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Category: Ukraine

  • MIL-OSI Europe: MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION on the white paper on the future of European defence – B10-0144/2025

    Source: European Parliament

    B10‑0144/2025

    European Parliament resolution on the white paper on the future of European defence

    (2025/2565(RSP))

    The European Parliament,

    – having regard to the common security and defence policy (CSDP) and the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) of the EU,

    – having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 42 thereof,

    – having regard to Title III, Article 3 of the Protocol on the concerns of the Irish people on the Treaty of Lisbon,

    – having regard to the announced publication of the white paper on the future of European defence on 19 March 2025,

    – having regard to the Helsinki Accords,

    – having regard to the various European defence projects of recent years,

    – having regard to Rule 136(2) of its Rules of Procedure,

    A. whereas, in line with the Treaties, the CSDP is part of the CFSP and is considered a policy framework through which Member States can develop a European strategic culture of security and defence, address conflicts and crises together, protect the Union and its citizens and strengthen international peace and security;

    B. whereas Article 42(2) TEU states that the Union’s CSDP must be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty;

    C. whereas NATO is largely dominated by the United States, and NATO membership entails a mandatory complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems, hence impeding the strategic and operational autonomy of Member States and other European countries;

    D. whereas at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, the US Government pushed for Ukrainian NATO membership against the opinion of several Member States; whereas following the Russian invasion, the United States pushed EU Member States to systematically increase the quantity and quality of arms deliveries to Ukraine;

    E. whereas different Member States have different military and security policies, including policies of military neutrality;

    F. whereas the United States saw windfall benefits from the Ukraine war through an increase of US shale gas exports to the European Union; whereas the US Government now unjustly wishes to control Ukrainian mineral resources and negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine with Putin, without involving Ukraine and the European Union;

    G. whereas unlike nuclear weapon states such as India and the People’s Republic of China, NATO and Russia refuse to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy, whereby they would formally refrain from using nuclear weapons, except in retaliation to an attack by an enemy power using weapons of mass destruction;

    H. whereas the US Government has launched a high number of wars and military operations that violated international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; whereas, in light of 2024 advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, the United States’ ongoing military support for Israel might make it complicit in genocide and illegal occupation; whereas the participation of EU Member States in violations of international law, including in wars of aggression and military invasions contrary to international law against countries such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, have undermined global adherence to the principles of international law;

    I. whereas the United States has forwardly deployed new B61-12 gravity bombs on the territory of EU Member States, increasing the risk that these Member States will fall victim to preventive or retaliatory strikes related to US foreign policy;

    J. whereas Russia’s repeated acts of war and aggression, starting with the war against Georgia in 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing illegal war of aggression against Ukraine, as well as an increasing number of acts of sabotage on critical infrastructure, have been factors in creating and exacerbating tensions;

    K. whereas Article 41(2) TEU prohibits charging expenditure arising from operations with military or defence implications to the Union budget;

    L. whereas the Commission has nevertheless launched several European defence projects over the last few years, including the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and, most recently, the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS) and the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP);

    M. whereas according to 2023 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute figures, EU Member States, together with the United Kingdom, already spend more nominally on defence than all other countries in the world combined, with the exception of the United States;

    N. whereas in April 2021, the Commission estimated that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save between EUR 25 billion and EUR 100 billion every year;

    O. whereas the Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships (DG INTPA) is planning to shut down more than four out of five of its hubs worldwide, reducing its diplomatic presence from around 100 delegations to 18 hubs;

    P. whereas in 2024, EU leaders agreed to cut EUR 2 billion from the EU’s external action budget in the multiannual financial framework for 2021-2027; whereas several Member States, such as France and Belgium, have also made cuts and reforms to their diplomacy services;

    Q. whereas Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has proposed a new common instrument to boost military spending across the EU to unlock up to EUR 800 billion of additional defence spending over the coming years;

    R. whereas even the military spending of the United States, which maintains over 700 military installations in over 70 countries, does not exceed 3.46 % of its GDP;

    S. whereas, nevertheless, the US Government, certain Member States and NATO and Commission officials are pushing for a further massive increase in defence expenditure, from an average of 1.9 % of GDP to 5 %;

    T. whereas even the military-oriented Niinisto Report, entitled ‘Safer Together –Strengthening Europe’s Civilian and Military Preparedness and Readiness’ highlights the fact that threats to the security of European citizens, including increasingly frequent and intense extreme weather events, such as megadroughts, floods and heatwaves, and the risk of new pandemics, would require massive investment in public services;

    U. whereas while the Draghi report on the future of European competitiveness highlights the need for massive investment in a variety of sectors, including energy, pharmaceuticals and transport, the Commission has placed seven Member States under an excessive deficit procedure, pushing for harsh austerity and structural reforms in social and public expenses;

    V. whereas a further massive increase in military expenditure will instead lead to cuts in public services, and in social, climate and environmental spending throughout Europe, endangering the social and human security of European citizens;

    W. whereas the Commission is nonetheless considering the suspension of economic governance rules for military expenses;

    X. whereas the Commission has failed to present a fully autonomous assessment of European defence needs and priorities, relying instead on NATO assessments of critical gaps in defence capability;

    Y. whereas Türkiye, a NATO member, illegally occupies 37 % of Cyprus, an EU Member State;

    Z. whereas in international relations theory the ‘security dilemma’ refers to a phenomenon whereby actions, such as arms procurement, taken by a state actor to increase its own security provokes reactions from other states, such as increased arms procurement or preventive attacks, that ultimately lead to a decrease rather than an increase in the original state’s security;

    AA. whereas the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, concluded in Helsinki between the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union and all of the countries of Europe, except Albania, played an important role in easing tensions between East and West during the Cold War;

    AB. whereas the Cold War collective security acquis has been systematically undermined by the United States’ withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the Open Skies Treaty, systematically followed by Russian withdrawals, and by the Russian withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and from the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty;

    AC. whereas a new European security architecture will have to apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems and offer security guarantees to all parties in order to avoid Europe being divided once again into two diametrically opposed blocs;

    Towards a European collective security architecture

    1. Recalls that the Treaties consider the CSDP part of the CFSP; asks, therefore, that any defence initiative at EU level be subordinated to a clear foreign and security policy and strategy for peace on the European continent;

    2. Rejects the militarisation of the EU and any belligerent objectives of the CSDP;

    3. Notes with great concern the diminishing respect for international and humanitarian law by parties all around the world, with Israel, Russia and the United States being flagrant examples; reiterates the need for European independence in shaping foreign and defence policy;

    4. Considers that in light of the United States’ past and ongoing violations of international law and the negative impact of US military interventions on neighbouring regions, the foreign, security and defence policy of the Union and Member States can no longer be aligned with the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); calls, therefore, on the European Council to start the process of revising the EU Treaties to remove this requirement from the TEU;

    5. Recalls that NATO and the EU are distinct organisations which serve very different purposes and whose membership is not even identical; regrets the conflation of NATO, a military alliance, with the EU;

    6. Is extremely worried by the fact that there are still more than 13 000 nuclear weapons scattered around the world, many of which can be deployed within minutes and could cause the end of humankind; notes with concern that despite a stated commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NATO’s nuclear member states invested USD 271 billion in nuclear weapons modernisation and maintenance between 2019 and 2023, while in 2023 China and Russia were the second and third largest spenders, with budgets of USD 11.9 billion and USD 8.3 billion respectively;

    7. Believes that NATO’s refusal to commit to a ‘no first use’ policy on nuclear weapons and the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons in Europe increases the risk of Europe becoming a target of nuclear strikes; demands, therefore, the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from the territory of Member States; is deeply concerned about nuclear threats to European security, including veiled warnings about the use of tactical nuclear weapons and Russia’s lowering of its threshold for using nuclear weapons;

    8. Urges the Member States to work on a new long-term collective security architecture for Europe inspired by the principles of the Helsinki process and including the concept of mutual security guarantees; notes that a fundamental aspect of such an approach is respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and a commitment to international law;

    9. Insists that a new European security architecture apply the principles of peaceful coexistence between countries with different political systems, and offer security guarantees to all parties;

    10. Calls on the Commission, in light of multiple threats ranging from climate-related catastrophes to pandemics, to abandon a narrow focus on military security and develop a policy centred on human security as defined in United Nations General Assembly resolution 66/290, which states that ‘human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood and dignity of their people’ and calls for ‘people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people’;

    11. Calls on the Commission and Member States to seek inspiration from Austria, which has enshrined neutrality in its constitution, committing not to join military alliances and not to permit the establishment of any foreign military bases on its territory;

    12. Calls on the Commission and Member States to also look to the example set by Ireland, with its tradition of military neutrality; recalls that this tradition includes an active approach towards peace support operations and crisis management, contributions to conflict resolution and peacebuilding, work for human rights and development, and efforts to promote disarmament and the elimination of weapons of mass destruction;

    13. Regrets the attacks on Irish neutrality and recalls that the people of Ireland were guaranteed continued military neutrality, underpinned by a commitment to only undertake operations with a United Nations mandate, ahead of their ratification of the Lisbon Treaty;

    14. Reiterates its call on Türkiye, a NATO member, to withdraw its troops from Cyprus, an EU Member State, and to work constructively towards finding a viable and peaceful solution based on the relevant UN resolutions;

    15. Calls for unanimity voting on defence issues to be maintained within the Council to promote consensus-based solutions that foster much-needed unity;

    Diplomacy as the cornerstone of European security

    16. Believes that diplomacy should remain a cornerstone of EU foreign policy;

    17. Recalls that conflict prevention is paramount to any security and defence strategy; underlines the fact that diplomacy prevents and ends wars, and that every euro invested in conflict prevention saves around EUR 16 later on;

    18. Believes that, given the deteriorating security situation on several fronts and increasing geopolitical tensions, preventive diplomacy requires sustained and enhanced attention; calls, therefore, on the Commission and Member States to immediately reverse the cutbacks made to diplomatic representations;

    19. Believes that its systematic alignment with US foreign policy, most recently with regard to Israeli war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices against Palestinians, has dramatically reduced the EU’s global diplomatic credibility and therefore worsened its security situation;

    20. Recalls that the participation of EU Member States in illegal military operations and the support for violations of international law abroad gravely endangers the security of EU citizens; urges the Commission and Member States to explore a non-aligned foreign and security policy stance based on the principles of the UN Charter, including peaceful conflict resolution, diplomacy and multilateralism;

    21. Believes that Europe has much to gain from diversifying its relations and maintaining diplomatic connections with as many countries as possible around the world;

    Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation

    22. Is deeply concerned that world military expenditure continues to rise to new record levels; highlights the fact that an arms race will not create security for European citizens, but instead, in line with the security dilemma, heighten the risk of violent conflict; calls on the Commission to actively promote new arms control treaties;

    23. Recalls that the EU strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction made non-proliferation a central goal of the EU’s CFSP, stating that ‘our objective is to prevent, deter, halt and, where possible, eliminate proliferation of concern worldwide’; calls, therefore, on Member States to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons;

    24. Notes that arms exports, also of small and light weapons, can fuel conflict and global terrorism and destabilise entire regions, states and societies, thereby thwarting sustainable development and crisis management efforts; calls on the Commission and Member States to strictly apply Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment in order to avoid a worsening of the security situation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood;

    25. Calls for the creation of a Directorate-General for Disarmament and Arms Control at the Commission;

    26. Demands an immediate arms embargo against Israel and any other country directly or indirectly involved in armed conflict, except in the case of those that are the victim of invasion by others, in order to stop EU complicity in war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocidal practices, whether perpetrated by Israel or any other country; calls on the Commission and Member States to base their foreign and security policy on the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and international law;

    Defence expenditure

    27. Urges the Commission and Member States to offer full transparency and a critical audit of the current defence expenditure within the Union, detailing why it estimates that European countries would be unable to defend themselves with budgets already vastly superior to those of most of the world’s countries;

    28. Notes with concern that the Commission has presented a new EUR 150 billion common defence fund; believes that an increase in defence spending is not the solution to finding a lasting peace and that cuts in the EU structural funds should not be used for this purpose, given how vital these funds are to the development of local communities across the EU;

    29. Notes that the share of GDP is not an adequate measure for the efficiency and impact of defence expenditure; calls on the Commission and Member States not to enter an arms race through a massive increase in defence budgets at the expense of both human and social security;

    30. Regards the NATO demand for complementarity and compatibility of European weapons systems with US systems as incompatible with European strategic autonomy; regrets that the Commission and the Council have failed to present a detailed assessment of European critical defence capability gaps; calls on both institutions to present such an assessment, including specific priorities, before considering increased defence expenditure; recalls that these should focus on defensive tasks, not on building capacities for military intervention all over the world;

    31. Recalls Commission estimates that increased cooperation between Member States in the field of security and defence could save up to EUR 100 billion every year; calls, in this regard, for inspiration to be drawn from existing intra-European cooperation structures, such as BACA, the Belgian-Dutch Naval cooperation BeNeSam and the Nordic Defence Cooperation, including Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, which have increased the efficiency of the participating nations’ national defence, and to explore common synergies and facilitate efficient common solutions;

    32. Considers that the military cooperation commitments that may be assumed in collective security organisations should be considered in light of strict respect for the UN Charter;

    33. Rejects the allocation of appropriations on the EU budget to the EU’s militarisation; calls for the reallocation of EU budget funds earmarked for the ongoing militarisation of the EU and its programmes to respond to the social and economic needs of citizens and promote cohesion between Member States;

    34. Highlights the fact that there can be neither autonomy nor security without digital sovereignty; calls on the Commission to prioritise the development of a democratic, public-led digital stack that includes digital infrastructure as a service, and universal platforms, such as search engines and foundation AI models, governed by new public institutions with public and civil society representation;

    35. Calls for heightened cooperation between Member States on sectoral issues of critical infrastructure protection, such as submarine cables;

    Defence industry

    36. Recalls that over the past three years, the EU has adopted a number of new initiatives on defence, and that the new Commissioner for Defence and Space believes that an additional investment of EUR 500 billion is needed in the coming decade, though other sources speak of EUR 700 billion;

    37. Recalls that the previous EU programmes have been implemented with a lack of transparency with regard to the application of EU ethical guidelines, and that decision-making is extremely opaque and heavily influenced by arms industry lobbyists;

    38. States that without ethics in investment choices, the EU will contribute to the creation of a more dangerous and lawless world order, where imperialist powers can disregard international law without facing consequences, while countries of the global south are exploited for their resources;

    39. Calls, in addition, for the EU to adopt a policy of transparent, mission-oriented military spending, with more conscious spending at the service of a defined foreign policy to ensure greater efficiency;

    40. Recalls that under Article 41(2) TEU expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications may not be charged to the EU budget; calls for a strict application of this article; demands a retroactive review of corresponding defence funds and budget lines and for their termination where needed;

    41. Expresses deep concern about the increased subsidies and public support for the military-industrial complex amid record total global military expenditure of USD 2 443 billion in 2023, making 2023 the ninth consecutive year in which military expenditure increased;

    42. Demands that European public money go to European companies and emphasises that public European companies should, by definition, remain in Europe, while private companies can relocate their activities if they so wish;

    43. Observes that leading arms companies have benefited shamelessly from the war in Ukraine; notes that Lockheed Martin alone distributed USD 6.8 billion of cash to shareholders in dividends and share repurchases in 2024; demands that windfall profits be taxed to finance climate adaptation, public health and housing, which are also components of a broader understanding of security;

    44. Considers that the use of public money should systematically correspond to a proportional public return on investment and not finance corporate profit;

    45. Stresses that focusing our resources, notably research and development spending, on the military sector will also slow down the development of other strategic industries with civilian purposes, such as renewable energy or pharmaceuticals;

    46. Adds that military spending does not address any of the major social or environmental challenges, and that, worse still, it reinforces polluting and energy-consuming industrial models, thus increasing pressure on resources and the climate, particularly critical materials;

    47. Believes that a massive increase in purchases of US-made goods would not only be detrimental to the European economy but would equally prolong Europe’s military dependence on the United States, while creating new industrial and technological constraints;

    48. Demands that the defence industry continue to be excluded from qualifying for the sustainability criteria with regard to investment;

    49. Calls for EIB financing to be strictly limited to civilian projects, excluding dual-use items;

    Reprioritising public services and social spending

    50. Is deeply concerned that militarisation, and specifically the ReArm Europe plan, is being used to further attack public services across the EU, which are already facing the suffocating effects of austerity measures imposed by the Commission;

    51. Is appalled by the fact that the Commission is willing to bend fiscal rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact to finance military spending, but considers it impossible to raise spending to fund crumbling public services and support social and economic upward convergence in Member States;

    52. Firmly insists that health, education, green mobility, climate adaptation, climate mitigation, biodiversity, food security and digital transition are elements of human security and should be considered priorities that require investments rather than budgetary cuts;

    53. Calls, in line with the concept of human security, for a reprioritisation of public services and social welfare spending, as well as for investments in fighting climate change, as imperative prerequisites for guaranteeing that people live in a safe and secure environment;

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    54. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service.

     

     

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Video: Afghanistan, Ukraine & other topics – Daily Press Briefing

    Source: United Nations (Video News)

    Noon Briefing by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesperson for the Secretary-General.

    Highlights:
    – Central Emergency Response Fund
    – Afghanistan
    – Ukraine
    – Democratic Republic of the Congo
    – Occupied Palestinian Territory
    – Yemen/Security Council
    – Mexico
    – Financial Contributions

    CENTRAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE FUND
    With global humanitarian funding being scaled back precipitously, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs announced today that $110 million has been allocated from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF).
    The aim is to boost life-saving assistance in 10 of the world’s most underfunded and neglected crises across Africa, Asia and Latin America.
    OCHA warns that more than 300 million people around the world urgently need humanitarian aid, but funding has been dwindling annually, with this year’s levels projected to drop to a record low.
    Tom Fletcher, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, said that for countries battered by conflict, climate change and economic turmoil, brutal funding cuts don’t mean that humanitarian needs disappear.
    The new funding will go towards Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Chad, Honduras, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, Sudan, Venezuela and Zambia.
    Resources will also support vulnerable people from climate shocks.

    AFGHANISTAN
    And turning to Afghanistan, OCHA is warning that the country continues to face a severe humanitarian crisis defined by decades of conflict, entrenched poverty, climate-induced shocks and rising protection risks, especially for women and girls.
    More than half of the population – almost 23 million people – are in need of humanitarian assistance in the country. This number is one of the highest globally, second only to Sudan – where 30 million people currently need aid and protection.
    Both food insecurity and malnutrition remain stubbornly high.
    During the first quarter of this year, nearly 15 million people – one in every three Afghans – will experience high levels of acute food insecurity. This is according to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, or IPC.
    Nearly 3.5 million children under 5 and more than 1 million pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to become acutely malnourished.
    Explosive hazards continue to pose a lethal threat, with an estimated 55 people killed or injured every month – most of them children.

    Full Highlights: https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/noon-briefing-highlight?date%5Bvalue%5D%5Bdate%5D=06%20March%202025

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EP_F6noLmbw

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: UN Assembly President calls for just and lasting peace in Ukraine

    Source: United Nations 4

    Peace and Security

    The President of the General Assembly on Thursday renewed his call for a just, lasting and comprehensive peace between Ukraine and Russia, in line with the UN Charter and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity.

    The meeting, held under the Assembly’s veto initiative, followed Russia’s use of its Security Council veto on 24 February to block amendments to a United States-led draft resolution on the conflict in Ukraine.

    The two amendments were proposed by the Council’s European members – France, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, and Slovenia. A third amendment introduced by Russia also failed to pass having failed to garner enough support.

    As a result, the US-led resolution passed in its original form, marking the first Security Council resolution since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Ten Council members voted in favour, while the five European sponsors of the amendments abstained.

    Earlier that day, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions – one introduced by Ukraine and the other by the United States, mirroring the text later submitted in the Security Council.

    The US-led resolution only passed after EU-led amendments were added, prompting the US to abstain on its own motion and vote on the same side as Russia, Belarus and the DPR Korea, more commonly known as North Korea.

    Promote peaceful and inclusive dialogue

    Opening the General Assembly debate on Thursday, President Philémon Yang underscored that the body must remain “steadfast in promoting peaceful solutions and inclusive dialogue.”

    He recalled the two resolutions adopted on 24 February, when the Assembly met in an emergency session on the situation in Ukraine.

    “In both, the General Assembly reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders,” Mr. Yang said.

    “Moreover, the Assembly was unequivocal in its call for a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace between Ukraine and the Russian Federation – a peace that aligns with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of sovereign equality and territorial integrity,” he added.

    Mutually reinforcing

    President Yang emphasised that the General Assembly and Security Council must work together in the pursuit of peace.

    “While the Security Council bears primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, the General Assembly plays a crucial role in responding to conflicts and crises,” he said.

    However, he expressed regret over the growing use of Security Council vetoes.

    “It is regrettable that we must convene under these circumstances, as the frequency of vetoes has continued to rise since 2022,” he added, urging Member States to reflect on how to make deliberations on the veto initiative more binding.

    Broadcast of the General Assembly meeting.

    Russia upheld its responsibility: Ambassador

    Taking the floor as the first speaker, Russia’s First Deputy Permanent Representative, Dmitry Polyanskiy, said that his country’s votes against the draft amendments were to “disrupt” the plans of Western Countries that would have undermined the mandate of the Security Council.

    “We highly value the US initiative, and we see the text that was ultimately adopted as a step in the right direction and grounds for further efforts for a peaceful solution to the Ukraine crisis,” he said.

    He noted that the change in tack in Washington following President Trump’s inauguration in January “caught European pseudo peacekeepers off guard.”

    “The American draft resolution is particularly in sharp contrast with the [General Assembly] draft put forward by Ukraine and the European backers, which promoted a new, more polished form of the futile elements of the infamous Zelensky formula,” he added.

    Ambassador Polyanskiy stated that his country takes a responsible attitude towards the use of veto and its actions on 24 February were to give peace a chance, rather than push it away.

    “Let us not delude ourselves, the hawks that call for continuing an armed conflict in Ukraine and in European countries are capitalizing on war and the suffering of civilians, and they do not plan on dropping their intention to interfere with peace between Russia and Ukraine.”

    No equivalence between aggressor and victim: EU

    Hedda Samson, Deputy Head of Delegation of the European Union (EU) to the UN, said Russia’s vetoes blocked the reference to the Security Council’s commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, as well as the call for a just and lasting peace in line with the UN Charter.

    The two proposals by Council’s European members received nine and 11 positive votes respectively, she said.

    “Let it be clear, Russia is abusing its veto power to block references to the principle of territorial integrity and to peace in line with the UN Charter,” she added, stating that Russia is undermining the core principles of the multilateral system.

    “Aggression is aggression wherever it occurs We cannot accept an equivalence between the aggressor and the victim of aggression. We cannot accept a world where might is right, where the power of law is replaced by the power of guns,” she noted.

    She stated that her delegation believes in a world based on rules, adding, “the time for peace is now. The EU supports all meaningful efforts to bring an end to Russia’s war of aggression.”

    US committed to ending Russia-Ukraine war: Ambassador

    Speaking for the United States, Acting Representative Dorothy Shea said her country is committed to ending the Russia-Ukraine war, which it demonstrated in the Security Council on 24 February.

    “Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Russians have died. The longer the war continues, the greater the suffering for both nations. The war must end now, and the peace must be durable and lasting,” she said.

    With the adoption of resolution 2774, she continued, the Security Council showed that the United Nations can still live up to the purposes and principles of its charter, mainly to maintain international peace and security, including through the peaceful settlement of disputes.

    “We reminded the world that there is common ground that we can all agree on. All UN Member States can agree that the war is a tragedy and that it must end. Security Council resolution 2774 does not end the war, but it has put us on a path to peace,” she added.

    Russia is abusing its veto: Ukraine

    Ukrainian Chargé d’affaires Khrystyna Hayovyshyn said that Russia’s behaviour in the Security Council following its aggression against her country is the “most vivid example” of how detrimental the misuse of the veto could be for the Council’s ability to respond effectively.

    “All draft resolutions that the UN Security Council attempted to adopt in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine since 2014 to 2024 were vetoed by the Russian Federation,” she said.

    She noted that the amendments proposed by Denmark, France, Greece, Slovenia and UK would have contributed to bringing Council resolution 2774 in line with the UN Charter and reaffirming the commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

    The adopted resolution, Ms. Hayovyshyn continued, lacked essential elements, especially those regarding the classification of the war as an act of aggression and failing to reflect the principles of the UN Charter.

    “The Russian Federation abuses its veto rights either to block the Security Council decision designed to address its aggression or, as we have seen recently, block those proposals that contribute to a just and lasting peace in Ukraine in line with the UN Charter,” she added.

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-Evening Report: Russia launching ‘suicide missions’ across strategic Dnipro river as pause in US aid hampers defence

    Source: The Conversation (Au and NZ) – By Veronika Poniscjakova, Deputy Director, Porstmouth Military Education Team, University of Portsmouth

    After publicly belittling Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in a White House meeting, Donald Trump has suspended US military aid to Ukraine and paused intelligence sharing. It is now clear that Ukraine is in trouble in both its political and military situations, and the latter will only worsen as the effects of the US aid suspension hit.

    Trump’s outburst has, to some extent, reinvigorated European support for the war-torn country. But Zelensky’s recent statement that “Ukraine is ready to negotiate about an end to the conflict” suggests that he recognises how precarious the situation has become.

    In Trump’s address to the US Congress on February 4, the US president welcomed this shift, and claimed that Russia was also ready for a truce.

    What would a negotiated peace look like? The side that holds the upper hand, both politically and militarily, will have a stronger position at the negotiating table.

    At the moment, the advantage is overwhelmingly with Russia, which is striving to press home its battlefield advantage and occupy as much territory as it can before a potential ceasefire. This is likely to mean a freezing of the conflict on its current lines of contact.

    The war has now lasted more than three years, and since Ukraine’s failed summer 2023 counteroffensive, there have been no major changes on the battlefield, except for Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024. Kyiv had hoped that seizing this territory could serve as a bargaining chip in future peace negotiations.

    But even this has not gone according to plan, as Russia has been steadily reclaiming the area, aided by North Korean troops.

    Recent battlefield developments reaffirm the ongoing stalemate. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (as of March 4), Russian forces continued offensives along various key strategic points in the east and south. While Russian advances continue to be slow, it’s a situation that could change quickly, particularly with the dramatic shutdown of US assistance.

    One of the key areas where Russia is now putting intense pressure on Ukrainian troops is in the Kherson oblast in the south of the country. Russian forces are reportedly attempting to cross the Dnipro river, aiming to establish footholds on the west (right) bank at four locations to allow them a clear run at the strategically important port city of Kherson.

    Russia has successfully negotiated river crossings during the three-year war, but this time, the situation seems more challenging. Recent reporting from the frontlines has described Russian assaults on Dnipro crossings as “suicide missions”, causing heavy Russian casualties.

    A high Russian body count is nothing new in this conflict. But why is Russia willing to sacrifice so many of its soldiers, particularly when the political prospects favour Putin and the Russians?

    Oleksandr Prokudin, the governor of Kherson, suggests that Russia is desperate to establish a foothold as crossing the Dnipro would open up Kherson oblast for further advances and could be used in negotiations to strengthen Russia’s claim over the entire region. The occupation of Kherson was listed by Russian defence minister, Andrei Belousov, as a key strategic goal for 2025.

    Strategic barrier

    Crossing the Dnipro will not be easy. Ukraine has tried and failed in the opposite direction on several occasions for example, in April and August 2023.

    At that stage, as part of the (ultimately unsuccessful) spring-summer offensive, Kyiv hoped crossing the river would be a major breakthrough that would lead to easier access to Crimea. This now looks like a lost cause – at least militarily.

    State of the conflict in Ukraine, March 5 2024.
    Institute for the Study of War

    The Dnipro is not only a natural barrier dividing the country into two parts. It’s also vital as a transport artery through the country and its dams provide energy.

    Russia realises this, and it has seen the river as one of Ukraine’s “centres of gravity”. On day one of the invasion, Russian forces made a beeline for the Dnipro, crossing and taking up positions that they were later forced to abandon as Ukraine fought back.

    Now, as Prokudin observed, Russia is once again throwing its troops at the river. A series of assaults in December 2024 were successfully repelled, but things have changed even in the few months since. Ukraine is in an increasingly difficult position.

    Ukraine’s military is facing increasingly critical troop shortages and has a far smaller population to draw on than Russia – something which is beginning to tell.

    And each day seems to bring further bad news. The US decision to pause intelligence sharing will mean its forces in the field will be virtually deaf and blind and at the mercy of Russian attacks on their positions (although there is reason to believe the pause may be reasonably shortlived).

    But, with the decision to halt military aid, it’s an indication of the Trump administration’s determination to force Kyiv into a peace deal – whether or not it’s acceptable to Ukraine.

    At this stage it looks almost inevitable that Ukraine will be unable to reclaim all the territory it has lost to Russia since 2014. Its best chance may be to secure what it still does control and go all-out to prevent further Russian advances. One of the ways it needs to do that right now is to ensure Russia does not establish a foothold across the Dnipro river.

    Veronika Poniscjakova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Russia launching ‘suicide missions’ across strategic Dnipro river as pause in US aid hampers defence – https://theconversation.com/russia-launching-suicide-missions-across-strategic-dnipro-river-as-pause-in-us-aid-hampers-defence-251439

    MIL OSI Analysis – EveningReport.nz –

  • MIL-OSI United Nations: What is the World Health Organization and why does it matter?

    Source: United Nations MIL OSI

    By Eileen Travers

    Health

    When the plague, cholera and yellow fever rippled deadly waves across a newly industrialised and interconnected world in the mid-19th century, taking a global approach to health became an imperative. Doctors, scientists, presidents and prime ministers urgently convened the International Sanitary Conference in Paris in 1851, a precursor to what is now the largest of its kind: the World Health Organization, known as WHO.

    From laboratories to battlefields, the United Nations specialised health agency has been dedicated to the wellbeing of all people since 1948. It is guided by science and supported by its 194 member nations, including the United States, a co-founder that on Monday announced plans to withdraw.

    What has WHO done for the world? The short answer is – a lot. The UN agency currently works with its membership and on the health frontlines in more than 150 locations and has achieved many public health milestones.

    © WHO/Neil Nuia

    WHO and partners provide COVID-19 and other vaccines to remote communities, including in Kuvamiti in the Solomon Islands. (file)

    Here’s what you need to know about the planet’s biggest health body:

    Tackling emergencies

    Amid crises, conflict, the continuing threat of disease outbreaks and climate change, WHO has responded, from wars in Gaza, Sudan and Ukraine to ensuring lifesaving vaccines and medical supplies arrive in remote or dangerous areas.

    With healthcare facing unprecedented risks, WHO documented in 2023 over 1,200 attacks affecting workers, patients, hospitals, clinics and ambulances across 19 countries and territories, resulting in over 700 deaths and nearly 1,200 injuries.

    Indeed, WHO teams often go where others do not. They routinely evacuate injured patients and provide lifesaving equipment, supplies and services in conflict or disaster-ravaged areas.

    Watch below as WHO teams helped to unroll a multi-agency polio vaccination campaign in war-torn besieged Gaza in September 2024, when the fast-spreading virus reappeared 25 years after it had been eradicated:

    Tracking and addressing health crises

    Every day and through the night, teams of WHO experts sift through thousands of pieces of information, including scientific papers and disease surveillance reports, scanning for signals of disease outbreaks or other public health threats, from avian flu to COVID-19.

    WHO mobilises to prevent, detect and respond to infectious disease outbreaks while also strengthening access to essential health services.

    That includes bolstering hospital capacity to do everything from delivering new babies to treating war injuries and training healthcare workers.

    © WHO/Ploy Phutpheng

    A laboratory scientist works at a WHO collaborating research centre in Thailand. (file)

    Eliminating diseases around the world

    A wide range of diseases and conditions are ripe for elimination given the right public health policies, including neglected infectious and vector-borne diseases, sexually transmitted infections, diseases passed from mother to child and those that vaccines can prevent.

    The UN health agency supplies essential medicines and medical equipment while working to enable – and where possible, strengthen – laboratory capacity to diagnose diseases.

    In 2024, WHO Member States achieved several milestones in tackling these major global health challenges. Seven countries (Brazil, Chad, India, Jordan, Pakistan, Timor-Leste, and Viet Nam) eliminated a range of tropical diseases, including leprosy and trachoma.

    Mother-to-child transmission of HIV and syphilis have been eliminated in Belize, Jamaica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Namibia reached a key milestone towards elimination of mother-to-child transmission of HIV and hepatitis B.

    WHO has also played a key role over the past seven decades, including in eradicating smallpox in 1980, achieving the near eradication of polio and providing lifesaving assistance in Gaza during the recent war.

    © WHO/Sebastian Meyer

    A WHO mobile clinic provides services in Duhok, Iraq. (file)

    AI and digital health

    WHO is embracing new frontiers, including artificial intelligence (AI), in digital health.

    As the influence of emerging AI technologies continues to grow, WHO is working to ensure its safety and effectiveness for health.

    That includes new guidance published last October listing key regulatory considerations on such issues as harnessing the potential of AI to treat or detect conditions like cancer or tuberculosis while minimising risks like unethical data collection, cybersecurity threats and amplifying biases or misinformation.

    WHO/Blink Media/Juliana Tan

    In Singapore, digital devices help patients reach their healthcare providers. (file)

    Taking on deadly climate-related health crisis

    The climate-related health crisis affects at least 3.5 billion people – nearly half of the global population.

    Extreme heat, weather events and air pollution caused millions of deaths in 2023, putting enormous pressure on health systems and the working population, from current wildfires burning across the US west coast to deadly flash floods in Indonesia.

    WHO/J.D.Kannah

    An Ebola virus survivor in the Democratic Republic of Congo has his eyes checked at a WHO-supported eye clinic in North Kivu. (file)

    Part of WHO’s response has been to protect health from the wide range of impacts of climate change, which includes assessing vulnerabilities and developing plans.

    The UN agency has also worked on implementing response systems for key risks, such as extreme heat and infectious disease and supporting resilience and adaptation in health-determining sectors such as water and food.

    What’s WHO working on now?

    WHO is leading efforts for a global treaty take a further, deeper step to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness and response, much along the lines of the founders of the 1851 International Sanitary Conference.

    The UN agency is also currently working to achieve its “triple billion targets”.

    Set in 2019, the targets are that by 2025, one billion more people will be benefitting from universal health coverage, one billion more people will be better protected from health emergencies and one billion more people will be enjoying better health and wellbeing.

    Who leads WHO?

    The leadership is truly international.

    Based in Geneva, the UN agency is headed by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus.

    The current approved biennium programme budget for 2024-2025 is $6.83 billion, coming from member assessments, alongside voluntary contributions.

    WHO’s decision-making body, the World Health Assembly, is made up of its member nations, which meet annually to agree on WHO priorities and policies.

    Members make decisions on health goals and strategies that will guide their own public health work and the work of the WHO Secretariat to move the world towards better health and wellbeing for all. That includes implementing reform measures that have made WHO more effective.

    Learn more about WHO here and in our latest video below:

    MIL OSI United Nations News –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Republicans Reject Sen. Welch’s Resolution Condemning Russia’s Brutal Invasion

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator Peter Welch (D-Vermont)
    Welch Speaks on Senate Floor Reaffirming Support for Ukraine
    WASHINGTON, D.C. – U.S. Senator Peter Welch (D-Vt.) last night took to the Senate floor alongside Democratic colleagues to reaffirm that Congress and the American people stand with President Zelenskyy and will not abandon the people of Ukraine as they defend their country against Russia’s unjust invasion. In his remarks, Senator Welch asked the Senate to agree to a resolution reaffirming the United States’ support for the principle that no country can take another by force or threat of force. Senate Republicans rejected Senator Welch and his colleagues’ resolutions. 
    “America’s global alliances and leadership have been anchored on the principle that no country should seize and occupy the territory of another country by force…My hope is that we in the United States Senate would reaffirm those principles of territorial integrity and do that on behalf of the American people. And I have introduced a resolution that does just this,” said Senator Welch. “I think all of us know that’s among the most fundamental propositions holding together the world’s very fragile peace. It’s also a fundamentally American principle that we have advocated for and defended. And it’s a principle that we must uphold today on behalf of the people and the sovereignty of Ukraine—not just for their benefit, but for our national security.” 
    Read the full text of the resolution here, and watch Senator Welch’s speech below: 
    Read the Senator’s remarks as delivered here.
    On the third anniversary of the Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Senator Welch joined Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.) and his colleagues in introducing the Protecting our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act, legislation that would provide temporary guest status to Ukrainians and their immediate family members who are already in the United States through the “Uniting for Ukraine” parole process. The bill allows Ukrainians to stay and work in the U.S. until the Secretary of State determines that hostilities in Ukraine have ceased and it is safe for them to return. 

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stefan Wolff, Professor of International Security, University of Birmingham

    Six days after the infamous shouting match between the US president and Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president is scrambling to try and repair what looked initially like a near-total breakdown in the relationship between the US and Ukraine.

    Zelensky, urged by European leaders, including the British prime minister, Sir Keir Starmer, and the Nato secretary general, Mark Rutte, has tried to mend his ties with Trump. The US president acknowledged as much in his first post-inauguration speech to congress on March 5, saying that he appreciated Zelensky’s readiness to work for peace under US leadership.

    But that happened just 24 hours after he decided to halt all military aid to Ukraine. And since then, the new director of the CIA, John Ratcliffe, and national security adviser, Mike Waltz, have confirmed that intelligence sharing with Kyiv, which was critical to Ukraine’s ability to hit strategic targets inside Russia, has also been suspended.

    Neither of these two moves will have an immediate game-changing effect on the war, but they certainly increase pressure on Ukraine to accept whatever deal Trump will ultimately make with Putin.

    So far, so bad for Zelensky. Yet Trump’s manoeuvring does not only affect Ukraine. It has also had a profound impact on the relationship between the US and Europe. On Sunday March 2, in the aftermath of the White House debacle, Starmer convened an emergency meeting in London with a select number of European leaders, as well as the Canadian prime minister, Justin Trudeau.

    This “coalition of the willing”“ has been in the making for some time now. Its members straddle the boundaries of the EU and Nato, including – apart from the UK – non-EU members Norway and Turkey. Since the relatively disappointing first-ever EU meeting solely focused on defence on February 3 – which was more notable for the absence of a European vision for the continent’s role and place in the Trumpian world order – Europe has embarked on a course of more than just rhetorical change.

    The UK was first out of the blocks. Ahead of Starmer’s visit to Washington, the UK government announced on February 25 an increase of defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by 2027. This was then followed on March 2 with a pledge of additional air defence missiles for Ukraine worth £1.6 billion.

    Europe responds

    In a crucial boost to defence spending at the EU level, the president of the European commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced the “Rearm Europe” plan on March 4. It is projected to mobilise around €800 billion (£670 million) for European defence.

    This includes a “national escape clause” for EU members, exempting national defence expenditures from the EU’s deficit rules. It also offers a new loan instrument worth up to €150 billion, allows for the use of already allocated funds in the EU budget for defence projects, and proposes partnerships with the private sector through the Savings and Investment Union and the European Investment Bank.

    Perhaps most significantly, in Germany, the two main parties likely to form the next coalition government announced a major shift in the country’s fiscal policy on March 5, which will allow any defence spending above 1% of GDP to be financed outside the country’s strict borrowing rules.

    This marks an important point of departure for Germany. Apart from what it means in fiscal terms, it also sends an important political signal that Germany – the continent’s largest economy – will use its financial and political muscle to strengthen the emerging coalition of the willing.



    Read more:
    Europe will need thousands more tanks and troops to mount a credible military defence without the US

    Donald Trump reads a letter from Volodymyr Zelensky during his speech to Congress, March 4.

    These are all important steps. Taken together, and provided that the current momentum is maintained, they are likely to accelerate Europe’s awakening to a world in which US security guarantees as no longer absolute.

    The challenges that Europe faces on the way to becoming strategically independent from the US are enormous. But they are not insurmountable.

    The conventional military threat posed by an aggressive and revanchist Russia is more easily manageable with the planned boost to conventional forces and air and cyber defences. Close cooperation with Ukraine will also add critical war-fighting experience which can boost the deterrent effect.

    Europe for now, however, remains vulnerable in terms of its nuclear capabilities, especially if deprived of the US nuclear umbrella and faced with Russia’s regular threats to use its nuclear arsenal – the world’s largest nuclear power by warhead stockpiles.

    But here, too, new strategic thinking is emerging. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has indicated his willingness to discuss a more integrated European nuclear capability. And in Germany, a country with an otherwise very complex relationship with nuclear weapons, such a European approach has been debated, increasingly positively, for some time, starting during Trump’s first term in office between 2017 and 2021.



    Read more:
    French nuclear deterrence for Europe: how effective could it be against Russia?

    Tectonic shift

    A stronger, and strategically more independent Europe, even if it will take time to emerge, is also crucial for the war in Ukraine. Increased European defence spending, including aid for Ukraine, will help Kyiv in the short term to make up for at least some of the gaps left by the suspension – and possible complete cessation – of US military support.

    In the long term, however, EU accession would possibly open up the route to a security guarantee for Ukraine under article 47.2 of the Lisbon treaty on European Union.

    This so-called mutual defence clause has been derided in the past for lacking any meaningful European defence capabilities. But if the current European momentum towards beefing up the continent’s defences is sustained, it would acquire more teeth than it currently has.

    With the benefit of hindsight, Zelensky may have walked away less empty handed from his clash with Trump last week than it seemed initially. If nothing else, Europeans have since then demonstrated not just in words but also in deeds that they are no longer in denial about just how dangerous Trump is and how much they are now on their own.

    Threatened by both Moscow and Washington, Europe is now on the cusp of a second zeitenwende, the “epochal tectonic shift” that the then German chancellor Olaf Scholz acknowledged after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. They may finally even have found an answer to the question he posed at the time: “How can we, as Europeans and as the European Union, remain independent actors in an increasingly multi-polar world?”

    Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.

    Tetyana Malyarenko does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Europe-Nato ‘coalition of the willing’ scrambles for collective response to hostility from Trump and threat from Putin – https://theconversation.com/europe-nato-coalition-of-the-willing-scrambles-for-collective-response-to-hostility-from-trump-and-threat-from-putin-251332

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI USA: Senate Republicans Reject Durbin’s Resolution To Condemn Russia’s Abduction Of Ukrainian Children

    US Senate News:

    Source: United States Senator for Illinois Dick Durbin

    March 07, 2025

    Since Russia’s full-scale war started in 2022, the Russian government has abducted, forcibly transferred, or facilitated the illegal deportation of at least 20,000 Ukrainian children

    WASHINGTON – In a speech on the Senate floor, U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Dick Durbin (D-IL), Co-Chair of the Senate Ukraine Caucus, asked for unanimous consent (UC) to pass a simple resolution he introduced condemning Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children and called on Russia to work with the international community to return all abducted Ukrainian children to their families. Since Russia’s full-scale war of aggression started in 2022, the Russian government has abducted, forcibly transferred, or facilitated the illegal deportation of at least 20,000 Ukrainian children. Senate Republicans rejected the resolution.  They also objected to every other straightforward resolution offered by Senate Democrats, including urging Russian President Putin to end the war, clarifying that Russia started the war, stating that Russia committed war crimes, reaffirming the U.S.-Ukraine relationship and support for its sovereignty, and clarifying that no nation should forcibly seize territory of another. 

    “War brings out the worst in humans. And Russia, under the bloody leadership of Vladimir Putin, has committed some of the worst wartime atrocities that a mind can imagine. Mass murders, rapes, torture, and deliberate targeting of hospitals and civilians, that’s been the three-year strategy of Vladimir Putin,” said Durbin.

    “But one of the most horrific of these atrocities is Russia’s kidnapping of Ukrainian children… Since Russia’s full-scale war of aggression started in 2022, the government of Russia has abducted, forcibly transferred, or facilitated the illegal deportation of at least 20,000 Ukrainian children,” said Durbin. “The depravity of Putin’s strategy is hard to imagine. But Putin and his government know no humanity or morality. It is not surprising that Putin would stoop to such a repulsive strategy.”

    “That is why I am asking unanimous consent to pass a resolution condemning Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children. And I am calling on Russia to work with the international community to return all of these children to their families. There is no tasteful way to violate the sovereignty of another nation.  But Putin takes depravity to a new extreme with his kidnapping of Ukrainian children. This barbaric act must be condemned—it should be easy for members on both sides of the aisle to just imagine for a moment if this had happened to American children. It has to be a priority of any peace process to acknowledge Putin’s responsibility for the invasion and the terrible policies in Ukraine,” Durbin continued.

    Last week, Durbin introduced the Protecting our Guests During Hostilities in Ukraine Act, legislation that would provide temporary guest status to Ukrainians and their immediate family members who are already in the United States through the “Uniting for Ukraine” parole process. The bill allows Ukrainians to stay and work in the U.S. until the Secretary of State determines that hostilities in Ukraine have ceased and it is safe for them to return. U.S. Senators Lisa Murkowski (R-AK), Tammy Duckworth (D-IL), Richard Blumenthal (D-CT), Jacky Rosen (D-NV), Chris Van Hollen (D-MD), Peter Welch (D-VT), Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Michael Bennet (D-CO), and Alex Padilla (D-CA) are cosponsors of the legislation. Bill text can be found here.  

    Durbin also joined U.S. Senators Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Roger Wicker (R-MS), and others in leading a simple resolution last week that expresses continued solidarity with the people of Ukraine and condolences for the loss of thousands of lives to Russian aggression; rejects Russia’s attempts to militarily seize sovereign Ukrainian territory; reaffirms U.S. support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine; and states unequivocally that Ukraine must be at the table for negotiations on its future.

    Video of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.

    Audio of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here.

    Footage of Durbin’s remarks on the Senate floor is available here for TV Stations.

    -30-

    MIL OSI USA News –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Russia’s veto flouted the voice of the General Assembly: UK Statement at the UN General Assembly

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Russia’s veto flouted the voice of the General Assembly: UK Statement at the UN General Assembly

    Statement by Ambassador Barbara Woodward, UK Permanent Representative to the UN, at the UN General Assembly meeting on the use of the veto.

    Last week, this Assembly marked three years since Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, in flagrant violation of the UN Charter.

    This Assembly voted decisively in support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and of the UN Charter, based on the facts – this was an invasion of a sovereign country by its neighbour. 

    It was a war of choice.

    As my Prime Minister has made clear, the UK continues to support peace in Ukraine.

    Our approach is based on four principles.

    First, to support Ukraine’s legitimate right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

    Second, any lasting peace must guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and Ukraine must be at the negotiating table.

    Third, and fourth, when a peace deal is reached, as a European neighbour, we will continue to support Ukraine’s defence and deterrence capability.

    And, we are ready to develop a coalition of the willing to defend a peace deal in Ukraine.

    For peace to be sustainable, it must be strong and just and deter further Russian aggression against its neighbours.

    This is why the UK, along with other Security Council Members, proposed amendments that would bring the Security Council resolution in line with the resolutions of the General Assembly, which had been adopted just hours beforehand.

    These amendments sought to acknowledge Russia as the perpetrator of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine;

    To reaffirm our commitment to the territorial integrity of Ukraine;

    And to ensure that peace in Ukraine would be in line with the UN Charter.

    In order to stop us, Russia exercised its veto.

    In doing so, it flouted the voice of the General Assembly.

    It vetoed respect for the UN Charter and for the sovereignty of a neighbour.

    And all the while, Russia has continued its campaign of aggression against Ukraine, including with this week’s drone attacks on civilian buildings in Kharkiv.

    We should judge Putin by his actions. And these are not the actions of a peacemaker.

    As we sit here today, discussing Russia’s use of the veto on amendments regarding its own violations of the UN Charter, let us remember one thing:

    If Putin wanted peace, he could have it tomorrow. 

    All Russia need do is cease its aggression and withdraw its forces from all of Ukraine.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Video: ReArm Europe Plan: Strengthening European Defence and Supporting Ukraine

    Source: European Commission (video statements)

    The ReArm Europe Plan mobilizes up to €800 billion to boost defense investment, reinforcing Europe’s security and supporting Ukraine in its fight for sovereignty and territorial integrity. This bold initiative aims to rearm Europe, strengthen the European Union’s defense capabilities, and stand by Ukraine for as long as it takes.

    Heavy Drums Bass by Audionautix is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_H_mQlVgmVU

    MIL OSI Video –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry RUSI Speech

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry RUSI Speech

    Minister of State for Defence Procurement and Industry: RUSI/IFRI Speech “Enhancing UK-France Defence Industrial cooperation”

    Esteemed colleagues. Distinguished Guests. Chers amis.

    I’m sure I speak for us all in thanking RUSI and IFRI for bringing us together at this pivotal moment for European security. And for all they do to advance Defence in our countries. As Putin continues to wage his unprovoked and illegal war against Ukraine amidst fierce debate about how best to end the conflict the common refrain coming from both sides of the Channel and both sides of the Atlantic is that Europe needs to step-up and take more responsibility for its own security. As our Prime Minister did again last week, by setting a path that will lift our defence spending from 2.3%,  to 2.5% by 2027,  and 3% in the next parliament.

    Amidst the uncertainty surrounding European security the one thing that is certain and that’s a fighting force is only as strong as the industrial base that stands behind it. So transforming European defence industrial capabilities and boosting capacity are going to be integral to this defining mission of our time. And I hope we all leave here today agreeing that as Europe’s most powerful military forces with two of its most advanced defence sectors the UK and France must spearhead this mission. Strengthening an alliance that has achieved so much since we struck the Entente Cordiale back in 1904.

    A military alliance that’s twice been pivotal in securing European freedoms. And an industrial alliance that has connected our electricity grids…

    shrunk our skies and tunnelled under the channel. Making it possible to enjoy a late morning croissant in Paris followed almost seamlessly, by mid-afternoon tea in London and more easily done than getting back to my constituency in Liverpool and faster most of the time.

    For the last fifteen years the Lancaster House Treaties have been our guiding light as our Armed Forces and our nations have again stood united in support of democracy and against the common threats of terrorism, tyranny, and hybrid warfare both in Europe and further afield.  And as we gather today to discuss the next chapter of our Defence industrial partnership I believe that the overwhelming majority of not just British and French people but the vast majority of Europeans are looking to our respective governments to provide leadership by doing more together in recognition that our combined military capabilities are the most significant stabilising force in European security.

    And as we step forward to help Europe step-up to the challenge we will be building on solid foundations. Our combined nuclear deterrents underpin Europe’s security. Our Combined Joint Expeditionary Force is on stand-by to respond swiftly to crises giving us a level of interoperability with the French Armed Forces, beyond anything we have with any other European allies. And our Industrial sector is also increasingly integrated.

    Through ‘One MBDA’ we’ve help safeguard European missile production capabilities and delivered innovative defensive and offensive systems…

    including Meteor and SCALP/Storm Shadow. Together we are co-developing powerful Future Cruise and Anti-Ship Weapons a sovereign capability that boosts our industrial resilience and will deliver the most advanced deep-strike weapons in Europe. And as part of our Maritime Mine Counter-Measures Project with Thales the UK will soon take delivery of our first set of autonomous mine hunting equipment marking an important new phase in that particular programme.

    But if we are to re-establish security across the European continent and dissuade Putin from coming back again to invade one of his sovereign neighbours we need to use our Summit in June to broaden our defence industrial collaboration beyond complex weapons. Putting something of an ‘Entente Industrielle’ at the heart to the UK-France Defence partnership that delivers more from our existing programmes that intensifies our cooperation in the most decisive domains and capabilities – including space, AI, and defeating hybrid grey-zone warfare and provides leadership to European Partners, including within NATO.

    For both our countries the need to significantly strengthen European deterrence represents a significant economic opportunity.

    And it can be a virtuous circle of enhanced capabilities, stronger deterrence, and economic growth that I believe can be mutually beneficial as we expand the range of our cooperation supporting a growing number of Defence jobs in both France and the UK.

    Last week marked the end of our public consultation on the UK’s forthcoming Defence Industrial Strategy I am glad to say because I was visiting every corner of the UK speaking to people about it, so I get a little bit of rest from travel. But that strategy will guide our approach to the sector.

    It is a strategy that will set out our wish to create new research and industrial ventures with international allies like France in order to broaden our capabilities, enhance standardisation, and boost interoperability whilst supporting our respective strengths across the defence value chain.

    We know the EU has a role to play in building a larger, more innovative, and more responsive European defence sector. And we would welcome French support as we seek an ambitious new UK-EU security pact. Continued coordination through NATO is also crucially important,

    in setting capability targets and standards, and making our collective defence industrial bases more coherent. We also know, a more resilient and responsive industrial base, requires a fundamentally closer relationship between governments and industry, hence adding that “industry” to the end of my title. I am not just in charge with procurement I am in charge of our relationship with defence industries as well. And we are recruiting a National Armaments Director, who will be held accountable for delivering that, alongside procurement reform.

    At the last UK-France Summit, our countries signed up to a closer industrial relationship. We agreed to strengthen supply chains and industrial resilience and facilitate reciprocal market access and exports. I think that recent geopolitical developments, have injected urgency into that work…

    and the need to strengthen European and NATO industrial and procurement initiatives is also apparent and that includes: the European Long-Range Strike Approach the DIAMOND integrated air and missile defence initiative and NATO’s Defence Production Action Plan and Multinational Procurement initiatives. Collective procurement will deliver more of the capabilities we need across the continent to deter Putin…

    and deliver more bang for our Pounds and Euros.

    Whilst UK and French visions for Europe’s security architecture haven’t always aligned during the Entente Cordiale era, UK and French values and interests overwhelmingly have and it is vital for European Security that we talk, and build on that unity.

    Our cooperation has long been a powerful force-for-good that has brought our people closer together and helped overcome tyranny and preserve freedoms. And we can do it again.

    So I will work closely with my counterpart Délégué Emmanuel Chiva…who I am going to be seeing tomorrow at the High-Level UK-France Working Group to put our defence capabilities and industrial cooperation at the top of the agenda of our Summit in June at the heart of our Lancaster House Treaties refresh and at the centre of our shared mission to bolster European security

    Because like our predecessors who built the Entente Cordiale to secure peace in their time we must now build an Entente Industrielle to guarantee European security in ours.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Why global firms are pushed to take sides in wars, and how they can avoid it

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Stephan Manning, Professor of Strategy and Innovation, University of Sussex Business School, University of Sussex

    Virrage Images/Shutterstock

    Russia’s war against Ukraine has changed how global firms respond to geopolitical events. Whereas in the past foreign companies often preferred to stay neutral in times of war, now they increasingly take sides.

    When Russia invaded Ukraine three years ago, global firms like Google and Amazon were swift to offer support to Ukraine with donations and supplies. Others, like Renault and Deutsche Bank, harmed the Russian economy by suspending operations and investment.

    Overall, more than 1,000 foreign companies reduced their activity in Russia, with nearly 300 of them leaving the country completely. These firms acted in line with the geopolitical position of their home countries, but often did so before their governments had issued any official policy.

    In our study of corporate responses to the Russia-Ukraine war, we call this
    “partisan behavior” – as it supports one side, while harming the other.

    But taking sides often comes at a cost. Shell, for example, lost almost US$5 billion (£3.9 million) by leaving a joint venture with Russia’s energy giant Gazprom, and the US digital communication company Cisco lost almost £200 million from pausing its operations in Russia.

    Supporting one side over another has also backfired for many firms in the conflict between Israel and Gaza. For example, McDonald’s restaurants in Israel (then owned by a franchise group) donated free food to Israeli soldiers, while Ben & Jerry’s sought to stop sales to Israelis in the West Bank.

    Both actions led to a considerable backlash, mostly in the form of consumer boycotts, which led to reduced growth for McDonald’s, and big losses for Ben & Jerry’s parent company, Unilever.

    So why do companies take such economic and reputational risks? One reason could be that geopolitical divides along with ongoing culture wars, amplified by social media outrage, have increased public pressure on large multinational firms to take a political stance.

    Yet continuing with business as usual does not seem to be an option either. After Coca-Cola continued to operate as normal during the Israel-Gaza conflict, it was accused by one Palestinian-led movement of being “complicit in a war crime”.

    Firms that maintained operations in Russia, such as Carlsberg and Unilever, were not only criticised for doing so by their home countries, but also faced the prospect of a takeover by the Russian state – since their western influence was perceived as threatening. In comparison, many Chinese firms took the opportunity and expanded operations in Russia – supported by the Russian government.

    A survey by the American thinktank the Conference Board confirms that western companies find it increasingly challenging to “maintain neutrality” in times of conflict. Yet geopolitical conflicts are on the rise, and multinational firms will continue to feel pressure to respond.

    Of course, sometimes foreign firms have little choice about what to do. For example their home governments may issue sanctions on a conflict party, making it difficult to continue business. This was the situation for many foreign firms operating in Russia during the war.

    Focus on the victims

    But often, foreign firms can choose how to respond. In those cases, our research suggests that they should take a non-partisan humanitarian position, and focus on supporting the victims of a conflict – on both sides – as much as possible.

    For example, two large US companies, Comcast (media) and Verizon (telecommunications), each committed US$1.5 Million to support humanitarian efforts, such as the charity Doctors Without Borders, in both Israel and Gaza. Neither firm has faced criticism or any kind of backlash.

    Humanitarian aid arriving in Gaza, February 2025.
    Anas-Mohammed/Shutterstock

    A further step would be for large corporations to develop a shared code of conduct which focuses entirely on non-partisan humanitarian measures in line with international law.

    Under this law, conflicting parties have an obligation to ensure passage of humanitarian aid, freedom of movement of humanitarian workers and the protection of civilians, refugees, prisoners and the wounded.

    Multinationals could play a constructive role in this effort. They could partner with NGOs and charities to finance essential services, provide logistical support and ensure the continuous flow of aid.

    Such a shared commitment to the humanitarian cause could also be a useful approach for other organisations, like universities. The resignations of US university presidents after they criticised pro-Palestinian campus protests could have been prevented with a clearer non-partisan approach.

    A politically polarised world can be difficult to navigate, and one that global businesses should be increasingly wary of. But a non-partisan humanitarian approach, which helps those who suffer the most, offers a balanced and ethical alternative.

    The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Why global firms are pushed to take sides in wars, and how they can avoid it – https://theconversation.com/why-global-firms-are-pushed-to-take-sides-in-wars-and-how-they-can-avoid-it-249409

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: The king has a tricky diplomatic role to play in inviting Trump for a state visit

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Francesca Jackson, PhD candidate, Lancaster Law School, Lancaster University

    As monarch, King Charles III is bound by constitutional convention to remain politically neutral. But that hasn’t stopped the UK government from deploying the king to advance its foreign policy agenda.

    During their inaugural meeting, Keir Starmer presented Donald Trump with a letter from the king, inviting the president for a “truly historic” and “unprecedented” second state visit to the UK and a visit to the monarch’s private Balmoral residence.

    Later that week, the government arranged for the king to meet Volodymyr Zelensky at the royal countryside retreat of Sandringham, to show support for the Ukrainian leader following his disastrous meeting with Trump.

    The government is walking a tightrope: it wants to avoid tariffs from Trump, while continuing to support Zelensky and Ukraine. And it is using the king to help it do so.

    Want more politics coverage from academic experts? Every week, we bring you informed analysis of developments in government and fact check the claims being made.

    Sign up for our weekly politics newsletter, delivered every Friday.

    It is not unusual for governments to use monarchs to boost international relations, particularly through state visits. The monarch has a huge amount of soft power and the pomp and ceremony of a state visit can help governments achieve their foreign affairs aims.

    State visits differ from regular diplomatic visits: they are the most formal way in which a foreign head of state can come to the UK, and happen just once or twice a year.

    Visitors are greeted by the king and other members of the royal family with a ceremonial welcome accompanied by gun salutes on the Horse Guards Parade ground in London. They then travel back to Buckingham Palace in a carriage procession, where they enjoy a formal state banquet at which the monarch toasts the visiting head of state.

    State visits are not cheap: Trump’s first visit cost £3.5 million in policing alone. But they can play a key role in diplomacy.

    A state visit to France by Queen Elizabeth II in 1972 helped seal the deal on the UK’s third attempt at joining the the European Economic Community. And in 2024, the UK’s defence partnership with Qatar was “strengthened” following the state visit of the Qatari emir.

    There is a danger that the monarch’s reputation is affected by hosting controversial heads of state. No doubt the palace PR team is less than enthused about the prospect of Charles being seen wining and dining Trump. The optics of hosting Trump during his first state visit reportedly put the late Queen Elizabeth in a “very difficult position”.

    But monarchs have little (if any) influence over who they host for a state visit. Charles will have been advised by the government to invite Trump in accordance with the cardinal convention. This fundamental constitutional principle requires the monarch to act on the advice of the government.

    Constitutional conventions are not legally binding. But in the UK’s constitutional monarchy, the monarch reigns but does not rule and power is exercised by democratically-elected ministers rather than the sovereign. Failure by the monarch to follow convention could spark a constitutional crisis, as fictional plays and dramas have long imagined.

    A royal invitation.
    Number 10 Flickr, CC BY-ND

    This is why the late queen had to host some controversial and less-than-democratic figures. It even once led her to hide in a bush to avoid encountering Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu in the Buckingham Palace gardens.

    And it is why Charles, on the government’s advice, will host Trump.

    Laying on the royal charm

    Usually, the public doesn’t see invitations for state visits, but we did see this particular letter. Signed “Yours most sincerely, Charles”, it feels particularly personal and designed to charm Trump, whose love of the British royal family is well known. The offer of an additional visit to Balmoral is a nod to the president’s mother, who was born in Scotland.

    The king’s invitation seems to have done the diplomatic trick. Trump ended his meeting with Starmer by stating: “I think we could very well end up with a real trade deal where the tariffs wouldn’t be necessary”.

    But the visit won’t be without controversy. In the days since, a petition asking for Trump’s invitation to be withdrawn has reached nearly 200,000 signatures. But Starmer has publicly dismissed calls to withdraw the invitation.

    No doubt Charles himself is less than thrilled to invite the president, both after his recent behaviour towards Zelensky and his decision to pull the US from the Paris agreement, given the king’s advocacy on environmental issues.

    Could the king raise such issues with Trump? Charles is bound by the doctrine of political neutrality: he must refrain from acting on political opinions. But that doesn’t mean there won’t be room for other senior royals not bound by the convention, like William, from doing so.

    Indeed, as prince of wales, Charles himself showed opposition to controversial leaders, effectively boycotting Chinese state visits in 1999 and 2015 allegedly in support for the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama.

    The monarch plays an important diplomatic role, especially during state visits. While the leaders they host may be controversial, the monarch must respect constitutional boundaries. Nevertheless, with an outspoken king and heir, this visit could prove to be even more unprecedented than it already is.

    Francesca Jackson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. The king has a tricky diplomatic role to play in inviting Trump for a state visit – https://theconversation.com/the-king-has-a-tricky-diplomatic-role-to-play-in-inviting-trump-for-a-state-visit-251308

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: Russia launching ‘suicide missions’ across strategic Dnipro river as pause in US aid hampers defence

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Veronika Poniscjakova, Deputy Director, Porstmouth Military Education Team, University of Portsmouth

    After publicly belittling Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky in a White House meeting, Donald Trump has suspended US military aid to Ukraine and paused intelligence sharing. It is now clear that Ukraine is in trouble in both its political and military situations, and the latter will only worsen as the effects of the US aid suspension hit.

    Trump’s outburst has, to some extent, reinvigorated European support for the war-torn country. But Zelensky’s recent statement that “Ukraine is ready to negotiate about an end to the conflict” suggests that he recognises how precarious the situation has become.

    In Trump’s address to the US Congress on February 4, the US president welcomed this shift, and claimed that Russia was also ready for a truce.

    What would a negotiated peace look like? The side that holds the upper hand, both politically and militarily, will have a stronger position at the negotiating table.

    At the moment, the advantage is overwhelmingly with Russia, which is striving to press home its battlefield advantage and occupy as much territory as it can before a potential ceasefire. This is likely to mean a freezing of the conflict on its current lines of contact.

    The war has now lasted more than three years, and since Ukraine’s failed summer 2023 counteroffensive, there have been no major changes on the battlefield, except for Ukraine’s incursion into Russia’s Kursk region in August 2024. Kyiv had hoped that seizing this territory could serve as a bargaining chip in future peace negotiations.

    But even this has not gone according to plan, as Russia has been steadily reclaiming the area, aided by North Korean troops.

    Recent battlefield developments reaffirm the ongoing stalemate. According to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (as of March 4), Russian forces continued offensives along various key strategic points in the east and south. While Russian advances continue to be slow, it’s a situation that could change quickly, particularly with the dramatic shutdown of US assistance.

    One of the key areas where Russia is now putting intense pressure on Ukrainian troops is in the Kherson oblast in the south of the country. Russian forces are reportedly attempting to cross the Dnipro river, aiming to establish footholds on the west (right) bank at four locations to allow them a clear run at the strategically important port city of Kherson.

    Russia has successfully negotiated river crossings during the three-year war, but this time, the situation seems more challenging. Recent reporting from the frontlines has described Russian assaults on Dnipro crossings as “suicide missions”, causing heavy Russian casualties.

    A high Russian body count is nothing new in this conflict. But why is Russia willing to sacrifice so many of its soldiers, particularly when the political prospects favour Putin and the Russians?

    Oleksandr Prokudin, the governor of Kherson, suggests that Russia is desperate to establish a foothold as crossing the Dnipro would open up Kherson oblast for further advances and could be used in negotiations to strengthen Russia’s claim over the entire region. The occupation of Kherson was listed by Russian defence minister, Andrei Belousov, as a key strategic goal for 2025.

    Strategic barrier

    Crossing the Dnipro will not be easy. Ukraine has tried and failed in the opposite direction on several occasions for example, in April and August 2023.

    At that stage, as part of the (ultimately unsuccessful) spring-summer offensive, Kyiv hoped crossing the river would be a major breakthrough that would lead to easier access to Crimea. This now looks like a lost cause – at least militarily.

    State of the conflict in Ukraine, March 5 2024.
    Institute for the Study of War

    The Dnipro is not only a natural barrier dividing the country into two parts. It’s also vital as a transport artery through the country and its dams provide energy.

    Russia realises this, and it has seen the river as one of Ukraine’s “centres of gravity”. On day one of the invasion, Russian forces made a beeline for the Dnipro, crossing and taking up positions that they were later forced to abandon as Ukraine fought back.

    Now, as Prokudin observed, Russia is once again throwing its troops at the river. A series of assaults in December 2024 were successfully repelled, but things have changed even in the few months since. Ukraine is in an increasingly difficult position.

    Ukraine’s military is facing increasingly critical troop shortages and has a far smaller population to draw on than Russia – something which is beginning to tell.

    And each day seems to bring further bad news. The US decision to pause intelligence sharing will mean its forces in the field will be virtually deaf and blind and at the mercy of Russian attacks on their positions (although there is reason to believe the pause may be reasonably shortlived).

    But, with the decision to halt military aid, it’s an indication of the Trump administration’s determination to force Kyiv into a peace deal – whether or not it’s acceptable to Ukraine.

    At this stage it looks almost inevitable that Ukraine will be unable to reclaim all the territory it has lost to Russia since 2014. Its best chance may be to secure what it still does control and go all-out to prevent further Russian advances. One of the ways it needs to do that right now is to ensure Russia does not establish a foothold across the Dnipro river.

    Veronika Poniscjakova does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. Russia launching ‘suicide missions’ across strategic Dnipro river as pause in US aid hampers defence – https://theconversation.com/russia-launching-suicide-missions-across-strategic-dnipro-river-as-pause-in-us-aid-hampers-defence-251439

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI Global: What climate vulnerability actually looks like

    Source: The Conversation – UK – By Charlotte Kate Weatherill, Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, The Open University

    Floods affected main roads in Norfolk, UK, in February 2024. mick wass photography/Shutterstock

    The imagery of climate change matters. How we perceive the world affects how we perceive climate change, and how it will affect us – or whether it will affect us at all.

    Imagery has long been understood as an important part of climate communication. Climate change is complex, and requires some simplification to be communicated widely. Yet, this process of simplification can rely too heavily on existing stereotypes, which can affect risk perception across different populations.

    Think of climate vulnerability. This term describes who is likely to be negatively affected by climate change. Perceptions of vulnerability are affected by the images that are chosen to represent climate change. However, the images that are chosen also reflect our perceptions of who is vulnerable.

    For example, sea level rise is often represented through aerial images of Pacific atolls and ice melt is made emotional through the use of polar bears. But which images are most often used to represent human vulnerability to climate change?

    Search online for an image of climate victims and you are likely to see a photograph showing a stereotypical image of “brown women and children” standing in rising flood waters. Images like this show women and children, usually in Asia or Africa, looking distressed in a way that frames them as victims.

    However, when searching by region, images of climate victims can look different. For example, compare the search for “climate victim Asia” and “climate victim UK”.

    Fuli Khatun, a flood victim whose home was submerged in the 2019 floods in Bangladesh.
    UN Women Asia and the Pacific, CC BY-NC-ND

    The image above of of Fuli Khatan, a Bangladeshi flood victim, shows a woman experiencing a disaster. But the image below is very different. It shows Mary Long-Dhonau, a climate victim from the UK whose home has been flooded several times. She is looking directly at the camera, smiling slightly. She is not portrayed as a victim, but as a campaigner.

    The difference in how these women are portrayed is effective in showing how climate vulnerability is understood. For the most part, the climate vulnerable are imagined to be women and children in the global south (developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America), due to their marginalised position within society.

    In other words, the climate vulnerable are portrayed as the same people who are already considered vulnerable.

    This framing makes climate change an issue that follows an established pattern of risk. It doesn’t seem like a new issue, but rather chalk on the white wall of other political issues such as development.

    This overlap is partly the result of long-running and deeply embedded power inequalities that have made some people vulnerable in order to make other people wealthy.

    However, this pattern is overstated and climate vulnerability extends beyond those we already understand as vulnerable. Last month, the European Copernicus climate service declared that 2024 was the first calendar year to pass the symbolic threshold of 1.5°C heating, as well as the world’s hottest on record. Every degree of heating means more people will suffer the effects of climate change.

    These images also reflect the dominant understanding in the UK of climate change vulnerability as something that only happens elsewhere – in countries that are already vulnerable.

    Climate is an ‘us’ problem

    I’ve often encountered this issue in my research on the politics of climate vulnerability. My work questions the assumptions of climate change and vulnerability, tracing them back to understand the logics on which they rely. For example, the Pacific was described as vulnerable and doomed to not being habitable long before climate change became an issue.

    At the same time, assumptions of safety are rooted in history. In developed societies, there is a popular narrative that affluence provides a shield, which assumes wealthier people will be better protected by default.

    And yet, the UK is already experiencing climate change.

    The UK’s rainfall intensity has increased markedly over the past 60 years, leading to an increase of extreme flooding events. The east coast is being eroded, and battling sea level rise. And the UK government’s climate change committee has argued that the UK has no credible adaptation plan.

    Also, in an interconnected world, we have already experienced how shocks elsewhere can affect our food supply and gas prices. Even if the UK could escape the direct effects of climate change, it would still feel the consequences.

    Our perceptions of vulnerability are so entrenched that even climate-related incidences in wealthy countries, like the recent floods in Valencia or wildfires in LA don’t lead to a change in narrative. In fact, climate activists continue to be criminalised.

    Being aware of how images are used to influence our perceptions of vulnerability is an important step in changing the narrative. Climate change is already at levels at which we are all affected. We need to make this clearer.

    The UK has an historical responsibility to mitigate but it also needs to take more steps towards adaptation to the climate change that is already locked in.

    Speaking in February 2025, professor of energy and climate change Kevin Anderson described the future of humanity as a range of possibilities that goes from “dire consequences” to “catastrophic outcomes”. The higher temperatures are pushed past 1.5°C warming, the truer it is that nobody is safe.

    Don’t have time to read about climate change as much as you’d like?

    Get a weekly roundup in your inbox instead. Every Wednesday, The Conversation’s environment editor writes Imagine, a short email that goes a little deeper into just one climate issue. Join the 40,000+ readers who’ve subscribed so far.

    Charlotte Kate Weatherill does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

    – ref. What climate vulnerability actually looks like – https://theconversation.com/what-climate-vulnerability-actually-looks-like-249422

    MIL OSI – Global Reports –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: International Women’s Day 2025: UK statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    International Women’s Day 2025: UK statement to the OSCE

    Ambassador Neil Holland outlines that progress towards a prosperous world free from poverty cannot be achieved without accelerating gender equality and the empowerment of all girls and women.

    Thank you, Mr Chair.

    As the United Kingdom prepares to mark International Women’s Day on 8 March, the day serves as an important reminder that gender equality benefits everyone. Progress towards a prosperous world free from poverty cannot be achieved without accelerating gender equality and the empowerment of all girls and women.

    The current global trajectory is deeply concerning. Gender equality is under threat, and the world is off track to achieve Sustainable Development Goal 5 on Gender Equality by 2030. The power of online disinformation, harm and abuse, and the harnessing of violent misogynistic narratives by influential actors and groups globally is driving new and acute threats to gender equality. Where there have been hard-won legislative safeguards protecting women’s control over their health and bodies, we are seeing these being undermined and removed. Maternal mortality rates are stagnating and, in some cases, increasing. Human rights defenders and those who have dedicated their lives to advancing gender equality face violence and intimidation. In the OSCE region, there has been horrific evidence of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated through Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

    Growing levels of conflict and crisis disproportionately affect women and girls. They bear the brunt of conflict; humanitarian disaster; environmental degradation and food insecurity. The rights, freedoms, and wellbeing of women and girls in conflict and under repressive regimes are acutely constrained, driving intergenerational inequality and suffering.

    In this context, it is more important than ever that we stand up for gender equality. Accelerated progress on gender equality will deliver global economic growth, contribute to a safer and more secure world, and contribute to solving the energy and climate crises.

    The theme of International Women’s Day in 2025 is “Accelerate Action”. This focuses on the importance of taking swift and decisive steps to achieve gender equality. According to data from the World Economic Forum, at the current rate of progress it will take until the year 2158 – roughly five generations from now – to reach full gender parity. There is an urgent need to increase momentum in addressing the systemic barriers and biases that women face, both in personal and professional spheres.

    The UK is committed to improving the outlook for women and girls globally, including through large-scale programmes to pioneer effective approaches to ending Gender Based Violence, and through supporting women’s rights activists’ advocacy in key decision-making fora. The UK particularly champions the voices and leadership of women and girls in Ukraine, recognising the critical contribution women are making on the frontline and in communities affected by Russia’s illegal invasion.   

    Mr Chair, we can only build a fairer, freer, safer, wealthier and greener world if we put women and girls at the heart of the OSCE’s work. Women’s inclusion in leadership and meaningful decision making is essential for local, national and regional progress.

    It is vital that we, as OSCE participating States, fulfil our commitments to gender equality – as set out in the 1999 Charter for European Security, and related decisions – and ensure adequate funding for OSCE executive structures working to implement the organisation’s gender equality commitments.

    As the UK has stated previously, the principles we mark on International Women’s Day are not just for a day. Advancing gender equality is a policy from which everyone benefits. It is vital that we follow through on our commitments to ensure the equal rights of all women and girls.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI Russia: Yuri Trutnev met with a detachment of volunteer civil servants from the Far Eastern regions who returned from the North-Eastern Military District

    Translartion. Region: Russians Fedetion –

    Source: Government of the Russian Federation – An important disclaimer is at the bottom of this article.

    Yuri Trutnev held a meeting with a detachment of volunteer state civil servants who returned home after fulfilling their duty to defend the Motherland.

    March 6, 2025

    Deputy Prime Minister and Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Far Eastern Federal District Yuri Trutnev held a meeting with a group of volunteers – state civil servants who returned home after fulfilling their duty to defend the Motherland.

    The detachment was formed six months ago. It included 27 people: employees of the office of the Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in the Far Eastern Federal District, the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and nine regions of the Far Eastern Federal District (Buryatia – 2, Yakutia – 4, Transbaikalia – 3, Kamchatka – 2, Primorye – 2, Khabarovsk Krai – 1, Sakhalin Oblast – 3, Jewish Autonomous Oblast – 2, Chukotka – 3). The volunteers worked in two directions (Kursk and Donetsk), carried out reconnaissance of the forces and assets of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on various modifications of UAVs. All volunteers were awarded the medals of the Ministry of Defense “Participant of the Northern Military District”, and the members of the Kursk group (21 people) were additionally awarded the medal “Defender of the Kursk Region”.

    “I want to thank you for the decision you made to go into the combat zone. I know that many of you carried out tasks that risked your lives, and did them well. I am sure that the memory of your work will remain for a long time. This will help you perceive life differently, perceive the work that we do together differently. Understand more how necessary it is. Maybe you will be a little tougher. This is also normal. All this will remain in the memory of Russia and in the memory of your families. In any case, today you can confidently say that you are not just ready to defend the Motherland, but you defended it. So thank you. I bow to you all. You know that we are preparing new groups. And it will be like this until we win. Until Russia wins. We will make every effort to bring this victory closer,” said Yuri Trutnev.

    The Deputy Prime Minister reported that the Patriotic priority development area has been created to modernize and expand production facilities that manufacture military and dual-use products. “Such support is already being provided to 26 Far Eastern enterprises that manufacture FPV drones, aircraft-type UAVs, electronic warfare and reconnaissance equipment, sights, snow and swamp vehicles, hemostatic tourniquets, bulletproof vests and other products. Last year, together with the commanders of units participating in the special military operation, the tactical and technical characteristics of the manufactured products were determined. All products are tested for compliance with current conditions at the front and supplied to units of the Eastern Military District. In 2023–2024, 22.5 thousand products have already been sent to the special military operation zone, another 13 thousand products are being prepared for shipment, 27 thousand products will be manufactured and supplied by the end of the first quarter of 2025,” Yuri Trutnev specified.

    The volunteers received letters of gratitude from the Deputy Prime Minister for their service to the Motherland, their courage and personal example of selfless fulfillment of military duty during the special military operation. And in turn, they thanked Yuri Trutnev, the office of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of Russia in the Far Eastern Federal District, the Ministry for the Development of the Russian Far East and all Far Eastern regions for their assistance and support, and also handed over to the Deputy Prime Minister a captured drone of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that they shot down and a Victory Banner signed by all members of the detachment.

    “In April last year, Yuri Petrovich Trutnev set the task of forming a third detachment of Far Eastern civil servants to provide assistance in the SVO zone. It took about five months to select personnel and form the detachment. And this coincided with the enemy’s attack on the Kursk region. Therefore, we carried out our main task there. The detachment consisted of 27 federal employees. We left for the Kursk region in mid-August. And for six months we carried out combat missions in the SVO zone. I believe that the detachment has fully completed the tasks assigned to it, and now it has returned to its regular civilian jobs in full force. In my opinion, when the Motherland has problems, especially military ones, any man, regardless of his official position, is obliged to take up arms and stand up to defend the Fatherland. And an official has double responsibility. He is a civil servant. The state gave him a job, a salary, a position in society. “And his first duty is to come to the defense of the Motherland, if necessary,” noted Mikhail Kagan, a member of the detachment, commander of the aerial reconnaissance group, and deputy plenipotentiary representative of the President in the Far Eastern Federal District.

    Please note: This information is raw content directly from the source of the information. It is exactly what the source states and does not reflect the position of MIL-OSI or its clients.

    MIL OSI Russia News –

  • MIL-OSI: ING publishes 2024 Annual Report on Form 20-F

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    ING publishes 2024 Annual Report on Form 20-F

    ING filed today its Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended 31 December 2024 with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The 2024Form 20-F will be available on the ING website and can be downloaded from the SEC website (sec.gov) today. Shareholders or holders of ADRs can also request a hard copy of ING’s audited financial statements, free of charge, at www.ing.com/Investor-relations/Financial-performance/Annual-reports.htm.

    Note for editors

    For more on ING, please visit www.ing.com. Frequent news updates can be found in the Newsroom. Photos of ING operations, buildings and its executives are available for download at Flickr.

    ING PROFILE

    ING is a global financial institution with a strong European base, offering banking services through its operating company ING Bank. The purpose of ING Bank is: empowering people to stay a step ahead in life and in business. ING Bank’s more than 60,000 employees offer retail and wholesale banking services to customers in over 100 countries.

    ING Group shares are listed on the exchanges of Amsterdam (INGA NA, INGA.AS), Brussels and on the New York Stock Exchange (ADRs: ING US, ING.N).

    ING aims to put sustainability at the heart of what we do. Our policies and actions are assessed by independent research and ratings providers, which give updates on them annually. ING’s ESG rating by MSCI was reconfirmed by MSCI as ‘AA’ in August 2024 for the fifth year. As of December 2023, in Sustainalytics’ view, ING’s management of ESG material risk is ‘Strong’. Our current ESG Risk Rating, is 17.2 (Low Risk). ING Group shares are also included in major sustainability and ESG index products of leading providers. Here are some examples: Euronext, STOXX, Morningstar and FTSE Russell. Society is transitioning to a low-carbon economy. So are our clients, and so is ING. We finance a lot of sustainable activities, but we still finance more that’s not. Follow our progress on ing.com/climate.

    IMPORTANT LEGAL INFORMATION

    Elements of this press release contain or may contain information about ING Groep N.V. and/ or ING Bank N.V. within the meaning of Article 7(1) to (4) of EU Regulation No 596/2014 (‘Market Abuse Regulation’).

    ING Group’s annual accounts are prepared in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards as adopted by the European Union (‘IFRS- EU’). In preparing the financial information in this document, except as described otherwise, the same accounting principles are applied as in the 2024 ING Group consolidated annual accounts. All figures in this document are unaudited. Small differences are possible in the tables due to rounding. Certain of the statements contained herein are not historical facts, including, without limitation, certain statements made of future expectations and other forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current views and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in such statements. Actual results, performance or events may differ materially from those in such statements due to a number of factors, including, without limitation: (1) changes in general economic conditions and customer behaviour, in particular economic conditions in ING’s core markets, including changes affecting currency exchange rates and the regional and global economic impact of the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and related international response measures (2) changes affecting interest rate levels (3) any default of a major market participant and related market disruption (4) changes in performance of financial markets, including in Europe and developing markets (5) fiscal uncertainty in Europe and the United States (6) discontinuation of or changes in ‘benchmark’ indices (7) inflation and deflation in our principal markets (8) changes in conditions in the credit and capital markets generally, including changes in borrower and counterparty creditworthiness (9) failures of banks falling under the scope of state compensation schemes (10) non- compliance with or changes in laws and regulations, including those concerning financial services, financial economic crimes and tax laws, and the interpretation and application thereof (11) geopolitical risks, political instabilities and policies and actions of governmental and regulatory authorities, including in connection with the invasion of Russia into Ukraine and the related international response measures (12) legal and regulatory risks in certain countries with less developed legal and regulatory frameworks (13) prudential supervision and regulations, including in relation to stress tests and regulatory restrictions on dividends and distributions (also among members of the group) (14) ING’s ability to meet minimum capital and other prudential regulatory requirements (15) changes in regulation of US commodities and derivatives businesses of ING and its customers (16) application of bank recovery and resolution regimes, including write down and conversion powers in relation to our securities (17) outcome of current and future litigation, enforcement proceedings, investigations or other regulatory actions, including claims by customers or stakeholders who feel misled or treated unfairly, and other conduct issues (18) changes in tax laws and regulations and risks of non-compliance or investigation in connection with tax laws, including FATCA (19) operational and IT risks, such as system disruptions or failures, breaches of security, cyber-attacks, human error, changes in operational practices or inadequate controls including in respect of third parties with which we do business and including any risks as a result of incomplete, inaccurate, or otherwise flawed outputs from the algorithms and data sets utilized in artificial intelligence (20) risks and challenges related to cybercrime including the effects of cyberattacks and changes in legislation and regulation related to cybersecurity and data privacy, including such risks and challenges as a consequence of the use of emerging technologies, such as advanced forms of artificial intelligence and quantum computing (21) changes in general competitive factors, including ability to increase or maintain market share (22) inability to protect our intellectual property and infringement claims by third parties (23) inability of counterparties to meet financial obligations or ability to enforce rights against such counterparties (24) changes in credit ratings (25) business, operational, regulatory, reputation, transition and other risks and challenges in connection with climate change, diversity, equity and inclusion and other ESG-related matters, including data gathering and reporting and also including managing the conflicting laws and requirements of governments, regulators and authorities with respect to these topics (26) inability to attract and retain key personnel (27) future liabilities under defined benefit retirement plans (28) failure to manage business risks, including in connection with use of models, use of derivatives, or maintaining appropriate policies and guidelines (29) changes in capital and credit markets, including interbank funding, as well as customer deposits, which provide the liquidity and capital required to fund our operations, and (30) the other risks and uncertainties detailed in the most recent annual report of ING Groep N.V. (including the Risk Factors contained therein) and ING’s more recent disclosures, including press releases, which are available on www.ING.com.

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    Attachment

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: The UK supports Ukraine in its aim to ensure Russia cannot attack it again: UK statement to the OSCE

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    The UK supports Ukraine in its aim to ensure Russia cannot attack it again: UK statement to the OSCE

    Ambassador Holland dismisses Russian disinformation and underlines the UK’s support to Ukraine in its aim to ensure Russia cannot attack it again.

    Thank you, Mister Chair.  It will not surprise you or anyone else here to hear from me today a restatement of UK commitment to Ukraine. There has been a lot of nonsense spoken in this room about the UK’s position over recent weeks. The actions taken by the UK Prime Minister over the last week, including at the London Summit, make very clear how wrong any suggestion that the UK wants to prolong the war in Ukraine actually is.

    But the UK believes that the legal and political commitments that we signed up to after the Second World War mean something. These commitments, including the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, form a framework for our stability. They clearly state how we should expect countries to behave towards each other and to our citizens. Fundamentals such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and the right to choose alliances are not negotiable – or suspendible when inconvenient. For 80 years, when we have lived up to them, they have kept us all safe from unintended conflict in Europe, even during the Cold War.

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is therefore not just an unacceptable act of aggression, wrong in absolute terms and brutal and indiscriminate in the way it has been conducted. Although that is all true.  It is also a dangerous repudiation of the framework of principles and commitments that keep us safe. And to allow such aggression to be rewarded is a terrible example to set.  It would encourage more of the same behaviour, in this part of the world and elsewhere.

    We have heard a lot about what the Russian state wants over the last few weeks.  But for peace, when it comes, to be lasting, Ukraine needs to be confident that the Russian aggression cannot happen again.  The UK does not like war.  We do not like our friends being at war.  We do not seek to prolong war. But we do support Ukraine in its aim to ensure Russia cannot attack it again and will continue to support Ukraine until it believes the peace on offer is one which guarantees its security in a sustainable way.  That means they must be able to negotiate from a position of strength. This has always been the UK’s position, before and during this unnecessary war. Ukraine is a sovereign country that can decide its own future without interference from other countries.

    Mister Chair, as ever Russia is producing a blizzard of disinformation to distract us from the facts. The facts are that Russia invaded Ukraine without provocation, that tens of thousands of soldiers on both sides have died unnecessarily and that this could stop tomorrow if Russia made the right choices and lived up to its commitments.

    Mister Chair, the UK’s position is simple to understand. Aggression should not be rewarded.  The principles we have all signed up should be protected. A peace should be sustainable. And Ukraine should be free to determine its own future.  That is a strategic vision worth holding out for.

    Thank you.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 March 2025

    Invasion of Ukraine

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Kerbside textiles recycling proves a hit in Oxford 

    Source: City of Oxford

    Oxford’s new kerbside textile recycling service has had an outstanding start.

    The first set of figures showing a strong public response. Launched in January, the free collection service allows residents to recycle their old textiles conveniently from home. 

    In just the first month of operation, the scheme collected an impressive 1,771kg of textiles through door-to-door collections, while the new textile bring bank at Rose Hill Community Centre added another 310kg.  

    Additionally, 510kg of pillows and duvets were collected, ensuring that these materials were given a second life instead of ending up in landfill. These items are weighed separately as they are processed differently.

    The scheme provides all Oxford residents with an easy way to recycle unwanted textiles, supporting efforts to reduce household waste, deter fly-tipping, and protect the environment. 

    A partnership for sustainability 

    The textile recycling service is operated in partnership with ODS and Recycling Solutions, a family-run company that collaborates with charities and local authorities across the UK. In Oxford, Recycling Solutions supports the Thames Valley Air Ambulance by raising funds through the sale of second-hand clothing. 

    Reducing waste and supporting communities 

    Textiles currently account for approximately 3% of household waste, with over a million tonnes going to landfill nationally each year. This new service ensures that, in Oxford, textiles are sustainably reused or repurposed, reducing environmental impact while also providing affordable clothing worldwide. 

    How the service works 

    Residents can arrange a kerbside collection through Recycling Solutions, who will provide details on when and where to leave items. Weekly collections are scheduled based on residents’ locations in Oxford. For more information and to book a collection, visit the Recycling Textiles webpage.  

    Items accepted include: 

    • clothing and shoes 

    • duvets, pillows, cushions, blankets, towels  

    • handbags 

    • wellington boots 

    Items not accepted include: 

    • rugs and mats. 

    All items must be clean and dry before collection. 

    Comment 

    “This new recycling service has really taken off and started to make a significant difference in only a short space of time. 

    “We had to close the on-street bring banks some time ago as they were becoming a target for fly-tippers. Now, together with our partners ODS and Recycling Solutions, we’re filling the recycling gap and at the same time providing a much-needed income stream for the Thames Valley Air Ambulance.” 
    Councillor Nigel Chapman, Cabinet Member for Citizen Focused Services and Council Companies 

    Additional recycling options 

    Residents can also drop off textiles at a new 24/7 recycling bank at Rose Hill Community Centre or take them to Redbridge Household Waste Recycling Centre.  

    Usable textiles can be donated to charity shops, shared with friends or family, sold in second-hand marketplaces, or repurposed creatively at home. 

    A free and inclusive service 

    The kerbside textile recycling service is completely free for Oxford residents, with no minimum amount required for collection. 

    An ethical recycling approach 

    Recycling Solutions ensure that collected clothing is ethically reused or recycled. High-quality items are sold to second-hand traders, primarily in Ukraine, while ‘end-of-life’ garments are repurposed into industrial materials, insulation, and new fibres.  

    The company follows a zero-waste policy, with proceeds benefiting Thames Valley Air Ambulance. 

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI China: Macron proposes to discuss nuclear deterrence for Europe

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    Flags of European Union (EU) and Ukraine are seen at the EU headquarters in Brussels, Belgium, Feb. 24, 2025. [Photo/Xinhua]

    French President Emmanuel Macron announced on Wednesday that he has decided to open strategic discussions with European allies on potential nuclear protection.

    “Responding to the historic call of the future German chancellor, I have decided to open a strategic debate on the protection of our allies in Europe through our (nuclear) deterrent,” Macron said in a televised address.

    Speaking on Europe’s defense and Ukraine, he emphasized that France’s nuclear deterrent has played a role in maintaining peace and security in Europe.

    On Ukraine, Macron asserted that the country has “the right to peace and security for itself, and it is in the interest of the European continent’s security.” He stressed the need to ensure that any future peace, once achieved, is sustainable.

    “This will certainly require long-term support for the Ukrainian army and could potentially involve deploying European forces,” he said.

    However, Macron clarified that such European forces would not engage in frontline combat but would instead help ensure that peace is upheld once secured.

    He also announced that France would host a meeting next week with countries willing to contribute to future European forces to be deployed in Ukraine.

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI China: Ukraine intends to take 1st steps towards peace soon

    Source: China State Council Information Office 3

    This photo taken on Feb. 27, 2022 shows smoke rising in the sky in Kiev, Ukraine. [Photo/Xinhua]

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said Wednesday that his country plans to take the first steps towards peace in the near future.

    “The first steps on the path to a just and lasting peace are incredibly important. We want to move forward speedily, in cooperation with the United States and all of Europe,” Zelensky said on social media platform X.

    Meanwhile, Andriy Yermak, head of the President’s Office, announced that he had discussed steps towards peace in a phone conversation with U.S. National Security Adviser Mike Waltz.

    “We exchanged views on security issues and the coordination of positions within the framework of bilateral relations between Ukraine and the U.S.,” Yermak said on Telegram.

    He added that Ukrainian and U.S. teams are set to meet soon to “continue this important work.”

    MIL OSI China News –

  • MIL-OSI: NXP Semiconductors Announces Quarterly Dividend

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    EINDHOVEN, The Netherlands, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — As part of its ongoing capital return program, NXP Semiconductors N.V. (NASDAQ: NXPI) today announced that its board of directors has approved the payment of an interim dividend. The actions are based on the continued and significant strength of the NXP capital structure, and the board’s confidence in the company’s ability to drive long-term growth and strong cash flow.

    The board of directors has approved the payment of an interim dividend of $1.014 per ordinary share for the first quarter of 2025. The interim dividend will be paid in cash on April 9, 2025, to shareholders of record as of March 19, 2025.

    Taxation – Cash Dividends
    Cash dividends will be subject to the deduction of Dutch dividend withholding tax at the rate of 15 percent, which may be reduced in certain circumstances. Non-Dutch resident shareholders, depending on their circumstances, may be entitled to a full or partial refund of Dutch dividend withholding tax. If you are uncertain as to the tax treatment of any dividends, consult your tax advisor.

    About NXP Semiconductors
    NXP Semiconductors N.V. (NASDAQ: NXPI) is the trusted partner for innovative solutions in the automotive, industrial & IoT, mobile, and communications infrastructure markets. NXP’s “Brighter Together” approach combines leading-edge technology with pioneering people to develop system solutions that make the connected world better, safer, and more secure. The company has operations in more than 30 countries and posted revenue of $12.61 billion in 2024. Find out more at www.nxp.com.

    Forward-looking Statements
    This document includes forward-looking statements which include statements regarding NXP’s business strategy, financial condition, results of operations, market data, as well as any other statements which are not historical facts. By their nature, forward-looking statements are subject to numerous factors, risks and uncertainties that could cause actual outcomes and results to be materially different from those projected. These factors, risks and uncertainties include the following: market demand and semiconductor industry conditions; our ability to successfully introduce new technologies and products; the demand for the goods into which NXP’s products are incorporated; trade disputes between the U.S. and China, potential increase of barriers to international trade and resulting disruptions to NXP’s established supply chains; the impact of government actions and regulations, including restrictions on the export of US-regulated products and technology; increasing and evolving cybersecurity threats and privacy risks, including theft of sensitive or confidential data; the ability to generate sufficient cash, raise sufficient capital or refinance corporate debt at or before maturity to meet both NXP’s debt service and research and development and capital investment requirements; our ability to accurately estimate demand and match our production capacity accordingly or obtain supplies from third-party producers to meet demand; our access to production capacity from third-party outsourcing partners, and any events that might affect their business or NXP’s relationship with them; our ability to secure adequate and timely supply of equipment and materials from suppliers; our ability to avoid operational problems and product defects and, if such issues were to arise, to correct them quickly; our ability to form strategic partnerships and joint ventures and to successfully cooperate with our alliance partners; our ability to win competitive bid selection processes; our ability to develop products for use in customers’ equipment and products; the ability to successfully hire and retain key management and senior product engineers; global hostilities, including the invasion of Ukraine by Russia and resulting regional instability, sanctions and any other retaliatory measures taken against Russia and the continued hostilities and the armed conflict in the Middle East, which could adversely impact the global supply chain, disrupt our operations or negatively impact the demand for our products in our primary end markets; the ability to maintain good relationships with NXP’s suppliers; and a change in tax laws could have an effect on our estimated effective tax rate. In addition, this document contains information concerning the semiconductor industry, our end markets and business generally, which is forward-looking in nature and is based on a variety of assumptions regarding the ways in which the semiconductor industry, our end markets and business will develop. NXP has based these assumptions on information currently available, if any one or more of these assumptions turn out to be incorrect, actual results may differ from those predicted. While NXP does not know what impact any such differences may have on its business, if there are such differences, its future results of operations and its financial condition could be materially adversely affected. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak to results only as of the date the statements were made. Except for any ongoing obligation to disclose material information as required by the United States federal securities laws, NXP does not have any intention or obligation to publicly update or revise any forward-looking statements after we distribute this document, whether to reflect any future events or circumstances or otherwise. For a discussion of potential risks and uncertainties, please refer to the risk factors listed in our SEC filings. Copies of our SEC filings are available on our Investor Relations website, www.nxp.com/investor or from the SEC website, www.sec.gov.

    For further information, please contact:                                                                                                                                                       

    Investors:  Media:
    Jeff Palmer  Paige Iven
    jeff.palmer@nxp.com paige.iven@nxp.com
    +1 408 205 0687  +1 817 975 0602
       

    NXP-Corp

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Advanced attack drones for Ukraine in new deal struck by UK government and Anduril UK

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Press release

    Advanced attack drones for Ukraine in new deal struck by UK government and Anduril UK

    Ukraine’s armed forces will be backed by more advanced attack drones to tackle Russian aggression in the Black Sea, following a deal struck by the UK government and an Anglo-American defence tech company.

    Defence Secretary John Healey visits Anduril in Washington DC

    • The deal with Anduril UK has been agreed ahead of the Defence Secretary’s meeting with his US counterpart Pete Hegseth at the Pentagon today.
    • During his visit to Washington D.C., John Healey MP met with staff at Anduril’s facility.
    • The UK continues to work with allies to put Ukraine in the strongest position for peace as it continues to defend itself against Russian aggression.

    Defence Secretary John Healey MP visited Anduril, the firm supplying the drones, in Washington D.C. ahead of a meeting with his US counterpart Pete Hegseth at the Pentagon today.

    The deal follows a meeting of world leaders in London last week, when the Prime Minister and allies agreed it was essential that military support continues for Ukraine to put the country in the strongest possible position for peace as it continues to defend itself from Russian aggression.

    The new contracts, totalling nearly £30 million and backed by the International Fund for Ukraine, will result in Anduril UK supplying cutting-edge Altius 600m and Altius 700m drones – known as loitering munitions – that are designed to monitor an area before striking targets that enter it.

    The Defence Secretary visited Anduril yesterday, where he spoke with a number of American and British staff. Founded in California, Anduril continues to invest significantly in the UK with a large footprint across the country and plans to rapidly scale, in line with the Government’s commitment to keeping the nation safe while providing highly skilled jobs.

    Securing a lasting peace in Ukraine and strengthening bonds between NATO allies set to top the agenda when the Defence Secretary meets with his US counterpart today.

    The visit follows Prime Minister Keir Starmer meeting the US President last week, and John Healey MP will hail the unparalleled depth of the UK’s special relationship with the US – the UK’s closest security ally – as both nations continue to collaborate to bolster security and support economic growth. 

    The meeting follows the recent decision by the UK Government to raise defence spending to 2.5% of GDP by April 2027 – the biggest sustained uplift since the Cold War. National security is a foundation of our Plan for Change, and the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary have said that Europe needs to take a greater responsibility for its security, and that defence can be an engine for economic growth.

    Defence Secretary, John Healey MP, said:

    We are determined to achieve a secure, lasting peace in Ukraine, which means putting Ukraine in the strongest possible position to prevent any return to Russian aggression.

    The UK has already provided more than 10,000 drones to Ukraine’s Armed Forces, which have proved vital in disrupting Russian troop advances and targeting positions behind the frontline.

    With a £2.26 billion loan from seized Russian assets, plus £1.6 billion worth of air defence missiles announced for Ukraine in the last week, the UK is continuing to show leadership in securing a lasting peace for Ukraine.

    The work with Anduril UK been led by Defence Equipment & Support – the procurement arm of the MOD – on behalf of the UK-administered International Fund for Ukraine (IFU). The fund now stands at more than £1.3 billion worth of pledges from 10 other countries, of which the UK has contributed £500 million. 

    Ukraine’s armed forces will take delivery of the drones, launchers and spare parts over the coming months. 

    Dr Rich Drake, MD of Anduril UK and Europe said:

    Anduril UK is proud to partner with the UK Government, working hand in glove to deliver vital capabilities for the UK and its Allies. Our focus on developing and deploying technology where and when it’s needed is at the core of everything we do – from the rapid delivery of Altius to Ukraine to the expansion of our presence here in the UK. We look forward to strengthening our partnership with the Ministry of Defence to protect our nation and our allies.

    In January, it was announced that 30,000 drones will be sent to Ukraine by the international Drone Capability Coalition, co-led by the UK and Latvia.

    Since July 2024, the Government has provided over £5.26 billion in military aid and financial support to Ukraine, including a £3 billion annual military aid and a £2.26 billion loan for military spending.

    The British and US Armed Forces operate in close alignment around the world, from the long-standing global coalition to combat Daesh in the Middle East to joint maritime security patrols in the Indo-Pacific. 

    The Defence Secretary’s visit to Washington D.C. comes as the UK receives the last of an order of 50 of the latest generation AH-64E attack helicopters for the British Army, the most advanced attack helicopter in the world. The helicopter was handed over this week at the Boeing site in Arizona under a programme that supports more than 300 UK jobs, helping to grow the UK economy – underscoring defence as an engine for driving economic growth. 

    The visit also comes at the conclusion of the 50th occurrence of Exercise Red Flag in Nevada, a joint exercise with the UK, United States and Australia. The training is designed to test equally matched air forces in a realistic combat scenario and involves more than 3,000 military personnel in high-intensity training, such as dogfighting, air-policing and practicing bombing runs, at Nellis Air Force Base.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Eurovision legacy lives on in Liverpool

    Source: City of Liverpool

    A new study has revealed how the Liverpool City Region is continuing to reap the rewards of hosting Eurovision 2023, with repeat visitors bringing an additional £11.1m to the local economy over the past year alone.

    This is in addition to the £54.8m generated during the event itself, which saw Liverpool shine under the global spotlight as 162 million viewers worldwide tuned in. But the true impact of Eurovision goes beyond just numbers; it has helped power Liverpool City Region’s record-breaking visitor economy, which is now worth an estimated £6.25bn.

    Hosting Eurovision on behalf of Ukraine was more than just a music event; it was a statement of solidarity, resilience, and global leadership. As the world grapples with ongoing challenges, Liverpool City Region has emerged as a city that doesn’t just watch history unfold but plays a part in shaping it.

    The ‘Eurovision effect’ has reinforced the Liverpool City Region’s position as a premier global destination, attracting record-breaking tourism. It continues to stage major events like EURO 2028, Radio 1’s Big Weekend, The Open Golf Championship and the World Boxing Championships, and solidifying its reputation as a cultural and economic powerhouse.

    Despite not ranking in the top 100 cities globally by population, Liverpool sits among the top 10 most recognised non-capital cities worldwide. The Eurovision effect has only strengthened that status, elevating the city’s brand on the international stage and proving that Liverpool continues to punch well above its weight when it comes to cultural influence.

    Liverpool City Region Mayor, Steve Rotheram, said:

    “Eurovision wasn’t just a music competition—it was a statement of solidarity with Ukraine and a testament to Liverpool’s global influence. We didn’t just host an event—we embraced a cause.

    “One year on, the Eurovision effect continues to deliver—boosting our economy, creating jobs, and securing our city region’s position as a place that welcomes the world. But the real legacy of Eurovision isn’t just financial—it’s the pride, unity, and lasting international partnerships we’ve built.

    “At a time when global events remind us of the importance of standing together, Liverpool proved that culture isn’t just entertainment—it’s soft power in action. Our doors remain open to the world, and Eurovision was just the beginning.”

    Councillor Liam Robinson, Leader of Liverpool City Council, added:

    “Liverpool’s hosting of Eurovision on behalf of Ukraine redefined the competition.

     “Not only was it our ambition to stage the most successful-ever contest – which we achieved in spades – but from the outset we wanted to make sure there was a lasting legacy of the event, which would continue to benefit Liverpool for years to come.

     “This latest report shows in black and white the value of hosting major events. For ten days in May 2023, Liverpool shone under the global spotlight, making it a destination people wanted to return to time and time again, or visit for the first time. In turn, that boosts our local economy, supports jobs and brings vital footfall to our culture and leisure industries.

    “And of course, seeing what a show this City can put on attracts other opportunities, and securing the likes of Radio 1’s Big Weekend and the World Boxing Championships can undoubtedly be attributed to the Eurovision-effect.

     “The City Council has spent more than 20 years investing and building its cultural credentials, understanding the true value of soft power and how transformational it can be, and we look forward to the next phase of our journey which will see us working with all of our neighbouring boroughs to make the City Region an enviable cultural capital.”

    Liverpool’s Director of Culture, Claire McColgan CBE, who is also Assistant Director – Culture for the Liverpool City Region, said:

    “Evaluation and learning is always at the heart of everything we do as it informs and shapes future events. Eurovision 2023 remains a standout event for this city and we’re still hugely proud or how we worked in partnership with the BBC, the Government, and of course the people of Ukraine, to deliver what is quite rightly regarded as the most successful competitions in the event’s history. These relationships continue to grow and strengthen, helping to cement Liverpool’s reputation as a global leader in major event delivery.

    “As the UK’s first UN Accelerator City, legacy will take centre stage once again this year, as we commit to introducing environmental innovation where possible in our creative sector, and in doing so ensuring that our major events leave a lasting legacy for our communities.”

    The research, commissioned by the Liverpool City Region Combined Authority and Liverpool City Council, highlights several key findings:

    • Repeat visitors: 54,417 people who attended Eurovision events returned to Liverpool, making a total of 72,454 additional trips.
    • Financial impact: These return visits generated £11.1m, adding to the £54.8m impact during the event itself.
    • Cultural value: The event delivered an estimated £4.6m in cultural benefits to domestic attendees.
    • Global reputation: Eurovision put Liverpool on the map for major international events, leading to record-breaking visitor numbers in 2023 and a £6.25bn tourism economy—£600m above projected figures.
    • Pride and community impact: Over 95% of Liverpool City Region residents said they were proud of Liverpool’s role as host, reinforcing the event’s lasting social value.

    Eurovision was just the beginning. Liverpool City Region has established itself as a major global events capital, and with an ever-growing £6.25bn visitor economy, it is ready to welcome the next wave of world-class events, partnerships, and opportunities.

    The city that staged Eurovision for Ukraine is now preparing to host the world—again and again.

    Read the full report here.

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI United Kingdom: Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine: UK national statement to IAEA Board, March 2025

    Source: United Kingdom – Executive Government & Departments

    Speech

    Nuclear safety, security and safeguards in Ukraine: UK national statement to IAEA Board, March 2025

    UK Ambassador to the IAEA Corinne Kitsell’s statement to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors meeting on Ukraine

    Chair, 

    Since Russia’s illegal invasion in March 2022, the nuclear safety and security situation in Ukraine continues to deteriorate. The UK is grateful to the Agency for its work with Ukraine to help decrease the risk of a nuclear accident, and to the IAEA personnel who continue to operate under the most challenging of circumstances. 

    The risks that the ISAMZ team has been subjected to over this reporting period – including the attack on their vehicle on their journey to ZNPP in December, and their extended stay at the plant due to intense military activity in the area – are unacceptable. The ISAMZ staff affected have the UK’s upmost sympathy and gratitude.  

    We are concerned that the IAEA was forced to conduct the most recent ISAMZ rotation through Russian temporarily controlled territory. It is imperative that this be an exception, on humanitarian grounds, and that future rotations are implemented using routes agreed with the Government of Ukraine and with full respect of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We welcome the DG’s commitment to this Board that the Agency will continue to comply fully with UN General Assembly resolution 11 / 4 adopted on 12 October 2022 and all relevant resolutions of the IAEA policy-making organs.  

    Three years after Russia’s illegal and irresponsible seizure of ZNPP we are grateful for ISAMZ’s continued reporting on the nuclear safety situation, where the unreliable water and electricity supply to the plant, and military activity within its vicinity, continue to pose challenges. We remain deeply concerned that ISAMZ still do not receive timely access to all relevant areas of the plant – despite repeated calls from this Board.  

    Chair, 

    Over the reporting period we have seen heightened military activity near all of Ukraine’s NPPs and continued Russian attacks on substations connected to those plants – a situation so serious that an extraordinary meeting of the Board of Governors had to be convened in December.  

    At that Board, we heard the Russian Ambassador claim that there was no decisive link between energy infrastructure and nuclear safety at NPPs. Contrary to this claim, paragraphs 26 to 30 of the DG’s report provide a useful overview of relevant IAEA Safety Standards and other publications, which make clear the need for NPPs to have reliable and stable power supply so that safety can be maintained.   

    Chair, 

    A drone hitting and causing a fire on the large protective structure at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant adds to the ongoing risks to nuclear safety and security posed by military activity in Ukraine.  

    We are relieved that despite significant damage caused by the fire, which lasted over two weeks and required over 150 holes to be cut in the external cladding to extinguish, there has been no change in radiation levels at the site. But the DG’s assessment that the damage could have an undetermined “adverse” impact on nuclear safety in the long term is extremely worrying.  

    In view of the precarious situation, we appreciate that staff and management of Chornobyl NPP are regularly exchanging information with the IAEA team on the ground. 

    Chair, 

    The work of this Board is serious. It is a forum for debate, discussion and decisions, not for spreading propaganda and false narratives. Colleagues who were here last year heard me express concern about deliberate attempts at gaslighting by some members of this Board, creating false narratives to try to make others question their perceptions of the truth and question the truth about events. Such game-playing as no place in a serious Board such as this. 

    Thank you Chair.

    Updates to this page

    Published 6 March 2025

    MIL OSI United Kingdom –

  • MIL-OSI: KVH Industries Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2024 Results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    MIDDLETOWN, R.I., March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — KVH Industries, Inc., (Nasdaq: KVHI), reported financial results for the quarter and full year ended December 31, 2024 today. The company will hold a conference call to discuss these results at 9:00 a.m. ET today, which can be accessed at investors.kvh.com. Following the call, a replay of the webcast will be available through the company’s website.

    Fourth Quarter 2024 Highlights

    • Total revenues decreased by 14% in the fourth quarter of 2024 to $26.9 million from $31.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2023.
       
    • Airtime revenue decreased by $5.1 million to $20.8 million, or 20% in the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to the fourth quarter of 2023.
       
    • Net loss in the fourth quarter of 2024 was $4.3 million, or $0.22 per share, compared to a net loss of $12.2 million, or $0.63 per share, in the fourth quarter of 2023.
       
    • Non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA was $0.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2024, compared to $2.3 million in the fourth quarter of 2023. The U.S. Coast Guard contract downgrade reduced non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA by $2.2 million year over year.

    Commenting on the company’s fourth quarter and full year results, Brent C. Bruun, KVH’s Chief Executive Officer, said, “Our recent results validate our strategic decision to integrate Starlink fully into our product and service portfolio. We shipped more than 1,000 Starlink terminals in the fourth quarter and, with more than 2,300 activations in 2024, Starlink is now the fastest growing product line in our history. At the same time, we have strengthened our multi-orbit, multi-channel portfolio with the addition of OneWeb, CommBox Edge, and the TracNet Coastal global 5G and Wi-Fi communication system.

    “Fourth quarter airtime and service revenue was $22.3 million, a $5.4 million reduction from the fourth quarter of 2023. Of this reduction, $2.2 million was related to the U.S. Coast Guard contract downgrade, while the remaining decline was driven by overall softness in the VSAT airtime market primarily due to the impact of customer demand for Starlink services. Our Starlink airtime margins continue to be strong, though overall airtime gross margins declined due in part to fixed costs for VSAT services. Our subscriber base increased by 4% in the fourth quarter, CommBox Edge activations doubled, and we achieved a fourth consecutive quarter of record terminal shipments. We are in a stronger position now than a year ago, and I believe we are on the path toward renewed growth and profitability. With this in mind, for full year 2025 we anticipate that revenue will be in the range of $115 million to $125 million, and adjusted EBITDA in the range of $9 million to $15 million.”

    Financial Highlights (in millions, except per share data)
             
        Three Months Ended   Year Ended
        December 31,   December 31,
          2024       2023       2024       2023  
    GAAP Results                
    Revenue   $                        26.9     $                        31.5     $                     113.8     $                     132.4  
    Loss from operations   $                        (3.2 )   $                      (12.2 )   $                      (11.9 )   $                      (17.3 )
    Net loss   $                        (4.3 )   $                      (12.2 )   $                      (11.0 )   $                      (15.4 )
    Net loss per share   $                      (0.22 )   $                      (0.63 )   $                      (0.57 )   $                      (0.81 )
                     
    Non-GAAP Adjusted EBITDA   $                          0.5     $                          2.3     $                          8.1     $                        14.3  


    Fourth     Quarter Financial Summary

    Revenue was $26.9 million for the fourth quarter of 2024, a decrease of 14% compared to $31.5 million in the fourth quarter of 2023.

    Service revenues for the fourth quarter of 2024 were $22.3 million, a decrease of 20%. The decrease in service sales was primarily due to a $5.1 million decrease in our airtime service sales, of which $2.2 million was related to the U.S. Coast Guard contract downgrade.

    Product revenues for the fourth quarter of 2024 were $4.6 million, an increase of 24% from the fourth quarter of 2023. The increase in product sales was primarily due to a $1.2 million increase in Starlink product sales, partially offset by a $0.3 million decrease in TracVision product sales.

    Our operating expenses decreased $2.7 million to $10.3 million for the fourth quarter of 2024 compared to $13.0 million for the fourth quarter of 2023. This decrease was primarily due to the $2.1 million charge incurred in 2023 for the discontinuation of a project for implementing a manufacturing-centric accounting system and a $0.8 million decrease in recurring salaries, benefits and taxes, partially offset by $0.9 million of restructuring severance charges.

    Full Year Financial Summary

    Revenue was $113.8 million for the year ended December 31, 2024, a decrease of 14% compared to $132.4 million for the year ended December 31, 2023.

    Service revenues for the year ended December 31, 2024, were $96.4 million, a decrease of 16% compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. The decrease in service sales was primarily due to a $17.1 million decrease in our airtime service sales, driven primarily by a decrease in VSAT-only subscribers, partially offset by an increase in Starlink service sales. $2.7 million of this decrease was related to the U.S. Coast Guard contract downgrade.

    Product revenues for the year ended December 31, 2024, were $17.4 million, a decrease of 2% compared to the year ended December 31, 2023. The decrease in product sales was primarily the result of a $2.2 million decrease in VSAT Broadband product sales, a $2.0 million decrease in TracVision product sales and a $1.3 million decrease in accessory and service product sales, partially offset by a $5.0 million increase in Starlink product sales and a $0.5 million increase in CommBox Edge product sales.

    Our operating expenses decreased $8.1 million to $47.1 million in the year ended December 31, 2024, compared to $55.2 million in the year ended December 31, 2023. This decrease in operating expenses was primarily due to a $4.9 million decrease in aggregate non-cash impairment charges against goodwill and long-lived assets, a $2.1 million charge incurred in 2023 for the discontinuation of a project for implementing a manufacturing-centric accounting system, a $2.0 million decrease in salaries, benefits and taxes, excluding costs related to the reduction in workforce, a $1.0 million decrease in professional fees, a $0.4 million decrease in external commissions, a $0.4 million decrease in computer expenses, a $0.4 million decrease in depreciation and amortization, and a $0.3 million decrease in expensed materials. These decreases in expenses were partially offset by $2.9 million of costs related to the reductions in our workforce and a $0.7 million reduction in reimbursements made by EMCORE for expenses incurred under the transition services agreement relating to the sale of the inertial navigation business in August 2022. The $8.1 million improvement in operating expenses reflects a reduction in non-cash impairment charges of $4.9 million from 2023 to 2024.

    Other Recent Announcements

    • December 10, 2024 – Seaspan Selects KVH to Equip Fleet with OneWeb Low Earth Orbit Solution
    • December 5, 2024 – Vroon and KVH Complete Deployment of Starlink/VSAT Hybrid Connectivity on 58 Vessels
    • December 3, 2024 – KVH Introduces TracNet™ Coastal and TracNet Coastal Pro 5G/Wi-Fi Terminals and Cellular Data Plans

    Conference Call Details

    KVH Industries will host a conference call today at 9:00 a.m. ET through the company’s website. The conference call can be accessed at investors.kvh.com and listeners are welcome to submit questions pertaining to the earnings release and conference call to ir@kvh.com. The audio archive will be available on the company website within three hours of the completion of the call.

    Non-GAAP Financial Measures

    This release provides non-GAAP financial information as a supplement to our condensed consolidated financial statements, which are prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”). Management uses these non-GAAP financial measures internally in analyzing financial results to assess operational performance. The presentation of this financial information is not intended to be considered in isolation or as a substitute for the financial information prepared in accordance with GAAP. The non-GAAP financial measures used in this press release adjust for specified items that can be highly variable or difficult to predict. Management generally uses these non-GAAP financial measures to facilitate financial and operational decision-making, including evaluation of our historical operating results and comparison to competitors’ operating results. These non-GAAP financial measures reflect an additional way of viewing aspects of our operations that, when viewed with GAAP results and the reconciliations to corresponding GAAP financial measures, may provide a more complete understanding of factors and trends affecting our business.

    Some limitations of non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA include the following: non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA represents net income (loss) before, as applicable, interest income, net, income tax expense (benefit), depreciation, amortization, stock-based compensation expense, goodwill impairment charges, long-lived assets impairment charges, charges for disposal of discontinued projects, loss on unfavorable future contracts, employee termination and other variable costs, executive separation costs, transaction-related and other variable legal and advisory fees, irregular inventory write-downs, excess purchase order obligations, gains and losses on sale of subsidiaries, and foreign exchange transaction gains and losses.

    Other companies, including companies in KVH’s industry, may calculate these non-GAAP financial measures differently or not at all, which will reduce their usefulness as a comparative measure.

    Because non-GAAP financial measures exclude the effect of items that increase or decrease our reported results of operations, management strongly encourages investors to review our consolidated financial statements and publicly filed reports in their entirety. Reconciliations of the non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures are included in the tables accompanying this release.

    About KVH Industries, Inc.

    KVH Industries, Inc. is a global leader in maritime and mobile connectivity delivered via the KVH ONE network. The company, founded in 1982, is based in Middletown, RI, with research, development, and manufacturing operations in Middletown, RI, and more than a dozen offices around the globe. KVH provides connectivity solutions for commercial maritime, leisure marine, military/government, and land mobile applications on vessels and vehicles, including the TracNet, TracPhone, and TracVision product lines, the KVH ONE OpenNet Program for non-KVH antennas, AgilePlans Connectivity as a Service (CaaS), and the KVH Link crew wellbeing content service.

    This press release contains forward-looking statements that involve risks and uncertainties. For example, forward-looking statements include statements regarding projected financial results, the anticipated benefits of our restructuring and other initiatives, anticipated cost savings, our investment plans, our development goals, and the potential impact of our future initiatives on revenue, competitive positioning, profitability, and orders. Actual results could differ materially from the results projected in or implied by the forward-looking statements made in this press release. Factors that might cause these differences include, but are not limited to: continued increasing competition, particularly from lower-cost providers, low earth orbit satellite systems and other telecommunications systems, especially in the global leisure market, which is reducing demand for geosynchronous satellite services, including ours; the impact of lower revenue from the U.S. Coast Guard; potentially lower product and service margins from reseller arrangements; the risk that sales of Starlink terminals will slow down or decrease; potential hardware and software competition for our new CommBox product offerings; unanticipated obstacles to implementation of our manufacturing wind-down; unanticipated costs and expenses arising from the wind-down; unanticipated effects of the wind-down on our ongoing business; the risks associated with increased customer reliance on third-party hardware; the lack of future product differentiation; new service offerings from hardware providers; potential customer delays in selecting our services; the uncertain impact of continuing industry consolidation; the risk that our OpenNet program will lead to further reductions in sales of our satellite products; the risk that our current and future non-exclusive arrangements with Starlink and OneWeb will not provide material benefits; contingencies and termination rights applicable to pending and future property and asset sales; uncertainty regarding customer responses to new product and service introductions; challenges and potential additional expenses in retaining our employees, particularly in the current competitive labor market characterized by rising wages; the challenges of meeting customer expectations with a smaller employee base; uncertainties created by our new business strategy, which may impact customer recruitment and retention; the uncertain impact of ongoing disruptions in our supply chain and associated increases in our costs; the uncertain impact of inflation, particularly with respect to fuel costs, and fears of recession; the uncertain impact of the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and international tensions in Asia, including the impact of dramatic shifts in U.S. geopolitical priorities; unanticipated changes or disruptions in our markets; technological breakthroughs by competitors; changes in customer priorities or preferences; increasing customer terminations; unanticipated liabilities, charges and write-offs; the potential that competitors will design around or invalidate our intellectual property rights; a history of losses; continued fluctuations in quarterly results; the uncertain impact of recent dramatic changes in both U.S. and foreign trade policy, including actual and potential new or higher tariffs and trade barriers, as well as trade wars with other countries; potentially inflationary impacts of tariffs and budget deficits; unanticipated obstacles in our product and service development, cost engineering and manufacturing efforts; adverse impacts of currency fluctuations; our ability to successfully commercialize our new initiatives without unanticipated additional expenses or delays; reduced sales to companies in or dependent upon the turbulent oil and gas industry; the impact of extended economic weakness on the sale and use of marine vessels and recreational vehicles; continued challenges of maintaining our market share in the market for airtime services; the risk that declining sales of the TracNet H-series and TracPhone V-HTS series products and related services will continue to reduce airtime gross margins; the risk that reduced product sales will continue to erode product gross margins and lead to increased losses; potential continuing declines or changes in customer demand, due to economic, weather-related, seasonal, and other factors, particularly with respect to the TracNet H-series and TracPhone V-HTS series; exposure for potential intellectual property infringement; changes in tax and accounting requirements or assessments; and export restrictions, delays in procuring export licenses, and other international risks. These and other factors are discussed in more detail in our Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 7, 2024. Copies are available through our Investor Relations department and website, investors.kvh.com. We do not assume any obligation to update our forward-looking statements to reflect new information and developments.

    KVH Industries, Inc., has used, registered, or applied to register its trademarks in the USA and other countries around the world, including but not limited to the following marks: KVH, KVH ONE, TracPhone, TracVision, AgilePlans, CommBox, and TracNet. Other trademarks are the property of their respective companies.

    KVH INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS
    (in thousands, except per share amounts, unaudited)
     
        Three months ended
    December 31,    		   Year ended
    December 31,
          2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Sales:                
    Service   $      22,324     $      27,739     $      96,446     $    114,622  
    Product              4,593                3,716              17,382              17,757  
    Net sales            26,917              31,455            113,828            132,379  
    Costs and expenses:                
    Costs of service sales            15,506              17,514              60,002              65,362  
    Costs of product sales              4,286              13,107              18,607              29,149  
    Research and development              1,668                2,020                8,439                9,399  
    Sales, marketing and support              5,363                5,252              21,013              20,925  
    General and administrative              3,299                5,760              16,513              18,899  
    Goodwill impairment charge                    —                      —                      —                5,333  
    Intangible asset impairment charge                    —                      —                1,137                    657  
    Total costs and expenses            30,122              43,653            125,711            149,724  
    Loss from operations            (3,205 )          (12,198 )          (11,883 )          (17,345 )
    Interest income                  623                    986                3,039                3,646  
    Interest expense                    —                        1                        2                        1  
    Other expense, net            (1,433 )                (821 )            (1,781 )            (1,404 )
    Loss before income tax expense            (4,015 )          (12,034 )          (10,627 )          (15,104 )
    Income tax expense                  295                    159                    421                    318  
    Net loss   $      (4,310 )   $    (12,193 )   $    (11,048 )   $    (15,422 )
                     
    Net loss per common share                
    Basic   $        (0.22 )   $        (0.63 )   $        (0.57 )   $        (0.81 )
    Diluted   $        (0.22 )   $        (0.63 )   $        (0.57 )   $        (0.81 )
                     
    Weighted average number of common shares outstanding:                
    Basic            19,453              19,250              19,389              19,130  
    Diluted            19,453              19,250              19,389              19,130  
    KVH INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS
    (in thousands, unaudited)
     
        December 31,
    2024    		   December 31,
    2023
    ASSETS        
    Cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities   $                   50,572                         69,771
    Accounts receivable, net                         21,624                         25,670
    Inventories, net                         22,953                         19,046
    Other current assets and contract assets                         16,016                            4,331
    Current assets held for sale                         11,410                                 —
    Total current assets                       122,575                       118,818
    Property and equipment, net                         27,014                         47,680
    Intangible assets, net                               828                            1,194
    Right of use assets                            1,361                            1,068
    Other non-current assets and contract assets                            3,146                            3,618
    Non-current deferred income tax asset                               157                               256
    Total assets   $                 155,081   $                 172,634
    LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY        
    Accounts payable and accrued expenses   $                   14,173                         22,412
    Deferred revenue                            1,039                            1,774
    Current operating lease liability                               660                               786
    Total current liabilities                         15,872                         24,972
    Long-term operating lease liability                               569                               289
    Non-current deferred income tax liability                                 15                                   1
    Stockholders’ equity                       138,625                       147,372
    Total liabilities and stockholders’ equity   $                 155,081   $                 172,634
    KVH INDUSTRIES, INC. AND SUBSIDIARIES
    RECONCILIATION OF GAAP NET LOSS TO NON-GAAP
    EBITDA AND NON-GAAP ADJUSTED EBITDA
    (in thousands, unaudited)
     
        Three months ended
    December 31,    		   Year ended
    December 31,
          2024       2023       2024       2023  
    Net loss – GAAP (1)   $      (4,310 )   $    (12,193 )   $    (11,048 )   $    (15,422 )
    Income tax expense                  295                    159                    421                    318  
    Interest income, net                (623 )                (985 )            (3,037 )            (3,645 )
    Depreciation and amortization              3,048                3,319              13,298              13,438  
    Non-GAAP EBITDA            (1,590 )            (9,700 )                (366 )            (5,311 )
    Stock-based compensation expense                  398                    645                2,027                2,078  
    Goodwill impairment charge                    —                      —                      —                5,333  
    Long-lived assets impairment charge                    —                      —                1,137                    657  
    Disposal of a discontinued project                    —                2,099                      —                2,099  
    Loss on an unfavorable future contract                    —                    337                      —                    337  
    Employee termination and other variable costs                  926                      —                3,863                      —  
    Prior period Brazil tax settlement                  446                      —                    446                      —  
    Transaction-related and other variable legal and advisory fees                  156                      41                    451                    275  
    Irregular inventory write-down                    —                5,225                      —                5,225  
    Excess purchase order obligations                    —                3,569                      —                3,569  
    Loss on sale of a subsidiary                    —                      53                      —                      53  
    Foreign exchange transaction loss                  176                      15                    493                      33  
    Non-GAAP adjusted EBITDA   $           512     $        2,284     $        8,051     $      14,348  

    (1) Net loss – GAAP includes a non-cash loss related to the disposal of AgilePlans revenue-generating fixed assets, in which no proceeds were received, of $819 and $333 for the three months ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively, and $900 and $667 for the years ended December 31, 2024 and 2023, respectively. 

         
    Contact:   KVH Industries, Inc.
    Chris Watson
    401-845-2441
    IR@kvh.com

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI: Marex Group plc announces record fourth quarter and full year 2024 results

    Source: GlobeNewswire (MIL-OSI)

    NEW YORK, March 06, 2025 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) — Marex Group plc (‘Marex’ or the ‘Group’; Nasdaq: MRX) a diversified global financial services platform, providing essential liquidity, market access and infrastructure services to clients in the energy, commodities and financial markets, today reported financial results for the fourth quarter (‘Q4 2024’) and year ended 31 December 2024 (‘2024’).

    Ian Lowitt, Group Chief Executive Officer, stated, “I’m pleased to confirm that robust levels of client activity and positive market conditions led to another strong performance in the fourth quarter, typically a slower quarter seasonally. This delivered a full year Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 of $321.1 million, up 40% year-over-year. Our performance in 2024 demonstrates the strength and scalability of our diversified global platform, as we delivered strong organic growth, gained market share and continued our track record of sequential profit growth. We have continued to execute our strategy of expanding our geographic footprint and product capabilities through both organic growth initiatives and strategic acquisitions, increasing our relevance to a growing client base, and are confident of achieving sustainable growth through a variety of market conditions. We have had a strong start to 2025 with positive momentum continuing into the first two months of the year, reflecting strong levels of client activity on our platform consistent with higher exchange volumes.”

    Financial and Operational Highlights:

    • Strong Q4 performance: robust client activity and supportive market conditions drove positive momentum and strong organic growth across the business. Average invested assets grew 12% over the quarter to $15.5bn delivering net interest income of $62.6m, broadly in line with the third quarter
    • Record full year 2024 profit: Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased 40% to $321.1m on a 28% increase in revenue, extending our track record of sequential profit growth to 10 years, as we continued to scale our platform
    • Executed growth strategy: expanded our geographic footprint and product capabilities through both organic growth and strategic acquisitions, increasing our market share and relevance to a broader client base
    • Successful IPO and secondary placing, supported by strong investor demand: publicly listed on Nasdaq in April, with successful first follow-on transaction in October increasing public float to 52%
    • Prudent approach to capital and funding: maintained a strong capital and liquidity position and further diversified funding sources with a $600m senior unsecured issuance
    • Dividend: $0.14 per share to be paid in the first quarter of 2025
    Financial Highlights: ($m) 3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023   Change   Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023   Change
          Restated2                
    Revenue 415.6   325.6   28%   1,594.7   1,244.6   28%
    Profit Before Tax 77.8   39.4   97%   295.8   196.5   51%
    Profit Before Tax Margin (%) 19%   12%   700 bps   19%   16%   300 bps
    Profit After Tax 56.7   28.1   102%   218.0   141.3   54%
    Profit After Tax Margin (%) 14%   9%   500 bps   14%   11%   300 bps
    Return on Equity (%) 23%   15%   800 bps   25%   19%   600 bps
    Basic Earnings per Share ($)3 0.76   0.37   105%   2.96   1.94   53%
    Diluted Earnings per Share ($)3 0.70   0.35   100%   2.72   1.82   49%
                           
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 81.4   52.6   55%   321.1   230.0   40%
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin (%)1 20%   16%   400 bps   20%   18%   200 bps
    Adjusted Profit after Tax
       Attributable to Common Equity1    		 57.8   38.2   51%   231.0   162.6   42%
    Adjusted Return on Equity (%)1 27%   23%   400 bps   30%   26%   400 bps
    Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share ($)1,3 0.82   0.58   41%   3.34   2.46   36%
    Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share ($)1,3 0.76   0.54   41%   3.07   2.31   33%
    1. These are non-IFRS financial measures. See Appendix 1 “Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators” for additional information and for a reconciliation of each such IFRS measure to its most directly comparable non-IFRS measure. The Group changed the labelling of its non-IFRS measures during 2024 to better align to the equivalent IFRS reported metric and enhance transparency and comparability.
    2. During 2023 an impairment of goodwill was recorded against the Volatility Performance Fund S.A. CGU (‘VPF’) . This impairment was previously disclosed in the Group’s discrete Q4 2023 numbers as part of the Group’s Q1 2024 earnings release update. Subsequent to this, management reassessed the impairment triggers as part of the Group’s interim results and concluded that the impairment triggers existed also as at 30 June 2023 and restated accordingly.  There has been no impact to the Group’s year to date 31 December 2023 impairment, only that the VPF impairment was restated to be reflected in three months ended Q2 2023 rather than the three months ended Q4 2023.
    3. Weighted average number of shares have been restated as applicable for the Group’s reverse share split (refer to Appendix 1 for further detail).
      Conference Call Information:
    Marex’s management will host a conference call to discuss the Group’s financial results today, 6 March 2025, at 9am Eastern Time. A live webcast of the call can be accessed from Marex’s Investor Relations website. An archived version will be available on the website after the call. To participate in the Conference Call, please register at the link here https://edge.media-server.com/mmc/p/59s7enfq.

    Investor Day:
    Marex plans to host an investor day 2 April 2025 in New York City to provide investors with a further understanding of its four businesses.

    Enquiries please contact:
    Marex
    Investors – Robert Coates
    +44 7880 486 329  / rcoates@marex.com

    		  

    Financial Review

    The following table presents summary financial results and other data as of the dates and for the periods indicated:

    Summary Financial Results

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023       Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023    
          Restated2                
      $m   $m   Change   $m   $m   Change
    – Net commission income 226.0   181.4   25%   856.1   704.9   21%
    – Net trading Income 128.1   111.5   15%   492.4   411.4   20%
    – Net interest income 62.6   30.2   107%   227.1   121.6   87%
    – Net physical commodities income (1.1)   2.5   (144)%   19.1   6.7   185%
    Revenue 415.6   325.6   28%   1,594.7   1,244.6   28%
                           
    Compensation and benefits (243.5)   (206.9)   18%   (971.1)   (770.3)   26%
    Depreciation and amortisation (7.1)   (6.1)   16%   (29.5)   (27.1)   9%
    Other expenses (90.3)   (71.7)   26%   (306.3)   (237.4)   29%
    Impairment of goodwill —   —   n.m.3   —   (10.7)   n.m.3
    Provision for credit losses (1.1)   (2.4)   (54)%   1.7   (7.1)   (124)%
    Bargain purchase gain on acquisitions —   —   n.m.3   —   0.3   n.m.3
    Other income 4.2   0.9   367%   6.3   3.4   85%
    Share of results in associates and joint ventures —   —   n.m.3   —   0.8   n.m.3
    Profit Before Tax 77.8   39.4   97%   295.8   196.5   51%
    Tax (21.1)   (11.3)   87%   (77.8)   (55.2)   41%
    Profit After Tax 56.7   28.1   102%   218.0   141.3   54%
                           
    Profit Before Tax 77.8   39.4   97%   295.8   196.5   51%
    Goodwill impairment charge2 —   —   n.m.3   —   10.7   n.m.3
    Acquisition related costs —   1.2   n.m.3   —   1.5   n.m.3
    Amortisation of acquired brands and customer lists 1.7   0.7   143%   5.5   2.1   162%
    Shareholder related activities —   3.4   n.m.3   9.3   9.1   2%
    IPO preparation and public offering of ordinary shares 1.9   7.9   (76)%   10.5   10.1   4%
    Adjusting items 3.6   13.2   (73)%   25.3   33.5   (24)%
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 81.4   52.6   55%   321.1   230.0   40%
                
    1. These are non-IFRS financial measures. See Appendix 1 “Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators” for additional information and for a reconciliation of each such IFRS measure to its most directly comparable IFRS measure.
    2. During 2023 an impairment of goodwill was recorded against the Volatility Performance Fund S.A. CGU (‘VPF’). This impairment was previously disclosed in the Group’s discrete Q4 2023 numbers as part of the Group’s Q1 2024 earnings release update. Subsequent to this, management reassessed the impairment triggers as part of the Group’s interim results and concluded that the impairment triggers existed also as at 30 June 2023 and restated accordingly.  There has been no impact to the Group’s year to date 31 December 2023 impairment, only that the VPF impairment was restated to be reflected in three months ended Q2 2023 rather than the three months ended Q4 2023.
    3. n.m. = not meaningful to present as a percentage.

    Costs and Group Headcount

    The Board and Senior Management also monitor costs split between Front Office Costs and Control and Support Costs to better understand the Group’s performance. The table below provides the Group’s management view of costs:

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023       Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023    
      $m   $m   Change   $m   $m   Change
    Front office costs1 (231.8)   (188.0)   23%   (881.5)   (690.4)   28%
    Control and support costs1 (100.1)   (76.0)   32%   (376.1)   (294.2)   28%
    Total (331.9)   (264.0)   26%   (1,257.6)   (984.6)   28%

    1) Management review Front Office Costs and Control and Support Costs when assessing Adjusted Profit Before Tax performance. These costs are included within compensation and benefits, other expenses and depreciation and amortisation in the Statutory Income Statement provided above.

    The following table provides a breakdown of Front Office and Control and Support Headcount

    Full Time Equivalent (‘FTE’) headcount1 2024   2023       2024   2023    
      Average   Average   Change   End of Year   End of Year   Change
    Front Office 1,250   1,028   22%   1,265   1,195   6%
    Control and Support 1,084   886   22%   1,160   972   19%
    Total 2,334   1,914   22%   2,425   2,167   12%

    1) For analysis purposes, average headcount is used in the performance commentary outlined below. 

    Performance for the three months ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue grew by 28% to $415.6m (Q4 2023: $325.6m) with strong organic growth across all businesses driven by robust client activity, market share gains and supportive market conditions. We continued to strengthen our position in the market outpacing growth in overall volumes in almost all markets in which we operate, particularly in Securities.

    Net commission income increased by 25% to $226.0m (Q4 2023: $181.4m). The growth was driven mainly in Agency and Execution, which grew 22% to $160.7m (Q4 2023: $131.3m), reflecting higher client activity in Energy, as well as in Securities, driven primarily by our acquisition of TD Cowen’s prime services business in December 2023.

    Net trading income rose by 15% to $128.1m (Q4 2023: $111.5m). The growth was driven mainly by Hedging and Investment Solutions which grew 24% to $52.6m (Q4 2023: $42.3m) as client demand grew for financial products.

    Net interest income increased by 107% to $62.6m (Q4 2023: $30.2m). This growth was primarily driven by higher average balances.

    Front office costs increased by 23% to $231.8m (Q4 2023: $188.0m), largely reflecting a 14% increase in average front office headcount and increased compensation on higher revenues.

    Control and Support costs increased 32% to $100.1m (Q4 2023: $76.0m), primarily reflecting investment in our Finance, Risk, Technology and Compliance functions, as we continue to invest in our systems and processes to support future sustainable growth.

    Reported Profit Before Tax increased by 97% to $77.8m (Q4 2023: $39.4m), driven by strong revenue growth and improved operating margins.

    Adjusting items reduced by $9.6m to $3.6m (Q3 2023: $13.2m). These costs are primarily related to corporate activities and are recognised within our Corporate segment. Adjusting items reduced mainly due to the non-recurrence of costs incurred in preparation for and associated with our successful IPO and owner fees in the prior period.

    As a result of the revenue and cost trends noted above, Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased 55% to $81.4m (Q4 2023: $52.6m) and Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 improved to 20% (Q4 2023: 16%). In addition, as a result of the revenue, cost trends and adjusting items noted above, Profit After Tax Margin increased to 14% (Q4 2023: 9%). 

    Performance for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue grew by 28% to $1,594.7m (2023: $1,244.6m) driven by momentum across all our business, continued market share gains and a supportive market backdrop. Growth during 2024 was predominantly organic as we continued to invest in our businesses, as well as benefiting from the integration of our prior acquisitions.

    Revenue growth was driven by net commission income which increased by 21% to $856.1m (2023: $704.9m). The increase occurred mainly in Agency and Execution, which increased by 28%, reflecting increased customer activity in Energy as well as strong performance in Credit and our prime services business, which we acquired from TD Cowen in December 2023. Net commission income also increased in our Clearing segment, up 11%, driven by our Metals business.

    Net trading income rose by 20% to $492.4m (2023: $411.4m). Within our Market Making segment net trading income was significantly higher, primarily from Metals, reflecting exceptional market conditions and market sentiment in the second quarter across Copper, Aluminium and Nickel.

    Net trading income was also driven by our Hedging and Investment Solutions business, which increased by 27% to $210.3m (2023: $165.7m) as demand grew for commodity hedging and financial products.

    Net physical commodities income increased by 185% to $19.1m (2023: $6.7m). This increase was primarily due to an increase in sales volumes from physical recycled metal, largely driven by growth in demand for recycled metals.

    Front office costs represent staff, systems and infrastructure costs associated with running our revenue generating operations. These costs increased 28% to $881.5m (2023: $690.4m), largely reflecting a 22% increase in average front office headcount.

    Control and Support Costs primarily reflect staff and property related costs, along with professional fees and other administrative expenses associated with support functions. These costs increased 28% to $376.1m (2023: $294.2m), primarily reflecting investment in our Finance, Risk, Compliance and Technology functions, as we continue to invest in our systems and processes to support future sustainable growth. Total control and support average FTE grew 22% to 1,084 for 2024 (2023: 886).

    Reported Profit Before Tax increased 51% to $295.8m (2023: $196.5m), driven by strong revenue growth and improved operating margins.

    Adjusting items decreased by 24% to $25.3m (2023: $33.5m). These costs are primarily related to corporate activities and are recognised within our Corporate segment. Adjusting items decreased primarily due to the non-recurrence of goodwill impairment recognised in 2023. For full year 2024, adjusting items were mainly costs incurred in preparation for and associated with our successful IPO, including growth shares, owner fees and secondary sell down costs.

    As a result of the revenue and cost trends noted above, Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased 40% to $321.1m (2023: $230.0m) and Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 improved to 20% (2023: 18%) demonstrating our platform’s ability to deliver scale benefits. Profit after Tax Margins increased to 14% (2023: 11%).

    Net interest income increased by 87% to $227.1m (2023: $121.6m). This growth was driven by higher average balances and investment returns, as well as the acquisition of Cowen’s prime services business in December 2023.

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023   Change   Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023   Change
    Average Fed Funds rate 4.7%   5.3%   (60)bps   5.2%   5.0%   20bps
                           
    Average balances1 15.5   11.3   4.2   13.5   12.9   0.6
                           
    Interest income ($m) 185.2   141.5   43.7   702.4   520.4   182.0
    Interest paid out ($m) (62.4)   (60.6)   (1.8)   (257.7)   (219.0)   (38.7)
    Interest on balances ($m) 122.8   80.9   41.9   444.7   301.4   143.3
                           
    Net yield on balances 3.1%   2.8%   30bps   3.3%   2.3%   100bps
                           
    Average notional debt securities ($bn) (3.2)   (2.3)   (0.9)   (2.8)   (2.1)   (0.7)
    Yield on debt securities % 7.5%   8.6%   (110)bps   7.8%   8.4%   (60)bps
                           
    Interest expense ($m) (60.2)   (50.7)   (9.45)   (217.6)   (179.8)   (37.8)
                           
    Net Interest Income ($m) 62.6   30.2   32.4   227.1   121.6   105.5
    1. Average balances are calculated using an average of the daily holdings in exchanges, banks and other investments over the period. Previously, average balances were calculated as the average month end amount of segregated and non-segregated client balances that generated interest income over a given period.

    Segmental performance

    Clearing

    Marex provides clearing services across the range of energy, commodity and financial markets. We face the exchange on behalf of our clients providing access to 60 exchanges globally.

    Performance for the three months ended 31 December 2024

    Our Clearing business performed well with revenue increasing 48% to $124.7m (Q4 2023: $84.1m). This was driven by net interest income which rose by 81% to $56.4m (Q4 2023: $31.2m) primarily reflecting higher average balances, and commission income.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased by 68% to $65.8m (Q4 2023: $39.2m). Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 increased by 600 bps to 53% (Q4 2023: 47%).

    Performance for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Our Clearing business performed well in 2024, benefiting from higher levels of client activity on our platform as we continued to gain market share, with the total number of contracts cleared up 30% to 1,116.0m in 2024 (2023: 856.0m). This increase reflects a combination of factors, including an increase in the number of higher volume clients as well as a larger mix of clients transacting in financial securities.

    Revenue increased 25% to $466.3m (2023: $373.6m), driven by net interest income which rose by 45% to $198.1m (2023: $136.2m) as a result of both higher average interest rates in 2024 compared to 2023 and higher average balances. Net commission income also grew by 11% to $263.0m (2023: $236.2m). Average balances increased 5% to $13.5bn in 2024 (2023: $12.9bn). This growth was driven by a record number of new Clearing clients combined with a high retention of existing clients.

    Revenue growth was supported by investment in staff with average front office headcount increasing by 10% to 278 (2023: 253).

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased by 34% to $247.3m (2023: $185.0m) while Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 increased by 300bps to 53% (2023: 50%).

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023       Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023    
      $m   $m   Change   $m   $m   Change
    Net commission income 65.6   52.5   25%   263.0   236.2   11%
    Net interest income 56.4   31.2   81%   198.1   136.2   45%
    Net trading income 2.7   0.4   575%   5.2   1.2   333%
    Revenue 124.7   84.1   48%   466.3   373.6   25%
    Front office costs (40.2)   (29.2)   38%   (149.2)   (117.1)   27%
    Control and support costs (18.6)   (15.7)   18%   (69.6)   (67.7)   3%
    Recovery/(provision) for credit losses —   0.1   —%   0.1   (3.6)   (103%)
    Depreciation and amortisation (0.1)   (0.1)   —%   (0.4)   (0.3)   33%
    Other Income and share of results of associates 0.1   —   n.m.3   0.1   0.1   n.m.3
                           
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax ($m)1 65.8   39.2   68%   247.3   185.0   34%
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 53%   47%   600 bps   53%   50%   300 bps
                           
    Front office headcount (No.)2 284   259   10%   278   253   10%
    Contracts cleared (m) 290.0   228.0   27%   1,116.0   856.0   30%
    Market volumes (m) 2,853.0   2,677.0   7%   11,471.0   10,220.0   12%
    1. These are non-IFRS financial measures. See Appendix 1 “Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators” for additional information and for a reconciliation of each such IFRS measure to its most directly comparable IFRS measure.
    2. The headcount is the average for the period. Management have re-assessed headcount for Clearing and Market Making and re-allocated for FY24, FY23, 4Q24 and 4Q23.
    3. n.m. = not meaningful to present as a percentage.

    Agency and Execution

    Agency and Execution provides essential liquidity and execution services to our clients primarily in the energy and financial securities markets.

    Our energy division provides essential liquidity to clients by connecting buyers and sellers in the OTC energy markets to facilitate price discovery. We have leading positions in many of the markets we operate in, including key gas and power markets in Europe; environmental, petrochemical and crude markets in North America; and fuel oil, LPG (liquefied petroleum gas) and middistillates globally. We achieve this through the breadth and depth of the service we offer to customers, including market intelligence for each product we transact in, based on the extensive knowledge and experience of our teams.

    Our presence in the financial markets is growing as we integrate and optimise recent acquisitions, enabling Marex to diversify its asset class coverage away from traditional commodity markets. We are starting to see a maturation of our offering across all asset classes, contributing to enhanced revenue growth and margin expansion for the overall business.

    Performance for the three months ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue increased by 22% to $192.2m (Q4 2023: $157.9m). This was driven by Securities revenues, up 25% to $119.0m (Q4 2023: $95.3m) reflecting growth in prime services. There was also strong organic revenue growth in the quarter, notably in Rates and FX owing to higher volumes and a new structured rates desk which commenced in 2024. This was further supplemented by the strong growth in our Energy business where revenues increased 17% to $72.7m (Q4 2023: $62.4m), reflecting a combination of increased activity levels in European Energy markets, good demand for our environmentals offering and the benefit of our bolt-on acquisitions.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased 29% to $37.4m (Q4 2023: $28.9m) while Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 increased 100 bps to 19% (Q4 2023: 18%).

    Performance for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue increased by 28% to $695.2m (2023: $541.5m), reflecting the benefit of recent acquisitions, primarily the prime services business we acquired from TD Cowen that completed in December 2023, as well as positive market conditions in the energy markets.

    Energy revenue increased 30% to $286.3m (2023: $219.8m). This growth was a reflection of strong levels of demand for our environmentals offering as we continue to support our clients’ transition toward a low carbon economy, investments in new desks and capabilities and continued improvement in activity levels in European Energy markets.

    Securities revenue increased by 27% to $407.2m (2023: $319.8m), driven by our prime services business, as well as growth across Equities, FX and Rates.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased 50% to $107.9m (2023: $71.9m) while Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 increased 300bps to 16% (2023: 13%), as we continued to optimise and integrate our acquisitions.

    Average front office headcount increased by 20% to 666 (2023: 553).

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023       Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023    
      $m   $m   Change   $m   $m   Change
    Securities 119.0   95.3   25%   407.2   319.8   27%
    Energy 72.7   62.4   17%   286.3   219.8   30%
    Other revenue 0.5   0.2   150%   1.7   1.9   (11)%
    Revenue 192.2   157.9   22%   695.2   541.5   28%
    Front office costs (138.7)   (121.4)   14%   (524.5)   (417.1)   26%
    Control and support costs (16.5)   (7.5)   120%   (62.0)   (51.1)   21%
    Provision for credit losses 0.2   (0.3)   —%   (0.1)   (0.9)   (89)%
    Depreciation and amortisation 0.1   (0.1)   (200)%   (0.8)   (0.8)   0%
    Other Income and share of results of associates 0.1   0.3   n.m.3   0.1   0.3   n.m.3
                           
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax ($m)1 37.4   28.9   29%   107.9   71.9   50%
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 19%   18%   100 bps   16%   13%   300 bps
                           
    Front office headcount (No.)2 657   603   9%   666   553   20%
    Marex volumes: Energy (m) 13.8   13.6   0%   57.4   44.7   27%
    Marex volumes: Securities (m) 73.7   64.7   14%   295.3   239.5   23%
    Market volumes: Energy (m) 442.3   376.7   17%   1,721.0   1,404.8   22%
    Market volumes: Securities (m) 2,744.0   2,601.0   5%   10,920.6   9,969.6   10%
    1. These are non-IFRS financial measures. See Appendix 1 “Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators” for additional information and for a reconciliation of each such IFRS measure to its most directly comparable IFRS measure.
    2.  The headcount is the average for the period.
    3. n.m. = not meaningful to present as a percentage.

    Market Making

    Our Market Making business provides direct liquidity to our clients across a variety of products, primarily in the energy, metals and agriculture markets. This ability to make prices and trade as principal in a wide variety of energy, environmentals and commodity markets differentiates us from many of our competitors.

    Performance for the three months ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue increased by 19% to $44.5m (Q4 2023: $37.5m). Higher revenue in Agriculture, Securities and Energy was partly offset by a more subdued operating environment in Metals.

    Revenue growth was supported by Front Office hiring, with average headcount increasing by 14% to 131 (2023: 115).

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased to $9.0m (Q4 2023: $8.3m), while Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 decreased 200 bps to 20% (Q4 2023: 22%).

    Performance for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue increased by 35% to $207.8m (2023: $153.9m). This was driven by Metals trading which benefited from unusual market conditions across Copper, Aluminium, Nickel in the second quarter. While this activity normalised in the third quarter, we continued to see strong performance. Revenue from Securities also grew primarily reflecting a stronger performance from Equities.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased by 97% to $65.6m (2023: $33.3m), while Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 increased 10 percentage points to 32% (2023: 22%) reflecting strong revenue growth.

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023       Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023    
      $m   $m   Change   $m   $m   Change
    Metals 5.7   26.5   (78)%   105.9   69.3   53%
    Agriculture 15.7   0.3   5,133%   33.8   27.5   23%
    Energy 12.7   7.3   74%   32.5   31.6   3%
    Securities 10.4   3.4   206%   35.6   25.5   40%
    Revenue 44.5   37.5   19%   207.8   153.9   35%
    Front office costs (27.2)   (19.9)   37%   (111.4)   (88.5)   26%
    Control and support costs (8.2)   (9.0)   (9)%   (30.4)   (32.7)   (7)%
    Depreciation and amortisation (0.1)   (0.1)   0%   (0.4)   (0.3)   33%
    Other Income and share of results of associates —   (0.2)   n.m.3   —   0.9   n.m.3
                           
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax ($m)1 9.0   8.3   8%   65.6   33.3   97%
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 20%   22%   (200) bps   32%   22%   1,000 bps
                           
    Front office headcount (No.)2 131   115   14%   129   109   18%
    Marex volumes: Metals (m) 11.3   6.8   57%   44.6   26.8   67%
    Marex volumes: Agriculture (m) 8.2   7.1   14%   35.1   28.1   25%
    Marex volumes: Energy (m) 0.7   0.6   17%   2.2   2.1   0%
    Marex volumes: Financials (m) 0.2   1.4   (86)%   1.6   5.3   (60)%
    Market volumes: Metals (m) 98.6   92.4   8%   422.7   343.5   23%
    Market volumes: Agriculture (m) 146.8   127.9   15%   581.3   521.1   12%
    Market volumes: Energy (m) 442.3   376.7   17%   1,721.0   1,404.8   22%
    Market volumes: Financials (m) 2,744.0   2,601.0   5%   10,920.6   9,969.6   10%
    1. These are non-IFRS financial measures. See Appendix 1 “Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators” for additional information and for a reconciliation of each such IFRS measure to its most directly comparable IFRS measure.
    2. The headcount is the average for the period. Management have re-assessed headcount for Clearing and Market Making and re-allocated for FY24, FY23, 4Q24 and 4Q23.
    3. n.m. = not meaningful to present as a percentage.

    Hedging and Investment Solutions

    Our Hedging and Investment Solutions business provides high quality bespoke hedging and investment solutions to our clients.

    Tailored commodity hedging solutions enable corporates to hedge their exposure to movements in energy and commodity prices, as well as currencies and interest rates, across a variety of different time horizons.

    Our financial products offering allows investors to gain exposure to a particular market or asset class, for example equity indices, in a cost-effective manner through a structured product.

    Performance for the three months ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue grew 20% to $39.9m (Q4 2023: $33.2m) driven by an expansion of the sales team leading to the onboarding of new clients.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased by 47% to $8.7m (Q4 2023: $5.9m), while Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 increased by 400 bps to 22% (Q4 2023: 18%).

    Performance for the year ended 31 December 2024

    Revenue grew 26% to $161.5m (2023: $128.1m) driven by increased client activity across both businesses. Hedging Solutions increased 12% to $69.2m (2023: $62.0m) benefiting from volatility across Cocoa and Coffee and favourable market events, while Financial Products increased 40% to $92.3m (2023: $66.1m) benefiting from positive investor sentiment and equity market performance. We also expanded our product coverage with custom index and FX capabilities and our global footprint which now includes business from Australia and the Middle East, bringing new clients onto our platform.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax1 increased by 24% to $42.0m (2023: $33.8m), while Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 remained at 26% as we continued to invest in the business infrastructure and distribution network. We have also invested in our people with average front office headcount up 57% to 177 (2023: 113). Other income and share or results of associates represents the tax credit from qualifying research and development costs.

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023       Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023    
      $m   $m   Change   $m   $m   Change
    Hedging solutions 7.7   16.0   (52)%   69.2   62.0   12%
    Financial products 32.2   17.2   87%   92.3   66.1   40%
    Revenue 39.9   33.2   20%   161.5   128.1   26%
    Front office costs (25.7)   (17.5)   47%   (96.4)   (67.7)   42%
    Control and support costs (7.3)   (6.1)   20%   (27.2)   (23.7)   15%
    Recovery/(provision) for credit losses (0.6)   (3.6)   (83)%   2.2   (3.8)   (158)%
    Depreciation and amortisation (0.2)   (0.1)   100%   (0.7)   (0.3)   133%
    Other Income and share of results of associates 2.6   —   n.m.4   2.6   1.2   n.m.4
                           
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax ($m)1 8.7   5.9   47%   42.0   33.8   24%
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin1 22%   18%   400 bps   26%   26%   0 bps
                           
    Front office headcount (No.)2 184   128   44%   177   113   57%
    Structured notes balance ($m)3 2,667.4   1,850.4   44%   2,667.4   1,850.4   44%
    1. These are non-IFRS financial measures. See Appendix 1 “Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators” for additional information and for a reconciliation of each such IFRS measure to its most directly comparable IFRS measure.
    2. The headcount is the average for the period.
    3. The structured notes portfolio consisted of 4,029 notes with an average maturity of 17 months and a total value of $2,667.4m at the end of 2024 compared to a total value of $1,850.4m in 2023 with an average maturity of 15 months.
    4. n.m. = not meaningful to present as a percentage.

    Corporate

    The Corporate segment includes the Group’s control and support functions. Corporate manages the resources of the Group, makes investment decisions and provides operational support to the business segments. Corporate net interest income is derived through earning interest on house cash balances placed at banks and exchanges. Revenue in Q4 2024 was $14.3m (Q4 2023: $12.9m), while full year Revenue in 2024 was $63.9m (2023: $47.5m), driven by net interest income primarily reflecting higher average balances.    

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023       Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023    
      $m   $m   Change   $m   $m   Change
    Revenue 14.3   12.9   11%   63.9   47.5   35%
    Control and support costs4 (49.5)   (37.7)   31%   (186.9)   (119.0)   57%
    (Provision)/recovery for credit losses (0.7)   1.4   n.m.3   (0.5)   1.2   (142%)
    Depreciation and amortisation (5.1)   (7.0)   (27%)   (21.7)   (25.4)   (15%)
    Other Income and share of results of associates 1.4   0.7   100%   3.5   1.7   106%
                           
    Adjusted Loss Before Tax ($m)1 (39.6)   (29.7)   33%   (141.7)   (94.0)   51%
                           
    Control and support headcount (No.)2 1,145   947   21%   1,084   886   22%
    1. These are non-IFRS financial measures. See Appendix 1 “Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators” for additional information and for a reconciliation of each such IFRS measure to its most directly comparable IFRS measure.
    2. The headcount is the average for the period.
    3. n.m. = not meaningful to present as a percentage
    4. Control and support costs are presented on an unallocated basis.

    Summary Financial Position

    The Group’s equity base increased during the year with total equity increasing by $201.0m, 26% to $976.9m as a result of strong profitability during the year and an increase in the share premium balance reflecting the primary issuance of shares as part of the IPO.

    Total assets and total liabilities have grown significantly during 2024 as a result of client activity driving customer balances and in addition our funding activities to support this increase. Our balance sheet continues to consist of high-quality liquid assets which underpin client activity on our platform. Total assets increased from $17.6bn as at 31 December 2023 to $24.3bn as at 31 December 2024 with the growth largely due to the increase in the Securities, Cash and liquid assets, balances with exchanges offset by a reduction in the reverse repurchase agreement balances.

    Securities balances increased to $6.5bn, up $2.5bn from December 2023 driven by hedging activity to support our prime brokerage clients and increased stock lending activity within our Agency and Execution business.

    Cash and liquid assets increased by $1.7bn primarily reflecting cash placed by clients, the Group’s US Senior issuance and growth in structured notes issuance under the Financial Products Program.

      31 December 2024   31 December 2023    
          Restated1    
      $m   $m   Change
    Cash & Liquid Assets² 6,213.0   4,465.9   39%
    Trade Receivables 7,553.2   4,789.8   58%
    Reverse Repo Agreements 2,490.4   3,199.8   (22%)
    Securities³ 6,459.7   4,022.7   61%
    Derivative Instruments 1,163.5   655.6   77%
    Other Assets⁴ 199.7   258.2   (23%)
    Goodwill and Intangibles 233.0   219.6   6%
    Total Assets 24,312.5   17,611.6   38%
    Trade Payables 9,740.4   6,785.9   44%
    Repurchase Agreements 2,305.8   3,118.9   (26%)
    Securities⁵ 6,656.7   4,248.1   57%
    Debt Securities 3,604.5   2,216.3   63%
    Derivative Instruments 751.7   402.2   87%
    Other Liabilities⁶ 276.5   64.3   330%
    Total Liabilities 23,335.6   16,835.7   39%
    Total Equity 976.9   775.9   26%
    1. Prior period comparatives have been restated. Refer to note 3(b) and note 37 in our Group Annual Report for further information.
    2. Cash & Liquid Assets are cash and cash equivalents, treasury instruments pledged as collateral, treasury instruments unpledged and fixed income securities.
    3. Securities assets are equity instruments and stock borrowing.
    4. Other Assets are inventory, corporate income tax receivable, deferred tax, investments, right-of-use assets, and property plant and equipment.
    5. Securities liabilities are stock lending and short securities.
    6. Other Liabilities are short term borrowings, deferred tax liability, lease liability, provisions and corporation tax.

    Liquidity

      31 December   31 December
      2024   2023
      $m   $m
    Total available liquid resources 2,439.8   1,369.8
    Liquidity headroom 1,060.0   738.8

    A prudent approach to capital and liquidity and commitment to maintaining an investment grade credit rating are core principles which underpin the successful delivery of our growth strategy. As at 31 December 2024, the Group held $2,439.8m of total available liquid resources, including the undrawn portion of the RCF (2023: $1,369.8m).

    Group liquidity resources consist of cash and high-quality liquid assets that can be quickly converted to meet immediate and short-term obligations. The resources include non-segregated cash, short-term money market funds and unencumbered securities guaranteed by the U.S. Government. The Group also includes any undrawn portion of its committed revolving credit facility (‘RCF’) in its total available liquid resources. The unsecured revolving credit facility of $150m remains undrawn as at 31 December 2024 (2023: $150m, undrawn). Facilities held by operating subsidiaries, and which are only available to that relevant subsidiary, have been excluded from these figures as they are not available to the entire Group.

    Liquidity headroom is based on the Group’s Liquid Asset Threshold Requirement, which is prepared according to the principles of the UK Investment Firms Prudential Regime (IFPR). The requirement includes a liquidity stress impact calculated from a combination of systemic and idiosyncratic risk factors.

    In October, the Group successfully completed an offering of $600m 5-year senior unsecured notes, further diversifying its funding sources and supporting future growth. The notes have a coupon of 6.404%, mature in November 2029 and have been rated BBB- by both S&P and Fitch. This latest senior note issuance adds to the existing €300m notes issued in February 2023 under the Euro MTN programme.

    Regulatory capital

    The Group is subject to consolidated supervision by the UK Financial Conduct Authority and has regulated subsidiaries in jurisdictions both inside and outside of the UK.

    The Group is regulated as a MIFIDPRU investment firm under IFPR. The minimum capital requirement as at 31 December 2024 was determined by the Own Funds Threshold Requirement (‘OFTR’) set via an assessment of the Group’s capital adequacy and risk assessment conducted annually.

    The Group and its subsidiaries are in compliance with their regulatory requirements and are appropriately capitalised relative to the minimum requirements as set by the relevant competent authority. The Group maintained a capital surplus over its regulatory requirements at all times.

    The Group manages its capital structure in order to comply with regulatory requirements, ensuring its capital base is more than adequate to cover the risks inherent in the business and to maximise shareholder value through the strategic deployment of capital to support the Group’s growth and strategic development. The Group performs business model assessment, business and capital forecasting, stress testing and recovery planning at least annually. The following table summarises the Group’s capital position as at 31 December 2024 and 2023:

      31 December
    2024    		   31 December
    2023
      $m   $m
    Core equity Tier 1 Capital1 623.9   437.7
    Additional Tier 1 Capital (net of issuance costs) 97.6   97.6
    Tier 2 Capital 1.6   3.1
    Total Capital resources 723.1   538.4
           
           
    Own Funds Threshold Requirement2 308.8   235.1
    Total Capital ratio3 234%   229%
    1. The own funds threshold requirement is the amount of own funds (i.e. capital) that a firm needs to hold at any given time to comply with the overall financial adequacy rule under the Investment Firm Prudential Regulation. The overall financial adequacy rule requires a firm to hold the amount of own funds for its ongoing business operations, taking into account potential periods of financial stress during the economic cycle. This is determined based on Group’s latest annual internal assessment.
    2. Own Funds Requirement presented as Own Funds Threshold Requirement based on the latest approved Group Internal Capital Assessment.
    3. The Group’s total capital resources as a percentage of Own Funds Requirement.

    At 31 December 2024, the Group had a Total Capital Ratio of 234% (2023: 229%), representing significant capital headroom to minimum requirements. The increase in the Total Capital Ratio resulted from an increase in total capital resources due to profit (unaudited) in 2024.

    Dividend

    The Board of Directors approved an interim dividend of $0.14 per share, expected to be paid on 31 March 2025 to shareholders on record as at close of business on 17 March 2025.

    Forward looking statements:

    This press release contains forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. All statements contained in this press release that do not relate to matters of historical fact should be considered forward-looking statements, including expected financial results and Adjusted Profit Before Tax and Reported Profit Before Tax, expected growth and business plans, expected investments and dividend payments. In some cases, these forward-looking statements can be identified by words or phrases such as “may,” “will,” “expect,” “anticipate,” “aim,” “estimate,” “intend,” “plan,” “believe,” “potential,” “continue,” “is/are likely to” or other similar expressions.

    These forward-looking statements are subject to risks, uncertainties and assumptions, some of which are beyond our control. In addition, these forward-looking statements reflect our current views with respect to future events and are not a guarantee of future performance. Actual outcomes may differ materially from the information contained in the forward-looking statements as a result of a number of factors, including, without limitation: subdued commodity market activity or pricing levels; the effects of geopolitical events, terrorism and wars, such as the effect of Russia’s military action in Ukraine, on market volatility, global macroeconomic conditions and commodity prices; changes in interest rate levels; the risk of our clients and their related financial institutions defaulting on their obligations to us; regulatory, reputational and financial risks as a result of our international operations; software or systems failure, loss or disruption of data or data security failures; an inability to adequately hedge our positions and limitations on our ability to modify contracts and the contractual protections that may be available to us in OTC derivatives transactions; market volatility, reputational risk and regulatory uncertainty related to commodity markets, equities, fixed income, foreign exchange and cryptocurrency; the impact of climate change and the transition to a lower carbon economy on supply chains and the size of the market for certain of our energy products; the impact of changes in judgments, estimates and assumptions made by management in the application of our accounting policies on our reported financial condition and results of operations; lack of sufficient financial liquidity; if we fail to comply with applicable law and regulation, we may be subject to enforcement or other action, forced to cease providing certain services or obliged to change the scope or nature of our operations; significant costs, including adverse impacts on our business, financial condition and results of operations, and expenses associated with compliance with relevant regulations; and if we fail to remediate the material weaknesses we identified in our internal control over financial reporting or prevent material weaknesses in the future, the accuracy and timing of our financial statements may be impacted, which could result in material misstatements in our financial statements or failure to meet our reporting obligations and subject us to potential delisting, regulatory investments or civil or criminal sanctions, and other risks discussed under the caption “Risk Factors” in our final prospectus filed pursuant to 424(b)(4) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) on 31 October 2024 and our other reports filed with the SEC.

    The forward-looking statements made in this press release relate only to events or information as of the date on which the statements are made in this press release. Except as required by law, we undertake no obligation to update or revise publicly any forward-looking statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, after the date on which the statements are made or to reflect the occurrence of unanticipated events.

    In addition, statements that “we believe” and similar statements reflect our beliefs and opinions on the relevant subject. These statements are based upon information available to us as of the date of this press release, and while we believe such information forms a reasonable basis for such statements, such information may be limited or incomplete, and our statements should not be read to indicate that we have conducted an exhaustive inquiry into, or review of, all potentially available relevant information. These statements are inherently uncertain, and investors are cautioned not to unduly rely upon these statements.

    Appendix 1

    Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators

    This press release contains non-IFRS financial measures, including Adjusted Profit Before Tax, Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin, Adjusted Earnings per Share, Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share, Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity and Adjusted Return on Equity. These non-IFRS financial measures are presented for supplemental informational purposes only and should not be considered a substitute for profit after tax, profit margin, return on equity or any other financial information presented in accordance with IFRS and may be different from similarly titled non-IFRS financial measures used by other companies. The Group changed the labelling of its non-IFRS measures during 2024 to better align to the equivalent IFRS reported metric and enhance transparency and comparability.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax (formerly labelled Adjusted Operating Profit)

    We define Adjusted Profit Before Tax as profit after tax adjusted for (i) tax, (ii) goodwill impairment charges, (iii) acquisition costs, (iv) bargain purchase gains, (v) owner fees, (vi) amortisation of acquired brands and customer lists, (vii) activities in relation to shareholders, (viii) employer tax on the vesting of Growth Shares, (ix) IPO preparation costs and (x) fair value of the cash settlement option on the Growth Shares. Items (i) to (x) are referred to as “Adjusting Items.” Adjusted Profit Before Tax is the primary measure used by our management to evaluate and understand our underlying operations and business trends, forecast future results and determine future capital investment allocations. Adjusted Profit Before Tax is the measure used by our executive board to assess the financial performance of our business in relation to our trading performance. The most directly comparable IFRS Accounting Standards measure is profit after tax. We believe Adjusted Profit Before Tax is a useful measure as it allows management to monitor our ongoing core operations and provides useful information to investors and analysts regarding the net results of the business. The core operations represent the primary trading operations of the business.

    Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin (formerly labelled Adjusted Operating Profit Margin)

    We define Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin as Adjusted Profit Before Tax (as defined above) divided by revenue. We believe that Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin is a useful measure as it allows management to assess the profitability of our business in relation to revenue. The most directly comparable IFRS Accounting Standards measure is profit margin, which is Profit after Tax divided by revenue.

    Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity (formerly labelled Adjusted Operating Profit after Tax Attributable to Common Equity)

    We define Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity as profit after tax adjusted for the items outlined in the Adjusted Profit Before Tax paragraph above. Additionally, Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity is also adjusted for (i) tax and the tax effect of the Adjusting Items to calculate Adjusted Profit Before Tax and (ii) profit attributable to Additional Tier 1 (“AT1”) note holders, net of tax, which is the coupons on the AT1 issuance and accounted for as dividends, adjusted for the tax benefit of the coupons. We define Common Equity as being the equity belonging to the holders of the Group’s share capital. We believe Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity is a useful measure as it allows management to assess the profitability of the equity belonging to the holders of the Group’s share capital. The most directly comparable IFRS Accounting Standards measure is profit after tax.

    Adjusted Return on Equity (formerly labelled Return on Adjusted Operating Profit after Tax Attributable to Common Equity)

    We define the Adjusted Return on Equity as the Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity (as defined above) divided by the average Common Equity for the period. Common Equity is defined as being the equity belonging to the holders of the Group’s share capital. Common Equity is calculated as the average balance of total equity minus additional Tier 1 capital. For the years ended 31 December 2024, Common Equity is calculated as the average balance of total equity minus additional Tier 1 capital as at 31 December of the prior year, 31 March, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December of the current year. For the year ended 31 December 2023, Common Equity is calculated as the average balance of total equity minus additional Tier 1 capital as at 31 December of the prior year and 31 December of the current year. For the three months ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 Common Equity is calculated as the average of 30 September and 31 December of the current period. For the years ended 31 December 2024 and 2023, Return on Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity is calculated as Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity for the year divided by average Common Equity for the year. For the three months ended 31 December 2024 and 2023, Adjusted Return on Equity is calculated for comparison purposes on an annualised basis as Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity for the period multiplied by four and then divided by average Common Equity for the period. It is presented on an annualised basis for comparison purposes.

    We believe Adjusted Return on Equity is a useful measure as it allows management to assess the return on the equity belonging to the holders of the Group’s share capital. The most directly comparable IFRS Accounting Standards measure for Adjusted Return on Equity is return on equity, which is calculated as profit after tax for the period divided by average equity. Average equity for the years ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 is calculated as the average of total equity s at 31 December of the prior year, 31 March, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December of the current year. For the three months ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 Average Equity is calculated as the average of 30 September and 31 December of the current year. For the years ended 31 December 2024 and 2023, return on equity is calculated as profit after tax for the year divided by Average Equity for the year. For the three months ended 31 December 2024 and 2023, Adjusted Return on Equity is calculated for comparison purposes on an annualised basis as Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Equity for the period multiplied by four and then divided by Average Equity for the period. It is presented on an annualised basis for comparison purposes.

    Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share and Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share

    Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share is defined as the Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity (as defined above) for the period divided by weighted average number of ordinary shares for the period. We believe Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share is a useful measure as it allows management to assess the profitability of our business per share. The most directly comparable IFRS Accounting Standards metric is basic earnings per share. This metric has been designed to highlight the Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity over the available share capital of the Group. Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share is defined as the Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity for the period divided by the diluted weighted average shares for the period. We believe Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share is a useful measure as it allows management to assess the profitability of our business per share on a diluted basis. Dilution is calculated in the same way as it has been for diluted earnings per share. The most directly comparable IFRS Accounting Standards metric is diluted earnings per share.

    We believe that these non-IFRS financial measures provide useful information to both management and investors by excluding certain items that management believes are not indicative of our ongoing operations. Our management uses these non-IFRS financial measures to evaluate our business strategies and to facilitate operating performance comparisons from period to period. We believe that these non-IFRS financial measures provide useful information to investors because they improve the comparability of our financial results between periods and provide for greater transparency of key measures used to evaluate our performance. In addition these non-IFRS financial measures are frequently used by securities analysts, investors and other interested parties in their evaluation of companies comparable to us, many of which present related performance measures when reporting their results.

    These non-IFRS financial measures are used by different companies for differing purposes and are often calculated in different ways that reflect the circumstances of those companies. In addition, certain judgments and estimates are inherent in our process to calculate such non-IFRS financial measures. You should exercise caution in comparing these non-IFRS financial measures as reported by other companies.

    These non-IFRS financial measures have limitations as analytical tools, and you should not consider them in isolation or as substitutes for analysis of our results as reported under IFRS Accounting Standards. Some of these limitations are:

    • they do not reflect costs incurred in relation to the acquisitions that we have undertaken;
    • they do not reflect impairment of goodwill;
    • other companies in our industry may calculate these measures differently than we do, limiting their usefulness as comparative measures; and
    • the adjustments made in calculating these non-IFRS financial measures are those that management considers to be not representative of our core operations and, therefore, are subjective in nature.

    Accordingly, prospective investors should not place undue reliance on these non-IFRS financial measures.

    We also use key performance indicators (“KPIs”) such as Average Balances, Trades Executed, and Contracts Cleared to assess the performance of our business and believe that these KPIs provide useful information to both management and investors by showing the growth of our business across the periods presented.

    Our management uses these KPIs to evaluate our business strategies and to facilitate operating performance comparisons from period to period. We define certain terms used in this release as follows:

    “FTE” means the number of our full-time equivalents as of the end of a given period, which includes permanent employees and contractors.

    “Average FTE” means the average number of our full-time equivalents over the period, including permanent employees and contractors.

    “Average Balances” means the average of the daily holdings in exchanges, banks and other investments over the period. Previously, average balances were calculated as the average month end amount of segregated and non-segregated client balances that generated interest income over a given period.

    “Trades Executed” means the total number of trades executed on our platform in a given year.

    “Total Capital Ratio” means our total capital resources in a given period divided by the capital requirement for such period under the IFPR.

    “Contracts Cleared” means the total number of contracts cleared in a given period.

    “Market Volumes” are calculated as follows:

    • All volumes traded on Marex key exchanges (CBOT, CME, Eurex, Euronext, ICE, LME, NYMEX COMEX, SGX)
    • Energy volumes on CBOT, Eurex, ICE, NYMEX, SGX
    • Financial securities (corporate bonds, equities, FX, repo, volatility) on CBOE, CBOT, CME, Eurex, Euronext, ICE, SGX
    • Metals, agriculture and energy volumes on CBOT, CME, Eurex, Euronext, ICE, LME, NYMEX COMEX, SGX

    Reconciliation of Non-IFRS Financial Measures and Key Performance Indicators:

      3 months ended 31 December 2024   3 months ended 31 December 2023   Year ended 31 December 2024   Year ended 31 December 2023
          Restated1        
      $m   $m   $m   $m
    Profit After Tax 56.7   28.1   218.0   141.3
    Taxation charge 21.1   11.3   77.8   55.2
    Profit Before Tax 77.8   39.4   295.8   196.5
    Goodwill impairment charge1 —   —   —   10.7
    Bargain purchase gains2 —   —   —   (0.3)
    Acquisition costs3 —   1.2   —   1.8
    Amortisation of acquired brands and customer lists4 1.7   0.7   5.5   2.1
    Activities relating to shareholders5 —   2.2   2.4   3.1
    Employer tax on vesting of the growth shares6 —   —   2.2   —
    Owner fees7 —   1.2   2.4   6.0
    IPO preparation costs8 —   7.9   8.6   10.1
    Fair value of the cash settlement option on the growth shares9 —   —   2.3   —
    Public offering of ordinary shares10 1.9   —   1.9   —
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax 81.4   52.6   321.1   230.0
    Tax and the tax effect on the Adjusting Items11 (20.43)   (11.1)   (76.8)   (54.1)
    Profit attributable to AT1 note holders12 (3.3)   (3.3)   (13.3)   (13.3)
    Adjusted Profit After Tax Attributable to Common Equity 57.8   38.2   231.0   162.6
                   
    Profit after Tax Margin 14%   9%   14%   11%
    Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin13 20%   16%   20%   18%
                   
    Basic Earnings per Share ($) 0.76   0.37   2.96   1.94
    Diluted Earnings per Share ($) 0.70   0.35   2.72   1.82
                   
    Adjusted Basic Earnings per Share ($)14 0.82   0.58   3.34   2.46
    Adjusted Diluted Earnings per Share ($)15 0.76   0.54   3.07   2.31
                   
    Common Equity16 870.7   662.6   775.6   629.2
    Return on Equity 23%   15%   25%   19%
    Adjusted Return on Equity (%) 27%   23%   30%   26%
    1. Goodwill impairment charges in 2023 relates to the impairment recognised for goodwill relating to the Volatility Performance Fund S.A. CGU (‘VPF’) largely due to declining projected revenue.
    2. A bargain purchase gain was recognised as a result of the ED&F Man Capital Markets division acquisition.
    3. Acquisition costs are costs, such as legal fees incurred in relation to the business acquisitions of ED&F Man Capital Markets business, the OTCex group and Cowen’s prime services and Outsourced Trading business.
    4. This represents the amortisation charge for the period of acquired brands and customers lists.
    5. Activities in relation to shareholders primarily consist of dividend-like contributions made to participants within certain of our share-based payments schemes.
    6. Employer tax on vesting of the growth shares represents the Group’s tax charge arising from the vesting of the growth shares.
    7. Owner fees relate to management services fees paid to parties associated with the ultimate controlling party based on a percentage of our EBITDA in each year, presented in the income statement within other expenses.
    8. IPO preparation costs related to consulting, legal and audit fees, presented in the income statement within other expenses.
    9. Fair value of the cash settlement option on the growth shares represents the fair value liability of the growth shares at $2.3m. Subsequent to the initial public offering when the holders of the growth shares elected to settle the awards in ordinary shares, the liability was derecognised.
    10. Costs relating to the public offerings of ordinary shares by certain selling shareholders.
    11. Tax and the tax effect on the Adjusting Items represents the tax for the period and the tax effect of the other Adjusting Items removed from Profit After Tax to calculate Adjusted Profit Before Tax. The tax effect of the other Adjusting Items was calculated at the Group’s effective tax rate for the respective period.
    12. Profit attributable to AT1 note holders are the coupons on the AT1 issuance, which are accounted for as dividends.
    13. Adjusted Profit Before Tax Margin is calculated by dividing Adjusted Profit Before Tax (as defined above) by revenue for the period.
    14. The weighted average numbers of shares used in the calculation for the years ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 were 69,231,625 and 66,018, 514 respectively. The weighted average numbers of shares used in the calculation for the three months ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 were 70,290,886 and 66,018,514 respectively. Weighted average number of shares have been restated as applicable for the Group’s reverse share split.
    15. The weighted average numbers of diluted shares used in the calculation for the years ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 were 75,279,454 and 70,323,467 respectively. The weighted average numbers of shares used in the calculation for the three months ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 were 76,338,715 and 70,323,467 respectively. Weighted average number of shares have been restated as applicable for the Group’s reverse share split.
    16. Common Equity is calculated as the average balance of total equity minus additional Tier 1 capital. For the years ended 31 December 2024, Adjusted Return on Equity is calculated as the average balance of total equity minus additional Tier 1 capital, as at 31 December of the prior year, 31 March, 30 June, 30 September and 31 December of the current year. For the years ended 31 December 2023, Adjusted Return on Equity is calculated as the average balance of total equity minus additional Tier 1 capital, as at 31 December of the prior year and 31 December of the current year. For the three months ended 31 December 2024 and 2023 Common Equity is calculated as the average of 30 September and 31 December of the current period.

    Appendix 2 – Supplementary Financial Information

    Revenue

    The following tables presents the Group’s segmental revenue for the periods indicated:

    3 months ended 31 December 2024 Clearing   Agency and Execution   Market Making   Hedging and Investment Solutions   Corporate   Total
      $m   $m   $m   $m   $m   $m
                           
    Net commission income/(expense) 65.6   160.7   (0.3)   —   —   226.0
    Net trading income 2.7   21.1   51.7   52.6   —   128.1
    Net interest income/(expense) 56.4   9.5   (4.9)   (12.7)   14.3   62.6
    Net physical commodities income —   0.9   (2.0)   —   —   (1.1)
    Revenue 124.7   192.2   44.5   39.9   14.3   415.6
    3 months ended 31 December 2023 Clearing   Agency and Execution   Market Making   Hedging and Investment Solutions   Corporate   Total
      $m   $m   $m   $m   $m   $m
                           
    Net commission income/(expense) 52.5   131.3   (2.4)   —   —   181.4
    Net trading income/(expense) 0.4   23.2   45.9   42.3   (0.3)   111.5
    Net interest income/(expense) 31.2   3.4   (8.5)   (9.1)   13.2   30.2
    Net physical commodities income —   —   2.5   —   —   2.5
    Revenue 84.1   157.9   37.5   33.2   12.9   325.6
    Year ended 31 December 2024 Clearing   Agency and Execution   Market Making   Hedging and Investment Solutions   Corporate   Total
      $m   $m   $m   $m   $m   $m
                           
    Net commission income/(expense) 263.0   597.1   (4.0)   —   —   856.1
    Net trading income 5.2   61.3   215.6   210.3   —   492.4
    Net interest income/(expense) 198.1   34.6   (20.7)   (48.8)   63.9   227.1
    Net physical commodities income —   2.2   16.9   —   —   19.1
    Revenue 466.3   695.2   207.8   161.5   63.9   1,594.7
    Year ended 31 December 2023 Clearing   Agency and Execution   Market Making   Hedging and Investment Solutions   Corporate   Total
      $m   $m   $m   $m   $m   $m
                           
    Net commission income/(expense) 236.2   473.4   (4.7)   —   —   704.9
    Net trading income/(expense) 1.2   62.1   182.8   165.7   (0.4)   411.4
    Net interest income/(expense) 136.2   6.0   (30.9)   (37.6)   47.9   121.6
    Net physical commodities income —   —   6.7   —   —   6.7
    Revenue 373.6   541.5   153.9   128.1   47.5   1,244.6

    Consolidated Income Statement

    For the Year Ended 31 December 2024

        2024 2023
        $m $m
    Commission and fee income   1,618.1 1,342.4
    Commission and fee expense   (762.0) (637.5)
    Net commission income   856.1 704.9
    Net trading income   492.4 411.4
    Interest income   765.2 591.8
    Interest expense   (538.1) (470.2)
    Net interest income   227.1 121.6
    Net physical commodities income   19.1 6.7
    Revenue   1,594.7 1,244.6
           
    Expenses:      
    Compensation and benefits   (971.1) (770.3)
    Depreciation and amortisation   (29.5) (27.1)
    Other expenses   (306.3) (237.4)
    Impairment of goodwill   — (10.7)
    Provision for credit losses   1.7 (7.1)
    Bargain purchase gain on acquisitions   — 0.3
    Other income   6.3 3.4
    Share of results in associates and joint ventures   — 0.8
    Profit before tax   295.8 196.5
    Tax   (77.8) (55.2)
    Profit after tax   218.0 141.3
           

    Consolidated Statement of Financial Position

    As at 31 December 2024

        31 December 31 December
        2024 2023
        $m $m
          Restated1
    Assets      
    Non-current assets      
    Goodwill   176.5 163.6
    Intangible assets   56.5 56.0
    Property, plant and equipment   20.8 16.6
    Right-of-use asset   59.9 40.6
    Investments   24.0 16.2
    Deferred tax   46.7 21.4
    Treasury instruments (unpledged)   53.5 60.8
    Treasury instruments (pledged as collateral)   46.1 300.4
    Total non-current assets   484.0 675.6
           
    Current assets      
    Corporate income tax receivable   12.5 0.1
    Trade and other receivables   7,553.2 4,789.8
    Inventory   35.8 163.4
    Equity instruments (unpledged)   231.4 189.6
    Equity instruments (pledged as collateral)   4,446.6 1,331.7
    Derivative instruments   1,163.5 655.6
    Stock borrowing   1,781.7 2,501.4
    Treasury instruments (unpledged)   556.2 481.8
    Treasury instruments (pledged as collateral)   2,912.9 2,062.6
    Fixed income securities (unpledged)   87.7 76.7
    Reverse repurchase agreements   2,490.4 3,199.8
    Cash and cash equivalents   2,556.6 1,483.5
    Total current assets   23,828.5 16,936.0
    Total assets   24,312.5 17,611.6
    1. Prior period comparatives have been restated. Refer to note 3(b) and note 37 in the Group Annual Report for further information.

    Consolidated Statement of Financial Position

    As at 31 December 2024

        31 December 31 December
        2024 2023
        $m $m
          Restated1
    Liabilities      
    Current liabilities      
    Repurchase agreements   2,305.8 3,118.9
    Trade and other payables   9,740.4 6,785.9
    Stock lending   4,952.1 2,323.3
    Short securities   1,704.6 1,924.8
    Short-term borrowings   152.0 —
    Lease liability   10.5 13.2
    Derivative instruments   751.7 402.2
    Corporation tax   41.9 7.6
    Debt securities   2,119.6 1,308.4
    Provisions   0.6 0.4
    Total current liabilities   21,779.2 15,884.7
    Non-current liabilities      
    Lease liability   67.0 39.4
    Long-term borrowings   — —
    Debt securities   1,484.9 907.9
    Deferred tax liability   4.5 3.7
    Total non-current liabilities   1,556.4 951.0
    Total liabilities   23,335.6 16,835.7
    Total net assets   976.9 775.9
           
    Equity      
    Share capital   0.1 0.1
    Share premium   202.6 134.3
    Additional Tier 1 capital (AT1)   97.6 97.6
    Retained earnings   722.4 555.3
    Own shares   (23.2) (9.8)
    Other reserves   (22.6) (1.6)
    Total equity   976.9 775.9
    1. Prior year comparatives have been restated. Refer to note 3(b) and note 37 in the Group Annual Report for further information.

    The MIL Network –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: European Commission and EIB Group sign €2 billion guarantee under Ukraine Facility to support country’s reconstruction and resilience

    Source: European Investment Bank

    • The agreement further supports urgent recovery and reconstruction projects in Ukraine.
    • The financing will target critical infrastructure, including energy, transport, housing, water and heating, to sustain essential services and economic stability.
    • Part of the EU’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility, this investment supports Ukraine’s priorities: to build back better and advance its EU integration.
    • Additionally, an agreement signed between the EIB and the Government of Ukraine will deploy experts under the EIB’s JASPERS advisory programme to help accelerate the projects on the ground.

    The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group and the European Commission signed a guarantee agreement at the EIB Group Forum that will allow the EIB to invest at least €2 billion in urgent recovery and reconstruction efforts in Ukraine. Aligned with the Ukrainian government’s needs and priorities, this funding is part of the European Union’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility for the period 2024-2027. 

    The funds will support public sector operations across key sectors. Investments will focus on strengthening Ukraine’s energy networks, including energy grids, expanding hydropower and renewable energy production, and improving energy efficiency. They will also go toward modernising railways, improving urban public transport, and upgrading transport connectivity, including EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes and border crossing points along key export routes. In addition, the financing will help restore municipal infrastructure, such as water and heating systems, public lighting, as well schools, hospitals and higher education institutions. The first projects under this Ukraine Facility guarantee were announced during EIB President Nadia Calviño’s recent visit to Kyiv.

    To further support the implementation of EIB investments under the Ukraine Facility, the EIB and the government of Ukraine have also signed an agreement to deploy a team of advisory experts on the ground in Kyiv. This team will provide hands-on expertise to accelerate the preparation and execution of critical projects and strategic documents – starting with energy, transport and housing and expanding to other sectors, including Ukraine’s public investment management reform. This initiative is being delivered by EIB advisory through a €20 million JASPERS advisory package for Ukraine, jointly financed by the European Commission and the EIB’s EU for Ukraine advisory programme in 2024, ensuring targeted and effective support for the country’s recovery.

    EIB President Nadia Calviño said: “Ukraine’s security is the European Union’s security. We stand by the country. Today, we express that commitment once again with the signature of agreements with the European Commission and the Ukrainian government to step up our support. This will allow us to make crucial investments in the recovery of Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and key public services, reinforcing the country’s resilience and its path towards integration into the European Union.”

     “Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction are at the heart of the Team Europe approach, and we are working together to ensure that vital investments reach the areas where they are needed most in Ukraine. This is not just about today. We are helping Ukraine build back better and lay the foundations for a stronger, more sustainable future within the EU,” added EIB Vice-President Teresa Czerwińska, who oversees the Bank’s operations in Ukraine.

    European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos said: “This guarantee agreement with the EIB underscores the European Union’s important role in supporting Ukraine as it faces the fourth year of Russia’s brutal war of aggression. We will stand by Ukraine for as long as necessary and with the intensity required. This new guarantee will help Ukrainians rebuild their country. It will help restore water and heating systems, schools and hospitals.”

    European Commissioner for Economy and Productivity, Implementation and Simplification Valdis Dombrovskis said: “The European Commission and the EIB Group have been working hand in hand to provide crucial support to Ukraine since Russia began its brutal, full-scale invasion. Today, our commitment to Ukraine has never been stronger. With this €2 billion agreement, we are providing further support for Ukraine’s urgent recovery and reconstruction needs, which includes repairing critical infrastructure and ensuring essential public services are maintained. The EU’s support for Ukraine is, and will remain, steadfast.”

    Yuliia Svyrydenko, Ukraine’s First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy, said, “The European Union and its institutions, particularly the EIB, remain steadfast partners in Ukraine’s recovery. We are accelerating investment projects that address our most pressing strategic needs, ensuring rapid reconstruction and modernisation. Each project brings Ukraine closer to the EU, strengthening our resilience and integration into the European family. We also welcome the deployment of JASPERS advisory support on the ground, which will help ensure the efficient implementation of these critical investments.”

    Background information  

    The Ukraine Facility is the European Union’s financial assistance programme for Ukraine. During the 2024-2027 period, €50 billion will be allocated by the European Union to finance the state budget, stimulate investment and provide technical support in the implementation of the programme.

    The Guarantee Agreement signed today is covered by the Ukraine Investment Framework (UIF), as part of Ukraine Facility. The UIF is designed to attract public and private investments for the recovery and reconstruction of Ukraine. It is endowed with financial instruments totalling €9.3 billion, with €7.8 billion in loan guarantees and €1.5 billion in blended finance.

    The aim of the UIF is to mobilise €40 billion of investments for the recovery, reconstruction, and modernisation of Ukraine.

    The EIB in Ukraine 

    The EIB Group has been supporting Ukraine’s resilience, economy and efforts to rebuild since the very first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion, with €2.2 billion disbursed since the start of the war. In 2024, the Bank supported projects aimed at securing Ukraine’s energy supply, repairing critical infrastructure that has been damaged, and ensuring that essential services continue to be delivered across the country.

    MIL OSI Europe News –

  • MIL-OSI Europe: Press release – European Parliament Press Kit for the Special European Council of 6 March 2025

    Source: European Parliament

    European Parliament President Roberta Metsola will represent the European Parliament at the special summit, where she will address the heads of state or government at 12.30.

    European Council President António Costa convened the Special European Council to discuss continued support for Ukraine and European defence, with the participation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

    Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine

    On 24 February 2025, the President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission issued a joint statement, saying “Russia and its leadership bear sole responsibility for this war and the atrocities committed against the Ukrainian population. We continue to call for accountability for all war crimes and crimes against humanity committed. We welcome the recent steps made towards the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine.”

    The three Presidents highlighted that “Ukraine is part of our European family” and that “the future of Ukraine and its citizens lies within the European Union.”. They said “the need to ensure the international community’s continued focus on supporting Ukraine in achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace based on the Ukrainian peace formula. We stand firm with Ukraine, reaffirming that peace, security, and justice will prevail.”

    On 11 February, Parliament’s Conference of Presidents issued a statement on continuing the EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine, after three years of Russia’s full-scale war of aggression. EP leaders reaffirmed their “steadfast solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who continue to demonstrate extraordinary resilience and courage in defending their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The European Union must remain united in its commitment to support Ukraine that includes political, military, economic, humanitarian and financial assistance. (…) . We call on the EU and its member states to increase and speed up the delivery of its support, in particular of its military support and establish a legal regime allowing for the confiscation of Russian-owned assets frozen by the EU.”

    Also on 11 February, the Chair of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada, Ruslan Stefanchuk, addressed a formal sitting of the European Parliament. Welcoming Mr Stefanchuk, European Parliament President Roberta Metsola said: “I am proud that this Parliament has stood with Ukraine from the very first moment – united, unwavering, and resolute. We will keep pushing for peace. Peace must be just, it must be dignified, and it must be based on the principle of ‘Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine’.”

    In a resolution adopted on 23 January, MEPs condemn the Russian regime’s systematic falsification of historical arguments to justify its illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. The text rejects historical claims by the Russian regime used to undermine Ukraine’s history and national identity as futile attempts to justify its ongoing illegal war. Parliament issues a strong call for the EU and its member states to increase and better coordinate their efforts to promptly and rigorously counter Russian disinformation and foreign information manipulation and interference. This is essential, they say, to protect the integrity of democratic processes and strengthen the resilience of European societies.

    The resolution also calls on the EU to expand its sanctions against Russian media outlets conducting disinformation campaigns championing Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. It urges EU countries to implement these sanctions thoroughly and to dedicate sufficient resources to effectively addressing hybrid warfare. MEPs also want the EU to step up its support for exiled independent Russian media to facilitate diverse voices in the Russian-language media.

    On 28 November 2024, MEPs adopted a resolution calling for more military support for Ukraine amid the involvement of China and North Korea. They condemn Russia’s use of North Korean troops against the Ukrainian army and its testing of new ballistic missiles in Ukraine. These recent escalatory steps represent a new phase in the war and a new risk for Europe’s security as a whole, MEPs argue, calling on the EU and Ukraine’s other international partners to respond accordingly.

    Insisting that “no negotiations about Ukraine can take place without Ukraine”, MEPs urge the EU to work towards achieving the broadest possible international support for Ukraine and identifying a peaceful solution to the war. The resolution also demands the Council extend its sanctions against Russia, particularly against sectors of special economic importance, such as the metallurgical, nuclear, chemical, agricultural and banking sectors, and on Russian raw materials.

    Extraordinary plenary session with Volodymyr Zelenskyy

    On 19 November 2024, Parliament held an extraordinary plenary session with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, marking 1000 days since Russia’s full-scale invasion. Opening the sitting, EP President Roberta Metsola said Parliament would stand with Ukraine until it has “freedom and real peace, for as long as it takes.” She added that the Ukrainian people’s sacrifice over the previous 1,000 days was not just for themselves but for every European’s freedom and way of life.

    In his address, President Zelenskyy thanked the EU for its support and said that Ukraine, all of Europe, and our partners in America and around the world have succeeded not only in “preventing Putin from taking Ukraine” but also in defending the freedom of all European nations. “Putin remains smaller than the united strength of Europe. I urge you not to forget this, and not to forget how much Europe is capable of achieving. We can surely push Russia towards a just peace. Peace is what we desire the most,” he added. President Zelenskyy concluded by saying: “No one can enjoy calm water amid the storm. We must do everything we can to end this war fairly and justly. 1,000 days of war is a tremendous challenge. We must make the next year the year of peace.”

    Statement by EP leaders marking 1,000 days of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine

    Also on 19 November 2024, Parliament’s President and political group leaders adopted a statement marking 1,000 days of Russia’s illegal and unjustified war against Ukraine. “We have started EU accession talks with Ukraine as it moves towards taking its rightful place in our European family. The gradual integration of Ukraine into the Union will be a central task for all EU institutions in this legislature, along with providing long-term financial and military assistance and much-needed support,” they said. They said, “The ultimate goal remains to achieve a just and lasting peace in Ukraine on Ukraine’s terms, ensuring the safety and dignity of its people within a peaceful and stable Europe. Together, the democratic world must send a clear, simple message: we stand with and support Ukraine in every possible way until its victory.”

    Measures against the Russian “shadow fleet”

    In a resolution adopted on 14 November 2024, Parliament calls for more targeted EU sanctions against Russia’s so-called ‘shadow fleet’, which provides a key financial lifeline for Moscow’s war in Ukraine. MEPs demand measures against these vessels in the next EU sanctions packages, including all individual ships as well as their owners, operators, managers, accounts, banks and insurance companies. They also call for the systematic sanctioning of vessels sailing through EU waters without known insurance and urge the EU to enhance its surveillance capabilities, especially drone and satellite monitoring, and to conduct targeted inspections at sea. MEPs want EU member states to designate ports capable of handling sanctioned vessels carrying crude oil and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) and to seize illegal cargo without compensation.

    Financial assistance to Ukraine

    On 22 October 2024, MEPs approved an extraordinary loan of up to €35 billion to Ukraine, to be repaid with future revenues from frozen Russian assets. Parliament endorsed the new macro-financial assistance (MFA) to help Ukraine against Russia’s brutal war of aggression. This loan is the EU’s part of a G7 package agreed last June, to provide up to $50 billion (approximately €45 billion) in financial support to Ukraine. The final amount the EU will contribute could be lower, depending on the size of the loans provided by other G7 partners.

    The Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism, a newly established framework, will make future revenues from the frozen Russian Central Bank assets located in the EU available to Ukraine. These funds will help Ukraine service and repay the EU’s MFA loan as well as loans from other G7 partners. While the mechanism’s funds can be used to service and repay loans, Kyiv may allocate the MFA funds as it sees fit.

    Further reading

    Joint statement on the third anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

    EP Conference of Presidents’ statement on EU support for Ukraine

    Ruslan Stefanchuk: “Peace in Ukraine can only be achieved if we stay strong”

    MEPs condemn Russia’s use of disinformation to justify its war in Ukraine

    More military support for Ukraine amid the involvement of China and North Korea

    Zelenskyy to MEPs: “We must end this war fairly and justly”

    1000 days: Statement on Ukraine by European Parliament’s leaders

    Parliament calls for an EU crackdown on Russia’s ’shadow fleet’

    Parliament approves up to €35 billion loan to Ukraine backed by Russian assets

    MEPs: Ukraine must be able to strike legitimate military targets in Russia

    Newly elected Parliament reaffirms its strong support for Ukraine

    MEPs approve trade support measures for Ukraine with protection for EU farmers

    Joint Statement by the Presidents of the European Union Institutions on the occasion of the 2 year anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine

    Parliament calls on the EU to give Ukraine whatever it needs to defeat Russia

    EU sanctions: new rules to crack down on violations

    MEPs: EU must actively support Russia’s democratic opposition

    Yulia Navalnaya: “If you want to defeat Putin, fight his criminal gang”

    Debate 12 March 2024: Preparation of the European Council meeting of 21 and 22 March 2024

    Debate 13 March 2024: Need to address the urgent concerns surrounding Ukrainian children forcibly deported to Russia

    Parliament wants tougher enforcement of EU sanctions against Russia

    A long-term solution for Ukraine’s funding needs

    How the EU is supporting Ukraine

    EU stands with Ukraine

    European Defence

    At the informal European Council meeting on defence on 3 February 2025, European Parliament President Metsola outlined her vision for how Europe can and must strengthen its own security and defence. “More action, more financing, and more cooperation,” must be the EU’s goals, she argued.

    “We need to do more, much more, to ramp up defence production and increase our defence industrial readiness” she said, stressing that “the best investment in European security is investing in the security of Ukraine.”

    President Metsola argued “investing in security, is not just about protection – it is about boosting European competitiveness, driving growth, creating quality high-skilled jobs and powering everyday breakthroughs that improve how we live, work and connect. The real incentive lies in addressing fragmentation within our markets. Different rules, standards, and systems are putting up barriers and risk holding us back. It makes no sense for Europe to have 178 different weapons systems, when the United States has 30.”

    “Fragmentation costs us billions: between €25 and €75 billion are lost due to duplication and inefficiencies. The answer to this is staring us right in the face. Now is the time to move forward with a single market for defence. Europe must be responsible for its own security. No one else will do this for us,” she added

    In a report adopted by the Foreign Affairs Committee on 30 January, MEPs push for the EU to strengthen its defence capacity against a backdrop of multiple security threats. The report emphasises the absolute need for the EU to recognise and meet the current challenges posed by multiple and evolving security threats. The EU, they say, needs to engage in new and better policies that will enable the European Union and its member states to strengthen their defence in Europe. Noting the limited progress and underinvestment in common European defence capability development, industrial capacity, and defence readiness since the establishment of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 25 years ago, MEPs restate need for a truly common European approach, policies and joint efforts in the area of defence. They say a paradigm shift in EU CSDP is essential to enable the European Union to act decisively in its neighbourhood, and on the global stage, to safeguard its values, interests, citizens, and promote its strategic objectives.

    On 13 January, MEPs discussed the security situation in Europe and beyond, as well as defence and EU-NATO cooperation, with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.

    Regarding EU-NATO cooperation, MEPs quizzed Mr Rutte on the EU’s contribution. Defence is not limited to military issues, MEP said, adding that it includes international relations, as well as social, economic and diplomatic relations. MEPs also asked about future cooperation with the incoming Trump Administration and expressed concern about the role of Türkiye in NATO.

    Other MEPs pointed out that there are differences between NATO allies on defence issues, but unity is necessary to secure a sustainable peace in Ukraine. They also highlighted the difficult security situation in the Mediterranean and the Western Balkans.

    Several MEPs enquired about the avoidance of duplication in military production as well accelerating the development of weapons, and others raised the issue of the need to tackle hybrid threats, particularly on the eastern flank of Europe and in the Western Balkans.

    Further reading

    “Europe must be responsible for its own security”, Metsola tells EU leaders

    MEPs call on Europe to strengthen its defence capacity

    Rutte to MEPs: “We are safe now, we might not be safe in five years”

    MIL OSI Europe News –