Category: Transport

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal dedicates IWT terminal at Jogighopa to nation

    Source: Government of India

    Union Minister Sarbananda Sonowal dedicates IWT terminal at Jogighopa to nation

    Rejuvenated Inland Waterways to propel India’s logistics growth, to advance PM Narendra Modi’s vision of ‘Viksit Bharat’: Sarbananda Sonowal  

    Sarbananda Sonowal flags off MV Padma Navigation II with 110 Metric Tonnes of cargo from Jogighopa to Bangladesh

    “New Terminal at Jogighopa is a game changer for Logistics sector of Eastern India — to boost trilateral trade between India, Bhutan & Bangladesh”: Sarbananda Sonowal

    Terminal at Jogighopa is built at a cost of more than ₹82 crores, equipped with RCC Jetty with Electric Level Luffing Crane for Cargo handling

    His Excellency, Lyonpo Namgyal Dorji, Minister of Industries, Commerce & Employment, Royal Govt of Bhutan attended the inaugural ceremony

    Posted On: 18 FEB 2025 5:30PM by PIB Delhi

    The Union Minister of Ports, Shipping & Waterways, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal inaugurated the Inland Waterways Terminal (IWT) at Jogighopa as he dedicated it to the people of the nation today. Marking the occasion, a ship with two barges was flagged off MV Trishul, along with Barges Ajay & Dikshu, by the Union Minister with 110 metric tonnes of coal along with stone chips to Bangladesh. The foundation stone for the Terminal was laid by the Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi in February, 2021.

    The terminal holds strategic importance as it is located at a distance of 91 km from Gelephu in Bhutan, 108 km from Bangladesh border and 147 km from Guwahati. This makes it crucial for India’s bilateral trade ties with Bangladesh and Bhutan. The Jogighopa terminal is also one of the declared Ports of call under PIWT&T between India and Bangladesh. By the year 2027, this terminal is expected to handle a cargo of 1.1 million tonnes per annum. The MV Padma Navigation II ship along with Barges Ajay and Dikshu are carrying 110 Metric Tonnes of coal, while MV Trishul is carrying stone chips to Bangladesh. 

    Speaking on the occasion, the Union Minister of Ports, Shipping & Waterways, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal, said, Today marks a historic day for the waterways transportation sector in the country as we dedicate the IWT Terminal at Jogighopa to the people and to the nation. Under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi ji, the waterways transportation has been undergoing a tremendous transformation propelling Indias logistics growth, propelling us towards Modi jis vision of ‘Viksit Bharat’. The IWT terminal at Jogighopa is set to transform the connectivity in the region and bolster our trilateral trade with Bhutan and Bangladesh. Its strategic position allows it to play the role of an economic multiplier for the region, a testament to PM Narendra Modis doctrine of Neighbourhood First.’”

    Through strategic regional projects and agreements with neighbouring countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and others, India is diligently establishing itself as a pivotal waterway gateway for the facilitation of enhanced regional trade and seamless transport connectivity thus contributing to the overall development and integration of South Asia, while ensuring the sustainability and vitality of the regions economic landscape.

    Built at a cost of more than ₹82 crores, the Jogighopa terminal has an RCC jetty with an RCC approach designed for Electric Level Luffing (ELL) crane for cargo handling. The terminal also has infrastructural facilities such as administrative building, customs office building, immigration office, truck parking area, 1100 sqm covered storage area with power back up, and 11,000 sqm open storage.

    Highlighting the role of inland waterways, Shri Sarbananda Sonowal said, The development of inland waterways holds great promise for transforming the logistics sector in India. By leveraging our extensive network of rivers and water bodies, we can create a sustainable, cost-effective, and efficient mode of transportation for goods. Under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi ji, the government has brought in many path breaking legislations like National Waterways Act, 2016, Inland Vessels Act, 2021 and others have been promulgated to empower and enable the ecosystem of inland waterways transportation for both cargo and passenger traffic.”

    The event was attended by His Excellency Lyonpo Namgyal Dorji, Minister of Industries, Commerce & Employment, Royal Govt of Bhutan; Ranjeet Kumar Dass, Minister of Panchayat & Rural Development, Govt of Assam; Bimal Borah, Minister of Industries & Commerce, Enterprises, Govt of Assam; Jogen Mohan, Minister of Transport, Govt of Assam; Phani Bhushan Choudhury, MP (Barpeta); Rakibul Hussain, MP (Dhubri); Pradip Sarkar, MLA (Abhyapuri South); Vijay Kumar, IAS, Chairman, IWAI among other dignitaries.

    In the Northeast, projects such as Comprehensive Development of NW-2, Ship repair facility at Pandu, Bogibeel Terminal development, last mile connectivity to Pandu are some of the projects which are currently in different stages of development. With huge investments are envisaged for development of North-Eastern waterways, it stands as a resounding testament to the critical role of these waterways in propelling economic growth and prosperity. Operationalisation of the new IWT Terminal at Jogighopa will be a step in that direction.

    Speaking on the role of IWT Jogighopa in Assams as well as the as the Northeast Indias economic development, Shri Sonowal said, Under the dynamic leadership of Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi ji, the Northeast has transformed into a growth multiplier with Assam spearheading this transformation. As we cruise towards realising the vision of Viksit Bharat, the immense potential of the Northeast has a major role to play. With our rich and complex inter web of riverine system with the Brahmaputra (National Waterways 2) playing a crucial role, the government has been developing infrastructure as well as curating an ecosystem to support the development of Inland Waterways transportation in the region. We are confident that the Inland Waterways as part of PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan will enable the economic and trade elements of our economy towards becoming an Atmanirbhar Bharat by 2047.” 

    The IWT sector has experienced an unprecedented surge in terms of trade and transport in the past decade. There has been a 767% increase in number of operational national waterways, 727% increase in volume of cargo handled on NWs, a phenomenal rise of 62% in multimodal terminals with an 860% increase in budget allocation for Inland Waterways. Cargo traffic on national waterways has witnessed an exponential growth in the last ten years – from 18 million tonnes a decade ago to 133 million tonnes in FY 2023-24 at a CAGR of over 22%.

    Inland Waterways also holds significance for the tourism sector. The historic journey of MV Ganga Vilas explained the potential of cruise tourism being the Worlds Longest River Cruise’ and travelling through 27 different river systems, 5 states and two countries. Substantial growth has been made in last one decade in river cruise tourism sector. The number of river cruise vessels has increased from 3 in 2013-14 to 25 in 2023-24.

    The average annual spending in the IWT Sector increased from a meagre Rs 58 Cr per year for 28 years from 1986 till 2014, to Rs 648 Cr per year during the last 11 years from 2014 till December 2024.

    A World class river cruise terminal is being developed in Guwahati as a one stop solution for passengers on their voyage along the rivers. In addition, development of 4 dedicated river cruise terminals at Silghat, Bishwanath ghat, Neamati and Guijan are being developed with adequate offshore facilities and modern amenities.

    The Narendra Modi government has also launched the Cruise Bharat Mission’ to boost cruise tourism in India over the next five years, aiming to establish 10 sea cruise terminals, 100 river cruise terminals, and five marinas. The mission seeks to double cruise calls and passengers, strengthen regional alliances, and significantly increase sea and river cruise travellers by 2029, enhancing tourism and connectivity across the country. The govt has also brought in major legislative reforms such as the enactment of National Waterways Act 2016 declaring 111 national waterways and Inland Vessels Act 2021 with an aim to streamline the safe and smooth movement of the vessels across the country.

    IWAI has envisaged to strengthen urban water transport system to develop water metro projects across 18 cities in 12 states — including one in Guwahati — to replicate Kochi Water Metro model, announced Sarbananda Sonowal.

    About IWT Jogighopa:

    The foundation stone for the Inland Waterways Terminal at Jogighopa was laid by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi on 18 February, 2025. IWAI, Ministry of PSW has entrusted NHIDCL for construction of the terminal. Total cost of the project is Rs. 82.03 Crores. Spread over an area of 15 acres, the terminal is connected to MMLP at Jogighopa with 4 lane road and adjacent to NH17. The terminal is important considering the MoU signed between India & Bangladesh for developing economic corridor under Bharat Mala Program with DALU-TURA-GOALPARA-GELEPHU Multimodal trade route. Jogighopa is one of the important Port of Calls along Indo-Bangladesh Protocol route (IBPR) for trade and Transit.

    The terminal is important for trade with Bangladesh and Bhutan. The distance of Jogighopa terminal is just 91km from Gelephu Bhutan (Gelephu Mindfulness City) where a modern city is under development by Royal Govt of Bhutan. The terminal is at a distance of 108km from BBorder and 147km from Guwahati by IWT. The terminal is connected to Bangladesh, Barak valley of NE as well as other part of India through IBP route connecting at Kolkata/Haldia. Among the main features of the terminal, the size of the RCC jetty is 100mx21m with a RCC approach (136mx8m). The project also consists of Admin building (G+2), Customs building, Immigration building, Transit (Covered storage) of 60m x18m size, Open storage (6280 sqm & 3700 sqm), Security with provision for 24×7 electricity with 412 KVA connection, secured boundary wall, adequate truck parking facility of 1500 sqm, canteen and rest room facility. The initial Capacity of the terminal is 1.1 MTPA. Primary commodities expected to be handled from this terminal includes food grain, fertilizers, tar coal/bitumen, POL & crude oil, edible oil, fly ash, imported coal, stone chips, etc. A railway BG siding is also proposed to be established connecting Jogighopa terminal with MMLP Jogighopa.

    ***

    G.D. Hallikeri / Henry

    (Release ID: 2104393) Visitor Counter : 46

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI Security: Three Aryan Brotherhood Prison Gang Members Convicted of Rico Conspiracy and Murder In Aid Of Racketeering

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    FRESNO, Calif. — Following a four-week trial before U.S. District Judge Jennifer L. Thurston, three members of the Aryan Brotherhood prison gang were found guilty of racketeering activity that included murder, drug trafficking, fraud, and robbery, Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith announced. 

    A federal jury found California State Prison inmate John Stinson, 70, guilty of one count of conspiracy to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

    The jury found California State Prison inmate Francis Clement, 58, guilty of conspiracy to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and five counts of murder in aid of racketeering for the murders of Allan Roshanski, Ruslan Megomedgadzhiev, Michael Brizendine, James Yagle, and Ronnie Ennis.

    The jury found California State Prison inmate Kenneth Johnson, 63, guilty of conspiracy to conduct the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and two counts of murder in aid of racketeering for the murders of Allan Roshanski and Ruslan Megomedgadzhiev.

    According to court documents and evidence produced at trial, between 2015 and 2023, AB members and associates engaged in racketeering activity, committing multiple acts involving murder, conspiracies to murder, fraud, robbery, and drug trafficking crimes. Using smuggled-in cellphones, Stinson, Johnson, and Clement directed various criminal acts while controlling the membership of the AB. Stinson was a leader of the AB and had significant authority over the enterprise, including resolving disputes among members and approving the murder of current or former members. Johnson and Clement ordered murders of individuals in the Los Angeles area of California.

    Additional individuals charged in the case and still pending trial include the following:

    • Jayson Weaver, 47, scheduled for trial in April 2026.
    • Waylon Pitchford, 47, scheduled for trial in April 2026.
    • Andrew Collins, 42, scheduled for trial in April 2026.
    • Evan Perkins, 38, scheduled for trial at a pending date.
    • Justin Gray, 39, scheduled for trial in September 2025.

    The charges against the remaining defendants are only allegations, and those individuals are presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    This case was the product of an extensive long-term investigation by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, with assistance from the Office of Correctional Safety (CDCR), United States Marshals Service, Los Angeles County Sheriff Department, Pomona Police Department, Torrance Police Department, San Diego Police Department, San Diego Sheriff Department, Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office, and Kern County District Attorney’s Office. Assistant United States Attorneys Stephanie Stokman and James Conolly and Department of Justice attorney Jared Engelking are prosecuting the case.

    Stinson, Clement, and Johnson are scheduled to be sentenced by Judge Thurston on May 19, 2025. Defendants Johnson and Clement face mandatory life sentences based upon their convictions for murder in aid of racketeering. Defendant Stinson faces a maximum sentence of life in prison based upon his RICO conspiracy conviction.

    The case was investigated under the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). OCDETF identifies, disrupts, and dismantles the highest-level criminal organizations that threaten the United States using a prosecutor-led, intelligence-driven, multi-agency approach. For more information about Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, please visit Justice.gov/OCDETF.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Police Officer Pleads Guilty To Gun Trafficking Offense

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    Orlando, FL – Acting United States Attorney Sara C. Sweeney announces that Michael Adrian Nieto (31, St. Cloud) has pleaded guilty to dealing in firearms without a license. Nieto faces a maximum penalty of five years in federal prison. A sentencing date has not yet been set.

    According to the plea agreement, Nieto, a sworn law enforcement officer, repeatedly purchased and resold firearms to individuals. Among others, Nieto supplied firearms to Ernesto Vazquez, a key member of a criminal conspiracy that smuggled hundreds of firearms to the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Haiti. In addition, to benefit the conspiracy, Nieto corruptly used police databases to provide sensitive and confidential information to Vazquez.

    Between June 6, 2022, and September 4, 2024, Nieto purchased at least 58 firearms. Many of the firearms were identical and were purchased together or close in time to one another. On October 17, 2024, FBI and ATF agents executed a federal search warrant at Nieto’s residence. At the time of the search warrant, 12 firearms were still in his possession.

    On October 17, 2024, Nieto was interviewed by FBI and ATF agents. He admitted to repeatedly buying and reselling guns to individuals, including Vazquez, despite knowing that Vazquez was transferring these guns to third parties, in violation of federal law. Nieto also admitted that Vazquez had provided him with illegal items, including a machinegun conversion device.

    Vazquez previously pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic firearms. His sentencing hearing is scheduled for March 25, 2025.

    “The St. Cloud Police Department has worked closely with the Department of Justice to assist them in their investigation regarding former officer Michael Nieto. In the wake of the recent DOJ findings, we are conducting our own in-depth investigation into the matter.” said St. Cloud Police Chief Douglas Goerke. “SCPD pledges to take immediate action should an officer act in a manner that could break a community’s trust, no matter their rank or tenure with the department.”         

    This case was investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives. It is being prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Noah P. Dorman.

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Security: Illegal Alien Charged with Firearm Offenses

    Source: United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms and Explosives (ATF)

    Paducah, KY –A federal criminal complaint and arrest warrant was issued last week charging an illegal alien with aggravated identity theft, making a false statement during a firearm transaction, and being an illegal alien in possession of a firearm.

    U.S. Attorney Michael A. Bennett of the Western District of Kentucky, Acting Special Agent in Charge A.J. Gibes of the ATF Louisville Field Division, Special Agent in Charge Rana Saoud of Homeland Security Investigations Nashville, and Commissioner Phillip Burnett, Jr. of the Kentucky State Police made the announcement.

    According to court records, on or about November 11, 2024, Manuel Antonio Xante-Ajanel, 25, a citizen of Guatemala, attempted to purchase a firearm from Academy Sports in Paducah using fraudulent identification belonging to another person. The transaction was terminated when the identification provided was flagged as being fraudulent. A search warrant was executed on January 31, 2025, at the defendant’s residence in Mayfield, Kentucky. Law enforcement located numerous fraudulent identification documents. Later that day, a search warrant was executed on the defendant’s vehicle, yielding a loaded 9-millimeter handgun. The defendant admitted to possessing the firearm and to being in the United States unlawfully.    

    Homeland Security Investigations verified that Xante-Ajanel is Guatemalan and entered the United States illegally.

    Xante-Ajanel is in state custody and will make an initial appearance before a U.S. Magistrate Judge in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Kentucky at a later date. If convicted on the charges in the complaint, Xante-Ajanel faces a minimum sentence of 2 years and a maximum sentence of 12 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine any sentence after considering the sentencing guidelines and other statutory factors.

    There is no parole in the federal system.

    This case is being investigated by the ATF – Paducah Post of Duty, HSI – Paducah Post of Duty, and the Kentucky State Police.

    Assistant U.S. Attorney Leigh Ann Dycus, of the U.S. Attorney’s Paducah Branch Office, is prosecuting the case.

    A criminal complaint is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

    ###

    MIL Security OSI

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Straight Talk Wireless Rewards People for their Use of Unlimited Data this Tax Season with The Data Bank by Straight Talk

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Straight Talk Wireless Rewards People for their Use of Unlimited Data this Tax Season with The Data Bank by Straight Talk

    NEW YORK – Straight Talk Wireless, a leading prepaid brand covered by Verizon’s 5G network and sold at Walmart, is launching The Data Bank by Straight Talk, a limited-time event that turns mobile data usage into real financial rewards. Taking place in Union Square Park in New York City on February 18 and Kennedy Commons in East New Jersey on February 19, The Data Bank brings attention to the exceptional value provided by Straight Talk’s unlimited data plans by giving customers the opportunity to check their data usage and be rewarded with a gift card through an interactive, bank-like experience.

    Tax season can be a stressful time for many, and Straight Talk recognizes that even when money feels tight, people can still be Data Rich – thanks to its real unlimited data plans.  In fact, data plays a crucial role in people’s everyday lives, especially during tax season. According to Straight Talk’s third annual Tax Time Survey, more than half of Americans (57%) use their mobile data for online banking, and 53% access it during tax season, whether it’s to file taxes right on their phone or speak with tax advisors. With this limited-time event, Straight Talk aims to give back when tax refunds might not be enough.

    “At Straight Talk, we understand that tax season can be a hectic time, and many families rely on their refund checks to help manage their finances. That’s why we aim to alleviate some of that tax time stress with the launch of our innovative Data Bank event,” said David Kim, SVP & CRO of Verizon Value. “The Data Bank by Straight Talk is designed to show how impactful having real unlimited data is by rewarding mobile data usage with gift cards, especially at a time when families are looking for extra financial flexibility. Straight Talk is committed to supporting consumers with their truly unlimited data during tax time and all year long.”

    How The Data Bank Works:

    At The Data Bank by Straight Talk, visitors will step into a custom-designed truck converted into a mobile “bank,” where they can interact with Straight Talk’s “teller,”@alexonabudget (influencer and money expert), check their data usage and convert their data usage into a gift card on site.

    Be one of the first to experience the bank-like event and get rewarded with extra cash at one of the following locations:

    • New York City: February 18 at Union Square Park 10AM ET until supplies last
    • East New Jersey: February 19 at Kennedy Commons 11AM ET until supplies last

    For those not in the area, you can still take advantage of Straight Talk’s unlimited data online at StraightTalk.com or at Walmart stores. In addition to supplying users with real unlimited data they can rely on, Straight Talk is also offering new and existing customers a free Samsung A16 or Moto G Power 5G with the purchase of a qualifying service plan. These offers will be available at StraightTalk.com and at Walmart stores so customers can take advantage of the latest features and benefits.

    For more information on Straight Talk Wireless, visit www.straighttalk.com.

    About Straight Talk Wireless

    Straight Talk Wireless provides quality no-contract wireless solutions to value-conscious consumers and is available exclusively at Walmart, Walmart.com, and Straighttalk.com.

    Straight Talk is part of the Verizon Value portfolio of prepaid brands, which includes Total Wireless, Visible, Tracfone, Simple Mobile, SafeLink, Walmart Family Mobile, and Verizon Prepaid.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Piero Cipollone: Striking the right balance: the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for monetary policy

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an MNI Connect webcast

    Frankfurt am Main, 18 February 2025

    Today I would like to discuss the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for our monetary policy.

    In recent years, the monetary policy debate has mainly focused on our interest rate decisions. This is for good reason. In response to the biggest inflation shock in a generation, we embarked on the fastest tightening of monetary policy in the ECB’s history through rate hikes.

    During this tightening phase, we used policy rates as the primary tool for setting our monetary policy stance, while normalising our balance sheet in a measured and predictable way. We initiated the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase programmes and recalibrated our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs).[1] As a result, the size of our balance sheet has fallen by more than a quarter from its peak.

    Policy rates remain our primary instrument and will therefore continue to attract the most attention. But we should not underestimate the important role that our balance sheet policies have played over time as a component of our overall monetary policy stance and in ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. This still holds true today as we make our monetary policy less restrictive.

    Inflation has now fallen substantially to levels close to 2%. Our latest projections foresee it converging towards our target over the medium term, and the risks to the inflation outlook – once sharply skewed to the upside – have now become more balanced.

    At the same time, the euro area’s economic recovery remains weak – especially in the near term. The risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside and, if they materialise, may derail the recovery, with implications for the inflation outlook.

    Against this background, the Governing Council has gradually been reducing the degree of monetary policy restriction by cutting policy rates towards neutral territory. While our direction is clear, we are very attentive to incoming information in view of the prevailing uncertainty about the economic environment. We continue to make decisions on a meeting-by-meeting and data-dependent basis. This gives us the option to adapt our interest rate path if necessary to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target.

    However, given the importance of financial conditions in determining the inflation outlook, we also need to consider the role played by the reduction of our balance sheet. In the tightening phase our rate decisions and balance sheet policies complemented each other, but they are now going in opposing directions.

    This divergence has important implications across at least two dimensions.

    First, it contributes to a steepening of the yield curve. Our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve. At the same time, the gradual runoff of our asset purchase portfolios exerts upward pressure on long-term and, to a lesser extent, intermediate yields. This has been compounded by recent spillovers from the US.[2]

    Second, it may affect credit supply. Declining levels of central bank liquidity could constrain banks’ ability to extend credit, resulting in tighter credit conditions and potentially slowing down the investment and consumption that are critical for economic recovery.

    In setting the policy stance, we therefore need to consider the impact of the overall set of financial conditions resulting from our interest rate and balance sheet policies. In other words, we need to strike the right balance if we are to achieve our inflation aim without an undue negative impact on incomes and employment. A rate cut has a more contained easing effect when the balance sheet is simultaneously reduced. This has implications when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    We also need to consider the potential risks to the transmission of our monetary policy. In the past, abundant levels of liquidity have acted as a safeguard against spikes in liquidity needs that emerged regardless of where our rates stood. With this in mind, we need to carefully monitor the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity, mindful of the potential implications for financial stability.

    Today, I would like to take stock of the ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies, explaining why they remain a vital part of our monetary policy toolbox. I will then discuss the implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for our monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies

    At the ECB, balance sheet policies have served a dual purpose over time, allowing us to deliver on our price stability mandate amid exceptionally difficult circumstances.

    First, during periods when interest rates approached their effective lower bound and inflation remained below target, the ECB used asset purchases to support an accommodative monetary policy stance.

    For instance, the ECB launched its asset purchase programme (APP) in 2015 to stimulate the economy and inflation at a time when deflationary threats loomed large. Asset purchases and the associated provision of central bank liquidity worked in several ways – including through the portfolio rebalancing, exchange rate and credit channels – to generate a significant upward effect on both economic activity and inflation.[3]

    Second, balance sheet policies have been pivotal to ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy, in both tightening and easing phases.

    At times when we were lowering our policy rates, our TLTROs, launched in 2014, provided banks with long-term funding on favourable terms to incentivise them to lend to firms and households. This led to a persistent compression in lending rates and an increase in loan volumes over time.[4]

    But balance sheet policies were also instrumental in ensuring the smooth transmission of monetary policy at times when we were increasing our policy rates. The announcement of our Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) in 2022 allowed us to embark on the fastest rate hiking cycle in our history without sparking financial fragmentation in the euro area.

    Of course, the stance and transmission functions of our balance sheet policies do not operate in isolation. There can be beneficial interactions between the two.

    As rates increased, for example, euro area banks had sufficient liquidity to manage any maturity mismatches that arose. This – alongside strengthened regulation and supervision – helped them to emerge unscathed from the market turbulence in March 2023 that saw the collapse of three regional banks in the United States.

    The proportionate use of balance sheet policies in an evolving economic landscape

    The substantial expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet required careful monitoring of potential side effects. That is why the principle of proportionality lies at the core of how we use our balance sheet instruments.[5]

    In its 2021 strategy review, the Governing Council assessed that its use of balance sheet measures – alongside negative interest rates and forward guidance – had indeed been proportionate, taking into account any side effects, for instance on inequality and the financial sector.[6]

    Some concerns, however, require a more nuanced perspective.

    For example, there is little evidence to suggest that excessive risk appetite may be attributable to larger central bank balance sheets. If this were the case, we should have seen less risk-taking in markets as central banks began to withdraw their market footprint.

    But the opposite has been the case. Today equity markets are near all-time highs. This may be due to “animal spirits”[7], which have also been observed outside periods of central bank balance sheet growth. We saw them at play, for instance, during the dot-com bubble – a period when the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio hit its historic peak and central bank balance sheets were distinctly lean.

    Moreover, as the Eurosystem gradually reduces its footprint in sovereign bond markets by reducing its holdings of euro area government bonds, concerns about the size of the balance sheet are becoming less and less justified (Chart 1).[8]

    Chart 1

    Size of euro area government bond market and the Eurosystem’s market footprint

    (left-hand scale: EUR billions; right-hand scale: percentages)

    Sources: Eurosystem and Centralised Securities Database.

    Notes: The chart shows the evolution of the size of the euro area government bond market and splits it into outright holdings (yellow) and mobilised collateral (green), as well as what is not held or mobilised as collateral with the Eurosystem (blue). The Eurosystem market footprint is a relative measure, computed as the share of the Eurosystem’s euro area government bond (EGB) holdings compared with the nominal amount outstanding. Outright holdings are EGBs held by the Eurosystem via purchase programmes, adjusted by EGBs lent back via the securities lending against cash collateral facilities. Mobilised collateral includes EGBs mobilised as collateral for open market operations. The latest observations are for 31 January 2025.

    Going forward, an evolving economic landscape suggests that balance sheet policies could be increasingly useful as monetary policy instruments. Let me highlight two developments that are particularly relevant here.

    First, the non-bank financial sector has grown considerably over time and is becoming increasingly relevant in the funding of the real economy.

    In the euro area, the financial assets of non-banks have more than doubled since the global financial crisis.[9] Compared with banks, non-banks are more responsive to monetary policy measures that influence longer-term interest rates, such as asset purchases.[10] Given that non-banks adjust their portfolios more actively in response to changes in interest rates, this also increases the need for sufficient liquidity in the system to facilitate these adjustments.

    Second, geopolitical fragmentation means that the global economy is becoming more shock prone and subject to higher levels of uncertainty (Chart 2).

    Chart 2

    Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index

    (index)

    Source: Bloomberg.

    Note: The latest observation is for December 2024.

    In this environment, we need to remember that the euro area is subject to fragmentation risk. A key lesson from the sovereign debt crisis is that balance sheet policies have been instrumental in making the euro area a more “normal” jurisdiction from the perspective of monetary policy.

    As we navigate an increasingly complex economic landscape, the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity represents an inflection point that also requires close monitoring.

    In this environment, banks’ liquidity needs are met via a broad mix of instruments under our new operational framework. These include our short-term main refinancing operations (MROs) and three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) and will also include – at a later stage – structural longer-term credit operations and a structural portfolio of securities.[11]

    However, the decline in excess liquidity warrants careful monitoring, as it could exert additional tightening pressures on financial and financing conditions, potentially exceeding the intended policy stance.

    The implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment

    It is in this context that I would like to talk about the implications of our balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s balance sheet has been reduced at a faster pace than those of central banks in other major economies during their tightening cycles (Chart 3). So far, much of this decline can be attributed to banks’ repayments of TLTRO loans.[12]

    Chart 3

    Central bank total assets

    (index = 100 at the start of the respective policy rate hiking cycles)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The x-axis starts on 21 July 2022, 16 March 2022 and 15 December 2021 for the Eurosystem, Federal Reserve System, and Bank of England respectively. For the Bank of England, reserve balances are used as a proxy for the total balance sheet. The latest observations are for 12 February 2025.

    Looking ahead, however, any further reduction in the size of our balance sheet will stem from the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase portfolios, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.

    As in the past, the normalisation of our balance sheet has implications for our monetary policy stance and the possible risks to monetary policy transmission.

    The monetary policy stance

    Let me start with the implications for our monetary policy stance.

    Our reaction function for rate decisions is built around three well-known criteria: (i) the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Inflation has fallen by around three-quarters from its peak in late 2022 (Chart 4). The disinflation process is well on track, and our staff projections see inflation averaging 2.1% this year, 1.9% next year and 2.1% in 2027.

    Chart 4

    Headline inflation

    (annual percentage changes)

    Source: Eurostat.
    Note: The latest observation is for January 2025 (flash estimate).

    Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. In particular, the ECB’s measure of the persistent and common component of inflation (PCCI)[13] – a more forward-looking indicator of underlying inflationary pressures that tends to better predict future inflation – stood at 2.1% in December, and 2.0% when excluding energy.

    Domestic inflation remains high, as wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. But our wage tracker is signalling a significant moderation in wage growth, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation.

    It is the third leg of our reaction function – the strength of monetary policy transmission – that I would like to discuss in more detail, however.

    As we cut interest rates, new borrowing for firms and households is becoming less expensive. But financing conditions continue to be tight – in part because our monetary policy remains restrictive and past rate hikes are still working their way through the economy.[14]

    While credit continues to expand, lending to firms and households remains subdued by historical standards. In December, the annual growth rate of lending to firms was roughly two-thirds below its historical average.[15] Growth in housing loans increased gradually but also remained muted overall, at around one-fifth of its long-term average (Chart 5).[16]

    Chart 5

    Loans to firms and households

    (percentage points)

    Sources: ECB (BSI) and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for December 2024.

    At the same time, the recent gradual recovery in lending has not kept pace with the nominal growth of the economy, as reflected in the continued decline of the loan-to-GDP ratio (Chart 6).

    Chart 6

    Ratio of bank loans to GDP

    (percentages)

    Sources: ECB (BSI), Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observation is for the third quarter of 2024.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting our monetary policy stance, the normalisation of our balance sheet may also affect the stance through two key channels.

    First, while our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve, our quantitative tightening exerts upward pressure on long-term maturities and, to a lesser extent, intermediate ones. This serves to tighten financial conditions.[17]

    Indeed, the runoff of the asset portfolios of central banks has arguably been one of several factors contributing to a steepening of sovereign yield curves in recent months – akin to a reversal of the duration risk channel previously associated with central banks through quantitative easing (Chart 7).

    Chart 7

    New duration risk absorbed by private investors

    (EUR billions per basis point)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB.

    Notes: The chart shows the month-on-month change in the duration of government bonds held by private investors (i.e. investors other than the domestic central bank). Rates are approximated by weighted average maturity.

    At its peak in early 2022, the impact of current and expected Eurosystem bond holdings in our asset portfolios lowered ten-year sovereign bond yields by around 175 basis points.[18] Due to quantitative tightening, however, the easing impact has now fallen to around 75 basis points and is expected to further reduce over time (Chart 8).

    Chart 8

    Impact of APP and PEPP sovereign bond holdings on ten-year sovereign risk premia

    (basis points)

    Source: ECB calculations.

    Notes: The impacts are derived from an affine arbitrage-free model of the term structure with a quantity factor (see Eser et al., op. cit.) and an alternative version of the model recalibrated so that the model-implied yield reactions to the March PEPP announcement match the two-day yield changes observed after 18 March 2020. The model results are derived using GDP-weighted averages of the zero-coupon yields of the big-four sovereign issuers (DE, FR, IT and ES). The continuous line represents estimates based on real-time survey expectations. The dashed line is based on projections of the Eurosystem’s holdings of big-four sovereign bonds in the APP and PEPP as informed by the ECB’s December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts. The model abstracts from any potential holdings in a structural portfolio of securities. The latest observations are for January 2025 (monthly data).

    According to ECB research, an expected €1 trillion reduction in bond holdings may raise long-term risk-free interest rates by about 35 basis points (Chart 9).[19]

    Chart 9

    Expected term premium impact from running down the asset portfolio by €1 trillion

    (basis points)

    Sources: ECB December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts (SMA) and Akkaya, Y. et al., op.cit.

    Notes: The chart depicts the expected effect on the term premium of various assets with a ten-year maturity resulting from an expected €1 trillion decrease in the ECB’s bond holdings. Results are based on individual SMA responses from December 2022 until December 2023.

    Second, an environment marked by declining levels of central bank liquidity may constrain banks’ ability to extend credit.

    Research documents the strong relationship between loan supply and structural sources of liquidity, such as reserves obtained through credit easing programmes or those injected through quantitative easing interventions.

    More specifically, a €1 change in non-borrowed reserves or credit easing reserves is associated with a corresponding change in credit of approximately 15 cents or 10 cents respectively.[20] In other words, a €500 billion drop in non-borrowed reserves – similar to the one expected in 2025 as a result of the decline in our APP and PEPP holdings – is associated with a €75 billion decline in credit supply, equivalent to about 0.6 percentage points of downward pressure on loans to the non-financial private sector.[21]

    Accordingly, as central bank liquidity declines, we may see tighter credit conditions in the economy. This could slow down investment and consumption, with firms cutting back on capital expenditure and consumers reducing purchases of big-ticket items that require financing.[22]

    Incoming data suggest that euro area GDP growth will remain subdued in the short term. Industrial production decreased notably in December and surveys indicate that manufacturing is continuing to contract, whereas services activity is expanding at a moderate pace (Chart 10).

    Chart 10

    Purchasing Managers’ Index

    (diffusion indices)

    Source: S&P Global.

    Notes: “Output” and “New orders” correspond to the manufacturing and composite indices, and “Business activity” and “New business” to the services index. The latest observations are for January 2025.

    Given the uncertain economic environment, we are yet to see a sustained rebound in investment (Chart 11).[23] And while we continue to expect consumption to be the main driver of the recovery, rising real incomes have not yet encouraged households to increase their spending in a commensurate manner (Chart 12).[24] In the face of subdued domestic demand, our latest staff projections forecast a slower economic recovery than had been forecast in the September projections.[25]

    Chart 11

    Detailed decomposition of euro area real GDP

    (quarter-on-quarter percentage changes and percentage point contributions)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 for real GDP, and for the third quarter of 2024 for the other components.

    Chart 12

    Real household disposable income and consumption

    (second quarter of 2022 = 100)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the third quarter of 2024.

    Moreover, geopolitical risks may create further headwinds for the recovery, which we will need to monitor carefully. Forthcoming findings from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) suggest that consumers’ concerns about geopolitical risks are negatively affecting economic sentiment – leading to more pessimistic expectations, more elevated income uncertainty and, ultimately, a lower propensity to consume.

    We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. As we gradually cut rates towards neutral territory, we need to be mindful of the fact that we now have two monetary policy tools working in opposing directions, given our ongoing quantitative tightening. This is a first in our history at the ECB.

    We therefore need to ensure that we factor in the tightening of our balance sheet when calibrating our rate cuts to achieve our inflation aim. This is because the stance effects stemming from our rate cuts will be somewhat dampened by the tightening induced by the normalisation of our balance sheet.

    This is an important consideration when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    Risks to the transmission of our monetary policy

    Similarly, we need to be mindful of the possible risks to the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy in view of the prevailing uncertainty and potential risks to financial stability.

    This cautious approach is crucial, especially given historical precedents where central banks faced unexpected challenges.

    In late 2019, for instance, the Federal Reserve System was unexpectedly forced to temporarily reverse its balance sheet retrenchment due to liquidity challenges in financial markets.[26] In 2022 the Bank of England halted quantitative tightening and launched emergency gilt purchases to safeguard financial stability after pension funds’ liability-driven investment strategies exposed systemic risks.[27]

    Recent bouts of market volatility also underscore that we should remain alert to the emergence of financial stability risks that may endanger transmission. Last August several factors converged to spark substantial market volatility.[28] The VIX, a market index that measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, recorded its largest ever one-day spike (Chart 13).[29]

    Chart 13

    VIX index

    (percentages)

    Source: ECB staff calculations.

    Notes: Long run average calculated since January 2000. The latest observations are for 7 February 2025.

    Faced with such episodes of volatility, the further decline in our balance sheet must remain on a gradual and predictable path to avoid financial amplification effects.[30] This is especially important in an environment where euro area banks are already tightening their credit standards, especially for firms and consumer credit, due to higher perceived risks related to the economic outlook (Chart 14).[31]

    Chart 14

    Credit standards, demand for loans to firms and contributing factors

    (net percentages)

    Source: ECB (bank lending survey).

    Notes: “Actual” values are changes that have occurred, while “expected” values are changes anticipated by banks. Net percentages for the questions on credit standards for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. Net percentages for the questions on demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”. “Other financing needs” as unweighted average of “M&A and corporate restructuring” and “debt refinancing/restructuring and renegotiation”; “Use of alternative finance” as unweighted average of “internal financing”, “loans from other banks”, “loans from non-banks”, “issuance/redemption of debt securities” and “issuance/redemption of equity”. The net percentages for “Other factors” refer to an average of the further factors which were mentioned by banks as having contributed to changes in credit standards or changes in loan demand, respectively. The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 (January 2025 bank lending survey).

    Our balance sheet policy instruments continue to be a crucial item in our toolbox. The expectation that we will use them if necessary protects the smooth transmission of our monetary policy and reduces the likelihood that we will need to use these tools in the first place.

    Moreover, in an environment of heightened uncertainty, even in the context of excess liquidity, we need to remain prudent and be ready to step in should another shock emerge. We should maintain the flexibility to swiftly expand liquidity facilities if stressful conditions arise.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies to date demonstrates their importance both for the monetary policy stance and for the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. They are a vital part of our toolkit.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting the monetary policy stance, we should also consider the role played by quantitative tightening in influencing overall financial and financing conditions – be it through the yield curve or through the bank lending channel.

    To strike the right balance, we should ensure that our rate decisions adequately compensate for the tightening induced by the reduction of our balance sheet.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Arizona Department of Public Safety partners with Thales for enhanced security of license and identity credentials

    Source: Thales Group

    Headline: Arizona Department of Public Safety partners with Thales for enhanced security of license and identity credentials

    • This new contract covers over 300,000 cards annually, including Concealed Weapons Permits (CWP), Certificate of Firearms Proficiency (LEOSA), Fingerprint Clearance Cards (FCC), and various licensed Security Guard and Private Investigator ID cards (SG/PI).
    • Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) joins a growing number of jurisdictions in North America who have switched to Thales’ 100% polycarbonate cards – resulting in more sustainable and secure cards.
    • The new cards are already accessible for licensed citizens, law enforcement partners, and other parties using these license and identity credentials.

    The Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) has awarded Thales a contract, with potential to extend through 2029, for off-site printing of their special license and identity cards including Concealed Weapons Permits, Certificates of Firearms Proficiency, Fingerprint Clearance Cards, and various licensed Security Guard and Private Investigator cards.

    As part of this award, these ID cards are being upgraded with stronger security features and a redesigned appearance to ensure a high degree of security and trust in each credential. The new security elements include transitioning to 100% polycarbonate cards, for stronger security and the ability to leverage a large number of embedded, visible security features making it easier for first-line inspectors and law enforcement to quickly and clearly identify whether the credential is genuine or has been altered.

    New security features being added to these cards include a detailed laser engraved portrait photo for a clear photo easy to identify in rapid or low light situations, smooth color transitions within a secure background pattern, and a reflective embossed pattern across the card surface for kinetic movement effects. All security features are safely located within, and protected by, the polycarbonate card body and cannot be tampered with without damaging the card, thereby making the tampering attempt extremely evident.

    Arizona DPS joins over a dozen other Thales partner agencies in North America that have switched to cards made from 100% polycarbonate, for best-in-class identity credential documents. In addition to the highest-level of security available, polycarbonate also provides a highly durable card with higher resistance to fraud over the life of the credential.

    Thales is the fastest growing provider of license and identity solutions in the U.S., with a true partner-based approach with our agency and jurisdiction customers. Thales offers the strongest security features in the marketplace for identity credentials, as well as regularly introduces new card security features, to ensure our commitment to the fight against fraud.

    “These next generation identity cards provide Arizona citizens, businesses and state officials with stronger security for these credentials, allowing for quicker validation,” said Tyson Moler, Vice President for Thales Identity and Biometric Solutions in North America. “Thales is pleased to partner with the Arizona DPS, leveraging our key strengths and expertise in reliable and secure documents solutions.”

    Thales is a trusted provider of driver’s license and ID solutions in the U.S. Thales provides driver’s license and ID card solutions to the following 17 agencies and jurisdictions across North America: Alaska, Arizona MVD and DPS, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, New Brunswick, New Hampshire, New York, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Quebec, Texas, Washington D.C., Wyoming.

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: France: Lawmakers must reject ‘discriminatory’ bill to ban hijabs in all sports

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Proposed bill would ban wearing ‘ostensibly religious’ clothing and symbols in French sports

    Senate to debate and vote the bill this week

    New law would exacerbate the blatant religious, racial and gender discrimination already experienced by Muslim women in France

    ‘The sports hijab bans in France are yet another measure underpinned by Islamophobia and a patriarchal attempt to control what Muslim women wear’ – Anna Błuś

    French lawmakers must reject a discriminatory bill that would ban the wearing of “ostensibly religious” clothing and symbols during competitions in all French sports, Amnesty International said ahead of this week’s Senate debate and vote. 

    The ban which would apply to competitions organised by sports federations, their decentralised bodies, professional leagues and affiliated associations as well as swimming pools, is being debated today and tomorrow ahead of an expected vote.

    Anna Błuś, Amnesty International’s Researcher on Gender Justice in Europe, said:

    “At the Paris Olympics, France’s ban on French women athletes who wear headscarves from competing at the Games drew international outrage. Just six months on, French authorities are not only doubling down on the discriminatory hijab ban but are attempting to extend it to all sports.

    “Under the guise of implementing the notion of ‘secularism’, these laws in reality target and disproportionately impact the rights of Muslim women and girls who will be excluded from competing in all sports if they wear a hijab or any other religious clothing.

    “To equate the wearing of a headscarf with “an attack on secularism” is not only absurd but dangerous and would only serve to create division this proposed law purports to want to tackle. This law would exacerbate the blatant religious, racial and gender discrimination already experienced by Muslim women in France.

    “All women have the right to choose what to wear. The sports hijab bans in France are yet another measure underpinned by Islamophobia and a patriarchal attempt to control what Muslim women wear. This bill must be rejected”  

    “Laïcité”, or “secularism”, which is theoretically embedded in the French constitution to protect everyone’s religious freedom, has often been used as a pretext to block Muslim women’s access to public spaces in France. Over several years, the French authorities have enacted laws and policies to regulate Muslim women’s and girls’ clothing, in discriminatory ways. Sport federations have followed suit, imposing hijab bans in several sports. 

    Damaging impact of hijab ban in French sport

    In the run up to the 2024 Olympic Games, Amnesty published findings setting out the damaging impact of hijab bans in sports on women and girls in France and exposing how the bans contradict the clothing rules of international sport bodies.

    The research looked at rules in 38 European countries and found that France is the only one that has imposed bans on religious headwear in sports. It found that preventing Muslim women and girls from fully and freely participating in sports can have devastating impacts on all aspects of their lives, including on their mental and physical health.  

    In October 2024, United Nations experts condemned these bans as “disproportionate and discriminatory” and called for their reversal. But instead of addressing these pressing concerns, French authorities are now attempting to expand their restrictions to Muslim women’s participation in sports through this bill.  

    As well as banning religious clothing, the bill would also prohibit prayers from taking place in any sports facilities or grounds and introduce a requirement for sports educators to undergo “administrative investigations…prior to the issuance of the sports educator’s professional card”.   

    Haïfa Tlili, sociologist and co-founder of Basket Pour Toutes, told Amnesty International:

    “There is no objective data to justify decisions that severely restrict the freedoms of Muslim female licence-holders who decide to wear sports headgear. It is therefore incorrect and unjustified to assert that the rules which exclude Muslim sportswomen and girls are necessary, appropriate and proportionate for the proper functioning of public service.”

    Basketball player and another Basket Pour Toutes co-founder, Hélène Bâ, described how hijab bans force Muslim women to make an impossible choice.

    This new law would have appalling consequences for Muslim women and girls: humiliation, stigmatisation, trauma, withdrawal from sport, breakdown of social ties, loss of self-confidence, disappearance of women’s teams, endangerment of clubs.”

    The explanatory note to the bill says that the “neutrality” requirement as interpreted in French law extends to employees and volunteers of sports federations, for instance coaches and referees and even “high level athletes”.  

    According to a report accompanying the bill, this legislation has been prompted by “growing attacks on secularism” and the need to address reports of “radicalisation”, “communitarianism” and “Islamist separatism” in French sports. It argues that banning clothing such as sports hijabs would prevent the formation of “counter-societies”.  

    By placing the wearing of a headscarf on the spectrum of “attacks on secularism”, which range from “permissiveness” to “terrorism”, this legislation, if passed, would fuel racism and reinforce the growing hostile environment facing Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim in France. Indeed, framing headscarves as a security threat or singling them out as a symbol of women’s oppression is imbued with negative and discriminatory stereotypes that are endemic to the “othering” of Muslim women because of their religion. 

    Political disagreement on the merits of the bill

    The proposal was submitted to the Senate on 5 March 2024 by Senator Michel Savin after being debated in the Standing Commission on Cultural, Educational, Communication and Sports Affairs, revealing deep disagreements between senators on the merits of the bill. A previous attempt to ban religious headwear in all sports at the national level was rejected by the Senate in February 2022.    

    https://www.senat.fr/rap/l23-667/l23-667_mono.html – explanatory note  

    https://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl23-668.html – bill text only  

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: France: Hijab ban in all sports would violate human rights and target Muslim women and girls 

    Source: Amnesty International –

    French lawmakers must reject a discriminatory bill that would ban the wearing of “ostensibly religious” clothing and symbols during competitions in all French sports, Amnesty International said ahead of a debate in the Senate which starts today and will be followed by a vote. 

    The ban which would apply to competitions organized by sports federations, their decentralized bodies, professional leagues and affiliated associations as well as swimming pools, is being debated today and tomorrow ahead of an expected vote.

    Six months after the Paris Olympics, French authorities are not only doubling down on the discriminatory hijab ban but are attempting to extend it to all sports

    “At the Paris Olympics, France’s ban on French women athletes who wear headscarves from competing at the Games drew international outrage. Just six months on, French authorities are not only doubling down on the discriminatory hijab ban but are attempting to extend it to all sports,” said Anna Błuś, Amnesty International’s Researcher on Gender Justice in Europe. 

    “Under the guise of implementing the notion of ‘secularism’, these laws in reality target and disproportionately impact the rights of Muslim women and girls who will be excluded from competing in all sports if they wear a hijab or any other religious clothing.” 

    “Laïcité”, or “secularism”, which is theoretically embedded in the French constitution to protect everyone’s religious freedom, has often been used as a pretext to block Muslim women’s access to public spaces in France. Over several years, the French authorities have enacted laws and policies to regulate Muslim women’s and girls’ clothing, in discriminatory ways. Sport federations have followed suit, imposing hijab bans in several sports. 

    In the run up to the 2024 Olympic Games, Amnesty International published findings setting out the damaging impact of hijab bans in sports on women and girls in France and exposing how the bans contradict the clothing rules of international sport bodies. The research looked at rules in 38 European countries and found that France is the only one that has imposed bans on religious headwear in sports. It found that preventing Muslim women and girls from fully and freely participating in sports can have devastating impacts on all aspects of their lives, including on their mental and physical health.  

    In October 2024, United Nations experts condemned these bans as “disproportionate and discriminatory” and called for their reversal. But instead of addressing these pressing concerns, French authorities are now attempting to expand their restrictions to Muslim women’s participation in sports through this bill.  

    As well as banning religious clothing, the bill would also prohibit prayers from taking place in any sports facilities or grounds and introduce a requirement for sports educators to undergo “administrative investigations…prior to the issuance of the sports educator’s professional card”.   

    “There is no objective data to justify decisions that severely restrict the freedoms of Muslim female licence-holders who decide to wear sports headgear. It is therefore incorrect and unjustified to assert that the rules which exclude Muslim sportswomen and girls are necessary, appropriate and proportionate for the proper functioning of public service,” Haïfa Tlili, sociologist and co-founder of Basket Pour Toutes, told Amnesty International.  

    Basketball player and another Basket Pour Toutes co-founder, Hélène Bâ, described how hijab bans force Muslim women to make an impossible choice. “This new law would have appalling consequences for Muslim women and girls: humiliation, stigmatisation, trauma, withdrawal from sport, breakdown of social ties, loss of self-confidence, disappearance of women’s teams, endangerment of clubs,” she told Amnesty International. 

    The explanatory note to the bill says that the “neutrality” requirement as interpreted in French law extends to employees and volunteers of sports federations, for instance coaches and referees and even “high level athletes”.  

    According to a report accompanying the bill, this legislation has been prompted by “growing attacks on secularism” and the need to address reports of “radicalisation”, “communitarianism” and “Islamist separatism” in French sports. It argues that banning clothing such as sports hijabs would prevent the formation of “counter-societies”.  

    “All women have the right to choose what to wear. This bill must be rejected”  

    By placing the wearing of a headscarf on the spectrum of “attacks on secularism”, which range from “permissiveness” to “terrorism”, this legislation, if passed, would fuel racism and reinforce the growing hostile environment facing Muslims and those perceived to be Muslim in France. Indeed, framing headscarves as a security threat or singling them out as a symbol of women’s oppression is imbued with negative and discriminatory stereotypes that are endemic to the “othering” of Muslim women because of their religion. 

    “To equate the wearing of a headscarf with “an attack on secularism” is not only absurd but dangerous and would only serve to create division this proposed law purports to want to tackle. This law would exacerbate the blatant religious, racial and gender discrimination already experienced by Muslim women in France,” said Anna Błuś. 

    “All women have the right to choose what to wear. The sports hijab bans in France are yet another measure underpinned by Islamophobia and a patriarchal attempt to control what Muslim women wear. This bill must be rejected”  

    BACKGROUND 

    The proposal was submitted to the Senate on 5 March 2024 by Senator Michel Savin after being debated in the Standing Commission on Cultural, Educational, Communication and Sports Affairs, revealing deep disagreements between senators on the merits of the bill. A previous attempt to ban religious headwear in all sports at the national level was rejected by the Senate in February 2022.    

    https://www.senat.fr/rap/l23-667/l23-667_mono.html – explanatory note  

    https://www.senat.fr/leg/ppl23-668.html – bill text only  

    The debate is scheduled for 18 and 19 February

    An OpEd was published in Nouvel Observateur here

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA: With University Of Rochester And Rochester Institute Of Technology Set To Lose A Total Of $50 Million In Federal Funding, Senator Gillibrand Highlights Potential Upheaval Of Local Economy, End To Lifesaving Medical Research

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Kirsten Gillibrand
    National Institutes Of Health Funding Supports 30,000 Jobs and $8 Billion In Economic Activity In New York Alone;
    Funding Cuts Will Cost Jobs, Derail Critical Research, And Endanger Public Health
    University of Rochester Is Region’s Largest Employer, Employs 3,000 Biomedical Researchers; 
    Gillibrand Leading Bipartisan Call To Reverse Cuts
    Today, U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand joined University of Rochester and Rochester Institute of Technology leadership at the University of Rochester to highlight the impact of President Trump’s recent attempts to cut National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding on the universities and the local economy.
    The University of Rochester receives hundreds of NIH grants to study cancer, cardiovascular disease, arthritis, diabetes, allergies, aging, mental health, children’s health, and much more. Slashed funding would force researchers to abandon this critical work and extinguish hope for patients and families looking for cures. This funding cut could also put thousands of jobs across New York State at risk; NIH funding supports roughly 30,000 jobs in New York State alone. 
    “New York is home to top notch universities that attract the world’s best scientists conducting cutting-edge research,” said Senator Gillibrand. “President Trump’s attempt to radically cut funding for the University of Rochester and Rochester Institute of Technology, as well as other research institutions, is irresponsible and short-sighted. It will imperil research that saves lives and is guaranteed to hurt our economy and the thousands of New Yorkers employed by local research institutions. These cuts are facing strong bipartisan opposition, and I am working across the aisle with my colleagues in the New York delegation, including Congressman Morelle, to call on the Trump administration to reverse them.”
    “I want to thank Senator Gillibrand for her leadership in opposing these draconian cuts and for her tremendous and unwavering support to our Rochester scientists, doctors, and patients. Arbitrarily and abruptly cutting groundbreaking biomedical research that has led to countless breakthroughs and that saves, extends, and improves human lives is no way to make government more efficient. It is detrimental to our efforts to improve health in the Rochester/Finger Lakes region and in the Southern Tier, threatens the future health of all Americans, and puts in jeopardy the nation’s position as the scientific and clinical research leader of the world,” said Sarah C. Mangelsdorf, President of the University of Rochester
    “NIH-funded research forms the backbone for scientific innovation in medicine, driving discoveries that improve lives and strengthen our nation’s global leadership in healthcare and related technologies. To remain competitive, universities must have the resources necessary to support groundbreaking research, including the associated indirect costs, such as laboratory facilities and infrastructure, compliance, and administrative assistance.  Indirect costs are not optional; they are fundamental to sustaining a research environment where faculty, staff and students can focus on advancing knowledge and solving the world’s most pressing challenges,” said David C. Munson, President, Rochester Institute of Technology. “Continued investment in NIH research at higher education institutions across the nation, and the full restoration of NIH indirect cost recovery, are necessary to ensure that we continue to attract the best talent and maintain our worldwide leadership in healthcare science and innovation.“
    Last week, the Trump administration announced that it would slash billions in federal funding for research institutions nationwide by imposing a cap on “indirect costs” for research associated with NIH grants. Indirect costs are expenses that are essential for scientific research, and include the construction and maintenance of research facilities, the purchase of costly scientific tools, and support staffing for major research projects. The University of Rochester is set to lose $40 million in funding for indirect costs, and Rochester Institute of Technology is set to lost $10 million, which would cripple their ability to continue to conduct much of their research. New York institutions are expected to lose $850 million in total. While a federal judge has temporarily paused these cuts from going into effect, they have created chaos and confusion for the New York institutions that rely on a steady and stable flow of NIH funding. 
    The full text of Senator Gillibrand’s bipartisan letter with Senator Schumer and Representatives Morelle, Garbarino, Lawler, Clarke, Espaillat, Gillen, Goldman, Kennedy, Latimer, Mannion, Meng, Meeks, Nadler, Ocasio-Cortez, Suozzi, Tonko, Torres, Velázquez, Riley, and Ryan highlighting the impact these cuts would have on New York is available here.
    The full text of Senator Gillibrand’s letter with 46 Senate Democrats is available here. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: With University At Buffalo Set To Lose $47 Million In Federal Funding, Senator Gillibrand, Rep. Kennedy, Highlight Potential Upheaval Of Local Economy, End To Lifesaving Medical Research

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Kirsten Gillibrand
    National Institutes Of Health Funding Supports 30,000 Jobs and $8 Billion In Economic Activity In New York Alone;
    Funding Cuts Will Cost Jobs, Derail Critical Research, And Endanger Public Health
    Gillibrand Leading Bipartisan Call To Reverse Cuts
    Today, U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Representative Tim Kennedy visited the University at Buffalo to highlight the impact of President Trump’s recent cuts to National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding on the university and the local economy. 
    The University at Buffalo receives hundreds of NIH grants to study cancer, cardiovascular disease, diabetes, infectious disease, arthritis, allergies, mental health, and much more. Slashed funding would force researchers to abandon critical work and extinguish hope for patients and families looking for cures. This funding cut could also put thousands of jobs across New York State at risk; NIH funding supports roughly 30,000 jobs in New York State alone. 
    “New York is home to top notch universities that attract the world’s best scientists conducting cutting-edge research,” said Senator Gillibrand. “President Trump’s attempt to radically cut funding for the University at Buffalo and other research institutions is irresponsible and short-sighted. It will imperil research that saves lives and is guaranteed to hurt our economy and the thousands of New Yorkers employed by local research institutions. These cuts are facing strong bipartisan opposition, and I am working across the aisle with my colleagues in the New York delegation, including Congressman Kennedy, to call on the Trump administration to reverse them.”
    “The administration’s arbitrary cuts to NIH funding are a matter of life and death,” said Congressman Tim Kennedy. “This funding is the difference between a grandparent keeping cancer at bay long enough to meet their grandchild or an infant benefiting from lifesaving research—these scenarios play out every day across our region and nation. The federal government should be investing in our future, not defunding cancer research and other critical health programs. These cuts need to be rescinded immediately, and we need to let scientists and doctors get back to the business of researching lifesaving technologies.”
    “NIH has been an exceptional partner to the University at Buffalo and universities nationwide, enabling life changing and lifesaving discoveries in all aspects of health, wellness, and healthcare,” said Venu Govindaraju, PhD, vice president for research and economic at the University at Buffalo. “The proposed changes to the NIH funding structure will make vital research difficult if not impossible to undertake and impede decades of scientific advancements.”
    “The Jacobs School, along with the health science community at the University at Buffalo, is dedicated to advancing scientific discovery and significantly improving health outcomes across Western New York. Through cutting-edge research funded in part by the National Institutes of Health, we aim to transform health care by developing innovative solutions, generating new knowledge, and training the next generation of health care professionals. We do research to enhance patient care and improve public health both locally and globally. However, the NIH’s recent announcement of a new policy capping the indirect cost payment rate for new and existing grants at 15% — a change that could threaten billions of dollars in funding for universities and health systems — will significantly diminish these efforts that are critical to the health of our community,” said Allison Brashear, Dean, Jacobs School of Medicine and Biomedical Sciences.
    “At SUNY, we are proud of our extraordinary researchers and the life-changing, groundbreaking medical discoveries they have dedicated their careers to advancing,” said SUNY Chancellor John B. King Jr. “From working to cure Alzheimer’s disease to improving cancer outcomes, from supporting 9/11 first responders to detecting brain aneurysms, their research is essential to our national security and economic leadership.”
    Last week, the Trump administration announced that it would slash billions in federal funding for research institutions nationwide by imposing a cap on “indirect costs” for research associated with NIH grants. Indirect costs are expenses that are essential for scientific research, and include the construction and maintenance of research facilities, the purchase of costly scientific tools, and support staffing for major research projects. The University at Buffalo is set to lose $47 million in funding for indirect costs, which would cripple its ability to continue to conduct much of its research. New York institutions are expected to lose $850 million in total. While a federal judge has temporarily paused these cuts from going into effect, have created chaos and confusion for the New York institutions that rely on a steady and stable flow of NIH funding. 
    The full text of Senator Gillibrand’s bipartisan letter with Senator Schumer, and Representatives Kennedy, Garbarino, Lawler, Morelle, Clarke, Espaillat, Gillen, Goldman,Latimer, Mannion, Meng, Meeks, Nadler, Ocasio-Cortez, Suozzi, Tonko, Torres, Velázquez, Riley and Ryan highlighting the impact these cuts would have on New York is available here.
    The full text of Senator Gillibrand’s letter with 46 Senate Democrats is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: With SUNY Upstate Set To Lose Millions In Federal Funding, Senator Gillibrand, Rep. Mannion Highlights Potential Upheaval Of Local Economy, End To Lifesaving Medical Research

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for New York Kirsten Gillibrand
    National Institutes Of Health Funding Supports 30,000 Jobs and $8 Billion In Economic Activity In New York Alone;
    Funding Cuts Will Cost Jobs, Derail Critical Research, And Endanger Public Health
    SUNY Research Foundation Would Lose An Estimated $79 Million 
    Gillibrand Leading Bipartisan Call To Reverse Cuts
    Today, U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand and Representative John Mannion visited SUNY Upstate Medical University to highlight the impact of President Trump’s recent cuts to National Institutes of Health (NIH) funding on the university and the local economy. 
    SUNY Upstate receives dozens of NIH grants to study cancer, cardiovascular disease, infectious disease, aging, mental health, and much more. Slashed funding would force researchers to abandon this critical work and extinguish hope for patients and families looking for cures. This funding cut could also put thousands of jobs across New York State at risk; NIH funding supports roughly 30,000 jobs in New York State alone. 
    “New York is home to top notch universities that attract the world’s best scientists conducting cutting-edge research,” said Senator Gillibrand. “President Trump’s attempt to radically cut funding for SUNY Upstate and other research institutions is irresponsible and short-sighted. It will imperil research that saves lives and is guaranteed to hurt our economy and the thousands of New Yorkers employed by local research institutions. These cuts are facing strong bipartisan opposition, and I am working across the aisle with my colleagues in the New York delegation, including Congressman Mannion, to call on the Trump administration to reverse them.”
    “I join Senator Gillibrand in rejecting cuts to NIH funding and staff that would have devastating consequences for lifesaving medical research happening right here in Central New York,” said Representative John W. Mannion said. “At the CNY Biotech Accelerator, researchers rely on NIH support to develop breakthrough treatments and technologies that improve and save lives. Slashing these resources will make government less efficient, put innovation at risk, delay critical medical advancements, and threaten local jobs in our growing biotech sector. We must protect federal investments in science and health.”
    “At SUNY, we are proud of our extraordinary researchers and the life-changing, groundbreaking medical discoveries they have dedicated their careers to advancing,” said SUNY Chancellor John B. King Jr. “From working to cure Alzheimer’s disease to improving cancer outcomes, from supporting 9/11 first responders to detecting brain aneurysms, their research is essential to our national security and economic leadership.”
    “Upstate Medical University is fortunate to have leading researchers among its faculty finding cures and better treatments for cancer, Alzheimer’s disease, lupus and many other disorders. Biomedical research is an essential part of being an academic medical institution that adds to the vibrancy of our CNY community,” said Upstate Medical University President Mantosh Dewan, MD.
    “Cutting NIH funding would be a devastating blow to the future of medical innovation and the fight against diseases like Alzheimer’s and cancer. These cuts threaten to stall groundbreaking research, delay critical treatments, and stifle the progress of startups working tirelessly to bring lifesaving therapies to patients. Right here in Central New York, the CNY Biotech Accelerator is home to incredible companies working on cutting-edge medical breakthroughs. Many of them rely on NIH support, and these cuts could mean fewer innovations, fewer jobs, and fewer solutions for the patients who need them most. We cannot afford to let innovation be the casualty of short-sighted policy decisions,” said NYS Senator Chris Ryan. 
    “The American people deserve the best medical research in the world and thanks to our historic investments in this area, scientists at universities and academic medical centers across New York State are finding cures and treatments for conditions like cancer, heart disease, Alzheimer’s, diabetes and stroke,” said Win Thurlow, Executive Director, LifeSciencesNY. “This work not only saves lives, but also strengthens the local economy.  Biomedical research creates jobs and opportunities for all New Yorkers. Cutting support for this research means that cures will go undiscovered, jobs will be lost and our communities will suffer.”
    “Basic and applied medical research at NYS higher education institutions and agencies is critical to improving and saving lives. Federal funding, particularly from NIH, is imperative. Any disruption in funding may cause delays in important discoveries and upheaval in the work and lives of researchers and patients. Federal funds help drive New York’s economy for all New Yorkers. Cutting NIH funding hobbles medical research resulting in both immediate and long-term consequences for all Americans,” said Assemblyman Al Stirpe.
    Last week, the Trump administration announced that it would slash billions in federal funding for research institutions nationwide by imposing a cap on “indirect costs” for research associated with NIH grants. Indirect costs are expenses that are essential for scientific research, and include the construction and maintenance of research facilities, the purchase of costly scientific tools, and support staffing for major research projects. SUNY Upstate is set to lose $5 million in funding for indirect costs, and the SUNY Research Foundation would lose an estimated $79 million overall, which would cripple New York scientists’ ability to continue to conduct much of their research. New York institutions are expected to lose $850 million in total. While a federal judge has temporarily paused these cuts from going into effect, they have created chaos and confusion for the New York institutions that rely on a steady and stable flow of NIH funding. 
    The full text of Senator Gillibrand’s bipartisan letter with Senator Schumer and Representatives Mannion, Morelle, Garbarino, Lawler, Clarke, Espaillat, Gillen, Goldman, Kennedy, Latimer, Meng, Meeks, Nadler, Ocasio-Cortez, Suozzi, Tonko, Torres, Velázquez, Riley, and Ryan highlighting the impact these cuts would have on New York is available here.
    The full text of Senator Gillibrand’s letter with 46 Senate Democrats is available here. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp. Executes Business Combination Agreement with Bangkok Tellink Co., Ltd.

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    The proposed transaction represents an equity value on a pro-forma basis of a total equity value of the combined company of USD350 million ~

    ~ Bangkok Tellink Co., Ltd. is an emerging leader in advanced telecommunications, mobile network technology, and Internet of Things (IoT) solutions ~

    ~ Leveraging its successful track record, Bangkok Tellink Co., Ltd. seeks enhanced access to U.S. capital markets to accelerate the rollout of its next-gen telecommunication technologies, foster broader geographic expansion, and provide increased financial flexibility to advance research and development efforts ~

    Miami, FL and Bangkok, Thailand, Feb. 18, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp. (OTC: AOGO), a Delaware special purpose acquisition company (“Arogo”), and Bangkok Tellink Company Limited, a Thai registered company (“Bangkok Tellink”), today announced their execution of a definitive business combination agreement (the “Business Combination Agreement”) for a proposed business combination in a transaction valued at $350 million on February 14, 2025.

    The transaction contemplated in the Business Combination Agreement is expected to result in a newly combined company to be listed on The Nasdaq Global Market. Upon the closing of the transaction, Bangkok Tellink will continue to be led by its CEO, Mr. Nusttanakit Sasianon. The boards of directors of Bangkok Tellink and Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp. have unanimously approved the transaction

    Bangkok Tellink is a licensed Mobile Virtual Network Service Operator (“MVNO”) as well as a licensed Mobile Virtual Network Aggregator (“MVNA”) and offers mobile phone packages across multiple frequencies (e.g., 700MHz, 850MHz, 2100MHz, 2300MHz, and 26GHz) and, under its “INFINITE” brand, provides a range of services including Smart Solutions, IoT Sim Cards, eSIMs, SMPP (i.e., virtual SMS), SIP trunk (voice virtual number), and software development.  

    The eSIM market in Thailand is growing as it offers convenience for consumers and flexibility for businesses. eSIM technology allows users to switch mobile operators without changing physical SIM cards and is spearheading a transformative shift in connectivity, promoting Thailand’s progression towards a sophisticated digital economy. The exploding demand for eSims reflects Thailand’s commitment to expanding its telecommunications infrastructure and has positioned it as a leader in Southeast Asia.1

    Bangkok Tellink is uniquely positioned to facilitate the growth of Thailand’s digital economy that is driven by the need for enhanced economic competitiveness, improved public services, and sustainable growth. eSIM technology supports this transformation by simplifying connectivity for businesses and consumers alike, facilitating more efficient operations, and enhancing the accessibility of digital services across the country

    Nusttanakit Sasianon, CEO of Bangkok Tellink commented, “This is an exciting moment for Bangkok Tellink to expand our business, enhance our product and service offerings, and accelerate our growth. We are excited to continue to foster this business combination with the Arogo team to generate attractive value for our shareholders.”

    Suradech Taweesaengsakulthai, CEO of Arogo added, “We’re thrilled to partner with the Bangkok Tellink team to capitalize on their proven track record and support the expansion of their operations to meet the demand for its services including Smart Solutions, IoT Sim Cards, eSIMs, SMPP (i.e., virtual SMS), SIP trunk (voice virtual number), and software development. We have strong confidence in Bangkok Tellink’s management team and business model. We look forward to a successful closing of the business combination.” 

    The completion of the business combination is subject to regulatory approvals, the approval of the transaction by the shareholders of Arogo and Bangkok Tellink, and the satisfaction or waiver of other customary closing conditions.   Bangkok Tellink believes that its planned listing, in addition to creating a capital platform for its development and gaining the attention of investors in the international capital markets, will further promote Bangkok Tellink’s growth strategy.

    Additional information about the business combination, including a copy of the Business Combination Agreement, will be available in a Current Report on Form 8-K to be filed by Arogo with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), followed by a Registration Statement on Form F-4 to be filed by Pubco with the SEC.

    Advisors
    Rimon P.C. (Washington D.C.) serves as United States legal counsel to Arogo.

    Araya & Partners Co., Ltd. (Bangkok) serves as legal counsel to Bangkok Tellink Co., Ltd.  

    ARC Group Limited is acting as sole financial advisor to Arogo.

    About Bangkok Tellink Co., Ltd.
    Bangkok Tellink Co., Ltd, established in 2019, is at the forefront of Thailand’s telecommunications industry. By offering mobile network infrastructure, IoT devices, E-sim services, and software development, Bangkok Tellink provides integrated solutions that foster connectivity and productivity. Bangkok Tellink invests in innovation, operational efficiency, and sustainability to position itself as a prominent telecommunications and technology leader.

    About Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp.
    Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp. is a blank check company formed in 2021 for the purpose of effecting a merger, capital stock exchange, asset acquisition, share purchase, reorganization or similar business combination with one or more businesses. On December 29, 2021, Arogo consummated an initial public offering of its units that consisted of one share of Class A common stock and one redeemable warrant. Each whole warrant entitles the holder to purchase one share of Class A common stock at a price of $11.50 per share, subject to adjustment. For more information, visit www.arogocapital.com.

    Important Information and Where to Find It.

    For additional information on the proposed transaction, see Arogo’s Current Report on Form 8-K, which will be filed concurrently with this press release. In connection with the proposed transaction, Arogo intends to file relevant materials with the SEC, including a registration statement on Form F-4 by Pubco, which will include a proxy statement/prospectus, and other documents regarding the proposed transaction. Arogo’s shareholders and other interested persons are advised to read, when available, the preliminary proxy statement/ prospectus and the amendments thereto and the definitive proxy statement and documents incorporated by reference therein filed in connection with the proposed business combination, as these materials will contain important information about Bangkok Tellink and Arogo and the proposed business combination.

    Promptly after the Form F-4 is declared effective by the SEC, Arogo will mail the definitive proxy statement/prospectus and a proxy card to each shareholder entitled to vote at the meeting relating to the approval of the business combination and other proposals set forth in the proxy statement/prospectus. Before making any voting or investment decision, investors and shareholders of Arogo are urged to carefully read the entire registration statement and proxy statement/prospectus, when they become available, and any other relevant documents filed with the SEC, as well as any amendments or supplements to these documents, because they will contain important information about the proposed transaction. The documents filed by Arogo with the SEC may be obtained free of charge at the SEC’s website at www.sec.gov, or by directing a request to Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp., 848 Brickell Avenue, Penthouse 5, Miami, FL 33131.

    Participants in the Solicitation

    Arogo and certain of its directors, executive officers and other members of management and employees may, under SEC rules, be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from Arogo’s shareholders in connection with the proposed transaction. A list of the names of those directors and executive officers and a description of their interests in Arogo will be included in the proxy statement/prospectus for the proposed business combination when available at www.sec.gov.

    Information about Arogo’s directors and executive officers and their ownership of Arogo shares of common stock is set forth in Arogo’s final prospectus for its for its initial public offering filed with the SEC on December 28, 2021, as modified or supplemented by any Form 3 or Form 4 filed with the SEC since the date of such filing. Other information regarding the interests of the participants in the proxy solicitation will be included in the proxy statement/prospectus pertaining to the proposed business combination when it becomes available. These documents can be obtained free of charge from the source indicated above.

    Bangkok Tellink and its directors and executive officers may also be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from the shareholders of Arogo in connection with the proposed business combination. A list of the names of such directors and executive officers and information regarding their interests in the proposed business combination will be included in the proxy statement/prospectus for the proposed business combination.

    Additional information regarding the participants in the proxy solicitation and a description of their direct and indirect interests will be included in the proxy statement/prospectus to be filed with the SEC on Form F-4. Shareholders, potential investors and other interested persons should read the proxy statement/prospectus carefully when it becomes available before making any voting or investment decisions. You may obtain free copies of these documents from the sources indicated above.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    Certain statements contained in this press release constitute “forward-looking statements” within the meaning of federal securities laws. Forward-looking statements may include, but are not limited to, statements with respect to (i) trends in the financial advisory industry, including changes in demand and supply related to Bangkok Tellink’s products; (ii) Bangkok Tellink’s growth prospects and Bangkok Tellink’s market size; (iii) Bangkok Tellink’s projected financial and operational performance including relative to its competitors; (iv) new product and service offerings Bangkok Tellink may introduce in the future; (v) the potential transaction, including the implied enterprise value, the expected post-closing ownership structure and the likelihood and ability of the parties to consummate the potential transaction successfully; (vi) the risk the proposed business combination may not be completed in a timely manner or at all, which may adversely affect the price of Arogo securities; (vii) the failure to satisfy the conditions to the consummation of the proposed business combination, including the approval of the proposed business combination by the shareholders of Arogo; (viii) the effect of the announcement or pendency of the proposed business combination on Arogo’s or Bangkok Tellink’s business relationships, performance and business generally; (ix) the outcome of any legal proceedings that may be instituted against Arogo or Bangkok Tellink related to the proposed business combination or any agreement related thereto; (x) the ability to maintain the listing of Arogo on OTC; (xi) the price of Arogo’s securities, including volatility resulting from changes in the competitive and regulated industry in which Bangkok Tellink operates, variations in performance across competitors, changes in laws and regulations affecting Bangkok Tellink’s business and changes in the combined capital structure; (xii) the ability to implement business plans, forecasts, and other expectations after the completion of the proposed business combination and identify and realize additional opportunities; and (xiii) other statements regarding Arogo’s or Bangkok Tellink’s expectations, hopes, beliefs, intentions and strategies regarding the future.

    In addition, any statements that refer to projections, forecasts or other characterizations of future events or circumstances, including any underlying assumptions are forward-looking statements. The words “anticipate,” “believe,” “continue,” “could,” “estimate,” “expect,” “intends,” “outlook,” “may,” “might,” “plan,” “possible,” “potential,” “predict,” “project,” “should,” “would,” and similar expressions may identify forward-looking statements, but the absence of these words does not mean that a statement is not forward-looking. Forward-looking statements are predictions, projections and other statements about future events that are based on current expectations and assumptions and, as a result, are subject, are subject to risks and uncertainties.

    You should carefully consider the risks and uncertainties described in the “Risk Factors” section of Arogo’s final prospectus for its for its initial public offering filed with the SEC on December 28, 2021, as modified or supplemented by any Form 3 or Form 4 filed with the SEC since the date of such filing and the proxy statement/prospectus relating to this transaction, which is expected to be filed by Arogo with the SEC, other documents filed by Arogo from time to time with SEC, and any risk factors made available to you in connection with Arogo, Bangkok Tellink, and the transaction. These forward-looking statements involve a number of risks and uncertainties (some of which are beyond the control of Bangkok Tellink and Arogo) and other assumptions, that may cause the actual results or performance to be materially different from those expressed or implied by these forward-looking statements. Arogo and Bangkok Tellink caution that the foregoing list of factors is not exclusive.

    No Offer or Solicitation

    This press release relates to a proposed business combination between Arogo and Bangkok Tellink, and does not constitute a proxy statement or solicitation of a proxy and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy the securities of Arogo or Bangkok Tellink, nor shall there be any sale of any such securities in any state or jurisdiction in which such offer, solicitation, or sale would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of such state or jurisdiction.

    Contacts

    Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp.
    Attn: Ms. Nisachon Rattanamee
    Email: nisachon@arogocapital.com

    Bangkok Tellink Company Limited
    Attn: Daniel Fong
    Email: daniel@s1winconsultant.com

    Sources
    Arogo Capital Acquisition Corp and Bangkok Tellink Company Limited


    1eSIM Technology: Fueling Thailand’s Transition to a Digital Economy | Global YO

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: Experts of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Congratulate Rwanda on Number of New Jobs Created, Ask Questions on Women’s Political Representation and Recognising the Cultures of Rwanda’s Different Ethnic Groups

    Source: United Nations – Geneva

    The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights today concluded its review of the fifth periodic report of Rwanda, with Committee Experts commending the State on the number of new jobs created, while raising questions about women’s political representation and how Rwanda recognised the cultures of its different ethnic groups. 

    Preeti Saran, Committee Expert and Country Taskforce Member, was impressed with some of the figures shared, including seven per cent gross domestic product growth and 1.3 million jobs created.  These were commendable and Rwanda should be congratulated.   

    Peters Sunday Omologbe Emuze, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Rapporteur for Rwanda, said Rwanda had made significant progress in gender equality, and especially women’s political representation.  What steps were being taken to increase women’s representation in local administration and the private sector? How was the gender pay gap addressed? What was being done to combat discrimination against women and stereotypes? 

    Ms. Saran said each ethnic group in Rwanda had a rich cultural heritage.  For the sake of national unity and reconciliation, if everyone was being referred to as Rwandan, how did the State propagate the cultural richness of the population?   Rwanda had been extremely welcoming to refugees from all over the world, who brought their own specific languages and cultures.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure equal cultural rights for ethnic groups that had come as aliens, refugees or asylum seekers? 

    The delegation said over the years, Rwanda had implemented measures to achieve gender equality, particularly in Parliament, where it was around 63 per cent in the Chamber of Deputies and around 53 per cent in the Senate.  Quotas were in place which mandated that a minimum of 30 per cent of leaders should be women.  When the issue of equality was dealt with properly, this had a cascading effect on other policies.  A few years ago, the State recognised that gender-based violent crimes were specific in nature and needed to be treated in a certain way. 

    The delegation said there was no significant cultural diversity within the country, as everyone shared the same language and culture.  Traditionally the ethnic groups had been defined based on occupation and turning them into an ethnicity was introduced by the colonialists.  It had been entrenched in identity cards for Tutsis, Hutus and Twas.  This negated the fact that people could have moved from one group to another.   There were no significant differences in culture between these groups.  Rwanda had received a number of people who faced difficulties in their own countries. Diversity days were organised at schools, encouraging refugees and asylum seekers to share their culture. 

    Emmanuel Ugirashebuja, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Rwanda and head of the delegation, said in 2023, Rwanda further refined its governance framework by aligning the schedules of presidential and parliamentary elections, enhancing efficiency and reducing electoral costs.  During the period under consideration, Rwanda successfully completed its ambitious 2020 Vision and adopted the Vision 2050.  From 2018 to 2024, Rwanda implemented its first national strategy for transformation, which laid the foundation for sustainable development, and was succeeded by the second national strategy for transformation, which ran until 2029.   Through these strategies, Rwanda maintained steady economic growth, with gross domestic product expanding at an average of 7 per cent and per capita income rising from $729 to $1,040 in 2023/2024. 

    In concluding remarks, Mr. Emuze thanked the Rwandan delegation for attending the dialogue, noting the high calibre of the delegation.  The Committee wished the delegation a safe journey home. 

    In his concluding remarks Mr. Ugirashebuja expressed appreciation for the constructive dialogue with the Committee.  The State had learnt many valuable lessons and looked forward to receiving the Committee’s recommendations.  Mr. Ugirashebuja extended an open invitation to the Committee to visit Rwanda in the future. 

    The delegation of Rwanda was comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Justice; the National Institute of Statistics; the Rwanda Education Board; the Department of International Justice Judicial Cooperation; and the Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations Office at Geneva.

    The Committee’s seventy-seventh session is being held until 28 February 2025.  All documents relating to the Committee’s work, including reports submitted by States parties, can be found on the session’s webpage.  Webcasts of the meetings of the session can be found here, and meetings summaries can be found here.

    The Committee will next meet in public at 3 p.m. on Tuesday, 18 February to begin its consideration of the seventh periodic report of the Philippines (E/C.12/PHL/7).

    Report

    The Committee has before it the fifth periodic report of Rwanda (E/C.12/RWA/5).

    Presentation of Report

    EMMANUEL UGIRASHEBUJA, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Rwanda and head of the delegation, said since the last review by the Committee over a decade ago, Rwanda had undergone significant changes in its policy, legal and institutional landscape.  In 2023, Rwanda further refined its governance framework by aligning the schedules of presidential and parliamentary elections, enhancing efficiency, and reducing electoral costs. 

    At the institutional level, Rwanda established the Rwanda Forensic Laboratory in 2016, upgrading it to the Rwanda Forensic Institute in 2023.  The Institute had enhanced forensic and advisory services, strengthening accountability in sectors critical to economic, social and cultural rights.  Its digital forensic and document services helped combat financial crimes like fraud and embezzlement.  In 2017, the Rwanda Investigation Bureau was established to enhance specialisation and professionalism in crime investigation. 

    In the judiciary, Rwanda made significant strides in strengthening its justice system.  In 2018, the Court of Appeal was established, further enhancing the country’s capacity to provide effective legal recourse.   In 2024, the establishment of an Appeal Tribunal to hear matters relating to refugee and asylum claims reinforced Rwanda’s commitment to upholding the rights of individuals in vulnerable situations.  Rwanda’s legal framework strongly supported the protection of economic, social and cultural rights, as enshrined in the Constitution.  Since the last report, Rwanda had enacted several laws that aligned with the provisions of the Covenant and contributed to the progressive realisation of economic, social and cultural rights.  These included the education law that guaranteed access to quality education at all levels, as well as health laws. 

    During the period under consideration, Rwanda successfully completed its ambitious 2020 Vision and adopted the Vision 2050.  From 2018 to 2024, Rwanda implemented its first national strategy for transformation, which laid the foundation for sustainable development, and was succeeded by the second national strategy for transformation, which ran until 2029.   Through these strategies, Rwanda maintained steady economic growth, with gross domestic product expanding at an average of 7 per cent and per capita income rising from $729 to $1,040 in 2023/2024.  

    Infrastructure development advanced with the construction of over 1,600 kilometres of national roads and 4,137 kilometres of feeder roads.   Job creation efforts led to over 1.3 million decent and productive jobs, while financial inclusion improved from 89 per cent in 2017 to 96 per cent by 2024.  Life expectancy also increased from 66.6 in 2017 to 69.9 years in 2024. 

    Rwanda also significantly strengthened its healthcare system under the strategy. Seven new hospitals were added to the existing 52, while 23 were rehabilitated or expanded.  Community-based health insurance coverage reached 93 per cent of the population. Healthcare modernisation included advanced imaging, laboratory equipment, local pharmaceutical manufacturing, and digital health systems.  

    In 2023, Rwanda, in partnership with Germany Biotechnology Company BioNTech, set-up an mRNA vaccine manufacturing facility, the first of its kind on the African continent, which would have the capacity to produce between 50 and 100 million doses of mRNA vaccines annually, and conduct trials on new therapeutics for malaria, tuberculosis, HIV, cancers and other diseases.  

    Through the Girinka programme (one cow per family programme), Rwanda distributed 333,146 cows to an equivalent number of households.  Rwanda valued the opportunity to engage in a constructive dialogue with the Committee.

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    PETERS SUNDAY OMOLOGBE EMUZE, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Rapporteur for Rwanda, asked how the 2015 constitutional amendments had affected Rwanda’s commitment to international human rights standards.  Did it enable the State party to override Covenant protections in favour of domestic law? What measures were being taken to ensure that the provisions of the Covenant were invoked by domestic courts? 

    What training programmes were in place for judges, law enforcement and government officials to ensure consistent application of the Covenant?  The important work of Rwanda’s national human rights institution was noted.  Was the selection process of its members carried out by a committee appointed by the President?  Did members require clearance from the Prime Minister’s office for official travel outside Rwanda?  Had the State party accepted the recommendations of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions to strengthen the institution in line with the Paris Principles?

    What measures had been taken to guarantee that human rights defenders could continue their work without undue restrictions on freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association?  What steps were taken to protect them from risks of unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, harassment and intimidation, including judicial harassment?  Could the State party clarify the concerns regarding non-governmental organization registration requirements?  Were there any obstacles for opposition groups to promote and advocate for the promotion of human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights? 

    When would the State party finalise a national action plan for business and human rights?  What steps were being taken to put in place a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework for human rights due diligence for businesses?  What measures were in place to ensure Rwanda met its nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement? 

    What measures were in place to combat corruption, particularly in public procurement and State-owned enterprises?  What challenges did anti-corruption institutions face in maintaining independence and effectiveness?  What measures were being taken to address them?  The Committee noted Rwanda’s legislative efforts to combat discrimination.  However, reports indicated persistent structural inequalities, particularly affecting Batwa people, women and girls, people living in deprived urban and rural areas, persons with disabilities, people living in poverty, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons.  How did Rwanda plan to address these challenges? 

    How did Rwanda plan to address the absence of disaggregated data to assess the situation of the Batwa people?  What steps were being taken to combat poverty, high infant mortality, malnutrition, and lower educational outcomes among the Batwa? What kind of barriers did the Batwa continue to face to land titling and how did Rwanda plan to secure their rights to land ownership?  What measures were in place to prevent forced displacement of the Batwa people from their ancestral lands?  How was adequate compensation provided when Batwa lands were expropriated?  How did the State party ensure consultations with Batwa people in decisions likely to affect them?

    Rwanda had made significant progress in gender equality, and especially women’s political representation.  What steps were being taken to increase women’s representation in local administration and the private sector?  How was the gender pay gap addressed?  What was being done to combat discrimination against women and stereotypes?  How had the Rwanda Gender Monitoring Office and its Gender Management Information System contributed to tracking gender equality initiatives? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said since the 2015 Constitutional amendments, no new organic laws had come into place.  There was consistent training on the use of human rights in courts.  However, the members of the bar tended not to apply international conventions in the courts. The reason for this was because the Constitution provided for a whole section of bill of rights, which was a replica of the Covenant.  However, lawyers were still trained on the use of human rights conventions.   

    Members of the human rights institution were manually selected via a presidential order.  This was a rigorous process, and many candidates were considered.  The appointment process was comparable to any other country with human rights mechanisms.  Whenever Commissioners wanted to travel, they informed the Minister’s office and a document was provided, called the travel clearance. Given that this caused significant confusion, the Government had decided to do away with the travel clearance.   

    Rwanda did all it could to strengthen the National Commission of Human Rights, and put in place any recommendations received. Rwanda was on track to reach its goals regarding carbon emissions.  The State was encouraging businesses to go green, which in turn would create “green jobs” which would contribute to more employment.  An example of this could be seen in the State employing young people to plant trees.  The Rwandan Government had heavily invested in areas key to social equality.  The community-based insurance now extended to certain diseases previously not covered, including cancer. 

    Rwanda aimed to achieve zero tolerance for corruption.  Key institutions like the Ombudsman’s office had played a key role towards achieving this goal.  Rwanda had improved its global ranking from 49th to 43rd place in 2024 in the Transparency Index Global Corruption Index.

    Rwandans and the Batwa spoke the same language and had the same culture.  The Batwa people could be found throughout the country and did not live in a designated area.  Rwanda aimed to ensure no one was left behind, regardless of their status.  Land registration helped to resolve dispute around land, and to ensure that land was adequately registered. 

    Over the years, Rwanda had implemented measures to achieve gender equality, particularly in Parliament, where it was around 63 per cent in the Chamber of Deputies and around 53 per cent in the Senate.  Quotas were in place which mandated that a minimum of 30 per cent of leaders should be women.  When the issue of equality was dealt with properly, this had a cascading effect on other policies.  A few years ago, the State recognised that gender-based violent crimes were specific in nature and needed to be treated in a certain way. 

    No discrimination against any group was tolerated in Rwanda.  Measures had been put in place to ensure that anyone who faced discrimination was able to access fast reparations.  There were many issues which were largely context-specific to Rwanda. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    PREETI SARAN, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, was impressed with some of the figures shared, including seven per cent gross domestic product growth and 1.3 million jobs created.  These were commendable and Rwanda should be congratulated.   What kind of resource constraints had the State faced in budgetary allocations for social spending?  What challenges had there been when dealing with external partners? 

    KARLA LEMUS DE VÁSQUE, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said marital violence affected 46 per cent of women who were married and 18 per cent of men, with many never seeking help for the violence they had suffered.  What measures had been put in place to combat the cultural norms which perpetuated marital violence?  How were victims of violence being supported so they could report the crime?

    A Committee Expert asked what steps were being taken by the Government to ensure safe access by humanitarian organizations to the population affected by the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?  How had the State ensured its policies and actions did not obstruct humanitarian aid? What was the coordination framework that the State had with armed groups operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly the M23?  How might the State respond to the concerns regarding any potential support for these armed groups? 

    What measures had been put in place to prevent and punish any involvement by Rwandan stakeholders in conflict zones in the Democratic Republic of the Congo?  What measures had the State adopted to ensure that no armed group benefitted from support from the State?  What measures had been put in place to remedy any violations, including forced labour in mining areas under the control of armed groups, among others? 

    Another Expert asked about the role of civil society when drafting reports to treaty bodies?  Were all civil society organizations invited to participate in the drafting procedures?  What was the position of Rwanda on the Rome Statute?  Was there a possibility that the Government might consider acceding to it? Rwanda had extraterritorial obligations. The President had reiterated a lack of knowledge regarding the Rwandan military participating in the conflict of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.  How was oversight of the military activities ensured?  How did Rwanda ensure that armed groups operating in other countries received no support?

    A Committee Expert asked what the State was doing to combat the illicit trade of minerals?  What specific measures were taken to enhance specific imports and exports? 

    PETERS SUNDAY OMOLOGBE EMUZE, Vice-Chair and Taskforce Leader for Rwanda, said there had been allegations of Government members committing unlawful killings, enforced disappearances, and intimidation and reprisals, against those defending human rights.  What had the State party done to prevent this? Despite measures taken by the State party to improve rights for indigenous peoples, challenges remained. How did the State party intend to address challenges in this regard, including the lack of disaggregated data? How would Rwanda address challenges such as poverty, infant mortality, lower school attendance, and higher drop-out rates, among others? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Rwanda had challenges in terms of budget.  The State aimed to address this through development partners.  However, resources were not always permanent.  Although Rwanda worked with development partners, the State aimed to be financially stable in terms of its own financing. 

    Rwanda had developed mechanisms to capture data regarding gender-based violence.  Initially, people were scared to report cases due to stigmatisation.  Investigators had been trained to interview victims of gender-based violence.  When cases proceeded, it was ensured that they were not held in public, so as not to endanger the lives of the victims. 

    The Democratic Republic of the Congo had its own problems as did Rwanda, and the State could not bear the burden of others’ problems.  Anything happening beyond the territory of Rwanda should be dealt with by those States. 

    Civil society played an important role in the drafting of the report and in helping Rwanda achieve its human rights obligations. Rwanda had not yet joined the Rome Statute, but if the appropriate time came and if it was necessary, the State would willingly join the Statute.  At present, the State was not considering joining the Statue in the near future. 
    Rwanda was the first country in the Great Lakes region to commit to a due diligence mechanism.  This ensured Rwanda could not be used as a route for illicit mines. There were mechanisms in place to protect against enforced disappearances.  There was zero tolerance for anyone who threatened human rights defenders. 

    Questions by a Committee Expert

    PREETI SARAN, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked what recent measures the State party had taken to address unemployment rates and to guarantee access to work?  What specific steps had been taken to address the problem of labour under-utilisation?  What major obstacles had Rwanda faced in addressing the employment challenge?  How was the integration of women into the labour force being promoted? 

    What specific steps had the State party taken for those facing discrimination to access the labour market.  What had Rwanda done to enforce laws dealing with discrimination at the workplace and to encourage employers to adopt anti-discrimination measures specifically related to sexual orientation at the workplace? How were systemic barriers for persons with disabilities being removed?  What measures had been taken to enable the transition of workers from the informal to the formal sector, particularly for women, the disadvantaged, and persons with disabilities?  What was the anticipated timeframe for establishing a minimum wage? 

    Many workers were reportedly exposed to frequent occupational accidents due to unsafe working conditions, leading to occupational injuries and fatalities.  Had the State party formulated an updated national policy on occupational health and safety?  How did the State party reinforce and implement the Labour Code on occupational health and safety?  Had the State party developed rights awareness programmes targeting domestic workers and employers? 

    What steps had been taken to establish a safe reporting system for domestic workers to report workplace violence?  What initiatives were in place to provide confidential and accessible health care for domestic workers?  What steps had the State party taken to remove any such legal barriers to the enjoyment of the right to form trade unions and the right to strike.

    The adoption of the updated national social protection policy (2020), which aimed to ensure that Rwandan citizens had a dignified standard of living, was commendable.  Were there any proposals to improve and expand the coverage process to ensure that it included the widest possible population, particularly the most marginalised and disadvantaged in the informal sector?  What steps had the State party taken to expand the community-based health insurance scheme to cover specialised health services, medicines, assistive devices, and commodities required by persons with disabilities? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said employment was a concern in Rwanda.  Rwanda had a young population and the State needed to create an enabling environment for the youth to thrive.  It was hoped the law on startups would ensure easy financing of start-ups for the youth. A proportion of the laws provided for special consideration for women and people living with disabilities, to ensure these traditionally marginalised groups could access these resources. 

    Despite the efforts that the Government had put in place, there were still instances of gender-based discrimination.  There had been instances in the private sector where questions had been asked about women’s marital status to ascertain if they would be looking to seek maternity leave.  The State was looking at how to incentivise the private sector to ensure they did not discriminate based on gender.  No one in Rwanda was discriminated against based on their sexual orientation.  If discrimination was there, the State worked with civil society to address this.  It was important to have a synergy with civil society organizations to address persistent discriminatory issues.  There were quotas of 30 per cent for women, and the State monitored these closely to ensure gender equity was being achieved.   

    There were a lot of workers employed in the informal sector, and the State tried to formalise these areas.  Cooperatives were important in ensuring people came together, and worked like trade unions to highlight challenges faced by people in the informal sector.  There had been a growth in the number of cooperatives registered over recent years. The State had seen unfortunate incidents where people had been trapped in mines due to unsuitable mining.  The Rwanda mining board ensured that it monitored mining sites; however, people sometimes ventured into illegal mining at nighttime and ended up being trapped.  Work was being done with the local governments to ensure these unfortunate situations were avoided. 

    The minimum wage was a difficult debate.  The Government was on the right path regarding what an acceptable minimum wage was in Rwanda.  The process was long, but the Government aimed to develop a suitable minimum wage for the greater good of the country.  Laws guaranteed safety for domestic workers, including salaries and leave. Labour inspectors took steps to ensure the legal mechanisms were being utilised. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert said the issues of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were relevant.  What tools and mechanisms had the State created to ensure there was respect for economic, cultural and social rights?  How was it ensured that impunity was combatted abroad, particularly in the context of the armed conflict? 

    KARLA LEMUS DE VÁSQUE, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, acknowledged that the State had extended fully-paid maternity leave for mothers in all sectors, but there were challenges to ensuring the legislation was enforced, particularly in the informal sector. What mechanisms were in place to ensure all working mothers could enjoy maternity leave?  Had the State considered implementing a specific measure to ensure women who gave birth to children with disabilities were given maternity leave commiserate with the situation of their child?  Were there incentives to encourage men to use paternity leave?

    What efforts were being carried out to punish employers who were in breach of child labour laws?  What results had the new national strategy on child labour yielded?  There were still high levels of poverty, especially for families.  What was the State doing in terms of the social schemes designed to eradicate extreme poverty?  What challenges did small-scale farmers meet when it came to increasing their yield and diversifying their crop?  What support programmes were in place for them?  Had the State considered expanding the food assistance programmes for vulnerable groups?

    A study of Rwanda’s development bank showed many people on low income still did not have access to affordable housing. What policies had been adopted to ensure the cost of housing was accessible?  What percentage of the national budget was set aside for the building and maintenance of social housing?  What initiatives had been launched to ensure that people who were vulnerable had access to affordable housing?  Had any laws been passed on rent control?  What measures could be implemented to ensure water rates were affordable? 

    Current adaptation measures were not enough to mitigate the impacts of climate change?  Had studies or surveys been carried out to assess the impact of climate change, and how had the State responded to findings?  What food resilience programmes could the State develop, including food storage programmes?  What measures had been implemented to ensure enough resources were set aside for the health sector, including for the most disadvantaged groups? What measures had been developed to extend the scope and coverage of mental health services?  What strategies had been developed to increase the number of qualified birth attendants in remote areas?  What measures had been implemented to strengthen investment in infrastructure?  How was equitable access to contraception guaranteed?   

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said in January 2025, the Cabinet approved the resolution on the additional package of services for the community-based health insurance, including kidney transplants, cancer care, blood transfusions, knee and hips replacements, dialysis and prosthetics, among other procedures.  These were now all covered by the community-based health insurance. 

    The one cow per family programme provided a cow to families in the most vulnerable communities.  More than 14,500 families had been provided with furnished housing and 124 model villages had been established between 2017 and 2024, with all the essential amenities. 

    Rwanda did not have effective jurisdiction over any country and could not be held accountable for human rights violations beyond its borders.  The problems of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were internal.  Rwanda would welcome refugees from the Democratic Republic of the Congo if the problems persisted. 

    Since the COVID-19 pandemic, certain programmes had been implemented, including a voluntary saving scheme which was open to any citizen.  The International Labour Organization, in collaboration with Rwanda, had recruited a team to conduct a study on the barriers to social protection in the informal sector, and it would develop recommendations to address these. 

    Since 2023, paid maternity leave had increased from 12 to 14 weeks.  New changes in the law mandated that a pregnant woman or a breastfeeding mother should not be made to do any work that was too physically demanding or damaging to their overall health.  Those on maternity leave received their full salary.   Regular labour inspections were conducted, with more than 5,000 inspections carried out every year.  More than 1,500 of the enterprises where inspections took place were in the informal sector.   In the 2023-2024 fiscal year, 112 businesses were administratively sanctioned due to employment-related issues.  In the same period, 26 investigations had been conducted into cases of child labour, and 18 had been referred to the courts with five convicted. 

    The Government of Rwanda had implemented various social protection initiatives to eliminate extreme poverty.  In 2024, over 102,000 vulnerable individuals received monthly cash transfers and more than 80,000 households benefitted from flexible employment programmes.  As of May 2024, there had been an old age grant for impoverished individuals over the age of 65.  As of 2024, 315,327 households had been enrolled in the programme for sustainable graduation, where they received mentorship, financial support, and access to productive assets. 

    It was becoming more difficult for farmers to predict the weather, given the adverse impacts of climate change.  Pilot projects were launched to allow farmers to access buyers in value chains, by ensuring their quality standards were high. The Rwanda culture board helped to increase agriculture and animal resources, advising farmers on the best seeds for each area of the country to ensure the best harvest.  The Government heavily subsidised fertilizer for farmers to increase their output.  The Government subsidised up to 40 per cent of the cost of water, and access to clean water had increased substantially in the country. 

    Rwanda aimed to quadruple its workforce of healthcare service providers.  Below the age of 18, parental consent was required for any health intervention, including contraception and reproductive health services.  To enhance access to sexual reproductive health services, the age of consent should be reduced to 15 years.  To address this, a draft health service law was currently under consideration by the Parliament.  The level of teen pregnancy had decreased due to education and sensitisation, but it was also expected the draft health service law would result in a further decrease in teen pregnancy. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    KARLA LEMUS DE VÁSQUE, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, asked if there was any recent study on the deficit in housing which would help address current challenges?  Were there any laws on rent control? 

    How was the State addressing social and economic gaps which could address the prevalence of non-communicable diseases. Despite progress made in public health, communicable diseases, including malaria and HIV/AIDS, were a cause for concern. What measures had been adopted to strengthen health infrastructure in areas where access was limited?  What was being done to improve the prevention programmes? 

    A Committee Expert asked about the national health insurance; how did it function?  Did the State consider sharing revenues with areas where they obtained the resources from? 

    Another Expert said the country’s drug policy was focused on criminalisation and punitive measures.  Would the State consider decriminalising drug use and changing the approach to one that was health-based?   What measures had been taken to provide specialised training to law enforcement agents?  What was being done to mainstream mental health in primary health services? 

    A Committee Expert asked whether Rwanda had considered using human rights methodologies to design and better assess public policies? 

    An Expert asked about access to water in rural areas? What measures had the State taken to address climate change and its impact on the agricultural sector? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said there had been a survey on housing deficits which had been presented in the Cabinet.  There were no laws on rent to reduce increases, but it was illegal to charge rent in foreign currencies, which helped to ensure rent was controlled.  Community health care workers were taught to deal with non-communicable diseases. There were also free community-based activities which took place to ascertain the levels of non-communicable diseases.  Community health workers had also helped sensitise people around diseases such as HIV and tuberculosis.   

    Around 90 per cent of land had been registered, and everyone, including women and vulnerable groups, had access to land.  After Rwanda developed its own gold refinery, businesses from other places came with gold to the refinery.  The Government agreed that drug consumption should not be criminalised, but the distribution of drugs should be criminalised.  More than 82 per cent of households had access to improved drinking water, and in Kigali this went up to 97 percent.  Numbers were lower in the western part of the country at around 75 per cent. 

    The Government was intensely investing in areas of water availability. 

    Questions by Committee Experts

    ASLAN ABASHIDZE, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said dropout rates in Rwanda had decreased to 5.5 per cent in primary schools and 7.5 per cent in secondary schools.  Could statistics be provided for the last five years, from 2019 to 2023, specifically on how many children were expected to enrol in primary school, and how many transitioned to lower secondary school, and then to upper secondary school?  According to the statistics provided, what percentage in the mentioned 40,000 students with disabilities who began their studies in schools and universities during the 2022/23 academic year represented the total number of children with disabilities who were expected to start schooling in that academic year? 

    What was the overall state of school infrastructure? Did schools meet the minimum requirements for lighting, drinking water, sanitation, and nutrition?  What steps was the Government taking in this regard? How were these initiatives funded? Why was disaggregated data on the Batwa group unavailable?   Could information on higher education enrolment and completion rates disaggregated by sex, rural and urban areas, and economic status be provided? 

    Was there a shortage of teachers in certain subjects? If there were challenges in this area, were there programmes to address them?  Could more details about the “We are all Rwandans” programmes be provided? How was the National Digital Inclusion Council funded?  Were private companies involved, and if so, on what terms?

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said the number of teachers had increased by around 73 per cent, from around 68,000 in 2013 to around 100,000 in 2023/2024.  A teacher management system helped to determine if there were any gaps across the country.  The school dropout rate continued to decline at all levels.  There was a programme called school feeding which provided adequate and nutritious meals in schools.  The Government had started the journey of constructing schools, with a focus on accessibility by adding ramps, widening doorways, improving ventilation and lowering blackboards, to ensure they were accessible for students using wheelchairs.  Of the 4,986 schools in Rwanda, 3,392 now met accessibility standards, a significant improvement from just 765 schools in 2017.  Rwanda was committed to promoting inclusive education for children with disabilities.

    Questions by Committee Experts

    A Committee Expert asked for clarification around the official languages?  What was the language taught in primary schools?  How many universities were there in Rwanda?  Were there international students who studied in Rwanda? Did the Government provide scholarships for foreign students, particularly Africans?  Was the Swahili language widely spoken? 

    PREETI SARAN, Committee Expert and Taskforce Member, said each ethnic group in Rwanda had a rich cultural heritage.  For the sake of national unity and reconciliation, if everyone was being referred to as Rwandan, how did the State propagate the cultural richness of the population?  Rwanda had been extremely welcoming to refugees from all over the world, who brought their own specific languages and culture.  What measures had the State party taken to ensure equal cultural rights for ethnic groups who had come as aliens, refugees or asylum seekers? 

    An Expert asked if the State was collecting data with regards to young people aged between 15 to 24, who neither studied nor worked?  If this issue was not resolved, it could generate major issues. 

    PETERS SUNDAY OMOLOGBE EMUZE, Committee Vice-Chair and Country Rapporteur for Rwanda, asked what Rwandan troops were doing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo? 

    Responses by the Delegation

    The delegation said Kinyarwanda was recognised as the official language.  Rwanda had just one language.  There was no significant cultural diversity within the country, as everyone shared the same language and culture.  Traditionally, the ethnic groups had been defined based on occupation and turning them into an ethnicity was introduced by the colonialists.  It had been entrenched in identity cards for Tutsis, Hutus and Twas.  This negated the fact that people could have moved from one group to another.   There were no significant differences in culture between these groups.  French was an official language in Rwanda, due to colonisation by Belgium.  However, the majority of instruction was in English.   

    As of 2025, there were 19 universities in Rwanda, comprised of three public universities and 16 private institutions.  Schools such as the Carnegie Melon University from the United States taught courses, and specific scholarships were offered to Africans.  Scholarships were also offered to people fleeing their countries due to dangers, such as women from Afghanistan and people from Sudan.  Education could solve a lot of issues, including criminality and unemployed youth. 

    Rwanda was doing its best to attain the highest standard of economic, social and cultural rights, and would take any opportunities to learn from other countries in this regard. 

    Swahili was now an official language, recognised in the Constitution as a Lingua Franca.  It was widely spoken and taught in schools. 

    Rwanda had received a number of people who faced difficulties in their own countries.  Diversity days were organised at schools, encouraging refugees and asylum seekers to share their culture. 

    Closing Remarks

    PETERS SUNDAY OMOLOGBE EMUZE, Vice-Chair and Country Rapporteur for Rwanda, thanked the Rwandan delegation for attending the dialogue, noting the high calibre of the delegation.  The Committee wished the delegation a safe journey home. 

    EMMANUEL UGIRASHEBUJA, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Rwanda and head of the delegation, expressed appreciation for the constructive dialogue with the Committee.  The State had learnt many valuable lessons and looked forward to receiving the Committee’s recommendations.  Rwanda’s achievements in access to health, education, and employment demonstrated the Government’s commitment to sustainable development. The country had a lot of challenges, including addressing inequalities, mitigating the effects of the global crisis, and ensuring policies translated into tangible improvements for the lives of the most vulnerable.  Rwanda was committed to resolving these challenges and to implementing the Committee’s recommendations.  Mr. Ugirashebuja extended an open invitation to the Committee to visit Rwanda in the future. 

    __________

    Produced by the United Nations Information Service in Geneva for use of the media; 
    not an official record. English and French versions of our releases are different as they are the product of two separate coverage teams that work independently.

     

    CESCR25.005E

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Health Net Federal Services, LLC and Centene Corporation Agree to Pay Over $11 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Liability for Cybersecurity Violations

    Source: US State of North Dakota

    Note: View the settlement agreement here. 

    Health Net Federal Services Inc. (HNFS) of Rancho Cordova, California and its corporate parent, St. Louis-based Centene Corporation, have agreed to pay $11,253,400 to resolve claims that HNFS falsely certified compliance with cybersecurity requirements in a contract with the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) to administer the Defense Health Agency’s (DHA) TRICARE health benefits program for servicemembers and their families. In 2016, Centene acquired all of the issued and outstanding shares of Health Net Inc., HNFS’s corporate parent, and assumed the liabilities of HNFS.

    “Companies that hold sensitive government information, including sensitive information of the nation’s servicemembers and their families, must meet their contractual obligations to protect it,” said Acting Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “We will continue to pursue knowing violations of cybersecurity requirements by federal contractors and grantees to protect Americans’ privacy and economic and national security.”

    “Safeguarding sensitive government information, particularly when it relates to the health and well-being of millions of service members and their families, is of paramount importance,” said Acting U.S. Attorney Michele Beckwith for the Eastern District of California. “When HNFS failed to uphold its cybersecurity obligations, it didn’t just breach its contract with the government, it breached its duty to the people who sacrifice so much in defense of our nation.”

    “This settlement reflects the significance of protecting TRICARE, and the service members and their families who depend on the health care program, from risks of exploitation,” said Cyber Field Office Special Agent in Charge Kenneth DeChellis of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), the law enforcement arm of the DoD Office of Inspector General. “DCIS will not be deterred from investigating contractors that fail to comply with federal cybersecurity requirements and risk exposing protected information vulnerable to criminal hackers. The U.S. taxpayers who fund these government contracts expect no less.”

    The settlement resolves allegations that, between 2015 and 2018, HNFS failed to meet certain cybersecurity controls and falsely certified compliance with them in annual reports to DHA that were required under its contract to administer the TRICARE program. The United States alleged that HNFS failed to timely scan for known vulnerabilities and to remedy security flaws on its networks and systems, in accordance with its System Security Plan and the response times HNFS had established. Furthermore, the United States alleged HNFS ignored reports from third-party security auditors and its internal audit department of cybersecurity risks on HNFS’ networks and systems related to asset management; access controls; configuration settings; firewalls; end-of-life hardware and software in use; patch management (i.e., installing critical security updates released by vendors to counter known threats); vulnerability scanning; and password policies.

    The Civil Division’s Commercial Litigation Branch (Fraud Section) and the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of California handled the matter, with assistance from DoD’s Office of Inspector General, including the DCIS, Cyber Field Office Western Region and the Inspector General’s Office of Audits, Cyberspace Operations Directorate, and DoD’s Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Industrial Base Cybersecurity Assessment Center.

    Trial Attorneys Christopher Wilson, Laura Hill, and Jonathan Thrope of the Civil Division’s Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorney Steven Tennyson for the Eastern District of California represented the United States in this matter.

    The claims asserted against defendants are allegations only; there has been no determination of liability.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protecting the broadcast rights to audiovisual works and sporting competitions – E-002981/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission recognises the importance of the fight against online piracy. In order to address the issues linked to the unauthorised retransmissions of live events, the Commission adopted, in May 2023 the recommendation on combating online piracy of sport and other live events[1].

    The recommendation builds on existing EU legislation and provides indication on how the legal remedies available under EU law can be used to tackle the illegal retransmission of live events.

    In particular, it encourages Member States to use dynamic injunctions to enable the blocking of pirate services, subject to certain safeguards.

    The Commission and the European Observatory on Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights in the European Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO)[2] work closely to monitor the implementation of the recommendation and its effects on online piracy of sports and other live events.

    No specific information is available at this stage on the effectiveness of the blocking measures implemented in certain Member States. The data collection exercise, based on key performance indicators[3] (KPIs) published following consultation with stakeholders, is ongoing.

    These KPIs look at the volume of piracy by measuring the traffic to piracy websites, the prompt treatment of notices, the use of dynamic injunctions, and at the availability and affordability of legal offer.

    By 17 November 2025, the Commission will assess the effects of the recommendation taking into account the results from the monitoring exercise.

    • [1]  COM(2023) 2853 final.
    • [2] https://www.euipo.europa.eu/en/observatory/enforcement/combating-piracy
    • [3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/recommendation-online-piracy-sports-and-other-live-events-commission-services-publish-key
    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Risk weight in Italian healthcare bodies – E-002729/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (Capital Requirements Regulation)[1] assigns under Art. 116 a 100% risk weight to exposures of credit institutions to Public Sector Entities (PSEs) without an external rating; unless it has an original maturity of three months or less, in which case a 20% risk weight is applied.

    However, the same provision specifies that, under exceptional circumstances, competent authorities of each Member State might decide to treat exposures to PSEs as exposures to the central government, regional government, or local authority in whose jurisdiction they are established, if they are covered by an appropriate guarantee by the central government, regional government or local authority.

    When proposing the Banking Package[2], the Commission recognised that different approaches to PSE funding structures exist among Member States, including in their health systems.

    In addition, that standardising these funding structures through banking regulation was not appropriate, leaving the consideration of such specific cases to the above-mentioned competent authorities.

    The co-legislators agreed with this approach when endorsing Regulation (EU) 2024/1623[3], which entered into force on 1 January 2025.

    To enhance transparency on the prudential treatment of lending to PSEs, co-legislators have tasked the European Banking Authority with creating and maintaining a publicly accessible database of PSEs within the EU which are treated as the central, regional, or local government of the Member State in which they are established for the purposes of prudential capital requirements.

    This initiative will provide a comprehensive overview of the approaches of the above-mentioned competent authorities, thereby promoting transparency across Member States.

    • [1] Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1-337.
    • [2] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/news/latest-updates-banking-package-2023-12-14_en
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1623 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2024 amending Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as regards requirements for credit risk, credit valuation adjustment risk, operational risk, market risk and the output floor (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L, 2024/1623, 19.6.2024.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Possible takeover of Commerzbank by UniCredit – E-003033/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission does not comment on individual cases of potential take-overs on which it might be required to decide, based on its competences.

    The banking sector in the EU has robust capital positions and ample liquidity. It has shown high profitability in recent years, in part due to the reforms carried out since the 2007 financial crisis, including the establishment of the Banking Union[1].

    In this context, take-overs, mergers and other forms of consolidation can make banks more resilient to shocks, for example where they lead to greater asset or geographic diversification.

    Bank consolidations may also allow European banks to increase the efficiency of their business models, to pursue growth strategies and to increase their investments in digitalisation.

    At the same time, EU merger control ensures that banking consolidations with a EU dimension do not stifle competition and thereby harm consumers.

    The Commission is in constant contact with Member States’ administrations and competition authorities and cover a wide range of subjects.

    • [1] https://finance.ec.europa.eu/banking/banking-union/what-banking-union_en?prefLang=fr
    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Spain’s inefficient management delays essential EU funds – P-000249/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF) can only be activated at the request of eligible Member States and accession countries hit by natural disasters within 12 weeks as from when the first damage occurred, demonstrating that the total direct damage exceeds the thresholds specified in Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002[1]. The EUSF is not a rapid response instrument but a post-disaster relief instrument. Its activation can take several months to complete. To shorten delays, the Commission provides significant upstream support to affected countries and there is a possibility to award advance payments to applicant Member States. The EUSF may cover part of the costs for emergency and recovery operations incurred by public authorities. This includes, for example, the recovery of essential infrastructure, provision of temporary accommodation to the population, cleaning-up operations and protection of cultural heritage.

    2. On 20 January 2025, the Spanish authorities submitted an application for financial assistance from the EUSF following the floods in the Autonomous Community of Valencia in October 2024. The application was submitted within the 12-week regulatory deadline. The Commission is carefully assessing the submitted documents. If it is assessed that the conditions for mobilising the EUSF are met, the Commission will determine the amount of financial assistance, within the limits of the available financial resources, and will submit its proposal to the European Parliament and the Council for approval.

    • [1] Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund (OJ L 311, 14.11.2002, p. 3) as amended by Regulation (EU) No 661/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 15 May 2014 (OJ L 189, 27.6.2014, p. 143) and by Regulation (EU) 2020/461 of the European Parliament and the Council of 30 March 2020 (OJ L 99, 31.3.2020, p. 9). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32002R2012
    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Commission staff working document of 4 February 2025: implications for European wine sector – P-000672/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-000672/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anna Maria Cisint (PfE), Roberto Vannacci (PfE), Isabella Tovaglieri (PfE), Paolo Borchia (PfE), Raffaele Stancanelli (PfE)

    The European wine sector, which is worth over EUR 100 billion, provides millions of jobs and is currently going through hard times, is facing yet another hurdle thanks to the European Commission. The document of 4 February 2025 – not shared with the sector – on the revision of Europe’s Beating Cancer Plan lists a number of proposals to reduce alcohol (and thus wine) consumption, including by increasing taxes on alcoholic beverages, introducing health warnings on labels, limiting advertising spots and increasing cross-border taxes.

    In view of the above:

    • 1.Why did the Commission publish this document, given that the measures envisaged in the previous European cancer strategy did not move beyond being ‘hypothetical’, as many operators and Member States expressed scepticism over their merit and applicability?
    • 2.Considering the hard times that the sector is going through, as also noted by the High Level Group on Wine in its conclusions, has it carried out a preliminary study on the possible economic consequences of these proposals and their compatibility with other EU measures in the wine sector?
    • 3.What does it intend to do to promote rather than penalise the wine sector, and how will it add value to it?

    Submitted: 12.2.2025

    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Unknown chemical status – E-000558/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000558/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Anders Vistisen (PfE)

    Denmark would like to modify the intercalibration of environmental objectives as regards the status of the Baltic Sea and Danish fjords and straits under the WFD[1] (GES[2]). In this connection, Denmark would like to lower the limit value for chlorophyll in order to comply with the GES objective for the Baltic Sea.

    Sweden and Germany have followed the WFD as regards the baseline analysis (WFD, Annex V); they have carried out the requisite analyses for chemical substances and concluded that the two countries’ water bodies have ‘poor WFD status’.

    In Denmark, these analyses have not been carried out to such an extent that they can be used in river basin management plans; and, in the baseline analysis and subsequently in the management plans, Denmark has made reference to ‘unknown chemical status’.

    • 1.Will it be possible to carry out an intercalibration exercise involving Denmark, Sweden and Germany if Denmark has termed chemical status ‘unknown’?
    • 2.Is it possible to comply with chemical requirements and obligations under the WFD if there is no knowledge of stressors (unknown status) other than nitrogen and to carry out subsequent intercalibration?
    • 3.As regards achieving good chemical status, ‘unknown chemical status’ strongly suggests that the data basis is inadequate. How can it be demonstrated that the WFD requirement for GES will be achievable?

    Submitted: 6.2.2025

    • [1] WFD – Water Framework Directive (https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32000L0060).
    • [2] GES – Good ecological status.
    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Region of Puglia water emergency – E-000559/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000559/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mario Furore (The Left), Danilo Della Valle (The Left), Valentina Palmisano (The Left), Dario Tamburrano (The Left)

    In 2022, Italy experienced a severe water crisis.

    Puglia is one of the twelve regions with high water stress: the continued lack of rainfall, the rise in temperatures and the sinking of unauthorised wells have pushed the Capitanata area into a water disaster, impacting the domestic water supply, agriculture and the local economy. Capitanata’s artificial reservoirs are down by 99 million cubic metres of water compared to last year. Immediate action is needed to maintain the existing reservoirs and build new ones. Building a link between the Liscione reservoir and Capitanata would mean millions of cubic metres of drinking water that are released into the sea each year could be transferred instead. Completing the infrastructure framework is the first step that needs to be taken.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.What financial measures could the Commission take to support Puglia in managing the water emergency?
    • 2.Can the Italian Government use additional water supply infrastructure, as provided for in the Commission communication of 18 July 2007 on addressing water scarcity and droughts in the European Union?
    • 3.Can the Commission verify the status of Puglia’s water infrastructure works financed with national recovery and resilience plan funds?

    Submitted: 6.2.2025

    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Briefing – Cyprus’s climate action strategy – 18-02-2025

    Source: European Parliament

    In 2023, Cyprus accounted for around 0.3 % of the EU’s net greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and achieved a net emissions reduction of 5.6 % compared with 2005. The country’s total emissions decreased by 4.7 % between 2005 and 2023, while its net carbon removals in the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector increased by 36 %. Emissions from sectors covered by the effort-sharing legislation have increased by 7.9 % since 2005, and in 2023 were slightly higher than those from sectors under the EU emissions trading system (ETS), which were down 14.9 % over the same period. Although Cyprus intends to reach zero net emissions in 2050 (see trajectory in Figure 1), the level of progress towards the EU climate neutrality objective appears to be insufficient. The European Commission assessed Cyprus’s draft updated national energy and climate plan (NECP) and made recommendations. The final updated NECP was submitted in December 2024. Almost half of Cyprus’s national recovery and resilience plan, which includes a REPowerEU chapter, is dedicated to the green transition, with a focus on energy and transport. In a 2023 survey, 39 % of Cypriots, compared with a 46 % EU average, identified climate change as one of the four most serious problems facing the world. Most expect the national government (69 %), business and industry (67 %) and/or the EU (63 %) to tackle climate change, while 41 % think it is a personal responsibility.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-Evening Report: More dry lightning in Tasmania is sparking bushfires – challenging fire fighters and land managers

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By David Bowman, Professor of Pyrogeography and Fire Science, University of Tasmania

    Tasmania has been burning for more than two weeks, with no end in sight. Almost 100,000 hectares of bushland in the northwest has burned to date. This includes the Tarkine rainforest and alpine ecosystems of Cradle Mountain that may never recover.

    The situation has taken emergency services and land management agencies by surprise. The seasonal bushfire outlook for summer 2024 suggested Tasmania’s fire risk was nothing out of the ordinary. The state was also well prepared for bushfire fighting, particularly with specialised aircraft.

    But this fire season has turned out to be anything but typical. Firefighting capacity has been stretched to the limit and interstate crews have been called in.

    It all began with a massive lightning storm in the evening of Monday February 3. The incidence of such lightning fires has been increasing in Tasmania since the 1990s.

    An official inquiry into the bushfires will no doubt be held, given the substantial social, economic and environmental harm – as well as the sizeable costs associated with fighting the fires from the air in remote and rugged landscapes.

    Nonetheless, important lessons are emerging from these fires, which speak to the broader, worsening threat as the climate changes.

    Understanding the impacts of the fires

    Fortunately, direct economic losses from theses fires have been limited so far, despite significant disruption associated with evacuation and road closures. Tourism operators and honey producers have been hardest hit.

    The fires caused brief but substantial smoke pollution across the state, placing a range of people with medical conditions at risk.

    The full environmental effects and the benefits of prescribed burning are yet to be evaluated. Nonetheless, there is grave concern about damage to unique rainforests and alpine ecosystems. If sufficiently dry the organic soils, or peats, that supports forests and treeless areas in western Tasmania are also vulnerable to combustion.

    We undertook a preliminary estimate of how much highly fire-sensitive vegetation – plant communities that will take more than 50 years to recover – may have burned. This involved comparing the current bushfire boundaries or footprint, based on satellite data and field reconnaissance, to vegetation mapping used for various purposes including fire management. We put the figure at 19,716 hectares of vegetation. However, it’s possible not all of this burned and islands of unburned vegetation persist within the broad fire boundary.

    Our estimation includes 10,419 hectares of temperate rainforest (10% of the fire area) and 462 hectares of alpine vegetation (0.45% of the fire area). Neither of these vegetation types can readily tolerate fire.

    Our analysis suggests about half of fire-affected rainforest areas have been previously burned by fires since 1982 (48%) and some small areas have burned twice (5%). Recurrent fires in rainforest can result in permanent loss of this vegetation. Just how much damage has been done will require further assessment.

    Current area affected by bushfires in northwestern Tasmania, comparing data from Geoscience Australia on bushfire boundaries and Land Information Services Tasmania on vegetation. Note, not all of the shaded area has burned.
    Grant Williamson

    Emergence of new fire patterns

    The number of fires ignited by lightning have increased in Tasmania since the 1990s. When the lightning occurs in storms without much rain, or where the rain evaporates before it hits the ground, it’s known as dry lightning.

    Concerningly, in the last decade two other major dry lightning fire events have occurred,
    likely a signal of a change in fire activity. As a result, fires are burning into areas that historically are rarely affected by fire, damaging the natural values of the Tasmanian wilderness.

    This event could not be predicted

    Going into summer, experts were concerned that soils across western Tasmania were particularly dry. This increased the fire risk in the seasonal outlook.

    The recent rapid fire growth in Tasmania was caused by the unusual combination of regional drying (including dry soils), an extreme lightning storm and subsequent strong winds.

    But the sequence of events that caused this fire to take off could not have been predicted more than a week ahead. That’s because it is impossible to predict lightning and windstorms outside the seven-day window of weather forecasts.

    What’s more, our research shows it is currently not possible to reliably predict which lightning strikes will start fire.

    By February 12, more than a dozen fires had burned around 50,000 hectares in the state’s northwest.
    NASA Earth Observatory

    Rapid attack and fire suppression have practical limits

    Massive lightning storms that ignite multiple fires overwhelm the capacity of firefighters to locate and immediately extinguish all the flames.

    Unfavourable weather conditions caused the west coast fires to rapidly grow. Firefighting shifted from attempts to extinguish the fire to instead contain its spread. This involved techniques such as targeted waterbombing, back burning and building fire breaks.

    These approaches have been successful in some cases, notably the deployment of retardant drops to contain the Canning Peak fire, saving extensive stands of conifer rainforest. But suppression efforts were imperfect, as the loss of a private tourist facility hut on the Overland Track has demonstrated.

    Managing these massive fires demands triage – making difficult choices about where to direct firefighting effort. Effective triage requires a detailed understanding of the location of areas of high economic, cultural and environmental value. High-quality mapping of these sites and involvement of specialists in the broader decision-making process is essential.

    The Tasmanian government does have maps and expertise to guide triage, but there are calls for more investment to protect the region’s ecological values. This is particularly important for small, localised sites vulnerable to fire, such as groves of ancient Huon pine.

    Fires continue to burn in Tasmania’s west, putting wilderness areas at risk (7.30)

    Broader lessons for fire fighting

    Dry lightning storms are hard to predict, extraordinarily difficult to contain, and can cause substantial economic, social and environmental harms.

    Technology alone – such as that which combines satellites, artificial intelligence, drones and water bombers – is not enough to eliminate these fires. What’s needed is a diverse portfolio of approaches, involving a combination of:

    • reducing fuel loads by prescribed burning
    • firefighting that is carefully targeted using high quality data
    • expertise embedded in firefighting teams.

    Researchers and fire managers must also identify the best strategies for prescribed burning to reduce bushfire risk while protecting areas of high economic, conservation and cultural value.

    Climate change will bring more frequent monster fires – and fighting them demands a broad suite of investment.

    David Bowman is an Australian Research Council Laureate Fellow and also receives funding from the New South Wales Bushfire and Natural Hazards Research Centre, and Natural Hazards Research Australia.

    Grant Williamson receives funding from the NSW Bushfire and Natural Hazards Research Centre, and Natural Hazards Research Australia.

    ref. More dry lightning in Tasmania is sparking bushfires – challenging fire fighters and land managers – https://theconversation.com/more-dry-lightning-in-tasmania-is-sparking-bushfires-challenging-fire-fighters-and-land-managers-250063

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Australian women will soon be eligible for a menopause health check. Here’s what to expect

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Susan Davis, Chair of Women’s Health, Monash University

    SpeedKingz/Shutterstock

    The federal government has recently pledged to create a new Medicare rebate for menopause health assessments. It’s due to be available from July 1.

    The announcement featured in the government’s response to the Senate inquiry into menopause, released last week, though was first flagged earlier this month as part of the government’s pre-election funding package for women’s health.

    So what is a menopause health assessment? And how will it improve the health care women receive during this stage in their lives?

    Why we need this

    Outside reproductive health, women’s health care has generally been modelled on the needs of men. A prime example is the government-funded midlife health check for people aged 45 to 49. This is intended to identify and manage risks to prevent chronic diseases such as diabetes and heart disease.

    The recent Senate inquiry into issues related to menopause and perimenopuase highlighted that the timing of this health check is not fit for purpose for women. This is because at menopause, which occurs on average at the age of 51 in Australia, women’s health profiles change.

    Women gain tummy fat, their cholesterol levels go up, and glucose (sugar) metabolism becomes less efficient. All these changes increase a woman’s risk of heart disease and diabetes.

    Vast numbers of women are given a clean bill of health at this midlife health check in their late 40s. But when they subsequently go through menopause, they can go on to develop heart disease and diabetes risk factors, which may go undetected.

    Some women also go through early menopause: around 12% between the ages of 40 and 45, and around 4% before 40.

    Those women who experience menopause before age 45 are known to be at significantly higher risk of heart disease than other women. But, by the time women with early menopause qualify for the midlife health check, crucial metabolic changes may have silently occurred, and the opportunity to intervene early to address them may be missed.

    Changes that happen at menopause can increase a woman’s risk of developing a chronic disease.
    Monkey Business Images/Shutterstock

    What will a menopause health check involve?

    The federal government has committed A$26 million over two years to fund the new menopause health assessments, as part of a $64.5 million package designed to improve health care for women experiencing perimenopause and menopause.

    Some $12.8 million will also be dedicated to a menopause-related community awareness campaign.

    My own research has shown women understand menopause means the loss of fertility, but often have little knowledge of the health changes that occur as part of the menopause transition. So increasing health literacy around menopause is much needed.

    Similarly, for the introduction of these menopause-specific consultations to be effective, women will need to know what these health checks are for, if they’re eligible, and how to access a menopause health check.

    The new menopause health checks will be provided by GPs. Exactly what they will involve is yet to be clarified. But I would anticipate they will include a combination of the assessment and management of perimenopause and menopause, overall health and wellbeing, and assessment of risk and prevention of future ill health, notably heart disease, diabetes and osteoporosis.

    Upskilling health-care providers

    Equally, health-care providers will need to understand the impact of menopause on long-term health and how best to mitigate against disease risks, including the role of menopausal hormone therapy.

    My research has shown health-care providers lack confidence in delivering menopause-related care, indicating a need for more education around menopause.

    In line with this, the Senate inquiry called for the upskilling of the medical workforce in the field of menopause through medical school training, postgraduate specialist programs, and ongoing education of clinicians.

    Women in Australia will soon be able to access menopause health assessments.
    Sabrina Bracher/Shutterstock

    While the government cannot mandate what is taught in medical schools or the content of specialist training programs, its response to the inquiry encourages these institutions to incorporate menopause in their curricula.

    Further, part of the government funding will go towards expanding a professional development program on managing menopause offered by Jean Hailes for Women’s Health.

    A good start, but still not enough

    The government’s new funding, and the new menopause health checks in particular, recognises that women’s health is strongly dictated by major biological events, such as menopause, as opposed to age.

    This is good news. But we need to do more to equip health professionals to provide the best menopause care to women in these health assessments and beyond.

    Adding new menopause modules to medical school and specialist training programs will ensure greater awareness of the impact of menopause on women’s health and wellbeing. However, awareness alone won’t ensure high-level training for the complex care many perimenopausal and menopausal women need.

    The opportunities for medical graduates to gain hands-on clinical experience in menopausal medicine are mostly limited to the select few who get to work in a hospital specialist menopause clinic during their training.

    Notably, there’s no credentialed training program in menopause medicine in Australia. Meanwhile, the North American Menopause Society does offer a credentialed program.

    The challenge has been that menopause does not belong to one medical specialty. This is why we need an accredited training program – for both GPs and medical specialists – to ensure a truly skilled workforce able to deliver gold standard menopause care.

    But without further federal funding to set this up, it will not happen.

    Susan Davis receives funding from NHMRC, Medical Research Future Fund, the Heart Foundation, MS Australia. She has prepared and delivered educational presentations for Besins Healthcare, Bayer, and Mayne Pharma and has served on Advisory Boards for Theramex, Astellas, Abbott Laboratories, Mayne Pharma, and Besins Healthcare. She is a Member of the Executive of the Australian Academy of Health and Medical Sciences.

    ref. Australian women will soon be eligible for a menopause health check. Here’s what to expect – https://theconversation.com/australian-women-will-soon-be-eligible-for-a-menopause-health-check-heres-what-to-expect-249499

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI Global: Net-zero homes are touted as a solution for climate change, but they remain out of reach for most

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Ehsan Noroozinejad Farsangi, Visiting Senior Researcher, Smart Structures Research Group, University of British Columbia

    Net-zero homes play an important role in combating climate change. (Shutterstock)

    Net-zero homes use natural energy sources and are designed to use less energy and, as such, are considered important in the fight against climate change. But for the average Canadian, they’re still out of reach.

    Net-zero homes are important for tackling climate change. This includes both net-zero energy (NZE) homes, which produce as much energy as they use each year, and net-zero carbon (NZC) homes, which don’t release any carbon dioxide.

    Released in the summer of 2024, the Canada Green Buildings Strategy outlines a bold vision to transform the country’s building sector, aiming for net-zero emissions and enhanced resilience by 2050. This is a bold step forward, but transforming the sector will require sustained collaboration across all levels of government, industry and communities.

    CTV News covers the federal government’s Green Buildings Strategy.

    Net-zero homes use green energy sources and efficient designs to match the amount of energy they produce with the amount they use. They use strategies like thermal shells that use less energy, high-performance components and the addition of green energy systems.

    Net-zero homes also help Canada reach larger climate goals by reducing the amount of carbon dioxide it releases into the air.

    Purchasing and installing these technologies can be cost-prohibitive, but in the long run, homeowners both save money on power bills and reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.

    Those who are unable to make changes to their homes can still live in a net-zero way by buying green power or carbon offsets.

    The sustainable housing market

    Net-zero homes are becoming more popular in Canada. To speed up building processes and reduce costs, builders are trying out pre-fabricated and modular building techniques.

    In 2024, the Canadian federal government announced a $600 million package of loans and funding to help make it easier and cheaper to build homes. This funding will support innovative technologies like pre-fabricated and modular construction, robotics, 3D-printing and mass timber to build homes faster and cheaper.




    Read more:
    Canada’s housing crisis: Innovative tech must come with policy reform


    The Net Zero Council of the Canadian Home Builders’ Association has also been important in enhancing standards and practices and promoting novel approaches that cut costs while still being environmentally friendly. In doing so, CHBA drives the adoption of cheaper, environmentally friendly technologies and processes, enhancing industry standards and practices across Canada.

    While CHBA collaborates with government agencies, such as Natural Resources Canada to promote innovation and elevate industry standards. Government programs typically provide funding, technical support and policy guidance, whereas CHBA focuses on training, best practices and market development for its members.

    Government research programs through CanmetENERGY also work to improve technologies and give builders and planners the tools they need.

    There are several reasons that owning a net-zero home has not yet become widespread. These include: high initial costs, limited awareness and education, gaps in policy and regulation and market challenges including difficulties in scaling up and integrating net-zero technologies.

    Future directions

    To make net-zero homes accessible to all Canadians, a multi-faceted approach is required.

    Increased subsidies and incentives and expanding financial support for both builders and buyers can lower barriers to entry. The government of Canada’s 2030 Emission Reduction Plan includes $9.1 billion in new investments over the next eight years — adding to the $17 billion announced in 2021 — to support decarbonization efforts.

    Enhancing public awareness and developing educational campaigns highlighting the cost savings and environmental benefits of net-zero homes are both essential approaches to raising awareness and support.

    Policy reform can accelerate adoption of net-zero homes. Examples include harmonizing building codes and introducing mandatory energy efficiency standards to accelerate adoption.

    Supporting continued research into technical innovation and developing cost-effective materials and renewable energy systems will drive down costs. Investment in modern methods of construction should be prioritized to accelerate the transition toward sustainable and energy-efficient building practices.

    Partnerships between governments, private developers and non-profits can bring together resources and expertise to scale net-zero housing initiatives.

    The Sustainable Finance Action Council recommends steps to mobilize private capital to support decarbonization and climate resilience in the Canadian economy, including in the housing sector.

    Solar panels the roofs of apartment buildings in Munich, Germany.
    (Shutterstock)

    Successful international models

    Several countries have demonstrated how net-zero homes can become a reality through innovative policies, community-driven approaches and public-private partnerships:

    BedZED in the United Kingdom is the country’s first eco-village project. It uses community-focused design and renewables to significantly cut carbon footprints.

    The Passive House standard is a German housing policy that sets a global benchmark for ultra-low energy consumption, emphasizing airtight construction and heat recovery.

    California’s ambitious Zero Net Energy policies help reduce overall carbon footprints by driving cutting-edge home construction practices.

    The Net Zero Energy House (ZEH) Program in Japan encourages advanced insulation, efficient appliances and rooftop solar.

    The Netherlands is a leader in innovative, large-scale retrofitting for net-zero housing, most notably through the Energiesprong program.

    These international models highlight that success lies in integrating strong policy frameworks, advanced technology and collaborative practices. They demonstrate that with the right mix of government support, industry innovation and residents embracing green choices, net-zero living can become more widespread.

    Housing is an important part of how to address climate change. As Canada pushes to make net-zero homes more affordable, each step forward strengthens communities, reduces greenhouse gas emissions and helps homeowners save money.

    Dr Ehsan Noroozinejad Farsangi has secured funding to develop innovative solutions for housing and climate crises.

    T.Y. Yang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Net-zero homes are touted as a solution for climate change, but they remain out of reach for most – https://theconversation.com/net-zero-homes-are-touted-as-a-solution-for-climate-change-but-they-remain-out-of-reach-for-most-247622

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – EU-based shipping companies selling vessels to the Russian shadow fleet – E-000602/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-000602/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Ville Niinistö (Verts/ALE), Maria Ohisalo (Verts/ALE), Villy Søvndal (Verts/ALE), Kira Marie Peter-Hansen (Verts/ALE), Rasmus Nordqvist (Verts/ALE), Nela Riehl (Verts/ALE), Jutta Paulus (Verts/ALE), Hannah Neumann (Verts/ALE), Isabella Lövin (Verts/ALE), Alice Kuhnke (Verts/ALE), Pär Holmgren (Verts/ALE), Sergey Lagodinsky (Verts/ALE), Erik Marquardt (Verts/ALE), Virginijus Sinkevičius (Verts/ALE)

    In its resolution of 14 November 2024, Parliament called on the Commission to take action to prevent and limit the activities of the Russian shadow fleet and to ensure the full enforcement of sanctions against Russia.

    In early February 2025, it was revealed that more than a third of Russia’s shadow fleet consists of tankers previously owned by shipowners from Western countries. For example, four Danish shipping companies have sold at least 10 ships either directly or indirectly to companies that currently operate in the Russian shadow fleet.

    Since then, the ships have transported Russian oil products.

    • 1.Is the Commission preparing sanctions to prevent EU-based shipping companies from selling ships to companies operating in the shadow fleet?
    • 2.Shadow fleet vessels have also been implicated in the sabotage of cables in the Baltic Sea. What actions is the Commission taking to support EU Member States’ monitoring of these vessels?

    Submitted: 10.2.2025

    Last updated: 18 February 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Piero Cipollone: Striking the right balance: the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for monetary policy

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Piero Cipollone, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at an MNI Connect webcast

    Frankfurt am Main, 18 February 2025

    Today I would like to discuss the ECB’s balance sheet and its implications for our monetary policy.

    In recent years, the monetary policy debate has mainly focused on our interest rate decisions. This is for good reason. In response to the biggest inflation shock in a generation, we embarked on the fastest tightening of monetary policy in the ECB’s history through rate hikes.

    During this tightening phase, we used policy rates as the primary tool for setting our monetary policy stance, while normalising our balance sheet in a measured and predictable way. We initiated the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase programmes and recalibrated our targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs).[1] As a result, the size of our balance sheet has fallen by more than a quarter from its peak.

    Policy rates remain our primary instrument and will therefore continue to attract the most attention. But we should not underestimate the important role that our balance sheet policies have played over time as a component of our overall monetary policy stance and in ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. This still holds true today as we make our monetary policy less restrictive.

    Inflation has now fallen substantially to levels close to 2%. Our latest projections foresee it converging towards our target over the medium term, and the risks to the inflation outlook – once sharply skewed to the upside – have now become more balanced.

    At the same time, the euro area’s economic recovery remains weak – especially in the near term. The risks to the growth outlook are tilted to the downside and, if they materialise, may derail the recovery, with implications for the inflation outlook.

    Against this background, the Governing Council has gradually been reducing the degree of monetary policy restriction by cutting policy rates towards neutral territory. While our direction is clear, we are very attentive to incoming information in view of the prevailing uncertainty about the economic environment. We continue to make decisions on a meeting-by-meeting and data-dependent basis. This gives us the option to adapt our interest rate path if necessary to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target.

    However, given the importance of financial conditions in determining the inflation outlook, we also need to consider the role played by the reduction of our balance sheet. In the tightening phase our rate decisions and balance sheet policies complemented each other, but they are now going in opposing directions.

    This divergence has important implications across at least two dimensions.

    First, it contributes to a steepening of the yield curve. Our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve. At the same time, the gradual runoff of our asset purchase portfolios exerts upward pressure on long-term and, to a lesser extent, intermediate yields. This has been compounded by recent spillovers from the US.[2]

    Second, it may affect credit supply. Declining levels of central bank liquidity could constrain banks’ ability to extend credit, resulting in tighter credit conditions and potentially slowing down the investment and consumption that are critical for economic recovery.

    In setting the policy stance, we therefore need to consider the impact of the overall set of financial conditions resulting from our interest rate and balance sheet policies. In other words, we need to strike the right balance if we are to achieve our inflation aim without an undue negative impact on incomes and employment. A rate cut has a more contained easing effect when the balance sheet is simultaneously reduced. This has implications when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    We also need to consider the potential risks to the transmission of our monetary policy. In the past, abundant levels of liquidity have acted as a safeguard against spikes in liquidity needs that emerged regardless of where our rates stood. With this in mind, we need to carefully monitor the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity, mindful of the potential implications for financial stability.

    Today, I would like to take stock of the ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies, explaining why they remain a vital part of our monetary policy toolbox. I will then discuss the implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for our monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies

    At the ECB, balance sheet policies have served a dual purpose over time, allowing us to deliver on our price stability mandate amid exceptionally difficult circumstances.

    First, during periods when interest rates approached their effective lower bound and inflation remained below target, the ECB used asset purchases to support an accommodative monetary policy stance.

    For instance, the ECB launched its asset purchase programme (APP) in 2015 to stimulate the economy and inflation at a time when deflationary threats loomed large. Asset purchases and the associated provision of central bank liquidity worked in several ways – including through the portfolio rebalancing, exchange rate and credit channels – to generate a significant upward effect on both economic activity and inflation.[3]

    Second, balance sheet policies have been pivotal to ensuring the smooth transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy, in both tightening and easing phases.

    At times when we were lowering our policy rates, our TLTROs, launched in 2014, provided banks with long-term funding on favourable terms to incentivise them to lend to firms and households. This led to a persistent compression in lending rates and an increase in loan volumes over time.[4]

    But balance sheet policies were also instrumental in ensuring the smooth transmission of monetary policy at times when we were increasing our policy rates. The announcement of our Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) in 2022 allowed us to embark on the fastest rate hiking cycle in our history without sparking financial fragmentation in the euro area.

    Of course, the stance and transmission functions of our balance sheet policies do not operate in isolation. There can be beneficial interactions between the two.

    As rates increased, for example, euro area banks had sufficient liquidity to manage any maturity mismatches that arose. This – alongside strengthened regulation and supervision – helped them to emerge unscathed from the market turbulence in March 2023 that saw the collapse of three regional banks in the United States.

    The proportionate use of balance sheet policies in an evolving economic landscape

    The substantial expansion of the ECB’s balance sheet required careful monitoring of potential side effects. That is why the principle of proportionality lies at the core of how we use our balance sheet instruments.[5]

    In its 2021 strategy review, the Governing Council assessed that its use of balance sheet measures – alongside negative interest rates and forward guidance – had indeed been proportionate, taking into account any side effects, for instance on inequality and the financial sector.[6]

    Some concerns, however, require a more nuanced perspective.

    For example, there is little evidence to suggest that excessive risk appetite may be attributable to larger central bank balance sheets. If this were the case, we should have seen less risk-taking in markets as central banks began to withdraw their market footprint.

    But the opposite has been the case. Today equity markets are near all-time highs. This may be due to “animal spirits”[7], which have also been observed outside periods of central bank balance sheet growth. We saw them at play, for instance, during the dot-com bubble – a period when the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings ratio hit its historic peak and central bank balance sheets were distinctly lean.

    Moreover, as the Eurosystem gradually reduces its footprint in sovereign bond markets by reducing its holdings of euro area government bonds, concerns about the size of the balance sheet are becoming less and less justified (Chart 1).[8]

    Chart 1

    Size of euro area government bond market and the Eurosystem’s market footprint

    (left-hand scale: EUR billions; right-hand scale: percentages)

    Sources: Eurosystem and Centralised Securities Database.

    Notes: The chart shows the evolution of the size of the euro area government bond market and splits it into outright holdings (yellow) and mobilised collateral (green), as well as what is not held or mobilised as collateral with the Eurosystem (blue). The Eurosystem market footprint is a relative measure, computed as the share of the Eurosystem’s euro area government bond (EGB) holdings compared with the nominal amount outstanding. Outright holdings are EGBs held by the Eurosystem via purchase programmes, adjusted by EGBs lent back via the securities lending against cash collateral facilities. Mobilised collateral includes EGBs mobilised as collateral for open market operations. The latest observations are for 31 January 2025.

    Going forward, an evolving economic landscape suggests that balance sheet policies could be increasingly useful as monetary policy instruments. Let me highlight two developments that are particularly relevant here.

    First, the non-bank financial sector has grown considerably over time and is becoming increasingly relevant in the funding of the real economy.

    In the euro area, the financial assets of non-banks have more than doubled since the global financial crisis.[9] Compared with banks, non-banks are more responsive to monetary policy measures that influence longer-term interest rates, such as asset purchases.[10] Given that non-banks adjust their portfolios more actively in response to changes in interest rates, this also increases the need for sufficient liquidity in the system to facilitate these adjustments.

    Second, geopolitical fragmentation means that the global economy is becoming more shock prone and subject to higher levels of uncertainty (Chart 2).

    Chart 2

    Global Economic Policy Uncertainty index

    (index)

    Source: Bloomberg.

    Note: The latest observation is for December 2024.

    In this environment, we need to remember that the euro area is subject to fragmentation risk. A key lesson from the sovereign debt crisis is that balance sheet policies have been instrumental in making the euro area a more “normal” jurisdiction from the perspective of monetary policy.

    As we navigate an increasingly complex economic landscape, the transition from abundant to less ample excess liquidity represents an inflection point that also requires close monitoring.

    In this environment, banks’ liquidity needs are met via a broad mix of instruments under our new operational framework. These include our short-term main refinancing operations (MROs) and three-month longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) and will also include – at a later stage – structural longer-term credit operations and a structural portfolio of securities.[11]

    However, the decline in excess liquidity warrants careful monitoring, as it could exert additional tightening pressures on financial and financing conditions, potentially exceeding the intended policy stance.

    The implications of the ECB’s balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment

    It is in this context that I would like to talk about the implications of our balance sheet for monetary policy in the current environment.

    The ECB’s balance sheet has been reduced at a faster pace than those of central banks in other major economies during their tightening cycles (Chart 3). So far, much of this decline can be attributed to banks’ repayments of TLTRO loans.[12]

    Chart 3

    Central bank total assets

    (index = 100 at the start of the respective policy rate hiking cycles)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB calculations.

    Notes: The x-axis starts on 21 July 2022, 16 March 2022 and 15 December 2021 for the Eurosystem, Federal Reserve System, and Bank of England respectively. For the Bank of England, reserve balances are used as a proxy for the total balance sheet. The latest observations are for 12 February 2025.

    Looking ahead, however, any further reduction in the size of our balance sheet will stem from the gradual unwinding of our asset purchase portfolios, as the Eurosystem no longer reinvests the principal payments from maturing securities.

    As in the past, the normalisation of our balance sheet has implications for our monetary policy stance and the possible risks to monetary policy transmission.

    The monetary policy stance

    Let me start with the implications for our monetary policy stance.

    Our reaction function for rate decisions is built around three well-known criteria: (i) the inflation outlook, (ii) the dynamics of underlying inflation and (iii) the strength of monetary policy transmission.

    Inflation has fallen by around three-quarters from its peak in late 2022 (Chart 4). The disinflation process is well on track, and our staff projections see inflation averaging 2.1% this year, 1.9% next year and 2.1% in 2027.

    Chart 4

    Headline inflation

    (annual percentage changes)

    Source: Eurostat.
    Note: The latest observation is for January 2025 (flash estimate).

    Most measures of underlying inflation suggest that inflation will settle at around our 2% medium-term target on a sustained basis. In particular, the ECB’s measure of the persistent and common component of inflation (PCCI)[13] – a more forward-looking indicator of underlying inflationary pressures that tends to better predict future inflation – stood at 2.1% in December, and 2.0% when excluding energy.

    Domestic inflation remains high, as wages and prices in certain sectors are still adjusting to the past inflation surge with a substantial delay. But our wage tracker is signalling a significant moderation in wage growth, and profits are partially buffering the impact on inflation.

    It is the third leg of our reaction function – the strength of monetary policy transmission – that I would like to discuss in more detail, however.

    As we cut interest rates, new borrowing for firms and households is becoming less expensive. But financing conditions continue to be tight – in part because our monetary policy remains restrictive and past rate hikes are still working their way through the economy.[14]

    While credit continues to expand, lending to firms and households remains subdued by historical standards. In December, the annual growth rate of lending to firms was roughly two-thirds below its historical average.[15] Growth in housing loans increased gradually but also remained muted overall, at around one-fifth of its long-term average (Chart 5).[16]

    Chart 5

    Loans to firms and households

    (percentage points)

    Sources: ECB (BSI) and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for December 2024.

    At the same time, the recent gradual recovery in lending has not kept pace with the nominal growth of the economy, as reflected in the continued decline of the loan-to-GDP ratio (Chart 6).

    Chart 6

    Ratio of bank loans to GDP

    (percentages)

    Sources: ECB (BSI), Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observation is for the third quarter of 2024.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting our monetary policy stance, the normalisation of our balance sheet may also affect the stance through two key channels.

    First, while our rate cuts exert downward pressure primarily at the short end of the yield curve, our quantitative tightening exerts upward pressure on long-term maturities and, to a lesser extent, intermediate ones. This serves to tighten financial conditions.[17]

    Indeed, the runoff of the asset portfolios of central banks has arguably been one of several factors contributing to a steepening of sovereign yield curves in recent months – akin to a reversal of the duration risk channel previously associated with central banks through quantitative easing (Chart 7).

    Chart 7

    New duration risk absorbed by private investors

    (EUR billions per basis point)

    Sources: Bloomberg and ECB.

    Notes: The chart shows the month-on-month change in the duration of government bonds held by private investors (i.e. investors other than the domestic central bank). Rates are approximated by weighted average maturity.

    At its peak in early 2022, the impact of current and expected Eurosystem bond holdings in our asset portfolios lowered ten-year sovereign bond yields by around 175 basis points.[18] Due to quantitative tightening, however, the easing impact has now fallen to around 75 basis points and is expected to further reduce over time (Chart 8).

    Chart 8

    Impact of APP and PEPP sovereign bond holdings on ten-year sovereign risk premia

    (basis points)

    Source: ECB calculations.

    Notes: The impacts are derived from an affine arbitrage-free model of the term structure with a quantity factor (see Eser et al., op. cit.) and an alternative version of the model recalibrated so that the model-implied yield reactions to the March PEPP announcement match the two-day yield changes observed after 18 March 2020. The model results are derived using GDP-weighted averages of the zero-coupon yields of the big-four sovereign issuers (DE, FR, IT and ES). The continuous line represents estimates based on real-time survey expectations. The dashed line is based on projections of the Eurosystem’s holdings of big-four sovereign bonds in the APP and PEPP as informed by the ECB’s December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts. The model abstracts from any potential holdings in a structural portfolio of securities. The latest observations are for January 2025 (monthly data).

    According to ECB research, an expected €1 trillion reduction in bond holdings may raise long-term risk-free interest rates by about 35 basis points (Chart 9).[19]

    Chart 9

    Expected term premium impact from running down the asset portfolio by €1 trillion

    (basis points)

    Sources: ECB December 2024 Survey of Monetary Analysts (SMA) and Akkaya, Y. et al., op.cit.

    Notes: The chart depicts the expected effect on the term premium of various assets with a ten-year maturity resulting from an expected €1 trillion decrease in the ECB’s bond holdings. Results are based on individual SMA responses from December 2022 until December 2023.

    Second, an environment marked by declining levels of central bank liquidity may constrain banks’ ability to extend credit.

    Research documents the strong relationship between loan supply and structural sources of liquidity, such as reserves obtained through credit easing programmes or those injected through quantitative easing interventions.

    More specifically, a €1 change in non-borrowed reserves or credit easing reserves is associated with a corresponding change in credit of approximately 15 cents or 10 cents respectively.[20] In other words, a €500 billion drop in non-borrowed reserves – similar to the one expected in 2025 as a result of the decline in our APP and PEPP holdings – is associated with a €75 billion decline in credit supply, equivalent to about 0.6 percentage points of downward pressure on loans to the non-financial private sector.[21]

    Accordingly, as central bank liquidity declines, we may see tighter credit conditions in the economy. This could slow down investment and consumption, with firms cutting back on capital expenditure and consumers reducing purchases of big-ticket items that require financing.[22]

    Incoming data suggest that euro area GDP growth will remain subdued in the short term. Industrial production decreased notably in December and surveys indicate that manufacturing is continuing to contract, whereas services activity is expanding at a moderate pace (Chart 10).

    Chart 10

    Purchasing Managers’ Index

    (diffusion indices)

    Source: S&P Global.

    Notes: “Output” and “New orders” correspond to the manufacturing and composite indices, and “Business activity” and “New business” to the services index. The latest observations are for January 2025.

    Given the uncertain economic environment, we are yet to see a sustained rebound in investment (Chart 11).[23] And while we continue to expect consumption to be the main driver of the recovery, rising real incomes have not yet encouraged households to increase their spending in a commensurate manner (Chart 12).[24] In the face of subdued domestic demand, our latest staff projections forecast a slower economic recovery than had been forecast in the September projections.[25]

    Chart 11

    Detailed decomposition of euro area real GDP

    (quarter-on-quarter percentage changes and percentage point contributions)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 for real GDP, and for the third quarter of 2024 for the other components.

    Chart 12

    Real household disposable income and consumption

    (second quarter of 2022 = 100)

    Sources: Eurostat and ECB staff calculations.

    Note: The latest observations are for the third quarter of 2024.

    Moreover, geopolitical risks may create further headwinds for the recovery, which we will need to monitor carefully. Forthcoming findings from the ECB’s Consumer Expectations Survey (CES) suggest that consumers’ concerns about geopolitical risks are negatively affecting economic sentiment – leading to more pessimistic expectations, more elevated income uncertainty and, ultimately, a lower propensity to consume.

    We are determined to ensure that inflation stabilises sustainably at our 2% medium-term target. As we gradually cut rates towards neutral territory, we need to be mindful of the fact that we now have two monetary policy tools working in opposing directions, given our ongoing quantitative tightening. This is a first in our history at the ECB.

    We therefore need to ensure that we factor in the tightening of our balance sheet when calibrating our rate cuts to achieve our inflation aim. This is because the stance effects stemming from our rate cuts will be somewhat dampened by the tightening induced by the normalisation of our balance sheet.

    This is an important consideration when discussing the appropriate policy rate path.

    Risks to the transmission of our monetary policy

    Similarly, we need to be mindful of the possible risks to the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy in view of the prevailing uncertainty and potential risks to financial stability.

    This cautious approach is crucial, especially given historical precedents where central banks faced unexpected challenges.

    In late 2019, for instance, the Federal Reserve System was unexpectedly forced to temporarily reverse its balance sheet retrenchment due to liquidity challenges in financial markets.[26] In 2022 the Bank of England halted quantitative tightening and launched emergency gilt purchases to safeguard financial stability after pension funds’ liability-driven investment strategies exposed systemic risks.[27]

    Recent bouts of market volatility also underscore that we should remain alert to the emergence of financial stability risks that may endanger transmission. Last August several factors converged to spark substantial market volatility.[28] The VIX, a market index that measures the implied volatility of the S&P 500 index, recorded its largest ever one-day spike (Chart 13).[29]

    Chart 13

    VIX index

    (percentages)

    Source: ECB staff calculations.

    Notes: Long run average calculated since January 2000. The latest observations are for 7 February 2025.

    Faced with such episodes of volatility, the further decline in our balance sheet must remain on a gradual and predictable path to avoid financial amplification effects.[30] This is especially important in an environment where euro area banks are already tightening their credit standards, especially for firms and consumer credit, due to higher perceived risks related to the economic outlook (Chart 14).[31]

    Chart 14

    Credit standards, demand for loans to firms and contributing factors

    (net percentages)

    Source: ECB (bank lending survey).

    Notes: “Actual” values are changes that have occurred, while “expected” values are changes anticipated by banks. Net percentages for the questions on credit standards for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “tightened considerably” and “tightened somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “eased somewhat” and “eased considerably”. Net percentages for the questions on demand for loans are defined as the difference between the sum of the percentages of banks responding “increased considerably” and “increased somewhat” and the sum of the percentages of banks responding “decreased somewhat” and “decreased considerably”. “Other financing needs” as unweighted average of “M&A and corporate restructuring” and “debt refinancing/restructuring and renegotiation”; “Use of alternative finance” as unweighted average of “internal financing”, “loans from other banks”, “loans from non-banks”, “issuance/redemption of debt securities” and “issuance/redemption of equity”. The net percentages for “Other factors” refer to an average of the further factors which were mentioned by banks as having contributed to changes in credit standards or changes in loan demand, respectively. The latest observations are for the fourth quarter of 2024 (January 2025 bank lending survey).

    Our balance sheet policy instruments continue to be a crucial item in our toolbox. The expectation that we will use them if necessary protects the smooth transmission of our monetary policy and reduces the likelihood that we will need to use these tools in the first place.

    Moreover, in an environment of heightened uncertainty, even in the context of excess liquidity, we need to remain prudent and be ready to step in should another shock emerge. We should maintain the flexibility to swiftly expand liquidity facilities if stressful conditions arise.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    The ECB’s experience with balance sheet policies to date demonstrates their importance both for the monetary policy stance and for the transmission of our monetary policy to the real economy. They are a vital part of our toolkit.

    While policy rates remain our primary instrument for adjusting the monetary policy stance, we should also consider the role played by quantitative tightening in influencing overall financial and financing conditions – be it through the yield curve or through the bank lending channel.

    To strike the right balance, we should ensure that our rate decisions adequately compensate for the tightening induced by the reduction of our balance sheet.

    Thank you.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Potential downgrade of the protection status of the wolf – E-002717/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. Member States are bound by the obligation to achieve and maintain a favourable conservation status for all protected species, irrespective of their listing under Annex IV or V of the Habitats Directive[1]. Furthermore, for species listed under Annex V, if the surveillance of the species reveals it is necessary, Member States may also implement temporary or local prohibition of hunting, regulation of the periods and methods of hunting, or the establishment of a system of licences or of quotas. In addition to strengthening the financing and implementation of prevention measures to ensure coexistence, f or wide-ranging species as the wolf, it is essential for Member States also to enhance coordination on monitoring, conservation and management of cross-border wolf populations, including with non-EU countries.

    2. The Commission does not intend to propose amendments to the international or EU legal protection status of species other than the wolf.

    3. The in-depth analysis study of December 2023 contains the most up-to-date scientific data on the wolf[2]. This includes the data published by the Large Carnivore Initiative for Europe. The Commission proposal to amend the species’ protection status under the Bern Convention[3] carefully considered all available data against the criteria contained in Recommendation No. 56 (1997)[4]. The Commission consistently promotes a science-based approach in its policy on coexistence with large carnivores.

    • [1] Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992, p. 7-50.
    • [2] https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/env/items/813295/en
    • [3] https://environment.ec.europa.eu/publications/proposal-council-decision-position-be-taken-eu-bern-convention_en
    • [4] Recommendation No 56 (1997) concerning guidelines to be taken into account while making proposals for amendment of Appendices I and II of the Convention and while adopting amendments, adopted by the Standing Committee on 5 December 1997: https://rm.coe.int/168074680c
    Last updated: 18 February 2025

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  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Mobility of persons with disabilities – E-002793/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    In the current multiannual financial framework 2021-2027, different funding instruments, notably the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and Cohesion Policy Funds can be used to support barrier-free access to transport.

    CEF finances actions to improve transport infrastructure accessibility, and to date has included a particular focus on accessibility for persons with reduced mobility in railway stations[1].

    T he Social Climate Fund was established to support vulnerable groups, among others, in the fair transition to clean mobility. Provided that the conditions of Regulation (EU) 2023/955[2] are respected, a part of this money could be used by Member States to improve the access of persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility to sustainable transport solutions, including making public transport infrastructure more accessible.

    The revised guidelines for the development of the trans-European network (TEN-T)[3] require that, when developing the TEN-T infrastructure, priority should be given, among others, to measures improving accessibility for all users, including persons with disabilities or reduced mobility.

    This should be pursued in particular by means of better integration of the different transport modes into the urban nodes, including by developing multimodal passenger hubs, which should facilitate seamless connections of TEN-T to public transport infrastructure by 2030.

    The European Union has adopted a wide range of legislation to bring about improvements in access to transport for persons with disabilities and persons with reduced mobility[4].

    The President of the Commission has indicated in her political guidelines[5] the new Commission’s commitment to implement and enforce EU legislation in this area.

    See annex : Annex

    • [1] Since 2014, nearly 150 CEF projects included such measures.
    • [2] Regulation (EU) 2023/955 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 10 May 2023 establishing a Social Climate Fund and amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 — OJ L 130, 16.5.2023, p. 1-51.
    • [3] Regulation (EU) 2024/1679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 on Union guidelines for the development of the trans-European transport network, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1153 and (EU) No 913/2010 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1315/2013 (Text with EEA relevance) OJ L, 2024/1679.
    • [4] Please find a non-exhaustive list of EU legislation which improve the barrier free access of people with disabilities to transport in the annex to this reply.
    • [5] https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/e6cd4328-673c-4e7a-8683-f63ffb2cf648_en?filename=Political%20Guidelines%202024-2029_EN.pdf

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