Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI: Alliance Witan PLC – Final Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    Alliance Witan PLC (‘the Company’)
    LEI: 213800SZZD4E2IOZ9W55

    7 March 2025

    A landmark year

    Annual results for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Highlights

    • 2024 was a landmark year for the Company, which was promoted to the FTSE 100 after the combination with Witan Investment Trust Plc (‘Witan’).
    • The Company’s share price was 1,244 pence (£12.44) as of 31 December 2024, representing a Share Price Total Return1 of 14.3%.
    • The Company’s Net Asset Value Total Return1 of 13.3%, while strongly positive, trailed our benchmark index, the MSCI All Country World Index (‘MSCI ACWI’), which returned 19.6%.
    • The Company’s average discount narrowed to 4.7% from 5.4% at the end of 2023, which compared favourably with the average discount for the Association of Investment Company’s Global Sector of 7.9%.
    • A fourth interim dividend 6.73p per share was declared on 28 January 2025, bringing the total dividend for the year ended 31 December 2024 to 26.70p per share. This is a 6% increase on the previous year, the 58th consecutive annual increase.

    Dean Buckley, Chair of Alliance Witan, commented:

    “The Company delivered strong outright gains for shareholders in 2024, although in common with most active global equity strategies, we underperformed our benchmark index, MSCI ACWI, where performance was concentrated in a handful of the largest US companies. Even so, the Company’s longer-term performance remains competitive, and demand for our shares was healthy last year, with the Company’s discount narrowing, bucking the industry trend towards widening discounts. We also increased our dividend for the 58th consecutive year.

    “Thanks to the support of both sets of shareholders, we achieved a historic combination with Witan, which places the Company in a strong position to realise economies of scale and offer better liquidity for our shares. With solid performance and a refreshed brand, supported by a marketing campaign that will continue in 2025, the Board is confident that the Company is well placed to continue delivering attractive returns for shareholders”.

    About Alliance Witan PLC

    Alliance Witan aims to be a core investment that beats inflation over the long term through a combination of capital growth and rising dividend. The Company invests in global equities across a wide range of different sectors and industries to achieve its objective. Alliance Witan’s portfolio uses a distinctive multi-manager approach. We blend the top stock selections of some of the world’s best active managers into a single diversified portfolio designed to outperform the market while carefully managing risk. Alliance Witan is an AIC Dividend Hero with 58 consecutive years of rising dividends.

    https://www.alliancewitan.com

    For more information, please contact:

    For more information, please contact:
    Mark Atkinson
    Senior Director
    Client Management, Wealth & Retail
      Sarah Gibbons-Cook
    Director
    Willis Towers Watson   Quill PR
    Tel: 07918 724303   Tel: 07702 412680
    mark.atkinson@wtwco.com   AllianceWitan@quillpr.com

    1. Alternative Performance Measure. Share Price Total Return is the return to shareholders through share price capital returns and dividends paid by the Company and re-invested. Net Asset Value (NAV) Total Return is a measure of the performance of the Company’s NAV over a specified time period. It combines any change in the NAV and dividends paid.

    Financial highlights as at 31 December 2024

    Net Assets Net Asset Value (‘NAV’) per Share
    £5.2bn 1,304.9p
    (2023: £3.3bn) (2023: 1,175.1p)
       
    NAV Total Return1 Share Price
    +13.3% 1,244.0p
    (2023: +21.6%) (2023: 1,112.0p)
       
    Share Price Total Return1 Discount to NAV1
    +14.3% -4.7%
    (2023: +20.2%) (2023: -5.4%)
       
    Earnings per Share (Revenue) Total Dividend per Share
    17.3p 26.7p
    (2023: 18.6p) (2023: 25.2p)

    1. Alternative Performance Measure – see page 116 of the Annual Report for further information.
    Notes:
    NAV per Share including income with debt at fair value.
    NAV Total Return based on NAV including income with debt at fair value and after all costs.
    Source: Morningstar and Juniper Partners Limited (‘Juniper’).

    Chair’s Statement

    • Landmark combination with Witan
    • Another strong year for equities
    • 58th consecutive annual dividend increase
    • Discount narrower than the AIC Global Sector average
    • Named by the AIC as a top 20 best performing investment trust over ten years1

    2024 was a landmark year for your Company. I would like to begin by thanking you for your support for the combination of Alliance Trust and Witan to form Alliance Witan and by welcoming all shareholders who have joined us as a result. This was a pivotal moment in our history, achieving economies of scale and elevating the Company to the FTSE 100. Now, as one of the industry’s leaders, this status will provide better liquidity for our shares and, with good long term investment performance and a strong brand, help us attract new investors. We made a number of commitments to investors as part of the proposals, for example in respect of dividends and costs, and you will see as you read through the Annual Report how we have achieved each of these.

    As I mentioned in the Interim Report for the six months ended 30 June 2024, there has been no change to the Company’s investment strategy, just a larger pool of assets for our Investment Manager, WTW, to manage with the same professionalism that it has brought to the job since April 2017.

    1. https://www.theaic.co.uk/aic/news/press-releases/top-20-best-performing-investment-trusts-for-your-isa

    Investment Performance

    It was another good year for global equity markets, and your Company delivered strong absolute returns. NAV Total Return was 13.3% and, due to a narrowing of the discount, Share Price Total Return was 14.3%. However, we lagged our benchmark index, the MSCI All Country World Index (‘MSCI ACWI’ or ‘Index’), which returned 19.6%. We also marginally underperformed our peers in the AIC Global Sector, which is disappointing, but we were slightly ahead of the much wider, more representative Morningstar peer group of open and closed-ended global equity funds.

    Simply put, our relative performance in 2024 suffered from not having enough exposure to the small number of very large companies that dominated market returns, especially in the US.

    The narrowness of returns from global equity markets has been a common problem for all active managers in recent years, and we take comfort from the fact that, despite this persistent headwind, we are ahead of the Index and have significantly outperformed both peer groups over three years. You can read more about the contributors/detractors to the Company’s investment performance during 2024 in the Investment Manager’s Report on page 9 of the Annual Report.

    Dividend increased for the 58thconsecutive year

    The Board declared a fourth interim dividend of 6.73p per share on 28 January 2025, resulting in a full year dividend of 26.70p, an increase of 6.0% on the prior year. This fulfils the promise we made at the time of the combination of Alliance Trust and Witan to increase dividends for the legacy shareholders of both companies. 2024’s increase marks the 58th consecutive annual increase, which is one of the longest track records in the investment trust industry. Dividends are well supported by revenue and reserves, and the Board is confident annual dividend increases can continue well into the future. Due to our steady approach, the Company has received a ‘Dividend Hero’ investment company award from the Association of Investment Companies (‘AIC’).

    Narrowing discount

    Many investment trusts continued to trade on large discounts to NAV throughout 2024, with the industry average widening to 14.7% from 12.7%.1 I am pleased to report that your Company fared better than most, with its average discount falling to 4.7% from 5.4% over the year. This compared favourably with the average discount for the AIC Global Sector of 7.9%.

    Your Board remains committed to the maintenance of a stable discount. We will continue to use share buybacks as appropriate and invest in promotional activity to widen our shareholder base, to support the management of the discount. During 2024, the Company bought back 4.7 million shares (1.2% of shares in issue2), versus 8.6 million repurchased in 2023. The shares bought back during the year were placed in Treasury. This level of buybacks was significantly below that of our peers, in a year in which industry-wide buybacks hit a record level of £7.5 billion3. The shares held in Treasury can be reissued by the Company at a premium to estimated NAV when there is market demand.

    Board changes

    Following the completion of the combination of Alliance Trust with Witan, we welcomed four new Non-Executive Directors to the Board: Andrew Ross, Rachel Beagles, Shauna Bevan and Jack Perry, all of whom were former directors of Witan.

    Clare Dobie, having served for almost nine years, is retiring as a Director at the conclusion of this year’s Annual General Meeting (‘AGM’), as is Jack Perry, reducing the size of the Board to eight members.

    On behalf of the Board, I would like to thank Clare and Jack for their contributions.

    Annual General Meeting

    The Board looks forward to being able to meet shareholders again at this year’s AGM, which will be held at the Apex City Quay Hotel in Dundee on 1 May 2025. For those shareholders who are not able to attend in person, we will be live streaming the event. As well as the formal business of the meeting, there will be an investor forum afterwards featuring two of our Stock Pickers, Jennison and EdgePoint, as well as members of WTW’s investment team. There will be another in-person investor forum in London in the autumn. In addition, shareholders can engage with the Company and its Stock Pickers via online presentations during the year. Further details of how to attend all these events can be found on the website.

    The Board would strongly encourage shareholders to use the opportunity to have their say and use their vote at the AGM. Further information on the arrangements for the AGM, including information on how to vote either directly through the Registrar or though different platforms, is on pages 134 and 135 of the Annual Report.

    Keep up-to-date

    In these unusual times, the website will provide timely updates to shareholders. Therefore, I would encourage you to visit the website which contains a vast amount of information on investment performance, details of shareholder meetings and investor forums, monthly factsheets, quarterly newsletters, and Stock Picker updates, as well as the Annual and Interim Reports.

    As always, the Board welcomes communication from shareholders and I can be contacted through Juniper Partners (‘Juniper’), the Company Secretary at investor@alliancewitan.com.

    Outlook

    Since the start of President Trump’s second term of office in January, tariffs have created uncertainty about the outlook for equities. Diplomatic tensions over efforts to end the war in Ukraine and conflict in Gaza have also raised geopolitical risks. Furthermore, European bond markets are adjusting to the prospect of increased borrowing to fund higher levels of defence and infrastructure spending.

    While there is a risk that heightened levels of uncertainty will impact on business and consumer confidence, global growth and corporate earnings forecasts are currently healthy, giving some grounds for cautious optimism, about further gains for shareholders, especially if there is a broadening out of market leadership.

    While the Index is highly concentrated, your portfolio has broader exposure to many good businesses that have not yet received the market recognition our Stock Pickers believe they deserve.

    The portfolio will not always outperform the market in every discrete period, but we believe it will continue to add significant value for shareholders in the long run.

    I look forward to meeting as many of you as possible at the AGM in Dundee or the next investor forum in London.

    1. Weighted average discount (excluding 3i Group). Source: Winterflood.
    2. Percentage based on the Company’s issued share capital (excluding shares held in Treasury) as at 1 January 2025.
    3. Source: AIC and Morningstar.

    Dean Buckley
    Chair
    6 March 2025

    Combination with Witan

    The most significant development during the year under review was the combination of the Company with Witan.

    Background

    Following a comprehensive review of management arrangements, the Witan Board concluded that a combination with the Company was in the best interests of Witan’s shareholders. Amongst other things this allowed them continued exposure to a successful multi-manager approach.

    The combination was undertaken by way of a scheme of reconstruction and members’ voluntary liquidation of Witan. The scheme required the approval of both the Company and Witan’s shareholders and took effect on 10 October 2024. It resulted in the Company acquiring approximately £1,539 million of net assets from Witan in consideration for the issue of new ordinary shares to Witan shareholders. The name of the Company became Alliance Witan and the stock exchange ticker ALW.

    Outcome

    The combination was expected to result in substantial benefits for all shareholders and future investors. The outcomes of the key elements of the proposals include:

    • Greater profile and FTSE 100 inclusion: the Company has assets of over £5 billion and is now a FTSE 100 Index constituent.
    • Lower management fees: WTW agreed a new management fee structure; this resulted in an even more competitive blended fee rate for all shareholders.
    • Lower ongoing charges: the new management fee structure and economies of scale have reduced ongoing charges to 0.56% (net of the management fee waiver).
    • No cost to either companies’ shareholders: the costs of the transaction were carefully managed, including the fee waiver from WTW, to ensure that the transaction was completed at no cost to all shareholders.
    • Attractive and progressive dividend policy: the third and fourth interim dividend payments of 2024 were increased to ensure that they were commensurate with Witan’s first interim dividend. It is expected that the dividend will continue to increase in the current year so that shareholders continue to see progression in their income.

    Portfolio Transition

    • The Company received assets including cash and equities from Witan and the Witan loan notes were novated to the Company. Details are provided in note 13 to the Financial Statements.
    • BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Limited managed the portfolio transition. Direct costs of the portfolio transition and Manager changes were less than 0.04% of the Net Asset Value of the enlarged portfolio.

    Investment Manager’s Report

    Market backdrop: equities untroubled by politics

    For the second year running, global equities delivered strong returns in 2024, with economics trumping politics. Despite a record number of elections, conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine reaching new heights, and a scary moment in Japan when the Nikkei Index of the top 225 blue-chip shares plunged 12% in a day at the beginning of August, investors focused on resilient global growth, falling inflation and interest rates, and healthy corporate profitability.

    Hence, our benchmark index, the MSCI ACWI, returned 19.6% in 2024 following a return of 15.3% in 2023. Since 1987, the Index has returned an average of 8.4% per annum1, so returns of this magnitude in two consecutive years are rare. The ebullient mood of equity investors was reflected in a surge in the prices of less established assets, such as cryptocurrency, with Bitcoin reaching all-time highs of over $100,000. Peanut the Squirrel Coin, a cryptocurrency named after the eponymous pet that New York environmental authorities seized and euthanised on 30 October 2024, at one point commanded a market cap of $1.7 billion.

    However, regional equity market performance was mixed. US markets once again led the way, with the S&P 500 delivering a 27% return when measured in British pounds. Chinese equities rallied briefly following government stimulus, but concerns over the country’s property market and trade tensions persisted. Together with a strong US dollar, these worries led to more subdued returns from emerging markets, which rose about 9%. In Japan, August’s technically driven decline proved temporary, and the Nikkei resumed its ascent to close the year at a record high, although the yen’s depreciation reduced returns for UK-based investors when converted into British pounds. The UK and European markets were more muted, with the FTSE All Share Index and the MSCI Europe ex UK Index returning 9.5% and 1.9% respectively.

    Gains driven by US tech giants

    Giant US technology related stocks were the standout performers, fuelled by investor excitement about generative artificial intelligence (‘AI’) and, from November onwards, hopes that Donald Trump’s victory in the presidential election would weaken regulatory scrutiny. The share prices of the so called “Magnificent Seven” – Apple, Amazon, Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft, NVIDIA and Tesla – increased by 60% on average and were responsible for 43% of MSCI ACWI’s gains. This was less than 2023 when they contributed 53%, but still a huge number emphasising the extreme concentration of index returns in a small number of companies.

    Even so, from mid-year onwards, returns were no longer quite as skewed to the performance of a handful of shares. Although NVIDIA and Tesla returned a massive 176% and 65% respectively, giant tech was not the only game in town. Financial stocks returned 26.5%, and returns from the consumer discretionary, industrial and utility sectors were also well into double figures, pointing to the potential broadening out of market returns as stock-specific drivers came to the fore.

    1. https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/8d97d244-4685-4200-a24c-3e2942e3adeb

    Portfolio performance: strong absolute gains but lagged benchmark index

    Our portfolio’s NAV Total Return was a robust 13.3% but, as with most active managers, it lagged the Company’s benchmark index. The portfolio does, however, remain ahead of the Index over three years (28.0% vs 26.8%), albeit behind over five years (64.7% vs 70.8%). Disappointing though it was not to beat the MSCI ACWI in 2024, we were not alone. AJ Bell calculated that, to the end of November, just 18% of active global equity funds outperformed their passive peers, largely due to their inability to match high Index weightings in the “Magnificent Seven”. The sheer size of these companies in the Index is mind boggling. NVIDIA, Microsoft and Apple, for example, represent 13% of the MSCI ACWI as at 31 December 2024 and, together, are bigger than the entire stock markets of several sizeable countries.

    The skew of the Index towards mega-cap companies has been a challenge, to varying degrees, since the start of our multi-manager strategy in April 2017. As a broadly diversified strategy, with capital spread between 8-12 Managers, all with different approaches to investing, our portfolio naturally has a structural bias away from stocks that on rare occasions represent such a large proportion of our global benchmark. While we have some exposure to most of the “Magnificent Seven”, it would require a lot of the Managers to choose them as one of their best ideas for us to be at Index weight, never mind be overweight.

    The Index may have been hard to beat in recent years, but market concentration poses significant risks for passive strategies. At the end of 2024, the Index on average allocated around 150 times as much capital to each of Apple, NVIDIA and Microsoft as it did to the average stock, akin to us placing about 95% of the portfolio in one manager’s hands and 0.5% each in the other ten.

    We do not believe this is the right way to manage risk for shareholders, bearing in mind that index trackers are not investing lots of money in these companies because they are good businesses trading at good valuations, but because they are very big. If US large-cap stocks continue to dominate, tracker funds may continue to outperform active funds. But if sentiment on the technology sector turns sour, passive funds with big stakes will be hit much harder.

    Not owning enough NVIDIA was painful

    The strong outperformance of our portfolio versus our benchmark in 2023 continued into the first quarter of 2024, when the biggest contribution came from not owning, at that time, poorly performing Tesla and Apple. But thereafter stock selection became more challenging, particularly within the “Magnificent Seven”. Although we benefitted from owning Amazon and Microsoft, we moved from an overweight to an underweight position in NVIDIA in the first quarter after its extraordinary outperformance, which then made it our biggest single detractor last year as that outperformance continued. Having helped us in the first quarter, the lack of exposure to Tesla and Apple, which both recovered strongly as the year progressed, counted against us from then on. Overall, our positions in the “Magnificent Seven” accounted for a third of the portfolio’s underperformance versus the Index in 2024.

    The remainder of the portfolio’s underperformance came from a combination of being underweight in large-cap stocks in general and stock specific issues elsewhere, in some cases due to partial reversals of performance in 2023. For example, stock selection in financials detracted in large part due to our relative lack of exposure to strongly performing US banks such as JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs. In the consumer discretionary sector, the share price of UK-based drinks company Diageo, owned by Veritas Asset Management (‘Veritas’) and Metropolis Capital (‘Metropolis’), continued to suffer from a post-Covid cyclical downturn, falling 8.5%, although both Managers believe the company will eventually recover lost ground when structural trends reassert themselves. Novo Nordisk, the Danish weight loss drugs company, was another notable detractor, as its shares fell 14% after disappointing test results. Our Stock Pickers see this as a temporary decline in a growing market in which Novo Nordisk has a leading position. Hence, it was one of our biggest purchases in 2024 (see table below).

    Indeed, our Stock Pickers express a high degree of confidence in the latent value of many of their holdings. By far the most important long run ingredient underpinning share price performance is strong fundamentals, such as market-leading products or services, solid profit margins, plentiful cashflow and strong management.

    Top 10 purchases and sales

    Top 10 purchases Value £m   Top 10 sales Value £m
    UnitedHealth Group 50.2   Alphabet 84.3
    Novo Nordisk 48.8   NVIDIA 71.3
    Synopsys 47.5   Fiserv 39.0
    Microsoft 45.0   Aena 37.9
    Netflix 41.5   Ebara 36.1
    Philip Morris 41.4   TotalEnergies 35.0
    Enbridge 39.4   PayPal 33.8
    AT&T 39.0   Bureau Veritas 33.4
    American Electric Power 37.3   KKR 33.2
    Eli Lilly 36.6   Taiwan Semiconductor 32.2

    Source: Juniper.
    The purchases and sales are calculated by taking the net value of all transactions (buy and sells) for each holding held within the portfolio over the period. The tables exclude any non-equity holdings such as ETFs and any transfers from the combination with Witan.

    Even so, in the short run, market sentiment can have a larger impact on share prices than fundamentals. When we break down the portfolio performance against the Index into fundamentals and sentiment, the portfolio’s strong absolute performance has been mainly as a result of company fundamentals, whereas the Index’s absolute performance has been more driven by market sentiment.

    A full breakdown of the contributors to our Total Return in 2024 is shown in the following table.

    Contribution analysis

    Contribution to Return in 2024 %
    Benchmark Total Return 19.6
    Asset Allocation -1.1
    Stock Selection -5.3
    Gearing and Cash 0.6
    Investment Manager Impact -5.8
    Portfolio Total Return 13.8
    Share Buybacks 0.1
    Fees/Expenses -0.6
    Taxation -0.1
    Change in Fair Value of Debt 0.4
    Timing Differences -0.2
    NAV Total Return including Income, Debt at Fair Value 13.3
    Change in Discount 1.0
    Share Price Total Return 14.3

    Source: Performance and attribution data sourced from WTW, Juniper, MSCI Inc, FactSet and Morningstar as at 31 December 2024. Percentages may not add due to rounding.

    In the table below, we also list the top five contributors and detractors to portfolio performance during the year relative to the portfolio’s benchmark.

    Sands, Vulcan and Lyrical were the top performers

    As we would expect from such a diverse line up, performance among our Managers was mixed. This is by design, as we do not want the portfolio to be biased towards any one approach of investing, which might make returns vulnerable to a sudden switch from one style to another. This happened in 2022 when growth stocks began to suffer significantly as central banks raised interest rates to combat inflation. Sands Capital (‘Sands’), Vulcan Value Partners (‘Vulcan’), and Lyrical Asset Management (‘Lyrical’) were the top performers last year. Sands and Vulcan both benefitted from owning tech giants. Sands held NVIDIA while Vulcan held Amazon, but Sands’ largest contributor to relative performance was Axon Enterprise, an industrial business which makes tasers, body cameras and other software products. Its share price surged by 134% last year.

    Top five stock contributors to performance

    Stock Sector Country Average Active Weight (%) Total Return in Sterling (%) Attribution Effect Relative to Benchmark (%)
    Amazon Consumer Discretionary United States 1.0 47.0 0.2
    Axon Enterprise Industrials United States 0.2 134.2 0.2
    Salesforce Information Technology United States 0.4 29.8 0.2
    NRG Energy Utilities United States 0.4 80.6 0.2
    Nestle Consumer Staples Switzerland -0.4 -25.9 0.2

    Bottom five stock detractors to performance

    Stock Sector Country Average Active Weight (%) Total Return in Sterling (%) Attribution Effect Relative to Benchmark (%)
    NVIDIA Information Technology United States -1.8 176.1 -1.2
    Broadcom Information Technology United States -0.5 113.4 -0.6
    Novo Nordisk Health Care Denmark 0.8 -14.0 -0.6
    Tesla Consumer Discretionary United States -0.8 65.4 -0.6
    Apple Information Technology United States -3.9 32.8 -0.4

    Source: WTW.

    The tables above illustrate the top five contributors and detractors to returns relative to benchmark in 2024. It aims to explain at a stock level which companies drove relative returns. For example, the Alliance Witan portfolio was underweight relative to benchmark in NVIDIA, Broadcom, Tesla and Apple. These stocks had very strong returns, which hurt our portfolio’s relative performance. Conversely, not having an exposure to Nestle helped our relative performance given the stock was held in the benchmark and was down over the year. Our overweight position in Amazon, Axon Enterprise, Salesforce and NRG Energy contributed positively to relative returns given their strong performance. The average active weight is the arithmetic simple average weight of the stock in the portfolio minus the arithmetic simple average weight of the stock in the benchmark over the period.

    Vulcan’s largest contributor to our performance was KKR, the US-based private equity group, which returned 82%, prompting Vulcan to take profits. Its holding in Salesforce also did well, rising nearly 30%.

    Lyrical, a deep-value style investor, benefitted from owning several less talked-about US-based companies, which all rebounded from cheap valuations. These included NRG Energy, Ameriprise Financials and eBay.

    Of our Managers, the most notable laggard was Sustainable Growth Advisors (‘SGA’), which was disappointing given its focus on large cap growth stocks which, as a group, had the strongest price momentum. SGA suffered from holding Novo Nordisk, and two of its other positions, ICON and Synopsys also stood out as detractors. The recent poor performance of SGA follows a long period of outperformance, so returns since we appointed SGA remain strong. Value Managers Metropolis and ARGA Investment Management (‘ARGA’), the latter replacing Jupiter Asset Management (‘Jupiter’) in April, also struggled in the recent market environment, which has generally favoured growth managers.

    Portfolio changes: two new Managers added after combination with Witan

    As well as adding ARGA for Jupiter in the first half of the year, following Ben Whitmore’s decision to leave Jupiter to set up his own business, there were two further changes to the Manager line-up during the integration of Witan’s portfolio. Altogether, this contributed to an unusually high level of turnover of 98.5% of the portfolio in 2024. Both Alliance Trust and Witan already had GQG Partners (‘GQG’) and Veritas in common, which meant that there were some in-specie transfers of stocks. Additionally, the combination of Alliance and Witan presented us with an opportunity to introduce Jennison Associates (‘Jennison’) to the portfolio at a low cost.

    Based in the US, Jennison specialises in investing in innovative, fast-growing businesses. It had been one of Witan’s most successful managers and blending it with our other Managers increased the diversity of holdings in growth companies. We also took the opportunity to replace Black Creek Investment Management (‘Black Creek’) with EdgePoint Investment Group (‘EdgePoint’), while we were using a transition manager to keep costs down to a minimum.

    This change was prompted by succession planning at Black Creek. We had been monitoring Black Creek for some time due to the departure of a senior team member for health reasons and the uncertainty surrounding the timing of founder Bill Kanko’s retirement. With a similar investment style to Black Creek, EdgePoint seeks to buy good, undervalued businesses and hold them until the market fully realises their potential.

    Through the combination, we inherited a small number of investment trust and private equity fund holdings, representing less than 3% of the combined portfolio. These are specialist funds with portfolios focused on, among other things, early-stage life sciences, valuable intellectual property, innovative internet platforms and renewable infrastructure assets. Collective investments such as these are not normally part of our investment strategy. However, they are all trading at prices we believe are well below their intrinsic value, so rather than sell them at a loss, we will hold them until we can achieve attractive values.

    Beyond that, the combination did not lead to any change in our investment approach. We retain high conviction in our line-up of Managers and their ability to pick winning stocks, although we keep them under constant review for any red flags and have access to a deep bench of talented replacements should these be needed.

    Gearing: remaining cautious

    Our gross gearing stood at 8.4% at the end of 2024 (4.9% net of underlying Manager and central cash), slightly above the level of 7.1% at the start of the year, reflecting the improving outlook for equities as the year progressed. However, given the strong performance from equity markets, it is still towards the lower end of the typical range of 7.5 to 12.5%.

    Market outlook: multiple risks warrant diversification

    As 2025 began, the mood among investors was upbeat, with many hoping President Trump’s promises of deregulation and tax cuts would be supportive of equity markets. If returns can spread beyond a narrow group of highly valued US mega-cap technology stocks, it could provide firmer foundations for another good year for shares. The strong start to the year for European equities certainly offered hope for geographical diversification.

    However, on-off tariffs and geopolitical tensions loom large, creating considerable uncertainty. This was reflected in an increase in equity market volatility in February.

    In the first 2 months of 2025, the benchmark index rose by 2.2% suggesting that investors were still willing to look through some of the risks while forecast global growth and corporate earnings remain healthy. But confidence is fragile and, with valuations in the US still close to a record high despite February’s pullback, the market is vulnerable to setbacks.

    In this environment, we believe bottom-up stock picking, based on company fundamentals, should be a more reliable way to add value for shareholders in the long term than making bold, top-down market calls. So, we will continue to position the portfolio to maintain balanced regional, sector and style exposures, that are similar to the Index weightings by periodically adjusting Manager allocations. This should provide stability and reduce risk, while we rely on our Managers to add value by seeking out the best companies in each market segment.

    While retaining some exposure to US mega-cap tech stocks that may continue delivering attractive returns, our portfolio is not reliant on them. It also contains many stocks that have remained in the shadows but have been performing well operationally and have excellent prospects not yet reflected in their share prices.

    Hidden gems: stock picks with high potential

    We asked our eleven Stock Pickers for examples of strong but underappreciated companies in the portfolio

    Lyrical highlighted five of its US holdings that have underperformed the S&P 500 Index since the start of 2024 but, at the same time, have grown their forecast earnings per share by more than the Index. These are healthcare providers Cigna and HCA, WEX and Global Payments, which both provide business-to-business payment technology, and Gen Digital, which is a leading provider of cyber security and identity protection.

    “Interestingly, even on this list there is inconsistency by the market,” says Lyrical. “Cigna has the worst stock performance, but the second-best earnings per share (‘EPS’) growth. Gen Digital has the slowest EPS growth in the group, but the best performance”.

    ARGA cited Accor, the global hotel business, which has transitioned to an “asset light” business model by selling most of its hotels, while maintaining the lucrative franchise and management agreements attached to these properties. While Sands Capital sees potential in the share prices of Sika, a maintenance and building refurbishment specialist.

    “Investment results have been weak despite solid fundamental results,” says Sands. “We believe that investors have focused on slower than historical organic growth, caused by several factors, including the real estate crisis in China, slowdown in electric vehicle production, and a pause in green building incentives.”

    Sands Capital also mentioned Roper Technologies, a diversified industrial technology company, and Keyence, a leading designer of high-end factory automation based in Japan, as attractive businesses with share price appreciation potential.

    Vulcan highlighted CoStar Group, an information provider to the commercial and residential real estate industries, and Everest Group, a global insurance and reinsurance business, while GQG mentioned the UK-based pharmaceutical company AstraZeneca, the Brazil-based oil and gas company Petrobras, Bank Mandiri in Indonesia, and the Indian tobacco company ITC.

    SGA backed Danaher, the US industrial group, Intuit, which provides do-it-yourself accounting software for small businesses, and HDFC Bank in India. Jennison highlighted Reddit, the online social media platform.

    “Reddit is targeting 49% growth in the third quarter of 2024 and consensus is at 41% in Q4, but then market estimates are fading down to around 20% in 2025, which we think is overly conservative and creates an opportunity for investment today.”

    Veritas’s nominations for underappreciated businesses were Amadeus, the Spanish software company focusing on air travel, The Cooper Companies, which makes contact lenses, and Thermo Fisher Scientific, the world’s largest scientific equipment provider.

    Japan specialist Dalton’s best stocks included Bandai Namco, a multinational that publishes video games and makes toys, Shimano, the bicycle equipment manufacturer, and Rinnai, one of the global leaders in water heaters. Metropolis highlighted Andritz, the Austrian headquartered business supplying industrial equipment to the pulp and paper, metals and hydropower industries, Crown Holdings, which makes aluminium drinks cans, and Admiral, the UK insurer.

    Finally, EdgePoint, the newest addition to our Manager line-up, pointed to Dayforce, a global human resources software company, Nippon Paints Holdings in Japan, Franco-Nevada, a gold-focused royalty company in Canada, and Qualcomm, which invented significant pieces of the underlying technology required for mobile phones.

    “The market looks at Qualcomm as a handset supplier and the stock moves in relation to expected handset sales over the following quarters,” says EdgePoint. “We consider Qualcomm to be one of the world’s leading designers of energy-efficient processors at a point in time when demand for energy-efficient processing is growing rapidly across a wide range of industries. Some of the major opportunities for Qualcomm over the next 5 years include artificial intelligence, automobiles, personal computers and smartphones.”

    Altogether, these fundamentally strong businesses combine with others to create a robust, multi-manager portfolio that offers attractive long-term growth with lower risk than a single manager strategy, and therefore a more comfortable ride through the ups and downs of the market. Such companies may have remained below the radar in 2024, when investors became giddy with the stellar returns from the US technology shares, but we look forward to their attributes receiving the recognition from the market that they deserve.

    Craig Baker, Stuart Gray, Mark Davis
    Willis Towers Watson
    Investment Manager

    The securities referred to above represent the views of the underlying managers and are not stock recommendations.

    Summary of Portfolio
    As at 31 December 2024

    A full list of the Company’s Investment Portfolio can be found on the Company’s website, www.alliancewitan.com

    Top 20 holdings

    Name £m %
    Microsoft 236.3 4.3
    Amazon 197.4 3.6
    Visa 156.2 2.8
    UnitedHealth Group 116.4 2.1
    Alphabet 107.7 1.9
    Diageo 92.4 1.7
    Meta 88.6 1.6
    NVIDIA 82.7 1.5
    Aon 75.1 1.4
    Novo Nordisk 73.1 1.3
    Netflix 70.9 1.3
    Mastercard 70.7 1.3
    Eli Lilly 69.9 1.3
    Salesforce 61.5 1.1
    HDFC Bank 58.2 1.1
    Safran 53.3 1.0
    Taiwan Semiconductor 49.9 0.9
    Petrobras 48.1 0.9
    State Street 48.0 0.9
    Philip Morris 47.6 0.9

    The 20 largest stock positions, given as a percentage of the total assets. Each Stock Picker selects up to 20 stocks.*
    Top 20 holdings 32.9%
    Top 10 holdings 22.2%

    * Apart from GQG Partners, which also manages a dedicated emerging markets mandate with up to 60 stocks.

    Dividend

    We have paid our shareholders a rising dividend for 58 consecutive years. Providing that level of reliability is something of which we are extremely proud. We carefully manage the Company’s dividend. For instance, should there be a year in which income is unexpectedly high, we may retain some of that income to help fund future dividends. Due to our steady approach, the Company has received a ‘Dividend Hero’ investment company award from the Association of Investment Companies (‘AIC’).

    Our dividend policy

    Subject to market conditions and the Company’s performance, financial position and outlook, the Board will seek to pay a dividend that increases year on year. The Company expects to pay four interim dividends per year, on or around the last day of June, September, December and March, and will not, generally, pay a final dividend for a particular financial year.

    While shareholders are not asked to approve a final dividend, given the timing of the payment of the quarterly payments, each year they are given the opportunity to share their views when they are asked to approve the Company’s Dividend Policy.

    Fourth interim dividend

    As previously announced, a fourth interim dividend of 6.73p per ordinary share will be paid on 31 March 2025 to those shareholders who were on the register at close of business on 28 February 2025.

    Increased dividend

    The Company has increased its total dividend for the year ended 31 December 2024 to 26.7p per ordinary share (2023: 25.2p), a 6.0% increase on the previous year.

    Dividend 2024 (p) 2023 (p) % increase
    1st Interim 6.62 6.18 7.1
    2nd Interim 6.62 6.34 4.4
    3rd Interim 6.73 6.34 6.2
    4th Interim 6.73 6.34 6.2

    Reserves

    It is the Board’s intention to utilise distributable reserves as well as portfolio income to fund dividend payments. Further details of the dividend payments for the year to 31 December 2024 and information on distributable reserves can be found in notes 7 and 2(b)(x) of the Financial Statements, respectively.

    Ongoing Charges and Discount

    Ongoing charges1

    The Company’s ongoing charges ratio (‘OCR’) decreased to 0.56% (including the impact of the investment management fee waiver) (2023: 0.62%). Total administrative expenses were £3.9m (2023: £2.9m) and investment management expenses were £18.4m (2023: £16.3m). Further details of the Company’s expenses are provided in note 4 of the Financial Statements on page 90 of the Annual Report. The Company’s costs remain competitive for an actively managed multi-manager global equity strategy.

    Maintaining a stable discount1

    One of the Company’s strategic objectives is to maintain a stable share price discount to NAV. The Company has the authority to buy back its own shares in the market if the discount is widening and to hold these shares in Treasury.

    During the year under review, the Company’s share price traded at an average discount of 4.7% (2023: 6.0%). As at 31 December 2024, the Company’s share price discount was 4.7% (2023: 5.4%). The average discount (unweighted) for the AIC Global Sector was 7.9%.

    Share issuance and buybacks

    As a result of the combination with Witan, 120,949,382 new ordinary shares were issued for assets valued at £1.5bn implying an effective issue price of £12.7459246 per share.

    The Company bought back 1.2%* (2023: 3.0%) of its issued share capital during the year, purchasing 4,722,000 shares which were placed in Treasury. The total cost of the share buybacks was £57.0m (2023: £86.6m). The weighted average discount of shares bought back in the year was 5.7%. Share buybacks contributed a total of 0.1% to the Company’s NAV performance in the year.

    1. Alternative Performance Measure – see page 116 of the Annual Report for details.
    * Percentage based on the Company’s issued share capital (excluding shares held in Treasury) as at 31 December 2024.

    What We Do

    How WTW manages the portfolio

    WTW as Investment Manager has overall responsibility for managing the Company’s portfolio. It is the Investment Manager’s job to select a diverse team of expert Stock Pickers, each of whom invest in a customised selection of 10-20 of their ‘best ideas’. WTW then allocates capital to them, relative to the risks the Stock Picker represents. For example, small-cap stocks are typically more risky than large-cap stocks, so on average a small-cap specialist would tend to receive less capital than a Stock Picker who focuses on large-cap stocks. However, the allocations do not remain static; WTW keeps them under constant review and varies them over time according to market conditions, with the goal of keeping our exposures to different parts of global stocks markets well balanced.

    Stock Pickers are encouraged to ignore the benchmark and only buy a small number of stocks in which they have strong conviction, while WTW manages risk through the Stock Picker allocations. On their own, each of the Stock Picker’s high-conviction mandates has the potential to perform well. This is supported by WTW’s experience of managing high-conviction portfolios and academic evidence1. But concentrated selections of stocks can be volatile and risky, so WTW mitigates these dangers by blending Stock Pickers with complementary investment approaches or styles, which can be expected to perform differently in different market conditions. This smooths out the peaks and troughs of performance associated with concentrated single-manager strategies.

    Several of the Stock Pickers in the current portfolio have been with the Investment Manager since inception of the multi-manager strategy, though it does actively monitor and rearrange the line-up where necessary.

    WTW invests a lot of time and effort on identifying skilled Stock Pickers for the Company’s portfolio, undertaking extensive qualitative and quantitative analysis. This due diligence process focuses on:

    • The investment processes, resources and decision-making that make up the Stock Picker’s competitive advantage;
    • The culture and alignment of the organisation that leads to sustainability of that competitive advantage;
    • Their approach to responsible investment. WTW aims to appoint Stock Pickers who actively engage with the companies in which they invest and have an effective voting policy. When necessary, they challenge the Stock Pickers and guide them towards better practices; and
    • The operational infrastructure that minimises risk from a compliance, regulatory and operational perspective.

    1. Sebastian & Attaluri, Conviction in Equity Investing, The Journal of Portfolio Management, Summer 2014.

    The Investment Manager’s views are formed over extended periods from multiple interactions with the Managers, including regular meetings. They look beyond past performance numbers to try to understand the ‘competitive edge’. This involves examining and interrogating processes for selecting stocks, adherence to this process through different market conditions, team dynamics, training and experience. Performance track records are just a single data point, and, without the context of the additional information, they are unlikely to persuade WTW that a Stock Picker is skilled.

    Once selected, the Investment Manager tends to form long-term partnerships with the Stock Pickers, generally only taking them out of the portfolio if something fundamental changes, such as the departure of a key individual from the business or a change in business strategy or fortunes. With highly active, concentrated portfolios, periods of short-term underperformance are to be expected and are not a reason to doubt a Stock Picker if they are adhering to their philosophy and process. WTW does, however, keep a constant eye out for talent and may bring new Managers into the portfolio at the expense of an incumbent if they are a better fit.

    Responsible investment

    WTW believes that Environmental, Social and Governance (‘ESG’) factors have the potential to impact financial risk and return. As long-term investors, WTW aims to incorporate these factors into its investment process.

    As stewards of the Company’s assets, WTW seeks to integrate responsible investment into its process for managing the portfolio. ESG factors can influence returns, so these risk factors are taken into account in WTW’s investment processes, including assessing how Managers evaluate ESG risk in their decisions over what stocks to purchase. Climate change poses potential significant risks to investment returns from many companies, which is why both WTW and the Company have stated an intention to manage the assets with a goal of achieving Net Zero greenhouse gas emissions from the portfolio by 2050, with an interim intention of reducing portfolio emissions by approximately 50% by 2030, relative to 2019.

    In 2024, we saw an increase in the portfolio’s weighted average carbon intensity (which measures carbon emissions as a proportion of revenue) from 71.9tCO2e/$M sales to 117. 9tCO2e/$M sales. Over the year, some higher-emitting stocks came into the portfolio including, industrial company Alaska Air and materials company Alcoa Ord, and our allocation to the higher-emitting Utilities sector went up slightly with purchases of companies such as Southern Ord and American Electric Power. We are monitoring our progress against our Net Zero goal, and our Managers and EOS at Federated Hermes (‘EOS’) continue to engage with the companies in the portfolio on climate related issues.

    Progress towards Net Zero will not be linear. Emissions from the portfolio are dependent on holdings, which can change from year to year as WTW’s Stock Pickers seek value for investors. If companies are perceived as being at higher financial risk by being slow to adapt to a Net Zero world, we expect to use stewardship, such as voting and engagement, to encourage positive changes to business practices. WTW believes this is preferable to excluding companies from the portfolio, since exclusion merely passes the responsibility of ownership to other investors who may be less scrupulous about adherence to ESG standards or regulation.

    As well as engaging with companies on climate change, WTW’s Stock Pickers, together with stewardship provider EOS, focused on a wide range of other issues last year.

    Overall, EOS engaged with 97 companies in the portfolio on 515 issues and objectives throughout the year. Key areas of engagement included board effectiveness, climate change, human and labour rights and human capital, biodiversity, digital rights and AI. Of these engagements, the environmental category accounted for 29% of the total number of engagements, with 63% of environmental engagements relating to climate change. Meanwhile the Stock Pickers cast votes at 3,346 resolutions in 2024. Of these resolutions, they voted against company management on 386 and abstained from voting on 38 occasions.

    How We Manage Our Risks

    In order to monitor and manage risks facing the Company, the Board maintains and regularly reviews a risk register and heat map. The risk register details all principal and emerging risks thought to face the Company at any given time. The principal risks facing the Company, as determined by the Board, are Investment, Operational and Legal and Regulatory Non-Compliance.

    As part of its review process, the Board considers input on the principal and emerging risks facing the Company from its key service providers WTW and Juniper. Any risks and their associated risk ratings are then discussed, and the risk register and heat map updated accordingly, with additional measures put in place to monitor, manage and mitigate risks as required. During the period the Board carefully reviewed the risks associated with the implementation of the combination and the post transaction integration risks.

    Principal risks

    The principal risks facing the Company, how they have changed during the year and how the Board aims to monitor and manage these risks are detailed below.

    Risk and potential impact Risk rating How we monitor and manage the risk
    Market risk: loss on the portfolio in absolute terms, caused by economic and political events, interest rate movements and fluctuation in foreign exchange rates. Increased due to geopolitical and macro-economic uncertainty
    • The Board sets investment guidelines and the Investment Manager selects Stock Pickers and styles to provide diversification within the portfolio.
    • The Board receives regular updates from the Investment Manager and monitors adverse movements and impacts on the portfolio.
    • An explanation of the different components of market risk and how they are individually managed is contained in note 18 to the Financial Statements.
    Investment performance: relative underperformance makes the Company an unattractive investment proposition. Stable
    • The Company’s investment performance against its investment objective, relevant benchmark and closed and open ended peer group are reviewed and challenged where appropriate by the Board at every Board meeting.
    • The Board receives regular reporting from the Investment Manager to allow it to review the approach to ESG and climate risk factors embedded within the investment process from the Company’s perspective.
    Strategy and market rating: demand for the Company’s shares decreases due to changes in demand for the Company’s strategy or secular changes in investor demand. Stable
    • The Board regularly reviews the share register and receives feedback from the Investment Manager and broker on all marketing and investor relations and shareholder meetings, to keep informed of investor sentiment and how the Company is perceived in the market.
    • The Board monitors the Company’s share price discount and, working with the broker undertakes periodic share buybacks as appropriate to meet its strategic objective of maintaining a stable discount.
    • The proposed combination with Witan and the benefits to ongoing investors in terms of scale and investor proposition were reviewed and thoroughly considered to ensure the enlarged Company would be an attractive proposition for both current and prospective shareholders.
    Capital structure and financial risk: inappropriate capital or gearing structure may result in losses for the Company. Stable
    • The Board receives regular updates on the capital structure of the Company including share capital, borrowings, structure of reserves, compliance with ongoing covenants and shareholder authorities, to allow ongoing monitoring of the appropriate structure.
    • The Board reviews and manages the borrowing limits under which the Investment Manager operates. As part of the Witan combination, additional borrowing was novated to the Company. These additional facilities provide an increased blend of interest rates and maturity dates.
    • Shareholder authority is sought annually in relation to share issuance and buybacks to facilitate ongoing management of the share capital.
    Operational
    All of the Company’s operations are outsourced to third party service providers. Any failure in the operational controls of the Company’s service providers could result in financial, legal or regulatory and reputational damage for the Company.
    Operational risks include cyber security, IT systems failure, inadequacy of oversight and control, climate risk and ineffective disaster recovery planning.
    Stable
    • The Board monitors the services provided by the key services suppliers and formally reviews the performance of each on an annual basis, including the review of audited internal control reports where appropriate. No material issues were raised as part of the evaluation process in 2024.
    • Cyber security continues to be a key focus for the Board. Reports on the cyber security, IT testing environment and disaster recovery testing of each key service provider are reviewed by the Board annually.
    • Any breaches in controls which have resulted in errors or incidents are required to be immediately notified to the Board along with proposed remediation actions.
    Legal and regulatory
    Failure to adhere to all legal and regulatory requirements could lead to financial and legal penalties, reputational damage and potential loss of investment trust status. Stable
    • The Board has contracted with its key service suppliers, including the Investment Manager and Juniper, in relation to its ongoing legal and regulatory compliance. The Board receives quarterly reports from each supplier to monitor ongoing compliance. The Company has complied with all legal and regulatory requirements in 2024.
    • Any breaches in controls which have resulted in errors or incidents are required to be immediately notified to the Board, along with proposed remediation actions.
    • The review of the Annual Report by the independent auditors provides additional assurance that the Company has met all legal and regulatory requirements in respect of those disclosures.

    Emerging risks

    Emerging risks are typified by having a high degree of uncertainty and may result from sudden events, new potential trends or changing specific risks where the impact and probable effect is hard to assess. As the assessment becomes clearer, the risk may be added to the risk matrix of ‘known’ risks.

    The Board is currently monitoring a number of emerging risks: geopolitical tension continues to be an emerging risk for the Company due to ongoing conflicts across the world. Along with increased populism and nationalism, these risks may impact individual economies and global markets. Although covered in the operational risk section above, the Board recognises the increased risk that cybercrime and the misuse of AI poses to the Company.

    Geopolitical events such as the conflicts in the Middle East region, coupled with the potential breakdown of post war alliances and potential new trade tariffs and changes to US economic and international policies introduced by President Trump, could bring uncertainty and fragility to capital markets in 2025, including persistent or reacceleration of inflationary pressures.

    Stakeholder Engagement – Section 172 Statement

    The Directors have a number of obligations including those under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006. These obligations relate to how the Board takes account of various factors in making its decisions – including the impact of its decisions on key stakeholders. The Board is focused on the Company’s performance and its responsibilities to stakeholders, corporate culture and diversity, as well as its contributions to wider society, and it takes account of stakeholder interests when making decisions on behalf of the Company.

    As an externally-managed investment trust, the Board considers the Company’s key stakeholders to be existing and potential new shareholders and its service providers.

    Full details on the primary ways in which the Board engaged with the Company’s key stakeholders can be found on pages 30 to 35 of the Annual Report.

    Dean Buckley
    Chair
    6 March 2025

    Viability and Going Concern Statements

    Viability Statement

    The Board has assessed the prospects and viability of the Company beyond the 12 months required by the Going Concern accounting provisions.

    The Board considered the current position of the Company and its prospects, strategy and planning process as well as its principal and emerging risks in the current, medium and long term, as set out on pages 27 to 29 of the Annual Report. After the year-end but prior to approval of these Accounts, the Board reviewed its performance against its strategic objectives and its management of the principal and emerging risks facing the Company.

    The Board received regular updates on performance and other factors that could impact on the viability of the Company.

    The Board has concluded that there is a reasonable expectation that the Company will be able to continue in operation and meet its liabilities as they fall due for at least the next five years; the Board expects this position to continue over many more years to come. The Company’s Investment Objective, which was approved by shareholders in April 2019, is to deliver a real return over the long term, through a combination of capital growth and a rising dividend, and the Board regards the Company’s shares as a long-term investment. The Board believes that a period of five years is considered a reasonable period for investment in equities and is appropriate for the composition of the Company’s portfolio.

    In arriving at this conclusion, the Board considered:

    • Financial strength: As at 31 December 2024 the Company had total assets of £5.6bn, with net gearing of 4.9% and gross gearing of 8.4%. At the year-end the Company had £182.7m of cash or cash equivalents.
    • Investment: The portfolio is invested in listed equities across the globe. The portfolio is structured for long-term performance; the Board considers five years as being an appropriate period over which to measure performance.
    • Liquidity: The Company is closed-ended, which means that there is no requirement to realise investments to allow shareholders to sell their shares. The Directors consider this structure supports the long-term viability and sustainability of the Company, and have assumed that shareholders will continue to be attracted to the closed-ended structure due to its liquidity benefit. During the year, WTW carried out a liquidity analysis and stress test which indicated that around 93% of the Company’s portfolio could be sold within a single day and a further 6% within 10 days, without materially influencing market pricing. WTW performs liquidity analysis and stress testing on the Company’s portfolio of investments on an ongoing basis under both current and stressed conditions. WTW remains comfortable with the liquidity of the portfolio under both of these market conditions. The Board would not expect this position to materially alter in the future.
    • Dividends: The Company has significant accumulated distributable reserves which together with investment income can be used to support payment of the Company’s dividend. The Board regularly reviews revenue forecasts and considers the long-term sustainability of dividends under a variety of different scenarios. The Company has sufficient funds to meet its Dividend Policy commitments.
    • Reserves: The Company has large reserves (at 31 December 2024 it had £3.7bn of distributable reserves and £1.5bn of other reserves).
    • Discount: The Company has no fixed discount control policy. The Company will continue to buy back shares when the Board considers it appropriate, to take advantage of any significant widening of the discount and to produce NAV accretion for shareholders.
    • Significant Risks: The Company has a risk and control framework which includes a number of triggers which, if breached, would alert the Board to any potential adverse scenarios. The Board has developed and reviewed various scenarios based on potentially adverse events as set out in note 18 on pages 100 to 107 of the Annual Report.
    • Borrowing: In consideration of the combination with Witan, the Company’s borrowing facilities were reviewed to ensure they remained appropriate. The Company’s available bank borrowing facilities were consequently increased by £50m; and £155m of fixed rate loan notes were novated from Witan as part of the combination. The Company’s weighted average borrowings costs have reduced by 0.3%. All borrowings are secured by floating charges over the assets of the Company. The Company comfortably meets its banking covenants.
    • Security: The Company retains title to all assets held by the Custodian which are subject to further safeguards imposed on the Depositary.
    • Operations: Throughout the year under review, the Company’s key service providers continued to operate in line with service level agreements with no significant errors or breaches having been recorded.

    Going Concern Statement

    In view of the conclusions drawn in the foregoing Viability Statements, which considered the resources of the Company over the next 12 months and beyond, the Directors believe that the Company has adequate financial resources to continue in existence for at least the period to 31 March 2026. Therefore, the Directors believe that it is appropriate to continue to adopt the Going Concern basis in preparing the financial statements.

    Directors’ Responsibilities

    The Directors are responsible for preparing the Annual Report and the Financial Statements in accordance with UK-adopted international accounting standards and applicable law and regulations.

    Company law requires the Directors to prepare Financial Statements for each financial year. Under that law the Directors are required to prepare the Financial Statements in accordance with UK-adopted international accounting standards. Under company law the Directors must not approve the Financial Statements unless they are satisfied that they give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of the Company and of the profit or loss for that period.

    In preparing these Financial Statements, the Directors are required to:

    • Select suitable accounting policies and then apply them consistently;
    • Make judgements and accounting estimates that are reasonable and prudent;
    • State whether they have been prepared in accordance with UK-adopted International Accounting Standards, subject to any material departures disclosed and explained in the Financial Statements;
    • Prepare the Financial Statements on the Going Concern basis unless it is inappropriate to presume that the Company will continue in business; and
    • Prepare a Directors’ Report, a Strategic Report and Directors’ Remuneration Report which comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 2006.

    The Directors are responsible for keeping adequate accounting records that are sufficient to show and explain the Company’s transactions, and disclose with reasonable accuracy at any time the financial position of the Company and enable them to ensure that the Financial Statements comply with the Companies Act 2006.

    They are also responsible for safeguarding the assets of the Company and hence for taking reasonable steps for the prevention and detection of fraud and other irregularities. The Directors are responsible for ensuring that the Annual Report and Financial Statements, taken as a whole, are fair, balanced and understandable and provides the information necessary for shareholders to assess the Company’s position, performance, business model and strategy.

    Website publication

    The Directors are responsible for ensuring the Annual Report and the Financial Statements are made available on a website. Financial Statements are published on the Company’s website in accordance with legislation in the United Kingdom governing the preparation and dissemination of Financial Statements, which may vary from legislation in other jurisdictions. The maintenance and integrity of the Company’s website is the responsibility of the Directors. The Directors’ responsibility also extends to the ongoing integrity of the Financial Statements contained therein.

    Report of Directors and Responsibility Statement

    The Report of the Directors on pages 36 to 69 of the Annual Report (other than pages 61 to 63 which form part of the Strategic Report) of the Annual Report and Accounts has been approved by the Board. The Directors have chosen to include information relating to future development of the Company and relationships with suppliers, customers and others, and their impact on the Board’s decisions on pages 30 to 35 of the Annual Report.

    Each of the Directors, who are listed on pages 37 to 40 of the Annual Report, confirm to the best of their knowledge that:

    • The Financial Statements, prepared in accordance with the applicable set of UK adopted International Accounting Standards, give a true and fair view of the assets, liabilities, financial position and profit or loss of the Company;
    • The Annual Report includes a fair view of the development and performance of the business and the position of the Company, together with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that the Company faces; and
    • In the opinion of the Board, the Annual Report and Financial Statements taken as a whole, are fair, balanced and understandable and provides the information necessary to assess the Company’s position, performance, business model and strategy.

    On behalf of the Board

    Dean Buckley
    Chair
    6 March 2025
    Statement of Comprehensive Income for the year ended 31 December 2024
      Year to 31 December 2024 Year to 31 December 2023
      Revenue Capital Total Revenue Capital Total
    £000            
    Income         72,463 354 72,817 69,591 1,678 71,269
    Gains on investments held at fair value through profit or loss 449,551 449,551 578,715 578,715
    Losses on derivatives (206) (206)
    Gains/(losses) on fair value of debt 16,708 16,708 (11,371) (11,371)
    Total 72,463 466,407 538,870 69,591 569,022 638,613
    Investment management fees (5,381) (13,058) (18,439) (5,074) (11,228) (16,302)
    Administrative expenses (3,661) (281) (3,942) (2,558) (344) (2,902)
    Finance costs (3,221) (9,662) (12,883) (2,380) (7,141) (9,521)
    Foreign exchange losses (1,010) (1,010) (3,737) (3,737)
    Profit before tax 60,200 442,396 502,596 59,579 546,572 606,151
    Taxation (6,545) (5,348) (11,893) (6,231) (251) (6,482)
    Profit for the year 53,655 437,048 490,703 53,348 546,321 599,669

    All profit for the year is attributable to equity holders.

           
             
    Earnings per share (pence per share) 17.30 140.95 158.25 18.55 189.98 208.53

    All revenue and capital items in the above statement derive from continuing operations.

    The ‘Total’ column of this statement is the profit and loss account of the Company and the ‘Revenue’ and ‘Capital’ columns represent supplementary information prepared under guidance issued by the Association of Investment Companies. The Company does not have any other comprehensive income and hence profit for the year, as disclosed above, is the same as the Company’s total comprehensive income.

    Statement of Changes in Equity for the year ended 31 December 2024
            Distributable reserves  
    £000 Share
    capital
    Share premium account Capital redemption reserve Realised capital reserve Unrealised capital reserve Revenue reserve Total distributable reserves Total equity
                     
    At 1 January 2023 7,314 11,684 2,669,933 103,754 102,334 2,876,021 2,895,019
    Total comprehensive income:                
    Profit for the year 75,430 470,891 53,348 599,669 599,669
    Transactions with owners, recorded directly to equity:                
    Ordinary dividends paid (71,378) (71,378) (71,378)
    Unclaimed dividends returned 14 14 14
    Own shares purchased (208) 208 (86,636) (86,636) (86,636)
    Balance at 31 December 2023 7,106 11,892 2,658,727 574,645 84,318 3,317,690 3,336,688

    Total comprehensive income:

                   
    Profit for the year 458,122 (21,074) 53,655 490,703 490,703
    Transactions with owners, recorded directly to equity:                
    Issue of ordinary shares in respect of the combination with Witan 3,024 1,535,877 1,538,901
    Costs in relation to the combination (4,947) (4,947)
    Ordinary dividends paid (82,414) (82,414) (82,414)
    Unclaimed dividends returned 9 9 9
    Own shares purchased (56,987) (56,987) (56,987)
    Balance at 31 December 2024 10,130 1,530,930 11,892 3,059,862 553,571 55,568 3,669,001 5,221,953

    The £553.6m (2023: £574.6m) of unrealised capital reserve arising on the revaluation of investments is subject to fair value movements and may not be readily realisable at short notice, as such it may not be entirely distributable. The unrealised capital reserve includes unrealised gains on borrowings of £22.8m (2023: £5.5m) and gains on unquoted investments of £3.5m (2023: £nil) which are not distributable.

    Balance Sheet as at 31 December 2024
      2024 2023
    £000    
    Non-current assets            
    Investments held at fair value through profit or loss 5,402,381 3,482,329
      5,402,381 3,482,329
    Current assets    
    Outstanding settlements and other receivables 11,282 9,321
    Cash and cash equivalents 182,725 84,974
      194,007 94,295
    Total assets 5,596,388 3,576,624
    Current liabilities    
    Outstanding settlements and other payables (13,057) (9,792)
    Bank loans (45,245)
      (58,302) (9,792)
         
    Total assets less current liabilities 5,538,086 3,566,832
         
    Non-current liabilities    
    Fixed rate loan notes held at fair value (299,276) (215,144)
    Bank loans (15,000) (15,000)
    Deferred tax provision (1,857)
      (316,133) (230,144)
    Net assets 5,221,953 3,336,688
         
    Equity    
    Share capital 10,130 7,106
    Share premium account 1,530,930
    Capital redemption reserve 11,892 11,892
    Capital reserve 3,613,433 3,233,372
    Revenue reserve 55,568 84,318
    Total equity 5,221,953 3,336,688
    All net assets are attributable to equity holders.
     
    Net asset value per ordinary share attributable to equity holders (£) £13.05 £11.75

    The Financial Statements were approved by the Board of Directors and authorised for issue on 6 March 2025.

    They were signed on its behalf by:

    Jo Dixon
    Chair of the Audit and Risk Committee

    Cash Flow Statement for the year ended 31 December 2024
      2024 2023
    £000    
    Cash flows from operating activities    
    Profit before tax 502,596 606,151
         
    Adjustments for:    
    Gains on investments (449,551) (578,715)
    Losses on derivatives 206
    (Gains)/losses on fair value of debt (16,708) 11,371
    Foreign exchange losses 1,010 3,737
    Finance costs 12,883 9,521
    Operating cash flows before movements in working capital 50,436 52,065
    (Increase)/decrease in receivables (2,274) 1,599
    Decrease in payables (43) (36)
    Net cash inflow from operating activities before tax 48,119 53,628
    Taxes paid (10,701) (6,654)
    Net cash inflow from operating activities 37,418 46,974
         
    Cash flows from investing activities    
    Proceeds on disposal of investments 4,697,547 1,600,165
    Purchases of investments (4,702,449) (1,489,643)
    Settlement of derivative financial instruments (206)
    Net cash (outflow)/inflow from investing activities (5,108) 110,522
    Net cash inflow before financing 32,310 157,496
         
    Cash flows from financing activities    
    Dividends paid – equity (82,414) (71,378)
    Unclaimed dividends returned 9 14
    Net cash acquired following the combination with Witan 177,581
    Costs paid in relation to the combination with Witan (4,947)
    Purchase of own shares (56,987) (88,060)
    Repayment of bank debt (59,000) (63,500)
    Drawdown of bank debt 104,874 15,000
    Issue of loan notes 60,632
    Finance costs paid (12,033) (10,357)
    Net cash inflow/(outflow) from financing activities 67,083 (157,649)
         
    Net increase/(decrease) in cash and cash equivalents 99,393 (153)
    Cash and cash equivalents at the start of the year 84,974 88,864
    Effect of foreign exchange rate changes (1,642) (3,737)
    Cash and cash equivalents at end of the year 182,725 84,974

    The financial information set out above does not constitute the Company’s statutory Financial Statements for the years ended 31 December 2024 or 2023, but is derived from those Financial Statements. Statutory accounts for 2023 have been delivered to the Registrar of Companies and those for 2024 will be delivered following the Company’s Annual General Meeting. The auditors have reported on those accounts; their reports were unqualified, did not draw attention to any matters by way of emphasis without qualifying their report and did not contain statements under s498(2) or (3) Companies Act 2006.

    The same accounting policies, presentations and methods of computation are followed in these Financial Statements as were applied in the Company’s last annual audited Financial Statements, other than those stated in the Annual Report.

    Basis of accounting

    The Financial Statements have been prepared in accordance with UK-adopted international accounting standards (‘IASs’).

    The Financial Statements have been prepared on the historical cost basis, except that investments and fixed rate notes are stated at fair value through the profit and loss. The Association of Investment Companies (‘AIC’) issued a Statement of Recommended Practice: Financial Statements of Investment Companies (‘AIC SORP’) in July 2022. The Directors have sought to prepare the Financial Statements in accordance with the AIC SORP where the recommendations are consistent with International Financial Reporting Standards (‘IFRS’). The Company qualifies as an investment entity.

    1. Income    
    An analysis of the Company’s revenue is as follows:    
         
    £000 2024 2023
    Revenue:    
    Income from investments    
    Listed dividends – UK 10,125 12,836
    Listed dividends – Overseas 60,838 55,761
      70,963 68,597
    Other income    
    Bank interest 1,475 987
    Other income 25 7
      1,500 994
    Total allocated to revenue 72,463 69,591
         
    Capital:    
    Income from investments    
    Listed dividends – UK 23
    Listed dividends – Overseas 331 1,678
    Total allocated to capital 354 1,678
    Total income 72,817 71,269
    2. Dividends    
    Dividends paid during the year    
         
    £000 2024 2023
    2022 fourth interim dividend 6.00p per share 17,498
    2023 first interim dividend 6.18p per share 17,849
    2023 second interim dividend 6.34p per share 18,028
    2023 third interim dividend 6.34p per share 18,003
    2023 fourth interim dividend 6.34p per share 18,003
    2024 first interim dividend 6.62p per share 18,799
    2024 second interim dividend 6.62p per share 18,676
    2024 third interim dividend 6.73p per share 26,936
      82,414 71,378
         
    Dividends payable for the year

    We also set out below the total dividend payable in respect of the financial year, which is the basis on which the requirements of Section 1158/1159 of the Corporation Tax Act 2010 are considered.

    £000 2024 2023
    2023 first interim dividend 6.18p per share 17,849
    2023 second interim dividend 6.34p per share 18,028
    2023 third interim dividend 6.34p per share 18,003
    2023 fourth interim dividend 6.34p per share 18,003
    2024 first interim dividend 6.62p per share 18,799
    2024 second interim dividend 6.62p per share 18,676
    2024 third interim dividend 6.73p per share 26,936
    2024 fourth interim dividend 6.73p per share, payable 31 March 2025 26,933
      91,344 71,883
    3. Earnings per share
    The calculation of earnings per share is based on the following data:
     
      2024 2023
    £000 Revenue Capital Total Revenue Capital Total
    Ordinary shares            
    Earnings for the purpose of earnings per share being net profit attributable to equity holders 53,655 437,048 490,703 53,348 546,321 599,669
                 
    Number of shares            
    Weighted average number of ordinary shares in issue during the year   310,079,630   287,573,436

    The Company has no securities in issue that could dilute the return per ordinary share. Therefore the basic and diluted earnings per ordinary share are the same.

    4. Related party transactions

    There are amounts of £1,222 (2023: £1,222) and £34,225 (2023: £34,225) owed to AT2006 and The Second Alliance Trust Limited, respectively, at year-end.

    There are no other related parties other than those noted below.

    Transactions with key management personnel

    Details of the Non-Executive Directors are disclosed on pages 37 to 40 of the Annual Report.

    For the purpose of IAS 24 ‘Related Party Disclosures’, key management personnel comprised the Non-Executive Directors of the Company.

    Details of remuneration are disclosed in the Remuneration Report on pages 55 to 60 of the Annual Report.

    £000 2024 2023
    Total emoluments 337 350
         

    ANNUAL REPORT

    The Annual Report will be available in due course on the Company’s website www.alliancewitan.com. It will also be made available to the public at the Company’s registered office, River Court, 5 West Victoria Dock Road, Dundee DD1 3JT and at the offices of the Company’s Registrar, Computershare Investor Services PLC, Edinburgh House, 4 North St Andrew Street, Edinburgh EH2 1HJ after publication.

    In addition to the full Annual Report, up-to-date performance data, details of new initiatives and other information about the Company can be found on the Company’s website.

    ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

    This year’s AGM will be held on 1 May 2025 at 11.00 a.m. at the Apex City Quay Hotel & Spa, 1 West Victoria Dock Road, Dundee DD1 3JP.

    The Board remains committed to maintaining a physical AGM, with shareholders and Directors present in person. However, the AGM will also be streamed live to shareholders. A web link will be provided for those shareholders wishing to join the AGM via the live stream. Information on how to obtain the link will be published on the Company’s website in due course.

    The MIL Network

  • MIL-OSI China: China to continue to play constructive role in defusing Ukraine crisis: FM

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, attends a press conference on China’s foreign policy and external relations on the sidelines of the third session of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing, capital of China, March 7, 2025. [Photo by Lun Xiaoxuan/China.org.cn]

    Speaking of the Ukraine crisis, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China is ready to work with the international community, in light of the wills of the parties to the conflict, to continue to play its constructive role in resolving the crisis and realizing lasting peace.

    China welcomes and supports all efforts for peace, said Wang while meeting the press on Friday. “At the same time, it is also important to see the complexity of the causes of the crisis.”

    “No one wins in a conflict, but everyone gains in peace. The negotiation table is where the conflict ends and peace starts,” he added.

    Although the relevant parties have not had their positions fully aligned, they all hope to have a fair and durable peace deal that is binding and accepted by all the parties concerned, according to Wang.

    “And that is a valuable common point, and all the parties should jointly strive for it,” he said.

    “All parties should learn something from the crisis,” Wang emphasized, adding that among many others, security should be mutual and equal, and no country should build its security on the insecurity of another.

    “We should advocate and act on the new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and that is the way to truly realize lasting peace and security on the Eurasian continent and across the world,” he said.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-Evening Report: The EU will spend billions more on defence. It’s a powerful statement – but won’t do much for Ukraine

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Jessica Genauer, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, Flinders University

    On March 3, US President Donald Trump paused all US military aid to Ukraine. This move was apparently triggered by a heated exchange a few days earlier between Trump, Vice President JD Vance and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in the Oval Office.

    In response, European Union leaders have now committed to rearm Europe by mobilising €800 billion (about A$1.4 trillion) in defence spending.

    26 of the EU leaders (excluding Hungary) signed an agreement that peace for Ukraine must be accompanied by “robust and credible” security guarantees.

    They agreed there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine’s participation. It was also agreed the EU will continue to provide regular military and non-military support to Ukraine.

    This jump in defence spending is unprecedented for the EU, with 2024 spending hitting a previous record high of €326 billion (A$558 billion).

    At the same time, the United Kingdom has committed to the biggest increase in defence spending since the Cold War.

    The EU’s united front will create strong defences and deter a direct attack on EU nations.

    However, for Ukraine, it will not lead to a military victory in its war with Russia. While Europe has stepped up funding, this is not sufficient for Ukraine to defeat Russian forces currently occupying about 20% of the country.

    For Ukraine, the withdrawal of US support will severely strain their ability to keep fighting. Ukraine will likely need to find a way to freeze the conflict this year. This may mean a temporary truce that does not formally cede Ukrainian territory to Russia.

    A Trumpian worldview

    The vastly different approaches of the US under Trump and the EU point to a deeper ideological divide.

    While the Trump administration has acted more quickly and assertively in foreign affairs than many expected, its approach is not surprising.

    Since Trump won the US presidential election in November last year, Europe and Ukraine have known that a shift in US policy would be on the cards.

    Trump’s approach to Ukraine is not only about economic concerns and withdrawing US military aid. It is about a deeper, more significant clash of worldviews.

    Trump (and, it appears, his core support base) hold a “great power politics” approach to world affairs.

    This approach assumes we live in a competitive world where countries are motivated to maximise gains and dominate. Outcomes can be achieved through punishments or rewards.

    Countries with greater military or economic strength “count” more. They are expected to impose their will on weaker countries. This viewpoint underpinned much of the colonial activity of the 19th and 20th centuries.

    This worldview expects conflict – and it expects stronger countries to “win”.

    Consistent with Trump’s outlook, Russia is a regional power that has the “right” to control smaller countries in its neighbourhood.

    Trump’s approach to Ukraine is not an anomaly. Nor is it a temporary and spontaneous measure to grab the global spotlight.

    Trump’s worldview leads to the logical and consistent conclusion that Russia will seek to control countries within its sphere of influence.

    Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine represented an attempt to impose its will on a militarily weaker country that it considered to be in its rightful domain of control.

    The EU alternative

    Contrary to this view, the EU is founded on the premise that countries can work together for mutual gains through collaboration and consensus. This approach underpins the operation of what are called the Bretton Woods Institutions created in the aftermath of World War II.

    This worldview expects collaboration rather than conflict. Mutually beneficial and cooperative solutions are found through dialogue and negotiation.

    According to this perspective, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is about a conflict between the values of a liberal democracy and those of an oppressive authoritarian regime.

    Zelensky has himself consistently framed the conflict as being about a clash of values: freedom and democracy versus authoritarianism and control.

    A mix of both?

    Since Trump’s second inauguration, European leaders have presented a united front, motivated by facing a world where US military backing cannot be guaranteed.

    However, there is internal division within European countries. Recent years has seen a sharp rise in anti-EU sentiment within EU member states. The UK’s exit from the EU is an example of this phenomenon.

    EU leaders previously followed a path of cooperation with Russia, with limited success. Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, France and Germany helped mediate the Minsk Agreements. These agreements, signed in 2014 and 2015, were designed to prevent further incursions by Russian-backed groups into Ukrainian sovereign territory.

    This did not prevent Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

    In an emerging new world order, leadership might require going beyond the seeming contradiction of a focus on military strength or cooperation. Leaders may need to integrate both.

    Jessica Genauer does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    ref. The EU will spend billions more on defence. It’s a powerful statement – but won’t do much for Ukraine – https://theconversation.com/the-eu-will-spend-billions-more-on-defence-its-a-powerful-statement-but-wont-do-much-for-ukraine-251710

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-Evening Report: Jonathan Cook: Yes, Trump is vulgar. But the US global shakedown is the same one as ever

    Report by Dr David Robie – Café Pacific.

    ANALYSIS: By Jonathan Cook

    If there is one thing we can thank US President Donald Trump for, it is this: he has decisively stripped away the ridiculous notion, long cultivated by Western media, that the United States is a benign global policeman enforcing a “rules-based order”.

    Washington is better understood as the head of a gangster empire, embracing 800 military bases around the world. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been aggressively seeking “global full-spectrum domination”, as the Pentagon doctrine politely terms it.

    You either pay fealty to the Don or you get dumped in the river. Last Friday, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was presented with a pair of designer concrete boots at the White House.

    The US president looked like a gangster as he roughed up Zelensky. But he wasn’t the one who stoked a war that’s killed huge numbers of Ukrainians and Russians. Image: www.jonathan-cook.net

    The innovation was that it all happened in front of the Western press corps, in the Oval Office, rather than in a back room, out of sight. It made for great television, Trump crowed.

    Pundits have been quick to reassure us that the shouting match was some kind of weird Trumpian thing. As though being inhospitable to state leaders, and disrespectful to the countries they head, is unique to this administration.

    Take just the example of Iraq. The administration of Bill Clinton thought it “worth it” – as his secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, infamously put it — to kill an estimated half a million Iraqi children by imposing draconian sanctions through the 1990s.

    Under Clinton’s successor, George W Bush, the US then waged an illegal war in 2003, on entirely phoney grounds, that killed around half a million Iraqis, according to post-war estimates, and made four million homeless.

    Those worrying about the White House publicly humiliating Zelensky might be better advised to save their concern for the hundreds of thousands of mostly Ukrainian and Russian men killed or wounded fighting an entirely unnecessary war — one, as we shall see, Washington carefully engineered through Nato over the preceding two decades.

    Henchman Zelensky
    All those casualties served the same goal as they did in Iraq: to remind the world who is boss.

    Uniquely, Western publics don’t understand this simple point because they live inside a disinformation bubble, created for them by the Western establishment media.

    Henry Kissinger, the long-time steward of US foreign policy, famously said: “It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal.”

    Zelensky just found that out the hard way. Gangster empires are just as fickle as the gangsters we know from Hollywood movies. Under the previous Joe Biden administration, Zelensky had been recruited as a henchman to do Washington’s bidding on Moscow’s doorstep.

    The background — the one Western media have kept largely out of view — is that, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US tore up treaties crucial to reassuring Russia of Nato’s good intent.

    Viewed from Moscow, and given Washington’s track record, Nato’s European security umbrella must have looked more like preparation for an ambush.

    Keen though Trump now is to rewrite history and cast himself as peacemaker, he was central to the escalating tensions that led to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

    In 2019, he unilaterally withdrew from the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces. That opened the door to the US launching a potential first strike on Russia, using missiles stationed in nearby Nato members Romania and Poland.

    He also sent Javelin anti-tank weapons to Ukraine, a move avoided by his predecessor, Barack Obama, for fear it would be seen as provocative.

    Repeatedly, Nato vowed to bring Ukraine into its fold, despite Russia’s warnings that the step was viewed as an existential threat, that Moscow could not allow Washington to place missiles on its border, any more than the US accepted Soviet missiles stationed in Cuba back in the early 1960s.

    Washington pressed ahead anyway, even assisting in a colour revolution-style coup in 2014 against the elected government in Kyiv, whose crime was being a little too sympathetic to Moscow.

    With the country in crisis, Zelensky was himself elected by Ukrainians as a peace candidate, there to end a brutal civil war — sparked by that coup — between anti-Russian, “nationalistic” forces in the country’s west and ethnic Russian populations in the east. The Ukrainian President soon broke that promise.

    Trump has accused Zelensky of being a “dictator”. But if he is, it is only because Washington wanted him that way, ignoring the wishes of the majority of Ukrainians.

    Reddest of red lines
    Zelensky’s job was to play a game of chicken with Moscow. The assumption was that the US would win whatever the outcome.

    Either Russian President Vladimir Putin’s bluff would be called. Ukraine would be welcomed into Nato, becoming the most forward of the alliance’s forward bases against Russia, allowing nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to be stationed minutes from Moscow.

    Or Putin would finally make good on his years of threats to invade his neighbour to stop Nato crossing the reddest of red lines he had set over Ukraine.

    Washington could then cry “self-defence” on Ukraine’s behalf, and ludicrously fearmonger Western publics about Putin eyeing Poland, Germany, France and Britain next.

    Those were the pretexts for arming Kyiv to the hilt, rather than seeking a rapid peace deal. And so began a proxy war of attrition against Russia, using Ukrainian men as cannon fodder.

    The aim was to wear Russia down militarily and economically, and bring about Putin’s overthrow.

    Zelensky did precisely what was demanded of him. When he appeared to waver early on, and considered signing a peace deal with Moscow, Britain’s prime minister of the time, Boris Johnson, was dispatched with a message from Washington: keep fighting.

    That is the same Boris Johnson who now breezily admits that the West is fighting a “proxy war” against Russia.

    His comments have generated precisely no controversy. That is particularly strange, given that critics who pointed this very obvious fact out three years ago were instantly denounced for spreading “Putin disinformation” and Kremlin “talking points”.

    For his obedience, Zelensky was feted a hero, the defender of Europe against Russian imperialism. His every “demand” — demands that originated in Washington — was met.

    Ukraine has received at least $250 billion worth of guns, tanks, fighter jets, training for his troops, Western intelligence on Russia, and other forms of aid.

    Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian and Russian men have paid with their lives — as have the families they leave behind.

    Mafia etiquette
    Now the old Don in Washington is gone. The new Don has decided Zelensky has been an expensive failure. Russia isn’t lethally wounded. It’s stronger than ever. Time for a new strategy.

    Zelensky, still imagining he was Washington’s favourite henchman, arrived at the Oval Office only to be taught a harsh lesson in mafia etiquette.

    Trump is spinning his stab in the back as a “peace agreement”. And in some sense, it is. Rightly, Trump has concluded that Russia has won — unless the West is ready to fight World War III and risk a potential nuclear war.

    Trump has faced up to the reality of the situation, even if Zelensky and Europe are still struggling to.


    Trump’s overt ‘genocidal’ warning over Gaza.   Video: TRT World News

    But his plan for Ukraine is actually just a variation of his other peace plan — the one for Gaza. There he wants to ethnically cleanse the Palestinian population and, on the bodies of the enclave’s many thousands of dead children, build the “Riviera of the Middle East” — or “Trump Gaza” as it is being called in a surreal video he shared on social media.

    Similarly, Trump now sees Ukraine not as a military battlefield but as an economic one where, through clever deal-making, he can leverage riches for himself and his billionaire pals.

    He has put a gun to Zelensky and Europe’s head. Make a deal with Russia to end the war, or you are on your own against a far superior military power. See if the Europeans can help you without a supply of Washington’s weapons.

    Not surprisingly, Zelensky, Britain’s Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron huddled together at the weekend to find a deal that would appease Trump. All Starmer has revealed so far is that the plan will “stop the fighting”.

    That is a good thing. But the fighting could have been stopped, and should have been stopped, three years ago.

    Money, not peace
    It is deeply unwise to be lulled into tribalism by all this — the very tribalism Western elites seek to cultivate among their publics to keep us treating international affairs no differently from a high-stakes football match.

    No one here has behaved, or is behaving, honourably.

    A ceasefire in Ukraine is not about peace. It’s about money, just as the earlier war was. As all wars are, ultimately.

    An acceptable ceasefire for Trump, as well as for Putin, will involve a carve-up of Ukraine’s goodies. Rare earth minerals, land, agricultural production will be the real currency driving the agreement.

    Zelensky now understands this. He knows that he, and the people of Ukraine, have been scammed. That is what tends to happen when you cosy up to the mafia.

    If anyone doubts Washington’s insincerity over Ukraine, look to Palestine for clarity.

    In his earlier presidency, Trump tried to bring about what he termed the peace “deal of the century” whose centrepiece was the annexation of much of the Occupied West Bank.

    The hope was that the Gulf states would ultimately fund an incentivisation programme — the carrot to Israel’s stick — to encourage Palestinians to make a new life in a giant, purpose-built industrial zone in Sinai, next to Gaza.

    That plan is still simmering away in the background. At the weekend, Israel received a green light from Washington to revive its genocidal starvation of Gaza’s population, after Israel refused to negotiate the second phase of the original ceasefire agreement.

    The Trump administration and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu are now spinning their own bad faith as Hamas “rejectionism”.

    They and the echo chamber that is the Western media are blaming the Palestinian group for refusing to be gulled into an “extension” of what was never more than a phoney ceasefire — Israel’s fire never ceased. Israel wants all the hostages back, without having to leave Gaza, so that Hamas has no leverage to stop Israel reviving the full genocide.

    The people of Gaza are still being fed into the Washington mafia’s meatgrinder, just as the Ukrainian people have been.

    Trump wants them out of the way so he can develop a Mediterranean playground for the rich, paid for with Gulf oil money and the so-far untapped natural gas reserves just off Gaza’s coast.

    Unlike his predecessors, Trump doesn’t pretend that Ukraine and Gaza are anything more than geostrategic real estate for Washington.

    The big shakedown
    Zelensky’s shakedown did not come out of the blue. Trump and his officials had been flagging it well in advance.

    Two weeks ago, the industrial correspondent for Britain’s Daily Telegraph wrote an article headlined “Here’s why Trump wants to make Ukraine a US economic colony”.

    Trump’s team believes that Ukraine may have rare-earth minerals under the ground worth some $15 trillion — a treasure trove that will be critical to the development of the next generation of technology.

    In their view, controlling the exploration and extraction of those minerals will be as important as control over the Middle East’s oil reserves was more than a century ago.

    And most important of all, the US wants China, its chief economic — if not military — rival excluded from the plunder. China currently has an effective monopoly on many of these critical minerals.

    Or as the Telegraph puts it, Ukraine’s “minerals offer a tantalising promise: the ability for the US to break its dependence on Chinese supplies of critical minerals that go into everything from wind turbines to iPhones and stealth fighter jets”.

    A draft of the plan seen by the Telegraph would, in its words, “amount to the US economic colonisation of Ukraine, in legal perpetuity”.

    Washington wants first refusal on all deposits within the country.

    At their Oval Office confrontation, Trump reiterated this goal: “So we’re going to be using that [Ukraine’s rare earth minerals], taking it, using it for all of the things we do, including AI, and including weapons, and the military. And it’s really going to very much satisfy our needs.”

    All of this means that Trump has a keen incentive to get the war finished as quickly as possible, and Russia’s territorial advance halted. The more territory Moscow seizes, the less territory is left for the US to plunder.

    Self-sabotage
    The battle against China over rare-earth minerals isn’t a Trump innovation either — and adds an additional layer of context for why Washington and Nato have been so keen over the past two decades to prise Ukraine away from Russia.

    Last summer, a Congressional select committee on competition with China announced the formation of a working group to counter Beijing’s “dominance of critical minerals”.

    The chairman of the committee, John Moolenaar, noted that the current US dependence on China for these minerals “would quickly become an existential vulnerability in the event of a conflict”.

    Another committee member, Rob Wittman, observed: “Dominance over global supply chains for critical mineral and rare earth elements is the next stage of great power competition.”

    What Trump appears to appreciate is that Nato’s proxy war against Russia in Ukraine has, by default, driven Moscow deeper into Beijing’s embrace. It has been self-sabotage on a grand scale.

    Together, China and Russia are a formidable opponent, and one at the centre of the ever-growing Brics group — comprised of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. They have been seeking to expand their alliance by adding emerging powers to become a counterweight to Washington and Nato’s bullying global agenda.

    But a deal with Putin over Ukraine would provide an opportunity for Washington to build a new security architecture in Europe — one more useful to the US — that places Russia inside the tent rather than outside it.

    That would leave China isolated — a long-time Pentagon goal.

    And it would also leave Europe less central to the projection of US power, which is why European leaders — led by Keir Starmer — have been looking and sounding so unnerved over the past few weeks.

    The danger is that Trump’s “peacemaking” in Ukraine simply becomes a prelude to the fomenting of a war against China, using Taiwan as the pretext in the same way Ukraine was used against Russia.

    As Moolenaar implied, US control over critical minerals — in Ukraine and elsewhere — would ensure the US was no longer vulnerable in the event of a war with China to losing access to the minerals it would need to continue the war. It would free Washington’s hand.

    Trump may be behaving in a vulgar manner. But the gangster empire he now heads is conducting the same global shakedown as ever.

    Jonathan Cook is an award-winning British journalist. He was based in Nazareth, Israel, for 20 years and returned to the UK in 2021. He is the author of three books on the Israel-Palestine conflict, including Disappearing Palestine: Israel’s Experiments in Human Despair (2008). In 2011, Cook was awarded the Martha Gellhorn Special Prize for Journalism for his work on Palestine and Israel. This article was first published in Middle East Eye and is republished with the author’s permission.

    This article was first published on Café Pacific.

    MIL OSI AnalysisEveningReport.nz

  • MIL-OSI China: Russia warns of NATO involvement

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov speaks during his annual press conference in Moscow, Russia, on Jan. 14, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Russia would view the potential deployment of European troops to Ukraine as direct NATO involvement in the conflict, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Thursday.

    Lavrov called the move a “direct, official and undisguised involvement of NATO countries in a war against the Russian Federation” and warned that the presence of such forces in Ukraine would be unacceptable to Moscow.

    The remarks came after French President Emmanuel Macron announced Wednesday that he would consider sending European troops to Ukraine to enforce a peace deal, although he said the troops would not engage in frontline combat.

    “This is a threat to Russia,” said Lavrov, adding that Moscow sees “no room for compromise” on the issue of deploying European forces to Ukraine.

    “This discussion is being conducted with an openly hostile objective,” he said.

    The foreign minister added that suspending U.S. military aid to Ukraine could help end the conflict quickly.

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: EU leaders greenlight defense plans

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky arrives at the European Union headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, on Feb. 9, 2023 for the EU member states’ special summit. [Photo/Xinhua]

    European Union (EU) leaders on Thursday greenlighted plans to enhance the bloc’s defense capabilities and reaffirmed their support for Ukraine.

    At a one-day special summit here, the leaders endorsed the ReArm Europe plan introduced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Tuesday.

    The EU leaders agreed to activate the national escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact in a coordinated manner, which allows for increased defense spending and provides immediate budgetary flexibility across EU member states, according to a statement released after the meeting.

    They called on the Commission to explore further measures, while ensuring debt sustainability, to facilitate significant defense spending at the national level in all member states.

    The leaders also acknowledged the Commission’s proposal for a new EU instrument that would offer member states up to 150 billion euros (161.8 billion U.S. dollars) in loans backed by the EU budget, according to the statement. They urged the European Council to “examine this proposal as a matter of urgency.”

    Trump has been pressing European partners to take more responsibility for their own defense, warning that the U.S. may not protect its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies who fail to meet spending targets. His remarks have raised concerns in the EU, prompting calls for stronger collective defense efforts.

    In a separate statement, 26 EU leaders expressed their support for Ukraine, with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban notably absent from the agreement.

    The leaders approved the bloc’s stance that there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine and that the Europeans must be involved in any talks involving their security. The EU has recently found itself sidelined in the peace talks, while the U.S. takes center stage in the negotiations.

    They also vowed to continue financial support for Ukraine, committing 30.6 billion euros in 2025. Of this, 12.5 billion euros will be disbursed through the Ukraine Facility, while 18.1 billion euros will come from profits generated from immobilized Russian assets, according to the statement. (1 euro = 1.08 U.S. dollar)

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: UK finalizes deal to supply attack drones to Ukraine

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    British Prime Minister Keir Starmer (L) shakes hands with visiting Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in front of 10 Downing Street in London, Britain, March 1, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    The United Kingdom (UK) has finalized a 30 million pounds (38.70 million U.S. dollars) deal with defense tech company Anduril to supply Ukraine with advanced attack drones, the Ministry of Defence said in a statement on Thursday.

    The agreement was secured during UK Defense Secretary John Healey’s visit to Anduril’s Washington D.C. facility ahead of talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth at the Pentagon.

    Under the deal, Ukraine will receive Altius 600m and Altius 700m drones, classified as “loitering munitions” capable of surveilling designated areas and striking targets. Deliveries of drones, launchers, and spare parts will commence in the coming months, the statement said.

    The deal is funded through the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine (IFU), which is supported by pledges from 10 nations, now totals 1.3 billion pounds, with the UK contributing 500 million pounds.

    The agreement comes amid concerns over the U.S. decision to halt intelligence-sharing with Ukraine, potentially hampering Kyiv’s access to critical data.

    The UK has emphasized its continued military support for Ukraine. Since July 2024, the UK has provided over 5.26 billion pounds in military and financial aid to Ukraine, including 10,000 drones already deployed. (1 pound = 1.29 U.S. dollar)

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: EU leaders greenlights defense plans, reaffirm support for Ukraine

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    European Union (EU) leaders on Thursday greenlighted plans to enhance the bloc’s defense capabilities and reaffirmed their support for Ukraine.

    At a one-day special summit here, the leaders endorsed the ReArm Europe plan introduced by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on Tuesday.

    The EU leaders agreed to activate the national escape clause under the Stability and Growth Pact in a coordinated manner, which allows for increased defense spending and provides immediate budgetary flexibility across EU member states, according to a statement released after the meeting.

    They called on the Commission to explore further measures, while ensuring debt sustainability, to facilitate significant defense spending at the national level in all member states.

    The leaders also acknowledged the Commission’s proposal for a new EU instrument that would offer member states up to 150 billion euros (161.8 billion U.S. dollars) in loans backed by the EU budget, according to the statement. They urged the European Council to “examine this proposal as a matter of urgency.”

    Trump has been pressing European partners to take more responsibility for their own defense, warning that the U.S. may not protect its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies who fail to meet spending targets. His remarks have raised concerns in the EU, prompting calls for stronger collective defense efforts.

    In a separate statement, 26 EU leaders expressed their support for Ukraine, with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban notably absent from the agreement.

    The leaders approved the bloc’s stance that there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine and that the Europeans must be involved in any talks involving their security. The EU has recently found itself sidelined in the peace talks, while the U.S. takes center stage in the negotiations.

    They also vowed to continue financial support for Ukraine, committing 30.6 billion euros in 2025. Of this, 12.5 billion euros will be disbursed through the Ukraine Facility, while 18.1 billion euros will come from profits generated from immobilized Russian assets, according to the statement. (1 euro = 1.08 U.S. dollar) 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI China: Russia warns of NATO involvement as Macron pushes for truce in Ukraine

    Source: China State Council Information Office

    Russia would view the potential deployment of European troops to Ukraine as direct NATO involvement in the conflict, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Thursday.

    Lavrov called the move a “direct, official and undisguised involvement of NATO countries in a war against the Russian Federation” and warned that the presence of such forces in Ukraine would be unacceptable to Moscow.

    The remarks came after French President Emmanuel Macron announced Wednesday that he would consider sending European troops to Ukraine to enforce a peace deal, although he said the troops would not engage in frontline combat.

    “This is a threat to Russia,” said Lavrov, adding that Moscow sees “no room for compromise” on the issue of deploying European forces to Ukraine.

    “This discussion is being conducted with an openly hostile objective,” he said.

    The foreign minister added that suspending U.S. military aid to Ukraine could help end the conflict quickly. 

    MIL OSI China News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Durbin, Shaheen Host Lithuanian Minister Of Defense To Discuss Increased Russian Aggression Toward The Baltic Region

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin
    March 06, 2025
    The meeting comes after President Trump’s shameful outburst toward Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office last Friday
    WASHINGTON – U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Co-Chair of the Senate Baltic Freedom Caucus, and U.S. Senator Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Ranking Member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, met with Lithuanian Minister of Defense, Dovile Šakaliene, to discuss an increase in Russian hybrid attacks in the Baltics and across Europe, and the need to maintain allied support forUkraine and NATO. The meeting comes after President Trump’s shameful outburst toward Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in the Oval Office last Friday.
    “My mother’s family originally came from Lithuania—a country that knows Russian tyranny too well,” said Durbin. “As I said to Minister Šakaliene, I was saddened, shocked, and stunned at what happened in the Oval Office last week with President Zelenskyy. During today’s meeting, we agreed that now, more than ever, the U.S. must reaffirm our support for our NATO partners in upholding democratic values and transatlantic security,”
    “Lithuania is a vital NATO Ally that has demonstrated leadership in support of Ukraine and countering the Russian threat,” said Shaheen. “During our meeting, I reiterated the bipartisan Senate commitment to the NATO Alliance, including our positioning of U.S. forces on the eastern flank.”
    Photos of the meeting are available here.
    As Co-Chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, Durbin has been a vocal supporter of President Zelenskyy and the people of Ukraine. Last night, Durbin, asked for unanimous consent (UC) to pass a simple resolution he introduced condemning Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children and called on Russia to work with the international community to return all abducted Ukrainian children to their families. Senate Republicans rejected the resolution.
    Last week, Durbin introduced the Protecting our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act, legislation that would provide temporary guest status to Ukrainians and their immediate family members who are already in the United States through the “Uniting for Ukraine” parole process. Bill text can be found here.  
    Durbin also joined Shaheen in leading a simple resolution last week that expresses continued solidarity with the people of Ukraine and condolences for the loss of thousands of lives to Russian aggression; rejects Russia’s attempts to militarily seize sovereign Ukrainian territory; reaffirms U.S. support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; and states unequivocally that Ukraine must be at the table for negotiations on its future.
      
    Durbin has also championed the creation of the Baltic Security Initiative (BSI), which enhances and strengthens U.S. security cooperation with the Baltics amid Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine and heightened tensions with China. In Fiscal Year 2024, Durbin secured $228 million in defense appropriations funding for the BSI.  
    In 2022, Durbin traveled to Vilnius, Lithuania, where he received the Aleksandras Stulginskis Star Award—only the second individual and first American to receive this award. It was granted to Durbin forhis decades-long support of Lithuanian independence and democracy and his promotion of parliamentary values. He was in Vilnius three years ago on the morning Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 
    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: “Ukraine has a right to peace and security, and it is in our interest”

    Source: France-Diplomatie – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development

    President Emmanuel Macron addresses the French people from the Élysée Palace (March 5, 2025)

    Men and women of France, my fellow citizens,

    I am speaking to you this evening because of the international situation and its consequences for France and Europe, following several weeks of diplomatic activity.

    You are rightfully concerned by the historic events under way that are disrupting the world order.

    The war in Ukraine, which has killed or injured nearly a million people, is continuing at the same level of intensity.

    The United States of America, our ally, has changed its position on this war, lessening its support for Ukraine and raising doubts about what is to come. At the same time, the United States intends to impose tariffs on products from Europe.

    Meanwhile, the world continues to be ever more violent, and the terrorist threat has not lessened.

    All in all, our prosperity and our security have become increasingly uncertain. Clearly, we are entering a new era.

    The war in Ukraine has gone on for more than three years now. We decided on day one to support Ukraine and to sanction Russia, and it was the right thing to do, because not only are the Ukrainian people bravely fighting for their freedom, but our own security is under threat as well.

    Indeed, if a country can invade its European neighbor with impunity, we can no longer be certain of anything. Might makes right and peace can no longer be guaranteed on our own continent. History has taught us this.

    The Russian threat goes beyond Ukraine and affects every country in Europe. It affects us.

    Russia has already made the Ukrainian conflict a global conflict. It has deployed North Korean soldiers and Iranian equipment on our continent, while helping those countries to further rearm. President Putin’s Russia violates our borders to murder his opponents and manipulates elections in Romania and Moldova. It organizes digital attacks against our hospitals to keep them from functioning. Russia is attempting to manipulate our opinions, spreading lies on social media. Basically, it is testing our limits in the air, on the seas, in space and behind our screens. Its aggressiveness seems to know no bounds. At the same time, Russia is continuing to rearm, spending more than 40% of its budget for that purpose. By 2030, it plans to have further expanded its army – to have an additional 300,000 troops, 3,000 tanks and 300 fighter planes. So how believable is it, then, that today’s Russia will stop at Ukraine? Russia has become a threat to France and Europe now and for years to come. I deeply regret it and I am convinced that in the long term, peace will return to our continent, with a once-again peaceable and peaceful Russia, but this is where we are today and we have to deal with it.

    In this world fraught with danger, it would be madness to stand back and watch from the sidelines. We must make decisions about Ukraine and about the security of the French people and the people of Europe without further delay.

    About Ukraine, first of all. All initiatives that help bring about peace are a step in the right direction, and I want to applaud them this evening. We must continue helping the Ukrainians to resist until they can negotiate a deal with Russia that ensures a solid peace for themselves and for all of us. That’s why we can’t abandon Ukraine on the road to peace – on the contrary. A peace deal can’t be signed at any price on orders from Russia. Peace can’t mean Ukraine’s capitulation. It can’t mean its collapse. Nor can it come about through a ceasefire, which would be too fragile. Why? Because once again, we’ve learned from the past. We can’t forget that Russia began its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, that we negotiated a ceasefire in Minsk, that Russia did not abide by that ceasefire and that we were unable to maintain it due to a lack of solid guarantees. We can no longer take Russia at its word.

    Ukraine has a right to peace and security, and it is in our interest – the interest of European security. It is with this in mind that we are working with our British and German friends, as well as several other European countries. That’s why over the past few weeks, you saw me bring together several of them in Paris, and that’s why I met with them again a few days ago in London, to solidify the necessary commitments to Ukraine. Once a peace deal has been signed, ensuring that Ukraine will not be invaded again by Russia, we have to prepare for it. That will most certainly require long-term support for the Ukrainian army. It may also involve the deployment of European forces. They wouldn’t immediately go off to fight – they wouldn’t be fighting on the front lines – but they would be there once a peace deal is signed in order to ensure full compliance. Next week, the joint chiefs of the countries that wish to shoulder their responsibilities in this regard will meet in Paris. What we prepared together with the Ukrainians and several European partners is a plan for a solid, lasting, verifiable peace. It’s the plan I championed in the United States two weeks ago, and around Europe. I want to believe that the United States will stand with us, but we must be ready if that’s not the case.

    Whether or not peace is achieved quickly in Ukraine, the European nations must be able to better defend themselves and to deter any new aggression, given the Russian threat I just described. Yes, whatever happens, we must be better equipped; we must improve our defense posture for the sake of peace and for the purpose of deterrence. In that regard, we remain committed to NATO and to our partnership with the United States, but we must do more – we must increase our independence in the areas of security and defense. Europe’s future cannot be decided in Washington or Moscow. And yes, the threat is back in the East, and the innocence, as it were, of the last 30 years, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, is now a thing of the past.

    In Brussels tomorrow, at the extraordinary meeting with the 27 heads of state and government, the Commission and the Council President, we will take decisive steps. We will make several decisions that France has been proposing for years. Member states will be able to increase their military spending without adding to their deficit. We will decide on large-scale, joint funding for the purchase and production in Europe of ammunition, tanks, weapons and some of the most innovative equipment that exists. I have asked my administration to work to make sure that this strengthens our military as quickly as possible and accelerates the reindustrialization of every region in France. I will be holding a meeting with the relevant ministers and industry representatives in the coming days.

    Now, the Europe of Defense that we have been championing for eight years has become a reality. That means European countries that are better able to defend and protect themselves, that work together to produce the equipment that they need in their own countries, and that are willing to cooperate more and reduce their dependence on the rest of the world, and that’s a good thing. Germany, Poland, Denmark, the Baltic states and many other partners of ours have announced plans for unprecedented military spending.

    Now, at this long-awaited time for action, France is in a unique position. We have the most effective military in Europe and, thanks to the decisions made by our predecessors after World War II, we possess nuclear deterrence capabilities. That affords us much better protection than a number of our neighbors. Moreover, we didn’t wait for the invasion of Ukraine to understand that the world was in trouble, and, thanks to the two military programming laws that I put forth, which were passed by two successive Parliaments, our military budget will have doubled over close to ten years. However, given the way that threats are evolving and in light of the acceleration I just described, we will need to make new budgetary decisions and additional, henceforward essential investments.

    I have asked my administration to get to work on this as quickly as possible. These new investments will require us to mobilize both private and public funding without raising taxes. To achieve this, we will need reforms, choices and courage.

    Our nuclear deterrence protects us. It is thorough, sovereign and French from start to finish. Since 1964, it has played a clear role in the preservation of peace and security in Europe. However, in response to the historic call sounded by the future Chancellor of Germany, I decided to launch a strategic debate on using our deterrence to protect our allies on the European continent. Whatever happens, that decision has always been, and will always be, up to the President and Commander in Chief of France.

    In order to control our destiny and increase our independence, we must step up our military efforts, as well as our economic efforts. Economic, technological, industrial and financial independence are critical. We must be prepared for the United States to impose tariffs on European goods, just as they confirmed they are doing with Canada and Mexico. This decision, which is just as incomprehensible for the U.S. economy as it is for our own, will bear consequences for some of our sectors. It makes these times more difficult but we will not let these tariffs go unanswered. Therefore, as we prepare to respond with our European colleagues, as I did two weeks ago, we will continue trying to convince them by every means possible that this decision will hurt us all. And yes, I hope that I can convince and dissuade the President of the United States of America.

    In sum, this time calls for decisions that have no precedent going back for many decades. When it comes to our agriculture, our research, our industrial sector, and all of our public policies, we cannot keep having the same debates as before. That is why I asked the Prime Minister and his cabinet to make proposals in light of this new context. I invite all the political, economic and union representatives of France to do the same. Tomorrow’s solutions cannot be yesterday’s habits.

    My fellow citizens,

    Faced with these challenges and these irreversible changes, we must not give in to any form of excess: neither excessive warmongering, nor excessive defeatism. France will follow only one course: that of the desire for peace and freedom, true to its history and its principles. Yes, that is what we believe in for our security, and that is also what we believe in when it comes to defending democracy, a certain idea of the truth, a certain idea of free research, a certain idea of respect in our society, a certain idea of freedom of expression that eschews hate speech, and a certain idea of humanism. That is what we believe in and that is what is at stake. Our Europe has the economic strength, the power and the talent to rise to meet our time. We have the means to hold our own in comparison with the United States of America and, to an even greater extent, Russia. Therefore, we must take action, united as Europeans and determined to protect ourselves. That is why our country needs you and your commitment. Political decisions, military equipment and budgets are important, but they can never replace a nation’s strength of character. No longer will our generation enjoy the peace dividends. It is up to us to ensure that one day, our children will enjoy the dividends of our efforts.

    So we will face this together.

    Vive la République.

    Vive la France

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress

    US Senate News:

    Source: The White House
    class=”has-text-align-center”>U.S. Capitol
    Washington, D.C.
    9:19 P.M. EST
    (March 4, 2025)
         THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.  (Applause.)  Thank you very much.  Thank you very much.  It’s a great honor.  Thank you very much. 
    Speaker Johnson, Vice President Vance, the first lady of the United States — (applause) — members of the United States Congress, thank you very much.  
    And to my fellow citizens, America is back.  (Applause.)
    AUDIENCE:  USA!  USA!  USA! 
    THE PRESIDENT:  Six weeks ago, I stood beneath the dome of this Capitol and proclaimed the dawn of the golden age of America.  From that moment on, it has been nothing but swift and unrelenting action to usher in the greatest and most successful era in the history of our country. 
    We have accomplished more in 43 days than most administrations accomplished in four years or eight years, and we are just getting started.  (Applause.)  Thank you. 
    I return to this chamber tonight to report that America’s momentum is back, our spirit is back, our pride is back, our confidence is back, and the American dream is surging bigger and better than ever before.  (Applause.)  The American dream is unstoppable, and our country is on the verge of a comeback, the likes of which the world has never witnessed and perhaps will never witness again.  There’s never been anything like it.  (Applause.)
    The presidential election of November 5th was a mandate like has not been seen in many decades.  We won all seven swing states, giving us an electoral college victory of 312 votes.  (Applause.)  We won the popular vote —
    REPRESENTATIVE GREEN:  (Inaudible.)
    THE PRESIDENT:  — by big numbers and won counties in our country —
    AUDIENCE:  Booo —
    AUDIENCE:  USA!  USA!  USA!
    REPRESENTATIVE GREEN:  You are — you have no right to cut Medicaid.
    AUDIENCE:  USA!  USA!  USA! 
    THE PRESIDENT:  — and won counties in our country 2,700 to 525 on a map that reads almost completely red for Republican.  (Applause.) 
    Now, for the first time in modern history, more Americans believe that our country is headed in the right direction than the wrong direction.  In fact, it’s an astonishing record: 27-point swing, the most ever.  (Applause.)
    Likewise, small-business optimism saw its single largest one-month gain ever recorded. 
    SPEAKER JOHNSON:  Mr. President —
    THE PRESIDENT:  A 41-point jump.
    (Speaker Johnson strikes the gavel.) 
         SPEAKER JOHNSON:  Members are directed to uphold and maintain decorum in the House and to cease any further disruptions.  That’s your warning.
    REPRESENTATIVE GREEN:  He has no mandate to cut Medicaid.
    SPEAKER JOHNSON:  Members are engaging in willful and continuing breach of decorum, and the chair is prepared to direct the sergeant at arms to restore order to the joint session.  (Applause.)
    Mr. Green, take your seat.  Take your seat, sir. 
    REPRESENTATIVE GREEN:  He has no mandate to cut Medicaid.
    SPEAKER JOHNSON:  Take your seat.
    (Cross-talk.) 
    Finding that members continue to engage in willful and concerted disruption of proper decorum, the chair now directs the sergeant at arms to restore order.  (Applause.)  Remove this gentleman from the chamber.  (Applause.)
    REPRESENTATIVE GREEN:  Shame on all of you.
         (Members of the audience sing “Na Na Hey Hey Kiss Him Goodbye.”)
         (Cross-talk.)
         You have no mandate.
    SPEAKER JOHNSON:  Members are directed to uphold and maintain decorum in the House.
    Mr. President, you can continue.
    THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.
    Over the past six weeks, I have signed nearly 100 executive orders and taken more than 400 executive actions — a record — to restore common sense, safety, optimism, and wealth all across our wonderful land.  The people elected me to do the job, and I’m doing it.  (Applause.)
    In fact, it has been stated by many that the first month of our presidency — it’s our presidency — (applause) — is the most successful in the history of our nation by many.  (Applause.)  And what makes it even more impressive is that — do you know who number two is?  George Washington.  How about that?  (Laughter and applause.)  How about that?  I don’t know about that list, but we’ll take it. 
    Within hours of taking the oath of office, I declared a national emergency on our southern border — (applause) — and I deployed the U.S. military and Border Patrol to repel the invasion of our country.  And what a job they’ve done. 
    As a result, illegal border crossings last month were, by far, the lowest ever recorded. Ever.  (Applause.)  They heard my words, and they chose not to come.  Much easier that way. 
    In comparison, under Joe Biden, the worst president in American history — (applause) — there were hundreds of thousands of illegal crossings a month, and virtually all of them, including murderers, drug dealers, gang members, and people from mental institutions and insane asylums, were released into our country.  Who would want to do that?
    This is my fifth such speech to Congress, and, once again, I look at the Democrats in front of me, and I realize there is absolutely nothing I can say to make them happy or to make them stand or smile or applaud.  Nothing I can do.  I could find a cure to the most devastating disease — a disease that would wipe out entire nations, or announce the answers to the greatest economy in history or the stoppage of crime to the lowest levels ever recorded, and these people sitting right here will not clap, will not stand, and certainly will not cheer for these astronomical achievements.  They won’t do it no matter what.
    Five times I’ve been up here.  It’s very sad, and it just shouldn’t be this way.  (Applause.)
    So, Democrats sitting before me, for just this one night, why not join us in celebrating so many incredible wins for America?  For the good of our nation, let’s work together and let’s truly make America great again.  (Applause.)
    Every day, my administration is fighting to deliver the change America needs, to bring a future that America deserves, and we’re doing it.  This is a time for big dreams and bold action. 
    Upon taking office, I imposed an immediate freeze on all federal hiring, a freeze on all new federal regulations, and a freeze on all foreign aid.  (Applause.)  I terminated the ridiculous Green New Scam.  I withdrew from the unfair Paris Climate Accord, which was costing us trillions of dollars that other countries were not paying.  (Applause.)  I withdrew from the corrupt World Health Organization.  (Applause.)  And I also withdrew from the anti-American U.N. Human Rights Council.  (Applause.)
    We ended all of Biden’s environmental restrictions that were making our country far less safe and totally unaffordable.  And importantly, we ended the last administration’s insane electric vehicle mandate, saving our autoworkers and companies from economic destruction.  (Applause.)
    To unshackle our economy, I have directed that for every 1 new regulation, 10 old regulations must be eliminated, just like I did in my very successful first term.  (Applause.)  And in that first term, we set records on ending unnecessary rules and regulations like no other president had done before. 
    We ordered all federal workers to return to the office.  They will either show up for work in person or be removed from their job.  (Applause.)  
    And we have ended weaponized government, where, as an example, a sitting president is allowed to viciously prosecute his political opponent, like me.  How did that work out? (Laughter.)  Not too good.  (Applause.)  Not too good. 
    And I have stopped all government censorship and brought back free speech in America.  It’s back.  (Applause.) 
    And two days ago, I signed an order making English the official language of the United States of America.  (Applause.)  
    I renamed the Gulf of Mexico the Gulf of America.  (Applause.) 
    And, likewise, I renamed — for a great president, William McKinley — Mount McKinley again.  (Applause.)  Beautiful Alaska.  We love Alaska.
    We’ve ended the tyranny of so-called diversity, equity, and inclusion policies all across the entire federal government and, indeed, the private sector and our military.  (Applause.)  And our country will be woke no longer.  (Applause.)
    We believe that whether you are a doctor, an accountant, a lawyer, or an air traffic controller, you should be hired and promoted based on skill and competence, not race or gender.  Very important.  (Applause.)  You should be hired based on merit.  And the Supreme Court, in a brave and very powerful decision, has allowed us to do so.
    Thank you.  Thank you very much.  Thank you.  (Applause.)
    We have removed the poison of critical race theory from our public schools.  And I signed an order making it the official policy of the United States government that there are only two genders: male and female.  (Applause.) 
    I also signed an executive order to ban men from playing in women’s sports.  (Applause.) 
         Three years ago, Payton McNabb was an all-star high school athlete — one of the best — preparing for a future in college sports.  But when her girls’ volleyball match was invaded by a male, he smashed the ball so hard in Payton’s face, causing traumatic brain injury, partially paralyzing her right side, and ending her athletic career.  It was a shot like she’s never seen before.  She’s never seen anything like it.
    Payton is here tonight in the gallery.  And, Payton, from now on, schools will kick the men off the girls’ team or they will lose all federal funding.  (Applause.) 
    And if you really want to see numbers, just take a look at what happened in the woman’s boxing, weightlifting, track and field, swimming, or cycling, where a male recently finished a long-distance race five hours and 14 minutes ahead of a woman for a new record by five hours.  Broke the record by five hours. 
    It’s demeaning for women, and it’s very bad for our country.  We’re not going to put up with it any longer.  (Applause.) 
    What I have just described is only a small fraction of the commonsense revolution that is now, because of us, sweeping the entire world.  Common sense has become a common theme, and we will never go back.  Never.  Never going to let that happen.  (Applause.)
    Among my very highest priorities is to rescue our economy and get dramatic and immediate relief to working families.  As you know, we inherited from the last administration an economic catastrophe and an inflation nightmare.  Their policies drove up energy prices, pushed up grocery costs, and drove the necessities of life out of reach for millions and millions of Americans.  They’ve never had anything like it. 
    We suffered the worst inflation in 48 years but perhaps even in the history of our country. They’re not sure.  As president, I’m fighting every day to reverse this damage and make America affordable again.  (Applause.)
    Joe Biden especially let the price of eggs get out of control.
    AUDIENCE:  Booo —
    THE PRESIDENT:  The egg price is out of control, and we’re working hard to get it back down. 
    Secretary, do a good job on that.  You inherited a total mess from the previous administration.  Do a good job.  (Applause.) 
    A major focus of our fight to defeat inflation is rapidly reducing the cost of energy.  The previous administration cut the number of new oil and gas leases by 95 percent, slowed pipeline construction to a halt, and closed more than 100 power plants.  We are opening up many of those power plants right now.  (Applause.) 
    And, frankly, we have never seen anything like it.  That’s why, on my first day in office, I declared a national energy emergency.  (Applause.)  As you’ve heard me say many times, we have more liquid gold under our feet than any nation on Earth and by far.  And now I’ve fully authorized the most talented team ever assembled to go and get it.  It’s called drill, baby, drill.  (Applause.) 
    My administration is also working on a gigantic natural gas pipeline in Alaska — among the largest in the world — where Japan, South Korea, and other nations want to be our partner with investments of trillions of dollars each.  There’s never been anything like that one.  It will be truly spectacular.  It’s all set to go.  The permitting is gotten.
    And later this week, I will also take historic action to dramatically expand production of critical minerals and rare earths here in the USA.  (Applause.)  
    To further combat inflation, we will not only be reducing the cost of energy, but we’ll be ending the flagrant waste of taxpayer dollars.  (Applause.)  And to that end, I have created the brand-new Department of Government Efficiency – DOGE. (Applause.) Perhaps you’ve heard of it — perhaps — which is headed by Elon Musk, who is in the gallery tonight.  (Applause.)
    Thank you, Elon.  He’s working very hard.  He didn’t need this.  (Laughs.)  He didn’t need this.  Thank you very much.  We appreciate it.  Everybody here, even this side, appreciates it, I believe.  (Applause.)  They just don’t want to admit that.
    Just listen to some of the appalling waste we have already identified.
    $22 billion from HHS to provide free housing and cars for illegal aliens.
    $45 million for diversity, equity, and inclusion scholarships in Burma.
    $40 million to improve the social and economic inclusion of sedentary migrants.  Nobody knows what that is.  (Laughter.) 
    $8 million to promote LGBTQI+ in the African nation of Lesotho, which nobody has ever heard of.  (Laughter.)
    $60 million for Indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombian empowerment in Central America.  $60 million.
    $8 million for making mice transgender.  (Laughter.)  This is real.
    $32 million for a left-wing propaganda operation in Moldova.
    $10 million for male circumcision in Mozambique.
    $20 million for the Arab “Sesame Street” in the Middle East.  It’s a program.  $20 million for a program.
    $1.9 billion to recently created decarbonization of homes committee, headed up — and we know she’s involved — just at the last moment, the money was passed over — by a woman named Stacey Abrams.  Have you ever heard of her?
    AUDIENCE:  Booo —
    THE PRESIDENT:  A $3.5 million consulting contract for lavish fish monitoring.
    $1.5 million for voter confidence in Liberia.
    $14 million for social cohesion in Mali.
    $59 million for illegal alien hotel rooms in New York City. 
    AUDIENCE:  Booo —
    THE PRESIDENT:  He’s a real estate developer.  He’s done very well.
    $250,000 to increase vegan local climate action innovation in Zambia.
    $42 million for social and behavior change in Uganda.
    $14 million for improving public procurement in Serbia.
    $47 million for improving learning outcomes in Asia.  Asia is doing very well with learning.  (Laughter.)  Don’t know what we’re doing.  We should use it ourselves.
    And $101 million for DEI contracts at the Department of Education, the most ever paid.  Nothing even like it.
    Under the Trump administration, all of these scams — and there are far worse, but I didn’t think it was appropriate to talk about them.  They’re so bad.  Many more have been found out and exposed and swiftly terminated by a group of very intelligent, mostly young people, headed up by Elon.  And we appreciate it.  We’ve found hundreds of billions of dollars of fraud.  (Applause.)
    And we’ve taken back the money and reduced our debt to fight inflation and other things.  Taken back a lot of that money.  We got it just in time. 
    AUDIENCE MEMBERS:  (Inaudible.)
    THE PRESIDENT:  This is just the beginning.  The Government Accountability Office, a federal government office, has estimated annual fraud of over $500 billion in our nation, and we are working very hard to stop it.  We’re going to.
    We’re also identifying shocking levels of incompetence and probable fraud in the Social Security program for our seniors and that our seniors and people that we love rely on.  Believe it or not, government databases list 4.7 million Social Security members from people aged 100 to 109 years old.
    THE PRESIDENT:  It lists 3.6 million people from ages 110 to 119.  I don’t know any of them.  I know some people that are rather elderly, but not quite that elderly.  (Laughter.) 
    3.47 million people from ages 120 to 129. 
    3.9 million people from ages 130 to 139.
    3.5 million people from ages 140 to 149.
    And money is being paid to many of them, and we’re searching right now. 
    In fact, Pam, good luck.  Good luck.  You’re going to find it.
    But a lot of money is paid out to people because it just keeps getting paid and paid, and nobody does — and it really hurts Social Security and hurts our country.
    1.3 million people from ages 150 to 159.  And over 130,000 people, according to the Social Security databases, are age over 160 years old.  
    We have a healthier country than I thought, Bobby.  (Laughter and applause.)
    Including, to finish, 1,039 people between the ages of 220 and 229; one person between the age of 240 and 249; and one person is listed at 360 years of age.
    AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Joe Biden!  (Laughter.)
    THE PRESIDENT: More than 100 years older than our country. 
    But we’re going to find out where that money is going, and it’s not going to be pretty. 
    By slashing all of the fraud, waste, and theft we can find, we will defeat inflation, bring down mortgage rates, lower car payments and grocery prices, protect our seniors, and put more money in the pockets of American families.  (Applause.) 
    And today, interest rates took a beautiful drop — big, beautiful drop.  It’s about time.
    And in the near future, I want to do what has not been done in 24 years: balance the federal budget.  We’re going to balance it.  (Applause.) 
    With that goal in mind, we have developed in great detail what we are calling the gold card, which goes on sale very, very soon.  
         For $5 million, we will allow the most successful, job-creating people from all over the world to buy a path to U.S. citizenship.  It’s like the green card but better and more sophisticated.  (Laughter.)  And these people will have to pay tax in our country.  They won’t have to pay tax from where they came.  The money that they’ve made, you wouldn’t want to do that, but they have to pay tax, create jobs.
    They’ll also be taking people out of colleges and paying for them so that we can keep them in our country, instead of having them being forced out.  Number one at the top school, as an example, being forced out and not being allowed to stay and create tremendous numbers of jobs and great success for a company out there.
    So, while we take out the criminals, killers, traffickers, and child predators who were allowed to enter our country under the open border policy of these people — the Democrats, the Biden administration — the open border, insane policies that you’ve allowed to destroy our country — we will now bring in brilliant, hardworking, job-creating people.  They’re going to pay a lot of money, and we’re going to reduce our debt with that money.  (Applause.)
    Americans have given us a mandate for bold and profound change.  For nearly 100 years, the federal bureaucracy has grown until it has crushed our freedoms, ballooned our deficits, and held back America’s potential in every possible way.  The nation founded by pioneers and risk-takers now drowns under millions and millions of pages of regulations and debt. 
    Approvals that should take 10 days to get instead take 10 years, 15 years, and even 20 years before you’re rejected.  Meanwhile, we have hundreds of thousands of federal workers who have not been showing up to work. 
    My administration will reclaim power from this unaccountable bureaucracy, and we will restore true democracy to America again. (Applause.)  Any federal bureaucrat who resists this change will be removed from office immediately — (applause) — because we are draining the swamp.  It’s very simple.  And the days of rule by unelected bureaucrats are over.  (Applause.)
    And the next phase of our plan to deliver the greatest economy in history is for this Congress to pass tax cuts for everybody.  They’re in there.  They’re waiting for you to vote.  (Applause.) 
    And I’m sure that the people on my right — I don’t mean the Republican right, but my right right here — I’m sure you’re going to vote for those tax cuts, because, otherwise, I don’t believe the people will ever vote you into office.  So, I’m doing you a big favor by telling you that.  (Applause.)
    But I know this group is going to be voting for the taxes.  (Applause.)
    Thank you.  It’s a very, very big part of our plan.  We had tremendous success in our first term with it.  A very big part of our plan.  We’re seeking permanent income tax cuts all across the board.
    And to get urgently needed relief to Americans hit especially hard by inflation, I’m calling for no tax on tips, no tax on overtime, and no tax on Social Security benefits for our great seniors.  (Applause.) 
    (Addressing Speaker Johnson.)  Good luck.
    And I also want to make interest payments on car loans tax deductible but only if the car is made in America.  (Applause.)  
    And, by the way, we’re going to have growth in the auto industry like nobody has ever seen.  Plants are opening up all over the place.  Deals are being made.  Never seen. That’s a combination of the election win and tariffs. 
    It’s a beautiful word, isn’t it? 
    That, along with our other policies, will allow our auto industry to absolutely boom.  It’s going to boom.  Spoke to the majors today — all three — the top people, and they’re so excited.  In fact, already, numerous car companies have announced that they will be building massive automobile plants in America, with Honda just announcing a new plant in Indiana, one of the largest anywhere in the world.  (Applause.) 
    And this has taken place since our great victory on November 5th, a date which will hopefully go down as one of the most important in the history of our country.  (Applause.)  
    In addition, as part of our tax cuts, we want to cut taxes on domestic production and all manufacturing.  And just as we did before, we will provide 100 percent expensing.  It will be retroactive to January 20th, 2025, and it was one of the main reasons why our tax cuts were so successful in our first term, giving us the most successful economy in the history of our country.  First term — we had a great first term.  (Applause.) 
    If you don’t make your product in America, however, under the Trump administration, you will pay a tariff and, in some cases, a rather large one.  Other countries have used tariffs against us for decades, and now it’s our turn to start using them against those other countries.
    On average, the European Union, China, Brazil, India, Mexico, and Canada — have you heard of them? — and countless other nations charge us tremendously higher tariffs than we charge them.  It’s very unfair.  India charges us auto tariffs higher than 100 percent.  China’s average tariff on our products is twice what we charge them.  And South Korea’s average tariff is four times higher.  Think of that: four times higher.  And we give so much help militarily and in so many other ways to South Korea, but that’s what happens.
    This is happening by friend and foe.  This system is not fair to the United States and never was.  And so, on April 2nd — I wanted to make it April 1st, but I didn’t want to be accused of April Fool’s Day.  (Laughter.)  Just one day, which cost us a lot of money.  (Laughter.)  But we’re going to do it in April. I’m a very superstitious person. April 2nd, reciprocal tariffs kick in.  And whatever they tariff us — other countries — we will tariff them.  That’s reciprocal, back and forth.  (Applause.)  Whatever they tax us, we will tax them.
    If they do non-monetary tariffs to keep us out of their market, then we will do non-monetary barriers to keep them out of our market.  There’s a lot of that too.  They don’t even allow us in their market.
    We will take in trillions and trillions of dollars and create jobs like we have never seen before.  I did it with China, and I did it with others.  And the Biden administration couldn’t do anything about it because it was so much money.  They couldn’t do anything about it.
    We have been ripped off for decades by nearly every country on Earth, and we will not let that happen any longer.  (Applause.) 
    Much has been said over the last three months about Mexico and Canada, but we have very large deficits with both of them.  But even more importantly, they have allowed fentanyl to come into our country at levels never seen before, killing hundreds of thousands of our citizens and many very young, beautiful people — destroying families.  Nobody has ever seen anything like it. 
    They are, in effect, receiving subsidies of hundreds of billions of dollars.  We pay subsidies to Canada and to Mexico of hundreds of billions of dollars.  And the United States will not be doing that any longer.  We’re not going to do it any longer.  (Applause.)
    Thanks to our America First policies we’re putting into place, we have had $1.7 trillion of new investment in America in just the past few weeks.  (Applause.)  The combination of the election and our economic policies — the people of SoftBank, one of the most brilliant anywhere in the world, announced a $200 billion investment.  OpenAI and Oracle — Larry Ellison — announced $500 billion investment, which they wouldn’t have done if Kamala had won.  (Applause.)
    Apple announced $500 billion investment.  Tim Cook called me.  He said, “I cannot spend it fast enough.”  It’s going to be much higher than that, I believe.  They’ll be building their plants here, instead of in China. 
    And just yesterday, Taiwan Semiconductor — the biggest in the world, most powerful in the world, has a tremendous amount — 97 percent of the market, announced a $165 billion investment to build the most powerful chips on Earth right here in the USA.  (Applause.) 
    And we’re not giving them any money.  Your CHIPS Act is a horrible, horrible thing.  We give hundreds of billions of dollars, and it doesn’t mean a thing.  They take our money, and they don’t spend it.  All that meant to them — we’re giving them no money.  All that was important to them was they didn’t want to pay the tariffs, so they came and they’re building.  And many other companies are coming.  
    We don’t have to give them money.  We just want to protect our businesses and our people.  And they will come because they won’t have to pay tariffs if they build in America.  And so, it’s very amazing.
    You should get rid of the CHIP Act.  And whatever is left over, Mr. Speaker, you should use it to reduce debt or any other reason you want to.  (Applause.) 
    Our new trade policy will also be great for the American farmer — I love the farmer — (applause) — who will now be selling into our home market, the USA, because nobody is going to be able to compete with you.  Because those goods that come in from other countries and companies, they’re really, really in a bad position in so many different ways.  They’re uninspected.  They may be very dirty and disgusting, and they come in and they pour in, and they hurt our American farmers.
    The tariffs will go on agricultural product coming into America.  And our farmers, starting on April 2nd — it may be a little bit of an adjustment period.  We had that before, when I made the deal with China.  Fifty billion dollars of purchases, and I said, “Just bear with me,” and they did.  They did.  Probably have to bear with me again, and this will be even better.  
    That was great.  The problem with it was that Biden didn’t enforce it.  He didn’t enforce it.  Fifty billion dollars of purchases, and we were doing great, but Biden did not enforce it.  And it hurt our farmers, but our farmers are going to have a field day right now.
    So, to our farmers, have a lot of fun.  I love you too.  I love you too.  (Applause.)  It’s all going to happen.
    And I have also imposed a 25 percent tariff on foreign aluminum, copper, lumber, and steel, because if we don’t have, as an example, steel and lots of other things, we don’t have a military and, frankly, we just won’t have a country very long.
    Here today is a proud American steelworker, fantastic person from Decatur, Alabama.  Jeff Denard has been working at the same steel plant for 27 years in a job that has allowed him to serve as the captain of his local volunteer fire department; raise seven children with his beautiful wife, Nicole; and over the years, provide a loving home for more than 40 foster children.  So great, Jeff.  (Applause.) 
    Thank you, Jeff.  Thank you, Jeff.  (Applause.)
    Stories like Jeff’s remind us that tariffs are not just about protecting American jobs.  They’re about protecting the soul of our country.  Tariffs are about making America rich again and making America great again.  And it’s happening, and it will happen rather quickly.
    There will be a little disturbance, but we’re okay with that.  It won’t be much. 
    AUDIENCE MEMBER:  No, we’re not!
    THE PRESIDENT:  No, you’re not.  Oh.  (Laughter.)
    And look — and look where Biden took us.  Very low.  The lowest we’ve ever been.
    Jeff, I want to thank you very much.
    And I also want to recognize another person who has devoted herself to foster care community.  She worked so hard on it.  A very loving person.  Our magnificent first lady of the United States.  (Applause.)
    Melania’s work has yielded incredible results, helping prepare our nation’s future leaders as they enter the workforce.  
    Our first lady is joined by two impressive young women — very impressive: Haley Ferguson, who benefited from the first lady’s Fostering the Future initiative and is poised to complete her education and become a teacher, and Elliston Berry, who became a victim of an illicit deepfake image produced by a peer.  With Elliston’s help, the Senate just passed the Take It Down Act — 
    This is so important.  Thank you very much, John.  John Thune, thank you.  (Applause.)  Stand up, John.  Thank you, John.  (Applause.)  Thank you all very much.  Thank you.
    And thank you to John Thune and the Senate.  A great job.
    — to criminalize the publication of such images online.  This terrible, terrible thing.  And once it passes the House, I look forward to signing that bill into law.  Thank you.  
    And I’m going to use that bill for myself too, if you don’t mind — (laughter) — because nobody gets treated worse than I do online.  Nobody.  (Laughter.) 
    That’s great.  Thank you very much to the Senate.  Thank you.
    But if we truly care about protecting America’s children, no step is more crucial than securing America’s borders.  Over the past four years, 21 million people poured into the United States.  Many of them were murderers, human traffickers, gang members, and other criminals from the streets of dangerous cities all throughout the world.  Because of Joe Biden’s insane and very dangerous open border policies, they are now strongly embedded in our country, but we are getting them out and getting them out fast.  (Applause.)
    And I want to thank Tom Homan.  And, Kristi, I want to thank you.  And Paul of Border Patrol, I want to thank you.  What a job they’ve all done.  Everybody.  Border Patrol, ICE.  Law enforcement, in general, is incredible.  We have to take care of our law enforcement.  (Applause.)  We have to. 
    Last year, a brilliant 22-year-old nursing student named Laken Riley — the best in her class, admired by everybody — went out for a jog on the campus of the University of Georgia.  That morning, Laken was viciously attacked, assaulted, beaten, brutalized, and horrifically murdered.  Laken was stolen from us by a savage illegal alien gang member who was arrested while trespassing across Biden’s open southern border and then set loose into the United States under the heartless policies of that failed administration.  It was indeed a failed administration.
    He had then been arrested and released in a Democrat-run sanctuary city — a disaster — before ending the life of this beautiful young angel.
    With us this evening are Laken’s beloved mother, Allyson, and her sister, Lauren.  (Applause.)
    Last year, I told Laken’s grieving parents that we would ensure their daughter would not have died in vain.  That’s why the very first bill I signed into law as your 47th president mandates the detention of all dangerous criminal aliens who threaten public safety.  It’s a very strong, powerful act.  (Applause.)  It’s called the Laken Riley Act.  (Applause.) 
    So, Allyson and Lauren, America will never, ever forget our beautiful Laken Hope Riley.  (Applause.)
    Thank you very much.
    Since taking office, my administration has launched the most sweeping border and immigration crackdown in American history, and we quickly achieved the lowest numbers of illegal border crossers ever recorded.  Thank you.  (Applause.)
    The media and our friends in the Democrat Party kept saying we needed new legislation.  “We must have legislation to secure the border.”  But it turned out that all we really needed was a new president.  (Applause.) 
    AUDIENCE:  Trump!  Trump!  Trump!
    THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you.
    Joe Biden didn’t just open our borders.  He flew illegal aliens over them to overwhelm our schools, hospitals, and communities throughout the country.  Entire towns, like Aurora, Colorado, and Springfield, Ohio, buckled under the weight of the migrant occupation and corruption like nobody has ever seen before.  Beautiful towns destroyed.
    Now, just as I promised in my Inaugural Address, we are achieving the great liberation of America.  (Applause.)
    But there still is much work to be done. 
    Here tonight is a woman I have gotten to know: Alexis Nungaray from Houston.  Wonderful woman.  Last June, Alexis’s 12-year-old daughter, her precious Jocelyn, walked to a nearby convenience store.  She was kidnapped, tied up, assaulted for two hours under a bridge, and horrifically murdered.  Arrested and charged with this heinous crime are two illegal alien monsters from Venezuela, released into America by the last administration through their ridiculous open border.
    The death of this beautiful 12-year-old girl and the agony of her mother and family touched our entire nation greatly. 
    Alexis, I promised that we would always remember your daughter — your magnificent daughter.  And earlier tonight, I signed an order keeping my word to you.  
    One thing I have learned about Jocelyn is that she loved animals so much.  She loved nature.  Across Galveston Bay from where Jocelyn lived in Houston, you will find a magnificent national wildlife refuge. A pristine, peaceful, 34,000-acre sanctuary for all of God’s creatures on the edge of the Gulf of America.
    Alexis, moments ago, I formally renamed that refuge in loving memory of your beautiful daughter, Jocelyn.
    So, Mr. Vice President, if you would, may I have the order?  (Applause.)
    (The president holds up the executive order.)
    Thank you very much. 
    All three savages charged with Jocelyn and Laken’s murders were members of the Venezuelan prison gang — the toughest gang, they say, in the world — known as Tren de Aragua.  Two weeks ago, I officially designated this gang, along with MS-13 and the bloodthirsty Mexican drug cartels, as foreign terrorist organizations.  (Applause.)  They are now officially in the same category as ISIS, and that’s not good for them. 
    Countless thousands of these terrorists were welcomed into the U.S. by the Biden administration, but now every last one will be rounded up and forcibly removed from our country, or, if they’re too dangerous, put in jails, standing trial in this country, because we don’t want them to come back ever.
    With us this evening is a warrior on the front lines of that battle, Border Patrol agent Roberto Ortiz.  Great guy.  (Applause.)  
    In January, Roberto and another agent were patrolling by the Rio Grande, near an area known as Cartel Island — doesn’t sound too nice to me — when heavily armed gunmen started shooting at them.  Roberto saw that his partner was totally exposed, in great danger, and he leapt into action, returning fire and providing crucial seconds for his fellow agent to seek safety, and just barely.  I have some of the prints of that event, and it was not good. 
    Agent Ortiz, we salute you for your great courage and for your line of fire that you took and for the bravery that you showed.  We honor you, and we will always honor you.  Thank you, Roberto, very much.  (Applause.)  Thank you, Roberto. 
    And I actually got to know him on my many calls to the border.  He’s a great, great gentleman.
    The territory to the immediate south of our border is now dominated entirely by criminal cartels that murder, rape, torture, and exercise total control — they have total control over a whole nation — posing a grave threat to our national security.  The cartels are waging war in America, and it’s time for America to wage war on the cartels, which we are doing.  (Applause.)
    Five nights ago, Mexican authorities, because of our tariff policies being imposed on them — think of this — handed over to us 29 of the biggest cartel leaders in their country.  That has never happened before.  They want to make us happy.  (Applause.)  First time ever.
    But we need Mexico and Canada to do much more than they’ve done, and they have to stop the fentanyl and drugs pouring into the USA.  They’re going to stop it.  
    I have sent Congress a detailed funding request laying out exactly how we will eliminate these threats to protect our homeland and complete the largest deportation operation in American history, larger even than current record holder, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, a moderate man but someone who believed very strongly in borders.  Americans expect Congress to send me this funding without delay so I can sign it into law. 
    So, Mr. Speaker, John Thune, both of you, I hope you’re going to be able to do that.  Mr. Speaker, thank you.  Mr. Leader, thank you.  Thank you very much.  And let’s get it to me.  I’ll sign it so fast, you won’t even believe it.  (Applause.)
    And as we reclaim our sovereignty, we must also bring back law and order to our cities and towns.  (Applause.)  In recent years, our justice system has been turned upside down by radical-left lunatics.  Many jurisdictions virtually ceased enforcing the law against dangerous repeat offenders while weaponizing law enforcement against political opponents like me.
    My administration has acted swiftly and decisively to restore fair, equal, and impartial justice under the constitutional rule of law, starting at the FBI and the DOJ.  
    Pam, good luck.  Kash, wherever you may be, good luck.  (Applause.)  Good luck.  Pam Bondi, good luck.  So important.  Going to do a great job.  (Applause.)  
    Kash, thank you.  Thank you, Kash.  (Applause.)
    They have already started very strong.  They’re going to do a fantastic job.  You’re going to be very proud of them. 
    We’re also, once again, giving our police officers the support, protection, and respect they so dearly deserve.  They have to get it.  They have such a hard, dangerous job, but we’re going to make it less dangerous.  The problem is the bad guys don’t respect the law, but they’re starting to respect it, and they soon will respect it.
    (Cross-talk.)
    This also includes our great fire departments throughout the country.  Our firemen and women are unbelievable people, and I will never forget them.  And besides that, they voted for me in record numbers, so I have no choice.  (Applause.)
    One year ago this month, 31-year-old New York police officer Jonathan Diller — unbelievably wonderful person and a great officer — was gunned down at a traffic stop on Long Island.  I went to his funeral.  The vicious criminal charged with his murder had 21 prior arrests, and they were rough arrests too.  He was a real bad one.
    The thug in the seat next to him had 14 prior arrests and went by the name of “Killer.”  He was Killer.  He killed other people.  They say a lot of them. 
    I attended Officer Diller’s service, and when I met his wife and one-year-old son, Ryan, it was very inspirational, actually.  His widow’s name is Stephanie, and she is here tonight.  Stephanie, thank you very much, Stephanie.  Thank you very much.  (Applause.)
    Stephanie, we’re going to make sure that Ryan knows his dad was a true hero — New York’s Finest.  And we’re going to get these cold-blooded killers and repeat offenders off our streets, and we’re going to do it fast.  Got to stop it. 
    They get out with 28 arrests.  They push people into subway trains.  They hit people over the back of the head with baseball bats.  We got to get them out of here. 
    I’ve already signed an executive order requiring a mandatory death penalty for anyone who murders a police officer.  And, tonight, I’m asking Congress to pass that policy into permanent law.  (Applause.)
    I’m also asking for a new crime bill, getting tough on repeat offenders while enhancing protections for America’s police officers so they can do their jobs without fear of their lives being totally destroyed.  They don’t want to be killed.  We’re not going to let them be killed.
    Joining us in the gallery tonight is a young man who truly loves our police.  His name is D.J. Daniel.  He is 13 years old, and he has always dreamed of becoming a police officer.  (Applause.)
    But in 2018, D.J. was diagnosed with brain cancer.  The doctors gave him five months at most to live.  That was more than six years ago.  (Applause.)
    Since that time, D.J. and his dad have been on a quest to make his dream come true, and D.J. has been sworn in as an honorary law enforcement officer, actually, a number of times.  Pec- — the police love him.  The police departments love him. 
    And tonight, D.J., we’re going to do you the biggest honor of them all.  I am asking our new Secret Service director, Sean Curran, to officially make you an agent of the United States Secret Service.  (Applause.)
    (Director Curran presents Mr. Daniel with a Secret Service Agent credential.)
    AUDIENCE:  D.J.!  D.J.!  D.J.!
    THE PRESIDENT:  Thank you, D.J. 
    D.J.’s doctors believe his cancer likely came from a chemical he was exposed to when he was younger.  Since 1975, rates of child cancer have increased by more than 40 percent.  Reversing this trend is one of the top priorities for our new presidential commission to make America healthy again, chaired by our new secretary of Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr.  (Applause.) 
    AUDIENCE MEMBER:  MAHA, baby!
    THE PRESIDENT:  With the name “Kennedy,” you would have thought everybody over here would have been cheering.  (Laughter.)  How quickly they forget.  
    Our goal is to get toxins out of our environment, poisons out of our food supply, and keep our children healthy and strong.  
    As an example, not long ago — you can’t even believe these numbers — 1 in 10,000 children had autism. 1 in 10,000.  And now it’s 1 in 36.  There’s something wrong.  One in 36.  Think of that. 
    So, we’re going to find out what it is, and there’s nobody better than Bobby and all of the people that are working with you — you have the best — to figure out what is going on.  
    Okay, Bobby?  Good luck.  It’s a very important job.  Thank you.  (Applause.)  Thank you.  Thank you.
    My administration is also working to protect our children from toxic ideologies in our schools. 
         A few years ago, January Littlejohn and her husband discovered that their daughter’s school had secretly socially transitioned their 13-year-old little girl.  Teachers and administrators conspired to deceive January and her husband, while encouraging her daughter to use a new name and pronouns — “they/them” pronouns, actually — all without telling January, who is here tonight and is now a courageous advocate against this form of child abuse.  January, thank you.  Thank you.  Thank you very much.  (Applause.)  Thank you.  Thank you. 
    Stories like this are why, shortly after taking office, I signed an executive order banning public schools from indoctrinating our children with transgender ideology.  (Applause.) 
    I also signed an order to cut off all taxpayer funding to any institution that engages in the sexual mutilation of our youth.  (Applause.)  And now I want Congress to pass a bill permanently banning and criminalizing sex changes on children and forever ending the lie that any child is trapped in the wrong body.  This is a big lie.  (Applause.)
    And our message to every child in America is that you are perfect exactly the way God made you.  (Applause.)
         Because we’re getting wokeness out of our schools and out of our military, and it’s already out, and it’s out of our society.  We don’t want it.  Wokeness is trouble.  Wokeness is bad.  It’s gone.  It’s gone.  And we feel so much better for it, don’t we?  Don’t we feel better?  (Applause.)  
         Our service members won’t be activists and ideologues.  They will be fighters and warriors.  They will fight for our country.           And, Pete, congratulations.  Secretary of Defense, congratulations.  (Applause.)
         And he’s not big into the woke movement, I can tell you.  (Laughter.)  I know him well. 
         I am pleased to report that, in January, the U.S. Army had its single best recruiting month in 15 years and that all armed services are having among the best recruiting results ever in the history of our services.  (Applause.)  What a difference.
         And you know it was just a few months ago where the results were exactly the opposite.  We couldn’t recruit anywhere.  We couldn’t recruit.  Now we’re having the best results, just about, that we’ve ever had.  What a tremendous turnaround.  It’s really a beautiful thing to see.  People love our country again.  It’s very simple.  They love our country, and they love being in our military again.  So, it’s a great thing.  And thank you very much.  Great job.  Thank you.  (Applause.)
         We’re joined tonight by a young man, Jason Hartley, who knows the weight of that call of duty.  Jason’s father, grandfather, and great-grandfather all wore the uniform. 
         Jason tragically lost his dad, who was also a Los Angeles County sheriff’s deputy, when he was just a boy, and now he wants to carry on the family legacy of service.  Jason is a senior in high school, a six-letter varsity athlete — a really good athlete, they say — a brilliant student, with a 4.46 — that’s good — GPA.  (Laughter.)  And his greatest dream is to attend the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.  (Applause.) 
         And, Jason, that’s a very big deal getting in.  That’s a hard one to get into.  But I’m pleased to inform you that your application has been accepted.  You will soon be joining the Corps of Cadets.  (Applause.) 
         Thank you.  Jason, you’re going to be on the Long Gray Line, Jason. 
         As commander in chief, my focus is on building the most powerful military of the future.  As a first step, I’m asking Congress to fund a state-of-the-art Golden Dome missile defense shield to protect our homeland, all made in the USA.  (Applause.) 
         And Ronald Reagan wanted to do it long ago, but the technology just wasn’t there, not even close.  But now we have the technology.  It’s incredible, actually.  And other places, they have it: Israel has it.  Other places have it.  And the United States should have it too.  Right, Tim?  Right?  (Applause.)  They should have it too.  So, I want to thank you. 
         But it’s a very important.  This is a very dangerous world.  We should have it.  We want to be protected.  And we’re going to protect our citizens like never before.
         To boost our defense industrial base, we are also going to resurrect the American shipbuilding industry, including commercial shipbuilding and military shipbuilding.  (Applause.)
         And for that purpose, I am announcing tonight that we will create a new Office of Shipbuilding in the White House and offer special tax incentives to bring this industry home to America, where it belongs. 
         We used to make so many ships.  We don’t make them anymore very much, but we’re going to make them very fast, very soon.  It will have a huge impact.          To further enhance our national security, my administration will be reclaiming the Panama Canal, and we’ve already started doing it.  (Applause.)
         Just today, a large American company announced they are buying both ports around the Panama Canal and lots of other things having to do with the Panama Canal and a couple of other canals. 
         The Panama Canal was built by Americans for Americans, not for others, but others could use it.  But it was built at tremendous cost of American blood and treasure.  Thirty-eight thousand workers died building the Panama Canal.  They died of malaria.  They died of snake bites and mosquitoes.  Not a nice place to work.  They paid them very highly to go there, knowing there was a 25 percent chance that they would die.  The most expensive project, also, that was ever built in our country’s history, if you bring it up to modern-day costs.
         It was given away by the Carter administration for $1, but that agreement has been violated very severely.  We didn’t give it to China.  We gave it to Panama, and we’re taking it back.  (Applause.)
         And we have Marco Rubio in charge.  Good luck, Marco.  (Laughter and applause.)  Now we know who to blame if anything goes wrong.  (Laughter.) 
    No, Marco has been amazing, and he’s going to do a great job.  Think of it.  He got a hundred votes.  (Applause.)  You know, he was approved with, actually, 99, but the 100th was this gentleman, and I feel very certain — so, let’s assume he got 100 votes.  And I’m either very, very happy about that or I’m very concerned about it.  (Laughter.) 
         But he’s already proven — I mean, he’s a great gentleman.  He’s respected by everybody.  And we appreciate you voting for Marco.  He’s going to do a fantastic job.  Thank you.  (Applause.)  Thank you.  He’s doing a great job.  Great job. 
         And I also have a message tonight for the incredible people of Greenland.  (Laughter.)  We strongly support your right to determine your own future, and, if you choose, we welcome you into the United States of America. 
         We need Greenland for national security and even international security, and we’re working with everybody involved to try and get it.  But we need it, really, for international world security.  And I think we’re going to get it.  One way or the other, we’re going to get it.  
    We will keep you safe.  We will make you rich.  And together, we will take Greenland to heights like you have never thought possible before.  
         It’s a very small population but very, very large piece of land and very, very important for military security.
         America is once again standing strong against the forces of radical Islamic terrorism. 
         Three and a half years ago, ISIS terrorists killed 13 American service members and countless others in the Abbey Gate bombing during the disastrous and incompetent withdrawal from Afghanistan — not that they were withdrawing; it was the way they withdrew.  Perhaps the most embarrassing moment in the history of our country.  
         Tonight, I am pleased to announce that we have just apprehended the top terrorist responsible for that atrocity, and he is right now on his way here to face the swift sword of American justice.  (Applause.)
         And I want to thank, especially, the government of Pakistan for helping arrest this monster. 
         This was a very momentous day for those 13 families, who I actually got to know very well, most of them, whose children were murdered, and the many people that were so badly — over 42 people — so badly injured on that fateful day in Afghanistan.  What a horrible day.  Such incompetence was shown that when Putin saw what happened, I guess he said, “Wow, maybe this is my chance.”  That’s how bad it was.  Should have never happened.  Grossly incompetent people. 
         I spoke to many of the parents and loved ones, and they’re all in our hearts tonight.  Just spoke to them on the phone.  We had a big call.  Every one of them called, and everybody was on the line, and they did nothing but cry with happiness.  They were very happy — as happy as you can be under those circumstances.  Their child, brother, sister, son, daughter was killed for no reason whatsoever. 
         In the Middle East, we’re bringing back our hostages from Gaza.  In my first term, we achieved one of the most groundbreaking peace agreements in generations: the Abraham Accords.  (Applause.) 
    And now we’re going to build on that foundation to create a more peaceful and prosperous future for the entire region.  A lot of things are happening in the Middle East.  People haven’t been talking about that so much lately with everything going on with Ukraine and Russia, but a lot of things are happening in the Middle East.  It’s a rough neighborhood, actually.
         I’m also working tirelessly to end the savage conflict in Ukraine.  Millions of Ukrainians and Russians have been needlessly killed or wounded in this horrific and brutal conflict with no end in sight. 
         The United States has sent hundreds of billions of dollars to support Ukraine’s defense with no security, with no anything.  (Applause.)
         Do you want to keep it going for another five years? 
         SENATOR WARREN:  Yes!
         THE PRESIDENT:  Yeah.  Yeah, you would say — Pocahontas says, “Yes.”  (Laughter.)
         AUDIENCE MEMBERS:  Booo —
         THE PRESIDENT:  Two thousand people are being killed every single week — more than that.  They’re Russian young people.  They’re Ukrainian young people.  They’re not Americans.  But I want it to stop.
         Meanwhile, Europe has sadly spent more money buying Russian oil and gas than they have spent on defending Ukraine, by far.  Think of that.  They’ve spent more buying Russian oil and gas than they have defending.  And we’ve spent, perhaps, $350 billion.  Like taking candy from a baby, that’s what happened.  And they’ve spent $100 billion.  What a difference that is.  And we have an ocean separating us, and they don’t. 
         But we’re getting along very well with them, and lots of good things are happening. 
         Biden has authorized more money in this fight than Europe has spent by billions and billions of dollars.  It’s hard to believe that they wouldn’t have stopped it and said, at some point, “Come on.  Let’s equalize.  You got to be equal to us.”  But that didn’t happen.
         Earlier today, I received an important letter from President Zelenskyy of Ukraine.  The letter reads, “Ukraine is ready to come to the negotiating table as soon as possible to bring lasting peace closer.”  “Nobody wants peace more than the Ukrainians,” he said.  (Applause.)  “My team and I stand ready to work under President Trump’s strong leadership to get a peace that lasts.  We do really value how much America has done to help Ukraine maintain its sovereignty and independence.  Regarding the agreement on minerals and security, Ukraine is ready to sign it at any time that is convenient for you.” 
         I appreciate that he sent this letter.  Just got it a little while ago.  
         Simultaneously, we’ve had serious discussions with Russia and have received strong signals that they are ready for peace.  Wouldn’t that be beautiful?  Wouldn’t that be beautiful?  (Applause.)  Wouldn’t that be beautiful?
         It’s time to stop this madness.  It’s time to halt the killing.  It’s time to end this senseless war.  If you want to end wars, you have to talk to both sides. 
         Nearly four years ago, amid rising tensions, a history teacher named Marc Fogel was detained in Russia and sentenced to 14 years in a penal colony.  Rough stuff. 
         The previous administration barely lifted a finger to help him.  They knew he was innocent, but they had no idea where to begin.  But last summer, I promised his 95-year-old mother, Malphine, that we would bring her boy safely back home.          After 22 days in office, I did just that, and they are here tonight.  (Applause.) 
         To Marc and his great mom, we are delighted to have you safe and sound and with us. 
         As fate would have it, Marc Fogel was born in a small, rural town — in Butler, Pennsylvania — have you heard of it? — where his mother has lived for the past 78 years.
         I just happened to go there last July 13th for a rally. That was not pleasant.  (Laughter.)  And that is where I met his beautiful mom, right before I walked onto that stage.  And I told her I would not forget what she said about her son.  And I never did, did I?  Never forgot.  
         Less than 10 minutes later, at that same rally, gunfire rang out, and a sick and deranged assassin unloaded eight bullets from his sniper’s perch into a crowd of many thousands of people.           My life was saved by a fraction of an inch, but some were not so lucky.  Corey Comperatore was a firefighter, a veteran, a Christian, a husband, a devoted father, and, above all, a protector. 
         When the sound of gunshots pierced the air — it was a horrible sound — Corey knew instantly what it was and what to do.  He threw himself on top of his wife and daughters and shielded them from the bullets with his own body.
         Corey was hit really hard.  You know the story from there.  He sacrificed his life to save theirs. 
         Two others — very fine people — were also seriously hit.  But thankfully, with the help of two great country doctors, we thought they were gone, and they were saved.  So, those doctors had great talent. 
         We’re joined by Corey’s wife, Helen, who was his high school sweetheart, and their two beloved daughters, Allyson and Kaylee.  Thank you.  (Applause.)
         To Helen, Allyson, and Kaylee, Corey is looking down on his three beautiful ladies right now, and he is cheering you on.  He loves you.  He is cheering you on. 
         Corey was taken from us much too soon, but his destiny was to leave us all with a shining example of the selfless devotion of a true American patriot.  It was love like Corey’s that built our country, and it’s love like Corey’s that is going to make our country more majestic than ever before.  
         I believe that my life was saved that day in Butler for a very good reason.  I was saved by God to make America great again.  I believe that.  (Applause.)  Thank you. 
         Thank you.  Thank you very much.  
         From the patriots of Lexington and Concord to the heroes of Gettysburg and Normandy, from the warriors who crossed the Delaware to the trailblazers who climbed the Rockies, and from the legends who soared at Kitty Hawk to the astronauts who touched the Moon, Americans have always been the people who defied all odds, transcended all dangers, made the most extraordinary sacrifices, and did whatever it took to defend our children, our country, and our freedom.
         And as we have seen in this chamber tonight, that same strength, faith, love, and spirit is still alive and thriving in the hearts of the American people.  Despite the best efforts of those who would try to censor us, silence us, break us, destroy us, Americans are today a proud, free, sovereign, and independent nation that will always be free, and we will fight for it till death. 
         We will never let anything happen to our beloved country, because we are a country of doers, dreamers, fighters, and survivors. 
         Our ancestors crossed a vast ocean, strode into the unknown wilderness, and carved their fortunes from the rock and soil of a perilous and very dangerous frontier.  They chased our destiny across a boundless continent.  They built the railroads, laid the highways, and graced the world with American marvels, like the Empire State Building, the mighty Hoover Dam, and the towering Golden Gate Bridge. 
         They lit the world with electricity, broke free of the force of gravity, fired up the engines of American industry, vanquished the communists, fascists, and Marxists all over the world, and gave us countless modern wonders sculpted out of iron, glass, and steel.  
         We stand on the shoulders of these pioneers who won and built the modern age, these workers who poured their sweat into the skylines of our cities, these warriors who shed their blood on fields of battle and gave everything they had for our rights and for our freedom.  
         Now it is our time to take up the righteous cause of American liberty, and it is our turn to take America’s destiny into our own hands and begin the most thrilling days in the history of our country. 
         This will be our greatest era.  
         With God’s help, over the next four years, we are going to lead this nation even higher, and we are going to forge the freest, most advanced, most dynamic, and most dominant civilization ever to exist on the face of this Earth. 
         We are going to create the highest quality of life, build the safest and wealthiest and healthiest and most vital communities anywhere in the world. 
         We are going to conquer the vast frontiers of science, and we are going to lead humanity into space and plant the American flag on the planet Mars and even far beyond.  (Applause.)
         And, through it all, we are going to rediscover the unstoppable power of the American spirit, and we are going to renew unlimited promise of the American dream. 
         Every single day, we will stand up and we will fight, fight, fight for the country our citizens believe in and for the country our people deserve.  (Applause.)  Thank you.  Thank you.
         AUDIENCE MEMBERS:  Fight!  Fight!  Fight!
         THE PRESIDENT:  My fellow Americans, get ready for an incredible future, because the golden age of America has only just begun.  It will be like nothing that has ever been seen before. 
         Thank you.  God bless you.  And God bless America.  (Applause.)
         Thank you.  Thank you, everybody.  Thank you.  Thank you very much.  Thank you very much.  Thank you. 
    Thank you very much.  Appreciate it.
    Thank you very much.
                                 END                11:00 P.M. EST

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: General Assembly Debates Russian Federation’s Security Council Veto of European Amendments Seeking ‘Just’ Peace in Ukraine Based on United Nations Charter

    Source: United Nations General Assembly and Security Council

    The General Assembly today addressed what many delegations decried as “misuse” of the Security Council veto by the Russian Federation on 24 February — the third anniversary of its aggression against Ukraine.

    On that day, Moscow vetoed two of the three European proposals seeking to align the United States-authored draft resolution with the Charter of the United Nations.  The two amendments — one inserting a reference to Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and another adding a reference to a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in Ukraine in line with the UN Charter — garnered 9 and 11 votes in favour, respectively, but were not adopted due to the negative votes cast by the Russian Federation.  The other amendment seeking to insert a reference to Moscow’s “full-scale invasion” of Ukraine failed to obtain enough votes to pass.  In the end, the text tabled by the United States was adopted as resolution 2774 (2025) by a vote of 10 in favour to none against, with 5 abstentions (Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia, United Kingdom), without any amendments.

    Opening today’s plenary, Philémon Yang (Cameroon), President of the General Assembly, expressed regret over another meeting pursuant to A/RES/76/262 following the casting of the veto by a permanent member of the Council — noting that the frequency of vetoes has continued to rise since 2022.  Affirming that Council and Assembly efforts must be complementary, he noted that, while the Veto initiative demonstrates improvement in the United Nations’ capacity to address matters of international security, “we could do more”.  Calling for the Assembly to reflect on how the outcomes of deliberations on the Veto initiative can be more binding.

    He recalled that, at the eleventh Emergency Special Session on 24 February, the Assembly adopted two resolutions:  “Advancing a Comprehensive, Just and Lasting Peace in Ukraine” and “The Path to Peace”, reaffirming its unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.

    In the ensuing debate, the Russian Federation’s representative recalled the Security Council meeting on 24 February and welcomed the adoption of the United States’ text “as a step in the right direction”.  The change of approach in Washington, D.C., following President Donald J. Trump’s inauguration, caught “European pseudo-peacekeepers off guard”.  Allies of the Kyiv regime have been consistently putting forward anti-Russian Federation draft resolutions with no bearing on reality.  Member States should not just choose Charter principles that are more to their taste, he said, as it is not a “restaurant menu”.  The Kyiv regimes’ non-compliance with the Charter caused the Ukraine conflict, he stated.

    However, Ukraine’s delegate stressed that the Russian Federation’s behaviour in the Council following its aggression against her country “is the most vivid example of how detrimental the misuse of the veto could be”.  The Russian Federation vetoed all draft resolutions that the Council attempted to adopt in response to its aggression against Ukraine since 2014. Amendments would have reaffirmed the commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, while the resolution lacks classification of the war as an act of aggression by one Member State against another.  Use of the veto should be restricted when a permanent member is directly involved in the conflict under consideration and therefore cannot be expected to exercise its voting rights and privileges in an impartial manner.  “Nobody wants peace more than Ukrainians, but peace must be real, not just a word,” she stressed.

    Throughout the debate, the Assembly heard a chorus of European voices condemning Russian Federation’s actions in the Council. “Let it be clear, Russia is abusing its veto power to block references to the principle of territorial integrity,” said a representative of the European Union, in its capacity as observer, also citing a second veto obstructing a call for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in line with the UN Charter.  The Russian Federation has bombed Ukraine cities daily as part of its unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression.  “Russia is undermining the core principles of our multilateral system,” she stated, adding:  “We cannot accept an equivalence between the aggressor and the victim of aggression.”

    MIL OSI United Nations News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Interview with FIVEAA Breakfast with David Penberthy and Will Goodings

    Source: Australian Government – Minister of Foreign Affairs

    Sonya Feldhoff, Host: This is a breakfast that is the biggest breakfast not only in South Australia. So, let’s get this right, this is all over the country and for the 23rd year running, it is hosted by Senator Penny Wong, who joins us now. Senator, thank you for your time.

    Penny Wong, Foreign Minister: Good morning to everybody. Happy, well, it’s not quite IWD because we hold this breakfast the closest day to, but happy almost International Women’s Day.

    Feldhoff: Now, this is your 23rd year as host, but I want to take a moment because this breakfast wouldn’t be without the person who founded it and led it for the first, what, 10 or 11 years? Senator Rosemary Crowley.

    Foreign Minister: Yes that’s right, who passed away just recently. And look, on International Women’s Day and at this breakfast, you’ve heard me talk about the importance of remembering and honouring women who’ve gone before and who’ve paved the way, as well as thinking about what more we have to do. And it’s really important for us to honour Rose today. I mean, she was the first woman the Labor Party sent to Canberra, elected in the early 80s, which seems remarkable that it took that long. First woman to be a Minister from South Australia in the Federal Parliament. And one of the things she did, as you said Sonya, was establish this breakfast. And I remember I was actually on her breakfast committee before I went into Parliament, helping organise it. It was smaller then and it’s grown year on year and it was something Rosemary was so committed to. So, it’s really wonderful to be able to honour her today.

    Feldhoff: And we talk about those important things that she did. But having sat next to her on several occasions, she had a fiery, fire in her belly. She had a sense of humour. She was an amazingly fun woman to be around.

    Foreign Minister: She really was. She had a great sense of humour, very witty, sometimes quite bawdy. I remember.

    Jules Schiller, Host: Bawdy.

    Foreign Minister: Bawdy, yes.

    Feldhoff: She was.

    Foreign Minister: I’d say Rose, Rose, I can’t say that.

    Feldhoff: She was an amazing woman. So, we remember her today and I think that she’ll be in the minds of many people today.

    Foreign Minister: Absolutely.

    Schiller: Let’s get to your portfolio, Penny.

    Foreign Minister: Can’t we just talk about this? This is much more, this is much more relaxed.

    Schiller: Well, I’ll hit you with a quote because I think this is a good quote to sum up what’s happened. Vladimir Lenin said ‘there are decades where nothing happens and there are weeks when decades happen.’ Does that sum up what’s happened this week with some momentous kind of tectonic plate shifting with alliances and, you know, support for Ukraine and not support for Ukraine? How are you handling everything?

    Foreign Minister: Okay, well, first, I don’t think the Australian Foreign Minister should be quoting Lenin. So, I’m just going to leave that with you. But you’re right, I mean, I think tectonic is probably the, you know, the phrase that people have been using which is, you know, this is a very different time. I’ve said for some time President Trump and the Trump administration have said they were going to do things differently. So, we ought not be surprised about that. And what’s important is that we remain cool headed and disciplined, work together and navigate what is a very changing world, in Australia’s national interests. And that’s certainly how I will approach it and how the Prime Minister is approaching it.

    Feldhoff: Is your job as Foreign Minister more difficult today than it was a week ago? Given what we’ve seen in the last week.

    Foreign Minister: I probably measure it in slightly longer terms. Before the election I did think a lot about what sort of world we were in and I talked about the fact that how many changes, how much there was moving in the international landscape and certainly since the election I think we’ve continued to see that. And it’s very important that one, to remain cool headed and calm and to work as we are to try and maximise Australia’s relationships, to elevate our presence in the region and to work with others across the world in support of those international rules which matter to us. I talk about relationships, rules and region, and that’s really defined what we have done this term and what I’ve done as your Foreign Minister.

    Schiller: We had Chinese warships obviously doing live fire exercises and that was big news. You know, Virgin flight kind of reported it and that was all. Have you been speaking to your Chinese counterparts about how that unfolded and maybe you’d like to see it happen differently next time?

    Foreign Minister: Oh, absolutely. I mean, I spoke to the Prime Minister when that happened and I was actually in South Africa for the G20 and had a bilateral meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi scheduled and we agreed that I would speak very directly and clearly to the Chinese about our views. Obviously, we also operate in international waters. Australia does, and we support the international laws which enable countries to operate in those waters, which are international waters. So, not Australia’s territorial waters. But when we do so, and if we engage in these sorts of exercises, we do give much more notice. You do issue what’s called a notice to airmen – still men, I’m afraid, Sonya – which is to ensure that all aircraft and vessels in the area are aware. But we also give earlier notice. And what I said very clearly to the Foreign Minister of China is that our expectation is that notice such as Australia would give in the South China Sea or elsewhere where we operate would be what we would expect.

    Feldhoff: You’re listening to 891 ABC Radio Adelaide. Sonya and Jules here with you for breakfast, broadcasting here from the Convention Centre which will host the International Women’s Day Breakfast, the biggest one in the country.

    Foreign Minister: I’m just going to tell your listeners that this is, we are sitting at a desk, being very good and talking to each other as these massive number of women and some men walk in and lots of school kids, I can see, who got up early. So, it’s pretty busy.

    Feldhoff: This is the thing, isn’t it? We’ve got a whole heap of school kids here and when we take it, look at the message for girls and women. But people generally, you know, I think a lot of us would have felt unsettled with the talk of nuclear weapons from Emmanuel Macron yesterday. As you talk to these women and men who will be in the room today, do you have a sense of optimism? Because I think there would be a lot of people at the moment for whom that would be far away.

    Foreign Minister: Well, first, just on the number of young women, that’s one of the things I have really sought to do as host, and that is to increase the number of schools that attend. And we’ve been really pleased at how that’s been taken up, because I think part of what matters today is that mix across generations and that you get women who’ve done a lot and been around a lot and have seen a lot engaging with girls, school kids who are at the beginning of their adult life and having that discussion. Optimism, I suppose. I think that we have agency so we have the capacity to do what we can do and we should do that. So, we should be talking about de-escalation, we should be talking about engagement and dialogue, because we know that to avert, to keep peace, you need both deterrence, but you also need reassurance and you need to engage as an international player in a way that provides both deterrence and reassurance. That’s how you ensure stability and peace. So, I suppose I think of it much more as what can we do? And we should focus on maximising what we can do rather than wringing our hands about what others are doing.

    Schiller: I know you have to go, Penny, but just message to women listening. I mean, I was thinking of younger women, especially because they’re facing – you’ve got Andrew Tate, they’ve got revenge porn, you know, all this, all these threats to, kind of things to overcome for them. Like, I guess women of your generation were. So, what’s your message to women on this day?

    Foreign Minister: Well, can I message both men and women? First I would say what I said about marriage equality. There’s nothing to fear from equality. Equality is about all of us having an opportunity and the world is a better place where we all have an opportunity. And what I’d say to young women is what I always say, is that women can do anything.

    Feldhoff: On that note, we’ll make sure you get to where you need to be to make sure you can do anything. Senator Penny Wong, who will be hosting this breakfast for the 23rd time consecutively. Thank you so much.

    Foreign Minister: Thank you. And can I just plug for the ABC? Know that they didn’t ask me to do this. Thank you so much for your support for this over so many years. It’s part of the, you know, what Adelaide does and we really appreciate the ABC support.

    Schiller: Thank you, Penny.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI Australia: Interview with ABC Adelaide Breakfast with Sonya Feldhoff and Jules Schiller

    Source: Australian Government – Minister of Foreign Affairs

    Sonya Feldhoff, Host: This is a breakfast that is the biggest breakfast not only in South Australia. So, let’s get this right, this is all over the country and for the 23rd year running, it is hosted by Senator Penny Wong, who joins us now. Senator, thank you for your time.

    Penny Wong, Foreign Minister: Good morning to everybody. Happy, well, it’s not quite IWD because we hold this breakfast the closest day to, but happy almost International Women’s Day.

    Feldhoff: Now, this is your 23rd year as host, but I want to take a moment because this breakfast wouldn’t be without the person who founded it and led it for the first, what, 10 or 11 years? Senator Rosemary Crowley.

    Foreign Minister: Yes that’s right, who passed away just recently. And look, on International Women’s Day and at this breakfast, you’ve heard me talk about the importance of remembering and honouring women who’ve gone before and who’ve paved the way, as well as thinking about what more we have to do. And it’s really important for us to honour Rose today. I mean, she was the first woman the Labor Party sent to Canberra, elected in the early 80s, which seems remarkable that it took that long. First woman to be a Minister from South Australia in the Federal Parliament. And one of the things she did, as you said Sonya, was establish this breakfast. And I remember I was actually on her breakfast committee before I went into Parliament, helping organise it. It was smaller then and it’s grown year on year and it was something Rosemary was so committed to. So, it’s really wonderful to be able to honour her today.

    Feldhoff: And we talk about those important things that she did. But having sat next to her on several occasions, she had a fiery, fire in her belly. She had a sense of humour. She was an amazingly fun woman to be around.

    Foreign Minister: She really was. She had a great sense of humour, very witty, sometimes quite bawdy. I remember.

    Jules Schiller, Host: Bawdy.

    Foreign Minister: Bawdy, yes.

    Feldhoff: She was.

    Foreign Minister: I’d say Rose, Rose, I can’t say that.

    Feldhoff: She was an amazing woman. So, we remember her today and I think that she’ll be in the minds of many people today.

    Foreign Minister: Absolutely.

    Schiller: Let’s get to your portfolio, Penny.

    Foreign Minister: Can’t we just talk about this? This is much more, this is much more relaxed.

    Schiller: Well, I’ll hit you with a quote because I think this is a good quote to sum up what’s happened. Vladimir Lenin said ‘there are decades where nothing happens and there are weeks when decades happen.’ Does that sum up what’s happened this week with some momentous kind of tectonic plate shifting with alliances and, you know, support for Ukraine and not support for Ukraine? How are you handling everything?

    Foreign Minister: Okay, well, first, I don’t think the Australian Foreign Minister should be quoting Lenin. So, I’m just going to leave that with you. But you’re right, I mean, I think tectonic is probably the, you know, the phrase that people have been using which is, you know, this is a very different time. I’ve said for some time President Trump and the Trump administration have said they were going to do things differently. So, we ought not be surprised about that. And what’s important is that we remain cool headed and disciplined, work together and navigate what is a very changing world, in Australia’s national interests. And that’s certainly how I will approach it and how the Prime Minister is approaching it.

    Feldhoff: Is your job as Foreign Minister more difficult today than it was a week ago? Given what we’ve seen in the last week.

    Foreign Minister: I probably measure it in slightly longer terms. Before the election I did think a lot about what sort of world we were in and I talked about the fact that how many changes, how much there was moving in the international landscape and certainly since the election I think we’ve continued to see that. And it’s very important that one, to remain cool headed and calm and to work as we are to try and maximise Australia’s relationships, to elevate our presence in the region and to work with others across the world in support of those international rules which matter to us. I talk about relationships, rules and region, and that’s really defined what we have done this term and what I’ve done as your Foreign Minister.

    Schiller: We had Chinese warships obviously doing live fire exercises and that was big news. You know, Virgin flight kind of reported it and that was all. Have you been speaking to your Chinese counterparts about how that unfolded and maybe you’d like to see it happen differently next time?

    Foreign Minister: Oh, absolutely. I mean, I spoke to the Prime Minister when that happened and I was actually in South Africa for the G20 and had a bilateral meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi scheduled and we agreed that I would speak very directly and clearly to the Chinese about our views. Obviously, we also operate in international waters. Australia does, and we support the international laws which enable countries to operate in those waters, which are international waters. So, not Australia’s territorial waters. But when we do so, and if we engage in these sorts of exercises, we do give much more notice. You do issue what’s called a notice to airmen – still men, I’m afraid, Sonya – which is to ensure that all aircraft and vessels in the area are aware. But we also give earlier notice. And what I said very clearly to the Foreign Minister of China is that our expectation is that notice such as Australia would give in the South China Sea or elsewhere where we operate would be what we would expect.

    Feldhoff: You’re listening to 891 ABC Radio Adelaide. Sonya and Jules here with you for breakfast, broadcasting here from the Convention Centre which will host the International Women’s Day Breakfast, the biggest one in the country.

    Foreign Minister: I’m just going to tell your listeners that this is, we are sitting at a desk, being very good and talking to each other as these massive number of women and some men walk in and lots of school kids, I can see, who got up early. So, it’s pretty busy.

    Feldhoff: This is the thing, isn’t it? We’ve got a whole heap of school kids here and when we take it, look at the message for girls and women. But people generally, you know, I think a lot of us would have felt unsettled with the talk of nuclear weapons from Emmanuel Macron yesterday. As you talk to these women and men who will be in the room today, do you have a sense of optimism? Because I think there would be a lot of people at the moment for whom that would be far away.

    Foreign Minister: Well, first, just on the number of young women, that’s one of the things I have really sought to do as host, and that is to increase the number of schools that attend. And we’ve been really pleased at how that’s been taken up, because I think part of what matters today is that mix across generations and that you get women who’ve done a lot and been around a lot and have seen a lot engaging with girls, school kids who are at the beginning of their adult life and having that discussion. Optimism, I suppose. I think that we have agency so we have the capacity to do what we can do and we should do that. So, we should be talking about de-escalation, we should be talking about engagement and dialogue, because we know that to avert, to keep peace, you need both deterrence, but you also need reassurance and you need to engage as an international player in a way that provides both deterrence and reassurance. That’s how you ensure stability and peace. So, I suppose I think of it much more as what can we do? And we should focus on maximising what we can do rather than wringing our hands about what others are doing.

    Schiller: I know you have to go, Penny, but just message to women listening. I mean, I was thinking of younger women, especially because they’re facing – you’ve got Andrew Tate, they’ve got revenge porn, you know, all this, all these threats to, kind of things to overcome for them. Like, I guess women of your generation were. So, what’s your message to women on this day?

    Foreign Minister: Well, can I message both men and women? First I would say what I said about marriage equality. There’s nothing to fear from equality. Equality is about all of us having an opportunity and the world is a better place where we all have an opportunity. And what I’d say to young women is what I always say, is that women can do anything.

    Feldhoff: On that note, we’ll make sure you get to where you need to be to make sure you can do anything. Senator Penny Wong, who will be hosting this breakfast for the 23rd time consecutively. Thank you so much.

    Foreign Minister: Thank you. And can I just plug for the ABC? Know that they didn’t ask me to do this. Thank you so much for your support for this over so many years. It’s part of the, you know, what Adelaide does and we really appreciate the ABC support.

    Schiller: Thank you, Penny.

    MIL OSI News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why Ukraine still holds the winning hand

    Source: The Conversation – Canada – By Aisha Ahmad, Associate Professor, Political Science, University of Toronto

    Days after United States President Donald Trump publicly humiliated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy at the White House, the U.S. paused military aid and cut off intelligence-sharing with Kyiv.

    Zelenskyy is now scrambling to salvage a deal with Trump, offering him Ukraine’s rich natural resources even without a firm security guarantee.

    What if Zelenskyy is getting scammed? Trump is notorious for violating agreements, and so dealing with him is risky. Does Ukraine have a choice? As Trump ominously told Zelenskyy: “You don’t have the cards.”

    It’s true Ukraine is the weaker party in the enduring conflict with Russia, but that doesn’t mean it has to surrender its freedom, territory and wealth to foreign invaders. Even if Trump’s deal turns out to be a con job, the Ukrainian people can still defeat Russia, and they can do it without America’s help.

    If the absolute worst should happen, Ukrainian fighters could choose to play a different hand: insurgency.

    Insurgents often hold the advantage

    I have studied asymmetric wars around the world for 20 years, and insurgency is the ultimate death trap for foreign powers that invade weaker countries. Insurgencies reverse the asymmetry of conventional wars: the weaker player has the battlefield advantage, while the stronger party slowly bleeds out and goes bankrupt.

    This is not a scenario that anyone in Ukraine wants, but if Trump and Russia’s Vladimir Putin refuse to deal fairly with Zelenskyy, they may unwittingly unleash this hell upon the world.

    If it turns out the peace deal is a scam, Ukrainian fighters could be forced to switch from conventional to irregular warfare.

    How?

    First, as Russia rapidly advances, Ukrainian fighters would disband regular armed forces and form covert, decentralized militia units. They would hide all military and cash assets, and blend into local communities. Civilian clothes only.

    From the outside, it would look like the defending military has dissolved and given up. The invaders will foolishly believe they have achieved total victory.

    Insurgents do this to lure the enemy deeper into their territory and stretch them thin. They let them put up their “Mission Accomplished” banners. They go to the invader’s victory celebrations and applaud them. They ensure their invaders feel comfortable, and that overconfidence makes them lazy and careless.

    Insurgents wait and watch

    In the first year, insurgents lay low, develop covert networks and watch every move, every detail.

    Within six months, they know how the enemy takes his morning coffee, and they have a perfect record of the critical supply lines feeding the invader’s army. They also join the enemy’s puppet security forces, using this as an opportunity to gather intelligence and plan raids. The first phase is all about reconnaissance and infiltration.

    Time is the great advantage of the insurgent. Smart insurgents measure their success over the course of decades, not months. The fact is, counterinsurgency operations are exponentially more expensive than the cost of waging a successful insurgency, and so the longer insurgents can embroil the invader in their trap, the more the invader goes bankrupt.




    Read more:
    Why annexing Canada would destroy the United States


    Insurgents allow invaders to spend tens of billions of dollars on pipelines and mining projects, and then they spend a few thousand dollars to blow up those investments. Or they co-opt those projects, tax them and use the revenue to destroy other enemy assets. Disorder is much easier to sow than order.

    Playing the long game

    Insurgents can play this game forever, while the invader drowns itself in futility and debt. Remember the Taliban’s old adage: “The Americans have all the watches, but we have all the time.”

    Conventional wars also typically have higher military casualties than insurgencies, so pivoting to irregular warfare will likely reduce soldiers’ casualty rates.

    In three years, the Ukrainian military is estimated to have lost at least 70,000 soldiers in its conventional war. That’s more than the Afghan Taliban lost in 20 years of insurgency.

    Holding a front line is a much bloodier business than blowing up a gas pipeline or supply convoy. Effective hit-and-run attacks are designed to keep insurgents alive, allowing them to blend back into civilian communities unnoticed.

    Unfortunately, because insurgents must blend into civilian populations to be effective, invaders typically retaliate by striking civilians targets, which may increase casualties. Russia would most certainly attack Ukrainian civilians, just as it is doing in the conventional war.

    Ukraine’s geographical advantage

    But Ukraine’s vast rural terrain makes it impossible for Russia to do to Ukrainians what Israel has done to Gazans.

    The Ukrainian landscape is comprised of expansive plains, forests and mountains in the west. Although it lacks jungles, a Ukrainian insurgency could deploy a combination of urban insurgency and guerrilla war tactics, using its vast rural territory to evade capture.

    Ukraine’s territorial advantages and military capacity would make it very hard for Russia to successfully repress an insurgency like it did in Chechnya.

    Attacks on civilian targets also inevitably draw more people into insurgency, thus creating an ever-expanding crisis for the invader. Whether through drone or missile strikes, this strategy is known to make insurgencies worse over time. Putin will inevitably scream about Ukrainian “terrorists,” but by then, Russia will be ensnared in the death trap.

    Nobody in their right mind would want to live in this grim and miserable future scenario. To avoid this calamity, Trump and Putin must realize that a Ukrainian insurgency could disembowel Russian power and destabilize Europe for decades. Unless they deal fairly with Zelenskyy today, they are gambling with European security, and playing a game where nobody wins.

    Aisha Ahmad receives funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

    ref. Why Ukraine still holds the winning hand – https://theconversation.com/why-ukraine-still-holds-the-winning-hand-251549

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Economics: Transcript of COM Regular Press Briefing, March 6, 2025

    Source: International Monetary Fund

    March 6, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

     *  *  *  *  *

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF press briefing. It is very good to see you all, both those of you who are here in person and, of course, our colleagues online as well.

    I am Julie Kozak, Director of the Communications Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. I will start with a short announcement and then take your questions in person on Webex and via the Press Center. 

    The 2025 Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group will take place from Monday, April 21 through Saturday, April 26. Press registration to attend the spring meetings in person in Washington D.C. is now open and you can register through www.IMFconnect.org. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And with that, over to you. 

    QUESTIONER: If the Congress does not approve the future agreement, as it is established by the local law, does the IMF give the money to Argentina? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so that is a question on Argentina. Any other questions on Argentina? I do not see any hands up in the room. Let us go online. QUESTIONER: Do you think we are already in the final stage? And what remains to announce the Staff Agreement with the IMF?

    QUESTIONER: Good morning. I was wondering about also there have been versions of a new loan up to $20 billion and the first deployment of $8 billion this year. Can you confirm that, or can you give us an insight into the fresh funds that could be coming in the new agreement? And also, when can we expect a signing of the letter of intent? 

    QUESTIONER: So, my question is about the Congress. President Milei confirmed that the staff-level agreement must be approved by the Parliament as indicated by the Argentine law. So, is that also a requirement from the IMF itself or could the President sign a decree avoiding the current law that requires the staff-level agreement to be approved by Parliament. 

    QUESTIONER: I want to ask about the scope of the potential agreement with Argentina. There are reports out saying it could be as high, or there is an expectation it could be as high as $20 billion.

    QUESTIONER: I think a few people have already asked, but when [do] you expect to reach a staff-level agreement, whether, as the Argentine government has said, it is only the final numbers that need to be agreed and not other technical aspects? And whether the IMF requires that the entirety of the SLA be reviewed by Congress for approval or if whether a general outline produced by the government will be enough? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. So, with that, let me go ahead and talk about Argentina. So, first, I just want to start by saying, as I think many of you know, both the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director recently met with the Argentine authorities. And as they recently emphasized, we are continuing to make good progress toward a program, and we are working constructively with the Argentine authorities in this regard. The authorities’ stabilization and growth plan is delivering significant results.

    It has made notable strides in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, and fostering a return to growth in the country, and poverty is finally beginning to decline in Argentina. To sustain these early gains, there is a shared understanding about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, while very importantly, advancing growth enhancing reforms. And the new program would build on the progress achieved so far while also addressing Argentina’s remaining challenges. 

    Now, with respect to some of the questions regarding Congressional approval, we do take note of President Milei’s commitment to seek congressional support for a new IMF supported program. As we have often said in the past, strong ownership and broad support are key to the program’s success, 

    Here, I want to emphasize, though, that securing congressional support is a decision of the authorities as legislated in Argentine domestic law. And at the same time, of course, as I just noted, broad political and social support can enhance program implementation. Questions regarding the specific process on achieving or seeking congressional support should be addressed really to the Argentine authorities because it is a matter of domestic law. 

    From our side, as I noted, the negotiations are continuing in a constructive manner. In terms of the process from the IMF side. Once the negotiations are completed, as with any IMF program or proposed program, the final arrangement, the documents, will require approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. And we will provide further updates as we have them. 

    With respect to some of the questions about the details of the negotiations, the potential size of the program. All I can say right now is this is still under discussion as part of the ongoing and constructive dialogue that we are having with the authorities. And we will provide an update when we have more information that we can share with you. 

    QUESTIONER: On Lebanon, so following recent reports that the Lebanese government is in discussions with IMF over a potential deal on its financial default in public debt. I just want to see if the IMF can confirm these reports. If so, what does it look like? Are there any contingencies to this? And will there be an IMF mission visiting Lebanon? Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Lebanon is that an IMF team will visit Lebanon very soon, March 10th to 14th. This mission is aimed at, of course, meeting the new authorities, discussing Lebanon’s recent economic developments, its reconstruction needs, and the authorities’ economic priorities in the near-term. This is a fact-finding mission that will take place. But beyond this fact-finding mission, as we look ahead, future next steps could include helping the authorities to formulate a comprehensive economic reform program.

    Our staff continues to be closely engaged with the authorities. We are providing policy advice and capacity development to help the authorities’ efforts to rebuild Lebanon’s economy and institutions in coordination with other international partners. And that is what I have for now on Lebanon. 

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask you about what is happening in the United States. The trade wars have begun, and we are seeing some impact already, both in terms of market reaction and a lot of volatility in the markets, ups, and downs. We are also seeing some interesting developments in terms of bond markets and yields; it is going to increase the cost of borrowing. So, I wanted to ask you if you, at this point, I know we’ve asked this question before, but I wonder if you’ve got an additional assessment, as we’re now seeing some of these policies that had been promised taking effect, and whether you can say now whether you’re expecting an impact on the global economy and also on the U.S. economy and the affected economies that have been targeted thus far — China, Canada, Mexico. 

    QUESTIONER: As a follow up to [that] question, does the IMF consider that the ongoing developments of the U.S. tariffs and trade wars would push other nations to seek more trade relations and more alliances with other economic organizations and trade organizations such as BRICS, for example, or others? And broadly speaking, what is the IMF assessment of the global fragmentation that is going on right now? Do you see that it is slowing down or opposite it is moving faster, taking into account the latest developments in the United States?

    QUESTIONER: I would like to focus on the development of 10 years of U.S. bond yield movement. The 10-year bond yield now decreased, dropping substantially. And what does it mean? What is the implication of the movement? Does it represent some U.S. recession or U.S. economy? 

    QUESTIONER: With the tariffs actually now in place, has the IMF undertook a study to determine the potential impact on small island states that are heavily dependent on flows and goods and commodities coming out of the United States, more specifically, those countries within the Caribbean region who are very much dependent and could face significant inflationary pressures based on these tariffs?

    MS. KOZACK: So, first I want to just step back a little bit to recognize that we have seen now several new and significant developments over the past few days. The U.S. has imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico as well as additional tariffs on China. Canada and China have, in response, announced tariffs on some U.S. goods and other measures. And Mexico has indicated that it will provide more details in the coming days.

    And as we have said before, you know, while assessing the full impact of tariffs on economic activity and inflation will depend on many factors, we do expect to provide an analysis of this, certainly at the global level and for the most affected countries at the time of our World Economic Outlook update in April. And of course we will also cover this issue, I imagine, in some of the regional updates where relevant. And I want to also emphasize that as part of our bilateral surveillance with countries, the individual Article IV reports this topic will also be covered to the extent that the countries are affected. 

    What I can say today is that if sustained the impact of the U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico can be expected to have a significant adverse economic impact on those countries given their very strong integration and exposure to the U.S. market. 

    Now, more broadly, there were some questions about financial market movements. So let me also just step back for a moment on some of these, and here I want to refer to some remarks that our Managing Director has been making recently. As she’s been saying, we are now in the midst of significant transformations, and these include the rapid advance of AI to changing patterns of capital flows and trade. She has also been mentioning that trade is no longer the engine of global growth that it used to be. 

    For example, during the period of 2000 to 2019, global trade growth reached nearly 6 percent on an annual basis, whereas over the more recent period of 2022 to 2024, global trade is growing closer to 3 percent. So global trade growth has been on a downward — has declined. And of course, it is in this more global context that governments are recalibrating their approaches and adjusting policies. 

    I also want to recognize, of course, that we have seen increased volatility in financial markets. We see that in indicators such as the VIX. We also have seen indicators of global uncertainty showing an increase. And what will be critical to assess what the economic impact of this will be — will be whether these trends are short-lived or whether they are sustained. Generally speaking, our research shows that both historically and across countries, sustained periods of elevated uncertainty can be associated with both households and firms holding back on consumption and investment decisions. And as I said, we will be providing a comprehensive analysis of our views on the global economy and individual economies as part of the World Economic Outlook that will be released in April. 

    On the specific question on U.S. bond yields, we do recognize of course, that U.S. bond yields have moved lower since the beginning of the year. And it does seem that on that basis markets may be reappraising or reassessing their views, particularly on the outlook for monetary policy. I will stop there and move on.

    QUESTIONER: When is the IMF Board expected to review and approve the next disbursement for Ukraine? Are there any remaining conditions or procedural steps that Ukraine must fulfill before approval? And the Ukrainian government is engaging in debt restructuring efforts with its creditors. How does the IMF assess Ukraine’s debt sustainability and what role does this play in bord’s decision making process regarding future disbursement announcements?

    QUESTIONER: So, to follow up on previous question. In February, you stated, that Ukraine would have access to about U.S. $900 million for the next review. Now we are speaking about $400 million. So, why the IMF has made a decision to adjust to the total sum of disbursement that will be provided to Ukraine?

    QUESTIONER: And do you think that it can impact financial stability of Ukrainian economy or there is no risk for them? 

    QUESTIONER: How do you expect the freezing of the U.S. aid for Ukraine might impact the program you have already on course right now? And how does this affect the global plan that had been made like a year ago or two years ago now? 

    QUESTIONER: I just want to follow up the last question about the impact — what the impact Trump administration is doing. Does this impact the IMF projections on Ukraine this and next year? 

    QUESTIONER: An adjacent question, maybe related to the prospect for ending the war. And, you know, we have seen economic developments in Russia continue to percolate along even though the war has been going on and there have been sanctions. Have you started to look at what the end of the war could mean for both the Russian and Ukrainian economies in terms of, you know, perhaps, you know, assuming that there would be an end of sanctions once there was a cessation of hostilities, whether that would give a boost to the Russian economy, maybe the European economy in general could lower costs, things like that? So just kind of walk us through what you are seeing there. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me go ahead on Ukraine. So, just to bring everyone up to speed. So, on February 28th, the IMF staff, and the Ukrainian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Seventh Review of the four-year EFF arrangement. This is subject to approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. Ukraine is expected to draw, as noted, about U.S. $400 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.1 billion.

    I just want to note that program performance in Ukraine remains strong. All of the end December quantitative performance criteria were met, and understandings were reached between the Ukrainian authorities and IMF staff on a set of policies and reforms to sustain macroeconomic stability. The structural reform agenda in Ukraine is continuing to make good progress, and there are strong commitments from the Ukrainian authorities in a number of other areas. 

    Now on some of the specific questions, first on the matter of the disbursement, what I can say there is that it is not unusual over the life of a program for the pattern of disbursements to shift based on evolving balance of payments needs. And that is what has happened in this case. It is also important to emphasize that the overall size of the program, which is $15.6 billion, remains unchanged. And so that shift in disbursement pattern reflects the shifting balance of payments pattern for Ukraine. 

    So, on the issue the debt restructuring and debt process, what I can say there is that restoring debt sustainability in Ukraine hinges on continued implementation of the authority’s debt restructuring strategy, where completing the treatment of the GDP warrants remains important. And it also hinges very much on continuation of the revenue-based fiscal adjustment strategy, which is supported under the program. And as you know, Ukraine’s debt has been assessed in the last review to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis contingent on these two areas that I just mentioned. And of course, there will be a revised debt sustainability assessment as part of the ongoing review. 

    With respect to the other question, what I can say here is that the Ukrainian economy, you know, has shown continued resilience despite the challenges arising from the war. At the time of the Seventh Review, the last review, we estimated GDP growth to be 3.5 percent in 2024. But we did expect it at that time to moderate to 2 to 3 percent in 2025. And that was reflecting some headwinds from labor constraints and damage to energy infrastructure, given the ongoing war. It is the case in general for Ukraine, and we have been saying this throughout the life of the program, that the outlook remains exceptionally uncertain, especially as the war continues and it is taking a heavy toll on Ukraine’s people, economy, and infrastructure. 

    On the more recent developments that you were referring to, we are following these developments very closely. It is premature at the moment to comment on them, but we are following them, and we will make an assessment in due course.

    And on your question, the answer is essentially the same. We are following the developments very closely, and we will, as developments evolve, be undertaking obviously an assessment of what a peace deal could potentially look like and what would be the implications for all of the involved parties. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, can you on the basis of having studied previous conflicts ending, can you just give us divorced from Ukraine and Russia, but just can you give us an indication of what generally happens when a conflict ends, what that means? And is there anything that we can draw on, at least just from history? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I do not have, you know, off the top of my head a piece of research that I can kind of point to in terms of the interest analysis. What I certainly can say is that we always, for all of our member countries, hope for peace and stability in all of our member countries. And I think at that moment this is really what I can say. But I take note of the importance of your point, and we will, I have no doubt, in due course be conducting all of the necessary analysis as events unfold.

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions mainly on Egypt. as Egypt is scheduled for 10th of March for the discussion of the Fourth Review of the EFF for the country, what are we expecting from this meeting? And if you please, could you update us on the RSF facility worth $1.2 billion for the country? Thank you so much. 

    QUESTIONER: I would second exactly those questions. And just to add to that, I know it says on the IMF Executive Board calendar that the Board will be discussing waivers of non-observance for some of the performance criteria related to Egypt’s loan program and modifications for others. Are you able to tell us any more about exactly which criteria the Board will be looking at? And on the RSF, if you are able to give us any more detail about the prospective value of that. I know it has been put at $1 billion before. A related question, not on Egypt but on Gaza. I would be interested to know if the IMF has begun to think, whether internally or with partners in the region, about what its potential role would be in funding a reconstruction plan for Gaza given the $50 billion, upwards of $50 billion, cost of any reconstruction. 

    QUESTIONER: I may repeat questions about the value of current tranche to be given to Egypt and the timing of when the central bank of Egypt to receive it. And also, I have another question about the program of state assets selling. Will we witness some steps, new steps in that program? Could it be connected with the decision to be taken in March?

    MS. KOZACK: And any other questions on Egypt? All right. And then I have a question that came in through the Press Center. I am going to read it out loud – ’Does the IMF’s approval of the fourth tranche to Egypt require Egypt to implement some reforms? And when will the Fifth Review of the loan be held? What is the estimated size of the loan allocated to Egypt, and here will it be dispersed in installments or in one lump sum?’

    On Egypt – on March 10th, our Executive Board will be discussing Egypt’s Article IV consultation and the fourth review under the EFF. It will also be discussing at the same time Egypt’s request for an RSF, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Subject to completion by the Executive Board, the authorities, would have access to $1.2 billion under the EFF. So, under the EFF program. And then in addition, subject again to approval by our Executive Board, the size of the RSF would be about U.S. $1.3 billion. Regarding the RSF, like all of the IMF programs, the RSF is also delivered in tranches. So, it is not one lump sum up front. It is a phased program where tranches are dispersed on the basis of conditions being met. 

    And with respect to some of the other questions, what I can say today is just that we will provide, of course, more details following the Board meeting and on the question of waivers and modifications and also the questions on the state-owned enterprises. And again, the board meeting will be on March 10th. 

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions related to Japan. Firstly, amid rising uncertainty due to President Trump’s tariff policy, I would like to ask you — ask your thoughts on whether the Bank of Japan, currently in a rate hike phase, should continue raising rate or take more cautious approach in assessing the impact. And secondly, President Trump recently made remarks suggesting that Japan and China are engaging in currency devaluation. I would appreciate it if you share your views on Japan’s foreign exchange policy. Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, maybe just stepping back to give a bit of context on Japan. What I can say on Japan is that on the growth side, growth this year is expected to strengthen, and we also expect inflation to converge to the Bank of Japan’s 2 percent target by the end of 2025. 

    In 2024, growth in Japan slowed due to some temporary supply disruptions. But since then, we have seen a strengthening in growth driven by domestic demand, particular — particularly private consumption in Japan and rising wages. And we expect this to continue into 2025, where we project growth, at the time of the January WEO, we projected growth at 1.1 percent for Japan in 2025. And of course, just to say that we will be updating this projection as part of the April forecast. 

    Looking at inflation — headline and core inflation, as I said, are expected to decline gradually toward the 2 percent target. We have been supportive of the Bank of Japan’s recent monetary policy decisions. We believe that these decisions will help anchor inflation expectations at the 2 percent target but also given balance risks around inflation, our assessment has been that further hikes in the policy interest rate should continue to be data dependent, and they should proceed at a gradual pace over time. 

     With respect to the question on the exchange rate, what I can say there is that the Japanese authorities have affirmed their commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime. Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime has helped the country or has helped the economy absorb the impact of shocks. And it also supports the focus of monetary policy on price stability. And at the same time, what I can say is that that flexible exchange rate regime is helping maintain an external position that is in line with fundamentals. 

    QUESTIONER: Could you give us an update on the negotiations for Ethiopia, please? And on El Salvador, the deal that you agreed on in December and was approved a couple of weeks ago involves the government not increasing its exposure to Bitcoin. Government has continued to buy through the Office of Bitcoin, which is linked to the presidential palace. But yesterday the Fund said that these purchases do not increase the government’s exposure to Bitcoin. Could you please explain that? 

    QUESTIONER: Also on El Salvador, obviously he was saying to not to not buy it as a government reserve. I just wanted to, I guess, contrast to the U.S. I mean, President Trump has very much announced a digital assets reserve, including Ethereum and other coins, as well as Bitcoin. And I wondered if the IMF could – can you comment on the U.S. program or how would you distinguish the two countries and why the IMF might be taking a different approach?

    MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go ahead and take the El Salvador question in Ethiopia and then we will go back. I see many hands up online. 

    So, on El Salvador, as you know, last week our Executive Board approved a 40-month Extended Fund Facility, EFF, for U.S. $1.4 billion and with an immediate disbursement of $113 million. The program is expected to catalyze financial and technical support from other IFIs. And this will lead to a combined total over the program period of about U.S. $3.5 billion of support for El Salvador. The goals of the program are to restore fiscal sustainability, rebuild external and financial buffers, strengthen governance and transparency, and ultimately create the conditions for stronger and more resilient growth. 

    Regarding Bitcoin, in particular, the program aims to address the risks associated with the Bitcoin project to protect consumers and investors, as well as to limit potential fiscal costs. So, to start, there were recent legal reforms that have made the acceptance of Bitcoin voluntary, and taxes can be paid only in U.S. dollars. Under the program, the government has committed to not accumulate for their Bitcoins at the level of the overall public sector. 

    Regarding the recent increase in Bitcoin holding by the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve Fund, the authorities have confirmed that these are consistent with the agreed program conditionality, and we do remain engaged with the authorities on this important issue. 

    And then, to your question. We are obviously closely monitoring President Trump’s announcement in this area. The Presidential Working Group on Digital Asset Markets has not yet completed its work. So, we do not yet have details on the implementation of this proposal, but we will come back in due course. 

    And then turning to the question on Ethiopia. So just an update on Ethiopia. On January 17th, the IMF Executive Board completed the Second Review of the arrangement, the ECF arrangement for Ethiopia, and that allowed for a drawdown of about U.S. $245 million. The ECF arrangement supports the authorities’ reforms to address macroeconomic imbalances, restore external debt sustainability, and lay the foundation for strong private sector-led growth. 

    I can also just remind you that the Managing Director recently traveled to Ethiopia. She was there February 8th and 9th. She met with Prime Minister Abiy and his team to take stock of the economic reforms and the progress that is being made in the country. And she also took the opportunity to meet with other stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector. 

    QUESTIONER: My question is on USAID. USAID has now totally stopped its business. And to what extent do you see the impact, especially on lower income countries at the global level? And should you consider using your facility to support them just in case? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, on this issue, we are obviously again paying close attention to developments, and we are working with our country authorities. But it is, at the same time, it is too early to really say what the precise impact may be. And so, we will come back in due course. For now, we are monitoring.

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Senegal. Following a recent audit of the country’s debt, it was found to be 99.7 percent of GDP. That was in 2023. And I know that IMF has said before that Senegal debt was stable even though it was high. I am wondering if that is the figure that you still consider sustainable. And then also with regards on talks of a new IMF program, I am wondering if Senegal could be asked to reimburse previous dispersion under this reporting period. 

    QUESTIONER: Still on Senegal, as soon as the report from the Audit Supreme Court was released, we saw rating agency downgrading Senegal sovereign notes. So, the country is now stuck. It cannot raise funds from the internal market, and it cannot go in a very comfortable position in international markets while they still face a lot of challenges. So, I am wondering why the IMF is working fast and bold to find a solution for Senegal in the midterm or even long-term. Is there any situation where IMF can provide a short-term, I mean, short-term relief to the country so they can go through these hard moments in a very soft way? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, on Senegal, what I can say is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities with respect to the Court of Auditors Report and the associated misreporting under the IMF program. The Court of Auditors Report was released on February 12th. The Court confirmed that the fiscal deficit and debt were under reported during the period of 2019 to 2023.

    So, what we are doing is working closely with the authorities in their efforts to preserve fiscal and debt sustainability. We are working actively to advance on our discussions following the publication of the report, and we are also working with the authorities on measures to correct and remedy the misreporting that took place. What I can add is that the resolution of the misreporting in line with IMF policy is a precondition for discussions of any future financial assistance by the IMF.

    And with respect to potential consequences, I can say that the IMF does not impose any sanctions for misreporting cases. It is up to our Executive Board to decide on the next steps. And those next steps, you know, could include a waiver. And that waiver could — it could also include; it could be a waiver without a request for reimbursement. So, all of those discussions on Senegal are now underway. We are actively, very much working with the authorities, supporting as much as possible their efforts on fiscal and debt sustainability, as I said. And we will come back and report back when we have more information on Senegal. 

    I have a question here online that I am going to read. It came from the Press Center on Thailand. And the question is – ‘The upcoming World Bank IMF Annual Meetings in Thailand will bring significant attention to Southeast Asia’s economic outlook. From the from IMF’s perspective, how can Thailand best leverage this opportunity to address regional challenges such as digital transformation, climate change adaptation, and income inequality? And what collaborative initiatives between the IMF and Thailand are being planned to ensure lasting economic benefits for the country beyond the meetings themselves?’ 

    So, on this very important question, a very nice question, actually, what I can say is that we are very much looking forward to having Thailand host the annual meetings in 2026. So, this will be in October of 2026. Every three years, we do our Annual Meetings abroad. 2026, October will be Thailand. So, mark your calendar. I can also add that preparations are underway. The Fund, the IMF staff are working hand in hand with the Thai authorities to make this a highly successful event and showcasing the significant strides that Thailand has made since it last hosted our annual meetings in 1991. So, it will be 25 years when we get to 2026. 

    The Managing Director recently met with Bank of Thailand’s Governor Sethaput at the AlUla Conference in Saudi Arabia. They discussed the preparations for the annual meetings and agreed that it would be a very good opportunity to showcase on the global stage the region’s dynamism and economic activities. And of course, the meetings will also allow Thailand to position itself as a key contributor to the international economic dialogue and to gather views and experiences from countries throughout the membership of the IMF and the World Bank. 

    This ongoing close relationship leading up to and beyond, we hope, the Annual Meetings will focus on prioritizing reform reforms that are necessary to ensure the lasting benefits for Thailand and building the relationships and the shared policy, dialogue and experiences we hope will deepen our engagement, our excellent engagement and relationship with Thailand and will be sustained even past the Annual Meetings in 2026.

    QUESTIONER: My question is, what are the IMF growth projections for Jordan amid the ongoing impact of the Gaza war? And when will the Third Review under the EFF begin? And are any adjustments expected to the war’s region effect on Jordan’s economy? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Jordan is that the Executive Board on December 12th completed the Article IV Consultation with Jordan and the Second Review under the EFF arrangement. The mission for the next review, which will be the Third Review, is expected to take place in April.

    What I can also say is that Jordan has demonstrated resilience and maintained macroeconomic stability throughout the prolonged regional conflict. This resilience reflects the authority’s continued implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and progress with reforms. While recent developments in the region, particularly the ceasefire agreements, give rise to some cautious optimism, uncertainty, of course, in Jordan does remain high. And with respect to the growth projections, what I can say is that growth in 2024 was 2.3 percent. We are projecting growth at 2.5 percent in 2025 and a further increase in growth in 2026 to 3 percent. But like in all countries, we will be updating these projections as both part of our April World Economic Outlook Global Forecast, and also, of course, the team will be doing a full assessment of the Jordanian economy as part of their mission in April 

    And so, with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to a close. Thank you all very much. Thank you very much for participating today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. The transcript, as always, will be made available later today on IMF.org. And in case of clarifications or additional questions, please reach out to my colleagues at media@IMF.org. And I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you very much. 

     

    * * * * *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    MIL OSI Economics

  • MIL-OSI USA: Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth Greets the United Kingdom’s Secretary of State for Defence John Healey and Takes Questions From the Press

    Source: United States Department of Defense

    SECRETARY OF DEFENSE PETE HEGSETH: Well, Mr. Secretary, your entire delegation, welcome to the Pentagon. It’s great to see you. It was wonderful to meet you the first time in Brussels, and have some great interactions about our mutual interest, no doubt. And your prime minister, it was a privilege to meet him as well. He was here last week. Our nations, as you know, share a long and special relationship. Stronger today than ever before. I experienced that firsthand myself, as many of our generation has, on the battlefield, shoulder-to-shoulder with British troops in Afghanistan. I know how capable they are, how tough they are, and how close our bond is as brothers across the Atlantic, full stop.

    And so we are grateful for oh the many years that we have stood by each other’s side. And at the same, we are in the middle of a dynamic security environment, where on that continent, President Trump is calling on our European allies to take the lead, and you have done just that, sir. In fact, you chaired the first meeting of the Ukraine defense contact group that I had a pleasure to speak to. That was your first time as chair, and you’ll continue to it. And that’s, again, the United Kingdom stepping up.

    And then, once again, when your prime minister was here, you called me, we had a chance to speak briefly about the increase in defense spending that the U.K. is undertaking. So U.K. leadership is absolutely critical, and we very much appreciate it. We want to work together to achieve peace and security in Europe by working to bring an end to the war in Ukraine, building sustainable deterrence on the continent, and then increasing our allied capabilities and interoperability.

    And European leadership of NATO, led by the U.K., led by others, is, we believe, the future of defense on the continent, ensuring we provide a peaceful future for your kids and my kids and your grandkids and my grandkids. That’s ultimately what it’s about. I also want to thank the British people for the warm support they give to US forces stationed in the U.K. as well. It’s a long-standing relationship that we are very grateful for. So, you’re true allies, longtime friends. We’re new friends, but we’re getting there, and fellow warriors, so thank you very much for being here, Mr. Secretary.

    SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENCE JOHN HEALEY: Mr. Secretary, thank you for such a warm welcome and such warm words. It’s great to be back in Washington, and it’s good to see you again. We last met last month in NATO, and then you challenged Europe to step up. You challenged us to step up on Ukraine, on defense spending, on European security. And I say to you that we have, we are, and we will further. And last week, the British prime minister announced the biggest increase in defense spending since the end of the Cold War, and we will go further.

    You also asked the U.K. to step up on leadership on Ukraine alongside the U.S., and indeed, you were with me when we had the 46 nations round the table at a week’s notice at the Ukraine Contact Group. Our meeting today follows very good discussions between President Trump and Prime Minister Starmer a week ago today, in which they both pledged to work together, our nations would work together to secure lasting peace in Ukraine. And we have a chance today to discuss the progress on that path to peace, with the opportunity that President Trump has created now since the 20th of January.

    When your president and my prime minister met last week, your president also said that the U.K. and the U.S. have a relationship like no other, and I think for me, that was exemplified last night at the British Embassy, when we were able to lay on a party to celebrate the 250th birthday of the U.S. Marine Corps. And for more than a century, your U.S. Marines and our Royal Marines have trained together. They fought together, and too often they’ve died together, defending the values that our two free nations share.

    And Pete, as you say, you know that from your own experience and your own service. And in many ways, for me, they embody the sort of warrior force that both you and I as defense secretaries are dedicated in our roles to strengthen because we know that we have to strengthen together with allies, deterrence in the face of rising threats.

    And finally, if I may, you’ve spoken about the deep bond between our two nations, and I’d say to you, I’m here today to strengthen that defense and security bond between our two nations. It’s needed now more than ever in this new era that we must face together. So thank you for receiving us and thank you for welcoming our delegation and I look forward to the discussions ahead.

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: And to that, I say, amen. Thank you. Appreciate you being here. If it’s OK, we’ll take a few questions for either myself or the secretary.

    Pentagon Press Secretary John Ullyot : We’ll take two from the U.S. press, and we’ll take two from the British press. Go with the U.S.

    Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said that Europe needs to do more to contribute to defense. Is a security guarantee of troops from France and the U.K. enough for Ukraine?

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: I think it’s been very encouraging to watch our friends in the U.K. and in France step up to say they are prepared to take the lead to ensure an enduring peace in Ukraine. What the president has also said time and time again is, let’s not get ahead of ourselves. Let’s get both sides to the table. Let’s get a commitment to peace, and that is what President Trump is actively doing, both with the Russians and Vladimir Putin and also the Ukrainians and Zelenskyy. So, there will be…in order to maintain enduring peace, there’s a security aspect to it. The U.K. and France have pledged, along with others, to be the core part of that, there will be other aspects that are part of further terms of the negotiation.

    Mr. Ullyot: British press. Go ahead.

    Q: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that a negotiating team will be going to Saudi Arabia next week. Given a renewed push for peace, will you reconsider resupplying Ukraine with weapons, or have the taps been turned off permanently?

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: As the president has pointed out, it is a pause. Exactly what he said from the beginning, pause pending a true commitment to a path to peace. The president is paying a very keen eye to precisely what the Ukrainians are saying and doing about committing to that peace process, and we’re very encouraged by the signs we’re seeing. Ultimately, he will make the determination, but it is a pause for now.

    Q: Thank you.

    Mr. Ullyot: U.S. press.

    Q: Missy Ryan, Washington Post. Secretary Healey, a question for you. Obviously, you both have referenced this strong, historic relationship. At the same time, what does it mean for the U.K. that its closest ally is now voicing the same narrative that Russia is voicing, vis a vis the war in Ukraine and seeming to align itself more closely with Russia versus what it has done in the past?

    SECRETARY HEALEY: Look, first of all, I don’t believe as members of government and decision takers, we’re the people to comment on every twist and turn in this process. I’m fixed on the historic opportunity the president has created to bring a lasting and secure peace to Ukraine. That’s what he and my prime minister dedicated themselves to do last week. And you’ve seen since then, the British prime minister pulled together in London, leaders of 18 nations to discuss the detail of a path to peace. And the president also has asked Europe to step up, and we are.

    The U.K. is ready to take on a leadership in that task. You saw that from Keir Starmer at the weekend, in the way that he is pulling the parties together, ensuring that we take Ukraine with us and that we work closely alongside the United States. And it’s the detail of those discussions which are rightly behind the scenes that the defense secretary and I will now pursue this afternoon.

    Mr. Ullyot: Last question from Danielle with the U.K. press.

    Q: Yeah. Thank you so much. Danielle [inaudible] Daily Telegraph. This is for both secretaries. What’s the plan if the Ukrainian Front line falls apart in the next couple of days? Does Britain, Europe have permission to intervene and help? And secondly, if I may, does Britain have the ability to use its nuclear deterrent by itself?

    SECRETARY HEALEY: Nobody who has been to Ukraine, who has talked with Ukraine, who has worked with the Ukrainian leaders, or met the Ukrainian servicemen and women, or the civilians, believe that they will not fight, nor do I or the prime minister doubt that as President Zelenskyy has said, they are ready to sign the important economic deal with the U.S. They are ready for a ceasefire. They want the guarantees and the security that must follow to ensure that they will not again face Russian invasion and Russian aggression. But they, like we, are willing to work to make the most of this unique opportunity that we now have, and that’s a responsibility on all of us. And that is very clear from our prime minister. It’s clear from the president. It’s also clear from President Zelenskyy, too.

    And as far as your question about nuclear, it is a question that it will be unthinkable and unprecedented for any defense secretary or any government to start commenting on or speculating on.

    SECRETARY HEGSETH: We are watching, obviously very closely, the front line of troops. I mean, our chairman our defense department, of course, we monitor that very closely. But ultimately, we’re interested in creating the conditions for peace. I mean, to the previous question from the Washington Post, the press is interested in narratives. Our president is interested in peace. So, we will get characterized one way or another, oh, your stance is pro Russia or pro…it’s all garbage. The president got elected to bring peace in this conflict, and he is working with both sides in a way that only President Trump can. Let’s be clear, only President Trump can, to bring them to the table to end the killing. And I can tell you from being behind the scenes, he is laser-focused on making that happen, and we’re closer today than we’ve ever been because of his leadership. Thank you very much.

    Mr. Ullyot: Thank you very much, press.

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI USA: Cornyn on Pres. Trump’s Efforts to End Ukraine War

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Texas John Cornyn
    WASHINGTON – Today on the floor, U.S. Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) lauded President Trump’s efforts to restore peace around the world through strength and deterrence and to broker an agreement that would end the war between Russia and Ukraine. Excerpts of Sen. Cornyn’s remarks are below, and video can be found here.
    “I was glad to see President Zelensky clearly express his gratitude to President Trump and the American taxpayer for our support for the country of Ukraine over the last three years.”
    “It’s time for the war in Ukraine to end. President Trump is right, but the more difficult question is how?”
    “We should all be grateful to President Trump for taking on the difficult but essential task of brokering a peace agreement to end this devastating war.”
    “In order to achieve a lasting peace, both sides of the conflict must be willing to sit down and negotiate and make concessions.”
    “I’m glad to see that President Zelensky has indicated a willingness for Ukraine to do so, in part through a critical minerals arrangement with the United States government.”
    “There must be some real and tangible and enforceable security assurances for Ukraine.”
    “President Zelensky and President Putin are not fighting this war in some sort of vacuum—allies of the United States and adversaries alike around the world are watching.”
    “What President Trump is doing to secure peace in this dangerous world is an act of moral leadership and, I believe, divinely inspired. Jesus said in the Beatitudes, ‘Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called sons of God.’”
    “If President Trump is successful in securing a lasting peace, I for one think he will have earned the Nobel Peace Prize.”
    “It’s my sincere hope that President Zelensky and President Putin will both accept the olive branch offered by President Trump by coming to the table and by making the necessary, enforceable concessions to ensure a lasting peace.”

    MIL OSI USA News

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Transcript of COM Regular Press Briefing, March 6, 2025

    Source: IMF – News in Russian

    March 6, 2025

    SPEAKER:  Ms. Julie Kozack, Director of the Communications Department, IMF

     *  *  *  *  *

    MS. KOZACK: Good morning, everyone, and welcome to this IMF press briefing. It is very good to see you all, both those of you who are here in person and, of course, our colleagues online as well.

    I am Julie Kozak, Director of the Communications Department. As usual, this briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. I will start with a short announcement and then take your questions in person on Webex and via the Press Center. 

    The 2025 Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group will take place from Monday, April 21 through Saturday, April 26. Press registration to attend the spring meetings in person in Washington D.C. is now open and you can register through www.IMFconnect.org. 

    And with that, I will now open the floor for your questions. For those connecting virtually, please turn on both your camera and microphone when speaking. And with that, over to you. 

    QUESTIONER: If the Congress does not approve the future agreement, as it is established by the local law, does the IMF give the money to Argentina? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, so that is a question on Argentina. Any other questions on Argentina? I do not see any hands up in the room. Let us go online. QUESTIONER: Do you think we are already in the final stage? And what remains to announce the Staff Agreement with the IMF?

    QUESTIONER: Good morning. I was wondering about also there have been versions of a new loan up to $20 billion and the first deployment of $8 billion this year. Can you confirm that, or can you give us an insight into the fresh funds that could be coming in the new agreement? And also, when can we expect a signing of the letter of intent? 

    QUESTIONER: So, my question is about the Congress. President Milei confirmed that the staff-level agreement must be approved by the Parliament as indicated by the Argentine law. So, is that also a requirement from the IMF itself or could the President sign a decree avoiding the current law that requires the staff-level agreement to be approved by Parliament. 

    QUESTIONER: I want to ask about the scope of the potential agreement with Argentina. There are reports out saying it could be as high, or there is an expectation it could be as high as $20 billion.

    QUESTIONER: I think a few people have already asked, but when [do] you expect to reach a staff-level agreement, whether, as the Argentine government has said, it is only the final numbers that need to be agreed and not other technical aspects? And whether the IMF requires that the entirety of the SLA be reviewed by Congress for approval or if whether a general outline produced by the government will be enough? 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, very good. So, with that, let me go ahead and talk about Argentina. So, first, I just want to start by saying, as I think many of you know, both the Managing Director and the First Deputy Managing Director recently met with the Argentine authorities. And as they recently emphasized, we are continuing to make good progress toward a program, and we are working constructively with the Argentine authorities in this regard. The authorities’ stabilization and growth plan is delivering significant results.

    It has made notable strides in reducing inflation, stabilizing the economy, and fostering a return to growth in the country, and poverty is finally beginning to decline in Argentina. To sustain these early gains, there is a shared understanding about the need to continue to adopt a consistent set of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies, while very importantly, advancing growth enhancing reforms. And the new program would build on the progress achieved so far while also addressing Argentina’s remaining challenges. 

    Now, with respect to some of the questions regarding Congressional approval, we do take note of President Milei’s commitment to seek congressional support for a new IMF supported program. As we have often said in the past, strong ownership and broad support are key to the program’s success, 

    Here, I want to emphasize, though, that securing congressional support is a decision of the authorities as legislated in Argentine domestic law. And at the same time, of course, as I just noted, broad political and social support can enhance program implementation. Questions regarding the specific process on achieving or seeking congressional support should be addressed really to the Argentine authorities because it is a matter of domestic law. 

    From our side, as I noted, the negotiations are continuing in a constructive manner. In terms of the process from the IMF side. Once the negotiations are completed, as with any IMF program or proposed program, the final arrangement, the documents, will require approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. And we will provide further updates as we have them. 

    With respect to some of the questions about the details of the negotiations, the potential size of the program. All I can say right now is this is still under discussion as part of the ongoing and constructive dialogue that we are having with the authorities. And we will provide an update when we have more information that we can share with you. 

    QUESTIONER: On Lebanon, so following recent reports that the Lebanese government is in discussions with IMF over a potential deal on its financial default in public debt. I just want to see if the IMF can confirm these reports. If so, what does it look like? Are there any contingencies to this? And will there be an IMF mission visiting Lebanon? Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Lebanon is that an IMF team will visit Lebanon very soon, March 10th to 14th. This mission is aimed at, of course, meeting the new authorities, discussing Lebanon’s recent economic developments, its reconstruction needs, and the authorities’ economic priorities in the near-term. This is a fact-finding mission that will take place. But beyond this fact-finding mission, as we look ahead, future next steps could include helping the authorities to formulate a comprehensive economic reform program.

    Our staff continues to be closely engaged with the authorities. We are providing policy advice and capacity development to help the authorities’ efforts to rebuild Lebanon’s economy and institutions in coordination with other international partners. And that is what I have for now on Lebanon. 

    QUESTIONER: I wanted to ask you about what is happening in the United States. The trade wars have begun, and we are seeing some impact already, both in terms of market reaction and a lot of volatility in the markets, ups, and downs. We are also seeing some interesting developments in terms of bond markets and yields; it is going to increase the cost of borrowing. So, I wanted to ask you if you, at this point, I know we’ve asked this question before, but I wonder if you’ve got an additional assessment, as we’re now seeing some of these policies that had been promised taking effect, and whether you can say now whether you’re expecting an impact on the global economy and also on the U.S. economy and the affected economies that have been targeted thus far — China, Canada, Mexico. 

    QUESTIONER: As a follow up to [that] question, does the IMF consider that the ongoing developments of the U.S. tariffs and trade wars would push other nations to seek more trade relations and more alliances with other economic organizations and trade organizations such as BRICS, for example, or others? And broadly speaking, what is the IMF assessment of the global fragmentation that is going on right now? Do you see that it is slowing down or opposite it is moving faster, taking into account the latest developments in the United States?

    QUESTIONER: I would like to focus on the development of 10 years of U.S. bond yield movement. The 10-year bond yield now decreased, dropping substantially. And what does it mean? What is the implication of the movement? Does it represent some U.S. recession or U.S. economy? 

    QUESTIONER: With the tariffs actually now in place, has the IMF undertook a study to determine the potential impact on small island states that are heavily dependent on flows and goods and commodities coming out of the United States, more specifically, those countries within the Caribbean region who are very much dependent and could face significant inflationary pressures based on these tariffs?

    MS. KOZACK: So, first I want to just step back a little bit to recognize that we have seen now several new and significant developments over the past few days. The U.S. has imposed tariffs on Canada and Mexico as well as additional tariffs on China. Canada and China have, in response, announced tariffs on some U.S. goods and other measures. And Mexico has indicated that it will provide more details in the coming days.

    And as we have said before, you know, while assessing the full impact of tariffs on economic activity and inflation will depend on many factors, we do expect to provide an analysis of this, certainly at the global level and for the most affected countries at the time of our World Economic Outlook update in April. And of course we will also cover this issue, I imagine, in some of the regional updates where relevant. And I want to also emphasize that as part of our bilateral surveillance with countries, the individual Article IV reports this topic will also be covered to the extent that the countries are affected. 

    What I can say today is that if sustained the impact of the U.S. tariffs on Canada and Mexico can be expected to have a significant adverse economic impact on those countries given their very strong integration and exposure to the U.S. market. 

    Now, more broadly, there were some questions about financial market movements. So let me also just step back for a moment on some of these, and here I want to refer to some remarks that our Managing Director has been making recently. As she’s been saying, we are now in the midst of significant transformations, and these include the rapid advance of AI to changing patterns of capital flows and trade. She has also been mentioning that trade is no longer the engine of global growth that it used to be. 

    For example, during the period of 2000 to 2019, global trade growth reached nearly 6 percent on an annual basis, whereas over the more recent period of 2022 to 2024, global trade is growing closer to 3 percent. So global trade growth has been on a downward — has declined. And of course, it is in this more global context that governments are recalibrating their approaches and adjusting policies. 

    I also want to recognize, of course, that we have seen increased volatility in financial markets. We see that in indicators such as the VIX. We also have seen indicators of global uncertainty showing an increase. And what will be critical to assess what the economic impact of this will be — will be whether these trends are short-lived or whether they are sustained. Generally speaking, our research shows that both historically and across countries, sustained periods of elevated uncertainty can be associated with both households and firms holding back on consumption and investment decisions. And as I said, we will be providing a comprehensive analysis of our views on the global economy and individual economies as part of the World Economic Outlook that will be released in April. 

    On the specific question on U.S. bond yields, we do recognize of course, that U.S. bond yields have moved lower since the beginning of the year. And it does seem that on that basis markets may be reappraising or reassessing their views, particularly on the outlook for monetary policy. I will stop there and move on.

    QUESTIONER: When is the IMF Board expected to review and approve the next disbursement for Ukraine? Are there any remaining conditions or procedural steps that Ukraine must fulfill before approval? And the Ukrainian government is engaging in debt restructuring efforts with its creditors. How does the IMF assess Ukraine’s debt sustainability and what role does this play in bord’s decision making process regarding future disbursement announcements?

    QUESTIONER: So, to follow up on previous question. In February, you stated, that Ukraine would have access to about U.S. $900 million for the next review. Now we are speaking about $400 million. So, why the IMF has made a decision to adjust to the total sum of disbursement that will be provided to Ukraine?

    QUESTIONER: And do you think that it can impact financial stability of Ukrainian economy or there is no risk for them? 

    QUESTIONER: How do you expect the freezing of the U.S. aid for Ukraine might impact the program you have already on course right now? And how does this affect the global plan that had been made like a year ago or two years ago now? 

    QUESTIONER: I just want to follow up the last question about the impact — what the impact Trump administration is doing. Does this impact the IMF projections on Ukraine this and next year? 

    QUESTIONER: An adjacent question, maybe related to the prospect for ending the war. And, you know, we have seen economic developments in Russia continue to percolate along even though the war has been going on and there have been sanctions. Have you started to look at what the end of the war could mean for both the Russian and Ukrainian economies in terms of, you know, perhaps, you know, assuming that there would be an end of sanctions once there was a cessation of hostilities, whether that would give a boost to the Russian economy, maybe the European economy in general could lower costs, things like that? So just kind of walk us through what you are seeing there. 

    MS. KOZACK: Okay, let me go ahead on Ukraine. So, just to bring everyone up to speed. So, on February 28th, the IMF staff, and the Ukrainian authorities reached a staff-level agreement on the Seventh Review of the four-year EFF arrangement. This is subject to approval of the IMF’s Executive Board. Ukraine is expected to draw, as noted, about U.S. $400 million, and that would bring total disbursements under the program to U.S. $10.1 billion.

    I just want to note that program performance in Ukraine remains strong. All of the end December quantitative performance criteria were met, and understandings were reached between the Ukrainian authorities and IMF staff on a set of policies and reforms to sustain macroeconomic stability. The structural reform agenda in Ukraine is continuing to make good progress, and there are strong commitments from the Ukrainian authorities in a number of other areas. 

    Now on some of the specific questions, first on the matter of the disbursement, what I can say there is that it is not unusual over the life of a program for the pattern of disbursements to shift based on evolving balance of payments needs. And that is what has happened in this case. It is also important to emphasize that the overall size of the program, which is $15.6 billion, remains unchanged. And so that shift in disbursement pattern reflects the shifting balance of payments pattern for Ukraine. 

    So, on the issue the debt restructuring and debt process, what I can say there is that restoring debt sustainability in Ukraine hinges on continued implementation of the authority’s debt restructuring strategy, where completing the treatment of the GDP warrants remains important. And it also hinges very much on continuation of the revenue-based fiscal adjustment strategy, which is supported under the program. And as you know, Ukraine’s debt has been assessed in the last review to be sustainable on a forward-looking basis contingent on these two areas that I just mentioned. And of course, there will be a revised debt sustainability assessment as part of the ongoing review. 

    With respect to the other question, what I can say here is that the Ukrainian economy, you know, has shown continued resilience despite the challenges arising from the war. At the time of the Seventh Review, the last review, we estimated GDP growth to be 3.5 percent in 2024. But we did expect it at that time to moderate to 2 to 3 percent in 2025. And that was reflecting some headwinds from labor constraints and damage to energy infrastructure, given the ongoing war. It is the case in general for Ukraine, and we have been saying this throughout the life of the program, that the outlook remains exceptionally uncertain, especially as the war continues and it is taking a heavy toll on Ukraine’s people, economy, and infrastructure. 

    On the more recent developments that you were referring to, we are following these developments very closely. It is premature at the moment to comment on them, but we are following them, and we will make an assessment in due course.

    And on your question, the answer is essentially the same. We are following the developments very closely, and we will, as developments evolve, be undertaking obviously an assessment of what a peace deal could potentially look like and what would be the implications for all of the involved parties. 

    QUESTIONER: Julie, can you on the basis of having studied previous conflicts ending, can you just give us divorced from Ukraine and Russia, but just can you give us an indication of what generally happens when a conflict ends, what that means? And is there anything that we can draw on, at least just from history? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, I do not have, you know, off the top of my head a piece of research that I can kind of point to in terms of the interest analysis. What I certainly can say is that we always, for all of our member countries, hope for peace and stability in all of our member countries. And I think at that moment this is really what I can say. But I take note of the importance of your point, and we will, I have no doubt, in due course be conducting all of the necessary analysis as events unfold.

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions mainly on Egypt. as Egypt is scheduled for 10th of March for the discussion of the Fourth Review of the EFF for the country, what are we expecting from this meeting? And if you please, could you update us on the RSF facility worth $1.2 billion for the country? Thank you so much. 

    QUESTIONER: I would second exactly those questions. And just to add to that, I know it says on the IMF Executive Board calendar that the Board will be discussing waivers of non-observance for some of the performance criteria related to Egypt’s loan program and modifications for others. Are you able to tell us any more about exactly which criteria the Board will be looking at? And on the RSF, if you are able to give us any more detail about the prospective value of that. I know it has been put at $1 billion before. A related question, not on Egypt but on Gaza. I would be interested to know if the IMF has begun to think, whether internally or with partners in the region, about what its potential role would be in funding a reconstruction plan for Gaza given the $50 billion, upwards of $50 billion, cost of any reconstruction. 

    QUESTIONER: I may repeat questions about the value of current tranche to be given to Egypt and the timing of when the central bank of Egypt to receive it. And also, I have another question about the program of state assets selling. Will we witness some steps, new steps in that program? Could it be connected with the decision to be taken in March?

    MS. KOZACK: And any other questions on Egypt? All right. And then I have a question that came in through the Press Center. I am going to read it out loud – ’Does the IMF’s approval of the fourth tranche to Egypt require Egypt to implement some reforms? And when will the Fifth Review of the loan be held? What is the estimated size of the loan allocated to Egypt, and here will it be dispersed in installments or in one lump sum?’

    On Egypt – on March 10th, our Executive Board will be discussing Egypt’s Article IV consultation and the fourth review under the EFF. It will also be discussing at the same time Egypt’s request for an RSF, the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. Subject to completion by the Executive Board, the authorities, would have access to $1.2 billion under the EFF. So, under the EFF program. And then in addition, subject again to approval by our Executive Board, the size of the RSF would be about U.S. $1.3 billion. Regarding the RSF, like all of the IMF programs, the RSF is also delivered in tranches. So, it is not one lump sum up front. It is a phased program where tranches are dispersed on the basis of conditions being met. 

    And with respect to some of the other questions, what I can say today is just that we will provide, of course, more details following the Board meeting and on the question of waivers and modifications and also the questions on the state-owned enterprises. And again, the board meeting will be on March 10th. 

    QUESTIONER: I have two questions related to Japan. Firstly, amid rising uncertainty due to President Trump’s tariff policy, I would like to ask you — ask your thoughts on whether the Bank of Japan, currently in a rate hike phase, should continue raising rate or take more cautious approach in assessing the impact. And secondly, President Trump recently made remarks suggesting that Japan and China are engaging in currency devaluation. I would appreciate it if you share your views on Japan’s foreign exchange policy. Thank you. 

    MS. KOZACK: So, maybe just stepping back to give a bit of context on Japan. What I can say on Japan is that on the growth side, growth this year is expected to strengthen, and we also expect inflation to converge to the Bank of Japan’s 2 percent target by the end of 2025. 

    In 2024, growth in Japan slowed due to some temporary supply disruptions. But since then, we have seen a strengthening in growth driven by domestic demand, particular — particularly private consumption in Japan and rising wages. And we expect this to continue into 2025, where we project growth, at the time of the January WEO, we projected growth at 1.1 percent for Japan in 2025. And of course, just to say that we will be updating this projection as part of the April forecast. 

    Looking at inflation — headline and core inflation, as I said, are expected to decline gradually toward the 2 percent target. We have been supportive of the Bank of Japan’s recent monetary policy decisions. We believe that these decisions will help anchor inflation expectations at the 2 percent target but also given balance risks around inflation, our assessment has been that further hikes in the policy interest rate should continue to be data dependent, and they should proceed at a gradual pace over time. 

     With respect to the question on the exchange rate, what I can say there is that the Japanese authorities have affirmed their commitment to a flexible exchange rate regime. Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime has helped the country or has helped the economy absorb the impact of shocks. And it also supports the focus of monetary policy on price stability. And at the same time, what I can say is that that flexible exchange rate regime is helping maintain an external position that is in line with fundamentals. 

    QUESTIONER: Could you give us an update on the negotiations for Ethiopia, please? And on El Salvador, the deal that you agreed on in December and was approved a couple of weeks ago involves the government not increasing its exposure to Bitcoin. Government has continued to buy through the Office of Bitcoin, which is linked to the presidential palace. But yesterday the Fund said that these purchases do not increase the government’s exposure to Bitcoin. Could you please explain that? 

    QUESTIONER: Also on El Salvador, obviously he was saying to not to not buy it as a government reserve. I just wanted to, I guess, contrast to the U.S. I mean, President Trump has very much announced a digital assets reserve, including Ethereum and other coins, as well as Bitcoin. And I wondered if the IMF could – can you comment on the U.S. program or how would you distinguish the two countries and why the IMF might be taking a different approach?

    MS. KOZACK: All right, let me go ahead and take the El Salvador question in Ethiopia and then we will go back. I see many hands up online. 

    So, on El Salvador, as you know, last week our Executive Board approved a 40-month Extended Fund Facility, EFF, for U.S. $1.4 billion and with an immediate disbursement of $113 million. The program is expected to catalyze financial and technical support from other IFIs. And this will lead to a combined total over the program period of about U.S. $3.5 billion of support for El Salvador. The goals of the program are to restore fiscal sustainability, rebuild external and financial buffers, strengthen governance and transparency, and ultimately create the conditions for stronger and more resilient growth. 

    Regarding Bitcoin, in particular, the program aims to address the risks associated with the Bitcoin project to protect consumers and investors, as well as to limit potential fiscal costs. So, to start, there were recent legal reforms that have made the acceptance of Bitcoin voluntary, and taxes can be paid only in U.S. dollars. Under the program, the government has committed to not accumulate for their Bitcoins at the level of the overall public sector. 

    Regarding the recent increase in Bitcoin holding by the Strategic Bitcoin Reserve Fund, the authorities have confirmed that these are consistent with the agreed program conditionality, and we do remain engaged with the authorities on this important issue. 

    And then, to your question. We are obviously closely monitoring President Trump’s announcement in this area. The Presidential Working Group on Digital Asset Markets has not yet completed its work. So, we do not yet have details on the implementation of this proposal, but we will come back in due course. 

    And then turning to the question on Ethiopia. So just an update on Ethiopia. On January 17th, the IMF Executive Board completed the Second Review of the arrangement, the ECF arrangement for Ethiopia, and that allowed for a drawdown of about U.S. $245 million. The ECF arrangement supports the authorities’ reforms to address macroeconomic imbalances, restore external debt sustainability, and lay the foundation for strong private sector-led growth. 

    I can also just remind you that the Managing Director recently traveled to Ethiopia. She was there February 8th and 9th. She met with Prime Minister Abiy and his team to take stock of the economic reforms and the progress that is being made in the country. And she also took the opportunity to meet with other stakeholders, including representatives of the private sector. 

    QUESTIONER: My question is on USAID. USAID has now totally stopped its business. And to what extent do you see the impact, especially on lower income countries at the global level? And should you consider using your facility to support them just in case? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, on this issue, we are obviously again paying close attention to developments, and we are working with our country authorities. But it is, at the same time, it is too early to really say what the precise impact may be. And so, we will come back in due course. For now, we are monitoring.

    QUESTIONER: I have a question on Senegal. Following a recent audit of the country’s debt, it was found to be 99.7 percent of GDP. That was in 2023. And I know that IMF has said before that Senegal debt was stable even though it was high. I am wondering if that is the figure that you still consider sustainable. And then also with regards on talks of a new IMF program, I am wondering if Senegal could be asked to reimburse previous dispersion under this reporting period. 

    QUESTIONER: Still on Senegal, as soon as the report from the Audit Supreme Court was released, we saw rating agency downgrading Senegal sovereign notes. So, the country is now stuck. It cannot raise funds from the internal market, and it cannot go in a very comfortable position in international markets while they still face a lot of challenges. So, I am wondering why the IMF is working fast and bold to find a solution for Senegal in the midterm or even long-term. Is there any situation where IMF can provide a short-term, I mean, short-term relief to the country so they can go through these hard moments in a very soft way? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, on Senegal, what I can say is that we are actively engaged in discussions with the authorities with respect to the Court of Auditors Report and the associated misreporting under the IMF program. The Court of Auditors Report was released on February 12th. The Court confirmed that the fiscal deficit and debt were under reported during the period of 2019 to 2023.

    So, what we are doing is working closely with the authorities in their efforts to preserve fiscal and debt sustainability. We are working actively to advance on our discussions following the publication of the report, and we are also working with the authorities on measures to correct and remedy the misreporting that took place. What I can add is that the resolution of the misreporting in line with IMF policy is a precondition for discussions of any future financial assistance by the IMF.

    And with respect to potential consequences, I can say that the IMF does not impose any sanctions for misreporting cases. It is up to our Executive Board to decide on the next steps. And those next steps, you know, could include a waiver. And that waiver could — it could also include; it could be a waiver without a request for reimbursement. So, all of those discussions on Senegal are now underway. We are actively, very much working with the authorities, supporting as much as possible their efforts on fiscal and debt sustainability, as I said. And we will come back and report back when we have more information on Senegal. 

    I have a question here online that I am going to read. It came from the Press Center on Thailand. And the question is – ‘The upcoming World Bank IMF Annual Meetings in Thailand will bring significant attention to Southeast Asia’s economic outlook. From the from IMF’s perspective, how can Thailand best leverage this opportunity to address regional challenges such as digital transformation, climate change adaptation, and income inequality? And what collaborative initiatives between the IMF and Thailand are being planned to ensure lasting economic benefits for the country beyond the meetings themselves?’ 

    So, on this very important question, a very nice question, actually, what I can say is that we are very much looking forward to having Thailand host the annual meetings in 2026. So, this will be in October of 2026. Every three years, we do our Annual Meetings abroad. 2026, October will be Thailand. So, mark your calendar. I can also add that preparations are underway. The Fund, the IMF staff are working hand in hand with the Thai authorities to make this a highly successful event and showcasing the significant strides that Thailand has made since it last hosted our annual meetings in 1991. So, it will be 25 years when we get to 2026. 

    The Managing Director recently met with Bank of Thailand’s Governor Sethaput at the AlUla Conference in Saudi Arabia. They discussed the preparations for the annual meetings and agreed that it would be a very good opportunity to showcase on the global stage the region’s dynamism and economic activities. And of course, the meetings will also allow Thailand to position itself as a key contributor to the international economic dialogue and to gather views and experiences from countries throughout the membership of the IMF and the World Bank. 

    This ongoing close relationship leading up to and beyond, we hope, the Annual Meetings will focus on prioritizing reform reforms that are necessary to ensure the lasting benefits for Thailand and building the relationships and the shared policy, dialogue and experiences we hope will deepen our engagement, our excellent engagement and relationship with Thailand and will be sustained even past the Annual Meetings in 2026.

    QUESTIONER: My question is, what are the IMF growth projections for Jordan amid the ongoing impact of the Gaza war? And when will the Third Review under the EFF begin? And are any adjustments expected to the war’s region effect on Jordan’s economy? 

    MS. KOZACK: So, what I can share on Jordan is that the Executive Board on December 12th completed the Article IV Consultation with Jordan and the Second Review under the EFF arrangement. The mission for the next review, which will be the Third Review, is expected to take place in April.

    What I can also say is that Jordan has demonstrated resilience and maintained macroeconomic stability throughout the prolonged regional conflict. This resilience reflects the authority’s continued implementation of sound macroeconomic policies and progress with reforms. While recent developments in the region, particularly the ceasefire agreements, give rise to some cautious optimism, uncertainty, of course, in Jordan does remain high. And with respect to the growth projections, what I can say is that growth in 2024 was 2.3 percent. We are projecting growth at 2.5 percent in 2025 and a further increase in growth in 2026 to 3 percent. But like in all countries, we will be updating these projections as both part of our April World Economic Outlook Global Forecast, and also, of course, the team will be doing a full assessment of the Jordanian economy as part of their mission in April 

    And so, with this, I’m going to bring this press briefing to a close. Thank you all very much. Thank you very much for participating today. As a reminder, the briefing is embargoed until 11 a.m. Eastern Time in the U.S. The transcript, as always, will be made available later today on IMF.org. And in case of clarifications or additional questions, please reach out to my colleagues at media@IMF.org. And I wish everyone a wonderful day, and I look forward to seeing you next time. Thank you very much. 

     

    * * * * *

     

    IMF Communications Department
    MEDIA RELATIONS

    PRESS OFFICER: Boris Balabanov

    Phone: +1 202 623-7100Email: MEDIA@IMF.org

    https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2025/03/06/tr030625-transcript-of-com-regular-press-briefing

    MIL OSI

    MIL OSI Russia News

  • MIL-OSI Global: Where Trump’s outbursts have left Ukraine and Europe

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Sam Phelps, Commissioning Editor, International Affairs

    This article was first published in The Conversation UK’s World Affairs Briefing email newsletter. Sign up to receive weekly analysis of the latest developments in international relations, direct to your inbox.


    It has not been a good week for relations between the US and Ukraine. After a meeting in the Oval Office between the two countries’ presidents descended into acrimony before the eyes of the world, the minerals deal that Donald Trump had said would be the first step towards a ceasefire with Russia was temporarily called off.

    Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky has since tried to salvage the relationship, announcing that he is ready to sign the minerals deal at “any time and in any convenient format”. Trump, on the other hand, has continued to fume. He took to his Truth Social media platform on March 3 to slam Zelensky’s remarks to reporters that the end to the war “is still very, very far away”.

    “This is the worst statement that could have been made by Zelensky, and America will not put up with it for much longer,” Trump wrote. “This guy doesn’t want there to be peace as long as he has America’s backing.”

    The following day, Trump paused US military aid to Ukraine. And he has now suspended intelligence sharing, cutting off the flow of information that has been critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia.


    Sign up to receive our weekly World Affairs Briefing newsletter from The Conversation UK. Every Thursday we’ll bring you expert analysis of the big stories in international relations.


    According to Stefan Wolff and Tetyana Malyarenko, who are both regular contributors to our coverage of the war in Ukraine, neither of these two moves will have an immediate game-changing effect on the war. But, in their view, they do increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever peace deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.

    Trump’s manoeuvring poses not only a threat to Ukraine, but the rest of Europe too. As Wolff and Malyarenko report, European nations are now scrambling to strengthen their own security. Following Friday’s White House showdown, the EU revealed plans to mobilise an additional €800 billion (£670 million) for European defence. European leaders were reportedly close to agreeing a deal for this plan as this newsletter was being written.

    The challenges Europe faces on the way to becoming strategically independent from the US are enormous, write Wolff and Malyarenko. But a stronger, and more independent Europe, will be crucial for the war in Ukraine moving forward – particularly as the effects of the US aid suspension hit.




    Read more:
    Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin


    As Veronika Poniscjakova of the University of Portsmouth writes, the battlefield advantage in Ukraine is now overwhelmingly with Russia. The Russian military is putting intense pressure on Ukrainian troops in the Kherson oblast in the south of the country.

    According to Poniscjakova, Russian forces are now reportedly attempting to cross the Dnipro river, which would allow them a clear run at the strategically important port city of Kherson. Reporting from the frontlines has described Russian assaults on Dnipro crossings as “suicide missions” that are involving heavy Russian casualties.




    Read more:
    Russia launching ‘suicide missions’ across strategic Dnipro river as pause in US aid hampers defence


    Russian forces are trying to seize a foothold across Ukraine’s Dnipro River.
    Institute for the Study of War

    Since returning to the White House, Trump has echoed some of Putin’s favourite claims. He has stated that Ukraine does not have any cards to play, is unwilling to do a peace deal and has to give up land to Russia.

    In the view of Natasha Lindstaedt, a professor in the Department of Government at the University of Essex, Trump’s support for Putin threatens security worldwide. It plays perfectly into the hands of China, she writes, which could now be emboldened to expedite its plan to annex Taiwan.

    All of this, Lindstaedt says, will make the US more vulnerable. In her view, the US is more secure and prosperous when it is working in partnership with its allies to ensure security, stability, free trade and investment. “If the US were to even reduce its security commitments to Nato by 50%, estimates suggest trade with members would fall by US$450 billion,” Lindstaedt says.




    Read more:
    How Trump’s spat with Zelensky threatens the security of the world – including the US


    Back in the Oval Office, Friday’s meeting was undoubtedly a major setback for Zelensky. He left the meeting publicly weakened, with Trump telling him to “come back when you’re ready for peace”.

    But Zelensky is not the first leader to walk out of a face-to-face meeting with their tail between their legs. In this piece, Marcus Holmes of the William & Mary Global Research Institute and Nicholas John Wheeler of the University of Birmingham draw a historical parallel in a 1961 summit between the then US president, John F. Kennedy, and the Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, in Vienna.




    Read more:
    Trump and Zelensky: when face-to-face diplomacy goes wrong it can be disastrous – especially if the whole world is watching


    At that time, Kennedy admitted that Khrushchev “beat the hell out of me”, leaving him convinced that tensions with the Soviet Union would escalate. “It’s going to be a cold winter,” he remarked afterwards.

    But, as Holmes and Wheeler write, there was one crucial difference: Kennedy and Khrushchev’s bruising exchange happened behind closed doors. Zelensky was forced to experience his own Vienna moment in front of the world. This, they say, could make it even harder for Zelensky to recover politically.

    The art of the deal

    At no point in the meeting did Trump and Vance seek a resolution to their disagreement with Zelensky or attempt to find common ground. Holmes and Wheeler call this a “domination ritual” – designed to make clear that Ukraine is in no position to set terms.

    In this piece, Andrea Caputo, a professor of strategy & negotiation at the University of Lincoln, breaks down Trump’s negotiation style. Unlike typical US negotiators who are thought to avoid emotional expression, Trump uses anger and confrontation to dominate discussions and control narratives.

    He frames negotiations in zero-sum terms, where every deal must have a clear winner and loser. This, Caputo says, reinforces his public image as a strong leader.

    Caputo argues that Zelensky should have structured negotiations around US economic interests rather than western unity or moral imperatives. Otherwise, he is speaking a negotiation language that Trump doesn’t understand.




    Read more:
    How to negotiate with Trump: forget principles and learn to speak the language of business


    In the high-stakes arena of international security, Caputo says that understanding your counterpart’s negotiation style isn’t just good practice – it may be essential for survival.


    World Affairs Briefing from The Conversation UK is available as a weekly email newsletter. Click here to get updates directly in your inbox.


    ref. Where Trump’s outbursts have left Ukraine and Europe – https://theconversation.com/where-trumps-outbursts-have-left-ukraine-and-europe-251661

    MIL OSI – Global Reports

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – “We cannot afford to depend on others to keep us safe”, Metsola tells EU leaders

    Source: European Parliament

    At the European Council in Brussels, the European Parliament President reassured leaders that the EP can move quickly and efficiently to meet today’s unprecedented security challenges.

    “Too much is at stake, and we cannot wait any longer”, she argued, stressing the urgency for Europe to take care of its own security.

    On Ukraine, she stressed that “Peace must be a real one that does not simply lull all into a false sense of security by allowing an aggressor to keep trying to take over sovereign nations. Peace must guarantee freedom for Ukraine, security for Europe and a deterrent for those who think they can take it through force.”

    On defence, she called on the EU to invest more in defence: “Our ambition must match the unprecedented threat, the boldness of our proposals, and the speed at which they are put into action.” She was encouraged to see many good proposals on the table. “Extraordinary times require immediate measures, so I welcome all creative and flexible solutions to substantially increase and accelerate our investments in the defence sector.”

    She reassured leaders that the European Parliament can adjust to demanding circumstances by moving quickly, efficiently and effectively. “Working through the European Parliament, especially on decisions of this magnitude, is a way of fostering trust in our Union. Yes, we need swift action, but acting together is the only way of ensuring broad and deep public backing.”

    Speaking about the next Multiannual Financial Framework, she called on leaders to “align our EU budget with our priorities. We have a real opportunity to fund the strategic autonomy we need,” she said.

    Read the full speech.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0149/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Reinis Pozņaks, Adam Bielan, Rihards Kols, Cristian Terheş, Alberico Gambino, Alexandr Vondra, Aurelijus Veryga, Jadwiga Wiśniewska, Joachim Stanisław Brudziński, Michał Dworczyk, Roberts Zīle, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Bogdan Rzońca, Carlo Fidanza, Ondřej Krutílek, Veronika Vrecionová, Geadis Geadi
    on behalf of the ECR Group

    B10‑0149/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the ‘Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security’, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 25 March 2022,

     having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

     having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[4],

     having regard to European Court of Auditors (ECA) special report 04/2025 of 6 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility – Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’[5],

     having regard to the report by Enrico Letta of 18 April 2024 entitled ‘Much more than a market’, and in particular the section ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’,

     having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’, and in particular chapter four thereof, ‘Increasing security and reducing dependencies’,

     having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty,

     having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration issued by NATO heads of state or government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

     having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept of 29 June 2022 and the Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

     having regard to the three joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

     having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state or government participating in the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C. on 10 July 2024,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, following the deteriorating geopolitical context and security environment in recent years, the strengthening of European defence, the bolstering of Europe’s operational capabilities and the ramping up of defence production are key initiatives that must be undertaken for ensuring peace, fostering development and strengthening unity between citizens and the Member States, and will contribute decisively to peace on our continent and towards ensuring the long-term security of Ukraine;

    B. whereas the recognition that Russia is the most significant threat to Europes security for the foreseeable future is paramount, and all Member States must therefore ensure a widespread increase in defence production and operational capabilities in order to ensure that credible deterrence is restored on the European continent, while simultaneously recognising that the instability in the southern neighbourhood must be fully taken into consideration;

    C. whereas, in light of the worsening external environment and despite the efforts made in recent years to enhance the EU’s crisis preparedness through new legislation, mechanisms and tools across various policy areas, the EU and its Member States remain vulnerable to multiple crisis scenarios;

    D. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius, and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, have been jointly tasked with producing a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of the mandate of the new Commission; whereas this paper aims to move from political objectives expressed in general terms to specific and quantifiable objectives, and to constitute an element of defence planning;

    E. whereas the timing of the white paper may coincide with a review of the Strategic Compass threat analysis, as well as with possible proposals for a revision of the Strategic Compass, as the majority of its commitments are due for completion by 2025;

    F. whereas the white paper’s principal focus must be to outline a clear plan for how the Member States can address and overcome their growing need for greater financial, operational and logistical resources for their national armed forces and intelligence services;

    G. whereas the white paper must ensure that an effective and financeable strategy that counters hybrid warfare can be realised, particularly one that counters the ongoing attacks on subsea infrastructure that are essential for global energy transport and digital communications, as approximately 99 % of global data traffic is reliant on undersea fibre-optic cables;

    H. whereas the undersea network of the Member States consists of 39 such cables, ensuring connectivity across the Mediterranean, North Sea and Baltic Sea; whereas recent undersea cable disruptions are often dismissed as maritime accidents; whereas emerging technologies and rapid advancements in autonomous underwater drones and deep-sea espionage capabilities create key vulnerabilities that are being exploited by hostile state and non-state actors;

    I. whereas the white paper must ensure complementarity with NATO’s Strategic Concept as NATO is and must remain the principal security guarantor for the Euro-Atlantic area;

    1. Reiterates its firm support for initiatives aimed at strengthening the European defence and deterrence capacity, addressing hybrid and cyber threats, promoting industrial cooperation in the defence sector, and providing the Member States and their allies with high-quality defence products in the required quantities and at short notice; underlines that these objectives require vision, concreteness and shared commitments, both in the strictly military field and in the industrial, technological and intelligence sectors;

    2. Emphasises that the EU must adopt a comprehensive, all-encompassing approach to civilian and military preparedness and readiness, involving both government and society as a whole, as European defence is confronted with increasingly complex challenges that demand a shift in approach, in particular regarding artificial intelligence (AI), cybersecurity and multi-domain operational strategies; considers the importance of strengthening cooperation with NATO and like-minded countries and engaging with the United States to increase the resilience of the transatlantic relationship;

    3. Expects the white paper on the future of European defence to differentiate between short-term and long-term plans and objectives, to predominantly address defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs, as well as to frame the overall approach to EU defence integration, with the aim of strengthening the Member States’ abilities to respond to threats – particularly in the context of Russia’s continuing war of aggression in Ukraine, combined with evolving geopolitical challenges to Europe’s southern flank, and increased military capabilities of hostile state and non-state actors – reinforce EU-NATO cooperation, ensure more efficient Member State defence spending, improve coordination between the Member States, and strengthen strategic partnerships while prioritising the transatlantic relationship;

    4. Underlines that Europe must take on greater responsibility and welcomes the fact that higher Member State investment in defence is already accelerating the consolidation of the EU’s Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), which includes a number of large multinational companies, mid-caps and over 2 000 small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); stresses that the different EU initiatives and regulations should work together to incentivise this process, rather than presenting obstacles; underlines the importance of improving coherence and coordination between EU instruments and programmes of common European interest for defence;

    5. Reiterates, in this regard, that it will also be important to promptly adopt the European defence industry programme (EDIP), in order to support the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS), adopted in March 2024, which aims to enhance the EU’s defence readiness and specifically its industrial capacity;

    6. Encourages the expansion of financial support to future European defence spending initiatives that promote the mass development of operational capabilities and strategic enablers, along with a robust enhancement of civil defence infrastructure to ensure the national resilience of the Member States;

    7. Welcomes the announcement of the proposal for the exemption of defence spending from EU limitations on public spending – a first, fundamental step in the right direction;

    8. Recalls that on 31 January 2025, 19 of the Member States sent a letter urging the European Investment Bank (EIB) to take a stronger role in financing security and defence, in particular re-evaluating the EIB’s list of excluded activities, increasing funding for defence-related investments and exploring the issuance of ‘defence bonds’;

    9. Calls on the EIB to further review its policy on defence investment; welcomes the EIB’s decision to update the definition of eligible dual-use projects, but notes that its lending policy still excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military use; underlines that more should be done to enable access to financing and facilitate the de-risking of defence projects across the financial institutions;

    10. Urges the Member States to support the establishment of a defence, security and resilience bank to serve as a multilateral lending institution designed to provide low-interest, long-term loans that can support key national security priorities such as rearmament, defence modernisation, rebuilding efforts in Ukraine and the buying back of critical infrastructure currently owned by hostile non-EU countries;

    11. Encourages EU defence actions aimed at supporting, initiating and incentivising better Member State coordination as Member States are the principal customers of defence equipment, and stresses that any EU initiative for defence must aim to reach a critical mass of capability development, support an appreciable share of Europe’s overall defence investments and support its defence industrial tools with financial means that have a structural effect, without coming at the expense of national defence spending;

    12. Encourages the Member States to promote cooperation between different European defence firms to encourage the combining of resources and competencies, in order to spur innovation and the development of modern military equipment;

    13. Considers that the strategic environments in which many EU common security and defence policy (CSDP) missions are present are radically deteriorating, with an ongoing war of aggression by Russia in Ukraine and its spillover effect into Moldova and the South Caucasus, a wave of coup d’états in the Sahel region and renewed terrorist campaigns in Somalia and Mozambique, all of which demonstrate the need for the white paper to ensure flexibility in a 360 degree approach to European security that strives towards building a credible and capable deterrence capacity for the Member States, and ensures that Member State civilian and military personnel can deter and respond rapidly to the growing threat environment;

    14. Recognises that the current geopolitical paradigm is the result of decades of underinvestment in European security and over-reliance on allies and partners; considers it a key priority of the white paper to outline an actionable plan to revitalise and advance deterrence along the periphery of Europe with a combination of joint civilian and military training missions that specialise in combined arms training, counter-unmanned aerial vehicle (C-UAV) and counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capabilities, and enhance interoperability and interchangeability among the Member States and non-EU countries;

    15. Calls for the white paper to ensure that the CSDP’s access to planning, resources and logistics is utilised in a manner that permits the CSDP to become the primary enabler of civilian crisis management during emergencies, and can be used as a practice hub for societal resilience and recovery in the face of both human-induced and natural disasters;

    16. Stresses that the white paper should promote close coordination between the EU and NATO to aid our collective defence and deterrence efforts, as well as the alliance’s effort to promote cooperative security through defence capacity-building and its open door policy;

    17. Calls for the white paper to outline how the EU and NATO should collaborate on building an integrated approach to the Black Sea, with a view to strengthening partnership in the areas of security, energy and connectivity; calls for the EU to redouble joint efforts by the EU and NATO to strengthen the deterrence and resilience of the Eastern Partnership countries by developing maritime defence capabilities, enhancing maritime interoperability, providing capabilities to deter and defend against cyber intrusions and attacks, expanding intelligence-sharing and maintaining modern outfitting of national armed forces;

    18. Highlights that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and Iran’s aggression against Israel have demonstrated the use of drones at an unprecedented scale in modern warfare, urges the Member States to utilise the European Peace Facility, Permanent Structured Cooperation, the European Defence Agency and other available and future instruments to ensure that investment, development and joint procurement of counter unmanned aerial systems (C-UAS) and airborne electronic attack (AEA) equipment are prioritised, and to integrate C-UAS and AEA into the strategic doctrine of CSDP military training missions;

    19. Concurs with the ambition of enhancing the European pillar within NATO, with a view to augmenting strategic complementarity, by increasing the amount and range of NATO advanced training courses between European allies and partners to ensure that the Member States close the gap with the United States in operational capabilities and effectiveness; stresses that the development of EU operational capabilities can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation;

    20. Emphasises that the rise of asymmetric transnational threats has increasingly blurred the distinction between external and internal security, as well as between military and non-military security, and that this shifting landscape necessitates a comprehensive and adaptive approach to security at EU level; underlines that the Member States’ increases in defence spending should be complementary to the EU’s overall security strategy, which must evolve in response to changes in the strategic environment;

    21. Recognises that NATO and leading allies such as the United States and the United Kingdom are playing a crucial role in coordinating and leading the efforts to support Ukraine militarily not only with weapons, ammunition and equipment, but also intelligence and data; considers Russia’s ongoing war of aggression as further evidence that the most important countries for European security remain the United States and United Kingdom, as the war continues to reveal profound structural faults in EU security and defence architecture and unacceptable shortfalls in its capabilities;

    22. Highlights the need to ensure the security of the Black Sea region by assisting in the demining of Ukraine’s seawaters and to encourage the Member States to offer joint training exercises in this regard, with an emphasis on the development of maritime mine counter measure capabilities and critical seabed infrastructure protection;

    23. Underlines the importance of undersea cables and in this regard expresses worry about the recent series of cable disruptions in the Baltic Sea, which raise concerns about hybrid warfare tactics, particularly plausible deniability in state-sponsored sabotage; recalls that Russia’s increased naval presence, also through its shadow fleet, in European waters, highlights the vulnerabilities of seabed infrastructure; stresses the need to expand NATO and EU naval coordination for Baltic Sea patrols, enhance surveillance and defensive capabilities, increase investment in undersea surveillance technologies and strengthen partnerships with private telecom and energy companies for real-time monitoring of undersea threats;

    24. Encourages the Member States to provide specialised opportunities for SMEs in the European defence sector so they have the capacity to participate in the bidding process via measures such as creating a pre-approved list of companies to facilitate a speedier engagement process, introducing private equity firms that invest in SMEs into the procurement process, assisting SME growth through incubation and capital investment, reducing the complexities of bidding for contracts, and devising an internal effort to reform the amount of time taken to address contract details;

    25. Encourages the Member States to support binding commitments in their defence budgets that ensure a minimum expenditure in the field of research and development spending, in order to ensure that SME engagement and a spillover effect into the civilian marketplace can be tangibly supported;

    26. Emphasises that the Member States’ ambitions to achieve defence readiness should also be advanced through partnerships and prioritise, where possible, the integration of the Ukrainian Defence Technological and Industrial Base into the wider European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) and transatlantic defence technological and industrial cooperation, with a particular emphasis on joint drone and munitions development;

    27. Encourages initiatives such as the EU’s Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) to serve as a standard for advancing the much-needed increase in munitions and capabilities required for our armed forces, using ASAP as a basis for combining credible and effective multi-domain conventional force capabilities, missile defences, space support, drone development and various other key capabilities as outlined in the EDA’s Capability Development Plan;

    28. Stresses that the white paper must include an outline of institutional reforms that reinforce changes in procurement regulations and intellectual property frameworks, as well as leveraging tax incentives to promote defence-related innovation; emphasises that any such changes must be designed to ensure speed and efficiency within the procurement process and management life cycle of Member State weapons systems;

    29. Encourages speedy financing for enhancing military mobility in a manner that guarantees the upgrading of infrastructure for dual-use military and civilian purposes, contributes to the EU’s defence capabilities and realises a fully operational military Schengen area; underlines that such investments offer significant economic and security benefits; calls on the Commission to act on the recommendations of the 2025 ECA special report on military mobility and to give greater importance to the military assessment during the selection process for dual-use projects;

    30. Stresses that military mobility requires the elimination of regulatory bottlenecks that hinder the delivery of capabilities and limit the investment required to modernise defence capabilities and improve military mobility; emphasises, therefore, that the removal of obstacles, implementation of flow-monitoring and optimisation of systems for addressing cross-border threats are crucial and must be reflected in the white paper;

    31. Urges the Commission to consider financing that ensures that anti-access/area denial capabilities and civil-military fusion are prioritised within any infrastructure development objectives, particularly along the eastern flank;

    32. Supports initiatives for industrial reinforcement actions that benefit SMEs or mid-caps, demonstrate a contribution to the creation of new forms of cross-border cooperation or involve the creation of new infrastructure, facilities or production lines, or the establishment of new or the ramping-up of existing manufacturing capacities of crisis-relevant products;

    33. Encourages the Member States to prioritise the pre-deployment of personnel and capabilities in support of the eastern flank, combined with a follow-on forces and rapid deployment capability that ensures effective border security and deterrence against both hybrid warfare and Russian military manoeuvres;

    34. Underlines the Arctic’s strategic importance within the EU’s defence framework, underscoring the need for strengthened deterrence and defence capabilities in close coordination with NATO; emphasises that this cooperation is essential to address the intensifying militarisation and resource competition operated by Russian and Chinese activities in the region, and to counterbalance their expanding influence and military presence;

    35. Encourages the Member States to ensure closer synergies with national joint training and evaluation centres in Eastern Partnership countries, while also ensuring that there is widespread Member State representation in CSDP missions throughout the Eastern Partnership region, and to encourage greater participation of non-EU countries in these missions, particularly non-EU countries that have hosted successfully completed CSDP missions;

    36. Considers outer space to be an increasingly contested area, with the weaponisation of space on the rise, space security becoming an ever more critical and contested issue, and a growing rush to militarise space infrastructure; highlights the need to prioritise the defence and security of space as a critical part of Europe’s defence, and underscores the importance of securing Europe’s space capabilities and infrastructure, both on land and in orbit, to ensure continuous, secure access to data and communications;

    37. Recognises the important role that emerging disruptive technologies such as quantum computing and AI will play in our future relations with Russia and China, and calls for increasing Europe’s resilience to emerging disruptive technologies in all CSDP missions and operations;

    38. Considers that hybrid threats in the years to come will see the systematic combination of information warfare, agile combat manoeuvres, mass cyber warfare and emerging and disruptive technologies from seabed to space, with both advanced air-breathing and space-based surveillance and strike systems deployed, all of which will be enabled by advanced AI, quantum computing, increasingly ‘intelligent’ drone swarm technologies, offensive cyber capabilities, hypersonic missile systems, and nanotech and bio-warfare;

    39. Underlines the importance of civil defence and preparedness in the medium and long term, including the need to establish adequate civil protection infrastructure and planning for emergency situations; calls for the EU, its Member States and local governments to ensure the necessary investments for those purposes and a dedicated investment guarantee programme within the EIB for crisis-proofing and civil defence infrastructure;

    40. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Commission, in particular the President of the Commission, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the other competent Commissioners, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the UN Secretary-General, the NATO Secretary General, the President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States and partner countries.

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0146/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Rasa Juknevičienė, Nicolás Pascual de la Parte, Riho Terras, Michael Gahler, David McAllister, Sebastião Bugalho, Andrzej Halicki
    on behalf of the PPE Group

    B10‑0146/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU),

     having regard to Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), in particular Chapter Two, Section Two thereof on provisions on the common security and defence policy (CSDP),

     having regard to the Versailles Declaration adopted on 11 March 2022 at the informal meeting of Heads of State or Government,

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence – For a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security, which was approved by the Council on 21 March 2022 and endorsed by the European Council on 24 March 2022,

     having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

     having regard to the Civilian CSDP Compact – Towards more effective civilian missions, approved by the Council on 22 May 2023,

     having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1968 of 17 October 2022 on a European Union Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)[1],

     having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2024/890 of 18 March 2024 amending Decision (CFSP) 2021/509 establishing a European Peace Facility[2],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 March 2019 establishing a framework for the screening of foreign direct investments into the Union[3],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2021/697 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2021 establishing the European Defence Fund and repealing Regulation (EU) 2018/1092[4],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[5],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[6],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2024/1252 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 April 2024 establishing a framework for ensuring a secure and sustainable supply of critical raw materials and amending Regulations (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1724 and (EU) 2019/1020[7],

     having regard to the Commission proposal of 18 April 2023 for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down measures to strengthen solidarity and capacities in the Union to detect, prepare for and respond to cybersecurity threats and incidents (COM(2023)0209),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 21 February 2025 on an EU Action Plan on Cable Security (JOIN(2025)0009),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on a European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence (JOIN(2023)0009),

     having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States[8],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 November 2022 entitled ‘Action plan on military mobility 2.0’ (JOIN(2022)0048),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 18 May 2022 on the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis and Way Forward (JOIN(2022)0024),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 on the update of the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Action Plan entitled ‘An enhanced EU Maritime Security Strategy for evolving maritime threats’ (JOIN(2023)0008),

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 5 March 2024 entitled ‘A new European Defence Industrial Strategy: Achieving EU readiness through a responsive and resilient European Defence Industry’ (JOIN(2024)0010),

     having regard to the report by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 20 June 2024 entitled ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy Report – Our priorities in 2024’,

     having regard to the political guidelines for the next European Commission 2024-2029 by Ursula von der Leyen entitled ‘Europe’s choice’, published on 18 July 2024,

     having regard to the report by Enrico Letta entitled ‘Much more than a market’, published in April 2024, and in particular the section thereof entitled ‘Promoting peace and enhancing security: towards a Common Market for the defence industry’,

     having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 on the future of European competitiveness and in particular Chapter Four thereof on increasing security and reducing dependencies,

     having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together: Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949,

     having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

     having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and to the NATO Vilnius Summit Communiqué issued by NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Vilnius on 11 July 2023,

     having regard to the joint declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

     having regard to the ninth progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017, submitted jointly by the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the NATO Secretary General to the Council of the EU and the NATO Council on 13 June 2024,

     having regard to the Washington Summit Declaration issued by the NATO heads of state and government participating in the North Atlantic Council meeting in Washington on 10 July 2024,

     having regard to Ukraine’s victory plan presented by the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, to the European Council on 17 October 2024,

     having regard to the speeches and statements made at the Munich Security Conference on 14-16 February 2025,

     having regard to the statements made at the Leaders Meeting on Ukraine, held in London on 2 March 2025,

     having regard to the temporary halt of all United States military aid to Ukraine,

     having regard to the statement by the President of the Commission of 4 March 2025 on the defence package, the ReArm Europe Plan,

     having regard to Rule 55 of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the security situation in Europe has seen an unprecedented deterioration over the past years; whereas there is a common understanding that Europe needs to be able to effectively address European security challenges and achieve a state of defence readiness;

    B. whereas Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine has been a watershed moment in European history; whereas Putin’s war of aggression against Ukraine is widely recognised as an attack on the European peace order established after the Second World War and on the global order as a whole;

    C. whereas despite previous signs and warnings, many countries have not taken the necessary defence measures; whereas the goal of committing 2 % of gross domestic product (GDP) to defence spending agreed by NATO members in 2014 is still not being met by all NATO members in the EU; whereas the gap between the 2 % goal and the actual defence spending by EU Member States amounts to EUR 1 770 billion over the 2006-2022 period[9]; whereas in 2024, 16 EU Member States that are also NATO allies were expected to exceed NATO’s 2 % defence investment guideline, compared to only nine in 2023;

    D. whereas as a result of these investment gaps, numerous reports, notably the Defence Investment Gaps Analysis of May 2022, have analysed a worrying capability gap in European defence;

    E. whereas the Draghi report highlighted a funding need of EUR 500 billion in European defence for the next decade and highlights a combination of structural weaknesses affecting the competitiveness of the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), and identifies fragmentation, insufficient public defence investment and limited access to financing as obstacles to a capable EDTIB; whereas the lending policy of the European Investment Bank (EIB) excludes the financing of ammunition and weapons, as well as equipment or infrastructure exclusively dedicated to military and police use;

    F. whereas the Niinistö report underlines the fact that the EU and its Member States are not yet fully prepared for the most severe cross-sectoral or multidimensional crisis scenarios, especially given the further deteriorating environment outside of the EU; whereas it insists that this preparedness is necessary for the EU and its Member States to signal to potential adversaries that they will not be able to outlast the EU; whereas it deplores the fact that the EU lacks a common plan in the event of armed aggression and underlines that the EU needs to rethink the way it defines its security;

    G. whereas Russia’s continued armament efforts and its cooperation with other authoritarian powers on armaments, vastly surpassing European stocks and production capacities, pose the most serious and unprecedented threat to world peace as well as to the security and territory of the EU and its Member States; whereas the Russian regime is strengthening its ties in particular with the autocratic leaderships of China, Iran and North Korea in order to achieve its objectives;

    H. whereas the EU is also facing the most diverse and complex range of non-military threats since its creation, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, including foreign information manipulation and interference, cyberattacks, attacks against underwater infrastructure, economic pressures, food and energy blackmailing, instrumentalisation of migration and subversive political influence; whereas the EU should take these kind of threats seriously in its defence and security policies;

    I. whereas the recent actions and statements by the US administration have further increased concerns about the future stance of the US vis-à-vis Russia, NATO and the security of Europe;

    J. whereas the EU’s security environment has deteriorated not only in eastern Europe, but also in countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood partnership and beyond;

    K. whereas the disastrous impact of past or ongoing wars, instability, insecurity, poverty and climate change in the Sahel region, north-eastern Africa and Libya poses serious risks to the EU’s security and its economic and trade interests; whereas the instability and insecurity in the southern neighbourhood and the Sahel region are closely interlinked with and remain an ongoing challenge for EU external border management and mitigation of illegal migration;

    L. whereas European security is linked to stability on the African continent, and the growing presence of non-European actors is testament to the lack of sufficient security and diplomatic engagement in the region to effectively counter the challenges and protect its strategic interests;

    M. whereas the Black Sea has shifted from a secondary to a primary military theatre for the EU and NATO, and, alongside the Baltic Sea, has become a pivotal strategic region for European security in countering the Russian threat;

    N. whereas the Arctic region is becoming increasingly important in terms of economic development and transport, while at the same time facing challenges linked to climate change and militarisation, as well as those resulting from increasing geopolitical competition and migration;

    O. whereas China, driven by the ambition to become a global superpower, is eroding the rules-based international order by increasingly pursuing assertive foreign and hostile economic and competition policies and exporting dual-use goods deployed by Russia on the battlefield against Ukraine, thereby threatening European security and interests; whereas China is also investing tremendously in its armed forces, using its economic power to quash criticism worldwide, and is striving to assert itself as the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific region; whereas China, by intensifying its confrontational, aggressive and intimidating actions against some of its neighbours, particularly in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, poses a risk to regional and global security as well as to the EU’s economic interests; whereas China has promoted an alternative narrative for many years, challenging human rights, democratic values and open markets in multilateral and international forums; whereas China’s increasing influence in international organisations has impeded positive progress and further excluded Taiwan from rightful and meaningful participation in these organisations;

    P. whereas in 2023, Parliament and the Council concluded agreements on the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), which, as short-term and emergency measures, aim to encourage the joint procurement of defence products, ramp up the European defence industry’s production capacity, and replenish depleted stocks;

    Q. whereas in 2024, the Commission proposed the establishment of a European defence industrial strategy (EDIS) and a European defence industry programme (EDIP), addressing, in particular, the improvement of EU defence capabilities and the governance, security of supply and integration of the Ukrainian defence technological and industrial base (DTIB) into its EU counterpart, the EDTIB;

    R. whereas building defence capabilities and adapting them to military needs requires a common strategic culture and shared threat perception and assessment, as well as the development of solutions to be combined in doctrine and concepts;

    S. whereas in the light of the above challenges and analyses, the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with drafting a white paper on the future of European defence, which is due to be published on 19 March 2025;

    1. Believes that the white paper on the future of European defence must put forward concrete measures and options to the members of the European Council so that truly groundbreaking and much needed efforts can be made, in the shortest possible time frames, which must address the following pressing needs: to urgently and substantially increase defence capabilities, overcome fragmentation in the European defence industry market, enhance the capacity of the EDTIB, promptly identify and implement pragmatic solutions for the considerable funding needs, deepen EU-NATO cooperation through a robust European pillar in NATO, and ensure an increase in our military support to Ukraine and other neighbouring countries that share our European values;

    2. Calls on Council President António Costa to immediately convene the European Council, based on the conclusions of the white paper, so that EU leaders can agree on immediate and far-reaching decisions to implement the European Defence Union as laid out in Article 42(2) TEU and elaborate on the measures identified in the white paper; urges both the Council and the Commission to identify clear and concrete priorities for the short, medium and long term, with a corresponding timeline of actions;

    3. Reiterates its previous calls to take seriously the direct and indirect threat of a Russian attack against the EU and to prepare urgently, without any further delay, to do the utmost to improve European military capacities in order to ensure that Europe is ready for the most extreme military contingencies; calls therefore for the threat analysis of the EU’s Strategic Compass to be updated and upgraded to a threat assessment and for the measures within the compass to be adapted accordingly, in order to reflect the threat magnitude in our threat environment;

    4. Strongly believes that Europeans must take on greater responsibility within NATO, especially when it comes to ensuring security on the European continent, and hence underlines that a strong and robust European pillar in NATO is the best way to foster our transatlantic security and ensure the security of all Europeans; recalls that a true transatlantic partnership means shared responsibility, joint efforts and equal burden-sharing;

    5. Stresses the importance of learning from Ukraine’s experience in countering Russian aggression and calls for immediate measures to enhance the security and defence of the EU’s north-eastern border with Russia and Belarus by establishing a comprehensive and resilient defence line across land, air and maritime domains to counter military and hybrid threats; emphasises the need to coordinate and integrate national efforts through EU regulatory and financial instruments to accelerate implementation;

    6. Stresses that Europe continues to stand firmly on the side of Ukraine as it courageously fights for our European way of life, and recalls its conviction that it is on the Ukrainian battlefields that the future of Europe will be decided; reiterates thus that the EU will support Ukraine for as long as it takes for Ukraine to win this war, as a forced surrender by Ukraine and acceptance of a ‘peace’ treaty on Putin’s terms could accelerate the timeline for Russia to shift its aggression toward the EU or NATO; urges the EU, accordingly, to develop a ‘Ukraine strategy’, outlining clear objectives for the support of Ukraine’s defence capabilities and the integration of the Ukrainian DTIB into the EDTIB, and to find the necessary resources to implement such a strategy, while supporting European defence industry activities in Ukraine in order to ramp up local production and enhance cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defence companies; underscores that such a Ukraine strategy must be an integral part of a ‘European defence’ strategy; calls on the EU Member States to commit at least 0.25 % of their GDP to military aid for Ukraine;

    7. Emphasises the need for a holistic approach to European security, ensuring that all EU policies incorporate defence and security dimensions, supported by both regulatory and financial instruments;

    8. Believes that the EU should develop economic cooperation contingency plans to prepare for mutual support in the event of large-scale security crises, and should deepen economic and defence industrial dialogues in relation to early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyberthreats, in order to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure, maritime and underwater safety, and other forms of deeper defence industrial cooperation; calls, in cooperation with NATO, for an enhanced response to Russia’s hybrid war that aims at destabilising not only Ukraine but the whole European continent;

    Addressing capability gaps

    9. Underlines the need to urgently address the gaps in military equipment and ammunition by building on the success of the EDIRPA and ASAP programmes and to swiftly finalise EDIP so that, through common procurement, our common European and Ukrainian capabilities are increased and our stocks of crucial defence equipment and ammunition are replenished; welcomes EDIP’s potential to improve the defence capabilities of the EU and its Member States, to strengthen security of supply and to improve the effectiveness and coherence of EU efforts through new governance structures; stresses that EDIP’s financial envelope will fall well short of meeting the ambitions laid out in EDIP and calls, therefore, for additional funding sources to be identified immediately and to include exploring the possibility of reallocations within the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), notably with regard to European defence projects of common interest and to the Ukraine support instrument that currently lacks any funding; stresses, with regard to the threat assessment of a possible Russian attack on EU and NATO territory within the next few years, the urgent need for EDIP to be implemented swiftly and for additional and substantial funding to be provided for joint European defence efforts before the next MFF;

    10. Calls for the need for a significant increase in availability of strategic enablers in the air, maritime, underwater, space and cyber domains to be addressed without delay;

    11. Suggests that successful Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and European Defence Fund (EDF) projects be prioritised along the lines of known capability gaps and that sufficient funding be ensured for projects that have proven to deliver; calls for the closure of PESCO projects that do not deliver results and/or do not provide added value in the closing of capability gaps and/or European defence readiness; stresses, in the light of the limited financial envelope of the EDF, that duplicated efforts, especially in crucial capability areas such as the hypersonic interceptor or future main battle tank systems, waste EU tax payers’ money, will prolong development efforts and thus increase the probability of procurement of such capabilities from the US, thus undermining the ambition laid out in EDIS;

    12. Calls for the architecture of the EU Defence Industrial Toolbox to be rationalised, as more financial resources alone will not ensure success, since it is even more important that these resources are spent in a more efficient and effective manner;

    13. Underlines the need to ensure coherence of output between the EU’s Capability Development Plan (CDP) and Coordinated Annual Review on Defence and the NATO capability targets, without delay, to foster complementarity and to prevent dysfunctional duplications; calls for a concrete action plan to be drawn up, including a clear timeline for each priority in line with both the CDP and the NATO Defence Planning Process;

    14. Welcomes the proposal for European defence projects of common interest on the development of common capabilities which go beyond the financial means of an individual Member State, such as a European air shield, autonomous space access and space surveillance, transport and communication capabilities, sovereign digital infrastructures, sovereign cloud infrastructure, long-range precision strike capabilities and integrated air defence, as well as complex maritime and underwater protective assets; stresses that the EU’s efforts in missile defence need to be aligned and integrated with NATO support for the European Sky Shield Initiative, driven by EU Member States; stresses the need to ensure adequate funding, to be established well before 2028, in order to deliver results with regard to the threat analyses of a possible Russian attack against EU and NATO territory within the next few years;

    15. Calls for the establishment of EU-specific rapid response strategies for underwater infrastructure protection operating in alignment with NATO while maintaining EU autonomy; encourages investment in advanced detection and surveillance systems for underwater infrastructure monitoring;

    16. Calls for the EU to further accelerate the implementation of military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from ‘mobility’ to ‘military logistics’; stresses the need for significant investment in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, fuel infrastructure through depots, ports, air, sea and rail transport platforms, railway lines, waterways, roads, bridges and logistic hubs; stresses that this must be done in cooperation with NATO by drafting a strategic plan for developing mobility;

    17. Underlines the need to quickly agree on additional common European military forces, given that the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) designed as a crisis management instrument provides only a limited European capability to react and support NATO efforts in the event of Russian aggression against EU and NATO territory; recommends, therefore, that the Helsinki Headline Goal of 1999 be revived and that the RDC be gradually extended to ultimately establish a European corps of 60 000 troops, which should be part of a permanent EU structure while being integrated into NATO’s force model;

    18. Recommends the establishment of a security of supply regime, including joint strategic stocks of raw materials and critical parts, to ensure the availability of raw materials and components needed for the production of defence products, and to allow production cycles to be ramped up faster and shortened;

    Fostering the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB)

    19. Calls for a significant increase in common procurement by EU Member States of required European defence equipment and capabilities; calls on the Member States to aggregate demand by procuring defence equipment jointly, with the possibility of granting the Commission a mandate to procure on their behalf, ideally ensuring a long-term planning horizon for the EDTIB, thus improving the EDTIB’s production capacities and the interoperability of the European armed forces, and making efficient use of taxpayers’ money through economies of scale;

    20. Underlines the outstanding success of the EU’s first joint procurement instrument, EDIRPA, by incentivising joint procurement by Member States; believes that there is a need to continue mechanisms similar to EDIRPA and ASAP while increasing the share of funding for joint procurements compared to support measures for research and development;

    21. Believes that the development of the EU’s joint capability should be based on risk analysis provided in threat assessments and on the impact of projects on mitigating the EU’s joint security risks;

    22. Believes that it is necessary to conduct systematic analyses of lessons learned from the war in Ukraine from a technology usage perspective, and analyses of the necessity of EU and NATO standards in comparison to how they affect the cost of technology and products compared to their usage effectiveness;

    23. Stresses that EDIP must actively facilitate the participation of small and medium-sized enterprises and new market entrants through simplified access to funding, reduced regulatory barriers, and dedicated support mechanisms for scaling up operations; emphasises that EDIP should be designed as a stepping stone towards greater European sovereignty in defence production;

    24. Highlights the need to support the development of pan-European value chains in EU defence cooperation by involving companies throughout the EU in the production of defence equipment and by distributing production facilities throughout the EU in order to improve security of supply, increase attractiveness of EU defence cooperation and, above all, enhance the resilience of the supply network, thus reducing our vulnerability in the event of an armed attack;

    25. Calls for the review and adaptation of current and future legislation with regard to negative effects on the EDTIB, especially concerning production capacities and security of supply; calls for an extended mapping, in cooperation with the EDTIB, to identify all horizontal hindrances in the current legislation; calls for a detailed action plan to be developed to resolve the issues as soon as possible; underlines the need to review, simplify and harmonise the current framework for export licences and intra-EU transfer licences, as well as for cross-certification of equipment, as one of the priorities to foster better cooperation within the market and among Member States;

    26. Strongly underlines the need to significantly increase our investment in emerging and disruptive technologies and structures in defence, taking care not to disperse our resources across too many projects, including cyber defence, outer space, complex underwater protective assets, novel materials and manufacturing, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cloud computing and sovereign cloud infrastructure, high-performance computing, the internet of things, robotics, biotechnology and nanotechnology;

    27. Calls on the Commission to leverage the full dual-use potential of space technologies, considering space as both a new operating domain and a critical enabler of multi-domain operations; underlines that the EU currently has a substantial gap in space capabilities compared to its main competitors and stresses that, in order to address this gap in space technologies, already existing flagship projects (i.e. Copernicus and Galileo) should be enhanced for defence applications; suggests, furthermore, that the EU should urgently pursue the development of its IRIS2 constellation, together with the development of further EU common projects, for example, for space domain awareness and space-based missile early-warning applications;

    28. Recalls the increasing threats of cyber warfare and underlines the need for the EU to establish an EU cyber defence coordination centre to monitor, detect and respond to cyberthreats in real time;

    29. Highlights the importance of the involvement of other industrial actors that do not undertake defence-related activities as potential partners in scaling up production when necessary;

    30. Calls for the EU to foster stronger collaboration between our armed forces, academia, industries and investors;

    Ensuring pragmatic sources of finance

    31. Calls on the Commission to bring forward a legislative proposal containing a binding commitment for Member States to reach a minimum threshold of 3 % of their GDP on defence expenditure by 2026, with the need to further increase it to 4 % by 2028 and to commit at least 0.5 % of their GDP to EU common defence; stresses that, in the light of three decades of underinvestment, the current threat to the EU requires much higher defence investment, while underlining that the EU budget can only complement but can never replace the efforts of the Member States in that regard; emphasises that national defence investment by Member States will continue to serve as the backbone of defence readiness, while EU funding and its role in harmonising and streamlining the processes may have an important impact in enhancing and multiplying these efforts; calls for the EU and its Member States to work and agree on specific ways and means to achieve a short- to long-term substantial increase in public and private investment in defence and security on the national and European levels;

    32. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement on the ReArm Europe Plan;

    33. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal to activate the national escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact;

    34. Welcomes the Commission’s proposal for a new instrument providing EUR 150 billion in loans to Member States for joint defence investment;

    35. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to direct more funds towards defence-related investment, including making it possible for cohesion policy programmes to be used;

    36. Calls for a system of European defence bonds to be explored for financing large-scale military investments up front, ensuring urgent capability development; calls for clear allocation criteria prioritising joint capability development, research and innovation, and military mobility infrastructure; calls, along the same lines, for the use of unused ‘coronabonds’ for defence instruments to be explored;

    37. Underlines the role of public-private partnerships which are essential to finance defence investment; proposes, therefore, a dedicated EU instrument incentivising private investment in defence following the example of InvestEU;

    38. Welcomes the Commission’s announcement of its plans to take action to mobilise private capital through an acceleration of the Savings and Investment Union and through the EIB; calls for an urgent revision of the EIB’s lending policy and immediate flexibility to remove current restrictions on financing ammunition, weapons and equipment or infrastructure dedicated to military use; stresses that this fundamental reform is necessary to unlock significant investment potential for the European defence sector, and to foster risk-sharing instruments to facilitate commercial bank lending to the sector; urges the EIB to take the necessary steps to facilitate private investment in defence, ensuring that the financial landscape supports the growing needs of the industry;

    39. Demands a review of past and new legislation and taxonomy to ensure that they are best suited to advance our European defence industry;

    40. Believes that environmental, social and governance criteria and taxonomy rules and their interpretation by rating agencies are an obstacle to ensuring increased public finance for defence and hence calls on the Commission to address this issue by, among other things, adapting the regulation on sustainability‐related disclosures in the financial services sector[10] with a view to explicitly ruling out a classification of the defence industry as sustainably or socially harmful;

    Supporting innovation

    41. Calls for the establishment of an EU agency, inspired by the US’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, as part of the European Defence Agency, which should be solely responsible for supporting research in emerging and disruptive technologies, equipped with an adequate amount of venture capital; emphasises the need for expanded research and development funding to ensure participation by all Member States through the creation of specialised ‘hubs’;

    42. Believes in the need to increase the funding for academic research programmes to cooperate with the defence industry to ensure long-term in-depth research in defence;

    Finalising the common market for defence

    43. Urges Member States to stop invoking Article 346 TFEU as a means of avoiding the application of the Procurement Directive[11], thus undermining the common market for defence; calls on the Commission to close this loophole by immediately launching a review of this directive, as well as of the Intra-Community Transfer Directive[12], which is scheduled for the second half of 2025, and to recast both regulations as soon as possible with a view to strengthening the common market for defence, as well as to introducing flexibility with regard to crisis situations like those we are currently facing;

    44. Calls for the transformation of NATO standards into EU legislation in order to facilitate the interoperability of European armed forces while strengthening our capacity to negotiate these standards within NATO and to enforce the consistent implementation of these standard in practice;

    45. Presses for a common European certification scheme for weapons systems and a move beyond the current system of national certification in order to speed up the introduction of weapons systems into the armed forces of Member States;

    Fostering effective governance

    46. Deplores the lack of cohesion and effectiveness of EU defence structures and instruments resulting from the loose institutional connection between the Council and the Commission, which not only significantly limits the added value and the effectiveness of cooperation in the EU framework but also results in the ineffective use of taxpayers’ money;

    47. Calls for the creation of a permanent Council of EU defence ministers;

    48. Suggests that the Commissioner for Defence and Space should become the head of the European Defence Agency and should also be nominated as the coordinator for PESCO projects by recasting the respective Council decisions;

    49. Encourages the creation of a ‘defence readiness board’ as proposed in EDIP, led by the Defence Commissioner, which should meet frequently in different configurations, for example, EU defence ministers, national procurement directors and industry representatives;

    50. Believes that the Defence Commissioner should exercise supervision over the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and military operations;

    51. Suggests that the funding for PESCO and the European Defence Agency be transferred into the common EU budget;

    52. Highlights the need for enhanced and effective parliamentary scrutiny in the area of defence, given its importance and the effects on other areas of increasing investment in defence; calls, therefore, for the establishment of an interinstitutional agreement ensuring Parliament’s access to classified information and the provision of physical infrastructure to that end, allowing for committee meetings to be conducted under the classification of EU restricted, or an even higher security classification;

    Fostering EU-NATO complementarity

    53. Calls for a true strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, in full respect of the agreed guiding principles of cooperation, as well as the decision-making autonomy of both organisations, and underlines that only together can we ensure our security and long-term prosperity;

    54. Underlines the need for an agreement on the exchange of classified information between the EU and NATO;

    55. Calls for the establishment of a regular joint armament conference between the EU and NATO in order to coordinate and align efforts with regard to capability development;

    56. Recalls the need to ensure frequent EU-NATO meetings and summits on political and experts levels, in an inclusive, non-discriminatory and reciprocal manner;

    57. Calls for the EU to reinforce the Structured Dialogue with NATO on the defence industry in order to enhance cooperation in key areas such as interoperability and standardisation;

    Fostering cooperation with non-EU partners

    58. Recalls that there is no alternative to strong and sustainable transatlantic cooperation and thus believes that every effort must be made to foster transatlantic cooperation in every field of the military and defence sectors, while recalling the need to foster European defence and develop our sovereignty;

    59. Underlines the need to enhance our partnership with like-minded countries, particularly those in Europe, such as the UK and Norway; calls for an EU-UK broad security pact, also covering key subjects such as energy, migration and critical minerals; points to the added value of fostering our relationships with global partners such as the US, Japan and Australia;

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    60. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the parliaments and governments of the EU Member States and NATO member countries.

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0150/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0150/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the EU is currently under attack, with hybrid incidents inside its borders, a large-scale war in its neighbourhood, and a realignment of global powers, all presenting real risks to the security of the EU and its citizens and requiring immediate, ambitious and decisive action;

    B. whereas the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy are expected to present a white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025, which should serve as a roadmap for such action;

    1. Urges the EU to act immediately to ensure its ability to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful defender of the rules-based international order and the principles of the European security architecture; urges the EU and its Member States to define a coherent, comprehensive and actionable strategy to achieve this; expects the Commission to present a proposal for such a strategy in its white paper on the future of European defence;

    2. Is firmly convinced that a united EU can overcome all the challenges it faces and become a global power for peace, security, human rights and sustainable development, but that this requires a strong EU budget or additional European financial instruments, a reliable and sovereign industrial basis, a full spectrum of European military capabilities, including strategic enablers, and an integrated command allowing all national forces to act under a unified structure at the service of the EU, alone or in complementarity with other allied forces;

    3. Believes that the strategy must include a renewed threat assessment, reflecting the recent unprecedented changes in the EU’s geopolitical context, a plan for supporting Ukraine against Russia’s war of aggression, as a key action to defend the EU’s values and protect its citizens and territory, a roadmap to close the capability gap, restore deterrence and enable autonomous EU action, and a plan to finance such vital transformations in the EU’s capacity to act;

    4. Stresses its firm commitment to continued close cooperation with NATO to reinforce deterrence, collective defence and interoperability; calls nonetheless for the development of a fully-capable European Pillar of NATO able to act autonomously whenever necessary;

    Assessing our threats and challenges

    5. Is convinced that the EU needs to define its foreign policy goals and strategic defence doctrine, identifying the most pressing challenges, systemic threats and rival actors, and to shape its defence strategy accordingly;

    6. Strongly believes that Europe is today facing the most profound military threat to its territorial integrity since the Second World War; believes that Russia and its allies are currently the most significant threat to our security and that of EU candidate countries and partners, and reiterates its condemnation in the strongest terms of Russia’s unprovoked, illegal and unjustified war of aggression against Ukraine; notes, however, that the instability in our southern neighbourhood, the rise in Chinese military power, the increased aggressiveness of some middle powers and the behaviour of the Trump administration, which appears ready to jeopardise transatlantic cooperation on common security and make a deal with the Russian aggressor at the expense of Ukrainian and European security, which are one and the same, must also be fully taken into consideration;

    7. Highlights the fact that on assessments by several European intelligence services, Russia will be ready to attack EU territory within 3 to 10 years, particularly if there is a ceasefire in its aggression against Ukraine that does not lead to a just and lasting peace; notes with deep concern that the Russian armed forces have grown in size and gained valuable battlefield experience, unlike any European forces with the exception of those of Ukraine, aims to have a 1.5 million-strong military by 2026 and has significantly ramped up its armaments production, making it an extremely worrisome threat for the EU’s security and for peace in Europe and globally;

    8. Strongly condemns Russia’s escalating hybrid warfare tactics within the EU and its neighbourhood, which encompass both non-physical and physical actions, including attacks on critical infrastructure and disruption of elections; highlights that Russia’s strategic doctrine includes significant conventional conflict in its conception and execution of hybrid war and conceives hybrid wars as the main line of future military development, rather than a temporary phenomenon; calls for the EU to immediately and significantly step up its ability to defend, attribute and punish hybrid warfare waged within its territory and that of candidate countries;

    9. Condemns all countries that are providing military equipment, financial support or any other form of assistance to Russia, thereby enabling and intensifying its ongoing aggression; warns of the very serious risks resulting from a widening of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine; is deeply concerned that the involvement of Iran and North Korea will provide them with important lessons to modernise their military capabilities, and may accelerate their paths towards nuclearisation;

    10. Reaffirms its grave concerns about China’s increasing military investments and capabilities; expresses serious concerns about the renewed Chinese and Russian commitment to further strengthen their military ties and condemns China’s supplying of components and equipment to Moscow’s military industry;

    11. Notes with concern the increase in both intra and inter-state conflicts in the EU’s wider neighbourhood, in part driven by the hegemonic ambitions of several middle powers, the presence of aggressive non-state actors and by the fragility of several states; also notes that this leads to clear threats to the EU’s security, namely by fostering terrorism and increasing the destabilisation of populations, often forcing their displacement;

    12. Is deeply concerned by the recent actions of the Trump administration, which distance it from the values that have been at the core of its relationship with the EU, namely democracy, the rule of law, freedom of speech and support for the rules-based international order; regrets, in this regard, the votes of the US Government, aligned with the Russian Government, in the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council on resolutions about the third anniversary of Russia’s war of aggression, as well as the unilateral decision to end Russia’s international isolation and to propose a normalisation of relations between them; strongly condemns any attempt to blame Ukraine, the victim, for the actions of the aggressor, Russia; urges the US Government to maintain maximum pressure on Russia until the latter agrees to a just and lasting peace for Ukraine; rejects any attempt by the US Government to impose a new security architecture on the EU and its Member States, and reiterates that any negotiation of such a security architecture must take place with the EU at the table; is deeply concerned by the actions of the US Government towards NATO and the doubts raised regarding the United States’ commitment to the security of the European continent; supports the peace process for Ukraine launched by European leaders, together with Ukraine, on 2 March 2025 in London, which seeks a just and lasting peace for Ukraine, and must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and crime of aggression, Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine and credible security guarantees for Ukraine;

    13. Concurs with the assessment of the Strategic Compass that the EU is surrounded by instability and conflicts, but notes that in the meantime the situation has changed dramatically; believes that, altogether, these developments produce an encirclement of Europe that reduces its scope for the pursuit of democratically defined and autonomous interests and values, and that this requires an immediate response; recognises the evolving nature of global security threats and therefore calls for the EU to conduct more frequent threat assessments, as they are the precondition for a realistic and successful planning of capabilities and operations;

    Supporting Ukraine

    14. Urges the EU and its Member States, together with international partners and NATO allies, to immediately increase their military support to Ukraine in order to assist it in exercising its legitimate right to self-defence against the Russian war of aggression according to Article 51 of the UN Charter; calls, in this regard, for the swift adoption of the next military aid package, which should be the largest to date and reflect the level of ambition this juncture calls for; calls on the Member States, international partners and NATO allies to lift all restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against military targets in Russian territory; calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; calls on the Member States, together with their G7 partners, to immediately seize all frozen Russian assets in order to maintain and step up the EU’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

    15. Urges the Member States to immediately engage in joint procurement of additional capabilities, in particular ammunition for air defence and artillery, as well as any capabilities in which US assistance has played a key role thus far; further urges them to plan in advance for a possible sudden stop in US military assistance;

    16. Welcomes the continued support for the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine, which has already trained more than 60 000 Ukrainian troops, and calls on the mission to continue training as many troops as possible; stresses the importance of specific training modules aimed at developing the capacities of existing and future officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces across all levels and in accordance with their needs; emphasises that the mission should also act as a platform for the exchange of best practices that would ensure that European forces also benefit from the lessons learnt on the battlefield by the Ukrainian Armed Forces; calls on the Member States to further expand training operations for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, including training operations in Ukrainian territory;

    17. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with, and the integration of, the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB), which offers clear advantages for both sides, and calls for speedier integration of the Ukrainian defence industry; recalls the importance of the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) to that effect, and highlights the urgency of properly financing EDIPs Ukraine Support Instrument, which is currently not budgeted; calls on the Commission to include Ukraine and its defence industry in all its defence industrial programmes;

    18. Praises the ‘Danish Model’ for support to Ukraine, which consists of procuring defence capabilities produced directly in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to strongly support this model and to make full use of its potential, as there is an underutilisation of Ukraine’s defence industrial capacity, estimated at around 50 %, and it brings many advantages to both sides, such as cheaper equipment, speedier and safer logistics as well as greater ease of training and maintenance;

    19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to actively work towards maintaining and achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war that must be based on full respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, the principles of international law, accountability for Russia’s war crimes and the crime of aggression, and Russian payments for the massive damage caused in Ukraine; urges the EU and its Member States to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

    Closing the capabilities gap and restoring deterrence

    20. Strongly believes that strengthening Europe’s security and defence requires not just a simple increase in ambition and action, but a complete overhaul of the way we act and invest in our security and defence, such that from now on we plan, innovate, develop, purchase, maintain and deploy capabilities together, in a coordinated and integrated fashion, while making full use of the complementary competences of all actors in Europe, including NATO;

    21. Calls on the Commission to come up with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, research, development, procurement and management of capabilities are all done through a European lens, and that all EU funds are used as a stimulus to joint EU action, instead of perpetuating the present state of market fragmentation, divergent and incompatible capabilities, and superfluous and wasteful investments; considers EDIP to be a good step forward and as such calls for its swift adoption;

    22. Recognises that the starting point must be a realistic assessment of the current capabilities and capability gap; calls on the Commission, with the support of the European Defence Agency and in cooperation with NATO, to identify critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU, in particular for strategic enablers, where the Member States have fallen behind and become dependent on non-European allies; furthermore, calls on the Commission to transform the capability gaps into clear industrial targets that can be the object of planning and programming and benefit from an industrial policy;

    23. Declares the EDTIB to be a strategic asset of the EU, and as such considers that the Commission should be tasked with its mapping and monitoring, so as to safeguard the EU’s strengths, reduce its vulnerabilities, avoid crises, and provide it with an effective and efficient industrial policy; calls on the Commission to draw on the EU Military Committee’s expertise in the definition of defence industries’ priorities and the formulation of defence initiatives in order to ensure alignment between industrial capabilities and military needs; recalls the importance of ensuring that the EDTIB is present in all Member States, distributing the burden and the benefits equitably, and preventing its disruption by a targeted attack on a particular area;

    24. Strongly believes that EU support for the production and procurement of defence products should focus on stimulating the EDTIB, increasing production volumes and ensuring the development of native European solutions for key capabilities, in particular for domains of action where we have so far relied on support from allies, and thus be oriented towards EU-based companies; rejects a scenario in which EU funds contribute to perpetuating or deepening dependences on non-European actors, whether for production of capabilities or their deployment; notes with concern that the vast majority of EU defence investment is diverted to defence industry players outside the EU; highlights that our investments should also contribute to bringing our European allies closer together, first and foremost Ukraine, but also Norway and the UK, finding synergies between complementary industrial strengths and bolstering the interoperability of our fighting forces; states, however, that joining common projects in defence and security requires a steadfast commitment to the EU’s values and norms and demands that any industrial partnerships with non-EU allies include strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority, ensuring that we do not face restrictions on the use of the capabilities acquired; highlights that EU funds will provide opportunities for the defence industry, but also require a commitment to give priority to orders linked to ensuring European security and defence, in particular in times of crisis;

    25. Urges the Member States to radically change the way they procure defence products, choosing common procurement by default, and to consider tasking the Commission with undertaking joint procurement on their behalf; considers that all products procured in the EU, particularly those supported by EU funds, must respect strong safeguards on technology transfer and design authority;

    26. Welcomes all measures that allow a faster and more effective ramp-up of production of defence products in Europe, in particular those that are most needed for a land war; calls for a change in paradigm from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with stock piles of materiel ready for a sustained increase in demand; notes, in this regard, the advantages offered by mechanisms such as advance purchase agreements, the establishment of ‘ever-warm’ facilities and the creation of defence readiness pools; calls on the Commission to support the Member States in developing wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and to deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners;

    27. Highlights that the EDTIB cannot thrive without a true single market for defence; emphasises, in this regard, the need for an effective regulatory framework aimed at encouraging innovation and cross-border cooperation in production, procurement and investment; insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU and calls on the Commission to act upon the results of the reviews of the Directives on the transfer of defence-related products[1] and defence procurement[2], considering the obstacles and costs imposed by the current fragmented framework for certification of defence products; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation for common rules on the certification of defence products and the creation of a European defence certification authority; underlines at the same time the importance of maintaining fruitful competition between different undertakings in the single market for defence; calls on the Commission to propose a regulation on the standardisation of defence products with binding industrial standards, taking advantage of the lessons learnt from the implementation of NATO defence standards;

    28. Stresses the need for greater transparency and convergence at the national and European levels on arms exports; points out the need for the Member States to respect the EU Common Position on Arms Exports, while acknowledging their competences in their defence acquisition policies;

    29. Underlines the importance of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in improving and harmonising the EU’s defence capabilities; reiterates its regret that Member States continue to not make full use of the PESCO framework; reiterates its call on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Member States, and with the involvement of the Commission, to assess projects and their potential regularly and comprehensively with a view to streamlining the current set of projects to a small set of priority projects; believes that priority projects must focus on reducing our dependencies regarding strategic enablers, such as battlefield command and control (C2), aerial and satellite intelligence, surveillance and recognition, satellite communication, air defence and suppression of enemy air defences, military mobility, strategic and tactical air transport and aerial refuelling, missile and deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, combat engineering and wet-gap crossing, and airborne electronic attack; believes that these could be European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI); regrets that Parliament is not in a position to properly scrutinise PESCO projects and calls for a change of paradigm for the governance of EDPCIs, such that Parliament is adequately involved; reiterates its call on the Member States to provide an implementation report on PESCO projects to Parliament at least twice a year;

    30. Calls on the Commission to propose an EU drones package, focusing on drone and anti-drone systems and auxiliary capabilities, containing plans and funds to stimulate research and development, which should learn from the Ukrainian experience and be open to the participation of Ukraine’s highly innovative companies, as well as an industrial programme dedicated to the joint development, production and procurement of drones and anti-drone systems, and a regulation on the use of drones in civilian and military contexts;

    31. Calls on the Commission to step up the ambition of the European Defence Fund, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and to better align its work programme with the capability planning exercises; recalls that the EU’s investment in defence research and innovation is much lower than that of its industrial competitors; considers that part of the investment from the European Defence Fund (EDF) should be designed to foster partnerships between academia, ministries of defence and the defence industry, and to the creation of dedicated research centres for defence; highlights the importance of promoting the participation of the most innovative high-tech companies from the civilian sector in the EDF;

    32. Recalls that the EDTIB is currently facing a shortage of skilled workers, and calls on the Commission and the Member States to develop a strategy to train, upskill and reskill workers; considers that funding from defence programmes must be paired with requirements regarding benefits for workers and communities where the investments are located, making the European defence industry a source of high-quality jobs and earning the EDTIB broad support from the population;

    33. Calls for the EU and its Member States to quickly improve the state of military mobility and logistics, removing all unnecessary obstacles that slow down the speed at which the EU can react to threats and deploy its forces;

    34. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive set of instruments to detect, prevent and react to hybrid attacks and threats and protect the Union’s citizens and assets, including critical infrastructure, but also democratic institutions and processes; reiterates its call on the Member States, the European External Action Service and the Commission to consider the creation of a well-resourced and independent structure tasked with identifying, analysing and documenting foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) threats against the EU as a whole to increase situational awareness and threat intelligence sharing, and develop attribution capabilities and countermeasures in relation to FIMI;

    35. Stresses the importance of enhanced intelligence sharing and information exchange among the Member States and EU institutions, including Parliament, to improve situational awareness and to be able to better anticipate and counter threats to collective security and define common lines of action under the common security and defence policy (CSDP), particularly in the area of crisis management; calls on the Member States to use the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (EU INTCEN) as an effective intelligence-sharing body to share intelligence securely, formulate a common strategic culture and provide strategic information to better anticipate and respond to crises within and outside the EU; reiterates its call for the deployment of intelligence-gathering capacities in all CSDP missions and operations, which would provide information to the EU INTCEN, EU military staff, the EU’s Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability;

    36. Welcomes the Niinistö report and its recommendations for strengthening Europe’s civilian and military preparedness and resilience; supports the adoption of a whole-of-society approach to resilience, involving the active engagement of the EU institutions, the Member States, civil society and individual citizens in strengthening the Union’s security framework; urges the EU to increase the alignment of existing EU instruments and policies, as well as that between EU and national policies, pioneering a ‘preparedness in all policies’ approach to security and defence, ensuring they do not generate contradictory obligations or jeopardise overall defence objectives, especially during a security crisis; expects the upcoming EU strategy on preparedness to offer details of the implementation of the report;

    Enabling autonomous EU action

    37. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU and its Member States with a framework for strengthening the EU’s security and defence and for advancing towards a common forward-looking strategic culture; reiterates that the Strategic Compass’s ambitious aims and milestones can only be achieved with the corresponding political will, adequate financial contributions and openness to cooperation where necessary; calls for the Member States to take all the necessary steps and decisions and fully implement the Strategic Compass; reiterates its call to strengthen the EU-s MPCC, establishing it as the preferred command and control structure for EU military operations and providing it with adequate premises, staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations, including those of the Rapid Deployment Capacity; insists that the Rapid Deployment Capacity must achieve full operational capability in the first half of 2025 at the latest, with at least 5 000 troops; calls on the Member States to urgently pursue a more ambitious pace and scale of command integration and joint operational capability, with the goal of enabling the EU to conduct large-scale operations independently, without reliance on non-EU countries for any capability, including strategic enablers; stresses that the EU and its Member States cannot develop consistent foreign and defence policies without strong support for democratic and agile structures and decision-making processes; underlines that further institutional discussions on removing the unanimity requirement to enhance cooperation should be explored;

    38. Underlines that in the current geopolitical context, the need for continuing to operationalise Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on mutual assistance, ensuring solidarity among Member States, especially those whose geographical position leaves them directly exposed to imminent threats and challenges, regardless of whether or not they are NATO members, is of utmost importance; calls on the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to present concrete steps towards developing a true EU solidarity policy, including by clarifying the practical arrangements in the event of a Member State triggering Article 42(7) TEU;

    39. Notes that EU candidate countries are frequently the target of destabilisation campaigns, and thus calls for the EU to ensure them greater support, in order to preserve stability and security and increase defence cooperation, especially in the fight against disinformation and hybrid warfare; is concerned that otherwise it will act as an invitation to Russia to invade them before they finally join the EU;

    40. Reiterates the importance of EU-NATO cooperation, as NATO remains, for those states that are members of it, an important pillar of their collective defence, such that EU-NATO cooperation should continue, in particular in areas such as information exchange, planning, military mobility and exchange of best practices; highlights that all EU-NATO cooperation must be mutually beneficial and inclusive and respect the EU’s capacity to act autonomously; remains concerned, in this respect, that Türkiye, a NATO member and EU candidate country, excludes Cyprus from cooperation with NATO, hampering an enhanced relationship between the EU and NATO;

    41. Underlines the need for a strong EU defence pillar within NATO, able to act autonomously from, and in complementarity with, NATO, turning the transatlantic alliance into a more equal partnership, and granting the necessary security guarantees to the EU, its Member States and whoever else they deem it necessary to extend them to;

    42. Considers it essential to formalise a security and defence partnership with the United Kingdom as a means of strengthening European security and the European pillar of NATO, in particular in the context of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine; underlines, in this regard, the importance of closer cooperation on information and intelligence sharing, military mobility, security and defence initiatives, crisis management, cyber defence, hybrid threats, FIMI and in jointly addressing shared threats;

    43. Calls on the Commission and the Member States to ensure that all instruments of external action, including development aid and cooperation, are aligned with the EU’s security objectives, fostering resilient societies by promoting inclusive economic growth, good governance and human rights; emphasises the crucial role that diplomacy and development cooperation play alongside military efforts in ensuring long-term international security; underscores that sustainable peace cannot be achieved through military measures alone, but requires comprehensive strategies that address the root causes of instability, such as poverty, inequality, governance failures and climate change;

    Financing our security and defence

    44. Considers that, in order to be able to protect its citizens, deter its enemies, support its allies and become a powerful actor in the defence of a rules-based international order, the EU requires an immediate, substantial and sustained investment in security and defence, in particular at EU level, using a mix of public and private funds and incentivising better spending and better collective action; calls for the EU and the Member States to urgently agree on concrete financial solutions to finance security and defence-related investments; welcomes the ReArmEU initiative by the Commission as an important first step towards swift action;

    45. Recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine; notes higher estimates, such as a Bruegel study referring to EUR 250 billion annually in the event that the United States withdraws its military presence from Europe; highlights that the cost of isolated action is much higher than the cost of joint action, and that the EU and its Member states can also increase their preparedness by making current investment more efficient and coordinated; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness and the consequent loss of autonomy and potential military defeat is much higher than the cost of acting decisively now;

    46. Strongly supports increased investments in our security and defence to ensure that the EU and its Member States are able to face all types of threats, from hybrid to conventional, and establish strong deterrence, while reducing dependences; notes that insecurity, social exclusion and poverty are persistently weaponised by our enemies, as they make large swaths of people more vulnerable to hostile propaganda and anti-democratic narratives; demands therefore that the increased investments in our security and defence come on top of the important investments in social cohesion and welfare, and not instead of them; calls instead for a comprehensive EU investment strategy, based on a permanent fiscal capacity that addresses both vulnerabilities in military capabilities and in the social fabric, empowering us to fight all threats to our values, social model, security and defence; underlines that this pressing investment requires raising public financial resources quickly and in substantial volumes and that this should be based on the principle of social solidarity and a fair redistribution of wealth within our European societies; calls therefore on the Commission to propose new own resources and taxes on the stakeholders benefiting from the current economic and security situation, notably through windfall profits, in order to ensure a fair and sustainable contribution to our collective resilience; recalls that investing in security and defence brings many additional benefits for European society besides greater security and autonomy, and contributes to the desire to make the EU’s economy more competitive;

    47. Warns that simply increasing national defence spending without addressing coordination issues, redundant efforts, and misaligned strategies could be counterproductive as it may exacerbate force integration challenges and drive up procurement costs for all Member States by intensifying competition between them; is therefore concerned by the Commission’s proposals in ReArmEU to activate the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments, which would change the fiscal rules without creating more fiscal space and without accompanying it with proposals for increased coordinated or joint spending; recalls that any exemption should take into account the need to avoid moral hazard and avoid rewarding countries with long-standing inadequacies in their security and defence spending; demands that the Commission and the Member States design any exemptions for defence spending ramp-up in a way that incentivises coordinated spending and ensures the definition of such investments takes into account all threats, including hybrid, and the need to improve military mobility, resilience and security of communications and the availability of skilled workers;

    48. Calls therefore for the bulk of the effort to serve EU-level action; regrets that the Commission’s ReArmEU initiative is mostly based on national expenditure; furthermore calls for the EU and its Member States to give prominent coordination roles to the Commission and the European Defence Agency in new financing instruments, which should be coupled with a complete programme for defence, including against hybrid attacks, ensuring that planning, development, procurement and management of capabilities is done together, in groupings of significant numbers of Member States, and often with the Commission and the European Defence Agency acting on their behalf;

    49. Recognises that the present multiannual financial framework (MFF) is unable to provide sufficient resources for security and defence, and rejects any increases in security and defence spending in the present and future MFFs at the expense of cohesion policy funds, as proposed by the Commission in its ReArmEU initiative; calls on the Commission and the Member States to adapt the cohesion policy funds to a new geopolitical reality, shifting from a reactive, crisis-response stance to a more proactive policy focused on resilience; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the defence spending gap, but has an important role to play; calls for additional EU-wide and European solutions to bridge the gap until the next MFF; highlights the importance of future MFFs in transforming the current immediate increases in security and defence into structural and sustainable EU-level efforts to ensure the EU’s security and defence;

    50. Notes the proposals to make use of readily available sources of capital to finance security and defence, namely the unspent funds of NextGenerationEU and potential financial lines from the European Stability Mechanism, similar to the programme put together during the response to the COVID-19 pandemic; believes that these options could be explored, but would fall short of the needs estimated by the Commission;

    51. Calls therefore on the Commission to raise common debt to provide the Union with the fiscal capacity to borrow in exceptional and crises situations, present and future, taking into account the experience and lessons learnt from NextGenerationEU, as we are now experiencing a pressing need to boost security and defence to protect the EU’s citizens, restore deterrence and support our allies, first and foremost Ukraine; notes additional ideas to create a rearmament bank or a special purpose vehicle with pooled national guarantees to ensure Member States have easier access to markets; underlines that the meaningful involvement of Parliament as one arm of the budgetary authority in the governance of future EU defence spending is a sine qua non; reiterates that the governance of whatever instrument is used should be such that it gives rise to a European defence programme that uses the funds to solve coordination problems in planning, developing, procuring, maintaining and deploying capabilities, reduces dependencies from non-European countries, supports the EDTIB and ultimately enables the EU and its close allies to act autonomously and in a coordinated manner;

    52. Recognises the importance of mobilising private capital into security and defence; recalls, however, that, as governments remain the sole procurers of military capabilities, private capital will not replace public capital in the security and defence sector; calls on the Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to consider an investment guarantee programme, similar to InvestEU, to assist in this effort; calls on the EIB to re-evaluate the list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate earmarked debt issuance for funding security and defence projects; calls for more consistent support for companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and simplifying procedures, in particular by increasing information-sharing between public authorities, upholding the once-only principle and making full use of digital technologies; calls for the EU to start preparing emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

     

    °

    ° °

    53. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies, and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Measures to limit the effects of the recent ecological disaster in the Black Sea – E-000084/2025(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The Commission acknowledges the increased difficulties for Romania and Bulgaria to protect their marine environment, exacerbated by Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and the absence of well-functioning regional cooperation.

    Under the Marine Strategy Framework Directive[1] (MSFD), Romania and Bulgaria have been assisted in developing their marine strategies to protect their marine waters.

    The EU Research and Innovation Framework Programme Horizon Europe[2] supports environmental protection in the Black Sea[3]. The Interreg Black Sea programme[4] provides EUR 95 million of EU funds[5].

    The Cohesion Policy[6] provides support for a total estimated value of EUR 70 million, focused on the Natura 2000 sites in the Black Sea and Danube Delta.

    A project[7] promoted monitoring and assessment activities, in line with MSFD requirements. Under the Common Maritime Agenda[8] for the Black Sea, projects against marine pollution due to the ongoing conflict started[9].

    The Commission alerts the authorities in Bulgaria and Romania daily on possible pollution incidents, including from oil spills, detected by satellite surveillance[10]. National authorities can request assistance from the Union Civil Protection Mechanism[11].

    Furthermore, the Ukraine Investment Framework[12] could support investments related to climate change, environmental and biodiversity protection.

    The Commission also works towards the EU goal[13] of acceding the Bucharest Convention, improving environmental protection of the Black Sea and strengthening the EU technical and financial contribution.

    • [1] Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy, OJ L 164, 25.6.2008, p. 19-40.
    • [2] https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe_en
    • [3] Notably through the EU Mission Restore our Ocean and Waters: https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-europe/eu-missions-horizon-europe/restore-our-ocean-and-waters_en and more particularly its Danube and Black Sea Lighthouse: https://restore4life.eu/eu-missions-restore-our-ocean-waters/ or through specific projects such as https://www.doorsblacksea.eu, https://bridgeblacksea.org/
    • [4] Involving eight countries https://blacksea-cbc.net/
    • [5] Much of it for risk prevention and biodiversity.
    • [6] https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/policy/what/investment-policy_en
    • [7] https://emblasproject.org/
    • [8] The EU sea basin strategy promoting maritime regional cooperation among the coastal countries in the Black Sea region, except for Russia.
    • [9] Building Response Frameworks under existing and new Marine Pollution Challenges in the Black Sea (RESPONSE): https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/org-details/999999999/project/101124661/program/43392145/details and Harnessing complementary curricular preparedness via sustainable management in response to civil and military pollution on the coastline, tributaries and lagoons in Black Sea’s North, West, South zone (Black Sea SIERRA): https://ec.europa.eu/info/funding-tenders/opportunities/portal/screen/how-to-participate/org-details/999999999/project/101124670/program/43392145/details
    • [10] CleanSeaNet hosted by the European Maritime Safety Agency: https://www.emsa.europa.eu/csn-menu.html
    • [11] https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/what/civil-protection/eu-civil-protection-mechanism_en via the Emergency Response Coordination Centre.
    • [12] https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/ukraine/ukraine-investment-framework_en
    • [13] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/39779/st10219-en19.pdf — The tenth paragraph refers to the EU’s accession to the Black Sea Commission, as follows: ‘(…) The Council reaffirms the EU’s aim to become a full member of the Commission on the Protection of the Black Sea against Pollution. The Council particularly takes into account the need for enhanced international cooperation for addressing the environmental and climate challenges in the Black Sea. (…)’.
    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0147/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Reinier Van Lanschot, Mārtiņš Staķis, Ville Niinistö, Damian Boeselager, Hannah Neumann, Maria Ohisalo, Sergey Lagodinsky, Virginijus Sinkevičius
    on behalf of the Verts/ALE Group

    B10‑0147/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to its previous resolutions on Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine,

     having regard its recommendation of 8 June 2022 to the Council and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the EU’s Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine[1],

     having regard to the UN Charter,

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, adopted by the Council on 21 March 2022,

     having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö, Special Adviser to the President of the European Commission, of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the President of the European Commission tasked the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence;

    B. whereas Parliament and experts have called for a white paper on defence for more than a decade;

    C. whereas the Strategic Compass was mainly drafted and negotiated before 24 February 2022; whereas the Strategic Compass is a very broad strategy that provides little guidance with regards to the urgent need to accomplish defence readiness and provide deterrence and defence capabilities to prepare for the most urgent military contingency;

    D. whereas there is an urgent need to strengthen parliamentary oversight of European defence in order to guarantee a sound democratic basis for this crucial policy area;

    E. whereas the European defence industrial actors not only face challenges but have also been able to profit from a much higher demand for defence products since February 2022, which has led to record profits, especially among prime contractors;

    F. whereas innovative defence and dual-use start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have not, in a comparable manner, been able to profit from relevant EU funds or orders from and funding by national governments compared to prime contractors;

    G. whereas the combined military spending efforts of EU Member States already exceed that of Russia but suffer from a lack of economies of scale and focus, highlighting the need for more efficiency and the streamlining of military expenses, in addition to the need for fresh investment;

    H. whereas the many concrete recommendations contained in the Niinistö report should guide the work on the white paper also because the report presents a comprehensive and holistic approach to preparedness and readiness that encompasses all civilian and military aspects; whereas the report underlines that the EU does not have a plan on what to do in the event of an armed attack against a Member State and that the EU currently lacks the comprehensive capacity to bring all necessary EU resources together in a coordinated manner across institutional and operational silos;

    I. whereas hybrid threats are designed to operate in the grey zone between peace and war, combining conventional and unconventional methods such as sabotage, espionage and political infiltration to undermine the EU’s stability and resilience; whereas cyberattacks have become a central element of these campaigns, exploiting the increasing digitalisation of critical sectors such as healthcare, finance and energy, causing cascading disruptions with potentially severe economic and societal consequences; whereas foreign information manipulation and interference complements these operations through the spreading of disinformation and propaganda to erode trust in democratic institutions and polarise public opinion; whereas the growing complexity, frequency and intensity of these threats underscore the pressing need to identify and implement effective solutions for safeguarding the EU’s security and resilience;

    J. whereas the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is a wake-up call for the EU, presenting an immediate threat to the European and global security order and to the security of the EU and its Member States; whereas this conflict shows the urgent need for the Member States to define a common perception of threats and demonstrate genuine solidarity with the frontline Member States;

    K. whereas the EU’s ability to take decisive action in response to external threats has been repeatedly hampered by the requirement for unanimity, with certain Member States blocking or delaying critical military aid to Ukraine and hence undermining European security;

    L. whereas the Trump administration is proposing a normalisation of ties with Russia, and has threatened to withdraw the US military from the European continent; whereas it appears that the US administration has ceased to be a reliable ally within NATO, which has negative repercussions for the collective territorial defence of its members;

    1. Stresses the seriousness of the threats to the security of the European continent, which have reached a level unprecedented since the Second World War; expresses deep concern at the rise of geopolitical fractures, also within the West, new and renewed imperialist ambitions for domination by authoritarian powers, systemic rivalry between great powers, nationalist unilateralism, the primary and growing use of force, and violence by certain states and non-state actors in order to promote their political and economic interests or to resolve disputes;

    2. Recalls that the EU is a peace project and should strive towards peace and stability while condemning aggression; underlines that, in order to achieve peace and stability, we must support Ukraine and become more resilient ourselves;

    3. Believes that the war of aggression against Ukraine was part of Putin’s plan to reshape the Euro-Atlantic security architecture and that this plan has been thwarted thanks to the Ukrainian people’s heroic defence;

    4. Underlines that Russian acts of sabotage against critical European infrastructure, and Russia’s manipulation of and interference in EU and NATO countries, have significantly increased; stresses that experts believe that Russia might further escalate its aggressive acts and also attack EU Member States with conventional armed forces during the coming years;

    5. Deplores the fact that the President of the United States has suggested that the US may attempt to annex Greenland, which would be in breach of international law, create considerable instability for the Greenland Government and people and the whole region, further exacerbating the deterioration of relations within the Atlantic Alliance;

    6. Calls, therefore, for the EU to increase its efforts to shift the trajectory of Russia’s war against Ukraine and set the conditions for a just, comprehensive and lasting peace on Ukraine’s terms; underlines that defeating Russia in Ukraine and ensuring Ukraine’s future success are the most effective and cost-efficient investments in European security for the short and medium term;

    7. Urges the Member States to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine, in as large quantities and as quickly as possible, to enable Ukraine to liberate its territory and deter further Russian attacks;

    8. Calls for making a fast and significant increase in the financing of military support for Ukraine a key and structural component of the white paper; calls on the Member States to scale up direct investments in the capacity of the Ukrainian defence industry to mass-produce essential defence products (Danish model), specifically drones, air defence systems, artillery and long-range strike capabilities; proposes the allocation of a specific multibillion euro budget to the European Defence Industry Programme’s (EDIP) Ukraine Support Instrument reserved exactly for this purpose; stresses the need to explore legal avenues for fully seizing the frozen assets of sanctioned Russian individuals and the Russian Central Bank for use as grants for Ukraine’s expenditure on its defence and resilience needs and its reconstruction, in accordance with international law; condemns the veto imposed by the Hungarian Government on the European Peace Facility (EPF), which blocks more than EUR 6 billion and renders the EPF almost useless; stresses, further, the urgent need also to consider the option of creating an alternative ad hoc arrangement for those European countries that wish to support Ukraine militarily and finance that aid jointly;

    9. Demands the inclusion of a plan in the white paper that describes how the integration of the Ukrainian defence industry into the EU defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) can be operationalised in the fastest and most efficient manner; recalls the urgency to properly finance EDIP’s Ukraine instrument; further proposes the provision of war insurance for critical EDTIB projects inside Ukraine; proposes the regular inclusion of Ukrainian Defence Ministry officials with observer status at meetings of relevant Council configurations;

    10. Expects the white paper on EU defence to define a new framework and the extent to which the EU must accomplish defence readiness and preparedness, in view of the most severe military contingencies, deter potential aggressors and defend itself also to assist NATO allies that are also EU Member States to become a credible European pillar in NATO;

    11. Stresses that the time has come to use the white paper process to clearly define what is meant by a true European defence union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was only a starting point, but that its implementation remains necessary and requires an update to reflect the goals of deterrence and defence readiness;

    12. Deplores the reluctance of the Council and the EU Member States when it comes to addressing deep structural challenges of the European defence industrial landscape and the lack of ambition as regards cooperation between their armed forces at EU level; calls on the Member States to join forces and support a quantum leap towards a very ambitious and comprehensive framework on defence;

    13. Welcomes in principle the announcements made by the President of the Commission on 4 March 2025 regarding a ‘re-arm Europe’ initiative; stresses, however, that the planned investments should address the lack of cooperation and coordination between Member States, including measures guaranteeing full interoperability and making joint procurement the rule;

    14. Urges the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) and the Member States to use the white paper process for outlining a comprehensive framework that is composed of at least the following key components:

    (a) a precise description of scenarios in which the EU and its Member States would use security and military instruments that include the latest risk and threat assessments and range from the most extreme military contingencies to crisis management abroad,

    (b) elements of a military doctrine which describe in detail the military tasks related to the different scenarios, including cooperation with NATO, in particular through a more precise operationalisation and routine exercises for scenarios under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

    (c) revised and adapted military headline goals, closely coordinated with the NATO Defence Planning Process, and a precise description of the necessary quantity and quality of military personnel, including training requirements and key military capabilities that are fully synchronised with the new NATO Force Model as regards EU NATO countries, such as strategic enablers, but also ammunition stocks, in order to fulfil current force generation targets,

    (d) proposals regarding armed forces cooperation structures that go beyond ad hoc arrangements, such as EU Battlegroups, including a strengthened Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), multinationally crewed strategic enablers (based on the Airborne Warning and Control System – AWACS – model) at EU level and additional permanent multinational military units with sufficient capabilities to provide deterrence and defence,

    (e) a description of the key parameters necessary for the establishment of an efficient and competitive single market for defence that would help Member States to reach the capability headline goals necessary for full defence readiness and equip our closest allies, such as Ukraine;

    15. Underlines that the EU must adopt a holistic and horizontal approach to security and defence by taking into account the many societal and systemic challenges it faces, such as climate change; emphasises the need for an impact assessment of current and future EU policies in order to find out how they can better support EU security and defence, including through other strategic objectives of the Union, especially the transition to a green, digital and just economy;

    16. States that major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale wars in our neighbourhood, have threatened and keep threatening the security of the EU and its citizens, that ‘business as usual’ is not an option, and that, to face the threats, the EU and its Member States must make EU-level cooperation of their armed forces and their defence industry the rule in order to create a capabilities-based EU defence union which can overcome threats and attacks against EU security;

    17. Strongly believes that more substantial progress needs to be made in operationalising Article 42(7) TEU and that a plan is needed on how to operationalise this solidarity policy in the white paper with respect to the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States;

    18. Insists on the need to ensure better cooperation and coordination by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK to become closer security partners; calls strongly for the creation of a European security council to coordinate actions between like-minded countries willing to form a vanguard in European defence cooperation and integration; calls for this European security council to serve as the foundation for a new European defence union, bringing together like-minded Member States and strategic partners that share a common security vision and mutual trust;

    19. Considers that current strategic documents, legislative proposals and studies such as the Strategic Compass, the European defence industrial strategy and the Niinistö report should finally inspire a concrete and comprehensive vision for the future of European defence, including specific goals, targets and roadmaps, which the white paper should constitute;

    20. Calls for the EU to better link common security and defence policy (CSDP) instruments with internal security tools and to strengthen dual-use and civil-military cooperation at EU level;

    21. Strongly supports the many good recommendations put forward by the Niinistö report; fully supports the report’s aim, which is ‘not to limit our level of preparedness to what is politically convenient’ but to address what is needed in order to cope with the most severe scenarios; insists on the importance of the upcoming preparedness Union strategy to put the EU on track for comprehensive preparedness, including a definition of EU-level vital societal and governmental functions, the development of EU-level preparedness baseline requirements for these functions, and ensuring the coherence of sectoral crisis plans at EU level; recommends, in particular, the Niinistö report recommendations aimed at empowering citizens to make societal resilience work, inspired by the Finnish concept of total defence;

    22. Calls for the EU to develop an EU risk assessment to identify cross-sectoral threats and the risks facing the EU as a whole, and supports the embedding of the ‘preparedness by design’ principle across the EU; insists on the need to develop a mandatory ‘security and preparedness check’ for future impact assessments and ‘stress-tests’ for current legislation as proposed by Niinistö; believes that there is a need to assess whether there are specific challenges that undermine the timely completion of projects identified as critical for effective military deterrence and the rapid arrival of capabilities to the eastern flank for military contingency;

    23. Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act to align EU and national efforts when possible;

    24. Calls for the EU and the Member States to set up and conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to test high-level decision-making and operational coordination;

    25. Calls for the CSDP to be guided by a human security approach and committed to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda; underlines the importance of other multilateral frameworks that strive to build a peaceful and stable future;

    26. Calls on the Member States to push for the deletion of the unanimity rule in foreign and security policy in the Council; asks for an amendment to Article 46(6) TEU to allow for qualified majority voting instead of unanimity in the management of permanent structured cooperation, with the exception of decisions leading to the creation of military missions or operations with an executive mandate under the CSDP, which must remain under unanimity;

    27. Proposes the strengthening of Parliament’s oversight and scrutiny role in line with the EU expanding its role in defence, including via delegated acts for the work programmes of the current and future defence industrial programmes and instruments that would allow for their implementation to be scrutinised, in particular the priorities set by the Commission concerning projects on priority capabilities; calls for a Parliament representative to be appointed to the new defence industrial readiness board proposed in EDIP, where currently none is provided for;

    28. Believes that the EU must acquire a clear understanding of what the actual gap is between the capability targets and defence capabilities of the Member States; stresses the need to ramp up defence industry production, as well as to have ever-ready production units to respond to foreign attacks or specific needs of its strategic partners;

    29. Considers regular threat analyses to be an absolute necessity and proposes synchronising their planning cycle with similar regular threat analyses within NATO and by key non-NATO partners;

    30. Reiterates its call to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation in order to build a more European NATO, particularly by fully aligning the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s strategic concept, the EU’s Capability Development Plan and NATO’s Defence Planning Process capability targets, except for areas where there are clear special interests for the EU only; proposes the appointment of a permanent EU representative to NATO, including to the military committee on information exchange and the respective military operations;

    31. Calls for the EU to address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls and focus efforts on specific projects of common European interest that are too expensive for a single Member State to procure, in particular strategic enablers, but also large stockpiles of critical equipment, in order to provide genuine EU added value, which could most efficiently be jointly procured and managed by an EU framework through a special off-budget instrument; proposes, in particular, the establishment of the following capabilities:

    (a) integrated air defence and long-range strike systems, optimally by coordinating the ongoing development of the European Sky Shield Initiative (ESSI) with the European Long Range Strike Approach (ELSA),

    (b) suppression of enemy air defences,

    (c) multi-type drone force,

    (d) electronic warfare,

    (e) defensive and offensive cyber systems,

    (f) AWACS, aerial refuelling and long-range transport,

    (g) Command, control, communications and computers (C4) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and space assets critical for early warning, navigation, observation and communication,

    (h) Main Ground Combat System (MGCS),

    (i) Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS);

    32. Urges the EU and the Member States to move from a ‘flow’ approach to a ‘stock’ approach, with mandatory targets for critical defence equipment; points to the need to ensure the socially and environmentally sustainable provision of relevant raw materials and to implement policies to close gaps in production and the labour market; stresses the urgent need to make defence production and stocking of ammunition and other products more security-relevant by developing plans on how to have a more decentralised and resilient network and joint stocks building on ‘readiness pools’ in regions facing a higher threat level and the possibility of large-scale conventional warfare;

    33. Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to move much faster when faced with wars or other large-scale crises; stresses that this can be done by designing and putting in place binding rules, which can be triggered in emergency situations to accelerate administrative and legal procedures, and taking measures in the input side of the supply chain, for the quick production and delivery of military goods, or the construction of infrastructure projects for European mobility, identified as critical for defence;

    34. Urges the EU to take immediate action to pool resources and expertise in the field of cybersecurity, recognising that individual Member States face limited capabilities in this domain; strongly advocates for the development of a unified European approach to cyber forces; further insists on the swift creation of joint European cyber capabilities to effectively address the common challenges faced by all Member States in the rapidly evolving threat landscape, thereby strengthening the EU’s collective resilience and strategic autonomy in the digital realm;

    35. Calls for the EU to use the white paper to describe a plan that helps to remove unnecessary national regulatory obstacles that slow down military mobility without undermining public security; considers that the definition of military mobility should apply to dual-use infrastructures that cover all logistical aspects of mobility, and that for dual-use projects, adequate criteria should be properly applied in terms of funding provisions, in particular at EU level; stresses the need for significant investments in military mobility infrastructures to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, camps, depots, ports, air, sea and rail platforms, railway lines, railroad terminals, waterways, roads and bridges;

    36. Reiterates its full support for the RDC to achieve full operational capability at the latest by mid-2025, with at least 5 000 troops available for rescue and evacuation tasks, initial entry and stabilisation operations or temporary reinforcement of missions; proposes upgrading the RDC by transforming it into a permanent multinational force with its own strategic enablers and command and control, learning from the failed experience of the ad hoc EU Battlegroups;

    37. Calls on the VP/HR to launch a discussion with Member States in order to create additional permanent multinational units to respond to the changed threat landscape for the EU since the decision to create the RDC, especially in the light of Trump’s recent rapprochement towards Putin and comments regarding Greenland, which have increased the need for effective European deterrence and defence in line with the most extreme military contingencies;

    38. Proposes strengthening the current Eurocorps and making it a multinational corps with its own strategic enablers and command and control to which national brigades can be permanently attached with standardised, jointly procured equipment; stresses that such a multinational European corps can enable smaller Member States to fulfil their current force-generation targets, provide industry with aggregate demand through standardised, large-scale equipment orders and provide the EU with its own capability focused on deterrence and defence, including for candidate countries;

    39. Proposes the joint creation of crewed and owned strategic enablers at EU level, based on the model of NATO’s AWACS, which are too expensive for individual Member States and important for the security of the EU as a whole;

    40. Calls for the European Air Transport Command to be transformed into an ‘EU crisis-response air fleet’ comprising military transport aircraft held at European level and made available to Member States for deployments of equipment or troops, emergency evacuations or civil security missions;

    41. Reiterates its call for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) to benefit from adequate premises, staff, enhanced planning, command and control, and effective communication and information systems;

    42. Calls for a more ambitious concept for military training and relevant planning, command and control elements at EU level to be part of the white paper action plan, such as a fully equipped and well-staffed MPCC; believes that the EU must expand the training of Ukrainian forces in line with Ukrainian needs to enable a higher level of operational coordination between units, allow for the most effective force generation possible, and create conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons from them;

    43. Urges the EU Member States to decide on a united and clear medium- and long-term vision for the European defence industry aimed at helping to meet the capability headline goals;

    44. Stresses the urgent need to change the way defence industrial programmes are implemented across the EU; believes that it is of crucial importance to synchronise their work programmes with the revised headline goals in order to be able to focus on the most urgent and militarily important capability gaps; underlines the importance of overcoming a very broad distribution of scarce financial resources and the need to prevent any further ‘dual sourcing’ or similar duplications at EU level that would add to a high amount of duplications in Europe and to the low efficiency rate of the defence industrial base, which is still characterised by fragmentation;

    45. Stresses that capabilities and resources must be increased, and that the fragmentation of the defence market must be overcome via the creation of a single market for defence, where binding common rules apply guaranteeing fair competition and full interoperability of defence products; shares the view contained in Mario Draghi’s report on the future of European competitiveness that the EU must urgently boost competitiveness in the sector by various means, such as mergers (inspired by best practice, such as that of Airbus), and more competition between traditionally nationally entrenched defence firms, and decide on incentives directed towards the EU defence industry for sufficiently large public and private investments in security and defence;

    46. Believes that the white paper should build on the European defence industrial strategy (EDIS), in particular EDIP, and also develop a concept for a wartime economic cooperation contingency plan to prepare for mutual support in case of large-scale security crises, and deepen wartime economic communication to provide early warnings of hard, hybrid and cyber threats;

    47. Stresses that a single European defence market is a priority, as fragmentation and a lack of competitiveness hamper the capacity of the EU to assume more responsibility as a security provider; deplores the fact that neither the EU defence industrial programmes nor the increasing national defence budgets have led to a surge in EU-level defence industrial cooperation that would have allowed Member States to reach their own 2007 cooperation targets as set in the European Defence Agency (EDA) framework; recalls the persistent low levels of European collaboration since 24 February 2022, which, for research and development (R&D), were 14 % in 2022 and 6 % in 2023, and for joint procurement 18 % in 2023, while the EDA was unable to provide data for 2023 (but stressed that there was ‘a temporary slowdown’); stresses the urgent need to analyse the reasons for the unwillingness of Member States to use EU-level cooperation and see it as the main tool for defence investment;

    48. Strongly supports the idea to make EU-level cooperation the rule in the European defence industrial sector and commit to concrete numerical targets for cooperation as presented in EDIS, which focus in particular on joint procurement (at least 40 % by 2030), intra-EU trade (at least 35 % by 2030), and procurement of EU-made defence products (at least 50 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2035);

    49. Urges the Commission and the Council to address the dual challenge of joint military equipment production and its effective utilisation across Member States; calls for a comprehensive strategy to guarantee increased interoperability through the promotion of agreed civil and military standards, such as NATO standardisation agreements, within EU defence industrial programmes; demands a commitment to tying the funding of current and future instruments to the standardisation of and convergence on certification by NATO allies and to make current standards more precise; calls on the Commission to present concrete plans to overcome interoperability obstacles and ensure the efficient utilisation of jointly produced equipment by all participating Member States;

    50. Insists on the importance of European defence projects of common interest as presented in EDIP, which are critical to European defence readiness and preparedness; believes that these should support the industrial and technological capacities that underpin common capability priorities and that cannot be implemented alone, such as strategic enablers; proposes that, based on the capabilities’ headline goals, the Commissioner for Defence create a clear ‘output plan’ listing relevant quantified targets not just for strategic enablers but also for the most critical large-scale equipment needs, such as MGCS, FCAS and ESSI and ELSA, which would then be jointly procured and maintained throughout the life cycle of the product in order to achieve economies of scale and interoperability in the most effective and fastest way;

    51. Believes that a competitive and resilient European defence industry will also lead to a restructuring of the industrial landscape, including through mergers, which would also reduce the number of parallel programmes that waste financial resources, as well as a better regional distribution of production sites; considers that our defence policies should encourage the growth of EU centres of excellence, also according to the criteria of decentralisation, security and resilience; stresses the need to massively boost start-ups, scale-ups and SMEs in the sector as a priority and as a structural element of the section of the white paper pertaining to the single market for defence; stresses that for well-established or systemic actors in the defence sector, public investment should be accompanied by additional safeguards to ensure that public money is reinvested and not used for the purpose of generating profits for their shareholders, such as by windfall profit taxes;

    52. Proposes to create European regional EDTIB clusters uniting research, development, production and maintenance facilities to create regional economies of scale and focus areas of technological specialisation; calls for these clusters to be strategically spread throughout the EU to allow for continued manufacturing in times of crisis and to more evenly distribute the economic opportunities for SMEs and Member States with relatively small defence industries; calls for these clusters to be aligned with EDIP’s proposal for the Structure for European Armament Programme;

    53. Calls for more coherence in support of companies by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access for small- and mid-cap companies within the defence sector;

    54. Calls for a comprehensive strategy to leverage current instruments such as the Defence Equity Facility and new initiatives such as EDIP’s Fund to Accelerate Defence Supply Chain Transformation; demands concrete commitments to increase the amount of funding per SME while ensuring transparency and accountability; requests the implementation of robust monitoring mechanisms to ensure that funds drive innovation and competitiveness among SMEs without distorting the market; demands, further, regular reporting on the impact and effectiveness of these financial instruments in supporting start-ups and SMEs in the defence industry and dual-use sector;

    55. Calls on the Commission to design a successor to the European Defence Fund (EDF) that supports common research and innovation all along the supply chain and lay the conditions to address technological challenges and provide European solutions to key capabilities gaps; calls for the establishment of a Commission agency with a specific focus on R&D with dual-use potential, taking inspiration from the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency; stresses the need to put a strong emphasis on EU-level support for the most disruptive and innovative technology via the creation of an accelerator hub for researching, developing and testing new breakthrough defence technologies, which would also contribute to economic competitiveness, bringing together industry, governments and the expert community; underlines that this organisation should nurture a risk-taking culture and be highly flexible by design; proposes, as a first step, that funding allocation should focus on a limited number of critical projects, including decarbonised defence and novel deterrence capabilities;

    56. Calls for the strengthening of energy resilience and the climate and environmental transition dimension under the successor to the EDF, and for the climate-proofing and decarbonisation (covering both adaptation and mitigation) of EU defence by design and across the five dimensions: operational, capability planning and development, multi-stakeholder engagement, governance, and R&D, for the benefit of the performance of military capabilities, the resilience of armed forces, and thus the competitiveness of the EDTIB;

    57. Is deeply convinced that the EU-level instruments should prioritise and massively increase support for SMEs and start-ups in the dual-use and defence sector; stresses the need to support SMEs and start-ups in bringing successfully tested prototypes to the market, including the scaling up of production; underlines the need to bridge the current funding gap as regards these important steps that would strengthen the EDTIB, including in close cooperation with the Ukrainian technological and defence industrial base;

    58. Insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU by reviewing the directives on the transfer of defence-related products and defence procurement; calls on the Commission to propose actions for better market access, smoother cross-border cooperation and increased security of supply, including by harmonising national export policies;

    59. Stresses the need to develop an effective EU-level armaments policy that includes the establishment of a functioning and effective external trade dimension that aims to support partners that face threats from aggressive authoritarian regimes and prevents arms deliveries to undemocratic aggressive regimes and regimes that make illegal use of them as assessed under the relevant international human rights and humanitarian law, in line with the current eight criteria under the Council Common Position on arms exports[2]; stresses the need to overcome the very narrow and national interpretation of Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) in this respect;

    60. Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority-ordering mechanism for defence production which builds on security and defence capability mapping to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations;

    61. Strongly believes that a European preference must be the cornerstone of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European know-how; underlines that the European preference principle must be reflected in EU defence regulations in clear and unambiguous eligibility criteria; underlines, however, that exceptions for emergency military contingencies and projects critical for ensuring defence readiness should be built into these criteria;

    62. Calls for a crisis response instrument for securing European sovereignty based on the model of the US Defense Production Act, so that the EU has a tool which can be activated to react quickly to emergency wartime or crisis needs; calls for such a tool to include the following key components:

    (a) joint procurement of specific defence products,

    (b) prioritising the provision of critical materials, and prioritising orders, for specific supply chains, such as artillery munitions,

    (c) fast-tracking administrative and legal procedures for moving military equipment and troops, and where possible the construction of (infrastructure) projects critical for military mobility or other military readiness priority areas, while avoiding the circumvention of environmental protection provisions and building in necessary safeguards;

    63. Deplores the lack of willingness by Member States to invest in EU-level cooperation and urges them to reach the EU objectives on security and defence; highlights the fact that the cost of non-preparedness for the most extreme military contingencies would be higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; recalls that aggregate EU defence spending is insufficient and that very little national defence spending is coordinated or even pooled with other Member States or invested in European collaborative projects; calls for the EU and the Member States to work and agree on concrete measures and means for short- to long-term public and private investment;

    64. Notes that, according to the Commission President, the defence spending gap currently stands at EUR 500 billion for the next decade, but that, if the EU needs to develop its own military capabilities, experts estimate that this amount will have to rise significantly; underlines that the EU budget alone cannot fill the gap, but has an important role to play;

    65. Underlines that increases in defence investment should not compete with other public investment priorities, including social expenditure, territorial cohesion and climate transition, which are all relevant to our European security; reiterates that the most effective way to maintain such priorities is to release fresh investment for defence rather than repurpose already earmarked funding; further recalls that financing orientations should be anchored in a whole-of-society approach to resilience and therefore need to be broadly supported by European citizens, and that this support needs to be sustainable in the long term;

    66. Opposes any proposal aimed at repurposing cohesion policy funds from their long-term objectives and recalls that only strengthening Europe’s social and economic fabric and reducing territorial disparities will contribute to the balanced development and stability of all EU regions, and will ultimately reinforce the EU’s ability to defend itself against disinformation and foreign influence;

    67. Supports the Commission President’s announcement to create a new EU financial instrument to assist Member States in increasing their defence spending through loans backed by the EU budget; takes note of the intention to establish such a new instrument under Article 122 TFEU; recalls that while the EU Recovery Instrument, which allocated borrowed funds to various EU programmes, was established by a Council regulation under Article 122 TFEU, various EU programmes to which the resources were allocated, including the Recovery and Resilience Facility, were adopted through ‘codecision’, relying on Article 175 TFEU; calls on the Commission to adopt a similar legal structure, respecting the ordinary legislative procedure and ensuring the democratic legitimacy of any new EU financing instrument for defence;

    68. Welcomes the further extension of the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group’s eligibility criteria to dual-use goods; welcomes the EIB Group’s 2022 Strategic European Security Initiative aimed at supporting innovation in dual-use technology; stresses that EIB investments should focus on innovative projects, but not expendable products such as ammunition; stresses that greater EIB investment in the defence sector can encourage commercial banks’ investment in the sector; calls on the EIB Group to review the impact of the extension of its new dual-use goods policy and insists that any further extension of lending in the sector should only take place if it has no negative impact on the overall financing costs of the bank or its investment pipeline, or on the contribution to financing the investment needed for enabling the EU to reach its climate goals;

    69. Considers that, complementing joint debt, further defence lending should be dealt with in a separate bank, as investment in defence cannot in principle be considered an environmental, social and governance investment; calls, therefore, on the Commission and the Member States to establish, as a matter of urgency, a new defence bank modelled on the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development that could address the global perspective of securing defence lending, while protecting other investment and allowing for allies to join;

    70. Takes note of the Commission President’s announcement on ‘activating the escape clause for defence investments’; underlines that, in view of other pressing policy priorities, the escape clause must be applied in a way that ensures that increases in defence expenditure do not lead to cuts in other areas and is conditional on being spent on developing common EU projects, including dual-use infrastructure such as railways, satellite systems and resilient power grids;

    71. Stresses that the current political context demonstrates that the recently adopted EU economic governance framework deprives governments of the financial resources needed to respond to current and new challenges; underlines that prioritising one policy area over another exacerbates rather than mitigates the multiple crises the EU is facing; calls for a review of the EU fiscal rules framework that would provide the long-term funding certainty required for investment in promoting the just transition, expanding European defence production capabilities and developing dual-use infrastructure, thereby underpinning a truly coordinated EU approach to investment policy;

    72. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next multiannual financial framework (MMF); believes that, as long as Member States refuse to allocate more resources to a higher overall EU budget, including the creation of new own resources, and given the unanimity requirement to change both the MMF Regulation[3] and the Council’s Own-Resources Decision[4], and given the urgency, solutions for alternative funding must be considered without delay, including:

    (a) the urgent launch of a discussion with a view to establishing another off-budget financial facility[5] which would sufficiently pool and Europeanise parts of national defence budgets at EU level and address the entire life cycle of military capabilities, from collaborative R&D and joint procurement to joint maintenance, training and security of supply, and which is, like the current off-budget EPF, open to non-EU countries such as Norway and the UK; stresses therefore the need to improve decision-making and oversight procedures compared to the current EPF governance model,

    (b) the issuance of EU risk guarantees by the Commission to lower interest rates for participants in EU-level projects identified as critical for defence readiness,

    (c) a new EU debt programme along the lines of the NextGenerationEU backed by genuine own resources to repay the borrowed funds,

    (d) the creation of new genuine EU own resources to create additional revenue flows to finance security- and defence-related investments at EU level,

    (e) greater mobilisation of equity and private capital; reiterates therefore its call for more private investment in EU defence,

    (f) the creation of specific financial products so that private banks invest more in the defence sector,

    (g) the development of emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars;

    73. Believes that the next MFF should have a greater allocation of funds for common security and be more flexible in order to react to unforeseen crises and emergencies;

    74. Welcomes the proposals made in the recent Niinistö report as regards the financing of European defence; supports the setting up of a defending Europe facility and a securing Europe facility; equally welcomes and supports the proposal to establish an investment guarantee programme based on the model of InvestEU with open architecture to trigger private sector investment and to issue a ‘European preparedness bond standard’;

    75. Insists that robust mechanisms be implemented to ensure the efficient use of scarce EU budget resources and prevent any duplication of efforts in defence projects; requests a comprehensive review of current oversight procedures and the development of a transparent framework for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of EU-funded defence initiatives;

    76. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commissioner for Defence and Space, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council and the Commission.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Answer to a written question – Mercosur – E-002261/2024(ASW)

    Source: European Parliament

    The EU-Mercosur agreement involves the Member States and the Mercosur countries[1]. Ukraine is not part of Mercosur and therefore the EU-Mercosur agreement will not regulate trade between the EU and Ukraine.

    Regarding sensitive EU agricultural products, such as beef, poultry, pigmeat, sugar, rice, honey and sweetcorn the EU has negotiated limited concessions in the form of tariff rate quotas that represent a small fraction of EU consumption, and using quota segmentation for some products, to avoid concentrating imports in the most sensitive part of the market.

    These partial openings will be introduced in gradual stages to allow for a smooth transition. The text of the 2019 agreement is publicly available at the Directorate General for Trade and Economic Security website[2].

    On 6 December 2024 at the Mercosur Summit in Montevideo, the EU and Mercosur reached a political agreement concluding the negotiations.

    The text of the negotiated outcome was published simultaneously in the site of the Commission[3] and the official sites of the Mercosur partners on 10 December 2024.

    • [1] Mercosur countries are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay.
    • [2] https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/mercosur/eu-mercosur-agreement/text-agreement_en
    • [3] See footnote 2.
    Last updated: 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0145/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0145/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Articles 24(1), 42, 43 and 45 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),

     having regard to the national security strategies of the Member States,

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/1525 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 July 2023 on supporting ammunition production (ASAP)[1],

     having regard to Regulation (EU) 2023/2418 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 October 2023 on establishing an instrument for the reinforcement of the European defence industry through common procurement (EDIRPA)[2],

     having regard to the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence,

     having regard to Commission Recommendation (EU) 2023/2113 of 3 October 2023 on critical technology areas for the EU’s economic security for further risk assessment with Member States[3],

     having regard to the joint communication from the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 10 March 2023 entitled ‘European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’ (JOIN(2023)0009),

     having regard to the report by Sauli Niinistö of 30 October 2024 entitled ‘Safer Together – Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’,

     having regard to the report by Mario Draghi of 9 September 2024 entitled ‘The future of European competitiveness’,

     having regard to Special Report 04/2025 of the European Court of Auditors of 5 February 2025 entitled ‘EU military mobility: Full speed not reached due to design weaknesses and obstacles en route’,

     having regard to the three Joint Declarations on EU-NATO cooperation signed on 8 July 2016, 10 July 2018 and 10 January 2023,

     having regard to the Madrid Summit Declaration adopted by the NATO heads of state and government at the North Atlantic Council meeting in Madrid on 29 June 2022,

     having regard to the NATO 2022 Strategic Concept and the 2023 NATO Summit in Vilnius,

     having regard to the opening remarks made by US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth in Brussels at the Ukraine Defense Contact Group meeting of 12 February 2025,

     having regard to the talks held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on 18 February 2025 between US and Russian negotiators,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas the Commission announced the release of a white paper on the future of European defence, co-authored by Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius and Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, by 19 March 2025; whereas this document will be the first of its kind produced by the EU and emulates similar documents published by Member States;

    B. whereas the white paper must respect the limits set by the TEU in terms of foreign policy and defence and it must take note of the international context and the strategic environment in order to provide a perspective and proposals that will enable the strengthening of Europe’s security;

    C. whereas the white paper on the future of European defence will provide the framework for future defence projects and regulations and will be a key point of reference for incoming negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework;

    D. whereas the international order is profoundly destabilised and is restructuring; whereas the international rules and organisations that emerged from the Second World War and then from the end of the Cold War are in crisis; whereas international relations are increasingly characterised by uncertainty, and the tendency to resort to armed force to resolve international disagreements is growing;

    E. whereas Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 has profoundly destabilised the security order in Europe; whereas this unilateral aggression has accelerated the integration of Sweden and Finland into NATO; whereas this war has considerably deteriorated relations and exchanges between Russia and the countries of Europe;

    F. whereas the war in Ukraine has highlighted the chronic underinvestment by Member States in their armed forces; whereas the stocks of arms and ammunition in Europe are largely insufficient; whereas certain critical military capabilities are not possessed by any European military; whereas the infrastructure that is essential for the security and proper functioning of European societies and economies is vulnerable; whereas some Member States have encountered significant difficulties in deploying and transporting military resources within the EU itself;

    G. whereas the relations between the United States and China will structure, to a large extent, the future of international relations in the 21st century; whereas the United States no longer has the will to maintain the same level of military involvement in Europe; whereas the US Secretary of Defence has expressly spoken of a ‘division of labour’ between allies, with the Americans prioritising the Pacific region, while emphasising that Europeans must be responsible for the defence of Europe and must increase their capabilities accordingly;

    H. whereas the European Union is composed of 27 sovereign states, with each having the sovereign right to determine its own foreign and defence policy;

    I. whereas it is in the interest of the Member States to adopt a common policy on matters of common interest to them; whereas enhanced cooperation on defence matters is mutually beneficial if it improves the security of the Member States against any direct aggression or if it increases their capacity to respond to any threat to their territorial integrity, sovereignty or prosperity;

    J. whereas the European defence market is too fragmented; whereas for a single armament type, there can be several or even dozens of different varieties of equipment in the EU, representing a collective loss of resources because of duplication, and preventing economies of scale;

    K. whereas Article 24(1) TEU stipulates that decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy are taken unanimously by the Council; whereas Article 24(1) TEU also stipulates that the EU cannot adopt legislative acts on foreign affairs and defence; whereas Article 36 TEU stipulates that Parliament has a consultative role;

    L. whereas, on 30 January 2025, 19 EU countries sent a letter to the European Investment Bank calling for it ‘to play an even stronger role in providing investment funding and leveraging private funding for the security and defence sector’;

    1. Stresses that diplomatic and defence policy issues are primarily the prerogative of the Member States, which remain the most relevant and the only legitimate political units in the international order; respects the right of every Member State to determine its own foreign and security policy; insists on the importance of maintaining the principle of unanimity in the Council for all decisions related to the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy;

    2. Underlines that strengthening the Member States’ militaries, based on threats, is necessary to compensate for the security deficit caused by decades of underinvestment and the gradual disengagement of the United States; emphasises that this rearmament policy led by the Member States must not aim to escalate tensions in Europe, but rather aim to reach a level that will deter any hostile actions, establish a continental balance and maintain peace;

    3. Notes that the United States remains the EU’s main military ally and is an essential member of NATO; insists that, irrespective of the political orientation of the White House, US foreign policy will continue to make the Asia-Pacific region a geostrategic priority and to perceive Europe as a secondary theatre; stresses that Member States must no longer subcontract their security and defence to other powers;

    4. Underlines that NATO is a crucial partner in the collective defence architecture in Europe; takes note of the ambition of building a European pillar within NATO; considers that a greater contribution from European states within the alliance must, for the sake of consistency, result in a more balanced distribution of command posts in favour of European military personnel; stresses that stepping up the defence capabilities of European states can go hand in hand with the deepening of EU-NATO cooperation with due respect for the neutrality of the EU Member States that are not part of the NATO alliance;

    5. Highlights the need to overcome the fragmentation of the EU’s internal market for defence products through greater cooperation between Member States and to collectively work on the interoperability of military capabilities; calls on the Member States to encourage cross-border defence procurement in order to strengthen intra-European industrial cooperation and achieve the objective of European strategic autonomy;

    6. Stresses that greater cooperation in the defence sector must actively involve defence SMEs, not only large defence actors, and serve as a platform for SME development, providing greater opportunities for them to contribute to the EU’s technological base and enhance European strategic autonomy;

    7. Notes, however, that the strengthening of the European defence industry must not result in the attribution of new competences to the Commission, which would be in breach of the Treaties and would undermine the sovereignty of Member States without increasing efficacy; reiterates, therefore, that decision-making regarding military requirements, the prioritisation of capability development and the purchase of defence products should remain within the remit of Member States; underlines that, despite the need for increased cooperation in the field of defence, such as on joint procurement and joint production, the Member States must retain full sovereignty over their arms export policies;

    8. Calls for the co-legislators to establish the principle of a European preference in future European defence regulations, including in the European defence industrial plan, so that European funds benefit European companies on European soil, which will enhance our industrial defence capabilities and will reduce our dependences on non-EU countries; recalls that this regulation must in no way restrict the freedom of the Member States to determine their own arms procurement and import/export policy;

    9. Calls on the NATO-affiliated Member States to cooperate in order to identify and fill critical capability gaps by building on and complementing NATO’s Defence Planning Process targets, which are required for sustained full-spectrum operations, including space systems and launchers, long-range missiles, integrated air and missile defence systems, ammunition production, artificial intelligence (AI), maritime drone capability, command and control capability, electronic warfare systems and air-to-air refuelling capacity;

    10. Calls on non-neutral Member States to adequately invest in their infrastructure to guarantee optimal military mobility across Europe in line with their respective military agreements and alliances;

    11. Emphasises the importance for European states to have the capacity and a framework to act independently within the NATO framework where possible and outside of the NATO framework if necessary; points out that the Rapid Deployment Capacity, an inter-state initiative under the control of the Member States, only comprised of 5 000 troops, does not allow for the possibility of engagement in a context of intense combat; reaffirms that it is in the Member States’ interest to strengthen their ability to fight together by conducting joint training and exercises that enhance the interoperability of the various national instruments;

    12. Expresses the need to consider European defence in all its dimensions, including land, air, naval, space and cybernetic; notes that contemporary strategic issues have a growing naval dimension and that the powers challenging the international order are deploying naval capabilities at regional level; stresses the importance of European cooperation at sea and welcomes the current progress of Operation Aspides, the lessons from which must be put to good use; stresses that European strategic autonomy has a maritime and naval dimension, and that European navies should cooperate more closely to ensure the protection of their maritime areas, as well as their underwater or surface infrastructure; stresses that the principle of freedom of navigation must be protected and calls, therefore, for an increase in surveillance and the ability to react quickly in the event of threats arising in European seas;

    13. Notes that space will increasingly become a key aspect of power and sovereignty; underlines that the Member States must maintain and guarantee their independent access to space; welcomes the launch of Ariane 6, but is concerned by the accumulated delays; draws attention to the need for the space sector to be industrialised to increase the number of rockets launched to put European satellites into orbit; welcomes the launch of the European satellite constellation IRIS², which should enable secure communications solutions for sovereign and military issues by 2030; emphasises the need for the future EU space law not to hamper the competitiveness of European companies and to apply constraints on non-EU players; notes the importance of Galileo, Europe’s global navigation satellite system;

    14. Underlines that, unlike the United States (Buy America Act) and China (Government Procurement Law), the European space industry is not shielded from international competition and does not benefit from a European preference; calls on the Member States and the Commission to implement a European preference in space industry procurement and promote innovation, research and development; stresses that the European Space Agency’s principle of geographical return hampers innovative European SMEs and start-ups from receiving adequate funding and contributes to the fragmentation of the European space industry; calls on the European Space Agency to abolish the principle of geographical return and adopt an innovative and efficiency-based approach to space procurement rather than a geographically driven one;

    15. Underlines that the strengthening of European defence capabilities will require significant financing; calls on banks, pension funds, insurance companies and other actors in the Member States to simplify and significantly increase the financing of projects and companies operating in the field of defence; insists that in the context of the urgent need to increase defence spending, financial institutions should not consider investments in the field of defence to be damaging for their reputation; rejects, however, the idea of issuing joint debt, such as defence Eurobonds, to support defence spending;

    16. Notes the growing importance of AI in warfare, particularly in the development of drones and autonomous weapons; recognises the indigenous AI advances in warfare made by Ukraine and Israel, demonstrating that the Member States are equally capable of developing similar capabilities; highlights that recent breakthroughs, such as the one made by the Chinese AI computing start-up DeepSeek, demonstrate the feasibility of cost-competitive AI systems; calls on the Member States to accelerate the development of AI capabilities; underlines that the AI Act[4], set to be implemented in 2025, creates uncertainty regarding the production and development of dual-use AI systems, an ambiguity that could hinder the development of essential defence industry products; calls for this issue to be clarified to ensure that the European defence industry is not disadvantaged compared to its American and Chinese counterparts;

    17. Stresses that a strong civilian manufacturing industry, particularly in the steelmaking, automotive, aerospace and shipbuilding sectors, is essential for deterrence and for maintaining long-term military and industrial capabilities in the event of conflict; notes the decline of these industries since the 1990s, especially in western Europe; calls on the Commission and the Council to safeguard the manufacturing industries that are vital to national security, including through the use of tariffs; urges the Commission to revise the Green Deal and revoke the net-neutrality goal, since it destroys manufacturing competitiveness and is responsible for the deindustrialisation of key industries in the Member States; stresses that the relocation of essential manufacturing industries to non-EU countries is counterproductive both in terms of global environmental impact and national security;

    18. Expresses concern over the growing dependence of the European defence industry on foreign components, particularly rare earths and semiconductors, which are essential for advanced military technologies; calls on the Member States to intensify efforts to develop domestic rare earth mining and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities to safeguard the autonomy of the European defence industry in the event of conflicts or severe supply chain disruptions;

    19. Welcomes the Dutch Government’s decision to tighten export control rules on advanced lithography systems, which are essential for semiconductor production; stresses that EU technological transfers to non-EU countries have significantly contributed to the rise of foreign competition and the deindustrialisation of Europe; encourages the Member States to impose stricter export controls on critical dual-use technologies and manufacturing products;

    20. Notes that 80 % of EU data is stored and managed in the United States and other non-EU countries, where it may be subject to extraterritorial intervention under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, the CLOUD Act, or China’s Data Security Law; stresses that protecting critical industrial and government data is essential to ensuring national security; welcomes the Swiss Government Cloud programme as a step toward cloud sovereignty and encourages the Member States to implement similar initiatives; encourages the Member States to strengthen regulations on telecommunications service providers, which are predominantly based outside Europe, creating a significant dependence on external actors;

    21. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to Commissioner for Defence and Space Andrius Kubilius, Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas, the Commission, the European Council and the parliaments and governments of the Member States.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0148/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    Nathalie Loiseau, Petras Auštrevičius, Dan Barna, Helmut Brandstätter, Engin Eroglu, Bernard Guetta, Urmas Paet, Marie‑Agnes Strack‑Zimmermann, Hilde Vautmans, Dainius Žalimas, Michał Kobosko
    on behalf of the Renew Group

    B10‑0148/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

     having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas over the last decade, major geopolitical shifts, amplified by the return of large-scale wars in the EU’s neighbourhood, have threatened the security of the EU, its Member States and its citizens;

    B. whereas the global order is fragmenting and is increasingly characterised by complex and entrenched instabilities;

    C. whereas the EU cannot be secure without security in its immediate neighbourhood; whereas Ukraine’s capacity to resist Russias war of aggression is vital to EU security;

    D. whereas recent statements by members of the US Administration, accompanied by the behaviour of the US leadership towards President Zelenskyy, reflect a shift in US foreign policy; whereas it is becoming increasingly clear that Europe needs to strengthen its own security and defence and must be in a position to help Ukraine win the war;

    E. whereas the biggest and fastest growth in Russia’s military capabilities is taking place close to Russia’s borders with the West, while the EU is taking its time to enhance its defence capacity;

    F. whereas there is an urgent need to further reform and strengthen the EU’s defence policy in the light of Ukraine’s recent war experience and the use of new war technologies;

    G. whereas it is in the EU’s interest to see Ukraine as an integral part of a genuine European security system;

    H. whereas, in their mission letters from the President of the European Commission, the Commissioner for Defence and Space and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy were tasked with presenting a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of their mandate;

    1. Considers that the EU must take urgent action to ensure its own autonomous security, strengthen useful partnerships with like-minded partners and significantly reduce its dependencies on other countries; stresses, therefore, that the EU is now facing a turning point in its history and construction; insists that ‘business as usual’ is no longer an option as it would mean the end of a safe and secure Europe; considers that the EU and its Member States have to choose between pulling together in a synchronised way and joining forces to overcome the threats and attacks against EU security, or standing alone at the mercy of aggressive adversaries and unreliable partners; recalls that Russia is the most significant direct threat to Europes security; emphasises, however, the fact that the instability in the EU’s Southern Neighbourhood must also be fully taken into consideration;

    2. Underlines that the EU must now adopt a holistic and cross-cutting approach, integrating a defence and security dimension into most European policies, including adequate regulatory and financial instruments to address identified capability needs and gaps;

    3. Believes therefore that the time has come for renewed political ambition to act and turn the EU into a genuine security provider, increase the EUs defence readiness and build a true European Defence Union; recalls that the adoption of the Strategic Compass was a good starting point, but that it must still be implemented in a timely manner; welcomes the recent EU defence instruments; insists on the urgent need to change scale, as EU defence efforts cannot remain limited in size, fragmented in scope and lengthy in delivery; calls for a quantum leap and a new approach on defence, accompanied by strong choices and decisions, an action plan and a short-to-long-term defence investment plan to enhance the blocs security infrastructure, improve deterrence, respond to hybrid threats and attacks, guarantee the mobilisation of equity and private capital and develop strategic enablers and strategic weapons systems to enhance Europe’s collective military power and thus reduce its dependency on others;

    4. Urges the EU to adopt a coherent, robust and comprehensive framework to strengthen its security and the security of its partners, to better identify potential future breaking points and prevent further crises, and, together with the Member States, to marshal responses similar to those required in times of war;

    5. Expects the white paper on European defence to define this new framework and the extent to which the EU can help Europe anticipate and ready itself for the most extreme military contingencies, deter potential aggressors and defend itself both in the short and long term with a view to becoming a credible power and a European pillar within NATO;

    6. Considers that common foreign and security policy (CSDP) missions and operations have to be reassessed and reviewed with this perspective in mind; insists that, to fulfil its role as an insurance policy for Europes security, the CSDP must become stronger and more agile, including by becoming the EUs instrument to fight against hybrid warfare;

    7. Stresses that capabilities and resources must be increased, and that the fragmentation of the defence market must be overcome; fully agrees with and shares the Draghi report’s[1] view that the EU and its Member States must urgently decide on incentives directed towards the EU defence industry and find creative solutions for large-scale public and private investments in security and defence;

    8. Urges the EU and its Member States to significantly increase their efforts to decisively shift the trajectory of Russias war against Ukraine; underlines that such a shift depends now almost entirely on Europeans; urges the Member States, therefore, to provide more arms and ammunition to Ukraine; warns, ahead of any negotiations, that if the EU should fail in its support, and if Ukraine were to be forced to surrender, Russia would turn against other countries, including possibly EU Member States; calls on the Council to work with Ukraine to identify a peaceful solution to the war, and to actively engage in implementing Ukraine’s Peace Formula; urges the EU and its Member States, first and foremost, to participate in establishing robust future security guarantees for Ukraine;

    9. Believes that the EU can play a crucial role in identifying the gap between Ukraine’s military capabilities and its needs, after three years of war, as well as in identifying the available defence capabilities of the Member States, with a view to coordinating the ramping up of defence industry production as well as ensuring the constant production of certain equipment in order to respond to foreign aggressions or the specific needs of its strategic partners;

    10. Calls for a significant increase in the financing of military support to Ukraine; condemns the veto imposed by one Member State on the functioning of the European Peace Facility; calls on the Member States to take the decision, together with their G7 partners, to use frozen assets as a basis for a substantial grant and loan to Ukraine, as a legally robust and financially substantial way to maintain and increase Europe’s response to Ukraine’s military needs;

    11. Urges the Council and the Member States to review and strengthen the enforcement of existing sanctions, and to adopt and strictly implement restrictive measures against all entities and countries facilitating the circumvention of sanctions and helping to provide Russias military complex with military and dual-use technologies and equipment;

    12. Insists on the paramount importance of cooperation with the Ukrainian defence industry and its integration, in the long term, into the EU’s defence technological and industrial base; recalls the urgency to properly finance the Ukraine instrument under the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP), which is not currently budgeted for;

    13. Strongly believes that the EU must further expand and improve its tailor-made training operations to respond to the needs of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and, in return, create the conditions for European armed forces to learn lessons and strategic practices from them;

    14. Calls for the EU and its Members States to facilitate the use of CSDP instruments to complement national security tools in the immediate vicinity of the EUs territory and territorial waters, and to strengthen dual-use and civilian-military cooperation at EU level, based on a whole-of-government approach; reiterates its call for the protection of critical underwater infrastructure and the development of protective countermeasures;

    15. Calls for the EU to develop a comprehensive EU risk assessment to help identify the major cross-sectoral threats and hazards and the concrete risks facing the EU as a whole, building on current sector-specific risk assessment processes;

    16. Insists on the importance of using the upcoming Preparedness Union strategy to put the EU on track towards comprehensive preparedness;

    17. Calls for a principle of ‘preparedness by design’ to be embedded consistently in a cross-cutting way across the EU institutions, bodies, and agencies; insists on the need to develop a mandatory security and preparedness check for future impact assessments and stress-tests of existing legislation; stresses the need to reduce the obstacles in current EU legislation that undermine the efficiency of European defence and security;

    18. Invites the Commission and the Member States to explore the feasibility of an EU preparedness act, setting joint standards and long-term guidelines, to align EU and national efforts wherever possible;

    19. Calls for the EU and its Member States to set up and regularly conduct an EU comprehensive preparedness exercise to test both high-level decision-making and operational coordination, in order to encourage the building of strong horizontal links between actors and across sectors;

    20. Calls for the EU to urgently adapt its tools to new realities by designing an administrative capacity to fast-track procedures during wars or other large-scale crises, and to adopt the appropriate tools;

    21. Considers regular threat analyses, like the one that was first conducted in the Strategic Compass, to be an absolute necessity; considers that the Strategic Compass, the CSDP, the white paper and the European defence industrial strategy should form the basis of a comprehensive vision for European defence;

    22. Recalls that the Strategic Compass provides the EU with necessary propositions; urges the Member States to take urgent decisions to ensure its full implementation; reiterates its call for the Military Planning and Conduct Capability to finally benefit from adequate premises and staff, enhanced command and control, and effective communication and information systems for all CSDP missions and operations; insists on the fact that the Rapid Deployment Capacity has to achieve full operational capability in 2025; strongly believes that more substantial progress must be made in bringing Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) into operation;

    23. Reiterates its call to strengthen EU-NATO cooperation with actions and not only words, including in the domains of information exchange, planning coordination, improved cooperation on their respective military operations, and joint efforts to significantly improve on military mobility initiatives, building on lessons learnt from military assistance to Ukraine;

    24. Invites the Member States to actively participate in a priority ordering mechanism for defence production to help prioritise orders, contracts and the recruitment of employees in emergency situations; underlines that such a mechanism should apply beyond current defence applications to encompass other essential resilience-building infrastructure such as energy, transport and telecommunications;

    25. Calls for the EU, in cooperation with NATO and with the support of the European Defence Agency (EDA), to identify and address the critical defence capability gaps and shortfalls in the EU and focus efforts on European strategic enablers to provide genuine EU added value; notes that in order to address the most extreme military contingencies, the EU must use the same force requirements as those set by NATO for critical military capabilities, particularly for air defence, ammunition, long-range fire capabilities, logistics and enablement;

    26. Urges the EU and its Member States to move from a ‘flow’ approach to their military capabilities, which has prevailed during peacetime, to a ‘stock’ approach, with stockpiles of defence equipment ready for a sustained increase in demand; believes that the Commission should take all possible action to increase trust between Member States and encourage greater exchange and transparency on long-term planning, more proactive measures aimed at securing raw materials, and policies to close gaps in production processes and on the labour market;

    27. Calls for the EU to adopt a global and coherent approach to external aid in all its aspects, with much closer alignment between the common foreign and security policy and the objectives and instruments of the CSDP;

    28. Considers that the CSDP must become the EUs armed wing in the fight against the hybrid war being waged against it, its Member States and its partners, in particular candidate countries; is deeply worried by the sharp increase in hybrid attacks including sabotage, cyberattacks, information manipulation and interference in elections, with the objective of weakening the EU and candidate countries; calls on the Member States to consider appropriate forms of deterrence and countermeasures, including the use of Article 42(7) TEU; insists on the need to improve the CSDP’s ability to identify, prevent and counter information manipulation aimed at hindering the EUs external action; reiterates its call to establish an effective horizontal strategic communications strategy adapted to all EU communication channels;

    29. Calls for the creation, under the CSDP, of an EU crisis response air fleet comprising military transport aircraft held at EU level and made available to Member States for EU deployments, transport of equipment or troops (military mobility), or emergency evacuation – the need for which was demonstrated by the capability gap during the withdrawal from Afghanistan – as well as for civilian security missions, based on the model of the European Air Transport Command;

    30. Expects the European External Action Service to carry out comprehensive and uncompromising reviews of CSDP missions and operations taking into account, in particular, the realism of their respective mandates in relation to the resources allocated, the recruitment method for the staff of missions and operations, particularly with regard to the link between the skills required and the different profiles, the rationalisation of resources and the management of missions and operations, the transparency of calls for tender, activities and results obtained, best practice and lessons learned, and difficulties encountered; asks the Council, on the basis of these reviews, to take the decisions required to adapt or abandon ineffective missions and to strengthen the most useful missions; believes that the evaluation and control of CSDP missions and operations must be improved;

    31. Believes that the EU should develop wartime economic cooperation contingency plans with close partners to prepare for mutual support in the case of large-scale security crises involving them directly, and deepen wartime economic dialogues with European and global partners to provide early warning of hard, hybrid, and cyber threats, to foster mutual support planning, protection of critical infrastructure and maritime safety;

    32. Calls for the EU and its Member States, in cooperation with NATO, to remove all unnecessary regulatory obstacles that slow down the speed at which Europe is able to develop its military mobility; believes that the EU has to move from the logic of ‘mobility’ to that of ‘military logistics’; considers that the definition of military mobility should apply to infrastructure that covers all logistical aspects of mobility, including but not limited to logistics hubs, fuel, spare parts, repair capacity and ammunition; stresses the need for significant investments in military mobility infrastructure to enhance cargo airlift capabilities, for increased development of logistical infrastructure such as camps, depots, ports, air, sea and rail platforms, railways, waterways, roads and bridges; insists on the need to adapt regulations with the rapid implementation of the technical arrangement signed under the aegis of the EDA Cross Border Movement Permission, the harmonisation of customs formalities and the preparation of a centralised and reasoned lifting of road and rail traffic standards in the event of a crisis situation;

    33. Believes that, in order to build a favourable ecosystem for the European defence industry, the EU must provide it with a united and clear long-term vision, giving it visibility and ensuring that priority needs are addressed;

    34. Urges the EU to increase the coherence between existing and future EU instruments, in particular between Permanent Structured Cooperation on demand consolidation, and the European Defence Fund (EDF) on programmatic roadmaps, between the European defence industry reinforcement through common procurement act (EDIRPA) on joint procurement, and the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP) on industrial ramp-up, between the EDIP on identification of dependencies, and the EDF on the resolution of identified dependencies; and within the EDIP itself on the coherence of actions related to the consolidation of demand and supply;

    35. Insists on the importance of EU flagship projects, in the form of European Defence Projects of Common Interest (EDPCI), which are critical to the European defence industry; believes that EDPCIs should be used to support the industrial and technological capacities underpinning major priorities shared by several Member States and in fields such as strategic enablers – particularly in space and European air defence – so as to act on the whole spectrum of threats, develop military mobility, in particular strategic and tactical air transport, deep strike capabilities, drone and anti-drone technologies, missiles and munitions, and artificial intelligence, as well as to develop sovereign infrastructure and critical enablers; emphasises that realism must prevail in view of the sheer number of priorities and the need to mobilise new resources; considers, in that regard, that the EU should focus on rapidly available and proven European technologies that reduce its dependencies and improve its security; calls for the creation of European defence industry champions as an objective to consolidate the EU’s defence technological and industrial base (EDTIB) and increase its global competitiveness; considers, furthermore, that instead of focusing on fair returns, EU defence policies should encourage the growth of European centres of excellence;

    36. Calls on the further development of the EU defence industrial policy to improve existing defence-specific instruments and develop new instruments where necessary, and to optimise the use of non-defence-specific instruments for the purposes of the EDTIB;

    37. Recalls the need to ensure the consistency of EU public policies, which must not generate obligations contradictory to the overall defence objectives, especially in a period of security crisis where the concept of ‘strategic exception’ should be introduced; calls for the creation of a genuine defence environment that supports industrial ramp-up efforts by taking better advantage of the Commission’s existing multi-sectoral instruments, screening, reviewing and, where needed, revising them to ensure that they do not undermine EU defence policy objectives;

    38. Proposes that relevant defence-related entities/activities be allowed access to InvestEU, and other EU funds taking advantage of the EU defence industry as a job creator; insists on the prioritising of defence-related entities/activities as appropriate with the support of the Chips Act, and the Critical Raw Materials Act; believes that simplification efforts announced by the Commission must fully encompass the defence sector;

    39. Insists on the need to ensure geographical coherence by taking stock of the will of the EU and the UK to work together, first and foremost to build security guarantees for Ukraine and to become closer security partners, but also to sign a joint declaration with concrete commitments and structured dialogue to strengthen EU-UK cooperation on the full range of foreign and security challenges the continent faces, the budgetary and regulatory conditions of which remain to be negotiated, and keeping in mind the importance of the EU’s decision-making autonomy;

    40. Calls for the coherence of the support offered to companies to be improved by reducing unnecessary administrative burdens and cutting red tape, and ensuring much easier access to support for small and mid-cap companies;

    41. Calls for greater coherence in governance, as the CSDP must become the instrument of a powerful Europe; considers that this requires a real link in governance between the Member States, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the other European Commissioners; urges the Member States to overcome the complexity of decision-making on European defence; calls for the creation of a Council of defence ministers and the move from unanimity to qualified majority voting for decisions in the European Council, the Council of Ministers and EU agencies such as the EDA, except for those on military operations with an executive mandate; until then, calls for the use of Article 44 TEU and the creation of a cross-sectoral task force on defence in the Commission; calls for increased democratic accountability through enhanced control by Parliament;

    42. Stresses that the creation of a single European defence market is a priority as the fragmentation and lack of competitiveness of the European defence industry have so far hampered the capacity of the EU to take more responsibility as a security provider; recalls that the notion of a ‘defence market’ implies a full recognition of its specificity and an appropriate and consistent application of EU public policies; recalls that this single market should aim for European preference by strictly linking it to territoriality and added-value generated in the EU;

    43. Strongly believes that European preference should be the cornerstone of EU policies related to the European defence market, as a strategic imperative aimed at protecting European know-how and strengthening European defence capabilities on a long-term basis, and to ensure that EU taxpayer money is used to create added value on EU territory;

    44. Calls for the notion of the internal market to be linked to that of territoriality, as defence is driven by Member State policy rather than the market, and as the defence industry is under authorisation to produce and under exemption to sell;

    45. Insists on the need to remove barriers to market entry for defence products across the EU by reviewing the directives on the transfer of defence-related products and defence procurement;

    46. Underlines that the European preference principle must be reflected in EU defence regulations by clear and unambiguous eligibility criteria both for entities and for products;

    47. Calls on the Commission to design a better resourced, more strategic and more efficient successor to the EDF that supports common research and innovation in defence all along the supply chain and lays down the conditions for addressing technological challenges such as advanced persistent threats, artificial intelligence and machine learning, quantum computing, military internet of things, security, supply chain attacks, zero-day exploits and cloud security; calls for the establishment of an EU agency inspired by the American Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), adapted to the EUs specific characteristics, in order to fund strategic, groundbreaking projects designed to promote European technological and economic superiority;

    48. Is concerned that, without a substantial increase in investment in defence, the EU will not reach its objectives on security and defence, either for military support to Ukraine or to bolster the EU’s common security; highlights that the cost of non-preparedness for most extreme military contingencies would then be much higher than the cost of decisive EU preparedness; recalls that aggregate EU defence spending is inadequate and lacks sufficient focus on innovation; calls for the EU and the Member States to work and agree on the concrete ways and means for short- to long-term massive public and private investments in defence and security; recalls that the Commission has estimated the funding needed at EUR 500 billion over the next 10 years (2025-2034), including EUR 400 billion to strengthen Member States’ defence capabilities and EUR 100 billion to support Ukraine;

    49. Considers that, in the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF), defence spending lines will have to reflect the new priority of being ‘ready for the most extreme military contingencies’ and include ambitious financing for military mobility, counter-mobility measures and defence industrial capacity building;

    50. Strongly supports the five-point Re-Arm Europe plan proposed by the Commissions President on 4 February 2025, which includes the possibility of triggering the escape clause of the Stability and Growth Pact for defence investments in order to allow Member States to increase their defence spending, a new instrument to provide EUR 150 billion of loans to Member States for defence investment, possibilities and incentives for Member States that choose to use cohesion policy programmes to increase defence spending, as well as the mobilisation of private capital through the completion of the capital markets union and the widening of the scope of the European Investment Bank (EIB); urges the Member States to support this plan;

    51. Strongly supports the notion that Member States must increase financing for their defence and security to new levels; notes that some Member States are already increasing their defence spending to 5 % of GDP and insists that the current security environment and multiple, complex and evolving security threats require Member States to spend at least 3 % of GDP on defence;

    52. Insists that urgent needs cannot wait for the next MFF; insists that innovative solutions for finding additional funding must be considered without delay, including:

    (a) re-prioritising existing EU funds,

    (b) investing in the defence sector by making it explicitly eligible under the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund, while leaving the regions and Member States free to decide whether to make it a priority according to local needs;

    (c) making it easier and faster to re-purpose funds from one project to another,

    (d) exploring the possibility of adjusting EU funding criteria to give new prominence to security criteria in allocating spending;

    53. Underlines that a ‘popular loan’ would not only mobilise the European families’ savings, but also unify the 450 million European citizens around the need to improve our collective security; stresses that this popular loan should be organised with the same rules and advantages in all the 27 Member States and could give a common sense of belonging to the nations of the EU;

    54. Is of the opinion that national recovery and resilience plans should be amended to allow for new defence funding;

    55. Recommends the identification of new resources that could require contributions from the Member States as part of a new EU debt programme along the lines of the NextGenerationEU plan, following on from the idea of ‘defence bonds’, to complement the Commission’s Re-Arm Europe plan, if necessary;

    56. Reiterates, in line with the Commission’s Re-Arm Europe plan, its call for the EIB, other international financial institutions and private banks in Europe to invest more actively in the European defence industry, as speeding up security and defence investments in the EU would leverage private funding and have a strong signalling effect as regards other investors and market operators;

    57. Calls on the EIB in particular to re-evaluate its list of excluded activities, to adjust its lending policy to increase the volume of available funding in the field of security and defence, and to investigate the possibility of issuing earmarked debt for funding security and defence projects;

    58. Calls for the development of emergency procedures for projects established in response to major crises or wars whereby the EU, jointly with the EIB, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Europe Development Bank, can enable banks to use faster processes to support projects necessary in crises or wars; calls for the EU also to consider amending the Treaties to allow the use of capital from the European Stability Mechanism for Europes war economy;

    59. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the European Council, the Council, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the President of the Commission and competent Commissioners, the EU security and defence agencies and the governments and parliaments of the Member States.

     

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