Category: Transport

  • MIL-OSI Russia: I. Musk threatens to remove congressmen who support D. Trump’s “One, Big, Beautiful” bill

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    WASHINGTON, July 1 (Xinhua) — U.S. billionaire Elon Musk on Monday again lashed out at U.S. President Donald Trump’s “One Big Beautiful” bill, threatening that lawmakers who support it risk losing their primaries next year.

    “Every member of Congress who advocated for cutting government spending and then immediately voted for the largest increase in debt in history should hang their head in shame!” he wrote on his social network X.

    “And they will lose the primaries next year if it is the last thing I do on this earth,” he said.

    In another post, Musk said he would support Republican Congressman Thomas Massie of Kentucky, whom Trump criticized for voting against the bill in the House of Representatives and promised to campaign “very hard” against him in the Democratic primary, promising that a “great American patriot” would run against him.

    Musk has been attacking Trump’s bill since he stepped down as head of the Office of Government Effectiveness in May, warning that it would raise the debt ceiling by $5 trillion, “destroy millions of American jobs, and cause massive strategic damage to our country.”

    The bill could also directly impact Musk’s electric car company Tesla, as it eliminates tax credits on electric vehicles — up to $4,000 for a used car and up to $7,500 for a new one. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. estimates that this would hit Tesla’s profits by $1.2 billion.

    On Saturday, E. Musk broke a brief silence on the controversial spending bill, calling it “completely insane and destructive” as the package moves through the Senate. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Tower joins Kiwibank New Zealander of the Year Awards to celebrate Aotearoa

    Source: New Zealander of the Year Awards Office

    New Zealand’s Local Heroes

    The New Zealander of the Year Awards Office is proud to welcome Tower as the new naming rights sponsor of the New Zealand Local Hero of the Year Award Te Pou Toko o te Tau within Kiwibank New Zealander of the Year Awards Ngā Tohu Pou Kōhure o Aotearoa.

    Tower’s sponsorship signals a powerful alignment of values. With a 155-year legacy of serving Aotearoa, Tower is deeply embedded in communities across the motu. Its long-standing commitment to care, connection, and backing everyday New Zealanders makes it a natural fit for an Award that honours those who quietly uplift the places and people around them.

    “Tower has been supporting New Zealanders for 155 years. As a proud Kiwi business, we are thrilled to take over the stewardship of the New Zealand Local Hero Award,” said Tower CEO Paul Johnston.

    “In line with our purpose to inspire, shape and protect the future for the good of our customers and communities, we are excited to join the Kiwibank New Zealander of the Year Awards in honouring local heroes across Aotearoa. Our people can’t wait to connect with our communities on this important work. To all past and future local hero nominees and finalists, thank you for your contributions to Aotearoa.”

    Miriama Kamo, Te Koruru Patron of the Kiwibank New Zealander of the Year Awards Ngā Tohu Pou Kōhure o Aotearoa, said the partnership marks a meaningful step forward for one of the programme’s beloved Awards. “The Tower New Zealand Local Hero of the Year Award celebrates the quiet champions who uplift our people and places every day. It’s a treasured category in the Kiwibank New Zealander of the Year Awards and we’re so pleased to welcome Tower as the new kaitiaki of this Award – helping us continue to honour the everyday heroes shaping their corner of Aotearoa for the better.”

    Nominations for the Kiwibank New Zealander of the Year Awards Ngā Tohu Pou Kōhure o Aotearoa open on 24 July 2025 and can be made in one or more of the seven Awards by any member of the public over 15 years of age until Sunday 24 August 2025 at nzawards.org.nz.

    For individuals:

    • Kiwibank New Zealander of the Year Te Pou Whakarae o Aotearoa

    • Young New Zealander of the Year Te Mātātahi o te Tau

    • Ryman Healthcare Senior New Zealander of the Year Te Mātapuputu o te Tau

    • Tower New Zealand Local Hero of the Year Te Pou Toko o te Tau

    • New Zealand Innovator of the Year Te Pou Whakairo o te Tau

    • New Zealand Sustainability Leader of the Year Te Toa Taiao o te Tau

    For duos or groups:

    • Mitre 10 New Zealand Community of the Year Ngā Pou Whirinaki o te Tau

    nzawards.org.nz

    @nzeroftheyear

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI USA: CMS Notifies Individuals Potentially Impacted by Data Incident

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services

    The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) is notifying Medicare beneficiaries whose personal information may have been involved in a data incident affecting Medicare.gov accounts. CMS identified suspicious activity related to unauthorized creation of certain beneficiary online accounts using personal information obtained from unknown external sources. CMS takes this situation very seriously. The safeguarding and security of personally identifiable information is of the utmost importance to CMS. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Calendar Year (CY) 2026 End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Prospective Payment System Proposed Rule – CMS-1830-P

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services

    On June 30, 2025, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a proposed rule to update payment rates and policies under the End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Prospective Payment System (PPS) for renal dialysis services furnished to Medicare beneficiaries on or after January 1, 2026. This proposed rule would also update the acute kidney injury (AKI) dialysis payment rate for renal dialysis services furnished by ESRD facilities for calendar year (CY) 2026 and proposes to update requirements for the ESRD Quality Incentive Program (QIP).

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Calendar Year (CY) 2026 Home Health Prospective Payment System Proposed Rule Fact Sheet (CMS-1828-P)

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services

    On June 30, 2025, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) issued a proposed rule that proposes updates to Medicare payment policies and rates for home health agencies (HHAs) under the Home Health (HH) Prospective Payment System (PPS) Proposed Rule for calendar year (CY) 2026. CMS is publishing this proposed rule consistent with the legal requirements to update Medicare payment policies for HHAs annually. This fact sheet discusses the major provisions of the proposed rule.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI: ‘Tiantan Award Panorama·Sydney’ Concludes Successfully, Chinese Films Receive Widespread Acclaim

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    BEIJING, CHINA, July 01, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — From 14th to 19th June, the Beijing International Film Festival “Tiantan Award Panorama·Sydney ” was held at Event Cinema George Street. The six-day screening programme brought together six award-winning Chinese films from the main competition section “Tiantan Award” of the Beijing International Film Festival, covering various genres including family, suspense, and realism, namely “G for Gap”, “Song of Spring!”, “The Shadowless Tower”, “Beyond the Skies”, “Strangers When We Meet”, and “Lost in the Stars”.

    “Tiantan Panorama” is a special screening programme launched globally by the Beijing International Film Festival, aimed at providing audiences worldwide with the opportunity to watch high-quality Chinese films in their local cinemas through a series of screenings of “Tiantan Award” nominated and award-winning films.”‘Tiantan Panorama’ hopes to build not only a platform for film exchange, but also a bridge for mutual learning between civilisations and mutual understanding and trust,” noted Bian Jian, Deputy Secretary-General of the Beijing International Film Festival Organizing Committee and Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Beijing Radio and Television Station, in his opening ceremony address.

    As the opening film of this touring exhibition, “G for Gap” took centre stage, with the film’s director Long Fei and actress Yue Hong attending in person to engage with the audience face-to-face about the original intention behind the film’s creation. This film employs a light comedy framework to tell the story of an ordinary person who pauses before setting off again, exploring the deconstruction of values surrounding “success” and “failure”, “moving forward” and “standing still”.

    Director Long Fei shared during the post-screening discussion: “We didn’t want to tell a story about ‘the science of success’.”Yue Hong, the actress who portrays the mother Jiang Meiling in the film, remarked: “Whichever path you choose, it belongs to you and is worthwhile. Life can only be lived once, and regret is actually part of it.”

    Many viewers expressed that they saw themselves reflected in this story. One viewer said with emotion: “This film answered all the confusion I’m experiencing at my current stage in life.” Others commented: “After watching the film, I realised that stopping isn’t so frightening after all, and I could finally have a proper rest.” Some wrote on social media platforms: “Sometimes, we just need a small pause to remember where we come from” and “I was deeply moved after watching it. I wish everyone can fearlessly be themselves, daring to move forward and daring to stop!”

    Following “G for Gap”, the other five films were subsequently screened for Sydney audiences. Many viewers shared their viewing experiences and photographs from the event on platforms such as Instagram and Xiaohongshu. Some audience members expressed their appreciation for the films in this screening programme, being moved by the emotional expressions within them and finding resonance in the characters’ experiences. Numerous posts also mentioned gratitude for this screening event, describing it as “a surprise beyond imagination”.

    On Letterboxd, some local viewers spontaneously rated the screened films, wrote brief reviews, and marked them as “liked”. “The Shadowless Tower” sparked resonance regarding family relationships, with one user commenting: “You won’t become your parents, but you ultimately carry their shadows.””Mom!” has moved many audiences to tears across different regions and time zones: “I never expected to see this film in Sydney, and I cried so thoroughly” and “The film made me reconsider the relationship between time and love”. The black and white imagery of “Beyond the Skies” has been described as “like flowing ink wash”, and its anti-genre structure has also sparked considerable interest among film enthusiasts. “Lost in the Stars” has been praised as “surreal in plot with strong memorable moments” and “despite being able to guess the twist, it still packs quite a punch”. Meanwhile, “Strangers When We Meet” has brought intense emotional turbulence: “My emotions were like a roller coaster. The rural scenery depicted in the film is also visually stunning.”

    In recent years, Chinese films have continued to gain popularity in the Australian market. Films such as “Ne Zha”, “Hi, Mom”, and “The Wandering Earth 2” have consecutively achieved both critical acclaim and box office success—a “double triumph”—in Sydney, Melbourne, and other cities. This global tour of “Tiantan Panorama” landing in Sydney represents an important opportunity for many local audiences to gain a deeper understanding of the diversity of Chinese filmmaking.

    As Wang Shuyu, Cultural Counsellor at the Chinese Consulate General in Sydney, said in her opening ceremony address: “Tonight is not just about box office success. What we see is the quieter, more complex, and more heartfelt side of Chinese cinema.” She encouraged the audience to “open a window or door in these films that you have never noticed before”.

    Films may come to an end, but the windows and doors remain open.

    Media Contact

    Company: Beijing International Film Festival

    Contact: Yulan Guo, Project Manager

    Telephone: 18600216712

    Email: invitation@bjiff.com

    Website: www.bjiff.com

    Address: 98, Jianguo Rd, Chaoyang, Beijing, 100022, CN

    SOURCE: Beijing International Film Festival

    The MIL Network

  • Thai court suspends PM from duty pending case seeking her dismissal

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Thailand’s Constitutional Court on Tuesday suspended Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra from duty pending a case seeking her dismissal, adding to mounting pressure on a government under fire on multiple fronts.

    The court in a statement said it had accepted a petition from 36 senators that accuses Paetongtarn of dishonesty and breaching ethnical standards in violation of the constitution over the leak of a politically sensitive telephone conversation with Cambodia’s influential former leader Hun Sen.

    The government is expected to be led by a deputy prime minister in a caretaker capacity while the court decides the case against Paetongtarn, who will remain in the cabinet as the new culture minister following a reshuffle. The government did not immediately respond to a request for comment on her suspension.

    The leaked call with the veteran Cambodian politician triggered domestic outrage and has left Paetongtarn’s coalition with a razer-thin majority, with a key party abandoning the alliance and expected to soon seek a no confidence vote in parliament, as protest groups demand the premier resigns.

    During a June 15 call intended to defuse escalating border tensions with Cambodia, Paetongtarn, 38, kowtowed before Hun Sen and criticised a Thai army commander, a red line in a country where the military has significant clout. She has apologised and said her remarks were a negotiating tactic.

    FAMILY CRISIS

    Paetongtarn’s battles after only 10 months in power underline the declining strength of the Pheu Thai Party, the populist juggernaut of the billionaire Shinawatra dynasty that has dominated Thai elections since 2001, enduring military coups and court rulings that have toppled multiple governments and prime ministers.

    It has been a baptism of fire for political novice Paetongtarn, who thrust into power as Thailand’s youngest premier and replacement for Srettha Thavisin, who was dismissed by the Constitutional Court for violating ethics by appointing a minister who was once jailed.

    Paetongtarn’s government has also been struggling to revive a stuttering economy and her popularity has declined sharply, with a June 19-25 opinion poll released at the weekend showing her approval rating sinking to 9.2% from 30.9% in March.

    Paetongtarn is not alone in her troubles, with influential father Thaksin Shinawatra, the driving force behind her government, facing legal hurdles of his own in two different courts this month.

    Divisive tycoon Thaksin, according to his lawyer, appeared at his first hearing at Bangkok’s Criminal Court on Tuesday on charges he insulted Thailand’s powerful monarchy, a serious offence punishable by up to 15 years in prison if found guilty. Thaksin denies the allegations and has repeatedly pledged allegiance to the crown.

    The case stems from a 2015 media interview Thaksin gave while in self-imposed exile, from which he returned in 2023 after 15 years abroad to serve a prison sentence for conflicts of interest and abuse of power.

    Thaksin, 75, dodged jail and spent six months in hospital detention on medical grounds before being released on parole in February last year. The Supreme Court will this month scrutinise that hospital stay and could potentially send him back to jail.

    (Reuters)

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges – A10-0122/2025

    Source: European Parliament 2

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064-2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    (Ordinary legislative procedure: first reading)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0164),

     having regard to Article 294(2) and Articles 164, 175, 177 and 322 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Commission submitted the proposal to Parliament (C10‑0064-2025),

     having regard to Article 294(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

     having regard to the budgetary assessment by the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to Rules 60 and 58 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Security and Defence,

     having regard to the letter from the Committee on Regional Development,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (A10-0122/2025),

    1. Adopts its position at first reading hereinafter set out;

    2. Calls on the Commission to refer the matter to Parliament again if it replaces, substantially amends or intends to substantially amend its proposal;

    3. Instructs its President to forward its position to the Council, the Commission and the national parliaments.

     

    Amendment  1

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities.

    (1) Given the major geopolitical and economic events that have reshaped some of the Union’s strategic political priorities, it is necessary to provide for more structural possibilities for Member States to address those strategic challenges and the investment needs of industries and to refocus their resources to newly emerging priorities in an inclusive manner and only where those challenges have not been addressed in the current programmes, while safeguarding cohesion, creating quality jobs and preserving a level playing field in the internal market.

    Amendment  2

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1a) The ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy. The main objectives of the ESF+ are to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and structures in the policy area of employment and social policies, which are far from met yet. ESF+ funding should support those objectives. The reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality.

    Amendment  3

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1b) The European Court of Auditors’ adopted on 6 May 2025 the opinion on the legislative proposal forming the basis for this Regulation.

    Amendment  4

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 c (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1c) Cohesion policy is often used as an emergency response tool, which risks undermining the primary longer-term policy and objectives of cohesion policy, as underlined in the European Court of Auditors’ opinion of 6 May 2025. It is essential to ensure that any measures taken in the context of emergencies do not interfere with the objectives of cohesion policy. Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of the cohesion policy.

    Amendment  5

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 1 d (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (1d) The Union and its Member States continue to show that they can rapidly react to geopolitical events and are willing to use sufficient financial resources towards strengthening our defence industry through different Union and national programmes, which is positive and needed for the security of the Union. It is important to strengthen our defence sector through competitiveness programmes. At the same time, it is of utmost importance to continue to invest in the social objectives of the Union through the ESF+, as social cohesion is a cornerstone of the Union’s  democratic and societal resilience which is essential in facing threats of aggression.

    Amendment  6

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) It is already possible to support the development of skills in the defence industry under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council2a, to facilitate the development of skills and training in the defence industry, while safeguarding social standards. Together with the Niinisto Report, ‘Safer Together’, the EU Preparedness Strategy, and the European Defence Industrial Strategy, the White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence, civil defence, the defence industry, dual use technologies and civil preparedness capabilities, which should be carried out together with social spending, creating employment and up- and reskilling opportunities . In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem.

    __________________

    __________________

     

    2a Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    3Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025)0090

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

     

    Amendment  7

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation.

    (3) It is already possible to support the adaptation of workers, entrepreneurs and enterprises to change under the ESF+. In line with the decarbonisation measures proposed by the Communication from the Commission – the Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation of 26 February 20256 and to further facilitate industrial adjustment linked to the decarbonisation of production processes and products, in the context of the objective of providing lifelong opportunities to regularly upskill and reskill people, as set out in the Union of Skills Communication, including through a newly proposed Skills Guarantee, the ESF+ should facilitate the skilling, job maintenance and quality job creation throughout the decarbonisation process by providing flexibilities to implementation. Particular consideration should be given to the specific needs and circumstances of less developed regions and rural areas, which should benefit from the green transition and to ensure their integration into the Union’s broader economic, social and environmental development. In accordance with Article 5(1),  second subparagraph, of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the ESF+ contributes to the specific objective of enabling regions and people to address the social, employment, economic and environmental impacts of the transition towards the Union’s 2030 targets for energy and climate and a climate-neutral economy of the Union by 2050, based on the Paris Agreement.

    __________________

    __________________

    6 COM (2025) 85 final

    6 COM (2025)0085

    Amendment  8

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    (4) It is already possible, under ESF+, to support investments contributing to the objectives of the ‘Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform’ (STEP) established by Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council7 which aims to strengthen the Union’s technological leadership and the development of skills. In order to further incentivise investments from the ESF+ in those critical fields, the possibility for Member States to receive a higher pre-financing for related programme amendments should be extended.

    __________________

    __________________

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    7 Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP), and amending Directive 2003/87/EC and Regulations (EU) 2021/1058, (EU) 2021/1056, (EU) 2021/1057, (EU) No 1303/2013, (EU) No 223/2014, (EU) 2021/1060, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695, (EU) 2021/697 and (EU) 2021/241 (OJ L, 2024/795, 29.2.2024, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/795/oj)

    Amendment  9

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (8a) Skills development and the training of young talent and entrepreneurs through incentives and targeted training are essential for job creation, and institutions working on skills creation and uptake should cooperate closely to align with labour market needs. Especially, vocational education and training institutes, given their direct links to the labour market and this should be supported through the ESF+.

    Amendment  10

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful reprogramming and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments

    (5) In order to enable Member States to carry out a meaningful and just reprogramming without losing focus on the main objectives of the fund and focus resources on strategic Union priorities set out in recitals 2, 3 and 4 without causing further delays in implementation, it is appropriate to provide for further flexibilities. The mid-term review should serve as an opportunity to address emerging strategic social challenges and new priorities therefore, Member States should benefit from additional time to complete the assessment of the outcome of the mid-term review and the submission of related programme amendments. While aligning with new Union priorities, diverting attention to global strategic challenges should not change the primary mission of the ESF+. The cohesion policy must remain firmly rooted in its core objective: reducing regional disparities.

    Amendment  11

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 6

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (6) In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine. In order to incentivise the re-programming towards key priorities in the context of the mid-term review, the additional pre-financing should only be available where a certain threshold for the reallocation of financial resources to specific crucial priorities is reached.

    (6) NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are disproportionate heavily impacted by Russian war of aggression, experiencing job losses, less economic activity and social exclusion. In order to accelerate the implementation of cohesion policy programmes and alleviate the pressure on national budgets and to inject the necessary liquidity for the implementation of key investments, an additional one-off pre-financing from the ESF+ should be paid for programmes. Because of the adverse impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine, the pre-financing percentage should be further increased for certain programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, with no specific conditions to reallocate financial resources of the programme to dedicated priorities.

    Amendment  12

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 8

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (8) It should also be possible to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 100% to priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    (8) It should also be possible, while taking into account the current differentiation between categories of regions, to apply a maximum co-financing rate of up to 95% to programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, given the adverse impact of the Russian aggression on those regions.

    Amendment  13

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    (9) Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to address strategic social challenges, refocus investments on critical new priorities and simplify and accelerate policy delivery, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States but can rather be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality as set out in that Article, this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve that objective.

    Amendment  14

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 9 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (9a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

    Amendment  15

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 11

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (11) [Given the urgent need to enable crucial investments in skills in the defence industry as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    (11) [Given the increased need to enable crucial investments in specific skills in the critical industries, including the defence industry, as well as in adaptation to change linked to decarbonisation in the context of pressing strategic geopolitical challenges, this Regulation should enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union,]

    Amendment  16

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level. The one-off pre-financing for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face, and the related subparagraph is moved in a new paragraph.

    Amendment  17

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing shall only apply where reallocations of at least 10% of financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d have been approved and provided that the measures supporting the dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d target smaller beneficiaries and provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

     

    For the purpose of calculating the total reallocations of the financial resources of the programme from the ESF+ to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d, as referred to in the first subparagraph, the Commission shall assess the measures and take into account only the measures responding to the strategic priorities identified.

    Amendment  18

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1a. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided that the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to supporting their resilience in countering hybrid attacks.

     

    The pre-financing due to the Member State which results from programme amendments pursuant to reallocation to the priorities referred to in the second subparagraph of this paragraph shall be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be de-committed in accordance with Article 105 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, provided that the request for programme amendment was submitted in 2025.

    Amendment  19

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU)2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 b (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    1b. Before disbursing payment for the pre-financing pursuant to this Article, the Commission shall assess the Union’s overall budgetary situation, in particular with respect to the principle of the sustainability of the Union budget. Where, on the basis of that assessment, the Commission identifies a risk to the Union budget arising from paying the full pre-financing amount in 2026, the Commission is empowered to adopt a delegated act in accordance with Article 37 to provide for only part of the pre-financing amount to be disbursed to the Member States in 2026, with the remaining part disbursed in 2027.

    Amendment  20

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 10% of the ESF+ financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Justification

    The minimum reprogramming threshold to be eligible to the 4,5% pre-financing should be lower as Member States should be incentivised to reprogramme to reasonable level.

    Amendment  21

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) When amending programmes, the Member States shall include, with the close and meaningful participation of social partners, for the dedicated priorities, obligations to the beneficiaries to respect working and employment conditions under applicable Union and national law, conventions of the International Labour Organization (ILO) and collective agreements.

    Justification

    In line with Articles 33 and 169 of the Financial Regulation.

    Amendment  22

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 95 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State.

    Justification

    The 95% co-financing rate for Eastern bordering regions should not be submitted to minimum reprogramming threshold taking into account the major challenges that these regions face.

    Amendment  23

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 4

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d within 2 months of the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX [this Regulation]. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    (4) In addition to the assessment for each programme on the outcome of the mid-term review to be submitted in accordance with Article 18(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, Member States may resubmit a complementary assessment as well as related requests for programme amendments, taking into account the possibility for dedicated priorities in accordance with Articles 12a 12c and 12d by 31 December 2025. The deadlines set out in Article 18 (3) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060 shall apply.

    Justification

    Taking into account that a significant level of reprogramming is expected, Member States could need more time to provide a complementary assessment.

    Amendment  24

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 2

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12a – paragraph 2 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment.;

    In addition to the pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, where the Commission approves an amendment of a programme including one or more priorities dedicated to operations supported by the ESF+ contributing to the STEP objectives referred to in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2024/795, it shall make an exceptional pre-financing of 30 % on the basis of the allocation to those priorities, provided that smaller beneficiaries have priority access to the funding and that the programme amendment is submitted to the Commission by 31 December 2025. That exceptional pre-financing shall be paid within 60 days of the adoption of the Commission decision approving the programme amendment;

    Amendment  25

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support to skills in civil preparedness and the defence industry

    Amendment  26

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12 c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support for the development of skills in the defence industry and cyber security under dedicated priorities, prioritising dual use capabilities related to civil defence and preparedness, provided that micro, small and medium- sized enterprises have priority access to the support. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    In this context, Member States may allocate resources to attract young talent and entrepreneurs, particularly to rural or less developed regions, through incentives and targeted training.

    Amendment  27

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%.

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  28

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepeneurs to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may, after consulting the social partners at national level, decide to programme targeted support aiming at skilling, up-skilling and re-skilling and training with a view to adaptation of workers, enterprises and entrepreneurs in particular micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and the social economy to change contributing to decarbonisation of production capacities under dedicated priorities, with in the objective of maintaining competitiveness, sustainability and innovation during the green transition. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (g).

     

    Member States may support promoting collaboration between different organisations, such as educational institutions who support skills development, provided that such measures support any of the specific objectives set out in Article(4), points (a) to (g).

     

    Resources allocated to the dedicated priority referred to in the first two subparagraphs of this paragraph shall be taken into account when ensuring compliance with the thematic concentration requirements as set out in Article 7.

    Amendment  29

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d – paragraph 5

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 100%..

    (5) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be increased by 10 percentage points above the co-financing rate applicable, not exceeding 100%.

    Amendment  30

     

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3 a (new)

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12d a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (3a) the following article is inserted:

     

    Article 12da

     

    Guidance and administrative simplification

     

    The Commission shall publish, by … [60 days after the entry into force of Regulation (EU) XXXX/XXXX (this amending Regulation)], detailed guidelines, accompanied by a Q&A system, aiming to clarify the technical, legal and procedural implications of the measures adopted in Articles 5a, 12c and 12d. Those guidelines shall support the managing authorities in the uniform application of this Regulation, reducing the administrative burden and facilitating solutions to early doubts.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

    Entity and/or person

    ETUC

    Social Platform

    Save the Children

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the concerned natural persons the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

    BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BUDGETS (18.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    (COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment: Jean‑Marc Germain 

    The Committee on Budgets has carried out a budgetary assessment of the proposal under Rule 58 of the Rules of Procedure and has reached the following conclusions:

    The Committee on Budgets,

    A. whereas the proposal does not modify existing budgetary commitments and remains within the limits of the overall allocations for the period 2021-2027 and is therefore budgetary neutral;

    B. whereas the combined effect of exceptional one-off 30 % pre-financing and 100 % co-financing on new EU priorities, as well as additional one-off pre-financing of 4.5 % (9.5 % for NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine) for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their resources to the new priorities, leads to a partial frontloading of estimated payment appropriations of EUR 500 million in 2026, followed by lower payments in 2027;

    C. whereas the extension of the eligibility period by one year – from the end of 2029 to the end of 2030 – for programmes that reallocate at least 15 % of their total allocation to new specific objectives creates payments in 2030 and changes the applicable decommitment rule for 2027 from year n+2 to year n+3;

    Conclusions of the budgetary assessment 

    1. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the MFF Regulation[1]; notes that the proposed measures are voluntary and do not involve any top-up of the initial allocation available to Member States;

    2. Notes that the proposal requires additional human resources of EUR 376 000 per year in 2025, 2026 and 2027, for two establishment plan posts; notes that the additional needs will be covered by redeployment within the Directorate-General or other Commission services; notes, however, that the overall impact of redeployments within the Commission services has reached its limit;

    3. Determines that the proposal is compatible with the Interinstitutional agreement on budgetary discipline (IIA)[2]; notes, however, that re-programming in the context of the mid-term review is considered not to alter the contribution to climate targets as set out in point 16 of the IIA; underlines that allocating resources to new objectives, including for the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, could lead to shifting resources from interventions with a higher coefficient for calculation of support to climate change objectives to interventions with a lower coefficient, thus potentially reducing the expenditure supporting climate objectives; invites the Commission to take preventive action to counter this risk; calls on the Commission to assess the impact of the revised plans on the shares of expenditure supporting climate objectives; notes also that the ‘do no significant harm’ principle should apply to all European investments in line with the applicable legislation;

    4. Considers that the proposal is compatible with the budgetary principles laid down in the Financial Regulation[3]; notes, however, that the pre-financing paid in 2026 will be counted as payments made in 2025 for the purposes of calculating the amounts to be decommitted, in particular as regards respect for the principle of annuality;

    5. Recalls the importance of the general regime of conditionality as set out in Article 6 of the Financial Regulation; urges the Commission and the Member States to ensure compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and to respect the Union values enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union in the implementation of the budget;

    6. Notes that the Commission does not expect any implications for the budget for 2025 beyond the redeployment of existing human resources; expects the Commission to take into account the current proposal and the updated payment needs for the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) in the budgetary procedure for 2026 following the actual re-programming by Member States and to keep Parliament informed in a timely manner of the progress of the mid-term review in the Member States; calls for a prudent approach to payment frontloading;

    Recommendations as regards budget implementation

    7. Notes that the proposal provides further flexibility and introduces incentives for Member States in the context of the mid-term review of cohesion policy to address strategic challenges that the EU is facing by redirecting resources to new EU priorities; underlines that cohesion policy should not be used again as a crisis response tool and maintains that this approach risks undermining its longer-term policy and investment objectives, including investments in regional development, skills, innovation and productivity; regrets that the Commission did not perform an impact assessment of the changes; acknowledges that the proposal offers a pragmatic, albeit unsatisfactory, way forward for dealing with insufficient budgetary flexibility and response capacity in the EU budget;

    8. Recalls that the ESF+ is an essential pillar of cohesion policy and its main objective is to support Member States and regions in achieving social inclusion and social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights by supporting investments in people and systems in the policy area of employment and social policies; highlights that the Member States should ensure safeguards in the regulatory framework to prevent the dismantling of the core objectives of cohesion policy; underlines the need to ensure that the implementation of the amended ESF+ Regulation[4] is accompanied by measures for simplification and strengthening of administrative capacities in order to drive investments in key sectors and increase the absorption rate;

    9. Underlines that the combined effect of reallocating a minimum of 15 % of resources and of lifting of the 20 % ceiling for transfer towards Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform (STEP) objectives may have a negative impact on the achievements of targets initially set in the ESF+ Regulation and could result in some initially planned actions for later years not materialising owing to a discontinuity in matching objectives with resources, while noting the need to adapt to new priorities, taking into account the recent geopolitical dynamics;

    10. Notes that payments to 2021-2027 cohesion policy programmes were of a very low level in the first years of implementation, leading to an increase in payment needs towards the later years; recalls that this actual payment cycle does not coincide with the more linear payment profile set out in the MFF Regulation[5] and that this situation results in a serious risk of exceeding payment ceilings; recalls that the gradual increase in payments towards the later part of the programming period is a feature of multiannual programmes; considers that the frontloading of payments towards 2026 could have an impact on the pressure on payments;

    11. Recalls that the STEP Regulation[6] and the RESTORE Amending Regulation of 2024 were accompanied by a frontloading of payment appropriations in the budgets for 2024 and for 2025; notes that the total amount of payment appropriations in the 2026 draft budget is very close to the payment ceiling and is concerned, in this respect, about the high level of uncertainty with regard to the volume of payment claims in 2026; highlights the difficulties in predicting the take-up of the newly introduced flexibilities and incentives and in estimating payment needs, as also underpinned by the ongoing trend of increasing inaccuracy of payment forecasts by Member States; calls on the Commission to closely monitor payment developments and provide timely information to Parliament in this regard, and to propose any remedial action to the budgetary authority if needed;

    12. Recalls that 100 % co-financing without additional resources leads to a lower total amount of financial support through the programme; insists that broadening the scope of investment must not lead to a reduction in financial support for the initial priorities of investing in employment, social services, inclusive education and skills, and of providing assistance to the most vulnerable, including children; recalls that mandatory co-financing is an important principle of cohesion policy funding;

    13. Requests that the Commission provide traceable information in the form of timely reports on transfers to ensure that the impact of the mid-term review is clearly identifiable for the budgetary authority;

    14. Calls on the Commission to maintain consistency in applying conditionality across all EU funding streams and insists that amendments in Parliament’s reading are essential to close any loophole; demands rigorous enforcement of conditionality mechanisms and explicitly rejects any reallocation of blocked cohesion policy funds if this would circumvent the rule-of-law-related requirements established in the Common Provisions Regulation[7]; underlines that rule of law conditionality is a fundamental principle that must apply to all EU funds without exception;

    15. Considers that the actual take-up of the proposal may depend on various factors, such as the effectiveness of the 15 % re-allocation threshold and the availability of more favourable funding options under other Union programmes; considers that the proposed condition of the reallocation of at least 15 % of the funds to new priorities may be too high and unsuitable for single national programmes, as it could create implementation complications; highlights the importance of preventing double financing and calls on the Member States and the Commission to ensure that support for new types of investment is in addition to support under other Union programmes, including the EDF, EDIP and SAFE;

    16. Notes that the mid-term review may reduce the amount of funds at risk of decommitment; recalls that an amount equivalent to the cumulative decommitments made on outstanding commitments since 2021 can be made available for the European Union Recovery Instrument (EURI); asks the Commission to provide further analysis of the impact of the mid-term review on the EURI instrument.

     

     

    AMENDMENT

     

    As part of its budgetary assessment, the Committee on Budgets also submits the following amendment to the proposal:

     

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital [9] a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    ([9]a) This Regulation has implications for the Union budget. Accordingly, the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets adopted a budgetary assessment, which forms an integral part of Parliament’s mandate for negotiations.

     

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for budgetary assessment declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Budgetary assessment by

     Date announced in plenary

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for budgetary assessment

     Date appointed

    Jean-Marc Germain

    12.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    5.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    24

    6

    3

    Members present for the final vote

    Georgios Aftias, Rasmus Andresen, Tomasz Buczek, Jens Geier, Thomas Geisel, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Andrzej Halicki, Alexander Jungbluth, Giuseppe Lupo, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Siegfried Mureşan, Jana Nagyová, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Matjaž Nemec, Danuše Nerudová, Ruggero Razza, Karlo Ressler, Bogdan Rzońca, Hélder Sousa Silva, Joachim Streit, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs, Lucia Yar, Auke Zijlstra

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Pablo Arias Echeverría, Roman Haider, Céline Imart, Rasmus Nordqvist, Jacek Protas, Annamária Vicsek

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Benoit Cassart, Andi Cristea

     

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    IN COMMITTEE ASKED FOR BUDGETARY ASSESSMENT

    24

    +

    PPE

    Georgios Aftias, Pablo Arias Echeverría, Andrzej Halicki, Céline Imart, Siegfried Mureşan, Fernando Navarrete Rojas, Danuše Nerudová, Jacek Protas, Karlo Ressler, Hélder Sousa Silva

    Renew

    Benoit Cassart, Joachim Streit, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    Andi Cristea, Jens Geier, Jean-Marc Germain, Sandra Gómez López, Giuseppe Lupo, Matjaž Nemec, Carla Tavares, Nils Ušakovs

    Verts/ALE

    Rasmus Andresen, Ignazio Roberto Marino, Rasmus Nordqvist

     

    6

    ESN

    Alexander Jungbluth

    NI

    Thomas Geisel

    PfE

    Tomasz Buczek, Roman Haider, Annamária Vicsek, Auke Zijlstra

     

    3

    0

    ECR

    Ruggero Razza, Bogdan Rzońca

    PfE

    Jana Nagyová

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND DEFENCE (17.6.2025)

    for the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    ((COM(2025)0164 – C10‑0064/2025 – (2025/0085(COD))

    Rapporteur for opinion: Urmas Paet

     

     

     

    AMENDMENTS

    The Committee on Security and Defence submits the following to the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, as the committee responsible:

    Amendment  1

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 20303 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the defence industry.

    (2) The White paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030 of 19 March 2025 paves the way for a true European defence union, including by suggesting to Member States to heavily invest into defence and the defence industry. Investment in defence and security-related skills covering dual use and transferable skills contributes not only to European defence resilience but also to territorial cohesion. In that regard, the Communication from the Commission – the Union of Skills of 5 March 20254 (‘the Union of Skills Communication’) sets out actions to address skills gaps and shortages in the Union, also through the Pact for Skills Initiative referred to in that Communication, and its large-scale partnerships, including one on the defence ecosystem. Furthermore, lifelong learning programmes and initiatives should promote continuous development and adaptation to emerging technologies and defence needs. Moreover, in the European Defence Industrial Strategy of 5 March 2024, the Commission set the priority of the full integration of defence and security as a strategic objective of relevant Union funding and programmes, including ESF+. Therefore, it is appropriate to include incentives for the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council5 to facilitate the development of skills in the European defence industry, in particular to address skills gaps and shortages directly related to the ability to address the critical capability gaps set out in the White paper. Defence industry should be understood as the industries producing defence products, their respective supply chains, and industries which develop and produce dual-use goods.

    __________________

    __________________

    3 Joint White Paper for European Defence Readiness 2030, JOIN(2025) 120 final, 19.3.2025.

     

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    4 COM (2025) 90 final

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    5 Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) and repealing Regulation (EU) No 1296/2013 (OJ L 231, 30.6.2021, p. 21, ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/1057/oj).

    Amendment  2

    Proposal for a regulation

    Recital 2 a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) In accordance with Article 7 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 , Member States should promote synergies and avoid duplications between actions arising for dedicated priorities referred to in Article 12c and actions resulting from other Union programmes that benefit the defence industry.

    Amendment  3

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes.

    In 2026, the Commission shall pay 4,5 % of the total support from the ESF+ as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as additional one-off pre-financing. The one-off pre-financing percentage in 2026 shall be increased to 9,5% for programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, provided the programme does not cover the entire territory of the Member State. Where, in a Member State, NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine are included exclusively in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State, the increased pre-financing set out in this paragraph shall apply to those programmes. NUTS 2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine require special attention and exceptional support as they are often at the frontline of potential conflicts and they are vulnerable to external threats, making it crucial to support their resilience in countering hybrid attacks, breaches of the Union’s external borders, terrorist activities and war.

    Amendment  4

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 1 – subparagraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    The additional pre-financing referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d have been approved; provided that the request for a programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  5

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    (2) By way of derogation from Article 63(2) and Article 105(2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the deadline for the eligibility of expenditure, the reimbursement of costs as well as for decommitment shall be 31 December 2030. That derogation shall only apply where programme amendments reallocating at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved.

    Amendment  6

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 2a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (2a) The Member States shall work closely with social partners, when reprogramming, and respect working and employment conditions  under applicable ILO conventions, Union and national law and collective agreements.

    Amendment  7

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 1

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 5a – paragraph 3

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 15% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    (3) By way of derogation from Article 112 of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the maximum co-financing rate for priorities in programmes covering one or more NUTS2 regions bordering Russia, Belarus or Ukraine shall be 100 %. The higher co-financing rate shall not apply to programmes covering the entire territory of the Member State concerned, unless those regions are included only in programmes covering the entire territory of that Member State. The derogation shall only apply where reallocations of at least 5% of the financial resources of the programme to one or more dedicated priorities established in accordance with Articles 12a, 12c and 12d of this Regulation in the context of the mid-term review have been approved, provided that the programme amendment is submitted by 31 December 2025.

    Amendment  8

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – title

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    Support to the defence industry

    Support European defence industry and cybersecurity

    Amendment  9

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry under dedicated priorities. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l).

    (1) Member States may decide to programme support to development of skills in the defence industry and related cybersecurity, as well as in skills related to civil defence and preparedness under dedicated priorities to meet urgent needs. Such dedicated priorities may support any of the specific objectives set out in Article 4(1), points (a) to (l). This support may include actions that promote the recognition of skills acquired during military service and facilitate their conversion into qualifications recognised on the civilian labour market.

    Amendment  10

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 3 – subparagraph 1

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 30% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    In addition to the yearly pre-financing for the programme provided for in Article 90(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) 2021/1060, the Commission shall pay 35% of the allocation to the dedicated priorities referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as set out in the decision approving the programme amendment as exceptional one-off pre-financing.

    Amendment  11

    Proposal for a regulation

    Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 3

    Regulation (EU) 2021/1057

    Article 12c – paragraph 5a (new)

     

    Text proposed by the Commission

    Amendment

     

    (5a) When allocating funds to dedicated priorities pursuant to paragraph 1, Member States shall ensure that those funds contribute to the Member States’ ability to address critical capability gaps set out in the White Paper for European Defence – Readiness 2030.

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The rapporteur for the opinion declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Committee(s) responsible

    EMPL

     

     

     

    Opinion by

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    Rapporteur for the opinion

     Date appointed

    Urmas Paet

    14.5.2025

    Discussed in committee

    3.6.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    31

    8

    4

    Members present for the final vote

    Petras Auštrevičius, Wouter Beke, Marc Botenga, Tobias Cremer, Salvatore De Meo, Özlem Demirel, Elio Di Rupo, Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Niclas Herbst, Costas Mavrides, Vangelis Meimarakis, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Hans Neuhoff, Andrey Novakov, Kostas Papadakis, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Reinis Pozņaks, Marjan Šarec, Mārtiņš Staķis, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Pierre-Romain Thionnet, Mihai Tudose, Reinier Van Lanschot, Roberto Vannacci, Michael von der Schulenburg, Alexandr Vondra, Lucia Yar

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    José Cepeda, Bart Groothuis, Marina Mesure, Thijs Reuten, Hélder Sousa Silva, Villy Søvndal, Petra Steger, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL
    BY THE COMMITTEE ASKED FOR OPINION

    31

    +

    ECR

    Michał Dworczyk, Alberico Gambino, Reinis Pozņaks, Claudiu-Richard Târziu, Alexandr Vondra

    PPE

    Wouter Beke, Salvatore De Meo, Niclas Herbst, Vangelis Meimarakis, Andrey Novakov, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Hélder Sousa Silva, Michał Szczerba, Riho Terras, Matej Tonin, Marta Wcisło

    PfE

    Pierre-Romain Thionnet

    Renew

    Petras Auštrevičius, Bart Groothuis, Marjan Šarec, Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Lucia Yar

    S&D

    José Cepeda, Tobias Cremer, Elio Di Rupo, Costas Mavrides, Ana Catarina Mendes, Sven Mikser, Thijs Reuten, Mihai Tudose

    Verts/ALE

    Mārtiņš Staķis

     

    8

    ESN

    Hans Neuhoff

    NI

    Kostas Papadakis, Michael von der Schulenburg

    PfE

    Petra Steger, Roberto Vannacci

    The Left

    Marc Botenga, Özlem Demirel, Marina Mesure

     

    4

    0

    PfE

    Anna Bryłka, Tomasz Buczek

    Verts/ALE

    Villy Søvndal, Reinier Van Lanschot

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

    LETTER OF THE COMMITTEE ON REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT (25.6.2025)

    Ms Li Andersson

    Chair

    Committee on Employment and Social Affairs

    BRUSSELS

    Subject: Opinion on Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges (2025/0085(COD)COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025)

     

     

    Dear Ms Andersson,

     

    Under the procedure referred to above, the Committee on Regional Development was asked to submit an opinion to your Committee.

     

    At its meeting of 9 April 2025, REGI committee decided to send the opinion in the form of a letter. It discussed the matter at its meeting of 13 May 2025 and adopted the opinion at its meeting of 25 June 2025[8].

     

    The Committee on Regional Development:

     

    1. Underlines the crucial role that cohesion policy and sectoral programmes, in spite of the fact that they are not crisis management instruments, have repeatedly and efficiently played in helping regions to respond effectively to emergencies and asymmetric shocks such as the COVID-19 crisis, Brexit, the energy crisis and the refugee crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as well as natural disasters;

     

    2. Is aware of the rapidly evolving economic, societal, environmental and geopolitical context, as well as the housing crisis, and shares the need for more flexibility in assessing the extent to which cohesion policy programmes can help respond to these changes; nevertheless is of the firm opinion that the capacity to offer flexible responses to unpredictable challenges should not come at the expense of the clear long-term strategic focus and objectives of cohesion policy, in accordance with Article 174 TFEU;

     

    3. Reiterates that ESF+ stands as positive example of EU solidarity and that its main objective is to support Member States and regions to achieve social inclusion, social cohesion, to activate the labour market and to deliver on the principles and the headline targets of the European Pillar of Social Rights that are far from met yet; stresses that the reprogramming of resources under the ESF+ should ensure that adjustment measures in response to strategic challenges do not undermine its social approach, but strengthen its capacity to combat inequality;

     

    4. Underlines the fact that cohesion policy shall first and foremost ensure social cohesion, not defence spending; nonetheless acknowledges that flexibility of the policy from the point of view of the beneficiaries is a key point, and stresses the need to provide regions with greater flexibility already when programming the funding, in order to cater for their particular needs and specificities, particularly border regions; furthermore acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities through the development of skills and training, while safeguarding social standards, is already possible under the ESF+ established by Regulation (EU) 2021/1057;

     

    5. Acknowledges that investment in defence capabilities and in adaptation linked to decarbonisation makes a key contribution to the promotion of the competitiveness, preparedness and strategic autonomy of the EU, and requires having people with the right skills; in general, recognises the importance of the development of skills through lifelong learning and training models, targeted in particular at young people not in education, employment and training (NEET) and unemployed people, and targeted also at teachers, trainers, mentors, coaches, as well as entrepreneurs and researchers; encourages in this regard private sector involvement to enhance skills development and labour market integration, ensuring that ESF+ investments translate into tangible economic benefits; calls for stronger partnerships between businesses, educational institutions, and regional authorities to align training programs with labour market demands, fostering innovation and job creation;

     

    6. Stresses the strategic importance of strong external border regions for the security and resilience of the EU; welcomes the focus given by the legislative proposal to the challenges the Eastern border regions are facing since the Russian aggression against Ukraine began; supports the proposal that programmes under the Investment for jobs and growth goal, with NUTS 2 regions that have borders with Russia, Belarus or Ukraine, should benefit from the possibility of a one-off 9.5% pre-financing of the programme allocation in 2026 and a 100% Union financing;

     

    7. Reaffirms that cohesion policy and ESF+ should reach all EU regions, especially those affected by transformation processes, while keeping a focus on least developed regions and people; stresses that cohesion policy should be deepened where possible, with a view to remain the EU’s main long-term investment instrument for reducing disparities, ensuring economic, social and territorial cohesion, and stimulating regional and local sustainable growth in line with EU strategies;

     

    8. Reiterates the importance of compliance with horizontal enabling conditions, and stresses that funds suspended under Regulation 2020/2092 should not be subject to amended programmes or transfers;

     

    9. Encourages the European Commission to allow for targeted simplification measures in Member States where administrative capacity constraints may hinder full or efficient absorption of ESF+ and cohesion funds, and to provide technical assistance to local and regional authorities to ensure efficient implementation and spending; furthermore stresses the importance of simplifying the rules and procedures to limit bureaucratic burden;

     

    10. Believes that the ESF+ strengthens a pro-European identity in the entire EU and should be communicated as such and that local and regional authorities, in light of their role as both beneficiary and managing authority, as well as social partners shall be meaningfully involved in the formulation of new legislative proposals and in the revision of programmes pursuant to the mid-term review, in order to guarantee more effectiveness and coordination between the ESF+ and the broader cohesion and regional policy and its financing tools;

     

    11. Suggests laying down measures to facilitate access for Outermost Regions to flexibilities introduced by the mid-term review, such as lowering to 10% the amounts of reallocations to one or more dedicated priorities established in the second subparagraph of Art. 5a(1), and in the first subparagraph of Art. 5a(2), which are required to benefit from the additional one-off pre-financing.

     

     

    Yours sincerely,

    Dragoş BENEA

     

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS
    FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    The Chair declares under his exclusive responsibility that he did not receive input from any entity or person to be mentioned in this Annex pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure.

     

     

    PROCEDURE – COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    Title

    Amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 establishing the European Social Fund + (ESF+) as regards specific measures to address strategic challenges

    References

    COM(2025)0164 – C10-0064/2025 – 2025/0085(COD)

    Date submitted to Parliament

    2.4.2025

     

     

     

    Committee(s) responsible

     Date announced in plenary

    EMPL

    5.5.2025

     

     

     

    Committees asked for opinions

     Date announced in plenary

    SEDE

    5.5.2025

    BUDG

    5.5.2025

    ITRE

    5.5.2025

    REGI

    5.5.2025

    Not delivering opinions

     Date of decision

    ITRE

    9.4.2025

     

     

     

    Rapporteurs

     Date appointed

    Marit Maij

    8.5.2025

     

     

     

    Simplified procedure – date of decision

    5.5.2025

    Budgetary assessment

     Date of budgetary assessment

    BUDG

    16.6.2025

     

     

     

    Discussed in committee

    13.5.2025

     

     

     

    Date adopted

    25.6.2025

     

     

     

    Result of final vote

    +:

    –:

    0:

    32

    15

    11

    Members present for the final vote

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Grégory Allione, Marc Angel, Pascal Arimont, Konstantinos Arvanitis, Nikola Bartůšek, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Rachel Blom, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Estelle Ceulemans, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Henrik Dahl, Johan Danielsson, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Elena Donazzan, Gheorghe Falcă, Chiara Gemma, Niels Geuking, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Sérgio Humberto, Katrin Langensiepen, Miriam Lexmann, Marit Maij, Marlena Maląg, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Idoia Mendia, Maria Ohisalo, Branislav Ondruš, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Nicola Procaccini, Dennis Radtke, Nela Riehl, Liesbet Sommen, Villy Søvndal, Pál Szekeres, Georgiana Teodorescu, Jana Toom, Raffaele Topo, Francesco Torselli, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne, Marianne Vind, Mariateresa Vivaldini, Petar Volgin, Jan-Peter Warnke, Séverine Werbrouck

    Substitutes present for the final vote

    Regina Doherty, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes, Hristo Petrov

    Members under Rule 216(7) present for the final vote

    Mireia Borrás Pabón, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral

    Date tabled

    30.6.2025

     

    FINAL VOTE BY ROLL CALL BY THE COMMITTEE RESPONSIBLE

    32

    +

    ECR

    Georgiana Teodorescu

    PPE

    Maravillas Abadía Jover, Pascal Arimont, Andrzej Buła, David Casa, Henrik Dahl, Regina Doherty, Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral, Rosa Estaràs Ferragut, Gheorghe Falcă, Niels Geuking, Sérgio Humberto, Jagna Marczułajtis-Walczak, Dennis Radtke, Liesbet Sommen

    Renew

    Grégory Allione, Hristo Petrov, Jana Toom, Brigitte van den Berg, Marie-Pierre Vedrenne

    S&D

    Marc Angel, Gabriele Bischoff, Vilija Blinkevičiūtė, Estelle Ceulemans, Johan Danielsson, Isilda Gomes, Alicia Homs Ginel, Marit Maij, Idoia Mendia, Aodhán Ó Ríordáin, Raffaele Topo, Marianne Vind

     

    15

    ESN

    Petar Volgin

    NI

    Branislav Ondruš, Jan-Peter Warnke

    PfE

    Nikola Bartůšek, Rachel Blom, Mireia Borrás Pabón, Marie Dauchy, Mélanie Disdier, Pál Szekeres, Séverine Werbrouck

    The Left

    Konstantinos Arvanitis, Leila Chaibi, Per Clausen, Kathleen Funchion, Rudi Kennes

     

    11

    0

    ECR

    Elena Donazzan, Chiara Gemma, Marlena Maląg, Nicola Procaccini, Francesco Torselli, Mariateresa Vivaldini

    PPE

    Miriam Lexmann

    Verts/ALE

    Katrin Langensiepen, Maria Ohisalo, Nela Riehl, Villy Søvndal

     

    Key to symbols:

    + : in favour

     : against

    0 : abstention

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: MOFA response to IPAC statement condemning China for alleged plot targeting Vice President Hsiao

    Source: Republic of China Taiwan

    MOFA response to IPAC statement condemning China for alleged plot targeting Vice President Hsiao

    June 27, 2025  The Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) issued a statement on June 27 condemning China for an alleged plot to engineer a collision with a car carrying Vice President Hsiao Bi-khim during a visit to the Czech Republic in March 2024 when she was serving as vice president-elect. It denounced China for conspiring to engage in an act of state terrorism and said that the planning of such an overt act of politically motivated violence in a foreign country represented the crossing of a threshold and disregard for international diplomatic norms. Expressing solidarity with Vice President Hsiao and with Taiwanese citizens who may be subject to coercion by the Chinese state while traveling abroad, the statement also emphasized that Taiwan’s future should be determined by the Taiwanese people and called upon the governments of IPAC member countries to condemn the PRC’s unacceptable actions.
     
    The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sincerely appreciates IPAC taking a stand and urging nations to strongly condemn China for seeking to engage in unlawful activities in other countries that amount to state terrorism. The contempt for international diplomatic norms, violent disregard for personal safety, and deliberate and worsening attempts to suppress Taiwan displayed by China in its actions are a clear demonstration of its exceedingly disgraceful and unscrupulous behavior. This is unacceptable to the international community. MOFA once again strongly condemns China and solemnly demands that it issue an apology.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Distressed by all the bad news? Here’s how to stay informed but still look after yourself

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Reza Shabahang, Research Fellow in Human Cybersecurity, Monash University and Academic Researcher in Media Psychology, Flinders University

    KieferPix/Shutterstock

    If you’re feeling like the news is particularly bad at the moment, you’re not alone.

    But many of us can’t look away – and don’t want to. Engaging with news can help us make sense of what’s going on and, for many of us, is an ethical stance.

    So, how can you also take care of your mental health? Here’s how to balance staying informed with the impact negative news can have on our wellbeing.

    Why am I feeling so affected by the news?

    Our brains are wired to prioritise safety and survival, and respond rapidly to danger. Repeatedly activating such processes by consuming distressing news content – often called doomscrolling – can be mentally draining.

    Unfiltered or uncensored images can have an especially powerful psychological impact. Graphic footage of tragedies circulating on social media may have a stronger effect than traditional media (such as television and newspapers) which are more regulated.

    Research shows consuming negative news is linked to lower wellbeing and psychological difficulties, such as anxiety and feelings of uncertainty and insecurity. It can make us feel more pessimistic towards ourselves, other people, humanity and life in general.

    In some cases, consuming a lot of distressing news can even cause vicarious trauma. This means you may experience post-traumatic stress symptoms such as flashbacks and trouble sleeping despite not being directly involved in the traumatic events.

    But this doesn’t stop us seeking it out. In fact, we are more likely to read, engage with, and share stories that are negative.

    Is there a better way to consume news?

    Switching off may not be an option for everyone.

    For example, if you have friends or family in areas affected by conflict, you may be especially concerned and following closely to see how they’re affected.

    Even without personal ties to the conflict, many people want to stay informed and understand what is unfolding. For some, this is a moral decision which they feel may lead to action and positive change.

    This is why, in research I co-authored, we suggest simply restricting your exposure to negative news is not always possible or practical.

    Instead, we recommend engaging more mindfully with news. This means paying attention to shifts in your emotions, noticing how the news makes you feel, and slowing down when needed.

    How to consume news more mindfully

    When you plan to engage with news, there are some steps you can take.

    1. Pause and take a few deep breaths. Take a moment to observe how your body is feeling and what your mind is doing.

    2. Check in. Are you feeling tense? What else do you have going on today? Maybe you’re already feeling worried or emotionally stretched. Think about whether you’re feeling equipped to process negative news right now.

    3. Reflect. What is motivating you to engage right now? What are you trying to find out?

    4. Stay critical. As you read an article or watch a video, pay attention to how credible the source is, the level of detail provided and where the information comes from.

    5. Tune into how it’s making you feel. Do you notice any physical signs of stress, such as tension, sweating or restlessness?

    6. Take time. Before quickly moving on to another piece of news, allow yourself to process the information you’ve received as well as your response. Has it changed your emotions, thoughts or attitudes? Did it fulfil your intention? Do you still have energy to engage with more news?

    It may not always be possible to take all these steps. But engaging more mindfully before, during and after you’re exposed to negative news can help you make more informed decisions about how and when to consume it – and when to take a break.

    Signs the news is affecting your mental health

    If you’re feeling emotionally overwhelmed, you’re more likely to have an automatic and emotion-driven response to what you’re reading or watching.

    Signs your negative news consumption may be affecting your mental health include:

    • compulsive engagement, feeling like you can’t stop checking or following negative news

    • experiencing feelings of despair, hopelessness, or lack of motivation

    • feeling irritable

    • difficulty concentrating

    • fatigue

    • strong physical symptoms (such as an upset stomach)

    • trouble sleeping

    • an increase in rash or risky behaviours, or behaviours you don’t usually display when you’re calm, such as panic shopping and hoarding following news about bad events.

    What should I do when I’m feeling upset?

    First, take a break. This could be a few minutes or a few days – as long as it takes you to feel emotionally steady and ready to re-engage with negative news.

    You might find it useful to reflect by writing down observations about how news is making you feel, and keeping track of intense fluctuations in emotions.

    It can also be helpful to connect with supportive people around you and do activities you enjoy. Spending time outdoors and doing hands-on tasks, such as gardening, painting or sewing, can be particularly helpful when you’re feeling anxious or emotional.

    But if you’re feeling overwhelmed and it’s affecting your work, life or relationships, it’s a good idea to seek professional help.

    In Australia, the government provides free mental health support at walk-in Medicare Mental Health Centres, Kids Hubs or via phone.

    Other free resources – including a symptom checker and links to online chat support – are available at Health Direct.


    If this article has raised issues for you, or if you’re concerned about someone you know, call Lifeline on 13 11 14.

    Reza Shabahang does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Distressed by all the bad news? Here’s how to stay informed but still look after yourself – https://theconversation.com/distressed-by-all-the-bad-news-heres-how-to-stay-informed-but-still-look-after-yourself-259913

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: China-Laos Railway sees 8.8% cargo growth H1 2025

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    An international cargo train of China-Laos Railway is pictured at Wangjiaying West Station in Kunming, southwest China’s Yunnan Province, on Jan. 2, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    The China-Laos Railway transported 3 million tons of cargo in the first half of 2025, marking an 8.8 percent increase compared to the same period last year, the local Pasaxon newspaper in Vientiane reported on Monday.

    Since its opening, the railway has become a key export route for Laos and neighboring countries. To boost exports and improve freight efficiency, it prioritizes Lao goods, especially agricultural products, and provides full support to operators upon request, regardless of shipment size.

    Service improvements include increasing train routes and container availability, raising train load capacity from 2,500 to 2,800 tons, and streamlining customs procedures through enhanced coordination with border officials.

    In addition, the China-Laos Railway is also collaborating with railway authorities in China, Thailand, and Malaysia to launch a cross-border freight service. This initiative aims to connect ASEAN countries more effectively through Laos, further integrating regional trade routes.

    Key exports from Laos to China include fruits, cassava, rubber, and minerals. The variety of products transported has grown dramatically, expanding from just over 10 types to more than 3,000 types.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Bridging the gap to a brighter future

    Source: Northern Territory Police and Fire Services

    Veronique, Jesse, Amy from Bridge to Brighter Futures Program


    In Brief:

    A summary of what the story is about

    • The ACT Government Adult Community Education (ACE) Grants Program provides funding to Canberra not-for-profits.
    • The program aims to help Canberrans overcome barriers to training, education and employment.
    • This article details how a current grant recipient is using the funding.

    The transition into work or study isn’t always easy.

    Bridge to Brighter Futures aims to support young people with this next step, through a free 10-week program.

    The course is delivered at Belconnen Youth Centre by Capital Region Community Services and funded through the ACT Government’s Adult Community Education (ACE) Grants Program. This program and is now open for term 3 enrolments for 17–24-year-olds.

    Jesse heard about Bridge to Brighter Futures while attending The Corner, Belconnen Youth Centre’s Dungeons and Dragons nights.

    With an interest in technology and creativity, he was looking to gain new skills.

    After completing six weeks of learning with the Bridge to Brighter Futures Program, Jesse transitioned into a work experience placement with the Capital Region Community Services, Marketing and Communications Team.

    During this placement, he got the opportunity to work on The Corner’s social media and website.

    Jesse brought thoughtful ideas and a fresh perspective to the team, including suggestions for better engaging young people online.

    He said the placement was positive and fun. He particularly appreciated having his own workspace and being given meaningful tasks, rather than routine or administrative work.

    Bridging the gap

    Bridge to Brighter Futures gives young people, between 17 – 24 the chance to develop their confidence and practical skills to enter the workforce. Especially those who have disengaged from traditional education.

    It focuses on:

    • recognising individual strengths and interests
    • tailoring support to help participants explore volunteer opportunities
    • finding secure jobs
    • building the capacity to pursue education
    • career pathways.

    Manager, Nicole Palmer said the program was developed in response to a need.

    “Our team identified a significant gap in services for young people who have disengaged from traditional education pathways,” she said.

    The program offers:

    • free access to essential skills in literacy, numeracy, English and IT
    • young people support to pursue further study
    • a pathway toward meaningful employment.

    “This initiative reflects our commitment to ensuring no young person is left behind,” Nicole said.

    “We are excited to continue working alongside the community to support brighter futures for all.”

    Jesse finished the program feeling confident, respected and included.

    He now hopes to pursue further study and become a software engineer.

    The Adult Community Education (ACE) Grants Program

    Capital Region Community Services developed the program thanks to ACT Government funding from the ACT ACE Grants Program.

    The 2024-25 ACE grant round provided a total of $240,000 in funding to three projects:

    • Capital Region Community Services
    • Stepping Stone Social Enterprise
    • Woden Community Service.

    The projects aim to help Canberrans with basic skills training and support. To help them overcome barriers to education, training and employment.

    To find out more visit the Bridge to Brighter Futures website.

    Find out more about the ACE Grants Program.

    Read more like this:


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    MIL OSI News

  • ‘Digital India, a people’s movement’: PM Modi charts roadmap for next decade

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Tuesday lauded the completion of ten years of the Digital India initiative, describing it as a journey that has transformed governance, empowered citizens, and positioned India as a global leader in digital technology.

    In a post on X, the Prime Minister said, “Today is a historic day as we mark #10YearsOfDigitalIndia! Ten years ago, Digital India began as an initiative to transform our nation into a digitally empowered and technologically advanced society. A decade later, we stand witness to a journey that has touched countless lives and ushered in a new era of empowerment.”

    Launched in 2015, the Digital India mission sought to bridge the country’s vast digital divide and make technology accessible to every citizen. Reflecting on the initiative’s impact, PM Modi said that India’s progress is visible not only in “data and dashboards” but also in the daily lives of 140 crore Indians.

    “While decades were spent doubting the ability of Indians to use technology, we changed this approach and trusted the ability of Indians to use technology,” PM Modi said in an article shared on LinkedIn.

    Expanding Access and Inclusion

    In 2014, India had about 25 crore internet connections. That figure has now grown to over 97 crore, with high-speed internet reaching remote villages and forward military outposts alike. The Prime Minister pointed out that over 42 lakh kilometres of Optical Fibre Cable now connect the country, equivalent to eleven times the distance between Earth and the Moon.

    The success of India’s real-time digital payments system, UPI, has also been a highlight. UPI now handles over 100 billion transactions a year, accounting for nearly half of all real-time digital payments worldwide.

    Through Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT), the government has directly transferred over ₹44 lakh crore to citizens, saving nearly ₹3.48 lakh crore by eliminating middlemen. Schemes like SVAMITVA have issued more than 2.4 crore property cards and mapped over 6.4 lakh villages, providing land ownership security to millions.

    Driving Entrepreneurship and Innovation

    Highlighting the impact on small businesses and entrepreneurs, PM Modi noted that initiatives like ONDC (Open Network for Digital Commerce) and GeM (Government E-Marketplace) have expanded opportunities for millions. ONDC recently crossed 200 million transactions, while GeM has surpassed ₹1 lakh crore GMV in just 50 days.

    “From Banarasi weavers to bamboo artisans in Nagaland, sellers are now reaching customers nationwide, without middlemen or digital monopolies,” the Prime Minister added.

    PM Modi also underlined India’s emergence as a global leader in Digital Public Infrastructure, citing examples like Aadhaar, CoWIN, DigiLocker, and FASTag. He said these platforms are now studied and adopted in other countries, with India launching a Global DPI Repository during its G20 Presidency.

    Looking Ahead

    Calling for greater innovation in the coming decade, the Prime Minister said India is moving from “digital governance to global digital leadership, from India-first to India-for-the-world.”

    He urged the country’s innovators and entrepreneurs to build technology that “unites, includes, and uplifts,” adding, “Let us build what empowers. Let us solve what truly matters.”

    The Prime Minister’s remarks come as India continues to scale its presence in emerging fields like artificial intelligence and digital commerce, supported by initiatives such as the $1.2 billion India AI Mission and new Centres of Excellence across the country.

    “Digital India has not remained a mere government program, it has become a people’s movement,” PM Modi said, reaffirming the initiative’s central role in building an Aatmanirbhar Bharat.

     

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Feedback sought on roading changes around new Dunedin Hospital

    Source: New Zealand Transport Agency

    New Zealand Transport Agency Waka Kotahi (NZTA) has released proposed changes to reshape transport in central Dunedin and achieve safe and efficient access to the city’s new hospital.

    From today, people can have their say on the preferred option for State Highway 1 Cumberland Street and State Highway 88 St Andrew Street, both of which are key routes connecting people to the new Dunedin Hospital. The hospital’s main inpatient and outpatient public entrances will both open onto the intersection of these two streets.

    The proposed roading changes, developed in partnership with Dunedin City Council after previous rounds of community feedback, can be viewed in detail here.

    “The new hospital development is a once in a generation development for Dunedin. It presents an exciting opportunity to reshape the surrounding transport infrastructure to best serve the community,” says NZTA Director of Regional Relationships, Ian Duncan.

    “Up to 10,000 pedestrians will be walking in and around the new hospital facilities daily when open. Many of these people will be ill, elderly or vulnerable, so safety will be paramount. Access to the new hospital will need to cater for frequent pick-ups and drop-offs by vehicles, and for unimpeded access by emergency services.”

    “At the same time, these changes we have laid out are aimed at ensuring we continue to have good traffic flow for road users in and out of Dunedin’s CBD.”

    Proposed changes include the following:

    • A new Barnes Dance crossing (where all pedestrians cross the road at once) at the SH88 St Andrew Street/SH1 Cumberland Street intersection to help people reach the hospital public entrances safely. 
    • Removal of the westbound right turn from SH88 St Andrew Street onto SH1 Cumberland Street to make space and time for the increased number of pedestrians, including people with mobility needs, to cross the road.
    • Two new signalised pedestrian crossings on SH1 outside the Woolworths and the Centre City New World supermarkets.
    • Changes to St Andrew Street and other nearby streets to help people driving, walking and cycling, and emergency vehicles, move safely and smoothly around the hospital and surrounding area.
    • Frederick Street will become the new SH88, moving right turning traffic from St Andrew Street to other streets.

    “Some of the proposed changes will mean road users having to adapt to new ways of moving through the area, but we think these are practical and sensible moves to make it safe and efficient for everyone,” Mr Duncan says.

    “We intend to have clear signage and guidance in place when any changes are introduced to avoid confusion.”

    “The removal of the right turn from St Andrew Street onto SH1 for westbound traffic is seen as the only practical option to give pedestrians enough time to cross safely and to keep traffic flowing.’’   

    Removal of this right turn will mean Hanover and Frederick Streets are expected to become key alternative routes for light vehicles. Larger trucks are expected to use Ward Street and the overbridge onto Frederick Street as an alternative route.

    “Both Hanover and Frederick Streets can handle the expected changes in traffic volumes, and we don’t believe travel times are going to be greatly affected.”

    The proposed removal of a right turn on St Andrew Street will mean traffic will be spread across other routes.

    The proposed changes do have some impact upon car parking, such as on the north side of St Andrew Street near Dunedin Central Fire Station where roading improvements mean the loss of 14 parks. This will be partially offset by new parks in Harrow Street, and analysis of public parking available in the wider vicinity of the new hospital shows there are multiple off-road parking facilities available to be used in addition to provision being made at the hospital itself.

    The proposed changes for SH1 and SH88 build on earlier work in 2023, when the decision was made to keep Dunedin’s existing SH1 one-way system.

    Mr Duncan says public feedback on the current proposed changes will need to be considered before any work on the affected streets take place over the next few years.  

    People can view the proposed changes and give their feedback via an online form. Printed material with the proposed changes and feedback forms can be found in the next few days at Dunedin City Council libraries and service centres, and those not online can send their feedback to NZTA by post.

    View proposed changes and give feedback 

    Feedback closes on 28 July, 2025.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-Evening Report: Trump demands an end to the war in Gaza – could a ceasefire be close?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Marika Sosnowski, Postdoctoral research fellow, The University of Melbourne

    Anas-Mohammed/Shutterstock

    Hopes are rising that Israel and Hamas could be inching closer to a ceasefire in the 20-month war in Gaza.

    US President Donald Trump is urging progress, taking to social media to demand:

    MAKE THE DEAL IN GAZA. GET THE HOSTAGES BACK!!!

    Trump further raised expectations, saying there could be an agreement between Israel and Hamas “within the next week”.

    But what are the prospects for a genuine, lasting ceasefire in Gaza?

    Ceasefires are generally complicated to negotiate because they need to take into account competing demands and pressures. They usually (but not always) require both sides to compromise.

    Gaza is no exception. In a conflict that has been going on for more than 70 years, compromise and concession have become a game of cat and mouse.

    Israel is the cat that holds the military strength and the majority of the political power. Hamas is the mouse that can dart and delay, but in the end has little choice but to accept the terms of a ceasefire if it wants to halt the violence currently being inflicted on Palestinians.

    Trump the peacemaker?

    Trump appears buoyed by what he perceives as the recent success of his efforts to broker a truce in the Israel–Iran war. He may think he can use similar tactics to pressure Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu into making a ceasefire deal for Gaza.

    US President Donald Trump has posted on social media that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is negotiating a deal with Hamas ‘right now’.
    noamgalai/Shutterstock

    Netanyahu will return to Washington next week for talks at the White House. This is a good sign some US pressure is being brought to bear.

    Trump’s current push for a Gaza ceasefire may also signal he is keen for a return to the normalisation of economic ties previously delivered by the Abraham Accords between Israel and various Arab states. A ceasefire could unlock frozen regional relationships, potentially boosting the US economy (and Trump’s own personal wealth).

    Israeli opportunities

    Another positive sign a ceasefire may be on the cards is Netanyahu’s recent comments that the war with Iran had created opportunities for Israel in Gaza.

    During its 12-day war with Iran, Israel assassinated 30 Iranian security chiefs and 11 nuclear scientists. Iran’s weakened security apparatus might disrupt its support for Hamas and help advance Israeli objectives.

    Similar to what happened in Iran, this might enable Netanyahu to publicly declare Israeli victory in Gaza and agree to a ceasefire without losing face or political backing from his government’s right wing.

    Domestic Israeli politics have also played a role in the Gaza ceasefire negotiations. As part of the current round, Trump reportedly demanded the cancellation of Netanyahu’s ongoing trial on corruption charges. The idea is to enable Netanyahu to reach a ceasefire without the threat of criminal conviction, and potentially prison, awaiting him afterwards.

    Given there are no political or legal prescriptions or rules around what terms need to be included in a ceasefire, it is possible for such a demand to be made, although it is unclear how it would be accommodated by Israeli law.

    Difficult terms

    The current ceasefire deal, as proposed by Qatar and Egypt, seems to pick up where the deal negotiated in January fell apart – with a 60-day ceasefire.

    Reports suggest it requires Hamas’ leadership to go into exile and that four Arab states, including the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, would be tasked with jointly governing Gaza.

    Hamas has said for many months that it is open to a
    more permanent ceasefire deal that Israel has so far refused. However, the proposed terms appear too far-reaching to make it likely Hamas would accept them in their current form.

    The uptick in Israel’s military bombardment, as well as recent evacuation orders for parts of northern Gaza, suggest that even if there is a deal it may well mean Israel retains permanent territorial control of the northern Gaza Strip.

    As part of any ceasefire, it also seems likely Israel would retain control over all Gaza crossings.

    This, and the ongoing highly problematic promotion by Israel and the United States of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation as the only organisation authorised to deliver and administer aid in Gaza, will be difficult for Hamas, and Palestinians, to accept.

    Displaced Palestinians carrying bags of flour distributed by the controversial Gaza Humanitarian Foundation.
    Haitham Imad/Shutterstock

    There have also been reports a deal would enable Gazans wishing to emigrate to be absorbed by several as-yet-unnamed countries. Such a term would continue the Trump administration’s earlier calls for the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, as well as Israel’s insistence such displacement would be a humanitarian initiative rather than a war crime.

    It would also not be the first time the terms of a ceasefire were used to forcibly displace civilian populations.

    Hope for the future?

    Many dynamics are wrapped up in getting to a ceasefire in Gaza.

    They include US allyship and pressure, domestic Israeli politics, and the recent war between Israel and Iran. There is also the international opprobrium of Israel’s actions in Gaza which, for public (if not legal) purposes, amount to a genocide.

    Ideally, any negotiated ceasefire would have detailed terms to ensure the parties know what they should do and when. Detailed terms would also enable international actors and other third parties to denounce any violations of the deal.

    However, a ceasefire would only ever be a short-term win. In the best case, it would enable a reduction in violence and an increase of aid into Gaza, and the release of Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners.

    However, amid the deep-seated sense of injustice and anxiety in the region, any ceasefire that does not address historic oppression and is forced on the parties would inevitably have deleterious consequences in the months and years to come.

    Marika Sosnowski does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Trump demands an end to the war in Gaza – could a ceasefire be close? – https://theconversation.com/trump-demands-an-end-to-the-war-in-gaza-could-a-ceasefire-be-close-260185

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: What are police allowed to do at protests and who keeps them in check?

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kelly Hine, Senior Lecturer in Criminology, University of the Sunshine Coast

    Earlier this week, former Greens candidate Hannah Thomas was hospitalised with serious injuries after being arrested at a protest in Sydney. This incident sparked public outcry, raising questions about the limits of police power and what happens when things go wrong.

    Protests are becoming more common and more intense across Australia and worldwide. This surge stems from growing social and political concerns.

    The right to peacefully protest is a fundamental aspect of democratic societies. It gives people the freedom to gather, speak out, and push for change.

    But that right is not unlimited and can be subject to certain restrictions. While the public has a right to protest, police have a responsibility to ensure the safety of everyone involved including protesters, bystanders and officers. Maintaining public order and respecting the right to peaceful assembly is a balance.

    So, what exactly are police allowed to do at protests? And if someone is hurt in the process, who is responsible, and who keeps police in check?

    Why do things go wrong at protests?

    Peaceful protesting is lawful in Australia and people have the right to gather and express their views. But that doesn’t mean anything goes.

    If someone’s behaviour at a protest threatens public safety or breaches the law, police have a responsibility to intervene, and individuals can be charged with an offence.

    Protests are emotionally charged events. Some groups may come to protests already hostile, especially those with strong anti-authority views or past negative experiences with police. In turn, this can increase the risk of confrontation from the outset.

    Often protests are driven by a shared sense of injustice. This can build strong group identity and solidarity among protesters, but it can also intensify resistance towards police who are seen as symbols of authority.

    When people act as part of a crowd, emotions can spread quickly. In these settings, individuals may feel less personally responsible for their actions and behave more impulsively or aggressively.

    At the same time, police responses play a big role in how protests unfold. Tactics that are seen as heavy-handed (like blocking movement or using force) can heighten tensions and lead to confrontation.

    In contrast, strategies focused on communication and de-escalation are more likely to calm things down and prevent violence.

    Typically, protests don’t turn violent on their own. Instead, it’s a mix of crowd dynamics and police response that often determines the outcome.

    What powers do police have at protests?

    Police have wide-ranging powers to respond to protests to prevent behaviour escalation. A person does not need to be committing an offence for police to exercise powers during a protest. Police consider the behaviour of individual protesters, or the risk they’re perceived to pose, rather than waiting for a specific law to be broken.

    While the specific laws differ between states and territories in Australia, there are several common features.

    Police can tell community members to move on in some circumstances. If a protester is in a public place and causing disruption, interfering with others, endangering others or being disorderly, police can direct that person to leave. An offence does not need to be committed for police to direct community members to move on.

    Where a person does not follow a police officer’s lawful direction, they are contravening the law and can be arrested.

    However, move-on powers are limited when there is a peaceful protest. Police cannot direct a person to move on just because they are peacefully protesting something, picketing or publicly sharing their views (such as speaking loudly or carrying a sign).

    States and territories have also criminalised certain behaviour related to protests. For example, it is unlawful to harass, intimidate or threaten a person accessing a place of worship in New South Wales.

    Police can use force to maintain peace or prevent violence. The force used must only be “reasonably necessary”. This means police can only use the minimum amount of force needed that is proportionate to the event.

    It might be appropriate for police to restrain a protester using their hands or handcuffs and individual circumstances will be relevant to whether use of force is permitted. Lethal force, though, would not be permitted against a protester unless a protester was endangering the life of another person.

    Injuries can occur during police arrests. It has been alleged that Hannah Thomas’ injury arising during her arrest was the result of “excessive use of force”. However, just because a person is injured during an arrest does not automatically mean a police officer acted inappropriately.

    Who holds police accountable if someone gets hurt?

    Where concerns arise about police behaviour during a protest (including the use of force or other actions), there are different ways police can be held accountable.

    Policing organisations have internal processes for investigating police conduct. Each policing organisation has a professional or ethical standards unit that investigates allegations of conduct.

    But integrity bodies have flagged police investigating police can perpetuate potentially problematic “cover up behaviours that can mask police misconduct”.

    Australia’s states and territories also have independent statutory organisations which target crime and corruption in the public service. These are generally corruption or integrity commissions and apply to all public service workers, including police officers. The relevant ombudsman can also assist to resolve complaints.

    Community members can also sue a policing organisation for injuries they sustained during an arrest.

    What’s the right balance?

    Protest is a democratic right, but it also presents real public safety challenges.

    Police face genuine risks and have a difficult job managing dynamic and often unpredictable situations.

    They need certain powers to do their job, but those powers must come with strong accountability. If police exceed their power, it damages public trust and can escalate tensions further.

    Good policing practices mean talking to protest organisers early, keeping communication clear, using de-escalation tactics and responding proportionally to individuals – not treating the whole crowd the same.

    Protesters also play a role by staying peaceful, notifying police of a protest, knowing their rights, and helping to de-escalate tensions. The goal should always be to protect everyone. This includes protesters, police and the general public.

    Dominique is a former police officer who was previously employed by the Queensland Police Service.

    Hena Prince and Kelly Hine do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. What are police allowed to do at protests and who keeps them in check? – https://theconversation.com/what-are-police-allowed-to-do-at-protests-and-who-keeps-them-in-check-260096

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • Trump suggests DOGE look at Musk’s companies to save money

    Source: Government of India

    Source: Government of India (4)

    U.S. President Donald Trump suggested on Tuesday that his efficiency department should take a look at the subsidies that Tesla CEO Elon Musk’s companies have received in order to save the federal government “BIG” money.

    Trump’s comments come after billionaire Elon Musk renewed his criticism on Monday of Trump’s sweeping tax-cut and spending bill, vowing to unseat lawmakers who backed it after campaigning on limiting government spending.

    “Elon may get more subsidy than any human being in history, by far, and without subsidies, Elon would probably have to close up shop and head back home to South Africa. No more Rocket launches, Satellites, or Electric Car Production, and our Country would save a FORTUNE. Perhaps we should have DOGE take a good, hard, look at this? BIG MONEY TO BE SAVED!!!,” Trump said in a post on Truth Social.

    In response to Trump’s post, Musk, in his own social media platform X, said “I am literally saying CUT IT ALL. Now.”

    After weeks of relative silence following a feud with Trump over the legislation, Musk rejoined the debate on Saturday as the Senate took up the package, calling it “utterly insane and destructive” in a post on social media platform X.

    On Monday, he ramped up his criticism, saying lawmakers who had campaigned on cutting spending but backed the bill “should hang their heads in shame!”

    “And they will lose their primary next year if it is the last thing I do on this Earth,” Musk said.

    The Tesla and SpaceX CEO called again for a new political party, saying the bill’s massive spending indicated “that we live in a one-party country – the PORKY PIG PARTY!!”

    “Time for a new political party that actually cares about the people,” he wrote.

    Musk’s criticism of the bill has caused a rift in his relationship with Trump, marking a dramatic shift after the tech billionaire spent nearly $300 million on Trump’s re-election campaign and led the administration’s controversial Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), a federal cost-cutting initiative.

    Musk, the world’s richest man, has argued that the legislation would greatly increase the national debt and erase the savings he says he has achieved through DOGE.

    It remains unclear how much sway Musk has over Congress or what effect his opinions might have on the bill’s passage. But Republicans have expressed concern that his on-again, off-again feud with Trump could hurt their chances to protect their majority in the 2026 midterm congressional elections.

    The rift has also led to volatility for Tesla, with shares of the company seeing wild price swings that erased approximately $150 billion of its market value, though it has since recovered.

    – Reuters

  • MIL-OSI Russia: UN Security Council Extends Mandate of UN Peacekeeping Forces in Golan Heights

    Translation. Region: Russian Federal

    Source: People’s Republic of China in Russian – People’s Republic of China in Russian –

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    UNITED NATIONS, July 1 (Xinhua) — The United Nations Security Council on Monday unanimously adopted a resolution extending the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights for six months, until December 31, 2025.

    Resolution 2782 emphasizes the obligation of both Israel and Syria to fully comply with the terms of the 1974 ceasefire and calls on them to exercise maximum restraint and prevent any violations of the ceasefire and the area of separation, or buffer zone.

    The document requires the Secretary-General of the world organization to ensure that UNDOF has all the necessary capabilities and resources to carry out its mandate safely and properly.

    UNDOF was established in May 1974 following the agreed disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces on the Golan Heights, which ended the 1973 Yom Kippur War. It is tasked with maintaining the ceasefire between Israel and Syria. –0–

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Delays on SH18, Greenhithe

    Source: New Zealand Police

    Police advise motorists travelling on the Upper Harbour Highway (SH18) to expect delays tonight.

    A four-car crash heading westbound has occurred just after the Tauhinu Road on-ramp, near Greenhithe.

    There are no serious injuries to report.

    While the vehicles are being cleared, there is an extensive backlog of traffic towards the Albany area.

    Please allow additional time to reach your destination safely this evening.

    ENDS

    Jarred Williamson/NZ Police

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI New Zealand: Protecting retailers from shoplifting

    Source: New Zealand Government

    The Government is making it easier for police to punish shoplifters and is introducing stronger penalties for low-level theft, Justice Minister Paul Goldsmith and Associate Justice Minister Nicole McKee say. 

    “Public confidence in our justice system is undermined if people can steal with apparent impunity. It’s disheartening, and our government will not sit by while shoplifters rob businesses of their livelihoods,” Mr Goldsmith says.

    “Currently, the administrative burden can deter retailers from making official complaints, and lower-level offending often goes unreported or unpunished. Our government is restoring real consequences for crime, and shoplifting is no exception.”

    The proposed changes include:

    Introducing an infringement regime for shoplifting in retail premises. For stolen goods valued up to $500, infringement fees will be up to $500. For goods valued over $500, fees will be up to $1,000.
    Strengthening the penalties for theft. The maximum penalties will be one year imprisonment (if the value is approximately $2,000 or less), or seven years imprisonment (if value is approximately more than $2,000).
    Creating a new aggravated theft offence for when the value of the goods is under $2,000 and the theft is carried out in a manner that is offensive, threatening, insulting, or disorderly.  

    “Harsher penalties could mean up to twice as long behind bars for aggravated theft, and criminals will be forced to think twice before destroying more lives,” Mrs McKee says.

    “Our government is focused on restoring law and order, reducing violent crime, and putting victims first in our justice system.
    “I want to thank the Ministerial Advisory Group, and its Chair Sunny Kaushal, for their work shaping this proposal.”
    These changes fulfill a commitment in the National/New Zealand First coalition agreement to ensure real consequences for lower-level crimes such as shoplifting.

    MIL OSI New Zealand News

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Govt condemns smears against NSL

    Source: Hong Kong Information Services

    The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government strongly condemned and opposed the malicious attacks on and the demonisation of the Hong Kong National Security Law (HKNSL) and other laws safeguarding national security, as well as the slanderous and fact-distorting remarks made on the city’s work in safeguarding national security by foreign politicians, anti-China organisations, and various media outlets on the important occasion of the fifth anniversary of the promulgation and implementation of the HKNSL.

    In a statement, the Hong Kong SAR Government pointed out that anti-China and destabilising forces, organisations or media have made sweepingly generalised and grandstanding comments, completely disregarding the profound historical significance of the HKNSL and its undeniable positive impact on the city.

    The statement made it clear that they distorted the facts and made slanderous remarks on the Hong Kong SAR and the HKNSL. They even attempted to interfere with criminal trials conducted in Hong Kong SAR courts, thereby obstructing the course of justice.

    It also indicated that they never utter a word about the strict enforcement of national security laws by their own countries and other governments against activities that endanger their national security.

    The statement described their actions as despicable political manipulation. It stressed that the Hong Kong SAR Government must sternly denounce their wrongdoing to set the record straight and expose their shameless ‘double standards’ to the world.

    The Hong Kong SAR Government also emphasised that safeguarding national security is a top priority of every country. In accordance with international law and international relations based on the Charter of the United Nations, it is each and every sovereign state’s inherent right to enact laws safeguarding national security, and it is also an international practice.

    Moreover, the statement mentioned that for a considerable period, external forces, through their agents, have conducted infiltration and sabotage activities in Hong Kong, and further instigated the “black-clad violence” and the Hong Kong version of “colour revolution” in 2019, which nearly brought the “one country, two systems” to ruin.

    With the promulgation and implementation of the HKNSL, its effect in stopping violence and curbing disorder as well as quickly restoring social stability in the Hong Kong community was immediate.

    The statement highlighted that the Hong Kong SAR fulfilled its constitutional duty by enacting the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance last year with broad societal consensus, thereby improving the legal system and enforcement mechanisms for safeguarding national security. This has enabled Hong Kong’s transition “from chaos to order” and advancement “from stability to prosperity”.

    It said the attempts by external forces to “use Hong Kong to contain China” are doomed to fail, leaving them with no option but to smear the HKNSL.

    The Hong Kong SAR Government pointed out that, over five years of its implementation, the HKNSL has restored the rights and freedoms that Hong Kong citizens were unable to enjoy during the period of “black-clad violence”, and has enabled the livelihood and economic activities of the Hong Kong community at large to swiftly return to normal and the business environment to be restored and improved continuously.

    It also stressed that human rights in Hong Kong have always been robustly guaranteed constitutionally by both the Constitution and the Basic Law, adding that the rule of law in Hong Kong is strong and robust, and withstands the test of time.

    In addition, the statement noted that, as guaranteed by the Basic Law, the HKNSL and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, all defendants charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to a fair trial by the Judiciary exercising independent judicial power. The courts of the Hong Kong SAR shall exercise judicial power independently, free from any interference.

    It also mentioned that foreign politicians, anti-China organisations, and various media have recently continued to make irresponsible and absurd remarks, distorting the truth regarding the national security case involving Lai Chee-ying, as well as his custodial arrangements, with the intention of perverting the course of justice.

    The Hong Kong SAR government has repeatedly pointed out that any attempt by any country, organisation, or individual to interfere with the judicial proceedings in the city by means of political power, to prevent any defendant from receiving a fair trial that they should have, is a blatant act undermining the rule of law of Hong Kong and should be condemned.

    The suggestion that persons or organisations with certain backgrounds should be immune from legal sanctions for their illegal acts and activities is tantamount to granting such persons or organisations privileges to break the law, perverting the course of justice, and is totally contrary to the spirit of the rule of law, the Hong Kong SAR Government stated.

    The HKSAR Government strongly urges any external forces to immediately stop interfering with the city’s internal affairs and the independent exercise of judicial power by the courts of the Hong Kong SAR.

    Regarding the custodial arrangements of Lai Chee-ying, the Hong Kong SAR Government reiterated that the Correctional Services Department (CSD) is committed to ensuring that the custodial environment is secure, safe, humane, appropriate and healthy, and has put in place an established mechanism to safeguard the rights of persons-in-custody (PICs), including regular independent visitors, namely Justices of the Peace, who inspect the prisons to ensure the rights of PICs are protected.

    The statement specified that the CSD consistently handles matters concerning Lai Chee-ying strictly in accordance with these mechanisms, no differently from other PICs.

    Furthermore, it clarified that the arrangement for Lai Chee-ying’s removal from association with other PICs has been made at his own request and approved by the CSD after considering all relevant factors in accordance with the law all along.

    The statement added that Lai Chee-ying’s legal representative has publicly clarified that he is receiving appropriate treatment and care in prison.

    The Hong Kong SAR Government emphasised that it will continue to uphold its constitutional duty and steadfastly safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests.

    The statement said that the Hong Kong SAR Government will continue to resolutely fulfil its duties and obligations to safeguard national security while simultaneously protecting the lawful rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents and others in Hong Kong in accordance with the law.

    By ensuring high-quality development with high-level security, a new chapter in the practice of “one country, two systems” would be continuously composed, the statement added.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News

  • MIL-OSI: Over half of sports fans are turning to AI or gen AI for more personalized content

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Press contact:
    Elsa Estager Bergerou
    Tel: +33 6 59 62 55 13
    Email: elsa.estager-bergerou@capgemini.com

    Over half of sports fans are turning to AI or gen AI for more personalized content

    • AI has overtaken traditional search engines as the main source for sports information, with 67% of fans wanting all sports data aggregated in one place.
    • Digital insights are filling gaps in the live sports experience, with nearly 70% of fans seeking stats related to team, players and playing conditions primarily pre-match and during breaks.
    • Spectators want balance between tech innovation and authenticity, with almost three out of five fans worrying that too much technology could impact the thrill of live sport.

    Paris, July 1, 2025 – The Capgemini Research Institute today released its latest report, “Beyond the game: The new era of AI-powered sports engagement”, revealing how AI and generative AI (gen AI) are reshaping the global fan experience. As AI-powered tools become the primary gateway for sports content and data, fans still seek the thrill of authentic, in-person moments, therefore highlighting the need to strike a balance between the digital and physical worlds of sport.

    AI and gen AI power the next era of fan engagement
    AI is redefining how fans interact with sports. Over half (54%) of them now use AI or gen AI tools as their main source of information with 59% trusting content generated by these technologies. From personalized match summaries to real-time highlights reels, fans increasingly expect AI and gen AI to aggregate all sports-related content – 67% want a single, streamlined platform where they can discover information aggregated from websites, search engines and social media.

    However, personalization and interactivity are key to ensuring a genuine and authentic fan experience. While the report finds fans are returning to stadiums since the pandemic, with 37% already having attended live matches this year, AI is transforming how fans engage with sports overall. The technology is delivering tailored updates that enhance their experience of the game, with stats and facts about their favorite teams, fixtures, and players.

    Indeed, 64% of fans want AI to provide updates customized to their preferences, a similar number want to compete against well-known players in a virtual space during live games, and 58% would like to replay matches using ‘what-if’ scenarios. Just over a quarter (27%) are even willing to pay a premium for these AI-driven, interactive experiences. For instance, Tour de France fans can now play and follow their Fantasy team in real time, vote and elect the most combative rider of the day or even experience the race from inside an official fans car.

    The true power of AI in sports, and especially gen AI, lies in its ability to transform how fans connect with the game, with athletes, and with each other,” explained Pascal Brier, Chief Innovation Officer at Capgemini and Member of the Group Executive Committee. “As technology evolves, unlocking new ways for fans to curate their own unique experience, will be a blend of real-time data with immersive, interactive opportunities. The challenge is to ensure that these innovations deepen the emotional connections that make sport so powerful for passionate supporters, while preserving the authenticity and integrity that defines the spirit of the game.”

    Balancing innovation with responsibility and the thrill of live sports
    Sports fans today are hungry for data but the report shows their digital engagement peaks before matches and during breaks, rather than during the live play itself. Nearly 70% of fans want access to player metrics and live match data, using these insights to enrich their understanding when the action pauses. By meeting fans’ appetite for insights at these key moments, data enriches the overall viewing experience while keeping the thrill of live sports intact.

    While digital innovation is widely embraced, nearly 60% of sports fans are concerned that too much technology could dampen the excitement of attending events, and over half fear it could diminish their overall enjoyment of the game or match. This highlights the importance of finding the right balance – leveraging technology to elevate the fan experience while preserving what makes live sports so uniquely compelling.

    The report finds that there is a lack of awareness about data privacy aspects of AI-powered sports viewing tools.
    For example, whereas about half of Gen Y and Gen Z fans are aware of the various kinds of data collected and explicitly consent to its storage, this is true for only 38% and 36% of baby boomers, respectively.

    There are also concerns about misinformation, as two-thirds of fans admit being worried that the spread of unverified content on AI or gen AI platforms could increase the risk of athletes being targeted or harassed by disgruntled supporters. What’s more, 57% of fans are concerned about the generation of false content resulting in the spread of misinformation about players or sports teams.

    Stadiums invest in tech to meet rising fan expectations
    The report finds that stadium operators are investing in apps and smart technologies to create smoother, more immersive experiences for digital-native audiences. Over half of attendees say ticketing, scheduling, and real-time apps enhance their stadium experience, while facial recognition entry and digital navigation are also valued.

    Download the full report here.

    Report methodology
    The Capgemini Research Institute surveyed f 12,017 sports fans across 11 countries, in March and April 2025: Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. The research explored fan behaviors, attitudes, and expectations around AI, gen AI, and digital innovations in sports.

    About Capgemini
    Capgemini is a global business and technology transformation partner, helping organizations to accelerate their dual transition to a digital and sustainable world, while creating tangible impact for enterprises and society. It is a responsible and diverse group of 340,000 team members in more than 50 countries. With its strong over 55-year heritage, Capgemini is trusted by its clients to unlock the value of technology to address the entire breadth of their business needs. It delivers end-to-end services and solutions leveraging strengths from strategy and design to engineering, all fueled by its market leading capabilities in AI, generative AI, cloud and data, combined with its deep industry expertise and partner ecosystem. The Group reported 2024 global revenues of €22.1 billion.

    Get The Future You Want | www.capgemini.com

    About the Capgemini Research Institute
    The Capgemini Research Institute is Capgemini’s in-house think-tank on all things digital. The Institute publishes research on the impact of digital technologies on large traditional businesses. The team draws on the worldwide network of Capgemini experts and works closely with academic and technology partners. The Institute has dedicated research centers in India, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was ranked #1 in the world for the quality of its research by independent analysts for six consecutive times – an industry first.

    Visit us at https://www.capgemini.com/researchinstitute/

    Attachment

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Trade and Environment, University of Adelaide

    Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

    US President Donald Trump’s 90-day pause on implementing so-called “reciprocal” tariffs on some 180 trading partners ends on July 8.

    How are countries responding to the threat, and will the tariffs be re-applied from July 9?

    What the US thinks ‘reciprocal’ means

    The United States is demanding four things from all trading partners, while offering little in return. So these negotiations are anything but “reciprocal”.

    The main demand is to rebalance bilateral goods trade between the US and other countries. Nations with trade surpluses – meaning they export a greater value of goods than they import from the US – will be encouraged to import more from the US and/or export less to it.

    The US is also pushing countries to eliminate a range of “non-tariff barriers” that may affect US export competitiveness. These barriers are drawn from the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) March 2025 report and include a variety of perceived “unfair” practices, from value-added taxes (such as the Goods and Services Tax) to biosecurity standards such as those Australia applies to agricultural imports.

    In a nod to the “tech bros”, (alleged) restrictions on digital trade services, such as Australia’s media bargaining code, and digital service taxes must be removed, along with taxes on the tech giants. On Monday, Canada dropped a new digital service tax on firms such as Google and Meta after Trump suspended trade talks.

    Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, Google CEO Sundar Pichai and Tesla CEO Elon Musk at President Trump’s inauguration ceremony.
    Saul Loeb/Pool/AFP via Getty Image

    Countries must also agree to reduce reliance on inputs from China in any exports to the United States. That means companies that moved manufacturing from China to countries such as Vietnam during President Trump’s first term trade wars will face challenges in sourcing input components from China.

    Put together, this is a difficult package for any government to accept without securing something in return.

    Who holds the cards?

    Trump has been fond of saying the United States holds “all the cards” in trade negotiations.

    It’s not known precisely how many countries are negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Between 10 and 18 countries are priority “targets”, or to use an early, colourful phrase, were targeted as the “Dirty 15”.

    Category 1 likely comprises many more countries than those in the US’s naughty corner. These countries were saddled with large reciprocal tariffs despite the tariff formula’s evident shortcomings. To paraphrase Trump, these countries don’t hold the cards and have limited negotiating power.

    They have no choice but to make concessions. The smarter ones will take the opportunity to make reforms and blame the bully in Washington. Mostly these are developing countries, some with high dependency on the US market, including the poorest such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Lesotho.

    To make matters worse, they must keep one eye on China for fear of retribution in case Beijing perceives any promises to reduce dependence on Chinese inputs would compromise Chinese interests.

    Category 2 consists of countries that “hold cards”, or have some degree of leverage. Some, such as Canada, Japan, India and the EU, will secure limited US concessions although they may resort to retaliation to force this outcome. From discussions with our government and academic sources, Japan and India likely won’t retaliate, but Canada has previously and the EU likely will.

    Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese initially said he would not negotiate and has repeated US reciprocal tariffs “are not the act of a friend”.

    However, the Australian government is wisely looking to bolster its negotiation cards, such as creating a critical minerals strategic reserve.




    Read more:
    Plans to stockpile critical minerals will help Australia weather global uncertainty – and encourage smaller miners


    No doubt policy makers are also reminding the US of their favourable access to Australia’s military infrastructure which could be essential to any US-China military confrontation.

    China is category 3.

    The Chinese government is determined not to kowtow to Washington as they did in Trump’s first term. The so-called “Phase 1 deal” was signed but instantly forgotten in Beijing.

    Beijing has several cards, notably dominance of processed critical minerals and their derivative products, particularly magnets, and the US’s lack of short-term alternative supply options.

    After China expanded export controls on rare earths and critical minerals, shortages hit the auto industry around the world and Ford was forced to idle plants.

    What happens next?

    Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, suggested on Friday more deals may be signed before July 8. But Trump is likely to undermine and/or negate them as his transactional whims change.

    The British, after announcing their US deal that included relatively favourable automotive and steel export market access, watched in horror as Trump doubled tariffs on steel imports to 50%, and reimposed the 25% tariff on the UK.

    The UK government was reminded this US administration cannot be trusted. That is why countries negotiate binding trade treaties governed by domestic and international laws.

    Many countries are waiting on the outcomes from various US court battles testing whether the president or Congress should have the power to impose unilateral tariffs. After all, if there is a chance the Supreme Court rules Trump cannot change tariffs by decree, then why negotiate with a serially untrustworthy partner?

    The Japanese government, for example, recently announced it is pausing negotiations after the US demanded increased defence spending.

    ‘I’m going to send letters’

    Trump on Sunday suggested he would simply send letters to foreign nations setting a tariff rate. “I’m going to send letters, that’s the end of the trade deal,” he said.

    That does not bode well for countries negotiating in good faith. It’s likely tariffs will be reimposed and bilateral negotiations will drag on to September or beyond as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said.

    After all, even the US government has limited bandwidth to process so many simultaneous negotiations. Category 2 trading partners will increasingly test their own political limits. And the rest of the world is hoping for a favourable Supreme Court ruling that may, like the character Godot in the play Waiting for Godot, never come.

    Nathan Gray receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    Kumuthini Sivathas and Peter Draper do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming – https://theconversation.com/im-going-to-send-letters-the-deadline-for-trumps-reciprocal-trade-tariffs-is-looming-259983

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Peter Draper, Professor, and Executive Director: Institute for International Trade, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of Trade and Environment, University of Adelaide

    Brendan Smialowski/AFP via Getty Images

    US President Donald Trump’s 90-day pause on implementing so-called “reciprocal” tariffs on some 180 trading partners ends on July 8.

    How are countries responding to the threat, and will the tariffs be re-applied from July 9?

    What the US thinks ‘reciprocal’ means

    The United States is demanding four things from all trading partners, while offering little in return. So these negotiations are anything but “reciprocal”.

    The main demand is to rebalance bilateral goods trade between the US and other countries. Nations with trade surpluses – meaning they export a greater value of goods than they import from the US – will be encouraged to import more from the US and/or export less to it.

    The US is also pushing countries to eliminate a range of “non-tariff barriers” that may affect US export competitiveness. These barriers are drawn from the United States Trade Representative’s (USTR) March 2025 report and include a variety of perceived “unfair” practices, from value-added taxes (such as the Goods and Services Tax) to biosecurity standards such as those Australia applies to agricultural imports.

    In a nod to the “tech bros”, (alleged) restrictions on digital trade services, such as Australia’s media bargaining code, and digital service taxes must be removed, along with taxes on the tech giants. On Monday, Canada dropped a new digital service tax on firms such as Google and Meta after Trump suspended trade talks.

    Amazon founder Jeff Bezos, Google CEO Sundar Pichai and Tesla CEO Elon Musk at President Trump’s inauguration ceremony.
    Saul Loeb/Pool/AFP via Getty Image

    Countries must also agree to reduce reliance on inputs from China in any exports to the United States. That means companies that moved manufacturing from China to countries such as Vietnam during President Trump’s first term trade wars will face challenges in sourcing input components from China.

    Put together, this is a difficult package for any government to accept without securing something in return.

    Who holds the cards?

    Trump has been fond of saying the United States holds “all the cards” in trade negotiations.

    It’s not known precisely how many countries are negotiating bilateral deals with Washington. Between 10 and 18 countries are priority “targets”, or to use an early, colourful phrase, were targeted as the “Dirty 15”.

    Category 1 likely comprises many more countries than those in the US’s naughty corner. These countries were saddled with large reciprocal tariffs despite the tariff formula’s evident shortcomings. To paraphrase Trump, these countries don’t hold the cards and have limited negotiating power.

    They have no choice but to make concessions. The smarter ones will take the opportunity to make reforms and blame the bully in Washington. Mostly these are developing countries, some with high dependency on the US market, including the poorest such as Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Lesotho.

    To make matters worse, they must keep one eye on China for fear of retribution in case Beijing perceives any promises to reduce dependence on Chinese inputs would compromise Chinese interests.

    Category 2 consists of countries that “hold cards”, or have some degree of leverage. Some, such as Canada, Japan, India and the EU, will secure limited US concessions although they may resort to retaliation to force this outcome. From discussions with our government and academic sources, Japan and India likely won’t retaliate, but Canada has previously and the EU likely will.

    Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese initially said he would not negotiate and has repeated US reciprocal tariffs “are not the act of a friend”.

    However, the Australian government is wisely looking to bolster its negotiation cards, such as creating a critical minerals strategic reserve.




    Read more:
    Plans to stockpile critical minerals will help Australia weather global uncertainty – and encourage smaller miners


    No doubt policy makers are also reminding the US of their favourable access to Australia’s military infrastructure which could be essential to any US-China military confrontation.

    China is category 3.

    The Chinese government is determined not to kowtow to Washington as they did in Trump’s first term. The so-called “Phase 1 deal” was signed but instantly forgotten in Beijing.

    Beijing has several cards, notably dominance of processed critical minerals and their derivative products, particularly magnets, and the US’s lack of short-term alternative supply options.

    After China expanded export controls on rare earths and critical minerals, shortages hit the auto industry around the world and Ford was forced to idle plants.

    What happens next?

    Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, suggested on Friday more deals may be signed before July 8. But Trump is likely to undermine and/or negate them as his transactional whims change.

    The British, after announcing their US deal that included relatively favourable automotive and steel export market access, watched in horror as Trump doubled tariffs on steel imports to 50%, and reimposed the 25% tariff on the UK.

    The UK government was reminded this US administration cannot be trusted. That is why countries negotiate binding trade treaties governed by domestic and international laws.

    Many countries are waiting on the outcomes from various US court battles testing whether the president or Congress should have the power to impose unilateral tariffs. After all, if there is a chance the Supreme Court rules Trump cannot change tariffs by decree, then why negotiate with a serially untrustworthy partner?

    The Japanese government, for example, recently announced it is pausing negotiations after the US demanded increased defence spending.

    ‘I’m going to send letters’

    Trump on Sunday suggested he would simply send letters to foreign nations setting a tariff rate. “I’m going to send letters, that’s the end of the trade deal,” he said.

    That does not bode well for countries negotiating in good faith. It’s likely tariffs will be reimposed and bilateral negotiations will drag on to September or beyond as Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has said.

    After all, even the US government has limited bandwidth to process so many simultaneous negotiations. Category 2 trading partners will increasingly test their own political limits. And the rest of the world is hoping for a favourable Supreme Court ruling that may, like the character Godot in the play Waiting for Godot, never come.

    Nathan Gray receives funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

    Kumuthini Sivathas and Peter Draper do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. ‘I’m going to send letters’: the deadline for Trump’s ‘reciprocal’ trade tariffs is looming – https://theconversation.com/im-going-to-send-letters-the-deadline-for-trumps-reciprocal-trade-tariffs-is-looming-259983

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kelly Lambert, Associate Professor Nutrition and Dietetics, University of Wollongong

    Fly View Productions/ Getting Images

    On Tuesday, some Australian university students got access to a new payment. The Commonwealth Prac Payment is available to eligible teaching, nursing, midwifery and social work students.

    It will provide A$331.65 a week during compulsory professional placements, to help with living and study expenses. This could include travel, accommodation, uniforms and lost income from other employment.

    But while the payment is a much-needed step in the right direction, many students are still missing out.

    Who’s not covered?

    The prac payment was a recommendation from the federal government’s 2024 Universities Accord review. It is designed to help students complete essential professional placements, so they can graduate and enter the workforce.

    But numerous other health degrees with time-consuming work placements are excluded from the payment.

    This includes medicine, physiotherapy, dietetics, psychology, radiography and other allied health professions. Veterinary medicine students are also ineligible. Many of these professions are also experiencing serious workforce shortages.

    The payment is also only available to teaching, nursing and social work students who already qualify for Ausstudy (the income support payment for students and apprentices who are 25 and over).

    So this means the prac payment is means tested. It is also considered taxable income and paid at the rate of Austudy – which is not generous. The basic Austudy rate is below the national poverty line.

    The payment is also only available to Australian domestic students, even though many international heath students end up working in the Australian health system after graduating.

    Why is this an issue?

    Researchers, including ourselves, use the term “placement poverty” to describe the impact mandatory placements can have on students. It can be a major barrier to students completing their degrees.

    Students have repeatedly described widespread impacts of doing up to 1,000 hours of unpaid work to graduate – taking a toll on their income and mental health.

    Kelly Lambert’s 2024 research suggests health and teaching students can incur a further $12,500–15,000 to the cost of degrees during unpaid placements.

    Students have explained the placement hours mean they can’t work in their regular paid casual or part-time jobs – and may lose this work as a result.

    What does this mean for students?

    In the short term, if students are not supported to complete their placements, they may not have enough money for food or accommodation.

    Our research found 29% of teaching and allied health students regularly skip meals while on placement. Some students also described sleeping in cars or driving excessive distances due to limited or expensive accommodation options near their placements.

    If students are not supported in their placements, research suggests they can experience burnout and may not finish their degrees. Or they may not even begin them in the first place.

    This is particularly the case for students from regional or rural communities (who may have further to travel), students with parenting or caring responsibilities, and students from low economic and otherwise disadvantaged backgrounds.

    We also know its important to support students to do placements in rural, regional and remote areas – students who complete placements in these communities are more likely to return and work in those communities.

    What do we need to do instead?

    As a first measure, the government should expand eligibility criteria for the current payment to include other health disciplines and those who don’t currently meet the means testing threshold.

    Research tells us financial hardship is not confined to students who qualify for Austudy, it is experienced across the board.

    Students have also suggested interest-free short-term loans, subsidised parking (similar to hospital employees), and greater transparency about the costs associated with unpaid placements. International students have also said public transport subsidies would help them complete their placements.

    Other, more significant changes could include apprenticeship-type compensation models for healthcare students, where students get paid to study as part of their training. These schemes are already available in Scotland.

    Ultimately, we want to support more students to do health and teaching degrees to fill workforce gaps – not discourage them with high costs of studying.

    Kelly Lambert has received funding from the Australian Centre for Student Equity and Success.

    Scott William does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students – https://theconversation.com/a-new-prac-payment-has-just-kicked-in-but-it-ignores-many-uni-students-260087

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Kelly Lambert, Associate Professor Nutrition and Dietetics, University of Wollongong

    Fly View Productions/ Getting Images

    On Tuesday, some Australian university students got access to a new payment. The Commonwealth Prac Payment is available to eligible teaching, nursing, midwifery and social work students.

    It will provide A$331.65 a week during compulsory professional placements, to help with living and study expenses. This could include travel, accommodation, uniforms and lost income from other employment.

    But while the payment is a much-needed step in the right direction, many students are still missing out.

    Who’s not covered?

    The prac payment was a recommendation from the federal government’s 2024 Universities Accord review. It is designed to help students complete essential professional placements, so they can graduate and enter the workforce.

    But numerous other health degrees with time-consuming work placements are excluded from the payment.

    This includes medicine, physiotherapy, dietetics, psychology, radiography and other allied health professions. Veterinary medicine students are also ineligible. Many of these professions are also experiencing serious workforce shortages.

    The payment is also only available to teaching, nursing and social work students who already qualify for Ausstudy (the income support payment for students and apprentices who are 25 and over).

    So this means the prac payment is means tested. It is also considered taxable income and paid at the rate of Austudy – which is not generous. The basic Austudy rate is below the national poverty line.

    The payment is also only available to Australian domestic students, even though many international heath students end up working in the Australian health system after graduating.

    Why is this an issue?

    Researchers, including ourselves, use the term “placement poverty” to describe the impact mandatory placements can have on students. It can be a major barrier to students completing their degrees.

    Students have repeatedly described widespread impacts of doing up to 1,000 hours of unpaid work to graduate – taking a toll on their income and mental health.

    Kelly Lambert’s 2024 research suggests health and teaching students can incur a further $12,500–15,000 to the cost of degrees during unpaid placements.

    Students have explained the placement hours mean they can’t work in their regular paid casual or part-time jobs – and may lose this work as a result.

    What does this mean for students?

    In the short term, if students are not supported to complete their placements, they may not have enough money for food or accommodation.

    Our research found 29% of teaching and allied health students regularly skip meals while on placement. Some students also described sleeping in cars or driving excessive distances due to limited or expensive accommodation options near their placements.

    If students are not supported in their placements, research suggests they can experience burnout and may not finish their degrees. Or they may not even begin them in the first place.

    This is particularly the case for students from regional or rural communities (who may have further to travel), students with parenting or caring responsibilities, and students from low economic and otherwise disadvantaged backgrounds.

    We also know its important to support students to do placements in rural, regional and remote areas – students who complete placements in these communities are more likely to return and work in those communities.

    What do we need to do instead?

    As a first measure, the government should expand eligibility criteria for the current payment to include other health disciplines and those who don’t currently meet the means testing threshold.

    Research tells us financial hardship is not confined to students who qualify for Austudy, it is experienced across the board.

    Students have also suggested interest-free short-term loans, subsidised parking (similar to hospital employees), and greater transparency about the costs associated with unpaid placements. International students have also said public transport subsidies would help them complete their placements.

    Other, more significant changes could include apprenticeship-type compensation models for healthcare students, where students get paid to study as part of their training. These schemes are already available in Scotland.

    Ultimately, we want to support more students to do health and teaching degrees to fill workforce gaps – not discourage them with high costs of studying.

    Kelly Lambert has received funding from the Australian Centre for Student Equity and Success.

    Scott William does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. A new ‘prac payment’ has just kicked in. But it ignores many uni students – https://theconversation.com/a-new-prac-payment-has-just-kicked-in-but-it-ignores-many-uni-students-260087

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: China announces 26-man squad for EAFF E-1 Football Championship

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    The Chinese Football Association (CFA) on Monday announced a 26-player roster for the upcoming East Asian Football Federation (EAFF) E-1 Football Championship, with four new players earning call-ups.

    The CFA has confirmed the dismissal of head coach Branko Ivankovic following China’s failure to qualify for the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Serbian coach Dejan Djurdjevic will serve as caretaker.

    Several veterans have been phased out and replaced by younger players. In goal, Yan Junling remains on the squad alongside two newcomers, Xue Qinghao and Yu Jinyong. Midfielders Kuai Jiwen and Liao Jintao, both of whom have delivered consistent performances in the Chinese Super League, received their first national team call-ups. All forwards named to the squad are familiar faces, having featured in World Cup qualifiers under Ivankovic.

    The EAFF E-1 Football Championship is scheduled for July 7-15, with China facing host South Korea in the opening match. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: China loses to Canada at 2025 Men’s Volleyball Nations League

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Jiang Chuan (R) of China spikes during the Pool 5 match between China and Canada at the Men’s Volleyball Nations League (VNL) 2025 in Chicago, the United States, June 29, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    The Chinese team lost 3-0 to Canada in the 2025 Men’s Volleyball Nations League (VNL) Chicago leg on Sunday.

    In the first set, the two teams were tied from 1-1 to 12-12 before Canada pulled away with five straight points to lead 17-12. China closed the gap to 20-21 with blocks from Zhang Zhejia and Li Yongzhen and powerful attacks by Jiang Chuan. However, Canada held on to take the set 25-23 with strong serving and offense.

    China fell behind 4-7 in the second set but responded with four straight points to lead 8-7. The teams stayed close until 16-16, when Canada pulled ahead to win 25-20. China committed more errors, saw a drop in offensive efficiency, and struggled to contain Canada’s momentum.

    In the third set, China trailed 6-1 early but narrowed the gap to 8-7 before losing steam. Led by captain Jiang Chuan, the team rallied to 19-17, but Canada held on to win the set 25-23 and seal the match.

    Zhang Jingyin missed the match due to a knee injury, while Jiang Chuan returned to the starting lineup. China had opportunities to tie or take the lead in both the first and third sets but fell short in key moments.

    The team continues to face challenges with first-pass stability, quick-attack execution from middle blockers, and setter variation.

    Ranked 11th in the world, Canada holds a clear advantage over 24th-ranked China. This latest defeat marks China’s fourth straight loss to Canada, compounding a psychological disadvantage.

    Jiang expressed his frustration. “Losing four matches in the Chicago leg is a wake-up call. We need to change some things in the next leg and strive for better performance,” he said.

    “We didn’t play our best match. One or two players did a good job, a lot of players could not bring what they can do,” said China’s Belgian head coach Vital Heynen. “But (for sports) sometimes you don’t play as good as you are. We have to accept.”

    “Seeing our whole situation, injuries, putting players coming back, some players have to take a lot of loads who are not used to do that, and cannot always bring that, that’s normal,” Heynen said. “I blame myself and the team, like we together are not good enough.”

    “I think every match is so difficult for us. So we will try next week to win at least one match, to have at least a good ending of this VNL.”

    Five national teams from China, the United States, Brazil, Italy and Canada competed in the Chicago leg of the 2025 VNL. China lost all four of its matches.

    The VNL group stage spans three weeks, with Chicago hosting the second week. The third week will take place in Gdansk, Poland; Ljubljana, Slovenia; and the Kanto region of Japan. The finals are scheduled for July 30 to August 3 in Ningbo Beilun, east China’s Zhejiang Province. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Defending champion Alcaraz labors to opening round win at Wimbledon

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Carlos Alcaraz reacts during the men’s singles first round match between Carlos Alcaraz of Spain and Fabio Fognini of Italy at Wimbledon Tennis Championship in London, Britain, June 30, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Men’s singles defending champion Carlos Alcaraz was dragged into a five-set marathon battle by Italy’s Fabio Fognini, as the Spaniard needed four hours and 37 minutes to progress from the first round at Wimbledon 7-5, 6-7(5) 7-5, 2-6, 6-1 here on Monday.

    Alcaraz, 22, struggled on his serve under the scorching sun, while 38-year-old Fognini, who was making his final Wimbledon appearance, showed great resilience and net skills.

    The world No. 2 was forced to play until the deciding set before extending his winning streak to 19 matches. The two-time defending champion will face British wildcard Oliver Tarvet in the second round.

    “I knew at the beginning that it was going to be really difficult playing against Fabio,” said Alcaraz who defended his French Open title earlier this month. “The talent that Fabio has is immense. In every match he can show his best tennis. I think today he has shown one of his best tennis.”

    Eighth seed Holger Rune of Denmark and ninth seed Daniil Medvedev were both knocked out of the first round.

    Rune lost to Nicolas Jarry of Chile 4-6, 4-6, 7-5, 6-3, 6-4, while Medvedev was defeated by France’s Benjamin Bonzi 7-6(2), 3-6, 7-6(3), 6-2.

    This is the first ever opening round exit for Medvedev at the grass-court Grand Slam.

    “I felt him playing very well. I felt like I didn’t play too bad. I don’t see much I could do better. I mean, it’s grass, so I could serve better on the tiebreak,” said the 29-year-old former US Open champion.

    In the women’s singles, top seed Aryna Sabalenka of Belarus saw off Canada’s Carson Branstine 6-1, 7-5 to set up a second round clash with Marie Bouzkova of the Czech Republic.

    Sabalenka admitted she met some challenges from her opponent as she could hardly read her serve.

    “I think the goal is to win as quickly, as easier as possible, so physically you’re more fresh in the next rounds. But I think it was really good for me to have this little fight in the second set just to see where my level is and if I’m mentally ready to fight,” said Sabalenka, who withdrew from Wimbledon last year due to a shoulder injury.

    But Sabalenka’s close friend Paula Badosa failed to reach the second round as the ninth seed from Spain was beaten by local favorite Katie Boulter 6-2, 3-6, 6-4.

    Chinese veteran Zhang Shuai, who entered the main draw by winning three qualifying matches, lost to Serbia’s Olga Danilovic 6-2, 6-4. Zhang’s compatriot Yuan Yue also exited after being defeated by Eva Lys of Germany, 6-4, 5-7, 6-2. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: No time for friendships as Luis Enrique’s PSG crush Messi’s Inter Miami in Club World Cup

    Source: People’s Republic of China – State Council News

    Lionel Messi (Front L) of Inter Miami CF competes during the round of 16 match between Paris Saint-Germain (FRA) and Inter Miami CF (USA) at the FIFA Club World Cup 2025 at the Mercedes-Benz Stadium, Atlanta, Georgia, the United States, June 29, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    European champions Paris Saint-Germain highlighted the gulf in class between European and North American football on Sunday, as Luis Enrique’s side overwhelmed Lionel Messi’s Inter Miami 4-0 to book a place in the FIFA Club World Cup quarterfinals.

    PSG was simply much sharper than a rival that may have Messi as its standard-bearer, but is clearly not quick or strong enough to compete with the elite.

    The Inter Miami squad had a familiar look to PSG coach Luis Enrique, with five key figures from his time at FC Barcelona – Sergio Busquets, Jordi Alba, Luis Suarez and Messi – in the starting 11, and Javier Mascherano on the coaching staff.

    He may have known them well, but that didn’t mean Luis Enrique’s side showed any mercy.

    The problem for Inter was age. Busquets and Alba are both 36, while Messi and Suarez are 38. Although their talent and legacy are unquestioned, against Europe’s best, it wasn’t enough.

    Just three minutes into the match, goalkeeper Oscar Ustari was called into action to stop Bradley Barcola after a brilliant run by Khvicha Kvaratskhelia.

    It was only a matter of time. PSG opened the scoring in the sixth minute when Joao Neves ghosted in at the far post to head in Vitinha’s free kick.

    Fabian Ruiz had a goal ruled out, but with PSG completely overrunning its opponent, the second goal felt inevitable. It came in the 39th minute when Neves finished a smooth passing move set up by Ruiz.

    The third came five minutes later, just before halftime, when Tomas Aviles deflected Desire Doue’s drilled cross into his own net. In first-half stoppage time, PSG carved open Inter’s defense again, with Achraf Hakimi adding a fourth.

    With the result all but sealed, PSG eased off in the second half, giving the game a more open feel and allowing Messi a few flashes of activity. He forced a save from Gianluigi Donnarumma in the 80th minute with a header, while at the other end, Ustari tipped over a Barcola shot in a half that did little to change the outcome. 

    MIL OSI China News