.

    Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

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    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/156171073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Three commercial premises in Babushkinsky district put up for city auction

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: Moscow Government – Government of Moscow –

    Entrepreneurs can purchase three premises for business in the Babushkinsky District from the city. The purpose of all the objects is free, the head of the capital’s Department of Competition Policy reported Kirill Purtov.

    “Commercial premises on the ground floors and in the basements of residential buildings in areas with already established development are the undisputed leaders in their category at city auctions. The infrastructure has already been formed here and there is a stable demand for everyday goods and services. Three options for such premises are presented in the Babushkinsky District. Their area varies from 106.7 to 579.2 square meters. The acceptance of applications for participation in the auction will end from July 4 to 10,” said Kirill Purtov.

    The premises are located in residential buildings on the streets Lensky (house 8, first floor), Verkhoyanskaya (house 10, first floor) andPilot Babushkin (house 11/2, building 1, basement). The first premises have electricity, water supply and sewerage, the other two also have gas supply. All objects have a separate entrance from the street. The winners of the bidding will be able to open almost any type of business in them.

    Open auctions will be held from July 15 to 22 on the Roseltorg electronic platform. Registration and an enhanced qualified electronic signature are required to participate.

    The capital puts various properties up for auction. The showcase for them is investment portal Moscow. In the section “Moscow Trades” Information about the lots is published, including photographs, documentation, conditions and form of implementation.

    Development of electronic services for business corresponds to the objectives of the national project “Data Economy and Digital Transformation of the State” and the regional project of the city of Moscow “Digital Public Administration”.

    Get the latest news quicklyofficial telegram channel the city of Moscow.

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    https: //vv.mos.ru/nevs/ite/156192073/

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Sudan: Sharp rise in attacks on healthcare after two years of conflict with 1,000 people killed this year – Save the Children

    Source: Save the Children

    PORT SUDAN , 03 July 2025 – Nearly 1,000 people have been killed so far this year in Sudan while seeking health care or visiting loved ones in hospital, with attacks on hospitals nearly tripling after two years of conflict [1] and exacerbating a cholera outbreak, Save the Children said.
    Save the Children analysis of attacks on healthcare as reported by the World Health Organization found that at least 933 people, including children, were killed in over 38 incidents in the first six months of 2025. This is nearly 60 times the number of deaths reported over the same period a year ago [2].
    Over 148 people were injured in healthcare attacks in the first half of 2025, which is nearly triple the number of people injured over the same period last year.
    The deadly attacks targeted clinics, health facilities, major hospitals, ambulances, and medical convoys while looting of warehouses housing drugs and medical supplies has put more people at risk in a country where half the population – 30.4 million people – are in need of humanitarian aid.
    Save the Children said the number of attacks on healthcare has been high since conflict broke out in April 2023 but the spike in casualty numbers this year was alarming, with nearly four times more people killed than in 2023 and 2024 combined.
    The latest attack on healthcare took place last week at Al-Mujlad Hospital in West Kordofan state and left over 40 people dead, including six children and five health workers, the WHO’s office in Sudan said. Dozens were also injured in the attack.
    In January this year, at least one girl and three boys were reportedly killed and three boys injured in an attack on the Saudi Hospital in El Fasher, in Sudan’s North Darfur. The children were among patients receiving care in the hospital’s emergency ward, being treated for injuries resulting from previous bombings in the area.
    The attacks on healthcare facilities and workers have increased as the country is reeling from a spiralling cholera outbreak, with 80,000 confirmed cases including more than 1,000 children under five and more than 2,000 deaths nationwide since the outbreak was declared two months ago [3].
    On top of direct attacks on hospitals, looting of medical supplies is further compounding the suffering for millions in Sudan. This has included the theft of ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF) – a crucial treatment for children suffering from severe acute malnutrition – from UNICEF’s supplies at Al Bashair Hospital in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, in March and Save the Children facilities.
    Save the Children is urgently working to increase life-saving supplies, especially ready-to-use therapeutic food (RUTF), a micronutrient-rich paste used to treat severe acute malnutrition (SAM) in children-especially into Darfur. But RUTF stocks are already dangerously low, and Sudan is among the countries projected to face critical global supply chain gaps in the coming months due to aid cuts.
    “Healthcare workers should never have to worry about their safety while providing health services and patients should never have to look over their shoulders while seeking care in hospitals.
    “The number of people killed and injured in direct attacks on healthcare this year is alarmingly too high and yet the biggest danger posed by these attacks is families and children opting not to seek services from hospitals when in need and turning to unsafe traditional means.
    “We are concerned that in most cases, the hospitals that have come under fire also happen to be the only remaining hospitals in those areas, putting healthcare out of reach for millions including displaced people. With at least 80% of hospitals in Sudan decimated by the conflict, all efforts need to be taken to protect the few standing health facilities still providing services.”
    Save the Children is urgently calling on the international community to redouble efforts to demand a ceasefire to allow safe and unhindered humanitarian access and a drastic scale-up of humanitarian assistance. This includes securing safe passage for food, medical aid, commercial supplies, and critical nutrition interventions for children suffering from wasting especially in the Darfur region.
    Save the Children has worked in Sudan since 1983 and is currently supporting children and their families across Sudan providing health, nutrition, education, child protection and food security and livelihoods support. Save the Children is also supporting refugees from Sudan in Egypt and South Sudan.
    Notes:
    [1] In the first half of 2025 at least 38 attacks on healthcare were reported compared to 13 attacks over the same period in 2024. At least 933 people were killed between 1 January and 30 June 2025 in attacks on healthcare recorded by the World Health Organisation’s Surveillance System for Attacks on Healthcare. This is compared to 16 people killed in 13 attacks on healthcare over a similar period last year. (Database accessed on 01 July 2025). Table below shows the number of attacks, deaths and injuries as retrieved from WHO’s surveillance system for attacks on health care (ssa) on 01 July 2025.
    Period Number of attacks Reported deaths Injuries January – June 2024 13 16 55 January – June 2025 38 933 148 2023 – 2024 (since start of conflict) 136 238 214
    [2] Important note that the WHO surveillance system came into full effect in November 2024 and there is a possibility of underreporting for previous years/ period.
    [3] According to data from Sudan’s ministry of health.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI China: Xi Jinping champions the cause of Global South

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese President Xi Jinping visits the New Development Bank and meets with Dilma Rousseff, president of the institution, in Shanghai, east China, April 29, 2025. (Xinhua/Huang Jingwen)

    On the banks of the shimmering Huangpu River that cuts through the Chinese metropolis of Shanghai sits the headquarters of the New Development Bank, co-founded by the BRICS countries more than a decade ago to foster the shared development of the world’s emerging economies.

    In his visit to this new landmark in China’s financial center late April, Chinese President Xi Jinping told the bank’s president and former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff this multilateral institution has been a result of “a pioneering initiative for the Global South to seek strength through unity.”

    For the Chinese leader, the BRICS mechanism is a major platform for promoting cooperation among countries in the Global South. In the coming days, this year’s BRICS summit will open in the Brazilian city of Rio de Janeiro under the theme of “Strengthening Global South Cooperation for More Inclusive and Sustainable Governance.”

    Xi’s April visit to the bank demonstrates his long-standing commitment to bolstering the solidarity and common development of the Global South, amplifying the role of over 6 billion people in a world fraught with uncertainty and challenges unseen in a century.

    Chinese President Xi Jinping poses for a group photo with other leaders and representatives attending the “BRICS Plus” Dialogue in Kazan, Russia, Oct. 24, 2024. (Xinhua/Yao Dawei)

    COLLECTIVE RISE

    “The collective rise of the Global South is a distinctive feature of the great transformation across the world,” Xi observed when addressing the “BRICS Plus” Dialogue held in Kazan, Russia, in October last year.

    Much more than a pure geographical or economic term, the Global South refers to a community of emerging markets and developing countries that share similar historical experiences, development stages and goals, and political pursuits.

    The concept of “South” was first coined in Antonio Gramsci’s work “The Southern Question” written in 1926, in which the Italian Marxist philosopher highlighted the development gap between northern and southern Italy.

    The rise of the Global South has been decades in the making. Back in 1955, the landmark Bandung Conference convened in Indonesia under the flag of solidarity, friendship and cooperation, marking the awakening of the Global South after centuries of Western colonial rule. In 1964, the Group of 77, a coalition of developing countries, was established in Geneva within the United Nations to promote South-South cooperation and form a new international economic order.

    Through extensive cooperation, the countries of the Global South have emerged as a key driver of global growth. These countries have contributed as much as 80 percent of global growth over the past 20 years, with a share of global GDP increasing from 24 percent four decades ago to more than 40 percent today.

    China, the world’s largest developing country, is a natural member of the Global South. In 2004, the United Nations Development Programme included China in its list of more than 130 Global South countries in a report titled “Forging a Global South.” Some Westerners have challenged China’s position that it is part of the Global South. In response, Xi has provided a clear answer.

    “As a developing country and a member of the Global South, China breathes the same breath with other developing countries and pursues a shared future with them,” Xi once said.

    Historically, China has suffered from Western colonialism and imperialism, much like other developing countries, said Cavince Adhere, a Kenya-based international relations scholar.

    “Even today, despite inordinate success by Beijing to rise from the backwaters of development to be the second-largest economy in the world, as well as the first developing country to eliminate extreme poverty, China still faces common development challenges, and holds similar views regarding the current international order and global governance,” he added. “Because of this, China has emerged as a strong champion for the legitimate rights and interests of many Global South countries.”

    Chinese President Xi Jinping attends the opening ceremony of the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and delivers a keynote speech at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, Sept. 5, 2024. (Xinhua/Liu Bin)

    LEAVING NO ONE BEHIND

    Ahead of Xi’s state visit to Brazil late last year, the Portuguese edition of the book “Up And Out Of Poverty” was officially launched in Rio de Janeiro. The book, first published in 1992, outlines Xi’s perspectives on poverty eradication, local governance, reform and development when he worked in the formerly impoverished prefecture of Ningde in China’s southeastern Fujian province.

    Poverty has long ranked atop among the problems facing the Global South. With Xi’s steadfast commitment and strong leadership, China has eradicated absolute poverty in its rural areas, a feat that no one had accomplished in China for thousands of years.

    At the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro last year, Xi spoke with quiet conviction, recounting his lifelong dedication to poverty alleviation, from his time as a local official to his current role as China’s top leader.

    In his speech, Xi said a weaker bird can start early and fly high. “If China can make it, other developing countries can make it too. This is what China’s battle against poverty says to the world,” he said.

    Xi’s “weaker bird” metaphor originated from his book on poverty. His speech struck a chord with several foreign leaders, who asked the Chinese delegation whether they could share a copy of the speech.

    The Chinese leader has placed great emphasis on development. For him, “development holds the master key to solving all problems,” particularly when the global development gap continues to widen. Over the years, Xi has also been active in rallying global efforts to put development back on the international agenda as a central priority.

    When attending the general debate of the 76th session of the UN General Assembly in 2021 via video, Xi proposed the Global Development Initiative, an international policy framework to promote sustainable development around the world. To date, the initiative has garnered the support and participation of over 100 countries and 20 international organizations.

    Intelligent equipment lifts containers at Chancay Port, Peru, on Nov. 14, 2024. (Xinhua/Li Mengxin)

    To boost common development in the Global South, Xi has been promoting practical cooperation through major infrastructure projects within the Belt and Road Initiative. During his foreign visits over the years, Xi would launch or visit major projects, such as the Chancay Port in Peru, the Dushanbe No. 2 power plant in Tajikistan and the Colombo Port City in Sri Lanka. When hosting leaders of the Global South in Beijing, Xi would also discuss with them major projects for cooperation during their talks.

    Xi believes that the Global South should be the main driving force for common development and that “On the path to modernization, no one, and no country, should be left behind.” He also supports countries of the Global South exploring paths of modernization tailored to their distinctive national conditions, rather than following Western development models.

    Also at last year’s G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro, Xi outlined eight measures in support of Global South cooperation, ranging from high-quality Belt and Road cooperation to boosting development in Africa. Months earlier, at the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing last year, Xi unveiled 10 partnership actions and granted zero-tariff treatment on all product categories to the least developed countries with which it has diplomatic relations.

    An exhibitor (R) introduces African products to visitors during the fourth China-Africa Economic and Trade Expo at Changsha International Convention and Exhibition Center in Changsha, central China’s Hunan Province, June 13, 2025.  (Xinhua/Chen Sihan)

    Gu Qingyang, associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, said, “China can play a positive role in the development of Global South countries,” adding that Chinese technology and expertise in industrial development can support the modernization of the Global South’s various regions.

    EMPOWERING GLOBAL SOUTH IN INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE

    As Xi once observed, in the face of global changes of the century, pursuing modernization and working for a more just and equitable international order are the sacred historic missions of Global South countries.

    Xi described the BRICS countries as “leading members of the Global South,” calling for building BRICS into “a primary channel for strengthening solidarity and cooperation among Global South nations and a vanguard for advancing global governance reform.”

    Since becoming Chinese president in 2013, Xi has always been a steadfast champion of BRICS cooperation. In Xiamen, he advocated for the “BRICS Plus” program at the 2017 BRICS summit, calling for more active participation from other emerging markets and developing nations. He played a crucial role in propelling the BRICS’ historic expansion in 2023, ushering in the era of greater BRICS cooperation.

    Effective coordination between BRICS members and other countries in the Global South has been adding more bricks to the global governance architecture. The New Development Bank exemplifies this effort.

    Xi said the bank serves as “an important emerging force in the international financial system,” which should work to “make the international financial system fairer and more equitable and effectively enhance the representation and say of emerging markets and developing countries.”

    Aerial photo taken on Dec. 17, 2020 shows the headquarters building of BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) in east China’s Shanghai. (Xinhua/Fang Zhe)

    Over the years, China, under Xi’s leadership, has taken concrete steps to advocate for developing countries, help Global South countries enhance their representation and voice in international governance, and promote a more just and equitable international order.

    At the 2022 G20 summit in Bali, Indonesia, China took the lead in supporting the African Union (AU)’s membership in the G20. In their meeting on the sidelines of the summit, then Senegalese President Macky Sall, who was also the AU chairperson that year, thanked Xi for being the first to publicly support the AU’s G20 membership.

    The global leadership today remains lopsided, and rebalancing this skewed system is a shared imperative for both the Global North and South, said Paolo Magri, managing director and chair of the advisory board of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, a think tank.

    “Global South countries marching together toward modernization is monumental in world history and unprecedented in human civilization,” Xi said at the “BRICS Plus” Dialogue in Kazan, Russia, last year, while acknowledging that “the road to prosperity for the Global South will not be straight.”

    “No matter how the international landscape evolves, we in China will always keep the Global South in our heart, and maintain our roots in the Global South,” Xi pledged.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI: FIND MINING swept the Bitcoin mining farms, and 42 BTC shocked the industry – Green computing power set off a new wave of global wealth

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York City, NY, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — As global investors re-examine their crypto asset allocation and the price of Bitcoin breaks through $107,000 per coin, British crypto technology company FIND MINING has once again sparked heated discussions in the industry. Recently, FIND MINING successfully mined 42 Bitcoins on the global Bitcoin main chain, with a single-day profit of approximately $4.48 million, breaking the single-day mining profit record this year and making this mining giant, known for its green energy, a leader in the global computing power list.

    This is the sixth large-scale mining victory of FIND MINING in the past six weeks, behind which is its strong capital strength and cutting-edge sustainable energy layout. At present, FIND MINING’s business has expanded to many European countries such as the United States, Italy, Iceland, Norway, etc., and it efficiently operates 135 professional mining farms, with a service network covering 175 countries and regions, more than 9.4 million registered users worldwide, and more than 1.32 million mining machines deployed cumulatively, continuing to provide the most cost-effective cloud mining contracts for global retail investors.

    Green energy and advanced computing power redefine Bitcoin mining

    Against the backdrop of increasingly stringent global carbon neutrality goals, FIND MINING has taken the lead in completing the full-chain integration of green energy. Its mines are widely distributed in clean energy regions such as Northern Europe, North America and Eastern Europe. They rely on hydropower, wind power and solar energy to power mining machines, which not only significantly reduces operating costs, but also makes customers’ returns more competitive.

    The core advantages of FIND MINING include:

    • Zero-carbon emission mining farm system: fully use renewable energy for power supply to create an industry-leading green computing power network.
    • Top mining machine cluster:Large-scale deployment of Bitmain’s latest generation of ASIC mining machines and multi-card GPU architecture, taking into account both explosive computing power and stable operation.
    • Cold wallet asset protection:All customer assets are encrypted and stored in multi-signature cold wallets, and are regularly reviewed by a professional audit team, making risk prevention and control more reliable.
    • Flexible multi-currency contracts:It supports cloud mining of multiple currencies such as BTC, XRP, DOGE, LTC, etc. There is no need for any hardware investment, and users can freely choose according to their needs.

    FIND MINING’s financial strength has attracted attention from the industry

    Since its establishment at the end of 2018, FIND MINING has completed strategic refinancing of more than 50 million US dollars, and its shareholders include veteran British venture capital institutions, international crypto funds and energy capital. In the current environment where the world is paying more and more attention to the security of mining platforms, FIND MINING has become a “safe haven” in the eyes of many investors with its compliant and transparent operations and regular audits.

    Industry experts pointed out: “As global capital continues to flow into the crypto mining track, FIND MINING is reshaping the new standards of global crypto mining with its three core pillars of technology, green energy and safe operation.”

    Zero threshold mining allows retail investors to easily grasp Bitcoin dividends

    Different from traditional mining farms that require high equipment costs, FIND MINING has created a “zero threshold” cloud mining service for individual and institutional users. Users only need to register an account and select a mining contract to view daily earnings in real time and automatically withdraw cash, without any technical background or maintenance costs.

    The platform also provides:

    Real-time revenue tracking dashboard

    24/7 online customer service support

    Flexible payment, supports more than 14 withdrawal methods including USDT, BTC, XRP, DOGE, LTC, ETH, etc.

    FIND MINING provides the most worthy cloud computing contracts for global retail investors. As shown below

    The Bitcoin market is brewing a new round of explosion, FIND MINING helps global investors stay one step ahead

    As the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy turns to easing, scarce assets such as gold and Bitcoin are ushering in a new round of value revaluation, and the on-chain computing power and miners’ income continue to rise. Against this background, FIND MINING is undoubtedly one of the most impressive and fastest growing crypto mining giants in the first half of 2025.

    The rise of FIND MINING is by no means accidental, but the result of precise technology layout, strong capital support and green sustainable concept. For individual and institutional investors who are eager to find stable returns in the global economic uncertainty, FIND MINING is becoming one of the few high-quality platforms that can be “boarded”.

    Visit the official website now to start your mining journey
    https://findmining.com

    Official APP download one-click download

    For interviews, business cooperation or media coverage, please contact:
    info@findmining.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI: FIND MINING swept the Bitcoin mining farms, and 42 BTC shocked the industry – Green computing power set off a new wave of global wealth

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    New York City, NY, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — As global investors re-examine their crypto asset allocation and the price of Bitcoin breaks through $107,000 per coin, British crypto technology company FIND MINING has once again sparked heated discussions in the industry. Recently, FIND MINING successfully mined 42 Bitcoins on the global Bitcoin main chain, with a single-day profit of approximately $4.48 million, breaking the single-day mining profit record this year and making this mining giant, known for its green energy, a leader in the global computing power list.

    This is the sixth large-scale mining victory of FIND MINING in the past six weeks, behind which is its strong capital strength and cutting-edge sustainable energy layout. At present, FIND MINING’s business has expanded to many European countries such as the United States, Italy, Iceland, Norway, etc., and it efficiently operates 135 professional mining farms, with a service network covering 175 countries and regions, more than 9.4 million registered users worldwide, and more than 1.32 million mining machines deployed cumulatively, continuing to provide the most cost-effective cloud mining contracts for global retail investors.

    Green energy and advanced computing power redefine Bitcoin mining

    Against the backdrop of increasingly stringent global carbon neutrality goals, FIND MINING has taken the lead in completing the full-chain integration of green energy. Its mines are widely distributed in clean energy regions such as Northern Europe, North America and Eastern Europe. They rely on hydropower, wind power and solar energy to power mining machines, which not only significantly reduces operating costs, but also makes customers’ returns more competitive.

    The core advantages of FIND MINING include:

    • Zero-carbon emission mining farm system: fully use renewable energy for power supply to create an industry-leading green computing power network.
    • Top mining machine cluster:Large-scale deployment of Bitmain’s latest generation of ASIC mining machines and multi-card GPU architecture, taking into account both explosive computing power and stable operation.
    • Cold wallet asset protection:All customer assets are encrypted and stored in multi-signature cold wallets, and are regularly reviewed by a professional audit team, making risk prevention and control more reliable.
    • Flexible multi-currency contracts:It supports cloud mining of multiple currencies such as BTC, XRP, DOGE, LTC, etc. There is no need for any hardware investment, and users can freely choose according to their needs.

    FIND MINING’s financial strength has attracted attention from the industry

    Since its establishment at the end of 2018, FIND MINING has completed strategic refinancing of more than 50 million US dollars, and its shareholders include veteran British venture capital institutions, international crypto funds and energy capital. In the current environment where the world is paying more and more attention to the security of mining platforms, FIND MINING has become a “safe haven” in the eyes of many investors with its compliant and transparent operations and regular audits.

    Industry experts pointed out: “As global capital continues to flow into the crypto mining track, FIND MINING is reshaping the new standards of global crypto mining with its three core pillars of technology, green energy and safe operation.”

    Zero threshold mining allows retail investors to easily grasp Bitcoin dividends

    Different from traditional mining farms that require high equipment costs, FIND MINING has created a “zero threshold” cloud mining service for individual and institutional users. Users only need to register an account and select a mining contract to view daily earnings in real time and automatically withdraw cash, without any technical background or maintenance costs.

    The platform also provides:

    Real-time revenue tracking dashboard

    24/7 online customer service support

    Flexible payment, supports more than 14 withdrawal methods including USDT, BTC, XRP, DOGE, LTC, ETH, etc.

    FIND MINING provides the most worthy cloud computing contracts for global retail investors. As shown below

    The Bitcoin market is brewing a new round of explosion, FIND MINING helps global investors stay one step ahead

    As the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy turns to easing, scarce assets such as gold and Bitcoin are ushering in a new round of value revaluation, and the on-chain computing power and miners’ income continue to rise. Against this background, FIND MINING is undoubtedly one of the most impressive and fastest growing crypto mining giants in the first half of 2025.

    The rise of FIND MINING is by no means accidental, but the result of precise technology layout, strong capital support and green sustainable concept. For individual and institutional investors who are eager to find stable returns in the global economic uncertainty, FIND MINING is becoming one of the few high-quality platforms that can be “boarded”.

    Visit the official website now to start your mining journey
    https://findmining.com

    Official APP download one-click download

    For interviews, business cooperation or media coverage, please contact:
    info@findmining.com

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI China: Consumption set to continue robust growth

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    chinadaily.com.cn | July 3, 2025

    Bolstered by sustained policy support for trade-in programs, China’s consumption is likely to continue its robust growth momentum in the second half of the year, better underpinning the country’s stable economic growth amid mounting external uncertainties, analysts said.

    China still has ample fiscal headroom to reinforce its trade-in initiative later this year should consumer demand exhaust its initial 300 billion yuan ($42 billion) allocation, they said, emphasizing that similar policy incentives could be extended to the service sector to foster more sustainable consumption growth.

    On Tuesday, the Ministry of Finance announced the issuance of 11 ultra-long-term treasury bonds in the third quarter, with four of them seeing their timelines accelerated compared with the previous plan released in April. This will help maintain a continuous flow of funding to support policies meant to boost consumption, analysts said.

    According to the National Development and Reform Commission, China’s top economic regulator, the third group of fiscal funding through ultra-long-term treasury bonds for the consumer goods trade-in program is scheduled to be allocated in July.

    The central government has earmarked 300 billion yuan in ultra-long-term treasury bonds to support the trade-in program for the whole year. The first two groups of fiscal funding, totaling 162 billion yuan, were allocated in January and April.

    “If the remaining 138 billion yuan runs out ahead of schedule, the possibility of unveiling additional funding this year cannot be ruled out,” said Zhao Wei, chief economist at Shenwan Hongyuan Securities.

    “As the trade war initiated by the United States still weighs on China’s economy, efforts to shore up domestic demand will be of paramount importance to mitigate external shocks and maintain steady growth,” he said.

    By avoiding a one-time, large-scale fund injection that could disrupt market dynamics, the phased allocation of the fiscal funds helps create a stable and supportive environment for the consumption recovery to take hold throughout the year, Zhao added.

    In late June, the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, also pledged to leverage various tools in support of the trade-in programs, such as increasing credit support for recycling companies and home renovation suppliers and fast-track financing for manufacturers of energy-efficient smart home products.

    “Boosted by the trade-in programs, sales of household appliances, furniture and communication devices have registered rapid growth. Sales related to trade-ins have surpassed 1.4 trillion yuan so far this year,” said Li Chao, a spokeswoman for the National Development and Reform Commission, when addressing a news conference on June 26.

    According to data from the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s consumer spending in May posted its strongest monthly growth since 2024, with retail sales of consumer goods expanding 6.4 percent year-on-year in May, a 1.3 percentage point increase from April.

    Experts cautioned that although the trade-in policies have been effective in driving sales of consumers goods, they also carry the risk of front-loading consumer demand, which could create challenges down the line.

    “Providing similar consumption incentives to promote service sector spending could become a key policy lever going forward,” said Jiang Zhao, an associate researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.

    Jiang noted that development patterns in advanced economies indicate that upon entering high-income status, nations typically experience a gradual rise in the proportion of service consumption. As China approaches this threshold, its consumption structure is transitioning from being focused on goods to being focused on both goods and services, he said.

    Nevertheless, service consumption spans diverse sectors such as elderly care, tourism, fitness and healthcare, implying that subsidy programs would demand substantial fiscal funding and pose significant oversight challenges, Jiang said, adding that any decision to implement such incentives would require prudent assessment based on practical conditions.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Governor Lamont Signs Biennial State Budget for 2026 and 2027

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    (HARTFORD, CT) – Governor Ned Lamont today announced that he has signed into law the biennial state budget bill for fiscal years 2026 and 2027, which makes historic investments to expand access to early childhood education, which is among the costliest item for families, all while holding the line on taxes.

    Notable investments include:

    • Early childhood education: The budget makes historic levels of investment to support Connecticut’s early childhood education system, including $417.5 million in fiscal year 2026 and $443 million in fiscal year 2027. General Fund appropriations for early childhood education are up $252.7 million between fiscal years 2018 and 2027 – a 133% increase. In addition to these investments, the budget establishes the Early Childhood Education Endowment by transferring up to $300 million of the unappropriated General Fund surplus at the close of fiscal year 2025. This endowment will be used to make more early childhood education slots available and enroll more children into the system.
    • Special education: The budget makes historic levels of investments to support special education, growing by $44.9 million in fiscal year 2026 and an additional $49.9 million in fiscal year 2027, as well as capital investments of $10 million in each year. By 2027, state investments in special education will have grown by 95%.
    • K-12 education: The budget fully funds Education Cost Sharing (ECS) grants for towns and cities, including a hold harmless provision that provides $8.7 million in fiscal year 2026 and $17.4 million in fiscal year 2027 to ensure that no municipality loses ECS funding over the biennium. Since Governor Lamont took office in 2019, ECS grants have grown by roughly $443 million – an 18% increases in support for K-12 public schools.
    • Higher education: The budget increases funding for the Roberta B. Willis Scholarship Fund – Connecticut’s state-funded scholarship program for residents who attend in-state public and private higher education institutions – by $1.4 million in fiscal year 2026 and $16.4 million in fiscal year 2027. When combined with $15 million previously reserved for fiscal year 2026, both years of the biennium will be funded at $41 million – the highest level of state-appropriated scholarship funding in more than a decade. General Fund support for UConn is increased by an additional $49 million in fiscal year 2026 and $34 million in fiscal year 2027; UConn Health receives an additional $29 million in fiscal year 2026 and an additional $25 million in fiscal year 2027; and Connecticut State Colleges and Universities (CSCU) receives a budget increase of an additional $32 million in fiscal year 2026 and $45 million in 2027.
    • Health and human service providers: The budget supports $50 million in fiscal year 2026 to annualize fiscal year 2025 increases and $126 million in fiscal year 2027 to support a 3% increase for private providers, plus an additional $30 million specific to non-DDS providers. Plus, the budget provides an additional $100.1 million to support the group home settlement over the biennium, representing a 15% increase.
    • Housing: The budget provides $3.5 million in fiscal year 2026 and $5 million in fiscal year 2027 to support eviction prevention, as well as support HUBs, which are the physical locations where individuals and families get appointments to gain access to homelessness resources. Plus $6.7 million is provided, beginning in fiscal year 2027, to increase elderly and disabled RAP vouchers, as well as HeadStart on Housing Vouchers, which is a system approach to combating homelessness with the support and collaboration of private providers, state agencies, and local communities across housing, childcare, and social services.

    Governor Lamont said, “This is a balanced, sensible budget that is under the spending cap, provides predictability and stability for residents, businesses, and municipalities, and holds the line on taxes while keeping us on a sound fiscal path. Importantly, it includes significant investments in our education system, beginning with historic levels of support for early childhood education, up through our K-12 public schools and our higher education institutions. It also protects our social services safety net, prioritizing our health and human services providers and increasing support for our most vulnerable residents, including seniors and those who have disabilities, who receive Medicaid. And while we are doing all of this, we are continuing to make historic and long-overdue payments into the pension system, preserving the strength of our fiscal guardrails, and making fiscally responsible investments into the rainy-day fund that will protect our state against any potential economic headwinds we may face in the future. I thank the legislature for their hard work and collaboration on this budget. While other states are increasing taxes and cutting services, economic analysts are pointing to Connecticut as an example of a state that has worked hard to maintain fiscal stability and is making the smart decisions that are critical for economic growth.”

    Senate President Pro Tempore Martin M. Looney said, “This budget includes several major initiatives, including a new trust fund for early childhood education that will be transformative in getting children ready for kindergarten, and a larger investment in special education to help towns deal with ever-increasing special education costs.”

    Speaker of the House Matt Ritter said, “Our budget showcases our priorities. We make critical investments in education and childcare while providing relief to thousands of working families with a $250 credit through the EITC framework. This budget was a team effort and I want to thank the chairs, Senate leaders, Governor and the staffs who worked so hard to ensure we crossed the finish line.”

    Senate Majority Leader Bob Duff said, “Voting for a significant special education funding increase and prioritizing millions of dollars more in the classroom underscores our commitment to students, parents, teachers and school personnel across this state. I want to thank Senator Looney for fighting for a strong state budget, as well as Senators Osten and Fonfara, Speaker Ritter, Majority Leader Rojas, their fiscal chairs, and all our hardworking staff for negotiating a two-year budget that delivers on so many of our promises.”

    House Majority Leader Jason Rojas said, “This budget represents a bold investment in Connecticut’s most vital asset: our people. It reflects our commitment to invest in our future – our youngest learners – through historic levels of funding for early childhood education and childcare as well as investments in special education and fully funding the state’s obligation to our traditional public schools. We know that when we invest in our children, we invest in the foundation of our communities. We continue to support our towns and cities by sustaining and increasing municipal aid to help relieve the pressure of property taxes and ensure that local governments can serve residents effectively. We’re also addressing some of the most urgent needs in our state, including affordable housing and transportation so people and our economy can keep moving forward.”

    Senator Cathy Osten, co-chair of the Appropriations Committee, said, “This is a good budget that addresses the real issues for real people that we heard about in countless hours of public hearings – food, health care, nonprofits and education.”

    State Representative Maria Horn, co-chair of the Finance, Revenue, and Bonding Committee, said, “This budget reflects the legislature’s commitment to responsible, people-first policymaking. We delivered a $250 refundable credit for working families, a $500 credit for home daycare providers, and new incentives to help families save for college – all targeted toward easing everyday costs. We also ensured small businesses can compete on a fairer playing field by modernizing our tax code and expanding support for local farms and rural economies. Even with a tough revenue forecast, we passed a balanced, forward-looking budget that supports families, strengthens our workforce, and creates a better environment for small businesses to thrive.”

    The budget bill is Public Act 25-168. The 2026 fiscal year begins July 1, 2025.

     

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: IMF Executive Board Completes the First Review under the Extended Credit Facility Arrangement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    July 2, 2025

    • The IMF Executive Board has completed the first review under the Extended Credit Facility arrangement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The decision allows for an immediate disbursement of US$ 261.9 million towards international reserves, to continue building buffers.
    • The DRC’s economy has been resilient in a challenging environment amid the escalation of the armed conflict in the eastern part of the country, which placed significant strains on the budget. The authorities have made good progress on the structural reform’s agenda, but a few quantitative targets were missed.
    • The recent peace agreement signed between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, mediated by the United States, is encouraging for the prospect of a peaceful resolution of the conflict and renewed focus on development goals.

    Washington, DC: The Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) completed the first review under the Extended Credit Facility (ECF) Arrangement for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) approved on January 15, 2025 (see PR 25/003). The completion of the first review allowed an immediate disbursement equivalent to 190.4 million SDR (about US$ 261.9 million) to support balance-of-payment needs, bringing the aggregate disbursement to date to 380.5 million SDR (about 523.4 US$ million).  

    The DRC has been facing significant challenges amid the intensification of the armed conflict in its eastern part since end-2024. The escalation of hostilities has claimed thousands of lives and caused severe social and humanitarian damages, including disruptions in access to essential services such as food, water, and electricity. Diplomatic efforts are ongoing to secure a cessation of hostilities and ensure sustainable peace in the region. The signing on June 27, 2025, of a peace agreement between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda, under the mediation of the United States, is encouraging for the prospect of a peaceful resolution on the ongoing conflict and renewed focus on addressing development goals.

    Despite the challenging environment, economic activity remained resilient, with robust GDP growth of 6.5 percent in 2024, driven by continued dynamism in the extractive sector.  External stability has strengthened, as the current account deficit narrowed and the accumulation of international reserves continued. Inflationary pressures continue to ease, and year-on-year inflation declined from 23.8 percent at end-2023 to 11.7 percent at end-2024 and [8.5] percent at end-June 2025.

    Performance under the program was mixed, as the intensification of the conflict has placed significant strains on the budget. Despite strong revenue collection, the domestic fiscal deficit reached 0.8 percent of GDP in 2024, exceeding the program target of 0.3 percent, owing to spending overruns linked to the escalation of the conflict, including on exceptional security spending and public investments. The program target on the Central Bank of the Congo (BCC)’s foreign exchange assets held with domestic correspondents was missed as well, due to higher-than-expected tax payments in foreign currency on government accounts. Other quantitative performance criteria of the ECF were met. Most indicative targets were also met, except those related to the floor on social spending and the ceiling on spending executed through emergency procedures—owing to elevated exceptional security spending linked to the conflict intensification. Appropriate corrective measures are being implemented by the authorities.

    In completing the first review, the Executive Board also approved the authorities’ request for waivers of nonobservance of the performance criteria on the floor on the domestic fiscal balance at end-December 2024 on the basis of corrective actions, and the continuous ceiling on the levels of foreign currency assets of the BCC held with domestic correspondents on the basis of the temporary nature of the deviation which has since been remedied. Further, the Executive Board completed the financing assurances review under the ECF arrangement. No reform measures under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility (RSF) arrangement, approved in January 2025, were due for review at this time.

    At the conclusion of the Executive Board’s discussion, Mr. Okamura, Deputy Managing Director and Chair stated:

    “The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been confronted with heightened security challenges since late 2024. The escalation of the conflict in the eastern part of the country has caused serious human, social and economic damage and induced the government to increase spending. Despite these difficulties, the macroeconomic environment of the DRC remained broadly stable. Growth has remained robust, due to the resilience of mining production. Inflation continues to decrease, and the external position has strengthened. The economic outlook remains positive, but is fraught with downside risks related to the persistence of the conflict, declining external humanitarian assistance, global economic headwinds, and potential escalation of geopolitical conflicts. The authorities are committed to closely monitor these risks and to respond proactively to evolving challenges.

    “Budget implementation remains challenging in a difficult security context. As a result, the domestic fiscal deficit is projected to be larger than initially projected for 2025, but is expected to return to the path envisaged at program approval starting in 2026, reflecting the authorities’ commitment to carry out measures to enhance domestic revenue mobilization and strengthen the budget implementation process. Additionally, to guard against unforeseen adverse shocks, the authorities have adopted a contingency plan.

    “The Central Bank of the Congo (BCC) has maintained a tight monetary policy stance, thereby helping bring inflation down to single digits for the first time in three years. The accumulation of international reserves has continued, on the back of the narrowing of the current account deficit. Efforts must continue, to strengthen the monetary policy implementation framework, refine the foreign exchange intervention strategy, enhance the governance and safeguards of the BCC and ensure its adequate recapitalization.

    “The authorities have committed to accompany these efforts to preserve macroeconomic stability with an acceleration of structural reforms in key areas, including strengthening the AML/CFT framework, improving the business climate, enhancing transparency and governance, combating corruption and upgrading national statistics. Efforts to lay the groundwork for a timely implementation of the reform measures underpinning the RSF arrangement approved in January should be stepped up.”

    Table 1. Democratic Republic of the Congo: Selected Economic and Financial Indicators, 2023-26

    2023

    2024

    2025

    2026

    Est.

    CR No. 25/023

    Prel.

    CR No. 25/023

    Proj.

    CR No. 25/023

    Proj.

    (Annual percentage change, unless otherwise indicated)

    GDP and prices

      Real GDP

    8.5

    6.0

    6.5

    5.4

    5.3

    5.1

    5.3

         Extractive GDP

    19.7

    11.6

    12.2

    7.7

    8.2

    5.2

    5.8

         Non-extractive GDP

    3.5

    3.2

    3.5

    4.2

    3.6

    5.0

    5.0

      GDP deflator

    14.4

    17.4

    19.9

    8.8

    8.2

    7.4

    6.7

      Consumer prices, period average

    19.9

    17.7

    17.7

    8.9

    8.8

    7.3

    7.1

      Consumer prices, end of period

    23.8

    12.0

    11.7

    7.8

    7.8

    7.0

    7.0

    (Annual change in percent of beginning-of-period broad money)

    Money and credit

      Net foreign assets

    19.9

    17.4

    23.0

    18.2

    14.5

    23.7

    22.7

      Net domestic assets

    20.3

    4.9

    5.6

    -3.5

    -1.0

    -10.9

    -10.5

         Domestic credit

    34.3

    15.4

    15.2

    9.9

    10.5

    3.7

    4.2

      Broad money

    40.3

    22.4

    28.1

    14.7

    13.8

    12.8

    12.3

    (Percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)

    Central government finance

      Revenue and grants

    14.8

    15.6

    15.2

    15.0

    14.8

    14.9

    14.9

      Expenditures

    16.5

    16.8

    16.5

    16.8

    17.0

    16.6

    16.6

      Domestic fiscal balance

    -1.2

    -0.3

    -0.8

    -0.8

    -1.2

    -0.8

    -0.8

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

    Investment and saving

     

     

     

     

     

     

     

      Gross national saving

    9.5

    9.1

    9.6

    12.2

    11.2

    13.0

    12.5

      Investment

    15.7

    14.2

    13.5

    15.0

    14.4

    15.3

    14.8

         Non-government

    12.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

    10.0

     

    Balance of payments

      Exports of goods and services

    44.0

             45.1

    47.4

    45.4

    46.1

    45.5

    46.6

      Imports of goods and services

    49.9

    48.9

    50.3

    47.3

    47.5

    46.9

    47.0

      Current account balance, incl. transfer

    -6.2

    -5.1

    -3.9

    -2.8

    -3.2

    -2.4

    -2.4

      Current account balance, excl. transfers

    -7.5

    -5.1

    -5.0

    -2.7

    -3.4

    -2.3

    -2.6

      Gross official reserves (weeks of imports)

    8.2

    10.0

    10.1

    11.5

    11.8

    12.7

    12.8

     

    External debt

      Debt service in percent of government revenue

    7.6

    5.7

    6.1

    6.7

    7.1

    7.0

    7.4

    Sources: Congolese authorities and IMF staff estimates and projections.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Tatiana Mossot

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/02/pr-25238-democratic-republic-of-the-congo-imf-completes-the-1st-rev-under-ecf-arrang

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI China: Beijing launches cities alliance to boost global digital economy ties

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 2 — A global alliance of over 40 cities was launched in Beijing on Wednesday as part of efforts to enhance multilateral cooperation on the digital economy.

    The Global Digital Economy Cities Alliance was initiated by Beijing — alongside partner cities in Europe, North America, the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Latin America — during the Global Digital Economy Conference 2025, which opened on the same day.

    The alliance aims to institutionalize multilateral collaboration beyond bilateral projects, focusing on key issues such as digital infrastructure, cross-border data governance, AI ethics and smart city applications.

    The move follows the launch of Beijing’s Global Digital Economy Partner City Cooperation Initiative in 2023, and its joint efforts with partner cities to adopt six action plans to implement the initiative in 2024. The alliance was established this year with support from international bodies including the UN Institute for Training and Research, the International Telecommunication Union and the International Trade Centre.

    Organized by the Beijing municipal government, the Cyberspace Administration of China, the National Data Administration, Xinhua News Agency and the United Nations Development Programme, this year’s conference will run through July 5 and feature an opening ceremony, six main forums and multiple thematic sessions, with over 1,000 participants in attendance.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI: NuVista Energy Ltd. Announces Updated Annual Production Guidance Due to Third Party Midstream Delays

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    CALGARY, Alberta, July 02, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — NuVista Energy Ltd. (TSX:NVA, “NVA” or “NuVista”) is providing revised guidance to our annual production volumes and reiterating our commitment to our shareholder return strategy. Due to continued delays in commissioning the Pipestone Gas Plant (“Pipestone Plant”) and additional required work discovered during a gas plant turnaround in the greater Wapiti area (“Wapiti Turnaround”), we now anticipate annual volumes to average approximately 83,000 Boe/d(1). The impact of the delays due to the Pipestone Plant and Wapiti Turnaround on annual production volumes is approximately 3,500 Boe/d and 6,000 Boe/d, respectively. Both third-party facilities are expected to be fully operational prior to September.

    It is important to note the nature of the Wapiti Turnaround. These activities take place once every four years and were planned for in our annual budget. However, additional work was discovered that the operator has chosen to proceed with to set the plant up for a major life extension, increase throughput and improve reliability. Although undertaking this work has increased the duration of the turnaround, we are supportive of it being completed at this time and are looking forward to decades of reliable processing capacity to support NuVista’s growth strategy.

    NuVista’s operations continue to progress extremely well with 43 new wells expected to be available for production by the end of the third quarter, setting us up for fourth quarter volumes to exceed 100,000 Boe/d as planned. As a result of the delays noted above, production in the second quarter averaged approximately 73,500 Boe/d. A comprehensive update on our continued well cost achievements, production performance and production guidance for the third quarter will be provided with our second quarter earnings release in August.

    Importantly, we are reiterating our commitment to our shareholder returns strategy. Our pristine balance sheet, opportunistic hedging, and less intensive second half 2025 capital plan will allow us to continue to make significant progress on our share repurchase program despite the reduced outlook in our annual production volumes. At current commodity price levels, we anticipate generating approximately $150 million in free adjusted funds flow(2) in the second half of the year, the majority of which will be directed to the share repurchase program. We plan to maintain debt levels below our soft ceiling of $350 million and have flexibility in our capital plans to adapt if there is downward pressure in commodity prices.

    We would like to thank our staff and contractors for their continued commitment to advancing NuVista’s delivery of top-tier returns to shareholders. So far this year, we have achieved a new record production in the first quarter of just under 90,000 Boe/d and have repurchased 7.9 million shares representing a 3.3% reduction to the number of shares outstanding at the beginning of the year. With 43 new wells ready for production once the facility work is complete, we will be in a strong position to produce above 100,000 Boe/d in the fourth quarter of the year.

    Note:  
       
    (1) See “NuVista Guidance Information”.
    (2) “Free adjusted funds flow” is a non-GAAP financial measure that do not have any standardized meanings under IFRS Accounting Standards and therefore may not be comparable to similar measures presented by other companies where similar terminology is used. Reference should be made to the section entitled “Non-GAAP and Other Financial Measures” in NuVista’s MD&A for the three months ended March 31, 2025 for historical information on free adjusted funds flow, which information is incorporated by reference into this press release and can be found on NuVista’s SEDAR+ profile at www.sedarplus.ca.


    About NuVista

    NuVista is an oil and natural gas company actively engaged in the exploration for, and the development and production of, oil and natural gas reserves in the province of Alberta. NuVista’s primary focus is on the scalable and repeatable condensate-rich Montney formation in the Pipestone and Wapiti areas of the Alberta Deep Basin. This play has the potential to create significant shareholder value due to the high-value condensate volumes associated with the natural gas production and the large scope of this resource play. The common shares of NuVista trade on the TSX under the symbol NVA. Learn more at www.nuvistaenergy.com.

    Advisories Regarding Oil and Gas Information

    BOEs may be misleading, particularly if used in isolation. A BOE conversion ratio of 6 Mcf: 1 Bbl is based on an energy equivalency conversion method primarily applicable at the burner tip and does not represent a value equivalency at the wellhead. As the value ratio between natural gas and crude oil based on the current prices of natural gas and crude oil is significantly different from the energy equivalency of 6:1, utilizing a conversion on a 6:1 basis may be misleading as an indication of value.

    Basis of presentation

    The reporting and measurement currency is the Canadian dollar. National Instrument 51-101 – “Standards of Disclosure for Oil and Gas Activities” includes condensate within the product type of natural gas liquids. NuVista has disclosed condensate values separate from natural gas liquids herein as NuVista believes it provides a more accurate description of NuVista’s operations and results therefrom.

    NuVista Guidance Information

    NuVista has updated its guidance for 2025 annual average daily production to approximately 83,000 Boe/d and its 2025 second quarter production estimate to 73,500 Boe/d. The production split for Boe/d amounts referenced in this press release are as follows:

    Reference Total Boe/d Natural Gas

    %

    Condensate

    %

    NGLs

    %

             
     Q2 2025 production estimate ~73,500  62 29 9
     Q2 2025 production guidance (original) (1) 75,000 – 77,000  62%  29%  9% 
     2025 annual production guidance (revised) ~83,000  61 30 9
     2025 annual production guidance (original) (1) ~90,000  61%  30%  9% 

    Note:

    (1) As of May 8, 2025.

    In this press release reference is made to 2025 price outlook in the forecast of annual free adjusted funds flow. The forecast is based on 2025 price assumptions of: US$65/Bbl WTI, US$3.70/MMBtu NYMEX, C$2.00/GJ AECO and 1.38:1 CAD:USD FX.

    Advisory Regarding Forward-Looking Information and Statements

    This press release contains forward-looking statements and forward-looking information (collectively, “forward-looking statements”) within the meaning of applicable securities laws. The use of any of the words “will”, “expects”, “believe”, “plans”, “potential” and similar expressions are intended to identify forward-looking statements. More particularly and without limitation, this press release contains forward looking statements, including but not limited to:

    • the expected impact to annual production caused by delays in the third party infrastructure in the Pipestone and Wapiti areas;
    • the expected timing of start-up of a third-party gas plant in the Pipestone area as well as expected timing of the completion of third-party turnaround activities in the greater Wapiti area;
    • revised guidance with respect to annual 2025 production and production mix;
    • expectations with respect to second quarter 2025 production as compared to previously provided guidance;
    • expectations that production in the fourth quarter will exceed 100,000 Boe/d;
    • that NuVista will continue to be able to make significant progress on its share repurchase program;
    • that an update of well cost achievements, production performance and production guidance for the third quarter of 2025 will be provided in our August earnings release;
    • that we will generate free adjusted funds flow of approximately $150 million in the second half of 2025;
    • our ability to continue directing free adjusted funds flow towards our share repurchase program; and
    • that we will maintain debt levels below our soft ceiling of $350 million.

    The future acquisition of our common shares pursuant to a share buyback (including through our normal course issuer bid), if any, and the level thereof is uncertain. Any decision to acquire common shares pursuant to a share buyback will be subject to the discretion of the Board of Directors and may depend on a variety of factors, including, without limitation, NuVista’s business performance, financial condition, financial requirements, growth plans, expected capital requirements and other conditions existing at such future time including, without limitation, contractual restrictions and satisfaction of the solvency tests imposed on NuVista under applicable corporate law. There can be no assurance of the number of common shares that NuVista will acquire pursuant to a share buyback, if any, in the future.

    By their nature, forward-looking statements are based upon certain assumptions and are subject to numerous risks and uncertainties, some of which are beyond NuVista’s control, including the climate and impact of weather conditions on our assets, personnel, third party infrastructure and the communities where we work. NuVista has included the forward-looking statements in this press release in order to provide readers with a more complete perspective on NuVista’s future operations and such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. The forward-looking information contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

    This press release also contains financial outlook and future oriented financial information (together, “FOFI”) relating to NuVista including, without limitation, free adjusted funds flow in the second half of 2025 and 2025 annual and second quarter production which are based on, among other things, the various assumptions disclosed in this press release including under “Advisory Regarding Forward-Looking Information and Statements”. Readers are cautioned that the assumptions used in the preparation of such information, although considered reasonable at the time of preparation, may prove to be imprecise and the impact of the tariffs on NuVista’s business operations and financial condition, while currently unknown, may be material and adverse and, as such, undue reliance should not be placed on FOFI. NuVista’s actual results, performance or achievement could differ materially from those expressed in, or implied by, these FOFI, or if any of them do so, what benefits NuVista will derive therefrom. NuVista has included the FOFI in order to provide readers with a more complete perspective on NuVista’s future operations and such information may not be appropriate for other purposes.

    These forward-looking statements and FOFI are made as of the date of this press release and, except NuVista disclaims any intent or obligation to update any forward-looking statements and FOFI, whether as a result of new information, future events or results or otherwise, other than as required by applicable securities laws, NuVista undertakes no obligation to publicly update such forward-looking information to reflect new information, subsequent events or otherwise law.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Beijing launches city alliance to strengthen global digital economy ties

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 2 (Xinhua) — A global alliance involving more than 40 cities was formally launched in Beijing on Wednesday as part of efforts to expand multilateral cooperation on the digital economy.

    The Global Alliance of Digital Economy Cities was launched by Beijing together with partner cities from Europe, North America, Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Latin America at the 2025 Global Conference on the Digital Economy, which opened on the same day.

    The Alliance aims to institutionalise multilateral cooperation beyond bilateral projects and will focus on key areas such as digital infrastructure, governance of cross-border data flows, the ethics of artificial intelligence and the application of smart cities.

    Earlier in 2023, Beijing launched the Digital Economy Partnership City Cooperation Initiative, and in 2024, the Chinese capital and partner cities adopted six action plans to implement the initiative. The current alliance was created with the support of international organizations including the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, the International Telecommunication Union, and the International Trade Centre.

    The 2025 Global Conference on Digital Economy will run until July 5, featuring an opening ceremony, six key forums, and a series of thematic sessions, with more than 1,000 participants. The event is jointly organized by the Beijing Municipal People’s Government, the National Internet Information Office of China, the National Data Administration of China, the Xinhua News Agency, and the United Nations Development Programme. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Kingdom of the Netherlands – Curaçao: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    July 2, 2025

    A Concluding Statement describes the preliminary findings of IMF staff at the end of an official staff visit (or ‘mission’), in most cases to a member country. Missions are undertaken as part of regular (usually annual) consultations under Article IV of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement, in the context of a request to use IMF resources (borrow from the IMF), as part of discussions of staff monitored programs, or as part of other staff monitoring of economic developments.

    The authorities have consented to the publication of this statement. The views expressed in this statement are those of the IMF staff and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF’s Executive Board. Based on the preliminary findings of this mission, staff will prepare a report that, subject to management approval, will be presented to the IMF Executive Board for discussion and decision.

    Washington, DC.

    Curaçao’s economic activity expanded by 5 percent in 2024, as strong tourism performance trickled into the wider economy. Stayover arrivals, growing at double digits, continued to outperform Caribbean peers and carried over to other sectors, including whole trade, real estate, and construction. Mostly related to holiday homes and hotels, construction was further fueled by strong mortgage growth and complemented by a resumption of public investments under the Road Maintenance Plan. Average headline inflation declined to 2.6 percent in 2024 from 3.5 percent in 2023, in line with global oil prices and lower US inflation. Real wages increased for the first time in five years but job creation continued to be dominated by informal construction and tourism-related sectors while formal employment declined. The primary surplus continued its upward trajectory on the back of increased tax collection on goods and services. The current account deficit widened due to higher merchandise imports, mainly related to construction activity.

    The government is pursuing an ambitious agenda to steer a now tourism-led economy, amidst heightened global uncertainty. Mindful of tourism saturation and a decoupling of local living standards, the authorities strive to improve social conditions while generating sustainable and green growth amid safeguarding solid public finances. The near doubling of the tourism footprint within five years brought profound structural shifts to Curaçao’s economy, including the decline in manufacturing and rise in services, lower overall wages, higher informality, and greater reliance on – more regressive – indirect taxation. Policy responses need to shift accordingly. Priorities are rightly focused on upgrading tourist experiences and diversification, improving skills and labor market conditions, and reforming the tax system in an equitable way while addressing social spending pressures. The administration has delivered on a first round of targeted, one-off pension increases this year, continued reforms to contain health costs, expanded investment in education infrastructure, and came closer to its renewables target with the opening of the latest wind park in 2024. The landspakket, a structural reform package agreed with the Netherlands in 2020, continues to guide structural reforms.

    Outlook and Risks

    Growth is projected to moderate to 4 percent in 2025, balancing domestic impulses and heightened global uncertainty, before gradually converging to 2 percent over the medium term. Further expansion of stayover tourism and construction activity will continue to support growth in 2025, along with fiscal expansion driven by higher public investments. Potential negative effects of slowing global demand and heightened uncertainty would dampen tourism flows towards the end of 2025 and 2026. Growth is expected to moderate to 2 percent over the medium term, given saturation in tourism and slower global demand, while public capital spending would be carried forward, including in road infrastructure and the energy value chain. Headline inflation is projected to stabilize at 2.5 percent in 2025, subject to oil price-related uncertainty. Fiscal accounts would remain in surplus, fully compliant with the fiscal rule, allowing the government to partially settle a large bullet loan in 2025 with own liquid reserves, thereby accelerating the impressive downward trajectory of debt. The current account deficit would decline in the medium term but remain elevated.

    Risks to the outlook are tilted to the downside. External risks include trade policy and investment shocks, which could induce higher inflation and lower external demand, adversely impacting tourism arrivals. Domestic upside risks include faster-than-expected advances in the green hydrogen value chain project and development of other energy sources. On the downside, lower-than-expected disbursements in public investments and delays in infrastructure improvements could set back the expected increase in potential growth from the expansion of hotel capacities. Continued high growth in mortgage credit fueling rising house prices could lead to financial sector as well as household balance sheet vulnerabilities. Buffers include access to favorable refinancing conditions on the Dutch capital market, subject to compliance with the fiscal rule, which grants the island substantial fiscal space, notably for capital and emergency spending.

    Tailoring Fiscal and Structural Policies to a Tourism-led Economy

    Safeguarding Medium-term Fiscal Sustainability

    Reaching the medium-term debt target and further sustaining growth will require weighing the need to boost investments and address social spending pressures while reforming the tax system in an equitable manner.  

    Advancing healthcare reforms is an urgent priority to restore the sector’s financial sustainability and limit medium-term fiscal risks. Annual deficits of the SVB healthcare fund amounted to around 5 percent of GDP over the past years, excluding central government transfers, with an additional 1 percent of GDP annual deficit by the Curaçao Medical Center. Transfers to the latter were recently increased to better cover operating costs and invest in new medical equipment, but the health system’s overall finances remain unsustainable. Curaçao’s health expenses, around 13 percent of GDP, stand out relative to regional peers and surpass the OECD average. Possible efficiency gains on the spending side would include additional volume and price measures for pharmaceuticals, re-evaluation of laboratory service tariffs, further expansion of primary care to contain hospital visits, and improvements in preventive care, with the latter likely to materialize over the longer horizon. Revenue reform options would include a broadening of the contributor base, e.g., via the inclusion of migrant workers, increasing co-payments for higher-income households, allowing for price differentiation for the privately insured, exploring options to charge for add-on services, with a possible secondary, private insurance market for these services, and expanding the potential in medical tourism. 

    The authorities’ plans to adjust pension benefits for lower-income households in a fiscally responsible manner are welcome and should be accompanied by widening the contribution base. Staff welcomes the intention to reassess benefit levels, given the pausing of indexation and a decline in real per capita benefits by 23 percent between 2016 and 2024. Applying inflation indexation to residents’ pensions only would allow for a broadly balanced budget of the old-age pension scheme (before central government transfers). Considerations to providing a supplement for low-income pensioners, which could cost around ½ percent of GDP per year, should be partially financed by broadening the contributor base. Legalizing predominantly young migrant workers and providing incentives for them and their employers to formalize (see below) would increase revenues by about 0.3 percent of GDP. Ensuring longer-term sustainability of social insurances would likely imply tapping general budget resources, which could be expanded with selected measures while avoiding earmarking (see below). Meanwhile, the current draft law to make second-pillar occupational pension plans mandatory would reduce reliance on old-age pensions and increase private savings, which would also help alleviate the sizable current account deficit.

    The authorities envisage the introduction of a VAT while continuing the modernization of the tax authority and improving revenue collection. Given Curaçao’s already significant tax burden and the recent expansion of direct taxation from a pre-pandemic average of 11 percent of GDP to 14 percent of GDP in 2024, plans to design the envisaged VAT reform in a revenue-neutral and equity-enhancing way are welcome. Expanding property taxation on second homes should be prioritized, as well as the purchase and implementation of digital infrastructure to modernize Curaçao’s tax system. Further considerations to introduce a tourism fee (by 2026), end tax holidays on import duties, and adjust permitting fees would lift revenues and contribute to compensating for potential pension increases.

    Further efforts are needed to boost investments and improve government service delivery. While capacity constraints were successfully addressed in the ramp-up of investments in 2024, including by hiring external project managers, capacity in planning and execution must be strengthened further to administer the needed investment increase of 2-3 percent of GDP in the coming years, including via a centralized investment planning unit. Implementing multi-year project budgeting and establishing a transparent procurement system will be critical to improve execution, ensure the efficient allocation of financing resources, and grant space to a gradual inclusion of adaptation investments against damage from sea level rise. Efforts to render health and pension spending as well as goods and services taxation more equitable hinge on improving means-testing and maintaining a state-of-the-art registry for lower-income households.  

    Labor Market Policies to Address Informality and Improve Education

    Informality could be addressed by strengthening incentives for formal work, improving enforcement and monitoring, and tightening eligibility criteria for receiving benefits. Decomposing changes in the formal workforce over the past decade, the strong decline in formal employment was mostly driven by a drop in registered jobs among men, especially in prime working age. Half of this decline cannot be explained by demographics, migration, or unemployment, and is likely attributed to the transition to informality. Tourism and construction sectors offer relatively more opportunities for informal work, making it harder to design the right incentives for formalization. Incentivizing formality, however, is crucial to maintaining government revenues and ensuring social protection for workers, and could be fostered by: facilitating access to education, increasing formal sector productivity, introducing more in-work benefits for workers with incomes between minimum and median wage, and stricter eligibility criteria for monthly assistance, along with strengthening enforcement and monitoring.

    Skill deterioration compounded by population aging is a key drag on long-term potential growth. The 2023 census showed that education levels of new entrants to the labor force are below the level of the pre-retirement cohort, and young employees tend to work in more precarious positions. Ongoing investments in education, in line with landspakket recommendations, including in schools’ physical as well as digital infrastructure, are very welcome. Recent initiatives to attract graduates back to the island, including with tax incentives, and an expedited labor permitting process for high-skill workers are important steps in the right direction. These could be complemented by vocational training to lift the overall skill level and reduce skill mismatches, in line with government’s proposed stimulation package with incentives for employer-led vocational education. Integrating migrants into the workforce would grant them perspectives to grow and invest in their skills.

    Fostering Competitiveness and Diversification

    Bracing for slower growth and mindful of market saturation and the global context, the authorities’ focus is rightly on tourism value added and diversification of source markets. Roads and transportation are among the key bottlenecks of the island, and more public investments are needed to improve the connectivity within the island for tourists to venture out. Public and private investments should also be directed to maritime infrastructure to attract more yacht tourists and move up the tourism value chain. Increasing the number of taxi licenses is welcome and will improve tourist experiences through better mobility. Efforts to tap markets in South America have proven successful, and new flight routes opened from Brazil, Argentina, and Colombia, countries with a large consumer base and rising purchasing power.

    Fostering non-tourism sectors in areas of competitive advantage would help build resilience against global shocks and attract additional investments. Building on recent successful reforms to expedite business permits and promote digitalization, more progress is needed to achieve the authorities’ goals as outlined in the National Export Strategy. Curaçao’s connection to a new submarine cable throughout the Caribbean and Miami from 2027 onwards could help expand the island’s data center industry – conditional on sufficient absorption capacity of the electricity grid and a moderation in electricity prices, which remain among the highest in the region. Planned investments in the grid by Aqualectra would be supported by funding from the Netherlands and provide the basis for lifting renewables electricity production to 70 percent by 2027 from around 50 percent currently. The envisaged floating offshore wind park of 3-10 GW would help cover Curaçao’s entire electricity demand and create new export opportunities, in addition to exploratory investments in other energy sources.

    In the presence of global uncertainty, diversification of trade as well as regional integration are key for mitigating Curaçao’s exposure to external shocks. Curaçao’s imports remain concentrated on advanced markets, providing ample room to expand goods imports from neighboring countries, such as Brazil and Colombia. As a new associate CARICOM member and acknowledging limitation of independent trade policy given Kingdom laws, Curaçao should continue strengthening regional cooperation and trade integration with neighboring states.

    The authorities’ commitment to lower corruption vulnerabilities are welcome. The online gaming law has been approved by parliament in end-2024, an important step towards meeting the landspakket’s rule of law target. Curaçao’s recent accession to the UN Convention Against Corruption and delisting from the EU grey list of non-cooperative jurisdictions, following key legal updates in 2024, is another step in the right direction and opens doors for further international cooperation and bilateral tax treaties, as pursued by the authorities. The mutual evaluations of the AML/CFT frameworks for both Curaçao and Sint Maarten are underway, with results expected to be published in mid-July 2025.

    The Monetary Union of Curaçao and Sint Maarten

    The external balance of the Union is expected to improve, following a mild deterioration in 2024. The Union’s current account deficit widened to around 17 percent of GDP in 2024 driven by higher imports, mainly related to construction on Curaçao, and despite strong growth in tourism receipts. Going forward, stronger travel receipts, moderation in construction-related imports, and an increase in renewables would support a contraction of the Union’s current account deficit towards 10 percent of GDP in the medium term. The deficit will continue to be financed by private investment inflows and decumulation of assets abroad. The stock of international reserves would remain broadly stable and adequate over the medium term. Given still sizable deficits and a sustained real effective exchange rate appreciation, staff’s preliminary assessment suggests that the external position in 2024 was weaker than the level implied by fundamentals and desirable policies in Curaçao and broadly in line in Sint Maarten, albeit subject to high uncertainty given persistent measurement biases. The assessment for the Union is the same as for Curaçao due to its larger size and current account deficits.

    The monetary policy stance is appropriate and continues to support the peg. Following developments in the US, the CBCS cut its benchmark pledging rate by a cumulative 100 basis points in September and November 2024 to 4.75 percent, and has kept it unchanged since then, in line with the pegged exchange rate regime. Transmission to banking sector interest rates continues to be weak, as deposit rates stayed broadly constant throughout the recent tightening and easing cycles, with a mild uptick in late 2023 driven by time deposits, and Union lending rates declined between 2018 and end 2024. Excess liquidity is the key impediment to the transmission, further exacerbated by the absence of interbank and government securities markets.

    With lending rates declining, credit growth has accelerated, entirely driven by mortgages in Curaçao. Mortgage credit in the union, the second highest in the Caribbean, has been growing by double digits in real terms post pandemic, while real overall credit growth has been negative. Driven by Curaçao, mortgages are expected to remain on an upward trajectory, including financing for the construction of second homes and vacation rental apartments. In Sint Maarten, on the contrary, mortgage credit growth turned negative in 2024, possibly reflecting delays in construction projects and cross-border financing on the French side. With the islands’ financial sectors predominantly financing tourism-related activities, credit to non-tourism sectors is declining in real terms.

    The financial sector is broadly sound and systemic risks are contained, but mortgage growth needs to be monitored closely while a macroprudential toolkit is further developed. Banks are well capitalized, among the highest in the region, but both NPLs and provisioning remain weaker than the CBCS early warning signal – and with respect to peers. Liquidity is abundant and has further increased, but the Union’s banks are somewhat less profitable than the Caribbean median and concentration remains high. Closely monitoring mortgage growth to detect overheating in the real estate sector and possible vulnerabilities in household balance sheets should become a priority, in particular given continued data gaps. Overcoming these gaps and further developing a macroprudential toolkit towards the introduction of CCyBs, and thresholds for the loan-to-value and debt-service-to-income ratios are warranted to detect vulnerabilities and ensure timely response to potential shocks. Caps on mortgage credit growth or mortgage loan exposure could be applied should the positive mortgage credit gap widen further.

    The IMF mission would like to thank the authorities for their cooperation and the candid and constructive discussions that took place during June 18-25.

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Reah Sy

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/07/02/07022025-curacao-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Global Conference on Digital Economy underway in Beijing

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    BEIJING, July 2 (Xinhua) — High-ranking guests from China and abroad gathered in Beijing for the 2025 Global Conference on Digital Economy, calling for international cooperation to develop the digital economy and build “digital cities” around the world.

    Global industry leaders gathered at the event, which opened in the Chinese capital on Wednesday, to build consensus on digital development through city-level collaboration, technology innovation and adoption, and promoting inclusive and sustainable growth.

    Stressing the key role of digital technology in urban development, Zhuang Rongwen, director of the Office of the Central Cybersecurity and Information Technology Commission, said the internet has unique advantages that promote global cooperation.

    Cities around the world should leverage these advantages to strengthen exchanges and cooperation in the fields of digital economy and artificial intelligence, thereby creating a favorable environment and greater opportunities for their development, he said.

    Fu Hua, director general of Xinhua News Agency, noted that Xinhua, as China’s state media, has long been covering China’s digital development and is willing to expand cooperation with all interested parties in promoting the digital economy.

    Fu Hua said the news agency will strive to comprehensively cover China’s progress in developing digital cities and tell vivid stories about the interactions between cities in China and other countries.

    UNDP Resident Representative in China Beate Trankmann praised Beijing’s achievements in digital development. She noted that the Chinese capital has taken many innovative steps that have provided important lessons for the global community, such as using digital technologies to improve urban governance.

    “Beijing, as a pioneer in building a global digital city, has not only integrated the concept of digital adaptation into its urban development strategy, but also set an example for the world by introducing a number of innovative practices,” said Zhang Xiangchen, Deputy Director-General of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

    According to him, the transformation in the digital era represents not only technological breakthroughs, but also an evolution of the concept of global cooperation. Zhang Xiangchen promised that the WTO will continue to play its role as a connecting multilateral platform through which technological advances can more effectively contribute to human well-being and global development. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Public procurement: when Brussels finances Turkish and Iranian companies – E-002575/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002575/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    Some French people find it difficult to watch their taxes being used to pay for free motorways in Poland, trains in Spain or nursery assistants in Romania. For example, the Commission has earmarked EUR 1.5 billion for the Romanian border[1], EUR 419 million for railway infrastructure in Spain (Almeria)[2] and EUR 448 million for the training of nursery assistants in Romania[3].

    Brussels should ensure a European preference when awarding public contracts.

    In Spain, Romania and Greece, many EU public contracts are awarded or subcontracted to companies from non-EU countries that do not apply reciprocity or are not signatories to the GPA[4]. For example, EU taxpayers finance companies supplying pipes and water pipes manufactured in Türkiye (SMS), China and Iran (Hanyco).

    • 1.How does the Commission ascertain if products used for public contracts benefiting from EU subsidies are made in Europe or in a country with reciprocal access to public contracts?
    • 2.Why does the Commission not publish a list of the countries that have not offered reciprocal access to their public contracts in the last five years?[5]
    • 3.Will the Commission require tenders – regardless of the amount and percentage rule[6] – containing products from third countries that do not apply reciprocity to be excluded, whether or not those countries have signed the GPA?

    Submitted: 25.6.2025

    • [1] Border-Curtici-Simeria railway line. Total budget (2013-2023): €1 809 360 168.12; EU contribution: €1 537 956 142.91 (85 %), https://kohesio.ec.europa.eu/en/projects/Q3095706.
    • [2] Murcia-Almería railway line. Total budget: €523 966 300.00; EU contribution: €1 419 173 142.91 (80 %), https://kohesio.ec.europa.eu/en/projects/Q3159194.
    • [3] ‘Progress in the quality of alternative childcare’. EU contribution: €448 million out of a budget of €530 million, https://kohesio.ec.europa.eu/en/projects/Q3097484.
    • [4] WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm.
    • [5] Article 86(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU (water, energy, transport and postal services), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0025.
    • [6] Article 85(2): any tender submitted may be rejected where the proportion of the products originating in third countries exceeds 50 % of the total value of the products.
    Last updated: 2 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Public procurement: when Brussels finances Turkish and Iranian companies – E-002575/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002575/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Virginie Joron (PfE)

    Some French people find it difficult to watch their taxes being used to pay for free motorways in Poland, trains in Spain or nursery assistants in Romania. For example, the Commission has earmarked EUR 1.5 billion for the Romanian border[1], EUR 419 million for railway infrastructure in Spain (Almeria)[2] and EUR 448 million for the training of nursery assistants in Romania[3].

    Brussels should ensure a European preference when awarding public contracts.

    In Spain, Romania and Greece, many EU public contracts are awarded or subcontracted to companies from non-EU countries that do not apply reciprocity or are not signatories to the GPA[4]. For example, EU taxpayers finance companies supplying pipes and water pipes manufactured in Türkiye (SMS), China and Iran (Hanyco).

    • 1.How does the Commission ascertain if products used for public contracts benefiting from EU subsidies are made in Europe or in a country with reciprocal access to public contracts?
    • 2.Why does the Commission not publish a list of the countries that have not offered reciprocal access to their public contracts in the last five years?[5]
    • 3.Will the Commission require tenders – regardless of the amount and percentage rule[6] – containing products from third countries that do not apply reciprocity to be excluded, whether or not those countries have signed the GPA?

    Submitted: 25.6.2025

    • [1] Border-Curtici-Simeria railway line. Total budget (2013-2023): €1 809 360 168.12; EU contribution: €1 537 956 142.91 (85 %), https://kohesio.ec.europa.eu/en/projects/Q3095706.
    • [2] Murcia-Almería railway line. Total budget: €523 966 300.00; EU contribution: €1 419 173 142.91 (80 %), https://kohesio.ec.europa.eu/en/projects/Q3159194.
    • [3] ‘Progress in the quality of alternative childcare’. EU contribution: €448 million out of a budget of €530 million, https://kohesio.ec.europa.eu/en/projects/Q3097484.
    • [4] WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm.
    • [5] Article 86(2) of Directive 2014/25/EU (water, energy, transport and postal services), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0025.
    • [6] Article 85(2): any tender submitted may be rejected where the proportion of the products originating in third countries exceeds 50 % of the total value of the products.
    Last updated: 2 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Hundreds of jobs at risk as a result of sugar factory closure in Spain – E-002549/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002549/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mireia Borrás Pabón (PfE)

    On 27 May 2025, AB Azucarera Iberia S.L. announced a collective redundancy plan which will affect 251 employees across all its sites in Spain. The plan involves closing the La Bañeza (León) sugar factory and converting the Miranda de Ebro (Burgos) sugar factory into a cane sugar refinery.

    The sugar beet sector in Europe – and in Spain in particular – has been in profound crisis since 2018. High production costs, price volatility, imports and stagnation of sugar production and content as a result of reduced active substances are driving sugar production towards dire straits.

    Considering the above:

    • 1.Will the Commission change its current plant health policy in order to restore productivity and the sugar yield per hectare of sugar beet?
    • 2.Does the Commission intend to improve the safety net and risk management under the common market organisation to avoid a market crisis like the one in 2017-2020?
    • 3.Does the Commission intend to substantially change the preferential quotas under the future EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement to help stabilise the markets?

    Submitted: 25.6.2025

    Last updated: 2 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports – A10-0133/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports

    (2025/2037(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the report of 31 March 2022 by the Wise Persons Group on the Reform of the EU Customs Union entitled ‘Putting More Union in the European Customs: Ten proposals to make the EU Customs Union fit for a Geopolitical Europe’,

     having regard to its position of 13 March 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013[1],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ (COM(2025(0037),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937[2],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[3],

     having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’[4],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A10-0133/2025),

    A. whereas e-commerce has transformed how consumers purchase and engage with businesses worldwide, unlocking unprecedented opportunities; whereas e-commerce presents significant challenges to the EU’s competitiveness and raises concerns over consumer rights and health and safety, particularly as certain product categories raise urgent concerns regarding their impact on vulnerable consumer groups; whereas it has an environmental impact, particularly through increased waste generation and carbon emissions resulting from transportation and logistics; whereas e-commerce has an impact on retailers’ attractiveness and therefore contributes to the hollowing out of city centres; whereas e-commerce also has social implications, particularly concerning working conditions in the warehousing and delivery sector;

    B. whereas over 75 % of EU consumers shop online; whereas the continued growth of e-commerce enhances consumer access, quality and price competition; whereas e-commerce lowers market entry barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs, fosters digital inclusion, supports underserved communities, and contributes to innovation, productivity and economic growth across the single market;

    C. whereas, with the surge in e-commerce imports, mainly coming from China, non-compliant sellers evading regulatory costs and undermining law-abiding businesses through means such as counterfeiting, have intensified unfair competition; whereas there is an urgent need to re-establish a level playing field for all businesses, especially SMEs; whereas it is crucial to ensure that enforcement efforts are adequately funded and equipped at both national and EU level, while avoiding excessive delegation of enforcement responsibilities to private actors;

    D. whereas European companies, namely SMEs, must comply with strict regulations and compete on an unlevel playing field with non-EU e-commerce platforms that avoid these obligations; whereas European companies dedicate material and human resources to ensure regulatory compliance, assuming significant administrative and financial burdens;

    E. whereas certain non-EU companies fail to comply with European data protection regulations, which guarantee a high level of privacy for consumers, by engaging in consumer profiling practices using personal data; whereas enhanced enforcement and cooperation is required to ensure consistent privacy protections for all consumers;

    F. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her 2024-2029 political guidelines, referred to the need to tackle challenges with online platforms to ensure that consumers and businesses alike benefit from a level playing field based on effective customs, tax and safety controls and sustainability standards, and tasked several Executive Vice-Presidents and Commissioners with fulfilling that mission;

    G. whereas the process of adapting the EU acquis to the online environment began several years ago, and numerous laws on products, consumer protection and product safety now include provisions to ensure robust safeguards in the digital landscape; whereas, notwithstanding these efforts, critical shortcomings persist in empowering authorities to hold the full supply chain accountable and ensure consumer protection, which need to be urgently addressed;

    H. whereas the Digital Services Act[5] (DSA), the General Product Safety Regulation[6] (GPSR), the Market Surveillance Regulation[7] (MSR) and the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (CPC)[8] contribute to a safer and fair e-commerce environment, if well implemented and enforced; whereas, despite these laws, consumer and other organisations, as well as national authorities, have raised concerns over the large number of unsafe products detected in the EU that fail to comply with EU legislation on product safety and environmental and chemical standards; whereas better funding of and coordination among Member States’ enforcement authorities are essential to address these risks effectively;

    I. whereas e-commerce may significantly impact consumers by providing them with unparalleled convenience, access to diverse products and competitive pricing; whereas e-commerce also exposes consumers to risks such as unsafe products, a lack of transparency and manipulative practices that exploit their vulnerabilities;

    J. whereas the protection of consumers is essential to the functioning of the EU’s internal market, as it ensures trust and fairness in commercial practices, thereby enabling sustainable economic growth and innovation; whereas addressing these concerns is important in promoting transparency, fairness and the responsible development of digital services and e-commerce;

    K. whereas people from more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, including low-income families and children, are more exposed to the risks posed by unsafe products due to their lower prices, aggressive marketing and widespread distribution;

    L. whereas concerns over the suitability of customs procedures under the current Union Customs Code[9] for e-commerce were a significant driver of the Commission’s customs reform package, including the legislative proposals on the revision of the Union Customs Code and establishing an EU Customs Authority (UCC reform), and the removal of the EUR 150 exemption threshold (de minimis) for the payment of customs duties and VAT on imported products;

    M. whereas customs authorities are in need of substantial investments, particularly to ensure a sufficient number of properly trained staff to guarantee the functioning of EU customs systems, which are facing an exponential increase in demand for customs checks; whereas without the necessary investments in staff, digital solutions cannot achieve benefits in terms of efficiency and harmonisation;

    N. whereas advanced screening technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, could significantly enhance the capacity of customs and market surveillance authorities to flag high-risk shipments and automate compliance checks at scale; whereas investment in such technologies remains fragmented and uneven across Member States; whereas increased EU-level funding, coordination and efforts to ensure interoperability are essential to accelerate their deployment and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms;

    O. whereas digital tools, such as artificial intelligence and the internet of things, can help track non-compliant products, but must respect consumer privacy and must not lead to the general monitoring of users;

    P. whereas the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on a comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce, highlights that the volume of e-commerce goods bought by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms is expected to continue growing rapidly, benefiting from the current customs duty exemption for low-value consignments (up to EUR 150);

    The surge in non-compliant goods in e-commerce

    1. Highlights the increasingly high number of purchases being made by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms in business-to-consumer environments and in emerging manufacturer-to-consumer and direct-to-consumer environments; emphasises, as described in the Letta report on the future of the single market[10], that the circulation of harmful products in the single market is escalating and that EU consumers are wasting EUR 19.3 billion per year buying dangerous products that can lead to injuries and that are detrimental to our economies;

    2. Notes that 4.6 billion e-commerce items under the EUR 150 exemption threshold were imported into the EU in 2024, 91 % of which originated from China, amounting to up to 12 million small e-commerce items per day and amounting to almost twice the number recorded in 2023 (2.4 billion) and more than triple the number in 2022 (1.4 billion); notes that this surge has exacerbated compliance challenges, especially in product safety, and that market surveillance authorities and independent investigations have reported alarming non-compliance rates;

    3. Stresses that most unsafe and illegal products are shipped to the EU in large volumes of individual, and often small, parcels sold to EU consumers via online platforms from non-EU countries, in particular China; stresses that such products are difficult to control, in particular for customs authorities at the entry points, which are mostly located at major ports and logistical airports for e-commerce; emphasises that this makes it almost impossible to stop such products from entering the EU and makes it increasingly difficult for market surveillance authorities to detect and remove such products from the internal market and for consumer authorities to do so once the products reach EU consumers;

    4. Stresses that the rapid growth of e-commerce has significant environmental implications due to issues such as a rise in packaging waste, the larger carbon footprint from low-quality and short life cycle products and their shipment, and problems with waste management and non-recyclable materials; underlines, in this respect, the need to ensure compliance with environmental legislation and to encourage sustainable ways of consuming;

    5. Stresses that some non-EU online marketplaces are facing allegations regarding the use of forced labour; underlines, in this respect, that Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibits products made with forced labour from entering the EU market, and that it must be effectively enforced after its application, including for online sales;

    6. Notes that, on 1 December 2025, Regulation No 2023/2411[11] on the protection of geographical indications for craft and industrial products will come into force; notes that, if not accompanied by adequate promotion and protection, especially with respect to the markets of non-EU countries, geographical indications risk remaining ineffective; calls, therefore, on the Commission, together with the customs authorities of the Member States, to strengthen checks aimed at intercepting products that violate the rules on geographical indications;

    7. Is concerned that the prevailing business model of certain major non-EU online platforms is based on the rapid, large-scale production and distribution of fast fashion and ultra-fast fashion products, prioritising speed and low cost over sustainability, safety and quality; regrets that many such products do not comply with EU legislation, yet non-compliant sellers frequently evade meaningful enforcement or sanctions; stresses that such practices constitute a form of social and environmental dumping, resulting in a persistent and unfair competitive advantage for these non-EU platforms, exerting disproportionate pressure on European undertakings, in particular SMEs and micro-enterprises; emphasises that this hampers the development of the EU’s textile and clothing sector;

    E-commerce crossroads: navigating compliance challenges

    8. Recognises that the EU has established a robust compliance framework, which also applies to products sold online, but that greater efforts are still needed for the full enforcement of the compliance framework; underlines, in this respect, the importance of the DSA, the DMA, the MSR, the GPSR, consumer protection rules and various product and environmental laws; emphasises that market surveillance authorities face challenges in applying these frameworks to online platforms as evidenced by the Commission’s recently published evaluation report on the implementation of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and, in particular, in cases where large quantities of a product are sold in small consignments; considers that the thorough implementation of the DSA and other regulatory acquis is necessary to combat unsafe, non-compliant and counterfeit products;

    9. Stresses the need to implement the existing compliance framework and evaluate these measures when considering new legislation, including new obligations for online marketplaces;

    10. Notes that conducting physical tests is particularly impractical for small parcels sent directly to the final consumer and that customs authorities will therefore continue to rely primarily on checking the documentation, rather than inspecting the products themselves;

    11. Highlights the significant enforcement gaps caused by the limited resources and insufficient level of digitalisation of customs and market surveillance authorities, the lack of human resources and harmonised and interoperable technological tools across Member States, and the insufficient data sharing and overall lack of cooperation and coordination between customs authorities, platforms and market surveillance entities; acknowledges that physical inspections are unavoidably and inherently limited given the volume of e-commerce parcels entering the EU;

    12. Considers that mystery shopping exercises by market surveillance authorities, as put forward in the Commission communication on e-commerce, are an important tool to verify compliance for products sold through online platforms; stresses, however, that if sellers are based outside the EU or are not traceable and if fake addresses are used for responsible persons, there is no liable legal entity and it is impossible for market surveillance authorities to take enforcement actions;

    13. Considers that EU manufacturers and retailers, particularly SMEs, face unfair competition due to non-EU platforms enabling non-EU manufacturers and their non-compliant products to easily enter the EU market, bypassing applicable regulations and standards; highlights that, while EU manufacturers must comply with strict safety, environmental and quality rules, many low-value products sold through these platforms evade customs and market surveillance checks due to the way they are shipped to the EU; raises concerns that some of these platforms and non-EU traders deliberately exploit this loophole, allowing non-compliant imports to enter the EU single market unchecked, putting European manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers at a disadvantage, weakening their competitiveness and hindering their ability to innovate, which could lead to the closure of many micro-enterprises and small enterprises;

    14. Stresses that EU manufacturers are de facto subject to significantly stricter market surveillance compared to non-EU manufactures that reach EU consumers via e-commerce platforms; deeply regrets the loss of market share and jobs caused by the influx of cheaper products that do not comply with European standards, particularly on safety and quality, as well as other illegal products, shipped from non-EU countries, directly affecting EU SMEs and the strength of EU companies and their capacity to invest and maintain profitability;

    15. Highlights the difference between online platforms acting as intermediaries and those acting as importers; notes, in particular, that the EU e-commerce platforms that act as importers face compliance costs that increase their retail prices up to 40 %, which has an impact on final consumers; underlines that EU-based importers face stricter obligations and higher costs, while intermediary platforms allow non-EU sellers to ship directly to EU consumers without ensuring compliance;

    16. Recognises that e-commerce platforms are subject to various obligations under the DSA and the GPSR and may be held liable under the Product Liability Directive[12] (PLD) in specific circumstances; recalls, in this respect, that online platforms are liable if they do not respect their specific obligations as intermediaries; believes, however, that consumer redress must be ensured in all cases; underlines, in this respect, that where the manufacturer is established outside the EU and no importer, authorised representative, or fulfilment service provider can be identified, online marketplaces should provide adequate and proportionate remedies to consumers where they fail to comply with the DSA, particularly with Articles 30 and 31 or with Article 22 of the GPSR;

    17. Emphasises that online marketplaces are requested to trace their traders (‘know your business customer’) under the DSA, which should discourage traders from selling unsafe or counterfeit goods, and are obliged to comply with the ‘compliance by design’ rules to increase overall traceability; highlights the lack of accountability of online platforms in case of untraceable sellers or sellers based outside the jurisdiction of the EU; notes the considerable level of non-compliance with the ‘know your business customer’ principle and the rise in new selling practices via social media platforms, where this obligation is not effectively applied, allowing non-EU sellers to offer non-compliant goods to EU users directly; stresses, therefore, the need for online platforms to make best efforts to ensure full traceability of sellers and products, preventing listings from appearing without verified product compliance details;

    18. Highlights the fact that the information of a responsible economic operator in the EU under the GPSR, acting on behalf of a non-EU trader or platform, is often wrong or missing; notes that even when this information is available, the responsible person in the EU may not be accountable, particularly when the responsible person is an authorised representative; is concerned that market surveillance authorities report significant difficulties in contacting these non-EU traders and enforcing EU law, and that even when contact is established, enforcing penalties against them is often unfeasible;

    19. Considers that creating a database of the responsible persons in the EU to enable real-time cross-checking for verification, along with establishing an accreditation procedure for them, could enhance transparency and reinforce accountability throughout the e-commerce import supply chain;

    20. Supports research and enforcement actions by consumer organisations and the opening of investigations initiated by consumer authorities in the EU, as part of the CPC network, as well as under the DSA, against non-EU online platforms for potential violations of EU product safety and consumer laws; expresses concern over the slow progress of these investigations and calls for their swift conclusion; underlines the need for enforcement to be a deterrent that includes adequate sanctions to ensure compliance; underlines, in this respect, that particular attention is necessary at national and EU level to address recurrent non-compliance that may have been identified in previous controls of similar products, including via the application of interim measures; stresses that the enforcement and effectiveness of commitments received from online platforms should be closely monitored;

    21. Urges the Commission and CPC authorities to initiate a structured enforcement dialogue with consumer representatives, traders and other stakeholders to identify systemic infringements requiring stronger enforcement;

    22. Notes the complexity for EU authorities to enforce EU laws when the economic operators are established outside the EU; highlights the need for enhanced international cooperation agreements, particularly with major e-commerce exporters;

    Strong enforcement policies to combat non-compliant e-commerce products

    Urgent need for short-term measures

    23. Urges the Member States to increase funding and resources for market surveillance, customs, consumer protection and digital services authorities so that they can better address the challenges posed by unsafe and illicit products; asks the Commission to support stronger cooperation, information sharing and data exchange between competent authorities, including market surveillance and customs authorities, and stresses that cooperation across different sectors should be improved; urges the Member States to ensure effective coordination among different market surveillance authorities in their territories, and to strengthen the powers of the single liaison offices; highlights that the Member States and the EU have the responsibility to ensure that market surveillance and customs authorities are properly resourced, trained and equipped to have the capacity to fulfil their mission, including proper investigative powers;

    24. Calls on market surveillance authorities to invest more resources in joint or coordinated activities with other Member States or relevant authorities and, in particular, to increase the number and the frequency of coordinated enforcement actions such as sweeps, mystery-shopping exercises and peer-reviews; urges relevant authorities to actively participate in these activities and the Commission to make full use of its coordination powers;

    25. Welcomes the Commission’s intention to coordinate the control of customs and market surveillance authorities under priority control areas focused on products from non-EU countries that pose significant safety hazards and a risk of non-compliance; emphasises that this initiative should generate valuable risk profile data, which could be used in further enforcement activities and penalties to non-compliant actors; calls on the Commission to strengthen cooperation within the EU Product Compliance Network and to increase EU funding for customs cooperation under the customs programme and for market surveillance operations under the single market programme; stresses that the lack of adequate resources has hindered the effective deployment of tools, such as the widespread use of mystery shopping activities by market surveillance authorities or the use of trusted flaggers under the DSA; points out to the Commission that, in addition to existing testing facilities for toys and radio equipment, more testing facilities for e-commerce goods are urgently needed, such as for batteries, textiles, cosmetics, electrical appliances and other products; asks the Member States to deploy sufficient resources to guarantee an increased capacity of testing facilities and to increase investments in equipment for the detection of unsafe and illegal goods;

    26. Emphasises that for data and security reasons, Member States should restrict high-risk vendors from operating in their critical infrastructure and border security systems, including for the procurement of security screening and cargo scanning equipment used at airports and ports;

    27. Highlights the fact that, under the GPSR, online marketplaces are obliged to establish a single point of contact, register with the Safety Gate Portal and indicate the information concerning their single contact point on the portal; asks the Commission to effectively enforce this and other obligations of online marketplaces and to support the Member States’ market surveillance authorities in implementing the GPSR and the MSR; notes that the GPSR introduced direct data exchanges between enforcement authorities and e-commerce platforms; believes, however, that in order for the system to work effectively, a direct link with customs authorities should be provided;

    28. Notes that the current system is more reactive than preventive, as authorities intervene only after dangerous products have already been sold to consumers, rather than preventing their distribution; recalls that, under the GPSR, online marketplace providers are encouraged to check products against the Safety Gate Portal before listing them on their interfaces; underlines that random sampling testing can only be efficient if it is conducted regularly;

    29. Emphasises that the swift implementation of the Digital Product Passport (DPP) for several critical products sold online is essential to strengthen the enforcement of existing legislation; urges the Commission to present the necessary secondary legislation on the DPP as soon as possible, in particular for textiles, toys, cosmetics, electronics and other products with high non-compliance rates and associated risks; calls on the Commission to continuously assess the requirements, technical design and operation of the DPP under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation[13] (ESPR) as a priority; calls on the Commission to support businesses, in particular micro-enterprises and SMEs, in the implementation of the DPP;

    30. Proposes a mandatory DPP with early compliance verification for all products imported via e-commerce, including detailed quality and compliance data, to be integrated directly into the EU customs data hub, allowing authorities to pre-screen information on products before they are placed on the single market;

    31. Urges the Member States to make substantial efforts to increase customs controls and improve risk analysis, as the detection and removal of non-compliant goods can reduce the harm to EU consumers and protect the economic interests of EU businesses; underlines that the introduction in the customs risk analysis of a presumption of non-compliance for goods identical to those already found non-compliant could facilitate controls by customs authorities and improve cost efficiency; stresses the importance of reinforcing customs centres so they are better equipped to handle the large volume of small parcels that are difficult to control using traditional methods, including advanced screening technologies to identify suspicious packages at entry points; asks for more rigorous compliance checks, as well as random checks by the authorities on high-tonnage transport; urges the Member States, furthermore, to significantly increase the level of digitalisation of import procedures in customs authorities in order to implement existing legislation and accelerate customs procedures, especially in view of the high numbers of parcels;

    32. Underlines that businesses, particularly SMEs, urgently require clear guidelines from the Commission for the effective implementation of the GPSR, including clarification on its interplay with overlapping legislation, such as the DSA, the MSR, the PLD, and sector-specific laws on toys, cosmetics and detergents; calls on the Commission to issue these guidelines before the end of the first half of 2025 to facilitate businesses’ compliance; considers that the evaluation report on the interaction of the DSA with other legal acts, which is due on 17 November 2025, should take into account different legislation, in particular on product compliance, the obligations of online marketplaces, enforcement rules and possible future improvements on simplification and implementation; calls on the Commission to assess all possible further actions, including the evaluation of sectoral legislation, which is necessary to ensure legal predictability and that no legal loopholes or enforcement gaps are left when it comes to direct imports from non-EU countries via online marketplaces;

    33. Calls on the relevant national authorities to make full use of the existing and recently adopted enforcement toolbox, especially in relation to provisions on e-commerce set out in the MSR, GPSR and DSA, such as takedown orders, prohibition, restriction on the making available of a product on the market or its removal, recalls and sanctions as measures to counter the rise of illegal and non-compliant imports from non-EU countries;

    34. Underlines that regulatory enforcement measures taken against non-compliant actors should not put disproportionate burdens on compliant actors or cause unintentional harm to the second-hand market;

    35. Stresses the need to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights in the light of the increase in non-European counterfeit goods on e-commerce platforms; notes that these practices harm the competitiveness of European companies and pose risks to innovation and the incentives for research and development; calls for stronger measures against the sale of counterfeit goods online; urges the Commission to issue clear guidelines on trusted flaggers and stresses that rights holders should be recognised as eligible trusted flaggers when they meet the criteria outlined in Article 22 of the DSA;

    36. Points out that the Member States should make better use of the available sets of penalties and sanctions against economic operators, as well as other available tools including interim measures, in order to create a deterrent effect to dissuade economic operators from infringing upon the applicable legislation;

    37. Urges the Commission to take effective measures, including legislative measures where legal loopholes are clearly identified, without delay to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field for European companies, placing particular emphasis on SMEs;

    The need for regulatory reforms

    38. Calls for the removal of barriers to enforcing consumer rights, such as legal warranty claims and the right to return items; calls on the Commission to review the CPC Regulation without delay as this will be fundamental for a more effective cross-border enforcement of EU consumer law and the fight against unsafe products; asks the Commission, in this context, to provide for clear measures to further strengthen enforcement powers over non-EU traders and platforms and ensure better coordination of EU and national actions and the exchange of information among authorities, as well as with authorities in non-EU countries; highlights that the structure of the European Competition Network could be used as an example to follow for enforcement and information exchange in the case of suspected violations impacting multiple Member States, especially to combat non-compliant products effectively; stresses the importance of granting the Commission direct powers to investigate and sanction certain high impact breaches of consumer law, thus ensuring more effective, simultaneous and uniform enforcement and sanctions under EU consumer law;

    39. Notes that the CPC Regulation already empowers enforcement authorities to act against non-compliant traders and even gives the possibility for Member States to impose penalties and interim measures such as restricting access to the website; acknowledges, however, that the limitation is that this action must be taken on a country-by-country basis rather than at EU level, with each country applying its own penalties, making the consequences of violations uneven;

    40. Notes that enforcement in the Member States is fragmented, which leads to inefficiencies; calls for better coordination of enforcement and compliance oversight effective information exchange between Member States and for a more uniform application of the EU acquis; calls on the Commission to assess the MSR, particularly the need for an EU Market Surveillance Authority that would ensure consistency and provide operational support to the activities conducted by the relevant national market surveillance authorities and foster cooperation with the new EU Customs Authority (EUCA), as well as the implementation of Article 4 of the MSR, defining the responsible economic operators in the EU for product compliance; stresses that, to date, the designated responsible economic operator often lacks the capacity to provide redress or compensation to consumers, in particular when being an authorised representative;

    41. Supports the Commission’s ambition to swiftly advance the upcoming interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament and the Council on the UCC reform and the two proposals for Council acts on removing the exemption threshold on customs duties for goods valued under EUR 150; urges, therefore, the Member States to accelerate the negotiation procedure in the Council, recognising the urgency of the customs reform for EU competitiveness and the protection of EU consumers; underlines, however, that removing the threshold is a necessary step but not a stand-alone solution, as customs authorities will still only be able to inspect a limited percentage of parcels; stresses that immediate removal of the customs duty exemption is necessary for high-risk imports from product and consumer safety perspectives; emphasises the need for the customs reform to ensure coherence across regulatory frameworks, particularly avoiding duplication or conflicts with the DSA, and highlights the essential role customs authorities play in detecting non-compliant and unsafe products;

    42. Stresses that the UCC reform will provide the necessary tools for customs authorities to better supervise and control the goods entering the EU, help to strengthen the single market and customs union, improve the detection of unsafe and illicit products, and contribute to a level playing field among economic operators; welcomes, in this respect, the proposal under the UCC Regulation to establish the cooperation mechanism with market surveillance authorities that will improve the effectiveness of product controls; emphasises the importance of enhancing customs infrastructure and staffing to manage e-commerce effectively; highlights the need for simplified compliance processes tailored specifically to SMEs; calls on the Member States to introduce automated, forward-looking customs clearing systems, for instance by obliging platforms to enrol and clear customs automatically at the point of sales;

    43. Is concerned that some non-EU traders are circumventing EU customs checks by clearing goods by customs at the point of origin; stresses that those non-EU trading companies often prefer to pay penalties rather than open packages upon arrival at EU customs, aiming to unload shipments and depart immediately; is deeply concerned that customs authorities find that many packages are either undeclared or incorrectly declared and are sometimes fraudulently labelled; highlights that the UCC reform should also address these aspects;

    44. Takes note of the concern expressed by the ECC network regarding the drop-shipping business model, which raises challenges in consumer protection, product safety and regulatory compliance; regrets that consumers often face misleading practices, difficulties in returning products, and unexpected import duties, while a significant share of drop-shipped products fail to comply with EU safety standards; stresses that drop-shipping complicates enforcement due to untraceable businesses and cross-border complexities, while VAT and data protection compliance remain key concerns; notes that when combined with influencer marketing, drop-shipping may exacerbate transparency issues, reputational risks and inconsistent outcomes; calls on the Commission to assess how to address drop-shipping-related issues;

    45. Highlights the fact that the concept of a ‘deemed importer’ aims to ensure a level playing field for both EU and non-EU online platforms; notes that, in the context of an online sale from outside the EU, this measure would relieve customers of non-EU online platforms from being considered importers, as they are under the current UCC, while a non-EU platform or trader would instead be considered the ‘deemed importer’; believes that ‘deemed importer’ responsibilities should be clearly defined and consistent with the provisions of the DSA; emphasises that platforms being responsible for ensuring that VAT and customs duties are collected at the point of sale, rather than upon entry into the EU, will reduce fraud and tax evasion;

    46. Expresses concern about the optional nature of the Import One-Stop Shop (IOSS) scheme for all online operators, which deviates from the original objectives of the VAT in the digital age (ViDA) initiative; underlines the necessity of additional actions to strengthen the system’s robustness and curb potential misuse; urges the Commission to engage closely with stakeholders to establish safeguards for the IOSS against fraudulent practices; recommends that such safeguards be both comprehensive and streamlined to effectively deter fraud while avoiding excessive administrative burdens; stresses the necessity of extending the IOSS applicability to goods beyond the customs duty exemption threshold of EUR 150 to prevent undervaluation and ensure fair competition;

    47. Calls for the establishment of a new EUCA in 2026 to provide expert support to the Member States’ customs authorities; underlines that the EUCA should in its coordination role also map testing and control capabilities of customs and market surveillance authorities in and across the Member States and be mandated to execute unannounced inspections to detect possible unsafe or non-compliant products and issue sanctions in case of non-compliance; notes that the new EU customs data hub will allow for enhanced cooperation between the EUCA and customs and other authorities through data exchange and the interoperability of national IT systems, and thus facilitate coordinated controls and the detection of non-compliant products; considers that it is essential to fully integrate the functionalities of the Customs Single Window into the EU customs data hub; notes in the context of the proposed EUCA, the importance of regularly consulting representatives of various stakeholders to provide early warning to the EUCA;

    48. Stresses that, given the urgency, the entry into force of different obligations planned in the UCC revision should be accelerated, such as the establishment of the EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to immediately start the preparatory work necessary for the establishment of the EU customs data hub, so as to speed up the preparation of its e-commerce functions in 2026;

    49. Urges the Commission to carry out an impact assessment regarding the idea of e-commerce items being shipped to the EU in bulk and, in turn, the establishment of warehouses in the EU by non-EU traders for such goods before they are put into parcels for delivery to customers; recognises that such shipments of e-commerce items in bulk and their storage in warehouses in the EU might increase the oversight of customs and market surveillance authorities and improve their controls and detection of non-compliant goods compared to single parcel shipments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all possible options to incentivise such practices, including a simplified status for trust and check traders and cost-benefit assessments for incentive schemes; further notes that bulk shipping may not be feasible for all non-EU traders, particularly those operating consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or second-hand models; emphasises that this approach should strike a balance between the compliance advantages and the practical requirements of e-commerce operators, ensuring that it avoids creating logistical bottlenecks or placing an undue burden on varying business models;

    50. Acknowledges that the Commission has released a non-paper outlining the introduction of a non-discriminatory handling fee on e-commerce items, to be charged by customs authorities for goods sold in distance sales with the aim of covering the increased supervisory costs of custom authorities, namely the checking of the data, carrying out risk analysis, performing documentary and physical controls and specifically the financing of the EUCA and the data hub; insists that Member States should avoid unilateral fees to avoid a fragmentation of the customs union; underlines that the proposal suggests a flat EUR 2 rate per item delivered directly to the customer or a smaller 50 cent fee for Trust and Check Traders operating a business model of a customs warehouse for distance sales within the EU; calls on the Commission to conduct a proper evaluation of whether the proposed amount complies with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and whether it is sufficient and proportionate to reach the objectives; insists that this handling fee not be incurred by the consumer;

    51. Notes the enormous waste management and product destruction cost arising from the huge amount of non-compliant and unsafe products imported via non-EU country e-commerce; underlines that a large share of these products is non-recyclable, environmentally harmful or non-compliant with applicable chemicals legislation, further driving up environmental costs for public authorities; calls therefore on the Commission to evaluate the necessary measures to mitigate the environmental impact of non-EU countries’ e-commerce activities including the feasibility of a waste management fee on all products sold via non-EU countries’ online marketplaces to ensure that environmental costs are not supported by EU taxpayers;

    52. Stresses that inconsistent penalties and different enforcement strategies for non-compliance in different Member States lead to ‘border shopping’ or ‘customs shopping’; supports the minimum harmonisation of infringements and non-criminal sanctions for non-compliance across the Member States and through the EUCA as this would avoid creating weak entry points in the EU customs territory; stresses that this should entail a common framework for minimum harmonisation to close existing loopholes and thus tackle e-commerce challenges; underlines that Member States can impose additional sanctions tailored to national contexts;

    53. Notes that the Commission is scrutinising certain non-EU online marketplaces for employing manipulative practices, including dark patterns, addictive design features, deceptive influencer marketing, and the dissemination of fake or misleading online reviews; recognises that, according to the Digital Fairness Fitness Check report, unfair commercial practices cost consumers nearly EUR 8 billion annually, and that the use of unfair techniques to pressure consumers, especially vulnerable ones and children, into impulse purchases leads to overconsumption and overspending; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act, unless they are already covered by existing legislation, with a view to effectively tackling unfair practices and closing existing legal loopholes, while staying consistent with existing legal frameworks and avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens;

    54. Emphasises the need to ensure that any new initiatives proposed by the Commission in the area of customs enforcement or compliance do not result in additional administrative burdens for European businesses, particularly SMEs;

    55. Stresses the importance of the role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in the field of cross-border investigations of customs offences, which notably include fraud, for example the illicit undervaluing of the price of products in order to avoid paying the import taxes; emphasises that the large-scale circumvention of customs duties, including fraudulent e-commerce declarations and undervaluation, as well as the avoidance of controls and ‘forum shopping,’ must be effectively combated through criminal law investigations conducted by the EPPO, with the support of customs authorities; stresses that the EPPO’s robust legal framework for cross-border investigations should be leveraged to dismantle the criminal networks behind such operations;

    Additional enforcement actions

    56. Calls on the Commission and the national competent authorities to strongly enforce the DSA with regard to the responsibility of online marketplaces, in particular their obligations in terms of recommender systems, interface design, right to information, the compliance by design rules to increase the overall traceability, and their ‘know your business customer’ obligation; highlights that compliance with these obligations should dissuade non-compliant traders from offering their products in the EU through marketplaces or shopping services of social media falling in this category, and calls on the Commission to provide practical support in tracing traders that do not abide by EU rules; stresses the need for a DSA-based network of trusted flaggers for illegal products and e-commerce to ensure that platforms fulfil their obligations effectively;

    57. Stresses that the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with national competent authorities is crucial; asks for more cooperation among all relevant authorities, such as Member State authorities, customs authorities, and consumer protection authorities, and for stronger coordination among all established expert groups; stresses that, under the DSA, the investigative actions against non-compliant online marketplaces need to yield results and lead to deterrent sanctions in order to prevent the offer of non-compliant products; emphasises the importance of these investigations in addressing systemic risks, compliance failures, illegal content dissemination, addictive design features, dark patterns and the use of influencers for manipulative advertising;

    58. Calls on enforcement authorities to strengthen monitoring and enforcement actions targeting new sales channels; recommends that competent authorities be equipped with adequate resources, technological tools, and cross-border cooperation mechanisms to effectively identify and take action against non-compliant traders operating via social media and other emerging platforms;

    59. Suggests that online marketplace sellers must provide a reshipping address and contact point within the EU to allow consumers to easily return non-compliant goods without undue costs and to allow authorities to inspect goods; believes that online marketplaces should be responsible for checking this and should be held accountable for enforcement;

    60. Calls for an urgent in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the provision of the ‘responsible person for products placed on the Union market’, particularly those of non-EU traders, building on the results of the evaluation report on Article 4 of the MSR; calls on the Commission to consider among its future actions the introduction of a mandatory requirement for non-EU traders to appoint a responsible person in the EU with increased legal and financial liability;

    61. Notes that postal and other delivery services are undergoing significant transformations due to the rapid growth of e-commerce; raises concerns that the Universal Postal Union’s terminal dues system in practice does not apply to e-commerce flows; notes that, as a result, Chinese e-commerce businesses, due to shipment volumes, enter into commercial agreements directly with the EU postal operators for exceptionally attractive delivery rates that are lower than those for goods manufactured within the EU, leading to deeper fragmentation of the single market for postal services; urges the Commission to evaluate the impact of e-commerce on postal services and the internal market, and to consider how postal services can contribute to strengthening the single market and benefiting consumers, and to the overall competitiveness of the EU;

    62. Welcomes the approval of the ViDA reforms, which represent a significant step towards modernising VAT collection in the e-commerce sector; emphasises the importance of the Single VAT ID for online marketplaces and for European manufacturers, enabling them to compete on a level playing field by simplifying VAT compliance across the Member States; highlights that this measure can also facilitate in-bulk importation and the warehousing of goods within the EU, reducing reliance on fragmented cross-border shipments and ensuring that value-added services, such as fulfilment and logistics, take place within the single market; stresses that these reforms will enhance tax compliance, reduce administrative burdens, and improve enforcement while supporting fair competition and strengthening EU supply chains; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of these measures to maximise their benefits for European businesses and consumers;

    63. Calls on the Commission to consider measures aimed at reducing the unnecessary regulatory and administrative compliance burden for EU manufacturers, in particular for SMEs, in order to level the playing field and enable them to better compete with global competitors operating under more efficient compliance standards;

    64. Calls on the Commission to enhance international cooperation with other like-minded countries to exchange best practices, identify common challenges and risks and develop joint actions on e-commerce;

    65. Welcomes, in this regard, the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce; notes that the agreement will benefit consumers and businesses by facilitating cross-border electronic transactions, reducing barriers to digital trade and promoting innovation in e-commerce; underlines, however, that the agreement is only a foundation and encourages the Commission to pursue ambitious trade agreements in negotiations with partners to ensure binding provisions on e-commerce;

    Increased use of IT tools

    66. Welcomes the fact that the Commission is preparing a project to streamline existing databases, including the Information and Communication System on Market Surveillance, the EU Safety Gate and the Customs Risk Management System, into a common interoperable system gathering all information on the safety of products, counterfeit product tracking and notifications of accidents and to ensure interoperability with the DPP and the future EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to publish information regarding the implementation timeline and the resource requirements of this initiative;

    67. Supports the Commission’s aim to provide market surveillance authorities with the e-Surveillance WebCrawler tool to flag reappearing dangerous products; asks the Commission to make available another web crawler for detecting new listings as soon as possible, in order to flag non-compliant products before they reach consumers;

    68. Supports the responsible use of artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things for scanning and analysing product listings on e-commerce platforms, automating customs and market surveillance inspections and risk identification and integrating product compliance databases for real-time checks between market surveillance and customs authorities, in line with EU and national laws; notes, however, that the high implementation costs of these technologies remain a barrier; underlines that the full uptake of these technologies will make handling more efficient, especially for low-value goods, and that the high volume of parcels containing many different items faces limited inspection capabilities;

    69. Demands that the Commission and the Member States exchange best practices and find incentives to provide the necessary funding and support for national authorities in order to increase the responsible use of technological solutions; suggests that artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things could be used to scan and analyse product listings on e-commerce platforms, automate inspections and risk profiling, and integrate product compliance databases for real-time checks by several authorities;

    70. Underlines that Member States should reinforce customs checks in particular with low-value shipments by implementing risk-based assessment systems and digital tracking to prevent non-compliant products from bypassing customs controls; calls on the Member States to increase the level of automated processes, such as automated scans of labels when processing parcels at customs;

    71. Recognises that some online marketplaces also use a number of IT tools to detect and remove unsafe and illicit products that are found on their platforms; highlights, however, the fact that online marketplaces need to further invest in and increase their use of these IT tools to effectively avoid the offer and sale of unsafe and illicit products; calls on the Commission to further incentivise the use of IT tools by online marketplaces in this regard, while ensuring full compliance with Article 8 of the DSA, which provides that there is no general obligation to monitor the information that providers of intermediary services transmit or store;

    72. Suggests that, without prejudice to the principle enshrined in the DSA that providers of intermediary services online should not be subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of general nature, online intermediaries engaged in the sale, promotion or distribution of products within the EU market should consider on their own the use of risk-based digital monitoring systems to identify and prevent the presence of illegal content (presentation, description or offering for sale of illegal or dangerous products); stresses the importance of implementing swift response mechanisms to ensure the permanent removal of specific illegal content as soon as providers of intermediary services online have actual knowledge of such illegal content being presented on their interfaces, as well as the necessity for hosting service providers to take all necessary measures to prevent the reappearance of the same or equivalent illegal content on their platform;

    Improvement of consumer awareness and information

    73. Emphasises that EU consumers and European SMEs engaged in importing activities often lack sufficient information on the possible dangers of potentially unsafe products and the harm they can cause; stresses that consumers are increasingly targeted by traders who, despite their legal obligations, often do not inform consumers that their products are made and shipped from outside of the EU; acknowledges that there is demand among EU consumers for cheaper products, which are purchased on non-EU online marketplaces due to their much lower production costs and uncompetitive conditions for EU businesses and online platforms; stresses that online marketplaces may use manipulative design techniques (dark patterns) to influence purchasing decisions; warns against the risks associated with compulsive purchasing behaviours, financial difficulties and the accumulation of unnecessary goods; calls on the Commission and the Member States to organise information and awareness-raising campaigns on the purchase of unsafe products online and their possible health, privacy, environmental and competitiveness consequences, with a special focus on vulnerable consumers and at peak consumption times;

    74. Recommends fostering second-hand consumption as a sustainable approach to addressing EU consumers’ need for affordable goods; stresses the importance of promoting and incentivising the reuse of second-hand products as an important driver for unlocking the potential of the circular economy;

    75. Asks the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the ecodesign requirements for textiles and other products under the ESPR, as well as the provisions of the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition[14] in order to make sure that consumers are better informed about sustainability aspects, such as environmental impacts, energy use, reparability and durability of products purchased on online marketplaces;

    76. Considers that consumer authorities, organisations, industry associations and chambers of commerce should be encouraged to conduct large, coordinated awareness-raising campaigns on consumer rights, potential risks, including the possibilities for collective redress, and redress mechanisms when purchasing online, in particular on non-EU online platforms; stresses the need to also raise awareness about the environmental, health and social impacts of unsustainable business practices and to alert consumers about the role of new advertising techniques, such as influencers and digital opinion leaders, in shaping perceptions of product safety and reliability; calls on the Commission to take a coordinating role as mentioned in the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on e-commerce and to explore possibilities to finance cross-border information campaigns developed in cooperation with researchers, civil society and other relevant stakeholders;

    Trade and development considerations

    77. Calls on the Commission to implement its level of ambition in agreements with international partners at the multilateral level, as unsafe products constitute not only a European, but also a global challenge; reiterates that, as set out in Parliament’s position on the UCC revision, the EUCA should establish working arrangements with the authorities of non-EU countries and international organisations; stresses that such arrangements should enable the EUCA to exchange information, including best practices, with non-EU authorities and international organisations, and to carry out joint activities; supports continued engagement in the UN Trade and Development working group on consumer product safety, which plays a crucial role in developing best practices for cross-border enforcement;

    78. Calls on the Commission to step up cooperation with international partners, within forums such as the WTO, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the G7, to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure reciprocity and rules-based trade; calls on the Commission to explicitly incorporate robust and enforceable obligations addressing forced labour when reviewing and renegotiating current trade and investment agreements; underscores the need for stronger EU-China cooperation mechanisms and transparent certification requirements to ensure compliance;

    79. Highlights the need to consider service and product safety and regulatory compliance provisions when negotiating future EU trade agreements; stresses the importance of specific regulatory dialogues and cooperation through administrative arrangements, improved customs enforcement cooperation, the traceability of shipments to the highest standards and enhanced data-sharing arrangements between customs authorities to effectively tackle non-compliant imports;

    80. Urges the Commission to be proactive and swiftly deploy targeted trade defence instruments, including anti-subsidy investigations, to address the adverse impacts on European businesses; emphasises that such actions must be coordinated closely with key international partners, to ensure effective global enforcement and reciprocal market fairness;

    81. Encourages the Commission to enhance diplomatic efforts and cooperation within international forums, particularly the WTO, the WCO and the G7, to counterbalance China’s strategic expansion into digital governance frameworks, including its Digital Silk Road initiative; stresses the need for open, more transparent and responsible digital trade rules in international standard-setting bodies to prevent internet fragmentation and mitigate the risks posed by restrictive digital governance models;

    82. Welcomes the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce as a vital step towards global digital trade rules; stresses, however, its current limitations, especially regarding customs transparency; urges the Commission to advocate stronger binding provisions to ensure its effective implementation and integration into the WTO legal framework, and to ensure enhanced global compliance standards;

    83. Emphasises the need for international capacity-building initiatives to support the sustainable and compliant participation of developing countries in digital trade; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with international organisations, especially the WTO, to enhance regulatory frameworks and technical assistance for e-commerce in developing countries;

    °

    ° °

    84. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports – A10-0133/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on product safety and regulatory compliance in e-commerce and non-EU imports

    (2025/2037(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the report of 31 March 2022 by the Wise Persons Group on the Reform of the EU Customs Union entitled ‘Putting More Union in the European Customs: Ten proposals to make the EU Customs Union fit for a Geopolitical Europe’,

     having regard to its position of 13 March 2024 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Union Customs Code and the European Union Customs Authority, and repealing Regulation (EU) No 952/2013[1],

     having regard to the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘A comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce’ (COM(2025(0037),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2024 on prohibiting products made with forced labour on the Union market and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937[2],

     having regard to Directive (EU) 2024/1760 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on corporate sustainability due diligence and amending Directive (EU) 2019/1937 and Regulation (EU) 2023/2859[3],

     having regard to the report of April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market: Speed, Security, Solidarity – Empowering the Single Market to deliver a sustainable future and prosperity for all EU Citizens’[4],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on International Trade,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection (A10-0133/2025),

    A. whereas e-commerce has transformed how consumers purchase and engage with businesses worldwide, unlocking unprecedented opportunities; whereas e-commerce presents significant challenges to the EU’s competitiveness and raises concerns over consumer rights and health and safety, particularly as certain product categories raise urgent concerns regarding their impact on vulnerable consumer groups; whereas it has an environmental impact, particularly through increased waste generation and carbon emissions resulting from transportation and logistics; whereas e-commerce has an impact on retailers’ attractiveness and therefore contributes to the hollowing out of city centres; whereas e-commerce also has social implications, particularly concerning working conditions in the warehousing and delivery sector;

    B. whereas over 75 % of EU consumers shop online; whereas the continued growth of e-commerce enhances consumer access, quality and price competition; whereas e-commerce lowers market entry barriers for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and entrepreneurs, fosters digital inclusion, supports underserved communities, and contributes to innovation, productivity and economic growth across the single market;

    C. whereas, with the surge in e-commerce imports, mainly coming from China, non-compliant sellers evading regulatory costs and undermining law-abiding businesses through means such as counterfeiting, have intensified unfair competition; whereas there is an urgent need to re-establish a level playing field for all businesses, especially SMEs; whereas it is crucial to ensure that enforcement efforts are adequately funded and equipped at both national and EU level, while avoiding excessive delegation of enforcement responsibilities to private actors;

    D. whereas European companies, namely SMEs, must comply with strict regulations and compete on an unlevel playing field with non-EU e-commerce platforms that avoid these obligations; whereas European companies dedicate material and human resources to ensure regulatory compliance, assuming significant administrative and financial burdens;

    E. whereas certain non-EU companies fail to comply with European data protection regulations, which guarantee a high level of privacy for consumers, by engaging in consumer profiling practices using personal data; whereas enhanced enforcement and cooperation is required to ensure consistent privacy protections for all consumers;

    F. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, in her 2024-2029 political guidelines, referred to the need to tackle challenges with online platforms to ensure that consumers and businesses alike benefit from a level playing field based on effective customs, tax and safety controls and sustainability standards, and tasked several Executive Vice-Presidents and Commissioners with fulfilling that mission;

    G. whereas the process of adapting the EU acquis to the online environment began several years ago, and numerous laws on products, consumer protection and product safety now include provisions to ensure robust safeguards in the digital landscape; whereas, notwithstanding these efforts, critical shortcomings persist in empowering authorities to hold the full supply chain accountable and ensure consumer protection, which need to be urgently addressed;

    H. whereas the Digital Services Act[5] (DSA), the General Product Safety Regulation[6] (GPSR), the Market Surveillance Regulation[7] (MSR) and the Consumer Protection Cooperation Regulation (CPC)[8] contribute to a safer and fair e-commerce environment, if well implemented and enforced; whereas, despite these laws, consumer and other organisations, as well as national authorities, have raised concerns over the large number of unsafe products detected in the EU that fail to comply with EU legislation on product safety and environmental and chemical standards; whereas better funding of and coordination among Member States’ enforcement authorities are essential to address these risks effectively;

    I. whereas e-commerce may significantly impact consumers by providing them with unparalleled convenience, access to diverse products and competitive pricing; whereas e-commerce also exposes consumers to risks such as unsafe products, a lack of transparency and manipulative practices that exploit their vulnerabilities;

    J. whereas the protection of consumers is essential to the functioning of the EU’s internal market, as it ensures trust and fairness in commercial practices, thereby enabling sustainable economic growth and innovation; whereas addressing these concerns is important in promoting transparency, fairness and the responsible development of digital services and e-commerce;

    K. whereas people from more disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, including low-income families and children, are more exposed to the risks posed by unsafe products due to their lower prices, aggressive marketing and widespread distribution;

    L. whereas concerns over the suitability of customs procedures under the current Union Customs Code[9] for e-commerce were a significant driver of the Commission’s customs reform package, including the legislative proposals on the revision of the Union Customs Code and establishing an EU Customs Authority (UCC reform), and the removal of the EUR 150 exemption threshold (de minimis) for the payment of customs duties and VAT on imported products;

    M. whereas customs authorities are in need of substantial investments, particularly to ensure a sufficient number of properly trained staff to guarantee the functioning of EU customs systems, which are facing an exponential increase in demand for customs checks; whereas without the necessary investments in staff, digital solutions cannot achieve benefits in terms of efficiency and harmonisation;

    N. whereas advanced screening technologies, such as artificial intelligence and blockchain, could significantly enhance the capacity of customs and market surveillance authorities to flag high-risk shipments and automate compliance checks at scale; whereas investment in such technologies remains fragmented and uneven across Member States; whereas increased EU-level funding, coordination and efforts to ensure interoperability are essential to accelerate their deployment and improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of enforcement mechanisms;

    O. whereas digital tools, such as artificial intelligence and the internet of things, can help track non-compliant products, but must respect consumer privacy and must not lead to the general monitoring of users;

    P. whereas the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on a comprehensive EU toolbox for safe and sustainable e-commerce, highlights that the volume of e-commerce goods bought by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms is expected to continue growing rapidly, benefiting from the current customs duty exemption for low-value consignments (up to EUR 150);

    The surge in non-compliant goods in e-commerce

    1. Highlights the increasingly high number of purchases being made by EU consumers on non-EU online platforms in business-to-consumer environments and in emerging manufacturer-to-consumer and direct-to-consumer environments; emphasises, as described in the Letta report on the future of the single market[10], that the circulation of harmful products in the single market is escalating and that EU consumers are wasting EUR 19.3 billion per year buying dangerous products that can lead to injuries and that are detrimental to our economies;

    2. Notes that 4.6 billion e-commerce items under the EUR 150 exemption threshold were imported into the EU in 2024, 91 % of which originated from China, amounting to up to 12 million small e-commerce items per day and amounting to almost twice the number recorded in 2023 (2.4 billion) and more than triple the number in 2022 (1.4 billion); notes that this surge has exacerbated compliance challenges, especially in product safety, and that market surveillance authorities and independent investigations have reported alarming non-compliance rates;

    3. Stresses that most unsafe and illegal products are shipped to the EU in large volumes of individual, and often small, parcels sold to EU consumers via online platforms from non-EU countries, in particular China; stresses that such products are difficult to control, in particular for customs authorities at the entry points, which are mostly located at major ports and logistical airports for e-commerce; emphasises that this makes it almost impossible to stop such products from entering the EU and makes it increasingly difficult for market surveillance authorities to detect and remove such products from the internal market and for consumer authorities to do so once the products reach EU consumers;

    4. Stresses that the rapid growth of e-commerce has significant environmental implications due to issues such as a rise in packaging waste, the larger carbon footprint from low-quality and short life cycle products and their shipment, and problems with waste management and non-recyclable materials; underlines, in this respect, the need to ensure compliance with environmental legislation and to encourage sustainable ways of consuming;

    5. Stresses that some non-EU online marketplaces are facing allegations regarding the use of forced labour; underlines, in this respect, that Regulation (EU) 2024/3015 prohibits products made with forced labour from entering the EU market, and that it must be effectively enforced after its application, including for online sales;

    6. Notes that, on 1 December 2025, Regulation No 2023/2411[11] on the protection of geographical indications for craft and industrial products will come into force; notes that, if not accompanied by adequate promotion and protection, especially with respect to the markets of non-EU countries, geographical indications risk remaining ineffective; calls, therefore, on the Commission, together with the customs authorities of the Member States, to strengthen checks aimed at intercepting products that violate the rules on geographical indications;

    7. Is concerned that the prevailing business model of certain major non-EU online platforms is based on the rapid, large-scale production and distribution of fast fashion and ultra-fast fashion products, prioritising speed and low cost over sustainability, safety and quality; regrets that many such products do not comply with EU legislation, yet non-compliant sellers frequently evade meaningful enforcement or sanctions; stresses that such practices constitute a form of social and environmental dumping, resulting in a persistent and unfair competitive advantage for these non-EU platforms, exerting disproportionate pressure on European undertakings, in particular SMEs and micro-enterprises; emphasises that this hampers the development of the EU’s textile and clothing sector;

    E-commerce crossroads: navigating compliance challenges

    8. Recognises that the EU has established a robust compliance framework, which also applies to products sold online, but that greater efforts are still needed for the full enforcement of the compliance framework; underlines, in this respect, the importance of the DSA, the DMA, the MSR, the GPSR, consumer protection rules and various product and environmental laws; emphasises that market surveillance authorities face challenges in applying these frameworks to online platforms as evidenced by the Commission’s recently published evaluation report on the implementation of Article 4 of Regulation (EU) 2019/1020 and, in particular, in cases where large quantities of a product are sold in small consignments; considers that the thorough implementation of the DSA and other regulatory acquis is necessary to combat unsafe, non-compliant and counterfeit products;

    9. Stresses the need to implement the existing compliance framework and evaluate these measures when considering new legislation, including new obligations for online marketplaces;

    10. Notes that conducting physical tests is particularly impractical for small parcels sent directly to the final consumer and that customs authorities will therefore continue to rely primarily on checking the documentation, rather than inspecting the products themselves;

    11. Highlights the significant enforcement gaps caused by the limited resources and insufficient level of digitalisation of customs and market surveillance authorities, the lack of human resources and harmonised and interoperable technological tools across Member States, and the insufficient data sharing and overall lack of cooperation and coordination between customs authorities, platforms and market surveillance entities; acknowledges that physical inspections are unavoidably and inherently limited given the volume of e-commerce parcels entering the EU;

    12. Considers that mystery shopping exercises by market surveillance authorities, as put forward in the Commission communication on e-commerce, are an important tool to verify compliance for products sold through online platforms; stresses, however, that if sellers are based outside the EU or are not traceable and if fake addresses are used for responsible persons, there is no liable legal entity and it is impossible for market surveillance authorities to take enforcement actions;

    13. Considers that EU manufacturers and retailers, particularly SMEs, face unfair competition due to non-EU platforms enabling non-EU manufacturers and their non-compliant products to easily enter the EU market, bypassing applicable regulations and standards; highlights that, while EU manufacturers must comply with strict safety, environmental and quality rules, many low-value products sold through these platforms evade customs and market surveillance checks due to the way they are shipped to the EU; raises concerns that some of these platforms and non-EU traders deliberately exploit this loophole, allowing non-compliant imports to enter the EU single market unchecked, putting European manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers at a disadvantage, weakening their competitiveness and hindering their ability to innovate, which could lead to the closure of many micro-enterprises and small enterprises;

    14. Stresses that EU manufacturers are de facto subject to significantly stricter market surveillance compared to non-EU manufactures that reach EU consumers via e-commerce platforms; deeply regrets the loss of market share and jobs caused by the influx of cheaper products that do not comply with European standards, particularly on safety and quality, as well as other illegal products, shipped from non-EU countries, directly affecting EU SMEs and the strength of EU companies and their capacity to invest and maintain profitability;

    15. Highlights the difference between online platforms acting as intermediaries and those acting as importers; notes, in particular, that the EU e-commerce platforms that act as importers face compliance costs that increase their retail prices up to 40 %, which has an impact on final consumers; underlines that EU-based importers face stricter obligations and higher costs, while intermediary platforms allow non-EU sellers to ship directly to EU consumers without ensuring compliance;

    16. Recognises that e-commerce platforms are subject to various obligations under the DSA and the GPSR and may be held liable under the Product Liability Directive[12] (PLD) in specific circumstances; recalls, in this respect, that online platforms are liable if they do not respect their specific obligations as intermediaries; believes, however, that consumer redress must be ensured in all cases; underlines, in this respect, that where the manufacturer is established outside the EU and no importer, authorised representative, or fulfilment service provider can be identified, online marketplaces should provide adequate and proportionate remedies to consumers where they fail to comply with the DSA, particularly with Articles 30 and 31 or with Article 22 of the GPSR;

    17. Emphasises that online marketplaces are requested to trace their traders (‘know your business customer’) under the DSA, which should discourage traders from selling unsafe or counterfeit goods, and are obliged to comply with the ‘compliance by design’ rules to increase overall traceability; highlights the lack of accountability of online platforms in case of untraceable sellers or sellers based outside the jurisdiction of the EU; notes the considerable level of non-compliance with the ‘know your business customer’ principle and the rise in new selling practices via social media platforms, where this obligation is not effectively applied, allowing non-EU sellers to offer non-compliant goods to EU users directly; stresses, therefore, the need for online platforms to make best efforts to ensure full traceability of sellers and products, preventing listings from appearing without verified product compliance details;

    18. Highlights the fact that the information of a responsible economic operator in the EU under the GPSR, acting on behalf of a non-EU trader or platform, is often wrong or missing; notes that even when this information is available, the responsible person in the EU may not be accountable, particularly when the responsible person is an authorised representative; is concerned that market surveillance authorities report significant difficulties in contacting these non-EU traders and enforcing EU law, and that even when contact is established, enforcing penalties against them is often unfeasible;

    19. Considers that creating a database of the responsible persons in the EU to enable real-time cross-checking for verification, along with establishing an accreditation procedure for them, could enhance transparency and reinforce accountability throughout the e-commerce import supply chain;

    20. Supports research and enforcement actions by consumer organisations and the opening of investigations initiated by consumer authorities in the EU, as part of the CPC network, as well as under the DSA, against non-EU online platforms for potential violations of EU product safety and consumer laws; expresses concern over the slow progress of these investigations and calls for their swift conclusion; underlines the need for enforcement to be a deterrent that includes adequate sanctions to ensure compliance; underlines, in this respect, that particular attention is necessary at national and EU level to address recurrent non-compliance that may have been identified in previous controls of similar products, including via the application of interim measures; stresses that the enforcement and effectiveness of commitments received from online platforms should be closely monitored;

    21. Urges the Commission and CPC authorities to initiate a structured enforcement dialogue with consumer representatives, traders and other stakeholders to identify systemic infringements requiring stronger enforcement;

    22. Notes the complexity for EU authorities to enforce EU laws when the economic operators are established outside the EU; highlights the need for enhanced international cooperation agreements, particularly with major e-commerce exporters;

    Strong enforcement policies to combat non-compliant e-commerce products

    Urgent need for short-term measures

    23. Urges the Member States to increase funding and resources for market surveillance, customs, consumer protection and digital services authorities so that they can better address the challenges posed by unsafe and illicit products; asks the Commission to support stronger cooperation, information sharing and data exchange between competent authorities, including market surveillance and customs authorities, and stresses that cooperation across different sectors should be improved; urges the Member States to ensure effective coordination among different market surveillance authorities in their territories, and to strengthen the powers of the single liaison offices; highlights that the Member States and the EU have the responsibility to ensure that market surveillance and customs authorities are properly resourced, trained and equipped to have the capacity to fulfil their mission, including proper investigative powers;

    24. Calls on market surveillance authorities to invest more resources in joint or coordinated activities with other Member States or relevant authorities and, in particular, to increase the number and the frequency of coordinated enforcement actions such as sweeps, mystery-shopping exercises and peer-reviews; urges relevant authorities to actively participate in these activities and the Commission to make full use of its coordination powers;

    25. Welcomes the Commission’s intention to coordinate the control of customs and market surveillance authorities under priority control areas focused on products from non-EU countries that pose significant safety hazards and a risk of non-compliance; emphasises that this initiative should generate valuable risk profile data, which could be used in further enforcement activities and penalties to non-compliant actors; calls on the Commission to strengthen cooperation within the EU Product Compliance Network and to increase EU funding for customs cooperation under the customs programme and for market surveillance operations under the single market programme; stresses that the lack of adequate resources has hindered the effective deployment of tools, such as the widespread use of mystery shopping activities by market surveillance authorities or the use of trusted flaggers under the DSA; points out to the Commission that, in addition to existing testing facilities for toys and radio equipment, more testing facilities for e-commerce goods are urgently needed, such as for batteries, textiles, cosmetics, electrical appliances and other products; asks the Member States to deploy sufficient resources to guarantee an increased capacity of testing facilities and to increase investments in equipment for the detection of unsafe and illegal goods;

    26. Emphasises that for data and security reasons, Member States should restrict high-risk vendors from operating in their critical infrastructure and border security systems, including for the procurement of security screening and cargo scanning equipment used at airports and ports;

    27. Highlights the fact that, under the GPSR, online marketplaces are obliged to establish a single point of contact, register with the Safety Gate Portal and indicate the information concerning their single contact point on the portal; asks the Commission to effectively enforce this and other obligations of online marketplaces and to support the Member States’ market surveillance authorities in implementing the GPSR and the MSR; notes that the GPSR introduced direct data exchanges between enforcement authorities and e-commerce platforms; believes, however, that in order for the system to work effectively, a direct link with customs authorities should be provided;

    28. Notes that the current system is more reactive than preventive, as authorities intervene only after dangerous products have already been sold to consumers, rather than preventing their distribution; recalls that, under the GPSR, online marketplace providers are encouraged to check products against the Safety Gate Portal before listing them on their interfaces; underlines that random sampling testing can only be efficient if it is conducted regularly;

    29. Emphasises that the swift implementation of the Digital Product Passport (DPP) for several critical products sold online is essential to strengthen the enforcement of existing legislation; urges the Commission to present the necessary secondary legislation on the DPP as soon as possible, in particular for textiles, toys, cosmetics, electronics and other products with high non-compliance rates and associated risks; calls on the Commission to continuously assess the requirements, technical design and operation of the DPP under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation[13] (ESPR) as a priority; calls on the Commission to support businesses, in particular micro-enterprises and SMEs, in the implementation of the DPP;

    30. Proposes a mandatory DPP with early compliance verification for all products imported via e-commerce, including detailed quality and compliance data, to be integrated directly into the EU customs data hub, allowing authorities to pre-screen information on products before they are placed on the single market;

    31. Urges the Member States to make substantial efforts to increase customs controls and improve risk analysis, as the detection and removal of non-compliant goods can reduce the harm to EU consumers and protect the economic interests of EU businesses; underlines that the introduction in the customs risk analysis of a presumption of non-compliance for goods identical to those already found non-compliant could facilitate controls by customs authorities and improve cost efficiency; stresses the importance of reinforcing customs centres so they are better equipped to handle the large volume of small parcels that are difficult to control using traditional methods, including advanced screening technologies to identify suspicious packages at entry points; asks for more rigorous compliance checks, as well as random checks by the authorities on high-tonnage transport; urges the Member States, furthermore, to significantly increase the level of digitalisation of import procedures in customs authorities in order to implement existing legislation and accelerate customs procedures, especially in view of the high numbers of parcels;

    32. Underlines that businesses, particularly SMEs, urgently require clear guidelines from the Commission for the effective implementation of the GPSR, including clarification on its interplay with overlapping legislation, such as the DSA, the MSR, the PLD, and sector-specific laws on toys, cosmetics and detergents; calls on the Commission to issue these guidelines before the end of the first half of 2025 to facilitate businesses’ compliance; considers that the evaluation report on the interaction of the DSA with other legal acts, which is due on 17 November 2025, should take into account different legislation, in particular on product compliance, the obligations of online marketplaces, enforcement rules and possible future improvements on simplification and implementation; calls on the Commission to assess all possible further actions, including the evaluation of sectoral legislation, which is necessary to ensure legal predictability and that no legal loopholes or enforcement gaps are left when it comes to direct imports from non-EU countries via online marketplaces;

    33. Calls on the relevant national authorities to make full use of the existing and recently adopted enforcement toolbox, especially in relation to provisions on e-commerce set out in the MSR, GPSR and DSA, such as takedown orders, prohibition, restriction on the making available of a product on the market or its removal, recalls and sanctions as measures to counter the rise of illegal and non-compliant imports from non-EU countries;

    34. Underlines that regulatory enforcement measures taken against non-compliant actors should not put disproportionate burdens on compliant actors or cause unintentional harm to the second-hand market;

    35. Stresses the need to ensure the protection of intellectual property rights in the light of the increase in non-European counterfeit goods on e-commerce platforms; notes that these practices harm the competitiveness of European companies and pose risks to innovation and the incentives for research and development; calls for stronger measures against the sale of counterfeit goods online; urges the Commission to issue clear guidelines on trusted flaggers and stresses that rights holders should be recognised as eligible trusted flaggers when they meet the criteria outlined in Article 22 of the DSA;

    36. Points out that the Member States should make better use of the available sets of penalties and sanctions against economic operators, as well as other available tools including interim measures, in order to create a deterrent effect to dissuade economic operators from infringing upon the applicable legislation;

    37. Urges the Commission to take effective measures, including legislative measures where legal loopholes are clearly identified, without delay to ensure legal certainty and a level playing field for European companies, placing particular emphasis on SMEs;

    The need for regulatory reforms

    38. Calls for the removal of barriers to enforcing consumer rights, such as legal warranty claims and the right to return items; calls on the Commission to review the CPC Regulation without delay as this will be fundamental for a more effective cross-border enforcement of EU consumer law and the fight against unsafe products; asks the Commission, in this context, to provide for clear measures to further strengthen enforcement powers over non-EU traders and platforms and ensure better coordination of EU and national actions and the exchange of information among authorities, as well as with authorities in non-EU countries; highlights that the structure of the European Competition Network could be used as an example to follow for enforcement and information exchange in the case of suspected violations impacting multiple Member States, especially to combat non-compliant products effectively; stresses the importance of granting the Commission direct powers to investigate and sanction certain high impact breaches of consumer law, thus ensuring more effective, simultaneous and uniform enforcement and sanctions under EU consumer law;

    39. Notes that the CPC Regulation already empowers enforcement authorities to act against non-compliant traders and even gives the possibility for Member States to impose penalties and interim measures such as restricting access to the website; acknowledges, however, that the limitation is that this action must be taken on a country-by-country basis rather than at EU level, with each country applying its own penalties, making the consequences of violations uneven;

    40. Notes that enforcement in the Member States is fragmented, which leads to inefficiencies; calls for better coordination of enforcement and compliance oversight effective information exchange between Member States and for a more uniform application of the EU acquis; calls on the Commission to assess the MSR, particularly the need for an EU Market Surveillance Authority that would ensure consistency and provide operational support to the activities conducted by the relevant national market surveillance authorities and foster cooperation with the new EU Customs Authority (EUCA), as well as the implementation of Article 4 of the MSR, defining the responsible economic operators in the EU for product compliance; stresses that, to date, the designated responsible economic operator often lacks the capacity to provide redress or compensation to consumers, in particular when being an authorised representative;

    41. Supports the Commission’s ambition to swiftly advance the upcoming interinstitutional negotiations with Parliament and the Council on the UCC reform and the two proposals for Council acts on removing the exemption threshold on customs duties for goods valued under EUR 150; urges, therefore, the Member States to accelerate the negotiation procedure in the Council, recognising the urgency of the customs reform for EU competitiveness and the protection of EU consumers; underlines, however, that removing the threshold is a necessary step but not a stand-alone solution, as customs authorities will still only be able to inspect a limited percentage of parcels; stresses that immediate removal of the customs duty exemption is necessary for high-risk imports from product and consumer safety perspectives; emphasises the need for the customs reform to ensure coherence across regulatory frameworks, particularly avoiding duplication or conflicts with the DSA, and highlights the essential role customs authorities play in detecting non-compliant and unsafe products;

    42. Stresses that the UCC reform will provide the necessary tools for customs authorities to better supervise and control the goods entering the EU, help to strengthen the single market and customs union, improve the detection of unsafe and illicit products, and contribute to a level playing field among economic operators; welcomes, in this respect, the proposal under the UCC Regulation to establish the cooperation mechanism with market surveillance authorities that will improve the effectiveness of product controls; emphasises the importance of enhancing customs infrastructure and staffing to manage e-commerce effectively; highlights the need for simplified compliance processes tailored specifically to SMEs; calls on the Member States to introduce automated, forward-looking customs clearing systems, for instance by obliging platforms to enrol and clear customs automatically at the point of sales;

    43. Is concerned that some non-EU traders are circumventing EU customs checks by clearing goods by customs at the point of origin; stresses that those non-EU trading companies often prefer to pay penalties rather than open packages upon arrival at EU customs, aiming to unload shipments and depart immediately; is deeply concerned that customs authorities find that many packages are either undeclared or incorrectly declared and are sometimes fraudulently labelled; highlights that the UCC reform should also address these aspects;

    44. Takes note of the concern expressed by the ECC network regarding the drop-shipping business model, which raises challenges in consumer protection, product safety and regulatory compliance; regrets that consumers often face misleading practices, difficulties in returning products, and unexpected import duties, while a significant share of drop-shipped products fail to comply with EU safety standards; stresses that drop-shipping complicates enforcement due to untraceable businesses and cross-border complexities, while VAT and data protection compliance remain key concerns; notes that when combined with influencer marketing, drop-shipping may exacerbate transparency issues, reputational risks and inconsistent outcomes; calls on the Commission to assess how to address drop-shipping-related issues;

    45. Highlights the fact that the concept of a ‘deemed importer’ aims to ensure a level playing field for both EU and non-EU online platforms; notes that, in the context of an online sale from outside the EU, this measure would relieve customers of non-EU online platforms from being considered importers, as they are under the current UCC, while a non-EU platform or trader would instead be considered the ‘deemed importer’; believes that ‘deemed importer’ responsibilities should be clearly defined and consistent with the provisions of the DSA; emphasises that platforms being responsible for ensuring that VAT and customs duties are collected at the point of sale, rather than upon entry into the EU, will reduce fraud and tax evasion;

    46. Expresses concern about the optional nature of the Import One-Stop Shop (IOSS) scheme for all online operators, which deviates from the original objectives of the VAT in the digital age (ViDA) initiative; underlines the necessity of additional actions to strengthen the system’s robustness and curb potential misuse; urges the Commission to engage closely with stakeholders to establish safeguards for the IOSS against fraudulent practices; recommends that such safeguards be both comprehensive and streamlined to effectively deter fraud while avoiding excessive administrative burdens; stresses the necessity of extending the IOSS applicability to goods beyond the customs duty exemption threshold of EUR 150 to prevent undervaluation and ensure fair competition;

    47. Calls for the establishment of a new EUCA in 2026 to provide expert support to the Member States’ customs authorities; underlines that the EUCA should in its coordination role also map testing and control capabilities of customs and market surveillance authorities in and across the Member States and be mandated to execute unannounced inspections to detect possible unsafe or non-compliant products and issue sanctions in case of non-compliance; notes that the new EU customs data hub will allow for enhanced cooperation between the EUCA and customs and other authorities through data exchange and the interoperability of national IT systems, and thus facilitate coordinated controls and the detection of non-compliant products; considers that it is essential to fully integrate the functionalities of the Customs Single Window into the EU customs data hub; notes in the context of the proposed EUCA, the importance of regularly consulting representatives of various stakeholders to provide early warning to the EUCA;

    48. Stresses that, given the urgency, the entry into force of different obligations planned in the UCC revision should be accelerated, such as the establishment of the EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to immediately start the preparatory work necessary for the establishment of the EU customs data hub, so as to speed up the preparation of its e-commerce functions in 2026;

    49. Urges the Commission to carry out an impact assessment regarding the idea of e-commerce items being shipped to the EU in bulk and, in turn, the establishment of warehouses in the EU by non-EU traders for such goods before they are put into parcels for delivery to customers; recognises that such shipments of e-commerce items in bulk and their storage in warehouses in the EU might increase the oversight of customs and market surveillance authorities and improve their controls and detection of non-compliant goods compared to single parcel shipments; calls on the Commission and the Member States to consider all possible options to incentivise such practices, including a simplified status for trust and check traders and cost-benefit assessments for incentive schemes; further notes that bulk shipping may not be feasible for all non-EU traders, particularly those operating consumer-to-consumer (C2C) or second-hand models; emphasises that this approach should strike a balance between the compliance advantages and the practical requirements of e-commerce operators, ensuring that it avoids creating logistical bottlenecks or placing an undue burden on varying business models;

    50. Acknowledges that the Commission has released a non-paper outlining the introduction of a non-discriminatory handling fee on e-commerce items, to be charged by customs authorities for goods sold in distance sales with the aim of covering the increased supervisory costs of custom authorities, namely the checking of the data, carrying out risk analysis, performing documentary and physical controls and specifically the financing of the EUCA and the data hub; insists that Member States should avoid unilateral fees to avoid a fragmentation of the customs union; underlines that the proposal suggests a flat EUR 2 rate per item delivered directly to the customer or a smaller 50 cent fee for Trust and Check Traders operating a business model of a customs warehouse for distance sales within the EU; calls on the Commission to conduct a proper evaluation of whether the proposed amount complies with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, and whether it is sufficient and proportionate to reach the objectives; insists that this handling fee not be incurred by the consumer;

    51. Notes the enormous waste management and product destruction cost arising from the huge amount of non-compliant and unsafe products imported via non-EU country e-commerce; underlines that a large share of these products is non-recyclable, environmentally harmful or non-compliant with applicable chemicals legislation, further driving up environmental costs for public authorities; calls therefore on the Commission to evaluate the necessary measures to mitigate the environmental impact of non-EU countries’ e-commerce activities including the feasibility of a waste management fee on all products sold via non-EU countries’ online marketplaces to ensure that environmental costs are not supported by EU taxpayers;

    52. Stresses that inconsistent penalties and different enforcement strategies for non-compliance in different Member States lead to ‘border shopping’ or ‘customs shopping’; supports the minimum harmonisation of infringements and non-criminal sanctions for non-compliance across the Member States and through the EUCA as this would avoid creating weak entry points in the EU customs territory; stresses that this should entail a common framework for minimum harmonisation to close existing loopholes and thus tackle e-commerce challenges; underlines that Member States can impose additional sanctions tailored to national contexts;

    53. Notes that the Commission is scrutinising certain non-EU online marketplaces for employing manipulative practices, including dark patterns, addictive design features, deceptive influencer marketing, and the dissemination of fake or misleading online reviews; recognises that, according to the Digital Fairness Fitness Check report, unfair commercial practices cost consumers nearly EUR 8 billion annually, and that the use of unfair techniques to pressure consumers, especially vulnerable ones and children, into impulse purchases leads to overconsumption and overspending; calls on the Commission to address these issues in the upcoming Digital Fairness Act, unless they are already covered by existing legislation, with a view to effectively tackling unfair practices and closing existing legal loopholes, while staying consistent with existing legal frameworks and avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens;

    54. Emphasises the need to ensure that any new initiatives proposed by the Commission in the area of customs enforcement or compliance do not result in additional administrative burdens for European businesses, particularly SMEs;

    55. Stresses the importance of the role of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) in the field of cross-border investigations of customs offences, which notably include fraud, for example the illicit undervaluing of the price of products in order to avoid paying the import taxes; emphasises that the large-scale circumvention of customs duties, including fraudulent e-commerce declarations and undervaluation, as well as the avoidance of controls and ‘forum shopping,’ must be effectively combated through criminal law investigations conducted by the EPPO, with the support of customs authorities; stresses that the EPPO’s robust legal framework for cross-border investigations should be leveraged to dismantle the criminal networks behind such operations;

    Additional enforcement actions

    56. Calls on the Commission and the national competent authorities to strongly enforce the DSA with regard to the responsibility of online marketplaces, in particular their obligations in terms of recommender systems, interface design, right to information, the compliance by design rules to increase the overall traceability, and their ‘know your business customer’ obligation; highlights that compliance with these obligations should dissuade non-compliant traders from offering their products in the EU through marketplaces or shopping services of social media falling in this category, and calls on the Commission to provide practical support in tracing traders that do not abide by EU rules; stresses the need for a DSA-based network of trusted flaggers for illegal products and e-commerce to ensure that platforms fulfil their obligations effectively;

    57. Stresses that the enhancement of cooperation and coordination with national competent authorities is crucial; asks for more cooperation among all relevant authorities, such as Member State authorities, customs authorities, and consumer protection authorities, and for stronger coordination among all established expert groups; stresses that, under the DSA, the investigative actions against non-compliant online marketplaces need to yield results and lead to deterrent sanctions in order to prevent the offer of non-compliant products; emphasises the importance of these investigations in addressing systemic risks, compliance failures, illegal content dissemination, addictive design features, dark patterns and the use of influencers for manipulative advertising;

    58. Calls on enforcement authorities to strengthen monitoring and enforcement actions targeting new sales channels; recommends that competent authorities be equipped with adequate resources, technological tools, and cross-border cooperation mechanisms to effectively identify and take action against non-compliant traders operating via social media and other emerging platforms;

    59. Suggests that online marketplace sellers must provide a reshipping address and contact point within the EU to allow consumers to easily return non-compliant goods without undue costs and to allow authorities to inspect goods; believes that online marketplaces should be responsible for checking this and should be held accountable for enforcement;

    60. Calls for an urgent in-depth evaluation of the effectiveness of the provision of the ‘responsible person for products placed on the Union market’, particularly those of non-EU traders, building on the results of the evaluation report on Article 4 of the MSR; calls on the Commission to consider among its future actions the introduction of a mandatory requirement for non-EU traders to appoint a responsible person in the EU with increased legal and financial liability;

    61. Notes that postal and other delivery services are undergoing significant transformations due to the rapid growth of e-commerce; raises concerns that the Universal Postal Union’s terminal dues system in practice does not apply to e-commerce flows; notes that, as a result, Chinese e-commerce businesses, due to shipment volumes, enter into commercial agreements directly with the EU postal operators for exceptionally attractive delivery rates that are lower than those for goods manufactured within the EU, leading to deeper fragmentation of the single market for postal services; urges the Commission to evaluate the impact of e-commerce on postal services and the internal market, and to consider how postal services can contribute to strengthening the single market and benefiting consumers, and to the overall competitiveness of the EU;

    62. Welcomes the approval of the ViDA reforms, which represent a significant step towards modernising VAT collection in the e-commerce sector; emphasises the importance of the Single VAT ID for online marketplaces and for European manufacturers, enabling them to compete on a level playing field by simplifying VAT compliance across the Member States; highlights that this measure can also facilitate in-bulk importation and the warehousing of goods within the EU, reducing reliance on fragmented cross-border shipments and ensuring that value-added services, such as fulfilment and logistics, take place within the single market; stresses that these reforms will enhance tax compliance, reduce administrative burdens, and improve enforcement while supporting fair competition and strengthening EU supply chains; calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure the effective implementation of these measures to maximise their benefits for European businesses and consumers;

    63. Calls on the Commission to consider measures aimed at reducing the unnecessary regulatory and administrative compliance burden for EU manufacturers, in particular for SMEs, in order to level the playing field and enable them to better compete with global competitors operating under more efficient compliance standards;

    64. Calls on the Commission to enhance international cooperation with other like-minded countries to exchange best practices, identify common challenges and risks and develop joint actions on e-commerce;

    65. Welcomes, in this regard, the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce; notes that the agreement will benefit consumers and businesses by facilitating cross-border electronic transactions, reducing barriers to digital trade and promoting innovation in e-commerce; underlines, however, that the agreement is only a foundation and encourages the Commission to pursue ambitious trade agreements in negotiations with partners to ensure binding provisions on e-commerce;

    Increased use of IT tools

    66. Welcomes the fact that the Commission is preparing a project to streamline existing databases, including the Information and Communication System on Market Surveillance, the EU Safety Gate and the Customs Risk Management System, into a common interoperable system gathering all information on the safety of products, counterfeit product tracking and notifications of accidents and to ensure interoperability with the DPP and the future EU customs data hub; calls on the Commission to publish information regarding the implementation timeline and the resource requirements of this initiative;

    67. Supports the Commission’s aim to provide market surveillance authorities with the e-Surveillance WebCrawler tool to flag reappearing dangerous products; asks the Commission to make available another web crawler for detecting new listings as soon as possible, in order to flag non-compliant products before they reach consumers;

    68. Supports the responsible use of artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things for scanning and analysing product listings on e-commerce platforms, automating customs and market surveillance inspections and risk identification and integrating product compliance databases for real-time checks between market surveillance and customs authorities, in line with EU and national laws; notes, however, that the high implementation costs of these technologies remain a barrier; underlines that the full uptake of these technologies will make handling more efficient, especially for low-value goods, and that the high volume of parcels containing many different items faces limited inspection capabilities;

    69. Demands that the Commission and the Member States exchange best practices and find incentives to provide the necessary funding and support for national authorities in order to increase the responsible use of technological solutions; suggests that artificial intelligence, blockchain and the internet of things could be used to scan and analyse product listings on e-commerce platforms, automate inspections and risk profiling, and integrate product compliance databases for real-time checks by several authorities;

    70. Underlines that Member States should reinforce customs checks in particular with low-value shipments by implementing risk-based assessment systems and digital tracking to prevent non-compliant products from bypassing customs controls; calls on the Member States to increase the level of automated processes, such as automated scans of labels when processing parcels at customs;

    71. Recognises that some online marketplaces also use a number of IT tools to detect and remove unsafe and illicit products that are found on their platforms; highlights, however, the fact that online marketplaces need to further invest in and increase their use of these IT tools to effectively avoid the offer and sale of unsafe and illicit products; calls on the Commission to further incentivise the use of IT tools by online marketplaces in this regard, while ensuring full compliance with Article 8 of the DSA, which provides that there is no general obligation to monitor the information that providers of intermediary services transmit or store;

    72. Suggests that, without prejudice to the principle enshrined in the DSA that providers of intermediary services online should not be subject to a monitoring obligation with respect to obligations of general nature, online intermediaries engaged in the sale, promotion or distribution of products within the EU market should consider on their own the use of risk-based digital monitoring systems to identify and prevent the presence of illegal content (presentation, description or offering for sale of illegal or dangerous products); stresses the importance of implementing swift response mechanisms to ensure the permanent removal of specific illegal content as soon as providers of intermediary services online have actual knowledge of such illegal content being presented on their interfaces, as well as the necessity for hosting service providers to take all necessary measures to prevent the reappearance of the same or equivalent illegal content on their platform;

    Improvement of consumer awareness and information

    73. Emphasises that EU consumers and European SMEs engaged in importing activities often lack sufficient information on the possible dangers of potentially unsafe products and the harm they can cause; stresses that consumers are increasingly targeted by traders who, despite their legal obligations, often do not inform consumers that their products are made and shipped from outside of the EU; acknowledges that there is demand among EU consumers for cheaper products, which are purchased on non-EU online marketplaces due to their much lower production costs and uncompetitive conditions for EU businesses and online platforms; stresses that online marketplaces may use manipulative design techniques (dark patterns) to influence purchasing decisions; warns against the risks associated with compulsive purchasing behaviours, financial difficulties and the accumulation of unnecessary goods; calls on the Commission and the Member States to organise information and awareness-raising campaigns on the purchase of unsafe products online and their possible health, privacy, environmental and competitiveness consequences, with a special focus on vulnerable consumers and at peak consumption times;

    74. Recommends fostering second-hand consumption as a sustainable approach to addressing EU consumers’ need for affordable goods; stresses the importance of promoting and incentivising the reuse of second-hand products as an important driver for unlocking the potential of the circular economy;

    75. Asks the Commission and the Member States to strictly enforce the ecodesign requirements for textiles and other products under the ESPR, as well as the provisions of the Directive on Empowering Consumers for the Green Transition[14] in order to make sure that consumers are better informed about sustainability aspects, such as environmental impacts, energy use, reparability and durability of products purchased on online marketplaces;

    76. Considers that consumer authorities, organisations, industry associations and chambers of commerce should be encouraged to conduct large, coordinated awareness-raising campaigns on consumer rights, potential risks, including the possibilities for collective redress, and redress mechanisms when purchasing online, in particular on non-EU online platforms; stresses the need to also raise awareness about the environmental, health and social impacts of unsustainable business practices and to alert consumers about the role of new advertising techniques, such as influencers and digital opinion leaders, in shaping perceptions of product safety and reliability; calls on the Commission to take a coordinating role as mentioned in the Commission communication of 5 February 2025 on e-commerce and to explore possibilities to finance cross-border information campaigns developed in cooperation with researchers, civil society and other relevant stakeholders;

    Trade and development considerations

    77. Calls on the Commission to implement its level of ambition in agreements with international partners at the multilateral level, as unsafe products constitute not only a European, but also a global challenge; reiterates that, as set out in Parliament’s position on the UCC revision, the EUCA should establish working arrangements with the authorities of non-EU countries and international organisations; stresses that such arrangements should enable the EUCA to exchange information, including best practices, with non-EU authorities and international organisations, and to carry out joint activities; supports continued engagement in the UN Trade and Development working group on consumer product safety, which plays a crucial role in developing best practices for cross-border enforcement;

    78. Calls on the Commission to step up cooperation with international partners, within forums such as the WTO, the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the G7, to counterbalance China’s influence and ensure reciprocity and rules-based trade; calls on the Commission to explicitly incorporate robust and enforceable obligations addressing forced labour when reviewing and renegotiating current trade and investment agreements; underscores the need for stronger EU-China cooperation mechanisms and transparent certification requirements to ensure compliance;

    79. Highlights the need to consider service and product safety and regulatory compliance provisions when negotiating future EU trade agreements; stresses the importance of specific regulatory dialogues and cooperation through administrative arrangements, improved customs enforcement cooperation, the traceability of shipments to the highest standards and enhanced data-sharing arrangements between customs authorities to effectively tackle non-compliant imports;

    80. Urges the Commission to be proactive and swiftly deploy targeted trade defence instruments, including anti-subsidy investigations, to address the adverse impacts on European businesses; emphasises that such actions must be coordinated closely with key international partners, to ensure effective global enforcement and reciprocal market fairness;

    81. Encourages the Commission to enhance diplomatic efforts and cooperation within international forums, particularly the WTO, the WCO and the G7, to counterbalance China’s strategic expansion into digital governance frameworks, including its Digital Silk Road initiative; stresses the need for open, more transparent and responsible digital trade rules in international standard-setting bodies to prevent internet fragmentation and mitigate the risks posed by restrictive digital governance models;

    82. Welcomes the WTO Joint Statement Initiative on Electronic Commerce as a vital step towards global digital trade rules; stresses, however, its current limitations, especially regarding customs transparency; urges the Commission to advocate stronger binding provisions to ensure its effective implementation and integration into the WTO legal framework, and to ensure enhanced global compliance standards;

    83. Emphasises the need for international capacity-building initiatives to support the sustainable and compliant participation of developing countries in digital trade; calls on the Commission to collaborate closely with international organisations, especially the WTO, to enhance regulatory frameworks and technical assistance for e-commerce in developing countries;

    °

    ° °

    84. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council and the Commission.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Newsletters – ENVI News – Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

    Source: European Parliament


    ENVI News | Newsletters | Home | ENVI | Committees | European Parliament


















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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Newsletters – ENVI News – Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety

    Source: European Parliament


    ENVI News | Newsletters | Home | ENVI | Committees | European Parliament


















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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Lobbying by services of the European Commission – E-002494/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002494/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Erik Kaliňák (NI)

    Recently, the media reported that the Commission had been providing annual support to environmental NGOs, allegedly amounting to six-figure sums, to lobby for and promote positions that often run counter to the official positions of the Commission itself. This was reportedly the case with the planned agreement with Mercosur, where the Commission’s Directorate-General for the Environment allegedly lobbied against the conclusion of an agreement prepared by another Directorate-General of the same Commission – the Directorate-General for Trade[1].

    In light of this, I would like to ask:

    • 1.Can the Commission confirm the accuracy of the information reported in the media?
    • 2.If so, what legal action has the Commission taken against the officials who mishandled EU citizens’ money in such a way?
    • 3.What measures has the Commission taken to prevent a similar situation from recurring in the future?

    Submitted: 23.6.2025

    • [1] https://table.media/en/europe/feature/secret-ngo-contracts-eu-funds-for-lobbying-against-mercosur/
    Last updated: 2 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Green taxation in Cyprus – E-001234/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The green taxation reform is a key element of Cyprus’ Recovery and Resilience Plan[1]. It aims to internalise environmental externalities, encouraging more efficient use of resources and incentivising the adoption of renewable energy.

    This is crucial in Cyprus where the green taxation system and municipal waste recycling lag behind the rest of Europe, and water scarcity is a particular issue.

    The green taxation reform includes a carbon tax, which constitutes a transition towards the Emissions Trading System 2 on buildings, road transport and additional sectors (ETS2) applicable from 2027, a levy on water and a charge on landfill waste, both of which will be incrementally increased.

    The reform should precisely set the right incentives for transitioning to climate neutrality, modernising waste and water management and enhancing renewable energy capacity. It is crucial to pass it soon so that this incentivisation happens quickly. The reform will help Cyprus come closer to its climate objectives and the legally binding maximum landfill rate of 10% by 2035.

    Regarding the availability of tools to support Cyprus in closing its infrastructure gaps and mitigating the transition costs for households, on top of e.g. structural and cohesion funds, the Social Climate Fund (SCF) will support a socially fair transition towards climate neutrality by addressing the effects of the EU-wide introduction of carbon pricing in the buildings and road transport sectors applicable from 2027.

    Already as of 2026, the SCF will provide Member States with dedicated funding to support vulnerable groups, with building renovation, decarbonisation of heating, renewable energy as well as sustainability mobility and transport.

    • [1] https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/economic-recovery/recovery-and-resilience-facility/country-pages/cyprus-recovery-and-resilience-plan_en.
    Last updated: 2 July 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Challenges for European fisheries and aquaculture – E-001824/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The EU illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing Regulation’s[1] main pillars (IUU catch certification and dialogues) serve to prevent IUU fish from entering the EU market, thus contributing to implement a level playing field for legitimate operators within the EU and outside. Also, the revised Control Regulation[2] enhances the control of the supply chain and traceability requirements of fishery and aquaculture products, including imports.

    The catch certificate ensures legality of imported fish. The revised IUU Regulation obliges EU importers and authorities, as of 10 January 2026, to use CATCH, an EU IT system digitising the paper-based system, to stop fraudulent use of catch certificates, ease controls and risk identification, and harmonise import controls, enhancing the level playing field for EU operators and defending our market from unfair competition.

    The EU also promotes its standards, including on fisheries control, in international fora such as the Regional Fisheries Management Organisations or in its relations with neighbouring fishing nations.

    2. The EU has strict controls on imported food to ensure high consumer protection and food safety. In other areas, consumer awareness of the higher standards of EU production can give a competitive edge to EU aquaculture over products from third countries not complying with similar standards[3].

    The level playing field regarding imported fisheries and aquaculture products is also part of the evaluation[4] of the CFP Regulation[5].

    As regards imports of aquaculture products, the Commission can use trade defence instruments, among other things targeting subsidies, to protect the EU single market from trade distortions[6]. Anti-subsidy measures are already in place on imports of trout from Türkiye.

    • [1] Council Regulation (EC) No 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008 establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No 2847/93, (EC) No 1936/2001 and (EC) No 601/2004 and repealing Regulations (EC) No 1093/94 and (EC) No 1447/1999: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2008/1005/oj/eng.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202302842.
    • [3] This is one of the key objectives of the ongoing communication campaign on EU aquaculture.
    • [4] https://oceans-and-fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-opens-public-consultation-common-fisheries-policy-regulation-2025-01-27_en.
    • [5] I ncluding the common market Organisation.
    • [6] In line with the World Trade Organisation’s rules on subsidies.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Safeguarding European citric acid production against unfair competition from China – E-001942/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Since 2008, there are anti-dumping measures in place on imports of citric acid from China ranging between 16.3% and 42.7%. These measures were extended for a further five years, in April 2021, following an expiry review[1].

    These measures reflect the levels of dumping found in the context of an investigation conducted in line with World Trade Organisation and EU legislation.

    Measures in place may be reviewed on request by interested parties where there are changed circumstances of a lasting nature. The Commission conducts such reviews where it receives evidence from the European industry that action is warranted. The industries affected are invited to contact the Commission’s trade defence services[2] to explore the options.

    As regards the speed of trade defence investigations, in the modernisation of trade defence in 2018, the length of anti-dumping investigations was shortened by one month. Provisional measures are now imposed eight, and in some cases seven months after initiation.

    Also, since October 2024 the Commission registers imports in all ongoing new investigations to facilitate the retroactive application of measures, i.e. before the date of provisional measures, if the legal conditions allow[3].

    With regard to additional support measures, it should be noted that the Joint European Forum for Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) is currently working on identifying a possible IPCEI candidate in the field of biotechnologies.

    Interested companies are invited to contact their respective national authorities to confirm whether their Member State is involved in this work and to inquire whether they may be included in the national consultation process.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32021R0607&from=EN.
    • [2] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/contacts/trade-defence-enquiries_en.
    • [3] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/news/commission-register-imports-all-products-under-trade-defence-investigations-bid-fight-unfair-2024-09-24_en.
    Last updated: 2 July 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Impact of the Trump administration’s decision to impose tariffs on European goods: impact on the Galician automotive sector – E-001311/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Industrial Action Plan for the European automotive sector recognises the challenges of an increasingly volatile geopolitical context and their potential impact on the EU automotive sector.

    Therefore, the Commission has committed on decisive actions to help secure global competitiveness of the EU automotive value chain and maintain a strong European production base.

    In line with the Automotive Action Plan, the Commission has proposed already an amendment to the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers Regulation[1], which will extend the support to workers in companies in restructuring processes.

    In addition, the mid-term review of the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[2] will be used to incentivise Member States to reprogramme more money for the automotive sector.

    Trade with the United States represents a source of prosperity and well-paying and quality jobs for the EU automotive value chain. The Commission is assessing the impact of the United States tariffs on EU automotive exports and will also monitor the indirect effects.

    The Commission will continue to seek a negotiated and constructive solution with the United States, while being ready to protect European interests.

    • [1]  COM(2025) 140.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:02021R1057-20241224.
    Last updated: 2 July 2025

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