Category: Transport

  • MIL-OSI USA: Meet Rob Navias: Public Affairs Officer and Mission Commentator  

    Source: NASA

    Editor’s note: This interview was conducted in October 2023. 
    As the International Space Station approaches 25 years of continuous human presence on Nov. 2, 2025, it is a meaningful moment to recognize those who have been there since the beginning—sharing the remarkable achievements of human spaceflight with the world.   
    If you have ever witnessed the live coverage of a NASA spacewalk or launch, then you know the captivating voice of celestial storyteller Rob Navias. Navias effortlessly blends expertise, enthusiasm, and profound insight into every mission. 

    Rob Navias
    Public Affairs Officer and Mission Commentator  

    Navias works within the Office of Public Affairs on mission operations and television in NASA Johnson Space Center’s Office of Communications, leading public affairs activities involving launches and landings of U.S. astronauts and international partner crew members. He is iconically known as the voice of NASA.   
    He has been a part of some of the most impactful moments in space exploration history, communicating the facts in real time with unmatched clarity. He covered every shuttle mission from the maiden launch of Columbia in April 1981 to Atlantis’ final voyage in July 2011. Navias is known for connecting others accurately and honestly to key moments in time.  
    Navias’ extraordinary contributions to space communications garnered him the 2017 Space Communicator Award from the Rotary National Award for Space Achievement Foundation. This prestigious accolade is presented to individuals or teams who have made remarkable contributions to public understanding and appreciation of space exploration. Navias’ unwavering dedication to NASA was recognized with the 2023 Length of Federal Service Award, commemorating his 30-year commitment to the agency.    
    His legacy continued on screen in Cosmic Dawn, the NASA documentary exploring the James Webb Space Telescope’s incredible journey. Featured for his role as the launch commentator during Webb’s Christmas Day 2021 liftoff, Navias brought historical context and lived experience to one of NASA’s most ambitious missions.

    Rob Navias
    Public Affairs Officer and Mission Commentator  

    He began his broadcast career as a correspondent for networks covering the Space Shuttle Program. Before joining NASA in 1993, Navias had a 25-year career in broadcast journalism where he reported the voyage of Pioneer 11, a robotic space probe that studied the asteroid belt and the rings of Saturn, as well as the test flights for the Space Shuttle Enterprise at Edwards Air Force Base in California and the Voyager missions from NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Southern California. 
    Navias also covered the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project as a broadcast journalist. That first international human spaceflight showed the world there was a way for nations to work together peacefully for a common goal, Navias stated.  
    “Once the commitment was made to fund the construction of an international space station, it broadened the agency’s scope to work multiple programs that could be a stepping stone beyond low Earth orbit,” Navias said.     

    ROB Navias
    Public Affairs Officer and Mission Commentator  

    Navias explained that during his time at NASA, he has learned a lot about himself. “The day you stop absorbing information, the day that you grow tired of learning new things is the day you need to walk away,” he said. “The challenge of spaceflight keeps me here at NASA.”
    Navias underscored the importance of nurturing and retaining the agency’s brilliant workforce who have shaped the pioneering mindset of human space exploration. He believes blending talent, resources, and industry expertise is the key to returning to the Moon and going to Mars. This collaborative mindset has not only resulted in establishing a laboratory in low Earth orbit but also paved the way for future missions.    

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: NASA’s Perseverance Rover Scours Mars for Science

    Source: NASA

    In addition to drilling rock core samples, the science team has been grinding its way into rocks to make sense of the scientific evidence hiding just below the surface.

    On June 3, NASA’s Perseverance Mars rover ground down a portion of a rock surface, blew away the resulting debris, and then went to work studying its pristine interior with a suite of instruments designed to determine its mineralogic makeup and geologic origin. “Kenmore,” as nicknamed by the rover science team, is the 30th Martian rock that Perseverance has subjected to such in-depth scrutiny, beginning with drilling a two-inch-wide (5-centimeter-wide) abrasion patch.  
    “Kenmore was a weird, uncooperative rock,” said Perseverance’s deputy project scientist, Ken Farley from Caltech in Pasadena, California. “Visually, it looked fine — the sort of rock we could get a good abrasion on and perhaps, if the science was right, perform a sample collection. But during abrasion, it vibrated all over the place and small chunks broke off. Fortunately, we managed to get just far enough below the surface to move forward with an analysis.”
    The science team wants to get below the weathered, dusty surface of Mars rocks to see important details about a rock’s composition and history. Grinding away an abrasion patch also creates a flat surface that enables Perseverance’s science instruments to get up close and personal with the rock.

    Time to Grind
    NASA’s Mars Exploration Rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, each carried a diamond-dust-tipped grinder called the Rock Abrasion Tool (RAT) that spun at 3,000 revolutions per minute as the rover’s robotic arm pushed it deeper into the rock. Two wire brushes then swept the resulting debris, or tailings, out of the way. The agency’s Curiosity rover carries a Dust Removal Tool, whose wire bristles sweep dust from the rock’s surface before the rover drills into the rock. Perseverance, meanwhile, relies on a purpose-built abrading bit, and it clears the tailings with a device that surpasses wire brushes: the gaseous Dust Removal Tool, or gDRT.
    “We use Perseverance’s gDRT to fire a 12-pounds-per-square-inch (about 83 kilopascals) puff of nitrogen at the tailings and dust that cover a freshly abraded rock,” said Kyle Kaplan, a robotic engineer at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Southern California. “Five puffs per abrasion — one to vent the tanks and four to clear the abrasion. And gDRT has a long way to go. Since landing at Jezero Crater over four years ago, we’ve puffed 169 times. There are roughly 800 puffs remaining in the tank.” The gDRT offers a key advantage over a brushing approach: It avoids any terrestrial contaminants that might be on a brush from getting on the Martian rock being studied.

    Having collected data on abraded surfaces more than 30 times, the rover team has in-situ science (studying something in its original place or position) collection pretty much down. After gDRT blows the tailings away, the rover’s WATSON (Wide Angle Topographic Sensor for Operations and eNgineering) imager (which, like gDRT, is at the end of the rover’s arm) swoops in for close-up photos. Then, from its vantage point high on the rover’s mast, SuperCam fires thousands of individual pulses from its laser, each time using a spectrometer to determine the makeup of the plume of microscopic material liberated after every zap. SuperCam also employs a different spectrometer to analyze the visible and infrared light that bounces off the materials in the abraded area.
    “SuperCam made observations in the abrasion patch and of the powdered tailings next to the patch,” said SuperCam team member and “Crater Rim” campaign science lead, Cathy Quantin-Nataf of the University of Lyon in France. “The tailings showed us that this rock contains clay minerals, which contain water as hydroxide molecules bound with iron and magnesium — relatively typical of ancient Mars clay minerals. The abrasion spectra gave us the chemical composition of the rock, showing enhancements in iron and magnesium.”
    Later, the SHERLOC (Scanning Habitable Environments with Raman & Luminescence for Organics & Chemicals) and PIXL (Planetary Instrument for X-ray Lithochemistry) instruments took a crack at Kenmore, too. Along with supporting SuperCam’s discoveries that the rock contained clay, they detected feldspar (the mineral that makes much of the Moon brilliantly bright in sunlight). The PIXL instrument also detected a manganese hydroxide mineral in the abrasion — the first time this type of material has been identified during the mission.  
    With Kenmore data collection complete, the rover headed off to new territories to explore rocks — both cooperative and uncooperative — along the rim of Jezero Crater.
    “One thing you learn early working on Mars rover missions is that not all Mars rocks are created equal,” said Farley. “The data we obtain now from rocks like Kenmore will help future missions so they don’t have to think about weird, uncooperative rocks. Instead, they’ll have a much better idea whether you can easily drive over it, sample it, separate the hydrogen and oxygen contained inside for fuel, or if it would be suitable to use as construction material for a habitat.”
    Long-Haul Roving
    On June 19 (the 1,540th Martian day, or sol, of the mission), Perseverance bested its previous record for distance traveled in a single autonomous drive, trekking 1,348 feet (411 meters). That’s about 210 feet (64 meters) more than its previous record, set on April 3, 2023 (Sol 753). While planners map out the rover’s general routes, Perseverance can cut down driving time between areas of scientific interest by using its self-driving system, AutoNav.
    “Perseverance drove 4½ football fields and could have gone even farther, but that was where the science team wanted us to stop,” said Camden Miller, a rover driver for Perseverance at JPL. “And we absolutely nailed our stop target location. Every day operating on Mars, we learn more on how to get the most out of our rover. And what we learn today future Mars missions won’t have to learn tomorrow.”
    News Media Contact
    DC AgleJet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, Calif.818-393-9011agle@jpl.nasa.gov
    Karen Fox / Molly WasserNASA Headquarters, Washington202-358-1600karen.c.fox@nasa.gov / molly.l.wasser@nasa.gov    
    2025-082

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: First Partner launches and expands her annual Book Club, celebrates libraries as community treasures open to all Californians

    Source: US State of California 2

    Jun 25, 2025

    What you need to know: The First Partner launched her annual Book Club today, which features great kids’ reads curated by librarians across California, as well as investments to support library community programming.

    SACRAMENTO – California First Partner Jennifer Siebel Newsom today launched and expanded her book club, which includes a list of children’s books curated by librarians across the state, as well as investments in library programs that help connect more kids to libraries and reading over the summer — and now all year-round. Part of the First Partner’s California for ALL Kids initiative, the Book Club is a partnership with the California State Library, aimed at boosting early literacy, reducing the “summer slide” of learning, and supporting the mental health and well-being of all California children. Libraries — increasingly under threat from the Trump Administration — play a key role in supporting kids’ early literacy and mental health. 

    “Books and storytelling have the power to change the trajectory of a life — especially the books we read when we’re young. That is why I’m so thrilled to share these inspiring children’s books, curated by librarians across the State of California. Our libraries create community and safe havens for us all, but particularly for our children, allowing them to escape into the joy and wonders of reading, disconnect from the online world, build early literacy skills, and so much more. Although we live in a time when beloved public resources like these are under increasing threat from the Administration in DC, California is working to protect them as the community treasures they are for kids, families, and entire communities.” 

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    This year’s Book Club list includes 20 books centered around themes of positive girl representation, environmental leadership, healthy lifestyles, and youth mental health. The books range in reading levels from preschool to high school and are now available for check-out at 890 public libraries across the state. For the full list of authors and books, see here

    To complement the Book Club, the California State Library “Book to Action” initiative has provided funds for libraries to build programming that encourages kids and families to visit public libraries — from volunteer projects in library gardens to digital storytelling workshops and craft programs. 

    “Books can open entire worlds for young people and access to them is something all California families can enjoy through our public libraries,” said California State Librarian Greg Lucas. “I encourage all families to head to your local library this summer and year-round and check out one of this year’s First Partner’s Book Club picks. We’re grateful for the First Partner’s leadership in helping ensure that our libraries can continue to provide inspiration, joy, learning, support, and community for all Californians.”

    Libraries as community hubs 

    Libraries are places where children learn, families gather, and anyone — regardless of income or background—can access tools to grow and explore. 

    The California State Library Parks Pass gives library cardholders free vehicle day-use entry to over 200 participating state parks. Since the start of the program, 26,000 California State Library Parks Passes have been distributed across all California public library jurisdictions. The First Partner helped spearhead and create the California State Library Parks Pass, as well as the California State Park Adventure Pass, which gives fourth graders and their families who live in California free access to 54 parks for an entire year. 

    Libraries play a key role in knitting communities together, and nowhere is this more visible than in regions rocked by natural disasters and public health emergencies — such as Los Angeles was during the Palisades and Eaton fires. Libraries served as key community hubs for recovery efforts. 

    To help highlight the importance of California’s libraries, the First Partner joined library friends, local authors, and advocates for a visit to the Altadena Library on June 18. Altadena’s Summer Reading program is now fully back and up and running after the Eaton fire and includes the “Lunch at the Library” program, which provides free lunches for children and teens from June 9 through August 1, 2025. Lunch at the Library is a project of the California State Library, supported with funds from the State of California. Last year, the program offered free summer lunch programs for kids at more than 200 libraries across the state.

    Libraries under attack

    Libraries are increasingly under budget attack from the current Administration in DC — and California is pushing back. 

    Summer learning and early literacy 

    Studies show that students who participate in summer reading programs have improved educational outcomes. Additionally, access to reading and learning opportunities between the ages of 0 and 5 are linked to an individual’s future health, education, and economic outcomes.

    Between 2011 and 2022, California had one of the largest gains in 4th-grade reading levels. However, the state has more work to do to ensure that all kids — no matter their zip code–have a chance to read, grow, and thrive. To that end, earlier this month, Governor Newsom announced the Golden State Literacy Plan, outlining sweeping new investments to boost student reading achievement. Under the Governor’s leadership, the state has continued to make foundational investments in education – from expanded before school, after school, and summer school programming, to universal school lunches and free pre-Kindergarten for all 4-year olds.

    Recent news

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    News What you need to know: President Trump’s unlawful deployment of military personnel to Los Angeles has slashed California’s National Guard fentanyl and drug interdiction force by 32% — undermining public safety and weakening border fentanyl seizure operations….

    News What you need to know: California is providing $15 million in new apprenticeship funding for youth for new high-paying opportunities that do not require a traditional education or four-year degree. SACRAMENTO – Governor Gavin Newsom today announced that 29 youth…

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: More drugs at the border, fewer troops to stop them: One-third of California National Guard counterdrug forces pulled amid Trump’s LA militarization

    Source: US State of California 2

    Jun 25, 2025

    What you need to know: President Trump’s unlawful deployment of military personnel to Los Angeles has slashed California’s National Guard fentanyl and drug interdiction force by 32% — undermining public safety and weakening border fentanyl seizure operations.

    Sacramento, CaliforniaAs President Trump escalates his unlawful militarization of Los Angeles, his actions are directly harming California’s ability to fight the flow of illegal drugs into our communities. 

    An estimated 32% of CalGuard’s servicemembers dedicated to the state’s Counterdrug Task Force have been reassigned by President Trump to militarize Los Angeles. Typically, under the Governor’s command, nearly 450 servicemembers are deployed statewide, including at ports of entry, to combat transnational criminal organizations and seize illegal narcotics. Now, those redirected servicemembers join about 4,000 others at Joint Forces Training Base, Los Alamitos sitting idly as Trump lets drugs flow freely across the border.

    Trump’s actions in Los Angeles are harming public safety. Whether it’s fentanyl takedown operations or wildfire response, the California National Guard plays a critical role in protecting our communities — and Trump is deliberately undermining that work.

    Governor Gavin Newsom

    The consequences are dire – CalGuard’s efforts help ensure the public safety of communities statewide. Since they started drug interdiction efforts in 2021, they have helped seize nearly 31,000 pounds of fentanyl and more than 50 million pills containing fentanyl, with a street value of more than $450 million. 

    So far this year, servicemembers, along with local and federal agencies, have helped seize 2,411 pounds of fentanyl and nearly 1.5 million pills for an estimated value of nearly $16 million. 

    Fentanyl is primarily smuggled into the country by U.S. citizens through ports of entry. Within the last year, Governor Newsom announced continued augmentation in staffing and enforcement of CalGuard’s illicit fentanyl operations. 

    Youth-focused efforts take a hit

    An estimated half of the 140 service members that are dedicated to CalGuard’s Youth and Community Programs Task Force, known as Task Force Torch, have also been impacted by Trump’s authoritarian orders. These programs help guide at-risk youth and promote community partnerships. 

    High-ranking U.S. military officials agree

    Retired four-star admirals and generals and former secretaries of the Army and Navy filed another amicus brief outlining the grave risks of Trump’s illegal takeover of the CalGuard. Recently, several veterans and veteran rights’ groups came together to decry Trump’s militarization of California. A recent report exposed that less than 20% of Trump’s federalized servicemembers are being utilized. 

    Hurting the state’s wildfire response capacity

    CalGuard’s critical firefighting crews – known as Task Force Rattlesnake – are operating at just 40% capacity. Eight of 14 teams have been diverted to Los Angeles as part of President Trump’s illegal – and highly inefficient – federalization of the Guard. Capacity has only worsened, reducing available crews from nine of 14 last week to just six now. 

    How we got here

    In 2024, Governor Newsom doubled down on the deployment of the CalGuard’s Counterdrug Task Force by more than doubling the number of service members supporting fentanyl interdiction, and seizing other drugs, at California ports of entry to nearly 400. Fentanyl is primarily smuggled into the country by U.S. citizens through ports of entry. 

    CalGuard’s coordinated drug interdiction efforts in the state are funded in part by California’s $60 million investment over four years to expand CalGuard’s work to prevent drug trafficking by transnational criminal organizations. This adds to the Governor’s efforts to address fentanyl within California, including by cracking down on fentanyl in communities across the state, including San Francisco.

    Recent news

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    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Members review farm policies, food security, technology transfer and transparency issues

    Source: World Trade Organization

    Updates on agricultural market developments and food security

    Members heard updates from observer international organizations, including the International Grains Council (IGC), the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP). Their contributions encompassed the overarching theme of global food security and related challenges, with a particular focus on the unique difficulties faced by least developed countries (LDCs) and net food-importing developing countries (NFIDCs), along with their continuous efforts to mitigate these challenges.

    The IGC reported that the prospects for the next grain harvest remain broadly favourable, although an unusually dry winter and early spring has reduced yield potential in parts of East Asia. Including upgrades for the Americas, the global crop projection is boosted by 2 million tonnes, to a record 2,375 million. Due to a slightly lower estimate for feed use, the forecast for total grain consumption has been revised down slightly month-on-month, now standing at 2,372 million tonnes.

    With grains and oilseeds markets expected to be comfortably supplied, the IGC emphasized the importance of open trade, noting that global price developments may be strongly influenced by demand-side measures, including trade policies. It also underscored the value of market transparency and drew members’ attention to the Wheat Maritime Trade and Food Security Dashboard, developed jointly with the WTO. This tool supports the monitoring of short-term trends in international wheat maritime trade flows in response to changing market conditions and enables analysis of longer-term developments.

    FAO shared with members the main information contained in The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World (SOFI) 2024. The publication confirmed that global progress towards the goal of ending hunger is not on track, with chronic hunger and food insecurity persisting at elevated levels. After a sharp increase between 2019 and 2021, the prevalence of undernourishment remained well above pre COVID-19 figures, reaching 9.1% in 2023. This means an estimated 713 to 757 million people facing hunger, with a mid-range estimate of 733 million – approximately 152 million more than in 2019.  

    FAO reminded members that the vast majority of people and countries facing acute food insecurity have remained in that situation for several years, underscoring the protracted nature of the crisis and the importance of resilience-building efforts. FAO also noted that it has been closely monitoring the global food security situation and has developed a dedicated web page – FAO Response to Global Food Security Challenges – which provides detailed information on various aspects of food security.

    The WFP stressed that global food insecurity remains alarmingly high, with 295 million people acutely affected. Catastrophic hunger, the most severe form, has surged – rising from 80,000 people in 2018 to 1.9 million in 2024. Conflict remains the primary driver, with 70% of the acutely food insecure living in fragile, violent contexts. Extreme weather, such as droughts and floods, also threatens food security, as do economic factors like inflation, debt and high food prices. Humanitarian operations are further strained by severe funding shortfalls, said the WFP, which in 2025 expects to assist 24 million fewer people than in 2024.

    To address this crisis, increased funding, humanitarian access and robust data systems are urgently needed. The WFP thanked WTO members for the Decision adopted at the 12th Ministerial Conference (MC12) to exempt humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions. The decision has improved access to local and regional production, facilitating international and regional movement of commodities and positively impacting the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of WFP operations

    Nairobi and Bali decisions – transparency

    Regarding the implementation of the Nairobi Decision on Export Competition, the Chair called on members concerned to make all possible efforts to fully conclude this exercise of aligning export subsidy schedules with the obligations under the Nairobi Decision. The next export competition dedicated discussion is scheduled for the Committee meeting in September. Referring to the Committee’s Decision in G/AG/2/Add.2 of December 2024, the Chair reminded members that 2024 is the last implementation year for which the information required under the export competition questionnaire (ECQ) needs to be provided via a response to the questionnaire.

    Starting from the implementation year 2025, members will be required to submit a new annual export competition notification, which consolidates and streamlines existing export competition related notification requirements and formats, including the ECQ. Members were urged to redouble efforts to submit outstanding responses to the ECQ, and to use the ECQ Agriculture Information Management System (AG IMS) on-line facility for this purpose.

    The Chair noted that the second triennial review of the operation of  the Bali Decision on Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) administration is due in 2025. This topic will remain on the Committee’s agenda all this year. Members shared thoughts on the possible contents and outcomes of this review. The Chair also reminded members of the specific issues raised at the March 2025 Committee meeting and invited them to build on those discussions.

    Issues addressed included the need for better follow-up on the first review’s conclusions , improved transparency and completeness of market access notifications, particularly for TRQs with country-specific allocations in the schedule of commitments, as well as the inclusion of tariff data in TRQ notifications. Members also called for action on TRQ underutilization by addressing barriers, such as unrelated licensing requirements, enhancing notification practices, compiling current challenges and exploring ways to reallocate underused quotas to improve TRQ effectiveness and transparency.

    Technology transfer

    Members expressed interest in advancing discussions on the transfer of technology to developing economies in the food and agricultural sector. Delegations expressed support for continuing discussions on the topic, with calls to shift from educational exchanges to examining how WTO rules could bolster technological development.

    To capitalize on this momentum, the Chair encouraged delegations to turn this interest into concrete, substantive ideas for collective exploration, utilizing the Committee’s nearly three decades of experience with the implementation of the Agreement on Agriculture. Despite encouragement from the previous Chair, Anna Leung of Hong Kong, China, at the March 2025 meeting, no written proposals have been submitted.

    The Chair suggested convening informal discussions and continuing to include this topic on formal agendas to support ongoing reflection and shape collective guidance.

    Agricultural policies review

    A total of 180 questions were raised by members concerning individual notifications and specific implementation matters during the meeting. This peer review process allows members to address issues related to the implementation of commitments outlined in the Agreement on Agriculture. Of these, 14 issues were raised for the first time, while 23 were recurring matters from previous Committee meetings.

    The 14 new items covered a range of topics, including Australia’s livestock industry funds, Brazil’s rural development efforts, Canada’s involvement in farm and dairy support, and the European Union’s emergency agricultural measures and tariff actions on Russian products.

    Other discussions focused on India’s domestic support programmes, sugar policy, and export duties, as well as Indonesia’s agricultural support. Japan’s initiatives to lower carbon emissions and secure fertilizers were also reviewed, along with Paraguay’s rural assistance project, Switzerland’s payments to farmers, Thailand’s debt relief and rice support policies, Türkiye’s tax and pricing systems, the United Kingdom’s schemes to enhance farm productivity, and the United States’ trade programmes, avian flu response, and broad agricultural support measures.

    Since the previous meeting in March 2025, a total of 53 individual notifications have been submitted to the Committee: 24 related to market access, 14 concerning domestic support, 11 regarding export competition, and four related to the implementation of the Marrakesh Decision on LDCs and NFIDCs.

    The Chair urged members to submit timely and complete notifications and to respond to overdue questions, stressing the critical importance of enhanced transparency.

    All questions submitted for the meeting are available in G/AG/W/255. All questions and replies received are available in the WTO’s Agriculture Information Management System.

    Next meeting

    The next meeting of the Committee on Agriculture is scheduled for 25-26 September 2025.

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    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-Evening Report: Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Olli Hellmann, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Waikato

    The winter school holidays will mean families across Aotearoa New Zealand will be looking for indoor activities to entertain children. With millions of visitors each year, museums focused on the country’s history will inevitably play host to local and international visitors.

    Museums tend to enjoy a high level of trust among the public. They’re widely seen as neutral, factual sources of historical knowledge.

    But like all forms of storytelling, museums present the past in particular ways. They narrate events from a certain group’s or individual’s perspective and explain why events unfolded in the way they did.

    In this respect, museums are not so different from historical films. Consider the different ways two recent movies – 1917 and the remake of All Quiet on the Western Front – narrate the first world war.

    In 1917, the storyteller takes the British side, encouraging viewers to invest in the bravery and endurance of British soldiers. But All Quiet on the Western Front is narrated from a German perspective, inviting viewers to grieve for German soldiers as victims of a political system that glorified war.

    Museum exhibitions tell stories in a similar way. Visitors should be asking not just what story is told, but why.

    Spoiler alert: it often has to do with national identity. Museums tell particular stories of the past because these stories support a particular image of New Zealand as a nation.

    Four questions for your next museum visit

    At its core, every story has two basic ingredients: actors and events. To turn these into a compelling narrative, the storyteller connects the events into a plot, so they build on each other. The storyteller also transforms actors into characters by giving them particular traits — brave, selfish, wise, cruel and the like. Museums do this, too.

    As you move through a museum exhibition, try asking yourself the following questions:

    1. Which historical events are included — and which are left out?

    Every story begins somewhere. Museums choose which events to include and which to leave out, shaping how visitors understand what happened and why.

    Take Te Papa’s Gallipoli: The Scale of Our War exhibition. It opens with the landing at ANZAC Cove but skips over events in the lead-up to WWI — such as Britain’s earlier moves to seize Ottoman territories like Cyprus and Egypt.

    Leaving these out helps frame Gallipoli as a noble – albeit tragic – “coming of age” for New Zealand. But in reality, ANZAC soldiers were fighting to support Britain’s imperial ambitions in the Middle East.

    2. How are events organised into a plot?

    Museums don’t just say “this happened, then that happened”. They link events into a larger plot — a chain of cause and effect that explains how one thing led to another. This can happen through text, but also through spatial layout, lighting, sound and other techniques that guide visitors through rising and falling moments of narrative tension.

    Often, museums use familiar plot types to connect events. One common example is the quest narrative — a story in which heroes must navigate unknown terrain, and where mistakes are part of the journey and threaten to derail the mission. It’s a bit like The Lord of the Rings: a journey full of challenges, wrong turns and personal growth.

    At Te Kōngahu Museum of Waitangi, Aotearoa New Zealand’s Treaty story is told using this quest structure. The Treaty is presented as something unique and unfamiliar and the British, confronted with this unknown, fall back on familiar colonial practices — the “mistake” that led to the New Zealand wars.

    Because this misstep is treated as part of the learning curve typical of any quest, the exhibition avoids harder questions about this violent part of history, and instead preserves the image of Aotearoa New Zealand as fundamentally tolerant and respectful.

    3. Who are the main actors in the story — and who is missing?

    Every story needs protagonists, and whose perspective frames the story matters. In many smaller regional museums, history is still told almost entirely from the viewpoint of European settlers. But what about Māori experiences of colonisation? Or the histories of Chinese communities and other migrants who arrived in the 1800s?

    By focusing narrowly on European settlers as the main actors, these museums present a one-sided view of the past and construct an image of New Zealand as a European nation — one that expects others to assimilate.

    4. How are the main actors characterised — and how are we meant to feel about them?

    It’s not surprising that museums portray some actors positively and others less so. What’s more revealing is how certain individuals are elevated as symbols of the nation and how museums invite us to form personal connections with them.

    In Te Papa’s Gallipoli exhibition, visitors can open drawers and boxes containing soldiers’ personal belongings. This intimate activity encourages us to feel close to these figures — not just learning about them, but identifying with them as embodying national qualities: bravery, resilience and a commitment to peace.

    Why does this matter?

    Historical museum narratives aren’t necessarily inaccurate — but, much like historical movies, they are selective. They highlight certain events, actors and cause-and-effect chains to tell a particular kind of story. Often, that story supports a specific idea of what it means to be an Aotearoa New Zealander.

    By reading museum exhibitions with a critical eye, visitors can better understand not just the past, but how storytelling shapes national identity in the present — and imagine how it might be shaped differently.

    Olli Hellmann does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. Whose story is being told — and why? 4 questions museum visitors should ask themselves this school holidays – https://theconversation.com/whose-story-is-being-told-and-why-4-questions-museum-visitors-should-ask-themselves-this-school-holidays-259538

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Scotland: Amnesty ‘deeply concerned’ about transparency and accountability of Scottish Enterprise review

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Amnesty International has today expressed its deep concern around the transparency and accountability of the review into Scottish Enterprise’s human rights checks, after the Scottish Government announced that the review had been completed.

    The review, undertaken in-house by Scottish Enterprise, came after sustained pressure from Amnesty International and others after it was revealed that — despite Scottish Enterprise awarding grants worth millions of pounds to arms companies linked to states like Israel and Saudi Arabia — no company had ever failed one of its human rights checks. 

    Issuing an update today, the Scottish Government said that the review — which took place behind-closed-doors — was complete and that Scottish Enterprise was putting in place some changes to its processes. But with the update light on detail and being published only a day before MSPs break up for summer recess, Amnesty have criticised the lack of transparency around the process, as well as the inability of MSPs to now scrutinise the review’s conclusions. 

    Responding today, Neil Cowan (Scotland Director at Amnesty International) said:

    “The update released by the Scottish Government was not only light on detail, but it was published the day before the Scottish Parliament enters a two-month recess in the knowledge that MSPs will have no opportunity to scrutinise it. 

    Amnesty has been deeply concerned from the outset about the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding this review. And the manner in which the review has finally concluded makes clear we were right to be concerned. 

    The Scottish public must be assured that this review has not simply swept the issues under the carpet. Scottish Enterprise and the Scottish Government need to urgently publish their findings and recommendations in full.”

    View latest press releases

    MIL OSI NGO

  • MIL-OSI USA:  Sen. Scott Applauds Treasury’s Action to Crack Down on Illicit Actors Fueling Fentanyl Trade

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for South Carolina Tim Scott

    Treasury’s orders are a direct result of the authorities provided by the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, legislation led by Senator Scott to target the China-Mexico fentanyl supply chain.

    WASHINGTON — U.S. Senator Tim Scott (R-S.C.), Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee Chairman, today applauded the U.S. Department of Treasury (Treasury) for taking action against three Mexico-based financial institutions who have played a key role in money laundering in connection with the illicit fentanyl trade. Treasury’s orders are a direct result of the authorities provided by the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, legislation led by Senator Scott to target the China-Mexico fentanyl supply chain.

    “For too long, Americans across the country have fallen victim to the illicit actors that fuel the fentanyl trade, and it was clear we needed a different approach to help save American lives. That’s why I drafted and led legislation that was signed into law last year to target the financial assets of the criminal groups in China and Mexico poisoning our communities and profiting off the backs of Americans suffering from addiction. Treasury’s action today – thanks to the authorities provided by our bill – is yet another demonstration of President Trump’s commitment to keeping our communities safe,” said Senator Scott.

    BACKGROUND:

    Senator Scott wrote and introduced the FEND Off Fentanyl Act, which directs the Department of Treasury to use U.S. economic security tools to choke off the profits of the Chinese precursor manufacturers and the Mexican cartels that push fentanyl across the border. The bill was debated and unanimously passed out of the Senate Banking Committee on June 21, 2023, during the committee’s first legislative markup since 2019. Multiple national groups, including law enforcement associations and anti-opioid abuse organizations, also voiced support for the bill. 

    Senator Scott’s bill was signed into law as part of the national security supplemental package in April 2024.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Protective equipment for motorcyclists and road safety – E-001776/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission shares the concern for the safety of riders of powered two-wheelers (PTW). This is a very vulnerable road user group, and the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, is promoting a range of initiatives to support PTW rider safety.

    In response to the questions:

    1. The Commission has no current plans for an EU proposal for the adoption of specific advanced protective equipment for PTWs, such as airbags.

    2. There are no EU-level funding streams to give specific financial support to the purchase of this equipment.

    3. The Commission promotes the safety of vulnerable road users through all available mechanisms, including the exchange of best practices through the High-Level Group on Road Safety[1] and the biannual EU Road Safety Conferences; a specific focus on vulnerable road users, and PTW safety in particular, for Member States participating in the EU Road Safety Exchange[2]; and highlighting successful initiatives to support PTW safety through the EU Road Safety Charter[3] and in the annual Excellence in Road Safety Awards[4].

    One recent winner of an Excellence in Road Safety Award, an initiative on the use of road markings to promote safe PTW driving in bends, has resulted in a 60% reduction in road trauma, and has been implemented in other Member States.

    The Commission would also emphasise that it recently adopted a proposal[5] to amend Directive 2014/45/EU[6] on periodic roadworthiness tests , where it proposed more stringent requirements by introducing mandatory inspections for motorcycles above 125 cm3.

    The Commission regularly collects the most recent research on topics related to the protection of vulnerable road users, PTW safety in particular, and makes it available to the public through the EU Road Safety Observatory[7].

    • [1] https://road-safety.transport.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/high-level-group-road-safety_en.
    • [2] https://etsc.eu/projects/eu-road-safety-exchange/.
    • [3] https://road-safety-charter.ec.europa.eu/.
    • [4] https://road-safety-charter.ec.europa.eu/content/excellence-road-safety-awards?page=0.
    • [5] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2025%3A180%3AFIN.
    • [6] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2014/45/oj/eng.
    • [7] https://road-safety.transport.ec.europa.eu/european-road-safety-observatory/data-and-analysis/thematic-reports_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU Trust Fund for Africa – 2023 discharge – E-001426/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Addressing migration is a joint responsibility and commitment between the EU, its Member States and EU’s partners based on the principles of solidarity and partnership.

    Fluctuations in irregular border crossings underscore the complex challenges of managing migration, which depends on variety of dynamic factors that require comprehensive and continuous efforts over the long-term.

    The EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)[1] has played a crucial role by addressing the root causes of irregular migration, which is now continuing under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation — Global Europe Instrument (NDICI-Global Europe).

    Recent data indicate a significant reduction of irregular border crossings via the Central Mediterranean route, with a 59% decrease in 2024 compared to 2023, and similar levels so far in 2025[2].

    The Commission remains committed to the continuous evaluation and adaptation of its programmes to ensure their effectiveness in the ever-changing migration landscape.

    The data provided concerns the voluntary returns and reintegration supported by the EUTF in 2023 and is not related to the North of Africa region.

    In 2023, voluntary returns were funded under NDICI-Global Europe, through the Migrant Protection, Return and Reintegration programme[3], and reached the number of 27 212 both from North and Sub-Saharan Africa while 23 823 were assisted for their reintegration in Sub-Saharan Africa.

    When considering the EUTF projects which created new jobs, most of them were in the private sector. The types of jobs[4] vary according to the region, and include mainly: agriculture, fishery, livestock production or processing sector, construction and infrastructure sector, education, healthcare and social services sectors.

    • [1]  https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/index_en, established on 12 November 2015.
    • [2]  European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex).
    • [3]  https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/programming/projects/migrant-protection-return-and-reintegration-programme-sub-saharan-africa-mprr-ssa_en#:~:text=The%20Migrant%20Protection%2C%20Return%2C%20and%20Reintegration%20Programme%20for,Africa%2C%20as%20well%20as%20within%20the%20African%20continent.
    • [4]  Source is the Monitoring and Learning System reports available on the EUTF website: https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/library_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024 – A10-0114/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and of the Council on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025 – 2025/0138(BUD))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the European Parliament and the Council (COM(2025)0250 – C10‑0102/2025),

     having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[1],

     having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[2], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

     having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[3], and in particular point 10 thereof,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 on the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1057 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+)[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/2115 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 2 December 2021 establishing rules on support for strategic plans to be drawn up by Member States under the common agricultural policy (CAP Strategic Plans) and financed by the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1305/2013 and (EU) No 1307/2013[6],

     having regard to its resolution of 27 February 2024 on the draft Council regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[7],

     having regard to its resolution of 17 December 2024 on RESTORE – Regional Emergency Support to Reconstruction amending Regulation (EU) 2021/1058 and Regulation (EU) 2021/1057[8], and in particular the budgetary assessment attached to it,

     having regard to the EEA Report No 1/2024 – European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA)[9],

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (A10-0114/2025),

    A. whereas in September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Austrian authorities at EUR 1 711,6 million;

    B. whereas in September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Polish authorities at EUR 3,04 billion;

    C. whereas in September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck entire Czechia which led to flooding resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Czech authorities at EUR 2,82 billion;

    D. whereas as of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions which led to the levels of the Danube and Morava rivers significantly rising resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Slovakian authorities at EUR 84,3 million;

    E. whereas in September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit several districts of Moldova resulting in total direct damages estimated by the Moldovan authorities at EUR 7,8 million;

    F. whereas in October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in several parts of the country resulting in total direct damages estimated by the authorities at EUR 841,85 million;

    G. whereas above mentioned occurrences caused by severe natural disasters are a result of global climate change; whereas the European State of the Climate 2024 confirms that 2024 was the warmest year ever recorded in Europe and that 30 % of the continent’s river network exceeded the “high” flood threshold while 12 % exceeded the “severe” threshold, resulting in the most widespread flooding since 2013;

    1. Expresses its deepest solidarity with all the victims, their families and all the individuals affected by the destructive floods in Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as with the national, regional and local authorities involved in the relief efforts;

    2. Welcomes the decision as a tangible and visible form of the Union’s solidarity with its citizens and the regions in the affected areas, including with those in partner countries;

    3. Reiterates the importance of communicating to the public the tangible benefits brought about by the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF), also to further increase citizens’ awareness of Union tools and programmes in the Member States and countries involved in accession negotiations with the Union;

    4. Highlights the increasing number of severe, destructive and deadly natural disasters in Europe and calls on Member States and the Commission to invest in climate mitigation and adaptation measures to avoid human and economic losses; underlines that in 2024 storms and flooding affected an estimated 413 000 people, resulting in the loss of at least 335 lives and that the damage from storms and flooding across Europe during the year is estimated to have cost at least EUR 18 billion[10]; considers that the budget of the EUSF or its equivalent should be substantially expanded in view of the upcoming Commission proposal on the new Multiannual Financial Framework and subsequent inter-institutional negotiations and that the EUSF or its equivalent must provide assistance commensurate to the magnitude of such disasters to citizens; notes that substantially increasing the EUSF would allow Member States to respond more effectively and quickly to disasters while other instruments, particularly cohesion funds whose primary purpose is not disaster response, could be preserved; urges also the Commission to explore all possible avenues for accelerating the mobilisation of the EUSF, in particular by amending current rules and granting higher advance payments to applicant countries;

    5. Calls on the Commission to develop dedicated crisis-response instruments for the post-2027 period, recognising that the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, health emergencies, geopolitical instability, and economic shocks require more agile and tailored financial mechanisms at the Union level; underlines the need for enhanced coordination with national civil protection systems and early-warning mechanisms, ensuring a more integrated and data-driven Union-wide disaster response; emphasises the importance of dedicated support for cross-border and regional cooperation in preparedness, mitigation, and recovery efforts, particularly in vulnerable or high-risk areas;

    6. Stresses that the EUSF is only a curative instrument and that the Union should also continue to address climate change adaptation and mitigation by supporting European and national policies to prevent natural disasters; underlines that EEA Report No 1/2024 ‘European Climate Risk Assessment’ warned that the Union is unprepared for the effects of climate change even if the world manages to keep global temperature rise to 1,5 degrees Celsius, as set out in the Paris Agreement, and stresses the need for action to avoid the climate risks identified reaching critical levels; recalls the need for effective synergies with other Union policies and programmes and underlines that Member States should make best use of funding opportunities in particular, of the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund+ and the rural development programmes; calls on the Commission to assess with due urgency any reasoned requests by Member States to reallocate funds within the National Recovery and Resilience plans to natural disaster assistance, in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council[11]; stresses also the need for preventive measures, not only to mitigate future damage but also to prevent the exacerbation of risk conditions following catastrophic events, such as floods, wildfires, landslides or the drying up of lakes and rivers; emphasises that all reconstruction financed by the EUSF must be climate-resilient; underlines the importance of adequate flexibility between the different programmes; underscores that assistance provided under the EUSF should not be to the detriment of Union funding received by Member States under other Union policies or programmes; recalls that Member States can grant State aid, in accordance with the applicable Union rules, notably for agricultural businesses that have suffered damages due to natural disasters;

    7. Recalls that RESTORE[12] and the specific measures under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD)[13] provide additional assistance to Member States affected by natural disasters through further flexibilities in the use of the funds; stresses that Member States should make use of the new opportunities; underlines also that RESTORE provided limited flexibility for some Member States as the implementation of the current Multiannual Financial Framework is very advanced;

    8. Recalls the importance of rapid and solid damage assessment that takes due account of the economic repercussions and calls for increased operational efforts to be made in order to reduce the average time for the release of advanced payments to offer timely assistance to regions affected by natural disasters and extreme weather events, while ensuring the Union budget is protected; stresses that Member States should, in the context of disaster response and recovery measures, give due priority to the needs of the affected population, with particular attention to vulnerable groups;

    9. Stresses the urgent need to release immediate financial assistance through the EUSF to ensure that support can reach the affected regions in a timely manner;

    10. Approves the decision annexed to this resolution;

    11. Instructs its President to sign the decision with the President of the Council and arrange for its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union;

    12. Instructs its President to forward this resolution, including its annex, to the Council and the Commission.

     

     

    ANNEX: DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

    on the mobilisation of the European Union Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia and Moldova relating to floods occurred in September 2024 and Bosnia and Herzegovina relating to floods occurred in October 2024

    THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

    Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 of 11 November 2002 establishing the European Union Solidarity Fund[14], and in particular Article 4(3) thereof,

    Having regard to Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of 17 December 2020 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027[15], and in particular Article 9 thereof,

    Having regard to the Interinstitutional Agreement of 16 December 2020 between the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on sound financial management, as well as on new own resources, including a roadmap towards the introduction of new own resources[16], and in particular point 10 thereof,

    Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

    Whereas:

    (1) The European Union Solidarity Fund (‘the Fund’) aims to enable the Union to respond in a rapid, efficient and flexible manner to emergency situations in order to show solidarity with the population of regions struck by major or regional natural disasters or major public health emergency.

    (2) The Fund is not to exceed the ceilings laid down in Article 9 of Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 2020/2093, as amended by Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/765[17].

    (3) On 29 November 2024, Austria submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (4) On 29 November 2024, Poland submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (5) On 4 December 2024, Czechia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (6) On 7 December 2024, Slovakia submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (7) On 5 December 2024, Moldova submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in September 2024.

    (8) On 27 December 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina submitted an application to mobilise the Fund following the floods in October 2024.

    (9) Those applications meet the conditions for providing a financial contribution from the Fund, as laid down in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002.

    (10) The Fund should therefore be mobilised to provide a financial contribution to Austria, Poland,  Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

    (11) In order to minimise the time taken to mobilise the Fund, this Decision should apply from the date of its adoption,

    HAVE ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

    Article 1

    For the general budget of the Union for the financial year 2025, the European Union Solidarity Fund shall be mobilised as follows in commitment and payment appropriations in relation to natural disasters:

    (a) the amount of EUR  42 789 075 shall be provided to Austria in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (b) the amount of EUR 75 998 939 shall be provided to Poland in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (c) the amount of EUR 113 979 781 shall be provided to Czechia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (d) the amount of EUR 2 108 187 shall be provided to  Slovakia in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (e) the amount of EUR 195 196 shall be provided to Moldova in relation to floods in September 2024;

    (f) the amount of EUR 45 669 725 shall be provided to Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to floods in October 2024.

    Article 2

    This Decision shall enter into force on the day of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

    It shall apply from [the date of its adoption][*].

     

    Done at Brussels,

    For the European Parliament For the Council

    The President  The President

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    The Commission proposes to mobilise the European Union Solidarity Fund (EUSF) in accordance with Council Regulation (EC) No 2012/2002 (EUSF regulation) for an amount of EUR 280 740 903 to provide assistance to Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to the natural disaster (floods) that took place in 2024.

     

    Austria – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 16 September 2024, exceptionally high levels of rainfall occurred in Austria causing severe flooding. Lower Austria, Upper Austria and Vienna were particularly affected. In some parts of Lower Austria, 300-420 mm of rain fell in five days. The entire province of Lower Austria was declared a disaster area. Protective measures had to be put in place along the Danube River. In Lower Austria, nearly 2 000 houses had to be evacuated, thousands of households were without electricity, drinking water and sewerage for days. The floods led to five fatalities and 24 people were injured in Lower Austria.

     

    Austria estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 1 711.6 million. This amount represents 0.38% of Austria’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Austria is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Poland – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 11 and 16 September 2024, heavy rain occurred in south-western Poland which led to the flooding of several rivers. The most impacted provinces were the Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces. Subsequently, nearly 10 600 residential and more than 2 000 farm buildings were flooded. Over 200 000 people were directly affected by the disaster. Numerous businesses were forced to temporarily suspend or significantly reduce their operations which led to significant financial losses.

     

    The Polish authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 3.04 billion. According the EUSF regulation, where the natural disaster concerns several regions at NUTS level 2, the threshold shall be applied to the average GDP of those regions weighted according to the share of total damage in each region. The direct damage expressed as a percentage of total weighted regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces is 8.46%. This amount exceeds 1.5% of the weighted average regional GDP of Dolnośląskie, Opolskie, Śląskie and Lubuskie provinces.

     

    Czechia – major natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 12 and 17 September 2024, very strong winds and heavy rain struck the entire country which led to flooding. The most affected regions were the Moravian-Silesian and the Olomouc Region. Dozens of houses and approximately 1 000 road and railway bridges and 2 000 km of roads and railway lines were destroyed, or damaged. More than 350 schools were flooded. Over 250 000 households were left without electricity, heat and drinking water. As a result, over 13 000 people, as well as several hospitals had to be evacuated. The floods also led to eight fatalities.

     

    The Czech authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 2.82 billion. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Czechia of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 1.58 billion in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Slovakia – neighbouring country natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    As of 15 September 2024, Slovakia experienced substantial flooding, particularly in Bratislava and the surrounding regions. Both the Danube and Morava rivers saw significant water level rises, with return periods exceeding 100 years in some locations. Cumulative rainfall reached up to 400 mm in the Záhorie region, exacerbating the impact. The most significant damage was attributed to smaller rivers, where levee breaches were reported, amplifying the flooding and leading to destruction in both rural and urban areas. Roads, bridges, and other critical infrastructure were severely affected, straining emergency response efforts.

     

    Slovakia estimates the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 84.3 million. This amount represents 0.07% of Slovakia’s Gross National Income (GNI) in 2022. As the same natural disaster qualifies a “major natural disaster” in Czechia, the application from Slovakia is eligible for a contribution from the EUSF without a specific threshold under the neighbouring country natural disaster criterion as laid down in Article 2(4) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Moldova – regional natural disaster: floods in September 2024

     

    Between 14 and 16 September 2024, torrential rain and the resulting floods hit the Cantemir, Hincesti, Leova, Straseni, Floresti and Telenesti districts of Moldova. Over 200 000 people were affected by the disaster. The floods destroyed or damaged 20 bridges, 8 educational institutions and several public buildings. Dozens of houses and cellars were flooded and over 60 people needed to be rescued.

     

    The Moldovan authorities estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 7.8 million. The Moldovan authorities submitted the application under the “regional natural disaster” criterion as laid down in Article 2(3) of the EUSF Regulation, which is any natural disaster in a region at NUTS level 2 of an eligible State resulting in direct damage exceeding 1.5% of that region’s gross domestic product (GDP).

     

    Bosnia and Herzegovina – major natural disaster: floods in October 2024

     

    Between 3 and 17 October 2024, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by heavy rainfall, which caused catastrophic flash floods, landslides and flooding in the central, southern and western parts of the country. Herzegovina-Neretva, Central Bosnia, Zenica-Doboj and Canton 10 were the most affected cantons. In addition to power outages lasting several days and disruptions to landline and mobile phone services, there was also a complete disruption to road and rail transport. This caused severe physical and financial damage to residential and commercial buildings, as well as to the transport, water and sewage system. The floods led to 27 fatalities and 22 people were injured. Many families were forced to leave their homes and were accommodated in temporary shelters.

     

    The authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina estimate the total direct damage caused by the disaster at EUR 841.85 million. This amount exceeds the ‘major natural disaster’ threshold for Bosnia and Herzegovina of 0.6% of its Gross National Income, which was EUR 138.33 million in 2024. Therefore, the disaster qualifies as a ‘major natural disaster’ according to Article 2(2) of the EUSF Regulation.

     

    Conclusion

     

    The methodology for calculating the aid was set out in the 2002-2003 Annual Report on the EUSF and accepted by the Council and the European Parliament. The Commision therefore proposes to the budget authority to mobilise the following amounts for the applications submitted by Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina:

     

    Disaster

    Total direct damage (EUR)

    Applied disaster threshold

    (EUR)

    2,5% of total direct damage (up to the threshold for major diasters) (EUR)

    6% of direct damage above the major disaster threshold (EUR)

    2.5% of total direct damage

    Total amount of aid proposed (EUR)

    Advance paid

    (EUR)

    Balance to be paid

    (EUR)

    Austria-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    1 711 563 002

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    42 789 075

    42 789 075

    10 663 587

     

    32 125 488

    Poland-floods

    (regional disaster)

    3 039 957 574

    538 909 893

    N/A

    N/A

    75 998 939

    75 998 939

    N/A

     

    75 998 939

    Czechia

    (major disaster)

    2 821 143 019

    1 579 680 000

    39 492 000

    74 487 781

    N/A

    113 979 781

    N/A

     

    113 979 781

    Slovakia-floods

    (neighbouring disaster)

    84 327 482

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    2 108 187

    2 108 187

    N/A

     

    2 108 187

    Moldova-floods

    (regional disaster)

    7 807 840

    226 331

    N/A

    N/A

    195 196

    195 196

    N/A

     

    195 196

    Bosnia and Herzegovia-floods

    (major disaster)

    841 851 670

    138 325 000

    3 458 125

    42 211 600

    N/A

    45 669 725

    N/A

     

    45 669 725

    TOTAL

    280 740 903

    10 663 587

    270 077 316

     

     

    Council Regulation 2024/765[18] of 29 February 2024 amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021-2027 split the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR) in two separate instruments: the European Solidarity Reserve and the Emergency Aid Reserve. The European Solidarity Reserve with an annual amount of EUR 1 016 million (in 2018 prices, corresponding to EUR 1 167.1 million in 2025 prices) will be used for assistance to respond to emergency situations covered by the EUSF.

    In order to avoid an early depletion of the annual allocation, Article 3(7) of the EUSF Regulation and Article 9(2), second subparagraph, of the amended MFF Regulation stipulate  that 25% of the annual EUSF allocation (i.e. EUR 291.8 million for 2025) shall remain available on 1 October of each year.

    Finally, according to the Article 4a(4) of the EUSF Regulation, the amount of EUR 50 000 000 has been already inscribed in the EU general budget 2025 (in commitments and payments appropriations) for the payment of possible advances.

    Therefore, the maximum amount that can be used by the EUSF at this stage is EUR 908,95 million (excluding the reserve for advances and the amound that will become available on 1 October). After this mobilisation EUR 980,64 million will remain available for upcoing mobilisastions.

     

    Amount available under the EUSF in 2025 (EUR):

     

    Total annual 2025 EUSF allocation (incl. 1 October tranche)

    1 167 064 638

    Amount carried over from 2024 (incl. unused advances) (+)

    194 316 161

    Credits reserved for advance payments (-)

    50 000 000

    Amount already used for advances to Spain and Austria (-)

    110 663 587

    Amount available only after 1 October (-)

    291 766 160

    Total amount currenty available (excl. reserve for advances and 1 October tranche)

    908 951 052

    Amount proposed for mobilisation under current  Mobilisation Decision (only balance to be paid)

    270 077 316

    Remaining amount for future applications (inc. for advances and 1 October tranche)

    980 639 896

     

     

    The Rapporteur recommends the swift approval of the Commission proposal for a decision annexed to this report, leading to the rapid mobilisation of the aforementioned amounts, as a sign of European solidarity with Austria, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The rapporteur calls on the Commission that this financial contribution should be delivered with particular urgency.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Warner & Kaine Introduce Bill to Protect Access to Reproductive Health Care

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Virginia Tim Kaine

    WASHINGTON, D.C.—Yesterday, on the third anniversary of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade, U.S. Senator Mark R. Warner and Senator Tim Kaine, a member of the Senate, Health, Education and Labor (HELP) Committee, joined Senators Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), and Patty Murray (D-WA) in introducing the Women’s Health Protection Act, legislation to guarantee access to abortion care across the country. The bill’s introduction comes as the Trump Administration and Republicans continue to attack reproductive freedom. Virginia is the last southern state where abortion is still legal, and Virginia has seen an increase in demand for abortions after other states have passed laws restricting access.

    “In the three years since Roe v. Wade was overturned, we’ve seen the consequences unfold in real time: women denied lifesaving care, doctors forced to navigate confusing and dangerous legal gray areas, and families left to deal with the fallout. Decisions about pregnancy should be made between a woman and her doctor, not by politicians,” said Warner. “This bill would once and for all restore the constitutional right to abortion, permanently making it safe and legal nationwide.”

    “Three years ago, the Supreme Court took away Americans’ ability to access reproductive health care, and since then, we’ve seen the tragic impacts of this decision for women across the country,” said Kaine. “I’m proud to be joining my colleagues in introducing this legislation to protect access to abortion nationwide and restore Americans’ freedom to make their own health care decisions.”

    Since the Dobbs decision, 19 states have banned abortion or severely restricted women from being able to access the procedure, leaving one in three American women without access to safe, legal abortion care. Additionally, state legislatures across the country have introduced hundreds of bills to include medically unnecessary restrictions that limit access to abortion care. In his second term, President Trump has continued to attack reproductive rights, including freezing Title X funding for clinics that offer reproductive care, cutting Biden-era emergency abortion protections, and fighting to defund Planned Parenthood. Additionally, the House-passed Republican budget bill kicks 16 million people off their health insurance and defunds Planned Parenthood, threatening the closure of 200 health centers across the country and putting access to vital reproductive care for millions of families at risk.

    The Women’s Health Protection Act guarantees the right to access an abortion—and the right of an abortion provider to deliver these services—free from medically unnecessary restrictions that interfere with a patient’s individual choice or the provider-patient relationship. The bill also protects the ability to travel out of state for an abortion, which has become increasingly common in recent years.

    Following the Dobbs decision, Warner and Kaine have strongly advocated for legislation to protect Americans’ access to reproductive health care. The senators cosponsored legislation to protect the right of women to travel across state lines for abortion services and help protect medical providers from being punished for providing patients with this care. Kaine has also introduced the bipartisan Reproductive Freedom for All Act to protect abortion rights and contraception access.

    In addition to Warner, Kaine, Baldwin, Blumenthal, and Murray, the Women’s Health Protection Act is cosponsored by Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Senators Angela Alsobrooks (D-MD), Michael Bennet (D-CO), Lisa Blunt Rochester (D-DE), Cory Booker (D-NJ), Maria Cantwell (D-WA), Chris Coons (D-DE), Catherine Cortez Masto (D-NV), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), John Fetterman (D-PA), Ruben Gallego (D-AZ), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Maggie Hassan (D-NH), Martin Heinrich (D-NM), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Mazie Hirono (D-HI), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Andy Kim (D-NJ), Angus King (I-ME), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ben Ray Luján (D-NM), Ed Markey (D-MA), Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Chris Murphy (D-CT), Jon Ossoff (D-GA), Alex Padilla (D-CA), Gary Peters (D-MI), Jack Reed (D-RI), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Brian Schatz (D-HI), Adam Schiff (D-CA), Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Elissa Slotkin (D-MI), Tina Smith (D-MN), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Reverend Raphael Warnock (D-GA), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), Peter Welch (D-VT), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI), and Ron Wyden (D-OR).

    Full text of the legislation is available here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Collins, Bipartisan Group Introduce Bill to Support America’s Nursing Workforce

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Susan Collins

    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senators Susan Collins, Jeff Merkley (D-OR), Tammy Baldwin (D-WI), and Marsha Blackburn (R-TN) introduced the Title VIII Nursing Workforce Reauthorization Act of 2025. This bipartisan bill would reauthorize, update, and improve critical programs under Title VIII of the Public Health Service Act, a law passed in 1944 to support public health and health care professionals. The Title VIII Nursing Workforce Reauthorization Act reaffirms Congress’ commitment to addressing all aspects of nursing workforce demand, including education, practice, recruitment, and retention.

    “The State of Maine continues to face a serious shortage of nurses, particularly in rural communities where hospitals struggle to recruit and retain staff,” said Senator Collins. “This bipartisan legislation would help strengthen the nursing workforce by reauthorizing critical programs that support nursing education, expand access to clinical training, and help schools prepare more students for careers in nursing. Doing so is essential to addressing the workforce shortages facing hospitals across our country.”

    The Title VIII programs were last reauthorized as part of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act in March 2020. Under the CARES Act, the Title VIII programs are authorized through September 30, 2025.

    Specifically, the Title VIII Nursing Workforce Reauthorization Act of 2025 would:

    1. Reauthorize funding for the Title VIII Nursing Workforce Development Programs from Fiscal Year 2026 through Fiscal Year 2030;
    1. Make technical changes to the Advanced Nursing Education Program and makes clear that grants for traineeships can cover the costs for clinical education and preceptors;
    1. Allow nurse education, practice, quality, and retention grants to be used to cover the cost of audiovisual or other equipment, simulation and augmented reality resources, telehealth technologies, and virtual and physical laboratories, as well as to be used to increase the number of faculty and students at schools of nursing in order to address nursing workforce shortages; and
    1. Clarify that nurse education, practice, quality, and retention grants can be used to provide care for survivors of sexual assault and to partner with a health care facility that provides educational opportunities for the purpose of establishing or expanding clinical education.

    The Title VIII Nursing Workforce Reauthorization Act is endorsed by more than 50 organizations, including the American Association of Colleges (AACN) and the American Nurses Association (ANA).

    “Maintaining access to healthcare services is necessary for achieving the best care outcomes and keeping Americans healthy,” said Dr. Deborah Trautman, President and Chief Executive Officer of AACN. “We are thankful for the bipartisan support for the Title VIII Nursing Workforce Reauthorization Act of 2025, which helps ensure that our nursing workforce can continue to meet the needs of all communities, including those with limited access to nurses and other healthcare providers.”

    “Federal investment in Title VIII is essential to sustaining nursing schools, faculty, and students,” said Dr. Jean Giddens, Chair of the AACN Board of Directors. “With the introduction of the Title VIII Nursing Workforce Reauthorization Act of 2025, we applaud the commitment of Senator Merkley, Senator Collins, Senator Baldwin, and Senator Blackburn for their support of a thriving healthcare workforce that will have a lasting impact on both nurses and patients across the nation.”

    “We are deeply grateful to Senators Merkley and Collins for championing the reauthorization of the Title VIII Nursing Workforce Development Program. This legislation is more than funding — it is a lifeline for the nursing profession. Title VIII supports the education, training, and advancement of nurses across the country, ensuring we have a strong, skilled, and sustainable workforce ready to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. At a time when our healthcare system depends so heavily on nurses, this investment is critical to the future of our profession and the health of our nation,” said Jennifer Mensik Kennedy, PhD, MBA, RN, NEA-BC, FAAN, President of the ANA.

    In addition to Senators Collins, Merkley, Baldwin, and Blackburn, the bill is cosponsored by Senators Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Chris Coons (D-DE), Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), Mark Kelly (D-AZ), Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), and Adam Schiff (D-CA).

    The complete text of the bill can be read here.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senators Collins, Shaheen Introduce Bipartisan Bill to Expand Access to Diabetes Self-Management Training and Lower Treatment Costs

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Maine Susan Collins

    Washington, D.C. – U.S. Senators Susan Collins and Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), co-chairs of the Senate Diabetes Caucus, reintroduced the Expanding Access to Diabetes Self-Management Training Act. This bipartisan legislation would expand Medicare coverage for diabetes self-management training (DSMT) sessions, where diabetes educators help train Medicare patients on how to manage their glucose, maintain a healthy weight, eat healthy foods, manage their insulin levels and improve general care for their diabetes. DSMT is associated with a reduction in risk for diabetes-related death and heart attack and, importantly, leads to improved self-care behavior and wellness, which greatly reduces hospital care costs.

    “Diabetes self-management training equips Americans with diabetes with the tools they need to successfully manage their disease,” said Senator Collins. “By supporting education and patient engagement, our bipartisan bill would improve health outcomes, enhance quality of life, and reduce health care costs by helping to prevent complications and hospitalizations.”

    “Diabetes is a lifelong condition that affects millions of Americans. Expanding access to diabetes self-management training will allow patients to improve their well-being and live healthier lives while being more self-sufficient in their care,” said Senator Shaheen. “Our bipartisan legislation would lower the cost of treatment for patients with diabetes and I’m proud to work across the aisle to continue supporting diabetes treatment, research and investment.”

    “The Association of Diabetes Care & Education Specialists (ADCES) applauds and thanks our champions, Senators Collins and Shaheen, for introducing legislation that would improve access to diabetes care and education for Medicare beneficiaries,” said ADCES President Veronica Brady, PhD, RN, FNP-P, BC-ADM, CDCES. “DSMT services help individuals with diabetes improve their health and reduce complications which in turn can decrease health care costs.”??

    There are 38.4 million Americans living with diabetes and one in three adults with prediabetes, a condition that is known to progress to diabetes without early intervention, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Diabetes is the seventh leading cause of death in the United States and can lead to many other chronic diseases and conditions, such as blindness and kidney failure. As one of the most expensive chronic diseases, diabetes costs the American health care system billions of dollars each year. Overall, one in every ten health care dollars is spent on diabetes and its complications, and one in every three Medicare dollars is spent on the condition.

    As co-chairs of the U.S. Senate Diabetes Caucus, Senators Collins and Shaheen have led action in the U.S. Senate to advance priorities that will lower the costs of insulin, invest in treatment, and prioritize diabetes research. Last month, they introduced the Promoting Access to Diabetic Shoes Act, legislation that would improve care for patients with diabetes by allowing nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician associates/physician assistants (PAs)—who often act as sole primary care providers for many patients with diabetes—to prescribe therapeutic shoes.    

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Welch Grills Bove During Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing 

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)

    WASHINGTON, D.C. — Today, U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.), Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, grilled Emil Bove III, President Trump’s pick to serve on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, on multiple allegations of ethical misconduct throughout Mr. Bove’s tenure as an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (SDNY). Senator Welch also called out Mr. Bove’s refusal to acknowledge that President Biden won the 2020 Presidential Election.  
    Senator Welch: “This question of temperament obviously is relevant. You’d acknowledge that?” 
    Mr. Bove: “Yes, Senator.”   
    Senator Welch: “I was a defense attorney, worked with many prosecutors, had enormous respect for those prosecutors. So, the temperament issue doesn’t always get into the question of whether it’s an ethical violation. But it does get into the temperament and why that—in my view—is very important whatever our job is, but particularly for a judge where you’ve got that incredible power.” 
    Watch Senator Welch’s full remarks below: 

    Similar to other Trump nominees, Mr. Bove refused to acknowledge that President Biden had won the 2020 presidential election: 
    Senator Welch: “Who won the 2020 election for President of the United States?” 
    Mr. Bove: “President Biden was certified as the winner of that election.”   
    Senator Welch: “So, you give the standard answer. You can’t say that he won because he got the majority of votes and also got the electoral college victory?”   
    Mr. Bove: “I think that the characterizations that you just made, Senator, are both political. And so, I can’t address them under the canons, and they’re also tied up in ongoing litigation.”   
    Senator Welch: “Help me understand how it’s political to state who got the most votes in any election.”   
    Mr. Bove: [PAUSE] “…Senator, I’m just trying to be precise. The process by which our country declares the victor in an election is a certification process. President Biden was certified.” 
    Ahead of Mr. Bove’s nomination hearing today, Senator Welch joined six Senate Judiciary Committee colleagues in requesting personnel records relevant to Mr. Bove’s conduct throughout his career in the Southern District of New York. Last month, Senator Welch and Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) led their colleagues in referring Mr. Bove to the Office of the Inspector General and called for an investigation into Mr. Bove’s potential abuse of prosecutorial authority within the Civil Rights Division.   

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Angiographic Catheter Recall: Cook Removes Beacon Tip Angiographic Catheters due to Tip Separation

    Source: US Department of Health and Human Services – 3

    This recall involves removing certain devices from where they are used or sold. The FDA has identified this recall as the most serious type. This device may cause serious injury or death if you continue to use it. 
    Affected Product

    What to Do
    On May 15, 2025, Cook sent all affected customers a letter recommending the following actions:

    Examine inventory immediately to determine if you have affected product(s) and quarantine any affected product that remains unused. Immediately cease all further distribution and use of the affected products.
    This notice must be shared with appropriate personnel, including down to the user level, within your organization or with any organization where the affected devices have been transferred.

    Reason for Recall
    Cook has become aware that catheters supplied in the affected device lots may experience tip separation. This issue was identified through field complaints, with users reporting tip separation occurring both prior to and during patient contact.
    If an affected product is used, potential patient harms such as catheter fragmentation and embolization may occur. Medical consequences associated with device fragmentation or separation may include sepsis, vessel perforation, thrombosis, embolism, cardiac arrythmia, and death.
    Cook has reported three serious injuries and no deaths associated with this issue.
    Device Use
    Beacon Tip Catheters are intended for use in angiographic (blood vessel imaging) procedures by physicians trained and experienced in angiographic techniques. Standard techniques for placement of vascular access sheaths, angiographic catheters and wire guides should be employed.
    Contact Information
    Customers in the U.S. with adverse reactions, quality problems, or questions about this recall should contact Cook Medical at FieldActionsNA@CookMedical.com or 800-457-9120.
    Additional FDA Resources (listed in order of most to least recent):

    Unique Device Identifier (UDI)
    The unique device identifier (UDI) helps identify individual medical devices sold in the United States from distribution to use. The UDI allows for more accurate reporting, reviewing, and analyzing of adverse event reports so that devices can be identified more quickly, and as a result, problems potentially resolved more quickly.

    How do I report a problem?
    Health care professionals and consumers may report adverse reactions or quality problems they experienced using these devices to MedWatch: The FDA Safety Information and Adverse Event Reporting Program. 

    Content current as of:
    06/25/2025

    Regulated Product(s)

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: UConn Adopts New Budget with Strategic Adjustments to Address Funding Shortfalls

    Source: US State of Connecticut

    UConn has adopted a 2025-26 budget that maintains excellence in its academic, research, and health care enterprises while addressing serious fiscal challenges resulting from state funding shortfalls and steep reductions in federal research awards.

    The budget increases UConn’s enrollment to bolster revenue; draws from one-time fund balances in accounts throughout the institution; and enacts stringent deficit mitigation plans at UConn Storrs, UConn Health, and the regional campuses.

    UConn’s Board of Trustees adopted the budget at its meeting on Wednesday, June 25, and it goes into effect July 1.

    UConn faces operating budget shortfalls in the upcoming fiscal year of $72 million for the Storrs and regional campuses and $61.8 million for UConn Health, for a combined total of $134 million.

    UConn has also lost $95 million in reduced, slowed, and terminated federal research awards under new policies enacted nationwide since January, and there are no indicators that the funding will rebound in the near future.

    As FY26 progresses, the state Office of Policy and Management (OPM) also could reduce UConn’s appropriations to balance the state budget if needed. With so many revenue sources in flux, UConn expects to continually pivot to adjust to new developments.

    “We’re going to have to forecast and reforecast every month as these changes take place and as we continue to move forward. It’s going to be very fluid,” Jeffrey Geoghegan, UConn’s CFO and executive vice president for finance, told members of the Board of Trustees’ Financial Affairs Committee on Tuesday, June 24.

    That committee reviewed and endorsed the budget proposal and passed it on to the full board for a vote.

    UConn plans to mitigate about $38 million and UConn Health plans to mitigate about $62 million of the FY26 funding losses through several actions, including optimizing and reducing personnel. That will occur through a variety of approaches, including restricting most hiring and reviewing non-permanent and temporary positions as an initial step.

    The University will also review overtime and compensatory time; encourage voluntary schedule reductions where feasible and appropriate; consolidate some office functions; and restrict employee travel, events, and other activities.

    Wherever possible, the University will work to grow its revenue streams as well. Units have been directed to fully utilize unspent balances they hold from UConn Foundation funds. Also, the University will work to identify potential opportunities for new revenue, including continuing to grow patient care revenue at UConn Health.

    “UConn Health is committed to making the difficult decisions necessary to mitigate the reduction in funding, while at the same time continuing its position as one of the highest quality, best patient experience, and fastest growing health systems in Connecticut,” says Dr. Andrew Agwunobi, UConn Health’s CEO and executive vice president of health affairs.

    The overall FY26 operating budget totals $3.6 billion, split roughly equally between UConn Health and the UConn Storrs/regional campuses operations.

    The state’s annual block grant to the University comprised one-quarter of the University’s revenue as recently as FY19 but has been steadily decreasing. In the coming year, that number has fallen to 12% (15% at UConn and 8% at UConn Health). The state allocation covers 23% of UConn’s personnel costs; the rest is borne by the University through revenue it generates.

    At UConn Health, the largest source of income in FY26 is clinical care at 72.5%. At UConn’s Storrs and regional campuses, the largest source of income in FY26 is student tuition and fees at 57%.

    UConn already had committed to leaving its tuition rates flat in FY26 before the new state allocation numbers were determined and does not intend to reverse that decision. Separately, fees that pay for housing, dining, and various student services will increase modestly to pay for those enterprises.

    The cost-cutting initiatives, efforts to identify new revenue sources, increasing enrollment from higher-paying out-of-state and international students, and other measures will all be critical in the coming budget year, UConn officials say.

    The University will also examine every individual account in which unspent funds have been held as part of UConn’s overall reserves and, where possible and appropriate, will consolidate them to use as one-time spending to help fill gaps.

    “These dollars are not held in a central pool, but are in hundreds of accounts and budget lines throughout the institution that are used to fund our operations, meet upcoming needs, maintain our bond rating, and invest in the future of our university,” wrote President Radenka Maric, Provost Anne D’Alleva, and Vice President for Research Pamir Alpay in a message to the community on June 23.

    “Much of these funds are already committed for specific purposes. Using these funds to close short-term deficits will create new financial problems that didn’t exist previously and new unmet needs throughout the institution,” they wrote.

    “And if these one-time funds become exhausted, they do not automatically replenish, and structural deficits will remain. Despite the very real challenges and hardships this will cause, our current financial picture does not leave us with a reasonable alternative.”

    With the FY27 projected deficits even higher than those in FY26, UConn officials say efforts to reduce costs and increase revenue will be needed moving forward while the institution continues to prioritize student success, academic strength, and research impact.

    “Please know that we are not alone in having to make these difficult decisions. Every large research university across the nation is being forced to take similar steps,” Maric, D’Alleva, and Alpay added in their message.

    Overall, Maric says, UConn will continue to focus over the next three to five years on core operational priorities: continuous improvement and effectiveness, improving the enrollment outlook, increasing the academic and research profile, supporting a championship culture and competitiveness in UConn Athletics; and advancing fundraising and engagement efforts at the UConn Foundation.

    “In this and everything we do, we will ask ourselves: Is this helping our graduation rate? Is this supporting student success?” Maric said Tuesday.

    UConn has had a long-standing commitment to providing student financial aid as part of that work and set aside 16.5% of its tuition-generated revenue for those uses – voluntarily higher than the 15% minimum established by the state.

    In the coming fiscal year, UConn will increase institutionally funded financial aid by 10.6% as part of its work to attract and retain students, of whom 85% receive at least one form of financial aid.

    In addition to approving the operating budget, the Board of Trustees also adopted the capital improvement budgets for UConn Storrs / regionals and UConn Health for FY26.

    Those allocations are limited to specific building and infrastructure projects and cannot be shifted to help allay the pressures on the operating fund.

    At the Storrs and regional campuses, the $175 million capital budget for FY26 will fund a variety of projects that include a major renovation of Gampel Pavilion; a portion of the cost of construction of a new nursing building; improvements in various residence halls; and other critical deferred maintenance and infrastructure repair projects.

    The UConn capital budget consists of $128 million in bond funds for projects under the UCONN 2000 program; $8 million of state general obligation bond proceeds; and $39 million from student fees collected to support infrastructure maintenance and residential life facility improvements.

    At UConn Health, the $58.4 million capital budget for FY26 is funded through $28 million in state general obligation bond funds and $30.4 million generated by UConn Health, which has more than doubled its clinical care revenue over the past 10 years.

    Like at UConn Storrs and regional campuses, the capital funds will be directed to UConn Health’s critical deferred maintenance and infrastructure repair projects as well as improvements to clinical spaces that enable revenue growth.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senator Murray Presses Secretary Collins on Politicization of VA’s Work, Jeopardizing Care for Veterans

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    ***WATCH: Senator Murray’s questioning with VA Secretary*** 

    Washington, D.C. — Today, at a hearing on President Trump’s fiscal year 2026 budget request for the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and a senior member and former chair of the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, pressed VA Secretary Doug Collins on recent decisions that jeopardize care for veterans and stifle VA’s critical work.

    In opening comments, Vice Chair Murray said:

    “Secretary Collins—you are charged with making sure we keep our promises to our veterans. And I will tell you, as the daughter of a veteran—one who had great need for the VA benefits—I take this work seriously.

    “Mr. Secretary, I know you hate scaring our veterans. But here’s what I know: when you fire thousands of VA staff with no rationale beside Musk said so—that really scares veterans.

    “When you cancel hundreds of contracts—including a cancer registry in my state—that scares veterans. When you muzzle our researchers—that scares veterans.

    “When you eliminate the VASP program which helped save veterans from foreclosure on their homes–that scares veterans.

    “When you remove language saying veterans and doctors can’t be discriminated against based on their political views or marital status—with no explanation until after people call it out—that scares veterans.

    “And more than just scaring veterans, it puts the care and the support they have not only earned but are entitled to in serious jeopardy. 

    “So if you are concerned about scaring veterans, my suggestion is to stop doing what you’re doing. Focus on what matters: stop implementing policies with no explanation or analysis. Lift the hiring freeze and get our facilities fully staffed.

    “To that end, I have a few questions about some of the actions that veterans have told me they are deeply concerned about, and I hope today you can put their minds at ease—to give us clear, straightforward answers.”

    [VA’S DISCRIMINATION GUIDELINES]

    Senator Murray began by asking about VA’s recent decision to explicitly remove language in anti-discrimination guidelines to ensure all veterans get the care they need: “Secretary Collins, there has been a lot of discussion regarding your decision to modify VA provider guidelines that would open the door to discrimination. You struck the words age, national origin, politics, marital status, and disability from the anti-discrimination policy that was applied to our VA hospitals and clinics. When you changed the guidelines and removed the words making clear when discrimination is not tolerated, what you actually signaled to veterans across the country that they may be denied the care they need. Mr. Secretary, if you insist these categories are already covered by federal law and therefore your changes do not provide openings for discrimination, will you commit then to reinstating the previous policy?”

    Instead of responding on the substance, Secretary Collins blamed news outlets for reporting on the changes he made, stating in part: “I appreciate you taking my own words because it’s about time that somebody decided that they were not going to continue to repeat false rings to keep people in veterans from actually trusting the VA…the Guardian who wanted clickbait, decided to run with something and then it was amplified. It’s scaring veterans. And if they’re concerned—”

    “You took words out—” said Senator Murray, pushing Secretary Collins on why he made the change if he insists the policy isn’t changing.

    Secretary Collins interrupted to continue railing against coverage of the decision instead of answering Senator Murray’s question about whether he would restore the language and the policy.

    Senator Murray reiterated, “Mr. Secretary, I have the floor for a second. What I am telling you is what veterans hear and what Americans hear. Please listen. When you take something out, it says that’s been eliminated, period.”

    “No, it does not,” responded Secretary Collins.

    “Well it does—” said Senator Murray.

    “Only when you have a cheap magazine like the Guardian who wants to put it out there and put it in a position,” replied Secretary Collins, again interrupting.

    Senator Murray pressed, “Ok, your position is: it doesn’t change anything.”

    Secretary Collins answered, “It doesn’t.”

    Senator Murray then asked: “Well, do you think it is possible to be eligible for care and still discriminated against when you try to access health care?”

    “No one is discriminated against at the VA,” demurred Secretary Collins.

    Senator Murray noted, “Well Mr. Secretary, in fact many of us have heard from women veterans—”

    “Did you help correct them?” Secretary Collins attempted to avoid the question.

    Senator Murray flipped the question back to Secretary Collins, “Did you? You took the words out, I did not.”

    Secretary Collins replied, “I did. I put out videos and have done everything because of a false article.”

    “Mr. Secretary, I’m simply telling you, when you took those words out, people heard it in a specific way. Therefore, I’m asking you, why don’t you put them back in and eliminate—” said Senator Murray, attempting to clarify that veterans are viewing this language change as loss of protections, even if VA does not intend that.

    “No. They heard it in a specific way because a reporter who looked for clicks, decided to write an article that he knew was false,” said Secretary Collins, again attempting to place the blame of veterans’ reactions on reporting on his decision-making.

    “Again, I’ve heard from women veterans about experiences, which is why—” responded Senator Murray.

    Secretary Collins again avoided the issue at hand, that there were veterans who were upset with the change in language, regardless of VA intent, “Do you have an example that you can give to me? Cause I’ll make sure it’s corrected. Nobody is to be discriminated against.

    Senator Murray pushed back, “Well, if you are going to call each individual woman in the country and tell them they are not going to be discriminated against… Let me move on.”

    [TOXIC EXPOSURE FUND]

    Senator Murray next asked Secretary Collins about guardrails to ensure Toxic Exposure Fund (TEF) resources are spent appropriately and no veterans’ care is affected by the administration’s request to spend out of the TEF: “Congress has already appropriated funding for Medical Care, which has been passed into law. Your budget request proposes to cancel $18 billion of that money and shift it over to the Toxic Exposures Fund. I am supportive of putting funds where they are needed, but I do want to make sure that you are aware that there are specific limitations for the use of those funds that are in statute. These are guardrails to prevent misuse and address concerns, we put that in because of concerns from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who were very concerned about turning that into a slush fund. Can you commit to us that you will abide by those limitations for all of the funds being spent from the TEF, to include agreements which made with the Committee about what ‘expenses incident to the delivery of care’ means?”

    Secretary Collins replied, “We are committed to following the law on the stuff we are supposed to.”

    “All I’m asking is, you are asking to remove $18 billion into that fund. Are you committed to following the guardrails that the language, that the statute language that surrounds those funds? Because Mr. Secretary, if that is true, then how can you commit that the veterans who were not eligible for care that is unrelated to toxic exposures will not have their care cut off or limited because of the $18 billion decrease to funds?” pressed Senator Murray.

    “Because, as we look at our budgets and take the money that is coming in, we are going to meet the needs of the veterans who come before us,” said Secretary Collins.

    [VA RESEARCH]

    Senator Murray then pressed Secretary Collins on VA directives to prevent researchers from publishing their findings without clearance from Trump administration political appointees: “I have repeatedly raised concerns over the direction VA is taking with the research program. And now it was reported that VA officials are ordering physicians and scientists to not publish their work without seeking approval from Trump’s political appointees. According to a VA official, this policy is specifically in place to prevent ‘negative national exposure.’”

    “So, Mr. Secretary, if a research finding would advance veterans’ health but does not align with the administration’s priorities, will you allow it to be published?”

    “I’m not familiar with the question you have and I’m not going to answer a hypothetical, but I don’t foresee anything, but we have not done anything to restrict our researchers going forward,” said Secretary Collins, refusing to answer the question.

    Senator Murray pressed, “This is on your website.”

    Secretary Collins ignored the fact that this is on the VA website and said, “We are not restricting our researchers. I don’t know how else to answer the question.”

    “If you are ordering physicians and scientists to not publish their work without seeking approval, you can answer that… by saying yes, of course we are not going to say no. But then I’m asking you—” said Senator Murray, clarifying her question before being interrupted.

    “I’m going to reach here and say this is also discussing a policy that had nothing to do with research and publishing research. It had a meeting about talking to media on other issues. I’m happy to take this and see what you are actually discussing, but nothing has changed as far as we know. Researchers can do their research,” responded Secretary Collins.

    Senator Murray again pressed, “All researchers? You will not deny research that shows whatever helps veterans?”

    Secretary Collins again avoided the question, “Again, hypotheticals, we can go down all that. I can’t answer a question if we don’t have an exact question on the end.”

    “Well, it leaves me with the question, that arbitrarily you are going to say no to any kind—” said Senator Murray in part, before again not being able to further clarify her point because she was again interrupted.

    Secretary Collins said, “At this point, I’m not saying either way. I’m sitting here saying that we’re not restricting it.”

    Senator Murray concluded, “Well, that leaves me very curious about how you’re going to move forward on research.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: FACT SHEET: Trump’s Rescission Package Would Gut Bipartisan Foreign Policy Investments 

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Washington State Patty Murray

    Rescissions package that Senate Republicans are debating—and House Republicans passed—would decimate core foreign policy investments made on a bipartisan basis 

    Lifesaving programs like PEPFAR, GAVI, humanitarian assistance; U.S. treaty obligations; investments to advance U.S. interests all on the chopping block  

    Washington, D.C. – Ahead of a hearing on President Trump’s $9.4 billion rescissions request with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Russ Vought, U.S. Senator Patty Murray (D-WA), Vice Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, released a new fact sheet detailing how the rescission package would devastate core bipartisan foreign policy investments—and breaking down the Trump administration’s misleading talking points on its request. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: This package would simply cut “woke” Biden-era initiatives—or a highly-selective short list of *past* examples of funded projects that the Trump administration finds objectionable.

    FACT: President Trump himself signed most of these funds into law in March—and his administration has flexibility to determine how exactly to fulfill the objectives provided by Congress for the funding. 

    While Congress specifies particular objectives for the foreign assistance it has provided to advance U.S. interests, the Trump administration has discretion over how exactly to execute the funding in compliance with the law—just as any administration does. 

    The Trump administration has trotted out a highly-selective, tiny list of past initiatives funded by these broader pots of money allocated by Congress—but the plain fact is it now is in charge of executing these programs, and most of the funds in the rescission request were signed into law by Trump himself. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The cuts are merely to “wasteful foreign assistance spending” that is “antithetical” to American interests. 

    FACT: Passing the rescission package would gut funding provided for all manner of important, bipartisan foreign policy objectives. 

    Passing this package would: 

    • Rip away $900 million provided for global health programs that save millions of lives and protect Americans from public health threats. The package would cut $400 million from PEPFAR and another $500 million for other global health programs, which address maternal and child health, family planning, and diseases like malaria, TB, and Polio. 
    • Rescind $4.6 billion for economic and development assistance—half of the total amount provided for fiscal year 2025. This funding pot is used to support cybersecurity, the Counter PRC Influence Fund, critical mineral supply chain diversification, support to partners in the Indo-Pacific, food security programs, support for U.S. businesses abroad, efforts to address irregular migration in our hemisphere, and many other bipartisan initiatives. 
    • Zero out $1 billion to meet U.S. treaty obligations and contributions to international organizations. This includes funds to cover dues to the United Nations, support peacekeeping missions, support UNICEF, and more—ceding ground to countries like China to expand their influence and shape the rules of the road without the United States. 
    • Eliminate $1.3 billion provided for humanitarian assistance, leading to needless suffering, promoting instability, and undermining U.S. interests. This includes emergency food needs, shelter, and other commodities that help stabilize conflict and disaster-stricken populations and stabilize partner governments. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The Trump administration has transparently detailed what this package would mean for bipartisan foreign policy objectives long supported by Congress. 

    FACT: The Trump administration has refused to tell Congress or the public how it plans to effectuate the sweeping cuts it seeks, allowing Russ Vought and President Trump to decide what specific initiatives to slash well after Congress debates and passes the package.  

    The Trump administration’s proposed rescissions of a variety of foreign policy priorities only spell out cuts to high-level accounts—not the specific programs and initiatives funded from within those accounts that they will cut if this package passes.

    We do not know which humanitarian responses that Congress intended to support will be reduced. We do not have details on which infectious disease programs or support for maternal and child health will be curtailed. We do not know which economic and development programs are going to be cut off, undermining congressional direction. Will they cut funding to counter the Chinese government, support American farmers—both? We don’t know. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: The $400 million cut to PEPFAR funding is surgical, and the package will preserve all life-saving assistance. 

    FACT: The package does not protect lifesaving care, nor does it detail what specifically will be cut or how—the Trump administration retains that discretion and has so far refused to provide details on what it plans to cut. Cutting preventative assistance means cutting lifesaving assistance, too.  

    Without robust prevention efforts, more people will become infected with HIV—costing lives and many more dollars in treatment down the line. Every dollar invested in prevention saves $20 in HIV treatment and care costs. The Trump administration’s decision to curtail support for prevention efforts is already seriously setting back efforts to end the H.I.V. epidemic. 

    ____________________________ 

    FICTION: Rescinding these funds will help “put the Nation’s fiscal house back in order.” 

    FACT: The requested cuts spanning multiple fiscal years represent less than 0.12% of all federal spending in fiscal year 2025. Rescinding these investments will do nothing to meaningfully tackle our debt—but President Trump and Republicans’ “Big Beautiful Bill” would explode it by $4 trillion. 

    While some Republicans insist making these cuts is necessary in the interest of fiscal responsibility, the plain fact is President Trump and congressional Republicans’ “One Big Beautiful Bill,” which Senate Republicans are laboring to pass this week, would add $4 trillion to the national debt over just the next 10 years.  

    While rescinding these investments to advance U.S. interests abroad would do exceptionally little to address the deficit or our national debt, they would decimate core objectives Congress has long supported on a bipartisan basis. 

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran – RC-B10-0284/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0284/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0285/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0296/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0299/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0300/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Michał Wawrykiewicz, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Loucas Fourlas, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Evin Incir, Daniel Attard, Chloé Ridel
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Aurelijus Veryga, Diego Solier, Nora Junco García, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Charlie Weimers, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Alexandr Vondra, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Bogdan Rzońca, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Marion Maréchal, Waldemar Tomaszewski, Kris Van Dijck
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Abir Al‑Sahlani, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Bart Groothuis, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Alice Kuhnke
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Jonas Sjöstedt

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0284/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on the case of Dr Ahmadreza Djalali in Iran

    (2025/2753(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on the Islamic Republic of Iran,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Swedish-Iranian national Dr Ahmad Reza Djalali, a specialist in emergency medicine and a scholar at Belgium’s Vrije Universiteit Brussel and Italy’s Università del Piemonte Orientale, was arrested on 24 April 2016 by the Iranian security forces;

    B. whereas Djalali was sentenced to death on spurious espionage charges in October 2017 following a grossly unfair trial based on a confession extracted under torture; whereas the sentence was upheld by Iran’s Supreme Court on 17 June 2018;

    C. whereas Djalali has been denied adequate medical care despite the severe deterioration in his physical health and the risk to his life, including a recent heart attack at Evin prison; whereas Iran has continued to threaten to implement his death sentence;

    D. whereas hundreds of individuals have already been executed in 2025 and at least 972 were executed in 2024, a 14 % increase on 2023;

    E. whereas the Iranian Government refuses to recognise Djalali’s Swedish citizenship;

    F. whereas this case is part of a systematic pattern of unlawful detentions and hostage diplomacy by the Iranian regime;

    1. Calls on Iran to immediately release Dr Djalali along with all political prisoners currently being detained; calls on Iran to put a moratorium on executions and to abolish the death penalty;

    2. Strongly condemns Djalali’s sham trial and the Iranian authorities’ brutal treatment of him, amounting to torture and ill treatment, as he was subjected to months of interrogation in solitary confinement, and then sentenced to death;

    3. Urges Iran to provide Djalali, whose health is deteriorating, with immediate and unrestricted access to necessary specialised medical care at an external hospital; urges Iran, furthermore, to provide Djalali with legal representation and legal defence, and allow him regular contact with his family;

    4. Calls on the relevant Member States and the European External Action Service to intensify diplomatic efforts and adopt targeted measures in response to Iran’s continued detention of EU nationals, including Cécile Kohler, Jacques Paris and others, as part of its hostage diplomacy and in violation of international law;

    5. Reiterates its call on the Council to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organisation and extend EU sanctions to all those responsible for taking EU nationals hostage and for mass executions of opposition voices and other human rights violations;

    6. Demands that Iran grant full access to UN human rights mechanisms, including the Special Rapporteur, and the EU’s full support and increase support for civil society organisations;

    7. Emphasises that EU-Iran engagements must be founded on tangible progress on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the release of all political prisoners;

    8. Asks the VP/HR to raise Djalali’s case publicly and in all engagements with her Iranian counterparts;

    9. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Government of Iran, the VP/HR, the Commission, the Member States and the United Nations.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Free movement in the EU – E-001781/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission would like to recall that legislation applicable to prostitution is a matter that remains within the competence of Member States, which have different approaches and legislations in this area.

    1. Restrictions on the right to move and reside freely on grounds of public policy and public security are set in Chapter VI of Directive 2004/38/EC[1], Articles 27 to 33. Member States retain the freedom to determine the requirements of public policy and public security in accordance with their needs, but they must interpret those requirements strictly. Restrictive measures, including a detention measure or ending a right to reside in or enter a Member State, may be taken only on a case-by-case basis where the personal conduct of an individual represents a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of the society of the host Member State[2].

    2. The Anti-Trafficking Directive (Directive 2011/36/EU)[3] provides for minimum common rules for Member States to address the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation as a purpose of trafficking in human beings, in so far as the other elements of the offence (i.e. the intentional act and the means) are met. It is for Member States to assess if, in individual cases, these elements are fulfilled. The directive is without prejudice to the way in which Member States deal with prostitution in their national law.

    • [1]  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004.
    • [2] C-331/16 and C-366/16, K and H.
    • [3] Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 April 2011 on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA, OJ L 101, 15.4.2011.
    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Memorandum of Understanding between the EU and Rwanda – E-000898/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU-Rwanda memorandum of understanding (MoU)[1] is a tool to help the EU address illicit trafficking and to promote a sustainable and responsible sourcing and processing of raw materials.

    The MoU was negotiated by the Commission on the basis of a mandate by the Council of the EU and is in line with the EU’s renewed Great Lakes Strategy[2].

    The MoU has provided a platform to encourage Rwandan authorities to adhere to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative[3]. Its cancelation would remove the basis for this engagement with Rwanda on improving transparency and traceability. The MoU and the Conflict Minerals Regulation[4] are coherent and have the potential to reinforce each other.

    The main objective of the regulation is to ensure that EU importers of tin, tantalum, tungsten buy from responsible sources only, in line with the standards set by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development[5].

    The EU has been financing the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals[6], an accompanying measure to the Conflict Minerals Regulation, while also aiming at improving mineral resources management.

    The programme ‘Peace and Security for Stability in the Great Lakes region’[7], which supports the implementation of a regional certification mechanism, also aims at reducing mineral resources impact on conflict.

    The Commission takes note of the call expressed by the European Parliament in its plenary resolution of 13 February 2025[8].

    Following the Foreign Affairs Council meetings of 24 February and 17 March 2025, several measures have been taken, including the adoption of additional restrictive measures, the suspension of the EU security and defence consultations with Rwanda. The MoU regarding critical raw materials was put under review[9].

    In line with the calls from African partners, the EU fully supports the mediation efforts aiming at ending the atrocities and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

    • [1] https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/58035.
    • [2] https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-6631-2023-INIT/en/pdf.
    • [3] https://eiti.org/.
    • [4]  Regulation (EU) 2017/821, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32017R0821.
    • [5] https://mneguidelines.oecd.org/an-international-standard-oecd-due-diligence-guidance-for-responsible-mineral-supply-chains.htm, https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-guidelines-for-multinational-enterprises-on-responsible-business-conduct_81f92357-en.html.
    • [6] https://europeanpartnership-responsibleminerals.eu/.
    • [7] Details of this programme are available at this link: https://mirego.bi/applications/views/UE.php.
    • [8] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2025-0020_EN.html.
    • [9] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2025/02/24/.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: JOINT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli – RC-B10-0282/2025/REV1

    Source: European Parliament

    pursuant to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of the Rules of Procedure
    replacing the following motions:
    B10‑0282/2025 (Verts/ALE)
    B10‑0287/2025 (Renew)
    B10‑0289/2025 (S&D)
    B10‑0290/2025 (PPE)
    B10‑0295/2025 (ECR)

    Sebastião Bugalho, Rasa Juknevičienė, David McAllister, Željana Zovko, Isabel Wiseler‑Lima, Tomas Tobé, Miriam Lexmann, Andrey Kovatchev, Ingeborg Ter Laak, Michał Wawrykiewicz, Dariusz Joński, Loránt Vincze, Danuše Nerudová, Mirosława Nykiel, Antonio López‑Istúriz White, Davor Ivo Stier, Luděk Niedermayer, Liudas Mažylis, Inese Vaidere, Loucas Fourlas, Krzysztof Brejza
    on behalf of the PPE Group
    Yannis Maniatis, Francisco Assis, Tobias Cremer
    on behalf of the S&D Group
    Adam Bielan, Małgorzata Gosiewska, Rihards Kols, Mariusz Kamiński, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Alexandr Vondra, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Bogdan Rzońca, Arkadiusz Mularczyk, Assita Kanko, Marlena Maląg, Waldemar Tomaszewski
    on behalf of the ECR Group
    Urmas Paet, Petras Auštrevičius, Malik Azmani, Dan Barna, Benoit Cassart, Olivier Chastel, Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Engin Eroglu, Svenja Hahn, Karin Karlsbro, Ľubica Karvašová, Ilhan Kyuchyuk, Nathalie Loiseau, Jan‑Christoph Oetjen, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Eugen Tomac, Hilde Vautmans, Lucia Yar, Dainius Žalimas
    on behalf of the Renew Group
    Lena Schilling, Markéta Gregorová
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group
    Hanna Gedin, Jonas Sjöstedt, Per Clausen

    Document selected :  

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts tabled :

    RC-B10-0282/2025

    Texts adopted :

    European Parliament resolution on media freedom in Georgia, particularly the case of Mzia Amaglobeli

    (2025/2752(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rules 150(5) and 136(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas Mzia Amaglobeli, a journalist and co-founder of Batumelebi and Netgazeti outlets, was arrested during pro-European protests on 12 January 2025 and faces four to seven years in prison for a provoked incident involving a police officer;

    B. whereas the adoption of draconian legislation – such as the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and amendments to the Law on Broadcasting, Code of Administrative Offences and Law on Grants – constitutes a dangerous acceleration of democratic backsliding and deliberate authoritarian strategy by Georgian Dream to silence critical voices in civil society and independent media and persecute the political opposition;

    C. whereas the authorities have virtually annihilated remaining independent media outlets in the country; whereas the public information space is fully dominated by pro-government media, spreading Russian-style propaganda and anti-European disinformation;

    D. whereas in Mzia Amaglobeli’s case, the authorities ignored procedural safeguards, imposed pre-trial detention without a clear legal basis, contested by the Public Defender, and assigned a presiding judge lacking qualifications in criminal law; whereas she is being punished for exposing corruption and reporting on election fraud during the 2024 elections;

    E. whereas she reportedly suffered inhumane treatment and undertook a 38-day hunger strike;

    F. whereas Estonia and Lithuania have imposed personal sanctions on Georgian judges and police officers linked to Mzia Amaglobeli’s case;

    1. Demands Mzia Amaglobeli’s immediate and unconditional release and the withdrawal of all charges against her, and denounces her politically motivated arrest and prosecution;

    2. Strongly condemns the Georgian Dream regime’s systemic assault on democratic institutions, political opposition, independent media, civil society and judicial independence;

    3. Expresses deep concern over arbitrary detentions and the harassment of, and violence against, journalists in Georgia, including smear campaigns, legal persecution, abuse and gender-based violence in detention; calls for independent investigations and urges the authorities to immediately end intimidation and ensure journalists’ safety and freedom;

    4. Urges the Georgian authorities to release all political prisoners and other illegally detained persons without delay, including activist Mate Devidze, opposition leaders Zurab Japaridze, Nika Melia and Nika Gvaramia, and former President Mikheil Saakashvili, and denounces the violent abduction of UNM Chair Tina Bokuchava’s husband and the reported threats to her children’s safety;

    5. Calls for the immediate repeal of all repressive legislation, the restoration of democracy, and full protection of media freedom and civil liberties;

    6. Calls for the EU to step up support for Georgia’s independent media and civil society following the entry into force of the FARA, and monitor ongoing trials;

    7. Regrets the persistent inaction of the Council, Member States and Commission and reiterates its repeated call on Member States to impose bilateral sanctions against Georgian Dream leaders and officials responsible for democratic backsliding;

    8. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, President Zourabichvili, and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: New State aid framework enables support for clean industry

    Source: European Commission

    European Commission Press release Brussels, 25 Jun 2025 The European Commission has today adopted a new State aid framework supporting the Clean Industrial Deal (CISAF), to enable Member States to push forward the development of clean energy, industrial decarbonisation and clean technology.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Desalination and sustainable water use – E-002419/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002419/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    According to the European Water Resilience Strategy, desalination of seawater can provide a steady supply of water in addition to what the hydrological cycle provides. However, it remains costly, energy-intensive and has a significant environmental impact. The strategy also mentions that the Commission will support innovation in this field with the aim of limiting energy consumption and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, in particular by promoting the use of renewable forms of energy. Innovative solutions should also mitigate the environmental impacts of brine disposal and increase recycling and reuse of energy and minerals contained in brine in the industrial sector.

    In view of the increasing support that desalination is receiving as a solution to water scarcity:

    How will the Commission ensure that, given its high environmental and energy impact, this technique does not perpetuate unsustainable patterns of consumption, and that it is limited exclusively to scenarios where all measures in place to save and reuse water and to use it more efficiently have proved insufficient?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Desalination and sustainable water use – E-002419/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002419/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    César Luena (S&D)

    According to the European Water Resilience Strategy, desalination of seawater can provide a steady supply of water in addition to what the hydrological cycle provides. However, it remains costly, energy-intensive and has a significant environmental impact. The strategy also mentions that the Commission will support innovation in this field with the aim of limiting energy consumption and reducing greenhouse gas emissions, in particular by promoting the use of renewable forms of energy. Innovative solutions should also mitigate the environmental impacts of brine disposal and increase recycling and reuse of energy and minerals contained in brine in the industrial sector.

    In view of the increasing support that desalination is receiving as a solution to water scarcity:

    How will the Commission ensure that, given its high environmental and energy impact, this technique does not perpetuate unsustainable patterns of consumption, and that it is limited exclusively to scenarios where all measures in place to save and reuse water and to use it more efficiently have proved insufficient?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    Last updated: 25 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026 – A10-0113/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    DRAFT EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    (COM(2025)0304 – C10‑0110/2025 – 2025/0158(NLE))

    (Consultation)

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission proposal to the Council (COM(2025)0304),

     having regard to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, pursuant to which the Council consulted Parliament (C10‑0110/2025),

      having regard to the Commission Convergence Report 2025 and the European Central Bank Convergence Report of June 2025,

     having regard to Rule 108 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0113/2025),

    1. Approves the Commission proposal;

    2. Calls on the Council to notify Parliament if it intends to depart from the text approved by Parliament;

    3. Asks the Council to consult Parliament again if it intends to substantially amend the text approved by Parliament;

    4. Instructs its President to forward Parliament’s position to the Council, the Commission, the European Central Bank, the Eurogroup and the governments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

    Bulgaria joining the euro area sends a strong political and economic signal of confidence in the enduring viability and appeal of the European Union’s single currency. More than two decades after the euro’s introduction, Bulgaria’s readiness to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026 reaffirms the Union’s cohesion and the euro’s role as a global symbol of stability and unity. Bulgaria has achieved substantial progress towards full economic convergence, making it well-positioned to become the twenty-first member of the euro area.

    Bulgaria introduced its currency board framework on 1 July 1997, pegging the Bulgarian lev to the German mark and subsequently to the euro. Since its EU accession in 2007, Bulgaria has held the status of a “Member State with a derogation,” subject to regular convergence assessments by the European Commission and the European Central Bank.

    At the European Parliament level, the Euro Accession Countries Working Group was established by a decision of the ECON Coordinators on 18 November 2019. It remained active throughout the entire 9th legislative term, scrutinising Bulgaria’s readiness to join the euro area and holding four dedicated sessions with experts, as well as Bulgarian Deputy Prime Ministers and Ministers of Finance. 

    On 25 February 2025, Bulgaria submitted a request for a convergence assessment. The ECB and Commission reports of 4 June 2025 include an examination of the compatibility between Bulgaria’s national legislation, notably the statute of its national central bank, with Articles 130 and 131 of the Treaty and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. The reports also examine whether a high degree of sustainable convergence has been achieved, by reference to the fulfilment of the convergence criteria, and take account of several other factors required under the final sub-paragraph of Article 140(1) of the Treaty.

    Based on its own convergence report and that of the ECB, the Commission proposed that Bulgaria adopt the euro as of 1 January 2026. In accordance with Article 140(2) TFEU, the Council shall decide, by qualified majority and on a proposal from the Commission, which Member States with a derogation meet the necessary conditions for adopting the euro, as defined in Article 140(1) TFEU. This decision is to be made following consultation with the European Parliament and on the basis of the Commission and ECB reports. The Parliament is thus consulted on the legislative proposal for a Council decision to allow Bulgaria to adopt the euro on 1 January 2026.

    On the Convergence Criteria under Article 140(1) of the TFEU, the Rapporteur observes:

    1. Compatibility of National Legislation with Articles 130 and 131 TFEU and the Statutes of the ECB

    Bulgaria’s national legislation, including the Law on the Bulgarian National Bank, is fully aligned with EU requirements. The law guarantees the independence of the national central bank and of the members of its decision-making bodies, the prohibition of monetary financing and privileged access, and ensures compliance with the objectives of the ESCB as formulated in Article 127 of the Treaty.

    2. Achievement of a High Degree of Price Stability

    Over the 12 months to April 2025, Bulgaria recorded an average inflation rate of 2.7%, below the reference value of 2.8%. An analysis of a broad set of indicators reveals no concerns regarding the sustainability of price stability. The reference value is calculated as the average inflation rate of the three best-performing EU Member States in terms of price stability, plus 1.5 percentage points. For the period from May 2024 to April 2025, the reference value of 2.8% is based on the inflation rates of Ireland (1.2%), Finland (1.3%), and Italy (1.4%). No Member States were considered statistical outliers in this calculation, as none showed inflation deviations significantly above the euro area average due to country-specific factors.

    3. Sustainability of the Government Financial Position

    Bulgaria is currently not subject to a Council Decision on the existence of an excessive deficit. Its general government budget deficit stood at 3.0% of GDP in 2024, i.e. at the level of the 3% reference value, and its general government gross debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 24.1%, i.e. well below the 60% reference value since 2007. 

    4. Compliance with the Normal Fluctuation Margins of the EMS’s Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at least the past 2 years

    The Bulgarian lev participated in ERM II in the two-year reference period from 20 May 2023 to 19 May 2025. Over the reference period, the lev did not exhibit any deviation from the central rate. Bulgaria has fulfilled nearly all of its post-entry commitments under ERM II. Further efforts are needed related to anti-money laundering and counter terrorist financing (AML/CFT) measures.

    5. Durability of Convergence, as Reflected in Long-Term Interest Rate Levels

    In the twelve months ending April 2025, Bulgaria’s average long-term interest rate was 3.9%, well below the reference value of 5.1%. The reference value for April 2025 is calculated as the simple average of the average long-term interest rates in Ireland (2.8%), Finland (2.9%) and Italy (3.7%) plus 2 percentage points, yielding a reference value of 5.1%.

    6. Economic Integration and Convergence (Article 140(1), Second Subparagraph TFEU) 

    In accordance with Article 140 TFEU, the Commission’s assessment must also consider additional factors relevant to economic integration and convergence, as these provide insight into a Member State’s capacity to join the euro area without significant difficulties. These include developments in the balance of payments and product, labour, and financial market integration.

    In this context, Bulgaria’s external position has improved, with its combined current and capital account close to balance in 2024. The country is well integrated with the euro area through trade and investment, benefiting from increased banking and financial integration and access to the broader euro area market. Bulgaria continues to make progress but further actions are needed to address the rule of law, anti-corruption efforts, and regulatory quality. 

    While the financial sector is small and bank-dominated, it is well embedded in the euro area, supported by Bulgaria’s participation in the banking union since 2020. Market-based financing remains underdeveloped, but potential financial stability risks are being mitigated by the Bulgarian National Bank’s conservative macroprudential policy and the robustness of the banking system. The Commission’s 2025 Alert Mechanism Report found no need for an in-depth imbalance review, but emphasized the importance of closely monitoring developments in competitiveness, the housing market, and credit growth.

    Bulgaria’s Recovery and Resilience Plan (RRP), supported by €5.7 billion in EU grants (2021–2026), targets structural reforms, competitiveness, and reducing regional disparities. A revised RRP was submitted in April 2025 to accelerate implementation, especially in decarbonisation, governance, and business environment. Cohesion policy funds (€10.7 billion for 2021–2027) further support competitiveness, the green transition, social inclusion, and education, with implementation progressing overall, despite some remaining challenges.

    7. Note regarding Consultation of the European Parliament

    In accordance with Rule 108 of the Rules of Procedure, when Parliament is consulted pursuant to Article 140(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the committee responsible shall submit a report to Parliament advocating approval or rejection of the proposed act on the basis of which Parliament shall deliberate. Parliament shall take a single vote on the proposed act, to which no amendments may be tabled, which shall apply also to the vote in committee. On 19 March 2025, ECON Coordinators agreed the file to be treated swiftly with plenary vote in July and to allocate the rapporteurship on this file as soon as possible.

    Based on the above, the Rapporteur recommends that the derogation be lifted and Bulgaria adopts the euro on 1 January 2026.

    ANNEX: ENTITIES OR PERSONS FROM WHOM THE RAPPORTEUR HAS RECEIVED INPUT

    Pursuant to Article 8 of Annex I to the Rules of Procedure, the rapporteur declares that she received input from the following entities or persons in the preparation of the draft report, prior to the adoption thereof in committee:

     

    Entity and/or person

    Commissioner for Economy and Productivity; Implementation and Simplification

    Minister of Finance of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Permanent Representation of the Republic of Bulgaria to the European Union

    Chair of the Committee on Budget and Finance in the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Association of Banks in Bulgaria

    Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank

    Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria

    Bulgarian Commission for Consumer Protection

     

    The list above is drawn up under the exclusive responsibility of the rapporteur.

     

    Where natural persons are identified in the list by their name, by their function or by both, the rapporteur declares that she has submitted to the natural persons concerned the European Parliament’s Data Protection Notice No 484 (https://www.europarl.europa.eu/data-protect/index.do), which sets out the conditions applicable to the processing of their personal data and the rights linked to that processing.

     

     

     

     

    MINORITY POSITION

    MEP Rada Laykova

    Minority position under Rule 56(4) of the Rules of Procedure

    Proposal for a Council decision on the adoption by Bulgaria of the euro on 1 January 2026

    The supposed job of the EP is to scrutinize the Commission´s assessment on behalf of the people, as they will pay the price of the ignored Maastricht criteria – mathematical rules to ensure no Ponzi scheme happens to the Euro.

    However, what did it do?

     Ignore incoherence between findings within the Commission report and its final assessment, which strongly suggests a political decision that ignores Maastricht criteria and math to the detriment of the people;

     ignore the suspicious Bulgarian budget data sent to the Commission with absurd income projections and concealed expenses;

     ignore the suppressed referendum in Bulgaria;

     replace the scrutiny by a gleeful statement cheerleading Bulgaria´s boarding of the “Eurotanic”, ignoring the obvious state of the Euro, which shows several classic terminal signs of a flat currency. A short statement like “shared sorrow is half sorrow” would have been more honest.

    The lack of diligence might have serious and far-reaching consequences for the people in the Eurozone or Bulgaria as it recreates certain aspects of Greece´s accession into the Euro.

    Here, the EU´s “democracy in action” was “democracy in name only” and the people will pay the price, as evidenced in the past.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024 – A10-0112/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the financial activities of the European Investment Bank – annual report 2024

    (2024/2053(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on European Union,

     having regard to Articles 15, 126, 174, 175, 177, 208, 209, 271, 308 and 309 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to Protocol (No 5) on the Statute of the European Investment Bank (EIB),

     having regard to Articles 41 to 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community,

     having regard to the EIB Group Activity Report 2024 of 30 January 2025 entitled ‘Priorities for prosperity’,

     having regard to the EIB Investment Report 2024/2025 of 5 March 2025 entitled ‘Innovation, integration and simplification in Europe’,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap of 21 June 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2024-2026 of 9 February 2024 and to the EIB Group Operational Plan 2025-2027 of 30 January 2025,

     having regard to the G20 commissioned review of Multilateral Development Banks’ capital adequacy frameworks (the CAF Review),

     having regard to Council Decision (EU) 2025/504 of 11 March 2025 amending Protocol No 5 on the Statute of the European Investment Bank[1],

     having regard to the EIB Board’s decision of 21 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027 of 13 October 2021,

     having regard to the launch of the EIB’s European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) on 13 February 2023,

     having regard to the EIB Group’s third annual report on EIB Group activities in EU cohesion regions of 15 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB Environmental and Social Standards of 2 February 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Group 2023 Climate Bank Roadmap Progress Report of 25 July 2024,

     having regard to the European Pillar of Social Rights,

     having regard to the ‘Main outcomes from EIB Group analysis and stakeholder consultation’, presented at the EIB seminar on housing on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the EIB press release of 6 March 2025 entitled ‘European Commission and EIB group lay foundations for a new pan-European investment platform for affordable and sustainable housing’,

     having regard to the letter by EIB President Nadia Calviño to the EU leaders of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the EIB Group Security and Defence Industry Action Plan presented at the Economic and Financial Affairs Council meeting in Luxembourg on 12 April 2024,

     having regard to the EIB’s updated list of eligibility, excluded activities and excluded sectors of 14 July 2022,

     having regard to the EIB Global Impact Report 2023/2024 of 13 June 2024,

     having regard to the Tripartite Agreement between the European Commission, the European Court of Auditors and the European Investment Bank, signed on 11 November 2021,

     having regard to the EIB Group Complaints Mechanism Procedures of 13 November 2018,

     having regard to the document entitled ‘Diversity, Equity and Inclusion at the EIB Group’ of 14 October 2024,

     having regard to the study of the European Parliamentary Research Service entitled ‘Increasing European added value in an age of global challenges – Mapping the cost of non-Europe (2022-2032)’, published in February 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 1 December 2021 entitled ‘The Global Gateway’ (JOIN(2021)0030),

     having regard to the study by the European Commission published on 11 January 2024 entitled ‘Access to equity financing for European defence SMEs’[2] ,

     having regard to the report of 17 April 2024 by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’,

     having regard to the report of 25 April 2024 by Christian Noyer entitled ‘Developing European capital markets to finance the future’,

     having regard to the report of 9 September 2024 by Mario Draghi entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to the report of 30 October 2024 by Sauli Niinistö entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 29 January 2025 entitled ‘A Competitiveness Compass for the EU’ (COM(2025)0030),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘Commission work programme 2025’ (COM(2025)0045),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 11 February 2025 entitled ‘The road to the next multiannual financial framework’ (COM(2025)0046),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘The Clean Industrial Deal: A joint roadmap for competitiveness and decarbonisation’ (COM(2025)0085),

     having regard to the Commission communication of 26 February 2025 entitled ‘Action Plan for Affordable Energy: Unlocking the true value of our Energy Union to secure affordable, efficient and clean energy for all Europeans’ (COM(2025)0079),

     having regard to the press statement by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, on the defence package (Rearm Europe plan) of 4 March 2025,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 19 March 2025 entitled ‘Savings and Investments Union – A Strategy to Foster Citizens’ Wealth and Economic Competitiveness in the EU’ (COM(2025)0124),

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/523 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 March 2021 establishing the InvestEU Programme and amending Regulation (EU) 2015/1017[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/947 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 June 2021 establishing the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe, amending and repealing Decision No 466/2014/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EU) 2017/1601 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 480/2009[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1056 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 June 2021 establishing the Just Transition Fund[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/1229 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 July 2021 on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism[7],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/795 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 February 2024 establishing the Strategic Technologies for Europe Platform[8],

     having regard to the Commission proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2025 amending Regulations (EU) 2015/1017, (EU) 2021/523, (EU) 2021/695 and (EU) 2021/1153 as regards increasing the efficiency of the EU guarantee under Regulation (EU) 2021/523 and simplifying reporting requirements (COM(2025)0084),

     having regard to its resolution of 12 March 2025 on the white paper on the future of European defence[9],

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the opinion of the Committee on Budgets,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (A10-0112/2025),

    A. whereas the EIB Group includes the EIB and the European Investment Fund (EIF); whereas the EIB, entirely owned by the Member States, is the largest multilateral financial institution in the world, operating in international capital markets and offering competitive terms to clients on favourable conditions in order to contribute to the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU  policies and projects both within and outside the EU, in accordance with Article 309 TFEU; whereas the EIF is owned by the EIB (59.8 %), by the EU (29.7 %) and by financial institutions (10.5 %) from the Member States, the United Kingdom and Türkiye;

    B. whereas the EIB Group has a balance sheet of close to EUR 600 billion; whereas the EIB Group states that its total investment reached a record level of EUR 88.8 billion in 2024, of which EUR 50.7 billion related to climate and the environment, EUR 16.2 billion to SMEs and mid-caps, EUR 14.4 billion to digitalisation and technological innovation and EUR 1 billion to enhancing Europe’s security and defence; whereas the EIB’s gearing ratio has been increased to 290 %, providing additional room for the EIB to invest and support the achievement of the EU’s objectives and support EU policies; whereas the EIB Group’s total investment is expected to increase to EUR 95 billion in 2025;

    C. whereas the EIB maintains solid financial fundamentals and has a ‘triple A’ rating, a cornerstone of its financial credibility and lending capacity, which is essential to preserve investor confidence and ensure low borrowing costs;

    D. whereas the EIB supports EU policies and projects and is the main implementing partner to leverage the mandates and guarantees of the EU’s budget and thus to mobilise large-scale public and private investment; whereas the EIB states that approximately 90 % of its annual investment is committed to projects within the EU and 10 % deployed in investments outside the EU;

    E. whereas the EIF, as part of the EIB Group, is an entity specialised in supporting the EU’s policy objectives, including in the areas of entrepreneurship, job creation and economic cohesion, and plays a key role in supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) by enhancing their access to financial markets, from venture capital to micro-finance; highlights the fact that the EIB Group supports companies at all stages of development;

    F. whereas as of June 2024, InvestEU is estimated to have mobilised around EUR 280 billion in additional investments, of which EUR 201 billion originated from the private sector; whereas the InvestEU envelope is almost depleted;

    G. whereas the latest reports on the future of the EU call for the EU’s competitiveness and productivity to be strengthened, emphasise the vital role of market integration and underscore the need to accelerate both public and private investment to build a stronger, more secure, autonomous and fair Europe;

    H. whereas the Draghi report on European competitiveness assesses the combined additional investment needs in Europe at EUR 750-800 billion per year by 2030; whereas the EIB Group plays a crucial role in helping bridge the gap both through its own lending capacity and by ‘crowding in’ private capital to finance these investment needs;

    I. whereas according to the Draghi report, EU companies spend less on research and innovation (R&I) than their US counterparts and Europe persistently fails to translate R&I into commercialisation, particularly in sectors like biotech, artificial intelligence and renewable energy, in the context of the EU’s lack of scale and incomplete single market, banking union and capital markets union; whereas the Draghi report highlights a 30 % EU-US productivity gap in 2023 and points to Europe’s missing out on the digital revolution – driven by the internet and the associated productivity gains – as a key factor, noting that only four of the world’s top 50 tech companies are European;

    J. whereas the Letta report estimates that EUR 300 billion of European savings are not invested in Europe, but mainly in the United States, due to the lack of an integrated capital markets union (CMU); whereas the President of the European Central Bank estimates that companies in the EU could raise approximately an additional EUR 470 billion a year in funding from the capital markets if the CMU were completed[10]; whereas the European Parliamentary Research Service estimates the potential benefits of a more fully integrated and more effectively regulated EU financial market of up to EUR 159 billion per year in the long run as well as the benefit of further progress in the integration of the EU banking sector of up to EUR 114 billion per year;

    K. whereas the EIB’s operations should contribute to achieving climate neutrality by 2050 at the latest, in line with the Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and support the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights; whereas the EIB has branded itself the EU’s climate bank in view of the investments needed to deliver the fair green transition; whereas the Commission estimates that the EU needs to increase its annual investments in energy, industrial innovation and scale-up, and transport systems by around EUR 480 billion compared to the previous decade[11];

    L. whereas in the light of the current geopolitical context, the development of the European defence technological and industrial base plays an increasingly important role within the internal market; whereas the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence identifies that an additional EUR 800 billion investment is needed in the defence sector over a four-year period; whereas the EIB announced that it would double its funding for security and defence from EUR 1 billion in 2024 to EUR 2 billion in 2025, while safeguarding its ‘triple A’ credit rating status;

    M. whereas housing prices in the EU rose by an average of 48 % between 2015 and 2023, and the housing crisis affects nearly all of Europe, increasingly impacting the middle class and not just the most vulnerable; whereas EIB data indicates a yearly need to build 1.5 million new homes and renovate five million more, requiring EUR 300-400 billion in annual investment; whereas the housing sector is of general interest but faces reduced public investment, which makes continued EIB investment crucial for this sector; whereas the EIB’s new action plan envisages investment of EUR 10 billion over the next two years;

    N. whereas the EIB Global lending arm, which was launched in 2022, is of key importance in terms of Europe’s position in the world; whereas EIB Global is expected to facilitate at least one third of the EUR 300 billion in investment that the Global Gateway sets out to generate by the end of 2027;

    O. whereas Parliament has repeatedly called for the conclusion of an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB; whereas Parliament has signed agreements with various EU bodies; whereas Parliament and the EIB share a long history of intensive cooperation, including (non-)legislative interactions and dialogue;

    General remarks

    1. Appreciates the EIB’s readiness to adapt to changing EU policy requirements, while respecting its long-term objectives; welcomes the EIB Group 2024-2027 Strategic Roadmap, which reflects the EU’s political priorities; points out that the eight priority areas set out in the strategic roadmap are: the EIB’s role as the climate bank, digitalisation and deployment of new technologies, security and defence industry, modern cohesion policy, agriculture and the bioeconomy, Europe’s social infrastructure, high impact investments outside the EU, and the capital markets union;

    2. Highlights the strong call for the EIB to play an even greater role in closing Europe’s investment gap, which Mario Draghi estimated at EUR 800 billion, of which EUR 450 billion is needed for the energy transition alone; calls on the Commission and the EIB to fully leverage the EIB’s potential to provide financial support for the EU’s common priorities and to fulfil its crucial role in driving the necessary investment for fair and inclusive sustainable growth, while maximising innovation gains in key EU policy areas; calls for the EIB Group’s contribution to be further strengthened in the next multiannual financial framework (MFF), particularly through financial instruments and budgetary guarantees that have proven highly effective in advancing key EU policy objectives; urges the Member States to provide sufficient funding for this purpose by assigning mandates to the EIB and through a possible capital increase, thus enabling the EIB to mobilise investments that truly meet pan-European needs and strengthen the EU’s relevance as a global player; recalls that the new Commission has set itself the goal of being an ‘investment Commission’;

    3. Stresses that the EIB’s ‘triple A’ rating is essential and a key asset that must be maintained; urges all relevant actors to protect and guarantee this rating when adapting the EIB’s lending policy and mandate; underlines that the rating is based, among other factors, on its solid capital position, excellent asset quality and performance, the creditworthiness of the Member States as its ultimate guarantors, and the fact that the EIB has been responsive to EU policy objectives; notes that, with a solid ‘triple A’ rating and a strong risk management framework, the EIB Group has the financial strength required to steadily increase its annual investments; highlights the fact that the EIB’s rating and financial position also allow it to ensure favourable financing conditions in funding public interest projects compared to private commercial banks, ensuring certainty and cost effectiveness, and allow it to absorb potential fluctuations in returns, retain investor confidence and contain borrowing costs; underlines that the EIB should further leverage its privileged status to take greater risks in funding European public goods and strategic investments; takes note of the decision of the EIB Board of Governors to increase the EIB’s gearing ratio limit from 250 % to 290 %; stresses that the EIB should adequately calibrate its intervention to ensure that it does not crowd out private investment;

    4. Notes that the EIB investment volume relative to GDP among European countries ranges from 0.1 %[12] to 1.4 % for 2024; calls on the EIB Group to ensure a more balanced geographical distribution of investments aiming to maximise its impact across all EU regions to promote cohesive and inclusive growth throughout the EU, with particular attention on under-represented and less developed areas; calls on the EIB to keep focusing on investment plans aimed at closing the gap between the more developed EU regions and island areas, inland areas, the outermost regions, economically depressed areas and all areas of the EU at a disadvantage owing to natural factors;

    5. Stresses the need to simplify, streamline, optimise and consolidate current and future EIB processes and mandates to enhance synergies, effectiveness and efficiency; suggests the development and introduction of a single rule book, with a uniform set of financial rules, to function as a unified framework across multiple EU programmes and simplify implementation for partners, which will contribute to enhancing the EIB’s operations;

    6. Stresses the importance of reducing the administrative burden and reporting costs as well as simplifying procedures for EIB-financed projects, in particular for SMEs and smaller-scale innovation-driven initiatives; underlines that a more streamlined process could increase the EIB’s impact and responsiveness; welcomes, in this regard, the establishment of one-stop shops to offer coordinated financial support and technical guidance;

    7. Acknowledges the EIB’s commitment to reforms to shorten time-to-market, with a target of a 30 % reduction by the end of 2024 and a 50 % reduction over the 2024-2026 period; notes that the implementation of these reforms is being accelerated to reduce bureaucracy, enhance synergies within the Group, to automate and streamline internal procedures and improve cost efficiency; calls on the Commission and the EIB to further assess how to speed up the EIB’s time-to-market as well as to simplify financing mandates without compromising auditing standards or transparency; calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts in the digitalisation of its operations;

    Closing the investment gap and fostering competitiveness

    8. Emphasises the important role of the EIB Group as a pan-European and international investment body in mobilising both public and private financing for EU priorities and supporting Member States in financing essential and strategic investments and EU policy goals;

    9. Recalls, however, that the EIB’s operations are by nature limited and can only play a supporting role in addressing the significant investment gap; reiterates that a more integrated economic and monetary union and strengthened economic architecture and effective coordination would support the EIB’s operations; calls, therefore, for swift and substantial progress regarding the capital markets union, particularly through concrete steps on the recently launched savings and investments union, the completion of the banking union, as well as, where appropriate, the establishment of EU-level investment instruments and tools designed to minimise the cost for EU taxpayers and maximise efficiency in the provision of European public goods;

    10. Affirms that more integrated capital markets and a deeper single market are also essential foundations for the EIB’s operations; welcomes the EIB’s strategic roadmap, which places the capital markets union high on its agenda; considers that a adequately completed savings and investments union will bring benefits to consumers and SMEs alike by providing high-yield investment opportunities in the real economy, and will ultimately strengthen the venture capital market, which is considered riskier than other forms of investment, by facilitating access to more diversified funding sources; emphasises that relevant European public actors should contribute to the savings and investments union and welcomes the EIB’s willingness to launch pilot projects and other concrete initiatives in this area;

    11. Calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to enhance efforts to deliver on the agenda for the Competitiveness Compass and the savings and investments union by mobilising private capital for productive investments, supporting innovation throughout companies’ life cycles, venture capital financing and more high-risk equity financing for start-ups and scale-ups; underlines that higher-risk instruments such as equity and venture debt must be used with clear risk frameworks and measurable performance indicators; encourages the EIB to expand financing for women-owned businesses;

    12. Recognises the central role of SMEs, as the backbone of the European economy, in driving economic growth, fostering innovation, creating employment and promoting territorial cohesion; recalls, in this regard, that the EU’s 24 million SMEs account for 99 % of all businesses, provide around two-thirds of all jobs and generate over 50 % of the total value added that is produced by EU businesses; underlines that supporting SMEs is a key objective for the EIB Group and that greater access to credit, the creation of tailored financial instruments, and targeted investments in SMEs can have a widespread positive impact by contributing to the Union’s economic resilience, the competitiveness of local production chains, and the digital and sustainable transitions in regional economies;

    13. Encourages the EIB to maintain and strengthen its role in facilitating access to finance for SMEs and start-ups, which frequently encounter obstacles when seeking funding from traditional financial institutions, providing targeted financing to ensure sufficient resources to grow and prosper; points out that SMEs continue to face challenges owing to high interest rates and raw materials and energy costs;

    14. Welcomes the EIF’s role in financing start-ups and scale-ups in Europe, including through its activities in the European venture capital market; stresses that EIF instruments must remain easily accessible for smaller applicants, and calls on the EIF to streamline its application procedures accordingly; calls for an increase in the budget of the EIF dedicated to the EU venture capital ecosystem, in line with the Draghi report recommendation; calls also for the introduction of first-loss guarantees and convertible instruments targeted at start-ups and scale-ups;

    15. Highlights the role of the EIB Group as a major contributor to developing the European venture capital and private equity ecosystem, but notes that further work is needed to support European innovation to provide start-ups with more opportunities to scale up and access funding throughout their life cycle; notes that, although a share of private investment already flows through venture capital funds, it remains insufficient and is unevenly distributed across Member States; underlines that a capital markets union could help address this imbalance and improve access to finance across Member States;

    16. Stresses that de-risking instruments and budgetary guarantees provided by the EU have proven to be powerful tools; considers that de-risking should continue effectively, particularly for investments in innovative and strategic sectors; is concerned that, according to the interim evaluation of the InvestEU programme, envelopes for many financial products may run out by the end of 2025 without budgetary reinforcements; welcomes, in this regard, the Commission’s proposal of 26 February 2025 to provide additional funding to InvestEU; calls for a balanced geographical distribution of financing under InvestEU, particularly with respect to smaller Member States;

    17. Recalls that EU budgetary guarantees are underpinned by taxpayer funds and that defaults on EIB-backed projects could directly impact the EU budget;

    18. Welcomes the continued expansion of the EIB’s network of European promotional banks and other international financial institutions to help to further leverage public and private investment, and to ensure broad geographical and sectoral coverage; recalls that InvestEU is 75 % implemented by the EIB; calls for the financial instrument component of the Competitiveness Fund to make use of the expertise of national promotional banks and institutions (NPBIs), particularly their knowledge of local and regional actors; in that context, calls for the blending of instruments between the EIB and NPBIs to be explored further, ensuring that such instruments do not compromise the funds already dedicated to NPBIs;

    19. Asks the EIB to increase its concessional loans to local and national financial intermediaries, including to credit guarantee consortia, microfinance institutions, ethical banks and collective guarantee structures working to facilitate access to credit for SMEs, with a particular focus on rural areas, inland and island areas, the outermost regions, and areas undergoing economic and environmental transitions;

    Consolidating the EIB’s role as the EU’s climate bank

    20. Acknowledges the EIB’s role as a climate bank and its alignment with the EU sustainable finance framework, including the integration, where applicable, of taxonomy criteria[13], supporting the transition by providing financing in sustainable and clean technologies and backing the Union’s efforts to decarbonise the EU economy; recalls that the EIB’s financial flows must be consistent with the EU’s goal of climate neutrality by 2050 and climate objectives for 2030; notes that all corporate clients of EIB financing are contractually required to publish a credible Paris alignment strategy (‘decarbonisation plans’)[14];

    21. Welcomes the EIB’s climate and environmental investments, which totalled EUR 50.7 billion in 2024, exceeding the target of channelling at least 50 % of total financing into climate action and environmental sustainability; calls on the EIB to uphold its high level of ambition, while emphasising that this commitment enhances the Union’s competitiveness, energy security and industrial resilience;

    22. Recalls that the green transition must be inclusive, fair and competitive, and that green investments must be viable; expects the EIB, therefore, to leverage its lending, financial instruments, technical assistance and advisory services to support citizens and businesses that face socio-economic challenges deriving from their efforts to achieve climate neutrality by 2050; stresses the need to support industrial restructuring, workforce reskilling, and the creation of new employment opportunities in affected regions; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty as a priority;

    23. Welcomes the EIB’s investments in renewable energy, energy efficiency, interconnectors, and electricity grids and storage, including its support for REPowerEU; underlines the importance of focusing on projects with high economic impact and measurable climate benefits; calls on the EIB to play a role in mobilising private capital for grid investments in support of lower energy prices; acknowledges, in particular, the increased investment in emerging technologies for industrial electrification and decarbonisation, recognising their role in supporting the transition to climate neutrality by reducing emissions from hard-to-abate industrial sectors, while expressing concern about their potential impact on the water supply in certain regions;

    24. Stresses the importance of addressing high energy costs in the EU to enhance the competitiveness of European companies; points out that a stable energy supply at competitive prices is one of the foundations of a successful industrial policy; calls on the EIB Group to especially support SMEs facing energy-related cost pressures, including through targeted financing and advisory services to improve energy efficiency and resilience; calls on the EIB to continue to support energy-intensive industries, in order to ensure that this highly strategic sector is in a position to successfully manage the energy transition;

    25. Notes that, in a world full of uncertainty, investments should be focused on the EU’s preparedness to face shocks; stresses the need for increased investment in climate adaptation and resilience; encourages further research and development, including of innovative technologies, for climate preparedness; calls for access to finance for SMEs in innovative green technologies to be enhanced; recalls that clean technology strengthens EU sovereignty and is essential for competitiveness, yet faces even greater funding challenges due to the green premium compared to incumbent technologies; highlights the Draghi report’s call for more public guarantee and counter-guarantee schemes to cover the investment risks of clean technology manufacturing projects;

    26. Recalls that the EIB was the first issuer of green bonds and is now the largest multi-currency issuer of green bonds; welcomes the fact that on 2 April 2025 the EIB issued its first Climate Awareness Bond aligned with the EU Green Bond Standard Regulation[15]; highlights the key role of the EIB in developing the green-bond market, providing financing solutions to sustainable companies; calls on the Commission and the EIB Group to maintain the EU’s leadership in green and digital bonds;

    27. Recalls the EIB’s commitment to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the post-2020 Global Biodiversity Framework and supports the EIB’s investments in biodiversity protection and the preservation of natural resources; welcomes the EIB and European Environment Agency agreement to deepen their collaboration on biodiversity and climate actions; emphasises that, in order to achieve the long-term benefits of restoration, conservation and protection of biodiversity and nature, attractive financing schemes should be made available to potential beneficiaries to engage in such practices on a voluntary basis;

    Financing peace, security and defence

    28. Welcomes the EIB’s proactive approach in the area of security and defence; highlights the fact that investment in this sector doubled in 2024 to EUR 1 billion, with the EIB’s 2025 plan set to double it again to a record EUR 2 billion; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; notes, however, that these amounts represent less than 1.1 % of EIB investments for  2024 (EUR 88.8 billion), and 2.2 % of its financing objectives for 2025 (EUR 95 billion) and emphasises that they can only play a complementary role in addressing the estimated EUR 33.6 billion to EUR 48 billion in new financing required by 2030 for defence companies to meet the increase in orders expected under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan; stresses that European-level funding is essential to meet the significant funding needs of Member States; underlines that any future structural European defence funding must be designed with clear conditions set and strong oversight, drawing on lessons learned from existing instruments;

    29. Supports the EIB’s continued and strengthened role in bolstering Europe’s security through targeted investments in both defence and civilian infrastructure, and stresses the need to concentrate strategic investments in projects delivering European added value and in dual-use technologies that contribute to both civilian and defence objectives, in line with the EU’s overarching goals of fostering innovation and enhancing the Union’s security and resilience; stresses that effective defence innovation depends on close collaboration between academia, research institutions and private industry, and encourages the EIB to act as a catalyst in structuring long-term public-private partnerships through targeted financial instruments;

    30. Welcomes the EIB’s plan to revise its operational framework, establishing a dedicated transversal public policy goal to enhance Europe’s peace and security, backed by ambitious financial and capital allocation[16]; supports, therefore, the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to integrate the EIB’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative (SESI) into a permanent, cross-cutting public policy objective, complementing the existing public policy goals; underlines, however, that any activities in the field of defence must be subject to appropriate financial parameters, regular risk assessment and transparent oversight and must be accompanied by strong risk management procedures;

    31. Welcomes the joint initiative of the Commission and the EIB Group to set up, via its subsidiary EIF, a fund of funds called the Defence Equity Facility, with a budget of EUR 175 million between 2024 and 2027, to support private investment in European SMEs developing innovative dual-use defence technologies, and to help address the equity financing needs of companies in the EU’s defence technological and industrial base, estimated at between EUR 6.8 billion and EUR 20 billion by 2030, to meet the increase in orders anticipated under the ReArm Europe / Readiness 2030 plan;

    32. Acknowledges the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 to broaden the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria for security and defence investments, limiting excluded activities, in accordance with the proposals approved by EU leaders at the European Council on 6 March 2025, as well as the approval of the EIB Group Security and Defence Action Plan in May 2024, aimed at enhancing support for the EU’s security and defence industry; notes that, under that plan, the EIB Group provides financing to SMEs and innovative start-ups operating in the security and defence sector in line with the dual-use principle, maintaining the requirement of ‘credible civil use’ while discontinuing the revenue test;

    33. Takes note of the EIB Board decision of 21 March 2025 that there will be no fixed ceiling for security and defence investments, with funding amounts to be determined annually in the EIB Group Operational Plan; asks the EIB to clarify the potential implications of that decision for other policy areas and the overall operations of the EIB;

    34. Suggests that the EIB should continuously reflect on and evaluate its role, as well as the scope of eligible investments, in contributing to Europe’s peace and security as outlined in the Commission’s white paper on the future of European defence, particularly in the light of the pressing need to scale up the European defence sector and ensure long-term security and strategic autonomy; warns that any adjustment to the EIB Group’s eligibility criteria or funding to align with new priorities must safeguard the Group’s financial position and ensure effective financing of other strategic EU priorities;

    Addressing challenges in social infrastructure, cohesion policy and housing

    35. Welcomes the EIB’s core strategic priorities to reinforce Europe’s social infrastructure and a modern cohesion policy for inclusive and sustainable growth across Europe; appreciates that in its Cohesion Orientation 2021-2027, the EIB committed to dedicating at least 40 % of its total financing in the EU between 2022 and 2024 to projects in cohesion regions, and that in 2024, such financing accounted for 48 % of total EU lending; calls on the EIB to continue to support infrastructure development, including investments in railways, healthcare and social infrastructure, which are crucial for social and economic cohesion, resilience and inclusive growth; underlines that, amid the geopolitical and economic uncertainties, the EIB can provide long-term solutions to address the cost of living crisis;

    36. Highlights the crucial role of skills development in driving long-term sustainable growth, employment and competitiveness in the EU; underlines that financing initiatives aimed at boosting human capital not only foster innovation and productivity and address labour market needs, but also strengthen social cohesion and economic resilience; calls on the EIB to step up investments in education, training, upskilling and reskilling, and health, in close coordination and cooperation with Member State initiatives in those areas, aiming to complement and enhance their impact;

    37. Welcomes the EIB’s commitment to addressing the challenge of the double market failure in the housing sector, including the insufficient provision of affordable and energy-efficient housing, as well as the market failure to increase the energy efficiency of the existing housing stock; notes the differences between Member States in both policies and the magnitude of the aforementioned market failures;

    38. Welcomes the EIB’s ‘Action Plan for Affordable and Sustainable Housing’ with planned investments of EUR 10 billion over the next two years; draws attention to the outcome of the EIB Group analysis and stakeholder meeting, which highlighted an estimated annual public and private investment gap of EUR 300 billion to 400 billion needed to build 1.5 million new housing units and to renovate 5 million additional units annually; encourages the EIB to mobilise even more funding for affordable housing projects throughout the Member States; invites the EIB to focus on sustainable urban development by ensuring that the EU’s housing and infrastructure needs are met for a stronger, sustainable, more cohesive and prosperous Europe, including investments in recovering existing infrastructure, with a focus on supporting urban regeneration projects and projects converting old or abandoned buildings into modern social housing;

    39. Calls on the EIB to take into account the differentiated burden of housing costs on different income groups and family structures, especially as some low-income groups are at risk of marginalisation; encourages the EIB to collaborate with other European public investment banks, local public financial institutions, local governments, and cooperative and social housing companies to finance housing solutions for vulnerable and low-income groups; welcomes the EIB’s intention to increase its focus on R&I in the area of housing;

    40. Calls on the EIB to scale up financial support through the deployment of standardised off-the-shelf financial products in energy and building renovation; highlights the fact that the EIB’s ‘originate-to-distribute’ model, channelling the savings of institutional investors, is an innovative model that could contribute to the integration of EU capital markets;

    41. Welcomes the EIB’s intention to expand financial and advisory support for affordable housing, especially for younger generations; encourages close synergy and exchange with the Commission, municipalities and local authorities, cooperative housing providers, housing associations and the construction sector, exchanging best practice and promoting pan-European cooperation; invites the EIB to support projects delivering affordable access to renewable energy, housing and public services, community-led initiatives and small projects with a particular focus on fighting energy poverty;

    42. Welcomes the EIB Group’s inclusion of agriculture and bioeconomy among its key priorities; underlines that agriculture is a key driver of growth and development in rural areas and that enhancing support and fostering innovation for this vital sector play a significant role in ensuring food security; highlights the financial challenges faced by farmers, particularly young farmers, noting that farmers and enterprises in this sector experience lower success rates when applying for financing; calls on the EIB Group to increase its involvement in the agricultural sector by improving access to funding;

    43. Calls on the EIB to intensify its efforts to promote youth employment, particularly by supporting projects and programmes that foster youth entrepreneurship, access to employment, vocational training and innovation, in order to contribute to fairer and more inclusive territorial development and to help curb brain drain, especially in the EU’s island regions and economically disadvantaged areas;

    Promoting the digital transformation and new technologies

    44. Calls on the EIB to strengthen financing for the EU’s open strategic autonomy in the digital field and to promote research, support the development of European digital infrastructure, foster new and disruptive technologies such as AI and quantum computing, and enable the growth of digital start-ups; underlines the importance of bridging digital divides, both within the EU and globally, to ensure inclusive access to digital infrastructure and services; highlights the importance of aligning EIB digital investments with EU strategic priorities such as the Digital Decade targets, including connectivity, digital skills and the digital transformation of businesses;

    45. Supports the EIF’s expansion of the European Tech Champions Initiative (ETCI) to attract private capital to scale up innovative start-ups into successful global leaders, ensuring that European-founded companies and technologies remain in the EU through the late growth stage; highlights the need for the deployment of the current ETCI to be accelerated in order to keep up with the pace of innovation and start-ups; calls, furthermore, for the successful experience of the ETCI to be built on to develop other similar initiatives to continue supporting the digital transition and other strategic sectors, and encourages the EIF to explore setting up a second generation of this initiative as well as to explore the possibility of investing in funds of funds;

    46. Underlines that institutional investors in Europe could play a bigger role in supporting venture capital, especially for scale-ups; urges the EIB Group therefore to create an European Tech Forum, bringing together the venture capital ecosystem, to engage institutional investors following the model of the Tibi initiative[17]; calls on the EIB to offer opportunities for such investors to build their expertise and opt in to co-investment schemes between the EIF and institutional investors, on transparent and pre-agreed terms;

    47. Highlights the fact that the Clean Industrial Deal aims to develop a TechEU programme with the EIB; stresses the importance of ensuring that this fund has a specific allocation target for start-ups and scale-ups;

    48. Calls on the EIB to support the strengthening of cybersecurity capabilities in the EU, in order to make Europe more resilient while enhancing existing cooperation between the Member States and in order to protect critical entities and essential services;

    49. Highlights the fact that the security of supply of critical raw materials (CRMs) is crucial for the green and digital transitions, the defence sector and the EU industrial base in general; recalls the role played by the EIB in the EU Raw Materials Alliance and the Union’s aim of becoming more autonomous as regards the CRM supply; emphasises the importance of a circular economy approach to CRMs, in order to reduce the EU’s dependence on non-EU countries and boost its strategic autonomy; calls, therefore, on the EIB to invest more in the CRM sector to enhance resilience in raw materials with a particular focus on the recycling of secondary raw materials;

    50. Calls on the EIB to support the technological transformation of European companies, as well as the development of digital skills among employees and entrepreneurs;

    EIB neighbourhood and Global Gateway

    51. Welcomes the EIB’s vital support for Ukraine in the light of Russia’s full-scale, unjustified and illegal war of aggression; calls for an increase in EU budget guarantees to allow the EIB to continue to deliver and strengthen public and private sector operations in Ukraine, supporting Ukraine’s immediate economic challenges, but also envisaging the reconstruction of the country over the medium to long term;

    52. Emphasises that, to decrease dependence on non-EU countries, the deployment of resilient European-controlled infrastructure, among others in the domains of satellite communications, energy and logistics, is essential;

    53. Stresses the important role that the EIB plays in supporting Members States and countries outside the EU, particularly candidate countries, in obtaining access to risk capital markets, thus expanding investment opportunities;

    54. Stresses that, as part of the EU’s external action toolbox, the Global Gateway is crucial for Europe’s global position and aims to promote the rules-based multilateral system, sustainable development, democracy, human rights, gender equality and the rule of law; welcomes the EIB’s role, as the EU’s leading development bank, in this regard; recalls the importance of predictable guarantees from the EU budget to enable the EIB to continue delivering operations outside the EU;

    55. Calls for enhanced transparency and disclosure practices in line with other multinational development banks, along with the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that can effectively address and remedy grievances; underlines the need for effective mechanisms to ensure the participation of, and accountability to, communities affected by EIB-financed projects to ensure that Global Gateway projects are responsive to local needs, are gender-sensitive and deliver meaningful developmental results; emphasises the importance of public participation, in particular in the EIB’s planning, appraisal and monitoring processes for CRMs, including the Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) of Indigenous communities, as provided for in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples;

    56. Reiterates its call for EIB Global to focus blending operations on areas where they can add value to the local economy while avoiding the crowding out of private capital and to ensure that blended finance is not used for essential public services, particularly health, education and social protection; recalls that EU development policy goals, and in particular the goal of enhancing affordable access to healthcare, should guide EIB investments in the field, to ensure better health outcomes for all, and in particular for women;

    57. Expects the EIB’s global activities to also respond swiftly to evolving realities and urgent needs; highlights the gap in development aid financing resulting from the US aid freeze and the reduction of funding towards the Global South; calls for concrete initiatives to prevent humanitarian or health crises, to support pan-African trade, infrastructure and regional integration, and strengthen ties with Europe; welcomes EIB Global’s intention to scale up higher-risk operations, enabled by the mandate of the Development and International Cooperation Instrument – Global Europe (NDICI-Global Europe);

    58. Expresses concern over reports that some EU-funded projects outside the EU, including under the Global Gateway, are being built by Chinese companies, with Chinese firms at times winning more EIB-funded contracts than EU firms; urges the Commission to ensure a level playing field by working with the EIB to boost European company participation; recommends procurement practices that prioritise best price/quality ratio over lowest price to promote fair competition and align with EU values;

    59. Welcomes the efforts of the EIB, together with nine other multilateral development banks, to strengthen their collaboration in advancing progress towards the SDGs; calls on the EIB to continue cooperating with other bilateral and multilateral institutions to develop and apply common methodologies for development impact analysis, with a view to ensuring long-term positive impacts and added value;

    60. Welcomes the EIB’s announcement to step up support for sectors such as water supplies, small businesses, renewable energy and energy efficiency, as well as to further reinforce partnerships within Europe and globally, including with private actors, to deliver maximum impact on the ground;

    Governance: accountability and transparency

    61. Stresses that the EIB’s growing role should be accompanied by greater democratic accountability and transparency; including more timely publication of project-related documents; reiterates its call for an interinstitutional agreement between Parliament and the EIB to formalise and enhance their existing cooperation, including through regular structured dialogue, improved Parliament access to EIB documents and data, and the possibility for Parliament to submit questions for written answers to the EIB, as already provided for the European Central Bank; in this context, asks the EIB to provide Parliament with a clear, simplified overview of EU budget contributions to its balance sheet, off-balance sheet, and profit and loss account;

    62. Highlights the importance of the EIB ensuring full transparency and traceability of projects funded, including more detailed information, to enable proper oversight by all relevant stakeholders, including civil society organisations, rather than solely by the ministries responsible; recalls that all recipients of EU funding have a general obligation to acknowledge its origin and ensure the visibility of any EU funding received; calls on the EIB Group to ensure that the final recipients comply with the visibility conditions of the EU’s financial support;

    63. Invites the EIB to boost the participation of European companies in procurement processes launched for projects financed by the EIB; encourages the EIB to advise borrowers to prioritise eligibility of European companies in order to strengthen European competitiveness;

    64. Underlines the importance of the EIB Group’s upholding the highest standards in preventing all forms of fraud, tax evasion, tax avoidance, money laundering and the financing of terrorism; notes that safeguarding the integrity of the EIB Group’s financing is essential to ensure public trust and the effective use of resources; takes note of the inquiries completed by the European Ombudsman and ongoing investigations by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the European Anti-Fraud Office, and expects full clarity and appropriate follow-up, including any necessary consequences;

    65. Reiterates its call for the EIB to consider aligning the division of labour within the Management Committee with recommendations from EU institutions, to help mitigate potential conflicts of interest;

    66. Welcomes the 2024 framework for the recognition of trade unions at the European Investment Bank;

    67. Welcomes the EIB’s principles of diversity, equity and inclusion, including the target of at least 40 % of management positions being held by women by the end of 2026; calls for a geographically balanced representation of EU nationalities among staff;

    68. Highlights the need to strengthen the EIB’s human rights policies, including the establishment of a clear and effective human rights due diligence framework and strategy; stresses that environmental and social impact assessments should be carried out by independent experts, and that independent verification mechanisms should be introduced to oversee the self-monitoring and self-reporting conducted by EIB clients;

    °

    ° °

    69. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the European Investment Bank.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia – A10-0110/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

    on the 2023 and 2024 Commission reports on Georgia

     

    (2025/2024(INI))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Commission communication of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘2024 Communication on EU enlargement policy’ (COM(2024)0690), accompanied by the Commission staff working document entitled ‘Georgia 2024 Report’ (SWD(2024)0697),

     having regard to the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of the other part[1],

     having regard to Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution, which requires that all possible measures be taken to ensure Georgia’s full integration into the EU and NATO,

     having regard to the final report of 20 December 2024 of the election observation mission of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) on the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on 26 October 2024,–  having regard to the Council conclusions of 27 June 2024 on Georgia and of 17 December 2024 on enlargement,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Georgia,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0110/2025),

    A. whereas in December 2023, the European Council granted Georgia candidate status on the understanding that the relevant nine steps set out in the Commission recommendation of 8 November 2023 and primarily relating to reforms in the areas of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights would be taken;

    B. whereas the situation in Georgia has deteriorated significantly since the publication of the 2024 Commission report on the country on 30 October 2024, particularly as a result of the actions of the Georgian Government;

    C. whereas Georgia has been experiencing democratic backsliding in recent years and in particular since the parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024, which failed to meet international democratic standards and comply with Georgia’s OSCE commitments, and resulted in an illegitimate parliament composed of only one political party, Georgian Dream; whereas Russia has systematically interfered in democratic processes in Georgia; whereas the fraudulent elections included voter intimidation, vote buying and harassment of election observers;

    D. whereas on 28 November 2024, Irakli Kobakhidze announced that Georgia would delay initiating accession talks with the EU and reject its financial assistance until the end of 2028, disregarding the country’s constitutional commitment to European integration and effectively undermining Georgia’s sovereign Euro-Atlantic aspirations, which have the strong support of the Georgian people;

    E. whereas concerns over the direction in which the country is heading and the decision to pause the efforts to start accession negotiations sparked large-scale protests across the country, with protesters demanding new, free and fair elections, the return of the country to its European path, an end to political violence and repression, investigations into and accountability for the serious human rights violations committed against protesters by law enforcement agencies, and the release of political prisoners; whereas protests have been taking place every day without interruption since 28 November 2024; whereas pro-EU protests have significantly increased across Georgia in 2025, with tens of thousands of citizens demonstrating against the government’s perceived shift away from EU integration; whereas these self-organised and spontaneous protests involving all segments of Georgian society underscore the Georgian people’s strong commitment to European values and democratic governance;

    F. whereas in response to the peaceful protests, the Georgian authorities began an unprecedented violent crackdown on demonstrations, accompanied by the unlawful use of force, torture and other ill-treatment by the de facto authorities; whereas since November 2024, at least 62 people have been criminally charged in connection with their participation in pro-European protests and 54 remain in pre-trial detention; whereas more than 500 people have been detained under administrative procedures, some 300 of whom have reportedly been subjected to torture or other forms of inhuman and degrading treatment and at least 157 of whom have suffered visible signs of serious physical injury;

     

    G. whereas the de facto Georgian Dream authorities systematically subject civil society and independent media to pressure, legal restrictions and physical violence; whereas at least 138 incidents of media freedom violations have been documented in the context of pro-European protests or related events since November 2024, and a total of 174 media professionals have been the target of state repression; whereas at least 30 reporters have suffered repeated violations, including physical assaults, damage to professional equipment, administrative fines, criminal charges and judicial harassment; whereas journalist Mzia Amaglobeli is currently in pre-trial detention on trumped-up charges;

     

    H. whereas the Georgian authorities have been restructuring or eliminating structures within the Georgian civil service responsible for pro-European reforms and dismissing professionals and civil servants en masse, in particular those who have criticised government policies, expressed pro-European views and condemned violence against peaceful demonstrators;

     

    I. whereas the illegitimate Georgian parliament has established the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission on the Activities of the Regime and Political Figures of 2003-2012, which was the period when President Mikheil Saakashvili was at the helm and paving the way for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic ambitions; whereas this commission is a tool for the further persecution of political opponents, especially leaders of opposition movements; whereas on 22 May 2025, Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze, the leader of the Girchi – More Freedom party and one of the leaders of the Coalition for Change, was arrested for refusing to appear before this politically motivated commission created and controlled by Georgian Dream, whose long-term ambition is to eradicate political opposition in Georgia; whereas on 29 May 2025, Nika Melia, another leader of the Coalition for Change, was arrested one day before he was due to appear in court for refusing to appear before the Temporary Parliamentary Investigative Commission;

     

    J. whereas, in order to maintain and further increase its grip on power, the ruling Georgian Dream party has unilaterally and without consultation adopted changes to the municipal electoral system for the elections to the city councils in October 2025; whereas the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recommended repealing these changes and the leaders of the main opposition parties have announced that their parties will not participate in those elections; whereas reforms to the formation process of the Central Election Commission further compromise election integrity, limit citizen participation and restrict the ability of observers and media to effectively monitor the electoral process;

     

    K. whereas despite progress towards a more equal and inclusive society, deep-rooted inequalities and stereotypes persist, resulting in high levels of gender-based violence, severe restrictions for persons with disabilities and violence and harassment against the LGBTI community; whereas due to insecurity at home, many LGBTI people choose to flee the country; whereas Georgia’s legal definition of rape does not comply with the standards set in the Istanbul Convention;

    Suspension of Georgia’s EU integration

    1. Reiterates its solidarity with the Georgian people and its unwavering support for their legitimate European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and wish to live in a prosperous and democratic country, as expressed in mass protests that continue despite brutal crackdowns by the authorities; remains ready to assist the Georgian people in achieving these goals; strongly condemns the violent repression, arbitrary and politically motivated detention without sufficient legal grounds and the reported systemic torture of peaceful protesters, civil society actors, political opponents and media representatives; demands that the Georgian authorities refrain from using force, respect the freedoms of assembly and of expression and annul the recently adopted draconian legislation aimed at stifling popular protests, notably through extortionate fines; expresses its particular concern regarding the growing number of political prisoners and reiterates its call for the immediate and unconditional release of all of them; calls for all acts of violence to be effectively and credibly investigated and for those responsible to be held accountable; expresses concern about the lack of independence within the judiciary, with high-placed judges with links to the Georgian Dream overseeing politically motivated court proceedings against peaceful protesters and government critics;

    2. Expresses deep regret over the fact that the ruling Georgian Dream party failed to use the historic opportunity granted to Georgia, as a candidate country, to progress on its European integration path, noting that European integration continues to be supported by an overwhelming majority of the population; recalls that candidate status was granted to Georgia with the benefit of the doubt, despite the already concerning trajectory of the Georgian Dream government’s actions, which were increasingly at odds with European values and democratic principles; underlines that Georgia under Georgian Dream’s rule has not moved forward, and has in fact even regressed, on the key provisions of the nine steps indicated by the Commission, despite the authorities’ claims to the contrary; stresses that Georgia’s EU integration process has effectively been suspended as a result of the continued democratic backsliding in the country and the rigged October 2024 parliamentary elections amounting to a clear turning point towards an authoritarian regime, the ensuing illicit capture of the state institutions and democratic safeguards, and the adoption of a series of anti-democratic legislative acts that run counter to the values and principles upon which the EU is founded; concurs with the European Council’s conclusions of 27 June 2024 that a failure to reverse the current course of action jeopardises Georgia’s EU path and urges the Georgian Dream to return to the course of democratic reforms and Euro-Atlantic integration;

    3. Deplores the dismissal of approximately 700 civil servants since December 2024 due to their participation in or support for pro-European protests; stresses that such retaliation erodes public trust in democratic institutions, violates freedom of expression and association, and contributes to the deepening authoritarian tendencies of the current regime; calls on the Georgian authorities to abide by labour law standards and to allow civil servants to register a trade union in order to protect them from the unjustified restriction of their labour rights; expresses its concern about the growing politicisation of civil service appointments, and calls for a repeal of the amendments to the Law on Public Service adopted in December 2024 that remove the competition rule for the appointment of civil servants and instead grant direct appointment powers to the heads of public institutions; reiterates that these amendments constitute worrying backsliding from the successful public service reform that was implemented by Georgia under the EU-Georgian Association Agreement and calls for their repeal; 4.  Stresses the need for an immediate and comprehensive audit of the EU’s policy towards Georgia given the ongoing democratic backsliding and the increasingly repressive political and legislative environment that constitutes a regression for many of Georgia’s democratic achievements and successful EU reforms, fundamentally weakens democratic institutions and further consolidates power in the hands of the ruling party; calls, in this regard, on the Commission to review the implementation of the EU-Georgia Association Agreement in the light of the blatant breach of Georgia’s obligations regarding the general principles laid down in Article 2, namely respect for democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms; reiterates that non-fulfilment of these obligations may result in the conditional suspension of economic cooperation and the privileges afforded by the Agreement;

    5. Deplores the fact that high-level ruling party officials, members of parliament and government-affiliated media regularly spread manipulative narratives, disinformation and conspiracy theories about the EU, its Member States, leaders and politicians, as well as European integration; stresses that the ruling party’s regime continues its purposefully deceitful and ambiguous discourse, fuelling the false belief among parts of the Georgian public that it remains in favour of European integration; regrets the fact that the media and information environment is being suppressed and dominated by TV and media outlets supported by Georgian Dream, which spread false narratives about EU integration, thereby emulating and playing into Russian-inspired propaganda and facilitating polarisation in society;

     

    6. Underlines the responsibility of Bidzina Ivanishvili and other officials and political leaders, including Irakli Kobakhidze, Shalva Papuashvili, Vakhtang Gomelauri, Mayor of Tbilisi and Georgian Dream Secretary General Kakha Kaladze, and the former Georgian Dream chair Irakli Garibashvili, for the deterioration of the political process in Georgia by enabling democratic backsliding resulting in the autocratic consolidation of power and by acting against the country’s constitutional objective of Euro-Atlantic integration; calls, therefore, for immediate and targeted personal sanctions to be imposed against Bidzina Ivanishvili, his family members and his companies and calls for the EU, in cooperation with other jurisdictions, in particular the United Kingdom, to freeze his financial assets; deplores the obstruction by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments of the Council decisions on the imposition of sanctions against individuals responsible for democratic backsliding in Georgia; condemns the unilateral actions by the Hungarian Government seeking to legitimise Georgian Dream;

     

    Continued backsliding on democracy and the rule of law and the autocratic consolidation of power

     

    7. Reiterates its position that the settlement of the current political and constitutional crisis in Georgia can only be achieved by way of new parliamentary elections, which should be held in the next few months in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international and independent domestic observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process that would reflect the true will of the people;

    8. Stresses that it does not recognise the self-proclaimed authorities established by the Georgian Dream party following the rigged parliamentary elections of 26 October 2024 and that it considers Georgia to be a state captured by the illegitimate Georgian Dream regime; consequentially rejects any decisions taken by the body that has taken control of the country, such as the rushed adoption of amendments to the Code on Administrative Offences, the Criminal Code and the Law on Assemblies and Manifestations; regrets the fact that the parliament of Georgia is a one-party parliament formed on the basis of fraudulent elections, which is incompatible with a pluralistic parliamentary democracy and the standards expected from an EU candidate country; welcomes the rejection of Georgian Dream’s credentials in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Georgian delegation;

    9. Deplores the continued attempts by the ruling Georgian Dream party to persecute political opponents, including through their illegal arrest and detention, threats and physical attacks; reiterates its calls for an end to politically motivated hostilities, an improvement to the political environment and the building of trust and cross-party dialogue;

     

    10. Condemns the unlawful prosecution of political opponents by the investigative committee of the de facto Georgian parliament under the leadership of the Georgian Dream party, which disproportionately targets the actions of the government that ended its mandate more than twelve years ago; highlights the political nature of the ‘investigation’, noting that the Georgian Dream party has been in power since 2012 but launched the investigative committee in parallel with its attempts to ban genuine opposition parties; notes with concern the statements by the chair of the investigative committee, Tea Tsulukiani, spreading Russian narratives; strongly condemns the arrest of Zurab ‘Girchi’ Japaridze and Nika Melia, and the threats to arrest  other politicians, and considers these individuals to be political prisoners;

     

    11. Expresses deep concern over recent declarations by leaders of the ruling Georgian Dream party indicating their intention to declare opposition parties – primarily the United National Movement – unconstitutional; recalls that the United National Movement played a pivotal role in initiating and advancing Georgia’s European integration process; notes the parallels between the conduct of the Georgian Dream de facto authorities and the current Kremlin regime, which cemented its rule by outlawing opposition parties; condemns the draft amendment to the Organic Law on Political Associations of Citizens and to the Law on the Constitutional Court adopted on 13 May 2025, which would empower the Constitutional Court to effectively and arbitrarily ban all opposition parties;

     

    12. Strongly reiterates its demand for the immediate release of former President Mikheil Saakashvili on humanitarian grounds for the purpose of seeking the necessary medical treatment abroad; emphasises that the Georgian authorities bear full responsibility for his health and well-being and must be held accountable for any harm that befalls him; calls, furthermore, on the Georgian Dream authorities to ensure that Members of the European Parliament are granted unhindered access to Mikheil Saakashvili;

     

    13. Underlines that the policy of non-recognition of the legitimacy of the one-party parliament and the president appointed by it should continue until there is a tangible change in the political course of Georgia and new free and fair parliamentary elections are held; calls for the EU’s and the Member States’ representatives and members of parliament to refrain from meetings with representatives of the regime, starting with the current de facto president; continues to recognise Salome Zourabichvili as the legitimate President of Georgia and representative of the Georgian people; praises her efforts to peacefully steer the country back towards a democratic and European path of development;

     

    14. Points out that the upcoming municipal elections in autumn 2025 present yet another test for the resilience of Georgia’s democracy and political pluralism; calls on the opposition to seize the opportunity presented by these elections to reflect the unity of the Georgian people in favour of democracy and the rule of law, as already demonstrated in the peaceful protests against the manipulation of the parliamentary elections and repression; calls for the municipal elections to be held in an improved electoral environment, overseen by an independent and impartial election administration and monitored through diligent international observation to guarantee a genuinely fair, free and transparent process;

     

    15. Is deeply concerned, in this context, by the further deterioration of the electoral system and the overall democratic environment ahead of the municipal elections, in particular the fast-tracked adoption of new amendments to Georgia’s Organic Law and to the Election Code in December 2024 that undermine the principle of equal suffrage and aim to solidify the ruling party’s dominance at all levels of governance; recalls that these amendments have been criticised by the Venice Commission and calls for them to be repealed; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States to consider imposing additional individual sanctions against Georgian officials if the upcoming municipal elections fail to meet the criteria for fair and free elections;

     

    16. Strongly condemns the continuing and deliberate destruction of the environment for Georgia’s vibrant civil society, with the adoption of several pieces of restrictive Russian-style legislation, including on the transparency of foreign influence, threats, and stigmatisation by the authorities; strongly denounces the new legislative initiative that requires the registration of all civil society organisation grants with the government and that obliges foreign donors to obtain executive approval to disburse grants to local organisations; regrets the recent decision by the authorities to freeze the bank accounts of crowdfunding initiatives and campaigns in support of political prisoners and their families; calls on the authorities to immediately cease the intimidation, threats, politically motivated prosecutions and physical assaults against civil society representatives, political leaders, civil activists, journalists and media workers in Georgia; condemns the arbitrary and unjustified refusal of several European journalists’ entry to Georgia;

    17. Condemns the recent adoption, without due public consultation, of legislation that enables further political persecution, limits the right of assembly, and further shrinks the space for civil society, independent media and the opposition to operate freely, including the Russian-style foreign agent law, the amendments to the Law on Public Service, the amendments to the Law on Grants, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, as well as new restrictive amendments to the Broadcasting Law; calls for the Georgian authorities to repeal these legislative changes; stresses that Georgian Dream’s political conduct, including its strategic alignment with the Russian Federation and the accelerated adoption of tools characteristic of authoritarian regimes, mirrors such developments within Russia itself;

     

    18. Commends the work of Georgia’s civil society in the past months, providing free legal aid, documenting serious human rights violations and taking the lead on domestic and international litigation to seek justice and accountability against a background of continued attacks, the criminalisation of civic space, and disinformation campaigns against the work of civil society;

     

    19. Stresses the urgent need to support Georgia’s civil society and independent media in the light of the growing repression and the suspension of the activities of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and therefore asks the Commission to increase financial support and disburse it without any further delay; calls for the EU’s funding mechanisms to be adjusted to take into account the needs that arise in a more hostile and anti-democratic environment and for funds to be reallocated to directly support civil society organisations, independent media and human rights defenders; stresses further, in this regard, that the Member States should be ready to receive and support Georgian civil society organisations and independent media outlets so that they can continue their work in exile;

     

    20. Stresses that beyond Georgian Dream’s rejection of Georgia’s EU integration, it rejects more generally international human rights law and democratic standards, while speedily moving along the negative trajectory previously witnessed in Russia; is deeply concerned, specifically, that this will have further trickle-down effects on the rights and well-being of women, minorities, migrants, persons with disabilities, LGBTI people, people living below the poverty line, and other vulnerable or at-risk groups; strongly condemns the adoption of anti-LGBTI legislation by the Georgian parliament in October 2024, which mirrors authoritarian, Russian-style policies and violates the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and calls for it to be repealed; calls for the reinstatement of gender quotas that were abolished by the parliament of Georgia in April 2024; calls on the EU Member States, when assessing asylum applications, to adequately take into account the fact that Georgia now has one of the most repressive anti-LGBTI laws in Europe; is concerned about the lack of protection of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia;

     

    21. Reiterates that the measures taken by the EU so far in response to the flagrant democratic backsliding and reneging on previous commitments do not reflect the severity of the situation in Georgia and its consequences across the region; regrets the lack of proactive measures taken and the generally limited and delayed reaction by the Council and the Commission; stresses that the absence of unanimity among the Member States should not prevent those willing to take appropriate and effective measures from doing so; calls on the EU’s leadership to urgently rally like-minded Member States to take coordinated action and thereby surmount the political obstacles to adopting EU-wide sanctions;

    22. Calls for the EU and its Member States to introduce, on a bilateral and coordinated basis, personal sanctions against key Georgian Dream political leaders, officials and the regime’s enablers in the administration, business, media, justice system, law enforcement agencies and the electoral commission who are responsible for democratic backsliding, electoral fraud, human rights violations and the persecution of political opponents and activists; further calls for sanctions to extend to mid- and lower-level public officials responsible for implementing repressive measures against the regime’s opponents and to maintain them until Georgian democracy is adequately restored; welcomes the imposition of bilateral sanctions by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Czechia, Germany and Poland, as well as by like-minded partners such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ukraine, and invites other EU Member States to follow suit; calls for the consideration of further restrictive measures, such as SWIFT cut-off or sectoral sanctions, aimed at cutting off the financial flows and sources of income of the Georgian Dream regime;

     

    23. Welcomes the Council’s decision to suspend visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials as a first step in response to the persistent negative developments in Georgia; reiterates its call on the Commission and the Council to review Georgia’s visa-free status, with the possibility of suspending it if the relevant benchmarks and standards on democratic governance and freedoms are not met because of the ruling party’s actions; stresses that Georgian Dream is fully responsible for any consequences stemming from the possible suspension of the visa-free regime for Georgian citizens; stresses the importance of visa-free travel for Georgian civil society actors, human rights activists and journalists, among others, both for travelling to the EU to inform European actors of developments in Georgia, but also for enabling them to quickly leave the country, as many face political persecution by the authorities;

    Alignment on foreign policy matters

    24. Deplores the fact that Georgian Dream is undoing decades of progress towards democracy, the rule of law and Euro-Atlantic integration and is alienating its allies, which had supported it throughout the process; regrets that Georgia has made no progress on implementing the EU’s recommendations on foreign, security and defence policy and that the level of Georgia’s alignment with the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) remains remarkably low, at 49 %, demonstrating its lack of commitment to European integration; emphasises that progress in the EU accession process requires full alignment with the EU’s CFSP, in line with the expectations for all candidate countries; regrets the fact that Georgia does not participate in the EU’s crisis management missions and operations under the common security and defence policy; regrets the fact that misalignment of Georgia’s foreign policy is leading to self-isolation and that Georgian Dream’s repressive regime is worsening the instability in the South Caucasus region and the Black Sea;

    25. Notes that Georgia, under the current government, is moving in a direction that puts it at risk of becoming a Russian vassal state like Belarus; regrets the fact that, at a time when the democratic world is standing in strong support of Ukraine against the Russian Federation’s unprovoked war of aggression, the current Georgian authorities are increasingly aligning themselves with Kremlin policies and rhetoric, thereby contributing to historical revisionism; notes that Georgia has not aligned with the vast majority of sanctions against Russia, Belarus and Iran, but has claimed that it has cooperated with the EU to prevent sanctions circumvention; expresses its concern, however, over reports alleging Georgia’s role in facilitating the evasion of EU sanctions against Russia; calls, therefore, on the Commission to conduct a thorough investigation into such allegations;

     

    26. Notes also with concern the recent strategic turn by the Georgian Dream government towards China and its increasing cooperation with Iran; notes the Georgian Dream’s public support for Chinese geostrategic initiatives and strengthened bilateral economic relations, including the award of the Anaklia deep-sea port construction project to a Chinese-led consortium; emphasises that such a move contradicts Georgia’s stated commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration; underscores that the Anaklia project now risks becoming a vehicle for increasing Chinese political, financial and economic leverage in the region, thereby further distancing Georgia from its strategic partners in the West; calls, in this regard, on the Commission and the Member States to review and, if necessary, suspend or redirect funding for regional connectivity projects; expresses serious concern about Georgia’s increased multifaceted cooperation with Teheran, which can lead to Georgia’s further isolation;

     

    27. Warns that Georgia’s ongoing turn towards authoritarianism and increasing alignment with Russia constitutes a growing threat to European security, particularly in view of Georgia’s strategic location and access to the Black Sea, which is critical to Russia projecting power in the region; underlines that the ruling Georgian Dream party’s strategy may be replicated elsewhere as a playbook for hybrid state capture; is concerned about regional repercussions and warns that the credibility of European action in the wider South Caucasus is at stake, especially in anticipation of the forthcoming EU Black Sea strategy;

     

    28. Is deeply concerned about Georgian Dream’s collaboration, rapprochement and ideological convergence with Russia and other authoritarian regimes, despite Russia’s creeping occupation of Georgia’s territory; denounces Georgian Dream’s promotion of and participation in Russian disinformation and manipulation, including the weaponisation of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine as a propaganda tool, which are at odds with the undiminished and extraordinarily high public support for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration; regrets the lack of cooperation with the EU in the fight against foreign information manipulation and interference;

    29. Reiterates its strongest condemnation of Russia’s ongoing occupation of Georgia’s regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the continued ‘borderisation’ process, which constitutes a violation of Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity; urges the Georgian government to maintain a clear and consistent position on Russian aggression and calls for the EU to remain actively engaged in conflict resolution, human rights monitoring and support for affected communities;

    30. Recommends the reinforcement of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) with increased resources and a broader mandate to monitor foreign interference and border destabilisation; urges the Member States to ensure adequate funding and personnel for the EUMM to respond to the current political and security crisis;

    31. Notes that support from the European Peace Facility, worth EUR 30 million, was rightfully suspended in 2024 in response to the democratic backsliding in Georgia and that no support is planned for 2025; highlights that this suspension will have detrimental consequences on the national stability and security of Georgia; reiterates that any future financial support can only be authorised with the stipulation that the self-declared Georgian regime step down and fair and impartial elections be held;

     

    °

    ° °

    32. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Commission, the governments and parliaments of the Member States, the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the President of Georgia Salome Zourabichvili and the self-appointed authorities of Georgia.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part – A10-0111/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT NON-LEGISLATIVE RESOLUTION

    on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part

    (10724/22 – C10‑0057/2024 – 2022/0184M(NLE))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part (10724/22),

     having regard to the request for consent submitted by the Council on 27 June 2024 in accordance with Articles 207 and 209, in conjunction with Article 218(6), second subparagraph, point (a), and Article 218(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (C10‑0057/2024),

     having regard to the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part[1] (EPCA),

     having regard to the Joint Roadmap for Deepening Ties between the EU and Central Asia of 23 October 2023,

     having regard to the joint communication by the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 May 2019 entitled ‘The EU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for a Stronger Partnership’ (JOIN(2019)0009),

     having regard to the Commission’s assessment reports on the EU’s Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) with Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to the first EU-Central Asia summit on 4 April 2025,

     having regard to the 11th High-Level Political and Security Dialogue between the European Union and the countries of Central Asia, held in Brussels on 5 June 2024,

     having regard to the joint press statement of the President of the Kyrgyz Republic, Sadyr Zhaparov, and the then President of the European Council, Charles Michel, published on 3 June 2023,

     having regard to the 14th Human Rights Dialogue, held in Bishkek on 25 June 2024,

     having regard to the 19th meeting of the EU-Kyrgyzstan Cooperation Council, held in Brussels on 15 November 2022,

     having regard to the opinions of the Venice Commission on recent legal amendments abridging the freedom of the press and hampering the work of non-governmental organisations in Kyrgyzstan,

     having regard to reports on Kyrgyzstan published by human rights organisations, such as the 2022, 2023 and 2024 annual world reports by Human Rights Watch,

     

     having regard to the International Partnership for Human Rights (IPHR) briefing on the protection of fundamental freedoms and civic space in Kyrgyzstan, published in February 2025,

     having regard to its resolution of 17 January 2024 on the EU strategy on Central Asia[2],

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Kyrgyzstan, notably that of 19 December 2024 on the human rights situation in Kyrgyzstan, in particular the case of Temirlan Sultanbekov[3],

     having regard to the visit of the delegation of its Subcommittee on Human Rights to Kyrgyzstan from 25 to27 February 2025,

     having regard to the statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, following his official visit to Kyrgyzstan from 19 to 20 March 2025,

     having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

     having regard to its legislative resolution of […] on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Kyrgyz Republic, of the other part,

     having regard to Rule 107(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

     having regard to the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (A10-0111/2025),

    A. whereas Kyrgyzstan occupies an important position in Central Asia, a region of increasing geopolitical significance that the EU has recognised as a key partner with which it engaged in structured dialogue at the first EU-Central Asia summit;

    B. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have been partners since the country gained independence in 1991, and have established a comprehensive legal framework for their cooperation through the EU-Kyrgyzstan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1999;

    C. whereas the EU and Kyrgyzstan have recently agreed to deepen their partnership by signing an Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA), which represents a modern and ambitious framework for strengthening dialogue and cooperation in key areas such as trade and investment, sustainable development and connectivity, research and innovation, education, the environment and climate change, as well as the rule of law, human rights and civil society;

     

    D. whereas the EPCA could also facilitate stronger cooperation on foreign and security policy, including conflict prevention and crisis management, risk reduction, cybersecurity, regional stability, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control and arms export control;

     

    E. whereas the EPCA, which enhances the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1999, was signed on 25 June 2024; whereas the EPCA requires Parliament’s consent for it to enter into force;

    F. whereas Kyrgyzstan has benefited from unilateral and preferential access to the EU market through the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+) since 2016; whereas Kyrgyzstan has acceded to 27 international conventions related to labour and human rights, environmental and climate protection, and good governance in order to be able to benefit from this scheme;

     

    G. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 98 million to support governance and digital transformation, human development and a green and climate-resilient economy in Kyrgyzstan over the 2021-2027 period, aligning with the National Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic;

     

    H. whereas the EU has allocated EUR 12 million to enhance the quality of legislation and increase the efficiency, independence, professionalism and capacities of the judiciary and services of the justice sector in Kyrgyzstan, thereby signalling its willingness to invest in stable growth that is consistent with the rule of law; whereas concerns over the independence of the judiciary persist, with politically motivated cases that target individuals critical of the government; whereas the 2021 reform of the Criminal Code of the Kyrgyz Republic has reintroduced the heavily criticised 1997 version of the Code, which gives greater power to law enforcement while reducing citizens’ rights;

     

    I. whereas the EPCA stipulates that the EU and Kyrgyzstan shall cooperate to strengthen civil society and its role in the economic, social and political development of an open democratic society;

     

    J. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 100th in the 2025 Global Terrorism Index of the Institute for Economics and Peace, and has been classified as a country with ‘no impact’ of terrorism;

     

    K. whereas, despite the Government of Kyrgyzstan repeatedly expressing its commitment to the principles of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law, human rights organisations have called attention to democratic backsliding and hardening authoritarian practices and persecution of civil society organisations in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, including during the negotiation of the EPCA and since its signing, with Transparency International and Freedom House finding that Kyrgyzstan has turned from a bastion of democracy with a vibrant civil society to a consolidated authoritarian regime that uses its justice system to target critics and whose authorities further undermine the balance of power and the system of checks and balances;

    L. whereas Kyrgyzstan ranks 146 out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index; whereas, at President Japarov’s initiative, the law on public procurement was amended to allow state-owned enterprises to circumvent tendering procedures; whereas there is no proper oversight of public spending due to a lack of access to such information; whereas state funds and national resources are used by the ruling elites to consolidate their power, silence dissent and resist reform;

     

    M. whereas human rights defender, investigative journalist and founder of the Temirov Live media outlet, Bolot Temirov, has been stripped of his Kyrgyz citizenship and forced to leave the country in retaliation for his work investigating widespread corruption; whereas at least 11 of his colleagues were arrested in January 2024, including Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, Azamat Ishenbekov, Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov;

     

    N. whereas in March 2025, independent journalist and activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova was arrested and remains in detention in retaliation for her social media posts critical of the government;

     

    O. whereas Kyrgyz Government propaganda has used false narratives to discredit independent media in the eyes of society and to portray them as ‘enemies of the people’ and ‘slaves of the West’;

     

    P. whereas in recent years, democratic standards and human rights have deteriorated alarmingly in Kyrgyzstan; whereas Kyrgyzstan has fallen from 72nd to 144th place in the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index; whereas it ranks as the country that has had the sharpest decline in press freedom leading up to 2025;

     

    Q. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities seek to shut down Aprel TV; whereas, as stated by the Committee to Protect Journalists, the prosecutors’ filing indicates that the authorities seek to shut down the media outlet on the basis of allegations that the outlet’s critical reporting portrays the authorities ‘in an unfavourable light’ and ‘undermines the authority of the government’;

     

    R. whereas Parliament expressed its concern about the persecution of opposition parties and independent media in its resolutions of 13 July 2023[4] and of 19 December 2024; whereas the persecution of members of the Social Democrats party (SDK) persists, despite repeated calls to ensure free and fair elections; whereas the leader of the SDK, Temirlan Sultanbekov, and two other members, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever, remain in detention; whereas there is cause for concern about Temirlan Sultanbekov’s medical condition following his prolonged hunger strike;

    S. whereas the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, adopted by the Kyrgyz Parliament in March 2024, which requires non-profits that receive funding from abroad and engage in broadly defined political activity to register as ‘foreign representatives’, discriminates against and stigmatises journalists, human rights activists and other non-profit workers and subjects them to intrusive oversight, burdensome reporting requirements and excessive fines; whereas this law mimics repressive legislation in other authoritarian regimes and can be considered a precursor to further attempts to suppress independent civil society and media;

    T. whereas the crackdown on human rights has targeted LGBTIQ+ people in particular; whereas Kyrgyzstan’s new legislative landscape, along with the broader political shift and repression, has effectively decimated the work of LGBTIQ+ rights organisations and activists, with key organisations completely shut down; whereas on 14 August 2023, Kyrgyzstan enacted discriminatory provisions against the LGBTIQ+ community under the pretext of protecting minors from ‘harmful information’; whereas the anti-discrimination bill recently considered by the Kyrgyzstan Supreme Council failed to include sexual orientation and gender identity as protected categories;

     

    U. whereas the law adopted on 6 October 2023 giving the President of Kyrgyzstan the power to overturn rulings of the Constitutional Court if they conflict with his own interpretation of ‘moral values’ fundamentally weakens the separation of powers – a foundational element of the rule of law – and constitutes a hollowing out of judicial independence in Kyrgyzstan;

    V. whereas Kyrgyzstan is increasingly investing in the promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, particularly through key national frameworks such as the National Strategy on Gender Equality until 2030; whereas Kyrgyzstan still faces high rates of domestic violence, over 20 % of marriages in Kyrgyzstan occur through ‘ala kachuu’ (bride kidnapping) and women hold only 22 % of parliamentary seats despite existing gender quotas; whereas, on average, women earn 25 % less than men, as they are predominantly employed in low-paying sectors such as education, healthcare and social services;

     

    W. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have engaged in actions that limit freedom of speech in the country and have arrested, put in long pre-trial detention or imprisoned journalists, bloggers, poets and regular social media users for criticising the country’s leadership or the situation in the country, and have also closed down an award-winning investigative media outlet;

     

    X. whereas Kyrgyzstan ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2014; whereas tentative steps have been taken towards improving accessibility for persons with disabilities and introducing the concept of inclusive education, though challenges remain, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of persons with disabilities;

     

    Y. whereas the law on ‘false information’, enacted on 24 August 2021, has been used to target independent media and individuals critical of the government; whereas on 10 April 2025, the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan approved amendments to the law that provide for administrative sanctions for the dissemination of ‘false information’ on social media;

     

    Z. whereas the Supreme Council of Kyrgyzstan is currently considering the re-criminalisation of the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, which has previously been misused against peaceful religious practitioners, and which, on account of the bill’s vague wording, could be used to silence legitimate political speech;

     

    AA. whereas two new laws on freedom of religion came into force on 1 January 2025; whereas these laws maintain the ban on all unregistered exercise of freedom of religion or belief and make it impossible for communities with fewer than 500 adult members to gain legal status;

     

    AB. whereas the negligence of the Kyrgyz law enforcement authorities in response to a campaign of intimidation and harassment has forced journalists and human rights workers to flee the country;

     

    AC. whereas the Kyrgyz authorities have silenced, arrested, detained and extradited refugees fleeing Russia for protesting against the war in Ukraine, contravening Kyrgyzstan’s obligation under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees not to return people to countries where their life or freedom is under threat on account of their political views, or where there are substantial grounds for believing that they would be in danger of being subjected to serious human rights violations such as torture or other forms of cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment;

     

    AD. whereas the Presidents of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a border demarcation agreement on 13 March 2025, which legally recognises the borders between the two countries and allows for the development of interstate roads and energy infrastructure, contributing to regional stability and opportunities for enhanced cross-border cooperation on energy, transport and trade; whereas the border agreement itself has not been made public or open to public consultations;

    AE. whereas the leaders of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Khujand Declaration of Eternal Friendship on 31 March 2025;

     

    AF. whereas the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, has drawn attention to the concerning signs of democratic backsliding in Kyrgyzstan in recent years, with particular emphasis on the increasing restrictions on civil society and independent journalism;

     

    AG. whereas Central Asia has yet to create horizontal regional frameworks free from the dominance of external actors pursuing their own geopolitical gains;

     

    AH. whereas Kyrgyzstan has historically close and intertwined relations with Russia, with both being members of the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Commonwealth of Independent States; whereas in October 2023, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin in Bishkek during Putin’s first foreign trip since the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant against him; whereas Kyrgyzstan, along with other Central Asian countries, has become a transit point for circumventing sanctions imposed on Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine; whereas exports of advanced technology and dual-use items to Kyrgyzstan – which are then exported to Russia – have significantly increased; whereas Kyrgyzstan has either abstained from voting or sided with Russia on votes on numerous UN resolutions on human rights and, in particular, on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine;

     

    AI. whereas OJSC Keremet Bank, based in Kyrgyzstan, was involved in a sanctions evasion scheme with Russian state-owned defence bank Promsvyazbank Public Joint-Stock Company (PSB), where it facilitated cross-border transfers on behalf of PSB; whereas in 2024, the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance sold a controlling stake in Keremet Bank to a Russian oligarch with ties to the Russian Government; whereas the United States has imposed sanctions on Keremet Bank;

     

    EU-Kyrgyzstan EPCA

    1. Despite the shared interests in strengthening the EU-Kyrgyzstan important political and trade relations, is concerned by the deteriorating situation of human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Kyrgyzstan, particularly in the context of the completion of negotiations and the signing of the EPCA; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities, in this context, to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression, and to foster an environment of cooperation and involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; underlines the importance of Parliament’s close involvement in monitoring the implementation of all parts of the EPCA; calls for an effective evaluation by both parties to the agreement, to be conducted within three years, of the implementation of its essential elements, with clear human rights benchmarks and time frames; calls on the Commission to present to Parliament the outcome of such evaluations; expects that, given the recent backsliding on these fronts and ahead of the EPCA vote in the European Parliament and its subsequent implementation, the Kyrgyz Government will take some concrete steps towards addressing the pressing concerns outlined in this report, such as releasing political prisoners and repealing recently adopted repressive legislation; considers that a negative assessment of the implementation of these essential elements could lead to Article 316 of the EPCA being triggered;

    EU-Kyrgyzstan relations

    2. Welcomes the long-standing and strategic relations between the EU and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the increasing cooperation and exchanges; recalls that Kyrgyzstan is the EU’s third-largest trading partner in Central Asia; reiterates its commitment to work together with the country and with its partners in Central Asia to ensure peace, security, stability, prosperity, democracy and sustainable development;

    3. Welcomes the outcomes of the first EU-Central Asia summit held in Samarkand on 4 April 2025; welcomes their commitment to regional and global stability, to the promotion and protection of the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to addressing climate action, connectivity and education; notes also the 20th EU-Central Asia Ministerial meeting held in Ashgabat on 27 March 2025;

     

    4. Highlights the need for cooperation in promoting green initiatives based on a sustainable market economy, private sector innovation, and long-term environmental stewardship, early warning systems for natural disasters, low-carbon development and the transition to renewable energy sources; highlights Kyrgyzstan’s initiatives to promote the mountain agenda on global platforms, including the preservation of mountain ecosystems, the protection of the environment  and the development of sustainable tourism and mountain communities; stresses that investments in Kyrgyzstan’s green energy goals would significantly contribute to reducing the country’s regional energy dependence and to tackling environmental challenges; commends the Kyrgyz Republic’s involvement in the Team Europe Initiative on Water, Energy and Climate Change;

    5. Supports Kyrgyzstan’s efforts towards sustainable development, aligning its initiatives with the country’s National Development strategy for 2018-2040, alongside the EU’s Global Gateway strategy and the EU strategy for Central Asia; recalls that the EU-Kyrgyzpartnership prioritises governance and digital transformation in order to enhance transparency and efficiency in public administration;

     

    6. Welcomes Team Europe initiatives seeking to build a green and climate-resilient economy in order to address environmental challenges and promote sustainable growth; highlights the recent signing of the agreement between the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which will strengthen the Kyrgyz Climate-Resilient Water Services Programme;

     

    7. Calls on the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to continue promoting joint cooperation initiatives in strategic areas such as energy infrastructure, in particular the hydropower sector, sustainable development and culture, while also building on the positive experiences of the Member States already active in the region;

     

    8. Highlights the importance of enhancing cooperation on critical raw materials, which have been identified as strategically important for ensuring secure, sustainable and diversified supply chains; takes note of the endorsement of the EU-Central Asia Joint Declaration of Intent on Critical Raw Materials at the first EU-Central Asia summit, and of Kyrgyzstan’s proposal to establish a partnership with the EU for the development of critical raw materials;

     

    9. Notes that the Erasmus+ programme has been instrumental in facilitating academic exchanges; welcomes the EU’s support for digitalisation and education in the country, and calls for the creation of a programme for the exchange of entrepreneurs in the field of digital transformation and the green transition; stresses the importance of fostering convergence and coordinated reforms in higher education, such as by aligning the Kyrgyz National Qualifications Framework with the European Qualifications Framework; highlights the need to foster academic and cultural exchanges between Kyrgyzstan and the EU Member States and the active involvement of Kyrgyz young people in non-formal education and civil society programmes; underlines the importance of strengthening academic and vocational exchanges, building on the 2024 education agreement;

     

    10. Welcomes the EU’s increased support for young people, gender equality and human rights in Kyrgyzstan, with the aim of empowering youth and women’s organisations, strengthening the country’s Ombudsman’s Office and enhancing the capabilities of its National Centre for the Prevention of Torture; expresses serious concern about attempts to dissolve the National Centre for the Prevention of Torture;

     

    11. Recalls that the EU has already allocated EUR 12 million to support the reform of Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system, confirming the EU’s commitment to the country’s institutional development; stresses the importance of continuing to invest in institution building, transparency and the independence of the judiciary;

     

    12. Expresses its concern, in view of the widespread corruption in Kyrgyzstan, about the transparent and efficient use of the EUR 98 million in EU assistance for the 2021-2027 period; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to publish detailed reports on the use of EU funds and to strengthen cooperation with international anti-fraud bodies, such as the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), in order to uphold global fund management standards and implement robust anti-fraud measures that protect the EU’s financial interests; calls on the Commission and other relevant EU institutions to ensure the highest possible level of oversight of the use of EU funds and to consider allocating additional resources to strengthen the financial and operational capacity of Kyrgyz agencies involved in their management;

     

    13. Stresses the importance of enhanced information exchange on terrorist threats, full compliance with international counterterrorism financing standards and the implementation of robust measures to prevent the acquisition, transfer and use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials for terrorist purposes;

     

    14. Underlines the importance of engaging all relevant stakeholders, facilitating cooperation between competent agencies and bringing national laws in line with international transparency standards in order to investigate financial crimes and promote good corporate governance; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in eradicating corruption and not to use the fight against it as an excuse for cracking down on civil society and government critics;

     

    15. Calls on the Kyrgyz Republic to review its technical regulations and strengthen collaboration on standards, metrology, market surveillance, accreditation and conformity assessment procedures to facilitate mutual market access, deepen bilateral trade with the EU and ensure fair treatment of investors; urges Kyrgyzstan to avoid restrictive measures that could disadvantage EU investors;

     

    Regional cooperation and global challenges

    16. Considers Central Asia to be a region of strategic interest for the EU in terms of security, connectivity, energy diversification, conflict resolution and the defence of the multilateral, rules-based international order, especially in a historical moment marked by profound geopolitical change; encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia on political, economic and security matters in line with the values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law that underpin EU external action; highlights that any further EU cooperation with Central Asian countries cannot be achieved at the expense of these values; emphasises the need for increased dialogue and collaboration on foreign and security policy issues, including cybersecurity, regional stability, crisis management, disarmament and arms control, in line with the principles of international law and the UN Charter;

    17. Underlines that the EU and Central Asia are facing profound global and regional geopolitical shifts and challenges; stresses, in this regard, the need to work towards long-term, structured and mutually beneficial cooperation on matters of common interest; strongly encourages the EU to intensify its engagement with Central Asia, given the region’s geostrategic importance, and to promote a strategic partnership with Central Asian countries by expanding cooperation at political and economic level; welcomes the increased high-level contact between the EU and Central Asia;

    18. Highlights the growing momentous challenges to multilateralism and a rules-based order for both the EU and the Kyrgyz Republic, such as Russia’s illegal war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, with concern, the neutral stance of Kyrgyzstan and other countries in the region towards the conflict, and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold international norms and contribute to regional efforts to safeguard sovereignty and territorial integrity; notes Russia’s influence in the region despite efforts by Central Asian countries to diversify their foreign relations; regrets that Kyrgyzstan has not condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine;

    19. Deplores the active role of Kyrgyz companies and banks, such as Keremet Bank, in helping Russia to evade sanctions and obtain technology and dual-use goods for its war effort against Ukraine; urges the Kyrgyz authorities to take further measures to stop the transit of sanctioned goods to Russia through Kyrgyz territory, such as enforcing stricter licensing requirements and conducting due diligence on companies involved in the trade of dual-use goods; highlights that failure to address the export of dual-use technologies could lead to secondary sanctions; calls on the Commission to assess the current level of sanctions evasion by Russia with the help of actors in Central Asian countries, and to propose concrete solutions for addressing this; recommends the establishment of a working group focused on monitoring and tracking the trade of dual-use goods;

     

    20. Regrets that, despite its stated commitment to respect democratic principles, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as agreed in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with the EU, Kyrgyzstan does not align its positions with those of democratic countries, in particular the EU Member States, when voting at the UN General Assembly;

     

    21. Deplores the fact that the Turkish Cypriot secessionist entity was granted observer status by the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) and was present at the OTS summit in Bishkek; reiterates that, as part of the Joint Declaration following the first EU-Central Asia summit in Samarkand, the Central Asian states, including the Kyrgyz Republic, are committed to the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions – 541 (1983) and 550 (1984);

     

    22. Recognises the need to strengthen relations to foster deeper, closer and values-based cooperation in facing common threats and achieving shared goals worldwide;

    23. Welcomes initiatives aimed at strengthening the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor and takes note of the Coordination Platform for the Corridor;

    24. Highlights the EU’s role as an important donor of aid to the region; stresses the need to increase the EU’s efforts in its support for development cooperation in Central Asia, in particular in Kyrgyzstan under the newly signed EPCA;

     

    25. Welcomes the border agreement reached between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and its recent ratification; urges both parties to take the necessary steps to implement the agreement, including by triggering consultations with the local populations, and to adopt measures to strengthen cross-border cooperation and support the border communities that have been hit hardest by the recent cross-border conflict; welcomes the EU’s financial support for the construction of facilities in the Sughd region of Tajikistan, which borders Kyrgyzstan; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to investigate the serious crimes, documented by independent observers, that took place during the September 2022 armed conflict and to hold those responsible to account;

    26. Welcomes the first trilateral summit bringing together Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan without mediation by external actors; welcomes Central Asian aspirations to strengthen their regional ties and set up a horizontal cooperation architecture in the region without the assertive involvement of external powers;

     

    Human rights, democracy and the rule of law

    27. Stresses that respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law strengthens stability, sustainable development and security, as they establish legal certainty, predictability and strong institutions; recalls that strong democratic legal frameworks and institutions foster innovation, trade, investments and economic expansion, while ensuring inclusive development and equal access to social and economic rights, and reducing social inequalities, and are indispensable in building resilient societies capable of resisting authoritarian influence and external destabilisation;

    28. Encourages Kyrgyzstan to enact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation that includes sexual orientation, gender, disability and ethnicity as protected categories; stresses that the protection of minorities in Kyrgyzstan requires a multifaceted strategy that addresses the root causes of discrimination, including existing obstacles in accessing justice;

     

    29. Welcomes the legislative acts to enhance protection against domestic, sexual and gender-based violence; calls on the Kyrgyz Government to ensure that the law is consistently enforced and perpetrators are formally charged with the relevant crimes, and to maintain efforts towards eliminating gender-based and domestic violence;

     

    30. Is concerned about the entry into force of new legislation restricting freedom of religion or belief in Kyrgyzstan, as it increases state surveillance and control over religious groups by creating a state registry for religious entities and buildings, introduces fines for wearing certain religious attire, such as the niqab, in state institutions and public places, and increases oversight of religious education; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure freedom of religion or belief is protected in the country, in line with international human rights standards and commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

     

    31. Encourages the Kyrgyz Government to develop a national action plan for human rights with the involvement of civil society, in line with the recommendations made by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights;

     

    32. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to unconditionally release all wrongfully imprisoned or detained journalists, bloggers and activists, including Kanyshai Mamyrkulova and those affiliated with Temirov Live, such as Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, and Aike Beishekeyeva and Aktilek Kaparov, and to drop all charges against them, as well as to restore Bolot Temirov’s citizenship and refrain from other unlawful practices; condemns the sentencing in October 2024 of journalists Azamat Ishenbekov and Makhabat Tajibek kyzy, from the Temirov Live platform known for its investigations into corruption, to five and six years in prison respectively; highlights the opinion of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention recognising the detention of Temirov Live’s journalists as arbitrary; welcomes the pardoning of journalist and Temirov Live employee Azamat Ishenbekov, and of activist Zarina Torokulova, who were convicted on charges of ‘inciting mass unrest’;

    33. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to ensure adherence to the principles of free and fair elections by safeguarding the rights to contest and campaign, while maintaining administrative neutrality towards all political parties throughout the current election cycle, in line with international standards; strongly condemns the Kyrgyz Government’s campaign of intimidation and legal persecution against opposition parties, particularly the SDK, which was removed by the Kyrgyz authorities from the November 2024 local elections in Bishkek; notes that discussions on electoral reform have taken place in the Kyrgyz Parliament;

     

     

    34. Strongly deplores the detention of Temirlan Sultanbekov, Irina Karamushkina and Roza Turksever on 13 November 2024, and calls on the Kyrgyz Government to urgently end their politically motivated prosecution by dropping all restrictions imposed on their respective sentences; condemns the fact that the proceedings against them have been marred by dubious practices, a lack of legal protections since the start and the violation of their right to due process; recalls that an audio recording of unknown origin, serving as the primary evidence and lacking judicial authorisation, is what initiated the investigation; laments that their trials have been held in a closed-door format without any audio or video recordings; denounces the fact that the conditions for their release on probation are disproportionate and violate their right to participate in public affairs;

    35. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from pursuing politically motivated prosecutions or exerting undue pressure on political opposition and dissenting voices, such as the SDK; emphasises that political pluralism is a necessary component of any modern democracy and must be respected to maintain long-term legitimacy and stability;

     

    36. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure the right to peaceful assembly by lifting the ban on protests in Bishkek city centre, which was initiated in response to a request from the Russian embassy to end anti-war protests outside its premises in 2022;

     

    37. Welcomes the acquittal of Klara Sooronkulova, Gulnara Dzhurabayeva, Asya Sasykbayeva and other members of the Committee for the Protection of the Kempir-Abad Water Reservoir; urges the Kyrgyz Government to drop its appeal of the decision of the court of first instance, and bring the politically motivated prosecution to an end;

    38. Strongly condemns, and urges the Kyrgyz authorities to end, the recent crackdown on civil society and to foster an environment of cooperation, with the involvement of civil society and local communities in public consultations and decision-making processes; deplores, in particular, the politically motivated detention of human rights activist Rita Karasartova, and calls for her urgent release; deplores further the seizure of the house of imprisoned human rights activist Kanyshai Mamyrkulova; expresses its admiration for Kyrgyz civil society and independent media which, despite the persecution and at great personal risk, remains one of the most vibrant civil societies in Central Asia;

     

    39. Calls on the EU Member States and the EU institutions to support Kyrgyz civil society organisations, human rights defenders and lawyers, LGBTIQ+ and environmental activists, independent media and bloggers, to express their grave concern over the deterioration of human rights in the country in all their exchanges with the authorities of Kyrgyzstan, and to reassess the country’s GSP+ benefits and adopt appropriate measures, including sanctions under the EU’s global human rights sanctions regime (‘EU Magnitsky Act’) as a last resort, if Kyrgyzstan continues to disregard its commitments to international conventions;

     

    40. Deplores several recent cases of individuals critical of the Kyrgyz Government living outside of Kyrgyzstan facing the threat of extradition to Kyrgyzstan, where they risk politically motivated arrest, imprisonment and torture in retaliation for their criticism; denounces the case of exiled activist Tilekmat Kurenov who was recently extradited from the United Arab Emirates to Kyrgyzstan, where he had previously been subjected to politically motivated imprisonment, torture and threats because of his activism;

     

    41. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to revoke the Russian-style ‘foreign representatives’ law, which severely impairs the ability of civil society to carry out legitimate public interest work and operate without undue interference and harassment while ensuring a safe working environment, and which contradicts Kyrgyzstan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its commitments as an EU partner under the EPCA; urges the Commission to ensure that the EU’s programmes and initiatives are not compromised by the proposed laws, which may limit freedom of expression and curtail the activities of non-governmental organisations;

    42. Urges Kyrgyzstan to respect and protect media freedom and pluralism, which are fundamental conditions for democracy, refraining from forcibly closing independent media outlets, as in the case of Kloop, or levelling unsubstantiated allegations against them due to their investigative and critical reporting; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to allow independent media professionals to carry out their work, to guarantee journalists and reporters will not face retaliatory persecution for their professional activities, including investigative journalism, and to provide adequate protection to reporters that might be harassed for their reporting; calls on the Commission and the EU Member States to ensure the continued operation of the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty service;

    43. Calls on the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan to conduct active public diplomacy and address false narratives spread by the Kyrgyz authorities, in particular those that misrepresent EU values and policies with the aim of discrediting independent media and civil society; urges EU and Member State diplomats in Kyrgyzstan to attend politically motivated trials and to provide support to the unjustly persecuted individuals and their families;

     

    44. Condemns the Kyrgyz authorities’ attempts to shut down Aprel TV by revoking its broadcasting license and terminating its social media operations on the basis of an investigation by Kyrgyzstan’s State Committee for National Security; laments these actions in a context of shuttering media outlets on illegitimate grounds;

     

    45. Expresses concern about the re-criminalisation of libel and insult laws and calls on the Kyrgyz Government not to abuse these provisions to target journalists and legitimate political opposition; invites the authorities to review this legislation in accordance with the Venice Commission’s recommendations;

     

    46. Urges the Kyrgyz authorities to revoke the law on ‘false information’ and the law prohibiting ‘LGBT propaganda’, which contravene Kyrgyzstan’s obligations under international law and have been systematically used to silence critical voices, including journalists and civil society actors; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to ensure that the mass media law is fully in line with international standards and does not result in violations of the freedoms of media or expression;

    47. Calls on the Kyrgyz Government to protect journalists, non-governmental organisation workers and activists from intimidation and harassment, including those facing death threats and other threats to their safety while in prison, and calls on the EU Delegation to closely monitor such threats and report regularly on the situation of at-risk individuals; deplores the government raids, blocking of news sites and prosecution of journalists and bloggers; condemns the court’s closure of the organisation behind the Kloop investigative platform over its alleged ‘negative’ coverage; regrets President Japarov’s call for the Kyrgyz Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to be shut down, accusing the Kyrgyz service of spreading misinformation;

    48. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to refrain from criminalising the possession of ‘extremist’ materials, as human rights watchdogs have warned that this could lead to the further deterioration of freedom of speech in Kyrgyzstan, given the potential for abuse of the law, and to maintain clear legal safeguards to prevent the misuse of laws that penalise public incitements of extremist activity; urges Kyrgyzstan’s Supreme Council to uphold the right to freedom of expression and recalls that countering ‘false information’ cannot lead to a crackdown on independent media, the opposition and others critical of the government;

    49. Urges the Kyrgyz Government to strengthen the rule of law, separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary in line with international standards, to establish processes to measure judicial performance, improve public oversight and increase transparency within the judiciary, and to enhance the engagement of the judiciary with civil society and other branches of government; calls on the Kyrgyz authorities to step up their efforts in guaranteeing equal access to justice, the right to a fair trial and the fulfilment of the right to due process;

     

    50. Is concerned by the high number of pre-trial detention cases, which has been highlighted by the Kyrgyz Ombudsperson Dzhamilia Dzhamanbaeva, and echoes the Ombudsperson’s call on Kyrgyz law enforcement and judiciary bodies to adhere to international standards, including the UN Standard Minimum Rules for Non-Custodial Measures;

     

    51. Notes the penitentiary system reforms carried out in recent years, mainly comprising the development of probation, the digitalisation of different processes and the introduction of alternative preventive measures; regrets, however, cases of mistreatment of prisoners and encourages the Kyrgyz authorities to take all necessary steps to ensure that prisoners do not experience inhuman or degrading treatment or conditions, and receive adequate healthcare in safe and secure conditions;

     

    52. Underlines the need to develop new legislation in the field of administrative law and justice, including the reform of public administration and alternative dispute resolution, and to strengthen the professional capacities of public administration and judiciary representatives, which could be partly achieved by adopting e-governance systems;

     

    53. Asks the Kyrgyz authorities to uphold the independence of the legal profession and ensure that lawyers are not subjected to interference or harassment as a result of fulfilling their professional duties, including the defence of their clients in politically sensitive cases;

     

    54. Commends Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the Central Asia Rule of Law Programme, which supported national efforts to prevent and fight corruption and money laundering, and raised awareness about human rights standards among legal professionals, among other matters;

     

    55. Notes the return of the controversial Land Code to the Kyrgyz Parliament by President Japarov, following public protests against it;

     

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    56. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and of the Kyrgyz Republic.

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