NewzIntel.com

Category: Transport

  • MIL-Evening Report: A war on diplomacy itself – Israel’s unprovoked attack on Iran

    ANALYSIS: By Joe Hendren

    Had Israel not launched its unprovoked attack on Iran on Friday night, in direct violation of the UN Charter, Iran would now be taking part in the sixth round of negotiations concerning the future of its nuclear programme, meeting with representatives from the United States in Muscat, the capital of Oman.

    Israel’s Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu claimed he acted to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb, saying Iran had the capacity to build nine nuclear weapons. Israel provided no evidence to back up its claims.

    On 25 March 2025, Trump’s own National Director of Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard said: 

    “The IC [Intelligence Community] continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorised the nuclear weapons programme he suspended in 2003. The IC is monitoring if Tehran decides to reauthorise its nuclear weapons programme”

    Even if Iran had the capability to build a bomb, it is quite another thing to have the will to do so.

    Any such bomb would need to be tested first, and any such test would be quickly detected by a series of satellites on the lookout for nuclear detonations anywhere on the planet.

    It is more likely that Israel launched its attack to stop US and Iranian negotiators from meeting on Sunday.

    Only a month ago, Iran’s lead negotiator in the nuclear talks, Ali Shamkhani, told US television that Iran was ready to do a deal. NBC journalist Richard Engel reports:

    “Shamkhani said Iran is willing to commit to never having a nuclear weapon, to get rid of its stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, to only enrich to a level needed for civilian use and to allow inspectors in to oversee it all, in exchange for lifting all sanctions immediately. He said Iran would accept that deal tonight.”

    Inside Iran as Trump presses for nuclear deal.   Video: NBC News

    Shamkhani died on Saturday, following injuries he suffered during Israel’s attack on Friday night. It appears that Israel not only opposed a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear impasse: Israel killed it directly.

    A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Esmaeil Baghaei, told a news conference in Tehran the talks would be suspended until Israel halts its attacks:

    “It is obvious that in such circumstances and until the Zionist regime’s aggression against the Iranian nation stops, it would be meaningless to participate with the party that is the biggest supporter and accomplice of the aggressor.”

    On 1 April 2024, Israel launched an airstrike on Iran’s embassy in Syria, killing 16 people, including a woman and her son. The attack violated international norms regarding the protection of diplomatic premises under the Vienna Convention.

    Yet the UK, USA and France blocked a United Nations Security Council statement condemning Israel’s actions.

    It is worth noting how the The New York Times described the occupation of the US Embassy in November 1979:

    “But it is the Ayatollah himself who is doing the devil’s work by inciting and condoning the student invasion of the American and British Embassies in Tehran. This is not just a diplomatic affront; it is a declaration of war on diplomacy itself, on usages and traditions honoured by all nations, however old and new, whatever belief.

    “The immunities given a ruler’s emissaries were respected by the kings of Persia during wars with Greece and by the Ayatollah’s spiritual ancestors during the Crusades.”

    Now it is Israel conducting a “war on diplomacy itself”, first with the attack on the embassy, followed by Friday’s surprise attack on Iran. Scuppering a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue appears to be the aim. To make matters worse, Israel’s recklessness could yet cause a major war.

    Trump: Inconsistent and ineffective
     In an interview with Time magazine on 22 April 2025, Trump denied he had stopped Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.

    “No, it’s not right. I didn’t stop them. But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, because I think we can make a deal without the attack. I hope we can. It’s possible we’ll have to attack because Iran will not have a nuclear weapon.

    “But I didn’t make it comfortable for them, but I didn’t say no. Ultimately I was going to leave that choice to them, but I said I would much prefer a deal than bombs being dropped.”

    — US President Donald Trump

    In the same interview Trump boasted “I think we’re going to make a deal with Iran. Nobody else could do that.” Except, someone else had already done that — only for Trump to abandon the deal in his first term as president.

    In July 2015 Iran signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) alongside the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union. Iran pledged to curb its nuclear programme for 10-15 years in exchange for the removal of some economic sanctions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also gained access and verification powers.

    Iran also agreed to limit uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent U-235, allowing it to maintain its nuclear power reactors.

    Despite clear signs the nuclear deal was working, Donald Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and reinstated sanctions on Iran in November 2018. Despite the unilateral American action, Iran kept to the deal for a time, but in January 2020 Iran declared it would no longer abide by the limitations included in JCPOA but would continue to work with the IAEA.

    By pulling out of the deal and reinstating sanctions, the US and Israel effectively created a strong incentive for Iran to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, not for the sake of making a bomb, but as the most obvious means of creating leverage to remove the sanctions.

    As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Iran is allowed to enrich uranium for civilian fuel programmes.

    Iran’s nuclear programme began in the 1960s with US assistance. Prior to the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran was ruled by the brutal dictatorship of the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahavi.

    American corporations saw Iran as a potential market for expansion. During the 1970s the US suggested to the Shah he needed not one but several nuclear reactors to meet Iran’s future electricity needs. In June 1974, the Shah declared that Iran would have nuclear weapons, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think”.

    In 2007, I wrote an article for Peace Researcher where I examined US claims that Iran does not need nuclear power because it is sitting on one of the largest gas supplies in the world. One of the most interesting things I discovered while researching the article was the relevance of air pollution, a critical public health concern in Iran.

    In 2024, health officials estimated that air pollution is responsible for 40,000 deaths a year in Iran. Deputy Health Minister Alireza Raisi said the “majority of these deaths were due to cardiovascular diseases, strokes, respiratory issues, and cancers”.

    Sahimi describes levels of air pollution in Tehran and other major Iranian cities as “catastrophic”, with elementary schools having to close on some days as a result. There was little media coverage of the air pollution issue in relation to Iran’s energy mix then, and I have seen hardly any since.

    An energy research project, Advanced Energy Technologies provides a useful summary of electricity production in Iran as it stood in 2023.

    Iranian electricity production in 2023. Source: Advanced Energy Technologies

    With around 94.6 percent of electricity generation dependent on fossil fuels, there are serious environmental reasons why Iran should not be encouraged to depend on oil and gas for its electricity needs — not to mention the prospect of climate change.

    One could also question the safety of nuclear power in one of the most seismically active countries in the world, however it would be fair to ask the same question of countries like Japan, which aims to increase its use of nuclear power to about 20 percent of the country’s total electricity generation by 2040, despite the 2011 Fukushima disaster.

    Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that Iran’s uranium enrichment programme “must continue”, but the “scope and level may change”. Prior to the talks in Oman, Araghchi highlighted the “constant change” in US positions as a problem.

    Trump’s rhetoric on uranium enrichment has shifted repeatedly.

    He told Meet the Press on May 4 that “total dismantlement” of the nuclear program is “all I would accept.” He suggested that Iran does not need nuclear energy because of its oil reserves. But on May 7, when asked specifically about allowing Iran to retain a limited enrichment program, Trump said “we haven’t made that decision yet.”

    Ali Shamkhani, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, said in a May 14 interview with NBC that Iran is ready to sign a deal with the United States and reiterated that Iran is willing to limit uranium enrichment to low levels. He previously suggested in a May 7 post on X that any deal should include a “recognition of Iran’s right to industrial enrichment.”

    That recognition, plus the removal of U.S. and international sanctions, “can guarantee a deal,” Shamkhani said.

    So with Iran seemingly willing to accept reasonable conditions, why was a deal not reached last month? It appears the US changed its position, and demanded Iran cease all enrichment of uranium, including what Iran needs for its power stations.

    One wonders if Zionist lobby groups like AIPAC (American Israel Public Affairs Committee) influenced this decision. One could recall what happened during Benjamin Netanyahu’s first stint as Israel’s Prime Minister (1996-1999) to illustrate the point.

    In April 1995 AIPAC published a report titled ‘Comprehensive US Sanctions Against Iran: A Plan for Action’. In 1997 Mohammad Khatami was elected as President of Iran. The following year Khatami expressed regret for the takeover of the US embassy in Tehran in 1979 and denounced terrorism against Israelis, while noting that “supporting peoples who fight for their liberation of their land is not, in my opinion, supporting terrorism”.

    The threat of improved relations between Iran and the US sent the Israeli government led by Netanyahu into a panic. The Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz reported that “Israel has expressed concern to Washington of an impending change of policy by the United States towards Iran” adding that Netanyahu “asked AIPAC . . . to act vigorously in Congress to prevent such a policy shift.”

    20 years ago the Israeli lobby were claiming an Iranian nuclear bomb was imminent. It didn’t happen.

    Netanyahu’s Iran nuclear warnings.   Video: Al Jazeera

    The misguided efforts of Israel and the United States to contain Iran’s use of nuclear technology are not only counterproductive — they risk being a catastrophic failure. If one was going to design a policy to convince Iran nuclear weapons may be needed for its own defence, it is hard to imagine a policy more effective than the one Israel has pursued for the past 30 years.My 2007 Peace Researcher article asked a simple question: ‘Why does Iran want nuclear weapons?’ My introduction could have been written yesterday.


    “With all the talk about Iran and the intentions of its nuclear programme it is a shame the West continues to undermine its own position with selective morality and obvious hypocrisy. It seems amazing there can be so much written about this issue, yet so little addresses the obvious question – ‘for what reasons could Iran want nuclear weapons?’.

    “As Simon Jenkins (2006) points out, the answer is as simple as looking at a map. ‘I would sleep happier if there were no Iranian bomb but a swamp of hypocrisy separates me from overly protesting it. Iran is a proud country that sits between nuclear Pakistan and India to its east, a nuclear Russia to its north and a nuclear Israel to its west. Adjacent Afghanistan and Iraq are occupied at will by a nuclear America, which backed Saddam Hussein in his 1980 invasion of Iran. How can we say such a country has no right’ to nuclear defence?’”

    This week the German Foreign Office reached new heights in hypocrisy with this absurd tweet.

    Iran has no nuclear weapons. Israel does. Iran is a signatory to the NPT. Israel is not. Iran allows IAEA inspections. Israel does not.

    Starting another war will not make us forget, nor forgive what Israel is doing in Gaza.

    From the river to the sea, credibility requires consistency.

    I write about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. I don’t like war very much.

    Joe Hendren writes about New Zealand and international politics, with particular interests in political economy, history, philosophy, transport, and workers’ rights. Republished with his permission. Read this original article on his Substack account with full references.

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Grattan on Friday: Sussan Ley has her first big outing with the national media next week, so here are some questions for her

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    On Wednesday, Opposition Leader Sussan Ley will front the National Press Club. So why is that a big deal?

    For one thing, her predecessor Peter Dutton never appeared there as opposition leader. For another, it’s a formidable forum for a new leader.

    It could all go badly wrong, but she’s right to make the early appearance. It sends a message she is not risk-averse.

    Ley wants to establish a better relationship with the Canberra Press Gallery than Dutton had. He saw the gallery journalists as part of the despised “Canberra bubble” and bypassed them when he could. That didn’t serve him well – not least because he wasn’t toughened up for when he had to face daily news conferences (with many Canberra reporters) on the election trail.

    Ley’s office has set up a WhatsApp group for gallery journalists, alerting them to who’s appearing in the media, and also dispatching short responses to things said by the government (such as links to ministers’ former statements). This matches the WhatsApp group for the gallery run by the Prime Minister’s Office. One of Ley’s press secretaries, Liam Jones, has also regularly been doing the rounds in the media corridors of Parliament House, something that very rarely happened with Dutton’s media staff.

    To the extent anyone is paying attention, Ley has made a better start than many, including some Liberals, had expected. She came out of the tiff with the Nationals well, despite having to give ground on their policy demands. Her frontbench reshuffle had flaws but wasn’t terrible. She’s struck a reasonable, rather than shrill, tone in her comments on issues, including Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s failure thus far to get a meeting with US President Donald Trump.

    Her next significant test will be how she handles at the Press Club questions she and her party are confronting. So here are a few for her.

    One (the most fundamental): How is she going to thread the needle between the two sides of the Liberal Party? Howard’s old “broad church” answer no longer holds. The church is fractured. In an era of identity politics, the Liberals have a massive identity crisis. The party’s conservatives are hardline, have hold of the party’s (narrow) base, and will undermine Ley if they can. Its moderates will struggle to shape its key policies in a way that will appeal to small-l liberal voters in urban seats.

    Two: How and when will she deal with the future of the Coalition’s commitment to net zero emissions by 2050? She has put all policies on the table (but made exceptions for several Nationals’ core policies). There is a strong case for her staking out her own position on net zero, and getting the policy settled sooner rather than later. With younger voters having eschewed the Liberals, Ley told The Daily Aus podcast this week,“I want young people to know first and foremost that I want to listen to them and meet them where they are”. One place they are is in support of net zero by 2050. If the Liberals deserted that, they’d be making the challenge of attracting more youth votes a herculean one.

    For the opposition. net zero is likely THE climate debate of this term – and such debates are at best difficult and at worst lethal for Liberal leaders.

    Three: Won’t it be near impossible for the Liberals to get a respectable proportion of women in its House of Representatives team without quotas? Over the years, Ley has been equivocal on the issue. She told The Daily Aus: “Each of our [Liberal state] divisions is responsible for its own world, if you like, when it comes to [candidate] selections”. This is unlikely to cut it: she needs to have a view, and a strategy. Targets haven’t worked.

    Four: Ley says she wants to run a constructive opposition, so how constructive will it be in the tax debate Treasurer Jim Chalmers launched this week? Ley might have a chat with John Howard about the 1980s, when the Liberals had internal arguments about whether to support or oppose some of the Hawke government’s reform measures. Obviously, no total buy-in should be expected but to oppose reforms for the sake of it would discredit a party trying to sell its economic credentials.

    More generally, how constructive or obstructive will the opposition be in the Senate? This raises matters of principle, not just political opportunism. In the new Senate the government will have to negotiate on legislation with either the opposition or the Greens. If the opposition constantly forces Labor into the arms of the Greens, that could produce legislation that (from the Liberals’ point of view) is worse than if the Liberals were Labor’s partner. How does that sit with them philosophically?

    Five: Finally, how active will Ley be in trying to drive improvements in the appalling Liberal state organisations, especially in NSW (her home state) and Victoria?

    The Liberals’ federal executive extended federal intervention in the NSW division this week, with a new oversight committee, headed by onetime premier Nick Greiner. But the announcement spurred immediate backbiting, with conservatives seeing it advantaging the moderates. Ley is well across the NSW factions: her numbers man is Alex Hawke – whom she elevated to the shadow cabinet – from Scott Morrison’s old centre right faction, and she has a staffer from that faction in a senior position in her office. The faction has also protected her preselection in the past.

    In Victoria, the factional infighting has been beyond parody, with former leader John Pesutto scratching around for funds to avoid bankruptcy after losing a defamation case brought by colleague Moira Deeming. Some Liberals think the state party could even lose what should be the unlosable state election next year.

    That’s just the start of the questions for Ley. Meanwhile, the party this week has set up an inquiry into the election disaster, to be conducted by former federal minister Nick Minchin and former NSW minister Pru Goward. Identifying what went wrong won’t be hard for them – mostly, it was blindingly obvious. Recommending solutions that the party can and will implement – that will be the difficult bit.

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Grattan on Friday: Sussan Ley has her first big outing with the national media next week, so here are some questions for her – https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-sussan-ley-has-her-first-big-outing-with-the-national-media-next-week-so-here-are-some-questions-for-her-258970

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Grattan on Friday: Sussan Ley has her first big outing with the national media next week, so here are some questions for her

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Michelle Grattan, Professorial Fellow, University of Canberra

    On Wednesday, Opposition Leader Sussan Ley will front the National Press Club. So why is that a big deal?

    For one thing, her predecessor Peter Dutton never appeared there as opposition leader. For another, it’s a formidable forum for a new leader.

    It could all go badly wrong, but she’s right to make the early appearance. It sends a message she is not risk-averse.

    Ley wants to establish a better relationship with the Canberra Press Gallery than Dutton had. He saw the gallery journalists as part of the despised “Canberra bubble” and bypassed them when he could. That didn’t serve him well – not least because he wasn’t toughened up for when he had to face daily news conferences (with many Canberra reporters) on the election trail.

    Ley’s office has set up a WhatsApp group for gallery journalists, alerting them to who’s appearing in the media, and also dispatching short responses to things said by the government (such as links to ministers’ former statements). This matches the WhatsApp group for the gallery run by the Prime Minister’s Office. One of Ley’s press secretaries, Liam Jones, has also regularly been doing the rounds in the media corridors of Parliament House, something that very rarely happened with Dutton’s media staff.

    To the extent anyone is paying attention, Ley has made a better start than many, including some Liberals, had expected. She came out of the tiff with the Nationals well, despite having to give ground on their policy demands. Her frontbench reshuffle had flaws but wasn’t terrible. She’s struck a reasonable, rather than shrill, tone in her comments on issues, including Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s failure thus far to get a meeting with US President Donald Trump.

    Her next significant test will be how she handles at the Press Club questions she and her party are confronting. So here are a few for her.

    One (the most fundamental): How is she going to thread the needle between the two sides of the Liberal Party? Howard’s old “broad church” answer no longer holds. The church is fractured. In an era of identity politics, the Liberals have a massive identity crisis. The party’s conservatives are hardline, have hold of the party’s (narrow) base, and will undermine Ley if they can. Its moderates will struggle to shape its key policies in a way that will appeal to small-l liberal voters in urban seats.

    Two: How and when will she deal with the future of the Coalition’s commitment to net zero emissions by 2050? She has put all policies on the table (but made exceptions for several Nationals’ core policies). There is a strong case for her staking out her own position on net zero, and getting the policy settled sooner rather than later. With younger voters having eschewed the Liberals, Ley told The Daily Aus podcast this week,“I want young people to know first and foremost that I want to listen to them and meet them where they are”. One place they are is in support of net zero by 2050. If the Liberals deserted that, they’d be making the challenge of attracting more youth votes a herculean one.

    For the opposition. net zero is likely THE climate debate of this term – and such debates are at best difficult and at worst lethal for Liberal leaders.

    Three: Won’t it be near impossible for the Liberals to get a respectable proportion of women in its House of Representatives team without quotas? Over the years, Ley has been equivocal on the issue. She told The Daily Aus: “Each of our [Liberal state] divisions is responsible for its own world, if you like, when it comes to [candidate] selections”. This is unlikely to cut it: she needs to have a view, and a strategy. Targets haven’t worked.

    Four: Ley says she wants to run a constructive opposition, so how constructive will it be in the tax debate Treasurer Jim Chalmers launched this week? Ley might have a chat with John Howard about the 1980s, when the Liberals had internal arguments about whether to support or oppose some of the Hawke government’s reform measures. Obviously, no total buy-in should be expected but to oppose reforms for the sake of it would discredit a party trying to sell its economic credentials.

    More generally, how constructive or obstructive will the opposition be in the Senate? This raises matters of principle, not just political opportunism. In the new Senate the government will have to negotiate on legislation with either the opposition or the Greens. If the opposition constantly forces Labor into the arms of the Greens, that could produce legislation that (from the Liberals’ point of view) is worse than if the Liberals were Labor’s partner. How does that sit with them philosophically?

    Five: Finally, how active will Ley be in trying to drive improvements in the appalling Liberal state organisations, especially in NSW (her home state) and Victoria?

    The Liberals’ federal executive extended federal intervention in the NSW division this week, with a new oversight committee, headed by onetime premier Nick Greiner. But the announcement spurred immediate backbiting, with conservatives seeing it advantaging the moderates. Ley is well across the NSW factions: her numbers man is Alex Hawke – whom she elevated to the shadow cabinet – from Scott Morrison’s old centre right faction, and she has a staffer from that faction in a senior position in her office. The faction has also protected her preselection in the past.

    In Victoria, the factional infighting has been beyond parody, with former leader John Pesutto scratching around for funds to avoid bankruptcy after losing a defamation case brought by colleague Moira Deeming. Some Liberals think the state party could even lose what should be the unlosable state election next year.

    That’s just the start of the questions for Ley. Meanwhile, the party this week has set up an inquiry into the election disaster, to be conducted by former federal minister Nick Minchin and former NSW minister Pru Goward. Identifying what went wrong won’t be hard for them – mostly, it was blindingly obvious. Recommending solutions that the party can and will implement – that will be the difficult bit.

    Michelle Grattan does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Grattan on Friday: Sussan Ley has her first big outing with the national media next week, so here are some questions for her – https://theconversation.com/grattan-on-friday-sussan-ley-has-her-first-big-outing-with-the-national-media-next-week-so-here-are-some-questions-for-her-258970

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: Türkiye: Unlawful use of force by police against protesters in March “may amount to torture”

    Source: Amnesty International –

    Turkish authorities must carry out prompt, independent, impartial and effective investigations into alleged human rights violations committed by law enforcement officials throughout mass protests in March 2025, some of which may amount to torture, said Amnesty International in new research findings. 

    “I cannot breathe”: Allegations of torture and other ill-treatment during protests in March documents police violence during and in the aftermath of largely peaceful nationwide protests that erupted following the detention of Ekrem İmamoğlu, Mayor of Istanbul and Presidential candidate of the opposition Peoples’ Republican Party (CHP), and 91 others on 19 March 2025. 

    “Our findings reveal damning evidence of unlawful force frequently used by law enforcement officers against peaceful protesters in cities across Türkiye. The authorities used tear gas, pepper spray, kinetic impact projectiles and water cannons against people who were simply exercising their rights,” said Esther Major, Amnesty International’s Deputy Director for Research in Europe. 

    “The violations documented constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and, in some cases, may amount to torture. These unlawful acts of violence must be investigated promptly and the perpetrators brought to justice in fair trials.” 

    Everyone around me was screaming ‘I cannot breathe.’…Everyone was on top of each other like a human pyramid of around 30 people

    Peaceful protesters suffered numerous injuries and even hospitalizations. According to the authorities, law enforcement officials detained at least 1,879 people, with more than 300 people remanded in pre-trial detention by the end of March. At least eight journalists and four lawyers were indicted under the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations which criminalises participation in unauthorised gatherings. Dozens of prosecutions, in which hundreds are being hauled before the courts, began in April with further hearings pending in the months ahead. 

    “They dragged me while I was on my knees. I thought I would die’’

    Amnesty International interviewed 17 protesters as well as several lawyers and our Evidence Lab verified dozens of videos documenting how protesters were beaten, kicked and dragged on the ground by law enforcement officials even when they were dispersing, not resisting or were already restrained. The organisation’s researchers also obtained and reviewed court documents, medical consultation reports and criminal complaints by protesters in which details of the allegations of ill-treatment and injuries were recorded, corroborating the accounts of the interviewed individuals.

    Protesters were subjected to water cannon, tear gas, kinetic impact projectiles by police, often at very close range directly targeting the head and upper body, in violation of international human rights law and standards. Officers used pepper spray directed at people’s faces often from a range of less than one metre causing burning, pain, and inflammation. 

    Warnings by police prior to dispersal consistently fell short of standards required by both domestic and international law, with insufficient time and space for participants to safely and voluntarily leave the protests. Almost all the people interviewed told Amnesty International that they had not heard police loudspeaker dispersal announcements or that force was deployed immediately following the warning.  

    We’ll put you in through the back door of the riot police bus, and your corpse will come out the front door

    One person told Amnesty International how, at a demonstration in Istanbul on 23 March, no time was allowed following a police order to disperse before the immediate use of pepper spray and kinetic impact projectiles. He described how many people trying to flee fell on top of each other like dominoes, and that police continued to use pepper spray and beat people when they were on the ground.

    He told Amnesty International: “Everyone around me was screaming ‘I cannot breathe.’…Everyone was on top of each other like a human pyramid of around 30 people.”

    On 23 March, one man in Istanbul’s Saraçhane Square was hit in the eye by a kinetic impact projectile. As a result, he underwent vitrectomy surgery, a procedure to remove the vitreous humour the eye, and has since been told that he might never fully recover his vision in that eye. Another protester in Ankara had his foot crushed by a water cannon vehicle. 

    A 27-year-old student who had joined a protest in Istanbul on 22 March told Amnesty International through her lawyer: “I was kicked so much that I couldn’t walk properly. I kept falling down. They dragged me while I was on my knees. I thought I would die.” 

    Another man who was at a demonstration in Istanbul on 23 March told Amnesty International: “Around six or seven riot police were kicking and punching me including in my face and head. One of them gave me a flying kick to my chest. Some of my teeth became loose due to the beating. As they were beating me, they were shouting insults like ‘I will f**k your mother, your sister’, son of a whore.”  

    Threats of violence including sexual violence were reported by others too. Student Eren Üner was detained at his home and beaten by police in Istanbul on 24 March, after sharing social media posts by police officers boasting about their ill treatment of protesters. Üner described how police officers who detained him told him: “We’ll put you in through the back door of the riot police bus, and your corpse will come out the front door.” He also told Amnesty International: “The senior officers said they would insert a baton into me and asked for a baton from the other police officers. But this did not happen.” 

    “It is clear from our findings that what happened in Türkiye during these largely peaceful protests in March was a blatant assault on people’s rights to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly,” said Esther Major. 

    “Instances of unnecessary use of force were not isolated but appear to reflect a pattern of law enforcement officials systematically targeting people who were peacefully protesting, standing by or trying to disperse. These violations are the latest in an egregious and ongoing crackdown on expressions of peaceful dissent. We call on the authorities in Türkiye to ensure they are investigated and perpetrators brought to justice, with victims receiving redress for the harm they were subjected to.” 

    Background  

    Under international law, states have a legal obligation to respect and ensure the right to freedom of peaceful assembly for those who wish to gather together with others. Any restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly must be prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate to that aim. Blanket bans on protests are presumptively disproportionate, and restrictions imposed on assemblies must instead be based on an individualized assessment by the authorities of the conduct of particular participants or of a particular assembly. Any use of force by law enforcement officials must be strictly necessary and proportionate and only the minimum force necessary may be used. Those who use unlawful force must be held accountable. 

    Ekrem İmamoğlu was remanded in pre-trial detention on 23 March, the same day he was nominated by his party as the main opposition candidate for the next presidential election following a symbolic primary in which over 15 million people participated. He was removed from his post alongside district mayors of Şişli and Beylikdüzü, who also face charges. By early June, four further waves of detentions had taken place with scores of elected representatives, employees of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality as well as people from the district municipalities taken into custody. 

    For more information contact [email protected]      

    Read more about Amnesty International’s ‘Protect the Protest’ campaign here

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI NGOs: India: Stop unlawful deportations and protect Rohingya refugees

    Source: Amnesty International –

    The Indian government must immediately halt all deportations of Rohingya men, women and children, recognize them as refugees and treat them with the dignity and protection they deserve under international human rights law, Amnesty International said ahead of World Refugee Day. 

    In just the last month, the Indian authorities allegedly deported at least 40 Rohingya refugees, including children and older people, by forcing them off a naval ship and giving them life jackets before abandoning them in international waters near Myanmar. In a separate incident, authorities also forced over 100 Rohingya refugees across the border into Bangladesh.

    “From Zoroastrians and Tibetans to Afghans, Bangladeshis and Sri Lankan Tamils, India has long been a sanctuary for those fleeing persecution. But the Government of India’s recent actions which includes dumping Rohingya refugees at sea and forcefully deporting refugees without following any due procedure, unfortunately betrays this proud tradition. History will remember how the government chose to treat the persecuted when they knocked on our door for safety,” said Aakar Patel, chair of the board of Amnesty International India.

    History will remember how the government chose to treat the persecuted when they knocked on our door for safety.

    Aakar Patel, chair of the board of Amnesty International India

    “The Indian government treats us like criminals”

    On 8 May, Indian authorities detained at least 40 Rohingya refugees living in Delhi, many of whom held identification documents issued by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), according to their relatives who spoke with Amnesty International. The refugees were then blindfolded, flown to the far-off Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and transferred onto an Indian naval vessel.

    In the Andaman Sea, the refugees were allegedly given life jackets and forced into the water, leaving them with no choice but to attempt to swim to an island in Myanmar’s territory. Speaking to Amnesty International, a relative of one of the Rohingya refugees said, “Once they reached ashore, they called us using the phone of a fisherman… After that we haven’t heard from them. We are very worried about their safety.” While the refugees are believed to have reached the shore safely, their current location and condition remain unknown.

    A few days later, over 100 Rohingya refugees detained at the Matia Transit Detention Centre in Assam, the largest such facility in India, were transported by bus and then forced across the eastern border into Bangladesh, reportedly without being granted access to any formal legal process or asylum review.

    On 17 May, two Rohingya refugees filed a petition urging India’s Supreme Court to intervene and immediately halt further deportations. However, the Supreme Court dismissed the plea, with the judge questioning the credibility of the “beautifully crafted story” lacking substantive evidence, while criticizing the timing of the petition filed during the recent India-Pakistan conflict.

    Speaking to Amnesty International on the condition of anonymity due to the fear of reprisal, a Rohingya refugee based in India said, “We are living in constant fear of being deported. Even though we hold UNHCR refugee cards, the Indian government treats us like criminals. In the past few months, so many of my relatives and friends have been taken without warning, without explanation and deported to Myanmar… How can the Indian government send us back to a place where death is almost certain?”

    On 8 May, in a case relating to the living conditions and deportations of Rohingya refugees, the Indian government told the Supreme Court that it neither recognizes the UNHCR-issued refugee cards nor the Rohingyas as refugees since India is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and therefore does not extend any refugee protections.

    The Supreme Court of India ruled that only Indian citizens have the constitutional right to reside in the country. Therefore, the situation of Rohingya refugees is to fall within the purview of the Foreigners Act which allows for forced deportations.

    Amnesty International believes that India’s non-ratification of the UN Refugee Convention cannot be an excuse to force people to conditions of danger, persecution and statelessness. India is still required under the principle of ‘non-refoulement’ in customary international law to refrain from forcing back people to places where they would be at real risk of being subjected to serious human rights violations and abuses. This is also a legal obligation under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to which India is a party.

    We urge the Government of India to uphold its legal obligations under international law and halt all deportations of Rohingya refugees at once. Recent allegations of deportations from the country must be urgently, independently and transparently investigated.

    Aakar Patel

    Cruel and unlawful deportations

    Forcibly returning Rohingya refugees back to Myanmar is both cruel and unlawful. They have been enduring the worst violence and persecution against their communities since Myanmar military-led campaign in 2017. In addition, tens of thousands of Rohingya seeking refuge in camps in Bangladesh face acute problems accessing essentials, such as food, adequate shelter and medical care, further aggravated by recent aid cuts.

    “We urge the Government of India to uphold its legal obligations under international law and halt all deportations of Rohingya refugees at once. Recent allegations of deportations from the country must be urgently, independently and transparently investigated. India must ratify the 1951 Refugee Convention and bring national laws in line with international obligations on refugee protection,” said Aakar Patel.

    “Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often emphasized India’s commitment to Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam, the belief that the world is one family. On this World Refugee Day, we call upon him and the Government of India to stand for this principle by recognizing and protecting the Rohingya as refugees living in India.”

    MIL OSI NGO –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: SA sends 10 critically endangered Black rhinos to Mozambique

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Ten additional black rhinos have been successfully translocated from South Africa to Zinave National Park in Mozambique to help secure the first founder population of black rhinos since becoming locally extinct 50 years ago.

    The rhinos, including five males and five females, were donated by South Africa’s provincial conservation entity, Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife, in collaboration with Mozambique’s National Administration for Conservation Areas (ANAC) and Peace Parks Foundation. 

    The translocation was made possible through funding from the United Kingdom’s People’s Postcode Lottery.

    By reintroducing wildlife to areas where the species once thrived, biodiversity is restored. The preservation of natural ecosystems is one of the most effective tools in mitigating climate change. Through the creation of ecosystem ‘carbon sinks’, these ecosystems can increase global carbon uptake by up to 12 times.

    With 37 rhinos already introduced and thriving, this initiative aims to enhance biodiversity and reinforce the park as Mozambique’s only ‘big five’ national park, setting a new standard for wildlife conservation and ecological restoration.

    Peace Parks Foundation approached Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife for a donation of black rhinos to boost the numbers to form a viable breeding population of black rhinos in Mozambique. 

    An agreement was reached on the ten rhinos sourced from Ithala Game Reserve and Ezemvelo’s three Black Rhino Range Expansion Project. The rhinos were initially relocated to Hluhluwe iMfolozi Park, where they were housed in specially prepared holding facilities in preparation for the 48-hour journey to Zinave.

    Minister of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment, Dr Dion George, described this as a significant conservation success.

    Goerge commended the Government of Mozambique and its co-management partner, Peace Parks Foundation, on achieving this important milestone, noting that establishing new founder populations is one of many critical interventions to secure the future of these species.

    “South Africa’s successes in rhino conservation and the implementation of anti-poaching and anti-trafficking efforts have stabilised its rhino populations, thereby placing the country in a position as a source of rhino for range States in Africa which have either lost many or all of their rhino and wish to re-establish populations or augment current populations, as is the case with this translocation. 

    “The export and import of these valuable black rhinos have been done in compliance with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora’s legislation of both countries,” the Minister said on Wednesday.

    To ensure successful translocation and compliance with all the required permits, the Department of Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment Management Inspectors (EMIs), together with officials from Border Management Authority (BMA), played a crucial role during the loading and endorsement of Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) permits at the ports of exit. 

    During the loading this week, the departmental EMIs ensured that all the allocated microchip numbers, as prescribed in the CITES permits, correspond with those inserted in the live rhino.

    The first rhinos were successfully translocated from South Africa to Zinave National Park in 2022, in the longest road transfer of rhinos ever undertaken. 

    This initiative, the result of a partnership between Mozambique’s National Administration for Conservation Areas (ANAC) and Peace Parks Foundation, marked the beginning of Mozambique’s efforts to rebuild founder white and black rhino populations as part of a national conservation initiative to reintroduce rhinos in the country. 

    In 2023, Peace Parks received a funding award of £800,000, raised by players of the UK People’s Postcode Lottery towards the translocation of ten more black rhinos to Zinave, which enabled this critical next phase in rhino rewilding.

    “Supporting the rewilding of critically endangered species like the black rhino is at the heart of what we believe in — creating lasting impact for people and planet. I am delighted that players of People’s Postcode Lottery have been able to support Peace Parks Foundation. 

    “This historic translocation to Zinave National Park simply wouldn’t have happened without player-raised funding. It’s a powerful example of what we can achieve when we come together across borders to restore nature and protect our shared future,” Managing Director of UK People’s Postcode Lottery Clara Govier said. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: Western Cape prepares for severe cold, wet weather

    Source: South Africa News Agency

    Western Cape MEC for Local Government, Environmental Affairs, and Development Planning, Anton Bredell, has confirmed that the provincial government is ready for the upcoming winter season. 

    Several days of cold and wet weather are forecasted for the remainder of this week and into next week in the Western Cape. 

    Bredell announced that disaster and emergency services will closely monitor the situation to respond swiftly where needed.

    “The Provincial Disaster Management Centre coordinates and supports the district disaster centres, and each local municipality in the province knows what is expected during the coming winter months to keep people safe,” Bredell said.

    In light of the recent tragic drowning of a young woman at a low-level bridge in Slanghoek, Bredell emphasised the importance of reminding the public about safety precautions during inclement weather.

    In addition, the Provincial Disaster Management Centre has advised residents to create a household emergency plan to ensure they know what to do in the event of a flood.

    “Assess where you live, as your home may flood if you are near a river or if there is poor drainage. Assemble a grab-and-go kit and keep it in a designated, easily accessible location,” the centre said.

    The grab-and-go kit should contain:

    •    Important documents such as IDs, passports, birth certificates, policies and clinic cards.

    •    Cellphone charger.

    •    Essential medication and copies of prescriptions.

    •    Credit cards and money.

    •    First aid kit. 

    “We appeal to the public not to litter or dump in stormwater drains, as this will stop the water from draining away and cause even more flooding,” Bredell said.

    When heavy rains occur, it is important to keep the following points in mind:

    •    Stay informed and heed warnings. Listen to the radio or check reliable social media sources, such as the South African Weather Services or your local municipality, for updates on areas at risk of flooding.

    •    Store a supply of drinking water.

    •    If you live in a flood-prone area or are camping in a low-lying area, get to higher ground immediately.

    •    If told to evacuate by authorities, please do so immediately. Lock your home when you leave. If you have time, disconnect utilities and appliances.

    •    Avoid areas, roads, and passes that are subject to sudden flooding.

    •    Avoid damaged live electrical infrastructure.

    •    Avoid walking or driving through flooded roads. Just 15 cm of fast-moving water can knock you down, and a depth of two feet can float a car. Never attempt to walk, swim, or drive through rapidly flowing water.

    •    Avoid contact with flood water as it can be mixed with sewerage, oil, fuel, or dangerous chemicals.

    •    Prevent children from playing in and near flood waters. 

    Bredell asked the public to trust and listen to emergency personnel when instructions are issued relating to flood prevention or during rescue operations. 

    “These men and women are trained to keep us safe, and they risk their own lives to do this. We can reduce these risks by giving our full cooperation and sharing a mindset of rather safe than sorry.” 

    On Friday last week, President Cyril Ramaphosa visited Mthatha in the Eastern Cape to offer support and assess the damage following the recent floods that killed about 90 people.

    The floods have caused widespread destruction to homes, government facilities, roads, hospitals, and schools, highlighting the urgent need to tackle climate change.

    President Ramaphosa said that this is becoming a new reality for South Africa, with both the Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal experiencing recurring annual disasters. – SAnews.gov.za

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – EU ETS for maritime transport – P-001895/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    All sectors, including maritime transport, must contribute to the EU climate neutrality goal by 2050 and the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is key to achieve this objective.

    For reasons of administrative practicability, ships below 5 000 gross tonnage (GT) were not included within the scope of the ETS Directive[1] from the start of its extension to maritime transport, but their inclusion in the future could improve the effectiveness of the EU ETS and potentially reduce evasive behaviour with the use of ships below the size threshold[2].

    Therefore, the ETS Directive requires the Commission to examine, no later than end of 2026, the feasibility and economic, environmental and social impacts of such a possible inclusion. Other, national measures could be taken, such as opt-ins within the ETS2 for buildings, road transport and additional sectors.

    The Commission recently adopted a report[3] assessing the potential inclusion of smaller ships under the scope of the EU Regulation for the monitoring, reporting and verification of maritime greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

    It notes that such an extension could have a positive impact on the level playing field since vessels just above or below the size threshold might be competing for similar market segments.

    In addition, it shows that it could help unlock the implementation of energy efficiency and low carbon solutions. However, the analysis also finds that the balance between administrative costs and additional monitored GHG emissions is less favourable for smaller ships.

    The Commission has committed to use 20 million EU allowances[4] until 2030 to support the decarbonisation of the maritime sector via the Innovation Fund, which can, as well as other instruments[5], support retrofitting of ships.

    • [1] Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC (OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32).
    • [2] The report from the Commission on the m onitoring of the implementation of the ETS Directive in relation to maritime transport from 18 March 2025 shows that there is no evidence of an increased use of vessels between 4 000 GT and 5 000 GT in 2024 compared to the previous year- COM(2025) 110 final — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0110 .
    • [3]  COM(2025) 109 final — https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025DC0109.
    • [4] Worth about EUR 1.5 billion with a price of EUR 75 per EU allowance.
    • [5] An inventory of financing products supporting investments in the shipping sector is available in the Ship Financing Portal — https://transport.ec.europa.eu/transport-modes/maritime/ship-financing-portal_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Exclusion of the ceramics sector from cost offsets under the Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the single market distortions caused by the allocation of free allowances – E-001557/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    1. Installations producing ceramic tiles are covered by the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). They receive free allocation on the basis of the spray-dried powder benchmark and of fall-back benchmarks for the processes not covered by the spray-dried powder benchmark. In this context, heat generated by means of combined heat and power (CHP) systems is rewarded by free allocation. In addition, operators of CHPs benefit from the ETS carbon price included in the electricity price, in particular as additional revenue for the electricity sold on the market. Therefore, the Commission does not see a need to change the current rules providing both, carbon leakage protection and incentives to invest into innovative low-carbon technologies including CHPs.

    2. The ceramics sector is energy-intensive for the production processes as well as trade-intensive. Therefore, it is considered at risk of carbon leakage and therefore eligible to receive free allowances at 100% of benchmark level in line with Commission Delegated Decision (EU) 2019/708[1] for the period 2021-2030. Member States may award state aid to electro-intensive industries to compensate for the cost of carbon emissions passed on through electricity bills (indirect cost compensation). However, the eligibility threshold set for this aid is an indirect emission intensity of at least 1 kg CO2/EUR, which was not reached for sector 23.31 (Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags) when the eligibility was assessed as part of the 2020 adoption of the relevant Commission guidelines[2]. The sector is therefore not currently eligible for this aid.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_del/2019/708/oj: OJ C 317, 25.9.2020, p. 5-19.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=oj:JOC_2020_317_R_0004.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – The final destination of EU development funds – E-000704/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    EU funds allocated to development assistance are implemented in accordance with the principle of transparency enshrined in the Financial Regulation applicable to the EU Budget[1].

    Detailed information on amounts funded are available in the Financial Annexes of the report on the Implementation of the EU’s External Action Instruments that the Commission publishes on a yearly basis[2]. These annexes provide a breakdown of the development assistance funding across multiple dimensions. In particular:

    — Table 3B provides a breakdown of disbursements by Instrument and responsible Directorate-General (DG International Partnerships vs. other services).

    — Table 5B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by thematic area/ sector being targeted (e.g. health, education, population policies, humanitarian aid) and the responsible Directorate-General.

    — Table 6B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by country/region and the responsible Directorate-General.

    — Table 8B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by country/region and thematic area/sector.

    — Table 13B provides a breakdown of disbursements made by type of contribution (e.g. contribution to a project, contribution to an NGO, etc…).

    Information on EU budget funding (with the exception of programmes under shared management[3]) awarded to specific recipients, such as European media outlets and think tanks, is publicly available through the centralised Financial Transparency System (FTS) web page[4].

    This tool provides information at individual project level (e.g. nature of the measure, committed amount, project start & end date, funding instrument, responsible Directorate-General) allowing to conduct searches across multiple dimension (e.g. name of the think tank, year of funding, beneficiary country).

    • [1]  Article 38 of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2024/2509 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2024 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2509/oj/eng.
    • [2]  For 2023’s activity, the Financial Annexes can be found in Section 8 of the Commission Staff Working Document (SWD(2024) 267 final) accompanying the 2024 Annual Report on the implementation of the European Union’s External Action Instruments in 2023 (COM(2024) 548 final): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=SWD:2024:267:FIN; https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/bfc002cc-bdca-11ef-91ed-01aa75ed71a1/language-en#:~:text=This%20is%20the%20staff%20working%20document%20accompanying%20the,international%20partnerships%2C%20humanitarian%20aid%2C%20foreign%20policy%20and%20enlargement.
    • [3]  Funding implemented through shared management represents less than 2% of the total volume of development aid, and mostly relates to interregional cooperation projects in EU border regions (e.g. transport, connectivity).
    • [4]  https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/eu-budget_en.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – The Commission’s use of public money for behind-the-scenes political lobbying – E-002388/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002388/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Mariusz Kamiński (ECR)

    In recent months a number of stories have appeared in the media concerning the Commission’s use of public money to carry out behind-the-scenes political lobbying to push through controversial policies such as the Green Deal and climate policy.

    The reports show that experts advocating the Commission’s preferred views are also receiving funding in the areas of agriculture and the common security and defence policy.

    What is more, reports in the Welt am Sonntag[1] suggest that, in addition to supporting ‘green’ NGOs in their efforts to lobby Member States and independent institutions, including the European Parliament, the Commission has also allegedly provided funding to help NGOs sue European companies.

    One example is ClientEarth, which received EUR 350 000 to take legal action against coal-fired power plants, with the explicit aim of increasing the ‘financial and legal risk’ for their operators.

    In view of the above, please provide specific answers to the following questions, which will speed up the work of the expected committee of inquiry that more than 200 MEPs have already called for:

    • 1.Has the Commission funded and in any way mandated NGOs, consultancy firms or lobbying outfits to influence the decisions and policies of democratic governments and independent institutions?
    • 2.In what areas – other than the already confirmed cases of the Green Deal, security and defence policy and agriculture – has the Commission conducted similar lobbying campaigns, and were activities promoting the agreement with Mercosur also financed?
    • 3.What steps is the Commission intending to take in response to the criticism that there is no credible and transparent overview of the EU funds that are going to NGOs?

    Submitted: 13.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/plus256221718/geheime-vertraege-offengelegt-eu-kommission-bezahlte-aktivisten-fuer-klimalobbyismus.html
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Industrial Emissions Directive – BREF for the ceramic manufacturing industry – E-002327/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002327/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Stefano Bonaccini (S&D), Elisabetta Gualmini (S&D), Sandro Gozi (Renew), Antonella Sberna (ECR), Sander Smit (PPE), Stefano Cavedagna (ECR)

    In November 2024, in the context of the application of the revised Industrial Emissions Directive, the Commission presented the draft Best Available Techniques Reference Document (BREF) for the ceramic manufacturing industry.

    The document establishes mandatory emissions and environmental performance levels, as well as the techniques to achieve them, constituting the basis for operational permits for ceramic manufacturing installations in the EU.

    Although the revised Industrial Emissions Directive introduces significant changes to permitting processes, with stricter emissions limits and ambitious decarbonisation and environmental targets, it also offers accessible and modern techniques, which would ensure viable technical and economic conditions in the ceramic sector.

    In the light of the above:

    • 1.Has the Commission properly assessed the impact on the ceramic industry of complying with the proposed targets, taking into consideration the heterogeneous nature of the sector and the investment needed to implement the required techniques?
    • 2.Can the Commission clarify the criteria for classifying the listed techniques (e.g. the electrification of continuous and intermittent kilns) as best available techniques, given their limited availability, the elevated costs of implementation and the absence of reliable data on their performance and related emissions?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Asia-Pac: Tender for re-opening of 3-year HKD HKSAR Institutional Government Bonds to be held on June 25

    Source: Hong Kong Government special administrative region

    The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority:
     
    The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), as representative of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government (HKSAR Government), announced today (June 19) that a tender of 3-year HKD Government Bonds (Bonds) through the re-opening of existing 3-year Government Bond issue 03GB2804001 under the Infrastructure Bond Programme will be held on Wednesday, June 25, 2025, for settlement on Thursday, June 26, 2025.

    An additional amount of HK$1.25 billion of the outstanding 3-year Bonds (issue no. 03GB2804001) will be on offer. The Bonds will mature on April 25, 2028 and will carry interest at the rate of 2.76 per cent per annum payable semi-annually in arrear. The Indicative Pricings of the Bonds on June 19, 2025 are 102.45 with an annualised yield of 1.882 per cent.

    Tender is open only to Primary Dealers appointed under the Infrastructure Bond Programme. Anyone wishing to apply for the Bonds on offer can do so through any of the Primary Dealers on the latest published list, which can be obtained from the Hong Kong Government Bonds website at www.hkgb.gov.hk. Each tender must be for an amount of HK$50,000 or integral multiples thereof.

    Tender results will be published on the HKMA’s website, the Hong Kong Government Bonds website, Bloomberg (GBHK ) and Refinitiv (IBPGSBPINDEX). The publication time is expected to be no later than 3pm on the tender day.

    HKSAR Institutional Government Bonds Tender Information

    Tender information of re-opening of 3-year HKD HKSAR Institutional Government Bonds:
     

    Issue Number : 03GB2804001
    Stock Code : 4291 (HKGB 2.76 2804)
    Tender Date and Time : Wednesday, June 25, 2025
    9.30am to 10.30am
    Issue and Settlement Date : Thursday, June 26, 2025
    Amount on Offer : HK$1.25 billion
    Maturity : 3 years
    Remaining maturity : Approximately 2.83 years
    Maturity Date : Tuesday, April 25, 2028
    Interest Rate : 2.76 per cent p.a. payable semi-annually in arrear
    Interest Payment Dates : April 25 and October 25 in each year, commencing on the Issue Date up to and including the Maturity Date, subject to adjustment in accordance with the terms of the Institutional Issuances Information Memorandum of the Infrastructure Bond Programme and Government Sustainable Bond Programme (Information Memorandum) published on the Hong Kong Government Bonds website.
    Method of Tender : Competitive tender
    Tender Amount : Each competitive tender must be for an amount of HK$50,000 or integral multiples thereof. Any tender applications for the Bonds must be submitted through a Primary Dealer on the latest published list.

    The accrued interest to be paid by successful bidders on the issue date (June 26, 2025) for the tender amount is 234.41 per minimum denomination of HK$50,000.

    (The accrued interest to be paid for tender amount exceeding HK$50,000 may not be exactly equal to the figures calculated from the accrued interest per minimum denomination of HK$50,000 due to rounding).
    Other Details : Please see the Information Memorandum available on the Hong Kong Government Bonds website or approach Primary Dealers.
    Expected commencement date of dealing on
    the Stock Exchange
    of Hong Kong Limited    		 : The tender amount is fully fungible with the existing 03GB2804001 (Stock code: 4291) listed on the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong.
    Use of Proceeds : The Bonds will be issued under the institutional part of the Infrastructure Bond Programme. Proceeds will be invested in infrastructure projects in accordance with the Infrastructure Bond Framework published on the Hong Kong Government Bonds website.

    MIL OSI Asia Pacific News –

  • MIL-OSI: Descartes Acquires PackageRoute

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Strengthens Final-Mile Carrier Capabilities

    WATERLOO, Ontario and ATLANTA, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Descartes Systems Group (TSX: DSG) (Nasdaq: DSGX), the global leader in uniting logistics-intensive businesses in commerce, announced that it has acquired PackageRoute, a leading provider of final-mile carrier solutions.

    Based in the US, PackageRoute’s mission is to simplify and optimize the daily operations of final-mile carriers. The company offers a mobile and web-based platform that provides real-time visibility into package deliveries, route optimization, and fleet management. PackageRoute’s software integrates seamlessly with pickup and delivery data, enabling contractors and drivers to make better-informed decisions and operate more efficiently.   

    “PackageRoute works primarily with subcontracted delivery service providers working as agents for larger carriers,” said James Wee, General Manager of Routing, Mobile and Telematics at Descartes. “We believe PackageRoute customers can get substantial value from our integrated Descartes GroundCloud routing, safety and compliance solutions.”

    Descartes GroundCloud helps ensure seamless operations, end-to-end visibility, and standards of safety and compliance are met, including helping final-mile carriers comply with the various safety mandates of large transportation brands.

    “We continue to invest in solutions that help final-mile carriers deliver shipments safely and efficiently,” said Edward J. Ryan, Descartes’ CEO. “We’re thrilled to welcome PackageRoute’s customers, partners and team of domain experts into the Descartes family.”

    PackageRoute is headquartered in Sammamish, WA. Descartes acquired PackageRoute for approximately US $2 million, satisfied from cash on hand.

    About Descartes Systems Group           
    Descartes is the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, security, and sustainability of logistics-intensive businesses. Customers use our modular, software-as-a-service solutions to route, track and help improve the safety, performance and compliance of delivery resources; plan, allocate and execute shipments; rate, audit and pay transportation invoices; access global trade data; file customs and security documents for imports and exports; and complete numerous other logistics processes by participating in the world’s largest, collaborative multimodal logistics community. Our headquarters are in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and we have offices and partners around the world. Learn more at www.descartes.com, and connect with us on LinkedIn and X (Twitter).

    Descartes Investor Contact         
    Laurie McCauley
    (519) 746-2969
    investor@descartes.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws (“forward-looking statements”) that relate to Descartes’ acquisition of PackageRoute and its solution offerings; the potential to provide customers with final-mile carrier solutions; other potential benefits derived from the acquisition and PackageRoute’s solution offerings; and other matters. Such forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance or achievements to differ materially from the anticipated results, performance or achievements or developments expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the expected future performance of the PackageRoute business based on its historical and projected performance as well as the factors and assumptions discussed in the section entitled, “Certain Factors That May Affect Future Results” in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and other securities commissions across Canada including Descartes’ most recently filed management’s discussion and analysis. If any such risks actually occur, they could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. In that case, the trading price of our common shares could decline, perhaps materially. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Forward-looking statements are provided for the purposes of providing information about management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. We do not undertake or accept any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements to reflect any change in our expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based, except as required by law.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Descartes Acquires PackageRoute

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Strengthens Final-Mile Carrier Capabilities

    WATERLOO, Ontario and ATLANTA, June 19, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Descartes Systems Group (TSX: DSG) (Nasdaq: DSGX), the global leader in uniting logistics-intensive businesses in commerce, announced that it has acquired PackageRoute, a leading provider of final-mile carrier solutions.

    Based in the US, PackageRoute’s mission is to simplify and optimize the daily operations of final-mile carriers. The company offers a mobile and web-based platform that provides real-time visibility into package deliveries, route optimization, and fleet management. PackageRoute’s software integrates seamlessly with pickup and delivery data, enabling contractors and drivers to make better-informed decisions and operate more efficiently.   

    “PackageRoute works primarily with subcontracted delivery service providers working as agents for larger carriers,” said James Wee, General Manager of Routing, Mobile and Telematics at Descartes. “We believe PackageRoute customers can get substantial value from our integrated Descartes GroundCloud routing, safety and compliance solutions.”

    Descartes GroundCloud helps ensure seamless operations, end-to-end visibility, and standards of safety and compliance are met, including helping final-mile carriers comply with the various safety mandates of large transportation brands.

    “We continue to invest in solutions that help final-mile carriers deliver shipments safely and efficiently,” said Edward J. Ryan, Descartes’ CEO. “We’re thrilled to welcome PackageRoute’s customers, partners and team of domain experts into the Descartes family.”

    PackageRoute is headquartered in Sammamish, WA. Descartes acquired PackageRoute for approximately US $2 million, satisfied from cash on hand.

    About Descartes Systems Group           
    Descartes is the global leader in providing on-demand, software-as-a-service solutions focused on improving the productivity, security, and sustainability of logistics-intensive businesses. Customers use our modular, software-as-a-service solutions to route, track and help improve the safety, performance and compliance of delivery resources; plan, allocate and execute shipments; rate, audit and pay transportation invoices; access global trade data; file customs and security documents for imports and exports; and complete numerous other logistics processes by participating in the world’s largest, collaborative multimodal logistics community. Our headquarters are in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada and we have offices and partners around the world. Learn more at www.descartes.com, and connect with us on LinkedIn and X (Twitter).

    Descartes Investor Contact         
    Laurie McCauley
    (519) 746-2969
    investor@descartes.com

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    This release contains forward-looking information within the meaning of applicable securities laws (“forward-looking statements”) that relate to Descartes’ acquisition of PackageRoute and its solution offerings; the potential to provide customers with final-mile carrier solutions; other potential benefits derived from the acquisition and PackageRoute’s solution offerings; and other matters. Such forward-looking statements involve known and unknown risks, uncertainties, assumptions and other factors that may cause the actual results, performance or achievements to differ materially from the anticipated results, performance or achievements or developments expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. Such factors include, but are not limited to, the expected future performance of the PackageRoute business based on its historical and projected performance as well as the factors and assumptions discussed in the section entitled, “Certain Factors That May Affect Future Results” in documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Ontario Securities Commission and other securities commissions across Canada including Descartes’ most recently filed management’s discussion and analysis. If any such risks actually occur, they could materially adversely affect our business, financial condition or results of operations. In that case, the trading price of our common shares could decline, perhaps materially. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance upon any such forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date made. Forward-looking statements are provided for the purposes of providing information about management’s current expectations and plans relating to the future. Readers are cautioned that such information may not be appropriate for other purposes. We do not undertake or accept any obligation or undertaking to release publicly any updates or revisions to any forward-looking statements to reflect any change in our expectations or any change in events, conditions or circumstances on which any such statement is based, except as required by law.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: JLT Mobile Computers announces a generational change in marketing leadership

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Växjö, Sweden, June 24, 2025 * * * JLT Mobile Computers, a leading developer and supplier of reliable computers for demanding environments, today announced the planned generational change in its marketing leadership. This leadership transition reflects JLT’s strategic initiative to centralize and mobilize its marketing resources, reinforcing its commitment to global growth and market expansion.

    Christian Meincke, who has served as Chief Marketing Officer at JLT since 2023, is retiring. Tejal Ranjan, Vice President of Marketing, will take on global responsibility for the company’s marketing strategy, planning, and operations.

    Tejal joined JLT as VP of Marketing, USA in October 2024 and brings over 20 years of international experience in B2B technology marketing. Throughout her career, Tejal has held executive marketing positions at global technology firms, leading digital transformation efforts, building high-performing teams, and launching integrated campaigns that accelerated revenue growth and brand recognition. She is recognized for her customer-centric approach, data-driven decision-making, and her ability to closely align marketing with sales for measurable business impact.

    To learn more about JLT Mobile Computers, and the company’s products, services and solutions, visit jltmobile.com. Financial information is available on JLT’s investor page.

    About JLT Mobile Computers

    JLT Mobile Computers is a leading developer and supplier of rugged mobile computing devices and solutions for demanding environments. 30 years of development and manufacturing experience have enabled JLT to set the standard in rugged computing, combining outstanding product quality with expert service, support and solutions to ensure trouble-free business operations for customers in warehousing, transportation, manufacturing, mining, ports and agriculture. JLT operates globally from offices in Sweden, France, and the US, complemented by an extensive network of sales partners in local markets. The company was founded in 1994, and the share has been listed on the Nasdaq First North Growth Market stock exchange since 2002 under the symbol JLT. Eminova Fondkommission AB acts as Certified Adviser. Learn more at jltmobile.com.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Verizon announces pricing terms of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and related tender offers open to certain investors

    Source: Verizon

    Headline: Verizon announces pricing terms of its private exchange offers for 10 series of notes and related tender offers open to certain investors

    NEW YORK, N.Y. –  Verizon Communications Inc. (“Verizon”) (NYSE, Nasdaq: VZ) today announced the pricing terms of its two previously announced related transactions to repurchase 10 series of its outstanding notes listed in the tables below.

    Exchange Offers

    The first transaction consists of 10 separate private offers to exchange (the “Exchange Offers”) any and all of the outstanding series of notes listed in the table below (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), collectively the “Old Notes”) in exchange for newly issued debt securities of Verizon (the “New Notes”), on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offering Memorandum dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offering Memorandum”), the eligibility letter (the “Eligibility Letter”) and the accompanying exchange offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offering Memorandum and the Eligibility Letter, constitute the “Exchange Offer Documents”). Only a holder who has duly completed and returned an Eligibility Letter certifying that it is either (1) a “qualified institutional buyer” (as defined in Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the “Securities Act”)); or (2) a person located outside the United States who is (i) not a “U.S. person” (as defined in Rule 902 under the Securities Act), (ii) not acting for the account or benefit of a U.S. person and (iii) a “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” (as defined below), are authorized to receive the Offering Memorandum and to participate in the Exchange Offers (such holders, “Exchange Offer Eligible Holders”).

    The Exchange Offers will each expire at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to an Exchange Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Exchange Offer, the “Exchange Offer Expiration Date”). Old Notes tendered for exchange may be validly withdrawn at any time at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to an Exchange Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Exchange Offer, the “Exchange Offer Withdrawal Date”), but not thereafter, unless extended by Verizon. The “Exchange Offer Settlement Date” with respect to an Exchange Offer will be promptly following the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Exchange Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Exchange Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the applicable Exchange Offer Yield and Total Exchange Price (each as defined in the Offering Memorandum) for each series of Old Notes, as calculated at 11:00 a.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers (as defined below), the “Price Determination Date”).

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points) (2)

    Floating Rate Note Total Exchange Price(3)

    Fixed Rate Note Exchange Offer Yield

    Fixed Rate Note Total Exchange Price

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    4.625% due March 15, 2026

    4.225%

    +0

    N/A

    4.225%

    $980.07

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    $1,006.00

    N/A

    N/A

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $1,000.71

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $982.00

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +20

    N/A

    4.069%

    $1,007.76

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +15

    N/A

    4.019%

    $950.62

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +30

    N/A

    4.252%

    $990.52

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +35

    N/A

    4.302%

    $951.02

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +55

    N/A

    4.502%

    $867.19

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +60

    N/A

    4.552%

    $1,152.36

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, if the New Notes Capacity Condition (as defined below) and/or the corresponding Cash Offer Completion Condition (as defined below) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Old Notes for exchange in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above (as used in the context of the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, each an “Acceptance Priority Level,” with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level). It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for exchange even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The Total Exchange Price payable per each $1,000 principal amount of a series of Old Notes validly tendered for exchange other than the Floating Rate Notes (as defined below) (the “Fixed Rate Notes”) will be payable in a specified principal amount of New Notes and will be based on the fixed spread specified in the table above (the “Fixed Spread”) for the applicable series of Fixed Rate Notes, plus the yield of the specified Reference U.S. Treasury Security for that series as of the Price Determination Date. The Total Exchange Price does not include the applicable Accrued Coupon Payment (as defined below), which will be payable in cash in addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price.

    (3) The Total Exchange Price payable per each $1,000 principal amount of floating rate notes due 2026 (the “Floating Rate Notes”) validly tendered for exchange and not validly withdrawn will be payable in a specified principal amount of New Notes. Any Floating Rate Notes validly tendered and accepted by us, will receive the Total Exchange Price listed above for the Floating Rate Notes.

    Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Exchange Offer Documents, Exchange Offer Eligible Holders who (i) validly tender, and who do not validly withdraw, Old Notes at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date or (ii) deliver a properly completed and duly executed Exchange Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery and all other required documents at or prior to the Exchange Offer Expiration Date and validly tender their Old Notes at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the second business day after the applicable Exchange Offer Expiration Date pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures, and whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange by us, will receive the applicable Total Exchange Price for each $1,000 principal amount of such Old Notes, which will be payable in principal amount of New Notes.

    Verizon is offering to accept for exchange validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to a $2.5 billion cap on the maximum aggregate principal amount of New Notes that Verizon will issue in all of the Exchange Offers (the “New Notes Maximum Amount”). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Exchange Offers described in the Offering Memorandum, Verizon will, in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Levels, accept for exchange all Old Notes of each series validly tendered and not validly withdrawn, so long as (1) the Total Exchange Price for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Old Notes of such series, plus (2) the Total Exchange Price for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Old Notes of all series having a higher Acceptance Priority Level than such series of Old Notes is equal to, or less than, the New Notes Maximum Amount; provided, however, Verizon may: (x) waive the New Notes Capacity Condition with respect to one or more Exchange Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Exchange Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Exchange Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Exchange Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the New Notes Maximum Amount to be exceeded and exchange all Old Notes of a given series in an Exchange Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to exchange the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Exchange Offer without exceeding the New Notes Maximum Amount. Subject to applicable law, Verizon may waive or increase the New Notes Maximum Amount at any time.

    In addition to the applicable Total Exchange Price, Exchange Offer Eligible Holders whose Old Notes are accepted for exchange will receive a cash payment equal to the accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Exchange Offer Settlement Date (the “Accrued Coupon Payment”). Interest will cease to accrue on the Exchange Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Exchange Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    The New Notes will mature on July 2, 2037. The table below indicates the interest rate (the “New Notes Coupon”) for the series of New Notes to be issued by Verizon pursuant to the Exchange Offers (as calculated at the Price Determination Date in accordance with the Offering Memorandum).

    New Notes

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Reference Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points)

    New Notes Coupon

    New Notes due 2037

    4.250% due May 15, 2035

    4.351%

    +105

    5.401%

    Pursuant to the Minimum Issue Requirement, Verizon will not complete the Exchange Offers if the aggregate principal amount of New Notes to be issued would be less than $750 million. Verizon may not waive the Minimum Issue Requirement.

    In addition to the Minimum Issue Requirement, Verizon’s obligation to accept any series of Old Notes tendered in the Exchange Offers is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions applicable to the Exchange Offer for such series as described in the Offering Memorandum, including, among others, the New Notes Capacity Condition and the Cash Offer Completion Condition. Verizon expressly reserves the right, subject to applicable law, to waive any and all conditions to any Exchange Offer, other than conditions described by Verizon as non-waivable.

    Notwithstanding any other provision in the Offering Memorandum to the contrary, if at the Exchange Offer Expiration Date, for a particular Exchange Offer, the Total Exchange Price payable for all validly tendered Old Notes of a particular series is greater than the New Notes Maximum Amount (after exchanging all validly tendered Old Notes of each series with a higher Acceptance Priority Level), then Verizon will not be obligated to accept for exchange, or issue any New Notes in exchange for, such series of Old Notes and may terminate the Exchange Offer with respect to such series of Old Notes (the “New Notes Capacity Condition”) in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Procedures described in the Offering Memorandum.

    Each series of Old Notes that is subject to an Exchange Offer pursuant to the Exchange Offer Documents is also subject to a corresponding Cash Offer pursuant to the Offer to Purchase (as defined below), which Cash Offer is only available to holders of the Old Notes that are not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders. The Acceptance Priority Levels set forth in the Offer to Purchase correspond to the Acceptance Priority Levels set forth in the Offering Memorandum. Verizon’s obligation to complete an Exchange Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes is conditioned on the timely satisfaction or waiver of all conditions precedent to the completion of the corresponding Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes (with respect to each Exchange Offer, the “Cash Offer Completion Condition”), and Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes is subject to various conditions, as set forth in the Offer to Purchase, including (i) that all of the conditions precedent to the completion of the corresponding Exchange Offer are timely satisfied or waived and (ii) that the aggregate amount of cash (excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment) that would have to be paid to purchase any and all of the validly tendered Old Notes of such series in such Cash Offer does not exceed the applicable maximum cash amount specified in the Offer to Purchase. Verizon will terminate an Exchange Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes, and Verizon will terminate the Cash Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes. The termination of a Cash Offer for a series of Old Notes will not impact the Exchange Offers for any other series of Old Notes. The Cash Offer Completion Condition cannot be waived by Verizon. If Verizon extends any Cash Offer for a series of Old Notes for any reason, Verizon will extend the corresponding Exchange Offer for such series Old Notes.

    If and when issued, the New Notes will not be registered under the Securities Act or any state securities laws. Therefore, the New Notes may not be offered or sold in the United States absent registration or an applicable exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act and any applicable state securities laws. Verizon will enter into a registration rights agreement with respect to the New Notes.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Exchange Agent for the Exchange Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Exchange Offers or for additional copies of the Exchange Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774.You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Exchange Offers. The Exchange Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://gbsc-usa.com/eligibility/verizon.

    Cash Offers

    The second transaction consists of 10 separate offers to purchase for cash (the “Cash Offers”) any and all of each series of Old Notes, on the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Offer to Purchase dated June 12, 2025 (the “Offer to Purchase”), the certification instructions letter (the “Certification Instructions Letter”) and the accompanying cash offer notice of guaranteed delivery (the “Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery” which, together with the Offer to Purchase and the Certification Instructions Letter, constitute the “Tender Offer Documents”). Only holders who are not Exchange Offer Eligible Holders (“Cash Offer Eligible Holders”) are eligible to participate in the Cash Offers. Holders of Old Notes participating in the Cash Offers will be required to complete the Certification Instructions Letter and certify that they are Cash Offer Eligible Holders.

    The Cash Offers will each expire at 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Expiration Date”). Old Notes tendered for purchase may be validly withdrawn at any time at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) today, June 18, 2025 (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Withdrawal Date”), but not thereafter, unless extended by Verizon. The “Cash Offer Settlement Date” with respect to a Cash Offer will be promptly following the Cash Offer Expiration Date and is expected to be June 25, 2025.

    Unless otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms used under the heading Cash Offers have the respective meanings assigned thereto in the Tender Offer Documents.

    The table below indicates, among other things, the applicable Cash Offer Yield and Total Consideration (as defined in the Offer to Purchase) for each series of Old Notes, as calculated at the Price Determination Date in accordance with the Offer to Purchase.

    Acceptance Priority Level(1)

    Title of Security

    CUSIP
    Number(s)

    Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Yield of Reference U.S.
    Treasury Security

    Fixed Spread
    (basis points) (2)

    Floating Rate Note Total Consideration(3)

    Cash Offer Yield

    Fixed Rate Note Total Consideration

    1

    1.450% Notes due 2026

    92343VGG3

    4.625% due March 15, 2026

    4.225%

    +0

    N/A

    4.225%

    $980.07

    2

    Floating Rate Notes due 2026

    92343VGE8

    N/A

    N/A

    N/A

    $1,006.00

    N/A

    N/A

    3

    4.125% Notes due 2027

    92343VDY7

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $1,000.71

    4

    3.000% Notes due 2027

    92343VFF6

    3.875% due May 31, 2027

    3.929%

    +15

    N/A

    4.079%

    $982.00

    5

    4.329% Notes due 2028

    92343VER1/

    92343VEQ3/

    U9221ABK3

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +20

    N/A

    4.069%

    $1,007.76

    6

    2.100% Notes due 2028

    92343VGH1

    3.875% due June 15, 2028

    3.869%

    +15

    N/A

    4.019%

    $950.62

    7

    4.016% Notes due 2029

    92343VEU4/

    92343VET7/

    U9221ABL1

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +30

    N/A

    4.252%

    $990.52

    8

    3.150% Notes due 2030

    92343VFE9

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +35

    N/A

    4.302%

    $951.02

    9

    1.680% Notes due 2030

    92343VFX7/

    92343VFN9/

    U9221ABS6

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +55

    N/A

    4.502%

    $867.19

    10

    7.750% Notes due 2030

    92344GAM8/

    92344GAC0

    4.000% due May 31, 2030

    3.952%

    +60

    N/A

    4.552%

    $1,152.36

    (1) Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, including if the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined below) is not satisfied with respect to every series of Old Notes, Verizon will accept Notes for purchase in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Level specified in the table above. It is possible that a series of Old Notes with a particular Acceptance Priority Level will not be accepted for purchase even if one or more series with a higher or lower Acceptance Priority Level are accepted for purchase.

    (2) The Total Consideration for each series of Fixed Rate Notes (such consideration, the “Fixed Rate Note Total Consideration”) validly tendered will be determined in accordance with standard market practice, as described in the Offer to Purchase, to result in a Total Consideration payable per each $1,000 principal amount of each series of Fixed Rate Notes that equates to a yield to the maturity date (or Par Call Date, if applicable) in accordance with the formula set forth in Annex A to the Offer to Purchase, for the applicable series of Fixed Rate Notes, equal to the sum of (i) the yield corresponding to the bid side price of the applicable Reference U.S. Treasury Security specified in the table above for such series of Fixed Rate Notes at the Price Determination Date plus (ii) the applicable Fixed Spread specified in the table above for such series of Fixed Rate Notes. The Total Consideration does not include the applicable Accrued Coupon Payment (as defined below), which will be payable in cash in addition to the applicable Total Consideration.

    (3) Payable per each $1,000 principal amount of Floating Rate Notes validly tendered and not validly withdrawn at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date or the Cash Offer Guaranteed Delivery Date (as defined below) pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures and accepted for purchase (such amount, the “Floating Rate Note Total Consideration”).

    Upon the terms and subject to the conditions set forth in the Tender Offer Documents, Cash Offer Eligible Holders who (i) validly tender, and who do not validly withdraw, Old Notes at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date or (ii) deliver a properly completed and duly executed Cash Offer Notice of Guaranteed Delivery at or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date and validly tender their Old Notes at or prior to 5:00 p.m. (Eastern time) on the second business day after the applicable Cash Offer Expiration Date (such date and time with respect to a Cash Offer, as the same may be extended with respect to such Cash Offer, the “Cash Offer Guaranteed Delivery Date”) pursuant to the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures, and whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase by Verizon, will receive the applicable Total Consideration for each $1,000 principal amount of Old Notes, which will be payable in cash.

    Verizon is offering to purchase validly tendered Old Notes using a “waterfall” methodology under which such Old Notes of different series will be accepted in the order of their respective Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, subject to the Maximum Total Consideration Condition (as defined below) and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition (as defined below). However, subject to applicable law, Verizon, in its sole discretion, has the option to waive or increase the Maximum Total Consideration Condition at any time.

    Subject to the satisfaction or waiver of the conditions of the Cash Offers described in the Offer to Purchase, Verizon will, in accordance with the Acceptance Priority Levels as listed in the table above, accept for purchase all Old Notes of each series validly tendered and not validly withdrawn, so long as the Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, for all validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes of all series having a higher Acceptance Priority Level than such series of Old Notes is equal to, or less than, the Maximum Total Consideration Amount; provided, however, Verizon may: (x) waive the Maximum Total Consideration Condition with respect to one or more Cash Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Cash Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Cash Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Cash Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the Maximum Total Consideration Amount to be exceeded and purchase all Old Notes of a given series in an Cash Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to purchase the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Cash Offer without exceeding the Maximum Total Consideration Amount. 

    In addition to the applicable Total Consideration, Cash Offer Eligible Holders whose Old Notes are accepted for purchase will be paid accrued and unpaid interest on such Old Notes from and including the immediately preceding interest payment date for such Old Notes to, but excluding, the Cash Offer Settlement Date (the “Accrued Coupon Payment”). Interest will cease to accrue on the Cash Offer Settlement Date for all Old Notes accepted in the Cash Offers, including those Old Notes tendered through the Guaranteed Delivery Procedures.

    Verizon’s obligation to accept any series of Old Notes tendered in the Cash Offers is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions applicable to the Cash Offer for such series as described in the Offer to Purchase, including the Maximum Total Consideration Condition and the Exchange Offer Completion Condition. Verizon expressly reserves the right, subject to applicable law, to waive any and all conditions to any Cash Offer, other than conditions described by Verizon as non-waivable.

    Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes validly tendered is conditioned (the “Maximum Total Consideration Condition”) on aggregate Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, payable for Old Notes purchased in the Cash Offers (the “Aggregate Purchase Consideration”) not to exceed $300 million (the “Maximum Total Consideration Amount”). Verizon’s obligation to complete a Cash Offer with respect to a particular series of Old Notes validly tendered is conditioned on the Maximum Total Consideration Amount being sufficient to pay the Total Consideration, excluding the Accrued Coupon Payment, for all validly tendered Notes of such series (after accounting for all validly tendered Notes that have a higher Acceptance Priority Level).  

    Verizon reserves the right, but are under no obligation, to increase or waive the Maximum Total Consideration Amount, in our sole discretion subject to applicable law, with or without extending the Cash Offer Withdrawal Date. No assurance can be given that Verizon will increase or waive the Maximum Total Consideration Amount. If Cash Offer Eligible Holders tender more Old Notes in the Cash Offers than they expect to be accepted for purchase based on the Maximum Total Consideration Amount and Verizon subsequently accepts more than such Cash Offer Eligible Holders expected of such Old Notes tendered as a result of an increase of the Maximum Total Consideration Amount, such Cash Offer Eligible Holders may not be able to withdraw any of their previously tendered Notes. Accordingly, Cash Offer Eligible Holders should not tender any Old Notes that they do not wish to be accepted for purchase.

    If the Maximum Total Consideration Condition is not satisfied with respect to each series of Old Notes, for (i) a series of Old Notes (the “First Non-Covered Notes”) for which the Maximum Total Consideration Amount is less than the sum of (x) the Aggregate Purchase Consideration for all validly tendered First Non-Covered Notes and (y) the Aggregate Purchase Consideration for all validly tendered Notes of all series, having a higher Acceptance Priority Level as set forth on the cover of the Offer to Purchase (with 1 being the highest Acceptance Priority Level and 10 being the lowest Acceptance Priority Level) than the First Non-Covered Notes, and (ii) all series of Old Notes with an Acceptance Priority Level lower than the First Non-Covered Notes (together with the First Non-Covered Notes, the “Non-Covered Notes”), then Verizon may, at any time on or prior to the Cash Offer Expiration Date: (x) waive the Maximum Total Consideration Condition with respect to one or more Cash Offers and accept all Old Notes of the series sought in such Cash Offer, and of any series of Old Notes sought in Cash Offers with a higher Acceptance Priority Level, validly tendered and not validly withdrawn; or (y) skip any Cash Offer for Old Notes that would have caused the Maximum Total Consideration Amount to be exceeded and purchase all Old Notes of a given series in an Cash Offer having a lower Acceptance Priority Level so long as Verizon is able to purchase the full amount of validly tendered and not validly withdrawn Notes in such Cash Offer without exceeding the Maximum Total Consideration Amount.

    Verizon’s obligation to complete any Cash Offer with respect to a given series of Old Notes is conditioned on the completion of the corresponding Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes (with respect to each Cash Offer, the “Exchange Offer Completion Condition”). Verizon will terminate the Cash Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Exchange Offer for such series of Old Notes, and it will terminate the Exchange Offer for a given series of Old Notes if it terminates the Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes. The termination of an Exchange Offer for a series of Old Notes will not impact the Cash Offer for any other series of Old Notes. If Verizon extends the Exchange Offer for a series of Old Notes for any reason, Verizon will extend the corresponding Cash Offer for such series of Old Notes. The Exchange Offer Completion Condition cannot be waived by Verizon.

    Global Bondholder Services Corporation is acting as the Information Agent and the Tender Agent for the Cash Offers. Questions or requests for assistance related to the Cash Offers or for additional copies of the Tender Offer Documents may be directed to Global Bondholder Services Corporation at (212) 430-3774. You may also contact your broker, dealer, commercial bank, trust company or other nominee for assistance concerning the Cash Offers. The Tender Offer Documents can be accessed at the following link: https://www.gbsc-usa.com/verizon.

    Verizon refers to the Exchange Offers and the Cash Offers, collectively, as the “Offers.”

    If Verizon terminates any Offer with respect to one or more series of Old Notes, it will give prompt notice to the Tender Agent or Exchange Agent, as applicable, and all Old Notes tendered pursuant to such terminated Offer will be returned promptly to the tendering holders thereof. With effect from such termination, any Old Notes blocked in DTC will be released.

    Holders are advised to check with any bank, securities broker or other intermediary through which they hold Old Notes as to when such intermediary needs to receive instructions from a holder in order for that holder to be able to participate in, or (in the circumstances in which revocation is permitted) revoke their instruction to participate in, the Exchange Offers or Cash Offers, as applicable, before the deadlines specified herein and in the Exchange Offer Documents or the Tender Offer Documents, as applicable. The deadlines set by any such intermediary and each clearing system for the submission and withdrawal of exchange instructions will also be earlier than the relevant deadlines specified herein and in the Exchange Offer Documents or the Tender Offer Documents, as applicable.

    This announcement is for informational purposes only. This announcement is not an offer to purchase or a solicitation of an offer to purchase any Old Notes. The Exchange Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offering Memorandum and related documents and the Cash Offers are being made solely pursuant to the Offer to Purchase and related documents. The Offers are not being made to holders of Old Notes in any jurisdiction in which the making or acceptance thereof would not be in compliance with the securities, blue sky or other laws of such jurisdiction. In any jurisdiction in which the securities laws or blue sky laws require the Offers to be made by a licensed broker or dealer, the Offers will be deemed to be made on behalf of Verizon by the dealer managers or one or more registered brokers or dealers that are licensed under the laws of such jurisdiction.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offers have not been approved by an authorized person for the purposes of Section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”). Accordingly, this announcement is not being distributed to, and must not be passed on to, persons within the United Kingdom save in circumstances where section 21(1) of the FSMA does not apply. Accordingly, this communication is only addressed to and directed at persons who are outside the United Kingdom and (i) persons falling within the definition of investment professionals (as defined in Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (the “Financial Promotion Order”)), or (ii) within Article 43 of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iii) high net worth companies and other persons to whom it may lawfully be communicated falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (iv) to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of Section 21 of the FSMA) in connection with the issue or sale of any securities may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (such persons together being “relevant persons”). The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes will be engaged in only with, relevant persons. Any person who is not a relevant person should not act or rely on any document relating to the Exchange Offers or any of their contents.

    This communication and any other documents or materials relating to the Exchange Offer are only addressed to and directed at persons in member states of the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), who are “Qualified Investors” within the meaning of Article 2(e) of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129. The New Notes are only available to, and any invitation, offer or agreement to subscribe, purchase or otherwise acquire such New Notes, will be engaged in only with, Qualified Investors. The Exchange Offer is only available to Qualified Investors. None of the information in the Offering Memorandum and any other documents and materials relating to the Exchange Offer should be acted upon or relied upon in any member state of the EEA by persons who are not Qualified Investors.

    “Non-U.S. qualified offeree” means:

    (i)       in relation to any investor in the European Economic Area (the “EEA”), a qualified investor as defined in Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 (as amended or superseded) that is not a retail investor. For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (a) a retail client as defined in point (11) of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/65/EU (as amended, “MiFID II”); or (b) a customer within the meaning of Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client as defined in point (10) of Article 4(1) of MiFID II;

    (ii)      in relation to any investor in the United Kingdom, a qualified investor as defined in Article 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 that is not a retail investor and that (a) has professional experience in matters relating to investments and qualifies as an investment professional within the meaning of Article 19(5) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (as amended, the “Financial Promotion Order”), (b) is a person falling within Article 49(2)(a) to (d) (“high net worth companies, unincorporated associations etc.”) of the Financial Promotion Order, or (c) is a person to whom an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity (within the meaning of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, as amended (the “FSMA”)) in connection with the issue or sale of any notes may otherwise lawfully be communicated or caused to be communicated (all such persons together being referred to as “relevant persons”). For these purposes, a retail investor means a person who is one (or more) of: (x) a retail client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2 of Regulation (EU) No 2017/565 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA”); or (y) a customer within the meaning of the provisions of the FSMA and any rules or regulations made under the FSMA to implement Directive (EU) 2016/97, where that customer would not qualify as a professional client, as defined in point (8) of Article 2(1) of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 as it forms part of domestic law by virtue of the EUWA; or

    (iii)      any entity outside the U.S., the EEA and the United Kingdom to whom the Exchange Offer may be made in compliance with all applicable laws and regulations of any applicable jurisdiction without registration of the Exchange Offer or any related filing or approval.

    Cautionary Statement Regarding Forward-Looking Statements

    In this communication Verizon has made forward-looking statements, including regarding the conduct and completion of the Offers. These forward-looking statements are not historical facts, but only predictions and generally can be identified by use of statements that include phrases such as “will,” “may,” “should,” “continue,” “anticipate,” “assume,” “believe,” “expect,” “plan,” “appear,” “project,” “estimate,” “hope,” “intend,” “target,” “forecast,” or other words or phrases of similar import. Similarly, statements that describe our objectives, plans or goals also are forward-looking statements. These forward-looking statements are subject to risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those currently anticipated, including those discussed in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase under the heading “Risk Factors” and under similar headings in other documents that are incorporated by reference in the Offering Memorandum and Offer to Purchase. Holders are urged to consider these risks and uncertainties carefully in evaluating the forward-looking statements and are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements. The forward-looking statements included in this press release are made only as of the date of this press release, and Verizon undertakes no obligation to update publicly these forward-looking statements to reflect new information, future events or otherwise. In light of these risks, uncertainties and assumptions, the forward-looking events might or might not occur. Verizon cannot assure you that projected results or events will be achieved.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Christine Lagarde: Strengthening economies in a stormy and fragmenting world

    Source: European Central Bank

    Speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the ninth Annual Research Conference “Economic and financial integration in a stormy and fragmenting world” organised by the National Bank of Ukraine and Narodowy Bank Polski in Kyiv, Ukraine

    Kyiv, 19 June 2025

    It is an honour to be here in Kyiv – a city that has come to symbolise resilience, dignity and the enduring spirit of freedom. Kyiv stands not only as the heart of Ukraine, but as a beacon of what it means to hold fast to democratic values in the face of immense challenge.

    As the great Ukrainian poet Taras Shevchenko once wrote, “In your own house – your own truth. Your own strength and freedom.” Ukraine’s fight today reminds all of Europe of this powerful truth: our security and prosperity rely on unity, on integration with our neighbours.

    In the face of Russia’s unjustified war of aggression, Ukrainians have demonstrated extraordinary courage and resilience in defence of their country.

    In my remarks today, and in keeping with the theme of this conference, I would like to reflect on the historical lessons we have learned about strengthening and integrating economies in an increasingly stormy and fragmented world.

    Experience shows that closer ties with the European neighbourhood can provide a strong foundation for Ukraine to rebuild and emerge stronger. And as geopolitical tensions rise and global supply chains fragment, the case for deeper regional cooperation has never been clearer.

    Europe’s own long history of integration offers valuable insights that can help guide Ukraine’s path forwards. Two key lessons stand out.

    First, while deeper integration increases the potential rewards, it also raises the risks if not managed wisely. Sound domestic policy frameworks are essential to maximise growth and safeguard stability.

    Second, the benefits of integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Maintaining them depends on continuous reform – but reforms must also deliver tangible improvements for people’s lives, and do so relatively quickly.

    The benefits of integration in a fragmenting world

    During the Cold War, the Iron Curtain fractured the European economy. Trade between East and West fell by half. This division was like imposing a 48% tariff – leading to immense welfare losses and isolating the Eastern bloc from global markets.[1]

    But the transformation since Europe’s eastern enlargement has been nothing short of remarkable. On average, countries that joined the EU in 2004 have nearly doubled their GDP per capita over the past two decades.

    Critically, this was not just about catching up from a low base. Between 2004 and 2019, the EU’s new Member States saw their GDP per capita grow 32% more than comparable non-EU countries.[2] The difference was deeper economic integration – and those that were already highly embedded in the regional economy gained the most.

    While all new members experienced gains, countries with stronger integration into regional value chains recorded nearly 10 percentage points higher GDP per capita growth compared with less integrated peers – regardless of geographic proximity.[3]

    This difference was driven mainly by technology and productivity spillovers. ECB research shows that a 10% increase in productivity among western EU firms translated into a 5% productivity gain for central and eastern European firms linked to their supply chains.[4]

    The case for regional integration is therefore clear – and in today’s increasingly fragmented geopolitical landscape, it has become even more compelling.

    First, regional integration underpins growth.

    European economies are highly open, which means a world splintering into rival trading blocs poses clear risks to prosperity. Yet Europe’s most important trading partner is Europe itself: around 65% of euro area exports go to other European countries, including the United Kingdom, Switzerland and Norway. For Ukraine too, Europe is the principal trading partner, accounting for over 50% of its goods trade in 2024.

    By deepening economic ties – more closely linking neighbouring economies – we can reduce our exposure to external shocks. Rising trade within our region can help offset losses in global markets.

    Second, regional integration strengthens resilience.

    One consequence of geopolitical fragmentation is the realignment of supply chains toward trusted partners. Nearly half of firms involved in external trade have already revised their strategies – or intend to do so – including relocating parts of their operations closer to home.[5] While this trend reduces strategic dependencies, it can also raise costs.

    Yet large integrated regions can mitigate these costs by replicating many of the benefits of globalisation at the regional level. Supply chains can be reorganised regionally, allowing each country to specialise based on its comparative advantage within regional value chains.

    Ukraine stands to benefit significantly from expanding these networks across the region – and the EU stands to benefit, too, from having Ukraine as a partner.[6]

    In the automotive sector, for example, Ukrainian firms already produce around 7% of all wire harnesses used in EU vehicles.[7] As the industry shifts towards electric vehicles, which require more complex wiring systems, Ukraine’s manufacturing base is well positioned to scale up and play a larger role in the EU value chain.

    Equally transformative is Ukraine’s drone industry, which has become one of the most advanced in the region. Drones are not only a critical component of modern warfare, but also a technology with substantial spillover effects and far-reaching dual-use applications.

    Indeed, the country’s ambitious goal of producing 4.5 million drones by 2025 has accelerated innovation in materials science, battery technology and 3D printing. These advances are already finding civilian applications in sectors such as logistics, agriculture and emergency response.

    In short, for both existing EU members and neighbouring countries like Ukraine, regional integration is both a path to prosperity and a strategic anchor in an increasingly fragmented world.

    Managing the risks of integration

    But examining the experience of countries that have used regional integration as a platform for growth and reform reveals two important lessons.

    The first is that if integration is not accompanied by appropriate reforms, it can create new vulnerabilities – especially in the financial sphere.

    Financial integration often brings volatile capital inflows, which can make it difficult to distinguish sustainable growth from unsustainable excesses in real time.

    One way this can happen is when productivity gains in tradable sectors, such as manufacturing, drive up wages in those sectors, which then spill over into higher wages in non-tradable sectors and push up overall inflation.[8]

    While this effect is a normal feature of catching-up, it can make it easy to mistake genuine convergence for economic overheating. If foreign capital is in fact driving financial imbalances – such as unsustainable real estate booms – countries may exhibit the same patterns of rising wages and inflation, masking underlying vulnerabilities.

    Another potential distortion is that capital inflows can significantly affect government fiscal positions by boosting tax revenues and creating the illusion of permanently greater fiscal space. This often leads to procyclical fiscal policies, with governments increasing spending or cutting taxes during boom periods – only to face fiscal stress when inflows reverse or growth slows.

    Both dynamics have been visible during Europe’s recent experience with regional integration.

    After the eastern enlargement, financial integration accelerated rapidly. Between 2003 and 2008, the new Member States experienced an extraordinary surge in capital inflows, averaging over 12% of GDP annually – twice the typical level for emerging markets globally.[9]

    Initially, this rapid financial integration brought clear benefits: it expanded access to credit, fuelled growth and enabled much-needed development. However, in many countries, foreign capital was disproportionately channelled into consumption and construction booms, while tax revenues rose sharply on the back of property transactions and buoyant domestic demand.[10] This led to widespread misallocation of private capital and inefficient public spending.

    Capital flows then reversed sharply when the global financial crisis struck, exposing these imbalances. Between December 2008 and May 2013, external bank liabilities in non-euro area central and eastern European countries declined by an average of 27% – with some countries experiencing drops of more than 50%.[11]

    Yet the risks associated with financial integration can be avoided. Not all countries in the region were affected equally. Those that performed better typically shared two key features.

    First, they had clear policies to channel foreign investment into productive sectors. Strong industrial strategies, a skilled workforce and integration into global supply chains helped direct capital towards manufacturing and tradable services – sectors that drive export growth and are less prone to unsustainable booms and asset bubbles.[12]

    Second, they maintained robust financial policy frameworks. Tighter capital requirements, active macroprudential measures and countercyclical buffers strengthened domestic banking sectors and curbed excessive mortgage lending. These tools enabled those countries to absorb large capital inflows without creating destabilising imbalances.[13]

    The lesson is clear: as countries integrate into the region, strong domestic policy frameworks are critical to ensuring that capital inflows support long-term growth rather than generating financial instability or inefficient allocation.

    This insight is especially relevant for Ukraine today as it charts its path towards recovery. If reconstruction proceeds as planned, the country could attract significant capital inflows over the next decade. But without the right safeguards, that capital risks being misallocated – undermining long-term productivity instead of strengthening it.

    There are encouraging signs. The EU–Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area have already driven significant reforms in the financial sector. Ukraine’s banking regulation now aligns with more than 75% of EU standards, covering critical areas such as capital adequacy, governance and auditing.[14]

    The National Bank of Ukraine has adopted a risk-based supervisory model inspired by the Single Supervisory Mechanism – the system of banking supervision in Europe – markedly improving oversight. Despite extremely challenging circumstances, Ukraine is also modernising its capital markets – consolidating exchanges, upgrading settlement systems and strengthening regulatory enforcement to attract long-term investors.

    These reforms are already delivering results: in 2023, Ukraine’s banking sector remained profitable and well capitalised despite the ongoing war – an outcome that would have been unthinkable a decade ago.

    Still, further progress is essential, especially in fiscal governance. Strengthening public investment management will be critical to ensure that reconstruction funds are allocated transparently and efficiently.

    This is not just about meeting external standards. It is about ensuring that every euro, and every hryvnia, delivers real returns for the Ukrainian people.[15]

    Making integration sustainable

    However, reforms cannot be treated as a one-time effort.

    So, the second key lesson is that the benefits of regional integration are neither automatic nor permanent. Sustaining them requires continuous reform – and, just as importantly, it requires citizens to see visible, tangible improvements in their daily lives.

    In this context, there are two risks to watch out for.

    The first is that institutional reform momentum can fade if economic benefits do not follow quickly.

    Deeper regional integration typically begins with aligning framework conditions, such as legal systems, regulation and public administration. These areas often improve rapidly. But for the economic gains to materialise, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors must respond to the new incentives created – and this takes time.

    In the long run, evidence shows that countries with initially weaker institutions benefit the most from adopting higher standards.[16] But in the short run, if people only see the effort and not the payoff, public support for further reforms can weaken, putting long-term convergence at risk.

    The second risk is that structural shifts in the economy may weaken the link between integration and economic convergence over time.

    The integration of goods markets has traditionally driven convergence almost automatically, as foreign direct investment flows to countries with lower land and labour costs, supply chains relocate and lower-income countries benefit from technology transfers.

    As I mentioned earlier, this will remain an important mechanism even in an era of supply chain reshoring. But countries cannot rely on it as heavily as in the past. Future growth in intra-EU trade is expected to depend increasingly on services – particularly digital services.

    However, research shows that services sector activity tends to concentrate in larger, more affluent urban areas that exhibit the hallmarks of a knowledge economy: high tertiary education rates, strong technology and science sectors and robust digital infrastructure.[17]

    This means that deeper integration alone will not guarantee broad-based convergence across all regions. Over time, countries will need to invest more in education, skills and digitalisation to ensure they can build high levels of human capital.

    Maintaining the path of convergence is therefore not easy. But slowing down reform efforts is not the answer – especially in the shock-prone world we face today.

    There is a clear link between strong institutions and economic resilience. ECB research indicates that, during the pandemic, regions with lower institutional quality experienced – all else equal – an additional decline of around 4 percentage points in GDP per capita compared with the ten regions with the highest quality of government.[18]

    As our economies are increasingly buffeted by global turbulence, institutional backsliding therefore risks creating a vicious circle: repeated shocks can undermine economic convergence and further erode public confidence in the reform process.

    The best way for countries to sustain reform momentum is to recognise the importance of maintaining public support and, as far as possible, pair governance improvements with a focus on sectors where they have a clear competitive edge – and where deeper integration with the region can unlock significant and rapid growth opportunities.

    This way, the benefits of reforms will be felt more quickly and more widely.

    Ukraine is well positioned to put this into practice. Its IT sector is already relatively strong: IT services exports reached nearly USD 7 billion in 2023, making it one of the country’s leading export sectors despite the war.[19]

    Ukraine also produces around 130,000 STEM graduates each year – exceeding Germany and France[20] – and it ranks among the top five countries globally for certified IT professionals.[21] Successful IT clusters are active in several cities, and major foreign firms – including Apple, Microsoft, Boeing and Siemens – have established R&D operations in the country.

    A dynamic defence tech ecosystem is also taking shape[22], with Ukrainian start-ups attracting almost half a billion US dollars in funding in 2024 – surpassing many of their peers across central and eastern Europe.[23] Experience from countries like Israel suggests that such a foundation can enable the country to emerge as a broader technology hub in the years ahead.

    If Ukraine stays the course on institutional reform and continues to adapt its economy to new opportunities, despite the stormy environment, it can emerge as a vital engine of growth and a key contributor to the region’s future.

    Conclusion

    Let me conclude.

    Ukraine stands at a pivotal moment – facing the hardships of war, the challenge of reconstruction and the opportunity of deeper regional integration.

    In a world marked by shifting geopolitical realities, such integration offers a clear path to recovery and lasting prosperity.

    The recent history of regional integration shows not only its immense benefits, but also the importance of managing transitional risks through robust policy frameworks. It also underlines the need to sustain reform over time by ensuring that people feel its benefits.

    I am confident that Ukraine will be able to fully realise its economic potential, turning the upheaval of today into the foundation for a dynamic future.

    As Ivan Franko, one of Ukraine’s greatest poets, once wrote: “even though life is but a moment and made up of moments, we carry eternity in our souls.”

    This enduring spirit captures the resilience and potential of Ukraine’s people and its economy – a spirit that will continue to drive advancement and renewal in the years ahead.

    MIL OSI Economics –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: United Arab Emirates (UAE) Undersecretary for Energy and Petroleum Affairs Joins African Energy Week (AEW) 2025

    Sharif Salim Al-Olama, Undersecretary for Energy and Petroleum Affairs at the Ministry of Energy and Infrastructure of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has joined African Energy Week (AEW): Invest in African Energies to discuss collaborative opportunities in oil and gas. Taking place on September 29 to October 3 in Cape Town, the event is the premier platform for Africa’s energy industry. Al-Olama’s participation is expected to open new doors for multilateral deals and partnerships.  

    The UAE has emerged as Africa’s largest source of foreign direct investment, with investments from Emirati companies totaling $110 billion between 2019 and 2023. This reflects a broader trend by Emirati companies to expand their portfolios in Africa, with strengthened cooperation set to unlock a wealth of development opportunities for African nations. As African countries pursue new sources of finance to advance projects in oil, gas and logistics, UAE expertise and technology will prove invaluable. During AEW: Invest in African Energies 2025, Al-Olama is expected to share insights into opportunities for UAE-Africa collaboration.  

    AEW: Invest in African Energies is the platform of choice for project operators, financiers, technology providers and government, and has emerged as the official place to sign deals in African energy. Visit http://www.AECWeek.com for more information about this exciting event. 

    Looking to consolidate its position as a major player in Africa’s energy landscape, the UAE has strengthened ties with African nations in recent months. A deal signed with Morocco will see the UAE support the development of the Africa-Atlantic gas pipeline – transporting Nigerian gas to North Africa and then on to Europe. The UAE will help mobilize financing for the project through its Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund. As of May 2025, the feasibility and preliminary engineering studies for the pipeline were complete. Agreements have also been signed with Tanzania for the operation and modernization of port infrastructure while the UAE and Kenya signed a landmark comprehensive economic partnership agreement in 2025. The UAE also launched the UAE-Africa Gateway initiative in 2025, aimed at enhancing investment opportunities for Emirati companies in the sub-Saharan African region. The initiative seeks to mobilize private sector investment to advance African projects and strengthen UAE-Africa cooperation.  

    The UAE’s state-owned oil and gas companies are also expanding their presence in Africa. Notably, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) is deepening its footprint across the continent, with strategic investments in exploration and infrastructure development. Recent milestones include ADNOC’s international arm XRG acquiring a 10% stake in Mozambique’s offshore Rovuma Basin Area 4 concession. The acquisition includes stakes in the operational Coral South FLNG project, the planned Coral North FLNG project and the Rovuma LNG projects. Collectively, these projects have a target production capacity of 25 million tons per annum. In Egypt, ADNOC partnered with energy major bp to establish Arcius Energy – a natural gas platform to unlock the country’s upstream potential. The platform aligns with ADNOC’s international expansion plans.  

    Beyond oil and gas, UAE-based companies have played an instrumental role in strengthening Africa’s trade and logistics sector. Companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports have expanded their presence across the continent. DP World operates six African ports while Abu Dhabi Ports have recently extended operations into Guinea, Egypt and Angola. In the clean energy space, Emirati companies are leading projects in solar, green hydrogen and power. Notably, Masdar has committed $2 billion to renewable energy projects in Africa through 2030, unlocking significant opportunities for African countries. AMEA Power is investing in a series of renewable energy projects across the continent, including $620 million in a 300MW wind project in Ethiopia; a 120 million solar project in South Africa; a 1GW green hydrogen development in Mauritania; two battery storage projects in South Africa; a 150 MW solar plant in Angola; among others. Currently, the company has more than 2.6 GW of clean energy projects either in operation of under construction in Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Egypt, Ivory Coast, Morocco, Togo and Tunisia.  

    “The UAE has emerged as a strong partner for African countries seeking to advance the development of their oil, gas, clean energy and infrastructure industries. By expanding their presence across the market, partnering with African firms and mobilizing capital for impactful projects, Emirati companies are playing a major role in supporting Africa’s economic growth,” states Verner Ayukegba, Senior Vice President, African Energy Chamber.  

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of African Energy Chamber.

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Africa: CORRECTION: Africa Data Centres and Blue Turtle partner to accelerate South Africa’s digital infrastructure and cloud transformation

    Africa Data Centres (https://www.AfricaDataCentres.com), a business of Cassava Technologies, a pan-African technology group, has formed a commercial partnership with Blue Turtle, one of South Africa’s leading enterprise IT solutions providers, to deploy colocation services in the Cape Town and Midrand data centres. This agreement marks a significant step in expanding South Africa’s enterprise cloud and digital infrastructure ecosystem, enabling secure, scalable, and compliant colocation and private hosted cloud services for local enterprise customers.  

    The partnership enables Blue Turtle to deploy several racks, providing their enterprise clients with access to world-class, secure, and compliant colocation and private hosted cloud services. Additionally, this collaboration will also allow South African businesses the opportunity to rapidly embrace cloud computing, digital transformation, and data-driven operations in a scalable, compliant, and high-performance colocation environment.   

    “This partnership enables us to offer customers trusted colocation and private cloud solutions in two of South Africa’s most strategic data centre locations,” said Jan Hitge, Head of Managed Services at Blue Turtle. “As enterprise clients increasingly look for secure, scalable, and cost-efficient alternatives to on-premises infrastructure, we anticipate strong market uptake – a confidence reflected in the accelerated ramp-up timeline we’ve committed to.”  

    By providing high-availability colocation services backed by regulatory compliance, low-latency connectivity, and disaster recovery capabilities, the partnership is expected to support enterprises in modernising their IT environments, enhancing security posture, and meeting evolving data sovereignty requirements under laws such as South Africa’s Protection of Personal Information Act (POPIA).  

    “This agreement is about more than just filling racks; it’s about enabling digital transformation across the economy,” said Adil El Youssefi, CEO of Africa Data Centres. “Blue Turtle brings a strong client base and the ability to scale rapidly, making them an ideal partner in our mission to deliver secure, resilient, and sustainable digital infrastructure across South Africa. As demand for trusted infrastructure continues to climb, we will work towards this partnership evolving to support broader cloud initiatives, edge computing, and AI-ready infrastructure deployments.”  

    With commercial partners like Blue Turtle, Africa Data Centres continues to expand its footprint and impact across the continent, powering the next phase of enterprise transformation and solidifying South Africa’s status as a leading technology hub in Africa.  

    Africa Data Centres, which operates the continent’s largest interconnected, vendor- and cloud-neutral data centre platform, will benefit from Blue Turtle’s strong go-to-market capabilities and proven track record in delivering IT solutions to South Africa’s enterprise sector. 

    Distributed by APO Group on behalf of Africa Data Centres.

    Africa Data Centres:
    Africa Data Centres owns and operates Africa’s largest network of interconnected, carrier and cloud-neutral data centre facilities. Bringing international experts to the pan-African market, Africa Data Centres is a trusted partner for rapid and secure data centre services and interconnections across Africa. Strategically located in South, East and West Africa our world-class data centre facilities provide a home for all business-critical data for Africa’s small, medium and large enterprises and global hyperscale customers. https://www.AfricaDataCentres.com  

    MIL OSI Africa –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – State of play of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine versus the Western Balkans – E-002321/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002321/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Friedrich Pürner (NI)

    Ukraine was granted EU candidate country status in 2022 and is among the ten countries hoping to accede to the Union. The Western Balkans embarked upon their journey to EU membership in 2003. Since then, only Croatia has joined the Union (in 2013), while the other countries are still working towards the Copenhagen criteria. By contrast, although Ukraine is at war, its accession process is advancing at a much faster pace.

    • 1.What progress has Ukraine made in ticking off the Copenhagen criteria and the individual chapters of the EU acquis since being conferred candidate status in June 2022, and what specific challenges remain, particularly in the areas of the rule of law, fighting corruption, and judicial reform?
    • 2.Are there discussions within the Commission about adapting or loosening the accession requirements for Ukraine in certain areas – for example, as regards the full implementation of the EU acquis or economic convergence – in order to speed up the accession process, and if so, how is a balance being struck between expedition and compliance with the accession criteria?
    • 3.To what extent is the Commission taking the current geopolitical situation and the ongoing war in Ukraine into account when setting timelines and priorities for the accession negotiations, and are there any plans to introduce transitional arrangements or special agreements in order to facilitate the accession process in these extraordinary circumstances?

    Submitted: 10.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Agricultural products from Türkiye containing banned pesticides – E-001061/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Food products from third countries, regardless of their origin, must comply with EU food safety standards laid down in EU legislation. According to Regulation (EU) 2017/625[1], Member States must carry out official controls and enforcement activities at all stages of distribution, including at the import stage.

    Where food of non-animal origin from third countries poses a risk, the Commission adopts measures through Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793[2], including increased frequency checks at border control posts.

    Member States are to impose penalties applicable to the infringement of the Union agri-food chain legislation. These penalties shall be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and the Member States’ competent authorities are responsible for the removal of non-compliant consignments from the EU market.

    The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) is established to ensure an exchange of information between Member States to support a swift reaction by food safety authorities.

    The Commission performs audits[3] in Member States and in third countries to ensure that their official control systems guarantee that goods intended for export to the EU comply with applicable EU rules. As suggested in the Vision for Food and Agriculture, a dedicated task force will be established, which will significantly increase the Union’s response to further strengthening the control on imports.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/625/oj.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1793/oj/eng.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit_reports/index.cfm.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Agricultural products from Türkiye containing banned pesticides – E-001061/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Food products from third countries, regardless of their origin, must comply with EU food safety standards laid down in EU legislation. According to Regulation (EU) 2017/625[1], Member States must carry out official controls and enforcement activities at all stages of distribution, including at the import stage.

    Where food of non-animal origin from third countries poses a risk, the Commission adopts measures through Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793[2], including increased frequency checks at border control posts.

    Member States are to impose penalties applicable to the infringement of the Union agri-food chain legislation. These penalties shall be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and the Member States’ competent authorities are responsible for the removal of non-compliant consignments from the EU market.

    The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) is established to ensure an exchange of information between Member States to support a swift reaction by food safety authorities.

    The Commission performs audits[3] in Member States and in third countries to ensure that their official control systems guarantee that goods intended for export to the EU comply with applicable EU rules. As suggested in the Vision for Food and Agriculture, a dedicated task force will be established, which will significantly increase the Union’s response to further strengthening the control on imports.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/625/oj.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1793/oj/eng.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit_reports/index.cfm.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Agricultural products from Türkiye containing banned pesticides – E-001061/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    Food products from third countries, regardless of their origin, must comply with EU food safety standards laid down in EU legislation. According to Regulation (EU) 2017/625[1], Member States must carry out official controls and enforcement activities at all stages of distribution, including at the import stage.

    Where food of non-animal origin from third countries poses a risk, the Commission adopts measures through Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1793[2], including increased frequency checks at border control posts.

    Member States are to impose penalties applicable to the infringement of the Union agri-food chain legislation. These penalties shall be effective, proportionate, dissuasive and the Member States’ competent authorities are responsible for the removal of non-compliant consignments from the EU market.

    The Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) is established to ensure an exchange of information between Member States to support a swift reaction by food safety authorities.

    The Commission performs audits[3] in Member States and in third countries to ensure that their official control systems guarantee that goods intended for export to the EU comply with applicable EU rules. As suggested in the Vision for Food and Agriculture, a dedicated task force will be established, which will significantly increase the Union’s response to further strengthening the control on imports.

    • [1] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/625/oj.
    • [2] https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg_impl/2019/1793/oj/eng.
    • [3] https://ec.europa.eu/food/audits-analysis/audit_reports/index.cfm.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Rescue at sea by the aid vessel ‘Madleen’ – P-002408/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Priority question for written answer  P-002408/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Özlem Demirel (The Left)

    On 5 June 2025, the Gaza-bound aid vessel ‘Madleen’ received a distress signal via a Frontex drone. It provided a location update for a boat with 30-40 people on board. The ‘Madleen’ contacted Greek authorities and, as the boat was in Egypt’s search-and-rescue zone, Egyptian authorities too. The crew launched a rescue boat. Another vessel approached; it was initially assumed to be Egyptian, but turned out to be a Libyan coastguard vessel. It took the people on board, apparently against their will. Four of them jumped into the sea out of fear; they were rescued by the ‘Madleen’, with Frontex subsequently taking charge of them.

    • 1.When and by what means (aircraft, drones, satellite reconnaissance) did Frontex observe and/or contact the ‘Madleen’ or the vessel ‘Conscious’, which had been on a similar mission?
    • 2.What facts are known to Frontex about the maritime emergency on 5 June 2025 (position and time, actor making the sighting, distress signals sent and received, maritime emergency coordination centres that were competent and took action, vessels in the vicinity, order given to the ‘Madleen’ to carry out the rescue)?
    • 3.Who directed Frontex to take charge of the rescued persons from the ‘Madleen’, and to hand them over to another centre, and where are those persons and the people taken on board by the Libyan coastguard vessel ‘Tareq Bin Zayed’ now?

    Submitted: 16.6.2025

    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Cybersecurity and operational readiness of port authorities – the need for pan-European coordination – E-002367/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002367/2025
    to the Commission
    Rule 144
    Nikolas Farantouris (The Left)

    As revealed by reports in the Greek press[1], the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Insular Policy’s information system has reportedly been out of operation for several days and remains so to this date, for reasons still unknown. Even the official webpage is down. The disruption affects some of the Coast Guard’s critical digital applications, which help ensure that citizens are safe and get the assistance they need.

    In addition, the Coast Guard is entrusted with critical responsibilities, including maritime safety, maritime transport control and the management of migration flows, which are relevant for European security.

    This incident, whatever may have caused it, calls into question the operational readiness of critical EU infrastructure, in particular in relation to services at the EU’s external borders.

    Can the Commission therefore say:

    • 1.Have its services been informed of the aforementioned malfunctions?
    • 2.Does it intend to establish, in particular, protocols and mechanisms to prevent and respond to such situations?
    • 3.Does it intend to establish a single framework for assessing the cybersecurity of Member States’ port and border structures?

    Submitted: 11.6.2025

    • [1] https://www.documentonews.gr/article/sovari-kataggelia-epese-o-server-toy-ypoyrgeioy-naytilias-tyflo-to-limeniko/, https://www.newsbreak.gr/ellada/888514/psifiaki-katarreysi-offline-ypoyrgeio-naytilias-kai-limeniko-ti-ginetai-me-ton-server/.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Written question – Sanctioning of sham charities supporting Hamas – E-002378/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Question for written answer  E-002378/2025
    to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
    Rule 144
    Pina Picierno (S&D)

    In October 2024, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three individuals and one sham charity that are prominent financial supporters of Hamas but also active in Italy, Germany and Austria[1].

    On 10 June 2025, OFAC sanctioned another five people and five sham charities outside the US that stand accused of financing Hamas’s military wing under the guise of conducting humanitarian work both internationally and in Gaza. Some of them operate in the EU, specifically, in Italy and the Netherlands, and are run by people already subject to sanctions[2].

    Despite those measures, the charities continue to operate undisturbed in Europe, carrying out activities for a movement that the EU has designated a terrorist organisation.

    Taking into account that the US, an important Atlantic Alliance partner in efforts to tackle international terrorism and bring stability to the Middle East, has already sanctioned those charities, will the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy apply similar sanctions at EU level with a view to curbing terrorist activities in the Member States?

    Submitted: 12.6.2025

    • [1] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2632.
    • [2] https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0162.
    Last updated: 18 June 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News –